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Interpreting the Obama Administration’s Rebalance Strategy:
Sustaining U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific

Anisa Heritage

Thesis submitted for the award of PhD in International Relations from the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, September 2016.

Word count: 101,546 words (excluding footnotes, bibliography and appendices)
Abstract

In 2009, with the continuation of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a global financial crisis, fears of American decline were compounded by the ‘rise of China’ and the potential for a transformation in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical environment that would destabilise the region’s post-war order and challenge U.S. regional hegemony. In the same year, the Obama administration initiated a recalibration of U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific that became known as the strategic rebalance. This thesis examines the way in which the Obama administration has responded to the Asia-Pacific’s regional geopolitics through its signature rebalance strategy in order to maintain its hegemonic position. This research contributes to IR by using a constructivist approach and discourse analysis to interpret hegemony as both an intrinsic part of U.S. identity, and a social, asymmetrical relationship, derived from multiple and overlapping sources of power. Hegemony is an asymmetric relationship that requires consent from the Asia-Pacific nations for its ongoing legitimacy. The rebalance strategy is an effort to make the U.S. ontologically secure – to secure its hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific. In examining how the U.S. reproduces its regional hegemony from these angles, this thesis develops the constructivist focus on ideas, identity and narrative as being intrinsic to foreign policy output. This approach allows for consideration of the co-constituted relationships between the belief system of American exceptionalism, the ‘rise of China’ narrative, U.S. hegemonic identity formation and U.S. foreign policy practice. The empirical analysis of U.S. hegemony applies Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power to examine the interplay between the different components of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. This holistic approach to U.S. hegemony and the exertion of power determines that the U.S. does not solely rely on coercive military power to achieve foreign policy outcomes. Instead, this thesis interprets the rebalance strategy as part of complex processes of social bargains, identity, narratives and forms of power working collectively in the production of U.S. foreign policy.
In memoriam

Mr Terence McGinnie

(1948-2015)

Pax aeterna
Acknowledgements

First and foremost I extend my whole-hearted thanks and gratitude to my supervisors, Dr P. K. Lee and Professor Ruth Blakeley, who have been constant sources of guidance, insight and encouragement through this four-year endeavour. Both stepped into the breach; and it is testament to their professionalism that they were able to turn a fading project into an examinable thesis. Words cannot really express my appreciation for the time and effort they have both put into my project.

To my grandparents, Jack and Florence Cogram, sadly no longer here in body, but who were the biggest champions of my academic interests from an early age. I owe them so much and this thesis is a tribute to them. My A Level politics teacher, Miss K. Phillips, is largely responsible for developing my interest in international politics. I often reminisce with old school friends about the afternoons spent in Fisher debating the issues from American, Soviet and British politics. It was her untiring optimism that we would go out into the world to make a difference which led me down the paths I have ultimately chosen.

My friends have supplied unwavering and unconditional support throughout this project and I cannot thank them enough for keeping me going, and helping me focus on the end goal. To my friends, especially Maureen, Kim, Alex, and Sarah Q., your support and never-ending supply of tea, and the life balance you have provided in relation to my academic studies have been very much appreciated.

Finally, to my husband, Gareth, whose tolerance and understanding throughout this project I have often taken for granted, I extend my heartfelt gratitude. You resolved all my technical issues. You provided moral support and tea. Most of all, you picked me up when I hit rock bottom and still married me.

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<th>Description</th>
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<td>A2AD</td>
<td>Anti-Access/Anti-Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Asian Bond Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADIZ</td>
<td>Air Defence Identification Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Asian Development Model(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMM+</td>
<td>ASEAN plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Asian Financial Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>Asian Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>The Australia, New Zealand, U.S., Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT</td>
<td>ASEAN-Plus-Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>AirSea Battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIT</td>
<td>Bilateral Investment Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Chiang Mai Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMIM</td>
<td>Chiang Mai Initiative Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>Code of Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter-Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>U.S. Congressional Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarised Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Declaration of Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>The U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>U.S. Department of State Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asian Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Term</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EX-IM</td>
<td>U.S. Export-Import Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FON</td>
<td>Freedom of Navigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FONOP</td>
<td>Freedom of Navigation Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTAAP</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFC</td>
<td>Global Financial Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOR</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPR</td>
<td>Intellectual Property Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOAC</td>
<td>Joint Operational Access Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KORUS</td>
<td>Republic of Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>Maritime Silk Route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>U.S. National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSR</td>
<td>New Silk Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBOR</td>
<td>“One Belt, One Road”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA-N</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army - Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMB</td>
<td>Chinese renminbi/yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Special Drawing Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;ED</td>
<td>Strategic and Economic Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lines of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOTU</td>
<td>State of the Union Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPT</td>
<td>Six-Party Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SREB</td>
<td>Silk Road Economic Belt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Terminal High Altitude Area Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIFA</td>
<td>Trade and Investment Framework Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPA</td>
<td>Trade Promotion Authority (fast track)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTIP</td>
<td>Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLOS</td>
<td>UN Convention on the Law of the Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>U.S. dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTR</td>
<td>Office of the U.S. Trade Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Regional Organisations in the Asia-Pacific

Source: Chatham House

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This map shows the principal island chains under dispute. ²

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. These islands are currently administered by Japan but also claimed by China/Taiwan.

In the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands are claimed entirely by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, and are occupied in part by all these countries except Brunei. Scarborough Shoal, occupied by China since 2012, is claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The Paracel Islands are claimed by China and Vietnam, and occupied by China.

In its letter to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, in May 2009, China claims ‘indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.’


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Chapter 1
Introduction

The ‘Rise of China’ and the Question of American Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific

This thesis interprets U.S. identity formation, narratives and security and analyses how these interrelated processes contribute to the preservation of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through the rebalance strategy. The puzzle at the heart of this project is the Obama administration’s decision to announce its rebalance policy in November 2011, two years into the strategy, when there was little material evidence of U.S. decline, and when the U.S. occupied a dominant and powerful position in the region, particularly in military terms. The thesis argues that we cannot understand the rationale for the rebalance by focusing solely on traditional understandings of security. Instead, the rebalance needs to be understood in light of America’s need for ontological security. In particular, this thesis is concerned with the centrality of U.S. hegemonic identity to American self-understanding and sense of security in the international arena. I consider how U.S. security narratives have interpreted the ‘rise of China’ and shaped the U.S. exercise of power in the region. The two main aims of this thesis are first, to explain the ideational rationales for the rebalance strategy, and second, to analyse how the U.S. has exercised power in the region in various ways in order to preserve its hegemony.

Background

The announcement of the rebalance strategy in November 2011 signalled the Obama administration’s intention to remain the hegemon across the vast expanse that constitutes the Asia-Pacific region.⁴ In recognising the significant role that the Asia-Pacific region would play in global politics in the twenty-first century, the Asia-Pacific rebalance was meant to denote the administration’s ‘smart and systematic’ approach concerning where the U.S. would invest ‘time and energy’ over the following decade.⁵ The muscular tone of the rebalance, or ‘pivot’ to Asia was a response to the administration’s concerns about regional reports that the U.S. was distracted by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the U.S. had been economically weakened by the 2008 global financial crisis.⁶ This heightened Washington’s

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⁴ The ‘Asia-Pacific’ region incorporates the sub-regions of Northeast and Southeast Asia, and Australasia, and increasingly the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) including India.
⁶ In her Foreign Policy article, Hillary Clinton pointed out, “Beyond our borders, people are also wondering about America’s intentions – our willingness to remain engaged and to lead. In Asia they ask...whether we can make – and keep – credible economic and strategic commitments.” Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”
anxieties that the Asia-Pacific was moving closer to China, attracted by Chinese economic advances.\textsuperscript{7} China’s international standing had been strengthened on account of its limited exposure to the 2008 global financial crisis, thereby increasing Beijing’s confidence in its international interactions.\textsuperscript{8} By November 2011, Washington perceived its initial engagement and accommodation strategy as having limited success in taming Beijing’s assertion of Chinese interests in the South and East China Seas, and China’s economic influence. The implication was that the United States was a declining power, with little impetus to lead, and China, the rising star in East Asia, was poised to replace the United States as the regional hegemon.

\textbf{Empirical Puzzles}

From the outset of the Obama administration, a plan to reorient U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific was already being formulated.\textsuperscript{9} During 2009 and 2010, the implementation of specific economic and diplomatic aspects of the reorientation were underway. Both President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton prioritised the Asia-Pacific for overseas trips, more usually designated to European allies. In 2010, Obama renewed U.S. interest in negotiating a regional free trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Obama’s decision to announce the rebalance strategy in Canberra, Australia, in November 2011, with specific focus on military rebalancing, when the reorientation strategy to the Asia-Pacific was already in process, was unexpected. Why did the United States, the Asia-Pacific’s preponderant military power, need to formally announce its Asia-Pacific strategy, two years into its implementation? More importantly, why was the focus on the military rebalance?

In her November 2011 Foreign Policy article, Hillary Clinton promoted the pivot, or rebalance, as indication of a broader recalibration of U.S. foreign policy. This recalibration was a much-needed response to concerns that the decade following September 2011 had drawn U.S. attention to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Obama administration concluded that Washington’s focus on the War on Terror during the G.W. Bush administration had enabled China to step into the leadership void in the Asia-Pacific. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, it was reasoned that this combination of conditions was transforming Asia-Pacific perceptions on the strength of American regional hegemony. In her


\textsuperscript{9} In his Obama administration memoirs, Bader notes that although the G.W. Bush administration policy towards the Asia-Pacific had been generally sound, it had been tainted by the focus on terrorism and U.S. attention elsewhere. Jeffrey Bader, \textit{Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy} (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2012), chapter 1.
article, Clinton revealed two specific U.S. concerns relating to U.S. regional hegemony: first, the Asia-Pacific’s regional economic and security architecture was gradually developing outside the sphere of U.S. influence, and second, regional doubts over Washington’s willingness to engage and lead in the region.  

Her article also makes implicit reference to the potentially harmful impact of China’s rising influence on regional development, as a consequence of its unfair economic practices and currency manipulation, its human rights record and opaque political system. Further, the unknown effects of China’s military modernisation, the developments in the South China Sea and matters relating to maritime and cybersecurity were set in opposition to the known quantity of U.S. regional hegemony. Contrasted with China, the U.S. has no regional territorial ambitions, it has a long record of providing regional common goods, underwriting regional security and has preserved regional stability for decades. The rebalance was expressed in terms of reasoned common sense: ‘a strategic turn to the region fits logically into our global effort to secure and sustain America’s global leadership.’ Clinton’s article resembled a manifesto for American regional hegemony.

The declaration to rebalance coincided with Obama’s announcement in Canberra, that there would be increased U.S. troop rotation through Darwin, along with other measures designed to strengthen the U.S. military presence across the Asia-Pacific. Until the announcement, the administration had focused its efforts on regional diplomatic and economic re-engagement, and on improving the damaged reputation of the U.S. internationally by avoiding any mention of military engagement outside operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the specific military edge to the rebalance indicated a shift in the administration’s regional emphasis.

The timing of the rebalance announcement also corresponded with China’s apparent increasing assertiveness in the South and East China Seas between 2009 and 2011. In cyclical spats of increased tension, incidences in the South China Sea typically involved Chinese Coast Guard harassment of fishing vessels from Vietnam and the Philippines entering disputed waters. The Chinese naval presence (PLA-N) in the western Pacific, Chinese island-building activities in the South China Sea and the territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas did not simply emerge between 2009 and 2010.

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10 Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”
11 Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”
Island-building amongst all claimants in the South China Sea dates back to the 1970s, and in this regard, China is late in this development. Since the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea was agreed between China and ASEAN in 2002, the situation in the South China Sea had remained relatively peaceful and stable.

In March 2009, the USNS Impeccable, an unarmed U.S. naval surveillance vessel, was harassed by Chinese ships in the South China Sea upon entering China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In a similar incident nearly a decade earlier, in March 2001, the USNS Bowditch had also been confronted by Chinese vessels in the Yellow Sea, for also entering China’s Exclusive Economic Zone. However, by July 2010, Secretary Clinton had stepped into the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, declaring U.S. support for ‘a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion.’

Prior to this, the administration had not indicated that the South China Sea was of national interest. There was no reference to the South China Sea in the 2010 National Security Strategy. While the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) makes reference to ‘potential future adversaries’ who could employ ‘some degree’ of anti-access capability ‘designed to contest or deny command of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains,’ China is not specifically mentioned, and the South China Sea warrants no place in U.S. strategic interests.

Moreover, American military preponderance in the Asia-Pacific has increased since the end of the Cold War, with the U.S. continuing to function as the regional hegemon in political economy terms. Put simply, the U.S. continues to underwrite the regional order in both economic and military spheres, even with the rising influence of China.

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The South China Sea territorial disputes appeared to take on added significance for the United States between 2010 and 2011. During this period, however, Beijing had neither directly threatened the United States’ military presence, nor actively threatened the physical security of its neighbouring countries, despite the ongoing territorial and maritime boundary disputes. Washington had begun to sequence specific events in historical procession, building a case for the threat to regional security that China’s activities presented. The representation of China’s behaviour in its near neighbourhood as assertive coincided with the perception of American regional hegemony in demise. By stepping into a regional matter as a potential mediator, Washington was demonstrating the efficacy of its role as a Pacific nation and resident power. At the same time, while official U.S. policy has consistently maintained that the U.S. does not take a position on specific sovereignty claims, as a treaty ally to the Philippines, the U.S. could not be viewed as a neutral mediator in the disputes – especially by China. What, therefore, was the rationale behind Washington’s approach to the South China Seas disputes, intensifying its involvement in a regional matter, in a move that would also increase the likelihood of Sino-U.S. confrontation?

Official American security narratives have progressively painted a picture of China’s activities as evidence of a threat to regional security and international norms concerning freedom of navigation, based on ‘credible’ external threats associated with China’s military modernisation and the assertion of the PLA-N’s naval presence in the East and South China Seas. Security narratives are particularly effective if ‘they capture the essence of threats and offer an interpretation of a security environment in terms that relate to the audience’s existing interpretive environment.’ Official, especially presidential, rhetoric is essential for constructing a crisis or problem in the international environment as a social reality. The disputes in the South China Sea presented a golden opportunity to promote U.S. re-engagement in the region, while reasserting its hegemonic legitimacy and authority through its mediation role. Under what conditions, therefore, was U.S. hegemony under threat and by whom?

The U.S, with its preponderant military capabilities, regional alliances and pervading physical presence in the Asia-Pacific, is not physically threatened by China. The U.S. has, nevertheless, constructed a threat around the ‘rise of China’ to justify certain uses of power to further entrench its regional

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18 The Obama administration’s narrative focuses on the South China Sea as a crucial link in the global commons, connecting the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Europe. See Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 201-202.

hegemony. Leading up to the rebalance announcement in November 2011, the administration systematically constructed a security narrative around China’s activities in the South and East China Seas that triggered a shift in U.S. threat scenarios in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. regional hegemony was under threat if the U.S. could not deter China’s behaviour in the South China Sea and China’s assertion of its core interests which conflict with those of the United States. The central argument of this thesis is that U.S. response to the conflict situation in the Asia-Pacific is indicative of U.S. ontological security-seeking behaviour. By drawing attention to activities in the South and East China Seas, and rhetorically constructing a story about them, a discursive connection between historical events, the articulation of national security interests, and the naming of specific security threats was established that could both reinforce America’s hegemonic identity and justify the rebalance strategy. The disputes in the South China Sea represent a much broader threat to U.S. hegemony, by creating insecurity in its hegemonic identity.

Research Questions

The empirical puzzle briefly outlined the Obama administration’s discursive construction of China’s activities in the South and East China Seas as a broader regional security problem that triggered the announcement of the rebalance strategy in November 2011. The main research question: How does the U.S. reproduce its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through the rebalance strategy? is concerned with examining how the mutually interdependent processes of identity formation, narratives and security are present in the formation of foreign policy to support the reproduction of U.S. hegemony. Specifically, I consider the role of the American belief system, driven by American exceptionalism, and the role of the ‘China’s rise’ narrative in managing threats and security in the formulation of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific. Encompassed within America’s understanding of ‘China’s rise’ is the threat that China’s military modernisation and growing naval presence represents to regional security, order and U.S. interests.20

There are two parts to this thesis. The first, theoretical part, (Chapters 2 and 3), examines the normative and ideational processes behind the reproduction of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The second, empirical part, (Chapters 4-6), assesses how the U.S. reproduces its hegemony through the rebalance strategy. Two sub-questions shape the direction of the thesis.

20 U.S. assertions that it is an Asia-Pacific power rest on its continuing capacity to provide regional security public goods, such as deterrence, maintaining freedom of navigation and sea lines of communication through the Pacific Ocean and offering humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR). Goh, Struggle for Order, 72.
Sub-question 1: what is under threat and by whom?

This first question seeks to explore the normative and ideational motivations for the rebalance strategy by examining what is under threat, and by whom. Policies, Hansen notes, are dependent upon representations of threats, countries, security problems or crises that they seek to address and in this way, foreign policies ‘articulate, and draw upon specific identities of other states…as well as on the identity of …Self.’\textsuperscript{21} The ‘threat’ to the United States is typically narrated in physical security terms, generated by the military escalation in the South China Sea. However, it is American hegemony – as a practice, through the maintenance of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific, and as part of American identity – that is made insecure. Focusing on non-material factors, this thesis adopts a constructivist/post-structuralist approach to understanding the origins of American ontological security and the centrality of its hegemonic identity to American self-understanding.

In line with the ‘linguistic turn’ in social theory, language is the primary medium of social control and power, giving meaning and producing and reproducing particular subjectivities and identities, while excluding others.\textsuperscript{22} The intensification of the ‘China rise’ threat narrative from 2009 coincided with a deterioration in America’s security of self, that has been created by a gradual loss of certainty about its global leadership role, worsened by a decade of war and the impact of the global financial crisis on the U.S. economy and the contrasting perception of China’s ascent. Authorised interpretations have reinforced existing attitudes towards what ‘China’s rise’ means to the United States and facilitated the justification of the rebalance strategy in physical and ontological security terms. The discursive representation of ‘China’s rise’ by American political officials, as indicated by their common sense and frequently myopic interpretation of China’s activities in the South and East China Seas, imposes a certain account of these events and shapes possible responses. The ‘China’s rise’ narrative is interpreted within the U.S. understanding of what hegemonic identity means to the United States, and how the U.S. relates to others through its hegemonic identity.

In clarifying what is under threat, sub-question 1 also considers what needs to be secured. The threat narrative requires contextualisation within America’s security-seeking behaviour. The traditional concept of security maintains that a state’s survival revolves around existential threats and the need for physical security to maintain freedom from threats or danger emanating from an external source.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{23} Kenneth Waltz, for instance, argues that ‘survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have.’ Kenneth Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics} (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 129.
Security is conventionally conceptualised to preserve the ‘survival’ meaning. However, the position taken by this thesis is that neither the physical security of the United States, nor its military preponderance, is currently threatened by China’s rise, or its activities in the South and East China Seas. The threat, as perceived within the broader ‘China’s rise’ narrative, has a deeper function in relation to American regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. hegemony needs to be secured. Hegemony is not treated here as an extension of U.S. primacy, rather, this thesis is concerned with the practice of hegemony, through the maintenance of the regional hierarchical order and America’s hegemonic role identity. Consequently, this research engages with the literature in IR that disaggregates security by distinguishing between the identity-related aspects of security - ontological security - and the conventional treatment of the physical and material dimensions of security.

Sub-question 2: how does the U.S. use its power to sustain its hegemony?

The rebalance strategy is the Obama administration’s response to the threat that China’s rise represents to the security of America’s hegemonic identity. Sub-question 2 seeks to interpret how the American exercise of power (re)produces its regional hegemony as a means to manage the perceived threat. This sub-question draws attention to the rebalance strategy as the foreign policy outcome of identity, narrative and security processes. American political officials are engaged in ontological security-seeking behaviour to affirm America’s sense of self-identity, and this process of reproducing, and securing American hegemonic identity informed the decision to announce the rebalance strategy in November 2011. Barnett and Duvall’s power framework is used in this examination of the rebalance strategy to give perspective on how the U.S. exercises its power in various forms to preserve its hegemonic identity and practices, and to demonstrate how America’s exercise of power sustains its hegemonic order through a combination of coercion and consent, ideological domination and oversight of institutions.

Research Aims

This research has two aims. The first is to establish the ideational and normative processes that inform U.S. foreign policy-making practice. The second is to interpret how these processes support U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through the exercise of American power.

The first step is to expose the belief system which infuses the foreign policy-making process through consideration of American exceptionalism on American identity formation. American exceptionalism encompass a range of ideas and values that explain the world and the American position within it. As a collective belief system, exceptionalism shapes American foreign policy activities and its understanding of threats and security, exhibited in language and behaviour. Narratives are an essential function in the reproduction of identity, with two processes discussed here.

The first process involves the internal construction of identity through the development of autobiographical narratives that exploit ‘national histories and experience to provide continuity and ‘substance’ to a state’s conception of its self-identity.’ America’s perception of its own identity is co-constituted with an autobiographical narrative that endorses ideas of American exceptionalism. This is an opportunity to assess the role that self-identity plays in the foreign policy decision-making process, linking American leaders’ perceptions of American hegemonic identity with security and threat narratives.

The second process considers the discursive articulation of American identity in relation to the external other. This process involves the production of the narrative around China’s rise that has interpreted China as a threat to the United States and regional order in the Asia-Pacific. Threat narratives do not need to be specific – they can be broad so as to maintain fluidity and draw in a range of evidence to validate the threat. Narratives have the role of systematically reinforcing American hegemonic identity so that the American state feels ontologically secure. In maintaining these narratives, American leaders are constantly aligning processes of identity and narrative formation, as they react to events and policy practices. By focusing on the threat narrative encapsulated within the ‘rise of China,’ the perception that China is challenging the security of the United States is constantly reinforced, thus requiring action to regain some sense of security.

The rebalance strategy is implicated in the maintenance and reproduction of U.S. hegemonic identity in foreign policy practice. The second aim, therefore, is to evaluate the practice of American hegemony through the American exercise of power. U.S. hegemony exists at several levels of international social interaction – military, institutional, structural (economic) and ideological (discourse). A hegemon has an unmatched range of power assets at its disposal with which it can coerce or garner consent from other states in its order. The taxonomy of power advanced by Barnett and Duvall takes these levels of

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social interaction between the hegemon and subordinate states into account, building them into corresponding forms of power – compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.\textsuperscript{27} I aim to empirically show how the U.S. reproduces and strengthens its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through the exercise of inter-connecting forms of power. This is an open-ended and continual process, but which can be recorded in keeping with Barnett and Duvall’s four forms of power taxonomy.

\textbf{Contribution}

This research adds to existing literature on the rebalance by drawing scholarly attention to the background ideational processes that (re)produce America’s hegemonic identity. These under-represented ideational processes include identity formation, narratives and security. Existing academic literature on the rebalance narrowly focuses on assessing the material implications of the rebalance on U.S. power in the region. America’s position as the preponderant military and economic power in the Asia-Pacific is broadly acknowledged within the literature, and thus the existence of its regional hegemony is tacitly accepted in the mainstream.\textsuperscript{28} This research broadens the discussion by drawing attention to the multiple levels of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. This research does not explain the rebalance strategy as an outcome of rational political processes, or as a rational and inevitable reaction to China’s activities in the region. Nor is it my intention to disparage existing analyses or theoretical explanations of the rebalance strategy. Instead, my aim is to add to the existing literature, thereby supplementing rationalist accounts, by providing a more complete understanding of the ideational processes that motivate states to take certain actions.

Since this research concentrates on interpretation, rather than prediction or verification, it does not address the effects of the rebalance strategy on individual states or sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific. Nor does it seek to determine the success of the rebalance strategy as a policy. These undertakings are beyond the scope of this thesis. The future of the rebalance strategy, with consideration of further study, is discussed in the concluding chapter. A fair assessment of the rebalance strategy’s success or failure depends to a large extent on whether Obama’s successor in November 2016 continues to develop the strategy, which is outside the time scale for this thesis. That being said, some academic work has

already focused on assessing the success of the rebalance on Southeast Asia – a region that is a focal point for the strategy.  

The point of this research is to draw attention to the ideational processes – the motivations – behind foreign policy decision-making that justify particular foreign policy behaviour and preferences. It looks beyond the traditional conceptualisation of security that prioritises physical security, to consider how America’s need for ontological security – in particular, the securing of its hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific – offers a plausible interpretation of the administration’s decision to announce the rebalance strategy in November 2011. Consequently, the primary focus is on the processes behind the continual (re)production of ontological security. America’s hegemonic identity and understanding of self and other interact to shape its approach to international politics, influencing how the U.S. deals with the rise of a competitor that ‘threatens’ American ‘security.’ This research does not claim that ideas replace conventional material factors to explain behaviour or outcomes. The purpose is to make sense of how ideas interact with other factors to influence foreign policy outcomes, and to provide a perspective on what the United States fears in China’s rise. It does assume, however, that the United States’ presence in the Asia-Pacific is an enduring feature of regional geopolitics. Furthermore, through the examination of the exercise of American power in the Asia-Pacific, the case studies demonstrate both the extent of American hegemony, and the broad acceptance of American hegemony within the region. 

Core Concepts

This thesis is concerned with the ideational processes that link identity, security and narratives with the making of foreign policy by the Obama administration. I now outline the core concepts of this thesis: hegemony, ontological security, narrative and power.

(i) Hegemony

There are several theoretical approaches to hegemony in International Relations theory. The mainstream theories of realism and liberalism give precedence to a state’s material – military and economic – capabilities as the main source of a state’s power within the international system. 


30 In his understanding of liberal institutionalism, G. John Ikenberry also views the maintenance of the American hegemonic liberal world order as grounded in American material power, as well as its capacity to exert influence.
theorists of hegemony were principally materialist. By conflating hegemony with primacy, they argued that a state’s position in the international order was determined by the preponderance of its material resources. Treating hegemony as synonymous with U.S. primacy in security affairs is, however, ‘conceptually, empirically and normatively unsatisfying.’ Hegemony is also frequently interchanged with imperialism as a way to understand dominance. While material sources of power are an essential element of a state’s capacity to exert influence in the international system, military or economic preponderance do not alone denote the status of hegemon. In this thesis, hegemonic status requires cooperation and consent, based on shared understanding of norms and values underpinning the hegemonic order. Hegemony rests on legitimacy and social power – the power that ‘permeates social relationships, institutions, discourses and media’ in addition to a hegemon’s material resource capabilities.

Hegemony is approached in this thesis in two ways: first, following constructivist understandings, hegemony is a treated as a practice of doing. In this approach, hegemony is conceived as a layered hierarchical social order. In maintaining a hierarchical order, focus is given to the ‘social dynamics of complicity and resistance through which the hierarchical order is created and reproduced.’ Asia-Pacific regional order, therefore, is produced and maintained through continual negotiation among its members in accordance with shared understandings relating to the normative and social structures of Asia-Pacific society.

The second approach to hegemony focuses on hegemonic identity, as the practice of being, which considers the processes that maintain and reproduce America’s hegemonic identity, using narrative to


34 Peter van Ham, Social Power in International Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 3.

35 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 210-211.

36 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 21.
integrate events into a common understanding of what it means to be hegemonic. Conceptualising hegemonic identity is developed within IR poststructuralist discourse theory.

The practice of hegemony

Informed by David Lake’s approach to hegemonic order, hegemony is understood here as a social activity with hierarchical characteristics, distinct from imperialism. Moving beyond the material accounts of hegemony, this research uses a Gramscian understanding of hegemony as a starting point, wherein hegemony is the social foundation of a prevailing order, in which certain modes of behaviour and expectations have to be consistent with that social order. This broad approach is necessary to expand study of ‘hegemonies as genuinely political phenomena,’ to challenge the pervasive view in International Relations that hegemony is broadly materialistic and that the ideas of hegemony and power are reducible to coercive assets. The Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony views hegemonic authority as resting on objective military and economic power, a legitimising ideology and a collection of institutions that act as mechanisms for globally, or regionally, dispersing that ideology. Neo-Gramscian interpretations of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony emphasise the ‘structure of values and meanings about the nature of order.’ Hegemony, at its core, denotes an asymmetrical relationship of dominance; it is also the manifestation of an established consensus, expressed in acquiescence to the hegemon’s ideas, and underpinned by material resources and institutions. Gramscian understanding of hegemony as a social order is combined with constructivist and poststructuralist approaches to hegemony – both broadly understanding hegemony as a collective identity that shapes and interprets the meaning of self and the other.

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37 Lake views ‘empire’ as requiring a formal-legal authority over a subordinate state. There have been specific times when the US has behaved in the manner of an empirical master. For instance, its administrative oversight of Japan after World War Two, or of Iraq, following the invasion in 2003. Generally, the US maintains different types of hierarchical relationships internationally, and at any one time. David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 57-59.

38 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 163. Cox also asserts that Gramsci based his conceptualisation of hegemony on the social and economic transnational class superstructure. Hegemony, therefore, is not only an order among states, it is an order within the world economy and a dominant mode of production that infiltrates states. Consequently, world hegemony is a social, economic and political structure. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 171-2.

39 The centrality of this commonly held position in IR is observed by Mark Haugaard, ‘Power and Hegemony in Social Theory,’ in *Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics*, eds. Mark Haugaard and Howard Lentner (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 62.


41 Herschinger, “Hell is The Other,” 69-70.

42 Herschinger, “Hell is The Other,” 69-70.
Since hegemonic order provides the overarching structure of international society, all states within that structure fall somewhere within the social hierarchy. A hegemonic state, therefore, relies on more than its physical and material capabilities to maintain order – hegemony is also ideological, since the hegemon maintains cohesion and identity through a common culture and processes of socialisation. Conceptual focus on the hegemon highlights the complex social dynamics of justification and consent to its strategic choices required by others within the hierarchy. Hegemony thus rests on a collectively agreed amalgam of material power, a collective image of world order and the set of institutions established in line with the collective understanding of order. Hegemony involves ‘a continuous process of opinion-shaping, and moulding of norms and ideas’ that (re)produce shared notions of social order. Consequently, this process acknowledges the ‘power inherent in language and meaning’ which generates behaviour that complies with hegemonic practices.

**Being the hegemon**

An important dimension of hegemonic power derives from constructivism’s intersubjective understandings about what the hegemonic order entails, undergoing continual negotiation through discourse and practice. Ikenberry observes that a hegemonic order is run on the basis of the hegemonic state’s view of what the world order should be and is influenced by their own social and economic development. As a consequence of the global responsibilities undertaken by the hegemonic state, and its internal historical biographical narrative underpinning its understanding of itself as the hegemon, a hegemonic identity requires continual reproduction, specifically through story-telling, and is contingent on others for its legitimacy.

Following the sociological turn in IR, this thesis conceives America’s hegemonic identity as a collective identity. McSweeney, for instance, contends that identity is not a fact of society but is instead ‘a process of negotiation among people and interests groups,’ dependent on subjective awareness and objective verification. Collective identity rests on perception, entailing a decision that relates biographical facts

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43 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 168.
46 Herschinger, “Hell is The Other,” 66.
of the collective past and present. However, collective identity is not ‘out there.’ What is ‘out there’ is identity discourse which is promoted by political leaders and intellectuals, who ‘engage in the process of constructing, negotiating, manipulating or affirming a response to the demand…for a collective image.’ Giddens asserts that self-identity is not given but is ‘routinely created and sustained in…reflexive activities’ which are understood in relation to interpretations of biographical histories and narratives. Identity formation, from this perspective, is found in the capacity of political officials to sustain a particular narrative by continually ‘integrating events that occur in the outside world, and organising them into an ongoing story about self.’ Consistent with a poststructuralist conceptualisation of identity within hegemony, this thesis also argues that for hegemonies to emerge, the creation of an antagonistic ‘other’ and ‘a vision of the opposed self’ are necessary. The interpretation of the ‘other’ and the vision of the ‘self’ need to be conceived of as the ‘political consensus among those agents concerned to allow for the adoption of accepted…measures.’

Hegemony is interpreted as a means to produce desired behaviour by determining the general conditions for a specific way of life, constructing ideational mind-sets and nation-state identities.

(ii) Ontological Security

Since this thesis is interested in uncovering the ideational processes behind foreign policy decision-making, which are driven, in turn, by self-identity needs, ontological security is critical to this work. Ontological security is conceptualised here as security-as-being, while physical security is security-as-survival. Ontological security is thus a distinct concern that motivates foreign policy behaviour. Security is an ontological necessity for the state - not only because the state has to be protected from external threats - but because its identity depends on them. Therefore, at a single point in time, states seek out several conditions of security. By disaggregating ontological from the more conventionally accepted physical security definition, the pursuit of physical and ontological security can be ‘characterised by different dynamics, processes, acts and discourses.’ With its concern with the stability or security of identity/subjectivity, the interest in conceptualising ontological security opens

50 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 73-76.
51 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 77-78.
53 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 54.
54 Herschinger, “Hell Is the Other,” 65.
55 Herschinger, “Hell Is the Other,” 66.
56 Herschinger, “Hell Is the Other,” 70.
58 Hansen, Security as Practice, 60.
up the concept of security, and separates it from rationalist concerns with the material distribution of power, by ‘challeng[ing] the exclusive association that conventional IR theories make between security and survival, physical threat and defence.’

‘Security, threats and insecurities’ are ontological necessities for the reproduction of American hegemonic identity. As Campbell asserts, American security policy is driven by the desire for a clear and coherent identity.

The survival motive denotes concerns about the physical survival of citizens, the preservation of the functions of the state and territorial integrity. Under usual circumstances, states do not consistently face an imminent threat that jeopardises their survival. Critical theories of security treat ‘security, threat, danger and risk,’ not as ‘objective conditions but social constructs.’ In other words, ‘we inhabit a securitised world of our own making.’

Understood in its broadest terms, ontological security requires a ‘relatively coherent sense of self or subjectivity.’ Ontological security does not presuppose a threat to identity but does underline an ongoing concern with identity stability.

The disaggregation of the two conditions of security thus facilitates a deeper look at how these distinct security conditions co-exist, and importantly, how ontological security-seeking activities impinge upon physical security in the ‘real world’ of foreign policy.

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60 Rumelili, “Identity and Desecuritisation,” 56.

61 This position is developed from the post-structuralist work of Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006) and David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

62 Campbell, Writing Security, 134.

63 Rumelili, “Identity and Desecuritisation,” 52.

64 Rumelili, “Identity and Desecuritisation,” 52.


67 Mitzen distinguishes between ontological security as the ‘security of being,’ from physical security that understands threats as physical violence and the use of force, understanding that ontological security-seeking can have consequences on physical security. Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” 354. Rumelili, in contrast, determines that physical and ontological security co-exist in distinct but interdependent levels, transformed into different conditions of physical (in)security and ontological (in)security by political actors. ‘Concerns about instability and uncertainty can easily be politically mobilised and manipulated into concerns about survival.’ Rumelili, “Identity and Desecuritisation,” 57. Since ontological security is essential to the maintenance and affirmation of self-identity, states can be compelled to pursue social actions that, while strengthening ontological security, can also have the effect of compromising physical security. Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), 3.
Since ontological security is ‘closely linked to narrative, identity, practice and action,’ this research claims that states engage in ontological security maximisation through a strategy of being and through a strategy of doing.\(^68\) This framework builds on Steele’s assertion that in being, identities emerge endogenously, ‘in the dialectic between self and other’ and also within the internal dialectic that arises from the ontological security-seeking process.\(^69\) Steele’s identification of this dual dialectic centres on the idea that states, just like individuals, are social actors seeking internal security within, as well as from, one another. In assuming that states are motivated by the search for ontological security on two levels of being (in relation to internal dialectic of self, and in relation to self and other), a likely assumption is that they would also engage in strategies to maintain and reproduce an appropriate intensity of ontological security. The strategy of doing maximises and reinforces ontological security by ‘upholding a stable cognitive environment through routinised practice.’\(^70\) In the process of maintaining and reproducing ontological security, the state of being and the state of doing are interlinked and mutually constitutive. These conditions cannot be understood in isolation from each other, linked by the interconnection between narrative and identity that aims to secure a durable identity and biographical continuity.\(^71\)

(iii) Narrative

Central to any state of ontological security, therefore, is the ability to tell convincing stories about themselves and others and to gain recognition for their self within intersubjectively constructed groupings.\(^72\) Narrative acts as a central support for identity and subjectivity.\(^73\) Sustaining self-biographies is critical to maintaining a sense of ontological security because they incorporate a story of self (who I am and what I want) and past experience (what I have done and why).\(^74\) Such biographies locate the actor in time and space, and in particular subject positions in respect of events and other actors, thereby establishing the expectations of continuity of relations and a sense of order over those events.\(^75\)

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\(^{69}\) Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, 32.


\(^{71}\) Flockhart, “The Problem of Change in Constructivist Theory,” 783.


Ontological security-seeking produces two separate, but interconnected, narratives. The first process concerns the internal dialectic of self-integrity, which, in the case of the U.S., is driven by an autobiographical narrative inspired by American exceptionalist beliefs. The second process concerns the relationship between self and other, which in the case of the U.S. perception of China’s rise, produces a narrative constructed around the threat that this rise presents to American hegemonic identity. Washington is uncertain about China’s rising power identity – a problem to which Obama alluded in Brisbane, Australia, in November 2014 – and what this means to the United States and the existing liberal order. These are co-constituted narratives. The discursive constitution of the threat represented by ‘China’s rise’ is constructed by American leaders, and the way in which they shape its meaning, creates a window into American self-identity, connecting the autobiographical and threat narratives, narratively developing a sense of continuity between the past, present and future. The inter-relation between ontological security and narratives is explicated further in Chapter 3.

(iv) Power

In dealing with important themes in IR concerning hegemony, regional order and security, this research also connects with the concept of power. The durability of the U.S. hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific relies on the ability of its officials to favourably express the multifaceted sources of American power. The maintenance of regional, or international, order requires understanding of how the leading state expresses and exercises its power. Hegemony and power are conceptually linked, not only through material power differentials, but also through our understanding of legitimised domination, rooted in hegemony, constituting ‘a system of dominant ideas’ to which subordinate states actively consent. Consensus is forged on shared beliefs on the normative underpinnings of the hegemonic order, which itself is not simply buttressed by the predominance of coercive, military power.

76 “And if, in fact, China is playing the role of a responsible actor that is peaceful and prosperous and stable, that is good for this region, it’s good for the world, it’s good for the United States.” The White House, “Remarks by President Obama at the University of Queensland,” Brisbane, Australia, November 15, 2014. [https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/remarks-president-obama-university-queensland](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/remarks-president-obama-university-queensland) (accessed March 14, 2016).


78 Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, 20.


80 This neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony differs from that offered by Hegemonic Stability Theory, which emphasises the predominance of coercive, military power, and economic power to maintain hegemony. Dualism exists in Gramsci’s own account of hegemony – as a source of domination on the one hand, and as a
Power is treated differently by scholars from contrasting theoretical back grounds because there are different kinds of power that exist ‘out there’.\(^{81}\) Since this thesis is concerned with the exercise of power as a means to animate hegemony, power can be expressed in several forms. It can be exerted directly and indirectly, in the conventional form of power over others, but also through the social structures and processes that ‘generate differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals.’\(^{82}\) The ‘social’ in social power derives from ‘the understanding that power is fluid and non-linear and that it moves through relationships and communication.’\(^{83}\) In this way, power works through ‘behavioural relations and interactions,’ and through social relations that constitute actors ‘with their respective capacities and interests.’\(^{84}\) Power can be ‘seen’ but can also co-exist in less tangible forms. In other words, power is not solely reflected in concrete decisions, it also exists through the creation and reinforcement of hierarchies and structures of international politics.\(^{85}\) Power, therefore, can work directly through social relations, and can also be seen working in indirect and socially diffuse relations.\(^{86}\)

Power ‘embraces coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation.’\(^{87}\) It also encompasses consent, involving some kind of acceptance, although not necessarily explicit acceptance by other states within the hierarchy, of the prevailing hegemonic socio-political order. American interventions in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that, ‘having military superiority is not the same as having power.’\(^{88}\) Moreover, power can be exercised through inaction as much as it is through direct action. Indeed, a powerful state need not always act in order to exercise power.\(^{89}\) In recognising that what it means to be powerful, or what it means to have power, rests on more than a state’s physical resources, it also concerns how these capabilities are perceived by others.\(^{90}\) To grasp the dynamics of American

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\(^{82}\) Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 42.

\(^{83}\) Van Ham, Social Power, 3.


\(^{87}\) Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty, 43-44; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 21.

\(^{88}\) Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 70.

\(^{89}\) The non-ratification of international agreements and non-participation in the International Criminal Court are also demonstrations of American power. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 77.

\(^{90}\) Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 3.
power, therefore, requires more understanding of the United States itself.\textsuperscript{91} Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power is the framework used to analyse how the Obama administration animates American hegemony. Its multi-dimensional approach to power provides the opportunity for a more thorough analysis of the ongoing and open-ended process of the reproduction of American hegemony. More will be said on Barnett and Duvall’s framework later in this chapter.

\section*{Approaches}

(i) Social Constructivism

Conventional security approaches are limited in their explanations of the rebalance strategy because they largely ignore ideational factors and identity formation processes in their thinking. Such accounts accept the rebalance as foreign policy ‘fact’, failing to look beyond policy-oriented prescriptions.\textsuperscript{92} They also fail to account for the lack of physical threat to the United States as the motivation for the rebalance strategy. With its focus on non-material factors, this thesis adopts a constructivist approach for understanding the origins of American ontological (in)security and the centrality of American hegemonic identity to its foreign policy. While constructivism does not claim to be a substantive theory of International Relations, it offers a framework for exploring the possibilities of social interaction.\textsuperscript{93} Since the focus is on understanding the subjective views of policy-makers, interpreting their actions, and reconstructing their motives, rather than on explaining outcomes via causal analysis, this project combines critical constructivist and poststructuralist approaches to discourse and identity. The mixed approach adopted here is critical in the sense that it sets out to identify and evaluate the social circumstances underpinning the decision to rebalance.\textsuperscript{94}

Constructivist approaches view the world as socially constructed rather than supposing the existence of a ‘real world’ out there, external to agents, waiting to be discovered.\textsuperscript{95} It allows for the identities of international actors to be ‘always in process,’ which is ‘dependent on minds and practices’ of the

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Constructivists discern that events, practices and concepts only have meaning through shared knowledge. This is achieved through the construction of identities that specify the meaning attached to social and material facts, and through the social norms and conventions considered appropriate behaviour for the identity in question. Attention is thus drawn to the importance of normative and ideational structures, underpinning the systems of meaning, which define how actors interpret their material environment. International relations are guided by intersubjectively shared norms, ideas and values held by actors, with ‘material resources only acquiring meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.’

This project does not intend to demonstrate causality; nor does it seek to predict the future for U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. It seeks to present an interpretation of events through consideration of identity, ideology and foreign policy outcomes. America’s hegemonic identity, imbued with the sense of righteousness inferred by the exceptionalist ideology, shapes American understanding of national security, privileging particular courses of action while impeding the legitimisation of others. Ideology informs a particular world view that also accounts for the construction and types of relations the U.S. has with other actors. Therefore, it is not as simple as viewing the rebalance as a response to China’s aggressive behaviour, rather it is uncovering the complex ideational processes behind which the U.S. determines China’s behaviour to be ‘aggressive’ or ‘assertive’ and thus threatening that forms the basis of this research. A constructivist ontology facilitates this approach to the co-constitutive processes of American identity, interest and narrative formation which influence foreign policy outcomes.

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96 Wendt’s idealistic and holistic ontology makes it possible to consider international structure as a distribution of ideas and to conceptualise structural change as the change in ideas shared by international actors. See Petr Družek, “Reflexivity and Structural Change,” in Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics, eds. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (London: Routledge, 2006), 147.

97 The ideational structure has a constitutive and not just regulative effect on actors. Structures lead actors to redefine their interests and identities in the process of interacting — in other words, they become ‘socialised’ by process. Ideational structures and actors co-constitute and co-determine each other. Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism,” in Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics, eds. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (London: Routledge, 2006), 3.


100 Particularly noteworthy here, is how the other regional rising power, India, is positively discursively constructed overall, as an opportunity and strategic partner of the United States. See, for instance, Jarrod Hayes, Constructing National Security: U.S. Relations with India and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
Interpretivism

Epistemologically, this research is post-positivist and interpretivist. The objective of much social constructivist research is to inquire how ‘we construct worlds we know in a world we do not,’ thereby challenging realist and empiricist assertions that the real world exists ‘out there.’ The main research question adheres to ‘how-possible’ questions, rather than ‘why’ questions favoured by mainstream realist and liberal approaches. This research does not seek to explain the rebalance as an outcome of the structure of the international political environment. It focuses on the internal processes that make the rebalance possible and that create these specifically American interpretations and meanings attached to social phenomena. An holistic understanding of the processes that motivate actors is made possible, by ‘plac[ing] an action within an intersubjectively understood context, even if such imputations are problematic or even ‘wrong’ in terms of their predictive capacity.’ The research draws on the double hermeneutic position, in which ‘the world is interpreted by the actors and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer.’ It offers an interpretation of the American view on the world, and its place within it, by focusing on how ideas ground America’s identity and shape the national security narrative that justify foreign policy outcomes. This project also uses a discursive analytical approach. In understanding the motivations behind the decision-making process, attention is given to the ontological security process, American identity, and the creation of meanings for actions through the autobiographical narrative.

Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is not one approach but ‘a series of interdisciplinary approaches that can be used to explore many different social domains.’ There are differing analytical approaches to discourse that mainly draw upon structuralist and poststructuralist language theory, but vary as to the extent to which they strictly adhere to poststructuralism in the sense that they view discourse as being the only means

\[\text{\footnotesize 101} \text{ Nicholas Onuf, } \text{World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations} \text{ (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 38.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 102} \text{ Onuf, } \text{World of Our Making}, \text{ 39.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 103} \text{ Doty observes that conventional foreign policy analysis is concerned with explaining why particular decisions were made, which renders unproblematic the possibility that a ‘particular decision or course of actions could happen.’ How-possible questions, in contrast, seek to uncover how meanings are both produced, and attached to various subjects/objects, that create certain possibilities and preclude others. Roxanne Lynn Doty “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” } \text{International Studies Quarterly} \text{ 37, no. 3 (1993): 297-8.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 104} \text{ Marsh and Furlong, “A Skin, not a Sweater,” 26.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 105} \text{ Friedrich Kratochwil, } \text{Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs} \text{ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 24-25.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 106} \text{ Marsh and Furlong, “A Skin, not a Sweater,” 19.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 107} \text{ Louise Phillips and Marianne W. Jørgensen, } \text{Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method} \text{ (London: Sage, 2002), 1.}\]
through which meaning is given to the social world. Discourse is a particular way of talking about and understanding (an aspect of) the world through the medium of language and social interaction. Discourse is ‘a form of social action that plays a part in producing the social world – including knowledge, identities and social relations – and thereby in maintaining specific social patterns.’ Our understanding of the social world is created and maintained through social interaction in which we construct our common knowledge and truths. This view determines the social world to be socially and discursively constructed and that its character is not pre-given or determined by external conditions.

My approach to discourse analysis is situated primarily within critical constructivist and poststructuralist theoretical approaches. This combination is possible, since ‘discourse theorising crosses over and mixes divisions between poststructuralists, postmodernists and some feminists and social constructivists.’ These approaches determine that ‘foreign policies rely upon representations of identity’ and in turn, that identities are contingent on the creation of foreign policy. Therefore, a state or collective identity is not detached from the discursive practices used in the presentation and practice of foreign policy. Rather, foreign policy discourses ‘articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas’ rendering them indivisible from each other. The role of narrative is of particular interest in this research, with specific focus on the interrelation between the ‘rise of China’ narrative and America’s autobiographical narrative. Narrative, as a tool of discourse analysis, is the foundation from which scholars ‘can begin to grasp how self-identity constrains and enables states to pursue certain actions over others.’ The logic here is that actors create meanings for their actions, consistent with their identities. Narratives are thus a ‘manifestation of a ‘reality production.”

108 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory is perhaps the purest adherent to the poststructuralist idea that discourse constructs the social world in meaning. In their discourse theoretical approach to the social, developed through a critical reading of Marxist theory, there is no distinction between discursive and non-discursive dimensions of the social. Discourse theory is developed in their principal work, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985).


111 Hansen, Security as Practice, 1.

112 Hansen notes that some constructivists and most liberals view ideas as another variable in foreign policy analysis. Hansen, Security as Practice, 1.

113 Hansen, Security as Practice, 1. In addition, Hansen argues that foreign policy and identity are ‘performatively linked’ and thus cannot be reduced to a causal relationship. Hansen, Security as Practice, 12.

114 Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, 10.

115 Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, 11.
Theoretical Framework

Social constructivists broadly agree that state identities are constructed within the social environment of international and domestic politics but disagree on the balance of international versus domestic environments in shaping state identities. This research takes the view that the effects of the domestic environment on identity is essential to interest and foreign policy formation. Identity and ideas are mutually reinforcing on the basis that what America ‘is’ in the world is determined by notions of what America ‘thinks it is.’ If America believes it is exceptional, that it is the guardian of freedom and liberty, and that it has a special role to fulfill in the world, then such beliefs inform not only identity, but also which interests the U.S. is likely to pursue. Therefore, identity is viewed here as an attribute arising from ‘national ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose that in turn shapes states’ perceptions of interest and thus state policy.’ The socially constructed nature of interests may not alter a state’s pursuit of material capabilities but American leaders respond to the social relationship between the U.S. and the military resources of others — through the identification of the other as friend or enemy, rather than to the military apparatus itself.

How interests are constituted (and redefined) is critical to our interpretations of international phenomena. Norms, rules and social structures of meaning are not simply reflections of hegemonic state interest; they are part of a reflexive process in which actors’ interests, self-understandings and behaviour are constantly reshaped. This approach contrasts with rationalist approaches in


120 Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” 302.


International Relations that under-theorise interest formation, treating preferences as exogenously-determined givens in existence prior to social interaction. Mainstream International Relations and conventional Security Studies present the existence of certain entities such as ‘the state’ in an environment within which they experience threats. Such assumptions ‘naturalise actors and their insecurities,’ while ‘rendering contingent and problematic their actions and strategies for coping with the insecurities.’

Rather than assuming that the state’s insecurities are natural, this research seeks to denaturalise these insecurities. Insecurities and actors’ identities are both culturally produced and mutually constituted, rather than ontologically separate entities. Insecurity, therefore, is not necessarily ‘external to the object to which it presents a threat, it is both implicated in, and an effect of, the process of (re)establishing the object’s identity.’ Insecurity is also created by non-material factors brought about by cognitive instability – a reduced confidence in the continued reproduction of the ‘known world.’

In a state of physical insecurity, the security narrative is framed so that the ‘self’ experiences concern about imminent harm, threats and danger, and also regards itself as inadequately protected. The decision to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, while discursively constructed as a counter-measure to the threat from China’s growing influence around the region, is not underpinned by an imminent threat to the survival of the United States. In a state of ontological insecurity, the ‘self’ experiences instability and uncertainty of being; therefore ontological insecurity may arise from deep uncertainty and/or from the failure to have its sense of ‘self’ affirmed by others. ‘China’s rise’ has been discursively constructed as threat to American hegemonic identity. The meaning of ‘China’s rise’ has been shaped in discourse which creates a window into American self-identity. Security seeking is thus a ‘social practice that implicates identity.’ Ontological security is thus achieved by routinised relationships with significant others, to which actors become attached.

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The focus of constructivism on the intersubjective social context enables investigation of the process in which particular contested understandings become shared and settled in global politics. This occurs mainly through public and linguistic processes. How states identify and assess threats in the international environment is critical to conduct of international relations, since the processes that give rise to social meaning are deeply political and power-laden. Powerful groups play a privileged role in the process of social construction. Consequently, this research also engages with critical forms of constructivism, which assert that ‘constructions of reality reflect, enact and reify relations of power.’ In particular, the postmodernist strand of critical constructivism concentrates on the socio-historical conditions under which language, meaning and social power interact, ‘in particular the how question concerning the sociolinguistic conditions of the construction of dominant knowledge forms and their disciplining and representation in contemporary life.’ The task of the critical scholar is to unmask these ideational structures of domination, where ideas are viewed as more tightly linked to relations of material power, in part by revealing their connection to existing power relations.

(i)  Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power

Hegemony and power are conceptually linked in this thesis through the Gramscian concept of hegemony, typically viewed as domination rooted in economic and military resources, as a means of coercion, and a more nuanced understanding of domination, constituting a system of dominant ideas to which subordinate states actively consent, thereby bestowing legitimacy on the hegemonic order. The characterisation of power, manifested as power ‘over’ and power ‘to’, presupposes some form of consent by subordinate states to the hegemonic order. Moreover, since power is expressed in a variety of overt and covert ways as a means to maintain hegemonic order, engagement with different analytical understandings of power is vital. Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power characterises four intersecting and interconnecting forms of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. In the U.S. case, compulsory power concerns America’s direct/command capabilities: its coercive, military, and economic muscle.

135 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 156. Other works using a discursive analytical approach include Constructing National Interests in which Jutta Weldes argued that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a social construction forged by U.S. officials in the process of re-asserting its identity as leader of the free world. Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minnesota: University of Minneapolis Press, 1999); Doty demonstrates how the developed “North” constructs discourses around the developing “South” to justify violent counterinsurgency policies and economic exploitation. See Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations (Minnesota: University of Minneapolis Press, 1996).
137 Haugaard, “Power and Hegemony,” 243.
especially military capacity; institutional power is demonstrated by America’s ability to construct and operate through formalised instruments of indirect control, for example through shaping regional institutions; structural power is demonstrated by America’s ability to (re)shape existing structures of economic production, for example through its regional trade policies; and productive power, is demonstrated by America’s ability to mould ideological understandings both discursively and through practices of representation.

Since Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy disaggregates power into four forms, there is inevitable affinity with different schools of thought in International Relations, although Barnett and Duvall acknowledge that the taxonomy ‘does not map precisely onto different theories of international relations.’ Nonetheless, they do admit that each theoretical tradition would ‘favour an understanding of power that corresponds to one or another of the forms.’ While their taxonomy is used in this thesis to address the means by which the U.S. takes steps to preserve and strengthen its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, Barnett and Duvall’s framework allows for a comprehensive exploration of the U.S. exercise of power that incorporates the critical dimensions of power relations. Developing the taxonomy around power’s ‘critical dimensions’ generates ‘different conceptualisations of power,’ that also supports a constructivist approach in addressing how identity, ideas, narratives and social relations are critical to any understanding of power. Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy, and the concept of power, will be further explicated in Chapter 2.

(ii) The Strategic Rebalance: A case study of American hegemony

The contributors to Barnett and Duvall’s seminal, edited volume, Power in Global Governance, focus on combining various forms of power to show how states/global institutions simultaneously use various power resources to influence outcomes. In their own examination of U.S. hegemony, Barnett and Duvall question the analytical overreliance on compulsory power, which emphasises the use of American resources to coerce and intimidate, as the primary source of American hegemony. Instead, they seek to refocus attention on the means and the manner in which international consent for American hegemony has been generated since 1945, broadening the debate to include the general international

138 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 44.
140 The first dimension asks whether power works through processes of social interaction or social constitution. The second dimension separates the social relations of any given expression of power into whether the relationship is direct and tangible, or indirect and diffuse. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 8.
consensus that developed on the purpose of American power, and also on the way in which the emerging multilateral institutions conferred legitimacy and constrained American power.\textsuperscript{141}

This research adapts their taxonomy of power to show how the U.S. consistently uses various aspects of its power – not only its physical resources – to influence and shape regional politics through the rebalance strategy. The empirical chapters forming the case study element of this thesis emphasise the multi-dimensional nature of America’s power capabilities. The themes of power resonate with Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, with its dualism of domination by coercive means, on the one hand, and the garnering of consent from subordinate states on the other, through whom legitimacy for U.S. hegemony is bestowed, or revoked. For each element of the rebalance strategy outlined below, the U.S. exercises power in various ways, as it attempts to consolidate its hegemony. Some forms of power are demonstrated more discretely, operating in the background, while others are more overtly expressed. The flexibility of Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power in animating American hegemony allows for a comprehensive study of hegemony as both identity and social practice. This research does not offer a case study in the traditional sense, in that it is not making an intensive study of a single case, where the purpose of that study is to shed light on a larger class of cases.\textsuperscript{142} Rather, the case studies offer insight into the American exercise of power as it seeks to preserve its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.

In her November 2011 Foreign Policy article outlining the core principles of the rebalance strategy, Secretary Clinton characterised six lines of actions to be taken:

- Strengthen alliances;
- Increase U.S. military presence;
- Improve relations with emerging powers;
- Deepen economic relations;
- Engage with multilateral institutions;
- Support for universal values, including democracy and human rights.\textsuperscript{143}

Since there is considerable overlap between these six strands, for the purposes of this research, these features of the rebalance are condensed into three areas of study: the military rebalance, the economic rebalance, and relations with the two main regional rising powers, China and India. In the examination

\textsuperscript{141} Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 62-63.
\textsuperscript{143} Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”
of each, reference is made to the role that American values pertaining to human rights and democracy and respect for international rules and norms and the rule of law, that are intrinsic to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.

**Military Rebalance**

A key priority of the rebalance is to strengthen the alliances that provide the foundation of U.S. engagement in the region and upon which regional stability continues to rest. The San Francisco alliance system, otherwise known as the hub-and-spokes system, remains at the core of U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy and thus is elemental to American compulsory power. The goal of the military rebalance is to strengthen these existing alliances and to develop them into burden-sharing arrangements and to create ‘webs’ between the spokes – in other words, to push existing allies to work cooperatively in military matters, and with more interoperability, with American oversight. In addition, the U.S. seeks to increase its military presence throughout Southeast Asia, Australasia and into the Indian Ocean – in other words, to rebalance its military presence within the Asia-Pacific as well as to the Asia-Pacific.

**Economic Rebalance**

The economic rebalance addresses a domestic priority of the Obama administration – to improve the state of the domestic economy by increasing American trade opportunities in the economically dynamic Asia-Pacific. This aspect of the rebalance emphasises American institutional and structural power, drawing attention to American engagement with the myriad regional institutions, including Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Attention is also given to the American-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Regional deliberation over the future of regional economic order offers a different vision to that of the United States. The ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes China and India and not the United States is one such vision. The Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative offers another alternative. Whose vision will eventually form the basis of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) is as yet undecided.

**Relations with Regional Rising Powers: China and India**

China presents the greatest challenge to American regional hegemony. This issue-dependent relationship ebbs and flows between accommodation, engagement and containment, even while there are common areas of interest between the two. India, in contrast, is often portrayed as an opportunity, rather than a threat to American interests and hegemony. A principal element of the discussion focuses
on the contrasting American narratives concerning these two rising powers; how China is perceived as
the authoritarian other, and India as a like-minded democratic state, despite the challenges in
strengthening and formalising the Indo-U.S. relationship on grounds acceptable to both. While other
rising powers, notably Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, and other middle powers with whom the U.S.
has good relations, including Singapore and Australia, are discussed, more attention is given to India
and China. Washington has tended to give strategic and economic priority to these two rising powers.
In improving strategic ties with India, Washington hopes that in the medium to long term, India will be
a friendly partner with the capacity to balance China in the region.

Research Data

This research engages with qualitative methods, which are aligned with an interpretative epistemology
that ‘stresses the dynamic, constructed and evolving nature of social reality,’ although the distinction
between the choice of methods and epistemological positions should not be exaggerated. The choice
of methods has been made on the basis of their suitability in answering ‘how-possible’ research
questions, rather than truth-seeking ‘why’ questions. In line with the constructivist approach of this
research, qualitative methods draw attention to contextual issues and are therefore good at capturing the
‘meaning, process and context’ of foreign policy practice within a wider social setting. The
combination of methods emphasises the interpretive nature of this research, recognising that any method
is not free from bias. Instead, the aim is to provide an ‘outside-in’ perspective on the practice of U.S.
foreign policy by interpreting the behaviours and beliefs that underpin it. I claim neither scientific
validity, nor the production of observable knowledge. Through a framework of methods and data, this
research offers an interpretation of the processes of identity, interest and narrative formation that use
data in a way that is as explicit as possible in the development of its argument.

(i) Primary source material

As an ‘outside-in’ examination of U.S. foreign policy using discourse analysis, for the purpose of this
research, U.S. foreign policy materials include official documents relating to military/security policy,
economic and trade policy, the use of diplomacy, and multilateral institutions. I have relied on official
publications as primary sources – speeches and statements – released by White House, the Department
of Defense, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and the State Department. National Security

and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 201.

\[145\] Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” 298.

Strategies and the Quadrennial Defense Review have been invaluable sources of material for military and security strategies emanating from previous and current administrations. For information on the TPP, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has provided some source material. From the legislative branch, I have made extensive use of the reports (both original and updated versions) published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Congressional hearings and testimony, particularly from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and to a lesser extent, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Memoirs, published by key insiders in the Obama administration, have provided a useful source of insider knowledge; above all memoirs offer insight into discussions that occur during critical decision-making processes, albeit subjective recollections.\(^\text{147}\)

(ii) Secondary source material

For up-to-date knowledge of the wider academic debates on U.S. foreign policy, with specific focus on the Asia-Pacific, I have referred to reports, blogs and other publications from a number of U.S. foreign policy think tanks, reflecting the varied positions on the Obama administration’s foreign policy.\(^\text{148}\) I have mainly consulted think tank output from the Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In the U.K, I have had the opportunity to attend several conferences and other events at Chatham House (the Royal Institute for International Affairs), that have provided broad discussion on U.S. Asia-Pacific policy, with input from experts from the U.S., the U.K., Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, Australia and the Philippines, offering a broader perspective on the rebalance strategy.

Given the contemporary nature of this research, and its focus on the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific, newspapers in the U.S. and U.K. and in the Asia-Pacific have been an essential secondary source of information as events occur – viewed with a critical eye. To this end, opinion pieces and editorials from the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post have provided up-to-date information; in the U.K, The Financial Times and The Economist have provided an international perspective and for Chinese responses to American policy, I have engaged with the Chinese state media outlets, Xinhua (English version) and China Daily (English version); for regional discussions, I have examined a range


\(^{148}\) Due to the nature of the political/academic/think tank circuit, most American think tanks employ political insiders from previous administrations who, given their knowledge of the Beltway, are able to offer an insider view of the goings on there.
of publications, including The Straits Times (Singapore), The Australian (Australia) and the Japanese broadsheet, Asahi Shimbun (English version).

Methods of Analysis

(i) Discourse analysis

I have adopted a discourse analytical approach for this research. As van Dijk observes, ‘discourse’ is an abstract structure that to gain coherence requires concrete construction via texts and conversations. The methodology is concerned with the analysis of language, offering a qualitative method of ‘uncovering some of the ways in which…actors or agents…seek to represent their actions in texts and language.’ The aim of discourse analysis is to work with texts, exploring patterns in and across statements, and identifying the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality. A discourse analysis, Milliken notes, ‘should be based upon a set of texts by different people…presumed to be authorised speakers/writers of a dominant discourse.’ The function of the source material is to make meaning, to ‘tell the story’ and to recreate a historical sequencing of events, rather than offering a systematic study via quantitative content analysis that looks for word patterns and overall word usage, and seeks to make generalisations.

Texts such as speeches and statements, as well as media coverage of events are interpreted within an analysis of broader social, political and cultural processes. Consequently, the analysis offered here does not focus on the texts, or other data alone, rather, it presents a richer analysis by interpreting how speeches and other documents are emblematic of broader social, political and cultural frameworks. It ‘problematis[e] the politics of the interpretive process, asking from whose perspective, and for whose benefit, the interpretation has been conducted.’ Supporting the study of narrative, other critical discourse analysis techniques, including intertextuality and predicate analysis, are applied to the source material.

151 Phillips and Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 21.
Fairclough’s intertextuality method, that is, how an individual text draws on elements and discourses of other texts, is used to investigate how language users draw on earlier discursive structures to build on already established meanings. The specific goal of this method is to investigate the constructions of identity within official discourse. Intertextuality refers to the influence of history on a text and to a text’s influence on history, in that the text draws on earlier texts and thereby contributes to historical development and change. The meaning of a text is partly created in processes of interpretation, thus texts have several meaning potentials that may contradict one another and are open to several interpretations. Additionally broadening the scope of analysis beyond official discourse to include the vibrant discourse of the political opposition (both Republican and occasionally Democrat) and the debates in online/print media provide invaluable source material for exploring the development and clout of alternative narratives to that of the official discourse.

This thesis draws primarily on Milliken’s theoretical framework of discourse. Conceptually, she discerns discourse as a system of signification - the way in which we integrate words, deeds, interactions, thoughts, feelings, places and time ‘to enact and recognise socially-situated identities.’ Discourses do not exist ‘out there’ in the world; rather they are ‘structures that are actualised in their regular use by people of discursively ordered relationships in ‘ready at hand’ language practices or other modes of signification.’ Predicate analysis is a suitable method for studying systems of signification that involves analysis of ‘the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns’ using texts from different authors with narrative authority. This type of analysis draws attention to the construction of an object that is given ‘particular features and capacities.’ Through implicit or explicit parallels and contrasts, other subjects are ‘labelled and given meaningful attributes by their predicates’ being differentiated from or related to, one another.

156 Phillips and Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 7.
157 Hansen, Security as Practice, 60.
159 Phillips and Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 75.
160 Hansen, Security as Practice, 61.
164 Japan, for instance, is constructed as ‘an independent but subordinate state that is key to US policy but one that is acted upon.’ Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,” 232.
165 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,” 232. See also Doty, Imperial Encounters, 378.
The second theoretical commitment involves discourses as being productive or reproductive of ‘things defined by the discourse.’ Discourse define ‘subjects authorised to speak and to act,’ as well as ‘the relations within which they see and are seen by each other,’ by also defining knowledgeable practices by these subjects towards the objects which the discourse defines. The theoretical commitment of discourse productivity also points to the third theoretical commitment, the play of practice, which focuses on the study of dominating discourses and ‘their structuring of meaning as connected to implementing’ intelligible and legitimate practices. Fundamental to this understanding of discourse, is that the ways in which we understand and represent the world are ‘historically and culturally specific, and contingent.’ In this way, discourses are, Doty observes, inherently unstable, rather than ‘grounded on a solid, meta-theoretical base that transcends contingent human actions.’ Being unstable, all discourses require work to articulate and rearticulate their knowledges and identities, to ‘fix the regime of truth.’ The analytical focus of discourse productivity requires consideration of how officials discursively produce their ‘regime of truth’ as common sense, excluding others, by defining ‘knowledgeable practices.’ Agents effectively use discourse as a ‘resource’ to direct their practices, making possible certain courses of action while precluding others. In this way, they attempt to shape new/existing social meanings in discourse through the practice of narrative or storytelling.

(ii) The discursive practice of narrative

The act of story-telling, as a discursive practice, represents events in a meaningful temporal and causal way that ‘suggest specific interpretations, shape possible responses and limit potential other representations.’ The ‘exercise of narration,’ Bode explicates, ‘involves linking real world events through a number of characteristic narrative devices such as the inclusion of characters and the development of plots.’ Throughout history, story-telling has been fundamental to making sense of, and shaping, social reality. Individual story-telling practices are performed within a social context and thus connect visions about how specific events should be interpreted. Consequently, the actor or agent telling the story is an integral part of the analytical picture. The story’s discursive success is

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166 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,” 229.
168 Emphasis in original. Doty, Imperial Encounters, 16.
169 Doty, Imperial Encounters, 16.
170 Phillips and Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 5.
174 Bode, Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations, 47.
176 Bode, Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations, 47.
as much a product of the way its narrator is telling it, and who the narrator is, as it is a product of its discursive and intersubjective construction.\footnote{Bode, \textit{Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations}, 47.}

The essence of narrative, especially in the political context, lies in the capacity of the story-teller to simplify complex situations into chains of events, to shape the present, relative to the past, and create a political reality from a particular perspective.\footnote{Shaul R. Shenhav, “Political Narratives and Political Reality,” \textit{International Political Science Review} 27, no. 3 (2006): 246.} For the actor, narratives perform several functions: they give meaning to particular events, decode the rules of behaviour, and set out the context.\footnote{Felix Ciută, “The End(s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action and Narrative Transformation,” \textit{Contemporary Security Policy} 23, no. 1 (2002): 37.} The role of narratives is to integrate events and make sense of them within the overall story line.\footnote{Bode, \textit{Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations}, 46-47; Ezzy, “Theorizing Narrative Identity,” 245.} They intrinsically and ‘simultaneously stabilise the meaningfulness and social predictability of interaction, and offer a vehicle for the transformation of knowledge, meaning and practice.’\footnote{Felix Ciută, “The End(s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action and Narrative Transformation,” 37-38.}

Narratives can be treated ‘intersubjective enterprises’ through which meaning is constructed, linking the project of action (the plot) with the context of action. Bode details three basic elements to a narrational representation of events: (i) a plot, understood as a structured and chronological sequence of events; (ii) the characters; and (iii) an interpretive theme in the form of regulative ideas that, in defining standards of behaviour, also try to order or constrain behaviour.\footnote{Bode specifies four plot phases: the initial setting or situation; change; the ‘revelation’ that uncovers a new predicament requiring a call for action; and the conclusion. The revelation phase is crucial since the events and actions of this watershed moment must be ‘story-worthy’ and offer a sensible interpretation of the situation. Bode, \textit{Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations}, 48-49.} In sum, the complex process of exchange between the characters, events and the plot structure until they interconnect gives purpose and sense to ‘the meaning, rules and context of interaction,’ and continually adjusted to meet the intentions, whims and expectations of actors.\footnote{Felix Ciută, “The End(s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action and Narrative Transformation,” 38.}

For the U.S., the evolution of its regional hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific context is framed within an overall logic involved with it being the hegemon, and it practising hegemony through the hierarchical regional order. From a narrativist and constructivist point of view, in maintaining ontological (and physical) security, it is the security narrative of the American state and political elite that provide the rules and meaning for political actions and strategic movements for other actors.\footnote{Felix Ciută, “The End(s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action and Narrative Transformation,” \textit{Contemporary Security Policy} 23, no. 1 (2002): 38.}
What the U.S. is, and what it does, are the result of a continuous process of narrative reinterpretation, grounded in the past and the present, and with the capacity to shape the future.\textsuperscript{185} The sequencing of how we understand the U.S. and what it does becomes a narrative by ‘a common thread, the plot,’ and the pervasive logic of ‘security’ which ‘gives coherence to this chain of events’ and authenticates the ‘appropriate criteria of action.’\textsuperscript{186} The narrative of the events in the South and East China Seas has been gradually reconfigured into a security context, characterised by a ‘broad’ and sectoral understanding of security,\textsuperscript{187} and of U.S. tasks as the hegemon, and supported by the discursive construction of ‘China’s rise’ as threatening within a broader American security narrative.

**Chapter Overview**

This research connects the rebalance strategy – as a discrete feature of the Obama administration’s foreign policy – with the processes that produce it. I aim to reveal a complex picture of U.S. foreign policy production, combining processes comprising narrative, identity and security, with foreign policy outcomes. Language is critical to these processes because it has a clear political purpose: it normalises and legitimises particular foreign policy practices within an authorised version of historical context, and validates a specific and narrow conception of American national identity and security.

Since the U.S. remains, arguably for the foreseeable future, the critical actor in the international sphere, the continuing legitimacy and consent for the post-1945 international order hinges on the U.S., as hegemon, to lead and reproduce this order. Gramsci’s conceptualisation of hegemony – emphasising coercion, consent and legitimacy – exposes the need for a broader representation of the social processes behind the reproduction of American domination of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific, in light of the Obama administration’s signature rebalance policy. I use Barnett and Duvall’s power framework to analyse the range of power assets that the U.S. has at its disposal, and to highlight the asymmetric social relations of power that facilitate and complicate the maintenance and reproduction of hegemony. I supplement Barnett and Duvall’s framework with discourse analysis through which I explore the nature, themes and consequences of the overarching narratives that weave through the American exercise of power that supports the maintenance and reproduction of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. This inquiry proceeds through six additional chapters.

\textsuperscript{185} The ‘double role of the narrative’ Ciută refers to as a ‘narrative shuttle.’ This term will be explicated further in chapter 3. Ciută, “The End(s) of NATO,” 38.
\textsuperscript{186} Ciută, “The End(s) of NATO,” 45.
\textsuperscript{187} Ciută, “The End(s) of NATO,” 51.
Chapter 2 establishes the first part of the theoretical framework of this thesis by opening up the concepts of hegemony, order and power. My approach to hegemony moves beyond rational considerations, giving priority to neo-Gramscian and constructivist understandings of hegemony.\textsuperscript{188} The focus is on exposing the social relationships that underpin American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, and the processes of negotiating regional order that rely on garnering legitimacy and consent in addition to enforcement through coercion. Moreover, the hegemon also makes concessions to the subordinate states as a means to maintain their acquiescence and which ultimately preserve the asymmetry and status quo in the existing order.\textsuperscript{189} Attention is also given to the domination of ideas, allowing for examination of the principal mechanisms of socialisation that underpin U.S. hegemonic legitimacy, and attempt to reproduce consent for the hegemonic order.\textsuperscript{190} As a means to situate the condition of U.S. hegemony that was passed onto the incoming Obama administration in 2009, I consider the shifts in the character of order in the Asia-Pacific, and the effects on hegemonic legitimacy, as a consequence of the G.W. Bush administration’s Global War on Terror. Finally, I present Barnett and Duvall’s four-fold typology of power as a means to connect the concepts of hegemony and order to the exercise of power by way of the strategic rebalance. Since American hegemony relies on a range of power assets for its reproduction, Barnett and Duvall’s typology facilitates a comprehensive examination of power that emphasises its social, as well as its physical foundations, thereby supporting a systematic examination of the coercive, consensual and legitimising aspects of U.S. hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific.

Forming the second part of the theoretical framework, Chapter 3 concentrates on processes of narrative, identity and security formation in the development of U.S. foreign policy. This chapter uses a constructivist approach, emphasising the role that ideas play in the social production and reproduction of America’s hegemonic identity and how this relates to its ongoing search for ontological security. It considers how identity is formulated through autobiographical (i.e. self) and self-versus-other processes. This chapter attends to the continuing influence of the exceptionalist ideology and belief in manifest destiny on American hegemonic identity (re)production. Attention is given to identity formation processes and their influence on national security narratives and the construction of threats to identity, often through a prism of a real or perceived physical threat. By examining hegemony as an American identity role, the process of maintaining security does not only occur on the physical level; rather, the (re)production of security is also needed at the level of self, to ontologically secure America’s

\textsuperscript{188} The English School also puts forward a conceptualisation of hegemony in international society that, once disaggregated from primacy, views hegemony as an institutionalised practice within international society, along with balance of power, the role of great powers, international law, diplomacy and war. Ian Clark, \textit{Hegemony in International Society} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 34.

\textsuperscript{189} Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 163.

\textsuperscript{190} Gramsci also considers hegemonic legitimacy which is explored in his notion of an ‘historical bloc’ which is discussed in more depth in Chapter 2.
hegemonic identity. Language is critical to all these processes, with the ‘China’s rise’ narrative evidently situated within the context of a consolidated U.S. regional hegemony. Discussion, therefore, focuses on the way in which the ‘China’s rise’ narrative has been constructed a result of Washington’s uncertainty over how to manage China’s rising power identity, its failure to understand and even shape China’s changing character and role, and how the U.S. interprets its own hegemonic identity. Linking back to hegemonic practices in the production of order, language and meaning are infused with power, demonstrated by the ability, or inability, of U.S. administration officials to favourably express American power, and by America’s capacity, not only to generate consent for its power, but to also continually cultivate behaviour that complies with its hegemonic order.

The empirical core of the thesis is located in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Each chapter focuses on a specific element of the rebalance, demonstrating how the U.S. exercises a broad range of power assets at its disposal to assert its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific. I aim to show how the U.S. simultaneously exerts different types of power, using Barnett and Duvall’s classification of compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power to produce regional hegemonic order and to secure its hegemonic identity. Since the U.S. has the capacity to exercise power interactively and constitutively in each case, the scope of its power assets, with which it can broadly garner consent for its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, even when it resorts to coercion, characterises American hegemonic order as legitimate by the majority of subordinate states in this region. Although hegemony is a form of dominance, the empirical chapters draw attention to the processes of consent and bargaining that occur between the U.S. and the subordinate states, who actively maintain asymmetrical social relations with the hegemon.

Chapter 4 focuses on the military element of the rebalance strategy, paying particular attention to the maintenance and development of the alliance system that has dominated the order of regional security since 1945. The economic element of the rebalance is examined in Chapter 5. This discussion centres on the Obama administration’s efforts to shape the regional economic order through the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and U.S. capacity to shape regional developments through regional multilateral institutions. Chapter 6 considers America’s evolving relationships with the region’s two main rising powers, China and India, varying distinctly in its respective approaches to each rise. A more detailed overview of the relationship of hegemony and power as manifested in the rebalance strategy, and examined in the empirical chapters, is provided at the end of Chapter 2.

Each empirical chapter also assesses how the U.S. uses various aspects of its power to dominate the structure of values and meanings about the nature of regional order, including threats to that order, to
influence the perceptions, domestic narratives and policies of the subordinate states. To further emphasise U.S. hegemonic practices, Barnett and Duvall’s framework is supplemented by analysis of the Obama administration’s discursive practices, focusing on identity and security narratives that seek to make sense of ‘China’s rise’ within the context of the strategic rebalance. Each chapter makes reference to aspects of U.S. ontological security-seeking behaviour, outlining autobiographical and self-versus-other processes, which connect attempts to secure American hegemonic identity, with the ‘real world’ of national security policies through which administration officials identify and act on real or perceived threats to its hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific. Determining the boundaries of the relationship with China in particular seems to challenge U.S. hegemony at the level of both regional order and in the way in which the U.S. views its hegemonic identity.

Chapter 7 brings this thesis to its timely conclusion. This chapter reviews my contribution to the study of American foreign policy, situating the Obama administration’s rebalance strategy within the broader academic debate on whether there is an ‘Obama Doctrine,’ that gives direction to Obama’s foreign policy. As Obama has looked to secure his foreign policy legacy during the final months of his presidency, I conclude with some final observations on whether the rebalance strategy will continue into the next presidency. Finally, I explore the limitations of my research, also suggesting opportunities for future research.
Chapter 2

Hegemony, Power and Legitimacy: A Framework for Analysis

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework for this thesis, in which hegemony provides the conceptual lynchpin. Hegemony in the international sphere is conceived here as an asymmetry in relationships defined and shaped by varying expressions of power over a sustained period. To be hegemonic requires the convergence of political, economic and cultural conditions that allow for the creation and reproduction of order. Using a Gramscian understanding of hegemony as a social relationship, the presence of hegemony is derived from consent, rather than coercion, which requires constant negotiation with the subordinate states.

The first section examines American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through the hierarchical structure of regional order. Thereafter, attention turns to the concept of hegemony in the international system, drawing on neo-Gramscian approaches to hegemony in IR, and focusing on Gramsci’s ideas on coercion and consent to hegemony. A neo-Gramscian approach allows for an analytical focus on the pervasiveness of American hegemony through its domination of ideas and practices permeating a core of global political and civil society, domination of economic and social forces, and supported by multilateral institutions that facilitate the expansion of these forces whilst also providing legitimacy and absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas. Since hegemony is treated here as a social relation which relies on more than America’s preponderant material power, this approach allows for deliberation of the non-physical aspects of U.S. regional domination in the Asia-Pacific, through the inclusion of ideational and ideological phenomena.

With neo-Gramscian and social constructivist approaches in IR focusing on hegemony as a social relationship requiring social control, attention turns to an explicit exploration of legitimacy – the subject of much debate in normative approaches to IR. This chapter draws on constructivist traditions to

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consider how mechanisms of socialisation are used to underpin U.S. hegemonic legitimacy, and which facilitate exploration of the social reproduction of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{193}

The post-9/11 world has drawn attention to the challenge of maintaining American hegemony, and the often difficult task of balancing coercion and consent across the political and socio-economic aspects of American hegemony. As such, this situation has precipitated normative focus on the issue of hegemonic legitimacy. Since 9/11, the focus on the consensual and social aspects of U.S. hegemony has become especially significant. The second section of this chapter deliberates on the crisis in U.S. hegemonic legitimacy emanating from the Global War on Terror, and whether this has led to a change in America’s worldview under Obama.\textsuperscript{194}

The durability of U.S. hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific relies on the ability of government officials to articulate and exercise U.S. power effectively through its rebalance strategy. Power, so understood, is not limited to America’s ability to use its preponderant material resources to directly shape the actions of the subordinate states. Nor is its ‘power’ solely manifested in coercive means. The final part of this chapter sets out the analytical framework for animating American hegemony in the strategic rebalance, using Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power, which categorises ‘power’ into four discrete dimensions, compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.\textsuperscript{195} Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy offers a broad framework through which the American exercise of power, as the Obama administration implements the rebalance strategy, can be more comprehensively analysed. This approach to power, therefore, goes beyond typical conceptualisations that limit focus to the condition of America’s military and economic capabilities to maintain regional order. Furthermore, the incorporation of the social


\textsuperscript{195} Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 39-75.
dimensions of power, as well as its material dimensions, allows for an interpretation of the mechanisms of socialisation that are present within U.S.-Asia-Pacific relations.

American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: Constructing regional order

In the decade following 9/11, Washington’s general commitment to, and capacity to underwrite, the existing post-Cold War hegemonic order came under pressure, with suggestion that U.S. foreign policy is in crisis. In the Asia-Pacific, U.S. hegemony was undermined by questions over its capacity to be the principal guarantor of regional order, its perceived weakness in underwriting global economic governance, and its singular focus on the global war on terrorism. The G.W. Bush administration’s attitude towards U.S. primacy following 9/11 reignited debate on the coercive nature of U.S hegemony, and the means by which consent from subordinate states was induced. To some, therefore, the adoption of such coercive hegemonic practices bordered on ‘empire-building.’ To others, America’s hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific has been undergoing transformation since the end of the Cold War, denoting that the hegemonic order is ‘produced and maintained’ by a continual process of negotiation between the hegemon and other states, resting on shared understandings of regional ‘order.”

Unlike rationalist conceptualisations of order that commence with the premise that the state with material preponderant power is most likely to dominate the international system, this study starts with

199 The hidden tension in the term ‘American empire’ reflects a persistent debate on the nature, role and purpose of American power. While the U.S. has pursued imperial-like policies at certain times and in places, it is not clear that empire-building has followed from a deliberate policy of imperial aggrandisement, or that an expansive global empire generally describes American conduct or purpose. Andrew Baker, “American Empire – A Dangerous Distortion?” Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 10.
200 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 6.
201 As a means to understand the existence of one leading actor in specifying the terms for the maintenance of order in the international system, Hegemonic Stability Theory determines that this actor has a predominance of coercive, military power to reinforce its hegemony. This theory was briefly touched upon in Chapter 1, page 12, footnote 33.
Hedley Bull’s definition of order as ‘rules-based interactions, underpinned by intersubjective consensus concerning the basic goals of, and processes involved in, the conduct of international affairs,’ Spanning a spectrum ranging from total disorder to a rules-based order, the construction of order is dynamic, adjusting to the underlying forces of international politics, the distribution of power, and the organising principles of the order. Order in the Asia-Pacific depends on historically produced and constantly evolving shared understandings. ‘Internal cohesion’ of an order requires the development of a shared identity expressed in part in collectively held norms and values and in part in common cultural links and similar domestic governance arrangements. Furthermore, shared ideas, manifested in ‘historically constructed normative structures – in international legal rules and practices, international political norms, and in the dominant ideologies and practices that animate them,’ are reached through ‘struggle, conflict, accommodation, and cooperation’ occurring between the hegemon and the subordinate states.

Order, therefore, is not static, but in a constant process of negotiation and evolution, with order existing on a continuum that ranges between rules-based order and disorder.

U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific was initially established on the back of U.S. military preponderance, unchallenged in its role of public goods provider since the Second World War. Of equal importance, however, the power exerted by the United States has social foundations, denoting that the exercise of American power permeates through social frameworks, to which other states in the system broadly acquiesce. As Cox observes, examination of orders must be broadened to encompass the basic processes behind the ‘development of social forces and forms of state, and in the structure of global political economy.’ With the focus on the social nature of power, rather than a myopic focus on material resources, how others perceive and interact with this unequal power distribution draws attention to matters of legitimacy, consent, and the process of negotiation that occurs in the (re)production of Asia-Pacific regional order.

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208 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 4
A study of the international sphere, including the resilience of the U.S. hegemonic order, therefore, require more than examination of material shifts of power. There is also the matter of norms of order, resting on the ‘social and ideological proclivities’ of powerful states within the system.210 As with any hegemonic order in history, the normative dimensions of U.S. hegemonic order influence its character, stability and durability, and govern social relations within the order.211 Social structures provide the ‘infrastructure of hegemonic order...give hierarchy and hegemony social character and enable the hegemon to assert its normative preferences.’212 Furthermore, hegemonic preferences not only pervade the international system but also infuse the practices, meanings, values and beliefs of political officials in subordinate states. Norms, therefore, ‘shap[e] the social relations that are the sinews of hegemony.’213 Hegemons advance their ideological and material interests in four broad dimensions of order: geopolitical, socio-economic, cultural and commercial.214 Consequently, the U.S. plays a critical role in constituting and shaping regional order and stability in the Asia-Pacific, and the current regional order continues to be formatively shaped by American liberal hegemony in economic and military terms, and in political and ideational terms. The core values and interests of Asia-Pacific regional society are broadly characterised by liberal U.S. principles, including the rule of law and an open economic system. U.S. regional alliances are defined by American principles and commitment, and are supported by loose regional multilateral cooperation.215

Regional order in the Asia-Pacific is classified here as hierarchical, rather than anarchic.216 Relationships are classed as anarchic if states possess no authority over one another,217 while at the other end of the continuum exist international hierarchical relationships, including empires, protectorates, spheres of influence and dependencies.218 The characterisation of a continuum negates

the ‘truism’ that all relationships within the system are anarchic. In its simplest form, hierarchy denotes the ranking and interaction of states within the order, based on the unequal distribution of power, underpinned by an agreement by the subordinate states to cede authority. Hierarchy is, in this sense, relational, imbued with features of consent and legitimacy. The relationship that has developed between the U.S. and many states in the Asia-Pacific over the past seventy years remains predominantly hierarchical, especially in security matters. Furthermore, many states in the Asia-Pacific continue to subordinate themselves in whole, or in part, to the authority of the U.S., acknowledging American authority to regulate their interactions, particularly in military matters, and/or in economic affairs.

Incorporated within this hierarchical conception of regional order, grounded in geopolitical, socio-economic, cultural and commercial logics, the U.S. is hegemonic. Hegemony is a crucial concept in understanding how a dominant state shapes and controls order. However, there is a marked difference in IR as to how hegemony is conceptualised and studied. Rather than adhering to problem-solving theories, which treat the prevailing social and power relationships as given, the emphasis here is on uncovering the configuration of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, hinging on multi-layered processes involving its material power, the (re)production and maintenance of a collective image of the American conception of order, including its normative foundations, and the institutions which ‘administer the order with a certain semblance of universality.

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222 Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, 3. Lake observes that economic and security relationships vary from the anarchic to the hierarchical, depending on the level of sovereignty ceded to the dominant state. Security relationships can vary from diplomacy at the anarchic end, to protectorates at the hierarchical end. Economic relationships between states range from market exchange at the anarchic end, to dependency at the hierarchical end. He also argues that hierarchies represent the outcome of consensual contracts, in which one state agrees to cede some sovereignty in return for various kinds of security, political, and economic benefits. This is not a one-way relationship, therefore, with negotiation occurring on both sides. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, 52-57.  
223 Kang, like Goh, treats hierarchy and hegemony as distinct: hegemony is overarching, more intrusive, and focuses on the largest power, while hierarchy is more concerned with the interaction of states up and down the ranked hierarchical order. David Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations,” in *International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific*, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 164-166.  
224 Cox describes world hegemony as ‘a social structure, an economic structure and a political structure...[and] must be all three.’ Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 171-2.  
225 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” 139. Cox emphasises that institutionalisation is an effective means of ‘stabilising and perpetuating’ order, since, at the point of origin, tend to reflect and perpetuate the prevailing power relations. Later on, institutions may take on a life of their own, or stimulate the creation of rival institutions. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” 136.
employed as an alternative to the state-centric power theories that dominate IR. This conceptualisation is then coupled with a constructivist approach to the reproduction of legitimacy through normative mechanisms of socialisation. However, before exploring the interactive social processes that work to maintain and embed U.S. hegemony, the next section outlines rationalist approaches that place little or no value on the normative aspects of hegemony.

**Conceptualising hegemony**

(i) Rationalist approaches in IR

Common to mainstream rationalist approaches of IR, hegemony is typically characterised by the dominant state’s preponderant material capabilities and order provision, compared to other actors in the international system. It is often used interchangeably with primacy and unipolarity, as a means to explain the presence of American power in Asia-Pacific regional order. There are differences in rationalist approaches in relation to their emphasis, or lack of emphasis, on the non-material elements of hegemony – the norms and ideas that also activate hegemonic orders. These differences stem from underlying theoretical assumptions about the nature of international structures, and the forms of power used by a hegemon to maintain order. While it is relatively uncontroversial to describe the United States as hegemonic, the nature of its domination in the Asia-Pacific remains open to theoretical interpretation. Nevertheless, regional preponderance represents an important element to any claim to major power status, since a state may promote itself, or may be seen by others, as the representative of a particular region.

Conventional realist and liberal IR scholarship on hegemony broadly focus on one state’s dominance over others, determined by a country’s economic and military resource base, and the use of coercion

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227 In realist terminology, primacy and preponderance both concern an abundance of a single actor’s material power over others. Unipolarity refers to the distribution of material capabilities, which overwhelmingly favour one state in the international system. See William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security* 21, no. 1 (1999): 5-41.


229 In broad terms, realist theories generally prioritise power, while liberalist approaches consider international institutions and preference formation. Uncovering processes of norms and ideas are widely explored in constructivist work. The difference approaches to ideas and norms are discussed in more depth in the following sections of this chapter.


231 Hurrell observes that a state may be seen as a major power if it takes on an assertive role in regional crisis management, or fulfils an order-producing role within its region. Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?” *International Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2006): 8.
and inducement to alter the preferences of leaders in subordinate states. Realist conceptions define hegemony as a relationship of dominance, in which the hegemon maintains international order by using its predominant material resources to reward and coerce subordinate states. There is often no distinction made between hegemony and primacy. John Mearsheimer asserted that, ‘a hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all other states in the system.’ Power, in materialist conceptions, equates to the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims; the most important of which are to protect and promote national material interests at home and abroad. American power is derived from the relative superiority of its economic and military capabilities in the world. Its productive capacity, defined by indicators such as wealth, technology, and population size, is a pre-requisite for building and modernising U.S. military forces. The rise and fall of a powerful nation is driven primarily by relative economic strength, as determined by its productive capacity, which is, in turn, heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other power assets measured over a sustained period. Economic strength and military power are interdependent.

Liberal approaches also emphasise the hegemon’s material and institutional power, in supporting the need for a hegemon to protect its preponderant material power and hegemonic order. Many liberals emphasise the formal institutional arrangements that protect the hegemon’s leadership position for mutually beneficial international cooperation but also which constrain hegemonic power. Some also

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232 Eminent IR academics in the field of liberal institutionalism treat hegemony as primarily reliant on material resources. Keohane, for instance, asserts that hegemony is simply a ‘preponderance of material resources.’ Keohane, After Hegemony, 32.


234 The U.S. is often described as a ‘hegemon,’ when nothing is intended beyond its material primacy. Ian Clark’s discussion of hegemony, from the English School perspective, separates hegemony from primacy. Hegemony is an institutionalised practice which is legitimated within international society. Conversely, primacy depicts nothing more than a distribution of power, in which one state enjoys predominance. See Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4, 23.


238 Pape, “Empire Falls,” 22.

239 John Ikenberry, also defining power in material terms, suggests hegemonic management occurs through institutional ‘lock-in’ which creates self-restraint on the part of the hegemon, and which leads to the creation of
content that through increased economic interdependence, the existing provision for global economic governance can continue to flourish without a hegemon.\footnote{In After Hegemony, Keohane examines the prospect for stability and cooperation in the absence of American hegemony. Future cooperation could be attained through institutional mechanisms via the logic of interdependence.} Other liberal theorists observe that American power is also exercised through its influence on legal and normative structures.\footnote{Moravcsik notes that ideational liberalism views ‘domestic social identities as the basic determinant of state preferences,’ however, liberal approaches generally have no ‘distinctive position on the origins of social identities or their social construction, nor on whether they reflect material or non-material factors.’ Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 525.} The emergence of international norms has come about through U.S. influence on regimes and institutions, and through U.S. capacity to influence choices between modes of governance.\footnote{Andrew Hurrell, “Pax Americana or the Empire of Insecurity?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005): 160.} In the main, liberals observe that liberal economic integration gives rising powers greater influence in global economic governance, which binds them into the existing system. The formation of state preferences matters more to liberals than the configuration of capabilities.\footnote{Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 513.} States balance economic welfare and development with considerations of power and autonomy.\footnote{Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order,” 18.} In this way, states expend resources, or make concessions, primarily as a function of preferences, and not capabilities.\footnote{Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 523.}

Rationalist approaches limit their understanding of hegemony to material considerations. Domination typically rests on material predominance, measured by the aggregate resources possessed by a single actor across a wide range of capabilities, and by the degree of concentration of these resources in terms of their international distribution.\footnote{Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 18.} Dominance, so understood, is not purely bilateral or relational, but can also be expressed through systemic rules, since hegemonic power is defined as one which is ‘powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so.’\footnote{Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1989), 234.}

The behaviour of states is thus conditioned by the distribution of material capabilities in the system at any one time.


\footnote{In After Hegemony, Keohane examines the prospect for stability and cooperation in the absence of American hegemony. Future cooperation could be attained through institutional mechanisms via the logic of interdependence.}

\footnote{Moravcsik notes that ideational liberalism views ‘domestic social identities as the basic determinant of state preferences,’ however, liberal approaches generally have no ‘distinctive position on the origins of social identities or their social construction, nor on whether they reflect material or non-material factors.’ Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 525.}

\footnote{Andrew Hurrell, “Pax Americana or the Empire of Insecurity?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005): 160.}

\footnote{Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 513.}

\footnote{Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order,” 18.}

\footnote{Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 523.}

\footnote{Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 18.}

(ii) Ideational approaches to hegemony in IR

In IR, constructivist and neo-Gramscian approaches to hegemony offer alternative conceptualisations that shift exclusive focus away from the hegemon and its accumulated material power, towards the needs and expectations of other actors in the order, and towards normative cohesion. Hegemony is not just something that the hegemon ‘does’ or ‘has,’ but something that international society ‘sees.’ This implies that hegemony requires something more, beyond the capability and willingness of the hegemon to coerce subordinate states. In these terms, material preponderance is understood as a necessary condition of hegemony, but on its own, offers an incomplete concept of hegemony. While it is agreed that a dominant actor, by definition, typically possesses a preponderance of material resources relative to other states, material resources alone do not ‘confer the entitlement or right to lead, and cannot ensure that a stable and sustainable political order is created or maintained.’

Gramsci conceptualised hegemony as a mode of social control pervading society by an actor or a dominant group, using ideology with which to dominate subordinate actors or groups by shaping personal beliefs. He initially situated hegemony, meaning direction, in the sphere of civil society, while coercion, meaning domination, was located in the realm of ‘the state.’ Gramsci put forward two definitions of ‘the state.’ In his limited definition of ‘the state,’ political society, engendering ‘the state,’ is the coercive apparatus that ensures popular conformity to the mode of production and economy. In contrast, the hegemony of a social group over society as a whole is exercised through civil society – the ‘private’ organisations (e.g. the church, trade unions and schools). These institutions of civil society ‘operate to shape, directly or indirectly, the cognitive and affective structures’ through which actors ‘perceive and evaluate problematic social reality.’ Together, civil and political society form the two levels of ‘superstructure’ in Gramsci’s conceptualisation.

249 Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 19.
250 Hurrell asserts that unlike empire, hegemony rests on ‘negotiation, legitimacy and followership’ and offers a ‘less intrusive mode of control.’ In an increasingly globalised world, the promotion of US economic and security interests requires deeper intrusion into the domestic arrangements of other nations. Hurrell, “Pax Americana or the Empire of Insecurity?” 153, and also 158-165.
251 Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 19. Recent interpretations of Gramsci’s work concur that he acknowledged the existence of ‘objective conditions’ but that he viewed them as ‘insufficient’ and not determinant of human thought or behaviour. See Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 120-121; Richard Bellamy, Croce, Gramsci, Bobbio and the Italian Political Tradition (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2013), 179-180.
252 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 11.
253 Cox, for instance, keeps the state as the primary focus of social struggle, and the ‘basis entity of international relations,’ but which also includes its social basis. Therefore, hegemony is a complex of international social relationships connecting the social classes of different countries. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 169 and 171.
254 Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 24.
Gramsci was not entirely consistent with his views on coercion and consent, which has led to much speculation on the extent to which hegemony involves leadership and domination. Gramsci identifies hegemony not as a ‘pole of consent’ that can be contrasted with ‘another pole of coercion’ but as a ‘synthesis of consent and coercion.' As a result, the distinction between political and civil society disappears and consent and coercion become co-determinous in his enlarged definition of ‘the state.' Gramsci is conscious of the problem of delineating the differences or boundaries between political and civil society. Opposition between civil and political society is developed into ‘hegemony armoured with coercion.' Consequently, the binary oppositions of state and civil society and coercion and consent in Gramsci’s understanding of the modern state are less well-defined in practical application. The distinction between state and civil society serves a ‘conceptual analytical’ function, since these spheres are reciprocally penetrated rather than distinct spheres of activity.

For a group to become hegemonic, it must possess the economic, political and cultural conditions that facilitate its emergence as the leading force. In Gramsci’s writing, ‘ideological superiority must have solid economic roots.’ Therefore politico-ethical hegemony must also be economic – the dominant group is ‘the decisive nucleus of economic activity.’ Gramsci uses ‘historical bloc’ to define the relationship of the structure (economic base) to the superstructure. The superstructure includes organisations and institutions of ideology and politics, including civil society, which are viewed as universal in form. Gramsci identified civil society with the ideological superstructure. Structures (or the base) relate to ‘the social relations of, and physical means of, production.'
superstructure, hegemony is exercised by the dominant group throughout society, and domination is exercised predominantly, although not always exclusively, by the political society through the state and judicial system.269

Although the historical bloc incorporates relations between different social agents, this must be seen within the context of the relationship between the economic structure (base) and the politico-ethical superstructure – a relation which is realised through the activity of different social groups. Hegemonic outcomes are not defined solely by specific superstructures but by the larger relationship between the dominant and subordinate classes, which is, in turn, shaped by production.270 The historical bloc represents the ‘complex interaction of various social and historical forces, ideas and relations.’271 Gramsci contrasted historical materialism, which accepts the value of ethical and cultural sources of political action (always related to the economic sphere), with what he described as ‘historical economism,’ whereby everything can be reduced to technological and material concerns.272

There are conceptual challenges with a strict separation of superstructure and base relations. The superstructure is related to its economic base and the reproduction of these conditions must be sustained by the political and ideological superstructure.273 However, as Gramsci appreciated, the correspondence between class interests and political activity occurred over a long period of time. At any point in time, the ideas, beliefs, cultural practices and political events represented in the superstructure may not necessarily be a direct articulation of economic interests. Economic conditions create boundaries for activities in the superstructure, rather than directly regulating them.274 For Gramsci, the political and the economic are not so easily separated.275 It has been argued, for instance, that the legal structure belongs to the superstructure of political, ideological or ethical relations but which equally could form part of the economic base since capitalism is founded upon property rights and relations.276 Consequently, Joseph raises questions about the distinction between base and superstructure and about the distinction between forces of production and relations of production.277 He argues that productive forces do not develop autonomously but within the context of particular social relations of the

270 Worth, “Recasting Gramsci in International Politics,” 383.
superstructures and economic base. By relating the historical bloc to the question of hegemony, Gramsci is attempting to give the base-superstructure relation a more dynamic character. Social hegemony is not given but must be constantly reproduced and developed.

Some neo-Gramscians argue that hegemony at international level cannot be envisaged in the same manner of occurrence in the nation state, as the international system lacks ‘a concrete hierarchical form in which hegemony could be constructed.’ This would need a shift back to the economic base in determining the productive area for class struggle. From this perspective, hegemony in the international sphere is determined as originating in capitalist relations of production. Consequently, the Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony has often prevailed in IPE but been less prominent in IR, despite Gramsci’s lack of credentials as a political economist. Gramsci rejected economic determinism but was keen to maintain the range of structural situations from the economic to the cultural and the political. A looser interpretation of the relationship between capital and production, and the ‘highly complex issues of culture, identity and class’ that are simultaneously occurring at different levels in international society.

Historical materialism maintains the connections between ‘power in production, power in the state and power in international relations.’ Prevailing historical structures are essential for understanding a particular configuration of forces. As an ideological and consensual form of control, the historical bloc requires a hegemonic social class to maintain social cohesion and identity within the bloc, which is also pertinent in international relations. Individuals and groups, like states, may be affected by, or resist, or oppose the pressures of the hegemonic group, but they cannot disregard them. Successful resistance requires an alternative, emerging configuration of forces – the formation of a rival historical bloc of states. The awareness of a reciprocal relationship between structure (economic relations) and

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278 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 38.
280 Worth, “Recasting Gramsci in International Politics,” 380.
281 For instance, see Fred Halliday, “The Pertinence of Imperialism,” in Historical Materialism and Globalization, eds. Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), 87. Structural Marxism is ‘designed as a framework for analysis of the capitalist state and society, which turns its back on historical knowledge in favour of a more static and abstract conceptualisation of the mode of production.’ Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 133.
283 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 51.
284 Worth, “Recasting Gramsci in International Politics,” 381.
superstructure (politico-ethical) in Gramsci’s thinking contains the potential for considering ‘state/society complexes as the constituent entities of a world order.’ However, the different configurations of state/society complexes remain largely underexplored in IR. More attention should be given to how relationships of consent are ‘constructed and deconstructed at every level of interaction.’

In the international sphere, hegemony intersects with material power, ideology and institutions. Cox notes that the world can be seen as:

‘a pattern of interacting social forces in which states play an intermediate though autonomous role between the global structure of social forces and local configurations of social forces within particular countries.’

Power is treated as emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of accumulated material capabilities that are derived from these social processes. Material capabilities, ideas and institutions reciprocally interact in an historical bloc. Hegemony on a global scale is a social, economic and political structure, and must be all three. It is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms for rules of behaviour for states and civil society acting across national boundaries, and supporting the dominant mode of production. Hegemony at the international level is not merely ‘an order among states; it is an order within the world economy with a dominant mode of production’ that penetrates all countries and connects social classes of different countries.

Social structures serve as the infrastructure of hegemonic order; they give hegemony its social character and enable the hegemon to assert its normative preferences. Normative preferences and social and cultural orientations also affect the character of hegemony and the nature of rule. Moreover, these

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290 Worth, “Recasting Gramsci in International Politics,” 382-383.
293 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 141.
298 Liberal approaches diverge from normative ones over the matter of self-interest, since liberal theory explores the conditions under which self-interested actors do, or do not, cooperate, whereas constructivist approaches do not assume self-interest as the basis for cooperation. See, for instance, Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80 no. 4 (1986): 1151-1169; Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 517.
norms are usually derived from the domestic order of the dominant state, and that order consequently reflects the hegemon’s own values and norms, as well as its preponderant power. Given the reciprocal nature of the relationship between leaders and followers, hegemony involves the use of power but cannot be reduced to an exercise of power, for it crucially relies on the ability of the hegemon to persuade others on the attractiveness of its leadership. Gramscian approaches to hegemony focus on the supremacy of a social group, manifesting both coercive and consensual practices. Social control, therefore, takes two forms: the dominant group can externally influence behaviour and preferences through a system of reward and punishment, and it can internally manipulate behaviour by shaping values, norms and interests. This is not a directly exploitative relationship, but one which most states ‘could find compatible with their interests.’

In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci distinguished between domination and ‘intellectual moral leadership,’ asserting that,

‘a social group can, indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership before winning governmental power…; it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to ‘lead’ as well.’

By making the distinction between leadership and domination in his conceptualisation of hegemony, Gramsci treats ideological leadership as the counter position of domination. Through the exercise of leadership rather than domination, hegemony is a ‘status’ bestowed by others, and rests on recognition by them, in return for the bearing of special responsibilities. In short, hegemony is ‘an institutionalised practice of special rights and responsibilities conferred on a state with the resources to lead.’ American hegemony depends on reciprocity and cooperation, in addition to coercion and material capabilities. Hegemony can, therefore, conceptually combine domination and leadership. As the

301 Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 24.
302 Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 24.
303 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 171.
305 Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 25.
306 From an English School perspective, hegemony seeks to ‘negotiate an accommodation between systems of power relations and shared normative frameworks.’ Clark regards recurrent practices as institutions of hegemony. These practices include international law, diplomacy, war, the balance of power and the collective special role and status of the Great Powers in international society, which institutionalise power disparities and degrees of hierarchy. Ian Clark, “Bringing Hegemony Back In: The United States and International Order,” International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009): 24.
main forms of neo-Gramscian discussion assert, consent facilitates relations of domination, consequently, domination is also present in an asymmetric relationship with a hegemon. Given the nature of asymmetric power relations, and since order largely reflects the material interests of the dominant state, a state with a preponderance of power can also be expected to dominate, sometimes coercively. It is the underlying ‘threat’ of the dominant state’s preponderant military power resources, and its willingness to use them, that supports the maintenance of hegemonic order.

Why nations adhere to a hegemonic order is handled differently by rationalist and normative approaches in IR. There is a tendency in rationalist approaches of IR to focus on two mechanisms of compliance (or social control), namely coercion and self-interest. The use of inducements cultivates voluntary compliance, but consent is derived from self-interest and self-gain. Acting in self-interest follows the same logic as coercion, in the sense that actors will assess the costs of punishment for non-compliance and the benefits of compliance. An overwhelmingly coercive order is, however, more likely to generate resistance and resentment, and, therefore, cannot be deployed in the longer term. Nor does self-interest guarantee long term compliance within the order, since interests change. Nonetheless, coercion underlies the consensual aspect of power. Subordinate states ‘obey’ the rules of order because they fear the sanction of the hegemon, and, more importantly, because they gauge that obedience is within their materially-defined self-interest. Acquiescence on the part of subordinate states is a consequence of coercion on the part of the dominant state, with inducements and sanctions ensuring cooperation rather than non-cooperation. Hegemony, therefore, ‘is enough to ensure conformity of behaviour in almost all but the most marginal and deviant cases.’

Basing social control on coercion, and acquiescence centred on self-interest fails to account for other mechanisms by which consent is derived. A sustainable hegemonic order requires consensus on the

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309 However, the consensual aspect of power denotes hegemony. Coercion is latent and only to be applied in ‘marginal, deviant cases.’ Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 164.


312 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 15-16.

313 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 164.

314 Femia observes that consent is a ‘psychological state’ that involves either acceptance of the socio-political order, in whole or in part. Voluntary agreement varies in intensity from, on one hand, a sense of obligation and internalisation of the dominant values, to partial assimilation based on uneasy acceptance on the status quo as the only viable option, on the other. Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 37-40.


316 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 164.
desirability of the dominant state’s leadership and on the social purposes of the order that it promotes.\textsuperscript{317} Neo-Gramscian approaches to hegemony in IR also provide a valuable counterpoint to rationalist conceptions of hegemony, by expressing a firmer role for ideology, institutions and normative belief systems in explaining the complexities between the state and civil society,\textsuperscript{318} and the stability and longevity of political order operating at the global level. Hegemony is ‘a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership.’\textsuperscript{319} However, consent is garnered, not only by including the interests of some subordinate groups, but also in the ‘conceptions and social practices of the dominant group as the natural order.’\textsuperscript{320}

Ideological subordination enables ‘rule by consent’ and this subordination is present in both civil and political society existing at national and international levels.\textsuperscript{321} Ideology relates to the social activities embodied in the community that can bind diverse social elements together, for example, through control of communication that is derived from control of the means of production.\textsuperscript{322} From this perspective, U.S. leaders have come to see themselves in ideological terms as the necessary guarantors of the world order.\textsuperscript{323} The dominant class within society, or the dominant state in the international order, maintains ‘cohesion and identity…through the propagation of a common culture.’\textsuperscript{324} In the shift towards the hegemonic level of consciousness,\textsuperscript{325} the interests of the dominant class are synchronised with those of the subordinate classes into ‘an ideology expressed in universal terms.’\textsuperscript{326} The relationship between the

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\textsuperscript{317}Kupchan notes that the normative foundations of order are dependent on the ideas and experiences of the hegemon’s domestic state. The mechanisms of social control are thus dependent on type of hegemonic order. Kupchan, “The Normative Foundations of Hegemony.”
\textsuperscript{318}Gill, for example, draws attention to what he considers the simplistic way in which conventional IR theorises the state and inter-state system by focusing on the uniqueness of the era of Pax Americana, and avoiding examination of social forces and social structures, and transnational class formation, simultaneously undergoing transformation. See Stephen Gill, “Epistemology, Ontology and the Italian School,” in Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 30-31.
\textsuperscript{319}Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982), 21.
\textsuperscript{320}Dani Filc, “Populism as Counter-Hegemony: The Israeli Case,” in Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance, eds. Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 121.
\textsuperscript{322}Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 25, 60. In Prison Notebooks, Gramsci observes that the forging of a collective will is dependent upon a process of intellectual and moral reform, ‘through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim.’ Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 349.
\textsuperscript{323}Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 141.
\textsuperscript{324}Cox enlarges Gramsci’s concept to include world order. See Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 168.
\textsuperscript{325}Gramsci distinguishes three levels of consciousness: (i) the economic-corporative; aware of the specific interests of a particular group; (ii) class consciousness; extending to a social class but only at an economic level; and (iii) hegemonic. The movement towards the hegemonic level requires passing from the specific interests of a particular group towards the building of ‘complex superstructures’ that include institutions and ideologies that are universal in form. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 180-195.
\textsuperscript{326}Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 168.
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dominant ideology and subordinate states at this level is thus grounded in common sense – ‘in the unconscious and uncritical way in which an individual (or a state) perceives the world.’

Reflected in the international arena, international institutions and rules, and the co-option of global civil society, generally initiated by the dominant state, can help establish hegemony. A global civil society ‘consists of the formal and informal networks, institutions and cultural practices which mediate between the individual and the state’ and which also intersect transnationally. The forces of global civil society facilitate hegemony by spreading the dominant ideology to the officials in other states, ‘ruling with and over, rather than against,’ subordinate states, thereby absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas. Global civil society therefore plays a critical role in producing and spreading consensus for hegemony, whilst maintaining the conditions of production, acting as the main agent of conformity to global hegemony and sustaining cultural domination for the hegemonic group.

Institutions are a means to stabilise and perpetuate a particular order; they reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and foster collective images in accordance with these power relations. International institutions support hegemony via rules, the production of ideological legitimacy, by co-opting officials from subordinate states and ultimately, by absorbing counter hegemonic ideas. Institutions are a way to secure the acquiescence of the subordinate states, especially if this leadership can be conveyed in terms of universal or general interests. Institutions may become the anchor for such a hegemonic strategy since they lend themselves both to the representations of diverse interests and to the universalisation of policy, while reflecting dominant social and economic forces. International institutions, for example, embody rules that facilitate expansion of

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327 Common sense is the way in which the masses make sense of their experiences and upon which the dominant ideology is constructed. Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 63 & 72.
328 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 172.
335 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 137.
dominant economic and social forces but at the same time permit adjustments to be made by subordinates – especially in monetary and trade relations.337

However, hegemony cannot be reduced to an institutional dimension – institutions are an expression of hegemony but are not identical to hegemony.338 They can develop their own identity; they are particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence the development of new ideas and capabilities that can potentially stimulate the creation of rival institutions reflecting different tendencies.339 Rival hegemony through institutions is difficult to achieve, however, because of the absorption and internalisation processes that occur institutionally. Through ‘trasformismo’ leaders and talented individuals of subordinate groups are typically co-opted into these institutions, which have the capacity to assimilate and tame potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition. Through the process of trasformismo, the formation of opposition to established social and political power340 is effectively thwarted by the merging of these subordinate state officials working within the existing hegemonic structures, thereby rendering complete counter-hegemony unlikely.341 The real aim of this ‘passive revolution’ that absorbs opposition is to maintain the status quo.342 Through the practices of international institutions, which promulgate and reinforce the dominant ideology, the moral, political, and cultural values of the dominant state achieve the status of common sense in the international arena.343 These international institutions can also help define policy guidelines for states and legitimise certain institutions and practices at the national level.344 Moreover, in adopting a comparable ideological discourse, national state structures are able to increase their regulatory and policy coordination in accordance with these international institutions.345

Hegemonic practices also occur within the broader structural confines of discourse.346 Actors establish legitimacy for their actions through the rhetorical construction of self-images, seeking out public

338 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 137.
342 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 50.
343 Hopf offers a neo-Gramscian-constructivist account of hegemony that advances constructivism’s ‘growing interest in the social power of practices and habits’ and how states ‘automatically perceive, feel and act without conscious reflection on either costs or benefits or normative proscriptions and prescriptions.’ Ted Hopf, “Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics,” International Organization 67, no. 2 (2013): 317-318.
344 Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 172.
justification for their priorities and practices, with other actors endorsing or contesting these representations through similar rhetorical processes. Establishing and maintaining legitimacy is a routinely discursive phenomenon, requiring skills in persuasion and attraction. Mirroring hegemonic groups in society, a regional or global hegemon also disseminates its beliefs, values and ideology, gaining support from others, through the use of language. In this way, discursive hegemony also emphasises consent through the manipulation of language, ideas and beliefs, rather than requiring physical force or explicit coercive forms of power on the part of the hegemon.

Discursive hegemony is moulded out of a series of discourses with legitimate norms that relies on social hierarchy, and other socially-naturalised conventions. The discursive practices of the hegemon are an important medium through which to maintain power and control, as well as providing a medium for counter-hegemony. The notion of discursive hegemony rests on the assumption that any discourse can be dominant. The ability of regional powers to transform their material capabilities into leadership depends on their ability to present their particular worldview as compatible with collective aims. As a dominant interpretation evolves, identification becomes more routinised, with new kinds of political action adhering to the dominant interpretative framework. Echoing Gramscian thought, as a method of social control, constructing and maintaining dominant discourses is an essential activity for the hegemon.

Hegemony, manifesting in both power and social relations, rests on a ‘delicate balance between coercion and consensus’; on the hegemon’s ability to balance the exercise of direct and indirect power, while accounting for its own autonomy of action and respect for the interests of subordinate states. Through a complex process of negotiation, consent to hegemony is an active process of subordination, and not a passive submission. However, Gramsci did not specify what kind of consensus defines a situation of hegemony. Consent can vary in intensity from, for example, wholesale internalisation of dominant values, to pragmatic acceptance. Gramsci’s concerns about hegemony were not focused on how established political institutions were legitimised by consent but how consent was integral to the process by which such institutions were initially established. The pursuit of political power –

348 Nabers, “Power, Leadership, and Hegemony in International Politics,” 939.
349 Nabers, “Power, Leadership, and Hegemony in International Politics,” 938.
350 Narratives are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
351 Some liberals also believe that hegemony requires constant negotiation between the strong and the weak, consequently the cultivation of legitimacy is essential for negotiation. Hurrell, “Pax Americana or the Empire of Insecurity?” 161.
352 Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 38.
when power is understood as a social relationship – can also be understood as the search for legitimacy.\textsuperscript{354} Hegemony, therefore, ‘involves the legitimate exercise of power,’\textsuperscript{355} with legitimacy intersubjectively agreed upon by all states within the hegemonic order.\textsuperscript{356} Legitimacy is assumed within Gramsci’s framework of hegemony through consent. Since consent can vary in intensity, legitimacy is not implicit within consent and requires consideration in its own right.\textsuperscript{357}

**Legitimacy as a form of social control**

There is broad consensus across IR theory that American power is enhanced when it is seen by other states as legitimate.\textsuperscript{358} Discussions on the legitimacy of the hegemon’s actions, typically emphasise their conformity to internationally-recognised rules and norms, the validity of the rules, and acquiescence to the power relations expressed in the hegemonic order.\textsuperscript{359} Yet differences in emphasis on the extent to which legitimacy matters stem from theoretical assumptions about the nature of international structures, power and the forms of power utilised by a hegemon to maintain order.\textsuperscript{360} The conflation of primacy and hegemony by realists in particular precludes other dimensions of power relations, including the relationship between hegemony and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{361} Since the focus here is on U.S. hegemony, attention is primarily given to how the U.S. derives legitimacy for its hegemony. Hegemony is treated as a social relationship, so consideration is also given to who grants legitimacy to U.S. hegemony, and how ‘legitimacy’ is not a fixed but a constantly evolving principle.

In normative approaches to hegemony, subordinate states do not only comply with U.S. hegemony out of fear of retribution, or by a rational calculation of self-interest, they act out of an internal sense of

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\textsuperscript{354} Inoguchi and Bacon, “Empire, Hierarchy, and Hegemony,” 121.
\textsuperscript{356} While Lake emphasises the need for the dominant state to gain political authority and legitimacy, he downplays the significance of intersubjective understandings in defining and shaping international authority. Lake’s approach remains wedded to the rationalist idea that authority rests on material exchange for compliance and legitimacy. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, xi-xii.
\textsuperscript{357} Clark observes that political theorists have long held the view that legitimacy resides in any political relationship, merely in the presence of consent. Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, 162-3.
\textsuperscript{360} Lee, *U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy*, 4.
\textsuperscript{361} Gilpin views a hegemon’s legitimacy of ‘right to rule’ as resting on three factors: its demonstrated ability to enforce its will on other states through victory in hegemonic war, its provision of public goods such as international security and economic order, and the on the ideological, religious or other values common to a set of states. However, Gilpin regards normative influences as ‘usually weak or non-existent.’ Prestige rests on a state’s reputation for being willing to use its economic and military capabilities to enforce the rules of order. Gilpin, *War and Change*, 31, 34.
moral obligation, in the belief that doing so is ‘rightful, proper and appropriate.’ In other words, they consent to hegemony for normative and ideational reasons, rather than for exclusively coercive or self-interest considerations. Since hegemony requires the consent of followers, legitimacy is the hallmark of hegemony as a social practice. While legitimacy is implicit in the process of gaining consent, it should also be explored in its own right. Legitimacy, as a device of social control, has longer term advantages over coercion, or motivations of self-interest, because habitual compliance is gained through a process of internalisation of the hegemon’s ideas by subordinate states. Since hegemony is understood to emphasise ‘consent in contrast to reliance on the use of force,’ legitimacy requires some clarification.

Suchman defines legitimacy as ‘a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.’ Legitimacy is intrinsically bound up with the observance of established rules and norms. Rules are deemed appropriate, either because they emanate from a recognised source of authority, with formal-legality attached to them (i.e. procedural), or because of their ‘congruence with extra-legal values.’ In the latter understanding, authority rests on a social bargain between the dominant and subordinate states, premised on the dominant state’s provision of a desirable social order. Authority, then, is a contingent relationship of compliance, with obligation flowing from the consent of the ruled, not the ruler. As a dynamic relationship, hegemonic authority requires constant maintenance and strengthening, and the capacity to adapt to changing conditions.

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362 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 16.
364 This position is particularly relevant to the neo-Gramscian approach to international legitimacy, which is typically seen in terms of consent in its application to hegemony. See Cox, Production, Power and World Order.
365 These three mechanisms of social control, coercion, self-interest and legitimacy recur in combination across all social systems, where rules exist to influence behaviour. Where rules or norms exist, compliance with them may be achieved by one or a combination of these devices. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” 379-380.
368 Mark Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” Academy of Management Review 20, no. 3 (1995): 574. Clark also notes that the practice of legitimacy draws heavily, but not entirely, on the norms of legality, morality and constitutionality. See Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 4. Because of its inherently social nature, legitimacy should not be conflated with these other social values – it draws on these values but is not bound to them. Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” 160.
371 There is convergence here with neo-Gramscian thought concerning the need to take into account the interests of some subordinate groups as a means to gain legitimacy. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 137.
Legitimacy is socially sanctioned and thus inextricably dependent upon social perception and recognition, resting on ‘individual normative judgement,’ drawn from ‘shared understandings of appropriate behaviour within a particular political community.’ As a subjective and relational quality, legitimacy is defined by an actor’s perceptions of the hegemonic order, and determined by the extent to which an actor internalises the legitimacy that order, and is prepared to abide by its rules. The ability to generate shared beliefs in the acceptability or legitimacy of a particular order – that is, the ability to forge a consensus among national officials on the normative underpinnings of order – is an important dimension of hegemonic power. Legitimacy is neither an alternative to power, nor distinct from it; it is an essential component of power. The social character of hegemony implies that the hegemon derives legitimacy from other states in the international system. Being seen to act legitimately enables a hegemon to maintain order without relying heavily on coercion and bribery, as followership by subordinate states is driven by internal acceptance of the legitimacy of the order.

Conceptualised as a ‘norm-defined, socially sanctioned status’ rather than an attribute of material power, hegemonic leadership is devoid of meaning unless others agree. Simply put, hegemony is not owned by the hegemon. As Buzan asserts, the hegemon has to be able to recruit followers. Power resources and political influence do not exist in a relationship of simple causality, with ‘material preponderance unproblematically spawning political influence.’ Effective influence depends on more than coercion, bribery or the threat of non-participation; it depends on the degree to which a state’s policies, and behaviour, are deemed legitimate by other states and by international public opinion. A powerful actor must also have the capacity to persuade others of the worthiness of its objectives, to

373 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 4.
374 Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” 381.
375 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 2.
377 Hegemony is a state or condition of the system itself, and not simply a property belonging to the hegemon. Cerny suggests that hegemony represents a structural space that is only significant in so far as it gives rise to, stabilises, manages, shapes, expands and/or controls the wider system in which it is embedded. Philip G. Cerny, “Dilemmas of Operationalising Hegemony,” in Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics, eds. Mark Haugaard and Howard Lentner (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 68.
379 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, 5.
realise its own objectives and to translate its resources into intended outcomes.\textsuperscript{383} Therefore, power, so understood, can comprise multiple material and non-material resources, including ideas, beliefs, norms and rules, as well as ‘the institutional structures and communicative processes that embed and mobilise them.’\textsuperscript{384} While material power factors may define ‘outer limits of feasibility,’ their social meaning, and hence their political importance, are determined by the intersubjective ideas, beliefs, norms and rule that actors attribute to them.\textsuperscript{385}

Both Weber and Habermas advocate that the legitimacy of power has its foundation in a set of shared beliefs in a normative order.\textsuperscript{386} A hegemon enjoys legitimacy for its order and for the way it exercises power when the values it espouses correspond with the values of the subordinates:

‘If binding decisions are legitimate, that is, if they can be made independently of the concrete exercise of force and of the manifest threat of sanctions, and can be regularly implemented even against the interests of those affected, they must be considered as the fulfilment of recognised norms.’\textsuperscript{387}

It is the common acceptance of a consensual normative order that binds dominant and subordinate states and legitimises power.\textsuperscript{388} Unlike compliance based on coercion or self-interest, legitimacy requires normative compliance. Consequently, political power is intimately connected to, and dependent upon, the spread and observance of norms.\textsuperscript{389} In a consensual relationship, a hegemon’s power can be deemed legitimate to the extent that it (i) conforms to established rules; (ii) these rules can be justified through shared beliefs by the dominant and subordinate actors; and (iii) there is demonstrable expression of consent by the subordinate states to the existence of the power relationship.\textsuperscript{390} Hegemonic legitimacy derives in large part from the hegemon’s willingness to be constrained by norms and rules, which are

\textsuperscript{383} Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” 162.
\textsuperscript{384} Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” 162. In developing Gramsci’s thoughts on hegemony, Cox asserts that ‘ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible to one another.’ Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 168.
\textsuperscript{385} Wendt, \textit{Social Theory of International Politics}, 111.
\textsuperscript{386} Weber’s concerns with the exercise of power within the nation-state is also relevant to the exercise of inter-state power. Weber argued that there are systematic incentives for rules to organise power in ways that establish or preserve the legitimacy of government institutions and decision-making. Indeed, ‘every such system attempts to establish and cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.’ Max Weber, “The Types of Legitimate Domination,” in \textit{Max Weber: Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology}, volume I, eds. Günther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 213.
\textsuperscript{387} Jürgen Habermas, \textit{Legitimation Crisis} (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1973), 101.
\textsuperscript{388} Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 289.
\textsuperscript{390} Beetham, \textit{The Legitimation of Power}, 15-16 and 18.
drawn from the negotiation of a social contract, rather than from top-down imposition.\footnote{A point also made by Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 137.} Legitimacy requires continual maintenance and reproduction.

The hegemon also has to behave in ways commensurate with its own acknowledged principles, which is equally as important as the adherence of subordinate states to international norms and rules.\footnote{Lebow considers whether ethics and interests have to be oppositional. While classical realism is more accommodating of the role of international rules and norms and the idea of legitimate power, it is still a theory of power in which moral action may require the subordination of normative beliefs where the survival of the state is at stake. Richard Ned Lebow, \textit{Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xii.} Such principles impose constraints on otherwise unrestrained behaviour, since the most powerful states are not externally bound. Hence, self-restraint is crucial:

‘Internal restraint and external influence are thus closely related. Self-restraint that prompts behaviour in accord with the acknowledged principles…both earns and sustains the hegemonia that makes efficient influence possible.’\footnote{Richard Ned Lebow, \textit{Tragic Vision of Politics}, 283-4. Ikenberry also asserts that dominant states ‘self-limit’ their power. See G. John Ikenberry, \textit{After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 25.}

The hegemon sets the rules, and is also obliged to abide by them. When it fails to do so, it moves closer to a perception of domination by coercion, which may not converge with the hegemon’s self-image of the normative foundations of its order. Adherence to norms, therefore, is in the interest of both dominant and subordinate states.\footnote{Lebow, \textit{Tragic Vision of Politics}, 284.} Activities perceived to be purely driven by self-interest and private gain erode the social basis for leadership, just as much as any reduction of material preponderance, since ‘legitimation is the link between states and the normative structures of international society.’\footnote{Kane, \textit{The Politics of Moral Capital}, 10; Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms,” 194.}

Dominant states seek legitimacy and limit the potential advantages of resorting to coercive abilities, since to acquire authority requires the tempering of actions promoting self-interest in favour of general interest.\footnote{Lake, \textit{Hierarchy in International Relations}, 177.\footnote{Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms,” 194.}} Not only is a hegemon’s power is enhanced when its actions are seen by other states as legitimate, and subordinate states are then more inclined to support those actions,\footnote{Social Identity Theory (SIT) is discussed in more depth in the next section. Drawing on social psychology, SIT seeks to understand the relationships between identity, norms and behaviour as a means to examine why actors engage with specific identities and adopt certain norms with particular behavioural expectations.} but also the hegemon’s own perception of its hegemonic identity is reinforced or enhanced.\footnote{64}
While normative assertions hold that legitimacy restrains power relations, clarifying the critical relationships between legitimacy and other international norms, and between legitimacy and the exercise of power is, however, challenging.\(^{399}\) Beetham, for instance, situates the problem as one of the lack of recognition of any causal influence between power and the process of its legitimisation.\(^{400}\) First, the practice of legitimacy is not a passive one; there is a degree of negotiation occurring between actors prior to normative adjustment. Legitimacy, therefore, is not an absolute standard.\(^{401}\) Second, a precise conceptualisation of the relationship between power and legitimacy is difficult.\(^{402}\) The generation of legitimacy may be autonomous from the power relations it legitimises, or, at the opposite end of the scale, legitimacy may be reduced to the preferences of those hegemonic forces that are thought to manufacture it in the first place.\(^{403}\) Third, it is difficult to separate the operation of coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. Consequently it is difficult to determine whether some particular rule is being followed by actors out of a sense of its legitimacy, fear of repercussion, or coincidental alignment between the rule and the actor’s self-interest.\(^{404}\) These problems do not, however, justify abandoning a study of legitimacy, or that legitimacy does not exist.\(^{405}\) The principles of legitimacy are ‘necessarily rather vague and uncertain in their applicability.’\(^{406}\) However, of greater importance is the process by which their applicability is decided, and the means by which legitimacy is bestowed.\(^{407}\) Legitimacy, moreover, is multi-dimensional; it is contextual and intersubjective and a judgement of degree.\(^{408}\)

To this point, the discussion has centred on how the hegemon derives consent for its order by securing consent from other states within the order. Legitimacy, rather than coercion or self-interest, is the preferred form of social control. Gaining legitimacy has longer term advantages over coercion and self-interest, since compliance is gained through the internalisation of the hegemon’s norms and ideas by the political officials, and hopefully, mass publics, of subordinate states. Social recognition of a hegemonic order is drawn from international legitimacy, the means to dominate communication, and the material capacities to maintain and reconstitute order.\(^{409}\) As Hurd discerns, the ‘agency that comes

\(^{399}\) Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, 21.

\(^{400}\) Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, 104.

\(^{401}\) Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, 19-20. Claude asserted that ‘the process of legitimisation is ultimately a political phenomenon, a crystallisation of judgment that may be influenced, but is unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles.’ Inis Claude, “Collective Legitimisation as a Political Function of the United Nations,” *International Organization* 20, no. 3 (1966): 369.

\(^{402}\) Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, 20.

\(^{403}\) Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, 20.


\(^{405}\) Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” 392.


\(^{409}\) Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” 165.
with power often leads to disproportionate influence over the development of rules and norms.\textsuperscript{410} Constructivist emphasis on the constitutive role of norms in international social life, and on how these norms impact upon the relationship between a hegemon and subordinate states, however, suggests that norm diffusion in a hegemonic order is a two-way, rather than top-down process.\textsuperscript{411} This requires consideration of the mechanisms used by the U.S. to permeate the normative foundations of the U.S. hegemonic order through the socio-economic and political strata of subordinate states.

\textbf{(Re)Producing U.S. hegemony}

Given its dominant position in the international realm, the United States typically presents American national interests as global interests and by extension, states with political regimes deemed objectionable by Washington are treated as being of legitimate global concern.\textsuperscript{412} If there is no viable alternative, subordinate states are used to accepting Washington’s assertions, even if they disapprove of U.S. motivations and self-interest.\textsuperscript{413} Furthermore, in some instances, states often appear to accept as unavoidable, or even natural, U.S. interest in others’ regional conflicts, without U.S. membership of the relevant international organisation.\textsuperscript{414} Equally, as the dominant state, U.S. involvement in international conferences is often valued because of the clout such presence brings to a particular issue. The U.S. is granted special privileges because of the general understanding that its power permits unequal rights, and also because the U.S. underwrites public goods provision. The extent to which states believe, and act upon the belief, that submission to the U.S. is a ‘realistic’ requirement of international life, continually reproduces the social relation of subordination to Washington.\textsuperscript{415}

Hegemony is both maintained and strengthened by processes of socialisation, primarily through ideological convergence of the political officials in subordinate states, also extending to the mass public.\textsuperscript{416} This can amount to a cultural transformation in the subordinate states.\textsuperscript{417} Beyond coercion and inducements, socialisation is a normative process of internalisation used by the hegemon, seeking to ‘justify [its] identities, interests, practices, or institutional designs,’ from which its hegemonic order

\textsuperscript{410} Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms,” 205.
\textsuperscript{412} For instance, the G.W. Bush administration’s ‘axis of evil’ included regimes such as Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea, but not Egypt.
\textsuperscript{413} Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms,” 205.
\textsuperscript{414} For instance, most ASEAN nations accept US Freedom of Navigation operations in the Western Pacific, despite the absence of US membership of UNCLOS – the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This convention determines that only signatory states can legally pursue such operations. See Michael McDevitt, “The South China Sea and US Policy Options,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 4 (2013): 175-187.
\textsuperscript{415} Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms,” 205.
\textsuperscript{416} Ideological convergence also occurs through international organisations, through which ‘the institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 172.
derives legitimacy. The socialisation of subordinate states is typically initiated by the dominant state through the national leaders of subordinate states, who internalise the hegemon’s norm and value orientation, leading to acquiescence among states participating in the system. These processes of socialisation help consolidate the hegemon’s position. Crucial to hegemony are the mechanisms through which secondary states acquiesce to the exercise of the dominant state’s power, working ‘at the level of substantive beliefs, rather than material payoffs.’ Acquiescence, or compliance, is the result of the socialisation of officials in subordinate nations who buy into, and internalise, norms that are communicated by the hegemon, and consequently undertake policies consistent with the hegemon’s idea of international order, under certain conditions.

The capacity to socialise is crucial to the exercise of a hegemon’s power, working alongside, rather than diminishing material capabilities as a source of hegemonic power. For the hegemon, activating mechanisms of socialisation are generally less costly to its hegemony, since it can expend fewer economic and military resources to secure acquiescence, which confers longevity on its hegemony. Socialisation mechanisms offer insight into a more productive means of diffusing and reshaping the

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418 Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” 159. ‘Socialisation’ is not entirely ignored by rationalist IR theories. Neorealism uses socialisation to describe the homogenisation of self-help balancing behaviour among security-seeking states interacting under conditions of anarchy. Institutions elicit norm-conforming behaviour to maintain their reputation, but mainly to reduce uncertainty about the commitment of others and thus help actors’ expectations to converge around cooperative results. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 127-8.

421 Internalisation implies that values, roles and understandings take on ‘taken-for-grantedness’ and become hard to change. The benefits of behaviour are calculated in abstract social terms rather than concrete consequential terms. Johnston notes that there can be degrees of internalisation, given that not all actors are exposed to exactly the same configuration of social pressures, nor do they enter into a social interaction with exactly the same social identifications. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 494-495.

422 Emphasis in the original. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 283. At the international level, socialisation frequently occurs indirectly through multilateral institutions, directly through acquiescence to the hegemon’s hierarchical but unequal economic and political structures, and indirectly through productive (discursive) means.

423 The conditions conducive to the socialisation process may be brought about by external or domestic factors, including war, or periods marked by international turmoil, or domestic political instability. Norm diffusion may additionally be initiated in the populace towards the political officials, or socialisation could be triggered by material inducement (e.g. threats of punishment, promise of rewards) by the hegemon that generate policy change consistent with the hegemonic order. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 289-90.

424 Reliance on material inducement and/or coercion, however, is never sufficient, ‘in and of itself,’ to attract or sustain legitimacy. Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” 165.
interests and activities of subordinate states over the longer term. Coercion and inducement, conversely, tend to produce more fragile hegemony, being exclusively based on the hegemon’s control of preponderant material resources. Different traditions of IR acknowledge that socialisation, as an element of hegemonic power, is not reducible to coercive capabilities. Material considerations and norms are mutually reinforcing, with neither being singularly determinative. Consequently, their occurrences are ‘frequently difficult to disentangle.’ They are, however, analytically distinct ways of exercising power, relying on different mechanisms, and which advance ‘quite different notions of the underlying fabric and durability of hegemonic power.’ However, empirically isolating the importance, in addition to the presence, of socialisation mechanisms can be problematic, since the hegemon may simultaneously use mechanisms of coercion/inducement and socialisation to persuade subordinate states.

For Ikenberry and Kupchan, the degree of socialisation is dependent upon the hegemon’s ability to disseminate its conception of order, and upon the subordinate states’ susceptibility to restructure. They see change occurring principally through external inducement or internal reconstruction rather than normative persuasion, which they view as insufficient on its own to drive the socialisation process. Officials in subordinate states only internalise the norms and ideals articulated by the

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426 In War and Change, Gilpin notes that while hegemonic power is ultimately established by military and economic supremacy, ‘the position of the dominant power may be supported by ideological, religious or other values common to a set of states.’ Gilpin, War and Change, 34. Cox, working in the neo-Gramscian tradition, argues that hegemonic structures are sustained by ‘universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states.’ According to this view, hegemony is the outgrowth of the intertwining of socio-economic, political and ideological structures, all of which are rooted in a particular mode of production. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 172.
432 External inducement relies on economic and military incentives to induce subordinate states to comply. G. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 291. Through internal reconstruction, the hegemon directly intervenes into the affairs of the subordinate state with the aim of transforming its domestic political institutions. The hegemon exports normative principles about domestic and international political order and officials in the subordinate state are meant to become accustomed to these institutions, gradually accepting them as their own. Such extensive intervention only occurs in certain conditions, namely in the aftermath of war, or as a result of colonial empire-building. Ikenberry and Kuphan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 291.
433 As conceptualised by Ikenberry and Kupchan, normative persuasion relies on ‘ideological persuasion and transnational learning through various forms of direct contact with officials, including...diplomatic channels, cultural exchanges and foreign study.’ Officials of subordinate states internalise the hegemon’s norms and adopt compatible policies. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 290.
hegemon after the provision of material incentives, or through the imposition of these norms via direct intervention. The dissemination of American norms, such as democracy and economic liberalisation, is heavily dependent on U.S. military and economic dominance, and frequently only internalised after material inducement.

Socialisation, however, is not as a one-way, top-down process that is initiated and controlled by the hegemon in its entirety. In Social States, Johnston advances two micro-processes in socialisation theory, persuasion and social influence, which can affect any actor in the system, and which are often ignored in constructivism. The determining feature of these processes concerns the nature of acceptance. Social influence confers compliance derived from social pressure to conform, while persuasion entails ‘public conformity with private acceptance.’ Rewards and punishments are socially determined because only the groups that can provide them, and only those groups, whose approval an actor values, have this influence. Social influence rests on the ‘influenced’ actor having prior identification with the relevant reference group. Identification with a group can generate a range of cognitive and social pressure to conform, and the more identity-conforming behaviour is repeated, the more commitment to the group is reinforced.

Persuasion, the first of Johnson’s micro-processes, relies on ideological persuasion and transnational learning through various forms of direct contact with political officials, who internalise the hegemon’s norms and move to adopt new state policies which are compatible with those of the hegemon and which

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437 For instance, by opening up the American domestic market to friendly countries. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 300.
438 Ikenberry and Kupchan recognise that interaction can affect the normative orientation of officials in dominant and subordinate states. If the initial efforts at socialisation by dominant state officials are ineffective, they may rework their terms. Dominant and subordinate state officials may also compromise, working together to reshape the normative order. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 293.
439 In Social States, Johnston outlines a third micro-process of mimicking; the borrowing of language, habits and ways of acting as a safe, first reaction to a new environment, used by novice states as they interact in the international environment for the first time. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Relations, 1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), xxv.
440 Johnston observes that the goal of diplomacy, for instance, is often the socialisation of others into accepting new understandings of world politics. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 489. Checkel agrees with Johnston’s assertion that constructivism has not been successful in explaining micro-processes about how precisely actors are exposed to, receive, process and then act upon the normative arguments that predominate in particular social environments such as international institutions. Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 343.
produce more cooperative outcomes. Typically a focus of constructivist work into processes of socialisation, persuasion involves ‘changing minds, opinions and attitudes about causality and affect (identity) in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion...lead[ing] to common knowledge...or...a homogenisation of interests.’ Persuasion, then, relies upon two-way communication between the dominant and subordinate states.

The act of persuasion combines three processes, as the persuadee responds to information from the persuader. In the first, the persuadee engages in a ‘high intensity process of cognition, reflection, and argument about the content of new information.’ The persuadee employs a systematic process of weighing evidence, assessing counter-attitudinal arguments and as a result, may draw different conclusions from their starting point. This is not necessarily a spontaneous process, and is more likely to occur under favourable environmental conditions which allow for the persuadee to consider the necessary connections. In other words, the opportunity to ‘think harder’ about the implications of their initial attitudes on outcomes that might affect their interests. In the second process, the persuadee is swayed by their ‘knowledge’ of their existing relationship with the persuader. Here, the persuadee looks for signals about the nature of the relationship to judge the legitimacy of counter-attitudinal arguments presented. Consequently, information from sources that are liked, trusted, or considered knowledgeable has more likelihood of being viewed as credible, than information from untrusted sources, or from sources outside the group. In the third process, a persuadee, entering into social interaction with the persuader, possesses characteristics that, when interacting with a particular social environment and other actors, leads to ‘variation in the degree of attitudinal change.'

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444 Unlike Ikenberry and Kupchan, Johnston’s treatment of normative persuasion does not place it as a mechanism of secondary importance to coercion and inducement.


446 Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 496.


449 There are several variables that could affect the persuadee’s openness to a message, including their cognitive-processing abilities, the strength of existing attitudes, a desire not to be seen as inconsistent, and the degree of autonomy from the persuader. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 497.
The second micro-process, social influence, refers to a 'class of micro-processes that elicit pro-norm\(^{450}\) behaviour through the distribution of social rewards\(^{451}\) and punishments.\(^{452}\) Drawing on social identity theory,\(^{453}\) social influence processes offer insight into an actor’s desire to ‘maximise status, honour, prestige and the desire to avoid a loss of status, shaming, or humiliation and other social sanctions.’\(^{454}\)

Social actors are motivated to maximise their status for reasons of ‘power, wealth and deference, and vice versa.’\(^{455}\) In this way, states acquire ‘psychological satisfaction’ from a ‘sentiment of superiority’ in relation to other actors in the system.\(^{456}\) However, the reward can also be psychological well-being.\(^{457}\) Since individual and collective identities are co-constitutive, drawing on group-conforming behaviour, status requires social recognition.\(^{458}\) A good image may encourage other actors to cooperate with you in other arenas and on other issues, which can help build trust, leading to reciprocity. Rather than an exploitative prisoners’ dilemma contest, it is in an actor’s best interests to routinise and socialise cooperation to make the reputation credible.\(^{459}\) There are seldom concrete benefits or leverage that can be attributed to a good image, rather membership in the club in itself bestows status with socially

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\(^{450}\) The term pro-norm indicates action/behaviour that is consistent with the norm in question, whether done because the norm has been internalised or because some kind of consequentialist calculation makes it useful to follow. An actor is not necessarily ‘for’ the norm but abides by it. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 492, 499.

\(^{451}\) Rewards might include psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, and a sense of well-being derived from conformity with role expectations.

\(^{452}\) Punishments might include shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning, or conflict derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity.


\(^{455}\) Gilpin’s focus on states at the top of the status hierarchy emphasises their economic and military power, with status being highly coercive. His approach places no significance in group-conforming behaviour from which status is also derived. Gilpin, War and Change, 30-33.


\(^{457}\) Well-being is derived from group-conforming behaviour and also reinforces one’s own identity. The need for ontological security is discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.

\(^{458}\) Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline,” 129-130.

\(^{459}\) Drawing on Gramscian and English School theory, Cronin and Reus-Smit separately argue that subordinate states follow a hegemonic leader if the basis of its international order is not purely exploitative but is universal in conception, in the sense of being compatible with their interests. While the hegemon is recognised as having greater interests and prerogatives, in return, subordinate states expect the hegemon to accept certain limits in their efforts to do so. Bruce Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony: America’s Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations,” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 108; Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, 58.
recognised advantages. Therefore, the appeal of gaining from the status of in-group membership is the ultimate motivator of conforming behaviour.\footnote{Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 38. There has to be an intersubjectively agreed notion of socially valuable behaviour. There must also be a forum or institution that makes acting a particular way public and observable. From this perspective, agency and structure are mutually constituted – derived from shared understandings of how an actor should act, and an institutional structure that provides information about the degree to which actors are behaving in ways consistent with this shared understanding. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 502.}

Conversely, fear of being shamed or criticised by the group, can be derived from violating status-related norms and practices. Since norms are intersubjectively understood, any state’s failure to comply with generally accepted rules and norms, or failure to discharge normative obligations, in the existing order, can be viewed as threatening or unacceptable. Such actions, especially if undertaken by the hegemon, may, ultimately, undermine the legitimacy of a generally accepted rule, thereby weakening the fabric of the system.\footnote{Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 150.} The mechanisms of socialisation, therefore, make no distinction between a hegemon and a subordinate state in requiring status validation. However, the hegemon has more to lose in terms of the legitimacy for its order, on which its authority rests, if its status is weakened. This confirms that hegemonic legitimacy is imbued through mechanisms of socialisation, through the hegemon’s capacity to persuade and to exert social influence, rather than resting on the hegemon’s material capabilities, or on their ability to coerce or induce.

The next section considers the effects of the G.W. Bush administration’s global war on terror (GWOT) strategy on U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific to determine the extent to which U.S. hegemonic legitimacy was damaged by the G.W. Bush administration’s post-9/11 foreign policy. The first aim is to show that U.S. hegemonic legitimacy is multi-dimensional, and gained from multiple sources. U.S. hegemonic legitimacy derives from its ability to conform to established rules and norms, to universalise the beliefs about these rules and norms, and to retain the consent of subordinate states to the asymmetric power relationship that exists in the order.\footnote{Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 15-16.} The second aim is to demonstrate that the U.S. hegemonic order during this period shifted towards coercion and deriving acquiescence through inducement, and compliance through social pressure. This shift negatively affected the administration’s ability to persuade subordinate states to accept and internalise changes to the normative foundations of U.S. hegemony. Nevertheless, while aspects of U.S. legitimacy were damaged by the G.W. Bush administration and the GWOT, legitimacy is not an ‘all or nothing affair.’\footnote{Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 19-20.} It follows with a brief
demonstrates the Obama administration’s attempts to address the legitimacy deficit in U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific by shifting back to U.S. support for multilateralism and shared values.

The effects of the G.W. Bush era on U.S. hegemonic legitimacy

In considering the effects of the GWOT on U.S. hegemonic legitimacy, three aspects of the G.W. Bush Doctrine are highlighted: the global implications of U.S. attempts to re-interpret international norms on pre-emptive strike and the use of force; its shift towards coercion and inducement in the Asia-Pacific to gain consent; and the effects of its swing towards unilateralism, with its disregard for multilateral institutions in the region that inevitably changed the social bargain underpinning U.S. hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific.

(i) International rules and norms on pre-emptive strike and the use of force

American policy under G.W. Bush shifted in approach to the international norm of ‘use of force’ and the definition of pre-emptive strike. The framing of U.S. foreign policy in moral, binary terms (e.g. ‘good versus evil’), characterised by a polarising ‘with us or against us’ mind-set, sought to mobilise support around what Washington deemed to be a common enemy. Despite initial support from the international community, there was growing concern by the end of 2002 that the U.S. was attempting to unilaterally re-interpret the terms of international rules and norms concerning pre-emption and the use of force for its own gain.

First, through the doctrine of preventive war and the ‘strategy of pre-emption,’ the U.S. attempted to shift the generally agreed interpretation of this international norm from striking against an ‘imminent threat’ to one of prevention, thereby being able to strike an enemy first, without specific evidence of an imminent attack. In this way, the G.W. Bush administration sought to approximate its strategy to one

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of ‘self-defence,’ meaning that if the threat was imminent, it could at least make some claim to legitimacy.\textsuperscript{467} American emphasis shifted from the punishment of the instigators of the 9/11 attacks, to the elimination of any regime, which the U.S. considered hostile, and who might also potentially be the source of any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by pre-emptive strike.\textsuperscript{468}

Second, the controversy over America’s interpretation of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1441, passed unanimously in November 2002, giving Iraq its final opportunity to comply with UN disarmament obligations, also had negative consequences on this essential condition of American hegemonic order – the legitimacy of internationally agreed rules and norms. The U.S (and Britain) treated Resolution 1441 regarding the inspections of the Iraqi weapons programme (combined with existing UNSC Resolutions relating to the first Gulf War), as grounds for the authorised invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The UN Charter, however, sets out that the legal right to determine how to enforce its own resolutions lies with the Security Council and not with individual nations.\textsuperscript{469} Although Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of the UN (1997-2006) declared the war illegal from the point of view of the UN Charter, and while the UNSC could, in principle, rule on the legality of the war, the British and American vetoes in the Security Council would have made the possibility of a ruling against the legality of the war highly improbable.\textsuperscript{470} When viewed alongside the authorisation by Congress through the ‘Joint Resolution to Authorise the Use of U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq,’ it was clear that U.S. domestic authorisation superseded agreed international rules and norms in this instance.

In seeking to reinterpret international law and long-standing norms, the G.W. Bush administration failed to understand that judgements of legitimacy are not just derived from law, but from what others perceive to be acceptable behaviour in accordance with existing norms.\textsuperscript{471} Furthermore, once it was clear there were no WMD in Iraq, the G.W. Bush administration sought to rebrand the war in terms of the ‘Freedom


Agenda,’ with a view to promoting democracy and ending tyranny across the Middle East.\(^\text{472}\) This strategy soon ran into problems since democracy promotion contradicted U.S. counter-terrorism strategy and the use of torture and rendition in the GWOT. Also running counter to the freedom agenda, the G.W. Bush administration embraced regimes with poor human rights records to support the GWOT.\(^\text{473}\)

In World Out Of Balance, Brooks and Wohlforth emphasise the power of the U.S. within the international system, which, they claim, does not constrain the agency of the U.S. derived from its material resources. Instead, they assert that U.S. foreign policy is a ‘realm of choice.’\(^\text{474}\) They disagree with institutionalist logic which accentuates the constraints on the hegemon through the need to maintain a ‘favourable multilateral reputation.’\(^\text{475}\) Brooks and Wohlforth assert that the hegemon can choose to ignore the ‘internal and inherent incentive to comply with the existing structure of international norms,’ by either absorbing the costs, or rewriting the norms.\(^\text{476}\) According to this logic, the U.S. holds several reputations across international institutions, and since subordinate states have various international interests, they do not value all institutions equally.\(^\text{477}\) While they concede to constructivist argument that U.S. hegemony is harder to maintain if other states cease their support for the institutional status quo, they disagree with the idea that unilateral norm-breaking in specific circumstances can generally erode the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony.\(^\text{478}\) Consequently, in their view, a complete crisis in hegemonic legitimacy is unlikely.\(^\text{479}\)


\(^{473}\) For instance, the administration improved its relationship with the former Uzbek leader, Karimov, to gain access to the airbase in Khanabad. It also supported the Musharraf military government in Pakistan because of Pakistan’s importance to the GWOT. Wyn Rees, “European and Asian Responses to the US-Led ‘War on Terror’,” \textit{Cambridge Review of International Affairs} 20, no. 2 (2007): 225.


\(^{475}\) Brooks and Wohlforth, \textit{World Out Of Balance}, 149.

\(^{476}\) Brooks and Wohlforth offer a two-way interaction between power resources and legitimacy. Legitimacy constrains the use of material power, and power also shapes legitimacy. Brooks and Wohlforth, \textit{World Out Of Balance}, 149, 179.

\(^{477}\) Despite international unease concerning the G.W. Bush administration’s push to change the norm on pre-emptive strikes, subordinate states continued to work with the U.S. in other institutions and bilaterally. Brooks and Wohlforth, \textit{World Out Of Balance}, 160.


\(^{479}\) Brooks and Wohlforth, \textit{World Out Of Balance}, 18. Hurd also criticises constructivist accounts that ‘overstate the constraining effects of international norms, while understating their dynamic nature.’ In contrast to Reus-Smit, Hurd contends that a ‘crisis,’ strictly defined, is unlikely. Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms,” 201, 205.
Unilateral norm-breaking, especially by the dominant state, does undermine the social base on which its hegemony is founded. While the U.S. has the capacity to influence the development of international norms, it is also situated within them. The U.S. cannot stand outside the international community by relying upon its preponderant material resources, or its capacity to influence international norms. A dominant state also needs to justify its reasons for delegitimising existing norms, and legitimising new ones. When a dominant state fails to convince its audience that it is committed to upholding existing norms in international society, it operates in the realm that Reus-Smit describes as ‘rule without right.’ At this point, social recognition for a hegemon’s identity, interests, practices, norms, or procedures declines, and the hegemonic actor, or institution, either adapts by reconstituting the social bases of its legitimacy, or by investing more heavily in material practices of coercion or bribery. The basis of U.S. appeared to move away from legitimacy and towards coercion and acquiescence through self-interest, which is highlighted by the responses to the GWOT in the Asia-Pacific.

(ii) Coercion and consent in regional geopolitics

Buzan notes that the GWOT was a ‘rather successful macro-securitisation,’ reinforcing the view outside the Islamic world at least that Al Qaeda presented a common threat. Acting in their own self-interests, China, India and several countries in Southeast Asia linked their own localised problems with ‘terrorist’ groups to the GWOT. In addition, the association of the GWOT with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) assisted the U.S. in establishing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003. As outlined by the G.W. Bush administration, the PSI was to be a ‘muscular enhancement of [our] ability collectively to halt trafficking in WMD components,’ and ‘to prevent the movement of WMD materials to hostile states and terrorist organisations.’ The aims was to form a ‘web of partnerships’ over land, by air and by sea that could stop shipments of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons bound for terrorists or countries deemed to support terrorism. Despite international reservations about rising

480 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, chapter 2.
484 Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” 158.
U.S. unilateralism, opposition to the invasion of Iraq, and concerns about the legality of intercepting trade, over 40 countries willingly participated in the PSI.\textsuperscript{489} This is despite the knowledge that, as a U.S.-led initiative, the U.S. was most likely to target states that were of concern to the U.S., in accordance with U.S. definitions.\textsuperscript{490} In the five years after September 2001, the GWOT was established as a macro-securitisation, attaining broad acceptance within international society.\textsuperscript{491}

The G.W. Bush administration used coercion and inducement to garner Asia-Pacific support for the GWOT, through the use of military and economic coercive power and incentives, with subordinate states, and regional institutions, being financially rewarded and/or with funds withheld, dependent on their support for the GWOT. In their response to the GWOT, Asia-Pacific states fell into two broad categories. States with strong strategic ties with the U.S., including Japan, South Korea and Australia, moved closer to the United States, motivated, not only by the threat perception from Islamic terrorism, but also by their own self-interest.\textsuperscript{492} In a move that provided legitimacy for the U.S. intervention, the Australian government under Prime Minister John Howard sent troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan, despite eliciting criticism from its Asian neighbours.\textsuperscript{493} While the South Korean government also broadly supported the GWOT, Seoul came to view the extension of the ‘axis of evil’ to include North Korea as provocative and unconstructive, and in direct opposition to South Korea’s strategy of cooperation and reconciliation with Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{494} Major regional allies acted in accordance with Washington’s concerns over Pyongyang’s potential to harbour terrorists, and to prevent the Kim regime from selling military goods and technology to anyone deemed actually, or potentially, hostile to U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{495} South Korea disagreed with U.S. policy but did not withdraw its consent to the GWOT. However, to counter-balance the U.S., Seoul shifted towards Beijing with regard to North Korea.\textsuperscript{496}

\textsuperscript{489} Mark Valencia, \textit{The Proliferation Security Initiative}, Adelphi Paper 376 (London: International Institute for Security Studies, 2005). Prominent dissenters to the PSI include China, India, Malaysia and Indonesia. For China, Malaysia and Indonesia, there was concern that through the initiative, the U.S. sought to exert greater influence over the Malacca Strait.

\textsuperscript{490} Kumar, “India’s Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative: Issues in Perspective,” 689.

\textsuperscript{491} Buzan, “Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ be the New Cold War?” 1106.

\textsuperscript{492} Rees, “European and Asian Responses to the US-Led ‘War on Terror’,” 223.


\textsuperscript{494} The South Korean-U.S. disagreement over the G.W. Bush administration’s North Korea policy came at a time when South Korea was becoming more assertive and confident in its foreign policy. Victor D. Cha, “South Korea in 2004: Peninsula Flux,” \textit{Asian Survey} 25, no. 1 (2005): 33-40.


\textsuperscript{496} The loss of confidence in Washington may have created the conditions that supported the intensification of ROK-China relations, culminating in the upgrading of the relationship to that of ‘strategic cooperative partnership’ in 2008. Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Sweet and Sour Aftertaste,” \textit{Comparative Connections}, January 2009. [https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SnyderByunSweetSourTasteCSISJan09.pdf](https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SnyderByunSweetSourTasteCSISJan09.pdf) (accessed April 7, 2015).
The counter-terrorism imperative also brought significant changes to the U.S-Japan alliance, with Japan ‘lock[ing] itself into’ the U.S. alliance even more firmly after 2001.\(^{497}\) The Japanese government under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi treated the strategic environment as justification for a broader redefinition of Japan’s global role, breaking the post-war restrictions on the role of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF), by committing it to a noncombat, reconstruction role in Iraq.\(^{498}\) Tokyo’s need to security-bind the U.S. was also grounded in serving Japanese national interests, at a time of escalating tensions in Northeast Asia, permeating from North Korea, and compounded by longer-term concerns about China’s rising power.\(^{499}\) As a result, Washington was able to push for an enhanced Japanese role in the GWOT, consisting of political support, the provision of some technical competences in dealing with terrorism, assistance in locating and obstructing terrorists’ financial resources, and, to a limited extent, intelligence.\(^{500}\)

The second category included several Southeast Asian states considered by the U.S. to be a source of regional instability. These states were subjected to intense pressure to accept U.S.-imposed counter-terrorism assistance.\(^{501}\) Inducements were garnered through existing bilateral alliances in Southeast Asia, with both the Philippines and Thailand, being upgraded to ‘major non-NATO ally status.’\(^{502}\) The U.S. also agreed to deploy combat troops to train and support the Filipino military in its fight against radical Islamist Abu Sayyaf insurgents in 2002. Military-to-military relations were restored with Indonesia in 2005, and a new Strategic Framework Agreement with Singapore expanded bilateral cooperation in counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of WMD, joint military exercises and training in the same year. Despite Washington’s distribution of assistance and smoothing of relations with Southeast Asian leaders, the impact of the Iraq war and the subsequent GWOT, ‘alienated, confused, and frustrated,’ domestic audiences in particular.\(^{503}\) The Bush Doctrine, and an impression of a military campaign against Islam, created anti-American sentiment in the predominantly Muslim countries of


\(^{498}\) Rees, ”European and Asian Responses to the US-Led ‘War on Terror’,“ 223.


\(^{501}\) Rees, “European and Asian responses to the US-led ‘war on terror’,“ 224.

\(^{502}\) Thailand and the Philippines became eligible for priority delivery of defence material and the purchase of certain controlled items such as depleted uranium tank rounds. They are able to stockpile U.S. military hardware and benefit from a U.S. government loan-guarantee programme for arms exports. Goh, *Struggle for Order*, 58.

\(^{503}\) Entering into a subsidiary relationship with a hegemon can create domestic political problems for the client state. Therefore the client state’s political officials may prefer to base their participation in the hegemonic system on normative claims, with the view to reducing the political costs concerning the loss of independence and autonomy suffered as a result of involvement in the hegemonic system. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 291.
Indonesia and Malaysia in Southeast Asia, provoking a backlash against Western targets.\textsuperscript{504} Such an attack occurred in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, when members of the Islamist terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, attacked a nightclub, killing 202 people, including 88 Australians.\textsuperscript{505} As one Southeast Asia analyst, Simon Tay, noted, ‘the U.S. post-9/11 agenda…complicated existing international conflicts and insurgencies in Southeast Asia.’\textsuperscript{506}

(iii) Undermining regional institutions

Washington wielded its agenda-setting powers within regional institutions, with APEC issuing its first ever political statement on counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{507} ASEAN also adopted various supportive declarations, offering enhanced regional cooperation in intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{508} The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) espoused an agenda for implementing UN anti-terrorist measures, including measures to block terrorist financing.\textsuperscript{509} Outside U.S. limited interests pertaining to the GWOT, other regional issues and political challenges drew less attention in Washington, with diplomatic, cultural, and economic approaches being underemployed, which reduced U.S. channels for normative persuasion and influence. Furthermore, Washington’s preoccupation with terrorism prioritised security issues and neglected multilateral relationships in favour of bilateral ones. Opportunities to retain its standing in Southeast Asia, for example, were reduced when key administration officials, including the president, frequently missed ASEAN meetings. Significantly, G.W. Bush failed to attend ASEAN’s 40th

\textsuperscript{504} Depictions of the ‘Islamic’ threat in U.S. foreign policy discourse contributed to rising levels of anti-American sentiment in the region, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia, both predominantly Muslim countries. Such sentiment was not confined to dissidents and separatists, but also found expression in pro-democracy movements and the general population. This was largely attributable to American complicity (or at least the perception of American complicity) in human rights abuses and the harsh suppression of political dissidents by local authorities. T.J. Pempel, “How Bush Bungled Asia: Militarism, Economic Indifference and Unilateralism Have Weakened the United States across Asia,” The Pacific Review 21, no. 5 (2008): 547–81 and T.J. Pempel, “A Response to Michael Green,” The Pacific Review 21, no. 5 (2008): 595–600. See also Jennifer Mustapha, “Threat Construction in the Bush Administration’s Post-9/11 Foreign Policy: [Critical] Security Implications for Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 24, no. 4 (2011): 498.

\textsuperscript{505} Members of the Jemaah Islamiyah group were convicted of the Bali bombings in March 2005.


\textsuperscript{507} Ravenhill asserts that the APEC 2001 Leaders’ Meeting occurred soon after 9/11, so it was no surprise that they would respond to the terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, the anti-terrorist agenda could provide a shared focus to detract from the disagreements over its central trade liberalisation agenda. John Ravenhill, “Mission Creep or Mission Impossible? APEC and Security,” in Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation, eds. Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 146.

\textsuperscript{508} A significant initiative, pushed by the US, was the creation of a Regional Counterterrorism Centre in Kuala Lumpur to share best practice amongst member states. Joakim Ojendal, “Back to the Future? Regionalism in South-East Asia under Unilateral Pressure,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 527.

\textsuperscript{509} Goh, The Struggle for Order, 58.
anniversary celebrations,\textsuperscript{510} which incorporated the inaugural U.S.-ASEAN summit, in Singapore in September 2007.\textsuperscript{511} During this period, the U.S. isolated itself from the institutions that were designed and set up, often at its initiative. Despite America’s unmatched military capabilities and the strength of its power, the effect of its willingness to discard the existing social contract on which its hegemony rested, undermined its legitimacy.\textsuperscript{512}

(iv) Consequences

The GWOT had two mutually reciprocal effects in the Asia-Pacific. First, it helped level the negotiating field between the U.S. and subordinate states by creating reciprocal strategic relations; and second, although U.S. strategic dominance in the region was reinforced, regional security decreased as a result of general uncertainty over America’s willingness to exert its extensive military power capabilities.\textsuperscript{513} Regional officials saw an opportunity to seek a more reciprocal hegemonic bargain with Washington, given the latter’s urgent security imperatives in the GWOT. Subordinate state officials exchanged their support for U.S. counter-terrorism, for economic access and political support for institutionalising great power constraints, in addition to security commitments from Washington.\textsuperscript{514} The G.W. Bush administration securitised regional economic and trade policy, subsuming them within the wider contextual discourse of its regional security agenda, to drum up support for the GWOT.\textsuperscript{515} For their part, Southeast Asian states in particular were ‘reciprocally opportunistic’ in their response to Washington’s post-9/11 security agenda.\textsuperscript{516} In the Asia-Pacific, therefore, there was little danger of states abandoning U.S. hegemony, where subordinate national officials were already inclined to collaborate with the U.S. counter-terrorism agenda.\textsuperscript{517} However, Washington’s capacity to persuade subordinate states to normatively internalise the changes to the social bargain was significantly reduced. Neither Japan, nor the ROK, entirely supported the U.S. security agenda, unconvinced by the ‘axis of evil’ logic but primarily driven by their fears of abandonment by the U.S. in the security sphere, which


\textsuperscript{512} Cerny, “Dilemmas of Operationalising Hegemony,” 81.

\textsuperscript{513} Goh, \textit{The Struggle for Order}, 58.

\textsuperscript{514} Goh, \textit{The Struggle for Order}, 60.

\textsuperscript{515} Mustapha, “Threat Construction in the Bush Administration’s Post-9/11 Foreign Policy,” 496.

\textsuperscript{516} Goh, \textit{The Struggle for Order}, 58-9.

\textsuperscript{517} For instance, Washington indicated strong support for ‘terror-related’ arrests by the Malaysian government under the country’s controversial Internal Security Act (ISA), which enabled indefinite detention without trial. This is the same Act that was vocally criticised by American delegates at previous APEC meetings prior to 9/11. Mustapha, “Threat Construction in the Bush Administration’s Post-9/11 Foreign Policy,” 499.
prompted them to act on their own regional security concerns.\textsuperscript{518} Despite the general support for the GWOT, there was also reticence throughout the Asia-Pacific – from strategic and non-strategic allies across Northeast and Southeast Asia – regarding U.S. objectives and the imposition of the GWOT agenda at the regional level.\textsuperscript{519} There was growing recognition that U.S. power in the region had to be more ‘actively curbed, not just channelled.’\textsuperscript{520}

The increasing over-reliance on coercion and the use of the U.S. military, and on inducement through incentives to underpin U.S. hegemony reached its peak in the G.W. Bush era. The G.W. Bush Doctrine assumed a simple causal relationship between power resources and political influence. It was also a radical project of hegemony that sought to reassert American dominance – rather than leadership – and sought to transform world order in the process.\textsuperscript{521} However, the administration attempted to do so in an international environment that was notably different from the post-1945 environment. The limits to the presuppositions that American practices are legitimate because American interests are generally expressed as being universal, and that the U.S. can resort to unilateral action, were exposed in the aftermath of 9/11.\textsuperscript{522} American willingness to resort so quickly to the use of its military force, and with its readiness to disregard international law, has not only complicated its ability to garner international support for the legitimate use of force, but has also reduced its leverage to persuade others not to use force.\textsuperscript{523} International support for the legitimacy of U.S. leadership waned, not only as a result of disagreements over the invasion of Iraq, and the use of torture, and in the way the G.W. Bush administration defined or practised the GWOT, but also as a consequence of its unilateralist turn, which mutually reinforced U.S. unpopularity and intensified disagreements over the deteriorating situation in Iraq.\textsuperscript{524}

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\textsuperscript{519} Jörn Dosch, The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 71-111.

\textsuperscript{520} Goh, The Struggle for Order, 60. Lake also notes that dominant states must credibly commit to limit their authority and power and not to exceed it. Subordinates will not enter or remain within a social contract unless they are assured that the authority they grant will not be used against them. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, 14.


\textsuperscript{522} Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, 138-9.

\textsuperscript{523} Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future of US Global Leadership,” 68.

\textsuperscript{524} Buzan, “Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ be the New Cold War?” 1110.
There was also growing disjuncture between American self-perception and global perceptions of its hegemony, which created a deficit of hegemonic legitimacy in the absence of collectively shared beliefs, as U.S. hegemony was increasingly lacking a normative basis. In effect, the G.W. Bush administration relied on coercion and inducement to gain support for its agenda, through the unilateral (re)interpretation of international norms, and the threat of its departure from existing multilateral institutions. While the G.W. Bush administration continued to command a degree of legitimacy among a small number of allies, U.S. policies and its approach to its hegemonic order, when combined, did not damage U.S. hegemony in its entirety, but has had longer terms effects on the perception of U.S. legitimacy across the international community, particularly affecting public perception. The GWOT, and the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, in addition to the global financial crisis, created a domestically-driven perception of failure, decline, and a loss of legitimacy, as well as within the international system as a whole.

**The Obama Administration: restoring American legitimacy**

The incoming Obama administration in January 2009 was confronted with international concerns over America’s capacity and readiness for leadership, and whether that leadership could be judiciously exercised. While many states continued to support the GWOT, U.S. international standing had been damaged by the growing range of policy disagreements concerning the narrow U.S. focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, WMD, its negative attitude towards international institutions, and human rights abuses in the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. With shared interests being critical to the maintenance of hegemony, the Obama administration, it was hoped, offered a return to hegemonic restraint, support for multilateralism and international norms, and a recalibration of U.S. foreign policy priorities away from the narrow focus on terrorism. From the

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525 Buzan, “A Leader without Followers?” 565.
526 McKeown, for instance, theorises on the conditions under which an existing, seemingly internalised international norm regressed - an area of focus under-theorised in constructivist discussion. His work examines how one of the strongest international norms, regarding the use of torture, was weakened by its most significant proponent. The consequence was the reframing, and thus regression, of torture from a humanitarian to a security issue. Ryder McKeown, “Norm Regress: US Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm,” *International Relations* 23, no. 1 (2009): 5-25.
528 The result of the GWOT strategy is arguably a decline in the perception of U.S. physical security, compounded by a loss of American ontological security. Identity security is discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.
perspective of its legitimacy, and the practicalities of the financial burden of sustaining its military hegemony, Obama asserted that the U.S. could no longer afford to bully ‘other countries to ratify changes [the U.S.] hatch[es] in isolation’ and would need to realign its interests with those of the international community.

U.S. hegemonic legitimacy is established and maintained when self-representations and institutional interpretations resound with the normative expectations of others. The deficit in hegemonic legitimacy can be resolved through the recalibration of mechanisms of socialisation, placing persuasion and voluntary compliance before material inducement and coercion. This process of recalibration involves the communicative reconciliation of the actor’s social identity, interests, or practices in accordance with the normative expectations of other actors. In 2007, Obama outlined his approach to American leadership as requiring a new humility, ‘of quiet confidence, a spirit of care and renewed competence.’ Rhetorically, at least, his core foreign policy themes included interdependence, humility, leadership, shared goals, and engagement with others. The intention was to rebalance the substance and practice of foreign policy, away from hard, coercive military-focused power, and towards the (re)integration of the soft power tools of attraction, including diplomacy and trade. Behind the rhetoric, the administration was ‘acutely aware of, and sympathetic to, the major criticisms directed at its predecessor’s approach to the world.’ There was an underlying understanding in the new administration that moral authority and legitimacy are essential tools of leadership and that the global environment was ‘less amenable’ to American instruments of hard power when manifested in a unilateral and aggressive manner. The smart power strategy was at the heart of Obama’s foreign policy vision to recalibrate American hegemonic leadership.

(i) A ‘smart power’ strategy

Academic interest in the study of hard and soft power substantiates the influence of Nye’s original premise that states need to balance command (inducements/coercion) and co-optive (attraction) power

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to achieve successful foreign policy outcomes. The efficacy of soft power as a means of conducting foreign policy has been widely debated, both theoretically and within the foreign policy community. Conceptual and foreign policy analysis problems notwithstanding, Nye asserts that soft power tools include diplomacy, economic assistance and communication, but any resource can contribute to soft power, including the military, since soft power relates to behaviour, rather than the kind of resource.

Soft power is about creating a ‘harmony of interests’ rather than a conflict of interests. American soft power rests on its culture (attractiveness), political values (living up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimacy and having moral authority). The power to attract others to what America wants depends on international perceptions of its culture, its domestic values and external policies.

A successful combination of hard and soft power, implemented in a specific context, is the key to a smart power strategy which combines hard power with the ‘power of attraction’ (soft power). Smart power, Nye contests, is about ‘power conversion’ – converting the full range of power resources at a state’s disposal into strategies that produce the outcomes they seek. While the idea of a ‘smart power’


539 Nye contends that military power can also be attractive when it is used for co-optive purposes: protecting and assisting rather than threatening and fighting (e.g. hearts and minds, humanitarian assistance, military-to-military communication). Similarly, economic power can also be used for command purposes (e.g. sanctions). Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 20-21.


543 Nye, *The Future of Power*, 10. Nye first developed the smart power strategy in 2004, to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy. Smart power is not ‘Soft Power 2.0.’ Smart power is the ability to combine hard and soft resources into an effective strategy. *The Future of Power*, 23.

strategy may appear fairly obvious, combining hard and soft power effectively is no simple task.\textsuperscript{545} Even states like the U.S., endowed with greater power resources, can be ineffective in converting their full range of power resources successfully because smart power relies upon good understanding of the strategic environment (i.e. contextual intelligence) and the ability to adjust tactics to a situation, by choosing between hard and soft power tools to reinforce, rather than destabilise, one another.\textsuperscript{546} Smart power underscores the significance of socialisation by attraction, rather than coercion or inducement, to the practice of hegemony. Garnering social influence is linked to concerns about international image and status, and therefore, by reducing reliance on the American military as the main channel of coercion, the U.S. could attract approval and limit disapproval. The smart power framework means to reclaim U.S. influence by being ‘smart,’ through the realisation that U.S. interests are furthered by enlisting others to support U.S. goals, through alliances, international institutions, judicious diplomacy and the power of ideas.\textsuperscript{547}

In the early stages of the Obama administration, the ‘smart power’ strategy was a conscious attempt at communicating a more balanced approach to U.S. foreign policy, with the aim of restoring American authority and hegemonic legitimacy. The ‘smart power’ strategy toned down the unilateral and aggressive use of military force in favour of an integrated strategy combining both hard military, and soft attractive, power.\textsuperscript{548} Hillary Clinton defined ‘smart power’ as an ‘intelligent integration and networking of diplomacy, defense and development and other tools of so-called hard and soft power.’\textsuperscript{549} In her confirmation hearing statement as Secretary of State, she explained that ‘smart power’ incorporated the use of:

‘the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy…We will lead with diplomacy because it’s the smart approach. But we also


\textsuperscript{546} Nye, \textit{The Future of Power}, 225.

\textsuperscript{547} Suzanne Nossell, “Smart Power: Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 83, no. 2 (2004): 131-143. Smart power can involve the use of hard power, so long as its use is consistent with internationally-determined principles such as protection, peace-keeping or liberation. Gallarotti, “Smart Power: Definitions, Importance, and Effectiveness,” 254.

\textsuperscript{548} Nye notes that the Cold War was won by a smart combination of hard coercive power and the soft attractive power of ideas. Joseph S. Nye, “Smart Power and the ‘War on Terror’,” \textit{Asia-Pacific Review} 15, no. 1 (2008): 4.

know that military force will sometimes be necessary, and we will rely on it...as a last resort."^550

While smart power does not rule out the use of force, in her autobiography, Hard Choices, Hillary Clinton described it as ‘choosing the right combination of tools – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural’ for each situation, with an expanded focus on technology, public-private partnerships and areas beyond the State Department’s standard portfolio as complementary resources to more traditional diplomatic tools and priorities.^551

Legitimacy is an inherent quality of U.S. hegemonic attractiveness.^552 Rebuilding the relationship between American legitimacy and its hegemonic power are essential to the allure of U.S. hegemony.^553 An important ‘attraction’ tool of the smart power strategy has been public diplomacy, an instrument used by governments to mobilise soft power resources regarding U.S. values, culture, and in demonstrating the way the U.S. handles relations with others. Appeal rests on the ability of the U.S. to communicate well, and to attract others – not just government, but also the public – through broadcasting, subsiding cultural exports, symbolic events, and people-to-people exchanges.^554 Public diplomacy initiatives, especially in Southeast Asia, have augmented the attractiveness of U.S. policy through a focus on public audiences, rather than the conventional focus on political officials.^555

The administration’s smart power strategy meant a return to diplomacy, cooperative engagement, economic assistance and communication. Emphasising the art of persuasion, smart power implied


^551 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (London: Simon Schuster, 2014), 33. Non-governmental commissions in 2008 and 2009 found a ‘bipartisan consensus on implementing/combining hard and soft power to elevate and strengthen civilian capacities (development and diplomacy) as essential tools for advancing US interests along with strong defense.’ It was also found that the infrastructure and an overarching strategy to integrate official instruments of military and civilian soft power tools was lacking. Center for US Global Engagement, “Putting ‘Smart Power’ To Work: An Action Agenda for the Obama Administration and the 111th Congress,” (Washington, DC: Center for US Global Engagement, 2010), 15.


^553 A 2007 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies acknowledged that ‘much of the world today is not happy with American leadership’, adding that ‘America’s reputation, standing, and influence are at all-time lows’. Even so, the report argued, the time was ripe for a ‘big idea’ that could restore legitimacy to American leadership and ‘preserve American pre-eminence as an agent for good.’ Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (2007), 3-6, 17. https://www.csis.org/analysis/smoanter-more-secure-america (accessed September 9, 2016).


^555 In Hard Choices, Hillary Clinton refers to the need to build strong relationships with foreign publics as well as governments to build more durable partnerships and also build support for American goals and values when the government was not with the U.S. but the people were. Clinton, Hard Choices, 49.
hegemonic constraint and the need to gain acceptance from others to endorse its authority and legitimacy. In other words, to reconstruct the image of benign American hegemonic leadership, U.S. foreign policy must be perceived as active rather than assertive, backed by an ‘engaged,’ not aggressive, military. The aim has been to persuade others that American power is benign; that the American military is friend rather than foe; and that ‘global leadership does not require global interventionism.’

In her Senate confirmation hearings as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton stressed the need to ‘strengthen America’s position of global leadership,’ to ensure America remains ‘a positive force in the world.’ The administration’s first National Security Strategy in 2010 was a product of the desire to signal a more restrained and nuanced approach to the world, moving away from framing the U.S. as a proactive agent of ‘transformational diplomacy’ abroad. This strategy also placed renewed emphasis on preserving the norms and institutions of the established liberal order. Importantly, the document also referenced U.S. ‘leadership’ in the context of the need to ‘renew’ it, rather than assuming its untarnished existence. A smart power strategy was intended to kick-start the process of (re)legitimating and recalibrating American foreign policy and hegemony through attraction and persuasion by redirecting U.S. attention to recalibrating its social influence through its adherence to existing norms.

(ii) Renegotiating U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: A two-way process?

The strategic rebalance is a lens into the Obama administration’s smart power strategy. As part of the administration’s objective to renew ties in the Asia-Pacific, reports back from the region had strengthened the incoming administration’s view that the GWOT had damaged regional perceptions of American hegemony. Rather than securing hegemony, the region felt less sure of American power.

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557 Hillar Y Clinton, “Transcript of Confirmation Hearing,” President Obama also advocated a smart power strategy. Clinton has more overtly supported America’s leadership role, while Obama has been more cautious, placing more emphasis on engagement. Hillary Clinton thinks of the U.S. as the world’s indispensable nation. This difference created tension and a degree of inconsistency in the first administration’s approach to foreign policy. See Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle inside the White House, especially chapter 17.

561 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 2.
Calls for Washington to pay more attention to the economic and non-military strategic needs of the region required positive action. While it was premature to conclude that the Asia-Pacific regional system was becoming Sino-centric, or less American-centric, the incoming administration was concerned about increasing Chinese influence across the region. As Hillary Clinton espoused, smart power translates into a concrete policy framework, through ‘cooperation with partners, principled engagement with those who disagree with U.S. policy, the integration of civilian and military action, and the leveraging of multiple sources of American power.’ Given the significance of the Asia-Pacific to U.S. interests, the aim was to create an image of a proactive American foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific that would be properly communicated, and stream-lined, involving multiple civilian and security government agencies.

The rebalance strategy is thus a conscious attempt to recalibrate American foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific, with a view to reasserting U.S. hegemony and proclaiming the durability of its regional presence in a balanced way. The main source of U.S. regional influence remains the bilateral security relationships, as the most prominent feature of U.S. engagement. Many of these alliances have been renegotiated and strengthened over the course of the Obama administration, with the view to increasing their usefulness in non-threat-centric contexts, such as integrating U.S. and regional military efforts in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Washington’s support for the Lower Mekong Initiative, which aims to ‘address complex, transnational development and policy challenges in the Lower Mekong sub-region,’ is another example of the move away from coercive power. The military option has therefore not been disregarded, but is moderated by values of understanding and deepened commitment to regional multilateral engagement. In Southeast Asia, for instance, there has been a concerted effort to constrain American power by engaging with the regional institutions, with Obama personally attending ASEAN and other regional meetings and maintaining direct and regular contact

565 The first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review in 2010 is auspiciously titled “Leading through Civilian Power.” In the opening statement, Hillary Clinton sets out the intention to build up America’s civilian power, with the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) taking a leading role. Moreover, as part of the smart power strategy, the aim is to ‘break down walls between agencies, [to] eliminate overlap, set priorities, and fund only the work that supports those priorities.’
with leaders across the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{568} His personal knowledge of Indonesia, for instance, has tempered the approach of his White House predecessor.\textsuperscript{569} The administration’s enthusiasm for the TPP underscores its commitment, not only to regional free trade, but also to binding the U.S. to develop a regional economic framework for the twenty-first century.

Implementing a smart power strategy in the Asia-Pacific – a region with ‘an increasingly complex mosaic of actors and factors,’ with overlapping spheres of influence and hierarchy – has not been an easy task.\textsuperscript{570} Across the region, subordinate states are managing strategic changes associated with China’s rise and American hegemony, while struggling to maintain autonomy and avoid over-dependence on the U.S. and/or China.\textsuperscript{571} Across Southeast and Northeast Asia, with notable exceptions, there is broad acceptance of the need for a regional order, hinging on a preferred hierarchical power distribution that retains U.S. predominance and assimilates China into the regional great power tier below that of the United States.\textsuperscript{572} Despite deepening economic integration with China, there is an underlying fear of being absorbed into a Sino-centric regional economic and political system, especially in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{573} The longer term goal for the Southeast Asian states in particular is to bind both China and the U.S. into regional economic and security institutions. The broader strategic aims of both Southeast and Northeast Asia are to avoid U.S. withdrawal and to prevent a Chinese challenge to U.S. hegemony. Through ASEAN-supported projects, Southeast Asian states have attempted to socialise China and the United States into accepting the ‘ASEAN Way’ of regional order-building through consensus.\textsuperscript{574} ASEAN’s goals are to avoid mutual coercion, to deter a potential Chinese push for

\textsuperscript{568} Obama has made ten trips to the Asia-Pacific during his eight-year presidency. This is Obama’s last opportunity to showcase his rebalance and climate change policies. His September 2016 visit to Laos is for the U.S.-ASEAN summit and the EAS. Laos has been viewed as being of limited strategic interest to Washington – even with the rebalance. However, one analyst observes that the new government is shifting towards closer relations with Vietnam, and away from China. This could potentially lead to the cultivation of links with Washington. See Joshua Kurlantzick, Obama Makes The First US Presidential Visit to Laos: Part 1,” Blog for Council on Foreign Relations, August 30, 2016.\textsuperscript{http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/08/30/obama-makes-the-first-us-presidential-visit-to-laos-part-1/} (accessed September 3, 2016). Mark Landler, “Obama Heads to Asia Seeking Breakthrough on Trade and Climate,” \textit{New York Times}, September 1, 2016.\textsuperscript{http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/us/politics/obama-heads-to-asia-seeking-breakthrough-on-trade-and-climate-change.html?_r=0} (accessed September 3, 2016).

\textsuperscript{569} As an example of Obama’s toned down rhetoric, Obama uses terms like ‘militant’ and ‘extremist’ rather than ‘Islamist’ to describe terrorists, and rarely if ever, has used the term ‘war on terror.’ Mustapha, “Threat Construction in the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 Foreign Policy,” 501.


\textsuperscript{571} The desire to avoid excessive dependence on external powers is related to the traditional nonalignment or neutrality strategies pursued by many small- and medium-sized countries across the Asia-Indo-Pacific. Amitav Acharya, \textit{Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order} (London: Routledge, 2001), 13.

\textsuperscript{572} Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” 120.

\textsuperscript{573} Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” 140.

\textsuperscript{574} The ASEAN Way is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
hegemony by preserving U.S. forces in the region, thereby retaining the gap between the U.S. and China; and to draw in other major regional players, such as India, Japan and Australia, to diversify sources of influence in the region.\footnote{The twin strategies are omni-enmeshment and complex balancing. Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” 153.}

The privileged position of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific is substantiated and sustained by reciprocal social bargains agreed between the U.S., the other regional middle powers and institutions (e.g. China, Japan, India, South Korea and ASEAN), and the smaller states. U.S. hegemony, as it has developed in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific context, exists, therefore, not simply because of American preponderant power, but because of the complicity of key regional states and institutions, who help sustain the hierarchy of U.S. regional hegemony. American hegemony is broadly seen as legitimate, with resistance to U.S. hegemony being limited by consensual compliance. Important strategic changes have not reflected balance of power challenges to U.S. primacy, but have instead indicated a complex process of renegotiating the consensus on values, rights and duties that underpin U.S. hegemony in its relations with other states.\footnote{Goh, The Struggle for Order, 4.} The conditions of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific are constantly undergoing a process of renegotiation. Nevertheless, U.S. hegemony remains a prominent condition of regional geopolitics.

Consent to American regional hegemony is negotiated and obtained for both material and ideational reasons, with instrumental logic underpinned by normative beliefs in this compliance.\footnote{Goh, The Struggle for Order, 6.} The decision to rely on the U.S. as regional security guarantor is based not only on calculations of U.S. force projection capabilities in the region, but also on the belief that the U.S. is a benign external power with no territorial ambitions in the region. Moreover, the U.S. generally agrees with regional allies on interpretations of critical crises, and intervenes in them to uphold values shared with regional states.\footnote{Goh, The Struggle for Order, 6. This ties in with data from the Asia Barometer Survey taken between 2005-7 which indicated weak anti-American sentiment across the region, with the predictable exception of China, and the Muslim countries of Indonesia and Malaysia. The assertion is made on the basis of shared interests and shared cultural and political similarities. See Matthew Carlson and Travis Nelson, “Anti-Americanism in Asia? Factors shaping International Perceptions of American Influence,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8, no. 3 (2008): 303-324.} In response to regional concerns, the Obama administration has reciprocated in the new bargain, employing trade agreements, including the TPP, and economic cooperation to signal its strategic commitment to the region. Crucially, there is a new institutional bargain that seeks to deepen U.S. participation in regional institutions, which has been incorporated into the administration’s strategic
By being relatively open to renegotiating the terms of its hegemony, and shifting back towards multilateralism and garnering consent, the U.S. is able to contain, some, not all, resistance, while regaining some of its lost legitimacy. 580

States across the Asia-Pacific continued to work with the U.S. despite their reticence in supporting the GWOT and the invasion of Iraq. In many cases, states used the GWOT to advance their own interests. As a result, the basis of U.S. hegemonic order shifted from consent through legitimacy to an order based on coercion and acquiescence through inducement. Legitimacy, it is noted, has longer term advantages over coercion or acquiescence because the production of hegemony requires more than a material base. In the long term, the financial cost of relying on military power as the sole means for its hegemony is unsustainable. The final section of this chapter sets out the analytical framework for exploring how the exercise of American power underpinning its regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is multi-dimensional.

The power in American regional hegemony

The discussion of hegemony to this point has focused on the characteristics of American hegemony, order-building activities, the use of coercion, the garnering of consent, and the socialisation processes of persuasion and social influence by which the hegemonic order accumulates social legitimacy. The maintenance and reproduction of U.S. hegemony relies on the capacity of the U.S. to exercise power in a manner broadly agreeable to the subordinate states. Power activates hegemony as it relates to the practice of U.S. foreign policy.

Power, van Ham notes, comprises a dual ontology: one as an essential condition and resource, but also, one based on social interaction. 581 Power cannot be reduced entirely to something possessed by actors and wielded over others. It takes different shapes; it has different forms, and the type of power exerted is context-dependent. Barnett and Duvall contend that no single conception of power can capture all forms of power in international politics. They call for a multi-dimensional approach to power with the capacity to unravel the various forms of social power that model the oscillation in hegemonic relationships over time. A dominant state uses various methods, over the short and longer term, including coercion and inducement, and by constructing consent and voluntary compliance through socialisation mechanisms in direct and indirect ways. The dominant state can also shape and reshape

579 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 61.
580 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 5.
581 Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 3.
structures and discourses that are co-constitutive of subordinate national officials and their foreign policies. Social power thus includes discursive power, with emphasis on the framing of norms, agenda-setting, methods of communication, and public diplomacy.\(^{582}\) Barnett and Duvall’s typology of power is used in this thesis to demonstrate how, in maintaining and reproducing hegemony, the U.S. simultaneously uses a variety of power assets at its disposal that is currently unsurpassed by any other state in the regional order.

In mainstream approaches, power is often presented almost exclusively in Dahlian instrumental terms, as the ability of an actor to achieve a goal or realise a desired outcome.\(^{583}\) This project uses Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power as the basis for framing different forms of power, since while the ability of the hegemon to compel others to change their foreign policies is an important manifestation of power, it is not the only way the U.S. exercises power to underpin its hegemony. As Barnett and Duvall clarify, there are other ‘enduring structures and processes of global life that enable and constrain the ability of actors to shape their fates and their futures.’\(^{584}\) Analyses of power must also include consideration of the normative structures and discourses that generate differential social capacities for actors as they define and pursue their interests and ideals.\(^{585}\)

Power, expressed in various forms, produces effects that shape the capacities of actors, ‘in and through social relations.’\(^{586}\) The over-reliance on realist conceptualisations as the ‘industry standard’ has, in their view, limited understanding on how global outcomes are produced, and skewed understanding of how actors are ‘differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates.’\(^{587}\) Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy identifies four forms of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive, that, while distinct, also interact with one another.\(^{588}\) These four forms of power do have some affinity with different schools within IR, with different theoretical traditions favouring an understanding of power


\(^{583}\) “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do,” For Dahl’s classic articulation of power, see Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (1957): 202-3.


specified in their taxonomy. By their own admission, their taxonomy ‘does not map precisely onto different theories of international relations.’

Barnett and Duvall’s classification of power identifies two analytical dimensions, producing four conceptually distinct but intersecting forms of power. The first dimension concerns whether power works through social interaction, or in social constitution. Interaction presupposes fully-constituted social actors with control over their behaviour in relation to others. Power, so conceptualised, is nearly always an attribute possessed by a dominant state, and used as a resource to shape the actions and/or conditions of others. Social constitution, in contrast, focuses on social relations which precede the ‘social or subject positions of actors and that constitute them as social beings with their respective capacities and interests.’ In other words, social constitution relates to the elements which create social actors, with their self-understandings, interests and capacities, prior to their behaviour and interactions with others. The conceptual distinction between power working through social relations of interaction, and in social relations of constitution, corresponds to the ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ distinction found in traditional understandings of power. Power over corresponds to concepts of power rooted in action and control over others, whereas power to correlates to concepts of power concerned with how social relations define actors, their capacities and practices.

The second dimension of their framework concerns the specificity of the social relations through which the effects of power are produced; in other words, whether the social relations between the subject and object are direct, immediate and tangible, or whether the mechanisms of relations are diffuse, spatially, socially and/or temporally distant and mediated. Together, the two dimensions – the kinds of social relations through which power works and the specificity of the social relations through which the effects of power are produced – generate a fourfold taxonomy of power (see Table 1).

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589 In simplistic terms, realists might focus on compulsory power, liberals on institutional power, and critical theorists on structural and productive power. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 4, 11-12.
Table 1: Types of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power works</th>
<th>Relational Specificity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Through interactions of specific actors</td>
<td>Compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In social relations of constitution</td>
<td>Structural</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional</td>
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<td>Productive</td>
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Source: Barnett and Duvall.  

Compulsory Power

Compulsory power refers to the most commonly used definition of power. It is, in Dahlian terms, the most direct form of control of another, defined as ‘the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do.’ The salient features of compulsory power include the extent to which B feels compelled by A’s material resources to alter its behaviour. Simply put, ‘A and B want different outcomes and B loses,’ because A has more resources than B. Dahl’s concept also suggests that A acts with intentionality to compel B to act against its will. For Barnett and Duvall, however, compulsory power is not dependent on intentionality. Compulsory power is present whenever A’s actions control B’s actions or circumstances, even when A is not conscious of how their actions produce unintended effects. A dominant state uses its decisive material advantages to compel others to align with its interests. In most cases, this implies the use of physical coercion through military means, but also includes financial inducements, or the withholding of financial inducements, to directly control the conditions of behaviour of a subordinate state.

The way in which this thesis examines how the Obama administration animates U.S. hegemony through the exercise of compulsory power primarily, although not exclusively, relates to the military rebalance. Cox observes that ‘material capabilities are both productive and destructive.’ The U.S. military presence, is, by its nature, coercive, yet there is also a degree of consent to this presence across the Asia-Pacific because many subordinate states across the Asia-Pacific have come to view this presence as stabilising. The collective understanding of the U.S. military presence perpetuates both the security

narrative and maintains social order. The way in which the U.S. exercises compulsory power is examined in Chapters 4 and 6.

In Chapter 4, I argue that the U.S. directly influences the regional security environment through its network of bilateral alliances and other strategic partnerships. Through the alliance system, the U.S. also directly exerts influence over its allies. These alliances reflect the prevailing power relations in the Asia-Pacific and also stabilise and perpetuate the U.S. vision of order. Since hegemony presupposes that the dominant states makes allowances for the interests and proclivities of subordinate states, a certain calculation of compromise is made by the hegemon. The U.S. clarification of its position on the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the Abe government’s decision to re-interpret Article 9 of the Japanese constitution in July 2014, in order to allow Japanese Self-Defence Forces to have a greater role outside Japan, has occurred within the scope of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The U.S.-ROK security alliance provides the context within which the U.S. is working towards installing the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) capabilities on the Korean Peninsula, through which the U.S. primarily aims to deter North Korean threats.

Demonstrating the coercive side of U.S. hegemony, in Chapter 6, I discuss U.S. attempts to challenge the behaviour of the rising regional power, China, in the South China Sea through deterrence, namely through its exercise of military power, including its naval presence and the execution of regular freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the western Pacific. This distinctly coercive hegemonic behaviour on the part of the United States is an attempt to constrain China into accepting the security arrangements of the prevailing hierarchical security order. However, coercion does not dictate Sino-U.S. relations overall. While coercion may dominate the military relationship, other aspects of the relationship, for example, in the economic sphere, are more consensual, given China’s extensive adherence to the rules of international economic governance. This is not to say Sino-U.S. economic relations are not also without tension but there is more willingness on the part of the Chinese to observe the general rules of international trade. Successful resistance requires ‘an alternative, emerging configuration of forces’ from economic, political and cultural spheres. While China resists certain aspects of U.S. hegemony, it does not, at present, have the amalgam of tools needed to establish a rival order.

600 Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders,” 135; Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 49.
With the other regional rising power, India, the focus is on Washington’s capacity to persuade New Delhi to join the U.S. hegemonic order centres on similarities in U.S.-Indian norms and domestic governance arrangements. Washington has endeavoured to bring India into the regional security order through the improvement and upgrading of the strategic partnership. The promise of security is coupled with the effective threat narrative concerning the increase of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean as a means to attract India to collaborate with other U.S. security partners in the region.

The U.S. has also resorted to coercion to impose its ideas and rules in the economic sphere. In Chapter 5, attention is given to the 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis, when the U.S. directly intervened, ostensibly through the IMF, to impose strict IMF bail-out conditions on the affected countries, to coerce them into following U.S.-sanctioned neoliberal restructuring of their economies. The Asian Financial Crisis, however, had far-reaching and unintended consequences for this aspect of U.S. regional hegemony. Second-tier powers in the region did not agree with the terms of U.S. hegemony in the economic sphere and worked to establish regional mechanisms to reduce direct reliance on the U.S. and indirect reliance on the IMF, which was seen as an American-controlled institution.

**Institutional Power**

Through institutional power, a hegemon exercises indirect control over subordinate states. Formal and informal institutions mediate between A and B, with A working through the ‘rules and procedures that define those institutions’ to guide, steer and constrain the actions (or non-actions) of B. The important distinction between compulsory power and institutional power is that compulsory power rests on the resources possessed by A to exercise direct control over B, whereas A does not ‘possess’ the institution that constrains and shapes B. By recognising and abiding by institutional arrangements, A and B are socially removed from, and only indirectly related to, one another, spatially and/or temporally. Spatially, A can only affect the behaviour and conditions of B through institutional arrangements. While A does not possess the institution, because ‘institutions are sites of power,’ A, through its role in constructing and operating the relevant institutional arrangements, can exercise power over B. Moreover, institutions established at one point in time exhibit ‘ongoing and unintended effects’ at a later point. Long-established institutions ‘represent frozen configurations of privilege and bias that

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601 If A exercises total control over an institution, then that institution is possessed by A and is therefore an instrument of compulsory power. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 15-16.


603 These institutions are defined by Barnett and Duvall as ‘decisional rules, formalised lines of responsibility, divisions of labour, and structures of dependence.’ Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 16.


can continue to shape the future choices of actors. In other words, the hierarchical status quo is efficiently institutionalised to prevent meaningful transformation in favour of newer, rising powers.

U.S. hegemonic order through the exercise of institutional power is discussed here through the construction of regional institutions that confer legitimacy on American hegemony by binding the U.S. to the region. The regional multilateral mechanisms have a predominantly economic focus – although this is slowly changing – and through these regional institutions, the U.S. attempts to generate consent for its neoliberal ideology and to shape the direction of regional order. The U.S. attempts to indirectly influence regional affairs through the range of regional multilateral fora, with, or without membership, including ASEAN, ARF, APEC and the East Asian Summit (EAS), which is the primary focus of Chapter 5 – the economic rebalance.

The economic aspect of U.S. hegemony requires more negotiation and compromise with the subordinate states. Furthermore, U.S. foreign economic policy suffers from the conflicting views on free trade agreements that emanate from the domestic political sphere, which has implications for its support of regional multilateral institutions. In Chapter 5 I track the oscillation of U.S. policy towards regional multilateral institutions and the consequences of its foreign economic policy in the Asia-Pacific. Following the Asian Financial Crisis and the manner in which the U.S. was able to use the IMF to create an outcome that served U.S. interests, there is often suspicion amongst subordinate states in the Asia-Pacific concerning the degree to which the U.S. ‘owns’ institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Consequently, after the Asian Financial Crisis, there has been a shift towards establishing Asian regional institutions to steer economic governance as a means to protect the region from outside influence. The U.S. commitment to Asia-Pacific multilateralism, particularly in the economic sphere, has been less consistent that in the security sphere. The fluctuation between Republican and Democrat presidents in their engagement with regional institutions also creates competition between the middle tier subordinates and the regional institutions as they vie to influence the direction of regional trade with or without U.S. leadership.

The Obama administration has shifted U.S. policy back towards multilateralism in order to influence the direction of regional trade. Ideological conditioning and control of the narrative enable rule by consent. At the same time, a commitment to supporting regional institution-building present U.S. hegemony as benign and demonstrates U.S. willingness to concede to regional attempts at limited order-

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building. As part of the strategic rebalance, the U.S. has strengthened formal ties with ASEAN, including the establishment of a permanent U.S. mission to ASEAN in June 2010, followed by the appointment of the first permanent U.S. ambassador to ASEAN in March 2011 and membership of the EAS in 2011. The aim is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to regional multilateralism and also with the hope to influence regional trade and security agendas but also to restore autonomy to regional institutions, particularly to APEC, that had been reduced during the G.W. Bush administration.

Chapter 6 examines a different aspect of the U.S. exercise of institutional power by focusing on the steady deepening of formal and informal ties with China and India. U.S. hegemony is demonstrated through the way in which both rising powers are actively encouraged to participate in regional institutions as a means to facilitate socialisation of both rising powers into the U.S.-led regional order. Active participation and inclusion prevents resistance by co-opting the leaders of subordinate states and by adjusting their ideas into the dominant coalition of states, thereby absorbing opposition, and ultimately, resistance.608

Structural Power

Structural power concerns ‘the determination of social capacities and interests’; it produces the social capacities of subjects and the interests that elicit action.609 It is these social structures that assign agents the capacity to act in the social world. The direct, co-constitutive element of structural power derives from its ability to constrain or enable actors through the internal relations of pre-existing structures. The internal mechanisms of structures directly create agents with differential capacities, differential advantages and competing interests based on their position. These structural relations, by definition, are hierarchical. Moreover, Barnett and Duvall explain, ‘structural position A exists only by virtue of its relation to structural position B,’ hence the capacities, subjectivities and interests of actors are ‘directly shaped by the social positions they occupy.’610 Social structure not only constitutes actors and their capacities, but it also ‘shapes their self-understanding and subjective interests,’ with ideologies emerging from the interests and imperatives of structural relations.611

608 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 50. See also Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 166-167.
Analyses of structural power in IR are typically, although not exclusively, associated with Marxian (and Gramscian) approaches. Critical approaches privilege the structure of global capitalism in determining the capacities and resources of actors, and, importantly, in shaping their ideologies. Structures give rise to economic imperatives that alter financial markets and patterns of economic production, which then reproduce structure through agents. States are embedded in the structural milieu of the global economy but have limited capacity to shape those structures, although a hegemon has greater capacity than other actors to reshape existing structures. Actors tend to view their social position as natural, even though they may be in a subordinate and unequal position within the hierarchy and their ‘buy-in’ reinforces existing structural hierarchies. Actors’ self-understanding reproduce, rather than resist, asymmetric capacities and privileges. Structural power operates covertly to the extent that it generates the social powers, values and interpretations of reality that structure internal control. It is overt to the extent that the dominant state can manipulate strategic constraints for the purposes of controlling the actions of subordinate states. While structural power privileges structure, it is the practices of agents, who intentionally and unintentionally produce and reproduce social structures.

U.S. structural power is manifest in the regional economic architecture aspect of U.S. regional hegemonic order. In line with Gramscian thought, Chapter 5 emphasises how the U.S. directly influences the structure of the regional economy and the hierarchy of states within it. Regional economic governance is more hotly contested by regional actors – both allies and less-friendly states. The chapter considers the competition between the U.S. and China to exert control over regional economic governance by examination of the TPP, which seeks to steer the future the regional economic order, whilst preserving American influence and control through the dominant neoliberal ideology.

612 Susan Strange presents a ‘non-Marxian’ face of structural power, focusing on security, production, credit and knowledge. See Susan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), especially 43-134. Barnett and Duvall note that many constructivists draw from structurally-oriented theories of sociology (institutionalism) in their exploration of structural power. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 54. In Social Theory, Wendt conceptualises structure in social terms. Social structures are ‘the distribution of ideas or stocks of knowledge based on actors’ ideas about the nature and roles of self and others. Wendt, Social Theory, 249. These ‘roles’ are structural positions, not actor beliefs. For actors to enact and reproduce subject positions, they must be incorporated into their identities and interests. Wendt, Social Theory, 259.

613 Barnett and Duvall define ‘ideologies’ as the interpretive system through which actors understand their interests and desires but which serves the interests of the dominant capitalists at the direct expense of the subordinate productive classes. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 19.


Chapter 6 examines whether the establishment of the China-led regional financial institution, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), in April 2015 is an attempt by China to resist, oppose or modify U.S. hegemony. Beijing’s move to establish this potentially competing institution to support regional trade – even if this institution fulfils a regional need – caused a degree of panic in Washington. Furthermore, American attempts to coerce allies into rejecting membership of the AIIB demonstrated its limited capacity to exert control over its allies.\textsuperscript{616} Despite U.S. opposition to the AIIB, the structure of the global economic remains tilted to American advantage. Many U.S. allies across Europe and the Asia-Pacific – who ultimately adhere to the rules of global economic governance – joined the AIIB as founding members, with the view that they could influence the direction of the AIIB from the inside.

**Productive Power**

Productive and structural power are both attentive to constitutive social processes that are beyond the control of specific actors. Both are concerned with the processes by which the social capacities of actors are socially produced, and how these processes shape actors’ self-understandings and perceived interests. Productive power, however, operates in a diffuse, less tangible manner, through ‘systems of knowledge and discursive practices.’\textsuperscript{617} Productive power highlights systems of signification and meaning (i.e. discourse), moving away from structures per se, looking beyond, or post, structures.\textsuperscript{618} Discourse, defined here as systems of signification, ‘situate ordinary practices of life and define social fields of action.’\textsuperscript{619} Discursive processes and practices also produce social identities and capacities, giving meaning to them.

Existing analyses of productive power refer to the ‘discursive production of the subjects, the fixing of meanings, and the terms of action, of world politics.’\textsuperscript{620} This can relate to the classification of subjects which generate asymmetries of social capacities through binary representations of, for instance, ‘civilised’ versus ‘uncivilised’, ‘rogue’ versus ‘compliant’, or ‘democratic’ versus ‘autocratic’, in determining the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Language is neither objective, nor neutral. It creates social subjectivity and is imbued in power.\textsuperscript{621} Discourse in this sense is more than language, it

\textsuperscript{616} Japan remains the only major US ally that has stayed outside the AIIB. The only other major ally that initially rejected AIIB membership, Canada, applied to join the AIIB in August 2016.

\textsuperscript{617} Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 20.


\textsuperscript{619} Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 20


encompasses all cultural practices, including images, symbols, meanings, and representations that produce social knowledge.

Extending Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to make explicit the role of discursive hegemony, U.S. productive power, through the use of targeted language about self and other pervades the three empirical chapters of this thesis. Whether friend or foe, through narratives, the U.S. indirectly influences systems of knowledge and reproduces identities for both self and other. Chapter 4 focuses on the security narrative as a means to strengthen regional order under the U.S. security umbrella. To produce ongoing consent for the U.S. military regional presence, U.S. narratives are connected with the domestic narratives of many of the regional allies to create a consistent set of ideas about the nature of ‘China’s rise.’ Chapter 6 also examines the ‘China’s rise’ narrative through the lens of U.S.-China bilateral relations – manifested through narratival processes of ‘othering’ –, to shape the identity of the other and to define the relationship between the incumbent hegemony and potentially competing rising power. In contrast, Chapter 5 investigates the way in which the U.S. seeks to discursively support the reproduction of the existing structure of the regional economy indirectly through its neoliberal narratives. Drawing on the Asian Financial Crisis, this chapter examines how a similar, yet moderated storyline on state-owned enterprises has been reproduced to draw regional states into negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter has been to set out the framework for understanding hegemony as an asymmetrical relationship between the dominant and subordinate states within a recognised hierarchy of order among states. Using Gramsci’s conception of hegemony as a social relationship, attention has been given to outlining the consensual, rather than exclusively coercive, nature of hegemony. A Gramscian approach to hegemony permits consideration of the way in which the ideas, practices and institutions of the leading state permeate subordinate states. In a two-way process, hegemony absorbs resistance but also draws legitimacy from the subordinates. I have argued that the durability of the U.S. hegemonic order relies on the ability of U.S. officials to articulate and exercise power in a way that maintains a social bargain between the U.S. and subordinate states.
A prevailing theme of this chapter has been the acknowledgment that social power relies on legitimate authority for recognition, with legitimacy conferred within existing relations of power. The legitimacy of the hegemon is conferred on it by subordinate states—they are not simply passive recipients. Legitimacy thus rests on normative judgement which requires constant reproduction. Furthermore, legitimacy is not merely an activity of the hegemon, rather, social power infers the ability to influence the beliefs of subordinate states, through the hegemon’s privileged access to cultural development and the dissemination of ideas. How legitimacy is conferred, requires consideration of the mechanisms of socialisation, which facilitate internalisation of the hegemon’s ideas, through processes such as persuasion and social influence. While this project focuses on American power, authority and legitimacy, it recognises that hegemonic relationships are, by their nature, asymmetric, but they are not entirely driven by top-down processes of coercion and socialisation. As in the case of pre-emptive strike, the U.S. can act unilaterally when it is unable to reinterpret international rules and norms in its favour, but the social basis for its hegemony changes towards coercion and acquiescence through inducement as a result, and this type of hegemonic order is unsustainable in the long-term. However, as the Obama administration’s attempts to recalibrate the hegemonic order have shown, the principles of legitimacy are not fixed.

The focus on hegemonic legitimacy connects to the exercise of U.S. power, with power, too, consisting of material and social dimensions. This chapter has considered how hegemony, as a mode of social control, is produced and reproduced over a sustained period of time by diverse expressions of power that emerge from these social processes. Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power provides the analytical framework for drawing together the production of hegemony and the exercise of power. Consequently, this chapter has outlined the range of power assets at the hegemon’s disposal with which it maintains social cohesion, group identity, the dominant mode of production, and absorbs resistance. Since the exercise of power cannot simplistically be reduced only to the hegemon’s capacity to dominate coercively through its military and economic power, their framework permits the study of the exercise of power through ideological and consensual forms of control. Barnett and Duvall’s framework will be put to use in the empirical chapters (Chapters 4-6).

Seeking to reproduce the consensual basis for its hegemony, this chapter considered the recalibration of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration and a shift to a smart power strategy that seeks to combine various elements of U.S. power—moving away from the use of its coercive, hard power

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622 Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 4.
623 Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 104.
capabilities that had become associated with the G.W. Bush administration, towards a more balanced approach, encompassing the power of attraction and persuasion, thereby reinforcing mechanisms of socialisation associated with consensual hegemony.

This chapter briefly touched upon the manner in which the practice of hegemony is drawn from the domestic arena, which determines the character and nature of the hegemonic order. Hegemonic order is simultaneously shaped by, and produces, the hegemon’s identity. Order and identity are thus bound together with social processes including the construction of narrative and security. Forming the second part of the theoretical framework, the next chapter elucidates on the processes which produce and reproduce U.S. hegemonic identity as the U.S. seeks ontological, as well as, physical security. It focuses on the role of narratives and the ‘rise of China’ narrative in particular, to create and maintain ontological security in its hegemonic identity.
Chapter 3

Exceptionalism and American Hegemonic Identity: The Rebalance and the ‘Rise of China’ Narrative

This second part of the theoretical framework examines the discursive articulation of American hegemonic identity. It focuses on narratives, ideas and belief systems that blend history, past experience and current events, fusing with a state’s particular self-identity and its interactions with other states. The aim is to show that narratives and identity continually interact with each other until they align, in this case, around security. I argue that this process concerns securing American hegemonic identity – American ontological security – which is typically manifested in physical security needs. This chapter exposes the narratives, grounded in the past, present and with capacity to shape the future, which fit together with identities, and which also seek to make sense of events within a broader narrative.

Mainstream American political officials treat ‘China’s rise’ as the single greatest threat to U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. This chapter identifies the processes that create the conditions for this interpretation, and specifically, what aspects of China’s rise ‘threaten’ the United States and how. The argument put forward here is that China’s rise represents a threat to America’s hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific. Constructivism contends that ideas play an essential role in shaping state identity, which affects perceptions of global status and national interests, and influences the formulation of foreign policy. American exceptionalism shapes American understanding of the nature and range of American foreign policy activities through language and behaviour. A constructivist approach allows for examination of the way in which the national security narrative identifies and constructs threats, produced by America’s understanding of itself, as the exceptional nation, and global/regional hegemon, and its interpretation of others, as either potential rivals or friends. These processes, constituted by identity and ideas, cannot help but shape foreign policy choices. Therefore, this study presents America’s hegemonic identity, its interests and practices as constitutive of each other; illustrating that American foreign policy behaviours are the outcome of its socially constructed identities.

This chapter advances in three stages. The first stage explores the main tenets of exceptionalism, uncovering how this belief system propels U.S. political leaders to make choices, to maintain American security, and to repel potential threats. Exceptionalism also informs the value system that feeds into the normative foundations of U.S. hegemony.

The second stage considers how exceptionalist beliefs, constitutive of American identity, are weaved into the national security narrative, which facilitates the construction of threats. The primary focus of this section is on the intersection of identity formation processes, and ontological security-seeking behaviours which determine what constitutes a threat to American hegemonic identity and how these threats are acted upon. Once a threat has been identified by political officials, the necessity for them to take action to contain or vanquish the ‘threat’ is generated. Attention is given to the national security narrative that isolates and normalises particular ‘threats’ – potential and/or real – to the general security of the United States. The aim here is to expose America’s fear of ‘China’s rise,’ beyond rational explanations that focus on the increasing economic and military competition between a rising and incumbent hegemon. This section examines how certain threats to American identity are repositioned as physical ones.

The third stage of this chapter concentrates on American interpretations and understandings of China’s national identity formation, and its own brand of Chinese exceptionalism, that inform Chinese responses to the rebalance strategy. It argues that the decision to rebalance has been driven by a perceived confrontation looming between American and Chinese versions of exceptionalism, and two competing visions of regional order in the Asia-Pacific, guided by American conceptions of national (in)security.

**Exceptionalism in U.S. foreign policy**

The much cited American historian, Richard Hofstadter, asserted that Americans do not embrace ideologies because America is an ideology. Ideology implies a set of ideas characterising the American way of life and its values, and informing policy decisions. Crucially, it is relative to these ideas that the world from the American perspective is explained. Ideas constituting American exceptionalism, for instance, constitutionalism, individualism, liberalism, democracy and

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egalitarianism, are not a ‘carefully articulated, systematic ideology,’ or a ‘scheme for establishing priorities among values and form elaborating ways to realise values.’ Exceptionalism functions as a broadly accepted ‘collective belief system,’ or, a ‘pervasive set of ideas’ that explains the world and America’s role therein, and informs the character of U.S. foreign policy.

The first term of the Obama presidency in particular, coincided with a period of anxiety over American purpose and global role, reviving interest into the continued relevance of American exceptionalism in the twenty-first century. In spite of this anxiety, American elite belief in exceptionalism offers a degree of continuity in thinking about America’s hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific – a position of responsibility and leadership – treated as a natural outcome of America’s unique political culture and self-awareness. Exceptionalism offers a distinctive blend of ideas about the United States and its approach to human rights, democracy and freedom around which the national identity revolves, generating national interests, security narratives and policy priorities. However, exceptionalism is controversial. There is no fixed or uncontested conceptualisation of a single American identity. Consequently, disagreement over what America does abroad is generally rooted in domestic tensions over American identity.

\[628\] This chapter does not discuss the merits of domestic interpretations of exceptionalism, focusing instead on the projection of elements of exceptionalism within foreign policy, as they relate specifically to the rebalance. For Huntington, the political ideas of the American Creed provide the basis of American national identity. Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 14-15, 23. There are other characteristics of American exceptionalism that warrant discussion, including the relationship between the state and citizens, socio-economic mobility, the Constitution and institutions of governance. Seymour Martin Lipset’s insight into exceptionalism focuses on liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez-faire in economic matters. Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: Norton, 1997).


\[632\] A characteristic of American exceptionalism is ‘manifest destiny.’ This concept embodied the expansion of the nation westwards, which was inscribed in the public imagination from the 1840s. Thomas A. Hietala, *Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 2.

\[633\] The nature and existence of ‘exceptionalism’ are subject to critique. Walt describes exceptionalism as a ‘myth’. He argues that the conduct of American foreign policy is determined by its relative power rather than ‘exceptional qualities.’ Stephen M. Walt, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism,” *Foreign Policy* 189 (November 2011): 72-75. Holsti asserts that U.S. foreign policy is not exceptional, offering post-revolutionary France and the Soviet Union as comparable cases that have also claimed exemption from the rules of international order. Kalevi J. Holsti, “Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy: Is it Exceptional?” *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 3 (2011): 381.

While exceptionalism does not solely determine the direction of American foreign policy, the tenets of exceptionalism are fundamentally fused into America’s worldview, which does provide a basis for foreign policy ideas. Two themes unite in exceptionalist thinking. The first, idealism, understands America to be the ‘local agent of the global common good,’ and the global ‘indispensable nation.’ The second, realism, relates to the United States’ rise to great power status over the course of the twentieth century that, due to American material preponderance, has required American oversight of global institutions and greater involvement in global affairs. The faith in exceptionalism facilitates the presentation of the United States as the necessary force for good in the world, and as a benign, liberal hegemon, and allows for the demonisation of those opposed to the American mission. Even as administrations respond in their own way to particular events, U.S. foreign policy behaviour is broadly guided by the conviction of America’s exceptionalist ideology.

The roots of exceptionalist thinking are a combination of historical fact and storytelling, centred on a part-mythical and part-historical interpretation of the nation’s birth. David Campbell observes that the tendency to view the United States as a ‘beacon of light’ can be traced back to the Puritan experience predating the formation of ‘the United States.’ The term exceptionalism was conceived by French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, in his classic work Democracy in America. De Tocqueville observed that ‘the position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be belied that no

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635 Zhang asserts that it is hard to claim a direct causal link between exceptionalist principles and actual foreign policy behaviour. Exceptionalism offers one possible influence on policy, while actual behaviour is also determined by other factors, including competing policy ideas and policy positions, and material-contextual factors. However, myths always have meaning and significance for some present purpose. Feng Zhang, “The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 2 (2011): 321. For discussion of the problematic character of American national identity based in creed and/or culture, see Carlson Holloway, “Who Are We? Samuel Huntington and the Problem of American Identity,” *Perspectives on Political Science* 40, no. 2 (2011): 106–114.


639 See Henry Tudor, *Political Myth* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972) for an overview of political myths as historical phenomena, which inspire their members with confidence in their destiny and glorify achievements with practical importance in the contemporary setting.

democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one.’ Offering an insightful analysis of the uniqueness of American domestic democracy and political culture, de Tocqueville’s work validated the American form of republican liberal democracy that directly influenced the development of exceptionalist thinking. Huntington adds that the United States was ‘conceived in terms of political ideals and inspired by the promise or dream of liberty and equality,’ and thus the constant pursuit of libertarian and democratic ideals is central to the American political experience.

Entering mainstream use during the twentieth century, exceptionalism was extended beyond its domestic remit to account for America’s purpose as a global power, with foreign policy characteristically reflecting American domestic economic and security interests, in addition to the political values and principles shaping American domestic identity. The exceptionalism of American history and its political institutions has been argued in diverse ways. Broadly speaking, U.S. identity has been shaped by the ebbs and flows of its self-perception as the exemplary beacon among nations. The U.S. also identifies itself as the exempt nation, free from the laws of history, and as the first self-conscious nation, with the ability to control its own fate and future. Exceptionalism emphasises America’s departure ‘from the established way of doing things,’ with the birth and development of the United States marking it out as the ‘exception to the global rule.’ Consequently, the United States inherited a ‘special spiritual and political destiny’ that is exportable to the rest of the world. These self-beliefs remain dominant components of U.S. national identity, also actively promoted through foreign policy.

643 Huntington, The Promise of Disharmony, 10.
645 Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, 241.
649 The well-developed link between national values (e.g. democracy, constitution, individualism) and their promotion in external affairs is commonly associated with the formation of American society held together by shared ideas rather than by religion or blood. See Joseph Leggold and Timothy McKeown, “Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 3 (1995): 382-83; Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, 237; and Margaret G. Hermann, “The Study of American Foreign Policy,” in The Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy, eds. Steven W. Hook and Christopher M. Jones (New York: Routledge, 2012), 4.
Exceptionalism is undergirded by a religious claim that American ‘primacy is both inevitable and the outworking of divine blessing.’ This spiritual dimension, combining a missionary role and special destiny, influences ideas about global responsibilities that link into two manifestations of exceptionalism. The first characteristic asserts that the U.S. leads by example. American actions demonstrate to others ‘how a republic founded on and governed by liberty, equality and justice leads to stability, prosperity and individual achievement.’ The second expression of exceptionalism involves America’s mission, or duty, to export its unique qualities. Exceptionalist thinking embodies a spectrum of historically-developed beliefs, establishing a range of cultural norms, values and foreign policy traditions that have merged with strategic priorities and American national interests. Not only is the belief in American uniqueness perpetuated by the religious dimension, it has also propagated the notion of American superiority to other nations. The battle between good and evil, right and wrong, civilisation and barbarism, highlights the essential goodness of American actions and objectives and the good nature and character of Americans vis-à-vis the ‘evil Other,’ resolved to destroy the American way of life.

These binary oppositions have a legitimising effect, rallying public support for ‘just’ causes. American vulnerability to assaults on its way of life was reinforced by the events of September 2001. The direct attack on American soil changed how Americans saw ‘the United States’ as geographically isolated and thus protected from the rest of the world. This experience was internalised in terms of ‘a religious judgment on the providential mission of America and on the idea of the Americans as a chosen people with immunity from dangers’ typically associated with other, less exceptional nations, residing ‘over there.’ In his reflections on 9/11, Ian Jack observed that,

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651 Campbell, Writing Security, 133; Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 45.
652 Tomes, “American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century,” 44. The first theme manifests in different forms, from a virulent strain of nationalism to a more reserved sense of being a role model that others can choose to emulate. Huntington refers to American efforts to propagate its cultural values as universal, as a likely source of conflict with other civilisations. See Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilisations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.
655 Esch observes that George H.W. Bush’s public opinion polls and focus groups showed that the public found rhetoric emphasising ‘axiological’ considerations such as the ‘evil’ deeds of Saddam Hussein to be more compelling in justifying the Gulf War than rhetoric emphasising economic reasons, such as jobs and oil. Esch, “Legitimizing the “War on Terror,” 371; Brandon Rottinghaus, “Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy, Opinion Polling, and the possible Limits of ‘Crafted Talk’,” Political Communication 25, no 2 (2008): 138–157.
657 Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 68.
increasingly there seems an almost religious dimensions to U.S. citizenship, not just because America is a remarkably Christian state led by a man who peppers his rhetoric with the words ‘good’ and ‘evil’, but because the sheer fact of being American is for many Americans to be part of an evangelical, patriotic faith – to be one of the elect, to be one of the saved.658

Americans place in their nation and its creed ‘many of the attributes and functions of the church,’ a ‘civic religion’ that provides a secular-religious dimension for the fabric of American society.659 Consequently, American statecraft imbues an ‘evangelism of fear’ that, in times of crisis, assumes apocalyptic proportions, and in which ‘a discourse of fear functions as providence and foretells a threat.’660

(i) Shifting meanings and applications of exceptionalism

As a political idea, American exceptionalism can be adapted to apply to changing circumstances, and provide significance for various narratives.661 Specific exceptionalist themes and characteristics are evoked for diverse purposes, with an administration responding to a need for a sense of purpose and strategy at a particular time.662 Consistently, ‘ideology is central, not incidental to policy-making,’ creating a political narrative around which support for, or opposition to, certain ‘policies, values and visions of American society’ can be unified.663 The exceptionalist ideology provides a crucial link between the American sense of nationhood, and acting with distinction in the foreign policy sphere, whilst offsetting domestic insecurities or problems.664 American exceptionalism is extended and constantly revised but remains anchored in the unerring belief that the U.S. is ‘unique and morally superior to other nations,’ to which the continued existence of American hegemony attests.665

661 Esch, “Legitimizing the “War on Terror,”” 369.
662 Administrations typically outline their foreign policy priorities, stating their main commitments to spreading democracy and economic liberalisation, and their modus operandi, for instance, supporting the use, or limited use, of military force, their approach to multilateralism or a preference for unilateralism. Crucially, therefore, diverging interpretations of exceptionalism attest to competing ideas on American primacy and cooperative engagement. Georg Löfflmann, “Leading from Behind – American Exceptionalism and President Obama’s Post-American Vision of Hegemony,” *Geopolitics* 20, no. 2 (2015): 308.
Interpretations of exceptionalist thinking intersect with geopolitical realities, linking two fundamental objectives of U.S. foreign policy with America’s unwavering obligation to defend its conception of freedom around the world.\textsuperscript{666} To protect America’s interests, the first objective is to expand democracy globally. Since America broadly understands threats to democracy as being located in alternative political systems, the U.S. has often opposed any ideological system that presents an alternative approach to liberal, American-style democracy.\textsuperscript{667} The second objective is to prevent the creation of competing economic systems that might create barriers to American trade. While the promotion and stability of free trade is often prioritised over the exceptionalist mission to expand democracy, the two objectives remain at the core of American understanding of the existing international order.\textsuperscript{668} Yet, American exceptionalism functions beyond a solely strategic purpose. Similarities between administrations’ rhetoric on many foreign policy issues illustrates the ‘existence of an institution of rhetoric with deep roots.’\textsuperscript{669} There may be divergence in concerns, styles and values, but the maintenance of exceptionalism indicates the existence of enduring norms, influencing the general character of U.S. foreign policy.\textsuperscript{670}

With the geopolitical uncertainties of the twenty-first century, the theme of American exceptionalism remains the obvious strategic choice for encouraging domestic political consensus about its international role and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{671} The President of the United States plays a unique role in articulating the geopolitical vision of American global leadership, tied to multi-functional interpretations of American exceptionalism. The President has the ability to frame the national narrative, and potentially recalibrate the articulation of geopolitical identity.\textsuperscript{672} It is the representations and practices employed by the President of the United States in defining the geopolitical identity of the United States, and in orienting U.S. foreign and security policy, which are crucial in understanding the co-constitutive processes of identity and politics in American geopolitical discourse.\textsuperscript{673} American exceptionalism offers a useful interpretive lens for the course, continuity, and change of dominant

\textsuperscript{666} Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 153.
\textsuperscript{668} Tomes, “American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century,” 39.
\textsuperscript{669} McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5.
\textsuperscript{670} These norms are also shaped by Washington’s international relationships and activities in a dynamic two-way process. McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5.
\textsuperscript{671} McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 146.
\textsuperscript{672} Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), especially chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{673} Löfflmann, “Leading from Behind,” 312.
conceptualisations of geopolitical imagination, in addition to producing and reproducing American global leadership.674

Therefore, key exceptionalist themes, such as leading by example and America’s global mission to export its values outside the United States, are constant characteristics of U.S. foreign policy. In 1991, at a critical and uncertain time in global affairs, President George H.W. Bush defined America’s role in bringing about the end of the Cold War in exceptionalist and missionary terms:

‘We in this Union enter the last decade of the 20th century thankful for our blessings, steadfast in our purpose, aware of our difficulties, and responsive to our duties at home and around the world. For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens and sacrifices. But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works.’675

His successor, President Bill Clinton, similarly asserted that American leadership was essential for navigating the new order, calling on the United States to assume the burden of leadership.676 Clinton’s second term Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, contended that America was the ‘indispensable nation,’ conjuring up an image of America’s global responsibilities and mission to justify the potential use of force against Saddam Hussein because the U.S. could ‘see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.’677 Falling back on exceptionalist themes, Albright asserted that the U.S. held overall responsibility for identifying and eliminating the world of evil, because in its superiority, only the U.S. had insight into the world’s problems and maintained the undisputed capacity to solve them.

American exceptionalism was appropriated to make sense of the 9/11 narrative and the threat from this form of terrorism.678 The War on Terror highlighted the power and value of exceptionalism as a

rhetorical legitimisation strategy. For President G.W. Bush, the burden of leading the world into the post-9/11 era would be shouldered by the U.S. alone, on the understanding that, ‘if the U.S. acted firmly and decisively, other nations would follow.’ The G.W. Bush administration’s interpretation of exceptionalism, heavily influenced by neo-conservatism, invoked an extreme sense of American morality and superiority that justified American unilateralism. The administration’s over-stated link between exceptionalism and faith, when applied in the extreme in this case, portrayed the United States as a ‘crusader nation,’ determined to impose its version of right and wrong, good and evil, on the world. Moreover, the sense of exceptionalism imbued in this particular administration, viewed America’s unmatched global position as not only bestowing upon the United States unique obligations to eliminate evil, but additionally conferred unique privileges, such as the capacity to ignore international opinion. In his 2004 State of the Union address, G.W. Bush declared that America did not need a ‘permission slip’ from other nations to protect itself and fulfil its mission in the world. This particular invocation of American exceptionalism shaped the administration’s approach to American identity and its global leadership role and enabled a rallying effect for its war discourse. The fusion of the administration’s strategic goals with a sense of moral purpose also created enough strategic ambiguity that widened the scope of foreign policy options, providing moral justification for military violence, including torture.

The exceptionalist ideology broadly allows for continuity in America’s hegemonic identity and provides a basis for the construction of threats. However, the G.W. Bush administration’s extreme invocation of exceptionalism uncovers underlying tensions that exist within this belief system in relation to

679 Esch and Jackson respectively offer thorough analyses of the War on Terror narrative. Esch, “Legitimizing the “War on Terror,” 357-391. See also Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), especially chapter 2.
680 Daalder and Lindsay note that the G.W. Bush approach created a narrow view of international relations which overlooked the long term consequences. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 2, 13.
681 Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 4.
American identity and the utility of American power. These tensions have become particularly discernible during the Obama administration and are explored in the next section of this chapter.

**Obama, exceptionalism and U.S. hegemony**

Obama’s interpretation of exceptionalism has created tension with traditional views that typically fuse America’s hegemonic identity with the material base of primacy. Obama’s understanding of exceptionalism rests on leading by example, and has attempted to uncouple American leadership from its over-dependence on the American military. His understanding of exceptionalism has led to claims that he lacks strategic vision. On the other hand, Obama remains true to the traditional understanding of national security and the utility of constructing threat narratives to steer U.S. foreign policy.

(i) Obama and American exceptionalism

President Obama articulates an interpretation of exceptionalism as a construct of geopolitical identity, drawing from the material base of America’s superior power, and ideationally from his belief in the superiority of American values of freedom and liberty. However, his geopolitical vision of America’s leadership identity does not endorse an interpretation of exceptionalism exclusively drawn from primacy and a unipolar world order. Here, he diverges from the interpretations of exceptionalism preferred by many of his predecessors. The fusion of hegemonic identity and superior power in Obama’s interpretation of exceptionalism does not convey the U.S. as a crusading leviathan. Instead it is an exceptionalism that attempts to recalibrate American identity of unique superiority and global responsibility through a grand strategy of engagement and burden-sharing. President Obama has re-appropriated the belief in the superiority of American values and the pre-eminence of American power and leadership by emphasising domestic renewal. There are practical and ideological reasons for this shift.

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689 Andrew Bacevich, for instance, argues that for the US to reassert control over its own destiny, it should abandon its imperial delusions and resist reliance on the military to accomplish freedom. The US should exemplify through self-mastery and not compellence of others. See Andrew Bacevich, *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism* (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 2009), 13.
Obama senses transformation in the global geopolitical environment; consequently, his acknowledgement of the ‘rise of the rest’ is reflected in the way he defines exceptionalism and uses it to orient U.S. foreign policy. This is exceptionalism for an increasingly complex and interdependent world, in which global hegemony is not exerted through coercion relying on the use of force. This worldview accepts that globalisation creates transnational challenges, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation and climate change that American material power cannot meet alone. Obama’s approach to leadership involves working with others on these issues by forging consensus. The issue for Obama is not whether the United States should continue to play the role of world hegemon, but rather, how the U.S. should approach its leadership role. In his 2007 Foreign Affairs article, Obama defined his vision by emphasising a need for balance between the economic, political and moral elements of American global leadership. At the core of the message was the presentation of exceptionalism as the capacity to lead by example to rejuvenate the perception of American hegemony at home and abroad:

‘The world has lost trust in our purposes and our principles…We must lead the world by deed and by example…This is our moment to renew the trust and faith of our people - and all people - in an America that battles immediate evils, promotes an ultimate good, and leads the world once more.’

Obama’s belief in ‘leading by example’ had twin aims: to restore global faith in both the U.S. capacity and moral certitude to lead, whilst also stressing the need to use ‘all elements of American power to keep [the U.S] safe, and prosperous, and free.’

As he asserted in his Foreign Affairs article, there is a clear commitment to domestic economic renewal as a means to rejuvenate global leadership, which ‘serves as the wellspring of American power.’ The focus on domestic economic issues, at the time of the global financial crisis, would reinvigorate America’s economic resilience and restore the confidence of the American nation. Obama also appealed to the civil religion tradition of his predecessors, rather than the moral and missionary language of presidents such as G.W. Bush or Ronald Reagan in characterising America’s global role.

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and responsibilities. This tradition invokes foundational myths that continue to inspire and animate the American people; a common unifying force used to justify and stimulate support for U.S. foreign policy actions that seek to maintain and advance national interests and U.S. power. While George W. Bush was closely identified with conservative evangelicals, Obama has sought to build a broader civic-religious base on which to globally restore the reputation of the United States. Obama’s inaugural address reminded Americans that they ‘have remained faithful to the ideals of our forebears and true to our founding documents.’ He conjured up the memory of the Founding Fathers to remind Americans that they had ‘drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man... Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake.’ America would remain exceptional by continuing to be ‘the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth,’ as the global defender of American values.

Obama’s conceptualisation of exceptionalism, determining how the U.S. should lead and shape the international environment, has produced an approach that seeks to facilitate the pursuit of American interests in a more cooperative and less military power-centric global environment. His conceptualisation reflects the most likely future scenario in which the U.S. is likely to remain the most powerful nation, but not the single dominating actor in the international arena. Obama connects his exceptionalist beliefs with an appreciation for the scope, but also the limitations, of American power. His first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 2010 asserted that ‘the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.’ The QDR acknowledged that the geopolitical dynamics of the rising rest would have

698 Marsden, “Religion, identity and American power in the age of Obama,” 331. In his 2007 article, Obama offers a route to spread democracy to the Islamic world through the promotion of civil society. ‘America must make every effort to export opportunity – access to education and health care, trade and investment – and provide the kind of steady support for political reformers and civil society that enabled our victory in the Cold War.’ Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2007): 11.
700 The White House, “President Obama’s Inaugural Address.”
701 Löffmann, “Leading from Behind,” 313.
implications for the United States. Instead of focusing exclusively on the status of the United States as the indispensable nation, with superiority of power and universally applicable values, Obama’s version of exceptionalism underscores the unique potential the U.S. in leading by example, and through cooperation to achieve global outcomes. Incorporated within this interpretation is the understanding that U.S. hegemony in the twenty-first century is strengthened when the U.S. leads through example. Obama’s geopolitical vision has neither abandoned America’s claim to leadership, nor indicated that it will refrain from deploying the tools of primacy. Furthermore, his vision continues to support the fundamental exceptionalist belief that the continuation of U.S. hegemony across the globe is both feasible and broadly supported. Yet, Obama is a realist, selectively sanctioning the use of force, whilst rejecting reliance on hard hegemony. He has also consistently downplayed America’s role as the global ‘fixer,’ notably in relation to the Arab Spring and the Syrian conflict. His image of American exceptionalism and America’s hegemonic identity has sought to uncouple American exceptionalism from its reflexive linkage with American (especially military) primacy. Instead he has advanced policies designed to lessen the burden of American leadership. In this way, he has inverted the conventional linkage of exceptionalist rhetoric and hegemonic practices that have so often been detrimentally expressed through foreign interventions and the use of military force. Obama remains convinced that only the U.S. has the capacity to lead globally, working with others, but his primary

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705 Obama’s interpretation contravened the Jacksonian unilateralism that has dominated foreign policy views in large parts of the Republican Party since Reagan’s era that places strong emphasis on U.S. military power. See, for instance, Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence* (New York: Routledge 2009), 218–263.


focus has been on how the U.S. demonstrates its preponderance, which he deems more important to sustaining American hegemony over the longer term.\footnote{Emphasis has shifted towards issues such as finalising the nuclear deal with Iran, a climate change deal with China and India, and normalising relations with Cuba, in addition to an emphasis on TPP and TTIP. McEvoy-Levy, \textit{American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy}, 144.}


As a consequence of tensions in American global identity and how it should lead, Obama is the only President asked to confirm his belief in American exceptionalism.\footnote{The question was posed by \textit{Financial Times} journalist Edward Luce at the NATO summit in Prague on April 4, 2009. Obama’s answer was, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” The White House, “News Conference by President Obama, April 4, 2009.” \url{https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conference-president-obama-4042009} (accessed November 17, 2015).}

In the lead up to the 2010 mid-term Congressional elections, the President was characterised as being ‘un-American’ and ‘intellectually hostile’ to the notion of American exceptionalism.\footnote{D’Souza describes Obama as ‘a man driven by the anti-colonial ideology of his father and the first American president to actually “seek” to reduce America’s strength, influence, and standard of living.’ See Dinesh D’Souza, \textit{The Roots of Obama’s Rage} (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2010). The debate on exceptionalism and the form of American global leadership promoted by Obama led to accusations that his American credentials were disputable. Kathleen Parker, “President Obama and that ‘Exceptional’ Thing,” \textit{Washington Post}, January 30, 2011. \url{http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/28/AR2011012805190.html} (accessed September 7, 2015).}

Exceptionalism once more became an issue of national importance and a matter of dispute, especially for Republicans during the 2012 presidential election campaign.\footnote{This was the first time that a President’s position on American exceptionalism became a prominent and overarching theme of the mid-term elections. Brooks, \textit{American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama}, preface, 14, 128.}

In foreign policy terms, the presidential election was a contest between competing geopolitical visions of American leadership between President Obama and the Republican candidate, Mitt Romney.\footnote{For Obama’s conservative critics, exceptionalism represents an item of faith that defines national greatness and provides the ideational foundation of America’s global leadership, supported by an expansionist grand
leadership should guide the nation into the future: President Obama’s approach of cooperative engagement, or Mitt Romney’s vision of American primacy resting on military capabilities.\textsuperscript{716}

Anxiety over America’s global leadership role generated a political reaction in the form of conservative defence of American greatness/exceptionalism, and criticism that ‘leading from behind’ and ‘no troops on the ground’ have become problematic when dealing with situations in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, where a strong U.S. position is needed.\textsuperscript{717} Obama has been criticised for his lack of grand strategic vision, and slow response to unfolding international events, that has allowed power vacuums to form in numerous regions, for instance in North Africa (Libya and Egypt), the Middle East (ISIS, Iraq and Syria), Central Asia (Afghanistan) and Europe (Russia, Ukraine).\textsuperscript{718} Mantras like ‘don’t do stupid stuff’ and ‘leading from behind’ are alien to America’s view of itself as the city on the hill, with a manifest destiny to lead.\textsuperscript{719} For others, the administration has failed to articulate a clear grand strategy and failed to convince Americans of a sound grand strategy that makes appropriate use of American power.\textsuperscript{720} ‘Leading from behind’ and cooperative engagement leave unresolved questions about American uniqueness and superiority, when not combined with primacy, whilst also stressing the limits of American power. The paradox of this less visible hegemonic role has implications at home, for U.S. allies, and also for competitors, including China and Russia. Opposite to his beliefs, Obama’s position implies that the U.S. is less superior and unique – less exceptional – and more dependent on its regional strategy. During the 2012 presidential election campaign, exceptionalism became an expression of who believed in America more. ‘I believe,’ declared Romney in 2011, that ‘we are an exceptional country with a unique destiny and role in the world ... that of a great champion of human dignity and human freedom.’ “Text of Mitt Romney’s Speech on Foreign Policy at The Citadel,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, October 7, 2011. [http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/10/07/text-of-mitt-romneys-speech-on-foreign-policy-at-the-citadel/](http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/10/07/text-of-mitt-romneys-speech-on-foreign-policy-at-the-citadel/) (accessed November 17, 2015).

\textsuperscript{716} Republican discourse strongly associates exceptionalism with the belief in a new ‘American century’ and the rejection of any notion of even relative decline. Löffmann, “Leading from Behind,” 317.

\textsuperscript{717} Brooks, \textit{American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama}, 130.


allies to sustain its global hegemony. Despite these tensions, exceptionalist beliefs pervade American hegemonic identity and connect to the interpretation of threats to that identity through the national security narrative.

(ii) America’s hegemonic identity: Ontological security-seeking behaviour

Exceptionalism is a critical component of national identity construction that helps maintain the continuity and endurance of America’s hegemonic identity.721 Uniqueness of American identity and the superiority of American power are merged in the American geopolitical imagination that consistently associates American exceptionalism and American leadership with American primacy. This association became more prominent after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the United States became the single most powerful state in international system.722 The uniqueness and superiority of American capabilities, especially military, and its ability to control the global commons (sea, air and cyber) is seen as the ultimate embodiment of American primacy.723 America’s abilities to project power globally and to reorganise geopolitical space through military force, underline how exceptionalism and hegemony are a defining feature of American geopolitical understanding, which constantly work to reproduce one another. The U.S. distinguishes its regional hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific as built on its preponderant power and on the universality of its values, its virtue and the belief in its global social purpose as characteristics of its exceptionalism.

Identity refers not only to the characteristics of individuals and national types; it also incorporates the form of domestic order, the social relations of production and the various subjectivities to which they give rise.724 America’s hegemonic identity is a role identity that acquires meaning from role positions in the social order.725 Role is a normative concept.726 Role identities are internalised roles; aspects of

721 Löffmann, “Leading from Behind,” 310. Flockhart makes a valuable distinction between ‘system’ and ‘order’ in contemporary international relations. In a situation where liberal order is no longer global and may need to co-exist with other orders, questions relating to which values, norms and institutions belong in the international system, or to international order, become more significant. Flockhart, “The Coming Multi-Order World,” 17.
724 David Campbell, “Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States,” Alternatives 15, no. 3 (1990): 272. Wendt, for instance, distinguishes role identities from type identities. Type identities are social categories of states that share some characteristics (e.g. regime type). Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of It,” 391-425.
an actor’s sense of self, which reflect the appropriation of roles, and which motivate behaviour. Role in this sense refers to behaviour rather than position. Since role identities are formed and sustained relationally, they depend on others to be realised. Wendt argues that identities are rooted in an actor’s self-understandings (and are thus subjective) but also depend on whether that identity is recognised by other actors, which gives them an intersubjective quality. Identity formation processes provide information on who the actors are (what defines them), and on how the actors should behave in social interactions. Through these social processes, actors can uphold a set of expectations regarding behaviour directed towards them, and these processes also determine how other actors would like to, or are able to, respond to the actions of others. The social nature of identity imbues social interactions with some degree of predictability, by creating a sense of social order.

The continual production and reproduction of America’s hegemonic identity is an engrained ‘habit of leadership,’ shaped by its interactions with the domestic and international environments. Policy-makers can therefore conceive of their nation playing different roles, or serving different functions in separate issue areas, geographical regions or sets of relationships. The perception of its hegemonic role identity by American political officials frames their understanding of how the U.S. should, or will act, in a particular context, since its role identity refers to its internalised attitude towards others in the regional hierarchy – the regional social environment – in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. subjectivity views itself as a powerful nation, the regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific, overseer of regional commons and defender of regional order. Internal and external factors interact to produce the U.S. as an actor with

732 Buzan, for instance, asserts that this ‘habit of leadership’ is engrained in U.S. institutions and self-image, internally supported by the longstanding belief in American exceptionalism. See Barry Buzan, “A Leader without Followers?” 557.
735 Holsti sets out a typology of national roles. The patterns of role concepts specific to the U.S. in the course of its regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific include, regional leader, regional protector liberator supporter, anti-imperialist agent, mediator, developer and faithful ally. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” 255.
a specific hegemonic role identity, which in turn, affects state action.\textsuperscript{736} Since role identities are co-constituted, states are profoundly dependent on each other for role recognition.\textsuperscript{737}

Identity provides a useful conceptual link to threat construction.\textsuperscript{738} To gain insight into threat construction, consideration must first be given to what is, or what needs to be secured. Security, according to Williams and Krause, is ‘a derivative concept,’ which, in itself, is meaningless. To have meaning, ‘security presupposes something to be secured.’\textsuperscript{739} From this, it can be assumed that the concepts of security and identity are interconnected, which can help address questions about what is to be secured or ‘whose security is being assumed.’\textsuperscript{740} Buszynski maintains that ‘ultimately security is about protection of identity.’\textsuperscript{741} Given the relational nature of identity, who and what we are, is most clearly defined by ‘highlighting who or what “we” are not, and what “we” have to fear,’ which serves as a source of insecurity.\textsuperscript{742} Ontological insecurity refers to the ‘deep, incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore.’\textsuperscript{743} In talking about national security, therefore, making sense of state identity is essential, since ‘definitions of threat and interest…have strong effects on national security policies.’\textsuperscript{744} Critical constructivism assumes that ‘insecurity is itself the production of processes of identity construction in which the self and the other, or multiple others, are constituted.’\textsuperscript{745} Identities and insecurities themselves are not pre-given, or natural occurrences existing separately, but which ‘are produced in a mutually constitutive process.’\textsuperscript{746} Rather than looking at what factors cause the self’s insecurity, critical constructivists are interested in exploring ‘the background conditions and linguistic constructions (social discourses) that made [such insecurity] possible in the first place.’\textsuperscript{747} Both aspects are now considered in more detail.

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\textsuperscript{736} Finnemore and Sikkink, “Taking Stock,” 399.
\textsuperscript{737} Mitzen notes that ontological security needs can also be met through relationships that sustain and routinise competition. She notes that some states prefer conflict to cooperation because ‘only through conflict do they know who they are.’ Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” 361-363.
\textsuperscript{738} Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 413.
\textsuperscript{742} Campbell, Writing Security, 48.
\textsuperscript{746} Weldes et al, “Introduction: Constructing Insecurity,” 11.
The traditional understanding of security, as derived from physical security, imbues state apparatus with the responsibility to protect their nation’s territory and governance structure from others who can cause material and physical harm. States also engage in ontological security-seeking. In its base form, ontological security is identity security; it is the need to feel secure in one’s identity. Physical and ontological security concerns co-exist, in distinct and interrelated layers, that can be transformed into different conditions of physical (in)security and ontological (in)security by political actors, since ‘concerns about instability and uncertainty can easily be politically mobilised and manipulated into concerns about survival.’ The disaggregation of the two conditions of security thus facilitates a deeper look at how these distinct security conditions co-exist and importantly, how ontological security-seeking activities impinge upon physical security in the ‘real world’ of foreign policy.

Feeling ontologically secure involves ‘a sense of continuity and order in events,’ seeking repetition and stability in the social world, knowing what to expect, and having trust in the stability of relations with others so that a state can continue to uphold its sense of identity and purpose. Since ontological security is ‘closely linked to narrative, identity, practice and action,’ it is useful to disaggregate being and doing ontological security, assuming that states engage in both behaviours to maximise their ontological security. In assuming that states are motivated by the search for ontological security, the next step would be to assume that they would also engage in strategies to maintain and reproduce a sufficient level of ontological security. In the process of maintaining and reproducing ontological security, the state of being and the state of doing are interlinked and mutually constitutive. These conditions cannot be understood in isolation from each other, linked by the narrative and identity nexus that aims to secure a stable identity and biographical continuity.

Current IR literature on ontological security is characterised by different approaches regarding the relationality and the constitution of identity. Steele stresses that identities emerge endogenously, not just ‘in the dialectic between self and other, but within the internal dialectic that arises from the

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751 Browning and Joenniemi, “Escaping Security,” 5
ontological security-seeking process. Steele’s identification of this dual dialectic centres on the idea that states, just like individuals, are social actors seeking security within as well as from one another. The first layer of being, the internal dialectic, is concerned with self-integrity, insecurity and the production of shame.

For Giddens, an actor’s sense of self can be affected by a ‘critical situation’ which produces anxiety in so far as their sense of self is being challenged. If an actor chooses a course of action that is incongruent with their sense of integrity within their perception of self-identity, they experience what Giddens calls shame. Shame occurs when too much distance exists between the state’s autobiographical narrative and the actions that fulfil a sense of self-identity. As Steele notes, ‘it is unnatural for a state to identify one way and to ‘perform’ acts in a different way.’ Actions, therefore, must reinforce the self-conceptualisation. The timing of the rebalance announcement and the content of the strategy in November 2011 was induced by the ongoing concern that inaction would be incongruent with America’s own perception of its hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific. Hegemonic identity is mutually constituted with the biographical narrative of the United States concerning its perception of its hegemonic role and historical memory in the Asia-Pacific.

The second layer of being rests on the relationship between self and other. In post-structuralist expressions, identity of self presupposes the fashioning of an external other in contrast to oneself. Mitzen underscores the relational nature of identity by placing emphasis on routinised cooperative and/or conflictual practices with significant others. This understanding of identity follows the work of Campbell, who articulates that ‘we secure ourselves as beings mainly by discourses and practices that differentiate ourselves from others.’ The United States is experiencing instability and uncertainty of being in its relationship with China, as the ‘other.’ Ontological insecurity may arise from deep uncertainty and/or from the failure to have its sense of ‘self’ affirmed by others.

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U.S.-China relations are framed within the construct of a security narrative in which the ‘self’ experiences anxieties about what the U.S. perceives to be the threat from China’s rise. Ontological security can be used to explain actions and behaviour that appear to be driven by traditional security motivations. In seeking to maximise ontological security, there can be unintended physical security consequences. This helps explain why actors respond to feelings of ontological insecurity through securitisation strategies, since the role of the state as the provider of physical security blurs with its ontological security needs. Consequently, the attempt to uphold an established basis for ontological security may in turn undermine other elements of an actor’s security. From this perspective, the U.S. responds to the threat to its hegemonic identity from China’s rise through the lens of physical security – military and economic – by focusing on issues such as China’s military modernisation, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, or Chinese cyber-attacks on American corporations and government networks.

The strategy of doing maximises and reinforces ontological security by upholding a stable cognitive environment and the autobiographical/threat narratives through routinised practice. Giddens notes that ‘self-identity is not something that is just given, as a result of the continuities of the individual’s action-system, but something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual.’ However, ontological security is derived from the agent’s capacity to manage changes in routine rather than in managing the normal – handling emergent change, disruptive events or unintended consequences. Actors adopt different ontological security-seeking strategies in response to feelings of ontological insecurity. One such strategy is to rely on established routines which are a way of reasserting the biography of one’s life. When identities are challenged by critical situations or in the broader context of structural transformations, actors turn to the past and reaffirm established routines, identities and stories to uphold a sense of ontological security and continuity.

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764 Mitzen notes that states can become attached to relationship routines that perpetuate physical insecurity and which are harmful, because they provide ontological security. Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” 354.
767 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 52.
768 Ian Craib, Experiencing Identity (London: Sage, 1998), 72; Flockhart notes that being ontologically secure is not about securing a stable identity. The condition of ontological security is derived from the capacity of ‘self’ to be continually reconstituted through narrative and identity processes. Ontological security is constantly under threat from destabilisation by ‘dislocatory events’ and can also be undermined by behaviour deemed undesirable, either externally or internally. Flockhart, “The Problem of Change in Constructivist Theory,” 807.
Even when these routines are not positive in the sense that they do not facilitate an actor’s ability to adapt to a changing environment, some states are likely to reproduce particular ontological security seeking behaviours, albeit compromising their physical security.\textsuperscript{771}

**National security narratives: Identifying danger and containing threats**

Narrative acts as a central support for identity and subjectivity since narrative is critical to meaning-making which is integral to definitions of threats and interests in the construction of national security.\textsuperscript{772} Central to any state of ontological security is the ability to tell convincing stories about themselves and others and to gain recognition for their self within intersubjectively constructed groupings.\textsuperscript{773} As constructivists have consistently argued, rational explanations obscure the influence of intersubjective understandings on agents’ interpretations of material incentives.\textsuperscript{774} ‘Structures do not come with an instruction sheet,’ and exogenous events and uncertainties must be interpreted; they cannot be defined simply in terms of their effects on military or economic capabilities.\textsuperscript{775} Events do not reflect some objective reality, they require interpretation, since they gain meaning through our perception and understanding of them, as they become fabricated into ‘coherent stories.’\textsuperscript{776} It is through the employment and reflexive recollection of the past that the continuity of the narrative in the present is ensured and it is through social processes of identity construction that intersubjective understandings of what constitutes good practice and shared knowledge are achieved.\textsuperscript{777}

Ciută characterises the relationship between identity and narrative as a dynamic process called the ‘narrative shuffle,’ in which narratives and identities are continuously reinterpreted and realigned against each other in a constant process between narratives and identity construction processes.\textsuperscript{778} The narrative shuffle produces a continuous process of reconstruction of both narratives and identities so that one supports the other. Political agents self-consciously and strategically seek to make sense of the

\textsuperscript{777} Flockhart notes that practice - understood to be inherently social and grounded in particular identities and normatively sanctioned repertoires of conduct - is an important but largely overlooked influence on both narrative and identity. Trine Flockhart, “Liberal Imaginations: Transformative Logics of Liberal Order,” in *Liberal World Orders*, eds. Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 81.
world and to shape how others make sense of the world through an authorised narrative. However, in practice, there are always other plausible ways of narrating an event, of representing the setting, the actors and their purposes.通过叙述的洗牌，有一种复杂的来回移动事件和情节结构，直到两者都很好地融合在一起。在这个过程中，意义、规则和互动的背景被赋予目的和意义，‘连续地适应于意图、期望和偶遇，这些塑造了参与者的日常行为。’

Framing the national security narrative consists of fitting the preferred policy into broadly accepted values, and ‘grafting’ new issues onto well-established ones. This process is essential because it grounds social life and weaves the community together. Constructing a credible threat around which the national security narrative can be woven, is intrinsically linked to America’s perception of self and the distinct other, in this case, China. In constructing a coherent story concerning China’s activities, a discursive connection is created between historical events, the articulation of national security interests and specific security threats that reinforce identity and justify certain uses of American power to enhance American ontological security. There are two distinct and inter-related narrational processes occurring simultaneously. The first is autobiographical and the second relates to the external other.

The first narrational process involves upholding self-biographies, which is critical to maintaining a sense of ontological security because they incorporate a story of self (who I am and what I want) and past experience (what I have done and why). Such biographies locate the individual in time and space and in particular subject positions in respect of events, other actors that establishes the expectations of continuity of relations and a sense of order over those events in the first place. The second narrational process involves ‘othering,’ which is also critical to hegemonic identity construction. Exceptionalism further animates an expression of a distinctly American sense of

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781 This theoretical framework is presented in detail in Felix Ciută, “Narrativity, Social Constructivism, and International Relations Theory,” paper delivered at the 5th *Brave New World* conference, University of Manchester, June 2000.
782 Public story-telling is powerful because it structures the field of political play, not because it leads to a particular policy outcome. Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security*, 37-39.
785 Huntington notes that identity requires differentiation and differentiation necessitates comparison: the identification of the ways in which ‘our’ group differs from ‘their’ group, who are also engaged in a similar process. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the U.S. for the first time in its history without any clear ‘other’ against which to define itself. Huntington, *Who are We?*, 25, 260.
identity, which relies upon comparison with a corrupt and dangerous ‘other’ to inform the national security narrative. 786 Although defining the exact nature of the threat is not necessary, the identification and ‘othering’ of the enemy allows any administration flexibility in determining who the enemy is and how that enemy should be contained or defeated. 787

The ‘state’ and its institutions act as the principal provider of national security, with the President holding ‘narrative authority,’ rooted in the public’s trust, alongside a limited number of speakers within the administration authorised ‘to serve as the community’s designated agents of narrative production.’ 788 One way in which the U.S. foreign policy establishment rationalises its activities is by dint of an overarching threat narrative. 789 The daily practices, and articulations of top Washington officials and governmental institutions continuously reproduce and reinforce core interpretations and narratives, providing a concrete external ‘reality’ and a sense of legitimacy for the public. 790 Government institutions are primed to receive an administration’s priority discourse. Consequently, U.S. security institutions are highly attuned to central narratives and representations of threats to American national security that are ‘reproduced, embedded, and normalised across a range of other social institutions and practices.’ 791 Over time, narratives become institutionalised and embedded within the institutions, practices and material interests of American society and politics, to the extent that accepted ‘truths’ appear external and self-evident. For its part, the American foreign policy establishment, through decades of cultural practice, is continually developing an interpretive framework which constructs and gives responses to threats in a highly militarised and impulsive fashion. 792 The American public look to authoritative speakers within an administration to provide a national sense of purpose.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) – the formal outline of U.S. foreign policy strategy – is a significant source of communication between the White House and the populace (and American allies and rivals), that sets out the strategic priorities and security agenda for that administration. The DOD’s Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), the last in 2014, assesses the threat environment and rebalances the Pentagon’s ‘strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today’s conflicts and tomorrow’s

786 McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 27.
787 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 157.
789 Campbell asserts that the way the US interprets danger and secures boundaries of its identity. Therefore danger, difference and threat constitute US identity. Campbell, Writing Security, 56.
792 See Campbell, Writing Security, 70.
The publication of regular NSS and QDR documentation creates the illusion that threats, and by extension, the nation’s security, can be predicted and managed in advance; that the United States has near full knowledge of the threats (and opportunities) it is likely to face. Strategising is a way for an administration to show the thought processes behind its choices but formal strategy documents are vague, typically laying out a ‘laundry list’ of threats and challenges, with potentially self-fulfilling implications by turning potential threats into real ones.

‘The ritual of crafting strategy encourages participants to spin a narrative that magnifies the scope of the national interest and exaggerates global threats. The aggressive policies adopted in reaction to the perceived threats make them real.’

The process of creating a national security strategy also justifies big defence budgets and limits policy choices by validating potentially more aggressive responses to counter the threat identified in the NSS and QDR. Put simply, ‘to enter the world of the National Security Strategy is to enter a world always at risk,’ which diverges with the goal of the process, which is to create the illusion of security and certainty, presenting the idea to the nation that the government is in control.

Dominant narratives of national security establish the common-sense givens of debate, set the boundaries of the legitimate, and limit what political actors can publicly justify. These narratives therefore shape the national security policies that states pursue because they define the national interest and identify global challenges and opportunities. Through the dominant narrative, officials generally legitimize their preferred policies with reference to it and thereby reproduce it. Dominant narratives do not abolish political difference but they do support a limited range of perspectives. A single unifying storyline reduces the likelihood of multiple narratives entering the public sphere, limiting the scope of the debate. The need for ontological security and the public demand for narrative order means that national officials are responsible for making sense of the world.

Reflecting on his first term, Obama admitted that the presidential remit was not just about policy, rather, ‘the nature of this office is also to tell a story to the American people that gives them a sense of unity.

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and purpose and optimism, especially during tough times. Obama’s admission highlights the importance of narrative leadership in domestic and foreign affairs, particularly concerning national security. The importance of owning and communicating the dominant narrative on national security is essential to the positive perception of the administration by the general public. Without it, the administration is viewed as lacking a coherent national security strategy. The Obama administration, keen to move away from the dominant G.W. Bush ‘War on Terror’ national security narrative, has found it difficult to construct a credible alternative.

(i) The threat to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: The ‘rising China’ narrative

Shared understandings of perceived or real threats provide a cultural resource which political officials can invoke to legitimise or ‘sell’ new policies and programmes. Identification of threats, however vaguely defined, is a critical resource for the state in reproducing its identity as the nation’s protector. In Writing Security, Campbell notes that specific sources of danger were not fixed during the Cold War. The Soviet threat was assessed in geopolitical terms but was often understood as a political rather than a primarily military danger, and often represented in cultural and ideological terms. Since threats to U.S., and more broadly, to American interpretations of global security, are typically understood in terms of disorder, the ‘China threat’ can be modified accordingly. The construction of the ‘China threat,’ primarily driven by the ‘rise of China’ narrative, is not merely what is said about

804 Washington has also had a hard time using the China threat discourse to convince regional states, who are generally wary of being caught up in this particular narrative. Jackson, “Culture, Identity and Hegemony,” 397.
805 Campbell, Writing Security, 31. Campbell considers how no all-encompassing or fixed conception of the Soviet threat was constructed during the Cold War. Although the Soviet threat was regarded as constant, the threat was ‘variably characterised’ and thus the danger to the United States did not flow from a constant military threat. David Campbell, “Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States,” Alternatives 15, no. 3 (1990): 268-9.
806 Campbell, Writing Security, 31.
807 The type of threat can also be very specific. In February 2015, President Obama identified Russia and China as the main sources of threat to military (and economic) information technologies, and terrorists as the main threat to social media – a medium through which human rights and democracy can be spread - but which terrorists use to spread their ‘hateful ideologies’. The White House, “Remarks by the President at the Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection Summit,” Stanford University, February 13, 2015. [https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/remarks-president-cybersecurity-and-consumer-protection-summit] (accessed November 18, 2015).
China, it is ‘a paradigm for how China is to be understood,’ and more significantly, how the U.S. understands China’s rising power identity.  

Washington bases its assessment of the China threat on Beijing’s growing regional influence, determining that, as a different type of rising power, China intends to replace the U.S. as regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific. China’s growing economic weight and military capabilities give it the capability to influence regional order, thus presenting the greatest threat to America’s liberal hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific. As Beijing’s presentation of a Chinese vision of regional order in the Asia-Pacific, discussed below, is interpreted as threatening, these assertions are assumed to challenge American hegemony across the Pacific Ocean – a cornerstone of American national security. Viewed through this lens, any acknowledgement of China’s core interests is interpreted as an indication that what China really seeks is U.S. compromise on areas of disagreement between the two. Moreover, seemingly separate issues are combined to provide evidence of this threat. Consequently, the speed and type of military modernisation and the level of military spending has attracted attention, especially since the PLA is developing anti-access/area-denial capabilities that, under the right conditions, might challenge the U.S. military’s ability to operate in the western Pacific, compounded by China’s island-building activities in the South China Sea.


810 Washington is concerned about the lack of transparency surrounding the control of the PLA, which is not officially part of the state, but is responsible to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and run by the Party’s Central Military Commission, not the Chinese Ministry of Defence. The CCP is even less transparent and accountable than the government. Susan V. Lawrence, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 2013), 1-3. For the Chinese perspective on US concerns, see Zhu Feng, “Chinese Perspectives on the U.S. Role in Southeast Asia,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2013): 55.


812 There has been a great deal of deliberation over what China’s spending means in terms of its capacity to challenge the U.S. military. At current levels, the projection is that China is expected to overtake US defence
Through the national security framework, particular events are deemed critical situations which amplify and feed into the threat construction process. Although military modernisation is occurring throughout the Asia-Pacific, it is China’s military modernisation which has developed into an actual threat to American interests and regional hegemony, prompting an immediate response from Washington. Chinese cyber activities have become a focal point for emphasising the direct threat that China presents to the United States, mainly because U.S. power projection, like the U.S. economy, depends heavily on computer networks for command and control. U.S. security analysts are concerned that Chinese cyber-attacks could be used to deter or restrict U.S. intervention in an East Asia crisis. Contrastingly, Beijing appears more concerned with the ideological threats of an open, unrestricted internet on its domestic environment, rather than emphasising the technical threats that encompass the Western notion of cyber-security.

Lindsay observes that “the discourse on China and cybersecurity routinely conflates issues as different as political censorship, unfair competition, assaults on infrastructure and internet governance.” All aspects of American fears about China’s rise are conflated into each issue – be it cyber security or Chinese naval activities in the South China Sea. Acting on regional concerns of China’s intentions along its periphery further boosts the legitimacy of Washington’s concerns, its regional hegemony, and its choice of policy action. As China rises and its challenge manifests on multiple levels of social and international interaction – militarily, institutionally, structurally and discursively – Chinese activities reinforce American attitudes towards China’s rise as ‘common sense’ and justifies American action in order to protect the hegemonic identity of the United States. Singling out specific threats can

spending in 2025 but it will take far longer for it to develop traditional capabilities to match those of the US. Xenia Dormandy with Rory Kinane, “Asia-Pacific Security: A Changing Role for the United States,” Chatham House, April 2014, 17.


815 In 2010, the director of the State Council Information Office and External Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party linked ‘hostile foreign forces’ and subversive ‘universal values’ to internet penetration in China, with the potential to undermine the power of the state. Information Office of the State Council, “The Internet in China,” Beijing, June 8, 2010 [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm (accessed June 24, 2016)].

816 Lindsay, “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity,” 7.


lead to the exaggeration of the actual danger that a particular threat presents, exacerbating the existing environment of mistrust.

(ii) Chinese exceptionalism: A competing narrative

The perception of the China ‘threat’ in the American psyche has been further reinforced by the development of China’s own version of exceptionalism. The implications of China’s rise and increasing political engagement in global affairs also dominate Chinese academic and policy elite discussion around the complexities of China’s global identity in a transforming region and in constituting its vision for global order. China’s growing international political and diplomatic responsibilities are pushing a reconsideration of the Dengist low profile strategy of the past to deal with numerous multi-faceted global issues, whilst not destabilising domestic reforms. As part of the debate over the meaning of China’s changing international profile, China’s self-perception is one of a civilisational entity, rather than merely another state. China’s sense of being exceptional is just one indication of the importance of national identity in its thinking, as it considers its international position.

One such potential invocation of China’s newly assertive great power identity comes in the form of Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream narrative. On taking over the mantle of CCP leadership in 2012, President Xi launched the ‘Chinese Dream’ strategy, primarily a vision of domestic progression, but also outlining his vision for China’s global aspirations. It details China’s national revival, following the century of humiliation, specifying that China will remain ‘faithful to its rich cultural heritage and socialist identity.’ Xi’s elaboration of the Chinese Dream indicates China’s re-emergence as a great power, pursuing an independent foreign policy. The underlying narrative is one of a people who are ‘heirs to a unique civilisation and a utopian destiny that entitle them to a privileged position in the world’ under Xi’s moral leadership. For Xi, it spells out the foretelling of China’s ascendency to military,

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819 Tim Summers, “China’s Global Personality,” Chatham House, June 2014. There is intense debate occurring within Chinese political and academic elite circles as to whether China should continue to focus on its internal economic development, and internationally pursue Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of ‘hiding one’s strength, biding one’s time.’ Chinese studies on grand strategy are becoming available to the English-speaking audience which suggests that Chinese academics wish to engage and communicate further afield. The extent of the debate implies China’s grand strategy is still in the developmental phase. This debate is discussed in depth in Chapter 6.


821 India, too, sees itself in a similar way, although this draws less attention in Washington because it is a democracy. See Mike Mochizuki and Deepa Ollapally, “Identity and Asian Powers: What does it mean for International Relations in Asia and beyond?” International Studies 48, no. 3/4 (2011): 197.


823 China Daily, “‘Chinese Dream’ to shape Global Landscape: Experts.”

economic, and cultural power. It is a vision of China’s rise that could materialise by the centenary of the CCP’s establishment in 2021, and that of the PRC’s founding in 2049. It is a conceptualisation of an exceptionalist ideology, with the potential to lead China to great power status that clashes with the American image of what a great power should be.

The articulation of the competing Chinese Dream narrative suggests that the notion of China’s exceptionalism is gaining traction within the CCP leadership. Studies of Chinese foreign policy have long recognised that China possesses a distinctive set of foreign policy principles derived from its long historical and cultural experience and China’s rising global influence has given more weight to the notion of Chinese exceptionalism. China’s exceptionalist beliefs are partly constructed through selecting certain aspects of its own unique history, culture and political myths that will underpin its trajectory to great power status through which China’s worldview can be interpreted. Ideas such as harmonious world and peaceful development, based on China’s historical greatness, present a model for China’s world order and elevate China to the moral high ground. The sources of the ideational construction of China’s foreign policy are being drawn from its own historical and cultural narratives of peace and accommodation, enabling the construction of China’s great power status that is supposed to be distinct from Western paradigms. Chinese analysts see their country as the successor of an eastern strategic tradition that is pacifistic, defence-minded, non-expansionist, and ethical, whereas Western strategic culture - especially that of the United States - is viewed as militaristic, offence-minded, expansionist, and selfish. China’s exceptionalist discourse discloses a desire to present a particular view of China’s past behaviour, which the outside world should accept as the ‘true’ representation of China’s history and culture. It is self-protection against what Beijing projects as


826 Zhang, “Chinese Exceptionalism in the Intellectual World of China’s Foreign Policy,” 43.

827 Zhang, “Chinese Exceptionalism in the Intellectual World of China’s Foreign Policy,” 56.

828 China professes to strive for a world of harmony and diversity, which separates it from American foreign policy that induces it to promote American values and remake the world in its image. Feng Zhang, “Chinese Exceptionalism in the Intellectual World of China’s Foreign Policy,” 56. Johnston argues that there is a gap between ideas such as benevolence, pacifism, peace and accommodation which inform China’s strategic culture and historical behaviour. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 27.


foreign misunderstanding, prejudice and misapprehension and is as much an ideal as it is based in foreign policy record.831

China’s shift to a more self-assured and assertive great power identity followed the 2008 global financial crisis. China’s handling of the crisis expedited the perception that global power relationships had changed markedly, affecting China’s position relative to the United States in particular.832 China was becoming ‘a state that will not be beholden to outside conceptions of its interests nor constrained by multilateral institutions or processes.’833 A 2011 White Paper addressed external concerns about China’s defence capabilities in protecting China’s core interests, stating that, ‘the fundamental purpose of modernising the Chinese armed forces is to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and interests of national development.’834 The articulation and protection of China’s core interests indicates that Beijing was starting to formulate a grand strategy contingent on its core interests rather than its relations with others – ‘a sign of a more self-confident and self-determining posture’ that is ‘no longer predicated on…how other great powers draw the world map.’835

Having an enemy – real or imagined – is not cost-free.836 Constructing and treating China as a threat increases the likelihood of China becoming a threat in practice.837 The China ‘threat’ paradigm thus becomes an ‘objective truth,’ implying the need to exert some level of control over China’s rise,

831 Zhang, “Chinese Exceptionalism in the Intellectual World of China’s Foreign Policy,” 59. Feng notes that Chinese exceptionalism is reflective of an important internal contradiction within China’s worldview – its strong desire to regain its historical great power status, underpinned by a fundamentally statist and nationalistic logic that contradicts cultural principles of inclusion, reformism and pacifism. From this perspective, China has no intention of pursuing a mission civilisatrice, exporting its value system to the rest of the world, unlike what they perceive to be the western preference for ‘domination by spiritual or military conquest.’ However, as its neighbours can attest, China has never been afraid to use coercion and intimidation against those it sees as contesting its interests. For historical consideration, see Johnston, Cultural Realism.


836 Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 85.

837 The 2014 QDR establishes the ‘scale of China’s military modernisation, combined with the relative lack of transparency and openness from China’s leaders regarding both capabilities and intentions’ as a threat to the United States, to its ability to sustain security globally and to project power and win decisively. ‘China will continue seeking to counter US strengths using A2/AD, cyber and space control technologies.’ Department of Defense, The Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC, 2014, 4-6. http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/QDR (accessed June 24, 2016).
including the nature of its rising power identity, even though this identity is yet to be defined from the Chinese perspective. The United States is increasingly fixated on the identity of China as an authoritarian and nationalistic state, which may eventually provide Washington with the moral justification for tougher measures. This is not to say that the hardening of U.S. policy towards China is not rooted in China’s increasingly forceful and erratic strategic behaviour on its periphery. After all, China’s global identity is partly the result of the way its behaviour is perceived by others and its regional policy thinking is also shaped by the foreign policy choices of other regional powers, including the U.S. and Japan. However, others’ perceptions may not fully account for the complex nature of China’s ‘internal processes, actors and systems, which inform the behaviour that China displays on the international stage.’

Distrust is self-perpetuating: it is ‘itself corrosive, producing attitudes and actions that themselves contribute to greater distrust.’ As the distrust deepens, it is difficult for leaders on each side to be confident they understand the deep thinking among leaders on the other side regarding the future U.S.-China relationship. The complex nature of bilateral relations between Beijing and Washington presents challenges for both, and neither agrees on how this relationship should evolve.

The ‘China threat’ narrative, with its implications for American exceptionalism and American regional hegemonic identity, is critical to understanding how the U.S. responds to China and how it manages U.S.-China bilateral relations. The increasingly narrowing focus on Chinese identity through the lens of nationalism, and China’s ideas about its own exceptionalism reinforces the interpretation of China’s behaviour as aggressive in the American psyche and helps construct the increasingly competitive environment in the Asia-Pacific. In Canberra, in 2011, President Obama indicated that the U.S. had

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838 Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 95.
842 At the 2009 White House meeting, Chinese diplomats suggested raising the relationship to one of strategic partnership so that U.S. officials would show respect for China’s rising world status. It is said the Americans saw the process in reverse: the U.S. could not agree on the definition of the relationship until the two countries started acting and cooperating like strategic partners. See Stephen Hadley and Paul Haenle, “The Catch-22 in U.S.-Chinese Relations: the future of bilateral ties,” Foreign Affairs (February 22, 2015).
843 To avoid reducing developments in the Asia-Pacific only to the rise of China narrative and bipolar U.S.-China relations, other regional narratives, including power diffusion, should be considered. See Xenia Wickett, Jon Nilsson Wright and Tim Summers, “The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US–China Narrative,” Chatham House, September 24, 2015.
844 Carlson, for example, observes that analysts focus on the narrow conceptualisation of Chinese identity through nationalism. Broadening the discussion to national identity formation – examining the production of Chinese collective imaginings allows for the idea that there is a high degree of contestation that exists in China
a ‘profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China’; China is a ‘partner’ and that the U.S. would seek more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing. During the course of the Obama administration, there has been a shift in emphasis from strategic reassurance and engagement, to strategic competition, in parallel with the intensification of the negative interpretation of China’s rise.

A shift in rhetoric was noticeable during the third presidential candidate televised debate in October 2012, when Obama pronounced China to be an ‘adversary,’ while admitting that it was also ‘a potential partner.’ Three years into the rebalance, in his speech to the University of Queensland in November 2014, Obama signalled that the U.S. was unclear as to what kind of global player China intended to be, and expressed uncertainty over the developing framework for Sino-U.S. relations.

‘If, in fact, China is playing the role of a responsible actor that is peaceful and prosperous and stable, that is good for this region, it’s good for the world, it’s good for the United States. So we’ll pursue cooperation with China where our interests overlap or align.’

Washington is placing the responsibility for improving U.S-China relations onto Beijing. Complicating matters further, President Xi Jinping, with his nationalistic rhetoric and the appearance of an uncompromising attitude, has encouraged the dominance of Washington’s foreign policy hawks in over basic aspects of its national identity, and following on from this, its rising power identity. See Allen Carlson, “It should not only be about Nationalism: China’s Pluralistic National Identity and its Implications for Chinese Foreign Relations,” *International Studies* 48, nos. 3/4 (2011): 224.


The White House, “Remarks by President Obama at the University of Queensland.”
controlling the narrative. Ignoring Chinese assertiveness would only fuel the idea of America’s decline and make the U.S. look weak. In the past, U.S. hesitation in taking strong action has been viewed by challengers as an opportunity to advance their own interests in the Asia-Pacific. This amplified narrative, particularly prominent in the media, appears to be obscuring the more moderate approach preferred by the administration that recommends the continued engagement and further consolidation of China within the existing order, alongside tougher action when required.

Obama, for his part, has appeared reluctant to produce, or communicate, the focused grand strategic thinking required to unify the American domestic audience. In his vision of global politics, as complex, and rapidly transforming into a multipolar and multi-layered world, it is difficult to formulate a specific foreign policy doctrine. His efforts to educate the American public on the limits of America’s power and the need to adapt American foreign policy to reflect the realities of transforming international politics have undermined the traditional conception of American hegemony rooted in American power without replacing it with a new narrative. Moreover, his inability to shape a new narrative on China has allowed Republicans to ‘fill the vacuum of interpretation.’

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strategy was on engagement, with ‘implicit containment, balancing or deterrence.’ Since the 2011 rebalance announcement, the deterrence and balancing elements of the strategy have become more pronounced, indicating that China is increasingly viewed in Washington as representing a threat to American hegemony. The process of institutionalising the ‘China threat’ also extends beyond the United States to its regional allies, since the feeling of threat and danger has the vital political function of constructing and sustaining any collective identity.

**Containment 2.0: Responding to the China threat**

There is a tendency in sections of the United States (especially in the media and in Congress) to view the Asia-Pacific primarily through a China lens in matters of economic and strategic competition. For many in the security community, China has become the new Cold War adversary, or at least the potential one. This reflects an American predisposition towards an external adversary, particularly on the part of military and policy hawks, who historically have required something or someone to plan against. This narrow focus, in part created by the exceptionalist tendency to see a power transition in zero-sum terms, is a self-fulfilling prophecy that creates mistrust and suspicion and stops other strategies such as accommodation from being considered.

The labelling of an issue as a ‘security risk/problem’ by any government automatically legitimises the use of exceptional means to counter or contain that threat. Containment was pivotal in attempting to halt the spread of the Soviet communist threat during the Cold War. This strategy has generally been considered the most effective military strategy to check the spread of an aggressive external threat and potential carrier of global chaos. The policy of containing the Soviet threat aimed to prevent the Soviet Union from using its power and position to reshape the post-war international order. As the strategy developed, containing the spread of Soviet ideology was prioritised. The National Security

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858 American allies, including Japan and Australia, have also institutionalised the China threat discourse to varying degrees, and embedded it within their security procurement programmes. Others, including the Philippines and Thailand have benefitted directly from U.S. military training and assistance programmes and cooperation in non-traditional security areas. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 114; Jackson, “Culture, Identity and Hegemony,” 395.


862 In his memoirs, George Kennan later disputed the militaristic bent of containment. His intention was the ‘political containment of a political threat’. George Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1967), 358.
Council document, NSC-68, produced in 1950, outlined both the aim of the containment strategy, which was to ‘bring about an internal change in the Soviet system,’ and how the U.S., with its western allies, would ‘morally and materially’ fight the Cold War.\(^{863}\)

Maintaining order, the organising principle of U.S. policy, drawn from NSC-68, ensured U.S. interests and mitigated against international chaos.\(^{864}\) The father of containment, George Kennan, intended for the internal contradictions of the Soviet regime to bring about its own collapse.\(^{865}\) Therefore, while the U.S. could increase the strains under which the Soviet Union and its allies operated, in the end it was the inefficiencies of command economies, the absence of political accountability and an ideology that suppressed the freedom of its peoples that would bring about its demise.\(^{866}\) Yet, the containment strategy arose and developed within a particular period, time and set of circumstances. It is debatable how successful containment was in delivering the end of the Soviet Union and how successful it would be against a very different animal that is China and in a geopolitical environment that is more interdependent and complex.

Although containment cannot be divorced from the historical context from which it originated, it has become shorthand for a range of political, economic and military policies directed at China. The growing domination of the rise of China narrative reinforces the notion that China’s increasing regional influence must be countered by engaging in some form of containment. The common aim of these measures is to dissuade or deter China from expanding its power beyond certain limits through the exertion of various degrees of pressure or coercion.\(^{867}\) The original containment strategy incorporated a series of measures to check Soviet military expansion and to weaken the Soviet Union economically and diplomatically.\(^{868}\) On this basis, the U.S. would be seeking to isolate China internationally by cutting its access to the global trading regime and shutting down its trade and investment ties. The goal


\(^{867}\) Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 86.

of engagement, however, has always been to support China’s integration into the existing order, encouraging it to play a more influential role, which has been a Chinese aspiration also. The U.S. commitment to engaging China economically has contributed to China’s growth, and helped China to narrow the relative power gap.

There is the potential for selective rather than wholesale transferability to the current context of the China ‘threat’ but this is not a Soviet-style containment strategy. A military containment policy would involve integrating China’s neighbours into a unified alliance system against Beijing; developing collective defence strategies against China; and pursuing an ideological campaign aimed at delegitimising the Chinese state and its governing regime. China’s military modernisation and general assertiveness along its periphery in the security realm have undoubtedly accelerated the military element of the rebalance. The long-standing practice of technological transfer restrictions on trade with China and U.S. pressure on the EU and Israel not to sell weapons to China are two such measures that imply military containment or balancing. In practice, such measures have not altered the general trend of China’s increasing influence and nor do they offset the trade, investment and diplomatic policies that have contributed to China’s overall rise. Alienating U.S. allies and others by forcing them to choose China or the United States at a time of relative peace and stability would cost the United States its ability to maintain a regional military presence and to build a countering alliance against China if Beijing were to become more aggressive in the future.

The U.S. is not attempting to stall China’s continuing economic growth, which is essential to the global economy. However the U.S. does want to prevent the use of that growing economic power in ways unacceptable to the United States. A balancing strategy has the core objective of protecting, and wherever possible, expanding, U.S. advantages in relative power terms, but without incorporating components suggestive of containment. Safeguarding U.S. hegemony requires Washington to support the rise of other powers along China’s periphery; deepen globalisation in specific ways to procure enhanced gains for itself and its friends; invest in preserving its military superiority; and, finally, revitalise the U.S. economy to sustain its dominance in the new leading sectors of the global economy.

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869 See Johnston, Social States.
870 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 380 & 385.
872 Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?” 110.
873 Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? 122.
The strategy of nurturing other regional powers along the Asia-Indo-Pacific periphery to balance China without containing it, therefore, provides the regional system with the best of both worlds: an opportunity to limit Beijing’s capacity for malevolence without sacrificing the common prosperity arising from trade and interdependence.

A further suggestion is that the U.S. strategy blends engagement with containment/balancing, combining military containment with economic engagement. A strategy of congagement is frequently defended with confusing statements such as ‘Washington must engage China in order to balance against it, and balance against it in order to engage it.’ The U.S. military seeks to contain China, as demonstrated by the highly offensive Air/Sea Battle operational concept that has emerged in response to China’s anti-access, anti-denial challenge to American power projection capabilities, combined with the increased military presence in the Pacific – in China’s backyard – over the next decade. A forward, yet defensive engagement with allies and proxies, deterrence and basing – reinvigorates America’s positions of strength against the next wave of hegemonic aspirants. Congagement also infers that Washington is pursuing a strategy of economic engagement, which, it is hoped, will make China more amenable to American foreign policy goals. However, China’s increasing wealth will make it harder to contain, as its political and military power develop to match its economic power. In turn, the U.S. is less able to contain China because of the growing economic interdependence between them. Equally, these approaches downplay the constructive partnership that both

877 Justin Logan, “China, America and the Pivot to Asia,” Policy Analysis no.717, Cato Institute, January 8, 2013, 9. Logan asserts that ‘congagement’ is not a hedging strategy. Hedging refers to a decision to make a conservative investment with low but likely returns in order to help cover potential losses from a risky investment with high but less likely returns. In the analogy with China policy, the large, risky bet would be trading with China, which narrows the relative power gap between the two countries, in the hopes that China will be transformed and will not compete with the United States militarily.
881 During President Xi’s visit to Washington in September 2015, the White House ‘declared a truce’ over the AIIB, pledging to back Beijing’s bid for the renminbi to be contained in the basket of IMF reserve currencies. At the same time, Washington secured a pledge from Beijing that it would increase contributions to the World Bank
Washington and Beijing seek in the long term. Both understand each other’s position on major issues and work bilaterally on a growing number of areas of global importance. The U.S.-China strategy is more complex than containment or balancing, or blended engagement strategies imply.

The rebalance strategy: A mixed approach to securing America’s hegemonic identity

The rebalance strategy is the product of the national security narrative and exemplifies Obama’s interpretation of exceptionalism that imbues his approach to American leadership and power. This initiative not only seeks to enhance American geopolitical influence in the Asia-Pacific; it also aims to reproduce American identity as the Asia-Pacific power, and deny this role to China. It is as much about reproducing America’s Asia-Pacific identity as it is about geopolitics. The conception of America as the resident Asia-Pacific power provides justification for the normalisation of America’s continued hegemony. It does not create an Asian identity for the United States. The United States, however, is not to be one of several Asia-Pacific powers, rather it sees itself, and aspires to remain, the Asia-Pacific power. This conception of being the primary Asia-Pacific power has become even more pronounced after the Cold War. The refocus on the Asia-Pacific suggests that America’s conception of itself as the resident Asia-Pacific power is enough for it to maintain its military presence in the region. Consequently, American leadership ‘will remain essential to shaping the region’s long-term trajectory’ in three critical areas of international relations: enhancing stability and security, facilitating trade and


884 Despite Obama’s personal Asian credentials, his administration has not successfully convinced Americans of its Asia-Pacific identity. US policymakers acting in Southeast Asia of the past often viewed it as a region composed of alien and inferior actors. The way in which American exceptionalism reacted with hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, viewed Asian nations as subordinate, rather than equals. While the U.S. is deeply embedded in the international relations of the Asia-Pacific and implicated in the region’s relative peace and economic dynamism, the United States has not assumed an ‘Asian’ identity. Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 52.


commerce through an open and transparent system, and ensuring respect of universal rights and freedoms.Obama’s rebalance strategy acknowledges that the changing geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific, as a result of the rise of China and India, has implications for American’s regional hegemony. The aim is to orient U.S. Asia-Pacific policy towards the re-establishment of existing commitments with allies and building new partnerships, based on a less coercive, although not on an entirely equal, footing. The rebalance aspires to redress the imbalance in the American use of power that over the course of time has become heavily tilted towards the military, by bringing strategic objectives in line with resources, in a period of fiscal constraint. For key White House and State Department officials, therefore, China is only one element of U.S. Asia-Pacific policy, not ‘the dominant focus that conditions policy towards the rest of the region.’ Nevertheless, the rebalance strategy aims to fortify U.S. leadership by restraining potential sources of disorder in the Asia-Pacific through its network of alliances and partnerships. India has been encouraged to play a bigger role in regional security and politics, as a way to keep China in check.

As the U.S. tries to shape the economic and strategic environment in which a rising China can operate, the rebalance becomes a strategy that, at least from China’s perspective, also seeks to control the construction of China’s rising power, or great power identity. Therefore, while the U.S. is not able to contain China’s physical rise, the U.S. does want to limit the impact of China’s rise on America’s hegemonic identity, by shaping the discourse within which China’s rising power identity operates. By constructing China as the threatening other, by depriving China of its subjectivity, the U.S. is attempting to shape the nature of China’s rise that conforms with America’s understanding of what China should be. The objectification of China sustains the dominance of American ‘self’ in its hegemonic identity.

Critical to the rebalance is the recovery of American prestige in Southeast Asia, demonstrated by the fostering of cooperation in areas of traditional and non-traditional security, and trade through bilateral, pluri-lateral and multilateral engagement. The rebalance also acknowledges the roles that a variety of large and small actors play in the region, which is substantiated by the deepening of relations with and

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890 The U.S. is facilitating regional allies to develop and enhance partnerships and strategic links with each other that could oppose China. Goldstein, “How China sees America’s Moves in Asia.”
between allies and partners and with ASEAN. The primary driver, however, is the need to extend economic and strategic ties across Southeast Asia and to develop better connectivity with India in South Asia with a view to reinvigorating the domestic basis of American power. The TPP represents the route to restoring American global leadership through economic vitality, since ‘power and influence follow money.’ The TPP is said to be strategically and economically mutually beneficial to regional partners, who would have enhanced access to the U.S. market for their products, and availing the U.S. of capital, high-value added services, and high-technology goods.

Through the TPP, Washington is attempting to shape future regional trade by promoting American trade standards that seek to regulate China’s behaviour and strengthen America’s competitive power. China’s exclusion from TPP suggests the U.S. is seeking to create new norms without China’s participation and actively obstructing China from influencing regional development. Washington’s active (if ineffective) discouragement of its allies from joining the China-led AIIB reinforces this view. U.S. executive policy statements on China have two, often contradictory, aims: they seek to reassure Beijing that Washington’s intentions are benign, and at the same time, they seek to reassure the American public, and American allies, that the U.S. will not allow China’s rise to threaten American interests. This combination produces what Chinese analysis perceive to be ‘sugar-coated threats.’ Within the context of America’s ‘China threat’ narrative, Washington’s frequent denials that the rebalance is not a containment strategy have not alleviated, and are not likely to alleviate, Chinese concerns, nor convinced regional allies.

Confronting the threat that China’s rise presents to American security of self serves as a ‘litmus test of U.S. credibility, ontological security and identity.’ Should the U.S. fail to stand up to the China

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891 In his speech to the NCAFP’s 2012 Gala Awards Dinner, Karl W. Eikenberry remarked that America’s ‘prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy. It taps the potential of our people and allows investment in new industry. And it will allow us to compete in this century as successfully as we did in the last.’ Karl W. Eikenberry, “The Effective Use of American Power: Defining and Defending America’s Interests Abroad,” American Foreign Policy Interests 34, no. 5 (2012): 229-230.

892 Tellis, “Balancing without Containment,” 114.


894 Nathan and Scobell, “How China Sees America.”


896 Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 93.
threat, it would no longer seem committed to, nor have the resolve for, the security and stability in the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{897} Pan observes that an ‘intellectual blindness’ on the part of Washington’s China threat analysts in understanding the key part they play in the spiral model of ‘tit-for-tat’ in Sino-U.S. relations, creates ‘a self-fulfilling, self-productive and self-perpetuating powerful mode of representation.’\textsuperscript{898} Consequently, the perception of the rebalance has developed into a strategy for containing any aspect of China’s rise. Giving space to alternative narratives, Obama has been unable, or unwilling, to change the dominant domestic narrative on China from one of threat, and instead has perpetuated that narrative, to capture the attention of the domestic political audience.

In the age of Obama, the narrative of exceptionalism is a more influential political force in U.S. domestic politics than at any other point in U.S. history.\textsuperscript{899} However, the domestic debate on American exceptionalism has increasingly focused on China’s rise as a threat to American security and sustaining America’s hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific. The rebalance strategy has further heightened the contradictions in the Obama administration’s exceptionalist narrative, which emphasises the ideals of American uniqueness and superiority, whilst conceding to the practical requirement of burden-sharing, asking its regional partners (in the Asia-Pacific and Europe) to shore up American hegemony. America’s regional liberal hegemonic identity remains the central idea driving its strategic vision and action in the Asia-Pacific. However, while the logic of the rules-based liberal order retains global support on the whole, the U.S. is striving to remain the ‘owner and operator,’ supporting the rules and institutions of liberal internationalism and continuing to provide military security that helps maintain open markets and stability, whilst simultaneously recognising the limits of its power to act alone.\textsuperscript{900}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Completing the theoretical framework of the thesis, this chapter has sought to make explicit how the co-constitutive processes that reinforce American exceptionalist ideology, national security and hegemonic identity interconnect to create a convincing threat narrative allowing for specific foreign policy behaviour as a means to protect hegemonic order. ‘China’s rise’ has been presented as the biggest threat to American security in the Asia-Pacific. Yet the notion of ‘China’s rise’ contains physical and ideational conditions that have led to the creation of ‘China’s rise’ as threatening to the

\textsuperscript{897} Pan, \textit{Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics}, 93.
\textsuperscript{898} Pan, \textit{Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics}, 105-6.
\textsuperscript{899} Brooks, \textit{American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama}, 125.
\textsuperscript{900} Ikenberry, \textit{Liberal Leviathan}, 2. Evelyn Goh’s conceptualisation of change is in terms of the renegotiation of order, which focuses specifically whether the U.S. can continue to maintain the legitimacy of the current order and why China’s growing power has not readily translate into regional dominance of hegemony. Goh, \textit{The Struggle for Order}, 19.
United States. A constructivist approach facilitates the examination of the production and reproduction of identity, security, threat constructions and narratives in a continuous and co-constituted cycle.

America’s hegemonic identity is fused with the American belief in its exceptionalism. Not only is American exceptionalism an essential component of American identity, it is also implicitly exhibited in American foreign policy – through notions of leading by example and the mission to export American values of democracy and human rights. The processes that produce hegemonic identity are also critical to the normative foundations of the American hegemonic order. Obama has attempted to recalibrate U.S. foreign policy through his interpretation of exceptionalism that emphasises engagement, burden-sharing and leading by example, requiring a globally shared vision of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Yet, his approach to U.S. hegemony, by appearing to disaggregate hegemony from primacy, has added to the insecurity being felt in America’s hegemonic identity, leading to questions about its global purpose and leadership role. ‘Security’ therefore, it not simply a physical condition of security-for-survival. There is also security-of-being – a state’s ontological security – which in its most base form, is the security of one’s identity.

Ontological security has been further separated here into conditions of being – through ideas of self and other – and doing – managing continuity, through routinised practice, and change. This chapter has argued that a state’s concerns about its ontological security are often politically mobilised and normalised into concerns of survival through narrative. Storytelling creates a plot that sequentially structures a series of events into a coherent whole; it defines the characters, gives meaning to the rules of behaviour, sets the context, and ultimately can determine a specific course of action. The national security narrative, in particular, is made ‘real’ through the national security documentation that elucidates potential and ‘real’ threats to the United States. The ‘China rise’ narrative not only defines how China is understood by the United States, but also determines how the U.S. understands China’s rising power identity in relation to America’s own identity. This narrative is connected to both the physical and ontological security of the United States. China is increasingly represented as a ‘real’ threat to the U.S. through its cyber, military and economic policies. However these threats are a physical manifestation of the threat that China’s rise presents to America’s hegemonic identity rather that a threat to the survival of the United States. America’s interpretation of China’s rising power identity, in relation to its own hegemony identity, contradicts China’s interpretation of its ‘rise,’ or ‘revival.’ China’s increasingly self-assuredness on the global stage can also be contrasted with America’s increasing uncertainty of its own global leadership identity after 2008.
The rebalance strategy draws together the two critical aspects of hegemony outlined in the theoretical framework – order and identity. The subsequent three empirical chapters use Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power as the analytical framework to animate the Obama administration’s production of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Informed by the theoretical framework, the following chapters initially show how the rebalance exemplifies the ongoing production of the social structures of hegemonic order, including aspects of coercion and consent, and the search to maintain legitimacy from the subordinate states for the current order. Since hegemonic order and identity are mutually dependent, the rebalance strategy is also viewed here as a foreign policy outcome of these interrelated identity, security and narrative processes. The subsequent chapters then emphasise the role of the rebalance as a means to secure America’s hegemonic identity in relation to self and to China’s rising power identity. In this sense, the U.S. is attempting to reproduce its hegemonic role identity in the Asia-Pacific, also reproducing the normative foundations of its hegemonic order, while seeking to control the narrative boundaries within which China rises. The rebalance is also an expression of America’s interpretation of China’s rise as a physical threat to American hegemony, as manifested by China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the region. This narrative flows into collective identity formation processes as a means to maintain social cohesion.

In its role as regional hegemon, the U.S. has an as yet unmatched range of power assets at its disposal which it uses to maintain the structure and character of order. American exercise of power is direct and indirect; it is consensual and coercive; it is manifested materially and is inherent in language and meaning; it also has the capacity to generate behaviour that complies with the rules of hegemonic order. The U.S.-led order is also internalised by subordinate states to varying degrees. What is considered in the following chapters is the purpose behind the exercise of American power in the Asia-Pacific. Each chapter takes an aspect of the rebalance strategy and examines how the U.S. exercises various forms of power simultaneously to maintain order and to secure its hegemonic identity. The features of hegemony outlined here – as the production of hegemonic order and hegemonic identity – are identifiable themes within each chapter, and continually intersect with the subsequent examination of the American exercise of power inherent in the rebalance strategy.
Chapter 4

Rebalancing Asia-Pacific Security

As the U.S. sets about shaping the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, the Obama administration has relied on the exercise of compulsory and institutional power to reproduce regional hegemonic order by means of the rebalance strategy.\(^{901}\) U.S. regional hegemony relies on its ability to underpin regional security through its military aptitude and leadership as a way to maintain social cohesion. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. does not impose regional order on the basis of coercive military power. Instead, there is evidence to show that a majority of states in the region give their consent to the U.S. military presence, and to the alliance system operating since 1945. Furthermore, many regional allies reinforce U.S. regional hegemony, soliciting increased U.S. military engagement and a strengthening and development of the alliance system pursued by the Obama administration.

In line with Gramsci’s position on the hegemon’s capacity to preserve ideological control, I explore how the alliances with the United States have been assimilated into the post-war identities of Japan and South Korea. In addition, there is focus on the way in which the U.S. deliberately uses its ‘China rise’ narrative to align with, give voice to, and coordinate, fears and concerns created by China’s rising power that are present across the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, an effective way for a hegemon to derive consent by subordinate states is through its commitment to regional multilateral institutions. Consequently, Obama’s attempts to emphasise and strengthen U.S. commitments to ASEAN and the East Asian Summit, as a means to extend its influence and to steer the direction of regionally-instigated order-building activities, is examined in some depth.

This chapter focuses on three specifics of the military rebalance strategy. The first two aspects of the military rebalance demonstrate the American use of its compulsory power. As the most critical aspect of U.S. security hegemony, and the core of the American-led regional security architecture, consideration is first given to how the alliance structure with key regional allies, Japan, South Korea and Australia, are being adapted to meet contemporary regional security threats and to ensure their ongoing support for the existing regional security order. The second aspect of compulsory power

\(^{901}\) The use of productive power is not discretely addressed in this chapter. Chapter 6 considers the ‘China’s rise’ narrative, and the American use of productive power in more detail. Instead, the American use of productive power is inferred through its framing of regional security issues as being directly and indirectly linked to Beijing’s regional activities, with the twin goals of moulding China into a responsible regional player, while dissuading it from challenging the regional security order.
concerns the efforts to transform relations between U.S. allies. Under the Obama administration, time and energy has been expended on facilitating the development of pluri-lateral relationships between American alliance partners, and with other strategic partners, including India. These networks are significant because they create webs between the existing spokes in the ‘hub and spokes’ structure of U.S. alliances. Not only do these nascent arrangements conform to the norms of American security arrangements, they also strengthen interoperability between U.S. partners, which, it is hoped in the longer term, will deter China from challenging U.S. regional hegemony in the security sphere.

The third aspect of the military balance relates to the American use of institutional power. The Asia-Pacific region’s multilateral forums present a challenging environment through which the U.S. attempts to influence the direction of regional security. Washington’s relationship with Asia-Pacific regional institutions with a security remit has been at best ambivalent. Despite this backdrop, the Obama administration has been keen to develop better relationships with two key regional security institutions, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Engaging with regional institutions is viewed as a way to build confidence among Asia-Pacific states of U.S. intentions to sustain its regional presence, and also, to influence the direction of regional multilateral security. The intention to rebalance concerns maintaining American superiority and the existing balance of power in regional security.

The Asia-Pacific sub-regional context

The sub-regional division of the Indo-Asia-Pacific expanses into Northeast, Southeast and South Asia was a practical bureaucratic necessity for the Pentagon and State Department, and a result of the Cold War geopolitical situation. Northeast and Southeast Asian (collectively East Asia) post-war experiences were shaped by the preponderant military power of the United States, exercising a form of ‘long-distance leadership’ that allowed it to exercise decisive influence over the developmental trajectory of the entire region. During the early 1950s, the U.S. established a series of defence partnerships in key strategic position across the Asia-Pacific. The ‘San Francisco system’ of U.S.-sponsored politico-military bilateral alliances stretching across the Asia-Pacific that developed during the 1950s remains an enduring feature of the post-Cold War regional security architecture.

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Much of East Asia’s security architecture was defined by the post-war and Cold War context, with U.S. strategic focus on Northeast Asia, particularly on Japan and the Korean Peninsula, from the late 1940s. In the 1970s, following the normalisation of relations with China, the unsettled status of Taiwan, neither officially recognised as a sovereign state, nor as part of the PRC, led to the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), which provided Taiwan with U.S. military protection against attack or military intervention from Beijing. In Southeast Asia, the U.S. strategic presence was formalised through defence treaties with the Philippines (1951) and Thailand (1954). From the 1960s, U.S. attention was drawn to containing the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 significantly reduced U.S. involvement in South East Asia. Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. signed the ANZUS defence treaty with Australia and New Zealand (1951). New Zealand’s ANZUS membership was suspended in 1986 following the New Zealand government’s refusal to allow the U.S. Navy to harbour its nuclear warships in New Zealand’s territorial waters. Nevertheless, New Zealand, along with Australia, plays a key role in maintaining stability across the Southwestern Pacific, with both supporting an active U.S. security presence in the region.

Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. strategic presence is less formal. Involvement in South Asia during the Cold War was mainly limited to a quasi-strategic relationship with Pakistan on an issue-by-issue basis, as the U.S. sought to contain Soviet influence in South Asia. The G.W. Bush administration viewed engagement with Pakistan as critical to fighting the war on terrorism. Under the Obama administration, attempts have been made to demonstrate U.S. commitments to U.S.-Pakistan strategic ties. Strengthening the U.S.—Pakistan relationship has been severely hampered by the American extraction of Osama bin Laden from his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, without permission, and American accusations that Islamabad is not committed to eradicating Islamic terrorist activities along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Following independence, India adhered to a non-alignment policy, although consistently maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.

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904 As part of the rebalance strategy, the Obama administration has re-established close defence and security cooperation with New Zealand. The New Zealand Prime Minister, John Key, has also sought to restore bilateral relations with Washington. The desire to strengthen relations is demonstrated by the signing of the Wellington Declaration (2010) and the Washington Declaration on Defence Cooperation (2012), which opened the way for further enhanced strategic dialogue and defence cooperation and included the lifting of the ban on New Zealand naval ship visits. High level U.S. officials have since made trips to New Zealand, including the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, in September 2012, and Vice President Joe Biden in July 2016. See Bruce Vaughn, New Zealand: U.S. Security Cooperation and the U.S. Rebalancing to Asia Strategy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 8, 2013), 1-2.
U.S. strategic relations with India have improved since the end of the Cold War, formalised by the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement (2005) and the Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation (2006), and further expanded through operational and defence cooperation activities, such as the annual U.S-Indian Malabar naval exercises.

As the regional security architecture has started to adapt to the realities of post-Cold War geopolitics, various overlapping regional collective security mechanisms have come to exist alongside the San Francisco alliance system. Figure 1 highlights the overlapping regional institutions and memberships encompassing the Asia-Pacific. There is no single regional collective security institution encompassing all Asia-Pacific sub-regions. Instead, the Asia-Pacific has a relatively underdeveloped collective security architecture with institutions having varying remits, and including diverse memberships. The ‘hub-and-spokes’ alliance system operates alongside the broadly inclusive and regionally-developed East Asian collective security mechanisms, primarily advocating dialogue and confidence-building measures, through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus Three (APT). Despite the existence of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) – an institution, which, on paper, has economic and geopolitical responsibilities, in practice, South Asian security has primarily been defined by tensions in Indo-Pakistani relations.

**Constructing a 21st century regional security architecture**

The U.S. has underpinned regional stability through its regional guarantees since 1945. Yet, Asia-Pacific security has been in a state of flux since the end of the 1990s. Into the twenty-first century, regional geopolitics are defined by a rise in nationalism, asymmetric economic competition, increasing military modernisation, nuclear proliferation and threats to the global commons (air and maritime) in the East and South China Seas. Security challenges across the Indo-Asia-Pacific are no longer confined to threats to a state’s sovereignty and territory, with non-traditional threats increasing in scope. With the shift in what constitutes a security threat, interaction between states in the region

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908 NTS issues are broadly defined as ‘those challenges that affect the survival and wellbeing of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime.’ There are some overlapping security/non-traditional security issues, depending on a particular state’s definition of traditional security issues, so traditional security may also include energy security and cyber security. Mely Caballero-Anthony and Alistair D.B. Cook, “NTS Framework,” in Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Issues, Challenges and Framework for Action, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony and Alistair D.B. Cook (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013), especially 1-5.
has changed, as they face common threats that go beyond national boundaries and require transnational solutions.909

The security environment in the Asia-Pacific offers the United States the opportunity to change incentives and promote better integrated capabilities among allies and partners as they adapt to new security challenges.910 From the American strategic view, adherence to a strict separation of subregions, sandwiched between the vast Indian and Pacific Oceans, has become less vital, with growing economic interdependence and the blurring of traditional and non-traditional security threats requiring a broader regional focus.911 The adoption of the rebalance strategy confirmed that the Asia-Pacific, or broader Indo-Asia-Pacific, region is emerging as a critical element of contemporary international relations and a crucial component of American global strategy that supports American core interests.912 Consequently, the rebalance strategy was introduced as a comprehensive American response to reviving American hegemony at a time of intensifying geopolitical change in the Asia-Pacific region by further embedding the U.S. strategic presence.913

The reorientation of U.S. policy towards the Asia-Pacific started in the mid-2000s and Obama’s rebalance strategy adopts and extends many of the policies initiated by the G.W. Bush administration.914 The rebalance represents minor physical and doctrinal updates – an internal restructure – in U.S. military strategy in the Asia-Pacific, rather than a transformation in strategic aims.915 The aim of the

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911 The 2015 NSS states that the rapid pace of technological change has created shared vulnerabilities, ‘as interconnected systems and sectors are susceptible to the threats of climate change, malicious cyber activity, pandemic diseases, and transnational terrorism and crime.’ The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC, February 2015, 4.
912 US core interests include: defending the U.S. homeland from emerging regional threats (i.e., long-range Chinese and burgeoning North Korean nuclear weapons systems); preventing great power wars (such as between China and Japan) that could spill over to undermine U.S. strategic and economic viability; maintaining allies security; preventing or at least containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ensuring an open and liberal international trading system; and advancing democracy. Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, “Introduction: Debating America’s Future,” America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration, eds. Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Century, May 2012), 8.
reorientation, initiated by the G.W. Bush administration and continued by the Obama administration, is to preserve the existing power balance in the region, underpinned by U.S. hegemony and therefore to dissuade China from competing for that role.916

The doctrinal shift of the rebalance involves updating the types of threat and responses to those threats that the Pentagon expects to encounter in the Asia-Pacific in the future.917 The Quadrennial Defense Review (2014) outlines a deliberate shift in tactical arrangements towards air/sea battle and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and potential for traditional competition between two near-peer competitors.918 Consequently, the Pentagon is prioritising investment in technologies to counter high-end warfare and near-peer competitors, including in A2/AD capabilities.919 The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), alongside the classified Air-Sea Battle concept (ASB) form a military strategy that gives preference to methods that counter the A2/AD capabilities of a rival.920 The updated strategy encourages interoperability between different services and use of dispersed forces in several bases to operate in ‘multiple, independent lines of operation...from strategic distance.’921 Consequently, the U.S. military is undergoing retraining and modernisation, with investment in nuclear and cyber technologies, infrastructure and force structure, unmanned air and undersea systems, missile defence and an 11-carrier navy, required to sustain America’s global presence.922 The JOAC and ASB concepts underscore the


917 The current commitment is to address ‘21st century challenges’ whilst reflecting U.S. fiscal constraints. The QDR (2014) focuses on the need to counter numerous future threats, from non-state extremists and terrorists, to near-peer adversaries with sophisticated high-end military capabilities. There is a substantial emphasis on modernisation and a shift towards HADR missions to counteract global trends including climate change. Davidson, “Retrench or Rebalance?” 2-6.


919 Anti-access/area denial involves strategies that seek to prevent an adversary from accessing territory and preventing them from using technologies deny your defence of that land.


need to protect America’s privileged unchallenged access to the regional maritime domain, emphasising the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. security interests, whilst recognising that the Indian and Pacific Oceans represent a potential flashpoint for future conflict.

**Strengthening regional security through the rebalance**

The first goal of the rebalance is to maintain the superiority of the existing alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific, by upgrading military hardware (particularly air/ naval) and forward presence via its regional network of bases and port accesses. There is acknowledgement in the White House that the traditional bilateral security alliances must be adapted to meet structural changes occurring in the region, and must also meet American needs to reduce military spending. A priority of the rebalance has been to rebalance within the Asia-Pacific, by intensifying the forward presence in South and Southeast Asia, through deepening and developing strategic relations with Australia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and India. By moving assets towards Southeast Asia, and potentially South Asia in the future, the aim, consistent with U.S. strategic interests, is to protect the sea lanes and promote responsible norms of maritime behaviour.

The second goal of the rebalance is to encourage U.S. regional allies to promote their own self-defence and resilience in the longer term to support the critically important economic stability of the region. In this way, the U.S. seeks to reduce its financial costs of providing regional security, and create a network of allies with interoperable capabilities. Washington supports the expansion of selected multilateral regional groupings as ‘specialised agents for change and development.’ The Obama administration has been particularly supportive of infusing mini-lateral (or pluri-lateral) security diplomacy into its existing regional alliance frameworks and related security partnerships to create networks. Under this

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924 The 2010 QDR outlined the expansion of rotational marine deployments to Darwin, littoral combat ships docking in Singapore, the reopening of the Subic base in the Philippines, re-posturing 60% of the US Navy to the region by 2020, missile defence assets to Japan, and new access and cooperation agreements with the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. US capabilities on Guam, in Alaska and Hawaii have also been augmented to reduce US vulnerability to Chinese missile forces.


The third goal of the rebalance concerns the Obama administration’s more visible and more extensive involvement in multilateral security politics in the Asia-Pacific. The 2010 National Security Strategy underscored the importance of regional order-building, engagement, and collaboration as the preferred options for building long-term regional stability. Adding an intensified diplomatic element to the rebalance, and in a series of confidence-building measures, the administration signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in July 2009, the precondition for membership of the East Asia Summit (EAS), formally joining the organisation, with President Obama in attendance, in November 2011. Highlighting the importance of ASEAN, President Obama also appointed the first resident American ambassador to ASEAN, Nina Hachigian, to formally represent U.S. interests, and to glean insider knowledge, in this forum with an exclusively Southeast Asian membership. In February 2016, President Obama also convened the first U.S.-ASEAN summit held in the United States. It was a significant step for U.S. Asia-Pacific policy, which has historically prioritised Northeast East Asian

927 Reflecting the changing nature of bilateral alliance security politics, the old defence burden-sharing debates, for example, will assume new forms that accentuate niche areas of collaboration and require higher levels of allied commitment to the U.S. strategic doctrine and postures (i.e. the new ASB concept). Tow and Envall, “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific,” 68.
928 Pluri-lateral or mini-lateral arrangements involve three or four states meeting and interacting informally to discuss issue-areas involving mutual threats, or, more often, to go over specific tasks related to building regional stability and order. The U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and a resurgence of trilateral consultations between American, Japanese, and South Korean officials at side-talks during Shangri-La Dialogues and in other informal but important multilateral forums have become important foundations for increasing interoperability. Tow and Envall, “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific,” 62.
929 Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot,” 75.
932 Washington has played a role in shaping the agenda for the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting+8 or “ADMM Plus” formed to address both traditional security issues such as maritime confidence-building in the South China Sea as well as broader or “non-traditional” security issues. Tow and Envall, “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific,” 49.
concerns and which is a ‘powerful symbol’ of the Obama administration’s commitment to Southeast Asia, and specifically, its acknowledgment of the importance of ASEAN in Southeast Asian affairs.  

Washington has not endorsed a single, over-arching approach in building, supporting, or participating in regional institutions. Instead, it pursues a discriminate strategy of using different and existing multilateral bodies to manage specific issue-areas. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping remains the paramount means for advancing U.S. economic interests, although this is increasingly supplemented by Washington’s promotion of the TPP to facilitate regional free trade. The Obama Administration has prioritised the EAS as the preferred forum for developing regional security dialogues because the region’s major players (the ten ASEAN members plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, and the U.S.) are members. U.S. policy-makers tend to view the EAS as less prone to domination by China. In contrast, Beijing prefers the ASEAN Plus Three format for discussing East Asian security issues on a more regionally exclusive basis, since this forum excludes the United States.  

As part of its evolving regional security posture, the move toward multilateral security policies is relatively discriminatory and limited. Obama also applies several preconditions for U.S. involvement in regional multilateral arrangements. Such involvement must be

‘consistent with the purpose and maintenance of its bilateral alliances in the region, must reflect clear and shared interests and values which the U.S. could endorse and support, and must pursue clearly designated action plans to realise those interests and values.’

Consequently, the smart power strategy, endorsed by the Obama administration, has attempted to combine the need for hard power capabilities, underpinned by the bilateral alliance politics, with diplomatic and politico-cultural soft power components that are most conducive to building regional confidence in American cooperation, thereby reproducing consent from subordinate states for the existing regional order. At the same time, American hegemonic interests continue to be promoted, with a view to producing an American-led regional security architecture that can potentially balance against rising Chinese regional power and influence.

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Compulsory Power: Strengthening and adapting the bilateral alliances in Northeast Asia

Compulsory power involves ‘power as relations of interaction of direct control by one actor over another.’ In the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. is the asymmetrical provider of security. As the regional security hegemon, the existence of its superior military capabilities and regional presence commands respect. The bilateral alliances form the bedrock of Washington’s regional strategy and security presence as part of the broader process of post-Cold War order-building. As the preponderant regional maritime power, the U.S. is the only state with the capacity to construct a security order in the Asia-Pacific that offers this degree of protection and stability. However, the hegemonic relationship is more complex than one of pure dominance: the U.S. also relies on its major regional allies to help it sustain regional order. The manner in which Tokyo has reconsidered Article 9 of its post-war pacifist treaty not only highlights the significance of U.S. hegemony to Japan’s stability, it is also indicative of a two-way symbiotic, albeit asymmetric, relationship that benefits both dominant and subordinate states in regional order production.

(i) The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation (1960) committed the United States to defend Japan if Japan came under attack, and also facilitated the continuation of the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia through the provision of bases and ports for American armed forces. Under the American security umbrella, Japan could concentrate on economic recovery and the U.S. was able to project power into the western Pacific. With this bargain, the United States had undertaken to defend Japan following an attack, while Japan had no reciprocal obligations. Since the Japanese constitution prohibited the exercise of collective self-defence, Japan was under no obligation to send troops or military hardware to support American combat operations. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, outlining Japan’s civilian and pacifist status was a means to allay regional concerns about a return to Japan’s pre-war militaristic traditions. However, the Japanese constitution had increasingly become a major obstacle to Washington’s plans for deepening and modernising the security alliances in the region. As a result of

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For Japan, the U.S.-Japan alliance is an integral part of the Japanese constitution that has enabled it to remain relatively unarmed, and facilitated its pacifist, non-threatening post-war identity. It is fully socialised into the American-led regional security order and entirely dependent on the array of western regional and multilateral economic and security organisations for its stability and functioning as a state since 1945.\footnote{For example, Japan funds approximately 20% of the UN budget, supports international commitments to human security and is a generous provider of official development assistance. See G. John Ikenberry, “A New Order in East Asia?” in East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, eds. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 226-7.} Article 9 has, however, been problematic in that it restricted the participation of Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in multilateral overseas commitments. With the encouragement of Washington, in 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe embarked on the process of normalisation through reforming Article 9, controversially challenging a pillar of regional stability in the post-war era.\footnote{Paul J. Leaf, “Promise and Potential Peril: Japan’s Military Normalisation,” The Diplomat, September 4, 2014. [http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/promise-and-potential-peril-japans-military-normalization/](http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/promise-and-potential-peril-japans-military-normalization/) (accessed September 19, 2014).} In part, Abe’s decision to re-evaluate Japanese security arrangements was driven by domestic concerns about regional stability. Tokyo has become increasingly uncertain of the future reliability of American security guarantees in view of a potentially underfunded American military.\footnote{Ikenberry, “A New Order in East Asia?” 228-9.} While the September 2015 legislative bill did not change Article 9’s language – that would require constitutional amendment – it does enable a reinterpretation of ‘self-defence.’\footnote{Matt Ford, “Japan Curtails Its Pacifist Stance,” Atlantic, September 19, 2015. [http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/japan-pacifism-article-nine/406318/](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/japan-pacifism-article-nine/406318/) (accessed May 9, 2016).} Regardless, this is a significant shift away from the renouncement of war, etched into Japan’s post-war pacifist national identity.

Following the renegotiation of the U.S-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty, finalised in April 2015, the Japanese SDF can participate in disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, missile defense and other
military missions, and to assist U.S. forces patrolling areas around Japan. The Joint Defence Guidelines outline an expanded role for the Japanese SDF, removing many of the limits placed on their activities by Article 9, including geographical restrictions on the SDF. An enlarged role for the Japanese SDF implies that the U.S. is unlikely to fight a war in the Asia-Pacific without direct assistance from Japan. The revised guidelines also allow Japan to respond to attacks on third parties, not just the United States, if those states have a close association with Japan. The renegotiation of the functions of the alliance gives Japan a greater stake in regional security. Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan is gradually contributing to a ‘favourable strategic and military balance’ for Washington, although the move was criticised by China and South Korea, and also split the Japanese nation. By renegotiating the conditions of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the alliance structure can be adapted to meet the twenty-first century geopolitical environment. Japan’s clear position in support of the system of alliances and security partnerships is an important step towards this system remaining an effective tool of dissuasion against regional near peer-competitors. Ongoing Japanese consent is therefore critical to the reproduction of the U.S hegemonic order.

Japan’s military normalisation is a contentious issue for America’s other Northeast Asian alliance partner, South Korea. Japanese-South Korean relations are at an all-time low, with Seoul unwilling to cooperate with Japan on trilateral military intelligence sharing, or on missile defence agreements with

946 The Japanese SDF has historically maintained a defensive orientation. With 240,000 military personnel, 400 fighter jets, 3 pseudo aircraft carriers, 16 submarines and 47 destroyers, Japan has the capability to project offensive power outside Japanese territorial waters. In the year up to March 2014, Japan scrambled fighter jets 415 times (a high that is up 36 percent from the previous year) to intercept Chinese aircraft encroaching its claimed airspace. See Leaf, “Promise and Potential Peril.”


Tokyo and Washington. The strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance has moderated the South Korean response to the changes in interpretation of Article 9, leaving President Park to focus on Japan’s imperial historical conduct, which is a domestic vote-winner. There is fear in Seoul that any increase in Japanese military power, as a result of the changes to the U.S-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty, and the reinterpretation of Article 9, may have the unintended effect of increasing Pyongyang’s military modernisation and Beijing’s assertive behaviour in the region, and potentially creating tension in ROK-China relations.

Despite the unenthusiastic response to Japan’s reinterpretation of Article 9 in Northeast Asia, Japan’s moves towards military normalisation has been better received by other U.S. regional partners, including Australia, India, the Philippines and Vietnam. As a result of the changes in Japan’s defence role, military cooperation between Japan and each of these countries in the sphere of military training and aid, joint weapons development, and arms sales has risen. Even Taiwan, also occupied by Japan during World War Two, appears receptive, with former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui stating that Japan’s move towards military normalisation would make the region safer. By enhancing its alliance with the U.S., Japan will assume a greater regional security role with American support, which enhances the central position of the alliances to regional order. The outcome being, that not only do Japanese interests remain closely aligned to those of the U.S., but through the alliances, the U.S. is also able to indirectly determine the narratival boundaries of regional insecurity. The China rise narrative supports the ongoing existence of the regional alliances, and maintains the asymmetric and hierarchic structure of regional order.

951 South Korean President Park Geun-hye has refused to speak to Prime Minister Abe. Park likely considers rapprochement with Japan politically risky, with nearly half of South Koreans deeming Japan a military threat to their country. South Koreans believe that Abe whitewashes Japan’s colonial past, including the issue of Korean comfort women, and high profile visits the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese war dead, including 12 convicted war criminals, are honoured. Leaf, “Promise and Potential Peril.”

952 President Park’s response to Prime Minister Abe’s 70th anniversary commemoration speech marking the end of the war in August 2015 was muted. The nationalist Prime Minister Abe reiterated Japan’s past expressions of remorse but did not offer a new apology. Park stated that the speech ‘left much to be desired’ and said Japan’s words should be backed up with “consistent and sincere conduct.” Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korean Leader Marks Anniversary of War’s End with Warnings to North Korea,” New York Times, August 15, 2015.


954 Taipei has not publicly protested Tokyo’s construction of a radar station and forthcoming deployment of troops on Yonaguni Island, which is 67 miles from Taiwan and 93 miles from islands claimed by Beijing, Tokyo and Taipei. See Jason Pan, “Lee Teng-hui Applauds Japan’s Self-Defense Move,” Taipei Times, July 4, 2014.

The U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defence Treaty

The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, signed in 1953 following the Korean War ceasefire, guaranteed South Korean national security, acting to deter the North by providing a nuclear umbrella and troops, while also bolstering defence for Japan. U.S.-ROK security relations are defined by the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and issues of East Asian strategic importance, particularly relating to China and Japan.

Their periodically differing attitudes to North Korea has often proven to be an issue of contestation between the U.S. and South Korea. During the G.W. Bush administration, relations were strained over their diverging North Korean policy, with Washington during this period attaching greater weight to its global interests, including WMD and non- and counter-proliferation. During the War on Terror, Washington’s global/regional strategy worked against Seoul’s intra-Korean/regional outlook, with detrimental effects on the alliance.956 The G.W. Bush administration’s hard line over North Korean nuclear proliferation contradicted Seoul’s commitment to a softer engagement strategy on Peninsula relations, which it interpreted not only through a security lens, but also through one of potential future reunification. During the governments of President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), there was a South Korean shift towards seeking reconciliation and unification with North Korea, as part of the South Korean Sunshine Policy.957 Subsequently, the hardening U.S. military posture on North Korea was frequently blamed for prolonging the political division of the Peninsula.958 Between 1998 and 2008, the relationship also developed problems on a wide range of issues including burden-sharing and division of labour within the alliance.959 The Roh Moo-hyun government’s self-proclaimed balancer role between China and Japan in 2005 was met with criticism in Washington, interpreting Seoul’s strategy as indicative of South Korea’s determination to move

956 Park and Moon, “Perception of Order as a Source of Alliance Cohesion,” 158.
957 Instigated and developed by President Kim, the Sunshine Policy sought to improve North and South Korean relations through this conciliatory policy of engagement. The Clinton administration approved of, and supported, President Kim’s efforts. In contrast, the G.W. Bush administration treated North Korean as a state that supported terrorism. This hard line stance emphasising coercion and punishment created unfavourable conditions for Seoul’s Sunshine Policy. The Sunshine Policy was abandoned when Lee Myung-bak assumed the South Korean presidency in February 2008. See Young Chul Cho, “Collective Identity Formation on the Korean Peninsula: United States’ Different North Korea Policies, Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, and United States–South Korea–North Korea Relations,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 10, no. 1 (2010): 93-127.
959 Park and Moon, “Perception of Order as a Source of Alliance Cohesion,” 158.
closer to China. This move was considered incompatible with the U.S-ROK alliance and was subsequently dropped by President Roh under pressure from Washington.

Despite the challenges of balancing global and regional interests during the G.W. Bush era, Washington and Seoul recognised their alliance as a natural extension of regional security policy and coordinated a series of bilateral talks focused on transforming the alliance into a more mature partnership. The Roh administration made several concessions to Washington in an effort to demonstrate its commitment to the alliance, despite fundamental disagreements on North Korean policy and President Roh’s aspirations to develop a foreign policy less driven by American security interests. The renegotiation of the terms of the alliance included a major realignment of United States Forces, Korea (USFK), permission to grant deployment of USFK in operations outside of the Peninsula (strategic flexibility), and the deployment of South Korean troops to Iraq, despite widespread domestic opposition. The G.W. Bush administration additionally agreed to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) to the South Korean military by April 2012 – an issue President Roh viewed as an important step in achieving a more equal alliance partnership. Although this transfer has never taken place, due to South Korean concerns over increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Washington’s willingness to renegotiate the terms of the alliance was symbolic for Seoul and reinvigorated South Korean consent to U.S. regional hegemony. During the second half of the G.W. Bush administration, its stance on Pyongyang softened, after initial progress on the Six-Party Talks led to greater cooperation and coordination with Seoul on North Korean policy. On the issue of strategic flexibility, Washington also addressed South Korean concerns about ‘alliance entrapment,’ if U.S. troops were deployed in a conflict outside the Korean Peninsula.

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961 It is claimed that after Roh’s visit to the U.S. in June 2005, ‘both states came to share the view that the U.S. is the ‘final balancer’ in the region.’ Park and Moon, “Perception of Order as a Source of Alliance Cohesion,” 156-7.
963 Despite strong domestic opposition, the US-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) was finalised between Seoul and Washington in 2007, in a move to show solidarity with the U.S. alliance. The FTA came into force in March 2012. Park and Moon, “Perception of Order as a Source of Alliance Cohesion,” 160.
The Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013) prioritised the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK alliance into a more comprehensive, multidimensional ‘strategic alliance.’ Since 2013, President Park Geun-hye has followed the path of her predecessor, and widened the partnership to include political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. From Washington’s perspective, the U.S.-ROK relationship is in its best state for decades. South Korea is undertaking an increased global role, slowly developing capabilities to enhance its own force projection, while complementing American global strategic objectives, and bearing more financial costs of the relationship. While Seoul’s moves to adopt a global role have occurred outside of, and independent from, the mutual defence treaty alliance, at the same time, President Park’s has worked hard to re-align American and South Korean interests through a joint strategic vision emphasising shared liberal democratic values.

U.S.-ROK strategic attitudes towards China and Japan, however, often diverge. South Korea is hesitant to antagonise China, and, like China, is mistrustful of Japan’s reinterpretation of its constitution that would expand Japanese military capabilities. China’s rise creates a strategic dilemma for South Korea, placing it between its relationships with the United States and China. Given the strength of the economic and diplomatic ties between Seoul and Beijing, and Beijing’s position as the only benefactor of North Korea, South Korea is trying to balance its positive relations with both Washington and Beijing. When President Park attended the military parade in Beijing, commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two, along with ‘an assortment of autocrats and dictators’ in

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971 Manyin, U.S.-South Korea Relations, executive summary.
September 2015, her presence received disapproval across the region and in Washington. Her presence was politically significant, as she was the only leader of a U.S. ally to attend an event that implicitly targeted Japan as the aggressive invader in the region. Yet the U.S.-ROK alliance remains a critical element of South Korean security strategy, and a feature of its post-Korean War identity. South Korea balances its security commitments to the ROK-U.S. alliance, and its economic well-being, dependent on the ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership. The challenge for Seoul is to achieve a balance between maintaining the alliance with Washington, whilst building positive economic relations with Beijing, whilst simultaneously engaging both in the maintenance of relative stability on the Korean Peninsula. However, sustaining friendly relations with both powers has often proven difficult.

Attempts to enjoy beneficial bilateral interactions with China complicates South Korean security cooperation with the United States. Equally, South Korean perceptions of China are also reflected in North Korean security-related issues. In March 2010, the North Korean sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan was followed in November 2010 by attacks on Yeonpyeong Island. In the wake of these provocations by Pyongyang, possibly the regime’s reaction to Washington’s decision to suspend the Six Party Talks and the cessation of U.S. aid to North Korea in 2009, the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise in August 2011 focused on improving combat readiness on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing reacted strongly to the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, identifying the ROK-U.S. alliance as a regional security threat, whilst consistently defending North Korean actions. Unhappy with Seoul’s emphasis on the U.S. relationship, Beijing has often questioned whether Seoul can manage the incompatibility between the Sino-South Korean ‘strategic partnership’ and the ROK-U.S. ‘strategic alliance.’

Beijing’s criticism of U.S-ROK relations has frequently triggered debates in South Korea concerning the future of the alliance and whether it is too costly to Sino-ROK relations, or can ameliorate the situation on the Korean Peninsula in the longer term. Despite pressure from Beijing, Seoul has not compromised on maritime territorial issues in the East China Sea (over Socotra/Suyan Rock).}

973 Han, “South Korea Seeks to Balance Relations with China and the United States.”
974 Han, “South Korea Seeks to Balance Relations with China and the United States.”
975 Han, “South Korea Seeks to Balance Relations with China and the United States.”
976 Han, “South Korea Seeks to Balance Relations with China and the United States.”
977 Han, “South Korea Seeks to Balance Relations with China and the United States.”
978 Along with North Korean security threats stemming from nuclear weapons and potential provocations, South Koreans rank China’s continued rise, China’s military modernisation, and South Korea's increasing dependency
Moreover, the expansion of China’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) into the East China Sea in November 2013 was officially criticised by Seoul, although the criticism was not as strong as Japan’s.\textsuperscript{979} When China refused to redraw its ADIZ, Seoul expanded its own ADIZ in December 2013, with Sino-South Korean relations temporarily cooling until 2014.\textsuperscript{980}

For Washington, North Korea presents ‘one of the most vexing and persistent problems for U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.’\textsuperscript{981} The critical state of intra-Korean relations since the 2010 attacks has not exposed major policy disagreements between Washington and Seoul during the Obama administration. In line with the Obama administration’s approach of equalising partnerships and building consensus, Washington has appeared to allow Seoul to take the lead on managing North Korea strategy.\textsuperscript{982} President Park and President Obama have ‘maintained tight coordination over North Korean policy, forging a joint approach containing elements of pressure and engagement.’\textsuperscript{983} In a move to strengthen defence ties, and to increase interoperability, in February 2015, U.S. and South Korean defence officials convened the first meeting of a Cyber Cooperation Working Group created to upgrade intelligence sharing on North Korean cyber threats.\textsuperscript{984}

In managing the increasingly tense situation on the Korean Peninsula, following Pyongyang’s ballistic missile testing (2012, 2013, 2014) and fourth nuclear testing (January 2016), the threat of an existential nuclear threat to South Korea continues to define President Park’s attitude and approach to the U.S and China.\textsuperscript{985} While President Park initially hoped that the strength of Sino-ROK economic ties and strong

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\textsuperscript{980} Rinehart, \textit{China’s Air Defence Identification Zone}, 25.

\textsuperscript{981} Under the terms of the bilateral alliances with Japan and the ROK, the US is obligated to defend both from an attack by North Korea. Emma Chanlett-Avery, \textit{North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation} (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 15, 2016), 2.


\textsuperscript{983} Manyin, \textit{U.S.-South Korea Relations}, executive summary.


diplomatic relations between the two would influence Beijing’s attitudes towards Pyongyang, and check North Korean nuclear intentions, it has become evident that Beijing has limited control over Kim Jong Un and that relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have significantly cooled. The U.S.-South Korean approach seeks to avoid pushing Beijing into a position where it feels compelled to provide more financial and diplomatic assistance to Pyongyang. Nevertheless, as North Korea becomes increasingly militarised, nuclearised and erratic, Park’s decision to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Air Defence (THAAD) missile system in South Korea is based on her need to protect her homeland and frustrations over Beijing’s North Korea policy. Following Pyongyang’s launch of three ballistic missiles in August 2016, President Park described the situation as evidence for THAAD in South Korea, despite strong domestic opposition to its deployment. For the first time, Seoul is in agreement with the U.S. on the need for regional missile defence, despite Beijing’s objections to the U.S. placing missile defence near to its border, and to the sharing of South Korean intelligence on North Korea with Japan.

Extending and deepening regional partnerships in Southeast Asia

The preceding discussion has focused on the U.S. alliance structure with key regional allies. This next section considers the efforts of the U.S. to develop the hub-and-spokes alliance structure into a network of pluri-lateral relationships that will ultimately strengthen U.S. regional hegemony. The rebalance strategy supports the expansion of U.S. capabilities and those of its strategic regional partners and allies. Washington has made inroads into adapting the traditional hub-and-spokes model of alliance operations towards the construction of a more diffuse and distributed network across Southeast Asia. Part of the challenge for the United States is to facilitate the improved coordination of its allies to address specific non-traditional security challenges such as humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery (HADR), in addition to responding to existing security matters and irregular threats. Concerns over sovereignty claims in the South China Sea have kept most Southeast Asian nations amenable to the U.S. military presence and the security advantages derived from the continued U.S. presence in the region, acting as a balance to growing Chinese military power. For the U.S., the broader perspective is to sustain its regional hegemony by protecting its freedom of maritime action. U.S. activities are narratively supported through the rhetoric of protecting the global commons against China, whose military


modernisation and assertive use of its military capabilities in the South China Sea seeks to transform the post-World War II regional order that lays the foundations of Asia-Pacific post-war stability and prosperity.\footnote{Raine and Le Mière, \textit{Regional Disorder}, 158.}

The two U.S. security partners in Southeast Asia, the Philippines\footnote{The upsurge in Filipino nationalism during the 1990s led to the closure of the Subic naval base and Clark air base in 1992. William T. Tow, “Pursuing U.S. strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific: Pivoting away from Disorder,” in \textit{Augmenting Our Influence: Alliance Revitalisation and Partner Development}, ed. John R. Deni, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, (April 2014), 19.} and Thailand,\footnote{Since its military coup in 2014, the Thai military junta overtly hedges between the U.S. and China, in light of US criticism over the lack of democracy, and the suspension of US military aid. William T. Tow, “Pursuing U.S. strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific: Pivoting away from Disorder,” 19.} vacillate between acceptance of, and detachment from, American regional security hegemony, often complicating the U.S. regional security picture as a result of their internal political disarray.\footnote{Following the July 2016 outcome of the international tribunal concerning the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, instigated by his predecessor, the new president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, has signalled that he is open to direct negotiations with Beijing on the issue, dispatching former president, Fidel Ramos, to initiate talks. Ramos met with Vice Minister of the Foreign Ministry, Fu Ying, for informal talks, in Hong Kong, in August 2016. Public opinion in the Philippines is overwhelmingly against China on the issue but Duterte also wants to repair and negotiate with China. Trefor Moss, “South China Sea Ruling Could Pose Dilemma for Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, July 12, 2016. [http://www.wsj.com/articles/tribunal-ruling-on-south-china-sea-could-create-dilemma-for-philippines-duterte-1468323025] (accessed August 19, 2016).} The Philippines relies heavily on the U.S. to guarantee its external security and for the U.S., the relationship has gained renewed prominence as a result of the rebalance.\footnote{During his April 2014 visit to the Philippines, President Obama asserted that the Treaty requires the United States to help defend the Philippines against external armed attack, adding that “our commitment to defend the Philippines is ironclad.” However, Obama did not assert that the Mutual Defence Treaty would apply to the South China Sea disputed islands. The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference,” April 28, 2014. [https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi] (accessed May 14, 2015).} With the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea, and its formal request of an arbitration tribunal through UNCLOS against China’s claims, the Philippines under former president, Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016), became more open to the U.S. military rebalance. Furthermore, the U.S. and Philippines narrative on ‘China’s rise’ also aligned during the Benigno Aquino presidency, creating opportunities for Washington to draw the Philippines further into its sphere of influence.

In view of its own rebalancing goals, and its own concerns over the growing influence of China in the South China Sea, the U.S. took the opportunity to enhance the limited capabilities of the Philippine navy, also allocating USD30 million in military financing for the Philippines in 2012.\footnote{Thomas Lum, \textit{The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests—2014} (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 15, 2014), 10.} The Enhanced
Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), finalised in April 2014, allows for an increased but non-permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines, and U.S. access to Philippine military bases and ports.995 The path to the EDCA was not guaranteed, despite the situation in the South China Sea. The EDCA was finally determined to be constitutional by the Philippines Supreme Court in January 2016, after much internal deliberation on re-granting the U.S. military access to Philippine territory.996 Nevertheless, in line with U.S. views on enhancing interoperability between its allies, the Philippines has also strengthened defence ties with other Asia-Pacific states, including Vietnam and Japan, also in dispute with China over maritime territorial boundaries.997

Given Thailand’s strategic value to the United States, and status as a long time U.S. strategic ally, the Obama administration hoped that Thailand would play a larger role as a partner in the rebalance. However, the rebalance has been complicated by political instability in Thailand following the 2014 military coup. Since the military junta had overthrown a democratically elected government, the United States suspended security assistance funds and cancelled joint military exercises and restricting U.S. involvement in the Thai-led Cobra Gold military exercises.998 Although the democratic rationale for an ongoing military relationship has been considerably undermined, maintaining the U.S.-Thai relationship is considered vital for the rebalance.999 Without it, the U.S. may lose access to Thailand’s strategically located military facilities, and China’s influence in Southeast Asia may accelerate.1000 Amid democracy concerns, the U.S. military has participated in the Thai-led Cobra Gold military exercises February 2015 and 2016, albeit on a limited basis.1001 With Bangkok internally occupied with political crises, Thailand’s ability to help with regional initiatives, particularly those supported by the United States, appears limited.1002

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997 In recent years, the Philippines and Vietnam have formalised cooperation in the areas of maritime security, through navy-to-navy contacts, and information sharing. Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests—2014, 10.
999 The contradictions of the U.S-Thai relationship highlight the tension in the need to maintain regional order and the normative foundations of U.S. hegemony that uphold US values and a commitment to democracy and the rule of law.
1000 Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, summary.
1002 Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, 1.
With the broadening of regional security relations already under way during the G.W. Bush administration, maintaining and extending the relationships as part of the rebalance strategy became a natural next step. Widening the network of U.S. security ties to include other security partners as part of the rebalance is a work in progress. Unlike its more formal bilateral relationships with well-established pathways for negotiation and management, U.S. security relations with informal partners more typically involve collaboration over specific issue-areas. A key factor driving these informal strategic relationships is shared concern about China’s increased assertiveness in Southeast Asia, particularly in the South China Sea. However, China is not the only motivation. The U.S. also supports partners in Southeast Asia, including Malaysia and Indonesia, in combating people trafficking, counter-terrorism and maritime piracy. The U.S. has been slowly and carefully developing a defence dialogue with Vietnam, which is becoming a crucial U.S. partner in Southeast Asia. Washington and Hanoi launched an annual defence policy dialogue in 2010, achieved a Memorandum of Understanding in 2011, and announced a ‘comprehensive partnership’ in 2013.

In July 2005, the United States signed a Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security with Singapore. While the terms of the agreement were not publicly disclosed, it is thought that it strengthened existing arrangements for U.S. ships and combat aircraft to access Singapore’s military facilities, and authorised greater levels of defence technology sharing. With the aim of improving interoperability in the region, security cooperation between the U.S. and Singapore has continued to grow under the Obama administration, with increased bilateral exercises and training. The strategic relationship was further broadened in June 2011, following the announcement that four U.S. littoral ships would be on rotation through Singapore’s naval port, designed to accommodate U.S. naval ships. This partnership strengthens U.S. regional engagement through joint naval activities and exchanges. The Singapore Army and the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) maintain well-developed relations through professional exchanges and military exercises.

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1003 Tow, “Pursuing U.S. Strategic Interests in the Asia-Pacific: Pivoting away from Disorder,” 21.
1005 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific.”
1006 The ‘comprehensive partnership is to provide an overarching framework for moving the relationship into a ‘new phase’. Manyin, U.S.-Vietnam Relations in 2014, 5.
1008 Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot,” 77.
1009 Tow, “Pursuing U.S. Strategic Interests in the Asia-Pacific: Pivoting away from Disorder,” 22-23.
Regional training exercises are viewed as opportunities to foster and sustain cooperative relationships in the region, focusing on areas designated by the U.S. as of regional interest, such as disaster relief, counter-piracy operations, mine clearing operations, and anti-submarine and air defense exercises. The multilateral Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise is the largest international maritime exercise; and the Cobra Gold exercises held in Thailand, are now regarded as the primary multilateral ground exercise in the region. In 2005, PACOM launched Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) with its series of mainly bilateral, annual exercises focused on counter-piracy and aimed at bolstering naval interoperability between the U.S. and partner nations, as well as increasing the capabilities of those partner nations, which now include all ASEAN member states with the exception of Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. The U.S.-Philippines annual military exercise, Balikatan, was established to help the Philippines tackle the threat from regionally-based transnational terrorist organisations and also aims to improve interoperability between the U.S. and the Philippine militaries in the area of crisis response. In addition to the regional military reorientation, the U.S. has also expanded military engagement with China, in an effort to channel China’s military modernisation in a more positive direction of regional cooperation. In 2014, the Chinese took part in RIMPAC for the first time.

Integrated into these combined training and knowledge-building exercises, U.S PACOM coordinates regional humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR), and search and rescue (SAR) activities. HADR and SAR are favourite areas for cooperation between navies and related services, without the political controversy that often accompanies defence cooperation. Collaboration emphasises the softer side of U.S. coercive military power and emphasises the value system underpinning U.S. hegemony through, for example, U.S. undertakings in humanitarian assistance activities. While HADR and SAR are considered to be at the ‘soft’ end of the spectrum of security cooperation, they are useful areas in

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1011 By 2012, 20 nations were participating in these exercises, including seven – the U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea - contributing forces.


1013 With US focus directed towards extremist terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia since September 2001, the U.S. has increased its regional counter-terrorist efforts against groups operating in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, including the Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf groups. Bruce Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 16, 2009).

1014 China was represented at RIMPAC by the Haikou (a missile destroyer), the Yueyang (a missile frigate), the Qiandaohu (a supply ship), and the Peace Ark (a hospital ship). A total of 1,100 Chinese officers and soldiers took part in the drill, including a diving squad and a commando unit. Tiezzi, “A ‘Historic Moment’: China’s Ships Head to RIMPAC 2014.”
which to develop personal relationships and interoperability, as well as providing an opportunity to generate goodwill.\textsuperscript{1015} The U.S. military also works alongside other governments, regional and international organisations, and NGOs that complement its own activities in HADR. HADR activities do promote American values, but trust-building is an important consequence of these joint training exercises, showing the softer face of American compulsory power, and also providing a valuable service of capacity-building in a region where natural disasters are a frequent occurrence. Building trust further extends the legitimacy of the alliance structure and U.S. security hegemony. The American military response to regional natural disasters such as the Tsunami and earthquake in the Indian Ocean in 2004, or Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, often yield positive consequences for building future cooperation, since such activities are associated with a ‘hearts and minds’ approach.

(i) Developing ties between U.S. allies: The emergence of pluri-laterism

As part of the rebalance strategy, the Obama administration has been keen to promote the development of partnerships between its traditional regional allies (the ‘spokes’) and other strategic partners across the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as strategic interests converge. Moving beyond the ‘hub and spokes’ model, and working towards ‘a more networked architecture of cooperation,’ U.S. allies are being encouraged to develop stronger security relations with each other under the guidance of the United States.\textsuperscript{1016} Under the Obama administration, the frequency and scope of multilateral military training across the Asia-Pacific continues to be expanded. The U.S., Japan and India conducted their first trilateral naval exercises in April 2007, and the U.S.-India Malabar exercise now includes Japan, Singapore, and Australia.\textsuperscript{1017} Other bilateral exchanges are also slowly proliferating through the Asia-Pacific: the Japanese-Australian Nichi Gou Trident exercises and the U.S.-Australia-Japan TAMEX anti-submarine maritime surveillance exercise, alongside the enhancement of U.S.-initiated partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{1018}


\textsuperscript{1017} Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes, 155-6.


These nascent relationships are cautiously advancing to avoid triggering an adverse response from Beijing. Australia and Japan jointly explored the possibility of an arms deal that would see Japan build a dozen submarines for Australia, using coveted Japanese technology, and binding these two vital U.S. regional allies together ‘in the most important area of security.’ For Japan, this would have been the first major deal since it lifted its self-imposed ban on weapons exports in 2014. This deal would have further cemented the Australian-Japanese defence cooperation agreement signed by the then Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Prime Minister Abe in 2014. Canberra’s decision to reject the Japanese bid in May 2016 caused disappointment in Washington defence circles, as a successful Japanese bid would have provided real strategic benefit for the U.S-Japan-Australia trilateral relationship. Media reporting in May 2016 suggested that Canberra’s decision was influenced by Beijing’s demands and the Turnbull government’s fear of upsetting Beijing.

Indian participation in the emerging networked architecture in the Asia-Pacific, and expanding security cooperation with Japan, Australia and ASEAN, also serve U.S. interests. Since the signing of the United States-India 2005 U.S.-India Defence Framework Agreement and 2006 Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation, India now conducts more exercises with U.S. forces than any other country. Over one third of PACOM’s total exercises are conducted with India, including military exercises across all services (including the naval exercise, Malabar, HADR and amphibious exercises). India also participates in a Trilateral Security Dialogue with the United States and Japan at the sub-secretary level. Bilateral dialogues between Australia and India have expanded opportunities for engagement in security and defence but have not, as yet, produced any concrete


1024 The then Australian PM, Kevin Rudd, damaged Australian credibility with India, when he pulled Australia out of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the U.S., India, Japan and Australia in February 2008. This has been viewed by some as a missed opportunity for Australia. David Brewster, "The India-Australia Security and Defence Relationship: Developments, Constraints and Prospects," Security Challenges 10, no. 1 (2014): 72.
results. Nevertheless, there is hope in the longer term that India will eventually become fully integrated into the existing regional order. The development of pluri-lateral dialogues enhances the opportunity for multilateral naval exercises, and increased cooperation and interoperability between U.S. partners.

Through the bilateral alliances, and offer of pluri-lateral security cooperation underpinned by American security guarantees, the U.S. is able to directly drive the alliance system forward in a direction that serves its purposes. The strategy of developing pluri-lateral and networked relations, building on converging issues between the spokes, deepens American security hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, anchors the U.S. firmly into the Asia-Pacific and keeps the Asia-Pacific centred on the Pacific, rather than developing an order centred on China or Asia. The process of modernising and strengthening the alliance structure not only enhances the military capabilities and interoperability of allies, this process further aligns the interests of strategic partners with those of the United States. The willingness of these U.S. partners to engage in these networked relationships and to align with U.S interests, consistent with the aims of the strategic rebalance, is indirectly influenced by the potency of the American narrative on China. The powerful and negative narrative concerning China’s rise is often implicit in the contrasting positive messages about America’s role in the Asia-Pacific that is typically presented to regional partners. The U.S. offers peace and stability and will enhance ‘a stable and diversified security order,’ prioritises cooperation rather than compellence, and reinforces a rules-based regional order, in contrast to the unknown quantity of China’s potential regional hegemony. Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, current tensions in the security environment draw allies closer to the U.S. regional outlook.

The significance of the security alliances with the United States shapes allies’ national security interests and often requires internally unpopular trade-offs. Being within the American security sphere complicates their diplomatic and economic relations with China. Both Seoul and Canberra are influenced by their economic dependence on Beijing. For Australia, the decision to choose the French bid over the Japanese one, appeared to reflect Canberra’s fear of angering Beijing. Beijing’s growing criticism of Seoul’s relationship with Washington elicited debates in the ROK about the future of its alliance with the U.S. in light of Chinese security concerns. In Japan, changes to the pacifist constitution, while supported in Washington, prompted similar domestic debates.

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1025 For India, the U.S.-Australia alliance remains a material factor in Indian thinking. Brewster, “The India-Australia Security and Defence Relationship,” 67-8.
The United States has a strategic interest in encouraging greater interoperability and military exercises involving both the ROK and Japan, and nurturing stronger strategic ties between Japan and Australia. Nevertheless, political officials in South Korea and Australia continually attempt to balance their intimate relationships with the United States in strategic affairs against and their economic relations with Beijing. South Korean sensitivities regarding its historical grievances towards Japan continue to influence security cooperation with Tokyo.\footnote{Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 30.} Despite their common interests in regional trends, Washington’s attempts to develop better security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo has been less successful.\footnote{Tense relations between Seoul and Tokyo are historically-related and also derive from the continuing dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands in the Sea of Japan.} Washington views the poor bilateral relations between Seoul and Tokyo as a major roadblock in the realisation of its security web between Northeast and Southeast Asia, particularly for the Pentagon’s intention to create an integrated U.S.-Japan-South Korea missile defence system.\footnote{Mark E. Manyin, \textit{U.S.-South Korea Relations} (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 24, 2014), 6.} The warming of Seoul’s attitudes towards THAAD are ultimately driven by fear of North Korean nuclear proliferation.\footnote{The House of Representatives has taken an interest in the comfort women issue and Japanese school textbooks, introducing two resolutions, in 2006 and 2007. These resolutions express the sense of the House that Japan should “formally acknowledge, apologise, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner” for its abuses of the comfort women. In 2013, Congress also urged the Secretary of State to encourage the Japanese government to address the issues raised. Manyin, \textit{U.S.-South Korea Relations}, 6.} However, the thawing of relations between President Park and Prime Minister Abe in December 2015, as a result of the progress made on the long-disputed matter of comfort women, has reduced this salient obstacle to the improvement of relations between Seoul and Tokyo, and potentially opens up the prospect of their working together to counter Pyongyang’s activities.\footnote{In December 2015, Seoul and Tokyo signed an accord on the matter of the comfort women - South Korean women used as sex-slaves by the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II - with Japan agreeing to reparation costs and an official apology by Prime Minister Abe concerning the treatment of the women. Kwanwoo Jun and Alexander Martin, “Japan, South Korea Agree to Aid for ‘Comfort Women’,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, December 28, 2015. \url{http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-south-korea-reach-comfort-women-agreement-1451286347} (accessed August 18, 2016).} The U.S. is hoping that the current geopolitical situation will work to its advantage by enabling the development of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan and South Korea that could serve as leverage to restart dialogue with Pyongyang and, more generally, enhance the existing regional security order.\footnote{McDaniel Wicker, “America’s Next Move in Asia: A Japan-South Korea Alliance,” \textit{National Interest}, February 24, 2016. \url{http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-next-move-asia-japan-south-korea-alliance-15301} (accessed August 18, 2016).}
Adapting the alliance partnerships, not the alliance structure

The alliance system is being increasingly used to manage changing regional power dynamics and to preserve America’s position as the Asia-Pacific hegemon. The alliances are an essential element of U.S. compulsory power, working directly through its interactions with its partner states, creating conditions that suit the U.S. and which, in turn, affects their ability to control circumstances. Continuing to cultivate special relationships with key states in the region through the existing bilateral alliances is a critical means by which the U.S. can assert its interests, and reinforces its position as the superior partner. The U.S. uses its military power to directly shape the actions of its partners, also constituting the social capacities and interests of its alliance partners which maintains their subordinate positions in the regional order. The aim is to shape perceptions, knowledge, and preferences in such a way as to get the other states to accept their supporting, yet subordinate, role in the existing order of things. Consequently, the U.S. does not need to exercise direct coercive control over the other states in the region because the regional security architecture already operates to maintain the existing hierarchy, (re)producing the internally-related positions of super- and subordination (or domination) that actors occupy.

Over time, regional interests tend to converge with U.S. interests and in so doing, the alliance system, as well as its new adaptations, are reinforced as a legitimate source of regional stability, thereby reproducing the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony.

National security policies and their legal infrastructure are closely connected to the U.S. alliances through the creation of norms and shared commitments to regional security. While the U.S. military continues to maintain wartime operational control of South Korean armed forces through OPCON, it can influence the national military capability procurement, technical standards and procedures of its allies. A security consensus is thus built into the institutional framework of alliances and related domestic security institutions. The U.S. alliance has also become a natural extension of both Japanese and South Korean national security policy, shaping national security interests. Alliance members are likely to consult the United States about their own security initiatives, which in time becomes a naturalised process. As has often been the case, alliance partners do question the policies

1032 The American regional vision ‘begins with a preeminent position for the country both as the keeper of the peace, a wellspring for economic prosperity, an advocate for open markets and a role model for social, cultural and political values.’ U.S. goals are, ‘to prevent any other single power from dominating Asia; to maintain peace and stability through a combination of military presence, alliances, diplomatic initiatives, and economic interdependence; and to increase access for U.S. exports and companies through the WTO, APEC and free trade and other agreements.’ See Dick K. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated January 4, 2008), 30-31.


1035 Hoffman and Yeo, “Business as Usual,” 1.

1036 Hoffman and Yeo, “Business as Usual,” 8.
that the U.S. wants to pursue in the name of the alliance. However, the existence of the alliance provides its members with a sense of belonging, rather than specific ‘operational or tactical level’ policies. Over decades, these alliances have become integral to their respective national identities. Since the principles of the alliances are also ‘wrapped within legal and institutional frameworks,’ official perceptions and beliefs about the U.S. alliance in Japanese and South Korean defence policy, and, by extension, its influence over national security narratives, are also sustained. The durability of the alliances demonstrates that, despite disagreements over specific policies from time to time, the Mutual Defence Treaties remain central to allied security strategies, with overall management determined by Washington.

The hub-and-spokes pattern serves as a foundation for nascent pluri-lateral linkages developing among regional allies, sitting between the U.S.-led bilateral alliances and less formal regional multilateral security initiatives. The existing exclusive bilateral system is being adapted to support more inclusive overlapping trilateral dialogues between American alliance partners and other regional partners with whom the U.S. has some form of strategic relationship. The long term goal is to leverage the close alliance relationships, developing them into a broader network focused on regional concerns that converge with U.S. regional priorities, in particular, the disputes in the East and South China Seas, counter-terrorism and combatting a range of transnational issues, including drugs and human trafficking, and climate change. While these arrangements could form the basis of an eventual regional multilateral security mechanism, they ultimately exist to service American compulsory power. In other words, the development of a networked architecture of cooperation rests on the existing alliance structure, bilaterally managed through Washington, and acts as a hedge against the emergence of an undesirable multilateral order in the region that could potentially erode America’s hegemonic status. The American exercise of compulsory power through its military dominance, is thus not being used coercively. Subordinate states across the region actively consent to U.S. military dominance.

1037 Hoffman and Yeo, “Business as Usual,” 8.
1038 Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-US Base Protests (New York: Cambridge University Press), 16.
Nonetheless, the strength of the U.S. military presence is meant to be a powerful symbol of deterrence in light of any attempt by China, or North Korea, to challenge the status quo.

**Institutional Power: Regional security institutions**

To support developments in the San Francisco alliance structure, the Obama administration has also directed its attention to deepening ties with the multilateral regional institutions with a view to indirectly exerting influence over regional developments. Institutional power also involves interactions between actors, but is used indirectly, consequently, this aspect of power stresses consensus-building. Through institutional power, a dominant actor is able to design or shape institutions to its long term advantage and to the disadvantage of others. The medium through which influence is channelled is indirect, or diffuse because ‘A stands in a particular relation to the relevant institutional arrangements,’ where its actions exercise power over B.  

In the complex array of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific, it is more difficult for the U.S. to exert influence over the regional agenda, or to shape their longer term direction. Given Washington’s preference of exerting direct influence and shaping regional security through the bilateral alliances, there has been little consistent interest in moulding the style and format of regional multilateral institutions. Consequently, the U.S. has not been engaged in decision-making processes, or the internal mechanisms, that have shaped these regional forums since their inception, and the U.S. absence from taking the lead over emerging multilateral processes up to 2008 was conspicuous. Consequently, the U.S has played only a limited role in institutionalisation processes in these mechanisms it now seeks to influence.

Significant attempts to weave regional security into the more developed cooperation mechanisms in trade and finance surfaced after the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998). What was viewed in Southeast Asia as direct intervention by the United States through the IMF into the region’s financial affairs created space and need for regional institutions with a narrower East Asian focus. Increased unilateralism under the G.W. Bush administration prompted a regional response that could work around America’s ‘self-conscious exclusion.’ Regional concerns reinforced the imperative to construct

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1042 Since the US cannot gain membership of ASEAN or the APT, the U.S. has installed a permanent ambassador to ASEAN, and through this role, the U.S. is able to exert institutional power. However, through its bilateral alliances with Thailand and the Philippines, it may use its existing compulsory power to exert indirect influence over ASEAN via these countries. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 15-16.


1044 Mark Beeson, Institutions of the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 73, 75.
multilateral institutions that would supplement the security guarantee bargain with the United States. A security order has emerged in Southeast Asia, organised around the hard bilateralism of the American alliances, and an emerging soft multilateralism, through the regional institutions.

Regional efforts at security cooperation have been overseen by ASEAN, the leading multilateral institution of Southeast Asia, which has instigated much of Southeast Asia’s political and security cooperation. ASEAN’s complementary subgroupings draw in Northeast Asian states, including Japan, China, and South Korea, in addition to states in the wider Indo-Asia-Pacific, including the U.S., Australia and India. ASEAN’s role is to offset the various interests and perspectives of regional security because there is no single identifiable common threat around which to build a security bloc. Rather than creating formal multilateral security organisations, cooperative security mechanisms have been incorporated into the frameworks of existing institutions, as the main channel for dealing with unavoidable political and security-related issues in the Asia-Pacific. There is considerable overlap within these institutions over matters concerning traditional and non-traditional security. The most significant post-Cold War security mechanisms are the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and the East Asia Summit (EAS).

(i) ASEAN-led initiatives

ASEAN is central to regional transformation. This association oversees and instigates dialogues with an increasing number of states across the Asia-Pacific in formal and informal settings. The most inclusive multilateral regional security organisation, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), has the objective of establishing a ‘more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia-Pacific region,’ bringing together ASEAN and non-ASEAN nations through confidence-building activities.

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1045 The urgency of the G.W. Bush administration’s post-September 2001 security objectives offered the opportunity for East Asian states to seek a more reciprocal bargain with the United States. Goh, The Struggle for Order, 60.
1046 The cooperative security norm (without legalistic and formal mechanisms) of the ARF embraces inclusiveness, enabling dyads such as the U.S. and China, India and Pakistan, and North and South Korea to exist within its membership. Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Norms and Regional Orders,” in International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation, ed. T.V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 208.
1047 Extending its inclusive credentials, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) was formed in 1977, opening up ASEAN to the participation of actors outside the Southeast Asia sub-region, including the U.S., Japan, and China and South Korea. After the internal ASEAN summit, meetings with the additional groupings are held, including the PMC, ARF and ASEAN +3. There is also an annual meeting for defence ministers (ADMM), and ADMM-Plus, for ASEAN Defence Ministers and ASEAN’s 8 dialogue partners that meeting biennially.
1048 APEC is discussed in depth in Chapter 5.
1049 The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created in 1994 as a forum for informal confidence-building measures in security issues among the ten ASEAN members plus seventeen others, including China, the U.S., Australia, Canada, and Pacific-facing Latin America states. North Korea but not Taiwan has membership.
The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process, incorporating ASEAN and Japan, China and South Korea, was established in 1997 against the backdrop of the Asian Financial Crisis as a means to broaden and strengthen political and security cooperation between Northeast and Southeast Asia, principally in areas of non-traditional security.¹⁰⁵⁰ For many leaders in East Asia, ASEAN was considered too small to manage the severity of the financial crisis, while APEC was too big to fully represent the interests of its Asian members.¹⁰⁵¹

Alongside the more exclusively Asian APT, the East Asian Summit (EAS), established via the 2005 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, is a forum for dialogue on ‘broad strategic, political, and economic issues of common interest and concern,’ involving ASEAN and now eight other Asia-Pacific nations.¹⁰⁵² The membership of the EAS underscores the significance of these formal and informal arrangements as reflecting the pattern for regional cooperation, offering a uniquely Asia-Pacific way of addressing a complex array of interests and issues. ‘Soft’ regionalism, in the form of dialogues such as the APT and the EAS, work alongside more formally institutionalised mechanisms including APEC and the ARF, intersecting the broader Asia-Pacific region.¹⁰⁵³

¹⁰⁵⁰ The APT dialogue is not a formal agreement. It remains a consultative organ for view exchange rather than making specific binding policy commitments. Douglas Webber, “The Regional Integration That Didn’t Happen: Cooperation without Integration in the Early Twenty-First Century East Asia,” *The Pacific Review* 23, no. 3 (2010): 317. Areas of cooperation include: transnational crime; trade and investment; finance; tourism; food, agriculture, fishery and forestry; minerals; small and medium enterprises; information and communication technology; energy; environment and sustainable development; networking of Track II diplomacy; poverty alleviation; promotion development of vulnerable groups; culture and people-to-people contact; education; science and technology; public health; and disaster management.


¹⁰⁵² The original 16 members of the EAS were the ASEAN 10, plus Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India. Membership was expanded after 2009 to include the U.S. and Russia. The summit is usually held back-to-back with annual ASEAN leaders’ meetings. See ASEAN, “The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter,” Kuala Lumpur, December 12, 2005. http://www.asean.org/news/item/kuala-lumpur-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-the-asean-charter-kuala-lumpur-12-december-2005 (accessed September 19, 2014).

The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an annual gathering of foreign ministers and other senior officials to discuss a wide range of regional political and security topics, has an inclusive and broader Asian-Pacific, rather than exclusively narrower Asian-centric, membership. Encompassing 27 nations, plus the EU, the ARF initiative was ASEAN’s acknowledgement that it needed to remain relevant in matters of post-Cold War security and dominate the region’s security discourse. Establishing the ARF ensured ASEAN participation in all regional security deliberations. By binding Japan, China and the U.S. into the ARF, ASEAN could play a central role in securing Southeast Asia’s stability, connecting the big regional players into a Southeast Asian-led institution, reflecting ASEAN’s preferred strategy of consensus diplomacy, known as ‘the ASEAN Way.’

The ARF reproduces ASEAN’s preferred strategy of consensus diplomacy, through which regional problems can be managed, rather than resolved. Since it is not a collective security arrangement, the ARF is ill-designed to resolve specific disputes. The ARF has limited capacities and little leverage over members, and has shown little ability to address the region’s principal flashpoints, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Korean Peninsula. ASEAN centrality and the ‘ASEAN way’ of consensus-building block a more proactive agenda, presented by the U.S., Japan, Australia, and Canada. Since only an ASEAN state can chair the ARF, disputes between ASEAN and non-ASEAN members are deliberated with great difficulty. The ARF still serves primarily to build confidence and trust, and has neither moved onto the proposed second stage of preventive diplomacy, nor to its longer term goal of conflict resolution. Multilateral cooperation on security issues remains consultative and marginal regarding the management of critical regional security concerns such as China-Taiwan relations, the North Korean weapons programme, and the territorial disputes in the East

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1054 For Southeast Asian states, the priority is to tie Japan and China into Southeast Asia, rather than binding Southeast Asia to the security dynamics of Northeast Asia. See Barry Buzan, “Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Levels,” *The Pacific Review* 16, no. 2 (2003): 156.
1056 For instance, the creation of the Six Party Talks to address security issues on the Korean Peninsula was a blow to ARF centrality in managing specific issues. Beeson, *Institutions of the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond*, 72-73.
1057 Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Beyond the Talk Shop?”
1058 Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Beyond the Talk Shop?”
and South China Seas. Any U.S. expectation of the ARF moving beyond confidence-building is a colossal task.

This distinct process of regional institution-building is defined as ‘the ASEAN Way,’ encapsulating an Asian approach to regional institution-building, rather than the formal, legalistic approach to order-building favoured by Washington. ‘Asian’ multilateralism intentionally contrasts with the ‘exclusive bilateralism’ of the hub-and-spokes bilateral alliances. By consciously rejecting ‘imported models’ (i.e. ‘western’) of multilateralism, the ASEAN Way of regional multilateral institution-building is defined by open regionalism (inclusive membership), consensus, and soft regionalism (confidence-building). Regional security cooperation and dialogues revolve around ‘cooperative security,’ which is a commitment to inclusiveness, whereby criteria for participation or an agenda cannot be imposed, and adherence to decisions are on a voluntary basis. Asian order-building narratives often contradict the U.S. position on regional institutional order-building. Rather than formalising obligations, the focus of the ASEAN Way is on the development of an informal, slow-moving, and consultative process based on existing regional norms and practices that promote consensus and good will, which occur in a non-confrontational and non-threatening multilateral setting. For ASEAN, the method of multilateral institution-building and the development of practices promoting cohesion have become more important than the realisation of specific or concrete goals.

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1059 Track Two dialogues, such as the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue provide another informal forum for discussion. See also Brian L. Job, “Track Two Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order,” in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 241-279.

1060 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy, 27.


1062 Consultation tend to be open-ended and not tied to a specific timetable or agenda. Care is taken not to embarrass or isolate any individual ASEAN member. ASEAN-style consensus has limited effect when dealing with issues that engage fundamental national interests, including sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such issues tend to be ‘swept under the carpet.’ Much of the discussion and agreed outcomes for regional summits are pre-agreed, or done on the side lines of official events. Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building,” 320-332, 327-329.

1063 The 1995 ARF Concept Paper envisaged three types of security cooperation: confidence-building, preventative diplomacy and ‘elaboration of approaches to conflicts.’ (This highlights the process of interaction rather than the substance of an agreement to prevent conflict). Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building,” 327.

1064 Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building,” 324.

1065 Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building,” 324.
(iii) The East Asia Summit

The East Asia Summit (EAS), first convened in December 2005, is a complementary dialogue to other existing regional security arrangements. It was initially set up as an annual summit held by the leaders of East and South Asia, as ‘the sole leaders-led institution focused on political and security issues.’ The EAS was initiated by the then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohammed, who was uncompromising in his vision for a regional organisation that only represented the views of Asian countries. ASEAN sets the EAS agenda and schedule, and establishes the criteria for membership, with accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation a prerequisite to membership of the EAS. Since the U.S. was not invited to attend the EAS, its creation caused some concern in Washington. The concern was that the EAS would replace APEC as America’s best medium through which to shape regional trade, marking a new era of Asian regionalism that would potentially limit U.S. influence. Such a transformation in regional affairs would negatively affect America’s central role in the Asia-Pacific and Washington would find it difficult to set the agenda and shape the goals for multilateral cooperation.

With China a member of the EAS, Washington anticipated that Beijing would use the EAS to consolidate a leading role in the Asia-Pacific and weaken U.S. influence, through its preference for an ‘Asian only’ grouping. The strategic importance of the EAS process was contained within its potential as the basis for a future East Asian community with a potential capacity to make collective agreements on trade or even security affairs without U.S. input, whilst also shifting the centre of the region from the broader Pacific Rim (including the U.S.) towards East Asia (and China). The creation of the EAS, and its formal exclusion of the U.S. represented a region pushing back against an increasingly unilateral U.S. foreign policy under the G.W. Bush administration.

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1066 The EAS is mainly concerned with matters of non-traditional security as a trust-building, preferring the ‘ASEAN-way’ to regional institution-building. There are five EAS priority areas for cooperation: finance, education, avian flu, disaster management, and climate change. Summits have also broached nuclear non-proliferation, the Korean Peninsula, developments in Syria and Iran, maritime security and management of disputes in the South China Sea. In non-traditional security, and economic spheres, progress in priority areas of functional cooperation include regional economic and financial integration, education, regional disaster response, energy and environment, health and connectivity.


1068 The divergent visions of an Asian-only identity, contrasted with an Asia-Pacific identity, are discussed in depth in Chapter 5.

1069 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 63.


1072 Vaughn, East Asia Summit (EAS): Issues for Congress, 1
The establishment of the EAS emphasises the struggle for supremacy between China and the U.S. in determining the centre of regional order-building, and has also become a battle ground for competing influence between Japan and China.\footnote{Goh, The Struggle for Order, 64.} There are diverging regional views between those states pushing for an exclusive Asian-centric grouping (led at different times by China and Malaysia), countered by a need for a broader Asia-Pacific grouping (pursued by U.S. allies, Japan and Australia).\footnote{Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 4.} In developing the EAS framework, China favoured a future East Asian community based on the more restricted membership of the ASEAN Plus Three states which would exclude Australia and New Zealand with their close alignment to the United States. India, as China’s traditional rival in Asia, was also to be excluded, especially since India was developing closer ties with the United States. China reportedly favoured a draft joint declaration for the summit, which portrayed ASEAN Plus Three states as only having a dialogue with India, Australia and New Zealand at the summit. Japan reportedly opposed such a definition of the extended grouping. India reportedly opposed any joint declaration that did not imply that the EAS would form the basis of a future East Asian Community.\footnote{Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), “Japan, China Clash Over East Asia Summit,” November 25, 2005, cited in Vaughn, East Asia Summit (EAS): Issues for Congress, 3} The outcome in favour of the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand to counter-balance Chinese influence reflects a regional preference for an Asia-Pacific rather than Asian-centric dynamic, aligning with U.S. preferences, and highlighting the indirect influence of the U.S. over regional interests and norm diffusion.

\textbf{U.S. capacity to shape regional institutions}

Under the Obama administration there has been a shift towards the recognition of what regional multilateral institutions can facilitate with regard to regional order-building. The bilateral alliance system offers insufficient capacity on its own to manage the array of regional security problems. The numerous multilateral institutions and dialogues can also offer value, by complementing and reinforcing the existing alliance network.\footnote{William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, “What is Asian Security Architecture?” Review of International Studies 36, no. 1 (2014): 101.} Washington’s endorsements of regional security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific have consistently been accompanied by strong reaffirmation of its traditional emphasis on bilateral alliances. While the U.S. has not been an initiator of regional institutions emerging in post-Cold War East Asia, it has still been able to exert a degree of political influence because, on the whole, the region accepts American security hegemony and wants to keep the U.S. firmly engaged. Thus the regional institutions act as a social framework for legitimising American regional power and leadership.
American strategic thinking under the Obama administration views more multilateral cooperation between allies and security partners as enhancing regional security. Hillary Clinton’s formal acceptance of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) at the July 2009 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) perhaps best illustrates this, driven as it was by Washington’s aspiration to gain membership in the East Asia Summit. Reminiscent of Washington’s decision to participate in the ARF, which was driven by the changing strategic context of the early 1990s, an important motivation behind U.S participation in the EAS has been to reassure the region of America’s ongoing commitment and involvement, whilst also inevitably drawing benefits from being on the inside. There is utility in a regional multilateral security dialogue in helping to reassure friends and allies in the region of U.S. continued commitment and in demonstrating its willingness to accept constraints to American power, as a way to reproduce consent for U.S. hegemony.

The U.S. approach to these multilateral mechanisms is drawn from its own requirements for regional order, and the construction of an Asia-Pacific identity integral to U.S. self-perception as the Asia-Pacific hegemon. Consequently, U.S. policy-makers have two main concerns relating to the role of regional multilateral institutions in the overarching regional security architecture. The first concerns the geographic boundaries and degree of inclusiveness of these institutions regarding non-Asian Asia-Pacific states. The U.S. has traditionally advanced an ‘open’ and ‘inclusive’ regional security architecture, under the inclusive description of ‘Asia-Pacific,’ on the understanding that such geographical designations can shape and develop the meaning behind architectural design.

The second preoccupation relates to the purpose or function of these institutions within the broader regional security architecture. Washington typically conceives regional security architecture in material terms, derived from judgements about utility and future viability, centred upon the production of outcomes as defined by the U.S., particularly in the area of crisis management. Washington’s preference is for formal and legalistic rules that embed legally-binding commitments covering a wide

1079 The same assurances were given to the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s, when there was also regional concern over America’s commitment to the region, leading to American involvement in the ARF. See Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian strategy,” The Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004): 52. Since 2008, the U.S. has become more receptive to the concrete gains it can acquire from regional cooperation. See Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture.
range of issues. This contrasts with the ASEAN Way, advocating a consensual and non-legalistic and non-binding commitments. ASEAN has instigated regional norms and practices towards cooperation, offering a distinct interpretation of the role that regional institutions can and should play in security cooperation. ASEAN’s preference for process-driven mechanisms, where style and process are more meaningful, tends to conflict with the American outcome-driven approach which prioritises short-term policy outcomes.

Historically, the U.S. has advanced a role for the ARF as a forum for confidence-building, rather than as a collective security mechanism, consistent with its own interests. The G.W. Bush administration opportunistically used the ARF as a forum to garner support for international norms, especially on human rights and counter-terrorism, rather than a forum for generating regional norms. Consequently, the G.W. Bush administration’s engagement with the ARF was purely transactional. During the global war on terror, the U.S.-initiated campaign against terrorism became the prime issue of common interest among ARF members. Keeping its options open, the U.S. simultaneously forged various counter-terrorism agreements with ASEAN. The attitude of U.S. policy makers towards the ARF during the G.W. Bush era emphasised its role as a forum for dialogue and declaratory statements, rather than an institution for affecting change, effectively downgrading its status as an emerging regional security institution. As the ARF moved its agenda towards discussion of non-traditional security issues, the G.W. Bush administration viewed the ARF as unable to offer any real contribution to the traditional security issues deemed critical to the United States. Instead, the G.W. Bush interpretation of multilateralism was subsequently channelled through APEC, with its economic liberalisation focus and summit-level meetings, and not the ARF.

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1085 The US chose the ARF meeting in 2002 as the forum to sign an anti-terrorism agreement with ASEAN. ASEAN announced at the 2003 ARF that the two sides would endorse a counter-terrorism plan which would involve US assistance in safeguarding shipping in the Malacca Straits. This was apparently viewed with some anxiety by Beijing. Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian strategy,” 59.
1086 From the American point of view, the Taiwan issue, peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, and the India–Pakistan nuclear contest rank top on US priorities, and a regional institution which could not address these issues, represented ‘low stakes’ for the superpower. Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” 59.
Washington’s influence over the ARF regional security agenda is also unambiguous under the Obama administration. The 2014 and 2015 forums addressed a plethora of traditional and non-traditional issues important to the United States, including:

‘marine environmental protection and conservation; the South China Sea; concerns over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs and human rights situation; the humanitarian crisis emanating from the irregular maritime movement of people in Southeast and South Asia and the Mediterranean; and regional cooperation on issues ranging from cyber-security to non-proliferation to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.’

The U.S. generally exerts indirect influence over the ARF through back channels and bilateral discussions. Securing agreements, or coordinating an approach to specific issues, for example over North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and the prospects for a code of conduct on the South China Sea, tend to occur on the sidelines. Typical ASEAN form requires positions and arrangements to be reached prior to the ARF meeting. Nonetheless, Washington can use these annual gatherings to advance its strategic thinking on regional issues, and unify regional narratives around America’s own negative perceptions of China’s rise. ASEAN’s continued dominance of the ARF may well strengthen the United States’ position in the region, given that the association is currently supportive of the U.S. regional presence, and also concerned over China’s intentions and growing military capabilities in Southeast Asia.

The role of the rebalance in increasing American influence over regional institutions

U.S. concerns over the expansion of Asian-centric groupings that could undermine the American-led security order dominate its interactions with regional security institutions. Socialised during the Cold War into a hierarchical mode of interacting with East Asian partners within asymmetric alliances, Washington appears unwilling to have its strategic options constrained by alternative, regionally developed norms, such as the ASEAN Way. Consequently, the U.S. appears reactive rather than proactive in leading regional multilateral institution-building. The creation of the EAS further highlights the often passive role of the U.S. in discussions over the development of regional

1089 Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Beyond the Talk Shop?”
1090 Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Beyond the Talk Shop?”
1091 Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, 66.
undertakings that occur outside the American-led alliance structure. The U.S. often undermines regional security dialogues by using other instruments of statecraft at its disposal, including the bilateral alliances, through which it can directly channel its preferences. As with the case of the EAS, until U.S. membership in 2011, U.S. regional allies viewed themselves as ‘regional adjudicators,’ for U.S. interests through their widening relationships with China and through participation in regional institutions. Their regional security policies are coordinated with Washington, thereby ensuring U.S. involvement in Asian-centric regional-order building initiatives. Regional allies act as a check against the expansion of Asian-centric order-building and Chinese influence on multilateralism.  

U.S. policy changes under the Obama administration reflect a shift in the position that Asian multilateralism was inimical to American interests. The principal attractions of the EAS for the U.S. are, first, its key regional allies such as Japan and Australia are already members, and second, it potentially offers a way of curbing China’s influence. As a signatory to TAC, the U.S. acceded to the EAS, confirming that the Obama administration placed ASEAN-led institutions at the heart of the rebalance strategy. In November 2011, Hillary Clinton emphasised, ‘the importance of multilateral cooperation, for we believe that addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action.’

Gaining membership of the EAS has been a prominent feature of the rebalance strategy. That regional multilateral institutions are seen by the Obama administration as potentially important ways of exerting influence is significant. More importantly, the U.S. has been able to shape the EAS agenda to focus on key political and security issues, including ‘ISIL and violent extremism, Ebola and global health security, Iran’s nuclear program, and maritime cooperation in the South China Sea,’ and is moving the EAS towards adopting a rules-based approach to managing inter-state relations in the future.

U.S. presence at regional summits is thus both critical and reassuring, proving the importance of using the President’s time to attend these annual summits. Obama’s failure to attend the 2013 East Asia
Summit and APEC meetings as a result of the U.S. government shutdown did nothing to emphasise America’s renewed commitment to multilateralism in the region. Consistency in Washington’s rhetoric and actions towards the region further compounds the regional view that U.S. interest in the EAS is unsustainable over the longer term. The President’s attendance at these regional security dialogues is an essential component of the rebalance strategy, further substantiates America’s commitment to the region and enables the U.S. to influence the direction of these forums. While the current administration is relatively happy to engage with ASEAN and other EAS members to gradually shape the future agenda and priority issues as part of the rebalance, its preference for a ‘results-oriented agenda’ has not changed. The new Trump administration is likely to change strategy, either withdrawing from, or reducing U.S. engagement with multilateral institutions. As was the case with its participation in the ARF, U.S. frustration with the EAS may grow in the future if the EAS does not develop the capacity to meet its goals and adhere to its commitments.

ASEAN depictions of an emergent regional architecture typically afford pride of place to ASEAN-led processes such as the ARF and the EAS. This preference for its own multilateral institutional arrangements largely reflects a desire to resist U.S. and Chinese dominance in the shaping and management of regional architecture. At the same time, ASEAN seeks to bind both the U.S. and China within an ASEAN-led regional framework.

‘Southeast Asian governments continue to view the U.S. role and its approach to Asian community building with some ambivalence [. . .] From the perspective of ASEAN states, the limited U.S. interest and engagement in broader, longer-term institutions [. . .] has worked to the advantage of the lesser powers, especially ASEAN itself, which does not want great-power dominance in the regional order-building process.’


1099 Capie and Acharya, “The United States and the East Asia Summit: A New Beginning?”


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The ASEAN Way of consensus-building tends to focus ASEAN efforts on non-traditional security issues (NTS). While NTS issues are pressing, they also tend not to raise the same level of sensitivity that traditional security issues generate. There are also doubts as to whether the ASEAN Way can provide practical solutions to regional security problems, especially since bilateral or multilateral issues are carefully and routinely kept outside the agenda of formal ASEAN meetings in favour of broader confidence-building measures. Consequently, most regional actors turn to bilateral and pluri-lateral agreements to advance security goals, thereby falling back on bilateral defence relationships with Washington. Multilateralism will not replace the existing bilateral alliances in managing regional security problems in the near future.

With the Asia-Pacific region divided over the future role of its multilateral institutions, American regional hegemony is ultimately strengthened. The lack of regional consensus on the structure and membership of regional security architecture limits attempts to define Asia-Pacific security. The core of the debate centres on whether there ought to be an inclusive institutional bargain which builds on the American-led security order, and one which also includes China. The alternative is an exclusively East Asian order, with China at the centre. Ultimately, the root of the discussion lies in the extent to which the region accepts the criticality of the American security guarantee for regional stability. An Asian-centric multilateralism would challenge the U.S.-led order, especially if China attempts to further isolate the United States from regional order-building. In situations and periods

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1103 The informal and non-legalistic procedures of the ARF require a creative approach to conflict resolution, requiring a non-threatening atmosphere for exploring problem-solving. Acharya argues that there is no evidence that slow institutionalisation, informal and indirect bargaining and consensus-seeking will ultimately produce better outcomes than multilateral institutions preferring formal and legal approaches. Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building,” 335, 338.
1106 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 69.
1107 At critical times since the end of the Cold War, East Asia has pushed to decrease its economic reliance on the United States. The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) was one such point, leading several Southeast states to build political relations with China in various multilateral settings, including the ARF, the APT and the EAS. The consequences of the AFC will be discussed in Chapter 5.
where regional preferences shift towards multilateralism, Washington has been forced to reciprocate, so as not to risk losing an important source of legitimacy for its regional hegemony.\textsuperscript{1109}

The Obama administration’s pledge to increase American commitment to regional multilateral forums is acknowledgement that greater involvement in regional security dialogues is critical for legitimising U.S. regional hegemony. American legitimacy as both an Asia-Pacific state and regional hegemon are strengthened when it works within multilateral frameworks. However Washington does not ‘possess’ the regional security institutions. ASEAN members do not give Washington their unqualified support, particularly if Washington appears likely to bring them into confrontation with China, or they are forced to choose between China and the United States.\textsuperscript{1110} There is no regional appetite for an overt or complete containment of China.\textsuperscript{1111} There is broad regional acceptance for the status quo in regional order: a U.S. military presence, in addition to stable economic relations with China. There remains uncertainty as to whether the U.S. is always a reliable partner and willing to work with the developing regional institutions, since America’s regional multilateral engagement has tended to be sporadic rather than consistent.\textsuperscript{1112} Nonetheless, American engagement remains critical for the achievement of the regional goal of binding Chinese power into the region. In 2003, the Singaporean Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong (1994-2004) emphasised that ‘no other country or combination of countries can balance a growing China.’\textsuperscript{1113} American intentions also emphasise the need to build institutional arrangements that bind, rather than exclude China.\textsuperscript{1114}

Washington is keen to assert its Asia-Pacific credentials. Despite its long-standing ties to the region, the United States is not an East Asian nation in the way that China is. Although the U.S. has been deeply involved in the Asia-Pacific, its global commitments mean it is often only intermittently attentive to the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{1115} Washington’s primary interests are not entirely Asia-Pacific-related.

\textsuperscript{1109} Goh, The Struggle for Order, 70.
\textsuperscript{1111} David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 195-6.
\textsuperscript{1112} Kang asserts that it is unlikely the U.S. would militarily defend Vietnam, Malaysia or Indonesia against China. It is also questionable whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan now as it did during the 1996 China-Taiwan crisis. Kang, China Rising, 186, 194-5.
\textsuperscript{1114} Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 34.
\textsuperscript{1115} Kang deems the U.S. to be an offshore balancer in East Asia. A state has to have more than interests in a region in order to be defined as a state of that region. The issues within the region have to be the primary ones upon which the state focuses. In this way, the U.S. is a global actor with regional interests and thus is defined as an ‘offshore-balancer’ rather than an East Asian state. Kang, China Rising, 187.
Intervention will only occur when it is in U.S. interests to do so, in ‘episodic and issue-driven,’ fashion rather than on a continual basis, as is the case for regional actors with regional perspectives. The American perspective contrasts with that of many Asia-Pacific states, who, with their geographical proximity, cultural/ethnic ties, historical memory, and regional outlook, concede that a consensual approach offers the necessary compromise for regional institution-building.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the interests of regional security remain predicated in terms favourable to the United States, providing evidence of U.S. capacity to exert compulsory and institutional power to produce regional hegemony. As a result, U.S. security interests come to be seen as the common interest of regional security. It is a means for the powerful to set the context for deciding what an interest is, consequently, American power can situate the overall ‘rules of the game.’ The alliances demonstrate an alignment of interests occurring within the alliance states – in relation to order-building and order-maintenance – mirroring those interests of the United States. A U.S. presence in the region has, for many decades, been considered as ‘the essential ingredient for stability,’ that also indirectly affects the agenda in multilateral security dialogues and forums. Within this reiterated U.S. commitment through the rebalance, the regional institutional agenda is also progressively being dictated by the American agenda in the South China Sea, which has assumed an important tangible and symbolic status in relation to regional stability. U.S. management of the disputes in the South and East China Seas shape regional perceptions of its commitments to the Asia-Pacific, allowing the U.S. to determine the regional agenda, and to construct the framework within which its alliance partners, and regional institutions, will act.

1117 Kang, China Rising, 187.
1119 Mabee, Understanding American Power, 82.
1121 Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder, 153.
1122 Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder, 154.

In an example of aligning of alliance interests in accordance with the U.S. vision, the U.S. Japan and Australia agreed to deepen military cooperation and work on strengthening maritime security, boosting ‘maritime security capacity building’ in the Asia-Pacific region. The aim was to allay concerns among allies of the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, vowing it would remain a ‘fundamental focus’ of U.S. foreign policy and that the U.S. would not be distracted by global events. Jamie Smyth, “U.S., Japan and Australia to Deepen
America’s Asia-Pacific strategy seeks to first prevent any other power from dominating the security order in the Asia-Pacific and second, maintain peace and stability through a combination of military presence, alliances, diplomatic initiatives and economic interdependence. The goal is to shape the emerging regional security order to allow the U.S. to remain the preponderant air/maritime power, and preeminent regional power, in the Asia-Pacific. Through the rebalance, efforts have been made to extend and further embed the importance of the alliances in East Asia. The continued existence of this structure requires the (re)production of legitimacy and purpose in the alliances, which act as the basis for the hierarchical structure of regional order.

The military rebalance strategy seeks to reinforce the U.S. as the principal source of regional order in three ways. The rebalance has prioritised a renegotiation of regional bilateral security alliances, through which it can assert direct influence, to enable partners to take on a greater role in regional security. These long-term alliances also provide the foundations for consent to U.S. regional hegemony among its regional allies. For Japan and South Korean, for example, these alliances have supported the creation of post-war identities, which in turn, bolster America’s own hegemonic identity, and giving purpose to its continuing military presence in the region. Demonstrating the adaptive capacity of U.S. hegemony, the U.S. has also encouraged the development of a number of pluri-lateral strategic relationships between key regional partners, primarily on an issue-by-issue basis, which strengthens the existing regional security order. Finally, the Obama administration has also endeavoured to increase involvement in regional security dialogues and frameworks, as a way to reassure the region of its continued commitment and to strengthen the consensual basis for its regional hegemony. Working alongside its military power, the U.S. has been able to indirectly shape the regional security architecture through the regional institutions, especially the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum. The Obama administration’s acknowledgement of the importance of regional institutions to the region, has strengthened the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony and helped to bind China, albeit begrudgingly, more closely with U.S. security interests, thereby consolidating existing asymmetries in regional order.

The rebalance strategy highlights U.S. domination of the regional security narrative and its unifying effects, through its discursive perspective on China’s rise. To this end, the Obama administration has largely been able to command the narrative concerning China’s assertive behaviour in the Asia-Pacific, creating a regional rallying effect around the negative perception of ‘China’s rise’ that has not only been

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1123 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 30.
channelled through the alliances, as would be expected, but has also been routed through regional institutions. American pressure on ASEAN, via American regional allies, has created a source of tension in this Southeast Asian institution. Despite Beijing’s charm offensive, and its attempts to induce support for its position in the region through its regional economic projects, China has not been able to overturn America’s dominant narrative on its emerging rising power status, which serves the purposes of producing U.S. hegemonic identity at the same time. The U.S. has also discursively shaped the terms of meaning that influence how actors see what is possible and desirable, which simultaneously legitimates the structure of regional order and the importance of the alliance structure within it. In so doing, Washington has been able to indirectly shape the regional security agenda to suit its priorities and interests.

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1125 Where there has been a shift away from America’s dominant narrative, changes in domestic political environments have been highly influential. In the Philippines, for example, the new president, Rodrigo Duterte, has made overtures towards Beijing, rebalancing the previous administration’s swing towards Washington. It is not clear whether this shift will improve Sino-Philippine relations in the South China Sea, as the Philippines hopes.

1126 As the bilateral alliances demonstrate, structures allocate differential capabilities and different advantages to different positions, shaping self-understanding and subjective interests. Despite the asymmetric military relations with the U.S., Japan and South Korea are ‘willing to accept their role in the existing order of things’, because their interests have been structured to support the existing order. Structural power operates even when there are no instances of A acting to exercise control over B. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 53.
Chapter 5

The Economic Rebalance

Discussion now turns to America’s ability to influence the shape of the regional economy and trade, as an essential aspect of its regional hegemony. Gramsci asserted that the prevailing group must be at the centre of economic activity, by controlling the dominant means of production. This chapter focuses on the ways in which the U.S. exercises various forms of power that overlap in the economic sphere. In addition, it is in the economic sphere where the U.S. meets more resistance to, but not wholesale rejection of, its hegemony. This resistance is accentuated by the challenges the U.S. experiences in pushing forward its neoliberal agenda, and in its continuing efforts to dominate the structure of regional trade as part of the rebalance strategy, most notably, through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP is meant to counter other regional proposals from ASEAN and China, who both also seek to dominate the future of regional economic order. The American exercise of structural and institutional power is combined with its quest to productively dominate and also modify elements of its neoliberal narrative since the 1990s, as a means to garner consent for its regional order.

Improving American access to Asia-Pacific trade and investment is a crucial aspect of the rebalance strategy. The region is vitally important to the U.S. economy: China, Japan, ROK and Taiwan are among the U.S. top twelve trading partners; the twenty-one APEC economies purchase almost 60% of U.S. goods; and the ten members ASEAN grouping is considered a ‘large and critical’ trading partner. As with its security strategy, Washington’s approach to post-Cold War regional economics has broadly focused on maintaining U.S. hegemony and asserting U.S. interests by building ‘inclusive economic frameworks that will define the rules of trade and investment in the 21st century.’ Regional trade and security configurations have taken historically divergent approaches. While regional security has advanced along bilateral lines, Asia-Pacific trade relations have developed on a more multilateral basis, influenced by the American exercise of structural power - its domination of global economic governance through institutions with global reach, such as the WTO and IMF. With the failure of


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the WTO Doha Round, the U.S. has adapted its regional trade policy to combine bilateral and multilateral mechanisms.

Since American hegemony in the economic sphere is more widely contested by many regional players, and not just China, Washington has to work harder to maintain overall control. There is greater regional desire for cooperation in trade matters, reflected in the number of initiatives to enhance cooperation that have originated from the region. U.S. capacity to shape the direction of regional economic matters is made more problematic by the U.S. domestic political arena and the lack of domestic consensus concerning the benefits of free trade agreements on the U.S. economy. To start, the chapter focuses on the pragmatic continuity in the U.S. approach to bilateral and multilateral regional trade in the post-Cold War era, and also addresses a significant event that continues to influence contemporary U.S.-Asia-Pacific trade relations. The Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) had a major effect on the manner in which many East Asian nations define their own approaches to forums for regional cooperation, and also how they continue to perceive U.S. structural power and U.S. influence in international financial institutions, including the IMF. There are competing visions for the future of regional trade: an inclusive Asia-Pacific order versus an Asian-centric order.

To assess the exertion of structural power, this chapter considers the role of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), specifically the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP is the main mechanism through which the Obama administration seeks to dominate the rules for, and shape of, regional economic order in the 21st century. Structural power is closely linked to the exertion of American institutional power indirectly through the TPP membership – many of whom are members of ASEAN and APEC. This provides the U.S. with another lever to assert its influence over regional institutions and to push forward its vision for the future of regional trade. Simultaneously exercising structural and institutional power, the U.S. uses regional institutions to promote the U.S. agenda and its structural power to both absorb calls for change and shape the direction of change whilst maintaining the status quo. In recognition of the interconnectivity between regional economic and security matters, the TPP is not simply a trade deal. Washington views the TPP through a strategic lens – as a means to reinforce America’s regional position amongst its allies, show commitment by binding the U.S. to the region further, and provide it with additional strategic ties.1130

1130 Malaysia and Vietnam stand out as two TPP negotiating partners with whom the US seeks to improve strategic ties.
American productive power – its power to dominate and shape narratives, or stories – has often been deployed with its compulsory power in the economic sphere.\textsuperscript{1131} This discussion focuses on Washington’s attitudes towards regional deviations from neoliberal ideology in the 1990s as outlined in the Washington Consensus. Washington’s shift towards coercive practices, away from consensus-building, and reinforced by its discursive attack on the Asian development models, as a means to absorb resistance to its hegemonic ideas, has had far-reaching consequences for developments in regional economic and trade cooperation. Washington’s discursive delegitimisation of the Asian development models following the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998), targeted the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in many East Asian economies as the antithesis of fair competition and a level playing field. Washington continues to promote the same narrative through the TPP, whilst additionally accentuating the TPP’s role as the ‘gold standard’ FTA when compared with other regional initiatives.

\textbf{Transformations in regional economic governance in the 1990s}

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has used multilateral forums to expand economic engagement and generate global growth and prosperity.\textsuperscript{1132} The American approach to regional trade veers towards pragmatism rather than principles, particularly in relation to multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{1133} The U.S. relies on ‘what works’ in a particular circumstance, focusing in broader foreign policy objectives, rather than pursuing a ‘principled commitment to bilateralism, multilateralism or unilaterialism.’\textsuperscript{1134}

The post-war liberal economic order has undergone several transformations under America’s watch.\textsuperscript{1135} Post-World War II, the U.S. concentrated its efforts on building global multilateral institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and World Bank). The multilateral approach served its own long term economic interests, and its

\textsuperscript{1131} In Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy, productive power makes some instances of compulsory power possible and legitimate, and in turn compulsory power shapes the terms of meaning that influences how actors see what is possible and desirable. The delegitimisation of the Asian Development Model after the Asian Financial Crisis is a good example of these two forms of power working in tandem. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics.”


\textsuperscript{1134} Michael Mastanduno, “Institutions of Convenience,” 30-1.

commitment to an open world economy. By the late 1970s and through the 1980s, partly as a response to Japan’s development model and protected markets, the U.S. shifted it approach towards bilateralism. The pragmatic solution was to negotiate bilaterally with Japan, using a variety of aggressive measures, to pry open markets across a number of sensitive sectors, including the automotive industry. The post-Cold War era saw a move towards support for global multilateral economic institutions and the establishment of the WTO. However, with the failure of the Doha Round of the WTO in the mid-2000s, and Washington’s inability to stop the Asia-Pacific shift towards Asian regional projects, U.S. trade strategy has also shifted towards regional measures in an effort to ensure its ongoing leadership of Asia-Pacific trade.

During the 1980s and early-mid 1990s, Washington’s domestic preoccupation with budget deficits was amplified by Japan’s economic boom. Consequently, criticism was levelled at Japan’s perceived security free-riding on the United States which had facilitated Japan’s economic surge. In addition, Japan’s industrial policy, underpinned by its alternative development model, was viewed as inconsistent with U.S. principles of open markets and free trade. With the region’s confidence bolstered by the economic success of the Asian tigers, strengthening regional trade cooperation and processes of economic liberalisation were in vogue in the late 1980s. These combined factors resulted in the creation of APEC in November 1989, the region’s first multilateral institution for coordinating regional economic cooperation. A key incentive for APEC’s creation was to bind the United States into a regional institution that would make U.S. economic policies ‘more predictable and available for regional multilateral scrutiny.’ Despite ASEAN’s initial reluctance, Japanese officials insisted on American inclusion, in part to mollify some of the tension created by the U.S.-Japan bilateral trade disputes, but mainly as a way to contain American unilateralism on trade issues.

1139 The Asian Tigers were Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, joined later by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
1140 APEC members are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong-China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam. ‘APEC was born out of fear – fear of a unilateralist or isolationist America, fear of [the] balkanisation of the world into competing economic blocs, and fear of the death of the GATT-centred world trading system.’ Yoichi Funabashi, Asia-Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995), 105.
1142 The ASEAN nations accepted Japanese rationale with regard to the inclusion of the ‘non-Asian’ US in APEC. Ikenberry, After Victory, 242-243.
Despite initial misgivings, Washington did come to support the development of APEC as the region’s core economic institution, on the basis that its remit intersected with the objectives of American policy in the Asia-Pacific.\(^{1143}\) Since APEC lacked substantive formal trade agreements, its capacity to challenge U.S. hegemony was minimal. Washington’s support of APEC was determined by the need to reformulate its regional economic strategy, rather than the promotion of regional multilateralism. Moreover, the APEC grouping was a better proposition than the one offered by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed. His East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) proposal sought to bring about a formal regional trade bloc designed to counter the rise of North American and European trade blocs, NAFTA and the EU. The Malaysian scheme also played on ASEAN states’ concerns that APEC, with its inclusive membership, would increase American pressure on them to ‘adopt formal negotiations, contractual commitments and invasive regulations for freer trade.’\(^{1144}\) From Washington’s perspective, the exclusively East Asian EAEG proposition would exclude the United States, could bring about the closure of East Asian markets to the United States and thereby bolster Japan’s position.\(^{1145}\) The G.H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations successfully applied pressure on U.S. East Asian allies to quash the EAEG proposal.

The two proposals – an inclusive APEC vis-à-vis an exclusive EAEG – underscore a constant theme of East Asian versus Asia-Pacific regionalism that has existed since the 1990s. The two options – APEC and the EAEG – emphasise a choice between the exclusively Asian EAEG, which would break with the U.S.-oriented Cold War bargain and create a more unified Asian voice in global trade negotiations, and the broader, more inclusive APEC. At this time, the APEC proposition would keep the United States in, keep Japan constrained, and allow regional states to ‘diversify their dependencies’ on Japan and the United States.\(^{1146}\) In order to sustain U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific, via APEC, some East Asian states agreed to the incremental opening of their economies to the U.S., whilst simultaneously restricting the formal liberalisation of domestic economic policies. East Asian states tried to constrain U.S. power, making it impossible for Washington to achieve or maintain domination, by shifting negotiations into APEC, an institution with consensual decision-making procedures and no enforcement mechanism, and an inclusive membership that could dilute American influence.\(^{1147}\)

\(^{1143}\) ‘To secure economic access to the region; to spread values systems preferred by Americans; and to prevent domination of the region by other powers.’ Richard Baker, “The United States and APEC Regime Building,” in Asia-Pacific Crossroads: Regime Creation and the Future of APEC, eds. Vinod Aggarwal and Charles Morrison (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998), 165.
\(^{1144}\) Goh, The Struggle for Order, 38.
\(^{1145}\) Goh, The Struggle for Order, 39.
\(^{1146}\) Goh, The Struggle for Order, 41.
The Asian Financial Crisis: Consequences for American hegemony

The Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) was a critical turning point for East Asia, shaping both contemporary East Asian identity and the framework for regional trade cooperation. The episode also emphasised Washington’s capacity to exercise the full gambit of compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power in coercive mode, which had long-term consequences for the perception of American economic hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The Asian Financial Crisis highlights Washington’s limits in imposing its neoliberal ideology using coercion. The application of Washington Consensus neoliberal principles following the Asian Financial Crisis, and the full force of American compulsory power in its pursuit of austere bail out conditions through the IMF, were perceived as punishment across East Asia. Lacking regional consent for its measures, Washington’s attempts to force the embedding of economic liberalisation across East Asia following the crisis by the IMF were highly contested and extremely unpopular. Moreover, the degree to which the bailout conditions were implemented was contradictory, ambiguous and uneven across the region.

The conditions set by the IMF in response to the Asian Financial Crisis were not specific to East Asia. However, the Asian bailout was the largest and most intrusive in the IMF’s history, which at the time, triggered controversy over its role. Bailouts, with structural conditionalities, had been previously tried and tested in Latin America and Africa, under the auspices of the Washington Consensus. The structural adjustment conditionalities imposed by the IMF, and the demands of the World Bank, prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s, were targeted at deregulating financial and trade regimes, imposing monetary stability and fiscal austerity across developing regions.

The ideological core of...
the neoliberal project emphasises the market, fiscal discipline, trade, investment and financial liberalisation, deregulation, decentralisation, privatisation and a reduced role for the state. The pillars of the Washington Consensus bound the policies of the World Bank and the IMF tightly to the U.S. government, notably through the U.S. Treasury. U.S. intervention via the IMF allowed the U.S. to influence the economic restructuring processes in these developing countries, and determine outcomes favourable to U.S. business.

The manner in which the East Asian economic miracle of the 1980s and 1990s had occurred, presented a challenge to Washington’s neoliberal ideology. Although the Asian development models proliferating across East Asia were ‘explained away’ by the World Bank as ‘market-conforming,’ an unambiguous discrepancy existed between the policy instruments recommended in the Washington Consensus that would facilitate ‘prudent macro-economic policies, outward orientation and free market capitalism,’ and East Asian success. Prior to 1997, the World Bank had praised Asian economies, alleging that an economic miracle was occurring. When the crisis hit in July 1997, Washington and the IMF dominated the narrative, determining the cause of the crisis to be the close relationship between the state and business, characteristic of many East and Southeast Asian economies. Following the crisis, the economic policies of these countries, some of whom were also U.S. security allies, were condemned as ‘crony capitalism,’ with state involvement in business activities branded as corrupt and


1153 Robison and Hewison, “East Asia and the Trials of Neo-Liberalism,” 185.
1155 Stiglitz links neoliberalism - which he terms ‘market fundamentalism’ - to the policies of the US Treasury and the IMF. In Globalization and Its Discontents, Stiglitz details how the Washington Consensus doctrine was applied in Latin America as a means to advance globalisation and used as a pretext for the implementation of policies of market fundamentalism. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).
1159 Separate from the US and IMF narrative, the Japanese determined the cause as a currency crisis created by excessive capital liberalisation. Developing countries had opened their capital accounts too much and too quickly, allowing the flight of capital flows out of developing nations to occur at the slightest loss of market confidence. See Goh, The Struggle for Order, 129. For the Japanese perspective on its attempts to move beyond US dependency prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, see Robert Wade, “Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective,” New Left Review 217 (May/June 1996): 3-36.
inefficient. The Asian development models were subsequently ‘marginalised and discredited by a sustained discursive and ideological attack emerging from both the U.S. and the IMF.’ Following the crisis, the U.S. felt vindicated in stressing the importance of open markets, thereby consolidating the authority of the Washington Consensus over alternative models.

Contrasted with U.S. support for the Mexican bailout in 1994, Asian leaders were critical of U.S. policy towards the unfolding Asian crisis, reasoning that U.S. reluctance to support Thailand from the outset had expedited the spread of the crisis to other countries in the region. There was a sense around the region that Washington’s delay in responding to the crisis was punishment of the Asian development models. Not only did the U.S. refuse to participate in the initial $17 billion fund, it later opposed Japan’s proposal to set up a permanent regional Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) that would help the region avoid the structural conditions attached to IMF bailouts. Although the AMF scheme was not widely supported by many regional governments, the IMF had not provided a solution that best suited Asian economies, and both Washington and the IMF had quashed the only regionally-derived potential remedy that could avoid the harsh restructuring conditionalities accompanying the IMF deal.

Washington firmly opposed the AMF proposal on the basis that the fund would be exclusively financed by Asian states and it would potentially legitimise the Asian statist development models that were not consistent with neoliberal orthodoxy. In addition, Washington wanted to prevent the advance of a strong Yen that could potentially act as the basis for the creation of a common currency in Asia and, in the long term, become a direct competitor of the dollar as the currency of last resort. The AMF also offered the chance for Japan to demonstrate a leadership role commensurate with its regional economic

1162 Robison and Hewison, “East Asia and the Trials of Neo-Liberalism,” 188.
1163 The Mexican bailout of 1994 entailed an international rescue package of $50 billion to stabilise the Peso at once without an attached reform programme until several months after the credit line became available. The difference in the policy response Wade attributes first, to the economic reform programme already initiated by the Mexican government upon the creation of NAFTA in January 1994, and second, the U.S. had a strong national interest in seeing a quick recovery on its southern border. U.S. national interests in East Asia, in contrast, lay in the opening of markets so that American firms could operate in the region as easily as Japanese firms. Robert Wade, “Wheels within Wheels: Rethinking the Asian Crisis and the Asian Model,” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (2000): 109-110.
1165 The disagreement between Washington and Tokyo over the Japanese-proposed AMF was overtly political, reflecting the tensions between IMF conditionality and statist models of development. Goh, The Struggle for Order, 129.
importance, potentially facilitating the creation of a Japanese-led, rather than U.S.-led regional policy. Through Washington’s pressure on Tokyo, Japan abandoned its proposal, conceding to U.S. and IMF claims that an AMF would duplicate the activities of the existing international financial institutions. Japan subsequently admitted that there was a danger that any adjustment funds not under the direct or indirect control of the IMF might be misused. With the U.S. Treasury and the IMF domination of the boundaries of the discussion, the logical inference to be drawn from the AFC was that East Asian states were unable and untrustworthy in the management of their own financial affairs.

Washington’s real fear was the development of viable regional financial institutions that could diminish American influence, and challenge the existing regional hierarchy. A successful AMF would be altogether inimical to U.S. regional economic interests. Washington made full use of its economic and security leverage in coercive mode. While the socio-political practices of the Asian development models were tolerated during the Cold War, in the post-Cold War context, Washington increasingly viewed these practices as conflicting with the interests of private capital in search of greater market share and profits in an era of deregulation. Wall Street’s concern with the AMF was that it would slow down the liberalisation of Asian financial markets and the U.S. Treasury made clear that support for bailouts, especially in South Korea, was contingent on continued financial opening. The U.S. Treasury virtually dictated the conditions attached to the emergency IMF financing arranged for Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. The crisis-hit countries, which by then had limited bargaining power, would be forced to accept the conditions and undertake structural changes intended to create institutions and rules closer to the American version of capitalism, and more acceptable to U.S. business.

Washington perceived the AFC as an opportunity for a convergence of the Asian development models with strengthened neoliberal structuring in favour of free markets, private sector capitalism, enhanced transparency and good governance. It was expected that state-led capitalism would be challenged, reformed and replaced across the region. The regional response to the IMF terms was mixed. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed, viewing the IMF bailout as a western conspiracy,

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1172 Robison and Hewison, “East Asia and the Trials of Neo-Liberalism,” 184.
refused to accept the terms and refuted the deal. Seoul, on the other hand, was driven by Peninsula security concerns following Pyongyang’s launch of a long-range rocket in August 1998, which far exceeded North Korea’s known capabilities. There was also concern about the growing movement in Washington that was calling for an end to the free-riding of U.S. junior partners in the Pacific alliance. Economic trade liberalisation and financial deregulation were the pay-off for a continued U.S. security presence on the Korean Peninsula.

**Regional pushback against U.S. economic hegemony**

The U.S. also used its influence in the APEC forum to quash the AMF proposal and assert the continuation of IMF control over adjustment funding. In late 1997, with U.S. endorsement, the IMF’s dominant role in the adjustment process was subsequently institutionally legitimised at the Vancouver APEC meeting. With the backing of APEC – at the time, the region’s only institution including all East Asian nations – of the IMF’s role, the Asia-Pacific region had endorsed the U.S.-promulgated model of macroeconomic policy reform. APEC had, in effect, sanctioned painful restructuring processes that would affect many APEC countries, including those in East Asia. APEC’s approval of the neoliberal ideology highlighted deep divisions between the two sides of the Pacific, reinforcing the separation between East Asia and the Anglo-centric, neoliberal Pacific states. The situation was aggravated by regional resentment towards the U.S. for its uncompromising attitude, and the IMF’s corroboration of U.S. neoliberal ideology in response to an ‘Asian’ crisis.

Rather than being a potential instrument for trade liberalisation, adhering to ASEAN’s principles of voluntarism and non-binding consensus, APEC had become an additional forum through which the U.S. could pursue capital market liberalisation and intervene in the domestic trade and commercial practices of other states. More broadly, U.S. commercial and national interests, enveloped in the language of the Washington Consensus, implied the existence of a universally agreed set of principles on what constituted a proper national economic and trade development agenda. In Washington, American economic interests were viewed as synonymous with global economic interests, often coming at the

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expense of the interests of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which further entrenched the asymmetry of regional economic relations.

The Asian Financial Crisis had a profound effect on East Asia in a number of ways. First, it emphasised the region’s feelings of vulnerability and economic over-dependence on the United States, prompting perceptions that the region’s existing institutions needed to be transformed, and/or supplemented. The crisis had highlighted the weakness of both APEC and ASEAN in formulating an effective regional response to emerging crises. Second, the East Asian experience of IMF conditionality, and the Asia-Pacific nature of APEC, influenced by an Anglo-Western rather than Asian identity, inspired an ‘Asia-centric’ as opposed to an ‘Asia-Pacific’ view of the region. The fostering of a regional identity was also inspired by shared experience at the hands of the western-dominated IMF. Consequently, there was a growing awareness that solutions to the management of East Asian financial interactions could be regionally produced. The response was the gradual, concerted effort to restructure and strengthen intra-regional trade processes.

Many East Asian governments supported the creation of regional support mechanisms that would circumvent Washington and the IMF. New regional mechanisms such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) emerged during the early 2000s, emphasising the shift towards an intra-Asian regional order recognising regional complexities, and a shift away from the dangers for financial stability of a Washington-centric configuration. The creation of CMIM, an intra-Asian financial arrangement operating since March 2010, was a response to the enduring resentment of the conditions and delays associated with the IMF. Since the creation of an emergency

1179 At the time, neither APEC nor ASEAN had the means to respond to the scale and speed of the crisis simultaneously affecting numerous states in the region. Nor had finance been a central feature of regional cooperation up to this point, given the region’s preference for maintaining sovereignty. Ralph Emmers and John Ravenhill, “The Asian and Global Financial Crises: Consequences for East Asian Regionalism,” Contemporary Politics 17, no. 2 (2011): 134, 136.
1183 Following the AFC, the CMI, initially a bilateral swap arrangement, was first mooted in May 2000, as a means to support regional currency reserves. When this arrangement was found to be inefficient, the CMI was multilateralised into the CMIM (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation) in December 2009, taking effect in March 2010.
1185 CMIM’s current membership includes ASEAN plus China, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. Ciorciari, “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization,” 927.
financial mechanism would still require nominal support from Washington, the CMIM became the first regional facility to possess an explicit link to the IMF. Eschewing a multilateral bailout system, on the scale of an Asian Monetary Fund, this compromise helped allay Western fears that the swaps would be used to provide ‘easy money,’ and avoided political opposition from Washington.  

The exclusive intra-Asian ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping, formally institutionalised in 1999, also grew from the need to diversify East Asia’s economic relations and to increase collective bargaining leverage. The APT initiative, a new, overlapping arrangement, emerged from the need to better protect East Asia against future financial instability, and widened the scope of cooperation by linking ASEAN to the largest economies in Northeast Asia under one economic and financial umbrella. More importantly, it excluded APEC’s western members, the U.S. and Australia. Without the Asian Financial Crisis, the idea of the APT might not have gained the necessary impetus from within the region. Washington’s apparent lack of opposition to the formation of the APT was regarded as legitimising the pursuit of exclusively Asian institutions, which also generated a degree of consensus on ‘East Asia’ as a regional community.

Beijing hoped that the APT grouping would dilute American power within the region, as well as being a mechanism through which it could reassure its neighbours. Rather than contesting U.S. hegemony, Beijing sought to reshape the ‘incentive structure’ through its membership of the APT, so that they would not become complicit in any overt attempt by the United States to constrain China. Reflecting Beijing’s growing regional influence, in 2005, the year in which the CMI process was formally announced, ASEAN Plus Three raised the share of funds available through CMI without an IMF programme from 10 per cent to 20 per cent. That decision, and the intention to multilateralise the

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1187 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 55.
1189 Also noteworthy: concerns over China’s growing influence in the APT prompted the creation of the rival EAS that included Australia, New Zealand and India, and now also includes the U.S. and Russia.
1191 The idea of constructing an ‘East Asian community’ is limited by the terms of the competitive bilateral Japan-China relationship, which is increasingly viewed as the key determinant of regional economic order. In this sense, the U.S. acts as a counterweight to Beijing’s and Tokyo’s strategic rivalry and potential ambitions. Goh, The Struggle for Order, 57, 61.
1192 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 56.
1193 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 57.
1194 South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, all of whom had recently concluded their own IMF restructuring programmes, were not eager to return to the Fund and were more sympathetic to Malaysia’s push for a looser CMI-IMF linkage. Japan supported the strong link to the IMF to ensure repayment. ASEAN, “The Joint Ministerial Statement of the 8th ASEAN Plus Three Finance Ministers’ Meeting,” Istanbul, Turkey, May 4, 2005, para. 6 (IV).
CMI, did raise concerns in the U.S. Treasury and the IMF, but the incremental nature of the change, and continued link to the IMF, restrained opposition in Washington. While the U.S. has not objected to the development of Asian regionalism in principle, Washington has insisted that Asian regionalism supports multilateral trade and financial regimes in keeping with globally-operating neoliberal principles, and consistent with its own interests.\textsuperscript{1195}

\textbf{Overcoming U.S. ambivalence to Asia-Pacific economic regionalism}

Global and regional forces, including globalisation and the rise of China, had created a shifting landscape in East Asian economic development that were orienting the region towards integration and multilateralism – increasingly without the United States.\textsuperscript{1196} With U.S. priorities focused elsewhere during the early-mid 2000s, minimal attention had been directed towards the economic cooperation initiatives emerging from East Asia. Seizing this opportunity and spurred on by China’s growing economic power status, East Asian states had quietly started to transform the regional economic architecture along Asian-centric lines. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, some Asian officials additionally expressed support for a more ambitious financial arrangement, reflecting greater Asian confidence vis-à-vis ailing Western economies.\textsuperscript{1197} The global financial crisis also exacerbated global imbalances, with emerging markets taking advantage of the U.S. government bailout and stimulus plans to step up purchases of American debt.\textsuperscript{1198} In addition, the so-called emerging economies have pushed for enhanced leadership roles in existing international economic governance institutions, leading to the formation of the G20. East Asian nations have also pressed for additional IMF votes to boost their leverage in line with the region’s growing economic importance.\textsuperscript{1199}

The growing influence of China, whose domination of regional institutions is likely to be inimical to U.S. interests, has come to dominate U.S. regional economic strategy in the 21st century. Fear of China’s capability to undermine U.S. security and economic interests, but more importantly, its potential to become the hub of regional power, has major implications for America’s regional economic


\textsuperscript{1197}Ciorciari, “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization,” 934.

\textsuperscript{1198}Following the global financial crisis, the ASEAN Plus Three nations hold more than half of global dollar reserves. Goh, \textit{The Struggle for Order}, 144.

\textsuperscript{1199}Ciorciari, “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization,” 947.
order. China’s substantial influence in regional economic affairs vis-à-vis America’s diminishing authority and expanding trade deficit was compounded by the burgeoning network of regional Free Trade Agreements (FTA) being concluded, and brought to the fore with the completion of the China-ASEAN FTA in 2004. This provided confirmation that America’s passive attitude towards East Asian regionalism was increasingly outmoded:

‘If the United States continues to downplay Asian regional arrangements – demonstrating an attitude of ‘benign neglect’ and a preference for bilateral agreements only – it will gradually lose influence, especially relative to China.’

Exacerbated by Washington’s self-exclusion from regional economic decision-making, and its own restrained response to the developing Asian regionalism, the view in Washington was that Beijing intended to ‘reclaim its position as the leader of Asia’ by displacing Japan and the U.S. as the primary trading partners of Southeast Asian nations. Increasingly able to provide economic assistance to the developing nations in the Asia-Pacific, Beijing could move the region towards an exclusively Asian economic order.

By the final year of the G.W. Bush administration, Washington recognised the need to modify its position on East Asian regional economic architecture in light of China’s increasing influence, the proliferation of regionally-negotiated FTAs and the stasis in the Doha Round of the WTO from 2006. In the 1990s, the U.S. had opposed Asian regionalism, leading to the self-exclusion of the U.S. from nascent regional economic cooperation mechanisms. Following the global financial crisis, the U.S. could no longer afford to be excluded from the developments occurring in this global economic hub. While Washington acknowledged a shift in strategy towards regional economic governance was required, none emerged that would best support U.S. interests and goals. Rarely at the forefront of multilateral ventures in the Asia-Pacific, Washington required a pragmatic, rather than principled approach to retain its influence, and to shape the direction of regional economic cooperation. G.W. Bush administration strategists concluded that U.S. policy towards the evolving economic arrangements


1201 Nanto, *East Asian Regional Architecture*, 4, 7. It is important to note here that by the 2000s, Tokyo had been displaced by Beijing as Washington’s major regional competitor and free-rider.

1202 The failure of the WTO’s Doha Round, and the proliferation of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific, have facilitated the shift in policy towards supporting regional integration, in an effort to ensure its position in Asia-Pacific trade. It was the G.W. Bush administration that agreed to the US joining the negotiations for the TPP. Nanto, *East Asian Regional Architecture*, 5.

1203 This decision taken by East Asian nations not to invite the U.S. to join the EAS in 2005 was indication of US self-imposed exclusion from East Asian affairs during the G.W. Bush administration.

in the Asia-Pacific required attention to ‘matters of intensity, inclusiveness and final structure.’ Intensity and inclusiveness would be influenced by broader regional matters, specifically China’s growing influence and the potential creation of an Asian-only organisation.

The U.S needed to stress its credentials as the region’s ‘security stabiliser and economic partner of choice.’ Washington’s typical external hegemon approach to its ad hoc, and occasionally heavy handed interventions in East Asian affairs, had resulted in ‘Asian nations tak[ing] the lead in proposing various organisations.’ For the U.S. to maintain its position as regional hegemon and indispensable partner in the Asia-Pacific, it would need to embed itself more fully into the region - not as an external power but as an Asia-Pacific power. This move would require the constitution of an inclusively Asia-Pacific rather than exclusively Asia-centric geographical designation. Washington maintains that the strategic and economic geography, upon which the Asia-Pacific can best build on its successes, is through trans-Pacific partnerships and institutions. Asia-Pacific multilateral structures would not only strengthen existing regional partnerships, including the bilateral U.S. security alliances, a broader Asia-Pacific outlook would make the region less inward-looking. The U.S. ‘would like for Asian institutions to straddle the Pacific Ocean, rather than stopping at the international date line in the Pacific.’ Working through regional institutions and broadening their membership to include Pacific-facing nations in the Americas, and moving towards the Indian Ocean to include another key regional player, India, is the strategy of choice in Washington, as the best means to increase trade flows and sustain U.S. influence.

The pragmatic approach assumed Washington would take a proactive leadership role. The emerging strategy therefore required maintaining U.S. access to the region via ‘bilateral agreements, global institutions, or through close coordination with friendly member nations.’ For the U.S. to maintain its regional position and influence over the direction of regional trade, U.S. policy would need to account for the region’s interest in FTAs. However, given the long history of debate in the United States concerning the disputed merits of FTAs, the G.W. Bush administration was conflicted on whether to conclude more FTAs with Asian economies, to continue with the status quo, or to halt further

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1209 Mastanduno, “Institutions of Convenience,” 40-42.
efforts. It was inconceivable in Washington that the Asia-Pacific region could take important trade integration decisions without U.S. involvement, since ‘American interests in Asia…are so deeply ingrained and the American presence so large that…American interests need to be represented whenever Asians meet.’ The negotiation of regional FTAs was likely to continue with or without U.S. input, and given the importance of the Asia-Pacific to the well-being of the U.S. economy, the U.S could not afford for its market to be displaced by China or intra-regional trade.

The strategy that emerged during the G.W. Bush administration involved negotiating FTAs with countries spanning the Americas and the Asia-Pacific. According to Robert Zoellick, the administration’s primary Trade Representative (USTR, 2001-2005), there was no focus on a particular region, rather, with the stalling of the global free trade agenda, the goal was to be the successful negotiation of FTAs, with the view to promoting trade liberalisation more generally. Consequently, consideration for FTA partners centred on whether the conditions in the U.S. and in the target countries were conducive, for instance, whether counterparts in the target countries were amenable, and willing to liberalise. In the Asia-Pacific, efforts were also concentrated on influencing the region’s economic progression through the regional institutions, APEC and ASEAN, in addition to working towards formalising trade and investment relationships through FTAs and other preferential trading arrangements. In February 2008, the U.S. also joined the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that would become the cornerstone of the Obama administration’s economic rebalance strategy the following year.

The Obama administration and the economic rebalance strategy

Under the Obama administration, the economic rebalance is motivated by domestic and regional economic developments. The first motivation is a domestic one: to address America’s deepening trade deficit with the Asia-Pacific, especially with China. The intention is to sustainably grow the American economy and ensure long-term competitive growth with Asia.

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1211 The debate concerns whether regional FTAs detract from multilateral negotiations via the WTO. What has emerged is the strategic importance of U.S.-negotiated FTAs, which lock in partners to economic liberalisation and potentially facilitate American leverage in other issue areas. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 3.

1212 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 3.

1213 Trans-Pacific economic and financial relationships have become fundamentally unbalanced in East Asia’s favour. China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan alone account for about 40% of the U.S. merchandise trade deficit. Those same countries have become major financiers of U.S. budget and saving deficits. Many U.S. jobs are also being outsourced to Asia. Dick K. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 28.

1214 In the Asia-Pacific, the G.W. Bush administration oversaw FTAs with Australia and Singapore, and the US-ROK FTA was eventually signed off under the Obama administration.

1215 Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot,” 82.


1217 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 3.
economy in the Asia-Pacific region, in recognition that the Asia-Pacific is likely to be the hub of global economic growth in the twenty-first century. Expanding American access to Asia-Pacific trade is essential for the U.S. domestic economy, since its share of total trade in the region in 2010 had steadily declined by at least 3 per cent since 2005, with a negative goods trade balance of $154.6 billion with the TPP countries reported in 2012.

The second, crucial element of the economic rebalance involves manipulating the structure of regional trade, and influencing regional institutions in favour of American trade interests to sustain U.S. economic order. The goal is to shape the regional economic institutions to best support the administration’s undertaking to grow the U.S. economy in the Asia-Pacific. The Obama administration recognises the value of regionally-fronted moves towards regional integration, but insists that Washington takes the lead on the direction and scope of integration. Although the G.W. Bush administration had signed up to the TPP negotiations in February 2008, the Obama administration has been the driving force behind the negotiations as the signature element of its regional economic reorientation strategy. The Obama administration immediately assumed a leadership role over the trade agenda, and decided upon TPP’s future direction.

Structural Power: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

Until the failure of the WTO’s Doha Round in 2006, the U.S. typically preferred rules-based global multilateral forums, like the WTO, to fulfil its trade objectives. The preference for a global system, and the limited number of American negotiated FTAs during this period also originated in the lack of

1220 The U.S. continues to have a healthy trade surplus of $78,207 million in services trade, according to 2012 data. Ian F. Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 21, 2013), 58.
1221 Norrlof argues that the U.S., as global hegemon, has benefited disproportionately from its structural power. America’s ability to attract capital, to provide a safe investment environment and strong tradition of property rights are related to the power of the U.S. Dollar. The U.S. is the monetary hegemon. Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage, 28
1223 U.S. trade policy objectives are broadly (1) to secure open markets for U.S. exports, (2) to protect domestic producers from foreign unfair trade practices and from rapid surges in fairly traded imports, (3) to control trade for foreign policy and national security reasons, and (4) to help foster global trade to promote world economic growth. William H. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 26, 2014), 3.
domestic consensus on whether FTAs could achieve long-term U.S. national interests and trade policy objectives. The debate centres on whether FTAs are a substitute for, or a complement to, U.S. commitments and interests in promoting a multilateral trading system via the WTO. Deliberation over the benefits of FTAs continues to dominate the U.S. domestic trade agenda. There is bipartisan opposition to these big trade deals, especially to NAFTA and the TPP, on the grounds that they remove domestic manufacturing jobs from the U.S. to developing nations. Opposition to FTAs is also supported by unions, and environmental and consumer groups. Despite this opposition, U.S. trade policy since the 1990s has been slowly, but increasingly dominated by bilateral and regional FTA negotiations, following rather than setting the trend.

Despite negotiating its first FTA with Israel in 1985, the U.S. was relatively late in late its interest in bilateral and regional free trade agreements. The Asia-Pacific region in contrast had already moved towards bilateral and regional trade agreements as a means to improve regional trade integration. The regional shift towards formalising relations with ASEAN was a calibrated response towards the realisation of an all-Asian free trade association after decades of dialogue but with little progress. America’s almost ideological resistance towards regional FTAs meant it lagged behind China in the negotiation of bilateral FTAs, and the U.S. had no regional equivalent to the ASEAN-China Free Trade

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1225 During the 2016 presidential election campaign, both nominees, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, opposed the TPP in its completed form. While Hillary may have conceded to some kind of TPP deal for strategic purposes, President-elect Trump indicated that he would walk away from TPP on his first day in office and renegotiate NAFTA. Demetri Sevastopulo, “Trump Vows to Renounce Pacific Trade Deal on First Day in Office,” Financial Times, November 22, 2016. [https://www.ft.com/content/dd98598a-b044-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1](https://www.ft.com/content/dd98598a-b044-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1) (accessed January 21, 2017).
1228 FTAs currently in force in the Asia-Pacific are: Australia (2004), Singapore (2004) and South Korea (concluded 2007, implemented 2011). US-Thailand FTA negotiations commenced in 2004 but were suspended following the 2006 coup.
1229 US structural advantages meant it could pursue unilateral measures, threatening retaliation, usually in the form of restricting trade partners’ access to the vast U.S. market, in order to get the partner to either open its markets to U.S. exports, or to cease other commercial practices and policies which the U.S. considers unsuitable. In the 1970s and 1980s, the US applied unilateral measures against Japan and South Korea to get Japan to amend domestic laws, regulations, and practices that prevented U.S. exporters from securing what they considered to be a fair share of the Japanese market – particularly in the automotive industry. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, 3-4.
Area (ACFTA) that came into effect in 2010. While the U.S remains a major regional economic player, the ASEAN-China FTA served to emphasise that in matters of trade, the U.S. is increasingly being overshadowed by China in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{1230} Moreover, through these initiatives, China is attempting to create a regional order that seeks to lessen the U.S. presence and influence.\textsuperscript{1231}

The trend in the Asia-Pacific towards FTAs could be supported by Washington on the basis that such agreements can be structured in a manner that serves as the building blocks of a global free trade system.\textsuperscript{1232} In the absence of any new global trade agreements, bilateral and regional FTAs can also lock countries into the process of neoliberal restructuring. This is done through the construction of formal-legal regimes designed to protect open, transparent and rules-based free market economy policies. The sacrifice of principles in favour of pragmatism, of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) like the TPP and the Trans-Atlantic Trade Partnership (TTIP), has advantages for the United States, with its large economy.\textsuperscript{1233} PTAs are a template for asymmetric trade agreements with weaker economies, through which the U.S. can directly shape the interests of the other parties. Specifically targeted, asymmetric FTAs also limit the problem of the dilution of neoliberal principles and the compromise needed for WTO trade rounds, enabling Washington to assert more control over the agenda, including the expansion of non-trade-specific areas now included in PTAs.\textsuperscript{1234} U.S. PTAs are a mechanism through which Washington advances U.S. values, adding a normative agenda to trade negotiations that seeks to influence the domestic policies of the negotiating countries.\textsuperscript{1235} The TPP exemplifies this updated form of PTA.

\textsuperscript{1230} Nanto, \textit{East Asian Regional Architecture}, 14.
\textsuperscript{1231} Williams, \textit{The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications}, 2
\textsuperscript{1232} As part of a broader foreign policy strategy that promotes respect for international rules and norms for trade. Williams, \textit{The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications}, 13.
\textsuperscript{1233} The Obama administration’s trade policy includes TPP, with Pacific Rim nations, and TTIP, the US-EU equivalent, which are mega-regional trade deals, deemed to be ambitious and far-reaching. Through these trade deals, the US aims to shape the direction of economic liberalisation for its largest trading partners into the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.
\textsuperscript{1234} For instance, the G.W. Bush administration incorporated a \textit{competition in liberalisation} policy into its FTA framework. From May 2007, new FTAs automatically included the International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Right of Work. U.S. FTA partners would be expected to agree to a range of conditions considered essential to the U.S., including, but not limited to, multilateral environmental agreements, port security, and foreign investor rights in investor-state disputes. Cooper, \textit{Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy}, 5.
\textsuperscript{1235} Bhagwati, economist and supporter of multilateral trade, notes his concern over the breadth of non-trade issues incorporated into FTAs, ‘that such templates now extend beyond conventional trade issues (for example, agricultural protection) to vast numbers of areas unrelated to trade, including labor standards, environmental rules, policies on expropriation, and the ability to impose capital-account controls in financial crises.’ Jagdish Bhagwati, “The Broken Legs of Global Trade,” Project Syndicate, May 29, 2012. [http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-broken-legs-of-global-trade#PO2LuZHxCuIObRz5.99] (accessed August 7, 2014).
When the rebalance strategy was officially launched in November 2011, the TPP negotiations assumed additional significance as the economic element of the Obama administration’s reorientation to the Asia-Pacific. Alongside the repositioning of regional security arrangements, the economic rebalance offered substance to America’s renewed commitment to the Asia-Pacific. There are distinct geopolitical and geo-economic elements in the TPP. The TPP fits into the Obama administration’s broader aim of securing its position as the dominant driving force within the regional economic architecture, by shaping regional economic rules, tightening economic linkages between the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies, and embedding eleven other Asia-Pacific states into an American-led formal trade agreement consistent with neoliberalism. It is hoped that the TPP agreement will complement U.S. security arrangements by ‘altering countries’ perception of where their strategic interests lie.’

In one comprehensive agreement, the TPP extends U.S. FTAs to five of the eleven TPP negotiating countries, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand and Vietnam. For the TPP partners with whom the U.S. does not have a bilateral FTA, the TPP enables the U.S. to play a proactive role in shaping the region’s rules and norms by including a major regional player with whom no formal trade agreement currently exists. There is broad scope for the U.S. to force open areas of their economies and formally commit them to a rules-based trade regime, including a mechanism for dispute settlement.

The Obama administration has depicted the TPP as the model for all future U.S. FTAs. The ‘gold standard’ U.S. FTAs of the future will focus on policies within borders, rather than those more basic FTAs that focus on ‘along borders’ issues such as tariffs. The U.S. outlines the contents for 21st century FTAs, setting the agenda and determining the interests of other actors. The negotiations of TPP chapters have incorporated disciplines from intellectual property rights, trade in services, government procurement, investment, rules of origin, competition, labour, to environment standards. Some topics,

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1238 Existing US FTA partners in the TPP negotiations are Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. The eleven partners account for 37% of US trade and the 12 combined account for 37% of global GDP. Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 6.

1239 Japanese accession to the TPP negotiations provided the U.S. with opportunities to push for the liberalisation of Japanese protected sectors, including agriculture, health and pharmaceuticals, and to remove the remaining Japanese restrictions on the import of American beef. Tokyo and Washington are focused on liberalising each other’s markets, with concessions on motor industry tariffs being made on both sides. Progress in the bilateral U.S.-Japan negotiations put pressure on the other members to liberalise their own sensitive sectors which push the negotiations towards a high standard agreement. Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 16.

such as state-owned enterprises, regulatory coherence, and supply chain competitiveness are innovative in FTA negotiations. Consequently, the TPP is a means by which the U.S. has pushed for regulatory reform in Asia-Pacific economies, especially relating to what it sees as unfair and uncompetitive practices. A particular area of contention for Washington concerns the area of state-influenced corporations, monopolies and state-owned enterprises, with a substantial presence in many Asia-Pacific economies. The TPP agreement will ‘involve substantial restructuring of the economies of some participants’ in the longer term.

Such restructuring would align the economies of the TPP trading partners better with America’s neoliberal principles such as trade and financial liberalisation. The aim is to shape the economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region by harmonising existing agreements with U.S. FTA partners, to establish regional rules in new policy issues facing the global economy, whilst potentially supporting future multilateral liberalisation under the WTO. Moreover, as a ‘living agreement,’ the TPP has the potential to be formally extended to others throughout the Asia-Pacific. Any nation will be able to join so long as all domestic laws and regulations adhere to TPP rules. Not only is Washington aiming to set the agenda for the composition of future trade agreements, it will have already pre-determined the interests of, and started the process of economic restructuring of, the states joining such agreements.

While Washington’s regional economic engagement through the TPP is broadly welcomed, there has been resistance to some of the far-reaching neoliberal-inspired American proposals. Washington conceded that it ‘may not be able simply to impose its vision or standards on those countries, and they

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1242 The TPP includes obligations in the SOE chapter that require increased transparency and prohibit governments from providing advantages to SOEs that distort their competition with private firms in commercial markets. Ian F. Fergusson, *The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): In Brief* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated, February 9, 2016), 13.


1245 The expectation is that TPP will be expanded – so long as new members strive for the same level of trade liberalisation as the current negotiating partners. Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand have publicly expressed interest in joining the ‘second round.’ See Fergusson, *The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress*, 7; Williams, *The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications*, 6.


1248 The TPP negotiations were also subject to high levels of domestic criticism, especially among civil society groups, critical of the unprecedented levels of secrecy shrouding the drafting and negotiation process, and the content of the proposed agreement which safeguards corporate rather than public interests. Wallach, “TPP: NAFTA on Steroids.”
are likely to make demands for concessions from the United States. During the negotiations, there was opposition to some of the more extreme corporate demands, with Australia refusing the parallel court system. Both Australia and New Zealand rejected a U.S. proposal to allow pharmaceutical companies to challenge their government medicine formularies’ pricing conditions that keeps their drug costs lower than in the United States. Every country rejected the U.S. proposal to extend drug patent monopolies. This wholesale rejection was attributed to the leaking of the text which enabled government health officials and activists to fight back. Some negotiating countries pushed for concessions from the U.S., including greater access to its agricultural markets (dairy and sugar) in particular.

Another issue that raised concerns among East Asian nations specifically, relates to the ability of governments to impose controls on capital outflows. Many TPP member countries also rejected a U.S. proposal prohibiting countries from using capital controls, taxes or other ‘macro-prudential measures to limit the power of financial speculators, particularly in times of financial crisis.’ This is an important issue for many East Asian countries who had implemented capital control procedures as a consequence of the Asian Financial Crisis. Also controversial has been the inclusion of the Investor-State Dispute Resolution mechanism, which empowers corporations to sue governments (outside their domestic court systems) over any action the corporations believe undermines their expected future profits or rights under the pact.

The Obama administration’s support for the TPP is grounded in strategic, as well as political and economic, logic. The TPP will not, in all likelihood, close America’s trade deficit in the Asia-Pacific,
or create American jobs.\textsuperscript{1255} Nor will the TPP solve the problem of state capitalist practices, or orientate many Asia-Pacific states from their export-driven economies towards embracing free trade.\textsuperscript{1256} The successful conclusion of the negotiations within five years of the Obama administration is meant to future-proof America’s commitment to the region. For the United States, the TPP represents the reversal of its declining dominance, also recalibrating U.S. leadership in crafting global trade rules.\textsuperscript{1257}

For President Obama, nearing the end of his second term, the successful completion of the TPP negotiations in February 2016 has broader significance for the success of the rebalance strategy, and his legacy of renegotiating the regional institutional bargains that position the United States as hegemon in the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{1258} As one expert observes, ‘there is no Asia pivot without an economic component, and that component is tied up in TPP.’\textsuperscript{1259} Without the economic reorientation element, the rebalance strategy would be reduced to a security strategy and open to further criticism that it is a thinly-veiled attempt to contain China.

The Obama administration has been able to push forward with the successful conclusion of the TPP negotiations. Countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore have been motivated by the benefits that deeper American engagement will bring, including the benefits of America’s regional security commitments and open markets. They also hope to mitigate against any American shift towards protectionism in light of America’s growing trade deficit with the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{1260} The U.S. does not need to exert direct coercive pressure to compel Asia-Pacific states into accepting an American-led regional economic order.\textsuperscript{1261} Nor is this relationship directly exploitative. Subordinate states acquiesce to capitalism as the dominant mode of production. The U.S. has been able to extract some bargains

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1255} As with NAFTA, the criticism of these FTAs is that they only further increase the US trade deficit with the negotiating countries that costs American jobs and continues to downgrade the competitive of American manufacturing. See Wallach, “TPP: NAFTA on Steroids.”
\item \textsuperscript{1257} Fergusson, \textit{The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): In Brief}, summary.
\item \textsuperscript{1259} Walter Lohman, director of the Asian studies program at the Heritage Foundation, quoted in Baker, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and a President’s Legacy.”
\item \textsuperscript{1260} Prestowitz, “The Pacific Pivot.” Norrlof suggests that unlike trade deficits in smaller countries that are seen as a liability, a U.S. trade deficit does not have the same impact because of its ‘multi-purpose power base.’ With its structural power advantage, the US is able to absorb more capital and goods, possesses the currency of last resort, and retains more policy autonomy. Its ‘policy-error threshold is also higher than for other countries. Others have a wide-range of incentives to invest in dollar-denominated assets. Norrlof, \textit{America’s Global Advantage}, 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{1261} As Norrlof notes, the U.S. has the ‘largest domestic economy, the key world currency, and the strongest military’ that give it certain ‘positional and structural advantages in the international economic system.’ These attributes enable the U.S. to shape the rules and institutions of international economic life. It is a system of ‘asymmetrical cooperation.’ Norrlof, \textit{America’s Global Advantage}, 6-7.
\end{itemize}
from the TPP negotiations because of its economic and military advantages, exacerbated by the uncertain geopolitical situation, tensions in the East and South China Seas, uncertain energy supplies, a volatile, potentially nuclear North Korea, and an assertive China in the neighbourhood. These problems draw many of the nations in the region into the American security sphere.1262

The biggest challenge to securing Obama’s legacy is home-grown – in Congress.1263 The Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which shields trade deals from domestic legislative debate, became the biggest and most public embarrassment to the positive realisation of Obama’s regional trade policy during summer 2015.1264 The TPA negotiations emphasised the strength of legislative opposition to free trade agreements that are seen to disadvantage Americans.1265 After much political wrangling, the gaining of TPA in June 2015 was a crucial step towards congressional approval of the TPP. Regardless of the importance of the TPP to foreign policy, there is little bipartisan consensus on the TPP, with Congressional members viewing the agreement through a domestic economic lens. There is no guarantee of congressional approval for TPP, even with TPA.1266 As Obama observed, ‘Geopolitics gets it very few votes.’1267 Without TPA, the TPP negotiations may have become inconsequential for the negotiating states, which could have led Japan, Vietnam and other partners to reverse course on economic reforms or tariff concessions required for the TPP agreement. If the TPP negotiations stalled, Washington would have had to contend with the possibility that momentum may have then shifted toward other regional economic institutions and agreements that exclude the United States, including

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1262 Prestowitz, “The Pacific Pivot.”
1263 There is little domestic consensus between officials and experts on the longer term impact of the TPP on the US economy. See Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 2.
1264 TPA forces Congress to vote for or against trade deals in their entirety, thereby speeding up the approval process and shielding FTAs from House and Senate amendments and scrutiny of the agreement minutiae.
the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, and the ASEAN-led RCEP.1268

There is no prospect of Congressional consent to the TPP agreement before the presidential election in November 2016, which will push the formalities of the highly contentious TPP into the next administration.1269 Nevertheless, the Obama administration has consistently defended the agreement on the basis that without it, China, not the U.S., will write the rules on regional trade.1270 The administration has also advanced a foreign policy argument that, without TPP, the U.S. would create a regional void for China to fill.1271 Also to contend with is the potential reputational damage caused to the U.S. from within the region, if the agreement fails to survive Congress.1272 In the Asia-Pacific, the TPP is directly linked to U.S. regional leadership and commitment, with significant implications for the regional perception of the U.S. if it fails to secure the TPP agreement. The Prime Minister of Singapore, valued regional partner of the U.S., has warned that “failing to get the TPP done will hurt the credibility and standing of the U.S., not just in Asia, but worldwide.”1273 Without U.S. commitment to the deal, it is increasingly unlikely that the TPP will survive.

(i) Contestation of U.S. structural power?

The TPP is an extensive free trade agreement involving twelve Pacific Rim countries, notably including Japan and excluding China. China’s absence from the trade negotiations, initially, at least, fuelled criticism from China that the TPP is the U.S. attempt to design East Asian trade, inspired by the ultimate goal of containing China.1274 The U.S. has consistently pursued efforts to integrate China into the global

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1268 Peter Baker, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and a President’s Legacy.”
1269 President Trump has stated that multilateral trade deals are a disaster for the US and has instead indicated a preference for bilateral trade deals that he says will invigorate the American job market. Robin Harding, “TPP ‘has no meaning’ without the U.S.’ says Shinzo Abe,” Financial Times, November 22, 2016. [https://www.ft.com/content/59972c38-b058-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1](https://www.ft.com/content/59972c38-b058-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1) (accessed January 20, 2017).
1271 Jon Huntsman, a Republican former governor of Utah, who served as Mr. Obama’s ambassador to China before mounting a campaign to challenge his re-election in 2012, quoted in Baker, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and a President’s Legacy.”
economy, thereby seeking to socialise China into international rules and norms. Furthermore, U.S.-China economic relations are also served by the current negotiations of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). From the Obama administration’s perspective, the long-term U.S. strategy is not to contain China, but rather to constrain it within the existing structure of global economic governance. The size of the Chinese economy, its significance to the global economy, and the extent of the economic interdependence between the U.S. and China are all factors that negate the containment argument. Rather than an ‘economic denial’ strategy, the intended effect of the TPP deal, as it indirectly relates to China, is to raise the standards on regional economic liberalisation, thereby putting pressure on China to do the same.

The TPP is a concerted attempt by the Obama administration to set the rules of the trade game in the Asia-Pacific, increasing the prospect that the future rules of the global economy will be devised through U.S. influence. China’s absence from the TPP may be politically expedient, but it may also undermine the potential potency of the trade agreement in the longer term, given China’s centrality to the regional economy. To draw China into TPP would strengthen the regional framework. However, while China has expressed interest in joining the TPP, it would not be able to meet all the necessary requirements for membership at this stage, needing to implement reforms to state-owned enterprises, intellectual property rights and labour standards. The U.S. would not be prepared to make compromises on the TPP’s non-trade-related provisions, since this would potentially undermine what the U.S. is attempting to achieve through the TPP - to set high standards and rules of trade and investment for the region.

(ii) Other regional initiatives

The TPP is by no means the only regional initiative with the potential to lead to the intended goal of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). In November 2010, APEC leaders declared that,
an FTAAP should be pursued as a comprehensive free trade agreement by developing and building on ongoing regional undertakings, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, among others.1280

In addition to the U.S.-led TPP, there are two other frameworks being developed. The first is the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) process which aims to place ASEAN at the centre of regional trade.1281 The RCEP, officially launched in 2012, has a broad membership, joining ASEAN and its six FTA partners – Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea into one collective FTA. As an ASEAN-led initiative, ASEAN centrality defines the RCEP process. Several countries, including Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam are negotiating partners in both the TPP and the RCEP.1282 RCEP members have not set themselves the same level of ambition in terms of tariff reduction and trade liberalisation as is required of the TPP.

The second framework is China’s Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and Maritime Silk Road (MSR), combined creating the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. The OBOR is a land and sea-based Asian-centric initiative that is not a formal, standardised free trade agreement, but which does embody China’s approach to regional trade. Unveiled by President Xi in 2013, to date, the initiative combines ‘diplomacy and investment funds’ for projects with neighbours across Asia, supported by the newly-established AIIB as the means to fund infrastructure projects along the SREB.1283 Through the OBOR initiative, Beijing is directing its leadership efforts towards under-developed areas and meeting unmet developmental needs throughout Eurasia, incorporating Central, South, and East Asia.1284 In contrast to the TPP’s homogenising framework, connecting nations through common rules and regulations, the OBOR connects nations with common interests in infrastructure, trade and investment rather than by practices of economic liberalisation.1285

1283 During 2015, the flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was created, with the announcement of a hydro power plant in Pakistan. Projects and funding have also been agreed with Kazakhstan and Russia. Ye, “China and Competing Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” 220.
1284 The OBOR initiative will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6.
The TPP, RCEP and OBOR offer three pathways for regional cooperation towards the goal of an FTAAP. Advanced by the U.S., ASEAN and China respectively, each framework represents different interests, ‘economic norms, and developmental impacts’ for the region. Each also emphasises regional cooperation, and overlapping membership offers opportunities for future coordination and specifically targets Southeast Asia – the sub-region connecting land and sea, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The three pathways also point to the competition between the three to strengthen their leadership potential in Southeast Asia. According to Wang Jinqiang, a professor at Shanghai University, RCEP was ASEAN’s response to the TPP. As the other formal framework, the RCEP is viewed by Washington as having the greatest potential to rival the American-led TPP and lessen American influence of the direction of regional trade development towards an FTAAP, chiefly because of China’s membership. However, according to observers from within the region, China’s decision to join the RCEP was motivated by Japan’s decision to join the TPP, rather than the existence of the TPP itself.

With growing regional and global interest in the AIIB and OBOR, Beijing’s attention to the RCEP has declined, accentuated by ASEAN’s demands over ASEAN centrality in the RCEP negotiations, which amounts to ‘process without progress’ regionalism. China is frustrated by RCEP’s lack of achievement, created in large part by ASEAN’s emphasis on ASEAN centrality, which puts China under ASEAN leadership. The U.S. views China’s membership of the RCEP, combined with China-led initiatives, the OBOR and AIIB, as policies designed to increase China’s influence in the global economic system and simultaneously counter, or reduce, U.S. influence. Since all 12 TPP members and 15 RCEP countries are also members of APEC, the pathway chosen to form the basis of the FTAAP is likely to be decided in this forum.

1286 Ye, “China and Competing Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” 212.
1287 TPP currently only includes four Southeast Asian members. Washington has been actively engaging with others to gain their participation in further rounds. Ba, “Will the TPP and OBOR Challenge ASEAN Centrality?”
1292 Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 10-11.
1293 India does not currently hold APEC membership. Following President-elect Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the TPP in November 2016, RCEP has attracted new interest from Latin American states including Peru, and stimulated ASEAN and Chinese efforts to conclude RCEP in early 2017. China has also opened its OBOR strategy to Latin American countries. Shawn Donnan, “China Pledges to Lead The Way on Global Trade,” Financial Times, November 19, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/ad63bc0e-ae88-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1 (accessed January 20, 2017).
Institutional Power: U.S. influence over APEC and ASEAN

The Obama administration views regional multilateral organisations as a means to promote and deepen the structures of neoliberalism, in support of trade and investment liberalisation. This goal can be achieved indirectly through the regional institutions. U.S. involvement with two regional institutions, APEC and ASEAN, is discussed here. The aim is to show that the Obama administration seeks to shape the structure of regional trade through regional forums regardless of whether the U.S. has membership.

(i) APEC

APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), the primary vehicle for economic cooperation within the broader Asia-Pacific, has typically been the main organisation through which the U.S. has attempted to influence the direction and structure of regional economic development. Consistent with the U.S. agenda, APEC has predictably focused its efforts on regional structural reform, good governance and transparency, and moves to reduce corruptive practices in its member states. It also promises to promote cross-border services trade and eliminate protectionism.\textsuperscript{1294} APEC aspires to create the FTAAP. However, as a forum for dialogue and non-binding commitments, relying on consensus-based, voluntary reductions in tariff and non-tariff trade barriers centred on ‘open regionalism,’ this is an ambitious goal.\textsuperscript{1295} Progress towards the fulfilment of its key regional strategy - the Bogor Goals – has been slow, and many short-to-medium term targets, that would move APEC in the direction of the FTAAP, are consistently missed.\textsuperscript{1296}

The G.W. Bush administration sought to elevate the importance of APEC as a means to reassert U.S. regional leadership, to counter China’s rising influence and as a complement to U.S. bilateral


\textsuperscript{1296} In 1994, APEC members agreed on the Bogor Goals, seeking to achieve ‘free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific’ by 2010 for industrialised countries, and 2020 for developing countries. Three principles underpin the Bogor Goals: The promotion of sustainable economic growth; developing and strengthening the multilateral trading system, and increasing the interdependence and economic prosperity of its members. See APEC, “Assessment and Achievement of the Bogor Goals,” \url{http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Achievements-and-Benefits/Bogor-Goals.aspx} (accessed September 10, 2014). In 2010, an assessment of five developed and eight developing economies that volunteered to be part of the exercise declared that no economy had reached the Bogor Goals, although ‘significant progress’ has been made towards them. See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “APEC’s goals and achievements,” last updated September 23, 2013. \url{http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/APEC/2-Goals-and-achievements.php} (accessed September 2, 2014).
ventures. The administration envisaged APEC as a ready mechanism to drive through regional economic integration, moving towards the FTAAP, and served as a potential counter mechanism to ASEAN efforts to create an ‘Asian only’ model for regional economic integration. Bringing together 21 nations, the APEC forum was also a central point for the U.S. to hold bilateral and multilateral discussions on non-economic matters in the Asia-Pacific region, such as international security and human rights. APEC became the principal vehicle to support the G.W. Bush administration’s economic and security interests.

The Obama administration initially continued to uphold U.S. support for APEC, acknowledging APEC to be a ‘valuable asset to the United States’ and ‘a primary venue for multilateral engagement with the Asia-Pacific on economic and other key interests.’ Over the course of the Obama administration, APEC’s role appears to have been downgraded to a, but not the forum, for advancing U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. In August 2014, Secretary Kerry did not mention APEC as a forum for realising America’s vision for Asia-Pacific economic integration. APEC’s role is described as complementary to the TPP in its promotion of regional economic integration but not as the primary vehicle towards the realisation of the FTAAP.

APEC has been reassigned to deliberating on human security issues, including climate change, women’s affairs and educational exchange, which are all important and necessary areas for regional cooperation but the role APEC plays in U.S. trade policy under the Obama administration, outside the speeches at least, is less clear. APEC has been identified as ‘potentially important in the promotion of liberalised international trade and investment in Asia, and possibly the rest of the world.’

1297 To address ‘the emergence of China economically, diplomatically, and militarily; promote mutually beneficial trade relations with China; and encourage China’s adherence to international norms in the areas of trade, international security and human rights,’ the G.W. Bush administration identified the APEC forum as a ‘ready mechanism for pursuit of such initiatives’ to ‘revitalise United States engagement in East Asia.’ Emphasis in the original. Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy, 1.


1301 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific.”


that the pursuit of U.S. goals and interests cannot be singularly achieved through APEC. APEC’s approach to trade liberalisation through consensus and compromise does not reflect the Obama administration’s high level, gold standard formalised approach to regional trade integration. The concern is that its informal modus operandi and voluntary implementation of decisions make APEC a secondary and support forum through which the U.S. can actualise its vision for regional economic cooperation.

The administration’s efforts to cultivate relations with ASEAN and the establishment of the TPP further substantiate APEC’s demise as the ‘primary venue’ for multilateral engagement with the Asia-Pacific under the Obama administration. While the Obama administration asserts that the TPP will provide the structure for the creation of an FTAAP in line with the long-term vision for regional economic integration under the APEC banner, the formal TPP negotiations contradict APEC’s consensus approach to trade liberalisation. The importance of the TPP to the administration as the platform for formalising the direction of regional economic integration underlines the shift away from APEC’s consensus- and voluntary-based approach as the best way to pursue the American regional goals of formalised, rules-based trade liberalisation, and further substantiates Washington’s generally pragmatic attitude towards regional institutions in the pursuit of American interests. Formalising U.S. relations with ASEAN, and the TPP negotiations, underline the pragmatic approach the U.S. takes in its dealings with multilateral institutions; the implication is that the U.S. uses numerous bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, in and through which, to pursue its interests, according to need.

(ii) ASEAN

Under the Obama administration, opportunities for ‘a rules-based regional order, a stable regional order on common rules and norms of behaviour that are reinforced by institutions’ rely on ‘elevating engagement in multilateral institutions from the ASEAN Regional Forum to the East Asian Summit.’

The first official meeting between the U.S. and ASEAN, in which both parties formally agreed to broaden and deepen ASEAN-U.S. cooperation, occurred at the 2009 APEC conference. The U.S. accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation has allowed the U.S. to formally join ASEAN discussions, including on the potential creation of the FTAAP. The administration has also used the U.S.-ASEAN summit as a forum to promote the rebalance strategy, build support for TPP, and address

\[\text{1304 Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy, 8.}\]
\[\text{1305 For instance, the 21 APEC countries do not negotiate FTAs. It is a forum for dialogue and establishes non-binding commitments towards the goals of open and free trade and investment in the region.}\]
\[\text{1307 Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy, 8.}\]
issues such as the South China Sea. The 2016 U.S.-ASEAN summit was described as a ‘diplomatic recruiting session’ to line up Southeast Asian support for U.S. Asia-Pacific policy. The U.S. is also working with ASEAN to strengthen the role of the EAS ‘as the premier organisation for addressing political and security issues…and bolster its institutional ability to respond to crises.’

In a move to further embed the spread of neoliberal economic liberalisation across Southeast Asia over the longer term, the U.S. has actively encouraged ASEAN initiatives for economic cooperation and integration. The U.S. was instrumental in the creation of the ASEAN common market – a potential precursor to deeper economic union – in December 2015. Washington has also established a number of long-term economic programmes with ASEAN partners, including the expansion of U.S. private sector support for ASEAN connectivity efforts, supported by the U.S.TDA (Trade and Development Agency). Washington has also committed to a U.S.-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement (TIFA) in support of regional trade, investment and economic integration in areas as diverse as digital connectivity, healthcare, agriculture and consumer goods. Playing to its corporate strengths, Washington has supported the creation of the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund with the aim of creating opportunities for U.S. businesses to participate in ASEAN infrastructure projects in the energy, transportation, and information and communications technology sectors.

The Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) Initiative is a framework for economic cooperation designed to expand trade and investment ties between the U.S. and ASEAN, with the goal of creating new business opportunities and jobs. Many E3 initiatives correspond to specific issues typically addressed in trade agreements. Cooperation with ASEAN on technical barriers to trade and good regulatory practices specifically aims to move ASEAN towards the goals of facilitating trade, broadening market access, and promoting regulatory coherence, which the U.S. sees as essential building blocks towards the creation of a neoliberal-inspired regional economic order. Consistent with its typical approach to trade and investment, U.S. operation in the E3 is reinforced by the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) ‘ASEAN Connectivity for Trade and Investment’

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1309 Otto, “US Moves to Boost Ties on China’s Doorstep.”
1310 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific.”
1311 Otto, “US Moves to Boost Ties on China’s Doorstep.”
1314 US State Department, “The U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) Initiative.”
(ACTI) programme. The ACTI programme aims to facilitate trade through ‘improving standards and systems, boosting the capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises, accelerating the deployment of clean energy technologies and expanding IT connectivity.’ The long-term goal of the E3 initiative with ASEAN is to build the capacity in Southeast Asia for future membership of the TPP and the FTAAP, and to structurally and institutionally embed the developing countries of the Asia-Pacific into a U.S.-dominated regional trade and investment architecture.

Motivations for working with regional institutions

Regional institutions are an essential forum through which the U.S. can promote its liberal trade agenda amongst other matters of interest to Washington. By strengthening its strategic ties to the region through these institutions, it is hoped that Washington’s credentials as an Asia-Pacific resident power will be improved. The U.S. still pursues a pragmatic approach to working with regional institutions in that they serve broader U.S. foreign policy aims, rather than being an end in themselves. The signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN was an important diplomatic attempt to reshape perceptions of the U.S. regional posture, alongside the acceptance of the correlation between increasing intra-regional economic activity and increasing intra-regional political and diplomatic cooperation. Through its relationship with the Asian-centric ASEAN, the U.S. is pursuing a number of regional trade and investment initiatives including the E3 initiative to indirectly influence the interests of the developing countries through the provision of USAID. The creation of an ASEAN-led East Asian Economic Community could become a free trade area and powerful Asian trading bloc to rival the free trade areas in North America and Europe. The best course of action for Washington is to start the process of creating its own community following its rules, using its economic leverage created by the high standard TPP. The aim is to begin with ‘a few willing nations on both sides of the Pacific to form a nucleus FTA that could be extended to other APEC members later.’ In this way, the U.S. influences the trade agenda of regional economic institutions and directly shapes the structural of regional trade through the TPP framework.

The Obama administration initially set about renewing U.S. membership of the inclusive regional grouping, APEC, as a means to demonstrate Washington’s Asia-Pacific credentials, to exercise constrained leadership, and to regain regional consensus for its hegemony more broadly. With the general preference in Washington to get legally-binding results, APEC does not currently offer the

1315 US State Department, “The U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) Initiative.”
1317 Martin, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy, 17.
1318 Martin, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy, 19.
administration the short-to-medium term structural gains in trade it wants to see, because it operates on a non-binding basis for agreements. Consequently, the administration shifted its focus to ASEAN, an exclusive Southeast Asian grouping, but with whom the administration has been able to negotiate the kind of formalised free trade agreements preferred in Washington because they are more likely to attain tangible results. There is a constant bargaining process occurring between the U.S. and the regional states as to whether the renegotiated bargain should deliver an Asian-centric grouping that potentially excludes the United States, or one which is trans-Pacific in nature that includes the U.S. and other nations from the western hemisphere.\textsuperscript{1319}

There are obvious limitations to U.S. capacity to shape regional institutions. The U.S. is able to indirectly influence the direction of regional institutions through its increased engagement but the capacity to directly transform the structure of regional Asia-Pacific trade is critical to the production of U.S. hegemony. Therefore, institutions are complementary to U.S. structural power. Similarly, the ability to dominate the narrative on regional trade closely operates with institutional and structural power. The debate over the competing visions for regional trade cooperation has hinged on the quality and coverage of each agreement on offer. The quality of the TPP agreement has been regularly offset against the inferior scope of other regional FTAs being undertaken, which directs attention towards the U.S. domination of regional trade narrative.

**Productive Power: reproducing the neoliberal vision**

Through its discursive practices, the U.S. seeks to indirectly legitimise and delegitimise the social and economic customs of other states, as well as to determine what constitutes the identity of the actors in question. The U.S. has a long history of exercising productive power in the Asia-Pacific, as a means to legitimise its hegemony, particularly associated with neoliberalism. This section focuses on three examples of the ways in which the U.S. exerts control over dominating narratives concerning historical events and economic practices in the Asia-Pacific. The first example focuses on the way in which Washington historically and consistently continues to discursively delegitimise state practices that are inconsistent with neoliberal vision, especially relating to state-owned enterprises. The second involves the representation of the TPP as the ‘gold standard’ of free trade agreements vis-à-vis other regional initiatives; and the third concerns U.S. attempts to create an inclusive regional Asia-Pacific identity around the TPP. Since the intended outcome of the TPP is to ‘lock in’ Asia-Pacific states to a process of economic restructuring compatible with neoliberal orthodoxy, these narrative processes are

\textsuperscript{1319} Fergusson, *The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement*, summary.
indicative of the interconnectivity between the exercise of American structural, institutional and productive power.

(i) State-owned enterprises (SOEs)

The growth in stature of state-owned enterprises, symptomatic of statist models, is viewed as the biggest potential threat to market capitalism in the United States.\(^{1320}\) A Harvard Business School summit of founders and CEOs of some of the world’s top companies identified state capitalism and its support for national champions among the ten most important threats to market capitalism.\(^{1321}\) In addition, managers of private firms often complain when they find their competitors heavily supported or subsidised by local governments.\(^{1322}\) Many of the practices associated with state capitalism, including the expansion of state-owned enterprises, present a challenge to the American vision of a market-driven, regionally-integrated Asia-Pacific economy.\(^{1323}\) Such practices among Asia-Pacific actors are consistently stigmatised in favour of practices that support global trade, and which reproduce the neoliberal vision.\(^{1324}\) The fixation with state-owned enterprises, represented as uncompetitive and unfair to those operating honestly in the global free market system, has become a ‘peculiarly American priority.’\(^{1325}\) The popularity of state-owned enterprises amongst developed and developing Asia-Pacific nations is treated as a threat to American trade relations, and to the perception that the American version of neoliberalism is globally applicable.

\(^{1320}\) Bremmer asserts that the current wave of state capitalism in developed countries has come about as a result of the GFC and will recede as economic growth is restored. However, in a number of developing countries, state intervention in the economy is a rejection of the free market doctrine. Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Come of Age,” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 3 (2009): 40.


\(^{1322}\) Musacchio and Lazzarini, *Reinventing State Capitalism*, 16.


The ‘discursive demolition’ of the Asian Development Models by Washington and the IMF, representing key practices of the Asian development models as ‘crony’ and ‘corrupt,’ grew out of the Asian Financial Crisis. The use of such terms by key actors, and the way they were used to represent the ‘causes’ of the crisis produced and reproduced the social meanings by which past and current social and economic practices were legitimized or delegitimized. The effect of this process was to re-create and reconstitute future conditions for strategic action. By relating the cause of the AFC specifically to the Asian Development Models, Washington and IMF could determine which particular Asian social and economic practices and domestic institutional structures were deemed as good or bad according to the neoliberal strictures of the Washington Consensus. With blame restricted to the supposedly homogenous practices of the Asian states, the spotlight on structural problems in capitalist practices was side-stepped. As a result of the Asian Financial Crisis, Asian development models were normatively delegitimated whilst market-based processes and outcomes were simultaneously normatively privileged. The attempt to discursively undermine the exclusively Asian economic development models was to have major implications for an Asian identity and the direction of regional trade during the 2000s, strengthening regional contestation of American hegemonic economic ideology.

Far from moderating contestation of economic neoliberalism, American discursive practices strengthened the resolve of many East Asian states to continue developing their own distinctly Asian versions of ‘state capitalism.’ While many Asian firms owned and operated by their governments were privatised between 1980 and 2000, state ownership and influence in those firms has not only continued, but has developed. The specific patterns of business-government connections, corporate organisation and broader social relations that form an essential part of Asian political economies appear to be quite durable. These models have not only proven themselves to be resilient but also modifiable, whereby the state works hand in hand with private investors in unusual governance arrangements. The development of new varieties of state capitalism has differed from the basic version in which governments own and manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as extensions of the public

1328 For instance, the response to the delegitimisation of South Korean social and economic practices had far-reaching effects that impelled the South Korean state to engage in structural reform in response to the discursive redefinition of its developmental state. For President Kim Dae-jung, the neoliberal discourse had been so pervasive and intrusive prior to his political career that it had constituted his identity, interests, and practices. By 1998, Kim was also using the neoliberal narratives representing market processes and market outcomes as natural, neutral, and inevitable. Hall, “The Discursive Demolition of the Asian Development Model,” 75-92.
1329 Musacchio and Lazzarini define state capitalism as: ‘the widespread influence of the government in the economy, either by owning majority or minority equity positions in companies or by providing subsidized credit and/or other privileges to private companies.’ Musacchio and Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism, 12.
1330 Musacchio and Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism, 19.
1331 Beeson and Islam, “Neo-Liberalism and East Asia: Resisting the Washington Consensus,” 209.
bureaucracy. Instead, there are three models of state capitalism, in which the state can act either as (a) a majority investor, or (b) as a minority investor. In the third, the state seeks to invest in companies – including ones not previously government-linked – through public development banks, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds and other vehicles.

Not only have various forms of state capitalism survived the Asian Financial Crisis, but they have also been adapted to meet the needs of the twenty-first century. Instead of a smooth transformation into open economies, hybrid state capitalist regimes endure across the Asia-Pacific. Not only is this the case in China, but also, more significantly, in some of the biggest economies in the Asia-Pacific, including Japan and India. The attractiveness of the state-owned enterprise is not just a Chinese matter, although China’s practices are especially singled out as part of the broader ‘China rise’ narrative. Partly due to strong popular opposition, privatisation programmes have virtually ceased among developing nations since the early 2000s, including the largest developing BRICS economies – a process which has accelerated since the 2008 global financial crisis. In order to mitigate against the potential roll-back of economic liberalisation amongst G20 nations, the U.S. has specifically targeted SOEs as part of its neoliberal-driven TPP narrative. This is a trade deal that seeks to ensure that ‘private [U.S.] firms have a fair shot at competing against state-owned enterprises,’ and to ‘level the playing field’ for American corporations that are competing against Asian SOEs that receive preferential treatment and government subsidies. As a new feature of U.S. trade agreements, an important goal of the TPP is to tackle SOEs that increasingly engage in international trade, acting as investors in foreign markets; and the regulatory policies that lack transparency and create advantages for SOEs.

While the regional challenge does not only originate from China, America has fewer economic and security leverage opportunities with its biggest regional competitor. The result has been an increased

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1332 The Chinese state favours the first approach: the state is typically a majority shareholder in 60% of stock market capitalised companies. See Musacchio and Lazzarini, *Reinventing State Capitalism*, 13.
1333 In India, the Life Insurance Corporation, is an example of the third form, being the largest stock market investor in the country. See *Economist*, “Leviathan as Capitalist: State Capitalism Continues to Defy Expectations of its Demise,” June 21, 2014.
1334 The number of SOEs among the 100 largest companies in the *Fortune* Global 500 list, ranking companies by revenues, went from 11 in 2005 to 25 in 2010. In 2005, there were no SOEs among the top 10, but by 2010, there were four—Japan Post Holdings, Sinopec and China National Petroleum (two of China’s national oil companies), and State Grid (a Chinese utility). Musacchio and Lazzarini, *Reinventing State Capitalism*, 15.
1336 Barack Obama, “The TPP would let America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade.”
focus by the Obama administration on a narrative of ‘levelling the playing field,’ highlighting the capacity of trade projects like the TPP to move into sensitive areas including services, agriculture, and state-owned enterprises, forcing open such areas for American businesses amongst the smaller regional economies and regional allies. The Obama administration has connected into the storyline originating in the 1980s and 1990s in the context of the ‘corrupt practices’ of SOEs, which was aimed at its main regional competitor, Japan, and to a lesser extent, the other Asian Tigers. The most recent interpretation of this narrative has shifted focus to those particular elements of state capitalism that are hostile to American interests and ways of doing business, almost exclusively targeted at China. With the prevalence of SOEs continuing to operate across East Asia, the Obama administration has taken a less coercive approach to managing this problem. State-directed economies that protect domestic industries from foreign competition remain antithetic to the American understanding of free trade. However by bundling its quest to reduce the number and capacities of SOEs into the TPP negotiations, the Obama administration has used its strategic leverage to bolster its structural power as a means to deflect regional resistance to the more extreme elements of its neoliberal ideology.

(ii) The TPP: the ‘gold standard’ FTA

Linked to the SOE narrative, the second aspect of American productive power concerns the narrative of the superior TPP agreement emanating from Washington officials. The TPP has been typically referred to as ‘ambitious but achievable,’ and ‘an unprecedented opportunity to update the rules of the road.’ The purpose of this is narrative is to highlight the ongoing benefits of membership of the U.S. economic order to subordinate states. The twelve TPP partners, at varying levels of economic development, have successfully negotiated the opening of often domestically-sensitive areas to foreign competition, eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, services, and agriculture, establishing rules on a wide range of issues including foreign direct investment and other economic activities, and addressing ‘new and cross-cutting issues’ presented by an increasingly globalised economy. Ambition and achievement are further consolidated through reference to a ‘gold standard’ agreement, measure of the highest possible achievable feat. The representation of the TPP as a ‘twenty-first century agreement’ and its role in ‘establishing the strongest environmental and labour standards of any trade deal in U.S. history’ conveys the message that previous agreements had more modest aims and that this framework is the model for all future agreements. The message conveyed through the

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American-led TPP infers its high quality, universal applicability, and ultimate superiority to any other agreement. The often challenging aspects of neoliberal restructuring are regarded as natural, neutral and inevitable.\textsuperscript{1343}

In contrast, the ASEAN-led RCEP, the region’s other formal trade agreement, has been discursively differentiated from the TPP as an inferior, low quality, run of the mill agreement that will not produce the economic ambition suitable for the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{1344} This subliminally negative representation of the RCEP as competition to the TPP is at odds with the view emanating from the RCEP-negotiating countries; nor is it supported by Washington think tanks. They interpret RCEP and TPP as potentially complementary rather than competing models for regional integration, albeit approaching regional integration differently.\textsuperscript{1345} Washington insists that the TPP is the only agreement that can pave the way for its vision of an FTAAP, pushing the idea that the RCEP and TPP offer competing ideologies on what constitutes a free trade agreement.\textsuperscript{1346} The juxtaposition of the two images maintains the distance between the superiority of Washington’s vision, in diametric opposition to the junior position of Asia-Pacific states, consolidating their existing positioning within the regional hierarchy. The implicit assertion is that ASEAN, with its consensual approach, is incapable of negotiating an ambitious, high quality agreement without Washington’s leadership and direction.

The choice is clear: the TPP reflects U.S. interests and values with universal application, offering protections for labour, the environment and IPR. In contrast, alternative state capitalist and mercantilist models offer ‘forced technology transfer, localisation, state champions and generalised protection.’\textsuperscript{1347} Consequently, state capitalism ‘has introduced massive inefficiencies into global markets and injected


\textsuperscript{1344} Given the overlap in membership of RCEP and TPP, it is questionable whether these can be competing models. Dual members are Singapore, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Brunei, New Zealand and Vietnam. Both India and China are RCEP members whereas neither is in the TPP. However, the TPP is more comprehensive than RCEP in what it seeks to achieve. It is generally agreed that both will define the parameters of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific, although a consequence of the differences in membership between the two might split ASEAN. See Brookings Institution, “TPP and RCEP: Competing or Complementary Models of Economic Integration?” The US has not officially rejected the OBOR initiative, perhaps because of its informal and largely bilateral nature. It has, however, voiced strong objections to the AIIB, formally part of the OBOR initiative. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.


\textsuperscript{1346} Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 7.

populist politics into economic decision-making.' While the U.S is characterised by its forward thinking, progressive attitudes towards regional trade through the TPP, China’s model is characterised as unsustainable, and its strategy as ‘self-defeating.’ According to the USTR, Mike Froman, Beijing is described as being slow to advance necessary structural reforms, vulnerable on its current path and protracted in addressing the commitments set out in the Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in November 2013. At this Congress, the CCP established objectives, including improving the transfer of technology, its IPR, and in its application of anti-monopoly laws and in any meaningful reform of the SOE sector. China is frequently represented in binary opposition to the United States in relation to economic strategies. Choosing the China option means a preference for opacity, not openness, self-serving Chinese interests, not regional ones, and an unworkable economic model in the longer term.

(iii) Creating an inclusive Asia-Pacific identity

The third aspect of American productive power originates from the representation of the TPP as an agreement between twelve like-minded states on both sides of the Pacific, who are working towards the same ambitious, far-reaching trade goals without any degree of overt coercion from Washington. Such language of inclusivity, represents the TPP members as having compatible high standards, climbing to the top, rather than a race to the bottom that is more typical of outmoded twentieth century FTAs. Who would not want to be in such a club?

‘It’s about generating growth for our economies and jobs for our people by unleashing a wave of trade, investment and entrepreneurship. It’s about standing up for our workers, or protecting the environment and promoting innovation. And it’s about reaching for high standards…’

By differentiating those ‘willing’ to make the necessary structural adjustments, from those who remain on the periphery, who are unwilling or as yet unable, to reach the international rules of trade (including China), the binary oppositions of superiority and junior positions are reinforced.

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1348 Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age,” 40.
1349 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the CSIS Asian Architecture Conference.”
1351 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the CSIS Asian Architecture Conference.”
1353 Prestowitz, “The Pacific Pivot.”
The TPP discourse constitutes the identities of Asia-Pacific actors incorporating the U.S. (and other Pacific-facing states in the Americas), in contrast to an exclusively ‘Asian’ identity. The TPP acts as channel through which the U.S. seeks to normatively legitimise American social and economic practices as synonymous with Asia-Pacific ones, to create a single shared identity based on ‘shared economic interests’ and perhaps more significantly ‘consistent…with our shared values’.

Secretary Kerry characteristically invoked the shared identity, appealing to a shared common understanding of the TPP as being:

‘built on its members’ shared commitment to high standards, eliminating market access barriers to good and services, addressing new, 21st century trade issues and respect for a rules-based economic framework. We always envisioned the TPP as a growing platform for regional economic integration. Now, we are realising that vision…The growing TPP is already a major step toward APEC’s vision of a region-wide Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific’

This is an Asia-Pacific vision for regional integration rather than an Asian-centric one. The key words here are ‘we always envisioned,’ denoting that America’s vision is a regionally shared vision, whilst also emphasising that America’s leadership will be the driving force for the platform of regional economic integration. Maintaining regional consent for this shared vision is essential to the production of the normative foundations of U.S. hegemony.

The tentative steps towards the development of an Asian-centric identity can also be linked back to the Asian Financial Crisis. For the U.S., the goal is to work towards the shaping of the idea of what the Asia-Pacific region is, in geographic and regional identity terms, thereby ensuring its inclusion and reinstating its credibility as an Asia-Pacific state and regional leader. The White House has turned the TPP into a gauge by which its leadership in the region is measured. It is portrayed as the most important element of the rebalance, and of the administration’s determination to set the rules, rather than allowing this role to transfer to China. However, the challenge for the U.S. is to create an American Asia-Pacific identity that is domestically acceptable and regionally viable. By focusing on the geopolitical significance of the trade deal, the Obama administration has less successfully convinced Congress and the domestic audience of the tangible benefits of the TPP.

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Conclusion

This chapter has explored the ways in which the rebalance reflects the U.S. exercise of institutional, structural, and productive power to produce its hegemony. The goals, simply put, are to maintain the American-led structure of regional economic governance, which facilitates American privileges and preserves the prevailing hierarchy, and allows the United States to shape the direction of an inclusive economic regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. The structure of regional economic governance should continue to fit in with the structure of global economic governance as expressed through the rules-based multilateral financial institutions, including the IMF, World Bank and WTO. The existing financial and economic structures and institutions through which U.S. hegemony is expressed, are resilient and adept at deflecting opposition and redirecting challenges in ways that strengthen its legitimacy. Furthermore, the privileged position of the dollar as the currency of last resort, and the infusion of U.S. preferences in the international financial institutions enhance the maintenance of its Washington’s structural advantages in the global economy.

However, there is more competition from other actors within the U.S. economic order in the Asia-Pacific, which has been manifested since the 1980s in regional contestation of America’s neoliberal economic ideology, leading to a regional debate over whether the regional economic order should be exclusively Asian-centric or inclusively Asia-Pacific-centric. This debate has been accentuated by the rise of China as the region’s largest economic power, which has compelled the U.S. to step up to the challenge. The American-led regional free trade agreement, the TPP, reflects the Obama administration’s ambition to further embed its rules and standards for global and regional trade and finance in the Asia-Pacific, with particular focus on Southeast Asia. In addition to the TPP, the U.S.-led E3 initiative, in partnership with ASEAN, aims to provide the economic building blocks for eventual membership to the TPP for those Southeast Asian states unable to currently qualify for the TPP. E3 provides the framework to draw these developing states into the liberal economic order, gaining their consent to the asymmetric economic bargain and leading to eventual internalisation of its dominant ideas in the process.

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1358 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 145.

The TPP is positioned with two other visions for the eventual regional Free Trade Agreement for the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) – the ASEAN-led RCEP and China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. Each framework represents the different interests, economic norms and types of order visualised by the initiators. The U.S.-led TPP promotes itself as a high standard, rules-based FTA that is more extensive in its desire to influence domestic labour and service standards than the other regional initiatives. The ASEAN-led RCEP has a less ambitious remit than the TPP; has a bigger membership, including China, India and Japan, and which represents ASEAN’s attempts to influence the direction of regional economic order. The RCEP deal is yet to be finalised, missing its initial December 2015 deadline and in all likelihood is hindered by a lack of shared vision on what a ‘comprehensive partnership’ should entail.\(^\text{1360}\)

The other framework for regional order is the China-led OBOR initiative which operates on a largely bilateral basis. While Washington has not indicated any major concerns with China’s OBOR initiative – despite its extension into Europe and potentially, into Latin America – the Obama administration was troubled by Beijing’s establishment of an alternative regional infrastructure and investment bank, the AIIB. Open to members in April 2015, the AIIB was viewed as a prospective competitor to the American-influenced Asian Development Bank. Global interest in the AIIB came as a surprise to Washington (and to Beijing), which had tried, in vain, to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB. U.S. concerns aside, Beijing has shown itself capable of establishing a development bank that is willing to work with, and not as a rival to, other MDBs within the existing structure of global economic governance. While the alternative initiatives to regional economic order-building challenge aspects of America’s dominant position in regional order, it is not yet clear whether China’s ultimate goal is to challenge America’s overall advantage in the global economy, or if the aim is to goal is to achieve greater decision-making roles for China and other rising powers, whilst maintaining the overall liberal economic structure.

U.S. capacity to exert its institutional and structural power are compelling, yet there has been less success for the U.S. in dominating narratives supporting its neoliberal vision. There continues to be significant contestation of the benefits of neoliberalism from within the U.S. and across the region. While the Obama administration has hinged America’s future prosperity, security and its role as an Asia-Pacific power on the ratification of the TPP, it has failed to convince domestic American audiences of the domestic benefits of TPP. Hillary Clinton, the Democrat presidential nominee, distanced herself

from this trade initiative that she had initially supported as Secretary of State. This is despite the administration’s attempts to describe the TPP as America’s single greatest opportunity to determine the future of regional trade instead of China.

Many Asia-Pacific states remain unconvinced of the advantages of embracing the American version of neoliberalism in its entirety. Yet many have been willing to sign up to the TPP as a way to bind the U.S. into the regional economic order, whilst also accepting the extension of American influence into their domestic economies as part of this deal. Nevertheless, many regional states continue to keep their options open through membership of the ASEAN-led RCEP. There has been a degree of scepticism towards the longevity of the rebalance post-Obama across the Asia-Pacific. As is argued here, the production of U.S. hegemony is dependent upon its social relations and consent-building activities. Consequently, the Obama administration has pursued multilateralism, not protectionism, as a way to challenge the regional perception that the U.S. is an unreliable trade partner. Committing to a leadership role in regional trade developments, the administration’s goal has been to limit the effectiveness of Chinese and ASEAN alternatives in realising the FTAAP. Furthermore, as the main proponent of the region’s Asia-Pacific, rather than Asian-centric identity, the TPP is an example of Washington’s capacity to influence the normative foundations of regional order, in light of China’s expanding regional economic status. Much has become contingent on the successful ratification of the TPP, including America’s ideas about security, its hegemonic identity and the future of American hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific, in view of the already negative perception of ‘China’s rise.’
Chapter 6
The role of rising powers in the rebalance strategy

The Sino-U.S. relationship is the centre point that dictates the future of the Asia-Pacific regional order. India also plays a critical role in the rebalance. Specifically identified as a ‘valued strategic partner’ to the United States, India has the potential to hold a significant role in the organisation and mobilisation of Washington’s regional security (especially maritime) agenda as deterrence against China’s rising naval power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.1361 The Obama administration has typically responded to expanding Chinese and Indian regional influence in contrasting ways, using American power differently to co-opt and socialise India and China into accepting the existing regional order. The variation in strategy is in large part driven by identity and narrative processes of ‘othering,’ dominated by the way in which ‘China’s rise’ has over time acquired negative connotations, in contrast to the seemingly more benign ‘India’s rise.’ Coverage of the implications of ‘China’s rise’ for the stability of regional order is well-developed in IR literature. This chapter draws attention first, to the way in which ‘China’s rise’ has been negatively assimilated and narratively reproduced, and second, to the effects of this narrative on America’s hegemonic identity as part of the ontological security-seeking processes that seek to understand and define the boundaries of this complex relationship between the U.S., as the incumbent hegemon, and China, as the rising regional power.

This chapter considers the different ways in which the U.S. attempts to garner consent for its order by rising powers. By focusing on various applications of American power, this chapter examines Washington’s attempts to dominate the shape and direction of these critical relationships, as the Obama administration engages in extremely complex bargaining processes with both rising powers to maintain America’s regional hegemonic status. Highlighted here is the mixture of coercive and consensus-building approaches used by the U.S. to reproduce its hegemony. The discussion of compulsory power focuses on how the U.S. uses its military power to deter China from asserting its naval power in the East and South China Seas. The U.S. also attempts to define the regional response to China’s island-building activities and territorial claims through regional institutions, exerting indirect influence over ASEAN. Attention is then directed towards the American response to China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. Developed and led by President Xi, this extensive regional development project, encompassing land and sea elements, and supported by the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), is considered the centrepiece of Chinese claims to restructure the region’s

economy. Finally, this chapter considers America’s productive power as it discursively seeks to assert control over China’s ‘rising power’ identity and shape the direction of dominant/rising power relations, and attempting to secure its own hegemonic identity as part of this process.

**U.S.-China relations during the G.H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations**

Since the normalisation of Sino-U.S. relations commenced in the 1970s, structuring and defining the relationship with Beijing has presented a recurring challenge to Washington bureaucrats. American attitudes towards China have typically reflected a desire to see China develop into a liberal democratic state. This goal was deemed possible once China started to open up to the international political economy from the 1980s, and gained membership of the WTO, World Bank and IMF in the early 2000s. Early post-Cold War administrations assumed that contact with the world, and the U.S. in particular, would facilitate China’s socialisation and co-option into the American-led order. This assumption has continued to shape U.S. China strategy.

The vacillation in the China strategies of post-Cold War U.S. administrations demonstrates the enduring complexity of Sino-U.S. relations. The violent crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 had major implications for America’s domestic political environment, between those supporting containment and those advocating engagement and accommodation to support China’s eventual transition to liberal democracy. The Tiananmen Square incident accentuated the difficulty for post-Cold War administrations concerning ‘ideational transitions and identity dilemmas,’ creating domestic ‘discursive tensions’ and incoherence in Washington’s China policy. In 1992, the G.H.W. Bush administration granted China an extension to its existing most favoured nation (MFN) status, which Democrats criticised for its disregard for human rights. However, the same MFN policy was lauded by the Democrat administration a few years later.

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1363 After Tiananmen, Beijing was relegated to international ‘pariah status’ and was largely excluded from the restructuring of the world order. By the time the Chinese Communist Party began to re-engage in international affairs, it was confronted with a post-Cold War western-dominated international hierarchy that promoted democracy and the market economy. Yong Deng, *China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 271.
The incoming Clinton administration, riding the wave of the public mood towards China, accused the preceding G.H.W Bush administration of indulging the Chinese leadership, and initially adopted a hard line stance towards Beijing. Applying a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to underpin China’s transition to liberal state and market economy, Clinton linked trade with pressure on China in relation to human rights, assuming that trade would be the appropriate leverage that would give the U.S. the advantage over China and allow it to embed U.S. values into all dealings with Beijing. By 1994, when it became evident that Clinton’s linkage between China’s most favoured nation (MFN) status and its human rights strategy was in disarray, the administration switched course. The Clinton administration focused on engagement and building a ‘constructive strategic partnership’ with China, without achieving the anticipated concessions from Beijing.

Given the divergent positions in Washington on how to interact with Beijing during its inevitable transition to global power status, neither the G.H.W. Bush administration (1989-1993) nor the succeeding Clinton administration (1993-2001) were able to construct ‘reliable strategic explanations’ for their policies. Consequently, American China policy swung between rapprochement, and competition with sanctions, in response to the transforming strategic environment, events in China, and its growing power. Competing representations of the ‘China threat’ re-emerged in the 1990s, uniting around ‘human rights, free trade, political reform, economic transformation and military modernisation.’ The challenge of developing a coherent policy or exercising leadership in a rapidly changing strategic environment in the 1990s gave significant voice to China sceptics, who, suspicious of China’s intentions, cited the non-existent political reform and military modernisation as indication of China’s emerging contestation of American hegemony. With the narrative concerning China’s potential threat to U.S. hegemony broadly developing along security and economic lines, the unfamiliarity with China’s emerging great power identity also created uncertainty for America’s role as global power and regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific.

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U.S.-China relations during the G.W. Bush administration (2001-2009)

The incoming G.W. Bush administration set out to reinforce U.S. power, seeking to confront the challenges that regional powers could present to the United States. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the potential for regional powers ‘to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests.’ In the Asia-Pacific, the 2001 QDR highlighted the possibility of ‘a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region,’ although China is not specifically mentioned. The QDR also highlighted U.S. concerns that ‘the density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure’ was less developed in the Asia-Pacific than it was in other areas of critical interest. As a means to expand and entrench U.S. hegemony, the strategy sought to reorient U.S. Asia-Pacific policy and prioritise existing U.S. regional allies. The attacks on September 11, 2001 duly shifted the G.W. Bush administration’s policy priorities and threat perceptions. Despite Washington’s strategic mistrust of Beijing, especially concerning Taiwan, there was effective, if transactional, cooperation between the two during the two G.W. Bush terms, focusing on mutual interests relating to non-conventional threats such as terrorism, leading to the expansion of bilateral cooperation to prevent the proliferation of WMD.

The relative stability of U.S.-China relations was achieved through the numerous economic and political dialogues that were established to create an institutional framework for developing communication and cooperation, and for managing disputes. In December 2006, Treasury Secretary Paulson established a U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, at the time the most senior regular dialogue held between the two. High level visits and exchanges of working level officials, and military-to-military relations were also resumed. There was cooperation on anti-terror initiatives, and cooperation via the Six-Party Talks to manage North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. The administration avoided confrontation

1376 Yang, “Leaders’ Conceptual Complexity and Foreign Policy Change,” 441.
with Beijing by avoiding the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, and G.W. Bush formally indicated in 2003 that the administration opposed ‘any unilateral decision, by either China or Taiwan, to change the status quo.’ In addition, there was heavy investment by U.S. companies in China and increased Chinese investment in the United States. However, the relative stability only concealed, rather than reconciled, the key issues and tensions in the bilateral relations that were reawakened by the global financial crisis in 2007-2008.

**Deteriorating U.S.-China relations: 2009-2011**

The strategy of the incoming Obama administration in November 2008 initially sought to maintain consistency in Sino-American relations, and to avoid the swings in approach that typically occurred between outgoing and incoming administrations. The Obama administration believed that the pendulum approach had undermined cooperation with Beijing on critical global issues. From the G.W. Bush administration, President Obama inherited several mechanisms for high-level engagement in economic, political and strategic areas. The new administration intended to develop ‘broader and deeper’ relations, focusing on areas of common ground, and to continue to strengthen the bilateral relationship. It hoped to secure greater cooperation from China on its agenda priorities including the global financial crisis, climate change, and the threat from Iranian and North Korean nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, the relationship had also grown significantly more ‘complex, multifaceted and intertwined,’ as China’s position in the global economy became more pronounced following the global financial crisis (GFC). There was an expectation on the part of the incoming Obama administration that China should take on more responsibility in global affairs.

The elevated position that China had assumed in U.S. Asia-Pacific policy during the G.W. Bush administration initially appeared to be sustained by the Obama administration, as it endeavoured to manage the global financial crisis in partnership with China. The ‘responsible stakeholder’ paradigm developed by the G.W. Bush administration was maintained, although absent from the terminology in

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This gave consistency to the administration’s message that China should take on a larger role of responsibility in the international arena, in concert with the United States. From the Chinese perspective, the GFC validated its view that America’s overwhelming international influence was waning, and also demonstrated the end of the primacy of the Washington Consensus as the universal model of economic development. Obama’s approach was construed as an indication that U.S.-China relations were the administration’s priority and there was talk of a G2 condominium with China. While Beijing also rejected the notion of a G2 condominium, Obama’s China policy implied acceptance of China’s advancing status in global affairs, through shared responsibilities on matters of global significance.

Their collective efforts to resolve the global financial crisis gave a false impression of the amicable condition of U.S.-China relations, and emphasised the growing tension in how each viewed the identity of the other. During her visit to Beijing in February 2009, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, implied the bilateral relationship needed strengthening, while Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi spoke of ‘important common responsibilities on major issues’ – in the Asia-Pacific and globally. Yang’s suggestion concerning the global financial crisis was that the U.S. and China should collaborate and lead. The expectation on both sides was the other would ‘make the greater contribution to global

1383 In 2005, the then deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, called for China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system, becoming ‘more than just a member – it would work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.’ Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York City, September 21, 2005. [http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm accessed August 13, 2015]. The significance of the ‘responsible stakeholder’ paradigm is discussed in more depth later in this chapter.


1388 The complexity of discursively shaping the bilateral relationship, and producing identities is discussed further in the section on productive power.


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economic recovery…and to [global] financial reform in favour of the other’s interests.” In an effort to downplay talk of a potential G2, at the first upgraded Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July 2009, Obama summed up the U.S. position by indicating that,

‘The relationship between the U.S. and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world…. If we advance [our mutual] interests through cooperation, our people will benefit and the world will be better off—because our ability to partner with each other is a prerequisite for progress on many of the most pressing global challenges.”

Obama’s reference to the U.S.-China relationship as important as any bilateral relationship did not infer a G2. The implication is that other relationship could be just as important. President Obama distinctly avoided classifying it the most important bilateral relationship. During the dialogue, Obama indicated that he and President Hu agreed to a commitment to build a framework for cooperation, and not that such a relationship already existed.

China’s aspirations to reposition itself in the centre of the Asia-Pacific regional order, and its contestation of America’s assumed right to regional hegemony were made clear to President Obama during his first visit to China in November 2009. This visit to Beijing stood in contrast to the deference and respect Obama had received during his other overseas trips. The customary bilateral negotiations, forming the framework for a presidential visit prior to the event, did not occur, suggesting that the White House had little leverage over its Chinese counterparts, in view of the impact of the global financial crisis on the U.S. economy. The demeanour towards Obama reflected Beijing’s perception that American financial mismanagement had caused the global financial crisis. Moreover, it appeared that Washington refused to accept China’s rising status on China’s terms and was attempting to shape the terms of China’s rise and global responsibilities. Beijing’s highly effective stage management of Obama’s first visit to China in November 2009 was an unanticipated signal from Beijing that it could, and would, push back against international, especially American, pressure. The limits of Washington’s leverage were evident: Obama’s ability to advance his global agenda were hampered,

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1392 The WSJ referred to this trip as a ‘turning point in relations between a weakened U.S. power and a China that senses its time has come.’ Obama was pressed on economic policy, largely ignored on human rights and restricted in his efforts to reach out to the Chinese populace. Jonathan Weisman, Andrew Browne and Jason Dean, “Obama Hits a Wall on His Visit to China,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2009. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1258577743503654225 (accessed August 12, 2015).
and Beijing successfully pushed Obama into endorsing Chinese positions on issues important to it.\textsuperscript{1394} At home, the conciliatory tone towards Beijing was criticised by conservatives as over-accommodation, especially on issues with no consensus between the two.\textsuperscript{1395}

A second problem in U.S-China relations opened up early on in the Obama administration as a result of its approach to the rest of the Asia-Pacific. The G.W. Bush administration’s focus on combatting terrorism in the Middle East, Central and South Asia, when coupled with the planned draw-down of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula, may have been viewed in Beijing as a sign of a reduction in U.S. interest in East Asia, tacitly conceding the region to Chinese influence.\textsuperscript{1396} The strategic space that opened up as a result, enabled China to concentrate on asserting its own regional influence in line with its economic development goals.\textsuperscript{1397} Anxious to reduce the trade imbalance with China by improving trade and diplomatic ties in the region, the Obama administration made its Asia-Pacific strategy a central priority, seeking to re-establish and salvage ties across the region that it viewed as damaged by the G.W. Bush administration’s focus on the global war on terror. The re-assertion of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, reinforced by numerous visits to the region by key administration officials, received negative attention in Beijing. Beijing had come to view the change in the balance of U.S.-China relations in its favour as indication that U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific was on the decline.

A series of troublesome issues in 2010 and 2011 further upset U.S-China bilateral relations following President Obama’s 2009 visit to Beijing. In their separate memoirs, administration insiders, Jeffrey Bader and Hillary Clinton, noted that Chinese officials attempted to derail the main talks at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, by holding a closed session with Brazil, South Africa and India.\textsuperscript{1398} The Chinese goal was to dilute, or stop the kind of agreement the U.S. was seeking, while also deliberately attempting to undermine the U.S. (and specifically, President Obama’s) position in shaping the global climate agenda.\textsuperscript{1399} Bilateral relations worsened in 2010, deemed a low point in U.S-China relations under the Obama administration, and for Chinese diplomacy in general.\textsuperscript{1400}


\textsuperscript{1395} Bader, \textit{Obama and China’s Rise}, 79. Prior to the trip to Beijing, Obama had postponed his meeting with the Dalai Lama so as not to offend Chinese leaders. Cooper, “China holds firm on major issues in Obama’s visit.”


\textsuperscript{1397} Goh, “The US–China Relationship and Asia-Pacific Security,” 223.

\textsuperscript{1398} To the surprise of these four leaders, Obama was alerted to their ‘secret meeting,’ which he subsequently attended whilst it was in session. Bader, \textit{Obama and China’s Rise}, 65-66 and Clinton, \textit{Hard Choices}, 492.


\textsuperscript{1400} In addition to worsening relations with the US, Chinese diplomatic relations with Australia, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN and India also deteriorated, largely caused by China’s assertive foreign policy, particularly in the

The ambiguity in managing U.S-China relations is animated by the perpetual uncertainty in Washington concerning China’s use of its rising capabilities, and a lack of consensus on whether the U.S. should engage and cooperate, or contain China’s challenge. The dominating perception in Washington was that China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy between 2009 and 2011 was brought about by Washington’s policy choices. Accommodation had not led to China’s co-option but had increased Beijing’s dissent of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. This acknowledgement pressed the White House into reassessing China’s intentions in the Asia-Pacific. As a result, the administration’s strategy became more active in strengthening its response to China’s open contestation of U.S. hegemony, revealed by its perceived assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, China’s lack of cooperation on global issues including climate change, and the half-hearted condemnation of North Korea’s missile tests in April/May 2009. Perceiving the origins of regional tensions to lay at China’s door, compounded by Beijing’s willingness to obstruct the U.S. global agenda, Washington needed an emphatic response to China’s revisionism. Furthermore, China’s activities demanded Washington’s reassurance of its regional allies and partners of U.S. intentions to remain committed to underpinning regional security, and that ultimately, it intended to remain the regional hegemon.

The strategic rebalance and U.S.-China relations

Holding the central position in the East Asian security complex, the U.S. is able to maintain order by deterring the use of force through the system of bilateral alliances and partnerships. The U.S. also determines the parameters of the disputes in the East and South China Seas by defining and prioritising what it considers to be essential regional security public goods, such as freedom of navigation, maintaining the adherence to international rules and norms by regional actors, and mobilising support

1407 Dumbaugh, China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, 2. Khalilzad notes that the challenge is to find a posture that encourages a ‘positive evolution in China’s relations with the world and appropriately respond to negative behaviour in the short term.’ He suggests a strategy of prevention plus containment, rather that engagement or containment. Khalilzad, “Congage China,” 1-2.

1408 Beijing had supported the G.W. Bush administration’s war on terror and the war in Afghanistan, even though this would increase the American presence in Central and South Asia, creating a Chinese strategic disadvantage. The Chinese government had also been relatively quiet in its opposition to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Beijing felt it had accommodated US activities, even when critical principles such as sovereignty were affected. Since China had adjusted to, and accommodated, the U.S., Beijing expected adjustment and accommodation in return. See J. Mohan Malik, “Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China’s Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses after 11 September,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (2002): 252–293; Brendan Taylor, “US-China Relations after 11 September: A Long Engagement or Marriage of Convenience?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 2 (2005): 179–199.


1410 Indyk et al, Bending History, 43.
The ability to negotiate the terms of its regional hegemony rests upon Washington’s capacity to continue to provide public goods, through its security guarantees, to maintain a stable regional order. An important element underpinning its regional hegemony is its capacity to manage (but not necessarily to resolve) regional conflicts. Conflict in the South China Sea could have systemic impact on regional peace and stability, especially if it reduces access to sea lines of communication (SLOC) or militarises them. This draws in the United States, whose authority as regional hegemon relies upon its capacity to manage these conflicts, to keep the sea lines open, and to deter major threats to regional security that may alter the status quo.

China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas threatened to unnerve friends and allies and to inhibit U.S. freedom of air and maritime navigation. Its non-compliance with international norms might also constrain Washington’s ability to project power in the region, if left unchecked. This would undermine American preponderance, and its continuing ability to provide for regional stability, both of which underpinned its regional hegemony. The rebalance strategy announcement in November 2011 signalled the Obama administration’s reaffirmation of its regional hegemony. The emergent strategy also notified Beijing of Washington’s determination to maintain its pre-eminent position in the Asia-Pacific. The rebalance was constructed as a necessary rebalancing of U.S. attention to deepen American credibility in the region, to advance U.S. interests, exploit opportunities, and reassure allies and friends of U.S. staying power and commitments. Washington’s assurances to Beijing that the strategy was not an attempt to ‘contain, encircle, or counterbalance’ China, placed the Sino-U.S. relationship in central position. Washington’s pushback against China’s increasing influence and contestation of its regional hegemony has involved the exercise of different modes of power in the Asia-Pacific.

### Compulsory Power: Deterring China in the East and South China Seas

Due to the significance of maritime geography to East Asian states in trade and security terms, the East and South China Seas are an essential arena for political interaction but also increasingly an arena for conflict. Regional states seek to assert their sovereign rights as a way to define national power and status, which has been combined with the lack of clear maritime boundaries and different interpretations

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1412 Goh, *The Struggle for Order*, 73.
1413 The Korean Peninsula also has systemic impact on regional security. See Goh, *The Struggle for Order*, 24.
of the normative tools that determine them.\textsuperscript{1417} The potential to exploit oil and gas reserves in the East and South China Seas provides an additional motivation to assert territorial and maritime continental shelf claims through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).\textsuperscript{1418} Territorial disputes focus on issues of sovereignty and on definitions of boundaries and overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZ). In the East and South China Seas, the application of UNCLOS is problematic, with disputes focusing on the ownership of inhabited and uninhabited islands and submerged rocks, EEZ, and undersea continental shelves, claimed by up to six countries in the South China Seas, and three in the East China Seas.\textsuperscript{1419}

In the South China Sea, the Spratly and Paracel island groups are claimed by China and Taiwan (similar claims), Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. In the East China Sea, China, Japan and Taiwan all claim the Japanese-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Figure 2 shows the positioning of the disputed islands in the East and South China Seas in relation to the claimants’ territories. Other disputes exist between Japan and South Korea in the Sea of Japan, and between China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea.\textsuperscript{1420} U.S. involvement in the East and South China Seas’ disputes has become more pronounced since 2010, as both Washington and Beijing assert their mutually contradictory interests in these strategically important arenas. While the U.S. has no territorial claims, and does not have an official position on the sovereignty disputes, it does oppose the use of coercion and force in the promotion of sovereignty claims, it supports the use of international law to resolve or manage disputes and has a particular interest in maintaining freedom of navigation for military and commercial vessels.


\textsuperscript{1418} UNCLOS was open to ratification in 1982 and came into force in 1994. The US is a signatory but has never ratified the convention. China is an UNCLOS signatory but has an opt-out from the dispute resolution chapters. UNCLOS entitles littoral states to a 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea, a continental shelf to a maximum 350 nm through a natural prolongation of land territory and an EEZ of up to 300 nm, extending sovereign rights but allows for international freedom of navigation (FON) along sea lines of communication (SLOC). See UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (accessed June 26, 2016).

\textsuperscript{1419} UNCLOS provisions do not extend to decisions on ownership of the landmasses. In addition, UNCLOS determines that only islands have an EEZ. Many features in the Spratly chain in the South China Sea do not qualify as islands since they are submerged at high tide and are not capable of sustaining human life and economic activity. Some claimants have resorted to island-building activities to bolster their territorial claims. See. Michael McDevitt, “The South China Sea and US Policy Options,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 4 (2013): 183.

The East China Sea disputes

The disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, and similar territorial disputes occurring in the South China Sea are a product of historical claims, the spoils of war and a legacy of colonial occupation. Japan’s claim to the five uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu features dates back to its annexation of these islands in 1895, with a lease granted to a Japanese businessman to establish a fish processing plant. China and Taiwan claim the islands were not uninhabited when Japan annexed them and were used by the Chinese from the 16th century. The PRC also claims that the islands should have been returned to Chinese control in 1945. At the end of World War Two, the U.S. assumed military control of Okinawa, of which the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were also part. When the U.S. returned Okinawa to Japanese control in 1971, administrative control of these uninhabited islands was also handed back to Japan as part of the Okinawa Prefecture. The competing claims to the islands have created political crises between Tokyo and Beijing since the 1970s, frequently linked to nationalist claims on both sides.

In addition to the conflicting sovereignty claims over the islands, Japan and China also have overlapping claims to continental shelves in the East China Sea and, thus to the resources, including oil, gas and metals, which can be found there. This aspect of the dispute involves their separate interpretations of the entitlement to continental shelves stemming from the different baselines. Since the East China Sea is less than 400 nautical miles (nm) wide around the gas fields, Chinese and Japanese EEZs overlap. The Chunxiao/Shirakaba and Tianwaitian/Kashi gas fields, located in the centre of the East China Sea, have become focal points for tension between the two, despite the historical track record.

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1421 Since the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki did not make direct reference to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Japan was not legally required to return them to China after World War Two. China disputes this historical claim.


1423 The PRC’s claim to the features is derived from Taiwan’s claim and not the PRC’s direct claim. Given Taiwan’s complicated status, the PRC’s claims are not clear-cut. Mark J. Valencia, “Asia, the Law of the Sea and International Relations,” International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 271.


1427 McDevitt, “The East China Sea,” 106

1428 China and Japan claim rights to exploration in the disputed fields. China argues the disputed area lies between the Japan-claimed median line and the Okinawa Trough – the limit of the Chinese continental shelf claim. Even according to Japan’s interpretation of international law, the filed lies within China’s EEZ but Japan draws entitlement to the resources because the fields extend into the east side of the meridian line and into its EEZ. Manicom, China, Japan and Maritime Order in the East China Sea, 122.
of cooperation in areas including fisheries exploitation and conservation, and hydrocarbon resource exploitation, and limited cooperation regarding maritime surveys.\textsuperscript{1429} In April 2007, China announced it had started producing gas from the disputed Tianwaitian/Kashi field, and that it was ready to begin production from the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field. Japanese protestation prompted a subsequent agreement between the two on joint exploration of oil and gas in the disputed areas, with the view to transforming the East China Sea into a ‘Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship’ in June 2008.\textsuperscript{1430} China’s agreement to the concession of ‘joint development’ of the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field, which falls within the Chinese side of the Japanese-claimed meridian line boundary, was in exchange for the inclusion of areas within the Japanese zone for joint development.\textsuperscript{1431} In January 2009, Japan claimed that China has violated the spirit of the East China Sea agreement by continuing development of the Tianwaitian/Kashi field and was siphoning off gas from the Japanese side of the line. China responded that the Tianwaitian/Kashi field fell within China’s undisputed jurisdiction. While both agreed to accelerate the implementation of the June 2008 agreement, there was no consensus on whether China could continue to drill in disputed areas, including the Tianwaitian/Kashi field.\textsuperscript{1432} No progress has been made on the interpretation and implementation of the joint development agreement.

The current status of the dispute rests on two separate but interconnected issues: territorial ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and maritime sovereignty claims relating to the continental shelf and the EEZ and ownership of resources.\textsuperscript{1433} Tensions started to re-escalate around 2009 and the situation was exacerbated in September 2010, following the announcement by a Japanese conservative politician, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the islands for the Tokyo municipality, primarily, it seems, to gain the attention of Japanese domestic voters.\textsuperscript{1434} The Japanese government claimed its intention to buy the islands was to ensure they did not fall into the hands of Japanese nationalists. Beijing’s response was that Japan had violated the agreement reached by Deng Xiaoping and the Japanese foreign minister in 1978 to defer the islands’ sovereignty issue until a date in the future.\textsuperscript{1435} Under the premise that Japan had disrupted the status quo with the island purchase, Beijing filed a claim with UNCLOS concerning the extended continental shelf, deployed China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) vessels to waters near the

\textsuperscript{1429} Manicom, \textit{China, Japan and Maritime Order in the East China Sea}, 4.
\textsuperscript{1430} Dolven, \textit{Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress}, 20.
\textsuperscript{1431} Valencia, “The East China Sea Disputes,” 192.
\textsuperscript{1433} Taiwan (Republic of China) also claims territorial ownership, an EEZ and continental shelf in the East China Sea. China’s claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu originates in its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. The 2013 Japan-Taiwan fisheries agreement means Taiwan implicitly recognises Japan’s sovereignty over the islands since the agreement stipulates that Taiwanese fishing boats cannot enter the 12nm territorial waters around the islands. Valencia, “The East China Sea Disputes,” 199-200.
\textsuperscript{1434} Patrulano, “Sea Power, Maritime Disputes and the Evolving Security of the East and South China Seas,” 52.
\textsuperscript{1435} McDevitt, “The East China Sea,” 102.
disputed islands and increased its Coast Guard presence in the East China Sea. Japan has also increased its Coast Guard presence in the disputed waters. Both view the exercise of their maritime jurisdiction in the disputed areas of the East China Sea as of vital strategic interest. The near-continuous presence of Chinese naval vessels and maritime presence, in addition to Japan’s requirement to resist this presence, has increased the prospect of confrontation between the Chinese and Japanese vessels.

In March 2009, the harassment of the USNS Impeccable, an unarmed ocean surveillance ship, by five Chinese vessels in the South China Sea pressed the U.S. into taking a tougher position on Chinese activities in both the South and East China Seas. Intensified Chinese air and naval activity in the East and South China Seas thus coincided with the diplomatic signals emanating from Washington during the summer of 2010. Washington promised a greater U.S. regional military presence to protect freedom of navigation operations (FONOP), ignoring Beijing’s designation of U.S. FON activities as illegitimate. The intention was to remind the region, especially China, that the U.S. is a serious strategic regional player. Consistent with its policy in the South China Sea, the U.S. asserts no territorial claims, nor holds a position on the sovereignty issues in the East China Sea. However it has inserted itself directly into the sovereignty issues of the East China Sea, through its support of Japan, in its repeated declaration that protection of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands falls within the remit of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty since 2012. During 2012, to assert its role as regional stabiliser and preponderant naval power, the U.S. Navy sent two naval battle groups and a Marine Corps task force through the East China Sea. While contradicting its own position that China and Japan should resolve their issues diplomatically, rather than resorting to coercion or the use of force, the decision to deploy American naval power was an assertion of U.S. hegemony. Affirming its conflict management and regional stabiliser role, a U.S. naval presence was deemed to mitigate Japan’s compulsion to increase its naval/air deployment to the area and deter China from taking any further action.

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1436 Following the ITLOS ruling against China on July 12, 2016, China’s air force is now conducting patrols over the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands in what it says will become regular practice as a means to defend its claims in the East China Sea. Kana Inagaki, “Chinese Vessels Raise Tension with Japan,” Financial Times, August 8, 2016. [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6458f1e6-5d2a-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95.html#axzz4IXvcpOlT](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6458f1e6-5d2a-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95.html#axzz4IXvcpOlT) (accessed August 27, 2016).

1437 Manicom, China, Japan and Maritime Order in the East China Sea, 166.

1438 The U.S. and China have fundamentally opposing positions on what military, especially naval, activities are permitted under UNCLOS. McDevitt, “The East China Sea,” 107.

1439 Dolven, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, 3.


Beijing’s decision in November 2013 to unilaterally announce an East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) overlapping Japan’s, with the ‘vague threat of actions by the PLA in the event of non-compliance’ was seen as an aggressive act. While the establishment of the ADIZ is not an illegal move, it significantly increases the risk of military accidents, which has a destabilising effect on regional relations. China’s actions are also observed from the perspective of its development as a regional power and responsible global actor. From Washington’s perspective, therefore, the ADIZ was a clear sign that Beijing was attempting to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea. Disregard for international law and resorting to intimidation and coercion in relation to the islands in both China Seas, is considered as evidence that China is not prepared to play by the rules. In 2013, both Obama administration secretaries of state, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, had attempted to exert pressure on Beijing, publically warning China against taking any further unilateral action that would undermine Japan’s administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, or escalate tension and inadvertently lead to a political miscalculation.

In a further attempt to de-escalate the tensions, and in response to pressure from Tokyo, presumably using the TPP negotiations as leverage, in April 2014, President Obama publically announced that the protection of the islands falls within article 5 of the U.S-Japanese Mutual Defence Treaty and that the U.S. would assist Japan in their defence of the features. This move, directly aimed at China, was to signal that U.S. credibility as a responsible treaty partner and as the regional hegemon are now implicated in the disputes. Nevertheless, midway into 2016, tensions continue to escalate, with the Chinese Navy, under the auspices of the Chinese Coast Guard, increasing the size and number of its ships located in the East China Sea, coupled with increased Chinese air force activity in addition to a record number of Japanese air sorties taking place. In June 2016, Japanese officials reported spotting a Chinese warship for the first time near disputed islands in the East China Sea, with reports of Russian

1444 McDevitt, “The East China Sea,” 103-104.
warships in the area also under investigation.\textsuperscript{1449} In August 2016, Japan accused China of installing a military-grade radar system on a gas platform in the disputed areas of the East China Sea.\textsuperscript{1450} Despite Beijing’s and Washington’s agreement on the rules of behaviour governing air encounters in September 2015, the limits of U.S. naval deterrence have also been demonstrated.\textsuperscript{1451} The number of incidents and ‘unsafe intercepts’ occurring between Chinese fighter planes and U.S. reconnaissance planes in May/June 2016 intensified the militarisation of the East China Sea, further increasing the likelihood of an accident that could spark an over-reaction.

(ii) The South China Sea disputes

For all nations concerned, the ‘highly emotional’ territorial claims give sustenance to the rising nationalism across the region.\textsuperscript{1452} China has serious concerns over its maritime border security and access to energy resources: it lacks control over the sea on which it borders, and fears its access to critical energy resources could be at risk from America’s control of the high seas.\textsuperscript{1453} Internal stability has a ‘major maritime strand’ since the economic development needed is dependent on the import of raw materials via constricted trade routes.\textsuperscript{1454} The South China Sea is also militarily sensitive, providing China with critical sea-based access to the submarine base on Hainan Island.\textsuperscript{1455} China’s historic claims to controlling the South China Sea, its ‘near sea,’ are incorporated within the ‘nine-dashed line’ (NDL) marking on its maps which covers approximately 80 per cent of the South China Sea, including the


\textsuperscript{1453} Vali Nasr, \textit{The Dispensable Nation} (New York: Double Day, 2013), 229. In order to escape the ‘Malacca Straits dilemma,’ and diversify its trade routes, China is pursuing alternative paths, over land via Central Asia, and via Myanmar in South East Asia, as part of the One Belt, One Road strategy, discussed later in the chapter. For more on China’s search for energy and trade route security, see Pak K. Lee, “China’s Quest for Oil Security: Oil (Wars) in the Pipeline?” \textit{The Pacific Review} 18, no. 2 (2005): 265-301.


\textsuperscript{1455} Bader et al, “Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective,” 4.
Spratly and Paracel Islands, also claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. China’s historical claims within the NDL remain contentious, and its unclarified and vaguely defined claims to the land features are not based on UNCLOS provisions. Nevertheless, the assertion of claims under the NDL reflect the sense of Chinese nationhood, its great power status and ‘righting wrongs done to China over time.’ Ambiguity over the NDL allows Beijing to undertake a wide range of activities, including the harassment of other littoral states in their own EEZ without having to make ‘legally dubious assertions.’ Figure 3 shows China’s claims to the South China Sea within its nine-dash line, as per its submission to the UN in May 2009.

The Obama administration has placed the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands directly into the broader context of U.S.-China strategic relations and managing the South China Sea (SCS) disputes have also come to signify a critical element of the rebalance. For decades, the U.S. has avoided entanglement in any competing sovereignty claims, yet, as with the East China Sea, U.S. hegemonic interests require the exertion of rules-based stability in the South China Sea. The rebalance strategy has inevitably drawn Washington into taking on more involvement in the ‘day-to-day security dynamic between China and the SCS littoral states.’ U.S. strategic interests are related to its hegemonic position in the region, primarily as regional stabiliser. As regional hegemon, the U.S. holds responsibility for determining the rules of the game, including managing regional conflict peacefully through international arbitration where necessary, and acceptance of, and adherence to, international agreed-upon norms on freedom of navigation for military purposes and the upholding of UNCLOS. In December 2014, the U.S. officially conveyed an official position that challenged the use of the NDL as a way to indicate China’s claims to

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1456 China’s historic claims to the Spratlys (Nansha islands) relies on references to islands in ancient documents and maps, but provides no information about which islands, and little proof of conquest, cession, or occupation. See Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: A Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 97-98.


1458 To date, Chinese officials have not clarified the rights China claims within the NDL. China expert, Mohan Malik, for instance, asserts that China uses ‘folklore, myths and legends, as well as history, to bolster greater lore, myths and legends, as well as history, to bolster greater


1460 McDevitt, “The South China Sea and U.S. Policy Options,” 175.
the land features in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{1461} In addition, U.S. neutrality with regard to the claims does not, however, extend to what it considers to be China’s assertive or coercive behaviour in settling claims.\textsuperscript{1462}

**Defending international rules and norms**

(i) **Coercion**

For China, the East and South China Seas represent arenas for contesting any intensification and consolidation of American military preponderance in the Western Pacific. Since 2009, China has been increasingly more willing to use its disproportionate size and military capacity to threaten and coerce the smaller littoral states in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{1463} This incrementally coercive approach ‘stays below the threshold of a direct use of violence.’\textsuperscript{1464} Nevertheless, China has actively intimidated fishermen from the Philippines\textsuperscript{1465} and Vietnam\textsuperscript{1466}, the most vocal littoral states in their criticism of Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Between September 2013 and June 2015, China additionally embarked upon an ambitious land reclamation scheme, creating new land features out of previously submerged reefs to reinforce its claims to the Spratly Islands, which are located more than 500 miles from the Chinese mainland. None of the Spratly features are naturally inhabitable. The scale of the

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\textsuperscript{1461} Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Daniel Russel, stated in his February 5, 2014 congressional testimony that “any use of the ‘nine-dash-line’ by China to claim maritime rights not based on land features would be inconsistent with international law.” US State Department, “Daniel Russel: Maritime Disputes in East Asia,” Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific,” February 5, 2014, \url{http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm} (accessed November 17, 2015).

\textsuperscript{1462} “We believe the nations of the region should work collaboratively together to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation, without threats.” US State Department, “Hillary Clinton: Remarks with Indonesian Foreign Minister Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa,” September 3, 2012, \url{http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197279.htm} (accessed June 6, 2016).

\textsuperscript{1463} In 2010, the year that Vietnam held ASEAN chairmanship, Vietnam was effective in bringing maritime security onto ASEAN’s agenda and urged others to become more active in promoting maritime security and FON in the South China Sea. Dolven, *Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea*, 15.


\textsuperscript{1465} Beijing rejected the Philippines offer to take their dispute over the Scarborough Shoal to a number of dispute settlement mechanisms in 2012. In January 2013, the Philippines formally requested international arbitration by the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on whether China’s claims and actions and its NDL comply with UNCLOS. Dolven, *Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea*, 14.

reclamation work undertaken by China is unprecedented and has no parallel with the activities of other claimants, who in the past have also carried out smaller scale land reclamation.\footnote{1467}

Land reclamation on this scale is viewed as a sign of China’s willingness to contest international law, its assertion of de facto rather than de jure sovereignty, and the strengthening of its capacity to project power into the South China Sea.\footnote{1468} In April 2015, Beijing presented its own public goods spin, by asserting that access to the islands expands China’s capacity to engage in regional humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) activities, which it hopes will enhance its moral legitimacy.\footnote{1469} Its current problem of projecting a substantial force presence for sustained periods far from mainland bases, will also be alleviated with island access, consequently there is little doubt that the Chinese Navy and Air Force will be able to use the islands to project military power further into the South China Sea.\footnote{1470}

Since 2013, the U.S. has treated these measures as China’s attempts to further destabilise the maritime security environment in the SCS, resorting to threats and coercion to strengthen its claims.\footnote{1471} Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2015, Secretary of Defence Carter emphasised that,\footnote{1472}


\footnote{1471} Daniel Russel pointed to Chinese actions including more extensive patrols by Chinese maritime authorities and other Chinese vessels, the blockading of some disputed features by Chinese maritime authorities, the announcement of fishing bans, energy exploration in disputed waters, and now the reclamation and infrastructure improvements on several Chinese-controlled features. US State Department, “Daniel Russel: Maritime Disputes in East Asia.”
…with its actions in the South China Sea, China is out of step with both the international rules and norms that underscore the Asia-Pacific’s security architecture, and the regional consensus that favors diplomacy and opposes coercion.  

China’s land reclamation in the Spratlys raises a number of issues for the United States, including the legality of China’s reclamation activities, which is currently indeterminable, since the sovereignty of these features has not been settled. The reclamation includes areas under consideration in the UNCLOS arbitration case, in which the Philippines sought a ruling on the legality of Chinese claims and behaviour in the South China Sea. In its July 12th ruling, the Permanent Court of Arbitration held that despite the transformation of the ‘features’ into man-made islands, this does not entitle the owners to an EEZ and that through its reconstruction activities, China had illegally prevented the Philippines from developing fisheries and potential energy reserves in its own EEZ. Furthermore, the tribunal ruled that there was no historical or legal basis for China’s claims to the South China Sea, incorporated within its nine-dash line. 

(ii) Freedom of Navigation

China’s extensive land reclamation activities in the disputed Spratlys implicates the United States in upholding existing interpretations of international law by directly challenging any claim of expanded rights for the artificial islands. Adding another layer of complexity, China offers different interpretations to American-derived international rules and norms pertaining to the conduct of Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in EEZs, as determined under the UN Convention on the Law of the

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1473 The construction of an artificial island raises legal questions if it occurs within the EEZ of another state. In contrast, land reclamation related to features located in the high seas appears to be permissible under UNCLOS. Consequently, the permissibility of China’s land reclamation activities depends on the delimitation of zones among the surrounding states. Dolven, *Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea*, 6.

1474 Dolven, *Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea*, 4.


Sea (UNCLOS). Freedom of navigation is critical for commercial vessels, consequently the free movement of these vessels along the regional sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and minimising disruption to trade is of interest to all regional littoral states, in addition to China and the United States. The situation is different for military vessels. U.S. maritime hegemony is underpinned by its preponderant sea power, which gives the U.S. Navy the freedom of action to collect intelligence and engage in effective naval diplomacy through its unlimited access to the global high seas. Free navigation of warships and submarines through, and under, the straits and sea lanes of Southeast Asia is critical to the nuclear strategy of the United States and its access to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The norm of FON underpins the exercise of American sea power and consequently the U.S. has been the most prominent defender of FON.

However, as a non-ratifier of UNCLOS, the U.S. is reliant on its relations with littoral states, who can decide whether to ‘grant treaty-sanctioned passage’ to U.S. military vessels. In practice, the majority of littoral states view U.S. assertions of FON as acquiescence to U.S. hegemony. Military activities in the EEZ can be a source of dispute, with some states, including China, India, Malaysia and Vietnam, adopting domestic legislation to prohibit military activities of other states in their EEZ. China’s contestation of American naval hegemony starts with the dispute over its interpretation of freedom of navigation. Beijing contests Washington’s interpretation of the rights of military vessels to transit through the resource zones of coastal states. As the primary security guarantor of the world’s oceans, the U.S. continues to exert influence over rules relating to the laws of the sea. Despite its refusal to ratify UNCLOS, the U.S. asserts that UNCLOS navigational provisions are part of customary international law and are therefore binding. As far back as 1995, the U.S. has emphasised its strategic interest in maintaining the SLOCs in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean and would

1482 In 1982, Republicans in the Senate rejected UNCLOS on the basis that it was inimical to US sovereignty and national security interests. In 2012, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 4 hearings on UNCLOS, considering the options of the Obama administration, but no vote was held. Dolven, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia, 7.
resist any maritime claims beyond those permitted by the Law of the Sea Convention.'\textsuperscript{1486} It is this customary law concerning FON and protecting passage through territorial seas that the U.S. is likely to use force to protect.

As a non-signatory to UNCLOS, Washington’s legal basis to invoke international rules may be reduced in the longer term. Its non-signatory status also drastically limits Washington’s leverage over Beijing regarding China’s land reclamation activity, the NDL or the territorial claims.\textsuperscript{1487} Any change to existing definitions of freedom of navigation could directly limit the U.S. Navy’s unparalleled access to international waters, but as a non-signatory, the U.S. could remain outside the process by which this will occur. Therefore, China’s attempts to clarify the rights and obligations of littoral states and other states within EEZ, with the view to limiting military activities there, are directly aimed at constraining U.S. naval primacy. For the U.S., any changes to the existing customary law, giving littoral states the rights to regulate navigation through their EEZ would set a precedent on curtailing U.S. naval freedom which is a vital aspect of American regional hegemony.

The rising number of air and naval confrontations between the Chinese military/coast guard and the U.S. military in China’s EEZ is an attempt to assert Beijing’s interpretation of freedom of navigation, although most Chinese activity continues to be directed against fishing boats and naval vessels from the littoral states. In an assertion of U.S. naval primacy and in defence of freedom of navigation, since May 2015, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy continue to conduct surveillance sorties over and around the reclaimed islands, directly contravening Beijing’s directives.\textsuperscript{1488} On completion of its land reclamation activities in June 2015, it was expected that Beijing would declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the area.\textsuperscript{1489} This would be the next step towards increasing Beijing’s authority over territory


\textsuperscript{1487} Responding to Daniel Russel’s comments on UNCLOS arbitration of the Philippines case in July 2015, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson retorted that, “attempting to push forward the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines, the US side just acts like an ‘arbiter outside the tribunal,’ designating the direction for the arbitral tribunal established at the request of the Philippines. This is inconsistent with the position the US side claims to uphold on issues concerning the South China Sea disputes. Being not a party concerned to the South China Sea issue, the US side should live up to its pledge of not taking sides and refrain from actions that go against regional peace and stability.” Chinese Foreign Ministry, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on the US Statement about Issues Relating to the Arbitration Unilaterally Initiated by the Philippines” July 24, 2015. \url{http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1283808.shtml} (accessed June 12, 2016).

\textsuperscript{1488} Since 1979 the U.S. has been conducting annual FONOPS\textsuperscript{a} to challenge what it sees as excessive or unlawful territorial claims. Smith, “Let’s Be Real: The South China Sea Is a US-China Issue.”

\textsuperscript{1489} A senior Chinese foreign ministry official first spoke of the possibility of implementing an ADIZ over the South China Sea at the end of May 2015. This was a calculated signal from Beijing. “In effect they are laying out the
in the South China Sea, and a provocative and direct move to limit American naval access and reduce its capacity to stand by its security guarantees. As at September 2016, there has been no declaration of an ADIZ in the South China Sea, as occurred in the East China Sea in November 2013, despite warnings by Chinese officials.  

While China is unlikely to accept U.S. preponderance in the western Pacific ‘in perpetuity,’ or its own subordinate position along its maritime periphery, Beijing is still likely to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States for some time to come, although it will continue to contest its unrestricted hegemony in the South China Sea through naval activity and its opposition to UNCLOS jurisdiction. Beijing will also continue to reject U.S. intervention into the South China Sea disputes. China’s response to the ruling on July 12, 2016 has been to increase its military presence in the South China Sea. During the summer of 2016, Chinese and Russian navies have held joint exercises in the South China Sea, described as ‘routine’ by Chinese officials, and in addition to the exercises held by the Chinese navy, in a show of force prior to the July ruling and likelihood of the Chinese air force also conducting regular patrols across the region. There are unsubstantiated claims emanating from Southeast Asia that Vietnam has deployed mobile rocket launchers to the Spratlys as a means to counter further Chinese expansion, which perpetuates the continual ‘action-reaction cycle’ in relation to the disputes.

Both Washington and the government of the Philippines have been restrained in their responses to the tribunal ruling. The Philippines new president, Rodrigo Duterte, also vowed to use the ruling as part of
‘ongoing efforts to pursue a peaceful resolution and management of our disputes.’ Duterte also dropped the Philippines’ previous request to have the ruling mentioned in the ASEAN joint statement at the ASEAN summit in Laos, July/August 2016. In an effort to calm down the tensions following the ruling, when National Security Advisor Susan Rice met with President Xi and State Councillor Jang in Beijing at the end of July 2016 to discuss the South China Sea, there was no public statement from Rice on the issue. At the ARF in Laos, Secretary Kerry also urged that the rule of law must be upheld, adding that ‘no claimant in the South China Sea should take steps that wind up raising tensions. Kerry also suggested that the U.S. would support renewed bilateral talks between the Philippines and China, but not on the basis of disregarding the legally binding international ruling.

The U.S. should also continue to push for the COC, while also following up with Beijing on President Xi’s 2015 statement that China does not intend to militarise the Spratlys. Non-compliance with the ruling and the increased naval presence may advance China’s South China Sea claims in the short term, but it will, in the longer term, undermine Beijing’s goal of being seen as a responsible and legitimate great power that abides by international law.

Another consequence of China’s activities in the South China Sea has been the shift towards the United States by many countries around the Asia-Pacific. This situation has not changed as a result of the tribunal ruling, particularly as China has responded with a show of strength in the affected areas. Washington’s energised security relationship with the Philippines has facilitated the return of the U.S. military to its former bases there. Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam have all established comprehensive strategic partnerships with the United States during the Obama administration. The situation in the South China Sea has also drawn two major U.S. regional allies, Japan and Australia, into protecting FON in the region’s water ways, in addition to improving the maritime security of the SCS littoral states.

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1495 Rauhala, “The First New Rule for the South China Sea Talks: Don’t Talk About the South China Sea.”
1497 Rauhala, “The First New Rule for the South China Sea Talks: Don’t Talk About the South China Sea.”
Compulsory and Productive Power in Tandem: The Indo-Asia-Pacific

As the U.S. has found it progressively more difficult to deter China’s behaviour in the South China Sea, Washington has drawn on the support of Southeast Asian allies and non-allied states, and more significantly, gained the consent of other partners outside Southeast Asia, including Japan, India and Australia, into actively supporting its framework for managing this particular conflict and the regional perception of China’s position within in. The U.S. has also responded to pressure from its regional allies to exert more diplomatic influence, and to intensify its naval presence, as part of its hegemonic bargain in conflict management.

(i) Social construction of the ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’

In her November 2011 article, “America’s Pacific Century,” Secretary Clinton emphasised the criticality of the three sub-regions to the rebalance, with her rhetorical symbiosis of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, through the ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’ construction.\(^{1503}\) The linkage of Northeast, Southeast and South Asia via their interconnecting oceans is an essential optic of American power through which the U.S. is building a strategic environment in which like-minded democratic states can be indirectly drawn together into the process of supporting American hegemony. Using the narrative of China’s assertiveness, and its quest to change the regional status quo, further justification for the rebalance strategy and the comfort of America’s security umbrella indirectly nudges ‘threatened’ countries of strategic value into assenting to American security hegemony.\(^ {1504}\) As part of the hegemonic bargain, the threat is not only to American national interests, but also to those of its regional allies and its partners, which creates a wide network of potential supporters for American interests and for the defence of the U.S. provision of public goods.

Stretching the sphere of operation to the Indo-Asia-Pacific enables the U.S., with its regional allies, to ‘naturally’ strengthen and expand their regional alliance networks to create webs within the hub-and-
spokes system as a means to future-proof the existing security architecture and limits China’s options to create a China-centric regional order in the Asia-Pacific. The emerging Asian maritime strategic system, encompassing the Pacific and Indian Oceans, is defined in large part by the geographically expanding interests and reach of China and India, and the continued strategic role and presence of the United States in both. By encompassing the South Asian sub-continent, India features prominently as a key partner in regional architecture building activities. Key allies of the United States, particularly Australia and Japan, view India as the lynchpin drawing the two oceans together and as a strategically significant partner in the South China Seas. The Indian government has classified the South China Sea as part of its ‘extended neighbourhood’ for over a decade.

One of the practical security aims of the Indo-Asia-Pacific regional construct is to shift the centre of gravity of Indian security concerns towards the South China Sea as a part of a burden-sharing strategy with the United States. It is a simultaneous attempt by the United States to engage India (and other allies), whilst also being a mechanism for maintaining its hegemonic position. The new imperative of shifting from the exclusively Indian Ocean, to an Indo-Asia-Pacific, regional security construct is in some measure driven by concerns over possible Chinese naval expansionism, and use of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean and in the South China Sea. From an American perspective, effectively managing these concerns requires the cooperation not only of India, but also of Australia, Indonesia, and China.

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Japan and other states that possess similar concerns.\textsuperscript{1511} From a regional geopolitical perspective, a loose partnership will affect a closer monitoring, and potential control over, the eastern exits and entrances of Indian Ocean access routes. The end result is clearly of global, not just regional, geopolitical significance.\textsuperscript{1512} The emergent Indo-Asia-Pacific reflects new geopolitical realities, particularly the energy and trade reliance on Indian Ocean sea lanes. Stability in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) also open up strategic opportunities for the U.S. to enlist India as a ‘desirable partner.’\textsuperscript{1513}

(ii) Expanding the regional strategic framework to include India

The Indo-Asia-Pacific construct entered India’s official lexicon as a complement to existing foreign policy concepts and ideas about regional engagement and is used by Indian pragmatists to promote the building of regional architecture that aligns India more closely with democratic states in the region, such as the U.S., Japan and Australia.\textsuperscript{1514} Yet, New Delhi viewed the 2011 rebalance announcement as an attempt by Washington to contain China, and to inadvertently push India into accepting America’s position on China.\textsuperscript{1515} While privately some senior Indian officials said they would welcome a stronger American presence in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi did not publically support the American agenda.\textsuperscript{1516} Consistent with its traditional non-alignment policy, India remains averse to becoming ensnared in any of Asia’s competing power centres that could damage its own economic development.\textsuperscript{1517} If ‘China

\textsuperscript{1511} India has concerns over China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy that attempts to link bases across the Indian Ocean, with the view to containing India in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China explains the strategy as a means to security energy routes from Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait. There is suggestion that the US-India cooperation seeks to counter potential Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the IOR. See Nitin Gokhale, “India’s Quiet Counter-China Strategy,” \textit{The Diplomat}, March 16, 2011. \textbullet{} Hankwon Kim, “The Implications of the Chinese “String of Pearls” for the U.S. Return to Asia Policy: the U.S., China, and India in the Indian Ocean,” \textit{Journal of Global Policy and Governance} 2, no. 2 (2013): 193-204.

\textsuperscript{1512} Rumley et al, “‘Securing’ the Indian Ocean? Competing Regional Security Constructions,” 5


\textsuperscript{1515} Like Southeast Asian nations, India pursues a complex engagement of China at political, economic and strategic levels; India also attempts to enmesh a number of regional powers including Japan and Australia into
perceives India as irrevocably committed to an anti-China containment ring, it may end up adopting overtly hostile and negative policies towards India. Consequently, New Delhi has attempted to avoid direct actions that could unnecessarily provoke China. Instead it has pursued multiple foreign policy options, including building stronger ties with the United States; attempting to normalise its often strained relationship with Beijing, on the basis of their shared post-colonial identities; and increasing its defence partnerships with other regional powers.

Based on shared concerns over China’s behaviour, New Delhi has, however, opted for increasing strategic convergence with Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia, including Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia, as well as the United States. Since the 1990s, India has expanded its joint naval exercises with all Southeast Asian countries and extended its military presence in the Western Pacific through multilateral exercises with the U.S., Japanese, Australian and Singaporean navies. Security cooperation between India and Japan is likely to increase because of their shared apprehensions about China’s intentions. In December 2015, Prime Ministers Abe and Modi issued a joint statement on their ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership,’ with specific focus on strengthening regional institutions such as the EAS, their support for UNCLOS and maintaining open SLOCs across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Both India and Japan are well aware of Beijing’s less than subtle attempts at preventing their rise, reflected in its opposition to the expansion of the UN Security Council to include India and the Indian Ocean, as well as supporting them in the South China Sea. For more on regional hedging strategies, see Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge,” viii.


1521 Pant and Joshi, “Indian Foreign Policy Responds to the U.S. Pivot,” 90.

1522 Pant and Joshi, “Indian Foreign Policy Responds to the U.S. Pivot,” 105.


Japan as permanent members. India’s participation in the East Asia Summit was facilitated by Japan, and while China resisted the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand in the ASEAN Regional Forum, Japan strongly backed their entry.

The U.S. is instrumental in India’s deepening relationships with its own strategic allies in the Asia-Pacific. Equally, the deepening of relationships between America’s key regional allies is advantageous to the United States. The cultivation of greater cooperation between the states of the various sub-regions suggests a ‘process of operationalising Indo-Pacific cooperation as a seamless construct’ is occurring in vital areas including maritime security, counter-terrorism, disaster relief and counter-piracy. The integration of the Indo-Asia-Pacific concept into Indian foreign policy circles strengthens the linkage to converging interests with the United States, and American allies, particularly in the case of the upholding of global public goods. India has made common cause with the U.S. on the issue of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and has joined in trilateral defence dialogues with the U.S. and Japan, in addition to strengthening strategic ties with Australia.

In 2014, India and Japan began regular national security consultations following the initiation of annual trilateral meetings between India, Japan and the U.S. in 2011, with Japanese SDF participation in three of the annual U.S.-Indian Malabar naval exercises. Growing security cooperation between India and Japan suggests an emergent regional balance of power that is potentially less threatening to Beijing than a possible alliance between India and the United States. Moreover, it suits India to maintain strategic autonomy by not becoming a spoke in the hub-and-spokes alliance system. Yet India’s

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1526 Harsh V. Pant, “China on the Horizon: India’s ‘Look East’ Policy Gathers Momentum,” *Orbis* 57, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 459.
1528 Pant and Joshi, “Indian Foreign Policy responds to the U.S. Pivot,” 112.
1531 Japan participated in the Malabar exercises in 2007, 2009 and 2014. The 2015 Malabar exercise was scheduled for the Bay of Bengal in October 2015. Since China protested against Japan’s participation in the 2007 Bay of Bengal Malabar exercise, the 2015 Malabar exercise was restricted to the U.S. and India, without Japanese participation. Menon, “The India Myth,” 55.
1532 Pant and Joshi, “Indian Foreign Policy responds to the U.S. Pivot,” 110.
1533 India rejects quadrilateral defence collaboration with the U.S., Japan and Australia. The first attempt at an informal strategic coalition collapsed following diplomatic protests by China. Washington’s desire for such a grouping was reiterated by Chief of PACOM, Adm. Harry B. Harris in March 2016. Despite its reluctance, ‘its
developing strategic partnership with the U.S. will remain critical, given that it cannot currently carry
the burden of its regional partners’ expectations in balancing China. India is increasingly issuing joint
communiqués with America, Japan and Australia, emphasising democracy and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{1534} During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington in September 2014, and Obama’s return
visit to New Delhi in January 2015, Modi all but aligned India openly with America.\textsuperscript{1535} In a rare but
unambiguous move, Obama and Modi issued a 430-word ‘joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and
Indian Ocean region,’ promoting stability, celebrating human rights and importantly, calling for
‘safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation…especially in the South China
Sea.’\textsuperscript{1536} It has become customary for other U.S. allies, including Australia and New Zealand to offer
similar joint communiqués urging restraint by China in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{1537}

Building on the work of the G.W. Bush administration in recognising India’s status as a regional power
and emerging global player,\textsuperscript{1538} the policy of working towards India’s global economic and security
integration has been strengthened under the Obama administration. While U.S.-India relations are not
unproblematic,\textsuperscript{1539} India’s support for the promotion of democracy and international rule of law has
bolstered India’s diplomatic position and international status. The Indo-Asia-Pacific concept brings
India indirectly into the American sphere, which strengthens American security hegemony via strategic
partnerships and alliances. India, too, openly plays up the China threat, citing border tensions and

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\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{1534} \textit{Economist}, “India in Asia: A Bit-More Player,” January 31, 2015, 54.
\item \textsuperscript{1535} The South China Sea was first mentioned in a joint statement where India iterated its position that maritime
disputes should be resolved in accordance with UNCLOS. This indicated a break from the usual past caution. The
\item \textsuperscript{1536} \textit{Economist}, “India in Asia,” 54.
\item \textsuperscript{1537} Following an Australian-New Zealand summit in February 2016, both nations noted that the increased
tensions in the South China Seas are creating difficulties for regional nations. Jamie Smyth, “Australia and New
\item Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, “Making U.S. Foreign Policy for South Asia: Off-Shore
\item India is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); on the economic front, the US is concerned
that India is not making sufficient reform on areas such as IPR and protected markets/foreign investment
restrictions. K. Alan Kronstadt, \textit{India-U.S. Relations and the Visit of Prime Minister Modi} (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service Insight, June 6, 2016).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
China’s escalating naval activity in the Indian Ocean. As China’s perceived assertive behaviour increases, the more regional states move towards the American security umbrella, remaining as bilateral spokes, or moving towards pluri-lateral webs, which renews and reinvents the bargain of American hegemony.1540

(iii) Securing American naval preponderance

The rebalance strategy has focused American attention on China’s militarisation and its intentions in the Asia-Pacific. Conversely, the rebalance has given Chinese officials, academics and PLA leaders ‘ample rhetorical ammunition’ to push through with military modernisation, especially accelerated naval modernisation and technical knowledge.1541 There is intense Chinese contestation with regard to America’s prioritisation of public security goods, including adherence to freedom of navigation, and, and modes of conflict management, including UNCLOS, as the primary conflict management tool in the South and East China Sea disputes. If the U.S. cannot protect its allies, or provide a sustainable security umbrella, the U.S. would be breaching one of the critical terms upon which its regional hegemony rests. Consequently, China’s attempts to challenge American military dominance in the South China Sea are being met with strong resistance from the United States.1542 From the American perspective, all trading countries using the Pacific and Indian Oceans have a common interest in maintaining order and should cooperate their efforts. With American direction, a more robust coalition incorporating pluri-lateral groupings of other regional actors, including India, Japan and Australia is vital for U.S. interests. Another important mechanism through which the U.S. seeks to influence regional responses to the South China Sea disputes is via the region’s main multilateral institution, ASEAN.

Institutional Power: Strengthening ASEAN’s role in conflict management

Since USNS Impeccable incident in 2009, U.S. officials have maintained a level of pressure on Beijing by constructing the South China Sea issue as one that extends further than disputed territory, to one of maritime security affecting regional stability in traditional and non-traditional security matters,  

1542 The rebalance is a multifaceted approach to the China threat. In addition to strengthening of the alliance system and expanding pluri-lateral groupings, Chapter 4 discussed the reorientation of U.S. military capacity to project American power, including the JOAC and ASB concepts, and THAAD that would target an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities.
including transport, resource extraction and fishing.\textsuperscript{1543} The U.S. government has issued a series of public statements critical of various Chinese actions, calling them ‘provocative’, ‘aggressive’, and ‘destabilising,’ pointing to a pattern of bullying and intimidation in Chinese behaviour.\textsuperscript{1544} U.S. officials have used every international venue as a forum for highlighting the situation in the South China Sea and using these mechanisms as a way to prioritise the issue and determine the direction of dispute management.\textsuperscript{1545}

Following Obama’s less than successful trip to Beijing in November 2009, it was Hillary Clinton who publicly voiced U.S. concerns over the situation in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, July 2010. In an interview with The Australian in November 2010, Clinton admitted that several Chinese officials, including Dai Bingguo, a senior foreign policy official in the Chinese government, had declared the South China Sea to be a core strategic interest at the May 2010 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.\textsuperscript{1546} By raising it to the level of Tibet and Taiwan, China was, in effect, declaring it would go to war over the South China Sea. Given the concerns of Southeast states over the Chinese declaration that the South China Sea was a core strategic interest, Clinton was reacting to what Washington deemed as a series of Chinese regional provocations. It was essential for the U.S. to initiate the conflict management mechanism for the South China Sea as part of the administration’s focus on renewing its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Consequently, Clinton set out the refined and expanded U.S. policy on managing the conflict at the Hanoi regional forum, making it clear that the conflict must be resolved in accordance with the rule of law.\textsuperscript{1547} Clinton outlined a ‘collaborative’ diplomatic process among claimants and strongly encouraged the negotiation of a legally binding Code of Conduct (COC) between ASEAN and China to manage the disputes.\textsuperscript{1548} She also asserted that the

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\textsuperscript{1544} Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael McDevitt, “Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective,” The Foreign Policy Brief, Brookings Institution, August 2014, 7.

\textsuperscript{1545} Since 2010, the South China Sea disputes have increasingly come to dominate the Shangri La Dialogue – the region’s foremost security dialogue, attended by regional, US and European defence ministers and military officials. The June 2016 conference was no exception – with attention focused on China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, island-building, the impending ruling by The Hague on the Philippines challenge to China’s South China Sea claims and the potential for China to declare an ADIZ. Wendell Minnick, “Shangri-La Dialogue Opens in Singapore; South China Sea Largely Dominating Summit,” Defense News, June 3, 2016. \textcolor{blue}{http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2016/06/03/shangri-la-dialogue-opens-singapore-south-china-sea-largely-dominating-summit/85361430/} (accessed June 26, 2016).


\textsuperscript{1547} Sheridan, “China Actions Meant as Test, Hillary Clinton says.”

\textsuperscript{1548} Bader et al, “Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective,” 4.
\end{footnotesize}
U.S. would be willing to help facilitate such a negotiation. ‘Collaborative’ was meant to convey that the territorial disputes were a regional concern. Beijing interpreted ‘collaborative’ to mean ‘multilateral’ and involving the mediation of the United States in what it saw as bilateral matters between the parties involved in the territorial disputes.\footnote{Indyk et al, \textit{Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy}, 48-9.}

Prior to the Hanoi ARF in 2010, Beijing had succeeded in keeping the disputes off the agenda at the ARF and other regional meetings. Beijing had also expressed interest in promoting separate spheres of influence and requested that the State Department not raise the South China Sea issue during the 2010 ARF.\footnote{John Pomfret, “Beijing Claims ‘Indisputable Sovereignty’ over South China Sea,” \textit{Washington Post}, July 31, 2010. \url{http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/AR2010073005664.html} (accessed June 26, 2016).} Beijing was therefore shocked by the U.S. intervention at the Hanoi summit.\footnote{Sheridan, “China Actions Meant as Test, Hillary Clinton says.”} Hillary Clinton not only raised the sovereignty issue, but she also rallied ASEAN claimants by stressing the pursuit of claims in accordance with UNCLOS. In this move, the Obama administration challenged China’s claims based on historical rights rather than legal ones, and Clinton’s proposal for a collaborative process additionally undermined China’s preference for bilateral negotiations with the ASEAN claimants.\footnote{Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry,” \textit{The Washington Quarterly} 35, no. 2 (2012): 149.} The South China Sea disputes bring into focus the contrasting views between the U.S. and China on regional conflict management, which is an important aspect of hegemonic legitimacy.\footnote{Public goods provision, including conflict management (in the absence of conflict resolution), is the ‘key basis of great power authority and a marker of hegemonic legitimacy.’ Goh, \textit{The Struggle for Order}, 73.}

Washington’s determination to multilateralise and internationalise the territorial disputes in the South China Sea has allowed for other regional players, especially India, Japan and Australia to become involved. India has supported the American agenda, consistent with its own concerns of China’s assertiveness, by starting to raise the South China Sea issue at various regional settings including ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asian Summit.\footnote{India continues to raise its concerns over the South China Sea disputes at the India-ASEAN Delhi Dialogue, the ARF in 2014, and the EAS. China’s \textit{Great Wall of Sand} also attracted criticism from New Delhi, along with China’s rejection of the UNCLOS arbitration process. Dipanjan Chaudhury, “Chinese Military Bases in South China Sea Worries India,” \textit{Economic Times} (Mumbai), March 26, 2015. \url{http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-03-26/news/60516212_1_south-china-sea-bilateral-cooperation-artificial-islands} (accessed August 13, 2015); Catherine Valente, “India backs PH in China Sea row,” \textit{Manila Times}, March 11, 2015. \url{http://www.manilatimes.net/india-backs-ph-in-china-sea-row/168539/} (accessed August 13, 2015).} Japan is pursuing a number of strategies to mitigate its concerns over the South China Sea. Japanese officials raise the problem at
regional security forums, Tokyo seeks to enhance cooperation with ASEAN on maritime security, discusses the matter bilaterally with ASEAN nations and has embarked upon capacity-building to the Philippines.  

Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper also outlines the strategic significance of Southeast Asia and the SLOCs to Australian trade and to Australian security. Since 2014, Australia has focused on deepening its ties with U.S. allies and strategic partners across East Asia. With its focus on land reclamation, support for UNCLOS and a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, and its recognition of the importance of ASEAN and the EAS, the Australian government’s 2016 Defence White Paper reflects the U.S. position and echoes its concerns.

(i) Promoting a regional institutional response to conflict management through ASEAN

The process of conflict management in the South China Sea has occurred mainly through ASEAN’s regional mechanisms, whose approach emphasises cooperation and ‘preventative diplomacy through regular official dialogue.’ In the case of the South China Sea, the U.S. has sought to share some authority in conflict management with ASEAN. ASEAN has taken on the mantle of conflict management through the negotiation of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea with U.S. support.  

The U.S. encourages ASEAN-led conflict avoidance frameworks as the key mode of regional conflict management, supported by international legal frameworks. The U.S. also uses the U.S-ASEAN annual summit to press for a consistent approach by ASEAN members over matters relating to the South China Sea.  

The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) that came into effect in November 2002 was the first multilateral, although non-binding

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1556 Australia has strengthened security ties with Indonesia, through the 2012 Defence Cooperation Arrangement and 2014 Joint Understanding on Intelligence cooperation. There is also a comprehensive strategic partnership (2015) with Singapore and relationships with Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Japan. See Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra, February 25, 2016), chapter 5, especially 56-58.  
1557 The 2002 Declaration committed ASEAN and China to peaceful dispute resolution; to self-restraint, including no further occupation of uninhabited features; and to enhancing exchanges and cooperation, especially search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and transnational crime. In October 2012, the parties recommitted to the Declaration. See ASEAN, “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” October 17, 2012.  
1558 A Code of Conduct would establish mutually agreeable mechanisms to manage the South China Sea, and may also include a dispute settlement mechanism and legally binding adherence to international law via UNCLOS.
1559 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 111.
1560 At the February 2016 US-ASEAN summit, the US encouraged all ASEAN members as a unit to put diplomatic pressure on Beijing to accept the ITLOS ruling regarding the Philippines. Geoff Dyer, “US to corral ASEAN Support in South China Sea Spat,” Financial Times, February 12, 2016.
statement of its kind on conflict management. This provided ASEAN with a role for regional conflict management within a U.S.-friendly framework, but one not directly influenced by the United States.\textsuperscript{1561}

Beyond the 2002 declaration, only modest progress has been made towards a binding Code of Conduct. Since formal negotiations recommenced in 2013, there has been scant agreement on what should be included and whether the Code should contain a binding dispute settlement mechanism.\textsuperscript{1562} China resists draft proposals that would limit its movements, thereby ending its military exercises in disputed waters, or that would reaffirm total freedom of navigation.\textsuperscript{1563} China’s land reclamation in the Spratly islands also arguably violates the spirit of the 2002 DOC and makes discussions over a potential Code of Conduct more difficult.\textsuperscript{1564} Any statement from Washington encouraging cooperation between ASEAN countries to bolster their position with China in negotiating a Code of Conduct has been dismissed by Beijing as American interference in a regional (or, more importantly, bilateral) matter.\textsuperscript{1565} It has been suggested that China continues to make only small concessions to the ASEAN Code of Conduct negotiations, while it continues to consolidate control over the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{1566}

ASEAN has been keen to avoid multilateralising the disputes partly in response to Beijing’s warnings, and also out of fear of testing members’ collective commitments to existing agreements and overlapping claims in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{1567} A low point for ASEAN came in 2012, when members failed to issue a joint communiqué at its annual foreign ministers meeting. It was reported that the chair, Cambodia, blocked reference to South China Sea disputes, at Beijing’s bidding.\textsuperscript{1568}

\textsuperscript{1561} Goh, The Struggle for Order, 105.
\textsuperscript{1562} Dolven, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, 30.
\textsuperscript{1564} Dolven, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options, 4.
\textsuperscript{1567} ASEAN cannot formally act as a third party mediator unless ascribed/asked to do so by a member. However, since it views its role primarily as confidence-building and contributing to the non-escalation of disputes, it can establish principles and mechanisms. Lin and Gertner, “Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific,” 24.
China’s assertive behaviour and land reclamation activities are deemed to be undermining ASEAN’s role in regional conflict management, and highlight ASEAN’s internal limitations in formulating a united policy on China and the South China Sea disputes. ASEAN’s Foreign Minister Meeting 2015 statement, criticising land reclamation activities and reaffirming the 2014 statement of ‘maintaining peace, stability, security and freedom of navigation in and over-flight over the South China Sea,’ indicates the importance of ASEAN to the regional conflict management mechanism.1569 With the 2016 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting following shortly after the tribunal ruling, the joint communiqué did not explicitly denounce China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea, instead preferring a soft response, implying the ongoing struggle within ASEAN to produce a strong and coherent approach to the South China Sea stems from conflicting interests and rivalries.1570

As a rising power undergoing international status anxiety and requiring positive domestic outcomes, Beijing fears losing of control over the multilateral agenda and is wary of the ‘potential influence of non-claimant interests allied to the United States.’1571 Instead, Beijing advocates bilateral negotiations over ‘border issues’ with the parties concerned.1572 From China’s perspective, the U.S. naval presence in the western Pacific has emboldened the ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea to oppose Chinese claims.1573 Beijing’s holds Washington responsible for the escalation of tensions, through its encouragement of weaker states, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, to assert their claims vis-à-vis China. Beijing is concerned that the other claimants, and ASEAN, will unite against China, while Southeast Asia’s increased dependence on American security provisions is being actively encouraged by Washington.1574 China refuses to acknowledge the outcome of the ITLOS process initiated by the


1571 Chinese public opinion views compromise with Southeast Asian ‘smaller countries’ as a sign of weakness. Without a hard stance, the domestic legitimacy of the regime may be undermined. Lin and Gertner, “Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific,” 14, 20.


1574 Bader et al, “Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective,” 3.
Philippines because it considers the matter a bilateral dispute that Manila has internationalised with Washington’s encouragement.

Beijing has appeared to soften its resistance to multilateral approaches, endorsing ASEAN’s lead role in managing and maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea along with China. Beijing has proposed a ‘dual track’ approach, whereby under a multilateral framework, ASEAN could play a suitable role, but mediation, or interference, from powers outside the region has been firmly opposed. The intention is to block U.S. involvement in the dispute settlement process. Beijing’s willingness to exacerbate the existing divisions amongst ASEAN nations to secure its own interests.

By favouring a regional mechanism, Beijing has consented to a relatively controllable regional multilateral mechanism which it hopes will exclude the participation of the United States. Beijing courted Brunei, Cambodia and Laos, with well-coordinated visits in April 2016, to reach agreement on a four-point consensus with these ASEAN nations on the South China Sea issue that affirms its dual track approach. This was an attempt to secure regional diplomatic support before The Hague ruling on the arbitration case in July 2016. At the same time, this move demonstrates Beijing’s willingness to exacerbate the existing divisions amongst ASEAN nations to secure its own interests.

U.S. twin track support of the UNCLOS, and establishing ASEAN as the primary forum for regional dispute settlement, has garnered support from the other ASEAN members. The Obama administration’s efforts to provide leadership, whilst recognising the vital role of ASEAN’s institutional processes and international legal frameworks, have been essential for gaining regional support. There is, however, a limit to Southeast Asian complicity with American regional hegemonic authority. While the region supports American deterrence in pressuring China into negotiating and abiding by a code of conduct on the South China Sea with ASEAN, there is no will to support American activities if this intends to either...

1575 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea (III),” 29.
1577 Xue, “How China Views the South China Sea Arbitration Case.”
1578 The four-point consensus affirms that the Spratly island disputes are not an ASEAN-China issue and should not have implications for ASEAN-China relations; that sovereignty is paramount and that no unilateral decision can be imposed; that the DOC is the best way to solve the disputes; that China and ASEAN can main effective peace and security without external interference. Sampa Kundu, “China divides ASEAN in the South China Sea,” East Asia Forum, May 21, 2016. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/21/china-divides-asean-in-the-south-china-sea/ (accessed June 26, 2016).
1580 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 111.
contain China, or lose their own autonomy.\textsuperscript{1581} However, out of necessity, a China that continues to limit ASEAN’s attempts to negotiate a binding Code of Conduct, and asserts unilateral sovereignty over the South China Sea, works in America’s favour. Many Southeast Asian states are increasing their dependence on America’s regional security guarantees to varying degrees, thus sustaining America’s leadership role in regional conflict management, and enhancing its hegemonic authority in the South China Sea.

As the regional hegemon, the U.S. has credibly demonstrated ‘sustained benignity’ in assuring others of its lack of territorial ambitions, its willingness to encourage multilateral institutional processes in conflict management, and its responsiveness to Southeast Asian security concerns from allies and non-allies.\textsuperscript{1582} The U.S. position stands in contrast to China, which has demonstrated a reluctance to commit to regional conflict management efforts or to international regimes of conflict resolution. There are two crucial consequences: first, China may not be able to ignore regional preferences over the longer term, which means it will have to negotiate terms of the position it seeks in the regional hierarchy with other regional actors. Second, this case reinforces the U.S. role as ‘ultimate deterrent and guarantor’ of regional security which also serves to strengthen American preponderance.\textsuperscript{1583}

**Structural Power: Accommodating competing regional trade and financial initiatives**

From Beijing’s perspective, the global financial crisis highlighted the structural weaknesses in the American economic model and signified a change in the international economic landscape. China and other BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa – had sustained their economic performance during the crisis better than many developed economies, particularly that of the United States and Europe. The financial crisis also drew Chinese attention to the potential weakness of the U.S. dollar and reduced their confidence in its status as the world’s reserve currency.\textsuperscript{1584} Prior to the 2009 G20 summit in London, Beijing used this opportunity to strengthen its position in global economic governance by pushing for reform of the international monetary system, suggesting a global reserve system to replace the dollar as the single reserve currency and proposing to expand the use of Special Drawing Rights to include the yuan.\textsuperscript{1585}

\textsuperscript{1581} Goh, *The Struggle for Order*, 113.
\textsuperscript{1582} Goh, *The Struggle for Order*, 213.
\textsuperscript{1583} Goh, *The Struggle for Order*, 204-5.
While China’s status in global economic governance was advanced by the global financial crisis, for the U.S., the crisis accelerated the perception of its decline against a backdrop of China’s rise. In Washington, this perception reinforced the need to reorient U.S. economic interests towards the Asia-Pacific – the hub of global economic growth – as part of the rebalance strategy. Moreover, it was critical for the U.S. to be integral to the direction of Asia-Pacific economic growth and cooperation by shaping the structure, norms and standards for regulating trade and finance. This was the acknowledgement that ‘economics are shaping the strategic landscape. Emerging powers are putting economics at the centre of their foreign policies.’ To maintain U.S. strategic leadership in the Asia-Pacific, U.S. leadership of global and Asia-Pacific economic governance has required strengthening. The shift towards defining U.S. foreign policy priorities in economic terms was outlined through a number of broad projects and initiatives encompassing Eurasia, through a New Silk Route, the Asia-Pacific, through the TPP, and China, through bilateral opportunities, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the negotiation of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). The goal is to facilitate political and economic reforms through these American-led initiatives and raise standards in trade and investment within a U.S.-sanctioned framework in view of competing Chinese regional projects. Through the exercise of American structural power over the global economy, including its control over international institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, the system can accommodate China’s rise, making necessary compromises that binds China more firmly within the existing structure. Given the more open contestation of U.S. hegemony in the economic sphere, Washington has to be both proactive in its own initiatives, and reactive to those of other regional players.

(i) Competing New Silk Road initiatives

In July 2011, Hillary Clinton announced an ambitious New Silk Road project that would be a ‘web of trade and transportation links reaching from the steps of Central Asia to the southern tip of India.’ While the strategic aim was to bring some economic stability to Afghanistan, the move into Central Asia was a means to weaken Russian, and potentially, Chinese influence, and, by uniting Central and

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1588 The TPP was discussed in depth in Chapter 5.
South Asia, to reshape the regional geopolitical configurations.1590 Moreover, although some projects were underway, such as a free trade agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, or planned, such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline (TAPI), first proposed in the 1990s, the potential challenges as a result of the instability in many of these countries would require vast funding resources that the U.S. government was not prepared to allocate to this region.1591 By 2014, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), scheduled to finance 40% of the project, withdrew, citing security concerns in Afghanistan following the U.S. drawdown.1592 The U.S. has continued to improve its trade relations with Central Asia, and established a U.S.-Central Asia Council on Trade and Investment, with the additional aim of potentially drawing Afghanistan into this grouping. The U.S. Silk Road project, however, remains an unrealised vision.1593

According to one source, Chinese officials were perplexed by Clinton’s use of the term Silk Road to describe a U.S. policy.1594 Given China’s sense of historical ownership of these trade routes – not just one road – stretching from China to the Mediterranean, during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, President Xi Jinping announced China’s vision to improve connectivity from China to Europe as an ‘economic belt’ so as to differentiate it from Clinton’s New Silk Road.1595 As part of the ‘New Neighbourhood Diplomacy’ strategy, Xi Jinping’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR), or Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), combined with the establishment of the Chinese-dominated AIIB, demonstrates the most sophisticated foreign policy shift in Beijing since 1989.1596 It is also a move by President Xi to fill the gap in trade and economic opportunities in Central Asia that the U.S., with its budgetary constraints, had not been able to exploit with its New Silk Road vision.1597

1595 Fallon, “The New Silk Road,” 140.
The initiative represents China’s efforts to play a leadership role in regional affairs by contributing ‘Chinese wisdom’ (zhongguo zhihui), by insisting on ‘win-win’ cooperation throughout Asia. Chinese leaders see the creation of links such as the Silk Road fund and the AIIB, and the trade they generate, as essential to building good relations with neighbouring countries. OBOR is an exercise in public diplomacy, setting out China’s priority for public goods that benefit all and exclude none on the basis of a state’s political inclinations. As a confidence-building measure, it is a move to produce the winning idea for future regional development and establish its own regional hegemony. Beijing seeks to convince countries in Southeast Asia and beyond that China is a legitimate regional power. At the same time, however, China’s relationships with littoral neighbouring countries continue to be tested by Beijing’s confrontational and coercive approach to the maritime security environment in the East and South China Seas. The concept of a ‘community with common destiny’ is intended to address the security and development challenges facing Asian states and to improve bilateral relations.

The strategy is reinforced with significant financial investment, through which Beijing hopes to convince Southeast Asian states in particular that its intentions are benign. The OBOR strategy attaches ‘no strings’ and intimates that collaborative partners will be treated as equals. This is an attempt to cement and legitimise Beijing’s influence and position in the region by mobilising consent to its own hegemonic claims through financial incentives. Money in exchange for influence, however, has not proven an entirely successful endeavour. Mobilising its financial resources to finance the

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1600 The Chinese ambassador to the U.K., Liu Xiaoming, describes the initiative as “an offer of a ride on China’s economic express train. It is a public product for the good of the whole world.” Liu Xiaoming, “New Silk Road is an Opportunity not a Threat,” *Financial Times*, May 24, 2015. [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c8f58a7c-ffd6-11e4-bc30-00144feabdc0.html](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c8f58a7c-ffd6-11e4-bc30-00144feabdc0.html) (accessed June 26, 2016).


1605 Shambaugh asserts that China’s investments are yielding a very low return, chiefly because China’s actions on the ground contradict its benign rhetoric. See David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft Power Push: The Search for Respect,” *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 2015), 100.
schemes, is a means of extending China’s influence across the Asia-Pacific (in addition to Central Asia and Europe), thereby shaping and managing regional production centred on the needs of the Chinese economy. China’s efforts to exercise structural power by re-organising regional production networks through the OBOR strategy in its favour has been contested. Furthermore, there is a great deal of political instability within the countries along the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) which is already beginning to affect the short term gains of the initiative.

(ii) The Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank

Integral to the OBOR strategy is the AIIB, a new regional financial institution launched by President Xi at the October 2012 APEC conference in Bali, to address the widening infrastructure gaps in the Asia-Pacific. The AIIB will concentrate on the infrastructure and investment requirements of the region’s emerging economies, providing the financial support for much needed investment in connectivity among Asia-Pacific economies, consistent with APEC’s existing commitment. The creation of the AIIB and the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank) reflect China’s confidence in asserting economic power, and its demand for greater input into the creation of rules governing global finance and investment. China, along with many developing countries, has voiced its frustrations

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1607 Many Southeast Asian countries want to diversify their economic options not proliferate economic dependence on China. They are concerned that Chinese goods may flood markets and overwhelm nascent industries. They view China’s emphasis as on building infrastructure, rather than sharing technical knowhow, using Chinese workers rather than local citizens. A deeper fear is that China has bigger plans than improving infrastructure, connectivity, and boosting trade: it is trying to expand its sphere of influence along with its markets. Economist, “The New Silk Road: Stretching the Threads,” 62-63.

1608 The SREB project has faced setbacks: In September 2011, Myanmar suspended Chinese construction of the Myitsone dam following domestic opposition; In July 2014, Thailand approved a $23 billion deal for two high-speed rail links with China but questions remain over the durability of an agreement made with the military junta. A change from the pro-Beijing to a pro-Indian government, following presidential elections in Sri Lanka, January 2015, has affected the degree of influence Beijing can exert in the Indian Ocean.


with existing global institutions in their slowness to provide a greater voice to emerging powers. These parallel regional and global financial institutions, which give developing countries greater influence, have the potential in the longer term to ‘entrench Sino-centric patterns of trade, investment and infrastructure.’

The creation of the AIIB is a statement of intent from China that it desires to play a leading role in defining new rules of the game for investment and development aid in the Asia-Pacific. While China recognises it has benefitted from membership of multilateral institutions including the WTO and the World Bank, which has helped improve the competitiveness of Chinese businesses, it also supports reform of a system which currently limits its capacity to lead. The AIIB operating guidelines differ in two areas from the IMF and World Bank. First, it will give more equal coverage of voting rights to Asian nations, and second, the AIIB will not implement the conditionality attached to IMF loans that enforce conditions of economic reform. In the short term, this strategy will improve China’s capacity to shape the rules of lending in its neighbourhood by building collateral and improving its legitimacy among neighbours.

On balance, the AIIB is also one of approximately twenty-eight international organisations specialising in aid and development. Financial development aid is a highly competitive business, and potential recipients can receive funds from a number of sources. Developing countries have become adept at picking and choosing from the range of ‘multilateral, bilateral, and private financing sources.

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1617 For more information on institutional bargains, see Goh, The Struggle for Order, 66.

the AIIB is seen as being overly dominated by China, other members may turn their attention elsewhere, ‘depriving the organisation of resources, attention, and skilled staff.’\textsuperscript{1619} Beijing has also taken advantage of the knowledge and experience of several Europeans on the board of directors.\textsuperscript{1620} While the AIIB is indicative of China’s global ambitions, its establishment and membership also draw China closer into existing structures of global economic governance, since the international backers will expect China to contribute to regional development in a more transparent and accountable way. The AIIB is attempting to be a ‘model of transparency’ in contrast to the Chinese government-owned China Development Bank, whose funding is often connected to natural resources.\textsuperscript{1621} Channelling its investments through international institutions, suggests self-imposed constraint, and not at the expense of U.S. structural power.

The failure of Washington’s public efforts to dissuade allies from joining the AIIB on the basis of the economic and political implications of a lending agency led by China highlighted the reduced influence it has among its allies in financial matters. This situation also emphasised that Washington’s fear of Beijing’s growing standing in economic global governance is not replicated across Europe or the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{1622} Washington’s initial opposition to the AIIB centred on the establishment of a new regional institution that could compete with existing development institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank; concern over the potential for weak environmental standards and social safeguards within the AIIB; and the opportunity for China to use AIIB-financed infrastructure for greater leverage in the region.\textsuperscript{1623} Washington also argued that China would have an effective veto on decision-making.\textsuperscript{1624} While China does have a voting share of 26 per cent, giving it veto power, as a super-majority of 75 per cent is required for important decisions, China only has minority status, since 15 per cent of voting rights are allocated equally to founding members.\textsuperscript{1625} U.S. arguments may have been

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  \item \textsuperscript{1619} Lipscy, “Who’s Afraid of the AIIB?”, June 24, 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{1621} Mitchell, “AIIB Gathers for Inaugural Annual Meeting.”
  \item \textsuperscript{1622} Kim Jong Kim, president of the World Bank, declared the AIIB to be an important new partner, adding that the developing world’s infrastructure investment needs are too large for one institution. Cited in Gabriel Wildau and Charles Clover, “AIIB Launch Signals China’s New Ambition,” \textit{Financial Times}, June 29, 2015. \(\text{http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ea61666-1e24-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.html#axzz4IxcpOIt}\) (accessed June 26, 2016).
  \item \textsuperscript{1624} \textit{Financial Times}, “America’s Flawed Strategy towards AIIB,” May 20, 2015. \(\text{http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eef600b8-fee0-11e4-84b2-00144feabd0c.html#axzz4Cu7RN7yS}\) (accessed June 26, 2016).
  \item \textsuperscript{1625} Wildau and Clover, “AIIB Launch Signals China’s New Ambition.”
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more convincing if the IMF had not been perceived as ‘the arm of coercive Euro-Atlantic discipline for the South’ by many in East Asia and Latin America with regard to IMF management of financial crises during the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{1626} Moreover, while the U.S. has less than 20 per cent of the votes in the IMF and World Bank, the U.S. retains a final say over matters of importance, including the head of each organisation.\textsuperscript{1627}

Beijing now has the opportunity to create rules and norms for regional investment and infrastructure projects and to set the regional agenda.\textsuperscript{1628} Washington opposes the establishment of a parallel financial institution led by Beijing, which would legitimise China’s global economic importance and corresponding influence, thereby reducing its own privileged position in matters relating to international economic governance. Washington’s response to the AIIB implies that the goal is to get China to play by the rules; China must not ‘gain significant share of the power to make the rules.’\textsuperscript{1629} While the U.S. recognises China’s growing influence, there is no will to share power with China within the existing institutions.

In September 2015, Washington conceded to the establishment of the AIIB and sought to resume U.S.-China economic relations. To allay U.S. fears, Beijing committed to increase its financial commitments to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, while the U.S. reiterated its pledge to back China’s bid for the inclusion of the yuan in the IMF basket of reserve currencies, as long as Beijing is declared credible by the IMF.\textsuperscript{1630} Washington had drawn concessions from Beijing with regard to its ongoing funding promises to the World Bank and ADB but has not altered the course for Chinese influence over the structure of the regional economy.\textsuperscript{1631} In December 2015, the yuan achieved special drawing rights (SDR), joining other major currencies in the basket of currencies used by the IMF. Before making its decision, the IMF asked China to make changes to its currency regime.\textsuperscript{1632} Inclusion in the SDR also deepens international expectations that China will increasingly allow market forces to decide the yuan’s


\textsuperscript{1627} \textit{Financial Times}, “America’s Flawed Strategy towards AIIB.”


\textsuperscript{1630} Donnan, “White House Declares Truce with China over AIIB.”

\textsuperscript{1631} Donnan, “White House Declares Truce with China over AIIB.”

exchange rate. Therefore, this move is more than symbolic; the hope is to embed the yuan in the international monetary system, thereby committing China to financial reform in the longer term. Preventing China from achieving market economy status in the WTO presents the next challenge for Washington.

(iii) Structuring China’s economic development bilaterally

In addition to the structural power the U.S. asserts through global financial institutions, Washington also attempts to exert structural influence over China through the bilateral relationship. It hopes that since China typically views the bilateral relationship as one which establishes its status legitimately on the international stage, China is more likely to be co-opted, if not completely socialised into the existing structures of the regional economy. For the U.S., bilateral forums do not dilute its bargaining power in the way of a multilateral setting. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) has provided the critical annual forum for developing bilateral relations with China. This forum, and its numerous sub-groups, cover every issue on which the U.S. and China cooperates, including piracy, counter-terrorism and climate change, and those on which they do not, including the contentious issues of cyber security and the South China Sea.

Through the S&ED frameworks, there has been gradual movement towards a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), with China agreeing to some SOE reform and the liberalisation of FDI restrictions during the 2014 S&ED. During the 2015 S&ED, the South China Sea disputes were indirectly covered

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1633 Economist, “Maiden Voyage: Reserve-Currency Status might make for a Weaker Yuan.”
through a new ‘oceans meeting’ as part of the strategic track. These bilateral talks may prove to be a conducive environment through which each can engage the other in order to diffuse tensions. The U.S. has gained China’s cooperation on issues of global importance, including climate change and Iran, agenda issues over numerous S&EDs that have proven invaluable for creating Sino-American consensus in the key issue areas of trade, security, finance and the environment for the Obama administration. Nevertheless, the 2016 S&ED failed to extract concrete results concerning China’s activities the South China Sea, or China’s overproduction of steel. Consequently, many observers remain sceptical of the overall success of these dialogues from the American perspective.

Productive Power: The challenges in shaping China’s rising power identity

Washington habitually treats Beijing as a challenger to the existing American hegemonic order, justifying extreme responses in the protection of the U.S. position in the order, and the order itself. This narrative neglects to accommodate China’s identity as a rising power and its core interests, and presents American hegemony as non-negotiable. Presenting China as a ‘power challenger’ satisfies the China threat lobby and justifies the strengthening of the bilateral alliances and regional partnerships to boost American preponderance in the Asia-Pacific by through its negative perception of China’s rise. For China, the regime cannot always control how its ‘personality’ is perceived or constructed outside of China. China’s economic influence may have increased substantially, but this has not necessarily


been matched yet by diplomatic, cultural and soft power, or military influence outside it existing ‘partners.’\textsuperscript{1645} China remains a ‘partial power,’\textsuperscript{1646} whose rise is ‘spread’ across the globe but without the depth of America’s commercial, social and political influence.

No post-Cold War administration has yet been able to firmly assign a new identity for China’s rising power status, nor set out a framework for managing the bilateral relationship. There have been persistently vague hopes that China’s perceptions and priorities would be altered by development, liberalisation, and socialisation.\textsuperscript{1647} For proponents of engagement, China’s integration into the global economic institutions perpetuated Washington’s ‘romantic view’ of China that it had become a ‘so-called Communist country.’\textsuperscript{1648} Based on the mistaken assumption that China’s membership of these international institutions indicated the inevitable internalisation of the rules and norms associated with the U.S.-led order, in the ultimate act of ‘self-deception,’ the United States has created a ‘highly optimistic script’ on how developments with China would unfold, without indication from Beijing that the U.S. vision was accurate.\textsuperscript{1649}

Many of the issues addressed in this chapter relating to U.S.-China relations – the territorial and maritime boundary disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the concerns over the AIIB – emphasise the increasing difficulty for both Beijing and Washington in shaping the identity of the other. Ontological security-seeking behaviour is reflected in these potentially highly explosive regional disputes. These disputes, with long historical backgrounds, and interspersed with equally long periods of calm, have become a physical manifestation of ontological security-seeking behaviour by the U.S. and China, and an arena for each to test the other. In their efforts to preserve a secure national identity, Washington and Beijing are setting expectations for their own actions, and conversely, how each expects the other to act towards them. After 2009, there is a transformation in China’s behaviour towards its claims in the East and South China Sea, and in its engagement with its neighbours. As China’s seeks to establish a regional power identity for itself, this process provides a lens through which to consider China’s changing attitude towards the disputes.\textsuperscript{1650} The escalation in tension after 2009 can be best explained through a broader pattern of identity formation processes, as the U.S. seeks to

\textsuperscript{1645} Summers, “China’s Global Personality,” 8.
\textsuperscript{1646} Shambaugh, The Partial Power, 15.
\textsuperscript{1648} James Mann, About Face, 147.
\textsuperscript{1649} Waldron, “The Asia Mess,” 160.
reproduce its hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific in view of a perceived challenges by China, and China searches for acceptance of its ‘rising power’ identity by the United States.

Despite the acknowledgement that the U.S. must work with a rising China, the difficulties in defining the relationship and the place of each within it, has produced extreme policy shifts between, and within, successive U.S. post-Cold War administrations – swinging between reprimand and coercion on one hand, and accommodation, engagement and consensus-building on the other. The first term G.W Bush administration disassociated itself from what it saw as the Clinton administration’s excessive accommodation of China, rejecting Clinton’s definition of bilateral relations as moving ‘toward strategic partnership, and instead designating Beijing as a ‘strategic competitor.’ Condoleezza Rice summarised,

‘It is important to promote China’s internal transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions. Cooperation should be pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide.’

In response to China’s increasing military power projection capabilities and growing economic power, the administration intended to pivot America’s relations back to the Asia-Pacific, by strengthening alliances with Japan and Australia, and expanding cooperation with friendly states, including Singapore. In response to the domestic China critics, America’s primacy in the Asia-Pacific was to be strengthened. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review inferred that China was a potential threat to U.S. interests, and most likely military competitor to the United States. East Asia, an area of ‘enduring interest’ over which no other state was allowed to dominate, was prime for the development of additional access and infrastructure agreements.

(i) The ‘responsible stakeholder’ paradigm

The G.W. Bush administration’s resolve to define U.S.-China relations was driven by America’s strategic focus after September 2001, which led to a reprioritisation of the principal security threats to U.S. national interests. Mirroring the shift, the 2002 National Security Strategy emphasised ‘great power cooperation,’ with great powers ‘increasingly united by common values,’ and ‘increasingly on

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the same side – united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.'  

Second, was the intensifying realisation that the focus on the GWOT had left a vacuum in the Asia-Pacific for China to fill. Uncertainty was growing in Washington over China’s activities, its use of power, the opacity of its political system and its rapid militarisation. In June 2005, in a speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China relations, Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, outlined his ‘responsible stakeholder’ framework for managing ‘China’s rise’ and the bilateral relationship. His speech offered a clear statement regarding the complexity of U.S.-China relations; it outlined U.S. hopes and concerns over the nature of China’s rise and the consequences for the U.S-led global order.

The ‘responsible stakeholder’ narrative set out a framework for what the G.W. Bush administration deemed to be the sort of behaviour characteristic of one who belongs to, and who appreciates belonging to, the international system that had facilitated China’s rise and wealth increase. This marked the first official U.S. recognition that China should be encouraged to give more to the international system, whilst also assuming that China would accept Washington’s global priorities and its hegemony more generally. China, Zoellick declared, should not simply act in its own national interests but as a responsible stakeholder, recognising that as the international system sustains China’s ‘peaceful prosperity,’ so China should work to sustain that order. The U.S. sought to define the behaviour associated with ‘responsible stakeholder’ status, dictating what makes China a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ global player based on American normative assumptions. The concept outlined a ‘set of behavioural benchmarks’ against which the U.S. could gauge Chinese policies and practices in the international system, including, for example, over WMD, Iran, North Korea, humanitarian crises and Beijing’s involvement in UN peace-keeping missions. The ‘responsible stakeholder’ framework provided, and continues to provide, a blueprint for what the U.S. considers U.S.-China mutual interests should be, and especially on the global stage.

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to secure China’s cooperation in areas that support the national interests of the U.S., as much as it was an attempt to preserve the existing global order.¹⁶⁶⁴

Zoellick’s speech, with its focus on the ‘responsible stakeholder’ narrative, encouraging greater responsibility from China, was intended for the U.S. domestic audience, as much as it was aimed at Beijing. There were deep anxieties in Washington regarding China’s military growth and global aspirations. The speech was presented just before the publication of the 2005 QDR, which, in its coverage of the Asia-Pacific, outlined the growing strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, in what Campbell terms, the 2005 QDR’s ‘China threat’ sections.¹⁶⁶⁵ The ‘responsible stakeholder’ framework, it was hoped, would appeal to the supporters of pro-engagement, and deliver a counter-attack against the bureaucratic in-fighting in Washington over the future of America’s China policy.¹⁶⁶⁶ By deeming that China ‘needs to recognise how its actions are perceived by others,’¹⁶⁶⁷ and asserting that China should share U.S. interests, the tone of Zoellick’s speech assumed Washington’s moral high ground when dealing with China, with a strategic thinking that stressed the need to ‘manage’ China’s rise.¹⁶⁶⁸ The speech presupposed U.S. capacity to shape China’s interests and to induce China’s compliance with the rules-based order.¹⁶⁶⁹

However, the G.W. Bush administration did not specify the obligations entailed with ‘responsible stakeholder’ status, although it was assumed internal reform was integral to the position, on the basis that ‘closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society.’¹⁶⁷⁰ The Chinese Communist Party has always set out two red lines: external interference in its domestic human rights practices, and moves to destabilise the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, are unacceptable.¹⁶⁷¹ Zoellick’s speech also placed the onus on China to increase its international contribution, which, at a time when the U.S. was enlisting China’s help in combatting terrorism, the responsible stakeholder role was seen as a U.S. attempt to draw China into a number two role in the U.S-led order.¹⁶⁷² Chinese commentators


became suspicious of a ‘western trap’ to burden China with ‘unfairly imposed international responsibilities,’ and consequently, Chinese analysts cited China’s ‘developing country status’ as a reaction to western demands of increased responsibility.\textsuperscript{1673} From the Chinese perspective, the framing of the ‘responsible stakeholder’ narrative by the G.W. Bush administration meant that by owning American-imposed ‘responsibility,’ China was also admitting guilt over, for instance, claims that China’s currency manipulation and under-valued yuan were a cause of the global financial crisis.\textsuperscript{1674}

Following the global financial crisis and the success of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, China appeared to undergo a significant transformation in its self-identity, with implications for its role in the Asia-Pacific region, how it expected to be treated by other states in the region, and how it perceived its relationship with the United States. Many China experts in the West detected an assertive shift in Beijing’s public statements, actions, and demands concerning its core interests and international status.\textsuperscript{1675} At the same time, U.S. uncertainty in its hegemonic identity and talk of decline following the global financial crisis required action to limit this uncertainty, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. While the rebalance strategy was meant to signify America’s return to the Asia-Pacific, from 2010, Beijing viewed the rebalance as U.S. opposition to China’s rising power status, especially resenting U.S. military surveillance activity in China’s EEZ, and U.S. ‘meddling’ in the South China Sea disputes.\textsuperscript{1676} Although Beijing and Washington offer statements on the importance of cooperative China-U.S. relations, neither President Obama, nor Chinese Presidents Hu Jintao and Xi, have devised a mutually agreeable narrative to manage this most critical bilateral relationship.\textsuperscript{1677}

(iii) Rejecting the bilateral ‘new type of great power relationship’

During his meeting with President Obama at Sunnylands in 2013, President Xi advanced the concept of a ‘new type of great power relationship’ through which China seeks to define its own identity, and that of the United States, and assert its international status, through a framework for equal partnership. The concept was predominantly, although not exclusively, designed to manage complex Sino-U.S.


\textsuperscript{1674} Deng, “China: The Post-Responsible Power,” 123.

\textsuperscript{1675} For a range of western discussion of China’s rise, see Bisley, “Biding and Hiding No Longer: A More Assertive China Rattles the Region.” Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China.” Schweller and Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline.”


\textsuperscript{1677} Roger Irvine, “Getting Back on Track: China, the United States and Asia-Pacific Security,” \textit{American Foreign Policy Interests} 35, no. 3 (2013): 144.
relations. At its core is the understanding that a stable and cooperative relationship with the U.S. is central to China’s peaceful rise. There are three features of the ‘new type of great power relationship: no conflict/non-confrontation; win-win cooperation through the advance of areas of mutual interest; and mutual respect of each other’s political systems and loosely defined ‘core interests,’ especially over the inclusion of the South China Sea as a core interest.1678

By taking the initiative to define the future framework for Sino-U.S. relations, through the re-classification of equal ‘great powers,’ the hope is to create a level playing field that establishes a new code of conduct commensurate with China’s core interests. Obtaining U.S. support of the concept would imply Washington’s recognition of China’s strength and power, recognition of China’s core interests, including the South China Sea, and acknowledgement of China as an equal, with its own sphere of influence in East Asia.1679 This is a narrative about the Chinese quest to gain international legitimacy and status versus the American quest to maintain the regional status quo. It naturalises China’s great power identity as America’s equal, accepted as ‘fact.’1680

There are some in Beijing who view even tacit acceptance of the ‘new type of great power relations’ as corroboration of American weakness and China’s inevitable rise.1681 This narrative of a declining United States is promulgated by the Chinese leadership, although Xi takes care to emphasise that he


1679 Chinese media interest in a joint endorsement of the concept by Obama and Xi suggests that gaining American recognition for the initiative has Chinese domestic motivations. Only the United States has the capacity to contain China’s rise. By strengthening China’s view of itself as a recognised and respected power, Xi Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership and gain political capital to consolidate his power base at home. See Ding Ding Chen, “Defining a ‘New Type of Major Power Relations’,” The Diplomat, November 8, 2014. [http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-new-type-of-major-power-relations/](http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-new-type-of-major-power-relations/) (accessed August 13, 2015).


believes there is room in Asia for two great powers to coexist and cooperate - as equals. In other words, the United States must accommodate, and accept China’s rise on China’s terms. While Washington acknowledges that the scope of the bilateral relationship requires clarification, there has been no move to accept Xi Jinping’s initiative as a way to define and manage the relationship. The features of the concept grant China great power status without placing any conditions on its behaviour. Such acceptance could indirectly commit Washington to concessions that are objectionable to vital U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests. Chinese plans to obtain foreign, and especially American, recognition of its ‘core interests’ could lead to a backdoor acceptance of China’s territorial demands, including official American recognition of its disputed territorial claims in the East and South China Seas.

American policy-makers have no interest in embracing a new framework offered by another country that would in any way undermine their regional status. Acceptance of China’s narrative could also negatively impact America’s relations with its allies in the region. There are unspoken concerns that American recognition of the Chinese concept would not only imply that Obama is taking a backseat role in the bilateral relationship, but would also suggest that the United States recognises itself as the declining regional hegemon. Washington does not accept the representations of the U.S. and China in Xi’s narrative that undermine the strategic understandings characterising the existing international system and American hegemony. Nor has the Obama administration developed a narrative to replace the ‘responsible stakeholder’ status. Until they find a way to deal with their mutually exclusive interests, and set out a workable framework for managing the relationship, the fluctuating pattern of relations will remain, and the negative China’s rise narrative will continue to gain traction in the United States.

The inability to make sense of, and re-inscribe China’s new identity in the transforming post-Cold War strategic situation, has had longer term implications for American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.
Washington has not been able to gain domestic consensus on China’s emerging identity, or present a clear discourse concerning China’s rise. While Beijing does want a constructive relationship with Washington, the bottom line is that China does not want to contribute more to sustaining the U.S.-led order. Nor does China identify itself as a responsible power, as defined by the U.S., which it views as the most recent ‘incarnation’ of American attempts to harm China. China has actively embraced existing international norms and mechanisms for cooperation but at the same time, it seeks to produce a distinctly ‘Asian’ identity for itself.

For China, whose rising power identity draws heavily on China’s history prior to the century of humiliation, this is time to construct a Chinese identity that places it as the centre and natural leader of Asia, with values distinct from those of western norms and ideas. This vision conflicts with the existing Asia-Pacific-centred order, created by the incumbent regional hegemon, the United States, and defined in terms of its own exceptionalism and its universally applicable value system, which, Ikenberry asserts, is ‘hard to overturn and easy to join.’ The U.S. is experiencing instability in its hegemonic identity vis-à-vis the rising power identity of China because its sense of self is not being affirmed within this critical relationship. The U.S. is also in a state of flux concerning its global role, which has, in part, been undermined by Obama’s attempt to decouple exceptionalism from primacy, leading to criticisms that Obama lacks belief in U.S. exceptionalism. Consequently, both Chinese and American identities are in a process of change.

The demonstration of power and assertion of positions in the interactions between the U.S. and China emphasise that their actions are motivated by a need to reproduce their own autobiographical identity, in addition to defining the boundaries of self-versus-other. At the level of self and other, the close interconnectivity between the two identities, both enhances and simultaneously constrains, the power of each. In addition, in every aspect of their relations – political, economic, security and cultural –

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1688 Goh, _The Struggle for Order_, 20-21.
1689 From this perspective, Yan Xuetong argues that taking on more responsibility for global problems is viewed as a ‘trap’ to exhaust China’s ‘limited resources.’ Yan Xuetong, cited in David Pilling, “Keeping its Distance,” _Financial Times_, February 11, 2010. [https://www.ft.com/content/77a928a0-1511-11df-ad58-00144feab49a](https://www.ft.com/content/77a928a0-1511-11df-ad58-00144feab49a) (accessed September 1, 2016).
their interests can be ‘common, complementary, conflicting and confrontational,’ rendering this relationship extremely complicated.1695

Conclusion

This chapter sought to examine the rising powers element of the rebalance strategy, focusing on the divergent relationships with China and India. The discussion alluded to the complex negotiations occurring between the U.S. and China over the future of regional order in the Asia-Pacific, with global implications. There has always been a degree of expectation on Washington’s part that Beijing would be sufficiently socialised into the existing order and by extension, would consent to American hegemony. The Obama administration has not actively undertaken a process of renegotiating the current strategic bargain with China. For its part, China has been ‘relatively unwilling’ to engage in substantive elements of the strategic negotiation on America’s terms.1696 The rebalance strategy has been used by both the U.S. and China as a means to assert their regional positions. China views the rebalance as a U.S. attempt to reinvigorate its waning hegemony and thus as a way to constrain China’s rise, which feeds into domestic nationalist sentiment concerning its century of humiliation. As the hegemon, the U.S. is applying downwards resistance to defuse China’s challenge by exerting different facets of its power and also by accommodating some of China’s requests in global economic governance as a means to extract buy-in for its hegemonic order.1697

U.S.-China policy veers regularly between coercive measures to limit China’s increasing influence, and attempts to build consensus as a means to accommodate China’s rising power status. Both strategies ultimately require China’s acceptance of U.S. hegemony and the U.S. hegemonic order. Beijing’s contestation of American hegemony is occurring at the level of order and is also creating insecurity within America’s hegemonic identity. Over time, Washington’s frustration with Beijing has developed into a negative image of ‘China’s rise’ in relation to its own identity, thereby highlighting the significance of narrative and identity formation processes, threat construction and foreign policy outcomes. The integration of narrative and identity processes in the practice of foreign policy result in the formulation of strategies that connect identity and physical security-seeking. The fluidity of the

1696 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 217.
1697 Goh observes that in IR, more attention is given to upwards resistance in regional hierarchy – from the subordinate state against the incumbent. ‘Superordinate’ states also apply ‘downward’ resistance to repel challenges from subordinate states. This could take the form of political-military containment but also ‘institutional, economic, or discursive strategies to circumscribe, isolate, limit or end attempts to compete with or replace their material and normative dominance.’ Goh, The Struggle for Order, Chapter 6, especially 216-219.
‘China’s rise’ narrative also demonstrates the way in which officials politically mobilise and manipulate ontological security concerns into concerns about survival.

Taking on degrees of otherness, India’s rising power identity is set against that of China’s by dint of its suitability to the United States, underpinned by shared values, including democracy, and converging interests in the Asia-Pacific. There is important congruence on issues from strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, freedom of navigation and maritime security and peaceful resolution of conflicts consistent with international law. By developing the construction of the Indo-Asia-Pacific maritime region, the Obama administration has been gradually able to draw India into its strategic sphere of influence, whilst also facilitating India’s strategic relations with other regional American allies. The South China Sea, for example, featured in the 2015 U.S.-India defence discussions, at which further bilateral defence agreements were signed. Highlighting the complexity of delineating relationships in the current international system, India does not seem to be challenging U.S. hegemony, but it does contest aspects of the U.S. hegemonic order that diverge from its own national interests. For instance, New Delhi will cooperate with China with regard to restructuring international financial institutions, the historical development of which also excluded India. India and China, in this regard, are united by a shared history of colonial control and their inability in the post-war period to have any say in the development of the post-war order. Nevertheless, New Delhi continues to work with Washington and its allies in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

This assessment of the exercise of American power as a means to sustain its regional hegemony underlines the unequal distribution of China’s contestation of American hegemony. It is still unclear whether China seeks to overturn U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific in its entirety, or whether it seeks a renegotiation of some aspects of it, especially in the economic sphere. However, this chapter has demonstrated that China does not (or cannot yet) challenge all aspects of American hegemony since it does not have the full gambit of power assets at its disposal. Significantly, China’s assertive and coercive behaviour in the South and East China Seas has been met with resistance, not only from the U.S., but also from other regional actors. China has been unable to convince regional actors of the

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1698 Hansen observes that constructions of identity take on varying degrees of otherness, indicating that there is a spectrum of ‘otherness’ which potentially opens up the possibility that ‘otherness’ can also be context-based. Hansen, Security as Practice, 40.
peaceful nature of its rise, and thus remains unable to garner support for its vision of a Sino-centric regional order. By remaining wedded to coercive practices that induce fear and insecurity, China does not yet have the capacity to garner consent for its aspiring regional hegemonic order. Consequently, for the time being, the foundations of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific remains strong. With that in mind, the concluding chapter assesses President Obama’s legacy in the Asia-Pacific.
Chapter 7

Conclusions

The starting point of this thesis derived from a need to understand the Obama administration’s decision to announce the rebalance strategy in November 2011, when the recalibration of U.S. foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific had been specified from the start of the administration in 2009. Second, the announcement coincided with a military rebalance to the region, which seemed to undermine the initial focus on rebalancing American power away from the military/security focus of the preceding G.W. Bush administration. In addition, the obvious multi-dimensional approach to the rebalance warranted closer inspection of the way in which the U.S. distributes its power capabilities beyond the narrow application of its military capabilities to sustain its regional hegemony.

After the global financial crisis, media and academic focus centred on global concerns of a declining U.S., a waning hegemon with neither the capacity, nor the will to lead in global affairs.\(^\text{1701}\) Since the strategy was initially pronounced to be a ‘pivot,’ emphasis was quickly placed on the strategy as evidence that the U.S. would also pivot away from its global commitments.\(^\text{1702}\) ‘Common sense’ dictated that this strategy was Washington’s last efforts to sustain its regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific in the face of China’s inevitable rise.\(^\text{1703}\) Yet, by 2011, the U.S. economy was showing signs of improvement,\(^\text{1704}\) and as closure on the events of 9/11, Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy Seals in Pakistan in May 2011. In the Asia-Pacific, beyond the narrow focus on the military rebalance, by 2011, the rebalance strategy was turning into a multidimensional strategy, combining different elements of U.S. power, and engaging multiple partners across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Contrary to the reports and analysis about U.S. decline, the rebalance strategy did not seem to indicate declining U.S. power; rather it demonstrated the reach of American power, emphasising the strength of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, the narrow focus on China’s military and economic rise as evidence of U.S. decline belied the nature of American hegemony beyond its material base.

\(^\text{1701}\) See, for example, Buzan, “A Leader without Followers?”
Two research questions have provided the structure to this thesis. The first question focused on uncovering the motivations for rebalancing U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific. This question inevitably drew attention to the issue of China’s rise and its alleged effects on American hegemony. To understand the rebalance as critical to the reproduction of U.S. hegemony, in Chapter 2 I conceptualised hegemony as the structure of ‘order’ by means of Gramscian thought. Hegemony is derived from the leader’s possession of an amalgam of political, economic and cultural conditions that enable its emergence as the leader. Hegemony is underpinned by a range of power assets at the leader’s disposal, sustained over time, and include its capacity to dominate the organisations and institutions of ideology and politics on a global scale. Rather than an extension of U.S. military primacy, hegemony incorporates a set of social relationships between the leader and subordinate states that relies on gaining consent from subordinate states for its ongoing production.

Developing hegemony further, in Chapter 3 I examined and assessed the inter-related processes of identity, narrative and security formation that shape U.S. foreign policy-making and underpin U.S. hegemonic identity. The style of hegemonic order is built on the character, identity and normative preferences of the leading state within it. Moreover, hegemony is fused into America’s understanding of itself – shaped by ideas of American exceptionalism and its manifest destiny to lead in international affairs. American hegemony is also formed by its perception of the other – of China – that is dependent upon the increasingly negative ‘China’s rise’ narrative. Since it is imbued with identity, hegemony is in constant need of reproduction because American ontological security depends upon it. The decision to rebalance is being driven by American insecurity in its own hegemonic identity and exacerbated by China’s rising power identity. Foreign policy outcomes do not simply ‘happen.’ A complex series of background processes are occurring, which contribute to foreign policy decision-making processes at the level of identity and narrative.

The second question focused on how the Obama administration has exercised American power to implement the rebalance strategy as a means to sustain its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. In the empirical chapters, the aim was to show how U.S. hegemony is continually generated through an analysis of different forms and interactions of power. Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power facilitates this study of hegemony by opening up the concept of power along the dimensions of interaction and social constitution. In so doing, power can be derived from the preponderant material resources of the hegemon, and power can be derived from the hegemon’s ability to create social actors – their self-understanding, interests and capacities – prior to their interactions with others. Since Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy also considers how relations of power can work directly and diffusely, a broader, relational picture of power emerges. The hegemon exercises power through a complex set of
ongoing relationships and social bargains. Consequently, consent for both the hegemonic order and hegemonic identity is continually required from the subordinate states in the order.

By looking at the multi-dimensional exercise of American power as a means to reproduce and consolidate U.S. regional hegemony, this thesis has shown that the American hegemony is itself deeply embedded in the Asia-Pacific and is broadly supported by other states in the Asia-Pacific. Since hegemony is treated here as a social relationship, American regional hegemony undergoes a continual process of negotiation between the U.S. and the other states. Moreover, the social nature of American hegemony means it is both fluid and adaptable and capable of absorbing resistance. Aspects of American hegemony are frequently questioned and challenged by allies and competitors alike. However, no peer competitor yet exists with the complete mix of material and non-material capabilities to either counter U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, or to create its own regional order.

The conclusions drawn from this thesis are theoretical and empirical. This thesis recognises the growing relevance of the concept of ontological security to the field of IR. Understanding the self-constitutive process of identification, incorporating the constitution of self and other, is an essential pre-condition for an agent’s action, which can thus explain attitudes and behaviour in both routinised practices and in managing change. Furthermore, uncoupling ontological and physical security has allowed for an exploration of how the state securitise issues, not only through the conventional lens of physical security, or ‘security-as-survival,’ but also in its endeavours to secure a stable self-identity. These self-constitutive processes are just as important in the desire for ontological security as the relationship with the other. In theoretical terms, ontological security is often conflated with physical security, which overlooks the ways in which states not only seek both ontological and physical security but also how their ontological security concerns are politically mobilised into fears of survival.¹⁷⁰⁵ I have drawn attention to how the theoretical distinction between physical and ontological security concerns expands on the IR discipline’s consideration of security, and to the interaction between identity, security and foreign policy practice.

Second, in developing an analytical framework for hegemony using Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power, several aspects of power are used to sustain U.S. hegemony. The empirical analysis of the rebalance strategy points to several conclusions. While the process of renegotiating U.S. hegemony is coupled with varying degrees of contestation by subordinate states, with the exception of China and

North Korea, the regional inclination is to maintain the American-led regional security order. In the economic sphere, where contestation of the neoliberal project has been more widespread and pronounced, resistance is constrained by the structure of global capitalist production. The majority of subordinate states have either internalised or pragmatically accept the structure of U.S. hegemony. Moreover, this is not a passive activity, rather, this is an active process of negotiation and consent by leaders of subordinate states to sustain U.S. hegemony. The success of the rebalance, therefore, depends as much on the region’s perception of the American-led regional order, and the sustainability of the American presence, as it does on Washington’s capacity to reassure its partners and preserve its regional hegemony.

In this concluding chapter, I start by revisiting the puzzle, followed by a brief summary of the two main research questions. The first covers the motivations for the rebalance, including an assessment of the theoretical approach used in chapters 2 and 3. I then move on to review the practice of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, drawing on the empirical material appraised in Chapters 4-6. Towards the end of this chapter, I also discuss the extent to which the rebalance forms the basis of an Obama foreign policy doctrine and underpins Obama’s legacy in the Asia-Pacific. This chapter concludes with an appraisal of my contribution to the field of International Relations, research limitations, and future research opportunities.

The puzzle

The announcement of the rebalance strategy in November 2011 presented a noticeable contradiction between the public statements and a strategy that was already two years into implementation. The announcement of the rebalance strategy in November 2011 coincided with the strengthening of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific, while the thrust of the previous two years’ work was economic and diplomatic. Moreover, with the rebranding of the strategy, attention shifted from a regional focus that had sought to rebuild relations and reconnect the U.S. to the Asia-Pacific, to one which had a hard power edge. With the announcement, the Obama administration’s regional strategy appeared to shift attention towards Beijing, motivated by China’s expanding assertions in the South China Sea during 2009 and 2010. While the tensions in the South China Sea have a long history, the U.S. had historically remained on the periphery. Yet between 2010 and 2011, the administration’s official narrative started to draw attention to the South China Sea as indicative of the looming threat that China represented to regional stability and, by extension, to U.S. regional hegemony.
This narrative was not borne out by specifics. The United States was clearly the preponderant military hegemon in the Asia-Pacific, the biggest military spender, and the underwriter of regional security through a system of formal alliances and other strategic partnerships. Beijing’s adoption of a more assertive stance in its regional strategy during the course of 2010 appeared to be the catalyst for Washington’s reassertion of its hegemony over the Asia-Pacific, reaffirming the importance of the United States to the strategic interests of its regional allies and to the ongoing stability of the existing regional order. Why were events between 2009 and 2011 interpreted by the U.S. to be evidence of China’s rising threat to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific? The decision to announce the rebalance in November 2011 reveals significant information about the condition of American hegemony in the American psyche and the importance of threat construction in driving U.S. foreign policy.

Although China has more frequently pushed against what it sees as U.S. interference in regional matters through the assertion of Chinese core interests since 2010, Beijing has not yet directly threatened U.S. military preponderance in the Asia-Pacific. It is, however, asserting its rights over maritime areas perceived as Chinese-owned. Despite its military modernisation, it is not clear whether China possesses the ability, or the will, to overturn the existing regional order, even if it is acting more assertively in its near neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the timing of the American announcement and the focus on the military rebalance in November 2011 coincided with an escalation in the administration’s negative narrative concerning ‘China’s rise’ and significant uncertainty in America’s sense of self. The combination of story-telling, the timing of the announcement, and Washington’s interpretation of Beijing’s behaviour have created the conditions for this common-sense foreign policy outcome in the shape of the rebalance strategy.

Motivations for the strategic rebalance

Following the global financial crisis in 2008, the notion of U.S. decline was rekindled. Rationalist studies focus on the decline of American material power, drawing attention to the redistribution of


1708 American decline is a cyclical discussion that has come to the fore at critical points since the 1950s. Samuel Huntington observed that between the 1950s and 1980s, there were five cycles of declinism in the United States. Samuel P. Huntington, “The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?” Foreign Affairs 67, no. 2 (Winter 1988/89): 94.
Wealth to the Asia-Pacific, and China’s increasing economic power as proof of U.S. decline. \textit{Time} magazine declared that the decade up to 2010 had been ‘the decade from hell’ for the United States: \footnote{Time magazine was clear about ‘the first 10 years of this century ... They will very likely go down as the most dispiriting and disillusioning decade Americans have lived through in the post-World War II era.’ Andy Serwer, “The End of the 2000s: Goodbye (At Last) to the Decade from Hell,” \textit{Time}, December 9, 2009. \url{http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1942973,00.html} (accessed July 16, 2015).} Starting with 9/11 and the G.W. Bush administration’s strategically heavy-handed response, the setbacks worsened with ‘the gradual erosion of economic certainty,’\footnote{Michael Cox, “Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?” \textit{International Relations} 26, no. 4 (2012): 370.} culminating in the global financial crisis with its roots in the U.S. financial system, which brought about the collapse of Lehman Brothers and exposed the dubious practices of American banks with regard to sub-prime mortgages.\footnote{For discussion of the US decline debate, see Michael Cox, “Is the United States in Decline - Again?” \textit{International Affairs} 83, no. 4 (2007): 643-653.}

where many Americans continue to believe that the U.S. is a declining power.\textsuperscript{1719} The ‘common sense’ argument says that U.S. hegemony is in decline and that the imminent power transition, created by China’s rise\textsuperscript{1720} will lead to intensified global conflict.\textsuperscript{1721} A global power shift towards China rests on the assumption that the U.S. is facing inevitable decline ‘that will, if it continues, either allow others to take advantage of its weakness or reduce its ability to lead.’\textsuperscript{1722} I have argued in this thesis that the U.S. is not a declining power, and nor is its hegemony waning.

Gramsci situated hegemony in the leader’s capacity to possess the economic, political and cultural conditions that enable its emergence as the leading force.\textsuperscript{1723} The dominant state must be at the heart of economic activity through control of the base – the principal mode of production – and through its capacity to sustain the political and ideological superstructure, through the organisations and institutions of politics and ideology through which it can universalise its ideas over a sustained period of time.\textsuperscript{1724} U.S. economic and financial hegemony continues, in part due to its embedded position in the world economic system and its long-standing regulation of capitalism through international financial institutions. Carla Norrlof observes that despite a gradual economic decline since the end of the World War II, the U.S. still possesses critical features that give it what she calls ‘positional advantages’ over all other states. Norrlof challenges the view that America’s hegemonic burdens outweigh the benefits, suggesting instead that Washington actually acquires more than it spends in the provision of public goods.\textsuperscript{1725} As Doug Stokes has compellingly argued, the privileged status of the dollar affords special advantages to the United States. This particular form of financial power is a side-effect ‘of others willingness to purchase, hold and use the dollar.’\textsuperscript{1726} Stokes concludes that the financial crisis has not weakened the position of the United States as much some have assumed. Moreover, despite the

\textsuperscript{1719} See, for instance, Gideon Rachman, “Think Again: American Decline,” \textit{Foreign Policy} (January/February 2011) [http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/03/think-again-american-decline/] (accessed July 14, 2015). China, with a population of around 20 per cent of the world’s total, generates between approximately one-seventh and one-tenth of global GDP. The United States, with 6 per cent of the world’s population, produces between 20 and 25 per cent. Cox, “Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?” 373.

\textsuperscript{1720} By 2010, China held 11.5 per cent of US Treasury securities, valued at US$895 billion. It had become the key economic player in the Asia-Pacific and was extending its influence in Australia, Latin America and Africa. Robert J. Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 125, no. 3 (2011): 364 (359-392).

\textsuperscript{1721} For Organski’s classic analysis of power transition and why power transitions lead to greater competition, insecurity and potentially war, see Abramo F. Organski, \textit{World Politics} (New York: Knopf, 1958).

\textsuperscript{1722} Cox, “Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?” 372.

\textsuperscript{1723} Joseph, \textit{Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent}, 49.

\textsuperscript{1724} Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 167-169.

\textsuperscript{1725} Norrlof, \textit{America’s Global Advantage}.

financial crisis, the U.S. is still regarded as a safe haven. Contrary to expectations, therefore, the financial crisis confirmed U.S. financial power, not weakened it.

In military preponderance terms, the U.S. has the capacity to mobilise its armed forces to project power globally, spends about 45 per cent of the world’s total on defence, and is still the main provider of security in the Asia-Pacific and Europe. It also retains more military personnel now than it did before 9/11. The extraordinary military capabilities of the U.S. suggests that it is not a declining power. When compared with the military capabilities of China’s armed forces, even with its huge standing army, its growing naval capacity that now includes one aircraft carrier, and the modernisation programme, China’s one aircraft carrier is miniscule when contrasted with America’s eleven carrier groups, and nor does its current military modernisation bring China’s military capabilities any near those of the United States. Even countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific with doubts about America’s current leadership abilities continue to ally themselves with the United States. No other country has the mix of capabilities that can guarantee their security like the United States. In the Asia-Pacific, China’s rise has led many states, including Vietnam and potentially Burma, to request more of a U.S. presence and not less. China’s heavy-handed behaviour in the South China Sea, coupled with its implicit support for North Korea has strengthened America’s position in the region, not weakened it.

American military power is not waning. However, the combination of the war in Iraq, the use of torture in the war on terror, and the global financial crisis in 2008 did prompt questions about America’s capacity to lead, and its willingness to garner support for its policies abroad – which are also integral to the maintenance of its hegemony. Consequently, while its capacity to wield coercive, hard power was evident, social consent for U.S. leadership, prompted by its willingness to unilaterally undermine international norms, was gradually being withdrawn. Consensus was replaced by inducement and self-interest among the subordinate states and coercion on the part of Washington. On this basis, the legitimacy of the U.S. hegemonic order was tarnished in international society, and consequently,

America’s global position was becoming more ‘fragile.’ Furthermore, China’s rise has inevitably put pressure on the existing regional hierarchical order, especially in the Asia-Pacific. Since the threat that ‘China’s rise’ presents to U.S. hegemony is located in more than Chinese physical capabilities, U.S. hegemony rests on more than primacy.

Rationalist accounts versus a non-material approach to the rebalance strategy

(i) Hegemony

The conventional treatment of American hegemony is to connect, and conflate it with American primacy. Put simply, the U.S. must maintain its primacy if it is to remain regional hegemon. American primacy is rooted in material preponderance and the preservation of America’s advantageous power position is in the American interest. Moreover, this view determines that American primacy has facilitated the creation and maintenance of the existing broadly liberal global order that reflects America’s values and interests. Preserving American primacy, according to the ‘usual and crude measures of power,’ implies that the U.S. has superior ability to exert its authority over a broad range of issues and states, establishing, or at the very least, influencing the ‘rules of the game’ in the international arena. Advocates of primacy understand it in terms of relative versus absolute gains and are thus preoccupied with the material manifestations of power as exhibited by territory and resources. These paradigms seem to assume that hegemony equates to ‘omnipotence,’ which skews the relationship between power, leadership and hegemony. This thesis, conversely, has viewed hegemony and primacy in different terms, observing that, ‘superior military capabilities do not necessarily bring superior status, acceptance, or respect.’ Primacy, Dueck observes, is a circumstance and an interest, not a strategy.

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1731 Buzan, “A Leader without Followers?”
1736 Dirk Nabers, for instance, enquires into the relationship between power, hegemony and leadership, whereby the relationship between hegemony and leadership is co-constituted, with power being discursively translated into leadership and hegemony through discursive means. Dirk Nabers, “Power, Leadership and Hegemony in International Politics: The Case of East Asia,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 931.
In seeking to rebalance the insufficiency of realist and liberal paradigms in theorising the relational and normative aspects of hegemony, this thesis has sought to capture the broader bounds of hegemony, considering not only the conventional expressions of power that fixate ‘on the most visible and destructive dimensions of power’ but also on the ‘normative structures and discourses that generate differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests.’ I have treated primacy and hegemony as conceptually distinct. Instead of a limited focus on primacy, hegemonic leadership is a distinctly social phenomenon. In a transforming and increasingly globalised world, American primacy of the 1950s cannot be restored, and the numerous issues facing the world of the twenty-first century – including terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation and climate change – do not respect American primacy.

Since the production of power creates the consequences that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate, in and through social relations, hegemony, therefore, when conceived of as leadership, rests on the capacity of the incumbent to be open to renegotiate the terms of its hegemony. The reproduction of hegemony is contingent on the agency of hegemonic actors and dependent on subordinate states for acceptance or contestation. While Gramsci assumes that legitimacy is inherent within the process of garnering consent, there is, in practice, a continuum of consent that can be located between internalisation of the dominant state’s ideas, norms and practices at one end, and pragmatic acceptance at the other. The need to maintain hegemonic legitimacy is an essential part of this process, emphasising the social and asymmetric relationships that exist between the hegemon and subordinate states. The processes of deriving and bestowing legitimacy requires greater analytical focus. An essential part of legitimacy is credibility, which rests first on an actor’s sufficient material resources to carry out threats, to deter others and to assist allies from attack; and second, rests on whether other states believe that the United States will live up to its pledges. Hegemony, therefore, is a social process, that is neither fixed by, nor condensed to, capabilities. Leadership in the current context thus requires the support and consent of others, including countries such as China, Russia and Iran, with whom the U.S. does not share similar values or world views. These regional powers are themselves constrained within the structure of the existing American-dominated order, into which they have no, or little, input.

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1743 Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” 63-95. Kupchan similarly observes that the modernisation of the rest will not follow the western path to modernity. Consequently, in the future, there are likely to be multiple models of modernity. The American model will need
In Chapter 2, I determined that the production of U.S. hegemony is not merely derived from American preponderance of material power; rather, U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific requires negotiation, consensus and legitimacy. That is, American hegemony rests on the perception of other states concerning America’s right, willingness and capability to lead. In the twenty-first century, primacy, with its preoccupation with military power, cannot alone sustain American leadership, or its credibility. American leadership requires buy-in from other global actors. U.S. regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is sustained and reproduced through the ongoing (re)negotiation of the existing social compact by the U.S. with regional states. It is this social compact, comprising ‘ideas, collective beliefs, and bargains about power, authority, security and community’ that produces and maintains the U.S.-centred hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific. An American-led order, thus, rests on normative foundations, infused with an American understanding of its identity, its values and its belief system. Any perceived threat to this order is also a threat to the hegemonic identity of the United States and to what the U.S. represents. Consequently, while China’s rise does not pose an existential threat to the U.S., it does present some kind of threat to the United States. The imminent threat is not derived in material decline but concerned with non-material ontological security threat – the threat from China’s rising power identity to U.S. hegemonic identity and the challenge to the U.S. of producing a rising power identity for China.

(ii) Identity, security and narrative

In addition to a social practice, hegemony is therefore also a defining characteristic of American identity. The co-constituted processes reproducing American hegemony as both an identity and a practice are inherently social. Similar to the production of hegemonic order, American hegemonic identity requires consistent reproduction through narratives and the practice of foreign policy.

Being the regional hegemon is integral to American self-perception, driven by long-standing beliefs in American exceptionalism. There has been considerable disagreement over the extent to which exceptionalism influences foreign policy. However, the character and meaning of American society encompassed within exceptionalism at the very least ‘provides the framework for discourse in U.S. foreign policy-making even if it is rarely the main determining factor of policy itself.’ In Chapter 3, I examined the American exceptionalist ideology underpinning American identity and perceptions of


1744 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 4-5.

1745 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 5-6.

national security. The aim was to uncover how the exceptionalist belief system helps shape America’s world vision and its hegemonic identity. The story concerning the unique formation of the United States (as either a crusader state or the promised land) is made possible by its exceptionalist beliefs – in its capacity to be unique, in the distinctiveness of its values, and in its capacity to universalise those values – that continue to inform American political life today.\textsuperscript{1747} As a result of the symbiosis of American exceptionalism and America’s hegemonic identity, both must be protected because so much of America’s self-perception and the cohesiveness of its national identity formation rest on its uniqueness and on its manifest destiny.\textsuperscript{1748}

The vacillations in the production of America’s identity are being projected outward onto China through the processes of threat construction and story-telling. The story of ‘China’s rise’ has come to be communicated as a threat to America’s hegemonic position in the Asia-Pacific and to the American-led regional order, made ‘real’ through events. China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, its threat to U.S. freedom of navigation, Chinese attacks on American cyber security and China’s unfair economic practices are some such events or occurrences. The outcome in foreign policy terms is the strategic rebalance, through which the U.S. intends to maintain its leadership position as the regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific by maintaining the existing regional hegemonic order, and reproduce hegemony as an integral part of American self-identity.

State identities need securing just as a state seeks physical security. To this end, ontological security and story-telling processes provide the conceptual focus of Chapter 3. Ontological security – the process of securing one’s own identity – is also a function of the state, requiring the constant production and reproduction of narratives that reflect the nation’s perception of its history, culture and identity. Furthermore, the state also determines the threats that undermine the security of a particular identity. Since threats to identity are often couched in terms of physical security needs, political officials, authorised to act on behalf of the state apparatus, construct narratives that activate foreign policies to counter any threat to identity, often encompassed (and therefore conflated) within the remit of physical security.

\textsuperscript{1747} For more on the pattern of presidents to view America’s global role regarding its values in terms of being either the Crusader State or the Promised Land, see Christopher Hemmer, \textit{American Pendulum: Recurring Debates in US Grand Strategy} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), especially chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{1748} Tomes asserts, for example, that the extent of exceptionalist thinking is likely influenced by both the reality and perception of America’s relative position as a great power. See Robert R. Tomes, “American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century,” \textit{Survival: Global Politics and Strategy} 56, no. 1 (2014): 46-47.
Identity plays an important role in shaping what is constructed as a security threat, and asserted that a state lives in several conditions of (in)security at the same time. The American state seeks to secure self – its ontological security – as well as its traditional physical security-seeking behaviour. Securing America’s hegemonic identity is made possible through the (re)production of the national security narrative that ultimately determines the shape of U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, I have contended that identity and interest formation are endogenously essential to the making of foreign policy, rather than exogenously given. Since narratives are critical to identity formation, and narratives also rely upon the sequencing of events for the elucidation of foreign policy activities, the timing of the decision to announce the rebalance strategy is more significant than is often depicted.

The rebalance strategy has been interpreted from the U.S. perspective, since the purpose of this thesis has been to examine how the hegemon perceives security threats, and how it uses various forms of power at its disposal to maintain order, or at the very least, how it adapts circumstances to maintain the hierarchical status quo. Priority is given to the U.S. within the Asia-Pacific’s regional order, since it is the processes that determine threat perceptions, the choices which determine who represents a threat, and finally, how the U.S. acts upon them, that will shape the future direction of regional order. Furthermore, the state is regarded as the principal actor in U.S. foreign policy-making, on the understanding that identity and state practices are mutually constitutive, and produce real material effects.

Through the U.S. national security narrative, political officials determine the nature of threats and present them as common sense. They are also able to marginalise, or exclude, alternatives, and justify foreign policy activities on this basis. It is the state apparatus, acting on behalf of the state and nation, which establishes the constitution of national security, and defines the ‘strategic perimeter’ that prioritises specific regions and issues. Infused, as they are, by America’s moral behavioural code, U.S. political officials act with authority in accordance with America’s autobiographical belief systems. Acting otherwise would produce what Giddens refers to as ‘shame,’ which would undermine the reproduction of American identity as a benign hegemon. Consequently, I argued that foreign policy-making is not separate from the articulation of identity, rather, that national security subliminally draws upon identity. Particular representations give specific policies a stable foundation upon which identity can then also be reproduced. ‘National security’ is thus required to reproduce ontological as well as

1750 Hemmer, American Pendulum, 14.
1751 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 64-68.
1752 Lene Hansen’s post-structuralist work on the discursive production of the Bosnian war provided useful insight into the formulation of my theoretical framework. Hansen, Security as Practice.
physical security. Since these normative processes are social by nature, it is the intended audience who must interpret China’s rise as a threat, for a state of (in)security to exist. It is through political interaction that a collective understanding of the security threat can be fashioned, simultaneously creating a shared identity that binds a society together.

Domestic identities also play an essential role in shaping national security narratives. The construction of identity and foreign policy are connected through national security narratives that are produced by authorised speakers, namely political and military officials. The ‘meanings that states and other political actors attach to power and security help us explain their behaviour.’ By taking this approach, this research claims that the treatment of the domestic socio-political context is essential to our understanding of the international security environment, and uncovers how material objective facts about security are inserted into the discursive realm. Hansen asserts that it is ‘useful to examine how facts are brought together to constitute events’ in any analysis of foreign policy debates. These ‘facts’ are then assimilated into broader questions of national security within political discourse, where they take on political saliency through the story-telling activities of authorised political actors.

Looking beyond conventional security narratives, this research illuminates the co-constitutive process of policy-making and identity construction of the American state, drawing attention to the processes that traditional IR approaches treat as pre-determined. The socio-political context, in which security is constructed, determines what the state treats as threat or opportunity; it is the social framework within which China’s rise is interpreted, and which determines China to be positioned as a security threat to the United States.

The theoretical approach

This thesis has adhered to a post-positivist, interpretivist epistemology, concerned as it has been with interpreting American foreign policy behaviour, rather than predicting or explaining in the positivist sense. ‘Facts’ are not divorced from theoretical contexts ‘as basis of legitimate claims to knowledge.’ They are established with a certain context which is determined by agents with inherited traditions of thought that drives their way of seeing the world. Consequently, this interpretation of the

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1753 Classical conceptualisations of security, for instance, separate the domestic and international domains. Hansen, Security as Practice, 34.
1755 Hansen, Security as Practice, 32.
1756 Hansen, Security as Practice, 33-34.
empirical material used in this thesis is shaped by my world views and thus interpretivism is an unavoidable mode of analysis. Interpretivists also contend that people act as they do because of their beliefs and knowledge about how the world works, and their place within that world. Agents’ behaviour can only be understood through their beliefs and theories that underpin their interpretations of the meanings of their actions, and the actions of others, in their social world, which also shapes their behaviour. Consequently, interpretivists are concerned with meaning and with explaining what political agents do by interpreting their interpretations of their social world. Interpretivists are not just concerning with understanding what agents think, but also with how and why they act. They are thus concerned with describing and explaining political practices and behaviour, which is what this thesis has set out to do.

Supporting the interpretivist understanding of knowledge, in the introductory chapter, I outlined reasons for choosing a critical constructivist and post-structuralist ontological approach. This mixed approach allows for a theoretical focus on the social sources of hegemony and leadership, and the articulation of identity, with identity simultaneously (re)produced through the formulation and legitimisation of policy through narratives. The premise, therefore, is that social cognitive structures are important, with identity being one of the most important. Since the narrative processes that generate social meaning are often controlled by political officials, the theoretical framework revealed how ‘deeply political and power-laden’ these processes can be. Situations require interpretation and require weaving into an effective story that justifies particular foreign policies; consequently, political officials compete to produce dominant narratives. Moreover, identity structures are the basis for ordering and designing social life, leading to practices as well as giving meaning to action. Opening up hegemony to include identity focuses on the social nature of hegemonic relationships that cannot exist entirely on material primacy. Hegemony is given meaning and ‘being’ through a shared understanding and interpretation by the states in the Asia-Pacific. While the American goal is to maintain the long-standing asymmetry in U.S.-Asia-Pacific relations and regional geopolitics through the existing structure of hierarchy in regional order, America’s position requires the consent of others for its legitimacy, as much as it rests on American material capabilities.

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1761 Hall, “The Promise and Perils of Interpretivism in Australian International Relations,” 309.
Rationalist IR literature tends to frame regional questions such as that of the South China Sea disputes as a matter of international security, typically explained in terms of the distribution of military and economic capabilities. Rationalist approaches tend to explain the rebalance as the administration’s reaction to events, namely China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas. These events have propelled the assertion of America’s hegemonic position in the Asia-Pacific. ‘China’s rise,’ and all that this entails, is deemed to threaten America’s top position in the regional order. Yet, on balance, China does not currently pose a direct, existential threat to the United States or its allies in the Asia-Pacific. The ‘China’s rise’ narrative connects events and weaves them into a believable story, linking specific events into a convincing themed narrative. Realist and liberalist approaches say little about national security narratives; they are overlooked because the established assumption is that only material factors produce security threats. Consequently, rationalist accounts ignore the underlying narratives of national security that determine which facts are relevant, or how threats and opportunities are initially constructed.

Isolating capabilities from the social and political contexts in which such capabilities are found, restricts their explanatory potential. Constructivism offers the opportunity to look beyond rational explanations by illuminating how events – for instance, China’s island-building activities in the South China Sea in disputed waters, or the timing of America’s decision to rebalance – are interpreted by actors and incorporated into foreign policy-making and outcomes. By taking a constructivist approach, which is ‘sensitive to both structures of meaning, with an appreciation for agency,’ this research presents an opportunity to add to the existing coverage of the rebalance strategy. The idea that identity shapes security processes rests on the claim that security is a social construction and is thus the product of social and political processes, rather than being an objective state of nature.

Invoking poststructuralism’s relational conceptualisation of identity allows for an understanding of identity that is ‘always given through reference to something it is not.’ Perceptions of what it means to be American sets out the boundaries for what is understood to be non-American. In other words,

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1764 Countries throughout the Asia-Pacific are competing to modernise their militaries but the arms build-up is not entirely related to China’s recent assertiveness or regional instability. This longer trend reflects the region’s rapid economic growth and increased wealth, and a range of longstanding external and internal security concerns that are not in every case specifically related to China. Economist, “Taking Arms,” February 27, 2016, 54.


1768 Hayes, Constructing National Security, 2.

1769 Hansen, Security as Practice, 6-7.
perceptions of ‘self’ are always related to perceptions of ‘others.’ Identity is also social in the sense that a particular identity is established through collective understandings of what it means to be American. Identity is politically mobilised and constructed within political national security narratives; identities are simultaneously a product of, and the justification for, foreign policy. Consequently, identities are constantly produced and reproduced through foreign policy discourse. Looking beyond the Sino-U.S. rivalry as an outcome of power capabilities, a discursive epistemology focuses on a relational construction of identity. The use of discourse analysis underlies a commitment to uncovering the ‘structures of signification’ that construct these social realities, by defining who is authorised to speak and act, how they endorse a certain ‘common-sense’ through narrative and how their structuring of meaning connects to the practice of foreign policy in ways that are both intelligible and legitimate. Discourse analysis thus supports a constructivist understanding of meaning in which ‘people construct the meaning of things,’ predominantly through linguistic sign systems. The growing rivalry between the U.S. and China is driven by competing statuses and identities, playing out within the framework of the regional hierarchy. China’s self-perception is one of achieving great power status that befits its non-Western, Sino-centric exceptional identity, and the U.S. self-perception is one of a benign, liberal hegemon with a manifest destiny and a universally applicable value system.

The power in American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific

To study how the Obama administration attempts to animate American hegemony, Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power provides the analytical framework for the three empirical chapters. Three elements of the rebalance strategy – the security rebalance, the economic rebalance and U.S. relations with two regional powers, China and India – provide the case studies, illustrating the American use of power to reproduce and consolidate its regional hegemony. Power, as we know, remains an essentially ‘contested concept,’ yet using a comprehensive framework to analyse power in four forms – compulsory, institutional, structural and productive – provides depth to this analysis. Moving the focus away from the economic and military aspects of the rebalance strategy enables the exploration of the depth of American hegemony, and uncovers how America uses elements of its power interactively and relationally. Power is as much a social activity as it is drawn from military and economic

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1770 Hansen, Security as Practice, 26.
1771 Hansen, Security as Practice, 26.
1772 Hansen, Security as Practice, 17.
1775 White, The China Choice, 3.
It is expressed through social constitution as well as interaction. The reproduction of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is just as dependent on America’s ability to institutionalise and maintain the legitimacy of an American-centred order, which invites discussion of how the U.S. uses various forms of power to get what it wants.

Power, like hegemony, remains conceptually problematic. However, operationalising power in different ways, which Barnett and Duvall’s analytical framework supports, offers a more insightful analysis into the workings of American hegemony. Not only do Barnett and Duvall allow for multiple forms of power to co-exist, the contributors in their edited volume, Power in Global Governance, demonstrate how these various forms of power interact and relate, rather than compete. In their varied applications of the taxonomy, perhaps on account of their different theoretical commitments, one or two forms of power receive more attention than the others. Nevertheless, such ‘cross-fertilisation’ is healthy since it promotes dialogues across theoretical perspectives. The use of the four forms of power in this thesis is not meant to detract from the ontological and epistemological differences that exist in the field of IR over power. An integrated approach, however, supports a ‘better, richer, and fuller understanding’ of how power works in international politics. A willingness to look for connections between the various forms of power articulated in this taxonomy ‘enhances and deepens’ our understanding of international relations.

Inherent in any analysis of power, and central to this discussion of hegemony, is the recognition that expressions of power invite contestation and resistance from subordinate states. The social nature of power provokes challenge and resistance from those on the ‘receiving end’ who seek greater capacity to ‘influence the social forces that define them and their parameters for action.’ Power and contestation are thus ‘mutually implicated.’ Resistance to, or contestation of, American hegemony is present in each form of power within the taxonomy. Through the empirical case studies, I

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1777 Barnett and Duvall note that attempts have been made to ‘modify, supplement [and] displace the realist conceptualisation of power but this remains the ‘industry standard.’ Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 8.
1781 In their article, Barnett and Duvall state that ‘there is no ontological or epistemological reason why scholars working with [interactive or constitutive] concepts need exclude the effects identified by the other.’ Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 45.
demonstrated that the American exercise of power generates varying degrees of contestation. Contestation of aspects of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific from time to time can be located not only in Beijing or Pyongyang, but also in the capitals of allies and partners across the region. Furthermore, pushback against the United States can be issue-specific, such as the matter of American bases on Okinawa, or, can take the shape of broader concerns, for instance, over America’s economic liberalisation agenda. However, while there are certainly incidences of contestation, requiring the U.S. to renegotiate the terms of its regional hegemony, this does not point to the overall demise of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Rather, most subordinate states accept the asymmetry of relations in the regional order and the nature of U.S. hegemony – channelled through institutions that encourage collective images and produce ideological legitimacy – is relatively good at absorbing resistance. The exercise of contestation in international relations, in all its forms, therefore, seems as complex as the exercise of power.\footnote{Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 23.}

The U.S. can exercise a range of power assets to maintain its ideological, economic, security and political hegemony, and does so consensually and coercively. Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy pinpoints two dimensions upon which power is expressed. The first dimension concerns the expression of power through interaction and constitution and the second dimension defines the specificity of social relations as being direct and immediate, or indirect, temporally and socially diffuse. Interactive expressions of power – compulsory and institutional – are the more conventional starting points for analyses of power, treating ‘social relations as composed of the actions of pre-constituted social actors towards one another.’\footnote{Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 9.} The constitutive expressions of power – structural and productive – are broadly concerned with how the social capacities of actors are socially produced through the perception of self and other, shaping interests and preferences, with the former working through direct structural relations and the latter entailing more diffuse social processes.\footnote{Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 20. As they explain in their article, constitutive relations cannot be reduced to the attributes, actions, or interactions of pre-given actors. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 46.} Social structures are co-constituted through the actions of agents, and structures such as discourses find expression in the rhetorical practices of actors, as they formulate preferred action. There is a place for agency in the structural and productive elements in this project that focuses its energies on the American exercise of American power.

Like the contributors to Power in Global Governance, this thesis looked for the connections between the different forms of power in each element of the rebalance strategy – the security rebalance, the economic rebalance and U.S. relations with two crucial regional rising powers, India and China. In
each case, the forms of power that animate American hegemony drew attention to the range of tools the U.S. has at its disposal to preserve the asymmetric relations with subordinate states in the region. Each case study attempted to capture the various forms of power expressed, with some more prevalent than others. In addition, each case study also made reference to the varying forms of resistance to aspects of American hegemony. This section addresses each form of power – compulsory, institutional, structural and productive, assessing how each case study reflects U.S. hegemony.

Compulsory Power: America’s coercive edge

Compulsory power rests on the hard, material power resources possessed by a state that directly controls another. Dahl notes that coercive power can be present, even without a physical presence. The starting point of the discussion on the American exercise of compulsory power is the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific that is shaping the behaviour of other states in the region without physical force being applied. The military element of the rebalance sustains America’s goal to remain the preponderant military power in the Asia-Pacific, by augmenting its existing presence, and repositioning a tranche of its military resources towards Australia and Southeast Asia by 2020. The goal is not only to rebalance to, but also to rebalance military hardware within, the Asia-Pacific. American hegemony is underpinned by the capacity of the U.S. military to maintain regional stability and its willingness and capacity to use those preponderant resources to directly shape the actions of others.

The manner in which the U.S. exercises its military power as a means to sustain its hegemony can be both coercive and consensual. In Chapter 4, I considered the exertion of U.S. compulsory power through the rebalance by bilaterally engaging with other regional partners, including India and Vietnam, working towards upgrading these strategic relationships, and enhancing the sphere of American influence across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The broadening of the alliance structure to incorporate burgeoning pluri-lateral arrangements between like-minded American allies also perpetuates and strengthens the existing regional security order. Cooperation between existing American allies expands the coverage of American-sponsored rules and norms concerning regional security behaviour across the Asia-Pacific, in ways that the U.S. could not do alone. The U.S.-Japan-India trilateral grouping extends U.S. influence and its capacity to extend interoperability with partners from Northeast Asia into the Indian Ocean. In Chapter 6, in contrast, I focused on the escalating tensions in the East and South China Seas as demonstration of U.S. willingness to use its preponderant military power as means of deterrence against potential resistance to the regional hegemonic order by China. The inclusion of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands within the U.S-Japan security alliance meant to deter China in the East China Sea after Beijing’s establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ in November 2013.
The exertion of U.S. compulsory power is not stand-alone. These disputes point to the strength of the American-led order that structures the conditions within which China and other regional players, can act and determine their own preferences. Since U.S. hegemony rests on the consent of others, coercion is not the best approach to sustain hegemony. In general, the U.S. does not resort to coercion to maintain the regional security order – rather the opposite. U.S. hegemony has proliferated through the myriad post-war global and regional institutions that could further American interests and spread U.S. values more comprehensively and in which its core regional allies are also heavily invested. The U.S. capacity to influence the direction of regional institutions, and to dominate the ideas that become universally accepted within the order, further sustain its hegemony.

Institutional power: securing American interests through regional multilateral mechanisms

Institutions, therefore, are an essential mechanism through which hegemonic order is sustained. As the more diffuse form of interactive power, institutional power involves the U.S. working through regional institutions to secure favourable outcomes. Institutions with a degree of autonomy from the U.S., and with partial control given to other (usually U.S.-friendly) states, denotes that these institutions are not possessed by the U.S. even though they reflect American views. Global and regional institutions reflect and maintain existing relations of power, producing rules and ideological legitimacy and co-opting officials from subordinate states to absorb counter-hegemonic ideas. Embedding the U.S. presence in regional institutions, including ASEAN, EAS and APEC, and nudging them towards the American way of thinking has been a strategic goal of the Obama administration.

In Chapters 4 and 6, I considered how the U.S. uses regional institutions to create a favourable response to U.S. interests. Despite being a non-member, increasing U.S. involvement with the main regional forum, ASEAN, has been instrumental in U.S. attempts to create common interests and a unified Southeast Asian response to China’s activities in the South and East China Seas. The way in which the U.S. has influenced the regional agenda to make this a regional problem from 2010, requiring a regional response, highlights the combined use of American compulsory and institutional power. Since ASEAN is keen to maintain its independence from either U.S. or Chinese control, the Obama administration has worked with ASEAN and accepted ASEAN’s role as the critical regional institution of Southeast Asia. The U.S. has supported ASEAN in the creation of a Code of Conduct for safe navigation in the South China Sea, advocating a legal framework consistent with the U.S.-favoured approach. Through the application of pressure, the escalated presence and freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea, the U.S. is viewed as discharging a regional stabiliser role, and as protector of UNCLOS, for the common good. This presents the benign face of U.S. hegemony, recognising the role of ASEAN as a critical regional institution, and empowering the regional states via ASEAN to manage the South China
Sea disputes. The empowerment of subordinate states and institutions is an important aspect of U.S. hegemonic maintenance.

In Chapter 5, I considered the role of the U.S. in shaping the regional economic order. The U.S. preference to promote institutions for global economic governance through the IMF, World Bank and WTO highlights a significant disjoint between developed and developing nations, especially in the Asia-Pacific. Institutional power ‘exposes the governing biases of institutions,’ generating ‘unequal leverage or influence in determining collective outcomes.’\(^{1789}\) Also consistent with the biases of institutions is the ability of great powers to preserve or further ‘their interests and positions of advantage,’ without direct or full control over them.\(^{1790}\) These institutions of global or regional governance reflect the underlying global class structure, thus helping to reproduce that structure by fostering a world view that there is either no alternative, or that the current social order is the most appealing.\(^{1791}\)

American hegemony in the economic sphere is more contested, with numerous regional economic actors – states and multilateral institutions – contributing to the dynamism of the regional economy. American influence on the IMF during the Asian Financial Crisis highlighted both the extent of American power and also the limits. The long term consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis produced regional institutions such as the ASEAN +3 mechanism that eschewed American influence. The choice of the U.S. course of action that emphasised coercion, especially working through an institution of global economic governance, the IMF, led to changing institutional terrain and greater contestation of the Washington Consensus. Moreover, the rise of new economic powers, including the BRICS nations has put increasing pressure on the U.S. dominant position in the global and Asia-Pacific economic order, and limited U.S. capacity to unrestrictedly exercise its structural power. These rising economic powers may not ultimately want to destroy the liberal economic order, they do challenge America’s unfettered dominance over the rules of the game and international institutions. The American model of neoliberalism continues to be contested across the region, yet, at present there is no viable alternative to this model, which may provide some explanation as to why many regional states have further locked themselves into this model through the TPP.

\(^{1789}\) Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 58.
\(^{1790}\) Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 58.
\(^{1791}\) Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 60.
Structural power: The U.S. trade agenda

Structures assign agents the capacity to act in the social world. This constitutive element of structural power is, by definition, direct, as agents are enabled and constrained through the internal relations of pre-existing structures. However, states have a role to play in the co-constitution (and reconstitution) of the structures that condition their existence through, for example, economic policy. As chronicled in Chapter 5, the U.S. uses free trade agreements (FTAs) to facilitate the neoliberalisation of the Asia-Pacific political economy, thus buttressing U.S. structural power in the region. The negotiation of FTAs has resulted in greater mobility for transnational capital, safer opportunities for U.S. investors and a general opening of markets through privatisation and deregulation.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations point to the direct power American retains over the structure of the global capitalist economy, as it is manifested in the Asia-Pacific region. The TPP reflects the ideological adherence to neoliberalism, as it supports the U.S. goal of opening markets, deregulation, limiting the number of state-owned enterprises and generally promoting transparency and good governance that will enable American companies to operate on a level playing field in the region. The TPP aims to place the United States at the centre of future regional economic development, shaping its future direction from the inside. Since the intended outcome of the TPP is to ‘lock in’ Asia-Pacific states to a process of economic restructuring compatible with American economic neoliberalism, this process is indicative of a defined connection between the exercise of American structural and productive power. The discourses and institutions of international and regional governance ‘contingently reproduce particular kinds of actors with associated social powers, self-understandings, and performative practices.’

As discussed in Chapter 6, the principal forum for China’s contestation of American-dominated regional economic governance – American structural power – has come in the form of the formal establishment of the China-led regional development bank, the AIIB, in April 2015. While this development does not necessarily imply a direct challenge to American hegemony, Washington’s initial response indicated that this was another step towards Beijing’s aspiration to displace the U.S. as the regional hegemon and to erode America’s capacity to exert structural power over the global economy. Beijing has asserted

1793 US economic influence over Southeast Asia, for instance, will remain limited, since from Southeast Asia, only Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam are current signatories of TPP. Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, for instance, remain within China’s economic orbit, given the high bar for TPP entry. RCEP, despite being less ambitious than TPP, includes all ASEAN states, India and China. Graham, “Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region,” 310.
1794 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 60.
that the AIIB will act in concert with existing regional and international financial institutions. The first AIIB projects are set to be joint efforts: one with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Central Asia and another with the Asian Development Bank in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{1795} At the spring 2016 meetings of the IMF and World Bank, prominent leaders of both the AIIB and the BRICS bank attended sessions on infrastructure with all the world’s multilateral development banks (MDBs).\textsuperscript{1796} One year on, cooperation, rather than confrontation, defines the relationship between the AIIB and the world’s multilateral development banks. This suggests that the U.S. retains considerable dominance over the structure of the global economy, and cultural domination of international institutions through its enduring capacity to universalise American interests, and heading up the still prevailing group of subordinate states.

**Productive Power: Constructing regional narratives**

Productive power works through diffuse and constitutive social processes ‘that are effected only through the meaningful practices of actors.’\textsuperscript{1797} It involves ‘the discursive production of the subjects, the fixing of meanings, and the terms of action, of world politics.’\textsuperscript{1798} Productive power runs through the discursive phenomena that produce identities, ideas and knowledge. It encompasses the contingency of subjects, who can (re)ascribe meaning to themselves and the world around them through language practices and knowledge production. Insofar as they legitimise the actions of more powerful actors, discursive representations are ideological and ideological subordination facilitates ‘rule by consent.’\textsuperscript{1799}

The obvious asymmetry of American compulsory power has conditioned the interests, preferences and even the identity of regional actors (especially the post-war pacifist Japan), as well as shaping the regional security discourse, particularly around the threat that China’s rise represents both to American hegemony and regional security. In Chapter 4, I considered how China’s military assertiveness in the East and South China Seas is increasingly represented as a collective regional security problem, in addition to the threat that China’s activities present to regional commons. While benefitting from the American provision of regional public goods, including freedom of navigation, and generally


\textsuperscript{1796} Buerkle, “China’s AIIB stresses Cooperation, not Competitions with MDBs.”

\textsuperscript{1797} Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 20.


acquiescing to the American military presence around the Asia-Pacific, many regional actors have resisted the security rebalance narrative that appears to support a quasi-containment of China strategy. Initial regional responses to the military balance were low-key. While an increased U.S. military presence is broadly accepted, ASEAN countries have not acquiesced to, or publically supported, the justification of the military rebalance that situates the China threat as the reasoning.  

The U.S. also has a long history of exercising productive power in relation to the process of economic development of the Asia-Pacific. As assessed in Chapter 5, in the case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, the U.S. represents the TPP as the gold standard of free trade agreements. At the same time, the objective is to create a regional Asia-Pacific identity around the TPP. The successful completion of the TPP negotiations became an administration priority in April 2015, in view of the difficult progression of TPA through Congress, and with the establishment of the AIIB by China. The negotiations became increasingly securitised by Obama administration officials, who emphasised the TPP’s significance to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Despite professing to be primarily a tool of American economic power, such actions have security implications. The linking of security and economic realms may potentially shift this free trade agreement into the compulsory power sphere in the future, especially as it makes specific reference to TPP members working collectively on cyber security issues, implicitly focusing on the increasing instances of Chinese cyber espionage against American corporations.

Washington has also consistently discursively delegitimised state capitalist practices that are inconsistent with its neoliberal vision. Conversely, regional contestation of the American-led neoliberal project, the Washington Consensus, has been more prevalent in the economic than in the security sphere. This regional contestation persisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s in the form of the Asian development models for economic growth. Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the effects of the harshness of the IMF bailout, ostensibly drawn up by the IMF, but entirely backed by the United States, are still being felt today, manifested by regional attempts to create Asian-only institutions to

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1800 From a regional perspective, the rebalance initially reawakened the over-militarisation critique of U.S. Asia-Pacific policy, with its upfront focus on the realignment of the US regional presence and on the tensions in the South and East China Seas. Graham, “Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance,” 306.


buffer the American-dominated APEC. The intra-Asian ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping grew from the need for diversify the region’s dependencies and to increase its collective bargaining leverage against the United States.

Chapter 6 focused on America’s application of productive power through the discursive trends that produce identities, ideas and ‘facts’ about what China is, in relation to the United States. As I make the case in the discussion in Chapter 3 concerning the processes that link identity and the national security narrative, China is consistently represented as the threatening other. India, in contrast, is represented in a more favourable light, because it is a democracy, and despite the challenges of the Indo-U.S. relationship. Both India and China contest aspects of American hegemony, even as the U.S. builds ever closer strategic and economic ties with India, and endeavours to create a formal framework for cooperation with China. They individually contest Washington’s attempts to shape their rising power identity, conveyed through their individual, but similar, historical memory narratives concerning their colonisation by western powers. For each, there is an unconcealed aversion to being involuntarily co-opted into the sphere of American preferences and action. In India’s case, it has challenged U.S. interests in the WTO and over climate change. China has asserted its rights in the western Pacific.

The use of this taxonomy has illuminated both the different ways in which U.S. power operates and the interconnections between the forms of power. The next section considers how the rebalance blends into the Obama administration’s broader strategic thinking about U.S. hegemony.

The ‘Obama Doctrine’?

The Global Financial Crisis and the Global War on Terror, and military overspend of the previous decade drew attention to the unsustainability of U.S. defence spending. Obama has no choice but to temper spending and rebalance the financially unsustainable foreign policy excesses of previous

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1804 For further discussion on the divergent trajectories of US-China and US-India relations, based on US perceptions of their value systems and attitudes towards democracy, see Hayes, Constructing National Security.
1805 For an informed discussion of the tensions and parallels in India’s and China’s strategies in the international system, see Lee and Chan, “China’s and India’s Perspectives on Military Intervention,” 179-214.
presidencies. Obama’s approach has prioritised domestic economic issues as a means to strengthen U.S. global leadership overall. Gideon Rose, for instance, understands Obama to be ‘an ideological liberal with a conservative temperament – someone who felt that after a period of reckless overexpansion and belligerent unilateralism, the country’s long-term foreign policy goals could best be furthered by short term retrenchment.’

Critics claim a trend towards isolationism under Obama and condemn his approach to restrained U.S. global leadership as accelerating U.S. decline. Some conservatives have accused Obama of misunderstanding power and the leadership role of the United States in the international system.

While the idea of a ‘grand strategy’ has often centred on military strategy, it requires a broader designation that includes economic priorities as well as military and diplomatic considerations within the nation’s strategic thinking. In essence, grand strategy implies ‘an integrated and inclusive approach to the policies that the state pursues in order to achieve its desired ends.’ The purpose of grand strategy is to define the U.S. role in the international system, and goals that policy-makers want the U.S. to achieve in line with interests and capacity. In this way, it is a framework for outlining the kind of world that the U.S. seeks to build. Academics offer several competing and often overlapping frameworks which define what is included in U.S. grand strategy. In this thesis, a grand strategy is perceived to offer a constant set of principles that underpins foreign policy behaviour. Implicit within

grand strategy are notions of identity, and as a collective endeavour, grand strategic thinking undergoes a constant process of articulation and re-articulation, of defining and redefining threats and interests, and for creating stories to support foreign policy endeavours.

Obama eschews the pursuit of a grand design in favour of small, incremental changes, making case-by-case judgements.\footnote{1816} However, the lack of an overtly verbalised doctrine does not signify that there has been no grand strategic thinking over the course of the presidency. From his inaugural address in January 2009, Obama framed his strategic approach in terms of managing domestic financial problems to ‘lay a new foundation for growth.’\footnote{1817} It was clear that American economic prosperity and security, and predominant international status continue to underpin U.S. foreign policy concerns, as they always have.\footnote{1818} His first National Security Strategy in 2010 outlined his grand strategic objective – to rebuild liberal hegemony – ‘the foundation of American strength and [global] leadership’— that could best be achieved through America’s domestic renewal.\footnote{1819} In acknowledging difficult fiscal realities, it was in the best interests of the United States to invest ‘wisely [in areas that] will yield the biggest returns, which is why the Asia-Pacific represents such a real 21\textsuperscript{st} century opportunity for us.’\footnote{1820}

A crucial theme of Obama’s strategic thinking has been the need to rebalance longer term U.S. foreign policy priorities by moving focus away from the dominance of the U.S. military as the key tool for delivering U.S. foreign policy. Ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, drawing down U.S. troop involvement, and keeping the U.S. military out of new operations in Syria and Libya – the ‘no boots on the ground’ strategy – has highlighted the depth of bipartisan disagreement in the United States concerning how the U.S. should lead in the international order.\footnote{1821} The administration’s view is that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1820] Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”
\end{footnotes}
the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan would allow the U.S. to ‘accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities,’ whilst also ‘press[ing] forward and renew[ing] our leadership.’

However, leading does not mean acting alone. Without international support for interventions in Libya and Syria, the Obama administration has not been prepared to act. This ‘leading from behind’ strategy has not only compounded the perception that the U.S. is a declining power, it has been unsuccessful in diffusing escalating violence in Iraq, or civil war in Syria, and has potentially created the conditions for the advance of ISIS. To avoid repetition of the mire of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration has rejected strategic options that only serve to ‘keep a lid on things.’ As Robert Kagan, writing in the Wall Street Journal observes, preserving the liberal world order has always involved ‘keeping a lid’ on regions in turmoil. Consequently, Obama’s approach has not been interpreted as leadership. The proposed reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe and the Middle East has generated concern and prompted claims that the administration was pursuing an offshore-balancing grand strategy.

Proponents of offshore-balancing argue that the U.S. should strive to maintain its dominance in the western hemisphere, while simultaneously preventing another state from achieving hegemonic status. The only region where competition to U.S. hegemony is likely is in the Asia-Pacific. The unlikely offshore-balancing strategy in Europe and the Middle East, where the U.S. has shown little will from Washington to take the lead, has proven ineffective. Obama’s caution in involving the U.S. military in any major interventions meant only the minimum military effort necessary to achieve limited goals was authorised in Syria and Libya. The limited and delayed U.S. response has allowed Russia to shape the geopolitical situation on the ground. Hemmer also notes that offshore balancing offers little guidance about threats such as nuclear proliferation, climate change or transnational diseases which require

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1822 Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”
1826 Mearsheimer and Walt suggest that even in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S should be an offshore-balancer, relying on regional powers to balance China. However, they concede that the distance between these regional powers makes it difficult to form a balancing coalition. On this basis, the U.S should remain the ‘indispensable nation’ by coordinating their efforts. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2016): 81
multilateral solutions. If Obama’s engagement with these issues suggests a recalibration of U.S. foreign policy commitments, not towards a military-focused offshore-balancing strategy, but rather in the way in which the U.S. leads and determines global priorities.

For much of the post-Cold War period, the effects of globalisation have radically altered the synergy between American national security policy and the international security environment. If there is an ‘Obama Doctrine,’ it rests on Obama’s global world view that recognises the limits of America’s capacity to meet twenty-first century threats alone. As a presidential candidate, Obama defined the U.S. security perimeter in global terms:

‘In today’s globalised world…whether it’s global terrorism or pandemic disease, dramatic climate change or the proliferation of weapons of mass annihilation, the threats we face at the dawn of the 21st century can no longer be contained by borders and boundaries.’

Obama acknowledges that U.S. leadership is not synonymous with bearing the financial and military burdens. ‘Leadership’ involves mobilising the international community, creating coalitions of the willing and working with partners to pay their share. President Obama has redefined America’s national security interests, by discarding the ‘war on terror,’ withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan and pushing the desire to reduce America’s global military footprint. Rather than suspending U.S. global leadership, or shunning military options, Obama has escalated the fight against Islamic terrorism by intensifying the use of drone warfare against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Obama retains a belief in American exceptionalism and in America’s global leadership but his understanding rests on America’s ‘ability to work with international institutions and uphold the rule of law,’ and its capacity to lead by example, rather than on what he terms the outmoded belief in military primacy as the single pillar of American hegemony.

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1827 Hemmer, American Pendulum, 181.
1830 In his 2007 Foreign Affairs article, Obama set out his vision for a post-G.W. Bush foreign policy. In this piece, he stated that, ‘Threats demand a new vision of leadership in the twenty-first century – a vision that draws from the past but is not bound by outdated thinking.’ Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2007): 2-16.
Obama’s legacy in the Asia-Pacific

The Obama administration has prioritised the Asia-Pacific within its global security perimeter. This is not the same as offshore-balancing. Nor is this universal or long-term retrenchment. Rather, partial retrenchment suggests that Obama is attempting to ‘save the core of the liberal order’ by shifting to the region where its hegemony is most challenged. The designation of the Asia-Pacific region as critically important to core American interests is indicative of partial and short-term retrenchment – a recalibration of U.S. priorities to sustain U.S. global leadership into the future – rather than a long-term offshore-balancing strategy. In view of the potential challenge that China’s rise presents to U.S. global leadership, the preservation of U.S. power and influence is the strategic priority. As the U.S. Department of Defense document, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, forewarns, ‘China’s emergence has the potential to affect the U.S. economic and our security in a variety of ways.’ In addition to rebalancing of U.S. military commitments and spending, the main political and strategic priority for future decades will be occupied by determining which great power – the U.S. or China – will structure the Asia-Pacific’s regional order, its institutional framework and the direction of the region’s future.

The rebalance is as much an attempt by the U.S. to structure the Asia-Pacific’s international relations, integrating the region more fully into the U.S.-led order, and securing U.S. hegemony, as it is concerned with managing China’s rise. The rebalance is a comprehensive strategy that aims to ‘future-proof’ the U.S. position as the resident Asia-Pacific power in military, economic and strategic spheres. The rebalance is the realisation of the Obama administration’s strategic thinking that uses a broad range of American power. These strategic themes include a preference for engagement, designed to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to an international order based on rights and responsibilities; improving bilateral relations; pursuing multilateralism where appropriate; and promoting burden-sharing. The rebalance strategy has been developed in keeping with the American liberal international order that is underpinned by the American approach to security and trade, including the extension of openness, rules, a transparent legal framework, institutions and multilateral norms and the support of international laws to resolve disputes.

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1833 Hemmer, American Pendulum, 160.
1836 Ikenberry questions whether the liberal world order still exists in the face of competition from newly rising states with different views, ideas and agendas for global order. G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America,” Foreign Affairs, 56, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 56.
While the goal remains to preserve American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, the challenge is to adapt the regional order to accommodate the rise of China and the ‘normalisation’ of Japan as a political and military power, but ‘to do so in ways that retain the virtue of the old order.’ Managing China’s rise includes shaping China’s rising power identity within the existing order. The prevailing wisdom continues to support engagement on the understanding that the U.S. can shape China’s choices and that China’s participation in the international system will prevent its revisionism and reduce the likelihood of Sino-U.S. conflict. Steinberg and O’Hanlon argue that shaping ‘China’s interpretation of U.S. strategy,’ and its ‘leaders assessments of U.S. intentions’ will produce reciprocal, positive Chinese responses. This approach highlights Washington’s tendency to superimpose its own values and world view bias onto its interactions with Beijing, leaving Washington disappointed with the result. Consequently, Obama has continued to pursue engagement, while at the same time, gradually broadening its own military and economic options in the Asia-Pacific and often striking an adversarial posture as he seeks to reassert American regional hegemony.

(i) Prospects for the Rebalance Strategy

The future of the rebalance falls to Obama’s successor to continue following the November 2016 presidential election. The trade element of the rebalance strategy is hugely contentious. Both parties in Congress – either on political or ideological grounds – could potentially hold up legislative approval of TPP, a vote that Obama hoped to hold in June 2016, is unlikely to occur before Obama leaves the White House. This is despite the administration’s hard-won securing of the Trade Promotion Authority that fast-tracks the legislative process for free trade agreements through Congress. Both Donald Trump, Republican presidential nominee, and Hillary Clinton, Democrat presidential nominee, have spoken out against the TPP deal in its current form, although Clinton may shift towards centre-ground once in the White House. There is also the matter of growing autocracy in the Southeast Asian region, most notably in Malaysia and the Philippines, which complicates the rebalance strategy,

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and the emphasis on human rights and democracy, as Obama’s attempts to entice these states within the U.S. sphere of influence. Deepening autocracy and the erosion of the rule of law in many Southeast Asian states also makes difficult Washington’s efforts to compel China to be bound by international regulations on, for example, the South China Sea disputes.  

As the campaign for the White House intensifies, Clinton and Trump inevitably offer competing visions for U.S. leadership for the next decade. Clinton has positioned herself as a guardian of the post-Second World War geopolitical and economic order, while Trump, a populist, offers an ‘America first’ vision that chimes with voters who have grown wary of the effects of globalisation. A Democratic presidency under Hillary Clinton would most likely continue and further deepen the rebalance strategy, which she fervently supported and executed as Obama’s first Secretary of State. Preliminary indications suggest that Hillary Clinton is more hawkish than Obama on foreign policy, and especially on China. A Hillary Clinton presidency is also likely to continue with the existing security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. Trump, in contrast, has indicated that he would insist on more burden-sharing from what he calls free-riding allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Sino-U.S. relations will remain an essential element of Asia-Pacific strategy but not the only consideration for the incoming President. Establishing a workable framework for Sino-U.S. relations will be critical for regional stability.

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1843 The outcome of the UK referendum in favour of Brexit - UK’s impending exit from the European Union – has highlighted a global nationalist trend, driven by concerns over domestic economies. Trump, aligned with the US version of the UK’s populist Leave campaign, advocates a renegotiation of all US FTAs, including the TPP on the grounds that the US needs to ‘take back control’ of its borders, economy and politics. Courtney Weaver and Demetri Sevastopulo, “White House Rivals Miles Apart on Visions for US Voters,” Financial Times, June 29, 2016, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e8ff178-3e12-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0.html#axzz4D4B9sS60 (accessed June 30, 2016).
Research Contributions

Current literature concentrates on the broader geopolitical implications, and treats the rebalance as a consequence of the competition between the U.S and China as the hegemon versus a rising power. While that may indeed be the case, this research contributes to the growing body of work on the Obama administration’s foreign policy by drawing attention to the non-material processes behind the intention and determination to maintain American hegemony and American power in the Asia-Pacific. The background processes that form the basis of this thesis concern the formation of identity, and thus interests, narrative and how these processes combine to produce and justify foreign policy outcomes. To date, these non-material processes are under-theorised in the existing literature on the rebalance strategy.

Since hegemony and primacy are often conflated within mainstream rationalist approaches, hegemony is treated as an extension of American material economic and military power. Critical, especially neo-Gramscian, approaches to hegemony, in contrast, focus on the social nature of hegemony. Hegemony is a social relationship of dominance that is built upon hierarchical order and relies on the consent of others for reproduction and legitimation. My contribution to the critical study of hegemony is through my interpretation of identity. I view hegemony as essential to the production and reproduction of American identity. How the U.S. acts to maintain its leading position in the regional order is driven by American interpretations of hegemony, which are essential to its understanding of self, as much as it is driven by the need to maintain its preponderant position in regional order. America’s identity as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemon is central to its decision to rebalance.1847

America’s understanding of its hegemonic identity, and the way it practises foreign policy, is interlinked with, and reproduced through, discursive processes, especially narratives/story-telling. The way the American state apparatus discursively constructs security and threats to that security feeds into American foreign policy behaviour, shaping the regional order commensurate with those constructions. These interpretations constrain the U.S. response to events and how it interprets ‘China’s rise.’ The rebalance has been justified on the basis that the U.S. is obliged to respond to China’s growing regional influence and justified in terms of the imminent threat that China now presents to the U.S. and its regional allies. To understand how the U.S. responds to regional trends and especially the rise of China, the internal identity and narrative processes shaping American foreign policy cannot simply be

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assumed; they must be explicitly acknowledged. How identity shapes world view and how identity interacts with real world contexts has implications for the practice of foreign policy.

There is a tendency in discourse analysis to explain how dominant discourses articulated by officials produce foreign policy practices. However, as Milliken observes, the weakness is to omit ‘what happens after a policy is promulgated among high-level officials.’ To go some way to rectify this omission, this thesis applies Barnett and Duvall’s framework of power to examine how power and hegemony intersect and reinforce each other over time. The durability of the hegemonic order relies on the Obama administration’s ability to effectively articulate and use American power assets legitimately. Power, like hegemony, is not reducible to material power advantages. Hegemony is dependent on the hegemon’s ability to garner consent for its order through the appropriate use of its compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. This comprehensive framework enables a study of how the Obama administration uses its power resources to implement and promote the benefits of the rebalance strategy across the region, and to assess the effects of the American use of power on the subordinate states. The focus on the rebalance strategy also provides analysis of how this specific policy has been enacted in a particular circumstance, driven by the ‘China’s rise’ narrative. Since hegemony involves states of being and doing, this research illuminates processes such as identity formation and narrative construction, linking them with foreign policy practices.

The timing of the rebalance strategy – often treated within the existing literature as linked with China’s increasingly assertive behaviour between 2008 and 2010 – is considered in this thesis to be a critical act of decision-making. Others, in contrast, view the timing of the rebalance announcement with the military aspect of the strategy as coincidental. This assumption creates the impression that the announcement of the rebalance strategy in November 2011 was America’s reaction to China’s activities – a position also endorsed by the administration’s official statements and speeches. However, this position cannot deepen our understanding of why key elements of the rebalance strategy were already being implemented from 2009.

The discursive practice of narrative, or story-telling, allows consideration of the timing of the rebalance strategy in historical perspective; the U.S. perception of events, its hegemonic identity and the (re)production of a dominant (or hegemonic) narrative that justifies action. The sequencing of events,

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linking the past and the present, is essential to narrative formation and thus the timing of the rebalance strategy is a critical moment in U.S. identity. The administration’s decision to announce the rebalance in November 2011 was as much propelled by the need to reproduce its hegemonic identity, at the moment its hegemonic identity was being undermined, as it was set in motion by China’s activities in the South China Sea, which, until 2010, were on the periphery of U.S. regional interests. The U.S. reaction was driven by ontological insecurity concerns, manifested in the need to secure physical security.

The discursive practice of narratives illuminates how the Obama administration’s dominant narrative on national security has legitimised the rebalance strategy as a positive move towards the Asia-Pacific – silencing alternative narratives on national security that could have defined the rebalance in strategic terms as anything other than a means to contain the ‘China threat.’ Two separate but interlinked narratives linked to self-identity and China’s identity are highlighted in this thesis: an autobiographical historical narrative linked to American exceptionalism, and a narrative about the threatening China’s ‘rising power’ identity. The rebalance strategy can still be interpreted as a reaction of the administration to the idea of ‘China’s rise’; however, this thesis asserts that ‘China’s rise’ is not simply a neutral term but one which relies on intersubjective understanding for its meaning. U.S. political officials constantly realign the two processes of identity and narrative construction as they react to events and policy practices. U.S. leaders attempt to sustain American ontological security, systematically buttressing its hegemony to feel less ontologically insecure and does this through threat narratives.

This thesis also engages with the developing literature on ontological security in International Relations. Prioritising ontological security instead of a myopic focus on physical security allows for the combining of identity and security processes. This conceptualisation of ontological security also incorporates the link to physical security. American ontological security-seeking behaviours have a direct consequence on physical security, with the U.S. interpreting China’s activities as a threat to American physical security and that of its allies. As Rumelili observes, ‘concerns about instability and uncertainty of being can easily be politically manipulated into concerns about survival.’ Furthermore, the conceptualisation of ontological security developed in this thesis disaggregates ontological security into states of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ that allows for the examination of particular foreign policy strategies, like the rebalance, as a means to sustain and reproduce American hegemonic identity. As both Mitzen

1850 Rumelili, “Identity and Desecuritisation,” 60.
and Steele independently observe, empirical phenomena are actually identity threats. By disaggregating ontological and physical security, this thesis is able to look at the constituting effects that these two conditions of security have on each other – neither privileging one over the other, thus broadening the position of existing literature on ‘security.’

One criticism levelled at an ontological security approach concerns the extrapolation from individual ontological security to state level. After all, states are not human beings and their behaviour might be subject to different logics. Critics argue that collectives – states and nations – do not have the same psychological needs as people and consequently, caution must be exercised towards any approach which seeks to treat them equally. Since we assume states seek physical security, why not also ontological security? Both are theoretically productive. Fundamental to the role of the state and its legitimacy is its ability to mediate anxieties by providing for basic individual and social needs, not only by providing order and physical and economic security, but also by providing reassurance about the nature of the world and the continuity of one’s self identity as seen through the collective.

Focus on ontological security in IR deepens existing understanding of state identity and the consequences for foreign policy. A society must be ‘cognitively stable’ in order to secure the identities of the individuals they seek to protect, and individuals become attached to these stable identities. States also exhibit behaviours that strengthen the ontological security-seeking position. States seek similarities with, or distinctiveness from, other groups, and seek routinised relations with other groups. The state also projects self-images that are either accepted or rejected by other states. Mitzen observes that the irrational reactions states exhibit towards another suggests that states, like humans, also reproduce mistrust, even without a physical threat being present. While collective actors like states do not have psychologies, they are constituted by, and seek to promote, certain values. Simply put, collectives, like nations and states, do have biographies, which are emotive and contested, and which policy leaders acting in their name, are both aware of, and seek to uphold. Self-narratives are not

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only important in connecting identities to interests but also entail significant emotional content – an element largely ignored in much constructivist analysis.\footnote{1860}

Limitations and future research opportunities

Rather than framing this research through the success of the rebalance strategy as a means to measure the strength of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, priority has been given to discerning how the American exercise of power through the rebalance strategy, which underpins the reproduction of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. American identity, preferences, interests and foreign policy choices have therefore provided the main foci. The administration has also consistently maintained that a crucial goal of the rebalance strategy is to reassure allies of the sustainability and willingness of the United States to lead the regional order. The degree to which individual Asia-Pacific nations feel reassured is vital for measuring the success of the rebalance strategy. Such a project would require extensive field work throughout the Asia-Pacific to ascertain individual state perspectives on whether they feel more or less secure with the rebalance. This would necessitate evaluation of the extent to which Asia-Pacific states are being drawn to the rebalance strategy, as a means of measuring its success, rather than their being drawn to the U.S. because of their greater concern over China. Although the Obama administration’s economic, diplomatic and military contributions to the region are many, measuring its tangible success is outside the scope of this project. The effectiveness of the rebalance strategy is not evaluated in this thesis since this is not the focus of this particular project. Such a project may also consider resistance to American hegemony from the perspective of the subordinate regional states – and not just China.\footnote{1861}

Finally, the constructivist approach of this thesis does not support any predictions concerning the trajectory of U.S-China relations. Nor does this thesis intend to offer any prescriptive plans that could improve American chances of maintaining its regional hegemony. China and the U.S. have different value structures and preferences, they also have fundamentally different identities, through which they have distinct visions for regional order in the Asia-Pacific and potentially for global order. The discourse of security, in addition to threat construction, facilitates the construction of self and other, presenting as natural what is essential contingent and culturally/historically-specific definitions of interstate relations. As Hansen observes, constructions of identity can take on varying degrees of

\footnote{1861} Goh’s work has taken this stance from the post-Cold War period. This position could be developed to include the rebalance. See Goh, The Struggle for Order.
Campbell additionally opens up the possibility that identity need not be constructed through radical otherness. Identity is never fixed or final; it is always in the process of becoming. There are still a range of options that can influence the direction of U.S.-China relations. America’s ‘pushback’ against the unknown quantity that is China’s rising power identity is a ‘natural and instinctive response’, but it is not the only possible response.

Judging the strength and U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific will inevitably depend upon America’s capacity and willingness to manage relations with China. If the rebalance strategy continues to form the framework of U.S-Asia-Pacific strategy, the U.S. will need to engage with regional allies, both multilaterally and bilaterally, to improve their economic and military capacities, to project American power, and to secure regional public goods, such as freedom of navigation, in addition to working with China bilaterally and multilaterally on matters of regional and global importance. One of the key challenges of the Obama administration, which will continue in the new administration, is the building of a political consensus at home and abroad that accepts some fundamental changes occurring in the international system and the constraints this places on America’s unilateral use of force. The challenge is also to adapt traditional thinking on America’s hegemonic identity, which is primarily focused on preserving primacy and maintaining the status quo. Instead, prolonging American hegemony requires re-negotiating the terms of its regional leadership by acknowledging the legitimacy of regimes that do not necessarily adhere to the American model.

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1863 Campbell, *Writing Security*.

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