CULTURES OF HONOR

Ayse K. Uskul*
University of Kent

Susan E. Cross*
Iowa State University

Ceren Günsoy
Iowa State University

Pelin Gul
University of Kent


* Corresponding Authors: Ayse K. Uskul & Susan E. Cross
The slogan “Don’t mess with Texas” is plastered on billboards, road signs, and souvenirs from this US state. It was originally designed as part of an anti-littering campaign, but it quickly caught on as a statement of Texas identity and braggadocio. In this context, to “mess with” someone means to taunt, tease, or threaten them in some way, and Texans are proud of their heritage of standing up to such threats (Fehrenbach, 2000).

Texas is one example of a culture of honor, where defense of one’s reputation by violence if necessary is a key cultural concern. The construct of cultures of honor has emerged in the past two decades as an important theoretical perspective that explains cultural variation in attitudes, behavior, and practices. This topic was brought to the attention of the field by the pioneering work of Nisbett and Cohen (Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). They focused on how the southern and western regions of the United States could be understood in terms of culture of honor formulations first developed by anthropologists studying Mediterranean communities. Since their initial research in the 1990’s, many other researchers have effectively applied this conceptualization to understand cultural influences on behavior in regions that are characterized by a culture of honor. In this chapter, we will first briefly review the research that led to Nisbett and Cohen’s (1996) articulation of the culture of honor theory in the context of social psychology, and the research that has ensued.

**Historical and Anthropological Foundations**

Three streams of scholarship laid the foundation for Nisbett and Cohen’s groundbreaking work on the southern culture of honor in the US. The first stream comes from anthropologists working in Greece, Spain, and other Mediterranean contexts, who described honor as a core concern in the region. One of the first anthropologists to write about honor, Pitt-Rivers (1965) described it this way: "Honor is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society" (p. 21). This definition includes the individual’s self-esteem and social image (or reputation) – how the individual evaluates him/herself, and how others evaluate the
individual. The foundations or sources of these evaluations are unmentioned in this definition, but they include the individual’s adherence to a particular honor or moral code (the behaviors expected of a person in that cultural context), as well as the person’s roles or status in the community (Campbell, 1964; Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965). Honor and respect are easily lost in these cultural contexts and once lost, difficult to recover (Stewart, 1994). Consequently, people engage in a variety of behaviors meant to earn or maintain others’ respect (e.g., living by the local honor code) or to defend their reputation from affront (Peristiany, 1965). The importance of honor in these cultural contexts is expressed in proverbs such as “Give your life; take honor in return” (Circassian) and “Honor before bread” (Arabic).

The second stream of scholarship started soon after the publication of the work by Pitt-Rivers and Peristiany describing the culture of honor in the Mediterranean, when Edgerton (1971) and Goldschmidt (1965) published their work on culture and ecology. They found that cultural traditions and means of subsistence (farming vs. herding) both were associated with the traits, attitudes, and behaviors of members of four East African tribes. In particular, although members of individual tribes were more similar to each other than to members of other tribes, there were consistent differences between herders and farmers in each of the tribes. Compared to the farmers, herders were more independent, self-reliant, aggressive, brave, and willing to withstand hardship due to the demands of caring for willful animals, the need to find pasture and water, and constant alertness to threats to the herd. In contrast, farmers were more emotionally constrained and cooperative with others, because their livelihood did not require constant vigilance and decision-making (Edgerton, 1971; Goldschmidt, 1965; see also Bolton et al., 1976).

The third stream of scholarship that shaped Nisbett and Cohen’s culture of honor hypothesis was a body of historical and sociological research that focused on the cultural, psychological, and sociological characteristics that differentiated the US South from other regions. Among other differences, the US South was shown to be more violent than the North
and Midwest regions of the US (Gastil, 1971, 1989; Hackney, 1969). Explanations for this
difference have pointed to the history of slavery (Tocqueville, 1835/1969), higher levels of
poverty and economic inequality in the South (Loftin & Hill, 1974), and hotter temperatures
(Anderson, 1989). Some historians, however, argued that this difference could be a function of
the settlement of the region by Scots, Welsh, and Irish. The Scots-Irish settlers brought with
them a legacy of open-range herding and with it an attitude that men must respond aggressively
to affronts (McWhiney, 1988; Fischer, 1989; Wyatt-Brown, 1982, 1986; see Brown & Osterman,
2012, for a useful summary). When men were the victims of affronts, threats, or theft, legal
means of recourse were often unavailable; thus, they were expected to take matters into their
own hands and duel or fight it out (McWhiney, 1988). In contrast, the Anglo-Saxons and
Northern Europeans who settled the northern and midwestern regions of the US were largely
farmers, and they brought with them cultural traditions that were more oriented toward
cooperation and the rule of law, compared to the Scotch-Welsh-Irish (Fischer, 1989).

These three lines of scholarship laid the foundation for Nisbett and Cohen's (1996)
hypothesis that high levels of violence and homicide in the American South can be explained in
terms of a culture of honor. Nisbett and Cohen argued that cultures of honor are most
commonly found in ecological contexts in which a) resources are scarce and individuals’
possessions are easily appropriated by others; and b) law enforcement is weak or absent and
so cannot easily prevent or punish theft (see also Schneider, 1971). These conditions are
common in regions where the chief source of subsistence is herding animals; such ecologies
are often ill-suited for intensive agriculture because they are arid, rocky, or mountainous. In
these regions, resources are often scarce, so raiding of herds is common; and the space
needed to maintain a herd results in low population densities and thereby lower levels of police
presence compared to other contexts. Ecologies that are used to graze animals are also difficult
to police due to lack of access, mountainous terrain, or long distances between settlements. As
a result, owners of herds must present an image of strength and a willingness to retaliate
against any possible threat to their possessions. A man’s reputation for vigorous, aggressive responses to any threat, real or perceived, leads others to have second thoughts about messing with him and his possessions. The crux of the culture of honor thesis is that the values, beliefs, norms, and practices brought to the American South by the Celtic peoples of the Scottish, Irish and Welsh borderlands have persisted and account for regional differences in some forms of violence (Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Nisbett, Polly, & Lang, 1995). As we summarize later in the chapter, Nisbett and Cohen found support for this thesis in a series of archival, experimental, and survey-based studies.

**Theoretical Framework for Honor and Dignity Cultures**

More recently, Leung and Cohen (2011) articulated a formulation that distinguishes cultures of honor from non-honor (or dignity) cultures of Northern Europe and the Northern and Midwestern US (as well as face cultures of East Asia, but we leave that discussion for another time). Following the work of Triandis (1994), they depict honor and dignity as cultural syndromes that are “constellations of shared beliefs, values, behaviors, practices and so on that are organized around a central theme” (p. 508). These diverse components of the cultural syndrome become part of a cultural logic that makes the varied elements (beliefs, values, practices, etc.) fit together into a coherent whole (at least from the perspective of members of that cultural group). The cultural logic of honor cultures is based on conceptions of individual worth as both internal to the individual and external (in others’ appraisals), that worth (honor) can be lost, and that good behavior comes from a desire to avoid shame (for personal failures) or retaliation (for affronts to others). Due to their origins in lawless environments, immediate responses to affront, or payback, creates a strong norm of reciprocity, which results in both positive reciprocity (returning gifts or hospitality) and negative reciprocity (retaliation for insults or harm). Leung and Cohen (2011) contend that reciprocity and reputation are so important in cultures of honor that they lead to short-term irrationality. People may not count the costs and hardships involved
in paying back an insult or returning a favor, because the burden of the obligation (to retaliate or to reciprocate) weighs so heavily.

Nisbett and Cohen’s earliest research contrasted the Southern US culture of honor with the Northern and Midwestern regions of the country, where different patterns of settlement and farming-based means of subsistence shaped a cultural logic that focused on collaboration with others (rather than competition). These regions of the US reflect the cultural norms and values of their northern and western European settlers. Although honor was an important legal and social construct in much of Western Europe from the 12th to the 18th Centuries (Bowman, 2006; Stewart, 1994), by the 18th century, the internal, self-respect and personal integrity component of honor began to dominate and the external, reputation-related component began to fade in importance. By the mid-20th century, notions of honor based on virtue, manliness, or hierarchy in Western European and Northern US contexts had given way to ideals of equality and concerns for the dignity and rights of the individual, without respect to the person’s position in society (Berger, Berger, & Kellner, 1973). Thus, the term “dignity culture” began to be applied to societies that affirmed individual human rights, equality, and the supremacy of personal characteristics over identity based on social roles, status, or family and group memberships.

In the cultural logic of dignity cultures, individuals are presumed to have inherent worth that is not “losable” like honor (Stewart, 1994). Instead, dignity is like an “internal skeleton” (Ayers, 1984); it is the person’s moral center and the core of identity. A strong sense of dignity, or of personal identity, allows the individual’s behavior to be self-determined and guided by the person’s own values, beliefs, and moral standards. Individual behavior is therefore constrained by guilt over failure to act in accord with one’s personal standards (in contrast to the shame of public reprobation in honor cultures), and is backed up by an adequate system of law enforcement. Leung and Cohen (2011) go on to characterize dignity cultures as typically having strong rule of law that protects individuals (as opposed to the bonds of reciprocity in honor cultures). Vengeance for wrongs is taken out of the hands of the individual and given to the
state; thus, reciprocity and retaliation has lost its strong salience in these societies (Miller, 1993).

These descriptions represent “ideal” types of honor or dignity cultures. In this view, a particular context is either characterized as an honor culture or not; if it is not an honor culture, then it is another kind of culture (perhaps a dignity culture or a face culture, as in East Asia). For example, anthropologists have described cultures that ring the Mediterranean as honor cultures (Peristiany, 1965). This perspective is also reflected in research on subcultures of honor, such as inner city gangs (Anderson, 1994) or Mafiosi (D'Andrade, 2002). Others have conceptualized honor cultures in terms of a single dimension on which multiple countries or societies may be arrayed (from highly honor-oriented to weakly honor-oriented). No single attribute of a society marks it as an honor culture, so scholars have used combinations of multiple factors as proxies for such a dimension. These have included measures such as the degree of economic precariousness that requires vigilant defense of one’s property and the trustworthiness of police protection (Altheimer, 2012), and the degree of settlement by herders or by immigrants from the Scotch-Irish borderlands (e.g., Baller, Zevenbergen, and Messner, 2009).

One could argue that the situations that create honor-related norms are available in many cultures, but may not be as accessible in some contexts as in others. For example, if vigilance for threats to one’s reputation is a key element of an honor-related context, then this concern could be primed among members of dignity cultures, who may then behave similarly to people who have been part of honor cultures their entire lives (IJzerman & Cohen, 2011; for further description of this conception of culture as situated cognition, see Oyserman, 2011). Finally, others have conceptualized honor cultures in terms of individual differences in the endorsement of the elements that make up the cultural logic of honor cultures (e.g., concern for reputation and retribution). Given this view, honor cultures would be those contexts composed of people who highly endorse these elements. Various measures of honor-related concerns or
ideologies have been created to assess individual differences and to examine their role in honor-related behavior (e.g., Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002b; Saucier & McManus, 2014). Attention to individual differences also permits researchers to tap variation in endorsement of the cultural logic within a group, and to identify when and where the prototypical values of a community are most likely to shape individual behavior (Leung & Cohen, 2011).

Review and Assessment

In the two decades that have passed since the publication of Nisbett and Cohen's first work on cultures of honor, their theoretical formulation has generated considerable new research and has become a prominent perspective for understanding cultural variation. It has been especially useful in helping researchers go beyond the earlier trends in cultural psychology that focused primarily on the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism (or its individual-level equivalent of independent/interdependent self-construals; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). Certainly the culture of honor thesis is not independent of individualism/collectivism (in fact, Vandello and Cohen, 1999, demonstrated that the American South is more collectivist than the American North), but, like a microscope illuminates objects too small to be seen by the naked eye, it clarified regional patterns of behavior that were not readily detected by other cultural lenses. For example, a growing literature has begun to demonstrate key differences among collectivistic “face” cultures (such as Japan or China) and collectivistic honor cultures (such as Turkey or Pakistan; Leung & Cohen, 2011; Boiger, Güngör, Karasawa, & Mesquita, 2014; Uskul, Oyserman, Schwarz, Lee, & Xu, 2013). Compared to honor cultures, face cultures are more strongly marked by concerns for hierarchy, humility, and harmony (Leung & Cohen, 2011). In face cultures, strong social norms and attitudes lead people to avoid conflict; when an offense occurs, the group or a higher-status person takes responsibility for meting out punishment, not the victim of the offense. Although honor and face
cultures may both be viewed as relatively collectivistic, they vary considerably in the ways reputation and social status are maintained (through retaliation versus humility and harmony) and attitudes toward conflict. Finally, the culture of honor thesis is a very useful lens for examining under-researched regions of the world, such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Latin America.

In the sections that follow, we first describe components of honor that have been revealed in research; we then review research that has used the theoretical lens of the culture of honor to explain variation in interpersonal behavior—especially violence and aggression—and associated emotion. Finally, we provide observations on the state of the research and suggest future directions for research in cultures of honor.

Components of Honor

From the earliest description of honor by social scientists, the construct has been viewed as having multiple components. Pitt-Rivers' (1965) definition of honor as “the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society” (p. 21) articulates two central dimensions: the individual's own perceptions of worth, and others’ evaluations of the person’s worth. This definition, however, is mute as to the basis for these evaluations of a person’s worth. Pitt-Rivers (1966) elaborated by explicitly linking honor to an individual’s conduct and then linking conduct to others’ evaluations. The expectations or standards of a cultural group for their members’ behavior have been called an honor code (Peristiany, 1965; Pitt-Rivers, 1965; Stewart, 1994). The content of the honor code for different cultural groups varies, but some features are consistent across most contexts. Honor based on individual, personal behavior has sometimes been referred to as horizontal honor, or honor-as-virtue (Pitt-Rivers, 1965; Stewart, 1994). In addition, individuals may also be respected by others based on their position, status, wealth, or achievements. This form of honor has been termed vertical honor or honor as precedence. This vertical form of honor is reflected in respect for the ingroup-relevant authorities, deference to the elderly, and attention to hierarchies and status (Henry, 2009; Salzman, 2008).
In the following description of research on components of honor, we focus primarily on the features or components that contribute to horizontal honor, or honor-as-virtue, as this is the focus of most research to date.

**Self-image and social image.** The two components of honor identified by Pitt-Rivers (1965) and Peristiany (1965) – self-image and social image – are the most commonly assessed components in subsequent research. Self-esteem, or self-respect, is the component that is most strongly shared between honor and non-honor (or dignity) cultures. For example, when Rodriguez Mosquera asked young people (aged 12 to 23) from Spain (an honor culture) and the Netherlands (a dignity culture) to answer the question “What does honor mean to you?” members of both groups generated a similar proportion of responses related to one’s sense of worth or self-image (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a). Similarly, a prototype analysis of features of honor generated by Turkish (an honor culture) and northern American (a dignity culture) college students revealed that self-respect was one of three factors that was central in both cultural contexts (Cross et al., 2014).

Honor and dignity cultures are most strongly differentiated by the importance of social image (Fischer, Manstead, & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999). In dignity cultures, individuals are encouraged to construct a self-view that is independent of others’ views and evaluations (although the likelihood that one could actually do this is questionable). Encouragement to disregard the taunts or insults of others is reflected in children’s sayings such as “Sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me.” In contrast, children in cultures of honor are socialized to develop a concern for others’ opinions, represented by a sense of shame (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Kağıtçıbaşı & Sunar, 1992; Taylor & Oskay, 1995; Yağmurlu, Çıtlak, Dost, & Leyendecker, 2009). Children who misbehave are often chided with statements such as “Shame on you! What will other people think of you?” Consequently, members of honor cultures are much more concerned about how others will evaluate their behavior, and therefore they are more likely to behave in ways that protect or maintain their social image compared to
members of dignity cultures (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996). The person who fails to do so may be ostracized from important groups, gossiped about, and discriminated against (Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001; Wikan, 2008).

Support for social image as a key component of the concept of honor comes from many sources. When asked to describe situations that would threaten a person’s honor, Turkish participants were more likely than Northern American participants to describe situations that included an audience or an event that included a social group (Uskul, Cross, Sunbay, Gerçek-Swing, & Ataca., 2012). Furthermore, Turkish participants generated more situations that involved false accusations than did the northern Americans; to be accused falsely of cheating, for example, stains one’s social image. When asked to describe situations that could enhance a person’s honor, Turkish participants were more likely than Northern Americans to list situations that involved being praised or appreciated by others (Uskul et al., 2012). Social image or respect was one of three factors that emerged in the Cross et al. (2014) prototype analysis of features of honor in Turkey and Northern US contexts (see also the Honor Values Scale of Rodríguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). Behaviorally, insulted men from the US South are more likely than men from the US North to engage in dominance related behaviors that that would repair one’s social image as masculine, tough, and not to be messed with (Cohen et al., 1996).

Moral behavior. Implicit in the conceptualization of honor is a foundation of personal behavior and morality, or the honor code. Stewart (1994, p. 55) describes the honor code as “a set of standards that has been picked out as having particular importance, that measures an individual’s worth along some profoundly significant dimensions; and a member of the honor group who fails to meet these standards is viewed not just as inferior but often also as despicable.” Honor codes observed by anthropologists in the Mediterranean region included attributes related to fairness and justice, hospitality, and protection of one’s family (Pitt-Rivers, 1965). Importantly, there are different honor codes for men and women; traditionally, men were
expected to demonstrate strength, toughness, and swift retaliation against threats, along with virility and sexual potency; women were expected to demonstrate modesty, chastity, sexual fidelity, and obedience to authority (Campbell, 1964; Gilmore, 1987; Rodriguez Mosquera, 2011; Peristiany, 1965; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Schneider, 1971). We review this literature later, but here we briefly survey the literature that connects honor to moral attributes.

The importance of integrity and virtuous behavior is in many ways the bedrock of cultures of honor, especially with regard to horizontal honor or honor among equals. The scoundrel, liar, or thief cannot be considered honorable. Instead, the honorable person is trustworthy, hospitable, honest, and true to his/her word (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). Cohen and Leung (2012, p. 162) describe the role these attributes play in the development of cultures of honor, where law enforcement was often weak: “In lawless environments, …it is good to be known as someone who will pay back both his threats and his debts – [one] who has the backbone to stand up for himself and his rights and the backbone to do what is right (rather than merely expedient).”

Consistent with the centrality of integrity in conceptions of honor, recent research in Turkey and Northern US has shown that behaviors such as honesty and trustworthiness are central to conceptions of honor in these cultural contexts (Cross et al., 2014). In fact, when asked to describe the concept of “honor” both Turkish and Northern Americans listed honesty or trustworthiness as one of the most central features of the concept of honor. Similarly, Uskul et al. (2012) found that when asked to describe how a person’s honor can be threatened, Turkish participants were more likely than Northern Americans to generate situations that unfairly attacked a person’s integrity or moral behavior.

One characteristic of the integrity component of honor is reciprocity. As mentioned above, cultures of honor originated in lawless environments where men had to develop a reputation as reliable, trustworthy partners along with a reputation for swift and strong response to wrongs and injustices. Thus, a good person in a culture of honor pays back both positive
actions (reciprocating a gift, for example) and negative affronts (retaliating against the source of a wrong; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In contrast, in dignity cultures, exchanges are marked by a contractual orientation backed up by individuals’ commitment to their own personal standards of honesty and a rule of law that enforces contracts. The role of reciprocity in honor versus dignity cultures was examined by Leung and Cohen (2011), who found that endorsement of honor-related aggression (retaliation after an insult) was positively related to returning a favor among members of honor cultures (American Latinos and Southern Anglos), but not among members of a dignity culture (northern Anglos).

In a culture of honor, the virtue component of honor is woven together with other components of honor, including masculine honor. One place where the attributes of masculine honor — strength, physical courage, and the defense of one’s group — is most highly institutionalized is in the military. Cohen and Leung (2012) examined historians’ and other experts’ ratings of US presidents, legislators, and Supreme Court Justices for their character and integrity, moral courage, and military experience. For all three groups, Cohen and Leung found that involvement in the military (especially leadership positions) positively predicted high levels of integrity or moral leadership among southern, but not northern, political figures. These findings suggest that in cultures of honor, an honest man who is not willing to fight for what is right is not an honorable man. In contrast, among members of dignity cultures, a man of virtue and integrity does not have to engage in physical aggression or violence to be considered honorable (see also Barnes et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 1996).

Individual acts of honesty, courage, or reciprocity are not the only ways that moral values penetrate the honor code; behaviors that enhance the standing of one’s family or ingroups and vigorous responses to threats to the reputation of one's ingroups are also critical to conceptions of the honorable person in cultures of honor. We address this element of honor later in the chapter. For now, the research on morality and honor can be summarized this way: in a culture of honor, the dishonorable person has not just made a mistake or done something
bad that is known by others, he or she is *immoral*, contaminated, and, in the words of Stewart (1994, p. 55) “viewed not just as inferior but often also as despicable.” Much as sin in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam requires atonement, so also a threat to one’s honor requires an action that in some way “cleanses the stain” of dishonor (Ginat, 1997).

**Honor as precedence.** As mentioned above, anthropologists also described honor in terms of status and hierarchy, with high-status individuals or families accorded more respect than others (Pitt-Rivers, 1965; Salzman, 2008). In his description of Bedouin blood feuds between families, Kressel (1996) describes the material costs of victory in such conflicts this way: “[Victory brings] the intangible benefit of enhanced self-image concomitant with hierarchical status… in a society that values family honor over economic achievements, [greater] deference more than compensates for the lack of material rewards” (p. 158). Henry (2009) addressed this component of honor in his theory of *low status compensation*. Drawing upon the early work by Nisbett and Cohen (1996), he argued that the link between herding societies and violent self-defense is attributable to status disparities in these societies and the desire of low status group members to bolster their threatened self-worth. Low status group members perceive themselves as stigmatized and experience defensiveness in their social interactions, which tends to translate into aggressive behaviors. When lower status participants have the opportunity to affirm their self-worth, however, they are less likely to show aggression when disrespected (Henry, 2009).

**Gendered components of honor.** Reputational concerns in honor cultures not only revolve around integrity, virtue and good moral character, but also tend to be gender-specific and include different honor codes for men and women. As noted earlier, for men, having honor means maintaining a reputation for strength, toughness, courage, vigilance in defending oneself from insults, willingness to protect one’s women, and authority over family. For women, having honor means maintaining a reputation for sexual purity, chastity and loyalty to men and family (Campbell, 1964; Gilmore, 1987; Rodriguez Mosquera, 2011; Peristiany, 1965; Pitt-Rivers,
1977; Schneider, 1971). Even though, these gendered honor codes are part of traditional
gender roles which exist nearly in all cultures worldwide (Gilmore, 1990; Rodriuez Mosquera,
2011), honor cultures exacerbate the importance of their inhabitants to comply with these
gender roles (Bosson & Vandello, 2011; Vandello & Cohen, 2008). The proximal reason for
honor cultures to place high value and expectations on men’s and women’s adherence to their
gendered honor codes is related to the costly consequences associated with losing honor.
Failure of individuals to fulfill their gendered honor codes bring shame upon the individual and
their families, and may have detrimental consequences for their self-esteem, health and well-
being (e.g., Mahalingam & Leu, 2015; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001; Vandello & Cohen, 2003, 2008).
Because of honor’s precarious status and the potentially costly consequences associated with
losing honor, both men and women in cultures of honor are sensitive to threats to their honor.
They engage in a variety of behaviors to maintain and protect it, and once it is tarnished, to
reaffirm their honor.

Traditional honor cultures tend to be also highly patriarchal, subordinating women and
exerting control over her sexuality (Glick, Sakalli-Ugurlu, Akbas, Metin, & Ceylan, 2015; Sev’er
& Yurdakul, 2001). In honor cultures, men’s reputation does not only depend on his own
behavior, but also on the behavior of his women (wives, sisters, daughters, etc.), especially their
sexuality. Men are held responsible for guarding women’s behavior to ensure that they remain
sexually pure and loyal to the men in their family. An Arab expression captures this aspect of
the gendered-honor code starkly: “man’s honor lies between the legs of a woman” (Beyer,
1999). Because of these patriarchal dynamics of honor cultures, women’s failure to adhere to
their honor codes can provoke extreme shame and anger in the family. The relatively high rates
of violence against women (e.g., honor killings) in honor cultures is related to male control over
women’s sexuality, and it is used to deter women from infidelity or sexual indiscretions and to
punish them to restore the family’s lost honor (Baldry, Pagliaro, & Porcaro, 2013; Caffaro,
Several social psychologists have investigated the degree to which gender-specific honor codes are endorsed by men and women living in honor vs. dignity cultures. For instance, Cihangir (2013) found that Turkish and Moroccan ethnic minority men in the Netherlands identified sexual purity of a female family member as more important to their own honor and felt more responsible to protect it than did native Dutch men (representative of a dignity culture). Another study comparing Chileans and Canadians showed that Chileans (an honor culture) agreed with gender-specific honor codes (‘a man must defend his honor at all costs’, ‘a women’s honor must be defended by the men in the family’) more than did Canadians (a dignity culture). Compared to the Canadians, Chilean men and women also thought that it is more important for their sons and daughters to have honor-related qualities such as being pure, respected by others, having a spirit of sacrifice (for the daughters), and being masculine (for the sons) (Vandello, Cohen, Grandon, & Franiuk, 2009). However, other research failed to find cultural differences in the endorsement of gender-specific honor concerns. For example, Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a) found that Spanish and Dutch men and women reported comparable levels of concern for maintaining their respective gender-specific honor (also see Rodriguez Mosquera, 2011 for similar findings). These authors interpreted this result as reflecting the change in contemporary Spain where gender egalitarian attitudes have become more commonplace, especially among university students. Importantly, studies examining sex differences in the endorsement of gender-specific honor codes within single honor cultures (Turkey, Southern US) revealed that men significantly report higher levels of adherence to masculine and feminine honor codes than do women (i.e., believing that men and women should adhere to masculine and feminine honor codes, respectively, not how much they individually adhere to those codes) (Glick et al., 2015; Saucier, Strain, Hockett, & McManus, 2015; Saucier et al., 2016). These results reflect men’s willingness to maintain personal
reputations for strength, toughness and courage, as well as their expectations for their female family members to remain sexually pure and loyal which can ultimately reflect on the men’s reputation.

Even though Nisbett and Cohen (1996) mentioned that women in honor cultures also play important roles in sustaining and perpetuating honor norms through socializing their sons with these values, and holding their men to honor standards, early culture of honor research has almost exclusively focused on men as the active agents of honor. More recent research reveals that women who are socialized in honor cultures can also be shaped by the general social pressure to value reputation for strength and fearlessness. Consequently, women residing in cultures of honor might display the motives and behaviors that are similar to those of culture-of-honor men. For example, both men and women in honor states in the US are more likely than those in dignity states to engage in excessive risk-taking, resulting in high rates of accidental deaths (Barnes, Brown, & Tamborski, 2012). Similarly, masculine honor mentality can have collective or national manifestations among men and women alike. Barnes et al. (2012) showed that both men and women from an honor state in the US (Oklahoma) supported more aggressive responses to a national-level provocation than those from a dignity state (Pennsylvania). They argued that even though it might not be in women’s interest to personally engage in the same violent behaviors that a culture of honor rewards among men, they still encourage and support their men’s efforts to defend their country’s good name from foreign attacks. This pattern of findings is further supported by a large scale cross-cultural research conducted in eight nations (Brazil, Israel, Japan, Macedonia, Spain studied as honor cultures and New Zealand, UK, US studied as non-honor cultures) which revealed that attributes and characteristics associated with masculine honor such as defending oneself from insults and an ability to support a family are often endorsed by both men and women alike (Guerra, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2013; see also Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a).
Together, these findings indicate that honor may influence women’s attitudes and beliefs much as it does men’s. Nevertheless, despite these recent research efforts, we still know very little about how living in cultures with strong honor norms influence women’s motivations, emotions and behavior. Understanding the consequences of culture of honor in women’s psychologies requires investigating outcomes that go beyond the realm of physical aggression or risk-taking which are regarded typically masculine-typed behaviors, and examining subtler social and moral processes (e.g., relational forms of aggression).

**Family honor.** A critically important component of honor is the respect and status accorded to one’s family. Family honor refers to values and norms related to the protection and maintenance of the social image or the reputation of one’s family (Rodriguez et al., 2002b) and is considered to be a central part of honor in Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and some South Asian regions (especially Pakistan, Bangladesh, and some regions of India). Comparative research on family honor shows that in honor cultures (Spain, Turkey), compared to non-honor cultures (the Netherlands, northern US), honor is more closely related to family (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002a), family honor is endorsed to a greater extent (van Osch, Breugelmans, Zeelenberg, & Bölük, 2013; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b; Shafa, Harinck, Ellemers, & Beersma, 2015), and honor-attacking situations involve family members as targets more frequently (Uskul et al., 2012). The importance put on family honor in honor cultures is also associated with important emotional, relational, and behavioral consequences. For example, compared to members of a dignity culture (European-Americans), members of cultures of honor (Pakistanis) experience more intense anger and shame and greater relationship strain when their families are insulted (Rodriguez Mosquera, Tan, & Saleem, 2014). Being accused of acting as a disgraceful member of the family has a greater impact on one’s self-esteem and leads to more intense shame experience in honor cultures compared with dignity cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). Finally, in an honor culture (Turkey) greater endorsement of honor
values predict retaliatory behavior against those who attack one's parents’ honor (Uskul, Cross, Gunsoy, Gercek-Swing, Alozkan, & Ataca, 2015).

In some honor cultures, family honor plays a more important role than other components of honor in explaining cultural differences in honor-relevant psychological outcomes. For example, concern for family honor (and, for example, not masculine honor) accounted for cultural differences in the intensity of shame in response to insults that attack one’s family honor (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). Concern for family honor also accounted for cultural differences in intentions to react aggressively following an insult described in a scenario (van Osch et al., 2013). This may be because family honor taps into the interdependent characteristic of relationships in collectivistic honor cultures, increasing its explanatory power in honor-related outcomes that involve social interactions. Other research, however, failed to find such a link: concern with family honor and involvement in violent behaviors were negatively correlated in a sample of Arab youth (Khoury-Kassabri, 2016). Note that in this study violent behaviors were measured as general delinquent behaviors and not as aggressive acts against honor attacks such as insults, suggesting that a strong concern with family honor may encourage individuals to stay away from violent behaviors that might damage family reputation.

In line with a strong overlap between the self and close others documented in many collectivistic cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), in honor cultures, one’s own actions have consequences for the reputation of close others; personal honor is rooted in the actions of close others and in how they are socially evaluated (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Miller, 1993; Pitt-Rivers, 1965, 1977; Stewart, 1994; Peristiany, 1965). Thus, honor is contagious -- an attack on an individual’s honor is felt to be an attack on the whole family (and even the larger social identity groups such as religious groups, gender groups, and society, see Gelfand et al., 2012; Lee, Gelfand, & Shteynberg, 2013). Research supports this strong overlap between personal and family honor. Individuals of Turkish origin view honor-relevant situations as having a similar impact on one’s own feelings and the feelings of family members (compared to northern
Americans, who evaluate these situations as having a greater impact on one’s own feelings than on the feelings of family members; Uskul et al., 2012). Similarly, among members of Pakistani culture, insults directed to parents and to oneself elicit similar emotional responses (compared to European Americans who responded more negatively to an insult directed to the self than to parents; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2014). Family honor is considered to be the strongest foundation of honor-related violence, mostly committed against female members of the family with a goal to protect and maintain the family’s honor believed to be stained by real or merely alleged dishonorable conduct (Cooney, 2014; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001). Thus it is heavily intertwined with gendered norms of honor, with the feminine honor code requiring loyalty, sexual purity, and modest behavior and the masculine honor code requiring ability to protect family honor by successfully overseeing behaviors by female family members (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b; Vandello & Cohen, 2003).

Summary. The construct of honor is made up of multiple components: Self-respect, social respect, moral behavior, precedence or status, gendered codes, and family honor. To focus on any of these in isolation would be short-sighted; they are a complex interdependent system of values, beliefs, ideals, motives, and practices – a cultural logic that makes most sense when viewed as a whole. In the following sections we address how the cultural logic of honor cultures, compared to the cultural logic of dignity cultures, shapes behavior and emotions.

Behavioral and Psychological Consequences of Honor

In this section, we review research that examines psychological and behavioral consequences of honor with a focus on retaliation after honor threats, expressed in violence and aggression, politeness, and honor-related emotions.

Honor Cultures and Retaliation

As we summarized above, honor cultures are societies in which defense of reputation is a core theme (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965). Members of
honor cultures (especially men) aim to create and maintain reputations for strength and toughness, and they strive to be prepared to engage in aggressive actions when their honor faces a threat (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). The social psychological literature on honor has, for the most part, focused on understanding the role of honor in cultural differences in preference for violence, particularly with respect to regional differences in the US. There is also growing attention paid to honor crimes in different parts of the world, a topic typically associated with difficulty in establishing validity and reliability in data collection (for a review see Kulczycki & Windle, 2011; also see Hayes, Freilich, & Chermak, 2016; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001).

In this section, we discuss the different forms of violence associated with honor concerns under three sections: interpersonal, intrapersonal and intergroup/collective violence, covering research evidence gathered using different methodologies. Our discussion below is largely informed by research that compares southern and northern honor states in the US given the extensive volume of related evidence, but we will also cover evidence from other parts of the world where available.

**Interpersonal Violence**

**Archival and social structural evidence.** There is plenty of archival research demonstrating that Southern US is more violent than Northern US when it comes to causes related to reputation and threat. For instance, argument-related (rather than felony-related) homicide rates among White males living in rural areas and small towns (where one’s reputation likely to be of particular concern) in the southern regions of the US are higher than among their counterparts living in the northern regions of the US (Ayers, 1991; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Moreover, the proportion of Southern-born individuals is also predictive of White homicide rates in non-Southern states (Lee, Bankston, Hayes, & Thomas, 2007, also see Lee, Thomas, & Ousey, 2010 and Doucet, D’Antonio-Del Rio, & Chauvin, 2014 for the relationship between southern subculture of violence index and female homicide offenders).
Other evidence points to the existence of a variety of culture-of-honor norms that govern the contemporary southern US. For example, the southern states have higher rates of executions, violent television viewership, violent magazine subscription rates, and hunting licenses per capita (Baron & Straus, 1989). Southern and western states are also more likely to have more permissive gun control legislation, representatives who vote for more hawkish foreign policies, more lenient laws toward domestic violence, greater tolerance for corporal punishment in schools, and self-defense laws that result in milder sentences for people who use violence in defense of self or property (e.g., shooting of an intruder; Cohen, 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). These observations suggest that laws and social policies of the South and West are more favorable toward violence committed to maintain and protect one’s honor; collective representations and cultural products of the region also follow suit. Moreover, in line with the finding that argument-related homicides are more common in rural areas and small towns of the southern states (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), Cohen (1998) observed that higher levels of social organization (defined by residential and family stability) is associated with more violence and more violent policies in the South, whereas these associations are reversed for the northern regions of the US. Cohen argued this is because individuals’ social reputation is more easily threatened and norms regarding honor codes are more easily transmitted and enforced in stable families and communities.

There is evidence that retaliatory violence is not restricted to adults only, but can also be seen among children and adolescents in honor states. Recently, Brown, Osterman, and Barnes (2009) found that both the percentage of high school students who reported having brought a weapon to school in the past month and the number of actual shootings were higher (to be exact, three times higher) in the honor states of the US than the non-honor states. These regional differences remained when a list of relevant state-level demographic variables were controlled (e.g., temperature, median income).

Cohen, Nisbett and colleagues, drawing upon previous insights from Wyatt-Brown
(1982, 1986) and McWhiney (1988) among others, argued that the observed regional differences in violence cannot be predicted by regional differences in temperature, poverty, or the institution of slavery, as other social scientists have argued, but are linked to a culture of honor deriving from a herding economy that has dominated the South. Some have failed to empirically establish this link (e.g., Chu, Rivera, & Loftin, 2000; Loftin & McDowall, 2003; Rivera, Chu, & Loftin, 2002) and have suggested that the use of direct measures and historical indices of herding vs. farming could provide a more stringent test of the herding hypothesis. Studies that were conducted with a much tighter focus on the farmer vs. herder distinction and using historical indices have indeed provided support for the herding hypothesis. For example, Reaves (1992), in a direct test of the herding hypothesis, examined rates of white male homicide in the hills and dry regions that are more appropriate for herding versus the moist plains that are more appropriate for farming. He found that white male homicide rates were substantially higher in herding regions than in farming regions. Furthermore, in an attempt to test the lasting effect of herding in the contemporary South of the US, Messner, Baller and Zevenbergen (2005) used two historical indices, measures of religious affiliation and agricultural production, as proxies for the prevalence of herding populations in the South. They found that, in line with the thesis put forward by Nisbett and Cohen (1996), counties and county clusters that relied more heavily on agriculture than herding in the 19th century showed lower levels of contemporary homicide by white men, controlling for a variety of structural variables.

More recently, Baller et al. (2009) found that the percentage of Presbyterian churches in 1850 (a proxy for presence of Scottish Irish communities) was positively associated with argument-related homicide in parts of the US South with high herding activity (i.e., higher numbers of cattle and pigs). They also found that argument-related homicide occurred less in parts of the South with high agricultural activity (i.e., that were more dependent on the production of crops in 1850), again providing supportive evidence to the role of herding as the ecological underpinning of a code of honor in the US South. Additional support for the herding-
culture of honor link comes from Grosjean (2014) who combined data on crime from the Uniform Crime Reporting program in the US and on historical settlements from the US Census to test the hypothesis that high prevalence of homicide rates in the US South is due to settlement by herders in this region. He found that historical Scots-Irish presence is associated with higher rates of homicide (particularly by white offenders) and that a culture of violence was transmitted to subsequent generations in the South and where quality of institutions was historically weak (defined by age of the state and the number of newspapers per capita). Finally, in a cross-cultural study involving 51 nations, Altheimer (2012) examined the argument that scarcity of resources and absence of strong law reinforcement should be related to the emergence of a culture of honor. He found that a culture of honor proxy created based on six measures tapping into economic precariousness and the inability or unwillingness of the state to provide protection of others significantly predicted homicide rates across nations. This study is the first to test Nisbett and Cohen’s arguments at a macro level across nations, and it provides evidence for the generalizability of the culture of honor hypothesis to other contexts outside of the US.

**Attitudinal evidence.** The archival and structural evidence documenting greater levels of violence (and its tolerance in regional structures) has been complemented by studies based on analyses of existing survey data showing that southern White males are more likely than Northerners to endorse violence when it is used for self-protection (e.g., a man has the right to kill a person to defend his house) and to defend one’s honor (e.g., the violent response to an insult is justified; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994). Crucially, this regional difference in endorsement of violence does not generalize to arbitrary use of violence, suggesting that southerners tend to view violence as useful to serve a function, namely to protect and restore a social image, especially when there is a threat directed to that image.

Research with other honor vs. dignity cultures provides confirming evidence for the pattern observed in comparative work originating from the US. In one study, when asked how they would respond in different situations involving an insult or rude behavior, Turkish
participants reported that they would respond more aggressively than did Dutch participants (van Osch et al., 2013, Study 1). In another study, Turkish-Dutch participants primed with Turkish identity (compared to those primed with their Dutch identity) reported that they would react more aggressively in a situation that involved a false accusation (van Osch et al., 2013, Study 2). Cihangir (2013) found that Turkish and Moroccan ethnic minority men in the Netherlands endorsed violence against themselves by their family if they were to violate their family’s honor more than did their female counterparts, and also more than did native-Dutch men.

Observations about positive attitudes towards honor-related violence at the individual level are mirrored in attitudes at the institutional level. For example, employers in honor states were more understanding and cooperative to job candidates with criminal records in honor-related conflict than employers in non-honor states (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). In a similar vein, newspapers in honor states produced stories more sympathetic to the perpetrator when the crime was committed in response to a family insult than did newspapers in non-honor states (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). Once more, differences in attitudes between honor vs non-honor states emerged in relation to honor-related violence, and not in relation to other types of violence. In a within-culture study, Baldry et al. (2013) showed that when given a real police intervention case of intimate partner violence coupled with a reference to the victim’s admission of an affair with another man (versus no affair), Afghan police officers showed more lenient attitudes toward violence against the female victim, which was associated with reduced intentions to intervene in the form of reduced willingness to arrest the male perpetrator and to provide support to the female victim. This study demonstrates how the concerns over masculine honor can take precedence over women’s rights.

In line with the gendered characteristics of honor cultures, the patriarchal dynamics embedded within cultures of honor are associated with more tolerance and acceptance of domestic violence. Vandello and Cohen (2003) compared residents of Brazil (an honor culture)
and the northern US (a dignity culture) with regards to their evaluations of husbands and wives in the context of female infidelity. They found that Brazilian participants reported that female infidelity caused greater damage to a male’s reputation than did participants from dignity cultures. Compared to the northern Americans, Brazilians were more likely to judge a man who responded with violence to his unfaithful partner as honorable (manly, strong and trustworthy) and his actions as positive, and they were more likely to view a woman who remained loyal in the face of jealousy-related violence favorably (nicer, stronger, more agentic; see Vandello et al., 2009). In addition, Vandello and colleagues (2009) found that participants from honor cultures (e.g., Latinos and U.S. southerners) evaluated a woman who remained in an abusive relationship more favorably than did participants from dignity cultures (e.g., U.S. northerners and Canadians). These findings not only highlight the importance of reputation for both men and women in honor cultures, but also demonstrate that the reputational focus for women in a culture of honor is on sexual purity and loyalty, as discussed in the gendered component section above.

Finally, in a study in Amman, Jordan of attitudes towards and potential predictors of honor crimes (acts of violence committed against female family members who are perceived to have brought stain on the family’s honor), Eisner and Ghuneim (2013) showed that 40% of adolescent boys and 20% of adolescent girls (especially those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and more traditional family backgrounds) considered it acceptable to kill a female family member who has dishonored the family, once again confirming that violence is viewed as a useful tool to protect female chastity and, by implication, family honor. Three proximal variables predicted attitudes towards honor crimes: traditionalism, belief in female chastity, and a general tendency to morally neutralize aggressive behaviors. Importantly, religion or intensity of religious beliefs did not predict attitudes toward honor crimes. Finally, in a study of attitudes towards honor killing in different hypothetical versions of adultery, Caffaro et al. (2014) found that overall, Turkish, compared to Italian, participants attributed more responsibility to the victim
and less responsibility to the perpetrator and proposed less severe punishment for the perpetrator.

**Experimental evidence.** Archival and attitudinal evidence is no doubt helpful in identifying differences between members of honor and dignity cultures, but they are limited in demonstrating and explaining cultural differences in actual honor-relevant behaviors. Moreover, given the sensitivity of the topic investigated, findings based on self-report, as in attitudinal evidence, are subject to social desirability effects. Thus, to augment the evidence summarized above with observations of behavioral evidence in more controlled settings, Cohen and colleagues (1996) conducted a set of studies within the lab where southern and northern male participants were bumped by a confederate in a narrow hallway while being called ‘asshole’ by him. They found that following the insult, southern participants were more likely to a) feel more upset as indicated by higher cortisol levels, b) be more cognitively primed for aggression as shown by projective tests, c) believe that the insult threatened their masculinity, d) show physiological readiness for aggression, as indicated by their testosterone levels, and e) to actually engage in aggressive displays, as indicated by a firmer handshake and waiting longer to give way to the confederate. These differences were argued to have arisen due to southerners feeling more insulted after the affront and having different rules of responding to an affront compared to northerners. Importantly, southern and northern participants did not differ in their responses in the absence of an insult; if anything, uninsulted southerners were the most polite and deferential.

Experimental research in the context of domestic violence provides evidence in line with attitudinal findings summarized above. To investigate how ‘proper’ behavior might get transmitted and reinforced in the relational dynamics involving men and women in honor and dignity cultures, Vandello and Cohen (2003) created a situation in the lab where participants witnessed a couple that ostensibly experienced a physical confrontation and then they interacted with the woman to give her advice. Cultural differences emerged in both participants’
private evaluations of the woman and their direct communication with her. Hispanics and southern Anglos were more favorable to the woman when she expressed loyalty to her partner (vs. intolerance and independence); northern Americans showed the opposite effect (and evaluated the woman who stayed as weak). Interestingly, there were no gender differences in these findings, suggesting that both men and women in each cultural group share similar cultural expectations surrounding how women should behave in abusive relationships.

Recent research shows that higher levels of violence in response to threats are not limited to southern versus northern differences in the US. Uskul and colleagues (2015) studied retaliatory responses to actual honor threats among Turkish and northern American participants, moving beyond the typically studied threats to masculinity and focusing on accusations of dishonesty as threats to honor (see Uskul et al., 2012). In their studies, participants wrote an essay describing the role of honesty in their lives and received feedback on their essay accusing them of being dishonest (vs. neutral feedback). Turkish participants retaliated more aggressively than did northern U.S. participants to the person who provided the feedback critical of their honesty, by assigning this person to solve more difficult tangrams over easy ones or by choosing sensory tasks of a higher level of intensity to complete.

**Intrapersonal Violence**

Recent research shows that norms in cultures of honor may not only shape interpersonal violence, but can also have a detrimental effect on violence against oneself. Applying some of the core elements of honor cultures, such as valued traits like self-reliance, toughness, and strength, to understanding how members of honor cultures might choose to cope with negative outcomes (e.g., failure, humiliation experiences), Osterman and Brown (2011) suggested that in such cultures a particular form of self-directed violence – suicide -- might be viewed as a way out. They found that suicide rates among men and (to a lesser extent) women living in honor states in the U.S. were higher than rates among men and women living in dignity states. Furthermore, they also found that compared to dignity states, in honor states depression rates
were higher and medical help-seeking for depression (operationalized as antidepressant prescriptions) was lower and there was a stronger association between depression and suicide. They reasoned that lack of appropriate help seeking in the face of mental health problems, based on a concern to avoid undermining one’s reputation in the eyes of others, might contribute to social isolation and feelings of burdensomeness among members of honor cultures and increase the perception that suicide can present an answer. Moreover, perhaps ironically, suicide can be seen as a sign of courage and strength, which can help a person rectify his/her damaged social image (Osterman & Brown, 2011). Crowder and Kemmelmeier (2014) followed up on this logic and replicated the finding that higher rates of depression were related to higher levels of suicide in honor states but not in dignity states. They showed that the relation between honor culture and suicide was explained by levels of antidepressant drug prescriptions and not by levels of depression, suggesting that higher suicide rates in honor states are primarily a result of a reluctance to seek treatment for depression.

**Intergroup and Collective Violence**

As discussed in the section on family honor, members of honor cultures tend to be more implicated by the reputation of the groups to which they belong compared to members of dignity cultures. These groups are mostly close ingroups, such as family, but can also include larger and more distant groups such as one’s religious group, political groups or national groups (e.g., Lee et al., 2013). Investigating whether honor concerns that have been previously linked to violent behaviors at the interpersonal level might also extend to similar behaviors at the collective level, Barnes et al. (2012, Study 2) showed that after the terrorist attacks against the United States on 9/11, participants from an honor state, compared to participants from a dignity state, more strongly endorsed deadly retaliation against individuals who committed the attacks. These findings overlap with Cohen’s (1996) observation that legislators from honor states were more supportive of aggressive national security policies than their counterparts in dignity states. In a different study testing a potential mechanism for the finding above, Barnes, Brown, Lenes,
Bosson, and Carvallo (2014) found that national identification mediated the relation between honor and defensive responses to illegal immigration and terrorism. In an extension of this line of research to different national contexts and focusing on the endorsement of group honor (rather than masculine honor), Levin, Roccas, Sidanius, and Pratto (2015) showed that Lebanese and Syrians who valued group honor were more likely to perceive that the US government wants to dishonor them (e.g., by humiliating and disrespecting Arabs), which in turn predicted support for aggressive responses towards Americans, above and beyond other typically researched group-related variables (social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism). This finding points to the potentially important role that group honor concerns could play in understanding intergroup violence.

Another example for the link between personal honor and violence at a group level comes from recent research conducted in the south of Italy, designed to examine the role of personal honor in collective opposition against criminal organizations. In southern Italy, the mafia operates under their own code of honor, called omertà, according to which individuals must be able to deal with offenses without the help of state authorities and they must stay quiet when they witness others’ illegal acts (Paoli, 2004). This region has groups that aim to decrease the power of mafia and the related omertà code that operate at political, judicial, or civil society levels. This research shows that endorsement of masculine honor was associated with more positive attitudes to these criminal organizations and lower intentions to collectively oppose these organizations (Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, 2016). Furthermore, identification with the region (Campano region in the south of Italy) predicted endorsement of masculine honor which in turn predicted lowered intentions to oppose these criminal organizations (Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Russo, 2015).

**Summary.** The original focus on interpersonal aggression in honor vs. dignity cultures in the literature has recently been expanded to include how the cultural logic of honor may shape other forms of aggression including intrapersonal and intergroup aggression. The majority of
studies in the literature on culture of honor is conducted in this domain and features a rich methodological diversity. More recently, researchers have started examining the honor-aggression link outside of the southern vs. northern US comparative context, adding evidence from different parts of the world. In the next sections, we review how members of honor cultures known for their aggressive tendencies when their honor is at stake paradoxically display politeness more than members of dignity cultures.

**Honor Cultures and Politeness**

Paradoxically, honor cultures can be known as places of great politeness (Cohen & Vandello, 2004). It has been suggested that honor cultures breed norms of politeness and hospitality to prevent causing offense to others which might potentially trigger a cycle of retaliation and retribution once a conflict erupts. Existing evidence supports this idea. In the absence of any offense, compared to members of dignity cultures, members of honor cultures show higher levels of politeness and friendliness: they give way to the other person more quickly and their handshake is evaluated as less firm, both suggesting a less aggressive or dominant response (Cohen et al., 1996); they also feel reluctant to interpret a situation as involving conflict and are more willing to handle a conflict situation constructively (Harinck, Shafa, Ellemers, & Beersma, 2013). These findings are mirrored when honor is measured as an individual difference variable: honor concerns correlate negatively with competitive conflict intentions (Beersma, Harinck, & Gerts, 2003). Similarly, individuals whose honor concerns are activated favor a more accommodating and less dominating conflict strategy compared to those whose honor concerns are not activated (Shafa et al., 2015). Moreover, at a regional level, southern honor states of the US score as the most helpful in the country (Levine, Martinez, Brase, & Sorensen, 1994) and appear less favorable towards violence than northerners when there is no context provided for violence (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; also see Hayes & Lee, 2005). Finally, there is evidence that politeness norms may play a greater role in some offenses than others. Cross, Uskul, Gerçek-Swing, Sunbay, and Ataca (2013) observed that members of an
honor culture (Turkish participants) showed more approval for a person who overlooked a rude insult (e.g., being called a vulgar name) than for a person who confronted the insulter; in contrast, Turkish participants also showed more approval for a person who confronted a false accusation (an honor threat) than for a person who walked away. This finding suggests the need for a more fine-tuned approach to understanding how politeness norms may operate across different honor-relevant situations cross-culturally.

To understand the dynamic nature of polite and aggressive responses among members of honor and dignity cultures, Cohen, Vandello, Puente, and Rantilla (1999, Study 1) examined how such responses may emerge in the face of accumulating minor annoyances over time. They observed that, when subjected to a series of annoyances, southern Americans did not rush to respond and seemed to keep their anger under control, but when the line was crossed and they did respond, their reactions contained more aggression and hostility than those of individuals from northern US. Moreover, their reactions showed sudden and dramatic escalations while the reactions of individuals from the northern US leveled out. They concluded that politeness in honor cultures may not act as signs of civility and courtesy, but may be a way of masking anger, rendering effective communication and conflict resolution difficult, which can eventually lead to aggressive eruptions. In a county-level analysis, Cohen and colleagues (1999, Study 3) showed that being friendly and helpful correlated with having fewer argument-related homicides in the northern US, whereas such a relation was absent in the southern US (and in fact slightly reversed). Recent evidence from a study with individuals high vs. low in honor endorsement suggests that prevention-oriented motivational orientation (as discussed by Higgins, 1997) might be the underlying motivational mechanism of this seemingly incompatible dual-nature of honor (Shafa et al., 2015, Study 2).

Honor and Emotions

Both ethnographic work and social psychological evidence suggest that honor-relevant events are associated with strong emotional responses; the pattern of related emotional
experiences shows cultural variation consistent with the concerns central in a given cultural context. The literature on honor has primarily focused on emotional consequences of negative honor-relevant events where one’s honor is attacked via offenses or insults (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). A natural result of this is that we know more about how honor is linked to negative emotions, such as anger and shame, than about how honor is linked to positive emotions such as happiness or humility (pride is an exception here which we will cover below). In this section, we focus on three emotions that have been the focus of studies on the honor-emotion link: anger, shame and pride.

As was implied earlier in the section on retaliation, anger is closely related to honor. In honor cultures, compared to dignity cultures, attacks on one’s honor in the form of offenses, insults or false accusation foster strong feelings of anger which can mobilize actions to retaliate against the perpetrator with a goal to restore one’s sense of honor (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Cohen, et al., 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965; Stewart, 1994). This seems to be especially true if the attacks target masculine honor (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; IJzerman, van Dijk, & Galluci, 2007, for an exception see Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b), as men in honor cultures are socialized to reject public humiliation and express anger to signal this rejection (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Peristiany, 1965; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Stewart, 1994).

Yet other studies revealed either no cultural differences in anger or contradictory patterns. For example, when individuals are asked to reflect on a recent episode of an insult, reported levels of anger did not differ between members of honor and dignity cultures (note that none of the episodes included threats to masculine honor; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008). Similarly, Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch and ethnic Dutch felt similarly angry when recalling a recent episode involving an insult (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008). In another study, Spanish participants, compared with Dutch participants, reported that they would experience lower levels of anger when they were asked to imagine themselves being subjected to insults that were framed as threats to individualism (i.e., portraying them as lacking autonomy and not being
assertive in social relations) (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b). Thus, the pattern of findings observed in cultural comparisons seem to depend on the focus of insults (explicitly honor related or not) or the method used; people from honor and dignity cultures appear more similar than different when they are asked to imagine or recall situations related to insults as opposed to when actual behavioral responses are examined. This might be because individuals select events that really mattered to them in the former case and events that really matter to individuals may lead to similar emotional/cognitive consequences across different cultural groups.

Shame is another emotion closely related to honor. It is typically experienced in response to moral violations or inferiority (e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002), and, important for the current context, in response to threatened social image. Thus, shame is tightly linked to loss of honor (Wikan, 1984; Miller, 1993; Peristiany, 1965). Members of honor cultures are socialized to feel shame when social respect is lost and their reputation is damaged, as a result of actions committed by oneself, such as failing to effectively respond to threats (Cohen, 2003), or by close others, such as lacking sexual modesty (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b). Feeling shame in response to loss of honor signals that one is attached to the honor code and highlights concern for external judgment. This way shame helps solidify one’s identity as someone who is concerned about his/her social image and reinforces social interdependence (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000; Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995). It is expected that both men and women in honor cultures experience shame when honor is damaged, albeit perhaps for different reasons: men for not being able to maintain and protect their family’s social image and women for engaging in actions that could potentially stain personal and family honor.

As with anger, research shows differences between members of honor and dignity cultures in the intensity of shame felt in response to negative honor-relevant events, as well as in how shame is experienced. For example, Spanish participants reported more intense shame in response to threats to family honor in a vignette than did Dutch participants (Rodriguez
An examination of descriptions of typical shame episodes generated by Spanish and Dutch participants showed that descriptions by the Spanish were more other-focused, whereas descriptions by the Dutch were more self-focused; the Spanish also were more concerned with possible negative social implications of shame events than were the Dutch (Fischer et al., 1999). Moreover, Spanish participants expressed their feelings of shame to a greater extent than did Dutch participants (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). Finally, Spanish cultural prototypes of shame were more available and elaborate than Dutch cultural prototypes of shame (Fischer et al., 1999).

In an investigation of how the experience of anger and shame may shape motivational and behavioral outcomes among members of honor (Moroccan/Turkish Dutch) and dignity (ethnic Dutch) cultures, Rodriguez Mosquera and colleagues (2008) asked participants to recall and describe a recent episode in which a person insulted them and report how they felt about the event and what they did. They found that for members of both types of cultures, feelings of anger predicted wanting to punish the perpetrator; wanting to punish the perpetrator predicted the extent to which participants engaged in verbal attack. By contrast, honor moderated how feelings of shame shaped motivational and behavioral outcomes. In line with past research on shame in individualistic cultures (e.g., Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996), feelings of shame led to withdrawal among low-honor participants, whereas feelings of shame among high-honor participants was associated with a desire to protect their social image, which in turn predicted confronting the perpetrator by expressing verbal disapproval. Moreover, anger and shame were negatively correlated among the low-honor participants, but were positively correlated among high-honor participants. This study demonstrates the different pathways shame can follow in reaction to insults, leading to engagement or disengagement with the perpetrator depending on the extent to which honor is valued in a given cultural context.

Pride is yet another type of emotion related to honor, but to positive aspects of honor, unlike anger and shame. It is a more complicated emotion compared to anger and shame, with
potentially both positive and negative consequences for members of honor cultures when expressed socially. This is because pride can potentially lead to a separation between oneself and others in interdependent honor cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000; Kitayama et al., 1995). Research suggests that pride carries more negative implications in honor cultures (Spain) than in dignity cultures (the Netherlands; Fischer et al., 1999). This finding is corroborated by another study comparing the Dutch and the Spanish which showed that the Dutch more often reported positive feelings in their descriptions of pride actions than did the Spanish (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). Similarly, American participants reported higher levels of positive emotions (including pride) in response to honor-enhancing situations than did Turkish participants (Uskul et al., 2014). As in the shame episodes mentioned above, Spanish descriptions of pride episodes tended to be other-focused, whereas descriptions by the Dutch tended to be self-focused (Fischer et al., 1999). Similar to shame, the cultural prototypes of pride were much more available and elaborate among the Spanish compared to the Dutch (Fischer et al., 1999).

In addition to individuals' emotional responses to honor-relevant situations across cultures, research has also investigated how honor is implicated in daily life, as can be observed in the nature of situations typically encountered by members of honor and dignity cultures, and how these situations may shape individuals' emotional experiences. Uskul and colleagues (2012) found that honor-relevant situations generated by Turkish participants were evaluated as having stronger emotional impact on oneself, one's family members, and one's acquaintances than did those generated by northern American participants. In a follow-up study, Uskul and colleagues (2014) showed that this was likely due to honor attacking and honor-enhancing situations generated by Turkish participants eliciting stronger negative and positive emotions, respectively, compared to those generated by northern American participants. In a similar fashion, Boiger and colleagues (2014) demonstrated that both Turkish and Japanese participants perceived situations with male protagonists generated by Turkish participants to
elicit intense levels of anger. An analysis of why Turkish situations might be associated with stronger emotional responses suggested that Turkish situations were more likely to contain emotionally charged extreme behaviors such as false accusation (Uskul et al., 2014) or intentional harm-doing (Boiger et al., 2014). A further inspection of situations examined by Boiger et al. (2014) showed that Turkish participants perceived anger and shame situations to occur more frequently to the extent that they elicited intense feelings of anger and shame, respectively, and that the affordance of anger and shame was perceived to be more pronounced in interactions with distant than close others. Moreover, they found that Turkish participants viewed shame to be promoted more in situations that involved a female protagonist. These findings demonstrate the need to go beyond assessments at the individual level when examining honor and emotions and highlight the power of situations in eliciting emotions in culturally meaningful ways.

Summary. So far studies have examined primarily anger, shame and pride in response to honor-related experiences which has helped us to gain a more comprehensive understanding of negative emotional consequences of honor than positive ones. With a few exceptions, most studies in this domain have made use of scenarios or past episodes of honor events (e.g., insults) and relied heavily on self-reports of emotional responses to these events. The type of method and insult included in the investigations seem to shape the pattern of cultural differences observed in emotional responses.

Cultural Transmission of Cultures of Honor

The norms, values, beliefs, and practices brought to the American South by Celts more than 300 years ago would have faded long ago without ecologies, socialization practices, institutions, and structures that maintained and perpetuated them over the generations. First, in the US South, the cultural of honor was most strongly maintained in geographic areas similar to those of the Celt’s homelands: regions dominated by herding, scarcity, and little access to the
rule of law (Baller et al., 2009; Messner et al., 2005; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Parents also pass down these norms and attitudes to their children. Cohen and Nisbett (1994) found that Americans from the South were more likely than those from the Midwest region of the country to endorse statements that reflected a positive attitude toward violence in response to an insult. For example, Southerners were more likely than Midwesterners to say they would encourage a boy who had been bullied to “take a stand and fight the other boy” (p. 560). Southerners were also more likely than Midwesterners to endorse spanking as a means of disciplining a child. Although much of the research on honor in the southern US has focused on masculine honor and men’s behavior, women play important roles in the maintenance and perpetuation of a culture of honor through enforcing it on their menfolk, socialization of honor norms in their children, and sometimes participating in its behavioral patterns too (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Vandello, Cohen, & Ranson, 2008).

Culture of honor practices and preferences play out in social institutions, as well, such as local schools. One of the authors (Cross), a native of the US South, recalls the wooden paddle that hung prominently in the high school principal’s office as a warning to troublemakers. As of 1997, public, state-supported schools in the US South were more likely than those in the Northeast to allow physical punishment of students for infractions (Arcus, 2002); rates of physical punishment were also higher in southern states than in other states (Cohen, 1996). Notably, the rates of fatal shootings in schools between 1992 and 1999 were highest in states where corporal punishment was permitted (controlling for other related factors, such as poverty and religion; Arcus, 2002; see also Brown et al., 2009). School shootings (almost entirely committed by males) often occur in response to bullying, taunts, or ostracism by others (Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003; Newman, Fox, Roth, Mehta, & Harding, 2005); thus, bullied children reared in cultures of honor may feel impelled to retaliate with violence.

Legal systems both reflect and maintain a society’s key values and ideals, and those in cultures of honor may legitimize violence for defense of honor, self-defense, or retaliation for
certain offenses. As mentioned above, the southern and western regions of the US have fewer gun control laws, more laws that permit aggressive defense of self and home, and more laws that allow the state to execute prisoners (Cohen, 1996). Legal systems in honor cultures also tend to apply less harsh punishment to instances of aggressive retaliation against threats to honor compared to those in dignity cultures. In some Middle Eastern countries, the law specifically takes account of provoked husbands in the case of honor crimes and extends more lenient punishments, compared to other similar crimes (Abu-Odeh, 1996; see also Safilios-Rothschild, 1969, for a discussion of punishment of honor crimes in Greece). A survey of honor crimes in fourteen countries conducted by the International Women’s Human Rights Clinic (2000) revealed that judges in many of the countries tended to be lenient toward male offenders; in this way, the judiciary sends “a powerful signal to the community that the State will allow this practice to continue” (p. 4, quoted in Torry, 2001, p. 319).

A comprehensive study of transmission of cultural practices involves not only asking ‘how’ the transmission takes place, but also ‘why’ it takes place. To understand the conditions under which honor cultures evolve and why and when honor cultures might be adaptive, Nowak, Gelfand, Borkowski, Cohen, and Hernandez (2016) carried out an agent-based model of honor. Their findings highlighted the need to consider the strength of institutions and toughness of the environment, as well as the interactions between different subcultures of a society in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the evolutionary basis of honor cultures. This study shows that honor cultures may be adaptive and functional under certain conditions (i.e., when institutions are weak) because honor cultures can control the spread of aggressive behavior, suggesting that short-term irrationality often associated with honor cultures has to be evaluated within the context of a long-term strategy (see Leung & Cohen, 2011). In a theoretical analysis of why honor concepts are culturally transmitted and preserved, Nodin (2013) suggests that certain cognitive systems referring to male formidable, management of reputation, coalitions,
costly signals, shame and stigma, and concerns for protectiveness and parental investment underpin the cultural selection of honor concepts.

In summary, ecological conditions, socialization patterns, school policies, and legal practices are just a few of the structures that uphold and transmit culturally-specific norms and values to new generations. This review is necessarily brief, but the existing empirical research is also relatively sparse, particularly outside the United States. Further research that specifically examines how concerns for honor are reflected in cultural products designed for children (such as children’s books; Tsai, Louie, Chen, & Uchida, 2007) or that empirically examines other cultural products (such as laws, social policies, or other institutional practices) is needed to facilitate a better understanding of how cultures of honor may persist or change over time.

Observations and Future Directions

General Observations

Our review of the social psychological literature on honor has yielded six general observations. First, research on honor has so far focused predominantly on comparisons between people in the southern/western and northern United States, representing honor and dignity states, respectively, and between western dignity cultures (e.g., the Netherlands) and southern and south-eastern European honor cultures (e.g., Spain, Turkey). Honor cultures in different parts of the world such as South Asia, South America, and the Middle East and other parts of Europe have received less attention. Our understanding of honor and its psychological consequences would benefit from a wider coverage of honor cultures and their comparisons with different non-honor cultures (i.e., not only different dignity cultures, but also face cultures). The literature would also benefit from more regional or group-based analyses of honor within countries other than the US (e.g., west vs. north of Turkey; Muslim vs. non-Muslim regions in India; Muslim immigrants within a Christian host society), if theoretical reasons render such comparisons meaningful, as well as more comparisons between different honor cultures (e.g.,
southern US vs. Turkey). Such comparisons will help researchers examine whether there are different forms of honor cultures (just as there are different types of individualistic or collectivistic cultures) by allowing us to discover the diverse ways in which honor may be conceptualized and lived by different groups. They would also help researchers discover alternative reasons why cultures of honor emerge or alternative mechanisms through which they are maintained. Overall, greater diversity in terms of samples and comparisons will help us move away from (implicitly) treating all honor cultures uniformly.

Second, research so far has concentrated on the negative consequences of honor or what happens when honor is lost in general and the honor-aggression link in the interpersonal domain in particular. Positive or non-aggression related consequences of honor, or what happens when honor is gained, have received relatively less attention. We suggest that a greater focus on honor as virtue and its positive consequences, as well as what happens when honor is enhanced, would help us understand honor in more complex ways compared to the more common pejorative lay understanding in the West (that honor leads to destructive behavior).

Third, most available evidence on cultures of honor comes from research conducted with adults. Our understanding of cross-cultural similarities and differences in what honor means and how it operates among children, and the ways in which children acquire and sustain honor codes is limited. More research in this area, including research using longitudinal methods, would shed light on developmental dynamics and cultural transmission of honor codes.

Fourth, while there is ample research conducted to demonstrate differences between regions or cultures in honor-related cognitive, affective, or behavioral outcomes, we still know little about the mechanisms that underpin these differences. Some mechanisms that have been put forward as promising candidates to understand why these cultural differences exist include differences in prevalent motivational orientations between honor and dignity cultures (e.g., prevention vs. promotion focus; Shafa et al., 2015), and perception of social norms surrounding
how one ought to respond to honor-threatening offenses (Cross et al., 2014; Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom, 2008). There are likely other cognitive, affective, and motivational processes that can help explain these differences.

Fifth, recent literature has started making finer conceptual distinctions in the study of honor. For example, some researchers have studied personal endorsements of honor (in the form of subjective commitments) and individuals’ perceptions of public norms surrounding honor-related expectations (Cohen & Vandello, 2001) and how these may differ in their relative predictive power for different outcome variables (Cross et al., 2013). Other researchers have distinguished between the meaning versus the importance of honor (Helkama et al., 2013). More conceptual refinements such as those will contribute to the field’s further theoretical development.

Finally, we find that researchers increasingly focus on feelings of honor originating from different group memberships (national, ethnic or religious groups). This emerging trend is also mirrored in the growing interest in exploring how honor relates to collective outcomes such as heightened vigilance to threats at the group level (e.g., Barnes et al, 2012, 2014; Dafoe & Caughney, 2016; Levin et al., 2015). It is likely that culture of honor research will continue expanding to other domains and we foresee that this expansion will help honor research be integrated to a greater extent in research in other subfields of psychology (e.g., self-regulation, intergroup violence) and in relevant research in other social science disciplines (political psychology, economics). This is indeed an emerging trend in the literature. For example, although historians, sociologists and criminologists have traditionally been interested in questions related to cultures of honor and violence (e.g., Altheimer, 2012; Baxter & Margavio, 2000, 2011; Messner et al., 2005; Wyatt-Brown, 2001), recent trends suggest that there is growing interest in economics (e.g., Brooks, Hoff, & Pandey, 2013, 2015), organizational science (e.g., Aslani et al., 2015, 2016; Gelfand et al., 2015), philosophy (e.g., Sommers, 2009),
and political science (e.g., Pely, 2011) in questions related to cultures of honor inspired by existing psychological research in this field.

**Future directions**

In addition to general observations based on the current state of evidence, we have also identified areas for future research that could make important theoretical contributions to the literature on honor. One question that, in our view, needs further elaboration is the relative importance of different components of honor in different regions of the world and in relation to different outcomes. For example, although in Latin American countries the concept of honor is strongly linked to masculine honor (e.g., Vandello et al., 2009), in Mediterranean regions and Middle Eastern and Arab societies, what seems to be more at stake is mainly family honor (e.g., van Osch et al., 2013). What aspects of these cultures drive one component of honor to be more important than another component of honor? Moreover, different components of honor can have a different relation to the same outcome within a single cultural group; for example, integrity correlates with higher levels of self-esteem, but family honor correlates with lower levels of self-esteem in a Turkish sample (e.g., Novin, Tatar, & Krabbendam, 2015). What makes these different components of honor operate differently in relation to the same psychological outcomes?

A further interesting question related to this point concerns what constitutes an honor threat in different cultures. In a study on construals of aggression in Japan, Pakistan, Israel, and the US, Severance and colleagues (2013) found that behaviors that targeted one’s reputation and social standing (e.g., being socially excluded, gossiped about) were seen as particularly damaging to self-worth in Israel and Pakistan, but not so much in the US. Similarly, Uskul et al. (2012) found that when asked what constitutes an effective threat to one’s honor, Turkish participants frequently mentioned being falsely accused for acts one has not committed or being subjected to unfair treatment, whereas northern Americans frequently mentioned attacks to one’s ideas or character features. In a single culture study with a sample consisting mostly of
Hispanic or Latino participants, Benavidez, Neria, and Jones (2016) found that participants with high levels of honor endorsement and closeness to a target showed the highest levels of (self-reported) aggressiveness towards a hypothetical honor code violation by that target. As these findings demonstrate, the actions that are considered to be honor threatening can take different forms; a more complete understanding of this variation would help researchers understand why members of some cultures sometimes respond aggressively to acts that members of other cultures might feel comfortable ignoring.

A further question that would benefit from additional refinement is the public versus private component of honor. Although ‘the public eye’ or how others evaluate us is defined as a core component of honor (e.g., Pitt-Rivers, 1965), so far, research has not always shown the expected differences between private and public situations in honor-related outcomes (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Uskul et al., 2015). This might have been due to public situations in experimental research typically involving an unknown adult or unfamiliar audience. More research is needed that operationalizes ‘public’ as the presence of close others (rather than strangers). Research also needs to expand into the study of honor in public spaces that do not involve face-to-face interactions. Recent studies have started capturing how surveillance and impression management experiences in social media might differ between honor (Turkey, Azerbaijan) and dignity cultures (e.g., Günsoy, Cross, Saribay, Olcaysoy-Okten, & Kurutas, 2015; Pearce & Vitak, 2015).

Finally, research on gender differences in honor endorsement and related outcomes has been less systematic than needed. This is partly due to a significant number of studies in the past focusing on masculine honor and its psychological consequences among men only. This is changing, however, with female participants more regularly included in study samples, but still gender rarely constitutes the focus of studies; it usually is an add-on variable in reported analyses. For example, a recent study on predictors of honor beliefs in a Turkish sample demonstrated that benevolent sexism predicted honor beliefs for women, but not for men, and
hostile sexism predicted honor beliefs for men, but not for women (Glick et al., in press). This points out the need for further research to highlight gender-specific underpinnings of honor beliefs and concerns (see also Barnes et al., 2012). More culture comparative and within culture research on how men and women respond similarly or differently to positive and negative honor relevant events, as well as research on when in the life course gender differences start emerging, would help us better understand the gendered aspects of honor, including honor related violence.

In sum, expanding current research to different national, ethnic, and religious samples in various life stages and to diverse types of honor losses and gains in different life domains will help broaden our understanding of honor and its relation to other social psychological concepts cross-culturally.

Methodological Considerations

Psychological studies of honor have employed a wide variety of methods ranging from laboratory research to field observations, and they have assessed a variety of outcome variables. Overall, with some exceptions, our review shows that most studies have used methods that include scenarios depicting honor relevant events where participants are asked to imagine that event or to recall an honor relevant situation that they personally experienced in the past. In terms of outcome variables, again with some exceptions, most studies rely on the measurement of self-reported emotions or evaluations and intentions to engage in behaviors rather than the observation of actual behaviors. All existing studies provide worthwhile evidence in this relatively new and growing area of research. We would like to highlight, however, that the type of method employed or the nature of the actual outcome measured seems to make a difference in whether similarities or differences emerge in cross-cultural comparisons. For example, we see more similarities than differences between cultural groups when individuals are asked to recall a behavior they experienced in the past that fits a certain criterion compared to when they experience a situation under controlled laboratory settings (e.g., Cohen et al.,
Likewise, we see more similarities across cultural groups when emotional consequences or appraisals are examined compared with when behavioral intentions, actual behaviors, or even physiology are the focus of investigation. Thus, it seems important to keep in mind the methodology employed and the outcome measures assessed in individual studies when drawing conclusions about cross-cultural similarities or differences.

Our review also reveals a shift in the psychological literature on honor from almost exclusively comparative research that focused on exploring (cultural or regional) differences between honor and dignity cultures in the 1990s to research that approaches honor endorsement as an individual difference variable. Indeed, the last two decades have witnessed the development of different measures of individual differences in honor endorsement at the explicit (Barnes, et al., 2012; Figueredo, Tal, McNeill, & Guillén, 2004; Guerra, Gouveia, Araújo, Andrade, & Gaudêncio, 2013; IJzerman et al., 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002; Saucier & McManus, 2014; Saucier et al., 2016; Somech, Elizur, 2009; Vandello et al., 2009; for the measurement of endorsement of honor-related violence see Leung & Cohen, 2011) and implicit levels (Imura, Burkely, & Brown, 2014). These measures focus on different aspects of honor beliefs, values, or ideologies (e.g., masculine honor, family honor, chastity). The coverage of the literature on individual differences in honor endorsement is beyond the focus of this chapter, unfortunately. Although the contribution of the individual differences approach to honor might be limited in terms of our understanding of cultures of honor, we do recognize that it allows researchers to investigate honor within a single culture or region and investigate its relations with other social psychological constructs with greater precision. The research literature also shows signs of growing interest in finding ways of manipulating honor by making salient its different components and testing how these impact different psychological processes (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Shafa et al., 2015), as well as how honor is embodied (IJzerman & Cohen, 2011).

Overall, it is exciting times for research on cultures of honor. The growing corpus of research on cultures of honor shows this framework has been useful in understanding cultures.
not typically included in the traditional East-West comparisons which have been studied for decades. It has also helped researchers go beyond the commonly employed individualism-collectivism cultural dimension and start unfolding different types of collectivism that might exist. With its increasingly diverse methodological toolkit and expansion to different life domains beyond interpersonal aggression, culture of honor is also a promising cultural syndrome that can be a meaningful framework for researchers in other disciplines who are interested in understanding human behavior cross-culturally.
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