Understanding Defensive and Secure In-group Positivity:

The Role of Collective Narcissism

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Author note

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Abstract

Integrating psychoanalytic ideas of group idealization with social identity and categorisation theories, this article discusses the distinction between secure and defensive in-group positivity. Narcissistic in-group positivity captures a belief in in-group greatness that is contingent on external validation. It reflects defensive in-group positivity, insofar as it stems from the frustration of individual needs, and predicts increased sensitivity to threats as well as undesirable consequences for out-groups and the in-group. Secure in-group positivity—that is, in-group positivity without the narcissistic component—is a confidently held positive evaluation of one’s in-group that is independent of the recognition of the group in the eyes of others. It stems from the satisfaction of individual needs, is resilient to threats and has positive consequences for the in-group and out-groups. I review evidence for these two distinct ways people relate to their social groups and discuss theoretical and practical implications for understanding intra- and intergroup relations.

Keywords: collective narcissism, in-group identification, defensiveness, intragroup processes, prejudice
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“Ask not what your country can do for you - ask what you can do for your country”

John F. Kennedy (1961)

In his inaugural address, U.S. President John F. Kennedy famously asked fellow Americans not to focus on how their nation can benefit them, but rather to consider how they can serve their nation. He called for a constructive engagement on behalf of the national in-group. Over 50 years later, Donald Trump’s presidential campaign suggests that he wants to work on improving his country. Yet, his proposal does not involve positive engagement of fellow Americans. Rather, he wants “to bring America back, to make it great and prosperous again, and to be sure [it is] respected by [its] allies and feared by [its] adversaries,” (Coyne, 2015, para. 7), thus insisting that members of other groups give America the respect it is due. These two views on what it means to benefit the nation reflect different ways in which people can be committed to their in-groups: the first seems to show a secure and constructive in-group positivity; the second a defensive and potentially destructive in-group positivity.

In this article, I will discuss the characteristics, antecedents and consequences of these two distinct types of positive commitment to social groups (referred to in this article as, broadly, *in-group positivity*). I will first review past research on constructive and destructive modes of in-group positivity and propose an overarching framework that characterises them in terms of security and defensiveness. To this end, I will briefly discuss security and defensiveness in individual self-evaluation and show how we can apply this distinction to the level of the collective self. I will then review evidence for the concept of collective narcissism capturing defensive in-group positivity, which stems from the frustration of the individual need for personal control and is linked to *negative* out-group attitudes. I will
proceed by reviewing evidence for non-narcissistic in-group positivity (in-group positivity without the narcissistic component) capturing secure in-group positivity, which stems from the satisfaction of the need for personal control and is not only unrelated to prejudice, but has the potential to foster positive out-group attitudes.

Based on this literature, I will propose a new framework, which articulates the motivational underpinnings of the two types of in-group positivity and their intergroup and intragroup consequences (see Figure 1). In essence, the framework argues that the more defensive form of in-group positivity—that is, collective narcissism—stems from the frustration of individual needs and fulfils a compensatory function. In consequence, collective narcissism is likely to predict a greater concern with how the group image reflects on the individual and a lesser concern with benefiting other in-group members. This should lead to negative out-group attitudes but also to undesirable consequences for the in-group. Secure, non-narcissistic in-group positivity, on the other hand, stems from the satisfaction of individual needs. In consequence, secure in-group positivity is likely to predict a lesser concern with how the group reflects on the individual and a greater willingness to realize one's potential by benefiting the group. This should have more positive consequences both for the in-group and out-groups. I will then review preliminary evidence for the intragroup consequences of secure and defensive in-group positivity. In the final section, I will discuss implications and limitations of the new framework, as well as avenues for future research.

-- Figure 1 --

Components of In-group Positivity

Substantial psychological literature suggests that group identification takes different forms and consists of multiple components (e.g., Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Cameron, 2004; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). For example, one tradition stemming from the social identity and social categorization theories (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) distinguishes between group-level self-investment (i.e., satisfaction with the group, feelings of solidarity with other group members and importance of the group to the self) and group-level self-definition (i.e., perceptions of the group as homogenous and oneself as similar to other members; Leach et al., 2008). A different perspective differentiates in-group sentiments that serve to protect the group image and establish dominance from those that seem more secure and constructive (Amiot & Aubin, 2013; Jackson & Smith, 1999; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; see Golec de Zavala & Schatz, 2012, for a review). Its roots can be traced to Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford’s (1950) psychodynamic theories of ideology and prejudice. These authors differentiated pseudo-patriotism, or a “blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups” (p. 107) from genuine patriotism which captures “love of the country and attachment to national values based on critical understanding” (p. 107). They further argued that a genuine patriot “can appreciate the values and ways of other nations, and (…) is free of rigid conformism, outgroup rejection, and imperialistic striving for power (pp. 107-108)

Adorno and colleagues (1950) inspired research on national identity predominantly in political psychology, political science, and sociology. For example, patriotic love for one’s country has been distinguished from nationalistic tendencies to dominate others (Druckman, 1994; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Li & Brewer, 2004; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001). Schatz, Staub, and Lavine (1999) suggested a distinction even more closely related to Adorno and colleagues’ (1950) theorising. They distinguished blind patriotism, characterized by a rigid national attachment and intolerance of criticism, from constructive patriotism, characterized by support for in-group criticism intended to benefit the group. In a similar vein, attachment to the national group was distinguished from glorification, which
corresponds to “viewing the national in-group as superior to other groups and having a feeling of respect for the central symbols of the group” (Roccas et al., 2006; p. 700).

Research has demonstrated that nationalism, blind patriotism and glorification predict outgroup prejudice and intergroup hostility, while group attachment and patriotism (especially in its constructive form) show less robust links with out-group negativity (e.g., Blank & Schmidt, 2003; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Spry & Hornsey, 2007). Nevertheless, past research has rarely examined why different types of in-group positivity might predict distinct attitudes towards members of other social groups. The current review goes beyond the study of the specific content of national attachment, to demonstrate that the different outcomes can be better understood if we consider the roots of the security and defensiveness of in-group positivity.

**Security and Defensiveness in the Self and the Group**

One way to understand defensiveness and security at the level of the collective self is to first consider these processes at the level of the individual self (e.g., Bizman, Yinon, & Krotman, 2001; Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004). Personal defensiveness can be seen as a self-favouring bias linked to a need for approval, allegedly stemming from “deep-seated” frustrations (Cramer, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Schneider & Turkat, 1975). Defensive self-evaluation is well captured by the concept of narcissism—a self-aggrandizing view of the self that requires external validation (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; John & Robins, 1994; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). Research demonstrates that narcissism is associated with “defensive” reactions to threats—these reactions are “defensive” in that they are aimed at protecting the self from psychological threats. They include avoiding information that might trigger negative affect and undermine the self, attacking or discrediting sources of threats, and a general predisposition for anger and hostility (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996;
Kernis, 2003; Kernis & Sun, 1994). Paradoxically, the narcissistic need to protect the
grandiose self-image also increases vigilance to any threats that could potentially undermine
one’s feelings of self-worth (Horvath & Morf, 2009; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Schneider &
Turkat, 1975). Understanding the defensive nature of narcissism helps clarify the meaning of
security in self-evaluation. According to Kernis (2003), secure self-esteem can be
“characterized by the relative absence of defensiveness, that is, being willing to divulge
negative behaviours or self-aspects in the absence of excessively strong desires to be liked by
others” (p. 13). Such self-esteem stems from positive experiences of successful management
of one’s personal needs and remains less sensitive to psychological threats.

In this review, I argue that just as defensive self-esteem can be captured by individual
narcissism, defensive in-group positivity can be captured by the concept of collective
narcissism. Collective narcissism can be considered defensive to the extent that it (1a)
measures a group-aggrandizing evaluation that requires external validation, (1b) increases in
response to the frustration of individual needs, and (1c) is linked to defensive intergroup
relations manifest in increased perceptions of threats to the in-group and hostile responses to
such threats. Collective narcissism can also help elucidate the concept of secure in-group
positivity. Building on research on secure self-esteem, secure in-group positivity should (2a)
be defined as in-group positivity free of the narcissistic component, (2b) stem from
satisfaction of individual needs, and (2c) be linked to security in intergroup relations manifest
as resilience to intergroup threats, that is lower vigilance to threats and less destructive
responses to threats. I will discuss each of these points below.

Defensiveness of Collective Narcissism

Measuring collective narcissism. Narcissistic in-group positivity, or collective
narcissism, is an attitudinal orientation towards one’s in-group that captures a grandiose and
inflated image of the in-group that is contingent upon external recognition of one’s group’s worth (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). This conceptualization is inspired by the psychoanalytic tradition of seeing collective narcissism as a compensatory idealization of one’s in-group (Adorno, 1963/1998; Fromm, 1973). The definition of collective narcissism parallels the definition of individual narcissism, which represents excessive self (rather than in-group) love that is contingent on external recognition of self-worth (e.g., Emmons, 1987; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). In other words, collective narcissism can be seen as the extension of the individual defensiveness to the group level of analysis. In fact, Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2009) designed the Collective Narcissism Scale (see Table 1) by adapting items from popular individual narcissism measures, such as the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988) and Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory—III (Millon, 2006), to make them appropriate for capturing narcissistic evaluation of the in-group. For example, an item capturing feelings of self-entitlement “I insist upon getting the respect that is due to me” was amended to “I insist upon my group getting the respect that is due to it” in order to capture group entitlement.

---Table 1---

Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2009; Study 1) tested the scale’s properties in three samples of students in the US (N=263), UK (N=47) and Poland (N=401). These tests resulted in a nine-item questionnaire, which reliably measures collective narcissism with respect to various social groups, such as nations, religions, or university students (alphas typically > .70). Participants are asked to think about a particular social group when completing the scale. The Collective Narcissism Scale can also be used in its shorter version (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013), which was originally prepared for inclusion in a large nationally representative survey (Bilewicz, Bukowski, Cichocka, Winiewski, & Wójcik, 2009). The shorter version includes five items chosen with the aim of avoiding content
overlap. It tends to show good reliability (alphas typically > .80). Both versions typically yield one factor solutions in factor analyses.

Those who score high on the scale tend to evaluate their in-group positively at the explicit level but not the implicit level—they do not automatically associate in-group symbols with positively valenced stimuli. They also tend to be convinced that others do not hold the group in high regard (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Study 4, Polish students). This suggests that collective narcissism might be linked to doubts about the group’s greatness, which is sometimes considered an indicator of defensiveness (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; cf. Bosson et al., 2008). Furthermore, collective narcissism tends to be associated with defensive individual self-evaluations. Individual and collective narcissism are usually weakly to moderately positively correlated, with rs between -.09 (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Study 3, Polish students) and .44 (Cichocka, Maciejewski, & Cisłak, 2016; Study 3, Polish adults). This positive association is not surprising given that the Collective Narcissism Scale was based on items measuring individual narcissism.

National collective narcissism tends to be positively associated with other measures of national commitment, which typically predict negative out-group attitudes. For example, collective narcissism correlates positively with nationalism (Kosterman & Feschbach, 1989), rs ranging from .34 (Golec de Zavala, Peker, Guerra & Baran, in press; Study 3, Polish adults) to .38 (Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010; Study 3, American students), blind patriotism (Schatz et al., 1999), rs ranging from .55 (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Study 4, Polish students) to .65 (Golec de Zavala et al., in press; Study 3, Polish adults), as well as national glorification (Roccas et al., 2006), $r = .78$ (Cichocka, Marchlewksa, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016; Study 2, Polish students). Similarly to these measures, collective narcissism captures convictions about in-group superiority and special
deservingness, which have the potential to foster out-group negativity. Yet, collective narcissism is unique in its measurement in that the items do not reflect any specific national or cultural context (cf. items: “The IDF [Israel Defence Force] is the best army in the world” and “One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our nation” from the in-group glorification scale originally developed in Israel, Roccas et al., 2006; or “The anti–Vietnam war protesters were un-American” from the blind patriotism scale originally developed in the US, Schatz et al., 1999). Thus, collective narcissism can be easily used to capture narcissistic identification with any social group, be it a nation, gender, religion, political allies, or college peers. Furthermore, collective narcissism largely reflects preoccupation with protecting the in-group’s image, regardless of securing its dominance over other groups—which is a major concern in the concepts of nationalism or blind patriotism (see Golec de Zavala et al., 2009 for more details).

Furthermore, collective narcissism tends to be positively associated with in-group identification (e.g., rs ranged from .17 for university to .66 for nationality assessed among Polish students; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013). Positive correlations were also noted between scores on the Collective Narcissism Scale and Cameron’s (2004) Social Identification Scale (e.g., Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013) as well as Leach and colleagues’ (2008) in-group identification scale (Cichocka, Marchlew ska, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., in press). This is because all these measures by definition capture positive evaluation of the in-group. By the same token, self-esteem tends to be positively correlated with narcissism (Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004).

Finally, collective narcissism is positively associated with ideological attitudes such as social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981; see Hodson & Dhont, 2015). SDO and collective narcissism tend to correlate positively, with rs ranging from .08 in a Mexican student sample to .53 in a US
student sample (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Studies 5 and 1 respectively). Although they overlap in the need to assert the greatness of the group, SDO reflects a general desire for unequal social relations, while collective narcissism is concerned specifically with the position and image of one’s own group. Indeed, at least in the American sample, national collective narcissism was more strongly associated with the desire for group-based dominance component of SDO than with the opposition to equality component. Collective narcissism is also linked to RWA (rs ranging from .02; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Study 5, to .56; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Study 1, American Mturk workers). Although both collective narcissism and RWA should predict concern with in-group cohesion and morality, Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2009) argued that this is likely to be driven by different motives: those high in RWA should care about how safe their environment is, while those high in collective narcissism should care about how this reflects on the in-group image. Overall, multiple validation studies indicate that collective narcissism is positively associated with individual difference variables that are typically associated with interpersonal or out-group negativity. Yet, it has unique predictive validity over and above these variables, evidence for which will be discussed in the sections on consequences of the two types of in-group positivity.

**Antecedents of collective narcissism.** Traditionally in psychology, commitment to important social groups has been seen as a way of satisfying individual motives. Research has shown that the endorsement of group membership can help manage various psychological needs (Correll & Park, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Roccas & Berlin, 2016), including existential (e.g. Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002), epistemic (e.g. Mullin & Hogg, 1998), and relational ones (e.g. Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Recent work (Agroskin & Jonas, 2010; Fritsche et al., 2013; Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011) explored the role of group membership in restoring and maintaining a sense of control—one of the basic human
motivations (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Fritsche and colleagues (2013) argued that “people who perceive low personal control may prefer to define their self via the in-group and act as an in-group member because this might maintain perceptions of power and control exerted through the (social) self.” (p. 20). Overall, past studies suggest that in-group positivity stems from the frustration of individual needs. A similar prediction can be found in the psychoanalytic tradition, which suggested that “weak egos” will seek compensation in “great collectives” (Adorno, 1963/1998). According to Fromm (1973), this compensatory process should foster feelings of grandiosity manifest by the rise of collective narcissism specifically.

Recent empirical studies demonstrated that frustration of the basic psychological need for personal control indeed increases collective narcissism, rather than non-narcissistic in-group positivity (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). In a large representative survey of over a thousand Polish adults, personal control was negatively correlated with national collective narcissism. This link was corroborated by two experimental studies conducted on MTurk among American adults. Participants were exposed to manipulations either lowering or boosting personal control. They were asked to recall memories in which they either did or did not have control over their lives (see Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). In one study participants reported negative experiences they did or did not have control over. In another, they reported positive experiences they did or did not have control over (this study also included a baseline condition in which participants were asked to simply report positive memories with no mention of control). After the manipulations, they reported their national collective narcissism and in-group positivity (measured as in-group identification; Cameron, 2004). In both studies, participants reported the highest collective narcissism in the low control condition, and this effect was especially prominent once we accounted for the overlap between collective narcissism and in-group positivity. Finally, a longitudinal survey conducted among 398 Polish adults recruited on-line via the Ariadna research panel
demonstrated that low personal control measured at Time 1 predicted higher collective narcissism measured at Time 2 (six weeks later), but Time 1 collective narcissism was not related to levels of personal control measured at Time 2. Overall, these findings indicate that collective narcissism serves to compensate an individual need and, thus, can fluctuate to some extent in response to the motivational state of the individual. Because collective narcissism stems from dealing with one’s shortcomings, it becomes defensive and difficult to maintain. This results in a constant need to validate the in-group image in the eyes of others. Here the in-group seems to be in the service of the self.

**Intergroup consequences of collective narcissism.** Defensiveness of collective narcissism should be manifest in a variety of undesirable intergroup outcomes, such as exaggerated perceptions of threat to the in-group as well as destructive responses to threats.

**Threat perceptions.** Several lines of studies indicate that collective narcissism is associated with a chronic conviction that others threaten the in-group. This can translate into an increased likelihood of belief in out-groups’ conspiracies against the in-group. In a study by Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, and colleagues (2016), 96 Polish students were asked about their perceptions of celebrations of the change of political system in Central and Eastern Europe. Although Poles are proud of the first free elections of June 4th 1989 that paved the way for the fall of Communism, citizens of other counties often consider the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th 1989 to mark the end of the totalitarian system. If this is the case, those high in collective narcissism should be especially sensitive to any information that undermines Polish achievements in the system change in Europe. In consequence, they might seek to attribute any underestimation of Polish input as a consequence of a malevolent international conspiracy. Participants completed measures of national collective narcissism, and in-group positivity (measured as collective self-esteem; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), and were exposed to a text discussing the lack of acknowledgement for Polish achievements in
the context of the fall of Communism. An excerpt from the text read: “On our continent, the symbols of overthrowing Communism are neither the Gdansk Shipyard, nor the Round Table, and especially not the Polish elections of June 1989. (...) It is November 9th 1989 that became a symbol of transition in Eastern and Central Europe.” Participants then reported to what extent they believed in an anti-Polish conspiracy, with items such as: “Western countries conspire against Polish people and intentionally falsify the history”. These convictions were significantly correlated with collective narcissism ($r = .54$), but only marginally with collective self-esteem ($r = .20$).

Another study conducted, among 223 Polish students, examined a different context frequently associated with conspiracy theories (Cichocka, Marchlewksa, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016; Study 2). The focus was on the Smolensk plane crash of 2010, which killed the Polish president, the first lady, and 94 other high officials. As the catastrophe happened in Russia, rumours about potential Russian involvement in the tragedy spread quickly. A survey conducted just days after the crash measured national collective narcissism, in-group positivity (in-group identification; Cameron 2004), and the endorsement of conspiracy theories about Russian involvement in the crash (e.g., “What happened is a consequence of Russian conspiracy”). In addition, the survey asked about perceptions of threat (two items measuring threats to the self and to the fate of the Polish nation). Again collective narcissism, but not in-group identification, was positively correlated with conspiracy beliefs ($rs$ of .24 and -.01, respectively). Additional analyses indicated that the link between collective narcissism and conspiracy beliefs was mediated by the perceptions of threat.

Finally, a survey of 341 American Mturk workers examined whether collective narcissism is associated with increased perceptions of threat stemming from out-groups specifically (Cichocka, Marchlewksa, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016; Study 3). The study compared beliefs in national (in-group) or foreign (out-group) conspiracies. Many conspiracy
theories accuse members of one’s own group, such as government officials, of secret plots against fellow in-group members. Notable examples include conspiracy theories about the national representatives’ involvement in the deaths of Princes Diana or JFK (e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 2008). We analysed the effects of national collective narcissism and in-group positivity (scale by Leach et al., 2008) on conspiracy beliefs. We used two versions of the conspiracy beliefs measure (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). Participants either responded to the items about foreign government’s (out-groups) or the US government’s (in-group) malevolent actions (e.g., “Foreign governments [the American government] deliberately conceal a lot of important information from the world public out of self-interest”). Thus, the study included a manipulation of the content of conspiracy theories. Regression analyses revealed that conspiracy theory content significantly, albeit weakly, moderated the link between collective narcissism and conspiracy beliefs ($R^2=.02$). Collective narcissism significantly predicted convictions about out-group conspiracies but not in-group conspiracies. We replicated this interaction in a separate sample of 269 American Mturk workers, which additionally controlled for individual narcissism (Cichocka, Marchlewksa, & Golec de Zavala, 2016; Study 2).

In a separate line of inquiry, Golec de Zavala and colleagues (in press) demonstrated links between collective narcissism and hypersensitivity to “perceived insult to in-group image even when it is debatable, not perceived by others and not intended by the other group (p. 2)”. For example, in a study conducted among 111 Turkish undergraduate students, national collective narcissism was associated with perceiving Turkey’s wait to be admitted to the EU as humiliating and shameful (Golec de Zavala et al., in press; Study 1). Overall, research demonstrates that collective narcissism breeds chronic suspicion towards out-groups. Being convinced that members of other social groups are conspiring against one’s own group provides an explanation for why the in-group does not always receive what it deserves.
Ultimately, any shortcomings can be attributed to secret enemy plots, rather than to the group’s own failings. This helps the in-group members blame others for their problems—a strategy likely employed by those high in defensiveness.

**Out-group attitudes.** This chronic lack of trust and suspicion are likely reasons why collective narcissism is associated with a general negativity towards out-groups, especially those that share a difficult history of mutual grievances or conflict with the in-group (Golec de Zavala & Golec de Zavala, 2012; see also Lyons et al., 2013). Examples include US-Chinese or Polish-Jewish relationships. In research by Cai and Gries (2013) conducted among 279 American adults, national collective narcissism predicted anti-Chinese prejudice ($r=.24$), negative attitudes towards the Chinese government ($r=.15$), as well as support for tougher policies towards China ($r=.46$; Study 1). These findings were mirrored in China (Study 2; 436 college students and adults), where national collective narcissism predicted for instance anti-American attitudes ($r=.25$) and lower declared likelihood of buying US products ($r=.42$).

In two surveys Golec de Zavala and Cichocka (2012) conducted among Polish undergraduates, national collective narcissism predicted anti-Semitism (measured as social distance in Study 1, $r=20$, or as a combination of negative emotions and behavioural intentions in Study 2, $r = .21$). Both studies also measured siege mentality, which is a chronic belief that the rest of the world has highly negative intentions towards the in-group (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992). Siege mentality was positively correlated with collective narcissism (Study 1 $r = .48$; Study 2 $r = .62$). The second study additionally measured a specific conviction that Jews conspire against the in-group (Kofta & Sędek, 2005), which also correlated with collective narcissism ($r=.43$). Analyses indicated that the link between national collective narcissism and anti-Semitic prejudice was mediated by siege mentality and Jewish conspiracy belief, both of which can be treated as indices of exaggerated threat perceptions. These
examples notwithstanding, out-group negativity associated with collective narcissism is more likely to increase as a defensive response to threat.

**Responses to threats.** One of the basic manifestations of defensiveness is overt aggression towards the source of threat (Baumeister et al., 1996). Research conducted at the individual level in the framework of threatened egotism theory has shown that narcissists (rather than people with high or low self-esteem) are prone to retaliatory aggression against anyone who dares to criticise or undermine their self-image (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Stucke & Sporer, 2002). Such aggression is not displaced beyond the sources of threat, indicating that it serves to punish the offender rather than results from generalised negative affect following an ego-threat. If collective narcissism indeed reflects defensive in-group positivity, we should observe a similar pattern at the group level of analysis (see Baumeister, 2002; Golec de Zavala, 2011): Collective narcissism should predict hostile responses to threats to the in-group image, although these responses should not be displaced to non-threatening targets. This, in fact, was argued by Fromm (1973), who stated: “Those whose narcissism refers to their group rather than to themselves as individuals are as sensitive as individual narcissists, and they react with rage to any wound, real or imaginary, inflicted upon their group” (p. 276).

Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec (2013) tested these hypotheses in four experiments conducted in national and university contexts. All studies manipulated criticism or praise of the in-group and then measured hostility in response to this criticism. Studies 1 (\(N = 134\)) and 2 (\(N=108\)) were conducted with American Mturk workers. Participants filled out the Collective Narcissism Scale with respect to their national group and then were exposed to threat embedded in an alleged interview with a British student. In the first study the interview either praised or criticised the US intervention in Iraq. In the second study it mentioned general opinions about the US being either “materialistic and arrogant” (criticism
condition) or “friendly and optimistic” (praise condition). Participants then reported their intentions to engage in confrontational behaviours towards members of the offending group (the British). We also checked whether hostility triggered by the threat would be displaced to members of irrelevant groups. To this end, we asked participants about their intentions towards a different nationality (in Study 1 Germans; in Study 2 New Zealanders). Participants were asked to what extent members of the two out-groups made them want to confront or actively oppose them (Study 1; see Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000) or hurt, offend, injure, intimidate, and humiliate them (Study 2). Regression analyses revealed interactions between collective narcissism and the experimental manipulation. In both studies, collective narcissism was associated with hostility towards the offending out-group in the criticism conditions but this association was negative, and non-significant, in the praise conditions (see Figure 2 for an example). Similar regression analyses did not find significant interactions between collective narcissism and the research condition for attitudes towards non-threatening groups, indicating that hostility associated with collective narcissism is retaliatory and not displaced towards other out-groups. These findings were replicated in a study (N=117), which experimentally manipulated whether the target of hostility was the offending or non-offending out-group (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, Study 3, Polish students).

-- Figure 2 --

The final study by Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec (2013, Study 4) used a similar procedure in the context of rivalry between universities in Poland. Participants (N=80) were students of the Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities, which has a strong psychology profile. They filled out a measure of collective narcissism with respect to their university peers. They were then asked to serve as judges in an alleged funding competition for a student project. Their task was to assess funding bids and assign funds to three
competing teams. One of the teams represented a major rival to their university—the Faculty of Psychology at the University of Warsaw. This team’s bid either criticised or praised the participants’ own institution. Collective narcissism predicted assigning lower funds and providing more negative assessment of the rival team in the criticism condition, but the effect was reversed in the praise condition. Furthermore, the negative effect of collective narcissism on funding evaluations in the criticism condition was mediated by perceiving the bid as threatening. No similar moderating effects were found for evaluations of the other two funding bids (non-offending groups).

All studies by Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec (2013) also measured control variables, including individual narcissism (Studies 1-4), in-group identification (Studies 1-4), blind and constructive patriotism (Study 2), SDO and RWA (Studies 1-3). All of these are important predictors of interpersonal and intergroup attitudes and are associated with collective narcissism. Nevertheless, collective narcissism emerged as the only predictor of retaliatory hostility in response to threat ($R^2$ for the interactions between .02 and .07).

Gries, Sanders, Stroup, and Cai (2015) found similar effects in a study examining the link between national collective narcissism in China and defensive responses to a potential cultural threat—exposure to American popular culture. Chinese participants ($N=129$; mostly students, Study 1) were exposed to either American or Chinese celebrities on the covers of Chinese magazines and then reported their feelings towards America, Americans, and the American government. For those high in collective narcissism, exposure to American celebrities resulted in more negative attitudes towards the US, compared to the Chinese celebrities condition. The effect was reversed for those low in collective narcissism—these participants reacted to American celebrities with more favourable attitudes. These findings were replicated in a separate sample of 339 Chinese (also mostly students, Study 2).
If overt aggression is not possible, another way to protect the in-group image is to avoid threats and criticisms, or dismiss them as invalid. One illustration of defensive avoidance of threatening information comes from research on perceptions of history. Imhoff (2010) examined Germans’ desire to distance themselves from memories of the Holocaust—a black mark on the nation’s history. He referred to this process as historical closure. In two surveys conducted in Germany with the use of on-line snowball sampling, collective narcissism was associated with a desire for historical closure, which further decreased feelings of collective guilt and subsequent intentions for reparations to the victims. This effect was attributed specifically to collective narcissism, rather than in-group glorification. Thus, collective narcissism was associated with a defensive desire to distance oneself from past events that might undermine the positive in-group image. Collective narcissism is also linked to attempts to discredit the source of threat. For example, in a nationally representative sample of Polish adults collective narcissism was associated with a belief that books and movies which refer to Polish anti-Semitism after WWII are a consequence of malicious propaganda (Jaworska, 2016; see also Golec de Zavala et al., in press).

Yet another way of dealing with in-group image threat can be collective schadenfreude—expressing enjoyment derived from out-group’s misfortunes (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). In the study conducted in Turkey by Golec de Zavala and colleagues (in press) increased perceptions of Turkey’s wait to join the EU as insulting mediated between collective narcissism and expressions of schadenfreude in response to the news about the economic crisis in Europe. These authors obtained similar effects in Portugal (164 adults, Study 2). Portuguese collective narcissism predicted collective schadenfreude derived from news about the economic crisis in Germany—a country perceived as being explicitly hostile towards Portugal.
Overall, research confirms that collective narcissists are defensive. They are more likely to see threats to the in-group, and be prejudiced to out-groups they perceive as threatening. They also defend the in-group image by aggressing against the source of threat, rejecting and discrediting any views that might put the in-group in a negative light, or compensating for them by expressing collective schadenfreude. This is in line with Locke’s (2014) research on intergroup goals, which indicated that collective narcissism is associated with self-protective goals, such as making sure the group members do whatever is in their best interest, at the same time endeavouring to appear better than other groups.

**Security of Non-narcissistic In-group Positivity**

**Measuring non-narcissistic in-group positivity.** Understanding the nature of collective narcissism helps elucidate the psychology of non-narcissistic in-group positivity. As outlined above, collective narcissism tends to be positively associated with various measures of in-group positivity. Yet, it is possible to observe the unique effects of collective narcissism without the variance explained by in-group positivity, and the unique effects of in-group positivity without the variance explained by collective narcissism. In the study of individual self-evaluations, this is achieved by including narcissism and self-esteem in a single regression analysis (Paulhus et al., 2004). The regression coefficients for each variable reflect the unique effects of narcissistic and non-narcissistic self-evaluations. In this way, we can observe the effects of self-esteem without the defensive component captured by narcissism, and show that the two variables have distinct interpersonal consequences. For example, while narcissism predicts anti-social attitudes, non-narcissistic self-esteem predicts more positive interpersonal attitudes (e.g., Locke, 2009; Paulhus et al., 2004).

Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Bilewicz (2013) reasoned that if it was possible to distinguish non-narcissistic self-evaluation by partialling out individual narcissism, it should
be possible to distinguish non-narcissistic in-group positivity by partialling out collective narcissism. Once their shared variance is accounted for by including collective narcissism and a measure of in-group positivity in one regression model, we can observe the effects of in-group positivity free of the defensive component captured by collective narcissism. In this way, we can measure non-narcissistic in-group positivity—a confidently held positive evaluation of one’s in-group that is independent of the recognition of the group in the eyes of others. It reflects an unassuming contentment with the group’s qualities that should be resilient to threats and criticism, and predict more positive out-group attitudes.

**Antecedents of non-narcissistic in-group positivity.** Most social psychological theories discussed so far emphasised the role of the group in managing individual needs. Recent research indicates that there is also a different route to forming bonds with the in-group—one in which in-group commitment stems from expression of individuality and increased satisfaction of individual needs. Jans, Postmes, and van der Zee (2011) propose that group identification can be built on expressions of one’s distinct individual (rather than shared) identity, which is complementary to, yet compatible with, other group members. This route for identity formation presumes that group identity is strengthened by diverse contributions from individuals. In a similar vein, Van Veelen, Otten and Hansen (2011) propose that aside from self-stereotyping, in which group characteristics are projected on to the self, group identification can also be strengthened by the projection of one’s own attributes on to the group. Others show that in-group commitment is associated with feelings of intrinsic motivation for goal pursuit (Gagné & Deci, 2005) and self-efficacy (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). In the context of national identity, Amiot and Aubin (2013) demonstrated that patriotism is predicted by self-determined motivation to identify with national groups that leads to greater well-being (while nationalism results from external motivations and social pressures). These various accounts suggest that it is at least plausible
for a strong self to foster support for social groups. Arguably, the individual can realize his or her potential by contributing to the well-being of the group.

We predicted that satisfaction of individual needs should then foster secure (i.e., non-narcissistic) in-group positivity. In the survey study conducted in Poland, in-group identification measured with Cameron’s (2004) scale was positively correlated with personal control (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). In the experimental studies which manipulated personal control, participants reported the highest in-group positivity in the high control conditions, and these effects were especially prominent once we co-varied out the variance shared with collective narcissism. This indicates that increased personal control can foster non-narcissistic in-group positivity. Similarly, the longitudinal study demonstrated that greater personal control predicted greater non-narcissistic in-group positivity measured six weeks later. Interestingly, non-narcissistic in-group positivity also increased feelings of personal control measured at Time 2, indicating that this type of in-group positivity may have desirable effects on individual functioning (see also Greenaway et al., 2015). This suggests that in-group positivity without the defensive component is secure and based on the strength of the individual self. Here, the self is in the service of the group.

**Intergroup consequences of non-narcissistic in-group positivity.** If non-narcissistic in-group positivity is indeed secure, then it should predict a lesser need to protect the image of the in-group. This should be manifest by decreased perceptions of threat to the in-group, lack of hostile responses to such threats and, importantly, greater tolerance overall.

**Threat perceptions.** The recent research focusing on intergroup conspiracies discussed above examined the effects of non-narcissistic in-group positivity alongside the effects of collective narcissism. Cichocka, Marchlewsk, Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2016) revealed a non-significant correlation between beliefs in conspiracies undermining
Polish achievements in the fight against communism and national in-group positivity. However, in-group positivity was significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism, $r = .61$. Therefore, in order to observe its effects without the variance shared with collective narcissism the two variables were included in a regression as joint predictors of conspiracy beliefs. When both types of in-group positivity were analysed, the effect of non-narcissistic in-group positivity became significant and negative, while the effect of collective narcissism on beliefs in anti-Polish conspiracy remained significantly positive. In other words, the negative effect of non-narcissistic in-group positivity on intergroup conspiracy beliefs became apparent once we co-varied out collective narcissism.

This pattern of results is indicative of a suppression effect, in which inclusion of a third variable in the model strengthens the initial link between the predictor and the outcome (Cichocka & Bilewicz, 2010; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Paulhus et al., 2004). In order to check whether the suppressing effect of collective narcissism was significant, we computed indirect effects with bootstrapping (Hayes, 2013). Analyses confirmed a significant suppression effect of 0.73 [0.47, 1.05], indicating that the effect of in-group positivity was significantly stronger once collective narcissism was included in the model. We conducted a similar analysis to check whether the effect of collective narcissism was suppressed by in-group positivity. Again, we found a significant effect of -0.26 [-0.46, -0.10] indicating that the effect of collective narcissism on conspiracy beliefs became stronger when both variables were included in the model. Thus, collective narcissism and in-group positivity acted as mutual suppressors in predicting conspiracy beliefs (see Figure 3 for a schematic illustration).

-- Figure 3 --

Similar effects were obtained for the belief in the Smolensk crash conspiracy (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). Although the bivariate correlation between in-group
positivity with conspiracy beliefs was non-significant, when collective narcissism was included in the regression analyses, non-narcissistic in-group positivity predicted lower endorsement of beliefs in a Russian conspiracy behind the plane crash, and lower perceptions of threat. Again, we observed mutual suppression effects (via collective narcissism, 0.32 [0.16, 0.51]; via in-group positivity, -0.16 [-0.31, -0.03]). Furthermore, differential perceptions of threat mediated the link between narcissistic as well as non-narcissistic in-group positivity and conspiracy beliefs (see Figure 4). Finally, we examined whether conspiracy beliefs were associated with US national in-group positivity (measured as group self-investment, Leach et al., 2008, which represents the core dimension of social identification, e.g., Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013; although results were similar when the full scale was included in the analyses). The bivariate correlation was not significant, but once collective narcissism was included in the model, non-narcissistic in-group positivity was significantly negatively associated with conspiracy beliefs. Furthermore, this effect was not moderated by the content of the conspiracies, indicating that participants high in non-narcissistic in-group positivity were equally likely to reject conspiracies implicating their own and foreign governments.

-- Figure 4 --

In a similar vein, studies by Golec de Zavala and colleagues (in press) demonstrated that non-narcissistic in-group positivity is associated with a lower likelihood of seeing actions of another group as insulting. In the Turkish study national in-group positivity (measured as collective self-esteem; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) without the narcissistic component was associated with lower perceptions of the EU admission wait as insulting to the in-group.

**Out-group attitudes.** If perceptions of threat are indeed negatively predicted by secure in-group positivity, such positivity should also be associated with more favourable attitudes
towards out-groups. In five studies, we tested whether collective narcissism and in-group positivity act as mutual suppressors in predicting negativity towards out-groups that share a history of competition or mutual grievances with the in-group (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). These studies relied on similar suppression analyses as the research on in-group positivity and conspiracy beliefs discussed above (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). The first survey tested the suppression hypothesis in the context of national identity in Poland. While collective narcissism was significantly correlated with out-group negativity ($r = .26$), in-group positivity alone was a negative but not significant predictor of out-group negativity ($r = -.07$). When we included both variables in the model, both of their effects strengthened and, importantly, the effect for non-narcissistic in-group positivity became significant. In other words, when the variance shared between collective narcissism and in-group positivity was accounted for, non-narcissistic in-group positivity became a predictor of positive out-group attitudes. We obtained similar results in samples of Polish adults (in the context of national identity) and UK students (in the context of national and university identities; see Table 2 for a summary).

-- Table 2 --

In the remaining study (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka & Bilewicz, 2013; Study 4), we also focused on two indices of national in-group positivity: constructive and blind patriotism (Schatz et al., 1999). Because blind patriotism is conceptually linked to collective narcissism, the two constructs were allowed to compete as suppressors of non-narcissistic in-group positivity. When each variable was analysed separately, both collective narcissism ($r = .21$) and blind patriotism, ($r = .14$) were significantly associated with out-group negativity, while constructive patriotism was not significantly related to out-group attitudes ($r = -.04$). Yet, once all three variables were included in the model, the negative effect of constructive patriotism became significant, the positive effect of collective narcissism strengthened, and
the effect of blind patriotism became non-significant. Thus, collective narcissism, as a broader construct reflecting defensive in-group positivity, proved to be a better predictor of out-group hostility. Follow up analyses found a significant suppression via collective narcissism but not blind patriotism. Although constructive patriotism could be seen as similar to non-narcissistic in-group positivity, its positive effects on out-group attitudes were only manifest once collective narcissism was co-varied out. Overall, our studies indicate that co-varying out narcissistic defensiveness allows the positive effects of non-narcissistic in-group positivity to emerge. Brewer (1999) argued that in-group love is not always linked to out-group hate. Our research goes a step further by demonstrating that positive in-group attachment has the potential to foster greater tolerance (see Allport, 1954).

**Responses to threats.** If non-narcissistic in-group positivity is indeed secure, we would also expect it not to be linked to aggressive reactions to threats to the in-group image. In the experiments by Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec (2013) examining responses to in-group criticism, non-narcissistic in-group positivity did not predict retaliatory hostility. In one of these studies in-group positivity was significantly associated with the willingness to confront both the offending \((r = .28)\) and non-offending \((r = .18)\) outgroups, although the latter effect became non-significant when we controlled for collective narcissism and the remaining control variables (Study 1). In two other studies national in-group positivity had weaker and non-significant relationships with the measures of overt hostility \((rs \text{ ranging between .01 and .20};\text{ Studies 2 and 4})\), and in the remaining study it had a significantly negative relationship with hostility \((r = -.26;\text{ Study 3})\). None of these effects depended on the experimental manipulations of criticism, indicating that in-group positivity without the narcissistic component is not associated with defensive retaliation in response to threats.
Non-narcissistic in-group positivity has also shown weaker links with other indirect responses to threats. In the Polish study by Jaworska (2016) non-narcissistic in-group positivity was unrelated to beliefs that movies criticising Polish anti-Semitism are a result of malicious propaganda. Golec de Zavala and colleagues (in press) also reported that non-narcissistic forms of in-group positivity were linked to a lower likelihood of expressing schadenfreude in response to perceived insult. These results of course do not suggest that non-narcissistic in-group positivity is never associated with defending the in-group image. However, one could expect that in the face of unjustified threat to the image or well-being of the in-group, non-narcissistic in-group positivity would predict more constructive responses, such as attempts to clarify the situation or reconcile.

Taken together, research on the consequences of non-narcissistic in-group positivity provides further evidence that it is indeed a secure commitment to the group. Non-narcissistic in-group positivity is linked to a lack of defensive responses to threats and criticism, lower perceptions of threat, and a lower likelihood of buying into theories accusing out-groups of malevolent intentions. This is in line with Locke’s (2014) findings indicating that non-narcissistic in-group positivity was linked to the group goal of appearing capable and assertive, rather than self-protective. This helps shed light on why non-narcissistic in-group positivity is also associated with favourable out-group attitudes more broadly.

Towards a Motivational Model of In-group Positivity

Our research demonstrates that frustration versus satisfaction of individual needs can affect ways in which people identify with social groups, confirming that individual level processes shape people’s collective selves (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). These findings can be integrated within a framework (Figure 1), which argues that understanding the different motivations that underlie defensive and secure in-group positivity helps shed
light on why they have opposing consequences. The more defensive form of in-group positivity—that is, collective narcissism—stems from the frustration of individual needs and fulfils a compensatory function. Thus, collective narcissism predicts a greater concern with how the group’s image reflects on the individual and a lesser concern with benefiting the in-group. This has two important consequences. First, it evokes the needs to proclaim in-group greatness and protect in-group image, which in turn foster out-group hostility. Indeed, this review has provided robust evidence for this link. Second, the compensatory nature of collective narcissism suggests that it might paradoxically be linked to a lesser concern with other in-group members, and a greater concern with individual outcomes. Secure in-group positivity, on the other hand, stems from the satisfaction of individual needs. In this process the individual self seems to serve the group. Thus, secure in-group positivity is likely to predict a lesser concern with how the group reflects on the individual and a greater willingness to realize one's potential by benefiting the group. This explains why secure in-group positivity predicts more favourable out-group attitudes, but also indicates that it should be associated with greater support for fellow in-group members.

Thus, the new model allows us to make predictions not only about the intergroup but also intragroup consequences of secure and defensive in-group positivity. Preliminary evidence supports this expectation. Jaworska (2016) examined predictors of in-group loyalty. In a nationally representative survey Polish participants declared whether they would be willing to leave their country forever, if they could make more money abroad. Narcissistic in-group positivity predicted greater willingness to leave, while non-narcissistic in-group positivity predicted lower willingness to leave. Therefore, despite their apparently strong commitment to the in-group, those with defensive in-group positivity might be more willing to abandon the group if it satisfies their personal needs.
Other evidence comes from the organisational context. In a series of studies conducted among Polish and English speaking working adults we examined in-group positivity and collective narcissism with respect to their company as predictors of organisational behaviour and attitudes towards co-workers (i.e., in-group members; Cichocka, Maciejewski et al., 2016). Results indicated that those high in narcissistic in-group positivity were more likely to treat their co-workers instrumentally for personal benefit (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008) or show counterproductive organisational behaviours, such as falsifying receipts (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The effect was reversed for those high in non-narcissistic in-group positivity—they were less likely to show undesirable workplace attitudes and behaviours. Similar effects were obtained even after controlling for individual level variables that are typically associated with interpersonal attitudes, such as narcissism and empathy. These findings suggest that defensive (narcissistic) in-group positivity predicts undesirable out-group as well as in-group outcomes, while secure (non-narcissistic) in-group positivity predicts desirable out-group and in-group outcomes.

Implications

By integrating ideas proposed by psychoanalytic and social identity theorists with recent empirical research, the current framework sheds light on how individual level processes affect the social self. By doing so, it helps us understand the many ways in which in-group positivity affects intra- and intergroup processes. This approach has the potential to inform applied work. As a robust predictor of intergroup hostility, collective narcissism has already been studied as a risk factor for intergroup conflicts and violence. For example, researchers working within the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (a programme supported by the US Department of Homeland Security) used collective narcissism as an important index of radicalization in evaluating interventions used with former members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Webber,
Collective narcissism has also been used to examine gang violence in forensic research. For example, Alleyne, Blake, and Walsh (2014) showed that collective narcissism among gang members predicts gang-rape proclivity.

The current framework can also be used in organizational and business contexts. In a recent review Galvin, Lange, and Ashforth (2015) argued that organizational collective narcissism might have negative consequences for organizational behaviour and this prediction was confirmed by our empirical findings (Cichocka, Maciejewski, et al., 2016). Antonetti and Maklan (2016) explored the role of national collective narcissism in examining responses to irresponsible corporate behaviour (e.g., releasing contaminated products). They found that collective narcissism predicted lower perceived similarity with and sympathy for out-group (vs. in-group) victims of irresponsible corporate behaviour. I hope that the current framework will further inform work on decreasing the biases and hostility associated with collective narcissism as well as on increasing secure in-group positivity.

**Limitations**

Arguably, the current review provides more information about the nature of defensive in-group positivity than secure in-group positivity. The latter is currently measured by co-varying out defensiveness captured by collective narcissism from measures of in-group positivity (be they in-group identification, collective self-esteem, or patriotism). One advantage of such operationalization of secure in-group positivity is that it allows researchers to measure it indirectly and with lower likelihood of responses being affected by participants’ impression management concerns (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). A disadvantage is, however, that findings translate less easily into real life phenomena. As secure and defensive in-group positivity might co-exist in individuals, it might be difficult to distinguish those individuals that show high versus low levels of the two types of in-group positivity.
A great body of work in this area is correlational and does not allow for firm claims about causality. It largely relies on a theoretical assumption that secure and defensive in-group positivity are predictors of in-group and out-group attitudes. To date, only one study examined links between narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group positivity using a longitudinal design. The study conducted in Poland indicated that indeed national narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group positivity measured at Time 1 predicted out-group attitudes measured in Time 2, but out-group attitudes measured at Time 1 did not predict narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group positivity measured at Time 2 (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). Although this result is consistent with Allport’s (1954) argument that in-group positivity is primary to out-group attitudes, there are certainly contexts in which intergroup relations could affect ways in which people identify with their in-groups.

**Future Directions**

A remaining challenge for the current research (and the broader literature on social identification) is to identify which needs could be involved in fostering in-group positivity. Research to date has concentrated largely on one important human motivation—the need for personal control. I expect, however, that collective narcissism would possess the property of multifinality, in that it likely satisfies various psychological needs. By assuring beliefs about in-group greatness, collective narcissism might be best suited to manage feelings of self-worth (see Correll & Park, 2005). Nevertheless, there is preliminary evidence showing that defensive in-group identification could also be linked to epistemic motives. For example, intolerance of ambiguity has been shown to be associated with nationalism, but not patriotism (Baughn & Yaprak, 1996), and with glorification, but not attachment (Berlin, Roccas & Sagiv, 2014; both cited in Roccas & Berlin, 2016). Based on these studies, we would expect epistemic needs to increase collective narcissism, although it seems that satisfaction of this type of need might be less efficient in fostering non-narcissistic in-group positivity. Possibly,
basic feelings of control and autonomy are needed for the self to be securely invested in the group (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Satisfaction or frustration of collective needs might also affect levels of secure and defensive in-group positivity. There is evidence that collective narcissism increases as a response to criticism of the in-group (Golec de Zavala, 2011). Although we could expect that the patterns of results would mirror those obtained for the individual-level factors, research showing motivational primacy of the self suggests that the effects might be stronger for individual, compared to collective, motives (see Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & Iuzzini, 2002).

Future studies should examine additional consequences of the two types of in-group positivity. Although this review highlighted diverse outcomes, it is conceivable that we will sometimes not observe differences in the effects of secure and defensive in-group positivity. For example, working for the group and adherence to group norms can be important for both those defensively and securely committed to the in-group. Also, both narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group positivity should predict responses to clearly illegitimate treatment of the in-group. Yet, the more constructive responses might be driven by secure in-group positivity, while the more destructive responses by collective narcissism.

More work is also needed to fully understand the relationship between individual and collective narcissism. Although most past studies report a positive correlation between the two variables, this might be largely due to the overlap between the item content. In a sample of 532 Polish adults (Golec de Zavala et al., in press, Study 4), national collective narcissism was more strongly associated with vulnerable narcissism (measured with the Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale, Hendin & Cheek, 1997; \( r = .25 \)), which is linked to low self-evaluation, personal insecurity and anxiety proneness, than with grandiose narcissism (measured with the NPI; \( r = -.01 \)), which is linked to stronger self-enhancement and dominance tendencies (Pincus & Roche, 2012). This finding is in line with the current framework suggesting that
collective narcissism might be linked to a weak individual self. Grandiose individual narcissists might be too focused on the self to invest in the in-group, but Golec de Zavala and colleagues (in press) suggest that this link could depend on group status. Grandiose narcissists might be more willing to show positivity towards high status groups. Interestingly, the distinction between vulnerable and grandiose narcissism might be applicable to the group-level of analysis. The current conceptualisation and measure of collective narcissism has largely been inspired by work on grandiose individual narcissism but it is at least conceivable that one could observe a distinct form of vulnerable collective narcissism, characterised by negative group-image and feelings of victimisation.

Last but not least, future research would do well to construct direct measures of secure in-group positivity, which would capture it without the need to co-vary out collective narcissism. The first step in this direction is to examine in more detail which components of in-group identification need to be included in measures of in-group positivity to capture security. Preliminary research points to the crucial role of in-group evaluation and commitment to the group, rather than self-categorization or the importance of in-group identification to the self (Jaworska, 2016). Still, more work is needed to fully integrate the role of cognitive and affective components of in-group identification highlighted by social identity and categorization theories (see Leach et al., 2008) with the study of security and defensiveness inspired by the psychodynamic approach.

Conclusions

The theoretical framework and empirical research presented in this review validate and extend classic ideas from the Frankfurt School about the relationships between the individual and the group (Adorno et al., 1950; Fromm, 1973). While previous research and theorising differentiated between constructive and destructive types of in-group positivity,
their characteristics were largely inferred from their intergroup consequences. Our work goes beyond this approach by integrating findings about the nature, consequences, and, crucially, antecedents of different types of in-group positivity. The framework outlined in this review shows that defensiveness and security have different motivational roots. Collective narcissism is a defensive type of in-group positivity. As argued by Fromm (1973) and Adorno (1963/1998), a weak and threatened ego can be compensated by a narcissistic investment in the group. At the same time, a strong self is linked to non-narcissistic in-group positivity that is secure and has the potential to nurture both in-group and out-group love. Just as modern social and political psychology was successful in revisiting the psychoanalytic ideas of authoritarian personality and ideology (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981; Imhoff, 2015; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Napier & Jost, 2008), I hope that this new motivational model of defensive and secure in-group positivity will offer a fruitful avenue for research and theorising in intra- and intergroup relations.
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Footnotes

1Kernis (2003) uses the term secure interchangeably with other terms used in the literature, such as optimal, genuine or mature self-esteem. Similarly, defensive self-esteem is used interchangeably with the terms fragile or threatened self-esteem.

2Note that Lyons and colleagues (2010) examine interactions between in-group identification and collective narcissism. Their findings indicate that in-group identification tends to predict negative out-group attitudes only at high levels of collective narcissism. Although interpreting the effects of in-group identification accompanied (vs. not) by collective narcissism seems theoretically justifiable, it is less clear how to interpret the effects of collective narcissism at low levels of in-group identification. Therefore, in our research we usually opt for analysing the suppressing (rather than moderating) effects of collective narcissism and in-group identification (or other measures of in-group positivity).
Table 1

*Items used in the original and short versions of the Collective Narcissism Scale*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective Narcissism Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of [my group].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I will never be satisfied until [my group] gets the recognition it deserves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I insist upon [my group] getting the respect that is due to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. It really makes me angry when others criticize [my group].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. If [my group] had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I do not get upset when people do not notice achievements of [my group]. (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of [my group].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The true worth of [my group] is often misunderstood.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Copyright (c) 2009 American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. The official citation that should be used in referencing this material is Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., Eidelson, R., & Jayawickreme, N. (2009). Collective narcissism and its social consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 1074–1096. doi:10.1037/a0016904. No further reproduction or distribution is permitted without written permission from the American Psychological Association. (R) Denotes a reverse coded item. Response scale from 1 = I strongly disagree to 6 = I strongly agree. The term “my group” can be replaced by the corresponding group name. The shorter version includes items: 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013).
### Table 2

**Summary of study characteristics and findings (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Suppress effects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Collective narcissism (CN)</td>
<td>In-group positivity (IGP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Polish undergrads (N=85)</td>
<td>Full scale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>British undergrads (N=81)</td>
<td>Full scale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Sample Type</td>
<td>Scale Type</td>
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<td>Study 3</td>
<td>Polish adults</td>
<td>Short scale</td>
<td>In-group identification</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(N = 974)</td>
<td>(Cameron, 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Full scale</td>
<td>Constructive patriotism</td>
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<td>undergrads</td>
<td>(Schatz et al., 1999)</td>
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<td>(N=267)</td>
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<td>Study 5</td>
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<td>In-group identification</td>
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<td>undergrads</td>
<td>(Crisp, Walsh, &amp; Hewstone, 2006)</td>
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<td>(N=241)</td>
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**Note.** Suppression effects are fully standardised indirect effects and were all statistically significant. For Study 1, the suppression effect is reported for the Private and Identity Subscales but analyses including the whole scale showed a similar pattern.
Figure captions

Figure 1. The motivational model of in-group positivity.

Figure 2. Interaction effect of collective narcissism and research condition on retaliatory intergroup hostility. Figure adapted from Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2009; Study 1).

Note. *p < .05. Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 3. Schematic model of suppression effects of collective narcissism and in-group positivity on out-group attitudes. Dashed line indicate typical bivariate correlations. Solid lines indicate typical regression coefficients obtained after the variance shared between collective narcissism and in-group positivity is accounted for. Model adapted from Cichocka and colleagues (2015).

Figure 4. Effects of collective narcissism and in-group identification on conspiracy beliefs via perceptions of threat (Cichocka, Marchlewksa, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016; Study 2).

Note. *p < .05. ***p < .001. Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dotted line indicates a non-significant path. Paths for covariates (political conservatism and prejudice) are not presented in the model for simplicity.
Narcissistic in-group positivity

Non-narcissistic in-group positivity

Out-group attitudes

0

+ -

+ -

+ -