Settling the Trade to Africa: The Anglo-African Trade, 1695-1715, and the Political and Economic Implications of 1698

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Settling the Trade to Africa

At the turn of the eighteenth century, in 1698, the English Parliament passed An Act to Settle the Trade to Africa. When coming into effect a year later, it was to allow hundreds of merchants legal access to engage in trade to and from West Africa. Only a decade previously, traders whom had attempted to engage in such commercial activity outside the confines of the Royal African Company (the RAC) were subject to draconian legal action which effectively branded them as pirates.\(^1\) It was common practice in the 1680s for the RAC to “have by vertue of his Maj’ties Charter...a Commission to Seize Interlopers”, their cargoes and their vessels when caught engaging in an illicit trade Anglo-African trade.\(^2\) Frequently referenced by historians as the beginning of an open trade, with merchants flooding to the West African coast, 1698 was the catalyst for the beginning of a huge increase in the numbers of enslaved Africans shipped across the Atlantic over the eighteenth century.\(^3\) With commercial competition to these ‘separate traders’ unmatched by any chartered monopoly company, historians have also marked this as the endpoint for not just the RAC but all European chartered companies trading to Africa.\(^4\) Yet it is the seemingly inseparable nature of these two entities – the Atlantic slave trade and the Royal African Company – that has hindered historians from looking at the bigger picture surrounding 1698. Dominated by the loud, boisterous pamphlets which circulated London, the nation as a whole and the Atlantic colonies in the 1690s and early 1700s, historians even recently have been too quick to label the intended ideological opposition between separate traders and monopolists from contemporary literature. Written by the likes of Charles Davenant and Daniel Defoe as well as dozens of anonymous pamphleteers, these works on the state of Anglo-African trade were not representative of the commercial interactions that existed between separate traders and the RAC. Their rhetorical strengths in portraying the African trading debates as two mutually exclusive ideologies which could never collaborate or partner has become the historian’s weakness in portraying the Anglo-African trade similarly. In reality, the 1698 Act initiated collaboration between Company and free trader that historians have heretofore failed to understand. Examining the Anglo-African

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2 ‘Instructions to Captain Samuel Kempthorne, London, the 4th May 1686’, in Donnan; Documents p.354.
3 Eric Williams; Capitalism and Slavery (London, 1944) p.32.
trade as much more than just the trade in enslaved Africans, this work looks at these aspects of cooperation, and encompasses the globalised nature of the trade to West Africa, focussing too on the deep commercial links that existed between English regional economies and West African markets by the turn of the eighteenth century. As well as this, with a focus on the Company’s colonial foothold on the West African coast, the imperial ideology of successive English and British governments regarding the West African coast is addressed.

In doing so, this work looks primarily at two large datasets, T 70/1198 and T 70/1199; information recorded by the RAC itself, which was to keep track of the Incomings and Outgoings (as the books are eponymously entitled) from the port of London trading to and from West Africa. The Incomings document charts the imported cargoes and vessels from West Africa, with the included commodities as well as the cargo owners and dates of voyage. The Outgoings does much the same, but for the exports and re-exports to West Africa. Following an insight into the 1698 Act itself, a methodological introduction and data description highlighting the essential aspects of what the Company’s Incomings and Outgoings are able to show, will allow for clarity on how these arguments are to be addressed. These documents allow for a deeper, more detailed analysis of not only what was being traded to West Africa in the early eighteenth century – building on the works by the likes of Marion Johnson’s Anglo-African Trade in the Eighteenth Century (1990) - but those whom owned the cargoes and their collaborators, as well as the non-commercial goods that were involved in maintaining the many settlements of the Royal African Company along the West African coast.

Chapter II provides insight into the volume of goods distributed to West Africa, the Outgoings illustrating a huge growth in the number of global goods which were common amongst merchants’ cargoes. The likes of East Indian textiles, beads, woods and luxury foodstuffs, American tobacco, furs and silver, European horticultural goods, cloth and linens, bullion, aliment and provisions, as well as a wide range of essential and luxury goods from across the British Isles were all extensively present, often in a single voyage. This aids in postulating an argument that the West African coast was one of the foremost globalised marketplaces at the turn of the eighteenth century. Observing the nature of the cargoes contained in the vessels travelling to West Africa, it becomes
clear that by 1708, most voyages contain goods with wide-reaching global origins, from China, the East Indies, Persia or regions of North and South America. Analysing the Company Outgoings, it is clear too that the Anglo-African trade was one in which commodities from all of these places were shipped together, by the same merchants on the same voyages in the first years of the eighteenth century. Traditionally, it has been the mid-eighteenth century that has taken focus regarding the emergence of globalised trade. The likes of Ralph Davis and Natasha Glaisyer have emphasised the importance of the 1740s-1760s as when Asian, American and European sourced goods were commonly incorporated on commercial voyages; when a British global trade was truly first witnessed.\(^5\) When combining the data of the Outgoings with contemporary political activity however, a clearer idea of the political economy of globalised commerce at the turn of the eighteenth century begins to emerge. Acts which catalysed the re-exportation of foreign goods and penalised and forbade the importation of certain Indian textiles - most notably the Calico Act of 1700 – were essential ingredients to this early globalised trade.\(^6\) The significance of the Outgoings in revealing the aspects of the globalised marketplace of West Africa lies most distinctly within the huge range of commodities listed. Furthering the work of Marion Johnson and others, the Outgoings chart over 450 separate commodities shipped to Africa, 1702-1712, not simply focus on the most prominent amongst them. Assessment of the Outgoings also provides revision on some of the heavily referenced data from the likes of K G Davies, the foremost historian of the RAC in the twentieth century, to highlight that the Company’s commercial and political strengths witnessed, for a short time, a growth in Company trading post-1698. This has long been overlooked in historiography. Crucially, noting the ownership of cargoes too, these documents allow for a far wider picture of the effect of the 1698 Act to Settle the Trade to Africa, with implications not only for the RAC, but its relationship with separate traders, as well as the intrinsic economic links between England and West Africa as early as 1700.

Chapter III looks at the communities within Britain whose manufacturing and productions were dependant on West African market demands. This becomes increasingly telling through the

\(^6\) Eacott, Jonathan; Selling Empire: India and the Making of Britain and America, 1600-1830 (North Carolina, 2016) p.89
cross referencing of the Outgoings with other such Company records of the day. The Outgoings highlight the significance West African markets held for English textile communities, and using a corroboration of other evidence it is possible to forge the political impact of these communities on the African trade debates in Britain. Where previous scholarly work with the likes of Joseph Inikori has established African influences on British manufacturing began in the 1760s, these documents insist that this was another process ongoing by the formative years of the eighteenth century. With this, it becomes possible to illustrate a view of the political ideology of successive English and British governments’ towards West Africa from the Restoration monarchs to the Parliamentary governments of the early eighteenth century. The 1698 Act was fundamentally about the security of the English colonial presence in West Africa, comparable to that of the Caribbean and East Indies, in spite of the very real weaknesses that been suffered and sustained during the War of the League of Augsburg.\(^7\) While they may have been inadequate in the supply of enslaved Africans, for decades they were considered by English governing powers to be the bastion of state control in West Africa.\(^8\) The imperial agenda of these governments was of crucial significance for the political development of the African trade debates, and a much under-studied aspect of the English experience on the coast. This is something that the T 70/1198/9 documents assist in highlighting greatly.

Understanding the dominant contemporary political issues is crucial to understanding the settlement of 1698; not least the shifting political dominance of Parliament and anti-Restoration views since the Revolution of 1689-90. Due to the War of the League of Augsburg, England for the first time had a national debt with the national bank, The Bank of England, established in 1694. By 1701 this had reached £14.1million.\(^9\) There was little let up from this, with the War of Spanish Succession underway by for England by May 1702, affecting commercial trading prospects deeply. Warfare had driven the costs of the nation upwards at a dramatic rate, and further investment abroad was called upon by some to be the answer to many of these economic questions. With this too came the investment already placed in the plantations of the West Indies and North American mainland

\(^7\) William St Clair; The Grand Slave Emporium: Cape Coast Castle and the British Slave Trade (London, 2006) p.36.  
\(^8\) K G Davies; The Royal African Company (New York, 1975) p.121.  
throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century. These were not purely commercial polities however, and a strong political lobby in the Caribbean especially had been born, with merchants in England invested heavily in the plantations’ success due to the trade in enslaved Africans. Investment in the East Indies through the East India Company (EIC) had also become a crucial arm of English commercial success with stock being traded more than 650 times per annum in the late 1680s. This, more significantly, was tied inherently to the general trade to the West African coastline too. A bustling and competitive collection of markets along a 4000 mile stretch of coastline, West African trade became the fastest growing extra-European market for English merchants in the eighteenth century.

Despite this, little focus has been given to the Anglo-African trade as a whole, with historians that do focus on the British experience in West Africa tending to focus heavily on the trade in enslaved Africans. Rightly, this focus has centred on the largest forced-migration in history, and contextualising the trade in enslaved Africans around its detrimental effects to West African societies. This has also concentrated its economic implications for the European nations of Britain, Portugal, France, Spain, Denmark, Brandenburg and others whom engaged in the trade. The slave trade certainly dominated the export market of West Africa, accounting for approximately 90% of all listed exportations. Further accounts have emphasised the role the Anglo-African trade – particularly in slaves – played in the success of Britain’s industrial revolution. Eric Williams’ deeply influential Capitalism and Slavery in many ways has been guilty of influencing much subsequent historiography on the British experience in West Africa. Joseph Inikori has furthered this approach, but in doing so has failed to seriously consider the preceding impact of the West African coast on the manufacturing of pre-industrial England in the 1690s and early 1700s, particularly with regard to textiles. The Company Incomings illustrate strong bilateral trade links established between England and West Africa, not just interests in triangular trade, and somewhat apart from the developing slave trade by

12 Johnson; Anglo-African Trade p.40.
the end of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the Anglo-African trade was one attended by commodities with a wide mixture of origin. Although dominated by textiles and iron, these goods along with the others that would frequent the West African coast more and more from the 1680s would constitute one of the foremost globalised marketplaces for European merchants. Merchandise of origin spreading from the Americas to the Far East all had their place in the demands of African markets at the turn of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the sheer volume of merchants engaging in the African trade was in great part due to the 1698 Act, legitimising the trade as open to merchants outside of the regulated RAC. In further understanding the 1698 Act itself, there follows a far deeper comprehension of the relationship of the RAC and the separate traders both politically and commercially, as well as securing a greater knowledge of the perception of the Company’s fortifications that, despite their huge expense, were deemed so fundamental to English success on the African coast.

The Act itself has been given weight in recent years due to its opening of the trade to any who wished to engage in England. It decreed;

“Any Subjects as well as the Company may trade to Africa between Cape Blancho and Cape Mount, paying £10 per Cent. for Goods exported; And £10 per Cent. on all Goods, &c. imported into England or America, from Africa”

It is evident the sheer numbers that sought to capitalise on this trading too, as even after the spike of separate trader activity in 1700, there were still more than double the separate traders than there were company voyages engaging the coast in 1703-4, when non-company trading was at its lowest. Yet, this was not the central focus of the act. Fundamentally, the Act was about reinforcing the English colonial presence in West Africa, deeming this essential to a productive commerce as well as a strong imperial ideology. The opening stipulation of the act was that the “Royal African Company shall maintain all their Forts, Castles, etc and supply the same with Men, Artillery etc.” It continued, “[the


RAC] shall maintain support and defend all such Forts and Castles as the said African Company now have in their Possession or shall hereafter purchase or erect...” In short, both the RAC and the post-1689 governments concluded that the protection of the forts was not only the job of the RAC, but was of the utmost importance to the preservation of African trade, which in turn was of fundamental importance to the state. Only once this was established was it decreed that,

“Any of the King’s Subjects as well as the Company, may trade to Africa, between Cape Mount and the Cape of Good Hope, paying £10 per Cent. And the better to enable the said Royall African Company their Successors and Assigns to maintain the said Castles and Forts.”

Solidifying the Company settlements as the Act’s nucleus, it then immediately stated that the ten percent duty would be for the “sole purpose” of “paying for the forts”. Between 1699 and 1712, over £52,500 was harvested through the Incomings and Outgoings books to maintain the forts, a figure which seemed pitifully lower than needed given the £400,000 loss incurred through the War of Spanish Succession. The years of 1702 and 1703 alone garnered over £72,000 for the separate traders. Indeed, the records give a false perception of the trade, this must be remembered, that the duties were being paid by all separate traders. This is not the case, clearly, as is displayed numerous times in the pamphlets surrounding the act. Davenant himself wrote in 1709 that the separate traders “never failed to magnify and improve any casual loss or misfortune which happened to the company during the late war”.

The act itself says many things. It was significant in establishing an opening of the slave trade whilst still maintaining elements of the RAC’s monopoly. It also suggests that the RAC and the separate traders were to have a less tense relationship given the right both recognised the other to have in trading. Separate traders would even be given the right to establish factories (although this did not occur), signified as the Crown and State’s representatives on the African coast. Furthermore, the act was not limited to the trade in enslaved Africans, rather acknowledged the Anglo-African trade in its

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17 An Act to settle the Trade to Africa (1698).
entirety. It is important to note that, with the exception of Gold, Silver and Africans themselves, the taxation paid to the RAC was to cover all goods significant in the African trade. Regarding Incomings, this was largely Ivory, Redwood (taxed at 5%) and Beeswax. Regarding Outgoings however, this encompassed virtually any commodity, given Africa being its destination and the purpose of its inclusion to be traded in Africa. Alongside this, was the allowance of goods such as copper to be re-exported to Africa whilst importation was strictly prohibited. Furthermore, this act was temporary. Expiring after thirteen years, it was not viewed by many a permanent solution to the burgeoning concerns of private interests in Africa. Indeed, this was a compromise the RAC had achieved in attaining, yet whilst some monopoly privilege survived it was nevertheless a slow progression towards no support for their forts and factories, and no right to tax separate traders in 1712. This was exactly the case that in both the Incomings and Outgoings documents, 12th July 1712, the notations ceased, and the tax was redundant and, without doubt, “The resolution of the Africa trade debates in 1712 left the separate traders supreme in the slave trade.”19 What remains here is the discussion of the wider inferences of these documents left by the RAC, and their effect on areas both global and domestic.

Historians’ views have differed widely on the reasons and significance of the act. K G Davies, the noted twentieth century historian of the Company, emphasised the “national opposition” built up by the anti-monopolist campaigners, with towns from Whitehaven to Kingsbridge given little significance by the RAC in their involvement with the Anglo-African trade. As such, many were inclined to support the separate traders’ cause.20 This was furthered by the support of the cities of Bristol and Liverpool, whom rejected the metropolitan centralisation of the trade in London. Sympathies of this view came from further afield, in the plantation communities of Maryland, Virginia, Barbados and Jamaica, homogenous in their desire for an increase in the volume of enslaved Africans to their ports they believed the separate traders would bring.21 Considered a grave defeat, the 1698 Act was marked the end of political and economic significance for the Company by Davies.

19 Pettigrew; Freedom's Debt p.192.
20 Davies; African Company p.130.
21 Ibid. pp.132-3.
Defining the 1698 Act as ‘mark[ing] the end of a fifty year contest between monopoly and free trade’, his views that it led to the perpetual decline and growing insignificance of the Royal African Company are quite deeply premature.\(^{22}\) His emphasis on the binary nature of the arguments between monopolists and separate traders fails to give significance to the complex and layered arguments and interests of all those that were affected by the Anglo-African trade. Placing the 1698 Act as the final nail in the coffin for the Company fails to appreciate the colonial responsibility the Act had cemented the RAC with, the significance of imperialistic intentions in Africa to the English state, as well as the influence it had over other such companies of the day. Commercially, Davies does make clear the Company’s shortcomings though; separate traders managed to transport around 75,000 enslaved Africans to the Americas 1698-1709, with the Company transporting around 18,000. Financially, the Act failed to provide the funds necessary for maintaining the forts. Raising £53,741, it was nowhere near the estimated £273,172 required.\(^{23}\) Yet these conclusions veneer the deeper significance of the 1698 Act. Davies’ view has been revised by William Pettigrew, asserting the Company, in his words, “achieved a remarkable statutory victory” in 1698. Parliament had provided a reprieve for the company by recognizing its charter, although at the price of opening the slave trade to the separate traders for twelve years, with a levy of 10 percent on the value on most merchandise to pass to and from the West African coast. In real terms, by 1701 the company’s share of the trade had plummeted to 8 percent, having been 88 percent in 1690 and the Company struggled to remain a significant force both in London and West Africa.\(^{24}\) Both historians yet remain agreed that this was an argument of free trade and monopoly with two mutually exclusive antithetical ideologies. In the difficulties of the Anglo-African trade however, the reality was far more pragmatic.

Both historians offer 1698 as a definitive turning point for the Company, one perceiving it ultimately as disastrous. In mounting debt by 1709, the Company had ceased trading entirely in the same year.\(^{25}\) Pettigrew’s assertions of a statutory victory are correct, and in many ways even understated. The Company maintained its charter, as well as maintaining the right to the cargoes of

\(^{22}\) Ibid. P.151
\(^{23}\) T 70/102; 18 December 1705; Journal of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 1704-9
\(^{24}\) Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt pp.37-9.
\(^{25}\) T 70/1199; Outgoings from the port of London recorded by the RAC, 1701-1712.
any interlopers found not paying the 10 per cent duty. Although cases were rare, those found interloping the duty were to have their assets forfeited with;

“One third part of all or any of the Forfeitures aforesaid shall be to the Use of his Majestie his Heirs and Successors One other third part to and for the Use of the Company and their Successors to be applyed for the Maintenance of the said Forts and Castles and the other Third part to and for the Use and Benefit of him or them that shall inform and sue for the same.”

Outside of the Act were witnessed some further strengths of the RAC. Adapting to the ruling of Parliament, and surviving for far longer than was to be expected by anyone in 1701, the Company managed to co-operate in the African trade with the separate traders frequently. Although presented as uncompromising, antithetical opponents of the trade by contemporary writers such as Davenant and Defoe and modern historians alike, the Company managed to share voyages, vessels and even cargo with numerous separate traders to Africa, as the Outgoings and Incomings illustrate. The 1698 Act legislated in favour of the Company given its colonial role in West Africa, and Parliament prioritised this over commercial activities in which the Company subsequently begin to suffer. Regardless of this however, it becomes clear that the 1698 Act was ruling in the African Company’s favour through understanding the T 70/1198 and 1199 documents, which must now be done.
I – Back and Forth: The Outgoings and Incomings of the Royal African Company

Methodological Assessment

Recorded separately, the tax books of the Company, entitled ‘Incomings’ and ‘Outgoings’, contain many distinctive insights into the trade, if a few discrepancies. Given their separation for imports and exports (including re-exports), the forthcoming details in this chapter have been split accordingly. Ultimately, the purpose of the documents were for tax collection – the listing of cargoes and their owners making it easier to deduct ten per cent of their value, and maintaining a record of whom was paying their dues to the Company. This provides clarity when assessing the data as, for the most part, there exists a uniform structure, with chronologically entered cargoes and the commodities contained within. Far more detail was kept than this however. After annotations of the year, month and day for each cargo (or collection of cargoes), there follows a recording of the ship name, captain, owner(s) of cargo, and the list of goods and commodities contained within. Separate from this, the recorded values of the goods and the taxation paid. This was the basis for the data analysis compiled in this work, and subsequent columns were added for assessment and, with the set of information presented, formatting and analysing the documentation becomes possible. Added into the table was a column for denoting whether the cargo is owned by the RAC or a separate trader, information only partially given by the documents. Separated columns purporting the cargo and ship owners were constructed and colour coded in reference to their political alignment. This was not simply the difference between Company and private traders, as stated before, but cross-referencing those whom were active politically - engaged in the pamphlet debates -and those whom were not. This was also done with those listed as separate slave traders. It also gave allowance for other such columns dictating the geographic origin of the goods in the cargo. East ‘Indian’, ‘American’, ‘European’ and ‘Domestic’

26 Also see Methodological Appendix.
27 See Methodological Appendix for assessment of ships in port.
28 Although not of prime importance to this study, it is also worth mentioning that when two instances of ships are noted with identical names, numerous years apart, if the Captain’s name is also different then it is treated as a different ship. Indeed, with the case of Amity, noted in October 1700 and again in July 1702, the first Captain is Hugh Shaxton, whereas the name given in 1702 is Edward Benson, and thus the ships are separated. This is estimation only, however the overall significance to this work is minimal – merely the number of voyages is the concern.
29 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt pp.227-234.
were all inserted into the spreadsheet illustrating which cargoes contained some, a mixture, or even all of these theatres’ commodities in a single voyage, under an investor’s possession.

The 1698 Act’s legislated taxation applied only to goods of the African trade and as such, the Incomings document lists only a handful of recurring commodities. Besides this, the data provided, as mentioned in the Data Description (below) is less comprehensive. Kept from 1699-1712, it begins one year earlier but finish at the same scheduled mid-July date. Notations were kept in much the same way as the Outgoings; the discernible difference for the Incomings being the voyage ‘Origin’ rather than ‘Destination’, which was expected of a document of importation. Issues arise, as often entries are placed in a muddled order, with for example entries dated for February, surrounding another for April. More frequently are months at a time are left absent of any trade, with entire months being absent from 1703 and 1704 notations. Indeed, often whole columns are left blank by the clerks, most frequently the name of ships but also the name of captains as well as the place from which they travelled. This accounts for some of the irregularity, however many of the months have dates noted in a non-chronological order, suggesting poor upkeep in general. Despite this, some voyages are traceable in their entirety when matched with the Outgoings, such as ‘Ship Captain’ on the ‘Ship name’, sailing from London in ‘Date’ with ‘Goods’, travelling along the West African coast and finally to ‘Place’, returning with ‘African goods’. These voyages give retrospective suggestions as to journey times across the Atlantic and back, and are clear signs of individual slave trading voyages. The location listed by the returning voyages in the Incomings provides useful analysis too regarding not simply triangular vessels. There was clear evidence, even at face value of the document, of a bilateral Anglo-African trade which has been given little assessment by historians at all. Using the list of independent slave traders presented in *Freedom’s Debt* allows for strong estimations of the percentage of voyages engaging in the transatlantic slave trade; however this is not possible for those whose interests were bilateral. With around 350 traders partaking in just shy of 500 voyages, it becomes clear that many of the voyages were not interested in the triangular Atlantic trade.

It is worth mentioning too, that the nature of these cargoes being listed in bulk means the individual values of each commodity per unit remains difficult to decipher. Clearly, as some
commodities are frequently loaded singularly, certain deductions can be made – iron, for instance, averages approximately £15 per ton. While useful for other purposes, measuring values is not the purpose of this study – rather the frequency of which each good appeared, and its origin. Indeed, this gives the greatest assistance in assessing the globalised marketplaces of West Africa. Given the relatively unprecedented scale of goods documented, it is possible to trace such global goods, with demands ranging from Canton to Rupert’s Land in their origin. Furthermore, since the Outgoings and Incomings have been recorded separately, it remains wise to document them as such given their lack of coordination in their data. Although, in theory, the documents together should form a fairly rounded picture of London’s African trading activity, in practice there is patchy cohesion. Only a small fraction of those ships documented leaving London in Outgoings are recorded returning in the Incomings. Highlighting the drawbacks of the document mentioned it was clear that the majority of merchants and traders active on the West African coast avoided registering their cargo, and thus paying the ten percent duty, whenever possible. There are exceptions of course, one being Samuel Bonham, the Essex slave-trader, whose Atlantic voyages are chartable from August 1702 – August 1711, being frequently documented in both the Outgoings and Incomings.30 However in the following descriptions of the data, it is necessary to assess the documents separately.

**Data Description – Outgoings**

Within contains the documents’ record of 677 voyages undertaken by sailors to and from London between 1699 and 1712. This data is spread across the two documents, with 372 and 311 recorded voyages in the Outgoings and Incomings respectively, documenting 1520 separate cargo loads registered for the Outgoings, with 534 for the Incomings. These voyages were conducted with involvement from 271 individual ship captains, with 268 individual merchants commercially active in the Anglo-African and Atlantic trades alongside the Royal African Company. Many cargo owners appear only occasionally and infrequently, or even just the once, whilst the likes of Daniel Jamineau,

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30 Charles Mosley ed.; Burke’s Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage vol. 1 (Delaware, 2003) p.423. Although Bonham, one of the most traceable of the merchants in the T70 1198/1199 documents, only registers his cargo in the Incomings document 50% of the time he is recorded leaving. This is a strong example of the limitation of this document in its focus only on London, however it is clear from the volume of voyages noted that other regional ports were not the primary cause of gaps in the London data.
Anthony Journey, Robert Heysham, Abraham Houlditch and Richard Harris dominate with almost 25% of the entries being owned by these men alone.\(^{31}\)

![No. of Voyages](image)

(Fig. 1 – The number of voyages recorded in the Outgoings per annum.)

![Value (£)](image)

(Fig. 2 – The total value of cargoes recorded in the Outgoings per annum.)

Invariably, the destination for the cargoes is listed as ‘Guinea’ or ‘Africa’, with the single exception of a voyage to Venice in February 1702. There is no discernible difference between ‘Guinea’ and ‘Africa’ for the Company clerk, given the frequency of examples of the very same voyage’s

\(^{31}\) A detailed analysis of this follows. See Chapter 2.
destination being listed as one or the other with each cargo load. The cargoes themselves provide much in the way of discerning geographical origin of the goods in transit to Africa, with 457 individual commodities listed in the document from the a smorgasbord of overseas locations. Amongst these, Iron was certainly the dominant export, appearing in 596 separate cargo loads on 306 voyages. Noted almost exclusively as a European good unless written otherwise, the spread becomes much more diverse. Tobacco, being the major American re-export, is seen on 239 of voyages, with the next seven most prominent goods including, pewter (258), perpetuanoes (240), gunpowder (211), spirits (186), down to great bugles (97), being domestic. Subsequently, a smorgasbord of East Indian goods are the most frequent, with Calicoes (140), Cowries (133), Nicanees (129), Tapseils (126), and Chints (119) being most common. Other European goods, featuring somewhat less frequently, had similar individuality defined by their geographic spread in Europe. French cloth, French linens, ‘Germany linens’, ‘Holland linens’, Italian silks and Spanish cloth and woollens were amongst the most commonly exported European commodities to Africa. Although the most prominent, these were by no means the entirety of the goods shipped, and sporadic assessment continues below.

Beyond a description of individual commodities, a greater indication of the trends of trade exists on a more global basis. Although domestic goods were clearly dominant in frequency, the ships varied greatly in the volume of their cargo listed, with many voyages having 5-10 entries, whilst many others only one. Significantly, no East Indian good held hegemony over another in the African trade, with the overall median of these goods is spread evenly across the recorded voyages in the Outgoings. This gave Eastern goods a burgeoning presence in the Anglo-African trade. As shown in Figures 5 and 6 below in Chapter II, domestic goods unsurprisingly were the most frequently documented aboard vessels overall. Goods originating in Europe increased in their frequency too, although given the nature of the Anglo-European iron trade at the turn of the C18th, the percentages in Figures 5 and 6 are reflective of the predominance of iron representing European goods below. Nevertheless, the cargoes being shipped to West Africa by the turn of the eighteenth century were globalised in the

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32 Chris Evans, Owen Jackson, Goran Ryden; ‘Baltic Iron and the British Iron Industry in the eighteenth century’, in Economic History Review, LV, 4 (2002) pp.642-665. This gives a good overview of how the greater volume of British iron was imported until the later C18th; “until the revolution in coal technology came to fruition in the last years of the eighteenth century the British iron market was dominated by imported bar iron, chiefly from Sweden and Russia.” P.643.
goods they held, with particular significance being placed upon 1708, whereby every vessel sent to Africa recorded in the document contained goods from all four geographic marketplaces, highlighting the increasingly globalised trade being developed by the first decade of the eighteenth century. Further analysis of this, and the year-by-year account of the global nature of these cargoes, is seen below. The ownership here, between separate trader and the Royal African Company, as well as those with voyages containing cargoes owned by both, is also represented below in figures 3 and 4, Chapter II. Most significant were the percentage of voyages conducted with ownership of both the RAC and separate traders aboard. ‘Both’ represents not only the voyages in which independent and Company merchandise sat side by side, but any voyage in which separate traders were shipping Company cargo on their behalf.

Significant too, were non-commercial as well as commercial voyages to the West African coast by both the Company and separate traders which must be considered. Of the 457 commodities listed, approximately 152 were for primarily non-commercial purposes, over one third of the total range of commodities exported. The likes of cheese, pork, beef, water stores, water tanks and gallons of spirits were shipped predominantly by the RAC. Items of construction were frequently alongside this, with, amongst others, handscrews, iron nails, jackscrews, ladders, marline (type of rope), mortars, shovels and spades, woodaxes, bricks, wooden planks and wheelbarrows. Tables, chairs, furniture both domestic and continental, haberdashery, paint brushes, painters colours and upholstery were all transported regularly. Administrative items were the most common, with every year at least one shipment filled entirely with RAC ledgers, journals, books, writing books, box, seals and weights, prayer books and ‘Sundry Necessaries for the Counting house’. More significantly were those included in the loaded goods which were specific for the establishment of factories. Tools and wares made more than occasional appearances, including butchers tools, apothecary wares, armourers’ tools, medicines and surgeons’ instruments, smiths’ tools and ironmongers’ wares. Military goods were included of course, with trumpets and drums for signalling, as well as fuses, muskets and guns (all accompanied with shot), and soldiers coats, colours and uniform. Amongst other more unique items were grindstones, firelocks and bullet moulds, as well as boiling mills, ‘great melting ladles’ as well
as a ‘copper pot for boiling negroes.’ As with the commercial voyages, these non-commercial cargoes were not exclusively shipped by the RAC, and in 1710 and 1711 the four voyages containing factory goods were carried exclusively by a single separate trader, Alexander Cleeve. Understanding the individuality of the separate traders further gives greater clarity in understanding Anglo-African trade as a whole and, as is shown below, the necessary breakdown of the separate traders into those politically active and those only commercially active, those who signed pamphlets and petitions and those who did not, produces explanations as to why the trade was not solely antagonistic as a study of the pamphlet debate would suggest.33

Data Description - Incomings

Although beginning a year earlier in its records, in 1699, the Incomings document is more lacklustre in its recordings and annotations than its counterpart, with the data itself somewhat more restrictive in the assertions that can be drawn. The failure by the Company clerks to note all of the incoming cargoes or the avoidance of paying the duty by these ships, or increasingly the docking of these ships at one of Britain’s outlying ports, or indeed a mixture of all of the above, such a conclusion cannot be reached. Frequently months are missed, which is most likely a combination of no trade to note in certain cases, and a failure to do so in others given the frequency in which previous days’ goods will be noted down weeks later. Nevertheless, comment and inference can be made reflecting the overall trends suggested in the Outgoings; the twilight of the RAC in vessels returning from the West African coast, the consistent collaboration between Company and separate trader, and a small collection of entire voyages of vessels, recorded leaving and re-entering London.

Indeed, the declining trend of Company trade is made more definitive in the Incomings document. The voyages for the Company again cease in 1709, with a decline in their number from 1700 onwards. These voyages were in every respect fewer, with the Company and Separate traders engaging in a total of approximately 194 recorded returning voyages in total, with only 33 undertaken

33 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt pp.74-5.
exclusively by the Company. As a result, it is difficult to assess the two documents together, with only a handful of journeys recorded in their entirety. What is clear however, is that many whom were paying their duties on the chief goods brought back from Africa – ivory, redwood dyes, beeswax, gum – were absent from mention in the Outgoings. This furthers to highlight the nature of T 70/1198 and 1199 as giving a false perception of the Anglo-African trade. Many defrauded the Company out of significant sums, not least Robert Heysham, the largest sugar importer to Britain after the RAC in the late 1690s, whom was known to have avoided payment to the Company the value in excess of £80,000.\(^3^4\) Despite this, and despite his previous role as a Company director, Heysham, the epitome of an anti-Company man, was one of the few to be seen making payment in both the Incomings and the Outgoings, and thus could not avoid payment of the tax entirely.

Furthermore, where in the Outgoings was listed the cargoes’ intended destination, for the Incomings this was noted as the origin of the voyage entering London. With occasional entry of European and North African cities and nations – Lisbon, Ireland, Larache - Most recurrent of these were Barbados, Jamaica, Nevis, Virginia and Maryland in the Americas, with another significant collection of voyages returning directly from the West African coast itself. Indeed, the data confesses that of those voyages recorded, approximately 66% were engaged in the triangular trade to either the Americas, whilst around 34% of voyages were focussed on a bilateral Anglo-African trade. In this document alone there are two clearly separated trades existing in parallel, with the triangular trade being concerned with the slave trade whilst the bilateral trade was not. The triangular trade, furthermore, was exclusively commercial in its interests, and any vessels intent on maintaining the forts and castles of the West African coast was usually engaging only between the forts and London. Whilst relatively unremarked upon by historians, the document highlights what was at the time clearly a large political lobby, as will be looked at, given the duty on redwood in the 1698 Act being halved to 5%. This closely ties to the textile lobby in England which had proved itself as a powerful force in banning East Indian imports, representing the single largest English industry at the turn of the

\(^3^4\) Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt pp.62, 136.
eighteenth century. It was clear that specific goods – such as redwood dyes – were of greater interest to the textile industries of Britain, and there was a separation for many between the slave trade and the ‘conventional commodity’ trade that existed as two independent strands of the Anglo-African trade. Something mentioned by Marion Johnson, it is explored further below. Inikori dates these African influences on English textile markets to begin predominantly in the 1760s. Despite their flaws, the most significant portrayal in the Incomings book of this is undoubtedly the wealth of bilateral trading that is present. Chapter 2 illustrates these bilateral connections regarding redwood, discussing further the power of clothier and dyeing lobbies surrounding the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa.

Overall, great care needs to be taken when using the RAC’s tax books however, in not misrepresenting the Anglo-African trade as a whole. The central issue contained within them is they give a false impression of African trade. Whilst in keeping with the arguments of the slave trade debates, that there were many merchants exterior to the RAC interested in trading to Africa, the documents severely underrepresent this demographic. Recent work has covered much ground in understanding not just the large-scale independent traders such as Robert Heysham, Humphrey Morice, Daniel Jamineau and Abraham Houlditch, but of the occasional traders to Africa too. The RAC was given the authority to register and tax all outgoing and incoming cargo that was to engage in trade between Cape Blanche and the Cape of Good Hope – where the RAC forts were – and exports only between Cape Mount and the Cape of Good Hope – where the majority of slaves were. Shipments recorded in the sources remain only a percentage of all which voyaged to Africa however. Taking outgoings year on year, one would assume the decline of 238 shipments in 1702 to 109 in 1711 and similarly with incomings, slipping from 108 in 1700 to only 21 in 1711, represented the entire Anglo-African trade. Alone, the documents represent a declining trade, a weakening Anglo-African connection and the 1698 tax perturbing merchants from engaging in trade to the West African coast. In reality of course, the greatest indication that African trade was booming, despite the ongoing War of Spanish Succession, was that the number of enslaved Africans transported to the Americas in

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36 Johnson; Anglo-African Trade p.53.
37 For an extensive list of the separate traders to Africa, see Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt.
the fifteen years after 1698 rocketed by 300 percent. Fifteen years prior to 1698, 5,500 enslaved Africans were transported to the Americas. A decade and a half subsequent, this figure was 15,000.\(^{38}\) The boom of slave trading experienced in 1700 and 1701 as a result of the 1698 Act would not see the same volume of slaves traded until 30 years later, in 1729.\(^{39}\) Subsequently then, the books would also suggest a decline in the volume of East Indian linen re-exports to Africa, however given the ban of their importation in 1701 and a boom of East India Company goods as re-export commodities thereafter, as well as the growth of demand for them in Africa, this was not the case. Meanwhile, the books do support such statistics that the growth of the separate traders’ share of the African market grew from 3 percent to 96 percent, 1689-1720, however with the assumption, again, that overall trade declines.

Ultimately, the tax books highlight that a fundamental transformation was underway in how the African trade was conducted after the 1698 act was passed. Contrary to what has been asserted hitherto, the act forced the Company into increasing cooperation and collaboration with the separate traders as much as they had been at loggerheads with them in the pamphlet campaigns in the 1690s. In this respect, although the overall volume of Company trade was to decline in this period, this was arguably as much a ‘defeat’ from separate trader competition as it was a reorganisation of the best possible use of Company resources – heavily reduced by 1705 – into assuring that the forts and factories of Africa could be maintained. The 1698 act was, although a formal challenge to the Royal African Company’s monopoly, a significant achievement of survival given the rampant anti-monopoly campaigns nurtured by opposition to the Company in the 1690s, as well as the unfavourable government born out of the 1688-9 Revolution as well as the settled Whig Junto. Whereby Pettigrew asserts that the Company ‘achieved a remarkable statutory victory’, this was undoubtedly true given the circumstances the RAC faced, yet also continues to highlight the inherent strengths of the RAC post-1698. Collaboration with one fifth of the merchants present in the tax books, and over a quarter of the voyages presented, gives significance to the argument that the Company’s long-standing interaction with the African trade allowed a basis for other separate traders

\(^{38}\) Pettigrew; *Freedom’s Debt* p.15.

to engage within it. The RAC’s inability to ship large quantities of goods alone is certainly represented in the documents too; however juxtaposing this is a clear evolution of the Company in these years, and its ability to work in cooperation with the independent merchant traders in order to survive as a political, colonial and commercial entity. The ability of the Company to collaborate with numerous separate traders – including staunch political rivals – was as much a mark of its strengths as anything else.

The African settlement was also a unique one. An unprecedented solution to the trading debates of Africa, there were no synonymous solutions to that of 1698. As Erikson has shown in recent assessments, private trade may have been tolerated in other companies such as the EIC; however it did so internally, with the settlement reached for the East India Company being one of separation that turned out to be only temporary. Rather than encourage and invest in the private trade of an exclusive Company, the private trade of private investors, merchants and traders were able to engage in this trade almost entirely unregulated, with the Company’s assets principally and almost exclusively circumventing the colonial presence of England in West Africa. Ultimately, it is laid bare to witness in the tax books of the RAC, the epitome of both the Company’s weaknesses and strengths at the turn of the eighteenth century, the complex political developments surrounding the Africa trade debates in this period. It is within the pages of these documents the priorities of the Company emerge, solidifying its commitment to the forts in Africa, but also using the advantages of a legitimately open trade to continue fulfilling these commitments despite overwhelming competition. Historiography has nevertheless positioned the Company and separate traders at juxtaposed commercial ambitions. Although the pamphlet debates of the 1690s lean heavily toward their ideological differences, the practical implications of trade presented in the Outgoings and Incomings on reflection make the rhetoric seem a little extreme. What is revealed by the Company Outgoings is a hidden mechanism of the Anglo-African trade not highlighted by the 1698 Act, nor contemporary pamphlet debates, nor even modern scholarly assessment. Assessing these arguments of the pamphlet debates surrounding the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa is what must follow.

II – Traders and their Trades

1698 and the African Trade debates

The statutory victory the Royal African Company achieved in 1698 was hard-won. The pamphleteering campaigns and petitions of the 1690s were relentless, and the Company’s support, although featuring some well-connected individuals, was never as broad as that of the separate traders.41 Indeed, the RAC was battling against arguments centuries older than itself - the idea of a freedom for all merchants to engage in trade; an idea that through the revitalised attacks from the likes of Roger Coke in the 1670s, as well as the spread of commercial wealth amongst the merchant populace, was gaining significant ground.42 The Glorious Revolution had brought about a shift towards greater openness within commerce at home and abroad too. For decades the plantation colonies had frequently declared a desire for a louder voice in the Atlantic trading system and in the 1690s this began to be recognised. Dalby Thomas made demands for

“A great Councell of Trade, to consist of members Elected and Deputed by every Plantation, Marritime, City, Company, Constitution and Trade, which would desire to send Members to it: And from thence after a free and full examination be represented to both Houses of Parliament for their Approbation or Dislike.”43

The Company had begun to feel the impact of challenges its monopoly, most directly from the ruling of Chief Justice Sir John Holt in Nightingale v Bridges, 1689. Subsequent to this, interloping increased dramatically, and the ruling, combined with Dockwra v. Dickinson, 1696, forced the Company to abandon any legal claim to seize interloping ships, and repay damages of over £4,300.44 By 1698 this had culminated in a compromised settlement that allowed all to engage in trade whilst paying a duty to the Company which would maintain the English forts in Africa. The 1698 Act and its effects would dominate the trading debates for fifteen years subsequently. The effects of the Act

41 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt pp.24-7.
43 Dalby Thomas; An Historical Account of the West India Colonies (1690) p.6 Accessed in ECCO. Date Accessed: 03/04/15.
44 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.32.
would keep the Company’s interests united, having their fundamental arguments recognised by the settlement, whilst the separate traders’ unity would fracture in attempts to reconstitute the trade upon its expiry. The arguments of the RAC would become adopted by the separate traders. The forts, which had been the central gripe of the anti-monopolists in the 1690s, would be recognised by many separate traders as integral to a prosperous Anglo-African trade. Moreover, the parliamentary ruling of 1698 cemented the imperial ambitions of the state in West Africa, which the Royal African Company had long represented.45

Although much of the arguments’ content did not change, the African Trading debates progressed significantly in little over a decade from the statutory compromise of 1698. Indeed, both Davies and Pettigrew have divided study of the political campaigns in the formative years of the eighteenth century. Davies’ approach was one which led to 1706 onwards being defined by the RAC concentrating its efforts towards securing such modification of the Act of 1698 as would encourage the investment of fresh capital.46 Nevertheless, Davies also asserts that no great change came in the demographic make-up of both the pro- and anti-Company arguments, with only the addition of the broader Scottish mercantile interest opposing the RAC since the Act of Union in 1707. Pettigrew denotes the shift in arguments themselves, whereby the separate traders’ arguments of the late-seventeenth century had focused on their “constitutional right to destroy economic restrictions”. The post-1707 debates, triggered by the Board of Trade enquiries, steered the traders to an argument that “celebrated freedom to trade and open competition as surer buttresses to national wealth...than an arbitrary state.”47 The ideology of the separate traders certainly did develop, although it would be problematic to assume that both the Company’s proponents and opponents were united in their respective political efforts. Given the 1698 Act’s venture into previously untrodden statutory ground, it was unsurprising that this fractured the political opponents of the company’s solidarity of aims especially. Surrounding the expiry of the 1698 Act in 1712 was, overwhelmingly, confusion as to what this signified. Whilst the Company pointed to the Creditors’ Act as a reinstatement of the RAC’s

45 Other works provide an in depth, blow-by-blow account of the 1690s African trading debates. Here, the focus is placed on how the various lobbies that found unity in opposing the monopolistic RAC diverged once the trade had been opened. See Freedom’s Debt for a full account.
46 Davies; Royal African Company pp.135-6.
47 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.94.
privileges on the West African coast, the separate traders had categorically illustrated their superiority regarding the commercial trade to Africa. As is noted, “The Africa Trade debates concentrated on the problem of who ought to have access to the slave trade. The separate traders had conclusively won that issue.” However this in no way led to unified separate traders.

In the year of 1698 pamphleteering became very intense. Those from the Planation lobby were concerned they would be hardest hit. One wrote that the,

“Duty of 10 per Cent. is very unreasonable, and a great deal too much. First, it will fall the heaviest on the Plantations, which can least bear the Tax, and are most to be regarded, that Duty being so great, will render the Negroes the dearer to them. Secondly it is very unreasonable to pay the Company so great a Duty, where they are at no Charge to maintain the Forts or Castles”.

Whilst the Company had certainly briefly occupied factories in the 1670s and 1680s at Offra and Whydah on the Slave Coast, no permanent settlements there had been made by 1698. Frequently mentioned was the critique that whilst all had to pay for the fortifications to be maintained, in 1698 there existed no RAC forts west of the Gold Coast, on the Slave Coast or beyond, where the majority of Africans were purchased. “From River Vultus [Volta] to Angola, and to Cape Good-hope…there is not one Fort nor Castle, nor anything like one, nor will the Negroes permit any to be built”. The expense of establishing a new fort was ground well-trodden in the pamphlet debates of the 1690s, with a conservative estimate for one potential fort in Gambia costing approximately £20,000 to establish, and a further £6,000 p.a. to maintain. Cheaper to capture a foreign factory it may have been, however engagements seen by the RAC in the Nine Years War had rendered the company largely ineffective for combat both during and subsequently. The Company itself had noted within the General Court the damage inflicted by the French seizure of their fort James in Gambia during the

49 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.154.
51 Considerations on the Bill for Settling the Trade to Africa...on behalf of the Plantations (1698). Accessed in EEBO. Date Accessed: 12/05/15
52 Considerations Relating to the Africa Bill (1698) p.3. Accessed in EEBO. Date Accessed: 25/06/15
conflict, and with it some control of the Senegambia trade.\(^{53}\) In the same report the Company was adamant that their trade in Africans was not a focus in Gambia or in Ghana, with a commercial interest predominantly in “hides, wax, elephants teeth and redwood...but few Negroes”.\(^{54}\) A pamphlet submitted the year before on behalf of the plantations echoed this sentiment, with a clear awareness of the plantations’ own centrality to a prosperous Atlantic trade; “The Interest of the Plantations are of infinitely greater concern to be preserved, than any Company with a Joint-stock can pretend to.”\(^{55}\) Even once the Bill had been passed through the Commons the lobbying continued. One pamphlet pleaded with the Lords, “this Bill in many Particulars lays great Hardships, and almost insuperable Difficulties on the Trade to Africa” and that the Duty of 10 percent was “very Burthensom and Discouraging”\(^{56}\).

Even in the 1690s, the tone of the pamphlets of the Plantations was somewhat more ideologically charged in the language used than its domestic counterparts centred in England. The politically active separate traders in England and the colonies demanded an open trade to Africa, and this became ideologically aligned with the beliefs of the Plantation owners not just through the mutual-benefit in the supply and demand of enslaved Africans to the Americas. Yet both successive monarchs and Parliaments believed they required, to a greater or lesser degree, omnipotence over British commercial activity. It was acknowledged almost universally by the end of the seventeenth century that the success of the trade was inherently linked to the success of the state. Nevertheless, the English trade to Africa developed into an open one unlike those to the East Indies, Muscovy, the Mediterranean and other parts of the globe. It has been established principally by Dunn and others that the colonial societies diverged dramatically from the English models that would develop at the turn of, and throughout the eighteenth century.\(^{57}\) Whilst British commerce would continue to be influenced by the protectionist policies of the Navigation Acts laid out in the seventeenth century, the Anglo-

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\(^{54}\) T 70/101, 68; Minutes of the General Court, 10\(^{th}\) January, 1698.
\(^{55}\) Considerations Humbly Offered to the Honourable House of Commons, by the Planters, in relation to the Bill to Settle the Trade to Africa (1697). Accessed in EEBO. Date Accessed: 14/02/15.
\(^{56}\) Considerations Touching the BILL for Settling the Trade to Africa Humbly Offered to the House of Lords in Behalf of the Plantations (1698). Accessed in ECCO. Date Accessed: 29/03/15.
African trade became the unique experience for English and British merchants after 1712. Although existing outside of direct involvement with the political landscape of London, the Plantation communities were still very much engaged with, and aware of, the political developments of the Anglo-African trade throughout the 1690s. Many, such as Edward Littleton, were some of the first to write in support of the idea of an open trade to Africa noting famously that “the once flourishing English Colonies have been brought to ruine.”

Within this account too existed some of the more potent language dissecting the relationship between the plantations and the nation.

“In Former times we accounted our selves a part of England: and the Trade and Entercourse was open accordingly so that Commodities came hither as freely from the Sugar Plantations, as from the Isles of Wight or Anglesey. But upon the King’s Restauration we were in effect made Forainers and Aliens: a Custom being laid upon our Sugars amongst other Forain Commodities.”

“Heretofore we could Ship off our Goods at any Port, or Bay, or Creek; and at any time, either by day or by night. But now since the Kings Restauration we must do it at those Times and Places only, at which the Collectors of the Customs please to attend. Heretofore we might send our Commodities to any part of the World. But now we must send them to England, and to no Place else.”

Littleton may have been emphasising the alienating damage the now deposed James II had done to the plantations economically and politically, however the effect was a sustained one, illustrated in the lobbying centred around the African trade debate in general, and the 1698 Bill. Although loosely ideologically connected, the Plantation mentality had diverged significantly in mind-set from the separate traders of London by the eighteenth century because of the political community and society that therein existed. Removed from the responsibility of maintaining a nation, whilst relying on the Royal Navy for defence, the plantation owners were focussed exclusively on turning a greater profit from their factories, and thus urged a free trade to their communities, alienated

59 Ibid. p.4.
by the metropolitan. Although this identity has been discussed much by Jack P Greene and others as a
causal factor for the American Revolution, as early as the late seventeenth century the rhetorical root
of these political and identity issues can be clearly witnessed.\textsuperscript{60} Recurring opposition to imposition by
both the monarchy and parliamentary authority bred a continuous political battle for pseudo-
autonomy. One central way this was manifested was the colonies’ adamant opposition to the sugar
duty, perceiving it unpayable if any form of profit were to be made in trading. The various councils of
the islands of the West Indies spoke in something of a single voice in their opposition too, and in
September 1685 the various Lietenant-Governors of the islands were lobbying the monarch, with
letters from Barbados and Jamaica being received in London fortnightly.\textsuperscript{61} The 1698 Act however,
served as a deeper watershed for this autonomous political identity to emerge than has been
previously anticipated. Amongst the later trading debates circumventing 1709-1713, there exhibited a
deep divergence in the ideologies of the separate trading lobby, with splits emerging between not only
colonial planters and separate traders, but amongst the various domestic traders themselves.

The pamphlets that appeared in favour of the Royal African Company in the years 1709-1713
remained very much the bread and butter of the pro-company literature ideology that was witnessed in
the seventeenth century. Influenced greatly by Davenant’s Reflections in 1709, much unity seemed to
come from mirroring his definitive approach. Trade with the West Africans, Davenant professed, “can
be made only by Princes themselves, or powers derived from them to bodies politick and
communities...within a society established with the sanction of a parliamentary constitution, and
having a sufficient joint stock, with exclusive privileges, and a coercive power to maintain their
alliances, as well as to defend their trade”.\textsuperscript{62} By 1713, this approach was maintained, with one
pamphleteer postulating the rather apriori argument that;

\textsuperscript{60} Jack P Greene; Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the

\textsuperscript{61} ‘America and West Indies: September 1685’, in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 12,
papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol12/pp86-99] Date Accessed: 02/06/15

\textsuperscript{62} Charles Davenant; Reflections p.137.
“The African Company and their Creditors claim as Purchasers by a Charter from the Crown, a Property in their Lands, Forts, Rivers, Coast and Settlements in Africa, and the Benefit the Profit of 'em, Exclusive of others, or else it can be no Property.”\(^{63}\)

In the same year a collection of company representatives petitioned parliament with a drafted bill reinstating the Royal African Company’s monopolistic charter “which their New Subscribers are to have Part of; and that by Charter they have a Right to the sole Trade there for 1000 Years to come...extending 7000 miles...[and would] exclude all English private Traders.”\(^{64}\) Throughout the 1690s, the RAC had operated on the mandate that their charter was the immutable statutory right for their sole access to the West African coast. Their practical ability to engage in trade effectively destroyed for the foreseeable future by the separate traders by 1712, the only hope for the Company was this perseverance of recognition of their charter. With the fears postulated before 1698 that the opening of the trade would be its downfall were disproven, the RAC could unite behind this single legal and constitutional argument.

For the separate traders, the story was very different. In ideology, they had become far less united. Separate traders had diverged in their arguments once the economic debate had been won, and the monopoly of the RAC overcome. In Britain, growing lobbies interested in the Anglo-African trade resulted in growing numbers of ideas as to how the trade should be conducted. In the Caribbean too, the rise of the ‘master class’ in the C17th, merchant-planters whom dominated the plantation societies’ land, profits and politics in every way, coupled with the isolation from the domestic political environment in London, placed a huge gulf between the identities of the planters and the domestic separate traders, as well as their political ideas. The societies of the Caribbean plantations were ‘radically different’ to those in Britain, or even those in the British North American mainland.\(^{65}\) Although sharing in the common goal of deconstruction of the RAC monopoly in the 1690s, the planters’ alliance with the domestic separate traders was one of circumstance and practicalities.


\(^{64}\) The Anatomy of the African Company’s Scheme for carrying on that Trade in a Joint-Stock Exclusive, on the foot of New Subscriptions (1713). Accessed in ECCO. Date Accessed: 22/06/15

\(^{65}\) Dunn; Sugar and Slaves pp.46-7.
Shared ideologies ran little deeper than a common understanding of the ideas of their ‘liberty’ to trade, their rhetorical rights as Englishmen, and of the economic redundancy of the joint-stock Company of Anglo-African trade. Much of the mutual understanding between them was that plantations particularly in Jamaica, Barbados and the Chesapeake North American mainland were not being adequately supplied by the RAC, and separate traders were not being adequately accommodated in their desire to trade. As a result of this, three distinctive arguments had emerged by 1710; one in favour of a continuation of the status quo with no legislation required to trade to Africa, another calling for legislation decreeing an open trade, and another, more surprisingly, calling for a new regulated company. For many, the decline of the RAC’s market share in Anglo-African trade, as well as the swelling of numbers of independent merchants trading to Africa, spoke for itself. These merchants, as well as the planters of the Caribbean, continued to assert the traditional arguments of the anti-monopolists; forts on the African coast were unnecessary, and the “mischiefs of monopoly” needed to be prevented. It was clear however that many separate traders were wary of the lack of statutory legislation confirming their right to trade freely by 1712, and others began arguing for a new regulated Company to be established to solidify their individual right to trade. Indeed, in a proposed bill for legislating the open trade to Africa in 1713, it was decreed “That all and every person or persons who shall...attempt to Raise or Cultivate any Sugar-Canes, Tobacco or other Commodities produced in the British Plantations in America...join with any of the Natives of the Coast of Africa...every such Person or Persons shall forfeit the Sum of Ten Pounds per annum”. The proposed fine of five hundred pounds to any colonial official entering the trade illustrated the clearly precarious position some separate traders saw themselves in too. Given the high-risk climate of Anglo-African trade this was to be somewhat expected, however the value of the proposed fine had risen sharply

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68 BL Cup 651.e.206; Reasons Against Confirming the Charter to the African Company by Act of Parliament, Humbly Offered to Consideration (1711).
69 A Bill for Establishing the Trade to Africa Free and Open to all Her Majesty’s Subjects of Great Britain, and the Plantations (1713). Accessed in ECCO. Date Accessed: 11/03/15.
since 1698. The impact of The Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was nevertheless clear, with the drafted bills heavily modelled on the stipulation of the 1698 Act.

The Caribbean plantations had been witnessing more independent control of their representation in Westminster throughout the 1690s too. Crucially, this was subsequent to the governors of the plantation colonies being chosen predominantly by the merchant-councillors in the plantations since the Board of Trade’s establishment in 1694. The royal and parliamentary prerogative in London had been maintaining metropolitan control over the settlements in the Americas and moreover Africa from the 1670s onwards. Whilst those on the West African coast held great contention for both separate traders and plantation owners in the 1690s restricting Company trade, the merchants in Britain were less concerned about metropolitan authority over the plantations. Deeply concerned by the metropolitan control over their economy that had existed from the 1660s to the 1690s; the Caribbean lobby’s primary concern was their sovereign ability to thrive as independent plantation economies. Increasingly, the risks included the potential plantations on the West African coast. Unsurprisingly, this was not of great concern to the domestic separate traders. Although cooperative in the formative years of the eighteenth century, with the plantations witnessing a boom in the numbers of enslaved Africans shipped to their shores, this move for the plantations towards greater economic independence from London was met by the separate traders with wariness with the expiry of the Act in 1712. One collection of planters of Jamaica replied simply to the proposed bill in 1713 to open trade; “‘tis hoped the said Bill will not pass into Law”. Indeed, it reverberated throughout the plantations that their voices remained insignificant to London, even to those whom they previously had shared a common goal. “That no Party or Persons are to be Accountable or Subject to the Complaints and Planters for neglects” to the trade, they were greatly affronted. With a deep concern resonating through the plantation lobby that the interests would be recognised second to those of Britain, as the historical narrative had dictated, this split in the separate plantations

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70 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.13.
traders is far clearer. Separated by the Atlantic Ocean they had always been, planters and merchants had now been drawn apart by the legacy of the 1698 Act, the duty placed on the trade, and a desire from each side to shift this duty onto the other. In this respect, it is hard to see how the African trade debates subsequent to 1698 were anything akin to, as Davies suggested, “so utterly barren of consequence.”

The other great significance of the 1698 Act on the trading debates was the overwhelming acceptance on the part of the separate traders that the fortifications of West Africa were essential for a profitable trade. One pamphleteer made the case for the shared concerns of the RAC and separate traders in 1712. As with 1698, this centred most distinctively on the issue of forts; they agreed “That Forts and Settlements be maintain’d and enlarg’d on that Coast” and “That the Charge of maintaining said Forts and Settlements, be born out of that Trade”. This had certainly become the focus of those separate traders drafting a bill for a new regulated company to the coast as well, with those wishing to trade to the coast having to be permitted membership of the Company, and that “all Monies paid upon Admissions of Freemen into the said Company...shall be apply’d by the said Governour and Company...for supporting and maintaining the British Forts and Settlements erected or to be erected in Africa.” Evaluations of the real cost of the forts were to be proffered, and a proposal for the RAC to sell any factories to the new regulated company deemed too costly were put forward. Furthermore, it decreed “that the said Company hereby Established shall, and they are hereby authorized and required to, make Agreements with the Natives in Africa, necessary for the Preservation of the said Trade.” Clearly, a steadfast acceptance of maintaining both the fortifications, and strong relations with the various African polities on the coast had occurred. These were acceptances of the Royal African Company’s core arguments, and now that the separate traders were in control of the Anglo-African trade, there had grown recognition of these concerns. One trader wrote that the lands which the Company held factories “had never been purchased, nor the Forts built at a vast Expence” and the issue of the forts remained very much in the public’s minds due to the cause-celebre of the African

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[74] Davies; African Company p.151.
[75] The RAC and Separate Traders agree that the following Particulars be provided for in a Parliamentary Establishment of the African Trade (1712). Accessed in ECCO. Date Accessed: 25/01/15.
trade in 1709 regarding Thomas Crisp’s protest to Parliament that the Company had no legal right to
the fortifications at all.\textsuperscript{77} Regardless of these wishes however, no legislation came to pass in 1712 or
subsequently, and the trade was laid open. It was argued that as the Company would never allow an
evaluation of the forts’ maintenance costs, traders would be forced to “pay what they [the RAC]
please to think a Competent Sum”.\textsuperscript{78} Even this was not wholly representative of the separate trader
opposition to such proposals however. Regarding the proposed take-over of the fortifications by the
regulated company, some professed “This Bill is so merciless to the present Company, that it doth not
so much as give them any time...to bring Home their Effects, or to recover their Debts.”\textsuperscript{79} Even
sympathy for the Company had arisen amongst some separate traders.

Yet all of these separate traders’ varying voices on the trade in 1712; propounding a charter
for a new regulated company, attempting to legislate a bill formally opening the trade, and even
opening the possibility of purchasing the Company’s forts, were by no means supported by the entire
separate trader lobby. This highlighted not only how the rhetoric of the pamphleteering campaigns
had developed hugely since the late-seventeenth century, but how the fortifications had remained at
the centre of the debate. Now disunited in their ambition, many separate traders, including some of the
most successful and wealthy, had accepted the state’s imperial agenda regarding the African coast.
Whilst the reformed Board of Trade from 1696 may have given greater consideration to the concerns
of mercantile practitioners (and with it the separate traders), the Company’s repeated arguments
surrounding the forts had not fallen on deaf ears. The freedoms of commercial activity may well have
been permitted to all English traders to the African coast after 1712, but there was no sailing around
the reality that, just as the RAC had been insisting for over a decade, the forts were as much a part of
the State’s interest in Africa as the Company’s. The Royal African Company may have lost
possession of the trade in 1712, but its possession of the forts was only reinforced under the eyes of

\textsuperscript{77} What followed was a series of testimonies by Crisp that the original forts established on the West African coast were done
so by his father, Nicholas Crisp. These were obtained without payment by the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to
Africa, and inherited by the RAC. See ‘A Full Answer to all the Objections to the Bill for Establishing the Trade to Africa, in
A Regulated Company’ (1712) and The Case of the African Company’s Property to the Trade and Settlements in
Africa...with...reasons for the Bill...for Establishing that Trade Free and Open (1713).
\textsuperscript{78} Objections to the Bill for Establishing the Trade to Africa in a Regulated Company (1712) pp.2-3. Accessed in ECCO.
Date Accessed: 12/06/15.
\textsuperscript{79} Some Further Objections Humby Offer’d to the Consideration of the Legislature, against the Bill, for Establishing the
the government. With this, the Company was not, as Davies suggests, in a ‘moribund position’ in
terms of its political or imperial significance. Conversely, the RAC’s sovereignty over their
fortifications in Africa gave fervour to an already strong imperial basis. What is more, the ability of
the Company to work alongside its apparent opponents in the trade gave it further staying power after
1698. Although much study has surrounded the Company and separate traders, this crucially
highlights how the issues surrounding them were not simply black and white. The separate traders
suffered from deep splits in their arguments for an open trade soon after the 1698 Act had been
passed, not just between the metropolitan and colonies, but amongst themselves in London too. In
doing so, the central arguments of the RAC and pro-monopolists, namely the necessity of colonial
settlement in West Africa, were conceded by many who had formerly opposed it. The political
opposition to the Company was clearly not as stringent as assumed from the pamphlet debates
themselves – something which the Outgoings illustrates clearly.

**Partners in Trade: The Royal African Company and the Separate Traders**

Shortly after the 1698 act was passed, the Company issued a decree to its factors on the West African
coast stating, “it is our desire that [the separate traders] be protected and treated civilly, but we
positively expect you should not assist them in buying or selling goods.” The Company made certain
to assure agents on the coast that protection of the separate traders and non-molestation of their trade
was to be policy “as if they were of and did belong to the company.” The Act to Settle the Trade to
Africa had made clear the legal right of separate traders, as Englishmen, to engage in commercial
activity with the West African coast, free from harassment from the RAC. These sentiments have
been broadly reflected in the scholarly work on the politics and economics of the African trade that
has followed over the last half-century. Many have furthered these assessments, with the likes of
Davies, Pettigrew, Hugh Thomas and James D Tracy touching on the separate traders of the Anglo-
African trade. In doing so, many have all allured to the conclusion that the relationship that existed

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80 Davies; African Company p.344.
81 T 70/51; Letter sent from the Company to their agents on the West African coast, 1698. pp. 5, 9, 11-12.
82 T 70/170, fos. 7, 7d.
between them was akin to an ongoing commercial as well as political battle. The political atmosphere of the African trade debates in London, moreover, led to the exaggerated and extreme rhetoric witnessed in the pamphlet debates. Historians should expect the political representation of the Company and separate trader relationship to exhibit pantomime qualities of ‘good vs bad’ rather than the complexities of collaboration. Not doing so is to overlook the very real partnership that existed between the Company and separate traders, dating from the 1690s and continuing to prosper after the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was passed in 1698. Consistent voyages that contained not only cargo owned by both the RAC and separate traders, but cargo with shared ownership between these politically opposed peoples were hugely prominent in the Anglo-African trade of the early eighteenth century. Further to this, separate traders’ held joint-ownership with many of the goods which were aboard non-commercial Company merchandise; goods for the forts and settlements of the West African coast. Some loaded and shipped cargoes onto vessels alongside their own, on the Company’s behalf, and even did so after the expiry of RAC voyages to the coast from 1710, with non-commercial goods solely for the purpose of resupplying and maintaining the Company’s forts and factories in West Africa. Rather than egregious relationships, there existed a clear mutual effort of independent merchants and the Royal African Company in carrying on the trade to West Africa.

Evidence of collaboration exists in numerous instances elsewhere. There have been occasional notations made of the Royal African Company’s commercial interaction with separate traders, with the slow decline of the company’s assets meaning the RAC “had been driven to trade with the ten per cent. men” from 1706. Dalby Thomas himself announced he was forced to transact with independent merchants or allow the Ashanti to see English factories bare of goods. This was unlikely to be the first time he had done so either, having two extremely close and long-time associates in Robert Gardiner and Sir Robert Davers, two prolific separate traders. Indeed, the illegal private trade by Company governors with separate traders was generally accepted as a practice of all;

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83 Davies; African Company pp.135-6.
84 Regarding measurements of collaboration between Company and separate traders, this section utilises predominantly the owner of cargo listed in the T70 1198/1199 books, cross referencing this with any information in primary or secondary sources regarding the individual. See Methodological Appendix for a full disclosure.
85 T 70/5, fo. 23d.; Letter from Dalby Thomas in Africa to London (1706).
English, Dutch and Danish. Before being appointed to the Company in 1697, Thomas himself was an active opponent of the joint-stock, and even dedicated his influential pamphlet on the effect of the RAC monopoly on the West Indian colonies to Davers. These connections were by no means severed after Thomas became a pivotal player for the Company in West Africa. Evidence of collaboration was extended by 1710 with an admission that Company merchants would be forced to engage with separate traders at Dixcove, Sekondi, Kommenda, Winnebah, and Shido to keep Company commerce active at all. Such assessments, however, imply that the African Company only facilitated trade with the separate traders some years after the 1698 Act, when both the financial situation and the number of voyages conducted by the RAC had continued to decline. In reality, members of the Company had been trading and voyaging alongside separate traders from the beginning of the RAC’s documentation. Many had previously held high positions in the Company too; Robert and William Heysham as well as Peter Paggen. The very first RAC voyages noted in the Company Incomings in June 1700, Providence and Blossome, held cargoes owned by both separate traders and the Company. This was matched in the Outgoings in 1702, with the Company’s second recorded voyage, Surroso, having cargo loaded and shipped by William Benson and their fourth, Christopher, cargo shared with Abraham Lodge. Indeed, this trend continued to grow, and as the number of exclusive RAC voyages declined almost consistently year on year, the percentage of voyages with shared cargoes rose correspondingly. From 1702 to 1708, there were a consistent percentage of shared cargoes averaged at 18%, nearly one fifth of the entire registered trade to West Africa in the Company Outgoings. By 1708, these shared cargoes represented the only voyages containing African Company goods at all. Both in 1706 and 1707, only a single exclusive voyage was undertaken by the RAC each year that did not involve separate traders’ assistance, collaboration or joint-venture. Over the recorded years 1702-1712, only 1702, 1704 and 1709 recorded a greater frequency of exclusive RAC voyages to West Africa than shared or collaborative ones.

86 Thomas; Atlantic Slave Trade p.349
87 Thomas; Historical Account of the West India Colonies.
88 Davies; African Company p.139.
To not engage joint-ventures would clearly have been incredibly problematic for the Company. Given the general acceptance among historians that it was not until 1710 that the Company was bankrupted and ceased commercial activity altogether, it is clear that from around 1705 the Company could only manage to operate at all through cooperation with separate trading merchants. Even from 1702, 43% of Company cargoes were shipped with some level of collaboration with separate traders. By 1703, this figure had risen to 59%.

(Fig. 3 – Ownership of cargo aboard each voyage per annum, Representing Separate Traders (ST), Royal African Company (RAC) and both together.)
(Fig. 4 – The percentages of ownership of cargo for each voyage per annum.)

Whilst the T70 1198/1199 documents may give a false impression of the Anglo-African trade overall, this fails to apply to the data on cargo ownership. Indeed, we can be confident that the RAC’s adherence to the 1698 Act was stringent given this was a document not only to register cargo and accurately measure taxation paid to them, but was able to give comparative data on the volume of RAC and ‘separate’ trade. Excepting a few voyages from Bristol and other, smaller English ports in these years, it is certain that these figures of London commerce represent the vast bulk of Company cargo. With similar studies concluding that Bristol’s participation in the slave trade rocketed post-1698, there will certainly be further deductions to draw from England’s regional trade about collaboration.89

This revelation in the management of Anglo-African trade is one that is relatively in keeping with the contemporary mercantile conduct of the early eighteenth century. Not least due to the War of Spanish Succession crippling British merchant vessels in the Atlantic, there were clear circumstances which created the need for cooperation in trade.90 Shared cargoes in this respect were not unusual, with other contemporary merchants increasingly spreading their cargoes amongst multiple vessels in case the vessel was struck, captured, sunk or simply lost. Part of the beginnings of a financial revolution in the late seventeenth century, the rise of insurance companies investing in overseas trading voyages had become commonplace, which continued the trends of shared and widely spread cargoes which avoided great loss or risk.91 Indeed, when financial crises hit between the years of 1701 and 1715, it largely affected the nation’s public finance, not overseas commercial activity due to such preventative measures.92 Despite their political differences, the collaborative way in which STs and the RAC conducted their commerce was in fact in keeping with the habitual trading routines of the day. The fact, too, that these traders were based all over the British Isles as well as in the colonies

90 Brewer; SineWS p.172.
would suggest that London was not the only port to witness such collaboration.\textsuperscript{93} Of course, it was the case that the Company retained a history of taking legal action against its own agents in the 1680s whom were accused of engaging in private trade with separate traders. Many complained that “Some of the factors on the Coast [of West Africa] keep the best of the Negroes to sell to the Interlopers”.\textsuperscript{94} Yet this was clearly not unusual for Company merchants by the 1690s and 1700s as the Outgoings illustrates, and in these years much of the limited recorded umbrage the RAC took with Company collaborators were with those such as Dalby Thomas, a former interloper himself and one of the few to publicly profess his doing so.\textsuperscript{95} Regardless of this, the collaboration was hardly a covert operation unknown to the Company, given not only its scale in London docks, but also the likes of Davenant presiding over the Company’s record-keeping such as these very Outgoings records.\textsuperscript{96} Political and diplomatic differences clearly failed to stop the Royal African Company from covert cooperation with other nations’ monopoly companies either. Agreements were made with the Dutch West India Company and the French Guinea Company in 1704, with an expressed desire on the behalf of all three companies to suppress the common enemy of the English interloping merchant.\textsuperscript{97} This went against much of the RAC’s rhetoric surrounding the necessity of an English joint-stock to counter those of the Dutch and French whom were “undermining People” and would “in a short Time, have the entire Command of the Coast” if the RAC were to not exist.\textsuperscript{98} Nor was the Company averse to dealings with Dutch interlopers on the coast – themselves not legally allowed to trade as the English separate traders were – whom were interloping not only against the Dutch West India Company but also the dominant English separate traders in the Company’s eyes and were “well paid for their pains” according to one pamphleteer.\textsuperscript{99}

Of those separate traders whom were not politically active, there also existed a varied consistency of those whom collaborated with the RAC and those who chose not to. Thomas

\textsuperscript{93} Davies; African Company pp.137n-139.
\textsuperscript{94} T 70/1; Complaints of Edwyn Stede and Stephen Gascoigne of the Royal African Company, Barbados, 26 October, 1680. pp.67-8.
\textsuperscript{95} Davies; African Company p.255.
\textsuperscript{96} Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt pp.94-5.
\textsuperscript{97} Swingen; Competing Visions p.183.
Coalhurst, Jonathan Travers, Jeffrey Jeffreys and Robert Diamond were among those whom did not collaborate with the RAC. Indeed, given their recorded seven or eight consignment each years in other such documents, and only one or two each registered in the Company Outgoings, it was clear too that many did not register their cargo at all. Other non-political traders however, such as Daniel Jamineau, Anthony Toruney, Sir William Benson and James Berdoe, all collaborated repeatedly with the Royal African Company. Of the 29 recorded voyages containing goods owned by Benson, 1702-1710, more than 20% were in active partnership with the RAC, of which half of those were Benson shipping Company goods on their behalf. Daniel Jamineau was more prolific still, and of the 82 individual voyages containing goods of his to West Africa, over 30% were alongside RAC cargoes, making him the most repeatedly cooperative merchant for the Company over the entire period of the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa’s enforcement, 1698-1712. Further to the collaborative nature of overseas trade at the turn of the eighteenth century, once Company commercial activities had ceased by 1710, Jamineau increased his shared voyages with other separate traders instead; Benjamin Way, John Lee, Isaac Milner and Thomas Coalhurst among others.

Unsurprisingly, many of the voyages undertaken by political separate traders did not contain shared cargoes with the RAC. Indeed, separate traders with the highest frequencies of political actions against the Company - Richard Harris, Humphrey Morice, Isaac Milner and Robert Heysham - were also some of the most commercially active individuals, and yet were still recorded sharing no vessels with the Company. Isolated incidents did occur, however. In April 1704, Peregrine Browne, whom took three separate political actions against the Company, shipped tobacco aboard Swallow Brigantine alongside a wide array of Company cargoes. Significantly, these shipments were almost exclusively non-commercial goods, intended to resupply and restock settlements on the West African coast. “Gunnery stores...soldiers’ clothes...books...heavy guns... gun mounts...” and other such commodities included illustrates clearly that although politically opposite and antagonistic, the practicalities of trade meant the Company was able to cooperate with even politically active separate traders on occasion. Similarly, Abraham Houlditch had taken six separate political actions against the

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100 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt pp.74-5.
101 See Appendix 1 for the full list of separate traders whom collaborated with the RAC, 1702-1712.
Company, yet this did not stop him from repeatedly trading alongside those whom were frequent collaborators with the RAC, such as Daniel Jamineau, for five of the 10 consignment years recorded, 1702-12. The cargoes of Robert Heysham and Richard Harris repeatedly shared vessels with Daniel Jamineau too, despite their 13 and 28 respective political actions taken. The same was true for Humphrey Morice, with 22 separate actions against the Company. Other separate traders were not only non-political, but were former-Company traders and maintained their connections with the RAC as separate traders. Alexander Cleeve, a former Company agent in Gambia, remained crucial to the lifeline of the fortifications and settlements of the RAC once voyages had ceased to be undertaken by the Company post-1710. In August 1710 and October and November 1711, three separate voyages were undertaken with the consignment of Cleeve clearly destined to restock the Company’s factories on the West African coast. Not only were there munitions present; demi-culverins, 100 muskets, 1,656 rounds of musket shot, pistol ammunition and 100 barrels of gunpowder, but Cleeve was also shipping great volumes of foodstuffs such as bread, beef, cheese, pork, grain, beans, biscuit and vinegar. Even the “surgeon’s instruments, medicines,...chandlerwares,...brassierwares,...stationaryware,...grindstones” and flags were being supplied by Cleeve.

The management and conduct of Anglo-African trade was not a straightforward struggle between separate trader and Royal African Company. It would be wildly inaccurate to suggest that separate traders existed as a homogenous group; Pettigrew has covered much ground on the differences between political and non-political separate traders at the turn of the century. Yet it would be inaccurate still to simply conclude the argument there. Evidently, the actions of the separate traders in the Anglo-African trade was not in the least as homogenous as the majority of their political campaigning had been in the 1690s and early 1700s. A sustained interest to achieve parliamentary victory was one thing; however the individuality of the separate traders is most clearly illustrated through their commercial conduct in London and West Africa. Here, the relationships were far more complex and far less rigidly aligned to their professed political ideology. The pamphlet debates

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102 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.78.
104 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.50.
askew the true nature of the Anglo-African trade, given their role as propaganda to the populace of London and the outlying regions of England. Separate traders depicting not just the RAC but chartered monopoly companies more generally as part of the broader ideological argument of an ‘open’ trade. A part of this widening ideological debate only led further to the Anglo-African trade being affected by increasingly global interests at home as well as abroad. The African trading debates were, after all, one of the first large-scale public debates due in part to the lapse of government censorship, the increase of printing, and the widespread interests nationally in the Anglo-African trade. Indeed, where one separate trader writes “They have been persecuted and tormented with all Violence and Cruelty” and “Many have been robb’d of their Ships and Goods” by the RAC, it was quite clear that collaboration was not an impossibility, far from it. The very fact that Company agents frequently discouraged West Africans from dealings with the separate traders did not mean they themselves were averse to such interactions. Even Thomas Phillips was open about commodities aboard his voyage of the Hannibal, 1694, which were the private trade of his and his associates, and others which were of the African Company’s ownership, declaring that it was those of the Company that failed to sell well, and not his own. Company agents such as Dalby Thomas were not alone, nor even the first by a decade, to have cooperated with private interests against the Company.

This is a symptom of the trading debates in general, with its perceived outcome just as flawed. The separate traders were not all successful; many failed in their ventures, and many made significant losses. Yet the accomplishments of the separate traders collectively were to out-price and outmanoeuvre the RAC on the West African coast, in the cases of some individuals without the expressed intention of doing so. This was, in many regards however, reason for the representation of the two antithetical positions of the Anglo-African trade thus far. With the bankruptcy of the

107 Considerations Concerning the African-Companies Petition (London, 1698).
108 Letter to a Member of Parliament p.1.
110 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.13.
Company, animosity continued to pervade publications. “Since the Expiration of that Act,” one merchant wrote, “which was in the year 1712; all others his Majesty’s Subjects have traded freely to Africa, without contributing anything to the said charge; and the Company have born and defrayed the Whole of that Expence; and by this means the separate Traders have reaped the whole profit of this Trade.”

Davenant surmised it well; “Whenever the [separate traders] should come to find their profit not answerable to their expectation, they would quickly draw their necks out of the collar, and give over the trade by degrees.” It was even noted by French merchants that the English separate traders were causing steep price rises of enslaved Africans. As the separate traders ‘out-bid’ the Company, it was perceived that the Company simply lost. These words of Davenant, written on the cusp of the RAC’s bankruptcy in 1709, have come to shape the way the trade has been examined ever since, yet the Outgoings and Incomings kept by the RAC fundamentally highlight the strengths, rather than the weaknesses, of the Company. The bankruptcy and apparent demise of the Company’s commercial activity subsequent to 1710, coupled with the expiry of the 1698 Act in 1712 appears in the eyes of many to only solidify what began in 1698 – the inevitable demise of the RAC.

Considering not only the British governments’ political animosity towards chartered companies at the dawn of the eighteenth century, but that of individual traders too, should have made it almost impossible for the Company to secure its monopoly and carry on its trade.

Indeed, investors abandoned the company, and only a year after the expiration of the Ten Percent Act. In June 1714, the stock was 37p; the lowest it had sunk to since the Company’s inception in the 1670s. Market capital had shrunk to £21,500. Historians have seen the 1698 Act as the beginning of a perpetual decline in the Company, but its expiry is moreover important. Whilst the RAC was clearly being outmanoeuvred both in the English ports and on the West African coast regarding both the volume and quality of its trade, investors maintained trust in the Company whilst its monopoly existed. In this regard, the fundamental success of the Company through these years was

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112 Law; Slave Coast p.173.
113 Charles Davenant; Reflections pp.154-5.
115 TNA T 70/45; Royal African Company to Richard King, June 3, 1714.
116 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.156.
to be able to continue its commercial activities whilst the cards were heavily stacked against its favour. This was the case in 1698, with the widespread enmity towards monopoly companies in general – particularly those with such strong historical connections to the Restoration monarchs. Ultimately, the ability of the Company to undertake joint ventures with almost 50 separate traders as its financial situation continued to nosedive – some of whom being its harshest political critics - was a remarkable success of the RAC. The Outgoings record kept by the Company, 1702-1712, provide a clear illustration not only of the willingness of separate traders to support the Royal African Company commercially, but to provide factory goods to maintain its forts and settlements which provided the framework of the RAC on the West African coast. This level of support was unprecedented by merchants, of whom some fundamentally disagreed with the very existence of forts and factories on the West African coast, and whom continued to believe them to be nothing more than the “mischiefs of Monopoly” and a huge waste of money.\(^\text{117}\) Harsh words they may have been, but given the author’s anonymity, there is now little to suggest they could not have been penned by a separate trader whom at some point collaborated with the Royal African Company; a chartered, monopolistic institution.

**Commercial Collaboration in the World’s Wealth of Goods**

In the formative years of the eighteenth century, the Anglo-African trade had developed into a wholly globalised commercial venture for British merchants. A booming re-export market and growing overseas experiences in the Americas, the East Indies and Europe was able to fuel the increasingly global demands of West African merchants. Traditional historiography alludes to ‘global marketplaces’ not developing external to Europe until the later eighteenth century, and yet the cargoes transported to West Africa in the Outgoings heavily suggests otherwise.\(^\text{118}\) The impact of overseas markets on domestic English political affairs and manufacturing industries had beginnings in the late seventeenth century, and specifically regarding West African marketplaces. Discussing the markets in their globalised characteristics helps to deconstruct the artificial bifurcation of what has developed

\(^{117}\) Reasons Against Confirming the Charter to the African Company by Act of Parliament, Humbly Offered to Consideration (London, 1711).

into two dominant theatres of historical assessment; East and West. Presenting instead the way in which markets were interconnected by their increasingly globally-sourced commodities exchanged there, and the effects these commercial networks had on domestic political administration, more accurately depicts the markets as a whole. Historiographical trends have circumvented either giving the arguments of ‘global trade’ a purely Atlantic lens and scope (largely excluding West Africa), or taking individual marketplaces as examples of globalised commerce without considering the domestic implications until the later eighteenth century. Many, such as Hopkins, state the beginnings of a ‘globalised’ world through commercial interaction did not really begin until the 1760s. It was with a distinctly West African sentiment that the seeds of global trade were sewn however, with enslaved Africans as labour, capital and currency shaping integration, dictated by Europeans, for over four hundred years with the escalation of Anglo-African trading after 1698 being vital to such global interaction. When Jacob Price insists we must be “impressed by the interdependence of the parts” of global trade – the East Indies, Central Asia, West Africa, East and Western Europe, the British Isles, North and South America – there is nowhere more impressive in its scope nor chronology than the West African coast. Examples of his ‘imperial economy’ pre-dated its full form of “a complex, multilateral trading system” of the 1770s by over 70 years. As well as fuelling commodity production in the American colonies however, the West African marketplaces became the central hub of global commodity exchange long before 1750s and 1760s so commonly purported to be the origins of globalised interaction.

Price summarised the typical, simple selection of goods commonly traded to West Africa, stating “Slaves were bought in Africa with Asian textiles as well as Birmingham guns and Italian

119 Stern; Company-State pp.3-7.
120 For the former’s look at specifically the Atlantic World, and an example of its predominant focus by historians post-1750 see David Hancock; Citizens of the World: London merchants and the integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-85 (Cambridge, 1995) For the latter’s focus on global economic integration and the study of globalised marketplaces, see Natasha Glaisyer; ‘Networking; Trade and Exchange in the Eighteenth Century British Empire’, The Historical Journal, 47, 2 (2004) pp.466-7.
beads”. The Company’s Outgoings show that this principle of domestic, American, European and East Indian goods were indeed amongst the most popular in West Africa. Widely ranging selections of commodities became commonly exchanged, driven in part by the differing interests of British merchants, with a further post-1698 boom in bilateral trade between the southern ports of England and the coast of West Africa. Giving momentum to other scholars’ works in the globalising overseas markets, outside of North-West Europe, the RAC Outgoings firmly place West Africa as much a part of a ‘global’ trade as it was of an ‘Atlantic’ one. Whereby Marion Johnson and others have illustrated the volume and value of goods being transported globally to the coast of Africa, these documents place an even wider array of goods within their set voyages. This allows for a rudimentary cross-examination of the Outgoings and Incomings with data elsewhere on these very same voyages to assert how valuable to the African merchant, not just London, these commodities were. It illustrates, too, how increasingly frequently these global goods were being combined and bundled together on single voyages. Combined with this, the existence of strong bilateral trading links between England and the West African coast were certainly prominent enough to witness most goods (other than Ivory) to be imported from Africa directly. These goods in many cases avoided the famed triangular trade. Although incomplete, the RAC documents give clear indication of the scale of this, and provide the springboard to this inquiry. Having been largely left out of historiographical assessments since, the focus of which has usually been on the trade in enslaved Africans, the bilateral trade had implications for numerous domestic English industries, chiefly that of textile manufacturing. Works have been published which, although outlining the general trend of the dominant goods shipped to West Africa, fail to give deeper analysis of these commodities’ global origins, nor do they trace the beginnings of their global influences. Whilst the English textile market found a home in West Africa, Virginian tobacco, Jamaican rum, handfuls of East Indian textiles and German linens were known to have been shipped there since the earlier seventeenth century. Yet it was only after the

124 Price; Merchants p.277.
126 Results shown in the Slavevoyages database gives information regarding the destination of the voyage, as well as the number of enslaved Africans obtained. With the information on the goods presented in the T 70/1199 document, unprecedented pieces of the Anglo-African trading puzzle can be put into place. http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces.
127 Johnson; Anglo-African Trade pp.53-96.
mass commercialisation of Anglo-African trade began in 1698, that West Africa could truly be defined as a global marketplace. The 1698 Act catalysed the dramatic increase in the volume of goods shipped to West Africa, and the number of English merchants engaging in the Anglo-African trade accordingly. The basket of these goods, too, became progressively cosmopolitan in nature, and with far more globally sourced origins than previously, the markets of the West African coast were globalised like no other extra-European commercial theatre. East Indian textiles were of prime significance. Indeed, forbidden from being imported to Britain by the Calico Acts, linens, cottons and calicoes from all over the subcontinent quickly found a home redirected to West Africa. Materials barred from London were frequently traded along the Gold Coast, the Slave Coast, and the Bight of Benin. Political activity in Britain thus placed the textiles of the Indian Subcontinent at the forefront of the commercial debate, with West Africa as the natural recipient of the Eastern textiles.

As Figures 5 and 6 show below, increasingly over the first decade of the eighteenth century the trade to Africa witnessed substantial growth in the proportion of East Indian as well as European textiles being shipped to the West African coast. In just four years from 1702 to 1706, the proportion of East Indian goods amongst Anglo-African trading vessels rose from 61% to 97%, predominated by textiles, cottons and linens from across the subcontinent. This was part of a much larger commercial trend, as after 1698 East Indian textiles quickly rose to become the largest trading commodity to the West African coast. Strikingly, there was no single dominant cloth of the East Indies amongst commercial voyages to West Africa; however those individual fabrics produced on the western coast of the Indian subcontinent were traded in greater numbers than any other. The varied African marketplaces along its coast made the introduction of these commodities at the beginning of the eighteenth-century very welcome. The preference of certain East Indian textiles among African markets has been developed in other literature by those such as Colleen Kriger, and until the end of

the nineteenth centuries, Indian cottons held the lion’s share of overseas textile imports to West-Africa. Crucially this varied from region to region, port to port. By the mid-eighteenth century, it was clear that baftas were popular on the Senegal basin, brawles, tapseils and nicanees were favoured on the Gold Coast, and muslins, calicoes, chints and pintadoes were sold almost exclusively in the Bight of Benin as trading patterns and records of the Cottons such as allejars and long cloth were sold all along the coast. This variation was key, and evidence below from the Outgoings illustrates the growth in the presence of these goods immediately after 1698. Propelled by the political action at home, East Indian textile re-exports by the 1720s were the dominant make-up of British shipping to West Africa. Yet even as early as 1705, whole shipments of goods were turned away by uninterested African merchants for being of inferior quality, or traded at a steep loss. On numerous occasions commodities would be turned away and deemed “not Vendible” for not being of East Indian origin. West African merchants were wise to English attempts at passing off cheap English and Welsh productions as high-quality Indian fabrics. Outgoings clearly highlight the increased proportion of these goods in the formative years of the 1700s, and since the mid-seventeenth-century, East Indian textiles being shipped to the West African coast were multiplied by the 1698 Act capitalising on the increasing desire of separate traders to engage in the Anglo-African trade. While some British manufacturers began to mimic the designs of East Indian fabrics after their importation ban, these were not a considerable export to West Africa until the mid-eighteenth century.

Among the Outgoings the most prominent and recurring textiles of the East Indies amongst Anglo-African cargoes were nicanees, brawles, tapseils, chints of all designs, and calicoes. Regarding the East India trade, the textile markets of Bombay and Surat crept ahead of other manufacturers on the subcontinent due to their proximity to English ports in the East Indies, and moreover the fact that these were the goods most imported by the English East India Company to domestic British ports. By extension, the wider areas of textile manufacturing in Gujarat, and down the western coast of the

132 T 70/22, Dalby Thomas to RAC; Cape Coast Castle, “Scheme of Goods Wanted and Abstracts of Letters from the Coast of Africa”, 26th March, 1706.
134 Kriger; 'Guinea Cloth' pp.121-123
subcontinent into Konkan and Malabar, held great significance in the profitability of the Anglo-
African trade. This was clear, as between 1702 and 1712, the African Company’s Outgoings recorded
nicanees, cheap and lightweight textiles produced along the west coast of India, aboard 129 separate
voyages.\textsuperscript{136} Similarly, tapseils, popular white and blue striped fabrics from the same areas, were
recorded aboard 114 separate voyages to Africa.\textsuperscript{137} Brawles too were noted by the Company agents in
no fewer than 114 individual voyages. These predominant commodities were accompanied by many
other goods, namely, bejutapauts, byrampauts, cheiloes, guinea graines, guinea stuffs, Gujarat chints,
Gujarat cloth, pallampores, sawes and other such stuffs all originating from Gujarat, Konkan and
Malabar.\textsuperscript{138} A widening of the British interactions in the East Indies was doubtless contributing to the
surge in the East Indian commodity trade to West Africa, along with the enforcement of the Calico
Act, 1699, which permitted East Indian textiles only for re-exportation. These circumstances,
combined with the influx of independent merchants now commercially active in the Anglo-African
trade, were considerable factors in the rise of the East Indian goods transacted, seen below.

In short, the difference in Anglo-African commercial activity post-1698 is significant. The
trade conducted solely by Company trading in the late 1690s, as recorded by Davies, saw the total
volume of goods in the trade multiply only a few years after 1698. The total value of the Anglo-
African iron trade was recorded to have increased from £3,354 in 1698 to £5,156 in 1704. For copper,
the growth was from £100 in 1698 to £652 in 1701. Perpetuanos saw a near-50% increase from
£10,364 in 1698 to £14,387 in 1704. Despite this, East Indian textile trade has heretofore been
recorded as largely floundering after 1698.\textsuperscript{139} Davies’ assessments, from T 70/910-920, ultimately
give unreliable recordings as they fail to include the Data from the Company’s Outgoings, which
highlight the Company voyages containing East Indian cargoes in 1702 alone were valued at over
£13,370. In 1704, this figure was over £35,000 and, although independent commodity values remain
difficult, it was clear that the mere £162 of nicanees, and lack of any recordings of tapseils at all

\textsuperscript{136} Jill Louise Geber; The East India Company and Southern Africa: A Guide to the East India Company and the Board of
Control, 1600-1858, PhD thesis (UCL, 1998) p.188.
\textsuperscript{137} K N Chaudhuri; The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760 (London, 1978).
\textsuperscript{138} For much of this section, the geographic origins of the East Indian textiles have been sourced from Chaudhuri’s Trading
World of Asia, as well as, Giorgio Riello, Roy Tirthankar ed.; How India Clothed the World: The World of South Asian
\textsuperscript{139} Davies; Royal African Company pp.351-357.
presented in Davies’ work, were not giving a rounded illustration of the trade. Further to this, declines in overall trading figures in these formative years of the eighteenth century were due in part to the War of Spanish Succession, beginning for Britain in 1702, which saw heavy losses to shipping that did not subside until 1708. Records for Davies ceasing in 1704, the T 70/1199 document continues until 1712, presenting an overarching trend of the Company’s commercial decline not shown by Davies. The Outgoings highlight a significantly wider array of commodities, with Davies’ data listing only eight separate East Indian textiles, and three English. Overall, studying only Davies’ figures of Anglo-African commercial interaction provides a narrow perspective on the trade, simplifying the commercial decline of the RAC which was a complex economic and political issue.

(Fig. 5 – The percentages of voyages containing goods by their regional origin per annum, 1702-1706.)
Dominant though it may have become amongst English merchandise shipped to Africa, the products of the west coast of India travelled alongside numerous goods from other regions of Asia. Indeed, calicoes were the most commonly shipped commodity of the East Indies, noted amongst 140 individual voyages to West Africa. Although a general term for textiles originating in the East Indies, numerous cargo loads of calicoes did contain annotated regional discrepancies, with calicoes not only from the west coast, but from the east. Alongside these came more specific textiles, such as allibanes, charridaries, cherconnaes, gurrah, handkerchiefs, nillaes, sannoes, sooseys and the more rare taffetas from Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Expensive throne silk was shipped by both the RAC and separate traders on three individual occasions; twice in 1702, and in late 1707. From the Coromandel Coast, there came to Africa diapers, dimities, long cloth, photoaes, romanles, and sallampores. This stretched further, whereby outside of the Indian subcontinent witnessed goods imported to West Africa. Two separate trading voyages in 1704 were recorded shipping ‘Flowered China Taffetas’ to West Africa, likely from the port of Canton, as well as threaded satin and china alongside similar cargoes.\(^{140}\)

Surpassing these were the records of chints which were shipped en masse to West Africa, not only from Gujarat, Coromandel or Bengal, but further inland of the Mughal Empire in Patna too, as well as Portuguese Goa. French chints were also shipped by the RAC on two separate occasions in

\(^{140}\) Chaudhuri; Trading World p.135.
1704 and 1705, likely from the central commercial port of the French East India Company at Pondicherry.\textsuperscript{141} Persian chints became a feature not uncommonly witnessed in the Anglo-African trade in these years of the early eighteenth century too, with 1704, 1705 and 1710 all featuring voyages containing the goods. Similarly, multan chints, from south-west Asia, were also shipped in 1707.\textsuperscript{142} Outside of the textile trade were East Indian cowries and rangoes - shells usually from the Maldives islands of the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{143} These were, particularly along the Slave Coast, noted by Europeans as being used for currency, with Thomas Phillips remarking that they could be used “to buy anything.”\textsuperscript{144} Indeed, this was the case recognised by Anglo-African merchants by the end of the seventeenth century, with cowries appearing as the most popular East Indian good traded to Africa after calicoes, as noted in the Outgoings document, loaded onto approximately 130 voyages. Similarly, rangoes were loaded onto approximately 90 voyages, with both shells along with other ‘bouges’ being in use within the West African economies since the mid-sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{145} Other Eastern goods were to be found in transit to Africa, including alloes and ticks, types of East Indian wood, and goods traded with the Dutch East Indies such as coffee, nutmeg and pepper, suggesting that cross-company trading between Europeans in extra-European markets was not uncommon. Indeed, separate traders would often illegally dock in ports of the Netherlands before setting sail to West Africa in order to attain an even wider stock of goods than other English merchants by ignoring the Navigation Acts.\textsuperscript{146} Contrary to this, tea and spices, staples of British East Indian trade by around 1713, both struggled to find a commercial foothold in Africa at least in these formative years of the 1700s, with tea loaded onto only seven separate cargoes, 1705-1710, by separate traders.\textsuperscript{147} Similarly, East Indian spices had only exclusive interest among non-commercial voyages of the RAC, with the intention of cultivation rather than consumption or trade.\textsuperscript{148} Recorded on six separate occasions, 1702-

\textsuperscript{141} Erikson; Monopoly and Free Trade p.141.
\textsuperscript{142} Vast numbers of other such commodities made up the East Indian trade to West Africa. See Appendix 2.
\textsuperscript{143} Law; Slave Coast p.48.
\textsuperscript{144} Philips; A Journal p.228.
\textsuperscript{146} Krieger; Guinea Cloth p.125
\textsuperscript{147} Chaudhuri; Trading World p.388.
\textsuperscript{148} These were aboard six individual voyages, each in 1709, 1707, 1705, 1704 and two in 1703.
1706, East Indian ‘spices’, nutmeg and cinnamon as well as pepper, were shipped in these years only for the attention of the European factors in Africa, not the African merchants.

Vast increases in the prevalence of East Indian goods were driven by their heightened demand on the West African coast. In many cases, West African merchants’ desires became far more difficult to satiate as the European interactions with the coast multiplied. The 1698 Act boosted the Anglo-African trade, and this in turn produced an overwhelming sense of a ‘buyers’ market’ in West Africa – merchants would accept only the finest quality of goods from Europeans. It was certainly, as Ty M Reese states, a “West African-dictated system.”\(^{149}\) Cheap imports were often only accepted if they were bundled with the most expensive East Indian goods, and European and English woollens, cottons and linens increasingly needed to be exported in bundles with East Indian textiles in order to maximise West Africans’ interest.\(^{150}\) East Indian textiles were, for many traders, the key to their success on the coast, and to this growth in commercial activity. When shipments were well received however, they were met with a huge potential customer base for European traders, with the commodities permeating through all members of society from the West African elites down to even the indentured servants of West Africa. It was a system, however, which was almost totally proscribed by the West African merchants and their desire for an expansive range of high-quality imports.\(^{151}\) The ingredients for a globalised trade in West Africa were all present, and this quickly became the case in the early eighteenth-century: a clear, open door to textiles shipped to West Africa, a burgeoning Anglo-African commerce due to the 1698 Act, and an increase in the volume of East Indian goods being traded by English merchants which could no longer be imported to the domestic English markets. This led to East Indian textiles being the single largest and dominant import to West African by Europeans as early as 1720.\(^{152}\)

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\(^{151}\) A. Van Dantzig; The Dutch and the Guinea Coast, 1674-1742: A Collection of Documents from the General State Archive at the Hague (Accra, 1978) pp.295-7 [Translation]

\(^{152}\) Kriger; ‘Guinea Cloth’ p.123
Witnessed amongst these exports and re-exports as well is the ownership of the cargoes aboard each voyage. Unsurprisingly, the separate traders, with the greatest volume of merchandise throughout the recorded period, consistently shipped the greatest volume of goods from around the globe. It was not simply the case in the earlier years of the recorded Outgoings that the separate traders exported increasing percentages of East Indian goods year on year. Fluctuations existed between independent merchants, the RAC and shared cargoes which were telling of the strength of the Company in these earlier years, not just in relation to East Indian trade, but European re-exports too and especially regarding American tobacco.

![Graph showing ownership percentages in 1702](image_url)
The ownership of cargoes aboard the voyages, and the percentage of goods and their origins contained therein, 1702-4, 1706, and 1708.

European re-exports were found with consistently higher frequency in the Outgoings from 1702; however this was largely due to the dominance of iron sourced from Sweden and its surrounding Baltic empires which was always in great demand. Voyages containing iron numbered 306 out of the total 372 recorded in the Company’s Outgoings (81%), making it by far the single most commonplace commodity traded with in West Africa by Europeans in the formative years of the eighteenth century. Indeed, iron was essential to West African markets, acting alongside cowries and rangoes as a benchmark currency which other commodities were measured against, including enslaved Africans. Textile manufacturing on the European continent grew significantly over the second half of the eighteenth century, leading to increased imports of particularly German linens which were re-exported in large quantities to West Africa. Indeed, 138 voyages contained German linens, narrow and broad, over the years recorded in the Outgoings, with a growing geographic spread.

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154 There will be some discrepancy here regarding the origin of the iron. On occasion it is denoted as ‘forreign iron’, although this is done by no means as often as it would need to be to represent the figures of other historians work on the matter – See Evans, Jackson, Ryden. Marion Johnson states in Anglo-African Trade that wrought iron in some cases contained weaponry and armaments, likely to therefore be a domestic cargo. The iron is taken in these few exceptions where made clear to be thus a domestic export, otherwise denoted as a European re-export in this work. Even Johnson, in her massive data collection, notes the difficulty in assessing these specifics however – see Johnson; Anglo-African Trade.

of the goods’ origins. Hessen canvas\textsuperscript{156}, sletias and lawns from Silesia and ozenbrigs from Bavaria were all popular amongst certain demographics in West Africa, with approximately 25 voyages collectively containing these goods from wider Germany.\textsuperscript{157} The United Provinces’ textile industry, as well as influencing English manufacturing in the seventeenth century, was itself exchanged frequently by British merchants on the West African coast. Amongst 17 individual voyages between 1702 and 1711 there contained large shipments of ‘Holland linen’, narrow and broad. Strained diplomatic relations and even warfare failed to sever commercial connections between the French and Spanish goods frequently seen in the Anglo-African trade. Between 1705 and 1710, various voyages were undertaken containing significant measurements of Spanish cloth, with Spanish snuff also included in one voyage in June 1706. Not only were French chints features of the Anglo-African smorgasbord of merchandise, but so too were linens manufactured in Brittany carried on separate trader voyages recorded in 1709. Continental European textile industries, particularly in central and northern Europe, were essential to the Anglo-African trade particularly after the boom in commercial activity post-1698. Not only were the domestic British textiles receiving great interest in the booming export market of West Africa, but merchants were quick to re-export European linens to satiate demand too. Even supplies considered more essential were not simply supplied domestically, with shipments of Westphalia bacon, cooking oil from Genoa, claret and brandy – ‘Aquavitae’ – from various French regions, Holland duck, Lubeck duck, Portuguese port and wine from Spain, Madeira, Italy and France, as well as ‘strong waters’ and beer from continental Europe. Interestingly too, listed amongst non-commercial Company cargoes to West Africa were other Dutch goods, specifically quils, ink-holders, ‘looking glasses’ and various meridian and sea compasses not present from other destinations. As such, there was a strong chance that the Company, despite its patriotic sentiments, was dependent on its chief rival in West Africa for such basic essentials in its settlements.\textsuperscript{158}

From across the Atlantic, there were large shipments of goods cultivated and produced in the Americas as well. Similar to the Europeans of the seventeenth century, West Africans also

\textsuperscript{156} Walter S Dunn Jr.; People of the American Frontier: The Coming of the American Revolution (Westport, 2005) p.85.


\textsuperscript{158} These were present in two separate voyages registered in August, 1702.
experienced something of an insatiable appetite for tobacco, which only grew after the turn of the eighteenth century. Senegambia particularly, as well as further inland, took to cultivation of the plant after its initial imports to the coast in the early seventeenth century, which managed to hold its own against European imports until the 1780s. Nevertheless, further east along, demand in the Gold and Slave Coast regions was significant enough to warrant mass-importation of tobacco and tobacco pipes, witnessed in the Company’s Outgoings. Indeed, no fewer than 240 voyages contained Tobacco, the second most shipped commodity in the African Company’s Outgoings after iron. Virginia tobacco was kept exclusive, usually distinguished for its geographical source of cultivation by the company agents as well as the Africans, but more commonly shipped was tobacco from the Caribbean islands. 

Alongside these, felt and castor hats fashioned from rabbit, beaver or deer from land settled by the Hudson’s Bay Company around Rupert’s Land in northern America were commonly traded. Muscovado sugars from the Caribbean was not uncommonly found, nor were spirits brewed in the Americas with the aid of molasses, shipped frequently in 1702, 1704 and 1710. Goods produced in the North America and the Caribbean were not, bar tobacco, felt and castor, not of the highest demand across some parts of West Africa, yet its significance as a destination for African-produced goods such as ivory, beeswax and redwood was more important to Anglo-African commerce still.

Very little scholarly work exists on the study of redwood importation from Africa, to either England or the Americas, however it was certainly the former which dominated demand. Very much a staple of the Anglo-African trade, it in many ways was more significant to English markets than even ivory was at the turn of the eighteenth century. Given the prevalence of the Gloucestershire and Devon trades through the port of Bristol at this time too, the focus on redwood has been disproportionately placed in such regions. This becomes more evident when assessing the Incomings as noted by the Royal African Company, determining that those merchants embarking on their return voyage from Africa directly, not engaging in the ‘triangular’ trade of the Atlantic, traded nearly tenfold the value of redwood than their counterparts whom sailed to the Americas. Over the

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159 Curtin; Precolonial Africa p.230.
twelve year period, 1699-1711, those returning directly from West Africa traded in over 2,100 tons of redwood, compared to the 270 by ‘triangular’ merchants. This bilateral Anglo-African trade was clearly substantial in volume, representing approximately 36% of voyages recorded in the RAC’s Incomings book.

Indeed, although at no point is it directly referenced, Marion Johnson’s volume of data signifies the contrast between ‘imports’ and ‘indirect imports’ from Africa, the latter being those brought via the middle passage across the Atlantic Ocean to the Americas. The Company’s Incomings record similar patterns of commerce too, with Johnson’s data consistently showing indirect imports valued at only 20-30% of the overall share of total imports from West Africa between 1699 and 1801. Despite being from a separate set of records entirely (CUST 3 & CUST 17), Johnson’s dataset for 1699-1708 highlights just over 20% of the total goods brought to England were indirect imports, mirrored in the T 70/1198 records, measuring 19.3%. This was with the make-up of bilateral voyages occurring for just under a third of all returning from West Africa, as recorded by the RAC’s Incomings. Hardly surprising that the bulk of commercial wealth coming from Africa came directly, it remains striking the proportion of Anglo-African trade that was not ‘triangular’. Indeed, combining bilateral voyages with the wider Atlantic commercial activity by British merchants, as well as the non-commercial voyages to West Africa which made up approximately 15% of all recorded voyages in the Company Outgoings, the slave trade was not the only vessel of commerce, nor was it “the spring and parent from whence other flow” regarding the wider Anglo-African commerce. Increasingly dominating as it was in Atlantic and global commerce, fuelling other dependant trades in the American plantations directly, hundreds of markets, manufacturers and merchants relied, by the turn of the eighteenth century, on the Anglo-African trade.

161 Johnson; Anglo-African Trade p.53.
162 The values being for Johnson; Imports – £156,066, Indirect Imports - £38,577, and for T 70/1198; Imports - £100,566, Indirect Imports – £19,370.
For many industries surrounding the textile trades of England, global influences on domestic markets were becoming especially true regarding West Africa. For decades now, historians have been aware that West Africans did not play a passive role in the slave trade. In not only supply of the slaves, but in varied patterns of consumption as well as wide variation of market demands, West African communities were an extremely active half of the Anglo-African slave trading commerce. If markets in West Africa were active in this way, however, there is argument to be made that African influences spread further, with greater degrees of influence over the development of English markets and manufacturing domestically. If differences in West African consumption patterns had significant repercussions for the English slave trading industry, this can be extended to the manufacturing markets in England, with livelihoods dependent on a booming Anglo-African trade. With regards to this, while the majority of voyages undertaken to West Africa were not bilateral, redwood was crucial to the dyeing communities of London and Gloucestershire. As is recognised in the section on the African trading debates, these polities held an undoubtedly powerful political lobby alongside other clothiers and textile workers both influencing and influenced by global markets both in the East Indies

164 See Hopkins; Economic History of West Africa.
165 David Richardson; ‘West African Consumption Patterns and Their Influence on the Eighteenth Century English Slave Trade’, in Gemery; Hogendorn; The Uncommon Market p.304.
166 Inikori; Africans p.396.
and West Africa. Previous scholarly work which touches on the dyestuff provides links only to the
Bristol trade to Africa, and its importation to the West Country’s burgeoning Atlantic commerce.167

This was due in great part to the passing of the 1698 Act to Settle the Trade to Africa,
allowing for the significant numbers of separate traders that operated from ports outside of London –
the main port of the Royal African Company – to do so legally.168 Significantly, the 1698 act itself
became central to many dyers’ concerns which were rapidly being transported overseas to not only
West Africa, but to the East Indies, where manufacturing abroad was capable of ruining their
livelihoods.169 Indeed, involved in these growing textile lobbies across England were many of the
same demographics whom were as opposed to the ten percent levy on redwood dyes from Africa as
they were to the importation of East Indian linen threatening to dominate their markets. In some cases,
communities of dyers whom had been well furnished with trade to Africa by the RAC, becoming
active in the national political debate on the side of the Company, were likely some of those voicing
their animosity to the tax on redwood dye imports.170 As numerous traders to West Africa were
disinterested with the slave trade and the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa being focused
predominantly on those merchants of the triangular trade, this concern held its own legitimacy.171

Much of the justification of lowering the tax on redwood dyes came from its sourcing predominantly
in the Senegambia region, which at the turn of the eighteenth century received little attention from
slave traders.172 Subsequently, pressure on both issues became strong enough to lower the levy on
redwood to five percent, half of every other commodity taxed in the Anglo-African trade. A year later
in 1699, it also pushed legislation enacting the ban on East Indian imported textiles, in turn fuelling
the boom in East Indian merchandise sent to West Africa illustrated by the RAC’s Outgoings.173

167 David Richardson; Bristol, Africa and the Eighteenth Century Slave Trade to America Vol. 1: The Years of Expansion
1698-1729 (Gloucester, 1986).
168 Davies; African Company pp.151-2.
169 LF Stock; Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America Vol II (Washington, 1927)
pp.222-3.
170 Various petitions from clothiers, serge-makers, dyers, weavers and tuckers dated January-February 1709, in Donnan;
Documents Vol II pp.96-7.
171 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.59.
172 Davies; Royal African Company p.132.
173 An Act to settle the Trade to Africa (1698).
“All wrought silks, Bengals, and stuffs mixes with silk or herba, of the manufacture of Persia, China, or the East Indies; and all calicoes, painted, dyed, printed, or stained there, which are or shall be imported into this kingdom, shall not be worn or otherwise used in Great Britain, and all goods imported after that day, shall be warehoused and exported again.”

From 1701 until 1712, recorded increases of East Indian textiles amongst voyages loaded onto Anglo-African voyages occurred from 61% to 100%. It was at the very cusp of the eighteenth century that not only were there mass increases in the numbers of those trading to West Africa, but an increase in the goods in demand on the West African coast needing greater supply there.

This was met with further such political debates in the 1690s, significant in their global application. The legal proceedings of the East India Company in this era were to affect the RAC significantly. This was true of legislation which supported the Company, for example, in 1685; it was the ruling by Sir George Jeffreys in East India Company v. Sandys that the monarch had the right to charter joint stock companies, whom in turn had the right to protect them with cargo seizures. What was true for one legally was, by extension, true for another, yet both the constructs and constraints of the joint-stock ran further still. Alongside this ruling in East India Company v. Sandys, Jeffreys ruled over the impasse of the crown’s sovereignty and naval capacity failing, ultimately, to cover the sprawling reaches of English commercial networks by the mid-1680s. Indeed, this was only further to the case a decade later, and would continue to be so as the commercial enterprises of the English and then British nation took merchants further east and west. Jeffrey’s ruling on the EIC was that the case favouring companies and societies was fundamentally due to the capital expenses in engaging in long-distance trades – principle among these being the maintenance of forts and factories, as well as establishing networked relationships with the local populations, used for aiding in self-sufficiency of the English colonial settlements. The English colonial experience in the East Indies may have

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174 Excerpt of the Calico Act, 1699, quoted in; William Milburn; Oriental Commerce (London, 1813) p.231.
176 Batchelor; London pp.200-1.
177 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.30.
dwarfed that of the RAC regarding governing populations – Madras’ 100,000 to Cape Coast Castle’s little more than 100 – yet the imperial ideology behind this in India, the Americas and West Africa, was one and the same, dictated by political and commercial events in London, as well as the experiences of the English merchants and factors abroad.\textsuperscript{178} Indeed, the limited number of soldiers and agents on the African coast, combined with the lack of significant military engagements witnessed there has likely contributed to this scholarly oversight when comparing the East Indies, Europe and North America.\textsuperscript{179} When, some years later in 1696, Chief Justice John Holt confirmed in Dockwra v. Dickenson that the RAC’s seizure of cargoes legally void, this also sent significant messages to the East India Company that the government’s outlook on joint-stocks were globally focussed.\textsuperscript{180} A ruling over the legal constraints of the EIC as a joint-stock would directly impact the actions of the RAC, and vice versa.

This was made painfully clear for the joint-stock and monopoly companies unanimously, with the almost simultaneous rulings in 1698 against their monopolistic privileges in one way or another. The Royal African Company’s trade to Africa was opened to separate traders which, although paid duties on their cargo and recognised the RAC’s monopoly, were regarded by some as the beginning of its downfall.\textsuperscript{181} The East India Company severed into two, ‘Old’ and ‘New’, with disdain for the old Stuart monarchs lingering in the Company’s split.\textsuperscript{182} The Muscovy Company, too, although kept under one joint stock, was forced to include members previously turned away under the Act to Enlarge the Trade to Russia.\textsuperscript{183} Not only was Parliament’s approach worldwide by 1698 though, but broad interests by many lobbies of merchants had begun to emerge. As those clothiers and textile manufacturers in England lobbied against both African and East Indian interests, merchants particularly of the tobacco trade whom lobbied against the African Company also did against the company in Russia. Many leading agitators of the Muscovy Company; Edmund and Samuel Harrison,

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{178} St Clair; Slave Emporium pp.84, 130.
\bibitem{180} Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt pp.31-2.
\bibitem{181} Michael Craton; Sinews of Empire: A Short History of British Slavery (London, 1974) pp.64-5.
\bibitem{182} Erikson; Monopoly and Free Trade p.42.
\end{thebibliography}
Sir Gilbert Heathcote, and Robert Heysham, were prominent pamphleteers against the Royal African Company. Contrastingly, Nathaniel Gould, director of the RAC, was also a prominent opponent of the Muscovy Company. Interests were converging on a global scale, whether they were of merchants, government officials or domestic manufacturers, and as the political governance of the English Empire broadened its reach in the Americas, East Indies and West Africa, the commercial interests would do so too. Marketplaces were becoming more varied as the seventeenth century turned to the eighteenth, with interests in England following suit, and nowhere was this more striking than in West Africa.

The Act to Settle the Trade to Africa in 1698 was, at the turn of the eighteenth century, a settlement with not only global ramifications, but pre-dated by, and coinciding with, legislation that was itself influenced by overseas affairs. West Africa not only held global significance by 1712 for the commerce sailing to its shores, but in the political and legislative actions that surrounded it. The Parliamentary view of overseas commerce was undoubtedly one seen through a global lens, with coinciding legislation being implemented for commerce in Europe, the East Indies and West Africa in 1698. Motivated by ideological reasons broadly opposing the Stuart chartered monopoly companies they may have been, but their actions were undoubtedly global, commercial and imperial in their focus. As political lobbies campaigned, and affected legal proceedings both in the East and West, they in turn shaped the emerging global commercial activities of the English, and then British, empires.

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(Fig. 13 – A map of the East Indies denoting the points of origin of a selection of goods listed amongst the cargoes of the Outgoings.)
(Fig. 14 - A map of Europe denoting the points of origin of a selection of goods listed amongst the cargoes of the Outgoings [excludes the British Isles].)
(Fig. 15 - A map of the Americas denoting the points of origin of a selection of goods listed amongst the cargoes of the Outgoings.)
(Fig. 16 – A map of the British Isles denoting the points of origin of a selection of goods listed amongst the cargoes of the Outgoings.)
III – The Political and Imperial Agenda

The Anglo-African commercial relationship in England and Africa

The Company Outgoings help to illustrate much in the way of the organizational structure of the RAC, exposing its strengths and weaknesses in doing so. The infrastructure of Company supply and maintenance of their forts and settlements may have been a prime argument in favour of the RAC’s continued existence post-1698, but also detrimental to its commercial prospects. Over the years, patterns began to emerge in their listed Outgoings cargoes which not only contained repeated listings of commodities; but the measures, weights and values of these goods, as well as the way in which they were recorded, were identical. For non-commercial cargoes intended to supply the Company factories, this was less of a problem, and consisted at times of the same quantities of foodstuffs, artisans tools and “Necessaries for the Counting house” shipped in February 1703, November 1704, January 1706 and so on. Yet this was a process not exclusive to the furnishing of Company settlements, and was carried out on a more frequent basis with commercial cargoes. Matching quantities of calicoes, European linens, woollen stuffs, East Indian textiles, tobacco and other such commodities were dispatched by the Company, sometimes with years apart. This was despite the constantly shifting demands across the wide array of polities and markets engaged in European trade on the African coast. The Company clearly had a less flexible commercial approach to Anglo-African trade than that of the separate traders, whom did not engage in such repetitive cargoes over numbers of years. With cargoes bound for Africa having to be meticulously and precisely assorted to meet the subtle distinctions of West African demands between one community and the next, the Royal African Company’s structure of trade clearly placed them at a significant disadvantage. This builds a greater reflection of the intricacies of the Anglo-African commercial relationship – one in which many domestic British manufacturers came to rely heavily on African markets for their livelihoods at the turn of the eighteenth century.

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185 T 70/1199; Outgoings of the Royal African Company.
186 This happened on numerous individual voyages 1702-8, with the principal commercial goods involved being calicoes, German linens, old sheets, beads and tobacco.
187 Richardson; ‘Consumption’ p.309.
Anglo-African trade not only witnessed a breadth of scale with wide-reaching global goods exchanged in West Africa, but was fundamental in impacting domestic manufacturing industries of England. As the English trade in enslaved Africans impacted Africa deeply, by the formative years of the eighteenth century, the reverse was also true. Regions of England were intrinsically economically linked with West Africa, and dependent on successful commerce with West African markets for their very livelihoods. Examining the operations of the RAC further also allows for a deconstructing analysis of the framework of the Company, and the way in which it operated, collaborating with numerous commercial rivals of Britain, relying in some cases on their goods and political support. Having given a rundown of the most frequently traded goods to West Africa recorded in the Outgoings; this section illustrates how it was on both a grand, national scale that the British economy relied on the West African trade, as well as of specific regional economies that operated almost entirely upon it.

Classic estimates for Anglo-African trade were undermined by the inclusion of West Africa part of a wider ‘extra-European theatre’ of trade, misrepresenting the intrinsic reliance that there was, growing amongst particular textile manufacturers in England on African markets. Indeed, Ralph Davies estimated that domestic textile exports valued at £310,000 p.a. were shipped to the Americas, East Indies and West Africa combined between 1699 and 1701.188 Marion Johnson estimates the West African portion of this trade to be less than £100,000 p.a. on average, including re-exports, before 1720, affected somewhat by the rumbling global warfare that took place almost uninterrupted, 1689-1713. Textiles dominated, averaging 65% of British exports to Africa 1699-1720, with Iron being the single-largest traded commodity, averaging 10% of exports in the same period. What Johnson fails to account hugely for however, is what constituted the ~25% of commodities dubbed ‘miscellaneous’ and ‘other goods’ which included none of the above, nor any military stores (themselves accounting for around 2% of the export trade).189 Many of these consisted of the non-commercial goods listen in

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the section above on the Company’s forts and factories on the West African coast. Others, of wide-reaching global origin are further mentioned in the section above.

One central distinguishing factor that led the English to success in the West African trade was, certainly, their achievements in the cloth trade. It was a demand shared by English and West African markets, and both the domestic development of a wide range of cloths in England, as well as the vastly increasing numbers of linens shipped from the East Indies together, would greatly saturate the these West African desires, fuelling the English transatlantic slave trade. Of this much, historians are already aware. What further historical assessment can show however is that the development of the English trading to the Levant and Mediterranean was shaping the development of lighter draperies which would suit markets on the West African coast also. Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, as well as the Ottoman Empire, were emerging as the dominant markets for the Northern European textile manufacturers, receptive to their demands of lighter textiles. As Charles Wilson puts it, the English and Dutch clothiers ‘despatched an Italian industry structurally ossified’, and effectively undercut the market. Throughout the seventeenth-century there was constant Anglo-Dutch competition, yet by the end of it, “an increasing percentage of West Country serges, Norwich stuffs...shaloons and camlets found their way to the customers [in Europe] by direct routes.” These fabrics, considered by economic historians of the period to be the ‘new’ draperies of the English textile industry, were undoubtedly instrumental in carrying on the Anglo-African trade from the 1670s until the nineteenth century.

Assessments of the textile industry in England pre-dominated economic historians’ works in the twentieth century. Since the 1960s and the likes of Charles Wilson, there has been little work published on a perhaps saturated and unfashionable historical area. Consequently, there is an entire lack of acknowledgement for the African market for English textiles, both of the ‘new’ and ‘old’ draperies. Figures 17 and 18 below highlight the prevalence of the old compared with the new.

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191 Charles Wilson; ‘Cloth Production’ pp.209-221. Hoskins goes into much detail on the direct links between Exeter, Topsham and Spain and Hamburg, as well as London and numerous ports across the Mediterranean, pp.74-8.
exported to the West African coast at the turn of the eighteenth century, the former of which has been rightfully asserted by P J Thomas as being a ‘long discarded’ section of the English economy’s analysis in the eighteenth century. Subsequent defining works on the topic however, still largely ignored this issue. Wilson himself gives a somewhat fragmented account of the development of English textiles in this period. There is much discussion of Dutch competition and European rivalry which dominated foreign markets, yet his overall analysis remains somewhat misleading. Kerseys were a staple of the old drapery sorts, their production in England dating from the C13th. Similarly, the awkwardly dubbed ‘cloth/clothe’ were woollen staples that are written as such due to their indistinctive, traditional weight and texture. Says were more complex. Norwich and its surrounding towns had long been a home to English textile manufacture, once producing heavier woollens commonly associated with the England’s clothier industry. It was in the late sixteenth century that this began to change, with migration from the Low Countries particularly giving rapid industrial change to the make-up of these goods, making them lighter and cooler for southern overseas markets, by the early 1600s. Much of the same had begun to occur by the mid-seventeenth century, beginning a shift in the composition of says in some areas of England, in line with the lighter, ‘new’ draperies. Yet given the increasingly expanded definition of ‘says’ that now encompassed a wide variety of structures across the nation’s markets, those textiles which evolved in places such as Norfolk and Suffolk were recognisable by their differences. Says produced in Norfolk, by the early seventeenth century, had come to be known more as ‘Norwich stuffs’ or ‘Worsteds’. The same was true for Suffolk and Exeter. Those that continued to be known as says were largely those which continued to be produced traditionally, as thicker, heavier woollens as they had always been as ‘old’ draperies from their existence since the early 1500s. These were the traditional English woollens that were associated with the rise of the textile industry in the late medieval and renaissance eras, which began

to face pressures from migrating European textile industries to England during the French Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years War the forty years either side of 1600.197

Wilson gives broad national approach to the trade, using mostly vague terminology of ‘woollens’ frequently, giving comparative analysis to examples of European textiles such as ‘lakens’, Dutch woollen goods. Furthermore, Wilson incredulously in this topic places greater weight not on the predominance of the goods manufactured, but the areas in which they were done so. Wilson charts Ipswich’s decline as a centre of the cloth industry as a trend of the industry as a whole at the turn of the seventeenth-century. Actually, taken broadly this was the beginning of new developments in cloth and drapery manufacturing.198 Regarding extra-Europeans too, Kerridge only hints towards this in his concluding points, stating the new threat facing producers of traditional European woollens was not foreign competition. Rather, he argued, it was domestic competition producing “swift imitations” of East Indian fabrics themselves.199 Yet, this was not a new phenomenon, as imitation of European cloths had been occurring in England throughout the seventeenth century regarding Worsteds, baysadoes, serges, and others, and works as an illustration of the market developments of the early- and mid-seventeenth century. Indeed, subsequent to these too, English manufacturers busied themselves with attempts at replicating African cloths at home. In the 1740s and 1750s, repeated requests went from London to Cape Coast Castle to ship samples of ‘Ashantee and Whydah cloth’.200 When examining the Outgoings kept by the RAC, a picture of the domestic cloth trade contrary to the assertions of the twentieth century historians emerges. Taking says, kersies and ‘cloth’/’clothe’ registered in the Outgoings as ‘old’ draperies, against perpetts, bays, serges, stuffs and Worsteds, there were clearly comparable amounts of old and new draperies being exported to West Africa 1702-1712. As can be seen in Figure 17 below, the percentage of old draperies only once dips below 27%, and averages at 37.5% of all English textiles exported. It was hardly insignificant.

199 Ibid. p.70.
200 J. K. Flynn; Asante and its Neighbours, 1700-1807 (London, 1971) pp.11-12
Table illustrating the percentage of draperies, old and new, amongst the voyages to West Africa per annum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Total number of Voyages containing draperies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1702</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1705</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1707</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1708</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1709</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>1711</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1712</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Fig. 17 – Table illustrating the percentage of draperies, old and new, amongst the voyages to West Africa per annum)

(Fig. 18 – Percentage of draperies, old and new, amongst the voyages to West Africa per annum. Old Draperies featured; says, kersies, English clothe. New Draperies featured; perpetts, Worsted, bays, serges, stuffs.)
It is certain that “at the end of the seventeenth century woollen textiles were still overwhelmingly the most important of the export commodities produced by England herself” despite a nudging increase of the variation of goods interacting in English markets. Declining from 90 per cent of London’s export market in 1640 to 72.6 percent in 1699-1701, textiles remained the central ingredient to a healthy English export trade – and yet, unsurprisingly, the focus is unmistakably Eurocentric. Clay does give focus to West Africa, and it is the Northern coast which demands his interest – noting that the Levant Company shipments “more than doubled to an average 13,762 a year by 1666-72 and rose further to 20,075 by 1673-7, a level which was more or less maintained...until the early eighteenth century.”

Whilst venturing further, from Anatolia to Persia, the focus is never stretched beyond a Mediterranean setting or much further than a European theatre of trade. In the information presented in the Outgoings as noted by the RAC, there is a distinctly untypical market share of draperies old, new and foreign between 1702 and 1712. Yearly analysis seen in figures 17 and 18, shows how significant the various West African markets had been to the textile manufacturers of the ‘old’ draperies of England. The West African markets, with their seemingly insatiable appetite for varieties of commodities and textiles, created for a short time at the turn of the eighteenth century, a surge in the production of merchandize that even modern historians had marked as in perpetual decline due to its lack of interest in the European trading theatre. Whilst the likes of Wilson and Kerridge asserted that the old draperies had “made way for serges and perpetuanas” in a trade which was dominated by interaction with Europe, it was very much the case that these manufacturers were looking to the extra-European markets for their livelihood. As the Outgoings make clear, the commodities that produced the ‘old’ draperies had not disseminated, nor had they all been forced to develop their manufacturers along the lines of ‘new’ draperies. This was where the effects of the Anglo-African trade at the turn of the eighteenth century ran deepest in textile communities in Britain. Stanley Chapman’s concept of a ‘widening circle of customers’ that occurred in the mid-eighteenth century was occurring much earlier on the West African coast.

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202 Wilson; Cloth Production p.211.
203 Chapman; British Marketing Enterprise p.205.
losing trade amongst conventional and traditional markets as these shifted, as were those whom were already moving their focus to market demands further south in Europe and Africa. These demographics were some of those met with the blossoming possibilities of the Anglo-African trade of which the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa in 1698 was its strongest catalyst.

Furthering this, Mitchell applies Chapman’s arguments of the ‘widening circles of customers’ to the African coast with the RAC developing distant markets whilst relying on British clothiers to assume the direction of manufacturing. This approach is certainly accurate, yet lacking in incorporating the far greater role played by the separate traders in this process. Increasingly in the 1690s, the RAC suffered great political opposition from lobbies of clothiers and dyers, with overwhelming support for the separate traders from the clothiers all over the country. Manufacturers from Berkshire, Devon, Essex, Gloucester, Norwich, Somerset, Southwark, Suffolk, Wiltshire, and Yorkshire all took part in lobbying against the RAC due to the Company’s control over textile exports. This control itself in many ways worked against the company’s favour commercially on the African coast, and in Britain only provided fringe support from the weaving lobbies of Witney, Shrewsbury and Kidderminster. The Company’s support may have been concentrated in only a few regions across the country, but the wealth delivered to the clothiers, manufacturers and dyers of those communities was in great proportions. Indeed, from Exeter and the surrounding towns of Devonshire, the RAC sold roughly £10,000 of serges – a woollen fabric originating from the fifteenth century – on the African coast every year until approximately 1705, making it by Johnson’s estimates more than 10% of the entire export trade to West Africa.

Matching this, the accounts of both Mitchell and Pettigrew give a good basis of the Company’s supporters in the textile industries, although they are perhaps a little thin. Given the focus of the RAC in the metropolitan too, there grew in the early-1700s small, focussed support from “the Dyers, Packers, Setters, Drawers, and Calendars, inhabiting in and about London” that had, they declared, “been very much supported by the working, and fitting for Sale, the Woollen Manufactures,204

205 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt pp.57-8.
206 Mitchell; Cloth Towns p.3.
usually exported in great Quantities by the Royal African Company.”207 Similarly, modest support for the Company grew amongst the “Weavers, Tuckers and other Artificers, belonging to the manufacturing of Perpetuanoes for Africa” in Exeter.208 Makers of Cottons, Serges and other Woollen textiles nationally were affected by the decline of the Company’s fortunes by 1708-9, all echoing that their “Trade is...in danger of being lost to the Nation, to the Ruin of the Petitioners”.209 Whilst the RAC may have ultimately been defeated by their separate trader opponents, the Company had developed strong commercial relationships with manufacturers in many regions of Great Britain whom now depended almost exclusively on the company’s success in Africa.210 In this respect, the demands of the West African merchants and populations directly affected both the metropolitan and regional economies up and down England. Although scholars have repeatedly stressed the significance of the integrated Atlantic economy by the early eighteenth century, this has yet to have been done with the English and West African markets for the turn of the eighteenth century.211 Inikori’s assessments come closest, stating that “the assessment of the role of Africans is based, therefore, on their contribution to the growth of England’s international trade.” Impacting especially on the regions dominated by textile manufacture such as East Anglia, the West Country, West Midlands and Lancashire, Inikori nevertheless states this beginning in the period 1760-1780. As such, the Outgoings clearly provide evidence of these deep connections between England and West Africa over half a century earlier.212 For the textile industry of England, dominating English exports globally, historiography has been typically dismissive of this crucial West African market, providing, as Hoskins asserted, an “insignificant fraction” of export markets in 1700.213 This was clearly not the case.


210 Mitchell; Cloth Towns p.3.


212 Inikori; Africans pp. Xvii, 182.

With this in mind, it is worth analysing that amongst these pro-Company pamphlets the lobbies were signatory to, were by and large not penned by themselves, but by the RAC’s secretary John Pery, as well as the Deputy Governor Thomas Pindar. Indeed, it appeared often enough that the weavers, workers and dyers operating with the RAC were less than forthcoming with their political support. The strong commercial relationships established by the Company with regional and metropolitan textile manufacturers, dyers and weavers was one of political allegiance, but of necessity through the livelihoods the Anglo-African trade conducted, controlled in these areas by the RAC. There was a very real apprehension amongst Company agents that they would be met with “opposition in procuring Trades mens hands” to sign pro-Company petitions by their textile manufacturers. 214 Significant levels of scaremongering were present in the Company’s coercive attempts to garner support, with relatively unfurnished claims that the Dutch would certainly “promote their owne manufactures for their own advantage” if the RAC was not fully supported. 215 Even administrative and executive powers in the towns with strong commercial links to the Royal African Company were reluctant to lend their support politically, including the Mayor of Exeter. 216 Despite apparent Company support being submitted to Parliament, by 1709 there were clear leanings towards the separate traders once the RAC began struggling financially, something which was heavily discouraged by the Company. 217 This was unsurprising, as the levels of total commerce, let alone perpetts and textiles from Exeter, had slipped into relative obscurity against the competition of the separate traders. As the Company’s Outgoings showed, for the entireties of 1708 and 1709 – the last years of RAC commercial activity recorded – there were only five voyages conducted by the Company to West Africa, two of which contained predominantly non-commercial supplies for the forts and settlements. 218

In this sense, the principle of freedom for the separate traders was a distinct commercial advantage on numerous levels. Successful merchants with a deeper understanding of the African markets held the freedom to choose from the plethora of the goods that existed in Britain, India, the

214 Mitchell; Cloth Towns pp.22-24.
215 T 70/44; Correspondence of John Pery to Matthew Barrett, 13th July, 1708.
216 T 70/44; Correspondence of John Pery to Matthew Barrett, 8th January, 1709.
217 T 70/44; Correspondence of John Pery to Matthew Barrett, 28th February, 1709.
218 T 70/1199; Outgoings of the Royal African Company.
Americas and Europe not nearly as readily accessed by the Royal African Company. Indeed within the RAC, the Committee of Goods held its own monopoly on the direction of the Company commercially, holding the lion’s share of decisions on the process of purchasing textiles, metals, munitions and all other commodities purchased by the Company merchants. Although setting high standards of work, the Committee’s narrow commercial scope could hardly satiate the increasingly diverse and ever-changing demands of the complex West African coast. Focussing on specific commodities had political implications, providing few strong voices to lobby on their behalf as well as hindering practical operations on the African coast. These self-imposed restrictions were not the only problem the Committee created for themselves; their monopoly on the trade before 1698 led to the penalising of these manufacturers whom were thought to be cooperating with separate traders. Indeed, on numerous occasions in the 1680s and 1690s, textile workers and dyers were prohibited from Company contracts due to “being concerned in Interloping to Gyney.” After The Act to Settle the Trade to Africa, the Company was finding interloping incredibly difficult to tackle not just in Africa and at sea, but amongst those who provided their export commodities in Britain. Many of these individuals barred from working for the Company for this reason, such as George Peck in 1695, were soon reinstated due to their experience in manufacturing or dyeing, befitting of the demanding African markets. This, combined with the pressure the Committee placed on the workers for producing commodities of the best quality, alienated some whom were provided business by the Company and thus rescinded chances of political backing in the Anglo-African trade debates.

Fundamentally, the Anglo-African commercial relationship was one which impacted not only on West Africa, as has been commonly asserted, but on English manufacturing markets which in turn affected political discourse. Where the separate traders argued for freedom, it undoubtedly benefited them in the practical application of trade. With the demands of African markets being so globally reaching, the separate traders had the liberty of choice in their wares. The RAC had no such luxury. This restrictive approach by the Company was to impact on its political development, contributing to

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219 For the Minutes of the Committee of Goods between 1695 and 1720, see T 70/129 and T 70/130.
220 Mitchell; Cloth Towns p.20.
221 T 70/128, 123v; Minutes of the Committee of Goods, 10th September, 1695.
222 Mitchell; Cloth Towns p.21.
only the small pockets of political support it received from the regions of England. Additionally, the impact West Africa had on English economic development at the turn of the eighteenth century was to encourage the production of many waning textile markets within England itself. The old draperies of England were not yet dead, in a large part due to West Africa. Despite the centralised constraints of the RAC however, this was in keeping with their nature as a colonial establishment on the West African coast. As mentioned above, this was the foremost concern of Parliament regarding the 1698 Act, and one which the documents in question assist in presenting a far deeper understanding. Not only was this the prime implication of the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa, but a deeper representation of the State’s imperial and colonial ambitions.

**Forts, Factories and Settlements of the RAC: Establishing the Imperial Agenda**

It is impossible to truly understand the developments of the African trading debates without an understanding of the imperial ideology of the English (and then British) state. The monarchy’s wish to expand and control the Atlantic economy went further than regulating trade, with desires of both developing trade with the ‘cash-rich Spanish Americas’, as well as expanding English interests in Africa by establishing plantations on the coast, similar to those in the Caribbean.\(^{223}\) Even recently, colonial ambitions and the development of plantations in West Africa has been steeply overlooked by historians. Simon Newman’s work on *The Development of Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic* barely touches the work done by the crown and Company at the turn of the eighteenth century in establishing plantations in West Africa.\(^{224}\) In reality, both attaining the ‘asiento’ contract – the legal right to trade enslaved Africans to the Spanish Americas – and cultivating crops and producing commodities for sale on the West African coast were long-term goals of the state ruled by Charles II, as well as by Walpole. Indeed, although the Company may have occasionally meandered from this shared view – most notably when trying to settle its immense debt by the sale of its forts in 1697 – the RAC had parallel commitments.\(^{225}\) For establishing plantations in West Africa, it began with a desire

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\(^{223}\) Pettigrew; *Freedom’s Debt* p.22.

\(^{224}\) Newman; *New World of Labor*

\(^{225}\) Davies; *African Company* pp.76-7.
to out-strip their Dutch superiors in the Atlantic in the 1660s and 1670s, and continued under a policy
that, post 1698, legitimised the Company’s existence long after the deposition of its royal patrons.
This was met with equally long-running opposition from the American plantations, and although
documentation of the gripes of the plantations remains sporadic, there was an ever-present feeling
within the ranks of the RAC that justification was necessary. Indeed, when political dissent against the
Company was rife in the colonies at the turn of the eighteenth century, deputy governor Thomas
Pindar commissioned pamphlets to be written, published and made readily available in Nevis,
Montserrat, Jamaica, Barbados and Virginia. Writing between 1708 and 1709, Pindar attempted to
convince colonists that the Company plantations were not the issue, but, of course, the Dutch. “It is
supposed the Enemy’s to the Company may have sent to your Colonies the surnious and false
pamphlets they distributed.”^226 The Company warned,

“The Climate being proper for Sugar, Indigo, Cotton and Ginger, and the Dutch once gaining
the Possession of the Country will have the Natives under their direction...and [will] soon
make considerable Colonies there, by the multitude of hands and import to all Europe
sufficient quantities of those Goods at much lower prices, than can be afforded from the
British Plantations, none of which can be done provided there be a British Company with a
Joint Stock able to maintain an Equall Power on the Coast with them.”^227

The British Company’s continuing attempts to do the same were not unnoticed however. With these
pamphlets, the Company admitted their knowledge of the possibilities of cultivation in West Africa
and wished to maintain an ‘equal power’ with the Dutch in this respect. Yet this was continually
shrouded by the Company’s own propaganda even after 1712 when the African trade debates had all
but ceased and the trade been laid open. It remained the position of the Company that it was “disabled
from making any manner of Profit from their Lands; for they can neither raise Tobacco, nor Sugar,
nor Cotton, nor Indigo, nor any other Commodities Produced in the American Plantations.” It

^226 Thomas Pindar; Some Considerations on the Late Act of Parliament, for Settling the Trade to Africa (London, 1709).
^227 Thomas Pindar; The Falsities of the Private Traders of Africa Discover’d, and the mischiefs they occasion demonstrated
concluded quite concisely, “The African lands will produce nothing else.” Legally, these comforts to the plantations were based on little fact. From 1712, given the absence of legislative rulings by Parliament at the expiry of the 1698 Act, the RAC continued to operate very much within the parameters of its now forty-year-old charter of 1672, albeit without a monopoly of Anglo-African trade.

“The Royal African Company of England hereafter mentioned...” was in charge of the state’s interests in “setting forward and furtherance of Trade intended, in the parts aforesaid, and the incouragement of the undertakers in the discovering the Golden Mines and settling of Plantations...by one body Politick and Corporate...and...shall be persons able and capable in Law to have, take, purchase, receive, possess and enjoy Masons, Messuages, Lands, Tenements, rents, liberties, privileges and hereditaments of whatsoever kind”. The latter domestic affections outlined for the Company in 1672; the masons, lands and privileges, were representative of the development of English political society by 1712. This was no longer the case for the Company, whom were already in debt to the tune of £153,413 in 1692, rising to £301,195 by 1708. Indeed, the Hanoverian successors were so disinterested with the RAC that they chose not to pay £2000 of debts owed to the Company between 1714 and 1721. In Africa however, the remit of the RAC had remained very much the same. Trade did continue post-1712, and even boomed until the South Sea Bubble’s effects were felt in the early 1720s, with its final descent of activity in the years surrounding 1725. Efforts at creating plantation-style communities which produced commodities had continued to be examined right through the Anglo-African trade debates, and the Company’s imperial significance was to grow in the post-war settlement of 1713.

Indeed, the significance of the RAC’s monopolistic arguments were such that even the separate traders were pushing for a new, regulated company to be established for the Anglo-African trade. Those with interests in a new trade to the Spanish American colonies were beginning to do so

228 Property derived under charters and Grants (1713).
229 T 70/1505; The Charter of the Royal African Company, September (1672).
230 T/70 1199; A list of debts, book and monetary, left unpaid to the Royal African Company, (1721).
231 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.13.
too. Previously, this had been asserted amongst the plethora of arguments the pro-company lobby postulated, whereby the RAC was ideally set for “making any advantageous Contracts with the Spaniards, or Portugueze, to furnish them with Negroes in their West Indies.”232 As political developments in 1710 and 1711 gave the Tories more dominance in Parliament, these could become realistic ambitions.233 Both the crown and parliament were firmly in favour of a newly established company for engaging in trade to Spain’s American colonies by 1710, deemed so essential to the post-war settlement that would eventually be signed in 1713.234 “Uniting the Trades to Guinea, and the Spanish West-Indies” together into a single company may have been a step too far for the now powerful lobby of the separate traders, and made little economic sense to give the RAC, still crippled with debt, further economic responsibility. Despite this however, the political philosophy and imperial ideology that existed within these arguments correlated with the government’s intentions greatly. Established in 1711, the South Sea Company was responsible for managing the national debt the government had accumulated during the War of Spanish Succession (now calculated at over £9.4m), and developing commercial relations with the Spanish Americas.235 Political leanings of the new Tory government led by Harley in 1710 gave precedence to the RAC’s new role from 1713 of providing enslaved Africans to the South Sea Company. Indeed, what was considered a firm basis of established contacts across the Atlantic and a working imperial infrastructure were dominant themes of the RAC’s participation.236 This decision was influenced greatly by the African trade debates, with Defoe claiming that it was the African Company alone that “[was] capable to enter into Contracts for the supplying it, and are alone capable of performing the contracts.”237 The Tory ministry concurred, and the SSC directors agreed to work in collaboration with the RAC, it making both political and economic sense to entrust the African Company providing 4,800 enslaved Africans per year to the SSC.

233 Swingen; Competing Visions pp.186-7.
234 Thomas; The Slave Trade pp.235-6.
237 Daniel Defoe; Brief Account p.75.
238 Swingen; Competing Visions p.189.
Swingen addresses the scholarly concerns that the RAC was too pre-occupied with securing the asiento contract to make its case against the looming expiry of the Ten Percent Act in 1712. Given the multitude of pamphleteering campaigns it was engaged in the years of 1711-12, this was unlikely. Indeed, it would be more accurate to echo the sentiments of Defoe - biased as he may have been - that the separate traders’ fractured aims were more damaging to securing a bill formally opening the Anglo-African trade statutorily. 239 Not only the separate traders’ divisions, but the unity of the African Company and the political assistance of their new allies of the South Sea Company even defeated a bill for an open trade in the House of Lords. 240 Less addressed directly is the reason the African Company’s framework provided the basis of the South Sea Company’s contract and treaty with the Spanish in 1713. The influences of the RAC’s charter and imperial agenda were striking.

The Asiento, “or, Contract for Allowing the Subjects of Great Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish Americas”, was a mark of the significant victory Britain had achieved in the War of Spanish Succession. Signed by “the Catholic King” Philip V, George I, by representatives of the French Guinea Company, it allocated the formal transition of the transatlantic trading contract from French to British hands. Simply, the asiento contract was “to supply the Spanish West-Indies with Black Slaves, for the Term of Thirty Years” from 1713-1743. Indeed, “One hundred and forty four thousand Negroes, Piezas de India, of both sexes, and of all Ages, at the rate of Four thousand and eight hundred Negroes...in each of the said Thirty Years” were intended to be shipped. 241 Given the Royal African Company had only managed to transport 150,000 slaves to the American colonies in the Americas in 50 years from 1672-1722, the contract was ambitious. 242 Being settled after the decisive British victory in the War of Spanish Succession however, the trade became as much the ‘spoils of war’ as a mutual trading agreement. Indeed, a commercial arrangement it may have principally been, yet the terms of which were unmistakeably imperialistic.

239 Defoe; Present State pp.64-5.
240 Swingen; Competing Visions p.190, “The humble proposition of the Royal African Company of England & of their Creditors united with them”, 26 June 1713, BL Add MS 70165, no. 82.
242 Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.11.
Although the Royal African Company had only a year previously lost its monopoly, and the national trend on the Anglo-African trade appeared to be separating trade for the individual merchant and imperialism for the collective state, The South Sea Company attained a monopoly on the trade in enslaved Africans to the Spanish Americas. In 1713, despite the outcome of the African trade debates, the SSC was granted privileges, rights and prerogative that were unseen since the Stuart monarchies of the seventeenth century.

“Assentists”, the agreement stated, “may make use of English Ports...for the Management and Direction of this Assiento, as well as in the Ports of America, as in the Inland Places [of Spanish America]...that are to go ashore in all the Ports, where they shall be allowed to settle and regulate their Factories, as well that they may go with the greater conveniency and security, as that they may provide all things necessary for the receiving the Vessels that shall go with Negroes”

Covering the vast majority of Spanish American colonies, the act regarded the ports of Buenos Ayres, Panama and Peru as its central focus, although was not limited to these if other commercial opportunities were to arise.

“The said Assentists may Nominate, in all the Ports and Chief Places of America, Judges Conservators of this Assiento, whom they may remove and displace, and appoint others at pleasure...[with]...All Audiences, Ministers and Tribunals, Presidents, Captians Genral, Governors, Corregidores, Great A lcaldes, and other Judges and Justices whatsoever, the Vice-Roys of those Kingdoms included, being forbidden to meddle therewith” Neither was an embargo on the Company’s actions permitted legal, nor the seizure of either South Sea or Royal African Company “stock, goods or effects” (although these were not infrequent occurrences).243

As well as in the extent of their legal prerogative, the commercial procedure was decreed in much the same way of the Royal African Company in its days of monopoly. “The Ships shall be searched on

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arrival”, and if any illegal goods or contraband discovered, “they shall be Seized [and] that those who are guilty, shall be severely punished, and their Merchandizes and effects Confiscated or Burnt”. The jurisdiction of the South Sea Company’s ability to deal punishments to interlopers was one which the Royal African Company had not enjoyed since 1696, with the ruling of William v. Dockwra being:

“The King may create a corporation of merchants, and give them, by charter, an exclusive right to trade, and hold territories, within certain limits therein described”; but a clause prohibiting others to trade within the said limits, “under pain of imprisonment, and the forfeiture and loss both of their ships and good wheresoever found...and giving power to enter into, search, and seize ships and goods”, is void. 244

This was not all, with the right of constructing “Houses or Magazines” in which to be used as factories and settlements for the South Sea Company factors. Constant shipments of supply were permitted, “to keep constantly Magazines filled with Clothing, Medicines, Provisions, and other Necessaries, in all the Factories that shall be established. Effectively, British colonisation of sections of the Spanish Americas was negotiated in the Asiento Treaty, with “the Factors of this Assiento...allowed to hire such Parcels of Land as they shall think fit, in the neighbourhood of the Places where the Factories shall be established, in order to Cultivate the said Lands, and make Plantations, in which they may raise fresh Provisions for their Relief and Subsistence”.

As in the West Indies, mainland North America and West Africa, the British settlement was one of colonialism and imperialism as much as it was of commercialism; one which had modelled itself on its effectual joint-stock predecessor, the Royal African Company. This was not without the RAC’s consultation either; throughout June and July, 1713, the SSC established the ‘Committee for the Assiento’ which had repeated, direct consultation regarding the most effectual way to establish the trade. Indeed, at their very first meeting in July, the principal consideration was of “proper Places in which to Settle Factorys or Settlements and how many and what Officers at each place.” Amongst other things were company salaries, commission, operations management and other administrative

244 See Alexander Renton, ed.; The English Reports, 178 volumes (1900-1932). This section from Vol 1, pp.309-312.
tasks with which the Royal African Company was of prime place to be used as a framework. In the finalised agreement between the RAC and SSC, the operation of the collaborative trade signed upon was very much a shipment of enslaved Africans from African Company factories, settlements and plantations to those of the South Sea Company. Regardless of the progress made by the separate traders in the years of African trading debates and the deconstructing of the national monopoly, the fundamental principle establishing the Royal African Company had remained intact. It had thrived in its example, leading to the establishment of the South Sea Company. And, although by the late 1720s the memory of both joint-stocks was dominated by their ultimate decline, the imperial agenda established by the RAC continued to ascribe the British government’s relationship to Africa throughout the eighteenth and into the nineteenth centuries. The RAC as a colonial proprietor and producer, as much as a commercial venture, was cemented in its most turbulent times of the 1690s by the ruling of the 1698 Act to Settle the Trade to Africa. The Act’s legislation of all merchants to pay ten per cent duties, with the intent to “better...enable the said Royall African Company their Successors and Assigns to maintain the said Castles and Forts”, carried through the debates for two decades so, in 1712, these opinions had only been solidified.

“That the Forts and Trade are inseparable; That the Trade without the Forts could never be gained, nor can now be maintain’d And the Forts without the Trade, had never been thought of, much less had been built or preserved at such a vast Expence, as has been laid out upon them.” The Company, as “purchasers” of the forts, were “at the hazard of Losing the whole [of] the Adventure” if they were sacrificed.

It was not simply through the asiento trade and the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht that the Royal African Company still held significance. Since the escalation of the African trade debates at the end of the seventeenth century, the Company looked to re-energise its possessions on the African

245 ‘Minutes of the Court of Directors for The South Sea Company’ (1713). In Donnan; Documents...Volume 2, pp.154-157.
246 T 70/38; Contract Between the South Sea Company and the Royal African Company (1713).
248 An Explanation of the African Company’s Property in the Sole Trade to Africa, “Making their right Equal with any Subject’s Rights to his Freehold. Do unto the Company and their Property as you would have others do unto you, and your Estates” (London, 1712) In, Elizabeth Donnan;...Volume II p.149.
coast. Crippled, captured or destroyed in the War of the League of Augsburg, it was difficult for the Company to justify both the Anglo-African trade’s reliance on the Company’s fortifications as well as “that those Forts and Castles have been hitherto been maintain’d by the present African Company” with their supply and maintenance in relative destitution.\textsuperscript{249} It was with this mindset that the RAC began a rapid acceleration of the repair, re-supply and maintenance of the forts, as well as continuing attempts to establish Company-owned plantations in West Africa from 1699.\textsuperscript{250} Not only were active, well-maintained forts needed to persuade the governments of the early eighteenth century that the fortifications were necessary and efficient, but with the promise of a ten per cent duty, legally certified only one year previously, it gave economic credence for the Company to spend greater amounts on the fortifications after the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa.\textsuperscript{251}

“After 1699”, asserts William St Clair, “the English began an extensive rebuilding that changed its shape and appearance and greatly increase the area within the perimeter walls.”\textsuperscript{252} This decision was far more politically charged than has been previously assessed, with it being no coincidence the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was settled only one year previously. Rather, it was necessary for the forts that were accused en masse by the separate traders of being in disrepair and of no use, to be brought to their best and most profitable condition – especially with the expected funds the 1698 Act was to bring in.\textsuperscript{253} It was with this mind-set that Cape Coast Castle, the Company’s headquarters on the West African Coast, was transformed by 1710 with brick walls fourteen feet thick, accompanied by 74 artillery guns and containing quarters for the Agents, factors, writers, artificers and soldiers. Water tanks and granaries, vaults of rum and other spirits, a chapel and potential cells for 1,000 enslaved Africans had featured in the extension of the Castle, with many other additions being made to the English forts along the Gold Coast.\textsuperscript{254} This was matched with a vast increase in the number of Africans, both enslaved and employed, that came under the Company’s

\textsuperscript{249}Consideration Relating to the African Bill Humbly Submitted to the Honourable House of Commons (1698) Accessed in ECCO. Date Accessed: 12/04/15.
\textsuperscript{250}St Clair; Grand Slave Emporium p.38.
\textsuperscript{252}St Clair; Grand Slave Emporium p.37.
\textsuperscript{253}Phillips; A Journal, Donnan; Documents...Volume I pp.394-5.
\textsuperscript{254}Davies; African Company p.241.
authority at the turn of the century, and a greater diversification of the roles they carried out. The training of castle slaves had been formally encouraged from at least 1695, with some British artisans whom travelled to West Africa were paid extra for every castle slave they trained in their respective craft. Yet they had become so necessary to supplement the high mortality rates among Europeans that the English, Dutch and Danish companies saw West Africans’ presence in the forts and factories as essential to their maintenance and growth. The RAC, in 1702, even had the treatment and status of their slaves codified making it mandatory for all company slaves to be taught skills to enhance their value and utility, and given specific roles in the forts. Bricklayers, carpenters, smiths, armourers, coopers, stoneblowers, labourers, and even soldiers were positions taken up by West Africans in the British forts. Their significance was so great that they were to be cared and provided for when in ill health, and were even permitted freedom to marry other slaves, or, over time, even free Africans from the communities outside Company jurisdiction.

Dalby Thomas, in his tenure as the Company’s central governor of Cape Coast Castle, increased the number of castle-slaves and African workers consistently. Initially increasing the number of slaves and Castle ‘grommetoes’ in 1704, he employed them in planting corn, cotton and sugar canes in ever greater numbers. He continued to request investment from the RAC in London in the form of more enslaved Africans, subsequently requesting a further fifty Castle slaves to work in the British factories and trading posts: “Negroes male & female...would be of great use & great profit.” The Company’s factors were willing, although lacked the resources and funds to support Thomas’ vision, and chartered him with its sole responsibility. “If you could propose a proper Scheme and a fit place for the doing of it on the Gold Coast, I think people would...be induced to...employ themselves in planting indigo, tobacco, cotton and country trade.” Despite these large developments, almost no information has been put forward surrounding the actual Company shipments to the forts and settlements during this time. The Outgoings of the RAC however, provide ample information regarding not only their supply and maintenance, but also the increasing focus

256 Ibid. P.141
257 T/70 14, 1704; Thomas to RAC. Abstract of Letters received by the Company in London 31st May 1704 – October 1706.
258 T 70/52.; John Pery, Secretary to the Company, to Sir Dalby Thomas.
being made by the Company on crop cultivation, settlement expansion, and the establishing of plantations in West Africa. Even in the bleakest days of the Company’s finances in 1708-1710, the RAC’s priority placed on the colonial purpose of the forts is telling.

This was not restricted to the English Royal African Company either, as the Danish increasingly turned towards establishing a plantation society in West Africa as well. During the eighteenth century, the profits of the Danish slave trade wavered increasingly, owing in part to the lack of a substantial Danish West Indian plantation economy which had only begun to be developed after 1672, and to the fierce competition introduced by the English separate traders. In response, the Danish sought to produce goods on the Gold Coast, where their forts and factories had been under their control since the late-1650s, and establish plantations.259 Indeed, it has been asserted that in many ways the Danes led the way in establishing plantation societies on the West African coast.260 Their factories were further developed socially and culturally as well as economically, particularly after the turn of the eighteenth-century, with the first schoolhouses and protestant missionaries, alongside the cultivation of coffee and tobacco. It was even these prohibitive costs that were a definitive factor in their inaugural abolition of the slave trade.261

For the Royal African Company though, it is not difficult to see how the maintenance and supply of the fortifications was so financially crippling. Overall there were 39 voyages undertaken by the RAC on 38 individual ships, with one ship, the Freeman, sailing twice in 1703 and 1705, respectively. With 1702 and 1705 being the exceptions, every single voyage undertaken between 1702 and 1709 by the RAC, either in collaboration with separate traders or apart, contained goods intended for the maintenance of the forts and factories on the West African coast. In 1702, 5 out of the 16 voyages - 31% - contained goods of supply, and overwhelmingly construction. In 1705, this figure was 67%, or 5 out of the 9 voyages. As such, there is little need to separate the voyages into those commercial and non-commercial given that most voyages contained evidence of both collections of goods. There were a handful of voyages however, that contained exclusively factory goods, tools and

259 Georg Norregard; Danish Settlements in West Africa 1658-1850 (Boston, 1966) Translated by Sigurd Mammen pp.181-2
260Ibid. p.175
equipment, items of construction and land cultivation. Three ships sent in 1702 (Christoher, Malagata and Vulcan) as well as one sent in 1704 (Angola Frigate), one in 1706 (Nicholson) and one in 1709 (Pinder) contained far larger bulks of factory goods than the other voyages, with a far broader collection of merchandise overall. Indeed, those sailing in 1702 contained much evidence of the Company’s immediate post-1699 drive to repair, resupply and renovate the infrastructure of the forts and factories, as well as arm the garrisons that existed therein. Huge re-construction was clearly underway with 20,000 bricks being sent in August 1702 to the coast, along with tools listed together such as “26 shovels & Spades...1 Crane...bundles [of] spades and saws...graplings...grindstone..., Brickmakers...1 Primare Bucacaneere Guns, 2 Demi Culverins...drawbridge chains...ladles and sponges for Demi-Culverins... 500 ft Elm Board...1 Flatt Bottom Boat, 1 Chest Medicines, 6 Ladders...Lyneseed Oyle” as well as oares.262

The construction and renovation plans clearly had expansion in mind, with even listings of “2 Tanks, 12 Houses, 1 Warehouse” and a plethora of construction tools, as well as tools for bricklayers, coopers, carpenters and smiths. The listed ‘Houses’ and ‘Warehouse’ is done so with an almost flat-packed style of construction, ready for assembly in on the West African coast. There were in fact numerous instances within the document whereby a wide array of commodities and items were listed as, for example, “12 Tunns of Material [to] Build a Boatt”, as was done on the Tunsonberg in February, 1703. Similar assumptions can be made of both the houses and warehouses, certainly regarding the expansion the Company settlements were undergoing. Further to this, the significance of the various artisans’ tools is great, given the scale at which they were being transported. The estimated size of Cape Coast Castle being not much larger than an English manor house in the 1690s, there was little chance of manufacturing, maintenance or cultivation on any great scale.263 The enlargement process that would continue throughout the eighteenth century began at its turn however, and these shipments were likely some of the first in developing Cape Coast into its more functional and colonial settlement, complete with carpenter’s shop, smithy, stockyard, and ‘industrial area’, as

262 See Appendix 2 for a full list.
263 St Clair; Grand Slave Emporium p.35.
well as the attempted cultivation grounds.\textsuperscript{264} Nine palm trees were also sent from the Americas to stand tall in and around the castle in August, 1702 and, giving a sense of the pageantry of British agents, governors and officers in West Africa, sedan chairs were also present amongst cargoes.

Alongside the large-scale artillery ‘Guns’ sent to fortify the garrisons, hundreds of muskets, pistols, sabres, swords and blunderbusses were frequently shipped as armaments for the soldiers to use, along with tons of ammunition. Indeed, this was accompanied in August 1702 with “25 grenadier capps [and] 25 soldiers coats”, in December 1703 with a further “Case [of] Soldiers Coates and Capps” and again in April 1704 with “boxes of soldiers clothes”. These continued to be sporadically sent, along with weaponry befitting the regiment – specifically halberds and grenades – until 1709. Furthering to this were frequent listings of drums, trumpets, flags, signals and other miscellaneous military supplies. Noted on more than one occasion amongst Company cargo as well were gun parts, small quantities of wrought iron, bullet moulds, mortar pieces, hammerlocks, firelocks, “rivelle punchers”, gun carriages, gunpowder and greater quantities of smiths tools. Marion Johnson has stated that it is likely iron, when noted as ‘wrought’, was in part or in whole small armaments being shipped to the African coast.\textsuperscript{265} Coupled with the bullet moulds, serving the only purpose of ammunition manufacturing, as well as assembly parts of arms, suggests greatly that part of the aforementioned ‘industrial area’ was dedicated to the manufacturing of weaponry for use in the forts as well as for trading purposes with the local native populations. Along the lines of production, this was not all.

In 1702 and 1703, three individual cargoes listed non-specific Mills amongst their lots, with one cargo also containing some “Copper Pot[s] for Boiling Negroes”. Although the harrowing aspects of English slavery did frequently bring many lives to an abrupt and gruesome end, it was more likely, given the accompanying cargo, that this was a pot used in an attempt to establish plantations with those enslaved within the fort. This theory is made more likely by the listing of ‘chains for slaves’ alongside the pot itself – an item that was carried on all slaving ships engaging in the triangular trade,

\textsuperscript{264} A W Lawrence; Trade Forts and Castles of West Africa (Stanford, 1964) p.187.
\textsuperscript{265} Johnson; Anglo-African Trade p.9.
but was nonetheless never registered in the document, not being taxed as a commodity. Here however, given the exception of its mention, it is likely that there were to be enslaved Africans traded specifically for the establishment of this plantation. Sugar production required a boiling process, with four separate occasions of raw sugar or sugar cane recorded being sent to the African settlements in 1702, 1703 and twice in 1705. ‘Boiling Wax’ was also present with the cargoes, along with significant amounts of tallow, a commodity that served numerous contemporary purposes, but worked as a fundamental oil-substance in the refining of sugar. These were listed alongside the mills and copper pots for boiling, suggesting a strong link towards attempted production supported further by the almost entire absence of sugar from the rest of the Outgoings. Despite this, sugar was clearly very much a commodity that appealed to the sweet tooth of the European, and not the African – failing to even be mentioned in Marion Johnson’s large-scale work on the commodities of the Anglo-African trade.

Listings of further mills, this time specifically for corn, were shipped for the Company’s territories in 1705, along with instruments befitting its raising. “Bundles [of] Spades & pitchforks”, garden seeds, hoes, wheelbarrows, wheat and barley and watering pots were collectively shipped, further suggesting attempted cultivation of crops in the factories. Indeed, many West African communities had begun their own cultivation of European-imported goods as the climate allowed for. Tobacco had been produced in Senegambia since the early seventeenth century, and continued to be done so until the late eighteenth. Alongside this, mustard seeds from the Mediterranean and North Africa were shipped on occasion, suggesting Company factors believed the climate in West Africa to be sufficient to cultivate this crop themselves for exportation. Other shipments’ bulk contained food supplies and stock, with firm favourites supplied throughout the document being domestic staples such as beef, pork, butter, cheese, vinegar, cooking oil, flour, biscuits, beans and salt. Other present goods repeatedly shipped were staples of the East Indies trade, sometimes even commodities more commonly found in the Dutch East Indies, such as ginger, mace, pepper, cinnamon and other, unlisted

266 George Richardson Porter; The Nature and Properties of the Sugar Cane with Practical Directions for the Improvements of its Culture and the Manufacture of its Products (London, 1830) p.331.
267 Johnson; Anglo-African Trade. Even amongst other foodstuffs, salt and drugs, sugar was not featured by Johnson.
268 Curtin; Economic Change p.230.
‘spices’. Beer, ‘strong beer’, ‘Aqua Vitae’ – brandy – and spirits were sent in dozens of gallons for the Company factors to drink, and were contained on practically every ship sent to the African coast. Even assorted essentials for the day-to-day of the settlements were supplied numerous times a year, with the likes of candles, wax, journals, “RAC lodges”, “quoils [of] rope...grapnells...compasses, quadrants...paper...ink...tobacco pipes...tobacco ...sives...lanterns [and] woodaxes...”. Pitch and tar was increasingly sent over the period for the maintenance of not only Company ships, but now too any separate traders that were engaging in castle as well as ship trade.269

Permanent imperial settlement in Africa was the intention behind the Company’s establishment in the 1670s. Persistent attempts by the Company, encouraged by the government of the day, were made at cultivation with the likes of Petley Wyburne being appointed factor of the Company’s fort at Whydah with the sole purpose of growing and selling pepper on a mass scale. In 1705, Dalby Thomas supplied indigo seeds to English settlements hoping to profit from their growth and sale, with the desire to spread plantations along the West African coast of other such commodities too.270 From the very way the forts were designed and constructed, it was clearly and increasingly evident that the intention of the Stuart monarchs in West Africa was similar to that of the Americas. Their developments post-1699 were illustrative both of how these objectives continued with the post-1689 governments, and how the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was a catalyst for a process which had slowed given the sufferings the forts and factories had come under in the late war. With colonial settlement brought the need for supply, something which was extravagantly expensive, costing the Royal African Company £20-25,000 per year in ships alone.271 Attempts at cultivation and production at Cape Coast Castle and other such settlements began at the turn of the eighteenth century as an offset of these immense costs of supplying even the most basic foodstuffs, and accompanied years of ambition at attempting to establish plantations in West Africa through an ongoing, long-term imperial agenda. Just as the commencing of the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa in 1698 accelerated this procedure, so did its expiry in 1712. Being utterly defeated commercially, coming to terms with its

269 Davies; African Company p.240.
270 Robin Law; Slave Coast pp.197-8.
271 T 70/101; Board Papers of the African Company, detailing its annual expenditures, 14th January, 1691.
identity as a colonial entity in West Africa became manifest through the efforts of James Brydges, duke of Chandos in constructing further forts in Angola during the reconstitution of the Company in the early 1720s.\textsuperscript{272} Influenced greatly by Davenant’s words of it being “the Undoubted Advantage of this Nation to plant, raise or Produce any Commodity...in other Countries for our Ready Money”, the hopes – dashed by the end of the 1720s – of establishing further plantations of indigo, pepper and cotton in Africa were high.\textsuperscript{273} Defoe gave irate callings in his celebrated Plan of Commerce that “Great improvements...in trade...must be made by Conquest”, frustrated that there “[wa]s not the least Use made of the Land” whilst “the fruitful Soil lies waste”.\textsuperscript{274} Reflecting upon a mood of colonial venture in Africa, others began to include West Africa in assessments of England’s administered colonies.\textsuperscript{275} Indeed, with Chandos raising 15,696 new shares for the Company on this basis, it had undoubtedly transcended into a colonial venture.\textsuperscript{276}

Although barely given space in scholarly work on British imperialism in the eighteenth century, Chandos’ expedition attempts are not surprising. Despite the mere few hundred British settlers and agents that existed on the West African coast, it was nevertheless at the forefront of British colonial concerns from the Restoration of Charles II in 1660. Where the charter of the Royal African Company specifically denoted its primary concerns over “lands, tenements” and “rents” being settled in West Africa in 1672, this not only continued into the eighteenth century, but developed into desires for plantation establishment and an economy of production as well as commerce, akin to that of the North American colonies.\textsuperscript{277} Under the central authority of the Stuart monarchies, possession of the trade and possession of the coast grew to become one and the same under their central authority – the trade was after all conducted by a single royally chartered company. This was made clear from the first declaration of the Company of Royal Adventurers, the RAC’s predecessor, in the early 1660s.\textsuperscript{278} The Act of 1698 was the catalyst which severed the legal connection justifying the Company’s

\textsuperscript{272} Pettigrew; Freedom's Debt p.165.
\textsuperscript{273} Davenant; Reflections p.138.
\textsuperscript{275} Wood; Survey p.193.
\textsuperscript{276} Pettigrew; Freedom's Debt p.167.
\textsuperscript{277} The Charter of the Royal African Company p.181.
\textsuperscript{278} Declaration of the Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading to Africa, January 12, 1663, in Donnan; Documents Vol 1 pp.157-8.
ownership of the trade and allowing for its opening to independent merchants, but reinforced the Company ownership of the forts, factories and settlements that had been in possession of the Crown since the mid-seventeenth century. With this, even many of the separate traders, as we have seen, recognised the role West African forts and Cape Coast Castle played in national security, and were considered alongside the likes of North American and East Indian settlements as necessary colonial institutions.
Conclusion

The imperial significance of the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was its longest lasting. Providing the legislative assurance that the colonial role of the Royal African Company was its prime role, the act provided a forerunner for British policy in West Africa most commonly associated with the British Empire of the late nineteenth-century. Although by the mid-1720s the Royal African Company had seen its last days of real profitable trading, its basis as a central part of British colonial and imperial infrastructure was cemented in what was by most regards a hostile political environment. It was of course correct that the 1698 Act heralded a huge rise in the numbers of enslaved Africans being transported across the Atlantic. In many ways, it embodies the beginning of the British slave trade that existed on a mass-scale, rightly coming to be associated with eighteenth century commerce with an average of over 26,000 individual Africans shipped per year.\(^{279}\) By satiating the domestic demand to trade however, the 1698 Act in turn cemented the desire for a strong colonial presence in West Africa to be maintained. In many ways although the 1698 Act has come to be associated with everything the Stuart ideology was opposed to – a more open trade, deregulation of colonial control, the spread of commercial interests outside of the London metropolitan – the opposite was moreover true. Negotiating the compromise between the Royal African Company and the separate traders was not only to satisfy a broad base of calls to widen the access of trade. The state was foremost concerned with settling what it saw to be the most pressing issue regarding West Africa – its colonial presence.\(^{280}\)

Correspondingly, by settling the Anglo-African trading dispute with such a compromise, the 1698 Act fostered the consequence of more, individual compromises between the agents of the RAC and separate traders. Although not rigid Company policy, legal constraints no longer prohibited agents from working alongside not only former company agents, but former interlopers which were not above defrauding the Company of thousands of pounds, as per Robert Heysham and others.\(^{281}\)


\(^{280}\) An Act to settle the Trade to Africa p.393.

\(^{281}\) Pettigrew; Freedom’s Debt p.136.
Whereby the likes of Davenant asserted that internal competition between separate trader and Royal African Company would only have a “pernicious effect” on economic prosperity of the Anglo-African trade, what is illustrated in the Company Outgoings and Incomings far more accurately represents a trade of collaboration.\(^{282}\) This cooperation between the Royal African Company and many separate traders illustrated in the Outgoings presented a hidden mechanism of Anglo-African trade which was to make it unique, and of its own kind when observing other such trades to the East Indies or across the Atlantic.

The Act to Settle the Trade to Africa also fundamentally highlighted the pressure regional as well as metropolitan political lobbies held at the turn of the eighteenth century. If only impacting redwood dyes, the lobbying of domestic textile interests in Britain illustrated significant economic links between England and West Africa heretofore not recognised as existing until the 1760s.\(^{283}\) These lobbies in turn had been formed in interests who were not only dependent on strong bilateral commercial relationships with West African markets, but influenced greatly by the growth of East Indian textiles appearing in Britain. Illustrating the global influences of English domestic politics, these subtle changes to legislature brought about through wide-spread domestic concern, of which the lowering of redwood duties in the 1698 Act was amongst the first – were to become a growing part of eighteenth century British political decision making. Not alone in showing the fundamental connection between markets in the East and West Africa, the Outgoings’ plethora of goods and commodities that were being provided by the English merchants multiplied as a result of the 1698 Act, impacting most significantly the Eastern textiles which had severe restrictions placed on their importation to Britain. Indeed, it is this very width and depth of the effects of the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa which signify its significance. Not just the trade in enslaved Africans, but the Anglo-African relationship as a whole was fundamentally recognised by the 1698 Act, colonially and commercially, bridging not only East and West in the minds of governance in London, but the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the minds of historians.

\(^{282}\) Davenant; Reflections p.93.
\(^{283}\) Inikori; Africans p.182.
Methodological Appendix

Numerous processes were maintained in the work on the T70 documents, listed here. A dictionary of every single commodity mentioned in both tax books - 473 in total – and cross referencing these with the likes of Chaudhuri’s Trading World of Asia and The English East India Company 1660-1760 (1978), Fedorowicz’ England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century (1980), Roy’s Traditional Industrial Economy of Colonial India (1999) and a host of works defining unique and technical linens and cloths, predominantly Cumming, Cunnington & Cunnington’s The Dictionary of Fashion History (1960).

Furthermore, columns were inserted giving a checklist of those voyages which were commercial, colonial and those that suggested engagement in the slave trade using the goods contained. Shipments containing the likes of East Indian calicoes, Worsted woollen goods and bullion represented the majority of commercial voyages, whilst cargoes containing Garden seeds, ladders, culverins, flags, oars, boats and warehouses were clearly with the intention of maintaining forts and establishing factories. These, as mentioned, were not restricted to simply Company vessels as numerous independent merchants would ship on behalf of the RAC. Establishing those voyages likely engaging in the slave trade was achieved by cross referencing firstly any voyages of which a full journey is tracked from the Outgoings, departing with linens and bullion, and appearing some months later in the Incomings document with African goods. As this thesis focuses heavily on the use of data, works such as Mary Poovey; A History of the Modern Fact have been referred to in order to better grasp presenting such data.

Worth noting too, is the documentation kept alongside the spreadsheets. Cataloguing the process of both assimilating the documents with present historical practice and the alterations and modifications has been crucial. Indeed, separate documentation was kept of the updates made to the data, whether placing the dates in line with the Gregorian calendar, the standardisation of spellings of ships, merchants and commodities (as there were, expectedly, many interesting variations) and further decisions taken in the construction of the spreadsheets. Accompanying these processes was the use of developed software with the aim of presenting the data in a clear and functional manner. Plotting the

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284 See Appendix for the full list of goods.
connections between merchants and commodities, and how frequently certain goods were traded with other goods, and by certain merchants was highly useful in understanding the extent of globalisation regarding British trade. Indeed, the most commonly associated goods with Worsted linens, for example, were cottons and other domestic products. This was the case, too, for East Indian and European commodities. However this does not undermine how frequently these goods were shipped together. Indeed, by far the most frequently shipped good to Africa in these documents was Iron, which was largely sourced from Northern Europe in the early eighteenth century. Iron too, shared cargoes evenly distributed between East Indian, Domestic, American and other European goods. Using Gephi software and the like illustrates most effectively this data. The world in a boat portrayed through the data time and again. The data is then stimulated once more by geo-plotting the origins of these goods on maps of the global trading theatres, of Europe, the Indian Subcontinent and the British Isles. Detailed illustrations highlighting not only the origin but the volume of these commodities present in the documents utilises the data in a highly presentable fashion.

When assessing the number of voyages, estimations have to be made regarding how long ships remained in port. Certainly it is the case that many ships docked, unloaded over the space of a matter of days and were not again noted for some years, or, as in numerous cases, at all. However there are numerous instances, particularly noted in the Incomings of ships remaining docked for months at a time. This is judged chiefly by the destination of the ship being noted, as well as the Captain. Numerous vessels are traceable in the Slavevoyages database suggest as such, highlighting that the last entry of cargo loading is not necessarily the day of departure. Some are, for example the Betty Frigate both loading cargo for the final time and departing respectively on 27-02-1703. In many cases months at a time passed before the ship was to set sail. In other cases the date of cargo loading is subsequent to that of the recorded date of departure in the database. An example of this is Happy Return, purported to depart on 06-03-1702, with cargo loads noted in the T 70/1199 document throughout September, ending on 27-07-1702. See: http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces
## Appendix 1

List of the 46 Independent traders whom collaborated with the RAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alexander Cleeve</th>
<th>Lewis Johnson</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Anthony Journey</td>
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<td>William Frost</td>
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<td>Richard Bartholomew</td>
<td>William Grosvene</td>
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<td>Samuel Ball</td>
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<td>Matthew Johnson</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Besouth</td>
<td>George Hammond</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Evano</td>
<td>Nathaniel Johnson</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Grey</td>
<td>Richard Bond</td>
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<td>Nicholas Batch</td>
<td>Edward Parber</td>
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<td>Daniel Marm</td>
<td>Gerard Gore</td>
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<td>Thomas Ogden</td>
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<td>Peter Joye</td>
<td>John Brace</td>
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<td>Anthony Manor</td>
<td>William Singleton</td>
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<td>John Ferguson</td>
<td>Ebeneezer Wyse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joseph Moore</td>
<td>William Grosdonor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Hueber</td>
<td>John Browne</td>
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</table>
Appendix 2

List of each of the commodities featured in the Outgoings (458 in total)

Allibanes  Blew Basts
Alloes  Blood Stones
Amber  Blood Stones
Anchors  Blunderbusses
Anvill  Boiling Mill
Apothecary wares  Books
Aquavitae  Bottles
Aquavitae (Barrells)  Bottles (Wickered)
Aquavitae (Gallons)  Box Seals & Weights
Armourers Tools  Brass
Augenge Cloth  Brassierware
Axelrods  Brawles* (See bottom of spreadsheet)
Axeltrees  Bread
Bacon (Westphalia)  Breeches
Baftas  Brickmakers & Bricklayers tools
Barge, Masts, Sails  Bricks
Baskets  Bridles
Basons  Brimstone
Battery  Brittany Linnen
Baysadoes  Bugle (Barrells)
Beads  Bullet Moulds
Beads  Butchers tools
Beanes  Butt Hair
Bedding  Bread
Beds  Breeches
Beefe  Bread
Beefe Meat  Brawles* (See bottom of spreadsheet)
Beer  Brickmakers & Bricklayers tools
Bejutapauts  Britany Linnen
Bevrill Cowtails  Bugle (Barrells)
Biskett  Cannon Balls
Black Jet  Cannon Balls
Blanketts (Printed)  Calicoes

*Note: Brawles are not explicitly listed in the Outgoings. They are inferred from the context and are assumed to be a type of beverage or liquor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Item</th>
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<td>Copper pot (Boiling Negroes)</td>
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<td>Copper Rods</td>
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<td>Corax</td>
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<td>Cordage</td>
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<td>Chains for slaves</td>
<td>Coriants (Printed)</td>
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<td>Chairs</td>
<td>Cork</td>
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<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>Corn Mills</td>
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<td>Cossaes Chints</td>
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<td>Deals</td>
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<td>English Spirritt (Barrels)</td>
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<td>English Spirritt (Gallons)</td>
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<td>Compasses (Meridian)</td>
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felt
Felt Hatts
Firelocks
Fishing Nets (Cases)
Flag
Flanders Ticks
Flannel
Flat bottom boat
Flints
Flints (French)
Flower (Fiskin)
Flowers (Arlan Gowncloth)
Fringe (Wool)
Fruit
Furniture
Fusees
Fusees Works
Fustians
Gad Steel (Flemish)
Garden Hoes
Garden Seeds
Genoa Oyle
Germany Linnen
Germany Linnen (Broad)
Germany Linnen (Narrow)
Ginger
Ginghams
Glass
Glass
Glass & Earthenware
Glass Pendants
Glass Violls
Goa Conchuraleas
Goads Plain
Goads Plain (Welch)
Gowne
Grapplings
Grapnells
Great Bugle
Grenadiers Capps
Grindstones
Grogram Yarn
Grose Pipes
Grout (Bushel)
Guinea Cloth
Guinea Graines
Guinea Pepper
Guinea Stuffs
Gujarat Chints
Gujrat Cloth
Gunflints
Gungnau
Gunnal
Gunners Stores (Cask)
Gunpowder
Gunpowder (Barrells)
Guns
Gurrh
Haberdashery
Hair (Barrells)
Halberds
Half Pikes
Hand Screws
Handkerchiefs
Hard Wine
Hatchetts
Herba
Hessen Canvas
Holland Linnen
Holland Linnen (Broad)
Holland Linnen (Narrow)
Hooks
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Northern Carpets
Nutmeg
Oares
Oatmeal (Casks)
Old Sheets
Onions
Ox horns
Oyle (Florence)
Ozenbrigs
Packet Casks
Padlocks
Paintbrushes
Painters Colours
Pallampores
Panns
Pantilles
Paper
Pearl (Venice)
Peas
Pencils
Pepper
Perewigs
Perpetts
Persian Linnen
Pewter
Pewter Basons
Photaes
Photaes (Langees)
Pinheads
Pistols
Pitch (Barrel)
Plaid Linen
Plaisterers Tools
Porke
Port
Potts (Iron)
Powd Horns
Prospector Glasses
Pruning Irons
Pumps
Quadrants
Quills (Dutch)
Quilts
RAC Lodges
Raisons Solis
Rangoes
Ranters
Rivetts
Rolls, Stores & Provisions
Romalles
Rope
Rosing
Rugs
Runlett
Sabre
Saddles
Sallampores
Salt
Sannones
Sawes
Sayes
Scimitar
Scotch Troil
Sea Compasses
Seales + Stilliards
Sedan
Serges
Sermon Books
Sewing Rods
Shalbats
Ship Blocks
Ship Carriages
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<td>Surgeons Instruments</td>
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<td>Wood</td>
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<td>Writing Books</td>
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<td>Wheelbarrows</td>
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