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From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: external policy, internal purpose

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Abstract: Security strategies are important sites for narrating the EU into existence as a security actor. The unveiling of a new global strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU immediately post-Brexit could be conceived as a pledge to remain together as a Union for the purposes of contributing to global security in a particular way. This paper offers a brief stock-taking of the EU’s way of writing security from the European Security Strategy (2003) to the EU Global Strategy (2016). A concise exegesis of these documents exposes an interesting dynamic: as exercises in ordering the world, both strategic guidelines have turned out to be major exercises in ordering the self. The comparative snapshot shows the EU as increasingly anxious to prove its relevance for its own citizens, yet notably less confident about its actual convincingness as an ontological security framework for the EU’s constituent members over time.

Keywords: EU; ESS; EU Global Strategy; ontological security; identity; status-seeking
This strategy, this collective vision, can also help our Union to re-discover its identity, its soul.

Federica Mogherini

The debate on the EU’s global actorness has been marred by trimming the Union to fit theories of security and diplomacy bound by nationalist straightjackets. It has been commonplace to conclude that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU can really be a very minimalist affair, providing only a hybrid and weak agency for the EU as an autonomous security actor. Yet, one is hard-pressed to find another international actor so obsessed about its global outreach, security identity and international credibility as the EU. The EU’s security strategies are illustrative of the complex entangling of the EU’s evidently increasing aspiration to provide ontological and physical security for its citizens, along with its equally heightened sense of responsibility and at times bravado for serving as a ‘force for good’ in the world at large. Due to its peculiar structure and intricate functioning mechanisms, the EU’s efficiency and autonomy as a security actor are but limited compared to some of its well-endowed member states. Unlike NATO that was established as a defence alliance in the first place, the EU has grown into the role of a sui generis security provider. Consequently, it seems to suffer from a case of status anxiety as a security actor, all the more one with a global reach, still struggling to live up to the ideal-type state.

The academic field of EU studies has only capitalized on this propensity to perpetual tail-chasing. The amount of introspection generated by even the seemingly incremental policy moves of the EU in the field of its external action, security and defence is indeed quite extraordinary. So are the schisms in the discourse reflecting on the nature and efficiency of the EU as an actor in the world stage. For the more upbeat, the EU is a ‘postmodern’ polity, transcending the territorial state; a ‘normative/ethical power’, awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 ‘for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe’, or indeed an emerging ‘global power’. For others, it is a ‘fringe player’ in the traditional diplomatic order of states; a ‘tragic actor’, who has been ‘sleepwalking into ever deeper strategic commitments with scant strategic thought’; bound to battle with the perpetual ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap, with a security identity ‘still in its infancy’ due to its inability to forge a strategic culture before developing as a supranational federal state.

The first security strategy of the Union – the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 – is no exception. It has been vigorously commented upon and anxiously pondered about in intense expectation of a strategic review of sorts – which has materialized with Federica Mogherini’s presentation of a new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) to the European Council on 28 June 2016. The latter’s timing is evocative in its own right: drafted on the heels of the eurozone and refugee/migration crisis, and launched just days after the British decision to leave the EU, it could be read as a severe case of denial or an exemplary show-off of the EU’s ability to thrive in crisis and keep searching for its lost ‘soul’ in its midst. Why outline a set of strategic guidelines for engaging more productively with the external world if the internal turmoil has reached just another saturation point – and boiled over? Just as the ESS of 2003 was to a large degree about contributing to its own crisis management after the diplomatic debacle over the invasion of Iraq within Europe and between the EU and the US, the decision to come forward with the EUGS immediately after the Brexit vote likewise reads as an internal crisis containment exercise.
This is paradoxical considering that since the official launch of a period of strategic reflection over the contents of the EU Global Strategy the gist has been to endorse the global actoriness of the EU. Understanding grand strategy as an intention, with Jennifer Mitzen, the unveiling of a new global strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU immediately post-Brexit comes across as a forcefully stated joint commitment to contribute to global security in a particular way. Moreover, it could also be conceived as a pledge to remain together as a Union for the purposes of that goal. It creates an internal obligation to the EU as a collective body to follow through with its shared commitment to pursue security goals together, and an external one to other global stakeholders. The EUGS thus appears as a strategy of survival in a broader sense: it not only provides the guidelines for managing the security of and for the citizens of the Union, but powerfully also serves as a re-affirmation of the EU’s will to survive in the first place, to maintain its position as a relevant actor on world stage whilst living through a major legitimacy crisis in its history. Signifying proactive stance toward the political environment, the EU’s new global strategy comes across as an antipode of muddling through.

This article will not ask the ‘how efficient’-question typical of the analyses of the EU security and defence policy. It would anyway be too early to speculate on the prospects of the EUGS to heal the newest – and indeed existentially proportioned – rift that has occurred within the Union itself, facing a host of uncertainties with the UK’s decision to leave. Instead, it provides a brief stock-taking of the EU’s way of writing security over the devil’s dozen years between the ESS and EUGS through the concept of ontological security. Ontological security theorizations and applications in International Relations (IR) generally suggest that all social actors crave for ‘security as being’ besides ‘security as survival’. States, among others, accordingly seek a stable sense of self in order to realize their continuous agency. Scholars mainly diverge in their corresponding emphases on the inter-subjective (external) or intra-subjective (internal) constitution of state identity, highlighting an urge to establish routines in relations with other states or ability to uphold a consistent biographical narrative respectively.

I proceed from an assumption that the ESS and EUGS are important folios illuminating the ways the EU narrates its identity across the internal/external division. My account stretches Brent Steele’s argument on the importance of state’s ability to tell convincing stories about its self through autobiographical narratives for its ontological security to the level of the EU. Accordingly, the EU’s security strategies could be read as the Union’s published ‘autobiographies’, outlining its conception of self as a security actor of a particular kind, with particular self-identity commitments in the world. Taking a further cue from Jef Huysmans’s distinct conceptualization of ontological security, the ESS and EUGS emerge as important sites of managing the EU’s anxiety in the world of quickly multiplying ‘unknown unknowns’.

By definition, security strategies seek to repress ambiguity in an attempt to create some sort of order out of the surrounding uncertainty, or lurking chaos. The ESS and EUGS are similarly exercises in ordering the world by establishing knowledge claims about ‘how the world works’ and thus attempting to keep the fundamental dread of uncertainty at bay. The latest EU security strategy acknowledges prominently the Union’s intensified sense of insecurity arising from the growing global interdependence, ‘a world devoid of certainty, of knowing what tomorrow holds’ where the life once led ‘is being contested and changed at the same time’. This is where Huysmans’s original conceptualization of ‘security’ as a ‘thick signifier’ that defines social relations in relation to death provides an especially productive lens for analysing the EU’s concurrent striving for ‘daily security’ and ‘ontological security’.
These two potentially distinct signifying practices articulate a strategy of survival by countering objectified threats and ‘managing the limits of reflexivity [...] by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order’, correspondingly. Whereas daily security concerns the mediation of friends and enemies, ontological security pertains to ‘the general question of the political’ rather than constructing concrete enemies or enumerating specific threats. The ESS and EUGS illuminate the dual functions of major strategic vision documents of the kind in providing concrete guidelines for engaging with the world to ensure survival along with a political rationale to live at peace with oneself and to be recognized as a legitimate actor in the world arena. Accommodating these divergent aims will inevitably be practically as arduous as it is ethically thorny.

In its quest to provide comprehensive security for its citizens and be concurrently recognized as a legitimate global actor among the traditional security providers in the international system of states, the EU faces a paradox. Its efficiency as a security provider could only be increased by further federalization of the EU’s security and defence policy provisions (on top of beefing up its pertinent capabilities, of course). This would, however, only exacerbate the EU’s already severe legitimacy problem in the eyes of the people of the Union and increase their alienation from the European project. The flip side of the EU’s stepped-up efficiency and credibility as a global security actor would thus be a serious undermining of its ability to offer its citizens a commonly shared and valued ontological framework, maintaining a sense of closeness, transparency, intelligibility and ownership for the citizens of its constitutive states. The UK’s decision to leave the EU could accordingly also be read as a pained reaction to the latter’s growing ambitions to step on the heels of the state in claiming itself major status as a security provider for the EU citizens.

I suggest that the ESS and EUGS speak volumes about the EU’s identity-building aspirations and, by extension, ontological security concerns. Departing from a narrative understanding of identity, the ensuing snapshot of the ESS and EUGS charts the story the EU tells about itself and the world in 2003 and 2016. I am particularly interested in the EU’s construction of the meaning of security in its two major security strategies and the broader political work these documents do for the EU as a polity. Taking a general cue from recent advancements of the study of temporality and status-seeking behaviour in world politics, it is of interest to examine whether the EU sees itself as improving or declining as a credible security actor over time in its strategic scripts. Regarding the ESS and the EUGS as key devices of rhetorical signaling of the Union’s status-seeking as a security actor, what concrete evidence can we find from these documents about the EU’s confidence in evaluating itself as a security actor of a particular kind over time?

The European Security Strategy of 2003

The ESS, with a subtitle ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, marked the EU’s coming of age as a strategic actor, aiming to constitute and communicate its ambition to become and be recognized as one. It is the first comprehensive communication of the EU’s status aspirations as a security actor, constituting a status symbol in itself. The document displays a rather absolutist understanding of security, assuming it to be an eventually achievable state. It also showcases the EU’s explicitly transformative zeal, putting an emphasis on spreading good governance, especially rule of law and protecting human rights as well as democracy promotion more generally. Its opening accord (‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free’) celebrates Europe as a peace project, taking core credit for having reached ‘a period of
peace and stability unprecedented in European history’ *inter alia* via enlargement policy.

Its main target audience – and key contextualizing (f)actor due to the Iraq dispute that laid bare the divisions not just between the American ‘Mars’ and European ‘Venus’\(^{35}\) – is the USA whose dominant position as a military actor is duly recognized, yet also subtly criticized (‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’) in the ESS. Hence, the announcement of the EU’s intention to ‘share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’ and call for a more active pursuance of the Union’s strategic objectives. This is mainly done by establishing a clear security-development nexus, linking poverty and economic failure to political problems and violent conflicts in the world, thus enabling to capitalize on the EU’s more developed civilian capabilities, including various assistance programmes, conditionality and trade measures. However, in order for a more responsible and active EU to emerge, carrying ‘greater political weight’, the development of ‘a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’ was forcefully called for as well. To fulfill the ambition of contributing to a wider spectrum of missions and sustaining several operations simultaneously, engaging both civilian and military measures, more resources were to be dedicated for defence. The defence spending was to be used more effectively, reducing duplication of assets and improving shared intelligence between EU member states and partners. This high-flown promise remains yet to be materialized.

The ESS depicts ‘the post-Cold War environment’ as inhabited by ‘more diverse, less visible, and less predictable’ new threats, ranging from terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure and organized crime to more traditional regional conflicts. Internal and external security have thus become entangled to the degree of near-impossible distinction. Meanwhile, large-scale military aggression against any EU member state is regarded as ‘improbable’. Since this mixture of threats is dynamic, preventive engagement is regarded as key (‘threat prevention cannot start too early’). While the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is considered to be a strategic priority for Europe, security-building in the (then soon-to-be enlarged) Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean area emerges as the key regional foci of the ESS.

The catchword of the ESS is ‘effective multilateralism’ which is envisioned as providing the basis for an international order. Such a clarion call for a ‘stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’, fundamentally framed by the UN Charter, naturally bespeaks of the EU’s discomfort with the post-9/11 USA’ increasing unilateralism and bypassing of the UN Security Council, emphatically depicted as having ‘the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’. The close working together with the UN was hoped to be complemented with the EU-NATO strategic partnership in crisis management – another false promise so far.

The EU’s aspiration to become a ‘global power’ is well highlighted throughout the ESS, but the strategy fails to lay out clear policy objectives, means, and instruments.\(^{36}\) The ESS displays comprehensive ambition across Christopher Hill’s taxonomy of the EU’s possible functions (that is, a superpower, a regional pacifier, a global intervener, a mediator of conflicts, a bridge between the rich and the poor, and a joint supervisor of the world economy)\(^{37}\) and Michael Smith’s four-fold typology of roles (that is, market actor, security actor, diplomatic actor, and normative actor).\(^{38}\) Yet, the Union’s description of its attempted power projection in the world does not yet dare to rise above euphemisms. As if drafted on the principle ‘don’t mention the war’, the ESS shies away from explicitly invoking the use of force.\(^{39}\)
The strategy’s ambiguity about concrete policy deliverables was attempted to be addressed more constructively in the ESS Implementation Report (ESSIR) of 2008 which specified the role of the European Defence Agency (EDA), Battlegroups, and Civilian Response Teams. It also included several new challenges, such as climate change, cyber, energy, and maritime security into the EU’s global laundry list. A host of smaller ‘sub-strategies’, ranging from specific regional strategic frameworks to functional policy guidelines (covering areas from counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation to cyber and maritime security) followed course, along with the adoption of a more comprehensive Internal Security Strategy. This put forth a call for ‘a European security model’, underscoring the protection of rights and freedoms; commitment to cooperation and solidarity between Member States; and prioritization of prevention, anticipation, and the targeting of ‘the causes of insecurity and not just the effects’, engaging all sectors relevant to public protection and recognizing the interdependence between internal and external security. By the EU’s proliferation of ‘writing security’ and strategic verbosity, it hardly comes across as a ‘quiet superpower’ anymore.

The EU Global Strategy of 2016

The earlier optimism about the past mission of securing peace in Europe being almost entirely overtaken by the EU’s new mission of building peace around the world has been put into a sobering perspective in the EUGS. ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’ emerges ‘in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union’, when the European project itself has come under threat and its ‘purpose, even existence’ is ‘being questioned’. Keeping faith of the EU citizens in the continuous relevance of the Union, and ‘forging unity’ across institutions, states, and peoples thus emerges as the main mission of this strategy post-Brexit, in the midst of a nasty upheaval of nationalism all over Europe after the migration surge and earlier solidarity crisis related to the fiscal troubles in the eurozone. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and involvement in the Ukrainian crisis further underscore the sad realization that ‘peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given’.

No wonder that the EUGS is, in fact, very much about the home turf: strengthening the EU as a security community and making it more resilient, especially in light of the recent terrorist attacks in the European ‘homeland’ which revealed the pathetic state of the intelligence-sharing and police cooperation in the Union. The self-diagnosis presented in the EUGS also takes due notice of the recent erosion of European values within the parts of the Union itself, reminding of the interdependence between the EU’s external credibility, influence, and the Union’s own consistency in living up to its self-proclaimed democratic values. These encompass respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, justice, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination, pluralism, and respect for diversity.

Yet, caving in is not regarded as an option as the traditional appeal for an outward- and forward-looking European foreign and security policy is powerfully put forth (‘[t]he Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off existential threats’). The intertwining of internal and external security is a fact – and hence ‘our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’. In the spirit of speech act theory, a public commitment to be ‘a responsible global stakeholder’ is accordingly made, as if saying it out loud in the affirmative future clause (claiming that the EU indeed ‘will be’ one) makes it already real, or at least more probable in spe. A similar pledge – this time targeted on itself – is made about filling the mutual assistance and solidarity
clause pronounced in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 with actual substance in order to translate the commitments of the member states into action.

Compared to the tone adopted in the ESS, the understanding of security in the EUGS is more relative. Instead of a ‘secure’ Europe, a ‘stronger’ one has become the call of the day in the world described as ‘difficult, more connected, contested and complex’. Instead of previously more pronounced normative power allusions, Europe is now in the business of emanating its ‘soft power’, not least via a better handling of its strategic communications. Of course, the EU is still keen on ‘mak[ing] a positive difference in the world’, addressing the root causes of conflict and poverty and championing the indivisibility and universality of human rights. Its faith in its own ‘enduring power of attraction’ being able to stimulate transformation to the Union’s east and south is seemingly intact, although it is evident that the Ukrainian upheaval and the souring of the Arab Spring has tempered the EU’s normative self-confidence considerably. The geographical scope of the EU’s ambitions for assuming responsibility is more emphatically ‘in Europe and its surrounding regions’ now, while pursuing engagement further afield is envisioned as more ‘targeted’. This healthy dose of realism is particularly pertinent after the most capable defence contributor has decided to leave the Union, thus seriously curbing the already questionable pool of resources and capabilities the EU has at its disposal for implementing its lofty strategic visions. In general, more emphasis is put on linking visions with implementation, for example via enlargement and migration policies.

Important correctives are entered about the previously held overly optimistic stance on progressing towards a strategic partnership with Russia. The strategy clearly upholds the EU’s assertive policy line taken after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. Russia’s fall from the EU’s grace – from ‘a major factor in our security and prosperity’ in the ESS to the country the relationship with which ‘represents a key strategic challenge’ – is indeed steep. ‘Resilience’ thus also concerns the protection of the European security order that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have significantly disturbed, showing the EU’s learning curve on the encounter between ‘postmodern’ and ‘modern’ security actors.

Likewise, the naïve – if good-willed – democracy promotion and good governance perspectives towards the Union’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods are revisited and kept in check with a healthy dose of ‘principled pragmatism’ which puts an emphasis on state and societal ‘resilience’ instead. The USA and NATO continue to be the key imaginary interlocutors of the EUGS drafters: the need for a ‘more credible European defence’ (that is, upping the EU’s defence spending against the mounting criticism of the Europeans’ free-riding on the American generosity) is recognized as essential for ‘a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States’. The EU still seeks to be able to act autonomously in the field of security and defence, but is very clear about its aspiration to ‘deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronized exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions’. The UN as the framework of the multilateral system remains a core partner of the EU.

While the list of threats the EU concerns itself about keeps growing (hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change, and energy insecurity as more noteworthy additions), the emphasis on the EU’s global outreach as an environmentally conscious ‘market actor’ (cf. a ‘green actor’) is spelled out significantly better in the EUGS than its strategic predecessor. This is in line with the external perception of the EU as still more of an economic, rather than a normative, power. It now appears as an emerging ‘cyber actor’ in the EUGS as well, promising to increase its focus on cyber security while keeping a strong commitment to open and free Internet. Implicit
punches are thus delivered to Russia and China who regard security and freedom to be incompatible aims in cyberspace governance.\textsuperscript{48}

If we use the ESS and EUGS as templates for assessing the EU’s status-seeking as a security actor in the international system via writing itself into existence as one, the Union’s elaboration of detail and comprehensive reach have certainly considerably increased over time. Meanwhile, the EU’s introspection has become soberer in its self-evaluation and ranking the Union relative to other (more traditional) security actors in the world. A concise exegesis of the EU’s two security strategies exposes an interesting dynamic: as exercises in ordering the world, that is, making the world intelligible for the EU and positioning the EU in the world in turn, both strategic guidelines have turned out to be major exercises in ordering the self.

The ESS served as a strategic glue to mend the divisions within the EU over the invasion of Iraq by articulating the parameters of the EU’s common vision and security actoriness in the world. Meanwhile, the EUGS in its notably well-composed (and indeed global) scope of strategic guidelines displays growing concerns about the Union’s ability to fulfil its historical mission to maintain peace and security even in Europe. It shows the EU as increasingly anxious to prove its relevance for its own citizens, yet notably less confident about the Union’s actual convincingness as an ontological security framework for its constituent members in comparison to the earlier ESS. While the EU’s confidence in the value of its unique set of capabilities as a comprehensive security actor has apparently grown, its status concerns about its place among the traditional security providers, such as the USA and NATO, remain yet to be sorted out in practice.

**Conclusion**

This brief reading of the EU’s security strategies from the ontological security perspective has highlighted the function of the ESS and EUGS as autobiographic narrations and rhetorical anchors in claiming the EU’s status as a global actor among the peers in the international society of states and traditional security organizations. Combining Mitzen’s insightful understanding of grand strategy as collective intention bridging actor preferences and action/behaviour with Steele’s and Huysmans’s distinct applications of the ontological security concept in IR, I proposed to render the ESS and EUGS as status symbols for the EU in its quest for global actoriness in the comprehensive realm of security. The EU’s security strategies have been important sites for narrating the Union into existence as a security actor.

A snapshot of the EU’s way of writing security via selective cuts into the ESS and the EUGS enables to trace the evolution of the Union’s macro-discourse in the broad field of security from the early 2000s up until today. The EU’s journey from the ESS to the EUGS can be conceived as a way of telling stories about the EU as a specific security actor and its relations to other global stakeholders. Further studies could inquire the degree to which the EU has actually earned international recognition and respect as a global actor of a particular kind in the eyes of its significant peers in the world as well as those of its own citizens.

It is noteworthy that the EU’s notion of self as a security actor is increasingly framed as interdependent on a host of other (f)actors in its progression of writing security, that is, providing a strategic diagnosis of the world and presenting a particular story of its own agency in global affairs over time. As such, the road from the ESS to the EUGS offers a wealth of intriguing empirical material for scholars interested in the relational study of international politics.\textsuperscript{49} The increasing emphasis on relationality and inter-subjectivity is well-reflected in
the processes of drafting the respective documents. Whereas the ESS was written in a relatively tight circle, without any formal negotiations on the text in the EU institutions outside of Javier Solana’s office, the drafting process of the EUGS provides an exemplary case study of a very engaging approach whereby various think tanks in Europe and elsewhere were consulted along with the EU member states via various EU committees and networks, the Commission, and the European Parliament. It is only characteristic of the EU’s perpetual balancing between the national and transnational dynamics that the strategic reflection process and the actual drafting of the new global strategy for the Union nonetheless bear a noticeably Italian imprint (with Federica Mogherini, Nathalie Tocci, and Antonio Missiroli as the figureheads of the EUGS).

Future research, linking the examination of the EU’s strategic visions and their actual implementation, could further address the inter-subjective dimension of the EU’s ontological security aspirations, or the Union’s maintenance of its self-concept in the world in and through relations with others via various practices of routinization. This is important as similarly to states, the EU’s security actorness is constituted through shared interpretations and mutual recognition – and through putting the ideas (and identity) in action/practice, by engaging with various peace-building missions and developing specific capabilities. The proof of the EU’s security actorness eventually remains in the pudding – in the Union’s actual ability to protect its people and territory and uphold its values at home and around the globe. For now, the most recent strategic deliberation of the EU is just good for the soul – which might not be a small feat considering the current state of the Union.

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1 Federica Mogherini, Speech by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, the EUISS Annual Conference ‘Towards an EU Global Strategy–The Final Stage’, Paris, 22 April 2016.


4 The EU foreign policy has been famously described as ‘single in name, dual in policy-making method, [and] multiple in nature’, thus pointing at the occasionally uneasy coexistence of the distinct policy-making modes of intergovernmentalism and community


18 Annegret Bendiek and Markus Kaim, ‘New European Security Strategy—The


Ibid., p.64.


Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State (New York: Routledge, 2008). This is in line with Zarakol’s transhistorical account, suggesting that the state is but one, and historically not an exclusive, form of ontological security provider. See Ayşe Zarakol, ‘States and ontological security: A historical rethinking’, Cooperation and Conflict (forthcoming), DOI: 10.1177/0010836716653158, pp.1–16.


Ibid., p.245.


Margaret Somers maintains that ‘it is through narrativity that we come to know, understand and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities’. See Margaret R. Somers, ‘The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach’, Theory and Society 23 (1994), pp.605–49, p.606.

See also Wolfgang Wagner and Rosanne Anholt, ‘Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: Pragmatic, problematic, or promising?’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 37, No. 3, this issue.


46 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations (note 6).


51 Tocci, ‘The Making of the EU Global Strategy’ (note 17).