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Clinically led commissioning: past, present and future?

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Introduction

One of the key elements of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA 2012) was the transfer of responsibility for commissioning healthcare services from managerially led Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to newly established Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), led by General Practitioners (family doctors or primary care physicians, generally known as GPs). The 2010 White paper, ‘Equity and Excellence’ argued that:

Commissioning by GP consortia [now known as CCGs] will mean that the redesign of patient pathways and local services is always clinically led and based on more effective dialogue and partnership with hospital specialists. It will bring together responsibility for clinical decisions and for the financial consequences of these decisions (Department of Health, 2010, paragraph 4.4).

The document goes on to acknowledge that this approach is not wholly new, arguing that, ‘commissioning never became a real transfer of responsibility. So we will learn from the past, and offer a clear way forward for GP consortia’ (Department of Health, 2010, paragraph 4.5).

In this chapter we examine that history, and explore what can be learnt from previous attempts to involve GPs in commissioning care. We will then apply that learning to the provisions of the HSCA 2012, highlighting the correspondences and discontinuities between what we know from history and what was proposed. We will then go on to present evidence from our research on CCGs, exploring what happened in practice when CCGs were established. Finally, we will
discuss the continuing evolution of health policy in the UK in the light of both historical evidence and our current findings. Throughout this chapter, the focus is upon GP involvement in commissioning, rather than the wider concern of clinician involvement. This is because the explicit goal of the HSCA 2012 was to bring GPs back into the forefront of commissioning.

Clinically led commissioning: a brief history

This and the subsequent section draw on a comprehensive literature review carried out between 2011 and 2014 (Miller et al, 2012; Miller et al, 2015), where all the relevant references can be found. Clinical involvement in the commissioning of healthcare services started with the introduction of the quasi-market into the NHS in 1991. The function of purchasing services was separated out from their provision, with Health Authorities established as purchasing bodies, responsible for assessing population needs and purchasing care from semi-autonomous NHS Trusts. Needs assessment within Health Authorities was led by public health professionals, with managers responsible for agreeing and monitoring contracts (Flynn and Williams 1997). At the same time, GP practices were invited to take on budgets for some aspects of services, notably elective (planned) care and prescribing. This was known as GP ‘fundholding’ (GPFH), and over the next five years approximately 50% of GP practices took on GPFH. From 1991–2010, GP involvement in what came to be called ‘commissioning’ waxed and waned, with successive reorganisations increasing, diminishing and reintroducing GP involvement as governments wrestled with problems of efficiency, effectiveness and engagement.

Table 8.1 summarises the characteristics of the various GP-led commissioning initiatives.

Thus, the nature of GP involvement in commissioning has varied over time. In particular, the extent of GP involvement has oscillated between leadership (fundholding, Total Purchasing Pilots (TPPs), Primary Care Groups (PCGs), CCGs) and a more advisory role (Locality Commissioning, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), Practice-based Commissioning (PBC)). Each iteration of policy was intended to remedy the problems of what went before. Throughout this period, however, the ‘programme theories’ underpinning clinical commissioning schemes remained the same: first, that engaged GPs would be more likely to be efficient and effective purchasers of services for this patients as they would have greater knowledge of patient needs; and second that incentivised GPs would be more likely to act
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to constrain demand (Mannion 2008; Coleman et al, 2009b). In the next section we explore the evidence about how the various initiatives played out in practice.

**Clinically led commissioning: research evidence**

The largest body of evidence available focuses upon GPFH and its derivatives, including TPPs. The key research focus was on outcomes, with a tendency to focus on the easily measured – for example changes to GP prescribing. Few studies focused on how these were achieved and whether clinical engagement was an important factor,
or explored the relationship between clinical leaders and the wider body of GPs. Only a small number of studies explore the leadership positions clinicians held and the degree of influence they exerted over commissioning decisions. Even fewer studies examined the influence of GP fundholders on other bodies with which they interacted, for example the Health Authority (HA) or provider organisations.

Motivations underlying GP involvement in the various types of clinically led commissioning vary, depending upon the nature of the scheme. Common to all, however, was a belief that GPs, as frontline clinicians, bring valuable clinical and patient-specific knowledge to the table, and a desire to innovate. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the extent to which GPs felt able to innovate was a key determinant of the extent of their engagement. Where autonomy is granted and ‘success’ experienced, engagement grows, but where perceived autonomy and control is less, GPs tend to disengage. Maintaining wider clinical engagement (beyond the leaders) was agreed to be a priority, but the extent to which this was achieved varied considerably. Engagement was easier in smaller schemes but these tended to be limited in scope, while more comprehensive schemes found it more difficult to engage with a wider GP community. Engagement was, notwithstanding, time-consuming and labour intensive.

In terms of outcomes related to clinically led commissioning, the evidence is not strong. The most detailed evidence comes from GPFH and TPP, focusing on easy to measure activity such as changes in referral patterns, prescribing costs and waiting times. There is some evidence that GPFH tended to reduce the rate of growth in both prescribing costs and referral rates, although causation cannot be assumed, as those practices which took up GPFH tended to differ systematically from those which did not. Despite these caveats, however, it seems likely that responsibility for a budget tends to make practitioners think more carefully about their prescribing and referral decisions, and to focus on improving quality of care within their practices, but this does depend upon good relationships with frontline GPs, who need to feel that the commissioning body has legitimacy and that the actions they are being asked to take are reasonable. Peer review by trusted peers seems to be an important mechanism underlying this (Coleman et al, 2009b). This is easier to achieve in smaller schemes, and can be enabled by relatively modest incentive schemes (Checkland et al, 2011). There is some evidence that clinically led commissioning of various types led to the establishment of a greater range of services in the community, such as physiotherapy services, and to the development of better liaison between primary and secondary care, via, for example, ‘discharge
liaison officers’. Such services were rarely critically assessed for quality or cost-effectiveness, however, with their establishment alone often being claimed as a ‘success’. Priorities for service development tended to be based upon individuals’ areas of interest or perceived local need, rather than a more systematic assessment of needs or service gaps. Furthermore, secondary care services tended to resist attempts at disinvestment, meaning that many such ‘out of hospital’ services represented duplication rather than substitution. There is very little evidence of any clinically led commissioning schemes generating significant changes to secondary care services, although where schemes made this their main focus they were able to make some short term changes to the pattern of hospital use. There is no evidence to support the contention that clinically led commissioning of any kind led to an overall improvement in quality of care.

**HSCA 2012: what was intended to happen?**

The White Paper, ‘Equity and Excellence’ (Department of Health, 2010) was published early in the life of the new Coalition Government. Its contents were generally seen as a surprise, as the Coalition agreement had specifically ruled out any significant reorganisation of the NHS (Cabinet Office 2010). As has been discussed elsewhere in this volume, the White Paper proposed a wholesale reorganisation in which Primary Care Trusts would be abolished, with commissioning responsibilities split between newly constituted ‘Clinical Commissioning Groups’ (CCGs) and a new arms’ length body, initially known as the ‘NHS Commissioning Board’ (later renamed NHS England). CCGs would be responsible for commissioning secondary care, community and urgent/emergency services, while NHS England commissioned primary care services (including general practice, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry and so on) and specialised services. The ‘vision’ underpinning the reorganisation was of an NHS that:

- is more transparent, with clearer accountabilities for quality and results;
- gives citizens a greater say in how the NHS is run;
- is less insular and fragmented, and works much better across boundaries, including with local authorities and between hospitals and practices;
- is more efficient and dynamic, with a radically smaller national, regional and local bureaucracy; and
• is put on a more stable and sustainable footing, free from frequent and arbitrary political meddling.

(Department of Health 2010, 9)

It was argued that CCGs would ‘shift decision making as close as possible to patients’, and ‘build upon the pivotal and trusted role that primary care physicians already play’ (Department of Health 2010, 27). The document sets out the perceived shortcomings of previous clinically led commissioning initiatives, and argues that the establishment of GP-led CCGs will avoid the problems associated with these previous initiatives. Membership of a CCG was to be compulsory for all practices, and an ambitious timetable was set out with CCGs established in shadow form in 2011, taking over full responsibility in April 2013. A series of further documents set out more details about the establishment, governance and responsibilities of CCGs (Department of Health 2011a; Department of Health 2011b; Department of Health 2011c; Department of Health 2011d; Department of Health 2011e; Department of Health 2011f). It was argued that CCGs would be different from their predecessors by virtue of their status as ‘membership organisations’:

CCGs will be different from any predecessor NHS organisation. While statutory NHS bodies, they will be built on the GP practices that together make up the membership of a CCG. These member practices must decide, through developing their constitution, and within the framework of legislation, how the CCG will operate. They must ensure that they are led and governed in an open and transparent way which allows them to serve their patients and population effectively. (NHS Commissioning Board, 2012c, 4)

It was also argued that the ‘added value’ that GPs would bring to commissioning included:

• strengthened knowledge of the needs of individuals and local communities and the variation in the quality of local services, by harnessing the unique role of general practice to be in everyday contact with patients, their families, and carers;

• increased capability to lead clinical redesign and engage other clinicians based on the understanding of clinical risk and evidence of best practice;
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- better involvement and engagement of local people to adopt improved services and move from familiar but outdated services based on the focus on quality and outcomes and the trusted positions held in communities;
- improved uptake of quality based referral options across practices based on greater involvement in priority setting and redesign;
- greater focus on improving the quality of primary medical care as a key part of clinically led redesign of care systems.

(NHS Commissioning Board 2012 paragraph 3.14)

It is instructive to test these claims against what is known from research. First, GPFH, TPP and PBC were all underpinned by the idea that GPs, as frontline clinicians, understood the needs of their patients. Evidence suggests that, in practice, while they were responsive to the needs of individuals, clinicians involved in commissioning were not necessarily better than their managerial counterparts in assessing wider need (Miller et al, 2012). Second, there is little evidence from previous clinically led commissioning schemes that GPs are more capable of leading large scale service redesign than PCTs. In terms of ‘engagement of local people’, those involved with PBC had aspirations to improve public engagement, but there is little evidence of significant success (Coleman et al, 2009a). The suggestion that the ‘trusted position of GPs in the community’ would enable them to persuade the public of the need to make significant changes to services such as significantly redesigning (or even shutting) hospital services is interesting, and yet the counterargument can be made that GPs’ position in the front line might make them less likely to support radical service redesign, as they would potentially be exposed to any public anger in their day to day work. It is certainly true that evidence suggests that referral patterns can be influenced by clinician-led commissioning authorities who are perceived to have local legitimacy, and that such groups can support peer-led approaches to quality improvement, but neither of these necessarily requires the clinical commissioners to hold statutory authority.

Taken together, the evidence base underlying these claims to benefits associated with the development of CCGs would seem to be weak. On the other hand, there is clear evidence from the past that clinician engagement in commissioning is more likely to be sustained if they feel themselves to have autonomy and freedom to innovate. As statutory bodies, CCGs were established with the freedom to decide what they...
commissioned, at least in the area of secondary care and community services; the extent to which they had freedom to innovate therefore depended upon the accountability and management mechanisms established in practice.

**CCGs: what do we know?**

Since 2011 the Policy Research Unit in Commissioning and the Healthcare System (PRUComm) has undertaken three phases of research on CCGs. The first phase, from early 2011 through to December 2012, followed CCGs from their initial establishment in ‘shadow’ form, through to their preparations for ‘authorisation’ as full statutory bodies. The second phase of the study ran from April 2013 until March 2015, focusing upon the claims made by participants in the research about the ‘added value’ that GPs brought to commissioning. Research methods and results from both of these phases of the study have been published in academic papers (see above) and in a number of reports (Checkland et al, 2012, 2014; McDermott et al, 2014; Miller et al, 2012). The final phase of this research commenced in April 2015, focusing upon the devolution of additional commissioning responsibilities to CCGs. In autumn 2014, CCGs were invited to express interest in taking on responsibility for commissioning GP services. This means holding responsibility for GP practice contracts, and raises issues of conflicts of interest as GP-led organisations will be commissioning their own practices. Three ‘levels’ of involvement were offered: full delegation of responsibility; joint commissioning, with CCGs and NHSE (NHS England) working together; and ‘greater involvement’, in which CCGs would advise NHSE on aspects of primary care commissioning (NHS England, 2014b). There is a clear expectation that those CCGs which opt for a lower level of involvement will, over time, move to take on further responsibility, but no firm timescale has been set for this.

This section is an updated version of evidence previously published as a paper in the *British Journal of General Practice* (Checkland et al, 2013b). We are grateful to the journal for permission to reproduce this here.

**CCG autonomy and decision making: structures and governance**

On paper, CCGs have significantly more autonomy than any previous clinical commissioning organisations, in that they are the statutory body and will carry full budgetary responsibility. In this section
we discuss the development of CCGs structures and governance
procedures, in order to explore how far this autonomy and associated
ability to make decisions is being realised in practice.

Guidance for CCGs about structures and governance was non-
prescriptive, suggesting only that CCGs should have a ‘Governing
Body’, which is responsible for ensuring ‘that CCGs have appropriate
arrangements in place to ensure they exercise their functions effectively,
efficiently and economically and in accordance with any generally
accepted principles of good governance that are relevant to it’ (NHS
Commissioning Board, 2012c, 32), and that they should set up relevant
subcommittees as required. As a consequence, we found significant
complexity and variety associated with emerging CCG structures and
governance arrangements, with widely differing subcommittees and
groups which were referred to using a bewildering variety of names.
Terms used included: board or shadow board; executive or executive
committee; clinical commissioning committee; council of members;
forum; collaborative; locality; cluster; senate; and cabinet. Total
governing body size as reported in the survey also varied considerably,
as did membership, with some establishing a relatively small group,
dominated by GPs, while others opened membership up to a variety of
other professionals such as social service representatives and public health
specialists. Smaller groups might find decision making easier to achieve,
but at the expense of less engagement with the wider health community.

Over time, there was a developing consensus around use of the title
of ‘Governing Body’ for the main statutory body, but considerable
variety remained around the naming of other subcommittees. This
made direct comparisons difficult, as it was not always clear how far
bodies in different sites with different names corresponded to one
another. In order to overcome these difficulties, we sought to identify
groups by their functions rather than their names. Overall, we found
the following functions represented in our study sites: an overarching
‘Governing Body’, holding statutory responsibility once authorisation
was completed; a number of ‘Operational’ bodies, including a number
of different committees or workstreams; a formally constituted
operational group, often called an ‘Executive’, which undertakes day
to day management of the group’s activities; a ‘Council of Members’
(CoM), consisting of practice representatives; and ‘Locality groups’,
consisting of smaller groups of representatives from a geographical
area. Not all sites had Locality groups, and two had also convened a
wider group of clinicians, managers and representatives from outside
(for example, from the local authority or the local provider trust) to
provide more general advice.
Even when it was possible to identify separate groups at each of these
different levels, the distribution of functions in a given site was more
fluid than this typology suggests with, for example, no clear separation
between Governing Body functions and more operational work, and with
considerable time spent in meetings discussing who should be responsible
for which type of decisions. The extent of the complexity embodied in
these different groups and subcommittees is illustrated by this quotation
from a manager in one of the larger CCGs that we studied:

> Well, because we're a large CCG, if we have everybody...the
> meeting's going to be, ah, less than, um, efficient. So what I've done
> is created a proposal for two boards. One is the statutory board ... The
> governing body. And the other is more of a... subsidiary board. So
> you have the locality chairs on one subsidiary board comprised solely
> of GPs, you have a superior board – the oversight and governance
> board – comprised of some GP representatives from the lower board,
> and all those statutory appointees. [Manager, ID 60]

In addition to their complex internal governance processes, CCGs are
also externally accountable to NHS England and, more indirectly, to
the local Health and Wellbeing Board (HWB). Thus CCGs, although
they have complete budgetary control, may be significantly constrained
in their ability to make rapid decisions or act autonomously in practice.

**Engagement with members**

In a clinical commissioning organisation with decision-making power,
active engagement of GPs increases the ability to achieve goals and
to innovate, albeit at a cost of significantly increased administrative
overheads (Miller et al, 2012). In this section we examine evidence
from our study about GP engagement and involvement.

**CCG ‘ownership’**

Official guidance stressed the importance of GP engagement, explaining
that: ‘CCGs are also membership organisations, accountable to
constituent GP practices’ (NHS Commissioning Board, 2012b, 3), and
suggesting that member practices should be actively engaged with all key
decisions (NHS Commissioning Board, 2012a). This implies that CCG
members should see themselves as ‘owners’ of the CCG and of its plans.
In practice, constitutions, strategic plans and commissioning plans were
generally developed by an executive group of GPs (aided by managers),
and then submitted to the wider membership for approval. It is not yet clear how far the GP members will see themselves as ‘owning’ these plans. The smaller CCGs in our study took this seriously, working hard to try to ensure that the wider body of members ‘owned’ the agenda. In one site, this issue was revisited in almost every meeting, and Council of Members meetings were actively used to engage the members. One GP described this process:

*We also have a check and balance of the Council of Members….*

The purpose was one, to hold us to account, but also to feed us information about what’s a problem. And you saw with the Mental Health Strategy. ‘This is wrong’. People giving both specific examples and endorsing broad feelings about how it did … And then go back to the provider of that service, and say ‘This is what everybody is saying about it. What do you think you’re going to do to change it?’ So to be at that stage is actually really quite exciting because it’s almost showing how we’re going to operate in the future. [GP ID 283]

Thus, this GP saw the Governing body as being ‘held to account’ by the membership. A manager from a different site sees it slightly differently, however, as quoted below, arguing that the Council of Members had given the Executive the power to make decisions, upon which the wider membership could then comment, rather than the wider membership owning the decisions. In other words, the Executive would be required to give an account to their membership, without necessarily being accountable in a more direct sense:

*Yes, that… I suppose that really is they have given the exec team responsibility decide, you know, that direction and the plan, so your first signoff is with the exec team, but then you take it to the wider group to say this is what we’re going to take forward …. so it’s just really exposing it to the wider remit as a sort of communication exercise really, but also it’s their then chance to say you’re all barking up the wrong tree. [Manager ID 42]*

**Engaging with members**

All case study CCGs were in the process of deciding how they should engage with their members. Many different modes of communication and engagement were planned, such as circulated newsletters or briefings and intranet sites. We found three broad approaches
represented in our sites. In some (usually smaller) sites, the key task was seen as getting grassroots members to engage with strategic planning, contributing ideas and ‘owning’ the strategy. In larger groups, the problem was more often formulated in terms of the need to disseminate information down, so that grassroots members were aware of what the CCG was doing. Finally, some fell between these two extremes, seeing the strategic role as falling to the Governing Body or executive group, but wishing to see a flow of ‘frontline intelligence’ up from the grassroots, in addition to the flow of information down.

To engage with members, five out of eight of the case study sites had established geographically-based ‘locality’ groups. In four of these, the Localities form the main forum through which members engage with the CCG, with wider membership meetings infrequent. In the fifth site, there is also an active Council of Members. Respondents across all these sites expressed a desire to have ‘strong Localities’; however, it remained unclear what this meant or what a ‘strong Locality’ might do. The rationale appeared to be that ‘strong Localities’ were necessary to engage the membership, but their ongoing role in the wider organisation remained undefined and insecure. One of the key questions was how much responsibility could reasonably be delegated to Localities. In one of the larger sites it was stated categorically that Localities could not work autonomously. In another site, by contrast, Localities were given delegated authority to make significant commissioning decisions, commit specified amounts of the overall budget without Governing Body approval, and even manage contracts with their local providers. This approach generated significant local buy-in and enthusiasm; the downside was that it required a significant commitment of managerial resources at the local level.

These findings suggest that what it means to ‘engage’ grassroots’ GPs in CCGs is yet to be clearly formulated. The meaning of ‘membership’, the extent to which grassroots’ GPs are expected to ‘own’ the agenda, the purpose of ‘communication’ and the role of Locality groups all need to be more clearly defined. Furthermore, it seems that ‘engagement’ may mean different things in groups of different sizes, and that, as was seen in the Total Purchasing Pilots, larger groups may find particular difficulties, unless they are able to devolve meaningful power to their Localities.

**Commissioning activity**

Previous GP commissioners have tended to focus upon activity based upon their direct clinical experience, leading to a focus on
such matters as hospital waiting times and the provision of additional community-based services, with limited engagement with a public health approach to population health. There is most direct evidence of GP commissioner impact on prescribing, improving services in primary care, and some limited impact on slowing the rate of increase in referrals and urgent or unscheduled care.

Commissioning responsibilities

At the time of the research, emerging CCGs were working as subcommittees of their local PCT Cluster, and were beginning to take over responsibility for leading commissioning, preparing to take over full responsibility from April 2013. Unlike all previous manifestations of clinically led commissioning, CCGs have statutory responsibility for virtually the entire commissioning budget. Respondents in our case study sites were very much aware of the implications of this, and of the challenges ahead:

> There is no longer going to be a PCT to pick up the pieces. We are going to have to hold each other to account (localities and GPs) and work hard at this. Localities need to own contracts. We have to look at financial credibility...We need to be on top of things from quarter one and decided how we are going to monitor things [Extract from fieldnotes executive meeting March 2012 M30]

Some Governing Body members appeared to recognise the need to take as broad a view as possible of the commissioning task, moving away from small scale, practice-level interventions:

> for me it's really amazing to watch these clinicians leading change on a really significant scale, and it's very different to, I guess, what I thought might happen, after seeing those early stages of practice based commissioning, which were, you know, doing a little bit of dermatology in your practice, for other practices, it was very small scale. [Manager ID 204]

We also found that, in general, meetings of Locality groups and Councils of Members tended to remain more focused upon more familiar topics such as small scale interventions to improve care for long term conditions in general practice.

Engaging with public health will be important if CCGs are to move beyond such small scale practice-level change. Under the new
architecture of the NHS, responsibility for public health has moved to Local Government authorities. Our case study sites were aware of the need to work closely with public health, with, for example, some participants acknowledging the difference between ‘formal’ public health knowledge and ‘informal’ general practice knowledge about health needs. Some sites were keen to ‘embed’ public health at Governing Body level, whereas others saw it in terms of public health offering the CCG a service. Respondents in all sites expressed concerns about the ongoing relationship between CCGs and public health. In the face of this uncertainty, personal experience of working together was seen as important:

...at the moment, there's still quite a good link, historical...with the public health and the names and faces are still there, and as a consequence what we get is based on those relationships, isn't it; do we have a thorough understanding of what public health information we would want contract to be provided to us, I don't know about that, that's a difficult one. It's a relationship that, hopefully, will just continue. [GP ID 104]

Research suggests that interactions between CCGs and their public health colleagues can take a number of different forms, with some public health professionals seeing themselves as ‘co-owners’ of the CCG agenda, while others act as ‘critical friends’ or ‘service providers’ (Warwick-Giles et al, in press). The implications of these different approaches are not yet clear.

One of the key areas in which our case study CCGs told us that they felt that CCGs would add value and ‘do things differently’ from previous clinically led commissioning schemes was in the area of negotiating with providers:

We're beginning to see some successes in terms of GPs’ involvement in some of the, some of the contracting rounds, so...They actually go along to the Contracting meetings. And, you know, and giving clinical view and clinical input around some of those discussions and conversations. And that can add real value in terms, for both the providers and the commissioners, to really start driving forwards some of those tricky conversations. [Manager ID 54]

When we followed this up in phase two of our study, however, we found that, while interactions between commissioners and providers could be enhanced by the involvement of clinicians, this requires
careful orchestration, with detailed planning, proactive chairing and a selective approach as to where to focus clinicians’ attention. This is important, as GPs have limited time and are under considerable pressure. This GP highlighted the stress he was facing:

And I spent yesterday, six hours in a Joint Strategic Needs Assessment on the Health and Wellbeing Board, for which I have not been paid, and I won’t get paid. That’s why I am still catching up on my clinical work, and I came in at 7 o’clock this morning to do all my paperwork and spent till 8 o’clock last night doing that. So I spend hours and hours of unpaid work…. doing the work that needs to be done. [GP ID 218]

Research by the Kings Fund/Nuffield Trust confirms these findings, and suggests that GP involvement in CCG Governing Bodies is declining (Holder et al, 2015). Defining clearly where GPs ‘add value’ will be important if CCGs are to be sustainable.

Quality of primary care

Previous manifestations of clinically led commissioning have had some success in improving care quality in general practice. The CCGs in our study had ambition in this regard. In particular, there was ambition to undertake some kind of performance management, including performance against commissioning budgets, referral behaviour and prescribing costs. While official documents refer to ‘improving quality’ in primary care, most of our respondents were happy to talk explicitly about ‘performance management’. Box 8.1 sets out the approaches seen.

Box 8.1: Approaches to quality improvement in primary care adopted by case study sites

• Sharing of named referral performance data (all sites)
• Sharing of named prescribing performance data (all sites)
• Sharing of named data detailing performance against budgets (some sites)
• Incentive schemes designed to target and improve performance (some sites)
• Visits to individual practices to discuss performance (some sites)
• Discussions of audit data in all practice meetings (some sites)
• Creation of intranet (dashboard) where data can be shared between practices (some sites)
• Referral management centre scrutinising all GP referrals (one site)
• ‘Buddying’ poorly performing practices with those doing better for support and guidance (one site).
In all sites, performance management activities similar to these had been running under previous structures such as Practice-based Commissioning (Coleman et al, 2009b). Some respondents, however, said that they were concerned that such performance review and management would be more difficult in future as they had fewer staff to do the work; in particular, visiting practices individually is very labour intensive and may not be possible. In addition, there was some tension identified between the desire to be a ‘bottom up’ organisation led by members and the perceived need to performance-manage those members.

How these tensions play out as CCGs take over responsibility for commissioning primary care services will be an important determinant of success. CCGs must maintain the trust and support of their members, while actively managing their performance and, potentially, enforcing local contract changes. The third phase of our research will explore the experiences of CCGs as they take over these new responsibilities.

Conclusions

If the split between ‘commissioning’ and ‘providing’ services is to be maintained, it seems clear that GP involvement is important. GPs in the UK are ‘gatekeepers’ to secondary care services, and, via their registered lists, are closely in touch with the health needs of the public. How best to involve GPs, however, is a question to which successive governments have provided different answers. The HSCA 2012 sought to give GP-led organisations statutory responsibility for a significant proportion of the commissioning budget. The argument underlying the abolition of PCTs was that they were too managerially dominated and had failed to engage GPs effectively. The solution – a significant reorganisation – contained some elements that seemed in keeping with available evidence. In particular, the HSCA 2012 seemed to promise significant autonomy to CCGs, with GPs firmly in the lead. In practice, however, their room for manoeuvre has been constrained by the financial challenges affecting the NHS as a whole, and it is not yet clear the extent to which CCGs will be able to make the significant service changes necessary to meet those challenges.

Since 2014, policy has moved forward rapidly. Simon Stevens took over as Chief Executive of NHS England, and quickly published his ‘Five Year Forward View’ (FYFV) (NHS England, 2014a). This document set out the scale of the financial challenge facing the NHS, and suggested that this challenge could only be met if the NHS did
things differently. In particular, the FYFV advocates the establishment of what have come to be called ‘vanguards’ to test out new models for services. These include: Multispeciality Community Providers, bringing together providers of a variety of types of care in community settings; Primary and Acute Care Systems, vertically integrating primary and secondary care; Urgent and Emergency Care networks, bringing together providers of different types of urgent care across a geographical area; and a variety of other models focusing upon specific care settings such as care homes, community hospitals and maternity services. In addition, as discussed earlier, Simon Stevens suggested that the commissioning of primary care services would be delegated to CCGs. Taken together, these developments suggest a future for commissioning in general and CCGs in particular that will look quite different. The new models of care under development suggest a situation in which, rather than assessing needs and procuring services, commissioners set agreed outcomes and hold large providers to account for meeting them. CCGs seem to be stimulating the development of provider ‘federations’ (Welikala, 2015), in which groups of general practices work together as providers across a larger footprint, and this brings potential conflicts of interest.

How these developments will play out in the longer term is currently unclear, with many questions remaining about the status of CCGs as membership organisations, the extent to which they can hold large providers to account and their management of conflicts of interest. The direction of travel – towards a greater focus on care provision in community settings – is supported by the evidence that we have presented here from the long history of GP involvement in commissioning.

Disclaimer

The research on which this chapter is based was carried out by the Department of Health-funded Policy Research Unit in Commissioning and the Healthcare System. The views are those of the authors, not the Department of Health.

Acknowledgements

This chapter is based upon research which has been published as a series of reports, accessible via the PRUComm website (www.prucomm.ac.uk) and in academic papers (Checkland et al, 2013a; Checkland et al, 2013b; Coleman et al, 2014; Perkins et al, 2014;
Petsoulas et al, 2014; Segar et al, 2014; Coleman et al, 2015; Coleman and Glendinning, 2015; Miller et al, 2015). Part of the chapter was previously published as an article in the *British Journal of General Practice* (Checkland et al, 2013b), and we are grateful to them for permission to reproduce it here. Table 8.1 is reproduced from Miller et al (2015) with permission from the *Journal of Health Services Research and Policy*.

We would like to acknowledge with gratitude the significant contribution of the wider PRUComm research team in carrying out and writing up this research. These were complicated projects, carried out at speed, and would not have been possible without the hard work, responsiveness and intellectual engagement of the team. Andrew Wallace, Rosalind Miller, Christina Petsoulas, Dorota Osipovic, Neil Perkins, Michael Wright, Erica Gadsby and Julia Segar contributed to data collection, analysis and report writing. In addition, Stephen Harrison and Rosalind Miller co-authored the literature review, while Andrew Wallace, Julia Segar, Christina Petsoulas and Rosalind Miller co-authored the *British Journal of General Practice* paper on which this chapter draws.

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