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A Schopenhauerian Reading of Henry James's *The Portrait of a Lady* and D. H. Lawrence's *The White Peacock*

by

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ABSTRACT

My study aims to offer a Schopenhauerian reading of Henry James's *The Portrait of a Lady* and D. H. Lawrence's *The White Peacock*. Throughout the dissertation, I am driven by two goals. First, I aim to examine the selected novels by considering Schopenhauer's philosophy. Secondly, I shall investigate why characters, especially the heroines, having recognised that their marriage was basically a mistake, still remained in their tormented relationships. Why it is important to answer this question and what makes this a unique concern, especially in James's novel, is the possibility that previous studies and many other critiques have questioned the destiny of these heroines in regard to the novelists' anti-feminist tendencies or their social and personal concerns, while I believe that by using Schopenhauer's philosophy I can provide a deeper conceptualisation of the novels' ending. In so doing, in the second chapter I will describe the reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy in England, and the direct and indirect presence of his philosophy in Lawrence's and James's Works. In the third chapter, I concentrate on Schopenhauer's concept of freedom, morality and the will in James's novel. My fourth chapter considers Lawrence's philosophy of love and reveals how his philosophy differs from Schopenhauer's. Furthermore, it draws his readers' attention to the Schopenhauerian notion of the will-to-live, acknowledged in Lawrence's novel.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BM</i>	<i>On the Basic of Morality</i>
<i>CL</i>	<i>The Conscious of D. H. Lawrence</i>
<i>CLH</i>	<i>The Complete Letters of Henry James</i>
<i>CN</i>	<i>The Complete Notebooks of Henry James</i>
<i>CS</i>	<i>A Companion to Schopenhauer</i>
<i>DD</i>	<i>Daniel Deronda</i>
<i>FR</i>	<i>On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason</i>
<i>GM</i>	<i>On the Genealogy of Morality</i>
<i>GTG</i>	<i>The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad</i>
<i>GT</i>	<i>The Great Tradition</i>
<i>HJA</i>	<i>Henry James: Autobiography</i>
<i>HJ</i>	Henry James
<i>Jr.</i>	Junior
<i>LB</i>	<i>Lady Barbarina</i>
<i>LC</i>	<i>The First Lady Chatterley</i>
<i>LS</i>	<i>“Lawrence, Schopenhauer, and the Dual Nature of the Universe”</i>
<i>Mm</i>	<i>Middlemarch</i>
<i>MR</i>	<i>Manuscript Remains</i>
<i>NS</i>	<i>Notes of a Son and Brother</i>
<i>PC</i>	<i>The Princess Casamassima.</i>
<i>PL</i>	<i>The Portrait of a Lady</i>
<i>RH</i>	<i>Roderick Hudson</i>
<i>Sch.</i>	Schopenhauer
<i>SL</i>	<i>Sons and Lovers</i>
<i>SLH</i>	<i>The Selected Letters of Henry James</i>
<i>Sr.</i>	Senior
<i>TM</i>	<i>The Tragic Muse</i>
<i>WWR</i>	<i>The World as Will and Representation</i>
<i>WP</i>	<i>The White Peacock</i>

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

As a forerunner of the changing conditions in the middle and the later nineteenth century, Arthur Schopenhauer had a discernible impact on literature as well as on the actual history of academic philosophy during this age. Perhaps this is primarily due to the fact that he was concerned with the dilemmas and tragedies of real life in a religious or existential sense and not merely with intangible philosophical concepts. The purpose of this thesis is to examine critically Henry James's *The Portrait of a Lady* and D. H. Lawrence's *The White Peacock* by using Schopenhauer's philosophy of the metaphysics of love, and morality. Such an aim, though simply stated, requires a treatment of much broader issues within Schopenhauer's philosophy of the world as will, the world as representation, the will to live, and his idea on freedom and morality. It is work worth doing, for the cognition of these theories provides a vivid background to having a better understanding of Schopenhauerian themes in *The Portrait of a Lady* and *The White Peacock*.

Schopenhauer was one of the first philosophers since the days of Greek philosophy to address the subject of love and marriage. In the nineteenth century, he was among the first to contend that at its core, love is sexual instinct and its final aim is nothing less than the composition of the next generation. Furthermore, during this period several writers were occupied in describing the relationship between the sexes. Therefore, the existence of a philosophy that would criticise human nature and

the ethical points was admirable. Most of James's and Lawrence's writings rely heavily on the multi-dimensional descriptions of love and the relationship between lovers. Among their works, my study focuses on *The Portrait of a Lady* and *The White Peacock*. I first singled out *The Portrait of a Lady* for the novel offers a series of suitors who are realistic individuals and each has their own assets. Ralph Touchett, Lord Warburton and Caspar Goodwood are not easily categorised as inappropriate choices but they are all rejected by Isabel. Secondly, Isabel's return to her manipulative and callous husband at the end of the novel has been considered by previous studies as an anti-feminist scene or as James's emphasis on the sanctity of privacy. In my study, I aim to reveal a new understanding of Isabel's destiny by considering three major problems in her character, will, egoism and lack of knowledge, which as I will show all align with Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will and compassion. Using Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will, I shall reveal a new philosophical approach for criticising James's novel, Isabel's character and her return to Osmond. I will prove that there is a convergence between Henry James's thinking in this novel and Schopenhauer's thinking.

After revealing the reason for selecting James's *The Portrait of a Lady*, the main significant reason for focussing on Lawrence's *The White Peacock* in relation to Schopenhauer's philosophy is the time period in which he began to write his first novel. Lawrence read Schopenhauer's essay "Metaphysics of Love," in 1906 and in the same year he started writing his novel. From his early attitudes in writing *The White Peacock* Lawrence was significantly impressed by Schopenhauer's

philosophy. Accordingly, a Schopenhauerian approach towards this novel can play a significant role in interpreting Lawrence's first novel. Moreover, Lawrence was in search of a philosophy to assist him in creating his own psychological and philosophical framework. He was familiar with George Eliot's idea of sexual affinities and the tragic conclusions in her novels. Therefore, to avoid these tragic endings, he emulated Schopenhauer's concept of sexual oppositions in "Metaphysics of Love." Throughout my study, I will examine in great detail the development of Lawrence's idea of love and I will also reveal that his concentration in *The White Peacock* is more Schopenhauerian rather than his own philosophical theory of love.

The rationale behind choosing James's *The Portrait of a Lady* and D. H. Lawrence's *The White Peacock* is twofold. First and foremost, the socio-cultural changes that influenced literary productions in America and England in a span of thirty years reveal an important gap between the two. Historically, Henry James's allegiance to late nineteenth-century morality and ideologies predates D. H. Lawrence's departure from late-Victorian aesthetics and value systems, however, I have tried to demonstrate in which ways this temporo-spatial gap does not stand in the way of a Schopenhauerian reading of the novels. This implies that Lawrence's modernist attitude towards producing the narratives that consist with modernist stylistic does not essentially impede the casting of philosophical light on his text, because despite the diachronic distance between Lawrence and Schopenhauer, there is a noticeable thematic and ideological likeness between the two. A major theme in Schopenhauer's philosophy is the role of women, a philosophy that some feel verges

on misogynism. This issue paves the way for a reading of *The White Peacock* under the influence of Schopenhauer's controversial treatment of reproduction, marriage, and female identity. Although Lawrence and James do not belong in the same category in terms of their consideration of women, Schopenhauer's philosophical understanding of subjectivity and women functions as an associative critical instrument that make it possible to apply his concepts of human nature to the texts of both authors.

The second reason for choosing the two novels for this research is the underpinning of modernism as the literary and cultural lynchpin of Lawrence's novels. While Lawrence had implicitly challenged the Victorian verities of life and sexuality in his long prose works, James avoided the blatant representation of sexual discourse to which the American conservative society in the late nineteenth century was still sensitive. In addition, both authors pay a significant consideration to the idea of reproduction. James's *The Portrait of a Lady* treats in a profound way the themes of love, marriage and sexual selection which his strategy in some ways resembles Schopenhauer's and Darwin's philosophy of the origin of species.¹ This idea can also be considered as a constant element of Lawrence's *The White Peacock*. Indeed, after reading Schopenhauer's, Spencer's, Darwin's and Nietzsche's philosophy of species the question of origins seems to be the most common question in his first novel. From this perspective, it makes sense to apply a Schopenhauerian reading to two narratives that although being produced in different and, to some

¹ See pages 85-90 of this study.

extent, opposing contexts, enjoy textual similar potentialities for being read under a specific, critical approach. So, a transhistorical conceptualisation of Schopenhauer's ideas is central to a critical reading which demands the presumption of two historically different texts as a holistic, textual entity. This is why the matter of chronology does not affect the probing into each novel to derive the philosophical findings which align with Schopenhauer's theories.

As complex and thoroughly puzzling as the novels may appear at first reading, my purpose is to show how they share commonalities with Schopenhauer's theories: the will to live and sexual love. The most successful depictions of love in *The Portrait of a Lady* and *The White Peacock* are those in which heroines rush into a romantic and unbridled affair, and the multiple reasons that surface urging them to remain in the relationship. This persistence in keeping their relationship intact remains even after the characters realise that the primary image that they had created of their mate was terribly inaccurate and basically wrong. The question arises as to why even after such a discovery the heroines still remain in their relationship or what is the impulse that keeps them in their relationship. Many critics believe that the answer is in the legal and social status of women in the late nineteenth century. For instance, Robert White in his article "Love, Marriage, and Divorce: The Matter of Sexuality in *The Portrait of a Lady*" (1986), Alan W. Bellringer in *Henry James* (1988) and Debra MacComb in "Divorce of a Nation; or, Can Isabel Archer Resist History?" (1996) have generally overlooked the novel's treatment of divorce. In their view, Isabel's return to her husband by the end of the novel emphasises the

impossibility of divorce. In my analysis of James's and Lawrence's novels, I aim to show the significant problem of this claim and prove that, besides honouring vows, the certain obligation which forces heroines to remain in their marriage is quite independent of the social status of women in the late nineteenth century.

In the Lawrence and James chapters, I wish to reveal the possibility of Schopenhauer's philosophy in both novels as an unrecognised impulse behind the acts of heroines that urge them to remain in their matrimony and face the repercussions of their mistakes. To provide a clear direction for the readers I divide my introduction into three sections. In the two first sections, I will focus on the examination of the existing literature on the novels and draw out my argument about Schopenhauerian elements in their works. In the third part, besides revealing Schopenhauer's primary attitudes towards the concept of will, I will detail and describe his philosophy on the will to live, egoism, compassion and suffering. It is work worth doing, for the structure of *The White Peacock* and *The Portrait of a Lady*, in some cases, embodies these Schopenhauerian themes. To achieve this goal, I will develop my argument by showing how his concepts can be used to examine James's and Lawrence's selected novels.

Henry James's *The Portrait of a Lady*

In the preface of the New York Edition of *The Portrait of a Lady*, Henry James describes how he came to create his characters. James notes, "I seem to myself to have waked up one morning in possession of them ... it was as if they had simply, by

an impulse of their own floated into my pen, and all in response to my primary question: “Well, what will she *do*?” (PL 14).² “She” refers to James’s heroine, Isabel Archer. According to James, her destiny is the “primary question” of the novel. It seems that the answer of this question was unknown even to James as he let it evolve through his characters stating: “Their answer seemed to be that if I would trust them they would show me; on which, with an urgent appeal to them to make it at least as interesting as they could, I trusted them” (PL 14).

Some critics expressed their apprehension and questioned Henry James specifically with regard to his anti-feminist tendencies after he stated in his preface that he formed his character, Isabel, without knowing her destiny. Patricia Stubbs, in *Women and Fiction: Feminism and the Novel*, contends that James’s statement, “what will she do?” represents a “cold-blooded spirit of observation,” as he wonders “how his heroine will responds to the pressures he builds into her situation” (159). Stubbs’s reason for James’s anti-feminist views is Isabel’s marriage to Osmond. Stubbs argues that James’s indifferent opinion is not only restricted to Isabel Archer, but emphasises that “the scheme James usually adopts in the novels is to place a woman in an impossible situation and then to pose as a neutral observer of her actions” (Stubbs 159).

James’s handling of his female characters and his reputed anti-feminist opinions have long been condemned by the critics as well as by Stubbs. This

²James wrote this commentary in the preface of the New York Edition of *The Portrait of a Lady* twenty-five years after the novel was originally published.

criticism is explicitly in regards to the destiny that James allotted to Isabel in her decision to wed Gilbert Osmond and later her decision to return to Osmond at the novel's end. In *Henry James and the "Woman Business"* (1989), Alfred Habegger recognises the marriage and return of Isabel to Osmond as the definitive sanction of James's weakening of his female characters and preference to male supremacy:

To make Isabel marry Osmond, and then go back to him once she knows better, was to be unfair and illiberal to the memory of a free spirit. It was to insist that even the American girl, the freest woman of all, finds freedom too much of a burden, and it was to forget that any heroine worth making an ado about can be defeated only against her will. (Habegger 26)

Habegger plainly observes the consequence of Isabel's marriage to Osmond and eventual return to him as anything but random. Reasonably Isabel is merely a pawn whose movements and fate are cautiously written by an author who wills to create a heroine condemn to suffering. Habegger argues, "the basic fact is that up until his late middle age Henry James was for the most part contemptuous of women's suffrage and women's entry into the professions. An early letter of his makes a passing pejorative reference to 'free thinking young ladies'" (6); ladies, most probably akin to the vast imagination of Isabel or intellectually curious like her.

Another recent critical assumption about the preface of James's novel is Peter Rawlings's *American Theorists of the Novel: Henry James, Lionel Trilling and Wayne C. Booth* (2006). Rawlings states, "James's emphasis is on the boundless array of perspectives available to individuals, on the different impressions each

person develops of his or her world, and on the degree to which how we look at the world is a way of shaping it” (84). He claims that the very framing of *The Portrait of a Lady* is illogical especially when James states that Isabel’s destiny was unknown to him and he let it evolve through his character. In his article “Vital Illusions in *The Portrait of a Lady*” published in 2008, he highlights James’s argument in his landmark essay “The Art of Fiction” for the independence of “character” and “incident.” In this article, James believes that the plot of a novel should be subordinated to the importance of its characters. Rawlings argues that the representation of Isabel’s experience directly contradicts the New York Edition preface’s account of her development, and that it invalidates, whatever James’s intentions, the theory he considered for the plot’s subordination. He defends his assertion by referencing James’s notebook. James notes, “the idea of the whole thing is that the poor girl, who has dreamed of freedom and nobleness, who has done, as she believes a generous, natural, clear-sighted thing, finds herself ground in the very mill of the conventional” (CN 15). Considering this statement Rawlings claims that there is “no sense in the actual planning of *The Portrait of a Lady* of a character somehow floating before the author and generating in his mind the action of the novel” (Vital 71). This resembles also the dominant view of Habegger and Stubbs that the novel is above all a search for James’s anti-feminist tendencies.

As much as Habegger and Stubbs seek to represent James as an anti-feminist author, I believe that both James’s letters and *The Portrait of a Lady* indicate that there is more flexibility in his views towards women. For example, in a collection of

letters between William and his younger brother from July 1876 to February 1877, they speak about George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* and are excessive in their praise of the writer for her book which was important enough that they comment on it in numerous correspondence with one another. In a letter on 1 May 1878, Henry writes to William about a meeting with George Eliot: "The great G.E. [George Eliot] herself is both sweet and superior ... I had my turn at sitting beside her & being conversed with in a low, but most harmonious tone ... I have not fault to find with her" (CLH 113). Here, James shows himself as a man abased when in the company of Eliot. Her writings were significantly impressive and James looks very excited at his "turn at sitting" besides a woman for whom he has great admiration.

This seemingly old-fashioned search for James's misogynistic character by Habbeger, Stubbs and etc. is also criticised by Priscilla Walton, Collin Meissner and Melissa J. Ganz. Walton's *The Disruption of the Feminine in Henry James* (1992) points out that James's *The Portrait of a Lady* is the "reductio ad absurdum of nineteenth-century Realist/humanist ideology" (68). As Walton indicates, humanist beliefs aim to endorse a subject's freedom of determination while the case for female subjects is that their character is prudently constructed by a presiding patriarchy. Women are requested to "participate" in the dialogue on freedom but at the same time they are "subject to a specifically feminine discourse of irrationality, submission, and passivity" (52). By considering a similar view, Meissner devotes closer attention to the question than Walton. In *Henry James and the Language of Experience* (2004), Meissner argues that "the ideological structures which

imprisoned women within a particular subject position were also at work constructing acceptable and unacceptable modes of subjectivity for men” (88). The conventional character of a male as an income producer or professional man left little time for sensibilities more at home in artistic production. Accordingly Meissner concludes that “James recognised in Isabel’s struggle for independence the very struggle he felt characterised his own life, that her capitulation to forces which eventually beat her down was an indication of how much harder he had to fight for his own independence and recognition, within his family and his world, as an individual and an artist” (89).

It is an underlying argument of my section on “Self-awareness or Vows” in the James chapter that such misogynistic views are mistaken, and that much can be usefully said about the novel’s ending. James was more than well aware of the difficult position of women in the nineteenth century. Moreover, his sister Alice “never allowed him to be unaware, and his devotion to her in the latter years of her life shows he never forgot” (Meissner 88). It is my contention that James recognised the equality of women’s intellect rather than any belief in the inferiority of the female sex. Contrary to Priscilla Walton’s and Collin Meissner’s view, I argue that James’s novel also conveys a deep Schopenhauerian theme rather than only representing a humanist ideology.

There are also critics who contend what Henry James reveals through his characters and Isabel’s fate needs to be seen through the lens of morality. Wayne C. Booth believes that James’s tales “are never moralistic, in the sense of being

reducible to a simple code, obedience to which will produce ultimate blessing. On the other hand, they always reveal, to any careful reader, an extensive list of judgments about what constitutes defensible and indefensible human behaviour” (364). He proves his view by referring to the second edition of *The Portrait of the Lady* (1881) where James revised some images and literary figures of Gilbert Osmond in order to increase the reader’s consciousness of moral judgements. Booth argues, “how can we think that any author who would revise, for a second edition, Osmond’s view of Isabel from ‘as bright and soft as an April cloud’ to ‘as smooth to his general need of her as handled ivory to the palm,’ was not wanting to guarantee a negative judgment” (Booth 364) of Osmond as a monstrously immoral individual, especially with regard to his attitude and behaviour towards Isabel. Booth’s consideration reveals the idea that the destiny of James’s characters are unalterable. In other words, James has already guaranteed his characters’ fate, and subsequently our judgement about the characters will align with what James wants us to conclude.

One of the other recent works on James’s ethical attitudes is Robert B. Pippin’s *Henry James and Modern Moral Life* (2000). In this book, Pippin contends that the conclusion of *The Portrait of a Lady* reveals the idea that the novel has been elaborately designed to “insist on the problem of sacrifice” (30). He draws out his claim by highlighting Isabel’s fantasy of freedom. James’s heroine searches to be a free, self-sustained and self-guided individual but for Pippin her self-renunciation at the end of the novel “look[s] more like a danger in Jamesean modernity than an ideal, the experience of dependence in the modern world more like a pathology than

an acknowledgement of mutuality” (126). Pippin upholds his emphasis on modernity as a philosophical challenge, asserting that in his fiction Henry James elaborated on a complex ethical philosophy that was entirely opposed to the fanatic righteous quandaries suggested by modernity. Pippin’s final conclusion is that Isabel’s rejection of “Goodwood’s proposal turns out to be a ‘renunciation of a life that cannot be or is too frightening to be lived’ but the rejection of the fantasy of independence and will that sealed her fate in the first place” (Pippin 143).

In analysing *The Portrait of a Lady*, Pippin calls attention to Isabel’s fantasy of liberty, and even considers her final decision a renunciation of freedom, while I think this idea on its own hardly makes a convincing case because if the idea of freedom is something offered to her by society, then what is the motivation that urges her to look for such independence? In the literary framework that James creates, Isabel’s maturity depends on her acknowledgement of what she did and what she wills to do finally. Therefore, the main question should be what is the impulse behind her choice? What James may have expected his readers to comprehend about Isabel’s character? By examining Isabel’s character merely based on the idea of freedom that is offered to her by modern society, we can never come to realise the impulse behind her desire. Accordingly, I am confident in my argument that Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the world as will can provide us a framework to criticise Isabel’s character and her final decision more philosophically. One can find a good many statements which lead one rather directly and indirectly to Schopenhauerian moral terms. To this end, I will argue in the James chapter that the

most significant understanding of Isabel, a discovery of her own portrait in her husband, and her self-renunciation is certainly criticisable through Schopenhauer's philosophy.

In examining *The Portrait of a Lady*, Schopenhauer's philosophy of morality can play a significant role to interpret Isabel's return to her oppressive marriage at the novel's end because his philosophy examines the inner nature of humans that is the primary source of all manners and actions. Morality, for Schopenhauer, revolves around how one can manage to overcome self-demands for another, or in other words, how one makes the ethical shift from self-satisfaction or desire to another individual's gratification. In my analysis of *The Portrait of a Lady* I examine three significant characteristics (imagination, wilfulness and the lack of knowledge) in James's heroine that are interpretable through Schopenhauer's philosophy. For me the moral aspect of Isabel's monumental decision to return to Osmond at the end of the novel represents Schopenhauer's argument about the relationship between imagination, experience and knowledge. I will contend, in the James chapter, how each of these three qualities is essential for the heroine's moral act.

With regard to Schopenhauer's influence on James, Joseph Firebaugh's "A Schopenhauerian Novel: James's *The Princess Casamassima*" (1958), seems the only work that has undertaken the connection between James and Schopenhauer. In his essay, he argues that in writing *The Princess Casamassima* (1885-86) James's ideas become "closely parallel to the thought of a famous philosopher [Schopenhauer]" (197). He gives his readers a hint that James "granted a kind of

permission to read the book as an objectification of many Schopenhauerian ideas” (178). To prove his claim, he refers to the direct references to Schopenhauer’s name. By using those passages which convey Schopenhauer’s name but avoiding the technicalities of his thought, Firebaugh argues that James’s novel is strongly indebted to Schopenhauer’s misogyny, the concepts of art, the will to live, and the theory of life as an alternation of boredom and happiness. Firebaugh’s work suffers from two major faults: initially, it focuses almost entirely on *The Princess Casamassima* without demonstrating the socio-historical context concerning women, marriage and sexuality; and secondly, it does not discuss Schopenhauer in a technical, philosophical manner. Where my approach differs from Firebaugh’s is in its technical concentration on Schopenhauer’s philosophy in order to form a complex and dynamic interpretation of James’s Schopenhauerian views. I intend to show how Schopenhauer’s ideas may have been in James’s mind during his early writing career, long before writing *The Princess Casamassima*. Instead of presenting examples from the passages in *The Princess Casamassima* as direct evidence, I will technically interpret *The Portrait of a Lady* to evaluate James’s indebtedness to Schopenhauer. This technical interpretation provides a framework for the readers to have a different understanding of the novel’s morality. Using Schopenhauer’s philosophy to criticise James’s novel, helps us to observe James’s moral concern further than Isabel’s renunciation of freedom or guaranteed destiny.

In the James chapter, I will argue that Schopenhauer’s concepts of compassion and will, perhaps subconsciously, underlined James’s *The Portrait of a*

Lady. Nonetheless, a number of similarities between the novel and Schopenhauer's notions suggest that James may have been, in part, constructing a novel that structurally embodies Schopenhauer's treatment of egoism and the will. I will contend that the cessation of wilful activity and self-assertion of which Schopenhauer wrote are common to the characters' lives and the narrative voice in *The Portrait of a Lady*. The consequence of this discovery can help to illuminate the Schopenhauerian allusions in James's novel. In addition, there are other sources that have also been suggested for *The Portrait of a Lady*, notably George Eliot's works, but with no mention of a possible connection between this novel and Schopenhauer. I will pay close attention to the similarities between James's and Eliot's approach. In doing so, my argument reveals how James's work can be read in a manner complementing and expanding upon Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will and egoism.

D. H. Lawrence's *The White Peacock*

The *Norton Anthology of English Literature* introduces David Herbert Lawrence (1885–1930) as an author who was constantly at war “with the mechanical and artificial, with the constraints and hypocrisies that civilization imposes. Because he had new things to say and a new way of saying them, he was not easily or quickly appreciated” (2243-44). One of the things that Lawrence put considerable effort to criticise in his psychology and philosophy was the concept of love and sex. In a letter to Mrs S. A. Hopkin (Christmas day 1912), Lawrence declares, “I’ll do my life work, sticking up for the love between man and woman,” a few lines later he writes, “I

shall always be a priest of love” (172-3). He wrote this letter a few months after publishing *The White Peacock* in 1911. Among critics there are a variety of ideas regarding Lawrence’s initial motivation in writing his first novel. Mark Spilka argues in *The Love Ethic of D. H. Lawrence* that “Lawrence was a religious artist, and that all his work was governed by religious ends” (3). Spilka’s critique is based on the novel’s emphasis of the Victorian social conventions and the dogmatic Christian belief. For Lawrence’s narrator, Cyril, Christianity is unable to provide a solution for the harshness of the age: “The church ... is rotten” (149). He even compares priests to the peewits who “add their notes to the sorrow” and who are “more black than white, more grief than hope” (156). W. M. Verhoeven’s critique in “D. H. Lawrence’s Duality Concept in *The White Peacock*” (1985) echoes a different characterisation. He believes, “*The White Peacock* is clearly the product of prolonged and intensive struggle, both within Lawrence himself and in the relationship with his surroundings” (249). Verhoeven claims that Lawrence’s ideas grew out of the “moral and philosophical confines of the rural” while in spirit he was “still Victorian, mining community.”

Yet while breaking away from his background rationally, he was still firmly rooted in his Midland soil emotionally. His intense relationships with [his] mother and with Jessie Chambers, and his deep love and reverence for the natural scenery of what he called “the country of my heart” continued to retain a powerful grip on him. This dichotomy launched him into a series of moral, psychological and religious dilemmas which destroyed his faith in traditional

values and moral codes, without immediately replacing them by clearly defined new values. (249)

Adding to this, I want to argue that Lawrence in the early period was trying to develop and formulate a philosophy that would encompass a comprehensive meaning for love and marriage, and it was also during this time period (1906-1911) that he began to write his first novel. In my point of view, Lawrence's work does not merely offer his agreement or disagreement with religious or traditional values, but it consists of a philosophical consideration of love and relationship.

As Lawrence notes in "Morality and the Novel" (1925): "The novel is a perfect medium for revealing to us the changing rainbow of our living relationships" (*Hardy* 175). In this sense, Lawrence's morality in relationships articulates around equitable relationships of the sexes. His examination of relationship and love via philosophy calls for a qualitatively diverse type of analysis that I intend to argue in this thesis. The fourth chapter of my study aims to provide a richer understanding of the relationships between the sexes in Lawrence's *The White Peacock* by using Schopenhauer's "Metaphysics of Love." Such a recognition enables us to trace the idea of love and union apart from religious and traditional values concerned by Spilka and Verhoeven. My study argues the reason for the union of the sexes who were not intended to be together from the beginning of the novel, and more specifically expresses Lawrence's attitudes towards Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will to live. This also cultivates our understanding of why Lawrence in his first version of *The White Peacock* (*Leatitia*) betrothed Lettie with George while in his

later version, *Nethermere*, he no longer believed that Lettie broke off her engagement to Leslie.

D. H. Lawrence's philosophical viewpoint on love can be roughly summarised in his ideas about polarity, irrationality, spirituality, affinity and physicality. In the area of spirituality and irrationality, Eleanor H. Green, the editor of *D. H. Lawrence Review* journal, has paid more consideration to the similarities between Schopenhauer's thinking and Lawrence's. In "Schopenhauer and D. H. Lawrence on Sex and Love" (1975), Green indicates that Lawrence confidently adopted Schopenhauer's concept of the will as a true nature of beings and he accepted the will to live as the primary concern of two lovers. She states that "the difference in the basic attitude of these two men toward sex is directly related to the difference in the value they place upon life and the will to live" (338). For Schopenhauer, the will is a natural force which is irrational and "blind"; it stays apart from the intellect and it is physical since my "body and my will are one" (*WWR 1*: 101). Lawrence also had the belief that "there is an eternal hostility" between "the intellect" and "the penis" and that "life is forever torn across by the conflict between them," but he felt that "man need not sacrifice the intellect to the penis, nor the penis to the intellect" (*LC 191*) because these two, though antagonist, are still capable of compromising. Green argues that Lawrence bridges the gap between intellect and body (the will) by considering the individual's spiritual nature that "partakes of and thus reconciles the nature of both. Indeed, he makes 'some sort of fluctuating harmony' between the two the main aim of man's life, whereas for Schopenhauer the

two poles remain forever separate” (335-36). Lawrence’s episode of the gamekeeper Annable very well expresses Green’s words. Annable is a man of physical vigour and animalness, who considers reign of nature over culture. He believes that people should be “true to [their] animal instinct” (*WP*147) and considers civilisation as the “painted finger of rottenness” (146). He is also disgusted with the idea of spirituality and detests Lady Chrystabel’s “souly” nature (150). Refusing cultural and spiritual standards, he marries the spiritual Lady Chrystabel who refuses to “have children” and for Annable “that was the root of the difference at first” between them. Although later she reconsiders and becomes pregnant, their marriage proves to be “an unfortunate misalliance” (151).

Green is not alone in her criticism of Lawrence’s treatment of Annable’s character, as Robert Montgomery’s *The Visionary D. H. Lawrence* (1994) argues that the reason for Annable’s failure is his weakness to create a balance between his “physical and mental” qualities (59). Montgomery contends that Lawrence could not combine these two qualities in his character – or nature and culture – because of his “Schopenhauerian view of the mental” (59). For Schopenhauer, the will subordinates the mind and they remain forever separate. He also claims that culture or the mental categories of love and beauty are an illusion because “beauty is the adequate and suitable manifestation of the will” (*WWR I*: 224) whose only purpose is to draw the sexes together to reproduce. In this process, the reason or mind are dependent of our sensation, which “precedes the application of the understanding” (*WWR I*: 20). In his philosophy, only the will is primary, whereas intellect is secondary as the reasoning

faculty is dependent on the will. Therefore, for Schopenhauer only the will and the body with its senses are of importance, and man could benefit by lack of reason. According to Montgomery, Lawrence also adopted this Schopenhauerian inability to join reason with the human will, of which Montgomery views as the cause of Annable's tragedy: by merely adhering to his will and instinctual impulses, Annable has ignored the fundamental part of a human being, specifically his mental desire for improvement and civilisation, as "man is inescapably both physical and mental" (Montgomery 59). Sarah Rubbens in "D. H. Lawrence as a Modernist Didactic Definer of 'the Natural Man': a Confrontation of *The White Peacock*, *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, and His Later Short Stories" (2009) believes that Montgomery's assumption is not correct. She contends that Lawrence's philosophy is "entirely dedicated to the propagation of an instinctive life, completely devoid of the rationality of the mind" (68). Accordingly, she observes Annable's decline in his inability to believe in mysticism: "Living in unison with nature and the cosmos was a right choice, but Annable should have combined this with a reverence for the mysticism in the cosmos, the mystery of its beauty, instead of seeing it as pure materiality" (66). In opposition to Rubbens's view, I do not think Montgomery's examination of Annable's character is wrong. In my view, Rubbens's claim lacks a technical Schopenhauerian approach. What she states in her study about Schopenhauer relies mostly on Montgomery's findings and quotations, which brings about the idea that she was not fully aware of Schopenhauer's philosophy or the

impression that Lawrence received from him in his primary attitudes in writing *The White Peacock*.

As I will show in the Lawrence chapter, by portraying Annable as a person dependent on his animal and instinctive nature, it seems that Lawrence's character expresses Schopenhauer's concept of sexual instinct. Meantime, Lawrence compares Lettie with Annable to make the readers conscious of Lettie's mistake which is characteristically reliant on cultural and civilised aspects. These two principles are central to understanding the difference between these authors as well as their common interest – especially with regard to the values placed on sexuality and how sex plays a part in the willing aspect of life. Lawrence demonstrates a more holistic approach, while Schopenhauer is far more clinical according to his idea about reproduction. Although Lawrence's development from Schopenhauer's theory of the will to live has been sensitively traced, it is possible to consider Lawrence's *The White Peacock* as a basic and possible premise of Schopenhauer's philosophy. It is this possibility that forms the subject matter of my chapter on Lawrence.

Carl Krockel's *D. H. Lawrence and Germany: the politics of influence* (2007) is one of the recent works that has considered the existence of Schopenhauer's philosophy of sexual love in D. H. Lawrence's writings. His book contextualises Lawrence's style and political values in German culture. To reveal the reason of Lawrence's interest in Schopenhauer's philosophy of sexual opposition, first he calls attention to the influence of Goethe's *Elective Affinities*, in which two pairs of lovers are motivated by their "elective affinities" with each other. He continues his

argument by showing the possibility of this idea in George Eliot's configuration of two pairs of lovers in *Middlemarch*. He states that "George Eliot and Goethe used a framework of two pairs of lovers to compare the chemical affinities among them, and to analyse relationships in an objective, scientific way" (19), but Goethe, and Eliot in *The Mill on the Floss*, abandons "affinities" when its sexual component endangered their moral virtues. They revert to tragedy that causes their protagonists to relinquish their "affinities" with one another. Krockel points out that while writing *The White Peacock* Lawrence was profoundly impressed by Schopenhauer's philosophy which foreground sexual opposition over personal affinity. Due to the same impression, in Lettie Beardsall and George Saxton, Lawrence expresses the character's division between bodily desires for otherness and the individual requisite for affinity.

While some critics like Carol Krockel and H. M. Daleski have been anxious to connect *The White Peacock* to an English realist tradition through the analogies they draw with George Eliot, Andrew Harrison in "*The White Peacock* and 'The School of Lorna Doone'" (2013) claims that Lawrence's first novel aligns with the school of William de Morgan or Richard Blackmore's *Lorna Doone*. He believes that the influence of William de Morgan can be understood when the reader considers that Hueffer had recommended that Lawrence send "Nethermere" to Heinemann, and the fact that De Morgan had published his first novel, *Joseph Vance*, with Heinemann just three years before 1906. As Harrison says, "Hueffer's comparison was clearly intended to interest the publisher in Lawrence's potential marketability" (49). Moreover, Harrison states that the quality of sentimental involvement in the

plot of *Lorna Doone* and its narrative technique defines the continuity between this novel and *The White Peacock*. Where my vision of *The White Peacock* differs from Krockel's and Harrison's approaches is in its concentration on the idea of reproduction and the reality of love after offspring, a process which is most observable by Cyril Beardsall who is Lawrence's alter ego. Moreover, in the analysis of Lawrence's novel, Krockel and Harrison do not draw attention to how Lawrence reveals the true nature of the world by portraying man's relationship with nature. In my work, I explore how Lawrence artistically represents Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will as the primary motivation of human actions by representing the similarities and differences between human nature and animals. Therefore, instead of focusing on Lawrence's view on Goethe's and Eliot's idea of affinity, I give more consideration to Schopenhauer's concept of the will to live in evaluating Lawrence's *The White Peacock*. Schopenhauer's "Metaphysics of Love" includes a variety of ideas that remained implicit in Lawrence's more condensed and metaphoric style. By highlighting these points in my study, I will develop my argument to provide a greater view of Lawrence's philosophical approach towards the concept of love.

Lawrence's hostility and prejudice towards love in *The White Peacock* can be to a large degree explained and justified by Schopenhauer's theories. In Lawrence's consideration of man's integrity and sexuality, we have his idea of wholeness, his assertion of blood consciousness and stress upon the dynamic relationships between males and females, his rejection of the mind and intellect, and his preference for union instead of the propagation of a new race. These views parallel those of

Schopenhauer, though they also have their traces in Lawrence's personal experiences and ideologies. In my analysis of *The White Peacock*, I will point out the Schopenhauerian concepts that Lawrence was familiar with and that he used to improve and form his own philosophy. Furthermore, my study of Lawrence's *The White Peacock* suggests that, in writing his first novel, he borrowed Schopenhauer's views on love (as a propagation of a new generation) and sexuality in order to create a vivid view of human nature. Indeed, in Lawrence's perspective and in his work, we see a prominent figure in the development of Schopenhauer's theory of the will to live.

Schopenhauer's Philosophy

1.3.1 The Thing-in-itself/The Will to Live

Schopenhauer's starting point towards the idea of the will was certainly based on George Berkeley's idea of sensations and Immanuel Kant's division of the universe into the noumenal and phenomenal world. In the phenomenal case, the individual can perceive the things by using his senses and in the noumenal the thing-in-itself is independent of the individual and he can only think or imagine it. As a rationalist, Kant believed that our sense organs are imperfect and that there are still some inborn ideas that have nothing to do with our sense organs. Accordingly, by seeing knowledge as an organisation of sensations, he spoke about the methods of our mind as inborn and independent from sensations. This theory, for Berkeley, was effectively negative because in his point of view, it is impossible to know the

existence of the outside world when our knowledge is the only thing with which we can relate. He believed that an object exists only when we can perceive and feel it. To assert the existence of a thing when no minds perceive it, to Berkeley, is by knowing its qualities; indeed, there is no other way to know things rather than by our sensations. Schopenhauer took an extra step and synthesised empiricism and rationalism. Schopenhauer favorably compared Kant to Berkeley, despite both Kant and Schopenhauer rejecting a true subjective idealism in which objects exist in no way independently of the consciousness. As Kant was confounded by the question of what the reality of the thing-in-itself is, Schopenhauer suggested that because diversity is part of the phenomenal experience, noumenal reality has to be a singular, undifferentiated, and an indistinguishable thing. He determined that the thing-in-itself is the reality of our nature which we call *Will* and it is through the will that one can experience the most immediate manifestation of the thing-in-itself.

Schopenhauer then elaborates as to what this will admittedly was, and draws his rationale from the dominant traditions of western philosophy but almost reaching a sort of voluntarism very congruent with Hinduism and Buddhism, with which he was very familiar. He claimed that the will-to-live (the impulse that pushes man towards lasting life and propagation) is the internal significance and dynamic force of the world, and that *will* and *desire* are ontologically ahead of intellect and reason. He viewed even falling in love as merely an oblivious factor of this dynamic force to propagate, and stated some elements that the individual considers in choosing mate. He pointed out that love is merely based on physical and material qualities. In his

contemplation of physical qualities, he considered that for instance a tall person is attracted to a short person and the individual with a large chin is attracted to one with a small chin, in hopes that their offspring will be well-proportioned. Further, he believed that the chase to find contentment and joy as well as the propagation of offspring are two separate ideas that love spitefully baffles us into considering as one in the interests of reproduction of the species. In a defence of love, nonetheless, he considered that only a compulsion as forceful as love could pressure us into this role, and that we have to fall in love without any option, as biology is more powerful than the intellect. He maintained that this tumultuous and strong passion to survive and procreate is basically what creates anguish and misery in the world.

In the early nineteenth century, when some writers were keenly interested in the concept of death as the most devastating event in human life and gave little notice to love, Schopenhauer paid more attention to this phenomenon for he believed that it is the will-to-live which brings us into existence. In his consideration, the will to live (the force driving man to remain alive) is the eternal enemy of death. The individual can perhaps defeat even death by the strategy of reproduction. In this process reproduction becomes the ultimate purpose of every organism, and its strongest instinct; for only the will can triumph over death. Accordingly, Schopenhauer measures love as a physical occurrence and genetic attitude. For him, “love determines nothing less than the establishment of the next generation” (*Metaphysics* 114). In other words, the powerful feeling that man feels towards the

opposite sex is not love but sexual instinct, which in its nature seeks the propagation of a new generation.

1.3.2 Egoism, Compassion and Suffering

In the primary course of *The World as Will and Representation* we learn that each act the individual performs, either for his own preservation or for any other goal, is an expression of the will. Personal preservation is what concerns oneself most directly, and it can be described as the attention that one pays to oneself or the attitudes that he makes for his personal happiness. In this process, any effort that the individual will make can also affect other people as well. However, this self-concentration is egoism and this egoism of the will is inherent to each human being.³ In religion and philosophy, this has traditionally been a concern in the area of morals. In Schopenhauer's ethical consideration what we want is an expression of the will that is predominantly stated in the essence of our individuality. The will that motivates an individual and forms his actions in nature is without reason or logic. According to Schopenhauer, "the intellect is originally quite foreign" for the will and it "remains so much excluded from the real resolutions and secret decisions of [the] will" (*WWR* 2: 209). The will, in it-self, is blind and longing for all objectifications, each satisfaction is brief and leads to a new suffering because the realised desire develops a new desire, and this process is endless. In the fourth part of *The World as Will and Representation I*, Schopenhauer argues that, ultimately, human beings could be

³Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation I*. P. 61-62.

liberated from suffering if they become empowered to overcome their own will. In the conflict between the will and the human being, compassion is an ethical way towards an ultimate denial of the will. The primary step towards compassion is the comprehension “that our true self exists not only in our own person, in this particular phenomenon, but in everything that lives” (*WWR I: 373*). In this way, “the heart feels itself enlarged, just as by egoism it feels contracted. For just as egoism concentrates our interest on the particular phenomenon of our own individuality” (*WWR I: 373*), identification of the self with everything living results in compassion and true love. In Schopenhauer’s opinion, compassion is an ethical phenomenon that can lead to a complete renunciation of the will, and is indigenous, natural, and ingrained in human beings. Compassion is the knowledge that apart from the will, every living thing is essentially the same: that one will is dynamic in all living beings. Compassion does not merely arise from observing or feeling existing suffering in another living being, but is already present in one as part of one’s being. In other words, “the well-being” of others for the compassionate individual is his “well-being” while the egoist’s hope rests in his “own well-being” (*WWR I: 374*). With this view, Schopenhauer goes farther and claims that “All love (*caritas*) is compassion or sympathy” (*WWR I: 374*).

Based on the fact that every desire springs from a need, Schopenhauer concludes that suffering is the essential and inseparable part of human life, and the joys are “the desire in stating that they are a positive good, but that in truth they are only of a negative nature” (*WWR I: 375*):

Therefore, whatever goodness, affection, and magnanimity do for others is always only an alleviation of their sufferings; and consequently what can move them to good deeds and to works of affection is always only *knowledge of the suffering of others*, directly intelligible from one's own suffering, and put on a level therewith. It follows from this, however, that pure affection (*caritas*) is of its nature sympathy or compassion. (*WWR I*: 374)

Accordingly, love, insofar as it is satisfied and attained, commences with the knowledge that suffering is identical in all beings and essential to compassion. From this idea it follows that affection is of its own nature compassion. As previously stated, the origin and functioning of compassion are not ultimately and inevitably in connection with one's suffering: with the realisation that we are one and the same, I already endure the pain of others. This suffering is "wholly direct and even instinctive".⁴ Schopenhauer accordingly elaborates that the deepest realm within our being, that which is the nearest to us, our carnal senses and compassion flowing from them, all these are original ethical phenomena.

By illustrating Schopenhauer's didactic and philosophical depths, this entire thesis is constructed around the idea that his philosophy can be constructive and didactic for Henry James and D. H. Lawrence as well, and that they were not singularly focussing on scepticism and the destruction of old values. In other words, I wish to explore the idea that beneath the novelists' ethical and realistic attitudes lies a Schopenhauerian philosophy. It is an underlying argument of my study that *The*

⁴Schopenhauer, "On the Basis of Morality" § 18, 163.

Portrait of a Lady and *The White Peacock* convey Schopenhauerian elements, and it is possible to offer a Schopenhauerian reading of these novels.

Summary

In summary, my project begins with an introduction to Schopenhauer's reception in England and his immediate influence on the writers of the time, especially George Eliot. I will show how she came to know Schopenhauer's philosophy, and more importantly, the question is how his philosophical view is represented by Eliot in her writings. Later I will argue for Schopenhauer's utility in the interpretation and understanding of literature around the same time period. I primarily explore how Schopenhauer's philosophy of love and compassion can be used to provide an interpretation and analysis of literary works by examining Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* and *Middlemarch*. The plot, the character establishment, development and relations in these two novels have striking Schopenhauerian parallels and even seem to follow Schopenhauerian themes on morality and the will. The latter is particularly apparent in the tension and relationship between the egoistic or selfish motivation exemplified in one character and another character who exemplifies compassion and selfless motivation. My research in the second chapter provides a captivating argument for the value that Schopenhauer's philosophy had on Eliot's literary works. It is work worth doing, for Henry James was critical of Eliot, and many have seen similarities between D. H. Lawrence and Eliot, though their conception of love was very different. This chapter does not aim to analyse Eliot's fiction regarding Schopenhauer, but rather aims to show where Schopenhauerian terms penetrated into

Eliot's novels. Throughout the remainder of the chapter and in my approach towards the works of James and Lawrence, I will argue for the possibility of considering Eliot as an indirect transmission of Schopenhauerian opinions into the writing of these novelists while my work in the third and fourth chapters argues and offers a Schopenhauerian reading of the two novels by James and Lawrence.

CHAPTER TWO

Schopenhauer, Direct and Indirect Acknowledgment

It is possible to call the years between 1885 to 1898 “an epoch of real pessimism” (Chesterton, qtd. Goodale: 241); not precisely because of the pessimists of this period, but also the authors of most literary works were primarily concerned with morality and the personal values of life. Many intellects of this time were searching to find an answer for the misery of the surrounding environment. English writers were not exempted from this matter. In particular, they were entangled with such pessimistic problems that led them towards the view of the universe's dullness and agony, and the idea began to spread in their literary writings. The idea that Schopenhauer has greater liability for nineteenth-century pessimism is widespread in critical and historical works, although Schopenhauer was not the only exponent of pessimism.⁵ Nevertheless, he had a significant impact upon European writers and the

⁵The first Buddhism impression was received by Europe in “1844; and after 1850 came a steady stream of English articles and translations of Buddhist documents. Edwin Arnold's poetic life of Gautama, *The Light of Asia*, 1879, was extraordinary popular.” The other German philosopher whose

German-speaking world. In this section, I argue that Schopenhauer's influence was not only limited to the German climate and he exercised and influenced English writers as well. These writings also open a new insight into other feasible clarifications of Schopenhauer's views. Due to the extent of the subject, the present chapter concentrates on Schopenhauer's pessimistic views on women, love and morality. Opening this chapter, I present the primary impact of Schopenhauer in Anglophone literature. Then I will review his philosophy while continually exploring certain areas where his philosophy can be used to provide an interpretation and analysis for some literary works. The goal of this chapter is not to provide a critical perspective; rather, it aims to portray a vivid view of Schopenhauer's philosophy in order to facilitate an understanding of his concepts used in the third and fourth chapters. Further, I intend to offer a primary connection between Schopenhauer and the novelists of my thesis. As Lawrence and James traced their primary attitudes from George Eliot, an integrated view of them should consider the connection between Eliot and Schopenhauer. To this end, I will explore how Eliot played a role in the construction of James's and Lawrence's works, and then with a wider concentration, I will show Schopenhauer's presence in James's approach and Lawrence's theory.

pessimistic views "stood very close to Schopenhauer [was] Eduard von Hartmann. [He] was first mentioned by the English press in reviews of Pfeleiderer's *Der Moderne Pessimismus* in 1875." (Goodale 243-3)

Schopenhauer's Reception in England

Schopenhauer inspired many artists and thinkers including Nietzsche, Wagner, Freud, and Wittgenstein. He found his fame not only among Germans but in England, where Heinrich Schopenhauer, his father, was so much inclined to their ideas that he desired that his first child should be born there. Accordingly, I will present when English readers became more or less familiar with Schopenhauer's thoughts. I will also explore the roots that extended Schopenhauer's philosophy in England and I will portray the development of his fame in three decades.

Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* was published in 1818, though it appears that his philosophy stayed unknown to British society until April 1853, when an article by John Oxenford, "Iconoclasm in German Philosophy," which was co-edited by George Eliot, appeared in the *Westminster Review*. Eliot knew German well and read Schopenhauer's works in the original.⁶ This seems to be the initial exposition of Schopenhauer's views in English. In Oxenford's article, Schopenhauer gains favourable acclaim for systematically undermining the entire system of German philosophy and for "the peculiar charm of his writings," and undoubtedly for being "one of the most ingenious and readable authors in the world" and "a formidable hitter of adversaries" (Oxenford 389, 407). As a result, Schopenhauer became known in Britain and the English-speaking world at last found access to read him. Moreover later in the century, his major work, *The World as Will and Idea*, was translated by Richard Burdon Haldane and J. Kemp in 1883-1886. In

⁶Karl's *George Eliot: Voice of a Century*. New York: Norton. P.131

the same decade, Mme. Hillebrand translated *On the Fourfold Root* and *On the Will in Nature* in 1889, and T. B. Saunders translated *Religion: a Dialogue* in the same year. Accordingly, it is possible to say that between 1883 and 1889, almost all of Schopenhauer's writings were translated into English and available.

Schopenhauer's philosophy became known in England for numerous reasons.

We can consider the primary reason Oxenford's article. The review states:

Few, indeed, we venture to assert, will be those of our English readers who are familiar with the name of Arthur Schopenhauer. Fewer still will there be who are aware that the mysterious being owning that name has been working for something like forty years to subvert the whole system of German philosophy which has been raised by university professors since the decease of Immanuel Kant, and that, after his long labour, he has just succeeded in making himself heard – wonderfully illustrating how long an interval may elapse between the discharge of the cannon and the hearing of the report. (388)

This article establishes a primary link between English readers and Schopenhauer. Oxenford confesses that his article is not fully comprehensive and seeks rather to be as representative as possible, but he says that “at the same time we shall be greatly surprised if our brief outline of this genial, eccentric, audacious, and ... terrible writer [Schopenhauer], does not tempt some of our readers to procure for themselves a set of works, every page of which abounds with novel and startling suggestions” (Oxenford 407).

The second step towards Schopenhauer's mediation in England was taken by Darwin. His *Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection* in 1859 made English readers familiar with Schopenhauer's philosophy. He offered a scientific approach to the Schopenhauerian view of species which in its nature pursues life by the light of the will to live. In other words, Schopenhauer believes that humans are afraid of death: therefore, they wish to live longer which creates the will to live. Accordingly, the eternal enemy of death is the will to live which is attained by the strategy of reproduction. Therefore, reproduction is the ultimate purpose of every creature and it becomes a sort of self-protection. Antonio Aliotta expresses that Darwin's turn to the origin of the species is closely connected with

The tendency of every organism to self-preservation – the motive power of the struggle for existence – does, as a matter of fact, approximate closely to Schopenhauer's will to live; hence the derivation of intelligence from instinctive life which Darwinism asserted itself able to prove woke an answering chord in his philosophy. (28)

Reproduction certainly is the main theme of Darwin's work. This is also documented in his writings on sexual selection, where he quotes Schopenhauer:

No excuse is needed for treating this subject in some detail; for, as the German philosopher Schopenhauer remarks, 'the final aim of all love intrigues, be they comic or tragic, is really of more importance than all other ends in human life. What it all turns upon is nothing less than the composition of the next generation ... It is not the weal and woe of any one

individual, but that of the human race to come, which is here at stake.⁷

Darwinian themes of sexual selection are similarly responsive to the subjects of love and sex, physical qualities and wealth, passion, death and life, marriage and offspring, the roles of male and female, the makeup and values of the future generations to promote the continued flourishing of the human race; in short, “love-intrigues” (*WWR 1*: 571) as Schopenhauer remarks, which in his opinion are the most significant fact of life.

In view of Oxenford’s welcome and Darwin’s confirmation, Schopenhauer’s philosophy provided an applicable philosophical ground for some contemporary writers and artists. For instance, in 1871-1872, Oliver Madox Brown, the son of the painter Ford Madox Brown, quotes casually from Schopenhauer in *The Black Swan*. Moreover, Brown’s brother-in-law, Dr. Francis Hueffer, the father of Ford Madox Ford, specifically acquired knowledge of Schopenhauer, and published his “Literary Aspect of the Work of Schopenhauer” in *The New Quarterly* magazine in 1874.⁸ It was during the same decade and later that Schopenhauer’s teachings gained widespread approval and filled the minds of some major English writers such as George Eliot, D. H. Lawrence, George Gissing and Thomas Hardy.

Thomas Hardy read Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation* in 1883 and in the years following he wrote *Tess*, which can be considered a

⁷Charles Darwin’s *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex*. Chapter XX – “Secondary Sexual Characters of Man.”

⁸More details in *Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer’s philosophy*(2005) by David E. Cartwright. p. 209

dramatization of Schopenhauer's concept of the will to live.⁹ In *Tess* Hardy suggests that a person's frequent lack of happiness is directly associated with the reality that the individual has no conscious choices in life. Hardy's characters live in an unreal world and a reverie which is based on no conscious choices. In this way Hardy tries to represent Schopenhauer's notion of the will. In *Tess* Hardy makes us see the unending cycle of desires and suffering, and stresses the point that lasting happiness is unattainable. His characters behave according to a blind force and impulse that leads them towards an unpleasant and miserable life, a force that Schopenhauer calls the will. Throughout the novel we see that the "impulse" is sometimes too strong, causing misjudgement, and it becomes most substantial when a character's action destroys his happiness. For instance, the most serious consequences in the novel occur when Tess "abandons herself to impulse" (84) and endures Alec's persistent unwanted attention. This impulse leads to her destruction. Once she is in physical danger by some Trantridge villagers, Alec offers to "rescue" her, when she climbs into Alec's carriage, instead of taking her home, he rides through the fog until he tells her that they are lost and there he rapes her. Angel, who is in love with Tess and she also loves him, too, on the night that Tess tells him about her past, feels that he should "trust" his impulses: "He waited in the expectancy to discern some mental pointing; he knew that if any intention of his, concluded over-night, did not vanish in the light of morning, it stood on a basis approximating to one of pure reason, even if initiated by impulse of feeling; that it was so far, therefore, to be trusted" (320). By the end of the novel, we see that this tendency to trust emotional impulse abolishes

⁹See: Paul Bishop's "Schopenhauer's Impact on European Literature." p.341

the chance of contentment in the life of both Tess and Angel. After Tess's confession, Angel informs her that she is reduced in his eyes and subsequently it is better for them to separate. It is not long after this separation that Alec reappears on the scene at Flintcomb-Ash and asks Tess to marry him. She writes to Angel and explains that because of Alec's attentions to her, she feels "pressed to do what [she] will not do" (429). Alec tells her that she will never hear from Angel anymore and better to forget him and marry Alec, accordingly she feels helpless and powerless to control her circumstances which urge her to accept Alec's proposal. Finally, the most blind impulse Tess gives way to is that which results in Alec's death. Angel who realises from Tess's friend, Izz, that "nobody could love [him] more than Tess did!", returns to Tess but she refuses him and gently asks him to leave. Thinking of herself, Tess considers Alec the reason for losing Angel's love for a second time and then denounces Alec for his lying when he said that Angel would never return to her. Therefore, she kills him and runs after Angel, and tells him that she hopes to obtain his forgiveness by killing the man who ruined their contentment. Angel is also appalled by Tess's "impulse" (492) which has resulted in Alec's death. In light of Schopenhauer's philosophy, Hardy's novel primarily highlights the most notable impulse. Tess's actions are the result of blind impulse or force in her nature, the will compels her to participate in what she is "pressed to do" (429) (accepting Alec's proposal) and does not will to do. Indeed, Hardy creates the impression that our actions are motivated by the work of the individual will rather than conscious.

The idea of the will as the primary motivation behind human acts was considerable for many writers. The other British writer who became interested in this Schopenhauerian concept is George Gissing. His early novels – *Workers in the Dawn* (1880) and *The Nether World* (1889) – convey a pessimistic view. They not only dramatise the bitterness and the suffering of poor people in the late-Victorian period but also portray that the anguished intellectual was a victim of hypocrisy of the deep-rooted Victorian class. As George Orwell says about Gissing:

Behind his rage ... lay a perception that the horrors of life in late-Victorian England were largely unnecessary. The grime, the stupidity, the ugliness, the sex-starvation, the furtive debauchery, the vulgarity, the bad manners, the censoriousness – these things were unnecessary, since the puritanism of which they were a relic no longer upheld the structure of society.¹⁰

In 1880, a friend of Gissing, Eduard Bertz, told him about Schopenhauer. The impression was strong enough that later in Tübingen chapter in *Workers in the Dawn* he gave his heroine the privilege of reading Schopenhauer's *Parerg und Paralipomena*. Two years later in 1882, he wrote an essay, "The Hope of Pessimism," considering Schopenhauer's philosophy.¹¹ Gissing observed that the *will*, in Schopenhauer's philosophy, demonstrates an empty force that coerces the masses to pursue ardent and substantial gratification and is assuredly a disastrous and egotistic rationale that will never be satisfied. He discovered that this *will* is the

¹⁰“George Orwell: George Gissing,” was written in 1948 but first published in *London Magazine* in June 1960. See http://www.orwell.ru/library/reviews/gissing/english/e_gis

¹¹ See: Gisela Argyle's *Germany as Model and Monster: Allusion in English Fiction, 1830s-1930s*.

driving motivation behind the hypocrisy of art works. Therefore, he was particularly drawn to Schopenhauer's theory of art. According to Schopenhauer, those who are gifted with artistic talent are able to ignore the self and immerse themselves into their own creativity, whether it be music, literature or painting. Indeed, they reach a spiritual reality in which desire is suspended and everlasting truth is observed. In other words, he argues that "genius is the ability to leave entirely out of sight our own interest, our willing, and our aims, and consequently to discard entirely our own personality for a time, in order to remain pure knowing subject, the clear eye of the world" (*WWR I*: 185-86). Gissing was persuaded by Schopenhauer's view on the position of art which stresses selflessness and separates the mind from the will. Accordingly in his essay he emphasises that egotism has to be destroyed and consequently through this self-resignation the artist can contemplate the object without self-demands and creates an image of pure beauty.

Based on all these evidences, it is possible to call the 1850s the age of Schopenhauer's discovery, opening with Oxenford's article and Darwin's work; the 1870s, the age of common knowledge towards the philosopher; and 1880s, his celebrity age in the English-speaking world. The impact is firmly documented that Schopenhauer had a discernible influence on literature and contemporaneous literary figures, and some very prominent writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries felt and acknowledged his philosophy. One of the nineteenth century writers, who was known as having her thoughts most influenced by Schopenhauer in particular, was George Eliot. The indebtedness of Eliot needs to be approached with more

caution because of the precise influence she had on D. H. Lawrence and Henry James and it can be considered as one of the indirect evidences of Schopenhauerian theme in their writings.

George Eliot and Schopenhauer

2.1.1 The Will and Desire

After presenting Schopenhauer's reception in England through his immediate impact on some British writers, it is time to characterise part of his philosophy which had a significant influence on George Eliot, for when Eliot began writing *Middlemarch* (1869) and *Daniel Deronda* (1876) Schopenhauer played an important role in the formation of her system of thought, and more importantly the above mentioned novels inspired Lawrence and James in writing *The White Peacock* and *The Portrait of a Lady*.¹² Later, in my analysis of *The White Peacock* and *The Portrait of a Lady*, I will extend my argument and will provide a vivid view of Schopenhauerian allusions in these two novels. Throughout this part, a reader should bear in mind that the purpose of the following section is not to criticise Eliot's fiction; rather, it aims to provide ample evidence to prove how Schopenhauer's ideas, as they are manifested in Eliot's works, influenced James and Lawrence.

Eliot's interest in Schopenhauer did not vanish after editing Oxenford's article. Her manuscript notebooks refer to Schopenhauer twice. In what is now MS 711 at the Pforzheimer Library, New York, she cited *The World as Will and*

¹² This has been verified through 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4 sections of this chapter.

Representation in a list of sources headed “read since September,” which must refer to September 1872, and it seems that she read Schopenhauer’s great work in January or February 1873. For the second time, Eliot refers to Schopenhauer in the notebook which is now the Folger Shakespeare Library’s M. a. 14.¹³

Like Thomas Hardy and George Gissing, George Eliot was also interested in Schopenhauer’s concept of the world as will. In *Daniel Deronda* and *Middlemarch*, the will is perfectly expressed or recognised through love or the sexual relationships between characters. For instance, early in *Daniel Deronda*, Gwendolen is introduced by her mother as a “willful daughter” (5) and it is this characteristic in her which leads her in selecting Grandcourt in hope to achieve financial security. The interaction between characters reveals that the true nature of will and its reality is as blind and irrational as the nature of sex. In both novels, she aims to show the destructive and brutal nature of the will.

Before revealing the purpose of the will in Eliot’s novels, it is very useful to have a distinct understanding of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of will. Schopenhauer argues that the world of existence is recognised by a person only through the sensations and thoughts. In his opinion, the way in which we come to know anything about the world starts with sensations but the thing in itself is not made up of sensations, for they do not have reality as things. Their reality is that of an event, an action. Indeed, sensation is an interaction between the subject and the object, a physical phenomenon. Then the signals resulting from that interaction start their long

¹³The evidence and dates are based on MacCobb’s two articles “The Morality of Musical Genius: Schopenhauerian View in *Daniel Deronda*,” and “*Daniel Deronda* as Will and Representation: George Eliot and Schopenhauer.”

path through the nervous system and the brain. Afterwards, the brain processes information from sense organs and forms its representation of the world or things. But it is hopeless to ascertain the nature of actuality by initially questioning content, and then continuing on to question thought. We can never arrive at the real nature of things from without. It is like “a man,” as Schopenhauer says, “who goes round a castle, looking in vain for an entrance, and sometimes sketching the facades” (*WWR I*: 99) which gives this idea that however much we may investigate, we obtain nothing but only images. As long as we rely on experience, the only thing we can realise is the appearance of things which is represented to our experience. There is only one thing in the world that we can experience from inside, and that is our own body. Schopenhauer wants us to begin to know things with what we know directly from the nature of ourselves. Accordingly, we will recognise that behind our sensational representation there exists a will, sightless and mindless. Subsequently, we will acknowledge that the existential world and works in it, they are all understood and perceived through our will. The will in Schopenhauer’s procedure has come to act alone and with a destructive result, for our consciousness becomes merely a veneer layer of the mind, and beneath the conscious intellect lays the conscious or unconscious will.¹⁴

Critics have acknowledged the importance of Schopenhauer to Eliot and especially the way in which the figurative role of will in her characters represents her

¹⁴Schopenhauer argues that in this process desires and emotions are expressions of the will and thus are not included under the class of representations. In other words, desires and/or passions are a direct product derived from will. The will is our basic instinct, it is a rough, unpolished, untrained, animalistic essence that lays within every human.

understanding of Schopenhauer's notion of will. U. C. Knoepfelmacher, in *Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel* (1965), asserts that there are echoes of Schopenhauer's philosophy throughout *Middlemarch*. He argues that will, its assertion, and resurgence moves events forward in Eliot's novel. As a matter of fact, Eliot's characters represent the idea of individual wills, and the ambitious and wilful life of nearly every character in the novel. Dorothea's self-centred will shapes the primary intent of her actions throughout the novel towards self-awareness at the end. Featherstone and Casaubon each make provisions in their last wills in hopes that the lives of their heirs will benefit in the future. As for Bulstrode, the banker, his desire to control human destiny is concealed by his hypocritical consideration of the empowerment of a divine will. The power of will and its effects can also be traced in the lives of some characters who are somehow aware of its existence. For instance, at one point, Caleb Garth says, "for my part, I wish there was not such thing as a will" (*Mm* 372) or Dorothea, who wishes to maintain some kind of control over her own will instead of submitting her destiny to the world. Her marriage to the aging scholar Casaubon is one of her efforts to achieve her personal will.¹⁵ Eliot seems "to [be] recasting the notion of will with a similar, though Schopenhauerian, objective" (LeFev 123). Based on the cumulative wills of characters and critics' acknowledgment of the idea of will in the novel, it is possible to say that the novel is purely the summation of humans' wilful actions, the yearning of desires which align Eliot's irony of events with Schopenhauer's philosophy of the world as will. This

¹⁵What she hopes to receive from her marriage to Casaubon is a healthy state of being by subduing her own selfishness and alleviating her thirst for knowledge which might be useful in helping humanity (starting with her husband).

alignment helps a reader observe how the transformation of a characters' will consistently makes them unable to turn away from the world and its obligations.

Moreover, in George Levine's "The Hero as Dilettante: *Middlemarch* and *Nostramo*" (1980), *Middlemarch* is said to be

marked with a deep new awareness of death. Her [Eliot] experience of the painful dying and death of Lewes's twenty-six year old son, Thornton, haunts almost every letter for a year. Suddenly she is full of consciousness of death's approach and seems almost to welcome it. There is, indeed, a Schopenhauerian quality to these letters. . . ., a recognition that only death of desire can bring peace. (170)

What is significant about this passage is that Levine is not merely providing a biographical sketch; rather, he wisely observes a "biographical and philosophical link to the sense of hopelessness and ascetic denial" (LeFew 14). He does not only consider the popular meaning of death. He associates two different concepts of Schopenhauer about death itself and death of desire which Eliot, after revealing the fact that the various states of characters' life are the consequence of will, takes into account. To provide a better understanding of Eliot's attitude towards this concept, it is worthy to have an initial overview on Schopenhauer's approach towards the notion of desire.

According to Schopenhauer, our desires are provoked by the will. Thus life, as a manifestation of the will, is fundamentally goal-orientated, and individuals are on an endless search for something. This is the real fact of all life but especially true

of the higher forms of life. If we only look for our goal, we find ourselves displeased and it is that unfilled desire that propels us forward in life. If we find that we are unable to please our desire, then we stay unsatisfied. Conversely, if we do fulfil the desire and achieve victory over the goal, then without a motivating factor, our lives basically come to an end. Accordingly, desire becomes the source of all our sorrows in the world. For each desire that is satisfied there remains a new desire to take its place. This circular process makes the desire infinite and its fulfillment impossible. For Schopenhauer, the fulfilment of desire is like

[t]he alms thrown to a beggar, which relieves him today so that his misery may be prolonged till tomorrow. Therefore, so long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or peace. (*WWR I*: 196)

The realisation of an ideal always proves to be fatal as fulfilment will never satisfy. Not only does the unsatisfied desire lead to tragedy but also “the satisfied passion leads more often to unhappiness than to happiness” (*WWR 2*: 555). In each individual, the recognised desire creates a new one, and this process is endless. At the bottom, “this springs from the fact that the will must live on itself, since nothing exists besides it, and it is a hungry will” (*WWR I*: 154). As the phenomenon of the will eventually heads toward completion, the suffering will becomes increasingly more prevalent. The further the will turns out to be satisfied the more suffering there

will be. As desire leads to human suffering, Schopenhauer's solution is essentially to destroy one's natural tendency to want. He thinks that by not giving into the desire, you get the best of it.

As the fulfilment of desire is impossible, Eliot also offers her characters the same solution to release them from their pain. She tries to show in each of her characters' personas that only rejection and denial of their worldly demands can silence the irrational will. Dorothea marries the aged scholar Mr Casaubon because she likes his great intellectual works. However, because she is so much in love with her image of Mr Casaubon, she fails to see that he is not actually what she thinks. Later, when she meets people who are genuinely in love, she remembers two of her lovers, Will Ladislaw and Tertius Lydgate, and notices the discrepancy between what she wanted and what she actually chose. As the novel ends, Dorothea is still suffering, looking back on a life which had given her nothing, a Schopenhauerian world where life is a gradual process of desires, starting in hope and ending in disappointment. Her first great disappointment is when she and her husband travel to Rome where she finds out that she has no educational knowledge of the city's history and art, and Casaubon does not have any inclination to give her knowledge. Later, she also becomes disappointed when at home she is merely given mechanical works like oral reading or copying rather than productive education. Dorothea recognises that egoism can only lead to torment; she realises that she must overcome her own self-demands and will by serving another. Therefore, her pity turns from "her own future" to her husband's "hard struggle" and his "lonely labour" (*Mm* 520). By

serving Casaubon, she looks for an opportunity to move “towards the perfect Right, that it might make a throne within her, and *rule the errant will* [italics mine]” (*Mm* 846). Accordingly, we see that the way Eliot offers her heroine for obtaining the “perfect Right” and ruling will is only achievable through death of desires; it is a theme that directly relates to Eliot’s Schopenhauerian recognition of desire and selflessness.

Traces of Schopenhauer can more precisely be seen through Will Ladislaw’s character and the final conclusion of *Middlemarch*. Apart from those qualities and manners in Eliot’s characters who are at the mercy of their individual wills, the evidence suggests that Will’s character is a significant representative of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Will is purely a symbolic picture of the will, his name can constantly be considered as a metaphor for Schopenhauer’s will, and his characteristic qualities equated with the qualities that Schopenhauer examines for the will. The narrator introduces Will as an unpredictable, rebellious, voluptuous person with unrestrained freedom. Mrs Cadwallader knows Will as “a dangerous young sprig ... a sort of Byronic hero” (*Mm* 415). His outward appearance highlights his chaotic hair which, when disturbed, gives the impression that he was like “an incarnation of the spring whose spirit filled the air—a bright creature, abundant in uncertain promises” (*Mm* 512), and his brisk motions are likened to “the manner of a spirited horse” (*Mm* 400). Like a wild stallion, proud and robust, Will basks in the energy of his own insubordinate disposition and flashes it brashly: “I come of rebellious blood on both sides,” he tells his new friend, “I am a rebel: I don’t feel

bound, as you do, to submit to what I don't like" (*Mm* 415, 427). Will who sees himself "necessarily intolerant of fetters" (*Mm* 109) and does not will to submit himself to mankind, subordinates himself to his admirer, Dorothea. She becomes a focus of Will's impatient love and attention. An odd transfiguration begins to occur as the obstinate, rebellious and wilful Will becomes gentle and domesticated. Will's transformation in the presence of Dorothea resembles Schopenhauer's idea of the will and his solution on how one can overcome the will's irrational demands by denying and refusing its worldly requests. Similar to Schopenhauer's view that selflessness can subordinate the will, Dorothea, in Eliot's *Middlemarch*, subordinates rebellious Will.

We realise throughout the novel that Dorothea has an ascetic nature. She is a visionary and kind-hearted woman who aspires towards the greater service of humanity, as evident by her humanitarian efforts like helping the local poor people. Her selflessness and her unworldliness are opposed to Will's nature, which warms "easily in the presence of subjects which were visibly mixed with life and action, and they easily-stirred rebellion in him helped the glow of public spirit" (*Mm* 501). Dorothea's ascetic nature tames Will's worldly nature and feeds his hunger for personal demands. When Will confesses that his love and affection for her is far-reaching and extensive and that his life would have no purpose without it, Dorothea says, "That was a wrong thing for you to say, that you would have nothing to try for. If we had lost our own chief good, other people's good would remain, and that is worth trying for" (*Mm* 868). This idea of self-resignation for another and the search

for the well-being of another individual ushers the novel towards a Schopenhauerian concept of compassion and egoism.

2.1.2 Compassion

According to Schopenhauer, all our deeds are “in agreement with or contrary to a will” (*BM* 141). He states that “things in agreement with a will” follow one’s welfare and happiness while “things contrary to a will” result in misery and sorrow. Consequently, all deeds will have a consummate ending, “a being susceptible to weal and woe” (*BM* 141). By identifying the weal and woe as the result of individual’s actions, Schopenhauer maintains his position that this well-being can be achieved by the doer of the action or the one impacted by it. In his opinion, individual actions end in four terminations. First, actions can culminate in personal welfare and happiness, and secondly, actions can result in one’s own suffering, or self-misery. Two additional possible outcomes are those which result in another’s welfare and happiness, and those actions which end in another’s misery. The awareness of these terminations is our motive to do something. Schopenhauer believes that individuals have three basic incentives. First, egoism leads the individual to act on the basis of his own well-being and happiness, then compassion, which drives him to wish for the welfare of others, and finally malice, which leads to the misery of others. He maintains that pleasure and pain are just incentive components of language in direct correlation to accordance or conflict with will. With regard to these three incentives, he elucidates the ways in which these motivations form the relationships between

individuals, how pure acts of compassion find a moral worth and how it is possible to overcome egoism.

Schopenhauer's theory that well-being is realised by the doer or the one effected by the action clearly influenced Eliot's writing. According to Eliot, egoism seems to be the catalyst for most of the world's misery; this view is strongly supported by the way she handles various minor characters in *Middlemarch* who rise above the devilish entrapment that is selfish individualism and are bestowed with rewarding, but not necessarily uncomplicated, easy lives. Caleb Garth is one of those examples. As I stated earlier, he wishes that "the will never exist in the world" (*Mm* 284) and considers the will as the reason of his poverty and misery. Accepting his poverty and life labour, "the world [seems] so wondrous to him" (*Mm* 284). Out of minor characters in the novel, the manifestation of this idea can also be traced in the case of Dorothea and Will. Through her love for Will, she feels a certain energy and zest for life overtake her being, and Will is also saved from his once reckless, unproductive, and aimless drift in life and his fondness for egotistical thoughts and acts. Even though Dorothea again tries to find satisfaction through the activities of a man, she now verifies that the activities are worthy, practical and valuable.

The influence of Schopenhauerian compassion is more observable in George Eliot's later work, *Daniel Deronda*. The novel conveys a pessimistic and hopeless atmosphere with a constant struggle between weal and woe, and between egoism and self-denial. *Daniel Derronda*, more so than any other novel by Eliot, revolves around the fear of losing individuality. In this novel, the individual searches for identity

while trying to reject the self to reach redemption. Actually, the novel inclines towards Schopenhauer's moral sense that as long as the individual is the instrument to breed carnal ill, the loss of oneself for another is a commendable achievement. In other words, to defeat the natural viewpoint of egoism, Schopenhauer argues that compassion is the origin of all deeds commanding righteous merit, "moral worth," and is the central incentive for people who possess a moral character. He emphasises that those who are often sympathetic to others live in a different world rather than those with egoistic and malicious characters who search only for their own well-being. In his view, for moral people, everyone is regarded as "I once more" while for selfish individuals the world is "not-I" (*BM* 212). The idea that there is not actually any certain difference between me and others can strengthen moral people to help others, while the egoist is unable to equate such a perception, as there is a permanent obstacle between the egoist and others that drives them to move predominantly towards worldly desires. Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* moves close to this concept and considers the alternative of morality over selflessness as an option for one manner of anguish.

Daniel Deronda opens with the meeting of two opposing characters in Leubronn, Germany, in 1865. Daniel is selfless and seeking to sacrifice his life for others. He is perhaps Eliot's most complicated character due to his resemblance to Schopenhauer's compassionate agent. He endeavours to quench his own desires or divert himself for the well-being of another. He is thoroughly cognisant of the fact that anguish will be the final outcome of either choice. Unlike Daniel, Gwendolen is

stubborn and self-centred. She loses all her money gambling. Once she pawns her necklace and when the necklace is returned to her by a doorman, she recognises that Daniel saw her earlier and had redeemed the necklace for her. Gwendolen comes to call Daniel “a priest” (485).¹⁶ She sees in him what Schopenhauer claims will exist within a person whose life is dedicated to things not born from one’s selfish nature. In opposition to him, Gwendolen is introduced as a stubborn egoist who tries to win all the games in her life in order to make her own fate. Deprived and self-centred, Gwendolen has little chance of spiritual redemption and it is incalculable to her that anything could be greater than her own domination. Even in her marriage, she believes that she has to achieve financial security to flee from poverty. In accordance, she marries the wealthy Grandcourt. In the first chapters, she asks frequently, “what is the use of my being charming if it is to end in my being dull and not minding anything? ... I will not put up with [marriage] if it is not a happy state. I am determined to be happy – at least not to go on muddling away my life as other people do, being and doing nothing remarkable” (58). Resolute on evading the destiny of her exhausted mother, she perceives that she must take command and direction of her deeds. In her thought, “other people allowed themselves to be made slaves of, and to have their lives blown hither and thither like empty ships in which no will was present: it was not to be so with her” (69). Gwendolen will be ultimately annihilated by the malice of egoism that already races through her veins. Her “inborn energy of egoistic desire” (71), which makes her seek out a beneficial marriage, shows that she is still unable to resign the illusory view of controlling her own will.

¹⁶Eliot, George. *Daniel Deronda*. New York: Penguin, 1986.

She tells her mother that “if I am to be miserable, let it be my own choice” (192). Indeed, her marriage can be considered her “last great gambling loss” (496), an inability to overcome the negative influence of the will. For her, even in marriage, “her will was peremptory” (46) and “felt well-equipped for the mastery of life” (69). Eliot’s unequivocal statements about the price of will throughout the novel, the repeated image of egoism and the difficulty of self-denial create a Schopenhauerian assessment of morality, a tension between ego and sympathy.

One of the major factors in Schopenhauer’s theory of compassion is the belief that it answers someone’s possible or genuine agony. He notes that compassion requires caring for another’s misfortune as one would care for herself and she can also take measures to stop and end it:

the other person becoming *the ultimate object* of my will in the same way I myself otherwise am, and hence through my directly desiring *his* weal and not *his* woe just as immediately as I ordinarily do only *my* own. But this necessarily presupposes that, in the case of his *woe* as such I suffer directly with him, I feel *his* woe just as I ordinarily feel only my own ... But this requires that I am in some way *identified with him*, in other words, that this entire *difference* between me and everyone else, which is the very basis of my egoism, is eliminated, to a certain extent at least ... However, the process here analysed is not one that is imagined or invented; on the contrary, it is perfectly real and indeed by no means infrequent. It is the everyday phenomenon of *compassion*, of the immediate *participation*, independent of all ulterior considerations, primarily in the *suffering* of another, and thus

in the prevention or elimination of it; for all satisfaction and well being and happiness consist in this. (*BM* 143-44)

Daniel's ability to question himself makes him all-embracing. He appears to be an embodiment of Schopenhauer's moral agent. Contrary to Gwendolen, Daniel's acute understanding of another's wants and demands is instinctual out of commiseration for himself: he is uneasy with the requirements of martyrdom. He often wonders "whether it were worth while to take part in the battle of the world" (*DD*225). Although the narrator notes that Daniel's "fervour of sympathy" is inborn, a result of an "early-wakened sensibility," the mature Daniel battles the consequences of a lifetime exhausted by discord with himself (*DD*218, 215). This discord relates to his ability to feel compassion, and that, in and of itself, causes him to exhaust his energy not only with his own will's desires, but also on a secondary level, as he wants to please others and desires prosperity for them as well; the resulting reality is that he is unhappy with himself because he cannot always provide others' welfare and he has subdued his own demands. The narrator tries to emphasise the price of altruism while he sees the evanescence of human compassion. The other character, Mirah, compares Daniel's self-denial to "Bouddha giving himself to the famished tigress to save her and her little ones from starvation" (*DD*522). In another scene, Daniel attempts several times to show Gwendolen the path of virtue and encourages her to help others to lighten her suffering. It is observable throughout the novel that Daniel is a counterpart to Gwendolen's character. He wants her to "look on other lives beside [her] own" and to "see what their troubles are, and how they are borne. Try to

care about something in this vast world besides the gratification of small selfish desires ... something that is good apart from the accidents of your own lot" (*DD*501-2). In fact, Gwendolen's narcissism and carnal desires steer her to the threshold of annihilation. For Daniel, his life of unselfish giving lifts him over the adversities of life and additionally helps him rescue those in need. In contrast to Gwendolen, Daniel suggests a Schopenhauerian commitment to selflessness and dedication to the needs of others. The Schopenhauerian choice, Daniel realises, is that although there is no end for suffering, the choice of self-denial over the needs of another can avoid a tragic end of suffering.

Transmission of Schopenhauerian Themes from Eliot to D. H. Lawrence

After a suitable transition has been found in George Eliot, we can see that the fiction of D. H. Lawrence is also indebted to Schopenhauer, possibly through the indirect impact of Eliot on Lawrence. The duality of nature, individuals' inextricable ties to the larger will, and the idea of generation are some Schopenhauerian notions that can be traced in Lawrence's works. The fourth chapter of my study considers the devotion of Lawrence to some of these concepts. Moreover, the disclosure of beliefs exchanged between Eliot and Lawrence can be helpful to explore the indirect possibility of Lawrence's acknowledgment of Schopenhauer's themes from Eliot's

writings. To this end, first I will reveal what Eliot and Schopenhauer offered Lawrence to form his philosophy and later I will disclose the Schopenhauerian ideas that Lawrence may have acknowledged by reading Eliot's *Middlemarch*.

George Eliot's preferred design would take two sets of lovers, examine the dynamic and chemical affinities between them, and analyse the relationships with an objective approach, even though there are some exceptions, like the final destiny of Dorothea and her relationship with Ladislaw. Nevertheless, the framework she used became part of Lawrence's interest. Jessie Chambers describes how Lawrence referred to Eliot's plot development process when he started to write *The White Peacock* in the spring of 1906: "'The usual plan, is to take two couples and develop their relationships,' he said. 'Most of George Eliot's are on that plan. Anyhow, I don't want a plot, I should be bored with it. I shall try two couples for a start'" (103). Further to the framework of two pairs of lovers, Eliot considers another quality in the relationship between the sexes which Lawrence acknowledged and developed by using Schopenhauer's view on the physical qualities between lovers. Personal affinity is what Eliot stresses considerably in the relationship between her characters. She tends to form her characters' affinities based on social similarities such as wealth, education, personal characteristics, and class. A possible work of Eliot which shows this idea is *The Mill on the Floss*, whose plot revolves around the respective relationships between Maggie, Philip and Stephen. Maggie's character is divided between her intellectual and sexual desires for Philip, who is a hunchbacked and intellectual person, and Stephen, an energetic young socialite in St. Ogg's, (assumed

suitor of Maggie's cousin Lucy Deane). Early in the novel, she develops a friendship with Philip, whose intellectual mind serves as an outlet for her intellectual romantic desires but when she later meets Stephen, against their irrational intellect and judgment, they become attracted to each other, and cause her to doubt her previous declaration of love for Philip. Eliot's heroine struggles between her love for Stephen and her duties to Philip and Lucy, but after all the efforts that Stephen puts into seducing her for marriage, she rejects him and immediately makes her way back to Lucy and Philip for forgiveness. The tension between circumstances that arise in the novel is often rooted in Maggie's frustrated attempts at satisfying intellectual or sexual desires. Jessie Chambers recalls Lawrence's disapproval of George Eliot's preference for intellect above sexual affinity, which allowed Maggie to subdue her sexuality:

Lawrence adored *The Mill on the Floss*, but always declared that George Eliot had "gone and spoilt it half way through". He could not forgive the marriage of the vital Maggie Tulliver to the cripple Philip. He used to say: "It was wrong, wrong. She could never have made her do it." When, later on, we came to Schopenhauer's essay on *The Metaphysics of Love*, against the passage: "The third consideration is the *Skeleton*, since it is the foundation of the type of the species. Next to old age and disease; nothing disgusts us so much as a deformed shape; even the most beautiful face cannot make amends for it." Lawrence wrote in the margin: "Maggie Tulliver and Philip." (Chambers 97-98)

Schopenhauer's theory of sexual affinity finds its primary roots in the idea of reproduction. It explains that the purpose of the will to reproduce is to maximise life. In other words, the individual, by giving birth to a new existence, attempts to conquer death. To achieve this goal, the sexual affinity forms its initial steps from the physical qualities of two individuals; indeed, each seeks a mate who will neutralise his or her "defect" (Sch., *Metaphysics*: 121-22). Schopenhauer states that in the first place "everyone will decidedly prefer and ardently desire the most beautiful individuals; ... in the second place he will specially desire in the other individual *those* perfections that he himself lacks" (*WWR* 2: 539). In this way, the individual guarantees the type of children by not transferring his own deficiencies. Hence, the individual serves the species whereas he is under the delusion that he is making love with his beloved. Accordingly, this particular child will be begotten as "the true end of the whole love-story, though the parties concerned are unaware of it" (*WWR* 2: 535). From this, Schopenhauer concludes that both sexes are immersed in a certain delusion. In fact, they search for "the maintenance of the regular and correct type of the species" (*WWR* 2: 540), not love. Based on this Schopenhauerian view, Lawrence opposes Maggie's rejection of vivacious and handsome, but unintellectual, Stephen for deformed, but clever, Philip. For Eliot, Maggie overlooks Philip's physical limitation in favour of his intellectual qualities; however, according to both Schopenhauer and Lawrence, sexual affinities always overpower and negate intellectual qualities when it comes to attraction between the sexes. As Schopenhauer explains this affinity works like "acid and alkali" (*Metaphysics* 124). According to him, although acid and

alkali remain as individuals, most are drawn towards and intertwine with one another, transform and alter one another, and only through their composition together, they create something new. I shall explore Lawrence's use of this Schopenhauerian concept in greater depth during chapter four.

The idea that Eliot tends to base her characters' affinities on social class, can also be traced in Lawrence's writings. For instance, in *The White Peacock*, Lawrence reveals a structural conflict between modernity and tradition; his heroine, Lettie Beardsall is a young woman living in the countryside who must choose between two admirers who are opposites of each other in their qualities, George Saxton, a farmer's son and Leslie Tempest, son of a wealthy mine-owner. One man is simple, with a rural appeal, and the other man is quite urbanised. The plot of the novel focuses on and revolves around this conflict, as the reader is shown the elaborate fluctuations of a duel attraction and courtship and how strongly passions affect the lives of the characters. This dynamic, which creates the essence of the storyline, concludes in Lettie's marriage to Leslie and George's despair and decline.

The same kind of choice can be seen in George Eliot's *Adam Bede*. Her character, Hetty Sorrel must select between Arthur Donnithorne and Adam Bede, and Silas Marner's dilemma varies only slightly: Eppie is essentially choosing, between two worlds. One lover and path leads into a modest, unpretentious life and the other to a proud and wealthy existence. It seems that when Lawrence started to write his novel, he approaches nearly to Eliot's idea of personal affinity. In *The Rainbow*, too, Ursula Brangwen must choose between two lovers. Her internal

conflict is between the gardener, Anthony Schofield, and the soldier, Anton Skrebensky. Likewise, in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, Connie Chatterley has to come to a resolution by choosing either her beloved spouse or his gamekeeper. Although these fictional conflicts between urban and rural can also represent the actual class conflict in the nineteenth century, the conflict between the working class and the nobility, I believe that Lawrence, at least in the case of *The Rainbow* and *The White Peacock*, is more inclined towards Schopenhauer's philosophy of opposition between the sexes. For instance, in *The White Peacock*, Lettie recognises that she and Leslie had no mutual sexual affinity; she cannot be "flesh of one flesh" (*WP* 167) with him. Accordingly, it seems that Lawrence admires Schopenhauer's concept of marriage in *The Metaphysics of Love*. Lawrence realises that negligence of physical appearance in choosing mate can lead to a tragic end. Indeed, Schopenhauer's philosophy of sexual affinity helped him to develop an alternative mythology to Eliot's idea of personal affinity.

George Eliot's writings not only became part of Lawrence's interest, but also appear as an intervening figure or the indirect transmission of some Schopenhauerian ideas like desire, will and the world as idea into the works of Lawrence. Although J. Schneider assumes that Lawrence read and studied *The World as Will and Idea* and his art is a development of Schopenhauer's view of *will* and *idea* (Allan R. Zoll and Mitzi M. Brunsdale also make the same assumption), they maybe consider Rose Marie Burwell's "A Catalogue of D. H. Lawrence's Reading from Early Childhood," which cites *The World as Will and Idea* (210) as well as Rudolf Dircks's translation

of the *Essays* of Schopenhauer among Lawrence's reading. Burwell's citation for *The World as Will and Idea* is more dependent on Harry T. Moore's *The Intelligent Heart*, which relies on Jessie's letter and the idea that Lawrence read aloud to her and her brother "The Metaphysics of Love" chapter from *The World as Will and Idea*. Although "The Metaphysics of Love" is published in some editions as a complement, it is not a chapter of Schopenhauer's major work. Even if it was a chapter of *The World as Will and Idea*, it is documented that Lawrence read it from Dircks's *Essays*. There is no evidence that Lawrence read Schopenhauer's major work or had it among his books. Furthermore, Burwell seems to have recognised Moore's mistake because in her later edited "Checklist" (published in Keith Sagar's *A D. H. Lawrence Handbook*) she does not list *The World as Will and Idea* and considers the translation of Dircks's *Essays* as the only Schopenhauerian source read by Lawrence.¹⁷ Accordingly, this raises the question of how the idea of will, desire and representation were created and then articulated in Lawrence's writing?

Eleanor H. Green assumes that "it is unlikely that Lawrence did not read and reflect at length on the entire volume before asking Jessie to read it" (*Lawrence*330) but what if we consider that *The World as Will and Idea* was not a source of transmitting Schopenhauer's concepts of will and idea into Lawrence's writing. I assume that George Eliot's *Middlemarch* and *Daniel Deronda* can be considered as indirect sources for Lawrence's acknowledgment of Schopenhauer's concepts, although "The Metaphysics of Love" has brief passing glances at these notions. Furthermore, I ascribe in particular some Schopenhauerian ideas in Lawrence's

¹⁷Evidence taken from Montgomery's *The Visionary D. H. Lawrence*.

works, especially in *The White Peacock*, into Eliot's writing. Early in this section, I asserted the details surrounding Lawrence's admiration of Eliot's writing, and moreover I explored the indebtedness of Eliot's works to Schopenhauer's philosophy of will in the section on "George Eliot, Schopenhauer and the Will." In *Middlemarch*, Eliot pays more attention to the idea of selflessness rather than selfishness. Schopenhauer's theory of will provides her with the appropriate medium which enables her to accomplish her most ambitious goal of instilling in the reader the idea of sympathy for another. Eliot considers sympathy as "consciousness of life beyond the self" (*Mm* 1) and this is the most significant characteristic of her heroine, Dorothea Brooke. Early in the novel, Dorothea enthusiastically seeks to help those around her and by the end she learns also to extend such compassion to her children. Furthermore, in Schopenhauer's philosophy, the discovery of the will in the self relies upon the potential of imagination and experience which results in an individual's act beyond the illusion of the isolated personality. Like Dorothea, Lawrence's heroine, Lettie, finds herself pregnant by Leslie, and it is this, rather than commitment which keeps her in her relationship. Opposed to her early presence in the novel, by the end she pays more attention to her role as a mother rather than considering her own desires and will. Lawrence works to show Schopenhauer's concept of will throughout *The White Peacock* in order to reach Schopenhauer's profound notion of the will to live. What impact this concept had on Lawrence and why Schopenhauer was so appealing to him is the argument that I will take into account in great details in Lawrence's chapter.

Apart from the concept of the will in *Middlemarch*, it can also be taken as a representation of Schopenhauer's philosophy of music and the world as idea. This consideration becomes more significant when we see that the same qualities can be traced in Lawrence's *The White Peacock*. Schopenhauer's philosophy holds that the impulse behind all human actions and nature is the will. It is through the will that individuals can ascertain the reason of their suffering. What we see in the world is the representation of the object. In other words, our perception is the interaction between our senses and the thing which creates an idea of the thing in our mind. By considering the relationship between the body and the will, Schopenhauer observes that not only the man but also the entire world is a "permanent battle-field" of one will, whose "inner contradiction with itself becomes visible" (*WWR I*: 266). In such an observable world, music, for Schopenhauer, plays an important alternative role among the visible contradictions of the world. It reveals the reality of the thing and expresses the will bypassing the ideas. In his view, music is closer to the essence of the thing in itself because it needs fewer symbolic and representational forms. Indeed, music does not imitate appearances; rather, it expresses the inner nature, the will as directly as possible. As Schopenhauer says:

Music does not express this or that particular and definite pleasure, this or that affliction, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, or peace of mind, but joy, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, peace of mind *themselves*, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature, without any accessories, and so also without the motives for them. (*WWR I*: 261)

This Schopenhauerian view of music provided Eliot a framework to portray sympathy by way of sound in *Middlemarch*. For instance, Casaubon is “not fond of the piano,” and he speaks about music unsympathetically as “measured noises” that reduce his concentration (*Mm* 64-65). At Lowick, Casaubon owns a harpsichord that is hidden under a heap of dusty books. For Mrs. Cadwallader this represents the idea that “[s]omebody put a drop [of his blood] under a magnifying-glass, and it was all semicolons and parentheses” (*Mm* 71). Casaubon’s icy attitudes towards music render more generally into the absence of interest in anything that is not associated with his academic works. Another example which can fully represent the idea of sounds as a copy of the will is Casaubon’s epistolary proposal, and Dorothea’s acceptance letter. It shows a silent and unpassionate love. Casaubon’s dried written betrothal lacks any declaration of love: as solely disclosed by his letter as an “accurate statement of [his] feelings” (*Mm* 41). The written offer of matrimony is accompanied with a “frigid rhetoric” which is “as sincere as the bark of a dog, or the cawing of an amorous rook” (*Mm* 48). As the reader reads Casaubon’s declaration, George Eliot directs his concentration away from the story to the irritating sounds of the barking dog and the raucous call of rook. Amazingly, in Casaubon’s icy terms, Dorothea honestly heeds something dissimilar, something much further than the apparent “thin music” of his wooing: “Dorothea’s faith supplied all that Mr Casaubon’s words seemed to leave unsaid: what believer sees a disturbing omission or infelicity? The text, whether of prophet or of poet, expands for whatever we can put into it, and even his bad grammar is sublime” (*Mm* 48). Through all this, it is

appropriate to say that Eliot not only renders Dorothea's "errors in seeing" Casaubon's true nature but also the weakness of her auditory imagination. In "Note on Form in Art" (1868), George Eliot writes that "boundary or outline and visual appearance are modes of Form which in music and poetry can only have a metaphorical presence" (356). It seems that Eliot by using Schopenhauer's view of music and by creating an aural world in her novel, ceases to provide a vivid view of the world as will and representation.

A similar idea and structure can be seen in D. H. Lawrence's *The White Peacock*. The novel is based on realism and ceases to represent the duality of the world and surrounding environment. An outstanding example of this idea is George Saxton, a young farmer, who represents the traditional rural world, a world close to nature, but on the other side Leslie, the son of a mine owner, who is the opposite of George, and an example of a complex modern world. In reading *The White Peacock* if the readers listen closely to the melodic functions of the sounds, they can find a primary connection between Schopenhauer's philosophy of music and Lawrence's purpose of representing the duality of the world. Following from his emulation of George Eliot's image of music which has its seed in Schopenhauer's philosophy of music, Lawrence thus embodies his novel with musical sound, dialects and tones which indeed aim to reveal the reality of the thing in itself. He creates a dual world. The young people of Nethermere gather in festivals, picnics, parties, receptions where they endlessly discuss literature, art and music. Meantime, the author represent a brutal nature of animal and human where animals are slaughtered by individuals or

killed by one another. Indeed, beneath the surface, the initial reality is the physical reality of life and nature generating violence and suffering.

This specific quality of music (as a copy of the will) applies to the plot designing of Lawrence's *The White Peacock*. He uses the conflicting and discordant sounds to create an aural or musical world. For instance, Lawrence begins the novel by establishing a level of crying and yelling sounds like the yelling and screaming of the maimed animals slaughtered by humans or stocked by animals. These sounds have a metaphorical presence suggesting a powerful, hungry, and irrational will behind all human and animal actions. Lawrence concedes, in terms very similar to Schopenhauer's view, that the apparent world is "a permanent battle-field" of one will (*WWR I*: 266). Sound, for Lawrence and Eliot, offers an important alternative or metaphorical way of portraying the observable contradictions of the visible world which results in individuals' suffering. Lawrence exhibits this musical function of sound in the first paragraph of *The White Peacock* when the murmur of the stream falling through the millrace evokes "the tumult of life" in "the young days when the valley was lusty" (*WP* 1), as it might have been for George Saxton before "the torture of strange, complex modern life" supervened (*WP* 319).

In *The White Peacock*, the realism that the reader encounters is not simply visual and external; it is also auditory and deeply internal. Lawrence's emphasis on tune demonstrates the more general consideration he gives to music. We see this point early in the novel when Lettie goes across the piano and plays "at random, letting the numbed notes fall like dead leaves from the haughty, ancient piano" (*WP*

14). After a while, George Saxton enters and asks her why does not she “play something with a tune in it” (*WP* 14). Lettie turns around in her chair to give him a sarcastic answer but his appearance scatters her words:

“A tune!” she echoed, watching the swelling of his arms as he moved them, and the rise and fall of his breasts, wonderfully solid and white. Then having curiously examined the sudden meeting of the sunhot skin with the white flesh in his throat, her eyes met his, and she turned again to the piano, while the colour grew in her ears, mercifully sheltered by a profusion of bright curls.

“What shall I play?” she asked, fingering the keys somewhat confusedly.

He dragged out a book of songs from a little heap of music, and set it before her.

“Which do you want to sing?” she asked thrilling a little as she felt his arms so near her.

“Anything you like.”

“A love song?” she said. (*WP* 14-15)

Lettie begins to play what she wills to play, her music is passionately internal, and rises from her inner nature. Her performance has a direct correlation with her feeling and the impression she has received from George. Perhaps she knows that “[music] is such a great and exceedingly fine art, its effect on man’s innermost nature is so powerful, and it is so completely and profoundly understood by him in his innermost being as an entirely universal language” (*WWR1*: 256). Yet applying the same critical view to the structural and melodic presences of music in *The White Peacock* allows us to consider Lettie’s impulse to play to impress George. Their relationship

begins and ends within both a deeply musical and a realistic text. It is in the last passionate scene between them that Lettie blames George, stating that, when the fibers of her life were untangled, he neglected to entwine them into a “chord” with his. Now she is bound forever to another. It seems that Lawrence, in terms very similar to Schopenhauer, posits a direct and necessary relationship between music and Schopenhauer’s much larger view of the individuals’ *will*: “music also, since it passes over the Ideas, is also quite independent of the phenomenal world, positively ignores it, and to a certain extent, could still exist even if there were no world at all, which cannot be said of the other arts. Thus music is as *immediate* an objectification and copy of the whole *will* as the world itself” (*WWR1*: 257). Through all this, it is possible to say that since “music is the language of feeling and of passion, just as words are the language of reason” (*WWR1*: 259), it became particularly interesting to George Eliot and Lawrence. For both of them, Schopenhauer joined all three lofty, individual and intellectual ideas: the world as will, the world as representation and music.

Like Eliot’s *Middlemarch*, *The White Peacock* is less about the language, and more about the harmonious sound over the verbiage that helps Lawrence create a Schopenhauerian sense of reality. As Jacqueline Gouirand says in “Language and communication in *The White Peacock*” (2013), Lawrence was trying “to find an appropriate language, though he preferred to write about artistic ‘utterance’ or ‘voice’ rather than language” (47). Accordingly, the musical realism in the novel seems Lawrence’s first step in creating a complete and coherent picture of individual

lives. Finally, we see that even if Lawrence had not read Schopenhauer's main work, but Eliot's *Middlemarch* which conveys great details of Schopenhauer's philosophy and was also part of Lawrence's interest, became an indirect source of receiving Schopenhauerian ideas in Lawrence's *The White Peacock*.

James's Indirect Acknowledgement of Schopenhauer

An indirect source for James's adoption of Schopenhauerian ideas can be considered George Eliot. In the section on George Eliot, I spoke precisely about Schopenhauer's theory of compassion in *Daniel Deronda* and *Middlemarch*, and I specified which characters represent Schopenhauer's views both directly and subtly. Furthermore, I argued the signs of his influence appearing at certain points in Eliot's text. Developing further my former findings that Eliot's works convey Schopenhauerian themes and that they come from the individual's worst nature and his inability to overcome the negative influence of the will, I aim to show in this section that James was so enchanted by Eliot that he wrote *The Portrait of a Lady*. More precisely, my study shows the importance of Eliot as a model for James's novel. It is work worth doing, for the cognition of this provides a vivid background to have a better understanding of the Schopenhauerian concepts in *The Portrait of a Lady* and increases the possibility of both sides of Schopenhauer's notion of the will in James's novel. One side of the will forces one to move forward, and it forms the events in one's life, and the other side leads one into a trap of one's own making.

The condemnation of the will as the source of human misery could be seen in *Middlemarch*, *Daniel Deronda* and *The Portrait of a Lady* as a common theme, and the denial of self as a compassionate act is viewed as a remedy for egoism.

In 1864, when James's first piece of fiction, titled *A Tragedy of Error*, was published, Schopenhauer had been dead for four years, Dickens and George Eliot were in full career and Hardy was far from beginning to publish. James's second novel, *Roderick Hudson* (1875), precedes George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* (1876), while his *Portrait of a Lady* (1881) follows it.¹⁸ George Eliot, as Alwyn Berland states, "asserted a more general, more pervasive influence on James than is ordinarily acknowledged" (72). This influence is neither direct nor exclusive, but its consequence creates a significant penetration of the Schopenhauerian views in James's writing. The works of Eliot do appear to offer more than just an interesting speculative analogy to James in writing *The Portrait of a Lady*. Eliot was absorbed in a philosophy that offered her a free mind and this was something that James greatly admired, as evident in his letter to Grace Norton remarking that "a marvelous mind throbs in every page of *Middlemarch*. It raises the standard of what is to be expected of women (by your leave!) we know all about the female heart; but apparently there is a female brain, too" (*Letters 1*: 351). James was not only interested in *Middlemarch*; rather, he believed that *Daniel Deronda* as well possessed a gorgeous mind. In another letter to his brother William, he noted "your remarks on *D.D* [*Daniel Deronda*] were most sagacious. The book is a great expose of the female

¹⁸Bellringer's *Henry James*.

mind” (12 January 1877, MH-H).¹⁹ In fact, James was so enchanted by Eliot that he wrote “*Daniel Deronda: A Conversation*” (1876). This essay shows the importance of Eliot as a model for *The Portrait of a Lady*.

“*Daniel Deronda: A Conversation*” is a discussion between three characters (Theodora, Pulcheria and Constantius) who argue about Eliot’s *Daniel Deronda* while having some ideas about *Middlemarch*. The story revolves around their criticism of Eliot’s novel. This conversation includes at least two comments which explicitly confirm my argument that James observed the ideas of the world as will and suffering through Eliot’s *Daniel Deronda*. Eliot’s heroine, Gwendolen Harleth, is a beautiful and complacent lady who is struggling to maintain her freedom; meanwhile, her marriage with cruel Henleigh Grandcourt leads to her being crushed by a cold, self-centred and manipulative husband. Constantius, James’s spokesman in the “Conversation,” is knowledgeable and has written reviews as well as one novel since the time of the conversation. He describes Gwendolen’s story in a way which is remarkably applicable to Isabel: “The universe forcing itself with a slow, inexorable pressure into a narrow complacent, and yet after all extremely sensitive mind, and making it ache with the pain of the process- that is Gwendolen’s story” (*Conversation*9). The internal pressure that forces Gwendolen and Isabel to choose their mates is similar. It is the *will* that forms their egoistic character and leads to their failure. Gwendolen’s character embodies an “inborn energy of egoistic desire” (*DD* 40). We observe that as well in Isabel’s character when the narrator considers

¹⁹I need to clarify that James’s understanding of “female mind” underscores only the works he discusses with his brother and Grace Norton, rather than attributing his theory to all Eliot’s novels.

her as a “rank egoist” (*PL* 53). Relying on their egoism, both heroines look for liberty in their marriage while the reality of marriage means not being independent. In both the novels, we encounter the narrators’ emphasis on the heroines’ wilful character. We see that Gwendolen’s “willful” (*DD* 444) thoughts do not allow her to sleep and Isabel as well is introduced to us as a person with a “strong will” (*PL* 42). The novels reveal this idea that the way in which Isabel and Gwendolen commit themselves to their personal desires and the fulfilment of the obligations imposed upon them by their own *will*. It is the existence of this characteristic in their nature that prevents them from seeing the absurdity of their desire.

Furthermore, the relationship between Gwendolen and Grandcourt is consistent with Schopenhauer’s concept of egoism and the will. Schopenhauer’s perception of the will is presented in both characters and forces them into a trap of their own making. From the start of the novel, the most important thing in Gwendolen’s and Grandcourt’s movement is self-gratification. Grandcourt is aware of his wife’s selfishness and his idea is “to engage all his wife’s egoism on the same side as his own, ... she ought to understand that he was the only possible envoy” (*DD* 599-600). Such a movement is also observed in the relationship between Isabel and Osmond when he wants her mind “to be his-attached to his own ... he expected her intelligence to operate altogether in his favour” (*PL* 432). The frustrating selfish manner in which James embodies Osmond’s character is not merely indebted to Grandcourt, for that egoistic quality can also be traced in Eliot’s character, Casaubon. Casaubon is a selfish character who longs for his own satisfaction and

knowledge. He represents Schopenhauer's notion of the blind ego, one that illogically and irrationally wants for and attains useless information just for the sake of acquiring it; it is a display of an unregulated unhealthy will and its ceaseless "pining hunger" (*Mm* 494). What is observable in Eliot's authorial voice, in asserting her male characters, is that they are both a certain representation of a wilful egoism which can be the fundamental nature of all individuals.

James's conception of Osmond is strongly similar to Casaubon and Grandcourt. Osmond's qualities suggest that James entailed the conflicts of Casaubon's characteristics and Grandcourt's in creating Osmond's character. The likeness between these male characters is confirmed by the common nature of the disillusion of both Dorothea and Isabel in realising the truth about their husbands. Dorothea chooses Casaubon partly because he is an intellectual and spiritual man and is not like her other suitors among "the commonest minds" (*Mm* 46). She thinks that in Casaubon's characteristic there is "clearly something better than anger and despondency" (*Mm* 210). This "something better" is her husband's knowledge and intellect that might enable her to achieve what she could not gain (knowledge). James's *The Portrait of a Lady* recounts Isabel's involvement with the same illusory perspective. Isabel is fascinated with Osmond's "knowledge of life" while "his egotism lay hidden like a serpent in a bank of flowers" (*PL* 430). She regards Osmond as having a fine mind and a deep soul. She rejects Ralph's reservations about Osmond that he is "narrow [and] selfish" (*PL* 345). Her youthful and naive mind is unable to believe her cousin. If Osmond is "to be narrow, if that's to be

selfish, then it's very well" to her and she is not "frightened by such words" (*PL* 347). "His ugliness; his awkwardness ... [and] the state of his health had seemed not a limitation [to her], but a kind of intellectual advantage" (*PL* 337). Soon after marriage, the heroines discover the tragic waste not only of their husbands but their own steadfast will. For instance, Isabel realises that "Osmond's beautiful mind gave [her] neither light nor air; Osmond's beautiful mind indeed seemed to peep down from a small high window and mock at her" (*PL* 429). They are caught in the situation that Schopenhauer describes as "the Will must be broken by the greatest personal suffering before its self-denial appears" (*WWR I*: 392).

James and Eliot posit their egoistic heroines in marriages with men who possess the same wilful quality. The heroines are unaware of just how crucial and offensive the will can be. They are a perfect picture of youthfulness, lack of knowledge and egoism. For example, in James's "Conversation," Constantius observes Gwendolen's immaturity and agrees that she "is perhaps at the first a little childish for the weight of interest she has to carry" (*Conversation* 9). This criticism is perhaps not applicable to Isabel, whose immaturity is of a radically different kind. The foundation of Isabel's knowledge is based on books and magazines and she lacks an image of reality. Although these characters suffer from lack of knowledge at the beginning, they obtain a greater knowledge of their inner nature through their experience of conjugal life. Gwendolen's main delusion is the belief that she can overpower Grandcourt in a similar manner as she had subordinated other men. Isabel and Dorothea, on the other hand, are warned about their husbands' wilfulness but

they have the same perspective and enter their marriage completely deceived about their character. It seems that for both novelists the very chance to acknowledge the truth of internal pressure, the will, is through experience.

Despite experience that seems the only way of recognising the inner nature, in the novels, there exists a clever and intellectual mind who wants to make the protagonist conscious of her illusory love and acts. Daniel in Eliot's novel is a great example of this idea, likewise Ralph in James's work. The use of these two characters gives one the sense that both authors were considering a moral philosophy. Daniel is the counterpart to Gwendolen, or the counterpart in the matter of egoism. He has a tendency to help others at a cost to himself and he is the one who guides Gwendolen onto a path of righteousness on which she will overcome her suffering and will by helping others. This reminds us of Schopenhauer's idea that the remedy of egoism is self-denial. The central view of compassion, according to Schopenhauer, is one's reaction to another's possible or real suffering and that compassion causes one to treat another's misery as one treats one's own misery. It seems that Daniel, by embracing the characteristic essence of Schopenhauer's morality, compassion and duty for others, wants to lead the desire of the individual will in charitable directions. Likewise, in James's *Portrait*, there is something very fascinating in Ralph's mission. He is a very generous man. He ignores his own self and provides Isabel an inheritance in the hope of freeing her from financial considerations when selecting a mate. He is the one who looks after Isabel and also warns her about Osmond. Daniel and Ralph are the only men with whom the

heroines achieve communication and understanding. Indeed, the heroic activity of these men is meant to emphasise the destructive role of egoism and stress the discrepancy between desire and what is achievable.

Moreover, the main characteristic of both Daniel and Ralph includes one of the most significant elements of Schopenhauer's philosophy. For Schopenhauer, one of the most important distinguishing factors between humans and animals is the connection between the will and intellect. Following Schopenhauer's philosophy that the world is the will, the role of intellect seems ineffectual and faint. According to Schopenhauer, the intellect appears on occasion to steer our will, but actually the will is "the strong blind man carrying the sighted lame man on his shoulders" (*WWR* 2: 209). Daniel's character, to a large degree, can be explained by this Schopenhauerian philosophy. He is the only one in Eliot's novel that shows "his intellect [as] he [begins] to examine the grounds of his emotion, and consider[s] how far he must resist its guidance" (*DD* 510). What Eliot wants to emphasise is Daniel's "want of tact" (James, *Conversation*: 7). As James states in his essay, "in the manner of Daniel Deronda, throughout, there is something that one may call a want of tact. The epigraphs in verse are a want of tact; ... the importunity of the moral reflections is a want of tact; the very diffuseness of the book is a want of tact" (*Conversation* 7). If we interpret "want of tact" to the "will of intellect," then Daniel's character, as a person who examines his emotion and resists "its guidance," offers a new solution to the problem of Schopenhauer's blind will. In what Daniel's character suggests, we find logic meaningful and practical while for Schopenhauer the intellect is only an

emissary of external happenings, “nature has produced it for the service of an individual will” (*WWR* 2: 142). Furthermore, according to James’s essay, we realise that the moral concern of Eliot’s novel lies in the idea of “want of act” (*Conversation* 7). This is also, as I shall make clearer later, applicable to Ralph Touchett.

Finally, it is possible to say that in the majority of the cases, it is the same conflict (between the mind and the will) that forms the tragic end of a romance novel. For instance, this point and its supporting imagery, as previously shown, appear in *Daniel Deronda*, albeit arranged differently, and concern primarily the psychological identity of an individual, the power of will, and the reality of selfishness. The same structure can be seen in James’s *The Portrait of a Lady*. There are good reasons, internal and external, to consider Eliot’s selected works as a model for this novel. In James’s “Conversation,” Constantius frequently emphasises that he can read “nothing of George Eliot’s without enjoyment” (4). He states that “in whatever she writes I enjoy her mind – her large, luminous, airy mind” (*Conversation* 4). It is enlightening that James used George Eliot as a touchstone to write *The Portrait of a Lady*. It seems that he structures his characters in terms that resemble Eliot’s characters. Accordingly, if one acknowledges *Daniel Deronda* and *Middlemarch* as the preferred measure of James’s character selection in writing *The Portrait of a Lady*, it is possible to say that Gwendolen and Dorothea, Grandcourt and Casaubon, and Daniel and Ladislav resemble Isabel’s selfishness and her pursuit of free-will, Osmond’s egotism and lack of genuine affection, and Ralph’s generosity as “[he] had never been egotistic” (*PL* 502).

CHAPTER THREE

Schopenhauer in Henry James's *The Portrait of a Lady*

As F. R. Leavis writes in his defence of a crucial aspect of *The Wings of the Dove* against some insensitive readers, “Henry James’s art ... has a moral fineness so far beyond the perception of his critics that they can accuse him of the opposite. This fineness, this clairvoyant moral intelligence, is the informing spirit of that technique by the indirections and inexplicitnesses of which these critics are baffled” (*GTG* 182). I cite this quotation here because it is quite predictable; misconceptions of James’s ideas and fiction abound not only in the public reading but among his professional critics. So, the critical scope of this chapter goes beyond the basic terms of analysis which identify the differences between James’s and Schopenhauer’s ideologies, highlighting marks of Schopenhauer in James’s writing. To this end, I employ Schopenhauer’s philosophical debates on will, love, egoism, compassion and suffering to analyse the meaning of James’s terms in *The Portrait of a Lady*. The implicit critical point on which the chapter is founded is that there is important evidence of Schopenhauerian allusions in James’s work; that is, that evidence through which we realise that James read and digested Schopenhauer, where his subsequent fiction deals with the themes associated with Schopenhauer, and the way in which a Schopenhauerian understanding of *The Portrait of a Lady* becomes possible.

James and Germany

“In his critical writing, James continually asserts that an artist’s full range of endeavour as well as the nature of his environment must be taken into account if a balanced evaluation of the artist’s achievement is to be reached” (Mossman 9). Considering this idea, a knowledge of James’s feelings and attitudes toward Germany has a particular value in the search for a greater understanding of his thought and works.

Henry James, Sr., wrote to his friend Emerson (1849) that he was planning to take his family to Europe for a few years to allow them “to absorb French and German and get a better sensuous education as they can’t get here [America]” (*HJA* 353). James’s family were immersed in European culture, and the impact was strong enough that they all learned to speak French and German.²⁰ From 1855 until 1858, William and Henry were in England and France, and then between 1859-1860 the James family moved back and forth between Europe and Newport, Rhode Island, in the US. Later James senior had decided that “it was time for his boys to absorb the German language and intellectual climate” (Hovanec 7). In so doing, in the summer of 1860, Henry and his older brother moved to Germany to study in a German school in Bonn. Consequently, it was during 1859 and 1860 that one may say that Henry James’s acquaintance with Germany arose.

²⁰Matthiessen’s *The James Family*. P.69

After moving to Germany in summer 1860, during his study in Bonn, he wrote to his friend T. S. Perry:

I am now working at Schiller's play of *Maria Stewart*, which I like exceedingly, although I do get along so slowly with it. I am convinced that German may take its stand among the difficult languages of the earth. I shall consider myself fortunate if I am able, when I leave Bonn, to translate even the simplest things. (*SLH* 14)

In 1867, James tells Perry that “I should think that by the time you get home you will have become tolerably well saturated with the French language and spirit; and if you contrive to do as much by the German, you will be a pretty wise man” (*SLH* 21). James notes that he “found German prose much tougher than the verse and thereby more opposed to ‘life’...” (*Autobiography* 255). Although James did enjoy the struggle with this difficult language, as Fred Kaplan writes, “In later years, the language was to grow distasteful to him, the culture the epitome of dullness and insensitivity” (43). Whether deliberately or unintentionally, a copious amount of what James perceived as to the characteristics of the Germans found its way into his fiction. In some parts, we see that James’s characters show an interest in German culture such as music, life style and discipline.

Being familiar with the German approach towards life, James saw these similar aspects in his own surrounding environment which subsequently led him to report them artistically. He presents an intricate reality with a beautiful structure by

exploiting the complex language of philosophy and the style of the Italian artists.²¹ To him, most of the German artists were deficient in the idea of beauty and they dealt in “the infinite variations of grotesqueness which they regard as the necessary environment of the human lot” (*Transatlantic* 352). He observed this and made a decision to deal with it through “the complex language of the German philosophers” (Hovanec 134) as expressed in his own artistic way. Although the language of the German philosophers was harsh and difficult for James, it mirrored the complexity of life in their circumstances. As such, he was clearly interested in using philosophy to represent the complexity of life and transfer its real meaning.²² Following this idea, James’s views of German culture and thoughts continue to remain a valuable preface for us to grasp his understanding and knowledge of a German philosopher like Schopenhauer.

James and Schopenhauer

There seems to be little consideration of Schopenhauerian allusions in Henry James’s works. For instance, J. Firebaugh’s article “A Schopenhauerian Novel: James’s *The Princess Casamassima*” appears to be the only study that has indicated the

²¹See Viola Hopkins Winner’s *Henry James and the Visual Arts*. P. 38-44.

²²Among German philosophers, Goethe seems to have appealed the most to him. Goethe’s works appear in James’s library as early as the 1860s (Edel’s *Henry James: The Untried Years* P. 260). James read Goethe when he was in Bonn in 1860 (James, *Letters*: 88), and also during his grand tour of Europe in 1869. In 1865, he reviewed a translation of *Wilhelm Meister* and later in 1875 a new translation of Goethe’s *Faust*. James started reading Goethe’s *Wahlverwandtschaften* in 1860 and in the same year Schiller’s *Thirty Years’ War*. As it is documented, he also worked on Schiller’s play of *Maria Stuart* (James, *Letters*: 30). For further detail see: Judith Ryan’s “Elective Affinities: Goethe and Henry James.” And Dietmar Schloss’s *Culture and Criticism in Henry James* (1992).

importance of Schopenhauer to James. Firebaugh has drawn some links between James and Schopenhauer and he believes that in writing *The Princess Casamassima*, James thought of certain aspects of Schopenhauer, such as the pendulum swing of life between satiation and ennui, and the will to live. In this chapter, I will argue that although these Schopenhauerian terms occur in *The Princess Casamassima*, James had portrayed these themes earlier in *The Portrait of a Lady*. Furthermore, I contend the possible influence of Darwin in James's work to see whether James was drawing on Darwin's philosophy or he was possibly synthesizing a range of philosophical ideas.

During the nineteenth century, the notions of race and ethnicity became public discussion and assisted to form and reform some social traditions, cultural beliefs, and national policy. Literature was not exception because of the importance and political ramifications of these terms. Many nineteenth-century authors such as Henry James immersed themselves in transposing scientific ideas about these terms onto their literary creations. Henry James lived through the Civil War and noticed its outcome and the extensive force on speculations of mankind's origins, advancement, and scientific classifications that came after the publication of Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859). These incident (among numerous others) can help one to realise how James started discussing and rethinking race and ethnicity. Before considering James's attitudes towards the idea of race and ethnicity, specifically man's animal and sexual instinct, an overview of the ways in which Darwin addresses sexual selection in his writing is called for.

Darwin considers two forms of selection between the sexes. The first model is natural selection, which aims to create individuals that are well personalised to their environment. The second is sexual selection, which does not personalise individuals to their environment; rather, it develops the qualities involved in mate possession. Darwin's philosophy of natural selection concentrates on machine-like beings that "compete, colonise and improve" (Radick 143). In natural selection theory, the environment assists to determine which beings endure and produce descendants. This process is "the chief engine driving change in biological systems" (Campbell 204). In *Origin*, Darwin explains that "this form of selection depends, not on a struggle for existence in relation to other organic beings or to external conditions, but on a struggle between the individuals of one sex, generally the males, for the possession of the other sex" (69). This sort of selection results in the birth of few or no children without considering the enhancement of the next generation. While sexual selection, as Darwin states, "[is] one general law leading to the advancement of all organic beings - namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die" (208). In *The Descent of Man* (1871), Darwin argues in-depth the concept of sexual selection and clarifies that its success "depends on the advantages which certain individuals have over others of the same sex and species solely in respect of reproduction" (183). In other words, his philosophy reflects two key principles: man competition (the passionate effort among men for possessing the female) and woman selection (her will to choose the strongest and honorable man).

Recognising this Darwinian view helps us grasp the way social and natural impulses converge and diverge in James's fiction.

Leon Edel reports that Henry James read and met Charles Darwin in 1869. Although James was not steeped in the scientific method, it appears that he did assimilate elements of Darwin's philosophy into his novels. In *The American* (1877) Henry James introduces Christopher Newman, a wealthy American looking for a spouse in Europe: "An observer, with anything of an eye for national types, would have had no difficulty in determining the local origin of this underdeveloped connoisseur ... The gentleman on the divan was a powerful specimen of an American ... He had a very well-formed head, with a shapely, symmetrical balance of the frontal and the occipital development, and a good deal of straight, rather dry brown hair" (35). Implicitly, as Eric Haralson says, "James links national type – the question of who best qualifies as "the" American – with certain racially associated physical qualities, leaving those who do not fit this ideal to define the "American" type in the margins" (433). Details of Newman's characterisation, from his amassed wealth to his physical qualities, reflects a past time that characterised individuals by their economic and social position as well as their racial traits.

In comparison to *The American*, in *The Portrait of a Lady* a woman choice is the major theme of the novel. The *Portrait* has been very much analysed for the novelist's examination of matrimony, female sexuality, and particularly American independence in the face of European social traditions. In this novel, James wants the reader to observe the source of Isabel's attraction to Gilbert Osmond, an American

expatriate who is selfish, manipulative and malicious. Isabel is not an easily impressionable woman as evidenced by the way she “narrowly scrutinizes” her companions (14). She is very fond of her independence and does not arrive in Europe looking for a husband. The best man is of course the one who could guarantee her individuality, not using her as an object of adornment. Among her suitors Osmond seems a powerful specimen of an American who can protect and secure her liberty.

Isabel frequently talks about the various specimens of men who encounter her. The word specimens plays a significant role in her vocabulary, such as when she comments after her first meeting with Warburton that he is “a favorable specimen” (57). Isabel eventually comes to believe that Osmond is a different man, and this is when “her terrible problem arises [because] her science fails her: ‘her mind contained no class which offered a natural place for Mr. Osmond – he was a specimen apart’ (241)” (Bender 142). Her science fails her for as Goodwood states, she thinks she is marrying a great man, “though no one else thinks so” (305). Osmond’s mind and his American background are in fact the tools of seduction that draw Isabel away from other suitors and entrap her in a miserable life with Osmond. For James, “a change in the ethnic makeup of the United States meant a change in aesthetics and art” (Haralson 434). Therefore, we can see that *The Portrait of a Lady* as well engages with a scientific and popular anxiety about racial fate, as evident by Isabel when she constantly takes note of the specimens.

Scientific words like specimen and concentration on physical qualities represent another social progress, that of ethnography and biomedical anthropology.

“These pseudo-sciences,” as Haralson states, “held that biological traits determined character and fate and correlated skin color and other physical features with relative intellectual ability” (433). Although in *the Origin of Species* Darwin argues about these terms through his view of natural and sexual selection, Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation* and his philosophy of species predated Darwin’s evolutionary theory.²³ In Schopenhauer’s view, the sexual selection depends on the advantage that certain individuals have over others of the same sex and species solely in respect to reproduction. In other words, everyone decidedly prefers and “desire[s] in the other individual *those* perfections that he himself lacks” (*WWR* 2: 539) in order to guarantee the type of species by not transferring his own deficiencies. Darwin’s approach towards the origin of the species is similarly responsive to Schopenhauer’s subject of love and sex. This is also documented in Darwin’s writings on sexual selection, where he quotes Schopenhauer and states, “as the German philosopher Schopenhauer remarks, ‘the final aim of all love intrigues ... is nothing less than the composition of the next generation.’”²⁴ Therefore, it is possible to say that the cranial proportions and physical qualities in Schopenhauer’s philosophy became an integral part of Darwin’s theory of sexual selection and indirectly a constant element of James’s novel. Although James reflects Schopenhauer’s philosophy in less direct ways, but further to the impression that he

²³ Darwin’s theory of evolution transformed the race conversation by proposing that race could evolve, change, and become extinct.

²⁴ Charles Darwin’s *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex*. Chapter XX – “Secondary Sexual Characters of Man.”

received from Darwin, there is evidence which points to his direct acknowledgment of Schopenhauer.

Henry James first heard of Schopenhauer through his brother William James, the future professor of philosophy, who first read about the German philosopher in the winter of 1858-1859. William acquired *The World as Will and Idea* in a Parisian bookstore and he wrote in his New York diary that he was committing himself to read Schopenhauer as well as many other authors.²⁵ Thomas Sergeant Perry wrote in his diary about a day with his friend Henry James and the two other James brothers in Newport where William read extracts from Schopenhauer on a family vacation in 1858. Perry wrote of their days together and of how they first heard of Schopenhauer from the oldest brother:

We fished in various waters, and I well remember when William James brought home a volume of Schopenhauer and showed us with delight the ugly mug of the philosopher and read us amusing specimens of his delightful pessimism. (Matthiessen 89)

It was William who first told Henry about Schopenhauer. The older brother accepted that there was “a kernel of truth in Schopenhauer’s system” (Perry, 2: 721) and he never failed to lay emphasis on some truths that Schopenhauer also insisted upon, such as “the strong motivating force of the passions, and the looming presence of evil in the universe” (Firebaugh 178). Schopenhauer would have appealed to William because of “his emphasis on the will as the essence of each human being and his

²⁵ Grossman’s *William James in Russian culture*. P.67

concern with compassion” (Grossman 67).²⁶ According to Schopenhauer, what drives one towards benevolent actions or compassion is not the moral will. He claims that since our being is the result of our will and egoism such benevolence never happens. He believes that individuals can serve their wills and sympathetic concern for another person’s circumstances by ignoring the self. But further to the impression that he received from his brother, it is evident that James read Schopenhauer’s *Essays* among the books that he read.²⁷

The other documented evidence which points to James’s understanding of Schopenhauer is *The Princess Casamassima*. James’s work, which was published in 1886, alludes to Schopenhauer many times. As Firebaugh says, the novel gives “his readers a hint that the philosophy of Schopenhauer was not far from his mind as he wrote *The Princess Casamassima*, and granted a kind of permission to read the book as an objectification of many Schopenhauerian ideas” (178). Based on this passage, it would appear that James was likely in accord with the concepts of Schopenhauer, viewing them as a possibility for the advancement of artistic skills. But it is also possible to claim that he would have been interested in the high currency of Schopenhauer’s name in the 1880s rather than reading his works before writing *The Princess Casamassima*.

²⁶In his 1875 review of Pflleiderer, William refers to his own first impression of Schopenhauer (whom he calls “one of the greatest of writers”) when he says of Schopenhauerian compassion that it “will of course exert a spell over persons in the unwholesome sentimental moulting-time of youth” (*ECR* 312). This rejection of the personal self (compassion) could have sat as well with Henry James. See my analysis of *The Portrait of a Lady*.

²⁷A partial bibliography of James’s library is *The Library of Henry James*, which was compiled by Adeline Tintner and Leon Edel and it lists Schopenhauer’s *Essays* (1899) as having been owned by James. This book is among the books whose whereabouts are unknown but whose titles have been derived from the three Fabes catalogues and the Hodgson list.

This novel indicates that Schopenhauer is able to take opposed ideas and resolve them by “annihilating the human will through conscious contemplation” (Hovanec 96). James’s protagonist, Hyacinth Robinson, is familiar with Schopenhauer’s ideas and his dialogues allude to the philosopher more than once. Hyacinth, a young man and a skilled bookbinder who is in charge of carrying out a terrorist assassination, has gone to visit the Princess at her country home to discuss a “first rate man” who is supposed to do the assassination. The first reference to Schopenhauer occurs when the Princess asks Hyacinth:

‘Don’t they also want by chance an obliging young woman?’

‘I happen to know he doesn’t think much of women, my first-rate man.

He doesn’t trust them.’

‘Is that why you call him first-rate? You’ve very nearly betrayed him to me.’

‘Do you imagine there’s only one of that opinion?’ Hyacinth returned.

‘Only one who, having it, still remains a superior man. That’s a very difficult opinion to reconcile with others it’s important to have.’

‘Schopenhauer did so, successfully,’ said Hyacinth.

‘How delightful you should know old Schopenhauer!’ the Princess exclaimed. (*PC* 48)

James’s hero believes that the “first-rate man” is one who “doesn’t think much of women” and “doesn’t trust them.” The Princess remarks that such a man “still remains a superior” and to reconcile his opinion with others is “very difficult.” For her, this man exists and “there is only one of that opinion,” and that is Schopenhauer. The passage, in its first three lines, contains a message that a man who really does not

trust women is going to be betrayed for a woman's purpose. This self-devastation in male characters happens in James's works when their life will be ended by a woman's existence. It appears that in *The Princess Casamassima* James shows less trust in women and his emphasis is on Schopenhauer's misogynistic persona.

The other remarkable reference to Schopenhauer is in Hyacinth's letter to the Princess from Venice. He writes:

Observe how much historical information I've already absorbed; it won't surprise you, however, for you never wondered at anything after you discovered I knew something of Schopenhauer. I assure you I don't think of that musty misogynist in the least to-day, for I bend a genial eye on the women and girls I just spoke of as they glide with a small clatter and with their old copper water-jars to the fountain. (*PC* 59)

The passage shows that James evidently assumes his anglophone readers are already familiar with Schopenhauer. As I argued earlier, that is perhaps because, at the time he published his novel, the translation of most of Schopenhauer's works were available, especially his major work *The World as Will and Representation*. Moreover, the use of Schopenhauer's name in these passages of the novel shows that James was indeed familiar with him. He offers the privilege of knowing Schopenhauer to his hero, Hyacinth, a far superior reader than others of his social standing. One of the significant points made by James's character, of course, is his reluctance to think about "that musty misogynist [Schopenhauer]" at least for a day and having a "genial" view on women. Schopenhauer's misogynistic characteristic is

dominant in both passages. This shows that in writing *The Princess Casamassima* James thought of certain well-known aspects of Schopenhauer.

Claiming that in writing *The Princess Casamassima*, James had known Schopenhauer's misogyny or had read his works on women is one thing and how far he agreed with Schopenhauer is something else. What is obvious from the first and second passage of his novel is that James was more or less familiar with the high currency of Schopenhauer's name in the 1880s but in *The Portrait of a Lady* James's treatment of women and marriage is mostly based on social and historical events. At the same time that the novel highlights the impossibility of divorce and the dominant role of Osmond in his conjugal life, it leaves separation as a possible option for Isabel. Henrietta asks Isabel to return to America for processing a divorce, rather than England and Italy, as English and Italian divorce law did not let a woman to dissolve her vows. English Law, after the passage of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, enabled a man to divorce his spouse if he could present evidence of her adultery, while a woman had to prove aggressive or inhuman treatment of her husband by providing the evidence of his adultery, cruelty, polygamy or abandonment for two years. After showing the evidence, the court granted only limited divorce in which the wife had permission to live apart from her husband but not to remarry (Shanley 35-44; Stone 378-82, 388).

In opposition to English and Italian courts, American tribunals were generally more liberal. Courts in the state that Isabel was originally from, New York, permitted only the spouse who had not committed adultery to remarry (Blake 64-66; Hartog

72-73). In case of cruelty and desertion, the spouses could obtain a judicial separation enabling them to live apart from each other but not to remarry, however, in the middle of the nineteenth century, many states granted absolute divorces for any of a number of reasons, such as abandonment, physical and mental abuse, violence, habitual drunkenness, and cruelty. In accepting mental mistreatment as grounds for divorce, “most courts—at least until the 1880s—required petitioners to show evidence of some type of physical injury” (Ganz 157-58). But in the years following new changes, many American courts allowed both spouses to remarry after receiving the decree (Ganz 158).

The developing liberalisation of separation laws started a furious argument between liberal and conservative parties. Liberal thinkers pointed out that spouses did not need the force of law to bind them together; “marriage was designed to be, and should be, the means of calling out all that is best and purest in the inner nature of man.” “[W]hen it becomes the daily source of anger, strifes, cruelty, brutality,” Robert Dale Owen argued, “it defeats God’s purpose, violates the Divine economy, becomes itself immoral, and ought to cease” (*Divorce* 55).²⁸ Owen insisted that the individuals do not need to suffer over their poor decisions in choosing true mates or their weakness to see their spouses’ actual characters (43-44). James G. Powers in 1870s and Elizabeth Cady Stanton in 1881 advanced this idea too. According to Powers, “Marriage contemplates the development, happiness, and improvement of

²⁸ *Divorce: Being a Correspondence between Horace Greeley and Robert Dale Owen, Originally Published in the New York Daily Tribune, March 1860.* New York: DeWitt, 1860.

the married parties.” “When this object is defeated by alienation, and such incurable incompatibility of disposition as leads to daily anger, strife, and contention,” he explained, “it ceases to be a blessing ... [and] its existence or continuation ... ought to cease” (96-97).

Conservatives like Horace Greeley were entirely opposed to this view. They considered the dangers of liberal divorce; undermining the stability of domestic life and growing adultery. Greeley, in his debate with Owen, insisted that “many persons are badly mated is true; but that is not the law’s fault” (5). In his point of view, men and women who perceived themselves glumly deceived about their partner’s true characters had to stay in their relationship and suffer the consequence of their wrong decisions rather than considering divorce. Nathan Allen advanced this position, too, in his essay in the *North American Review* in June 1880. For him, “when individuals enter upon the marriage relation under a low range of motives and influences they soon develop separate interests that grow wider and wider apart, resulting in an intense *individualism*, which is nothing more nor less than supreme selfishness, and nothing short of a permanent separation will then satisfy them” (559-60). Therefore, divorce was not only a sign of individualism but also a threat to social ties. Moreover for conservative thinkers, the publicity of divorce was one great evil of separation; “the public mind is becoming habituated to look upon divorces without shock, and without a thought of their injury to public morals” (Davis 35). Accordingly, they objected also the newspapers for revealing prurient and disgusting details of divorce tribunals which debased the concept of marriage and its duties.

James's novel also shares many of the concerns discussed by the conservatives and liberals. On the one hand, the novel portrays conservatives' view that strict divorce laws make the individuals more considerate and thoughtful about choosing their mates. When Isabel chooses Osmond among other suitors, she is completely deceived about his true character. She thinks he has a generous and expensive mind but it is soon after their marriage that she realises she has been sorely deceived. Although Isabel suffers in her miserable conjugal life, she never does take back her vows. Indeed, the novel evinces deep concerns about the sanctity of marital relation and the significant role of social duties above personal desires. On the other hand, it reveals the possibility of divorce as an appropriate remedy for unhappy spouses. When Henrietta suggests Isabel to leave her husband, it seems that the novel offers divorce as a solution to her miserable situation. This alternative remedy can also be seen in Mrs. Touchett's and Madam Merle's conjugal life. They refuse to remain in their marital unity when there is no harmony in their marriage. Indeed, the popularity of divorce stays the major theme in the novel rather than Schopenhauer's misogynistic philosophy, and Isabel's miserable destiny is entirely the result of her poor decision.

James would have been interested in the high currency of Schopenhauer's name in the 1880s but in his novel he challenges the socio-historical context concerning women, marriage and sexuality. His novel embodies a covert act of force directed against women. Osmond refuses Isabel's separate identity by subsuming his wife's ideas into his own. He wants Isabel "to feel with him and for him, to enter into

his opinions, his ambitions, his preferences” (*PL* 481). He expects her not to travel across Europe and has an ideal of what she “should do and should not do” (*PL* 583). This form of marital unity played a crucial role in nineteenth-century Anglo America culture. At that time as William Blackstone explains, “[by] marriage, the husband and wife [were] one person in law” and the wife’s identity “[was] suspended during ... marriage, or at least [was] incorporated and consolidated into that of [her] husband” (430). Osmond’s character represents this idea. Meantime, James’s language conveys a sense of Isabel’s fear and suffering. “James supported the idea of granting some form of *legal redress*,” as Ganz states, “to a wife who suffered from her husband’s physical abuse, he could not countenance the idea of granting such relief to a woman who had voluntarily formed a loveless but otherwise acceptable union” (162). Thus, the novel gives a greater weight to the importance of the commitment and the sanctity of conjugal tie rather than highlighting the misogyny of Schopenhauer’s ideas.

The Portrait of a Lady

According to Alan Bellringer, “*The Portrait of a Lady* is ... an unconventional long-novel, but philosophically consistent” (62). Considering this idea that a philosophical view is presented in *The Portrait of a Lady*, there remains an unresolved question as to which type of philosophy James used in his novel, and more importantly, how this philosophical view is represented by him in the novel. I intend to explore the

possibility of Schopenhauerian allusions in James's work and to indicate how *will*, Schopenhauer's ultimate metaphysical principle, came to be postulated in this novel. I will argue that in writing *The Portrait of a Lady*, there is a convergence between James's thinking in this novel and Schopenhauer's concepts of egoism, suffering and compassion. By using Schopenhauer's essays "On Women," "The Metaphysics of Love" and his principal work *The World as Will and Representation*, I attempt to show how Schopenhauer's philosophy could be used as an integral aspect of James's *The Portrait of a Lady*. One of the major issues that I am going to address throughout this section is why Isabel remained in an unhappy marriage. To this end, the novel can no longer be read as it has before as I will elaborate on a Schopenhauerian approach towards the last scene of the novel.

Traces of Schopenhauer

James's works deal largely with the impact of Europe and its society on Americans, especially in his early novels *Roderick Hudson* (1875) and *The Portrait of a Lady* (1881). From the beginning, he pays considerable attention to the relationship between males and females and their nationalities. For example, *The Portrait of a Lady* does not just depict but explores the central figure of an American woman, Isabel, who moves to Europe in hopes of experiencing the older civilisation. The novel focuses on marriage, one of the important aspects of the nineteenth century. Responding to his situation and based on his earlier experiences, James was trying to

formulate a conception of real life that was doubly independent from the world as it appeared which possibly was affected by Schopenhauer's philosophy. The manner in which James articulates the novel's events and some of the passages, one may suspect that perhaps these ideas and references owe their existence to the German philosopher, Schopenhauer. In this part, first I will discuss the reason behind James's fascination in portraying the union between the sexes during the period in which he was writing his novel, and secondly, I will argue how the philosophical language of the novel resembles Schopenhauer's philosophy.

The Portrait of a Lady establishes the idea that one's optimistic attitude towards marriage can turn pessimistic in the end. This is the reality that James so carefully delineates in his heroine, Isabel Archer. To situate James's portrait of an unhappy marriage, though, it is helpful to understand the larger treatment of domesticity and married life during the period in which James was writing. "Two facts about nineteenth-century America," as Hadella says, "explain the popularity of fiction dealing with strained marriages":

Marriage was considered the central event of a woman's life, and women – young women, predominantly – made up the vast majority of the novel-reading public. In novel after novel, authors engaged in an exploitative game of "what if" with their female readers, touching their deepest fears by asking, in effect, "what if the single most important decision that you will make in your life turns out to be all wrong?" (2)

These two facts lend an interesting, foundational support for the repeated images of happiness and unhappiness in *The Portrait of a Lady*. In the preface to his story, James introduces Isabel as “an intelligent but presumptuous girl” who wants to keep her independence even after marriage, the specific problem that “millions of presumptuous girls, intelligent or not intelligent, daily affront their destiny” (PL xi). In other words, the daily problem that most of the young girls of nineteenth century were dealing with was the confrontation of their irrational desires with the reality of marriage. In thinking of how to represent that problem, James “place[d] the centre of the subject in the young woman’s own consciousness”; he concentrated on the question, “what will she *do*?” (PL xiv) Early in the novel, Isabel receives a sudden proposal of marriage from Lord Warburton; she will also receive proposals from Caspar Goodwood and Gilbert Osmond. Her cousin, Ralph Touchett, stays one of her suitors till the end of his life. She is unable to choose among these various suitors. The novel focuses on the irrationality of Isabel’s thoughts on marriage: she likes her “liberty too much. If there is a thing in the world that [she is] fond of, ... it is [her] personal independence” (PL 161). Here it is presented that Isabel is constantly pursuing her freedom and it is her main concern even in marriage. James expands on how illogical such a proud but inflexible woman can become as she upholds her own ideas with little or no thought. It is clear that after the eradication of slavery and the end of the Civil War, “the fairer treatment became the most contentious reformist issue in American politics. James saw the potential of this change in social attitudes for both comedy and pathos in his fiction. Indeed, his

fiction was ahead in this respect and contributed to the change” (Bellringer 45). This is one of the reasons that some of his female characters in *The Portrait of a Lady* move from the new world to Europe, and have different ideas in contrast to their female contemporaries. They do not like going back to America and for them returning to homeland is a sort of a punishment. When Madame Merle leaves for America, Mrs Touchett says to Isabel:

‘To America? She must have done something very bad.’

‘Yes – very bad.’

‘May I ask what it is?’

‘She made a convenience of me.’

‘Ah,’ cried Mrs Touchett, ‘so she did of me! She does of every one.’ ‘She’ll make a convenience of America,’ said Isabel, smiling again and glad that her aunt’s questions were over. (*PL* 573)

For those characters who have left the new world, America is a distant memory. But for Isabel, America had instilled in her the desire for independence and in that, she has taken great pride. Now she looks for someone whose presence in her life secures her freedom. In her opinion, “a large fortune means freedom” (*PL* 223). That is why throughout the first chapters, she does not wish to marry because to do so would be to lose her liberty. Indeed, the sense of failure that penetrates the novel comes from Isabel’s initial inability to recognise her own nature and disproportioned desire in selecting a mate.

Isabel's negative will to do everything she wants is significant from the first scene: she moves to England and when told that, in England, young girls do not sit with gentlemen alone late at night, she argues that "I always want to know the things one shouldn't do" (*PL* 68). James represents Isabel as a young American woman that does not like to sacrifice her freedom, clings to American culture and has strong desires. "Expectation is, in fact, the structural principle on which *The Portrait of a Lady* is built. In order to make the question 'what will she do?' significant, James frees Isabel from all external inhibitions" (Wegelin 66). He portrays a woman who is immature and has illogical desires. From the start of the novel, Isabel is shown to be liberty-loving but naive in her expectation that she can get away with that. She does whatever she pleases and her life is built upon her expectations and desires. James addresses Isabel's inability to distinguish dreams from reality. The following sketch of James's perspective of his character establishes certain similarities to Schopenhauer's theory, for in the case of both writers 'will' is seen to structure an individual's annihilation. For Schopenhauer, the primary motivation of life is irrational will, which blindly forces the individual into a trap of their own choosing. The ultimate life-force which leads any individual human is the will, and subsequently, man can realise their individuality only by asserting the action of their will. Schopenhauer then notes that what prevents man from self-understanding and his absolute will is the lack of consciousness on the existence of his own will. Therefore, the will creates illusory goals and the individual becomes most of the time displeased whilst caught up in the pursuit of illusory pleasure. We encounter

this metaphysical view in our first introduction to Isabel Archer and Ralph. James sets the atmosphere by repeatedly showing Isabel's interest in book reading. Before her aunt's arrival at the house in Albany she is focused on reading about the history of German thought. Moreover, at the beginning of chapter five, James introduces Ralph Touchett as "a philosopher" (*PL* 37). With regard to this, I want to discover how far the character's view on will is related to Schopenhauer. The narrator introduces Ralph with a capability of observing the "thing in itself." This characteristic empowers Ralph to see the truth of Isabel, who is "evidently not insipid" (*PL* 41). A few lines later, the narrator endures Isabel's character with a quality that resembles Schopenhauer's answer to the question of what is the thing-in-itself? He portrays Isabel as a person "with a strong will" (*PL* 42), a Schopenhauerian reality that the thing-in-itself is the will. endure

With regard to the importance of "things" in the novel, and with the significant role that representation plays in the events, there stays a notion of the world as an idea. In Madame Merle's opinion, the way she appears in society represents a large part of her identity: "I know a great part of myself is in the clothes I choose to wear. I've a great respect for *things*! One's self – for other people – is one's expression of one's self; and one's house, one's furniture, one's garments, the books one reads, the company one keeps – these things are all expressive" (*PL* 201). As the narrator states Madame Merle becomes "very Metaphysical" (201). Although Isabel is fond of metaphysics, she refuses such a representational structure. For Isabel, her clothes "may express the dressmaker, but they don't express [her]" (*PL*

202). The truth behind the representation is something or someone else, the “dressmaker.” Schopenhauer also believes that the essence of the thing is not what it appears; rather, it entirely corresponds to the desire by which the will reveals itself. For example, the teeth, the throat and the bowels represent hunger and the organs of reproduction represent sexual desire. Consequently, he asserts that one should take the first step to get to know the thing with what one has learned straight through his own personal experience, as it is impossible to resolve the metaphysical riddle of the thing and discover the secret essence of truth by first investigating substance and then continuing to investigate a concept. “We can never arrive at the real nature of things from without. However much we may investigate, we can never reach anything but images and names” (*WWR I*: 128). Madame Merle seems to be one of “the most brilliant women in Europe” (*PL* 194) and Isabel has the same idea about her, but by the end of the novel Isabel discovers Madame Merle’s crucial will and desire. Isabel’s acknowledgment of Madame Merle’s practice is part of a process whereby she recognises the importance of “the things” in the world around her and the people in that world. The context of a thing or person is not what it appears in the first glance; it is a truth which will reveal itself later in the novel.

Self-awareness or Vows

Many critics have long questioned as to whether James had adequately justified the paradoxical contradiction of freedom in his novel. In their views, the last scene of the novel in which Isabel goes back to her husband emphasises the solemnity of the vows of marriage in the nineteenth century. For instance, Alfred Habegger observes that “[d]ivorce as a topic is strangely absent from Isabel’s life and mind” (163). Likewise, Allen F. Stein notes that divorce is “out of the question as both [Isabel] and James see it” (139). Debra MacComb delves deeper into the examination of this question than most critics but in the end draws the same conclusion, that divorce is inconceivable in the novel. Delineating the differences between the English and the American stance on marriage, MacComb upholds the view that the novel criticises the Americans’ “celebrated tendency” to raise personal freedom over social responsibility thereupon turning to divorce to achieve such freedom.²⁹ It seems that these critics have dismissed the idea that the text offers divorce as an alternative to Isabel, but this very topic is fully covered in the excellent article by Melissa Ganz in 2006 on *The Portrait of a Lady*. Ganz’s “‘A Strong Opposition’: *The Portrait of a Lady* and the Divorce Debates” shows very nicely how Henry James allows Isabel to toy with the idea of divorce and why she steps back from it, which is mainly to do with the *publicity* that attached to a divorce court hearing.³⁰ Adding to Ganz’s view, my interpretation of Isabel is that, besides the idea of publicity, she herself fears making another wrong choice if she should choose divorce. In addition to her personal fear, I believe that there is a possibility of an illusory image of happiness

²⁹“Divorce of a Nation” 129, see also *Tales* 53–77.

³⁰James detested publicity and insisted on the sanctity of privacy. Hence his decision to burn all letters addressed to him and his request that his friends destroy his letters to them.

and escape from misery that keeps her in her marriage. In accordance with the aforementioned statements and in connection with Schopenhauer's philosophy, I will argue that Schopenhauer's theory is useful in the analysis of Isabel's character. I will show that the two major problems in her character, fear and illusory satisfaction, can be derived from Schopenhauer's view on the will and punishment.

Isabel thinks she "ha[s] a certain way of looking at life which [Osmond takes] as a personal offence" (*PL* 429); "the whole thing – her character, the way she [feels], the way she judge[s]" is "so different" from Osmond's. Nevertheless, she insists on keeping her conjugal tie and emphasises that "certain obligations were involved in the very fact of marriage, and were quite independent of the quality of enjoyment extracted from it" (*PL* 581). As I argued before opening my analysis of the novel, one of these certain obligations was the publicity of divorce in that time. Isabel was afraid of this publicity and preferred to honour her vows and remain in her marriage. Therefore, she gave a greater weight to the importance of the commitment. Moreover, Isabel appears to be a woman of honour, high standards, strong principles and full of compassion. For her, "marriage meant that a woman should cleave to the man with whom, uttering tremendous vows, she had stood at the altar" (*PL* 540). Next to all these ideas, another factor that keeps Isabel in her relationship is her overconfidence created by her will, a destructive element in Schopenhauer's view. When Isabel marries Osmond, she is entirely deceived about his actual intention. "[She] had taken all the first steps in the purest confidence" (*PL* 424). She thinks she is marrying someone whose mind is curious, generous and expansive; however, after

her marriage she finds that she has been absolutely betrayed. In the narrator's words, "she had suddenly found the infinite vista of a multiplied life to be a dark, narrow alley with a dead wall at the end" (*PL* 424). This discovery does not cause her disappointment; rather, it creates a fear in her character for later movements and actions. But one may suspect that further to the social perspective of the nineteenth century that men were considered dominant at home and women were passive, is Isabel's fear the general fear of women in the nineteenth century that they were almost afraid of their husbands because of their superior role or there is another separate reason for her to remain in her marriage?

The answer to the question posited above and its connection with Schopenhauer's idea of punishment help us to discover a further element of Schopenhauerian theory in the novel. In fact, although there is a gulf of difference between them, she is not afraid of "her husband – his displeasure, his hatred, his revenge; it was not even her own later judgment of her conduct – a consideration which had often held her in check; it was simply the violence there would be in going when Osmond wished her to remain" (*PL* 540). To this I may add the main point that she is however "afraid of [herself]" (*PL* 503), anxious of acting upon her desire to leave her spouse. I take Isabel's anxiety in consideration by interpreting it through Schopenhauer's thoughts on punishment. In Schopenhauer's opinion, once we make a choice, "we assume as necessary that decision was preceded by something from which it ensued, and which we call the ground or reason, or more accurately the motive, of the resultant action" (*FR* 212). In this process, choices are

not made liberally and our actions are obligatory and made because “every human being, even every animal, after the motive has appeared, must carry out the action which alone is in accordance with his inborn and immutable character” (*FR* 49). Accordingly, a person’s final action forms when a specific motive affects his or her immutable character. So, one can avoid repeating something wrong by placing “beside every possible motive for committing a wrong a more powerful motive for leaving it undone” (*WWR I*: 62). Indeed, by considering the cost (punishment) that the individual has to pay for their action then they can stop doing it again. This idea comes across in the novel when Ralph shows sympathy and tells Isabel the origin of her misery: “you wanted to look at life for yourself – but you were not allowed; you were punished for your wish.” And Isabel admits that she has “been punished” (*PL* 577). Isabel states that she is afraid to divorce Osmond because, aside from her possible motive for divorce, she has a more powerful motive for not leaving her husband. That powerful motive comes from her previous experience. Our unthoughtful Isabel is now more conscious about the evil side of the world. She is afraid of her own will because she has already paid once for it by marrying Osmond and she does not want to experience that traumatic situation again by accepting Goodwood’s offer.

Next to her personal fear and the social dimension as to the impossibility of divorce for a woman in the nineteenth century, the novel highlights Isabel’s pursuit of illusory satisfaction because “she had an infinite hope that she should never do anything wrong” (*PL* 51) and now it is hard for her to accept that after delaying her

marriage she had made the wrong decision. Schopenhauer's view on this sort of illusory satisfaction in marriage and love is that since one derives positive emotions out of something, he gains satisfaction and this satisfaction keeps her desire alive. What keeps Isabel's desires alive is the image of freedom. Her only ambition in marriage is "to be free" (*PL* 346) to follow her feelings and desires. But her marriage with Osmond is not what she expected. The image of freedom is quite significant in the action of the novel. When she leaves to comfort the dying Ralph in England, Goodwood encounters her at Ralph's estate and begs her to leave Osmond and to come away with him. He beseeches her:

"Why should you go back – why should you go through that ghastly form? What have you to care about? You've no children; that perhaps would be an obstacle. As it is you've nothing to consider. You must save what you can of your life; you mustn't lose it all simply because you've lost a part. It would be an insult to you to assume that you care for the look of the thing, for what people will say, for the bottomless idiocy of the world. We've nothing to do with all that; we're quite out of it; we look at things as they are. You took the great step in coming away; the next is nothing; it's the natural one. I swear, as I stand here, that a woman deliberately made to suffer is justified in anything in life – in going down into the streets if that will help her! I know how you suffer, and that's why I'm here." (*PL* 589-90)

Indeed, Goodwood warns Isabel of what she was always afraid of losing, her freedom. He also tells her of this early in the novel that "[she'll] get very sick of [her] independence" (*PL* 163) in the future. He wants Isabel to believe that a woman like

her who is “made to suffer is justified in anything in life” (*PL* 590). His words are seductive and powerfully delights that side of Isabel that is inclined towards the passion of freedom: “we can do absolutely as we please; to whom under the sun do we owe anything? ... The world’s all before us – and the world’s very big” (*PL* 590). His acknowledgment of independence is similar to Isabel’s opinion: “it would be an insult to you to assume that you care for the look of the thing, for what people will say, for the bottomless idiocy of the world. We’ve nothing to do with all that; we’re quite out of it; we look at things as they are” (*PL* 590). Despite all Goodwood’s efforts to seduce Isabel, she is not persuaded to part from Osmond, though she constantly thinks about leaving him. The novel confirms that she has lost her freedom and is imprisoned in her relationship: “it may appear to some readers that she gave herself much trouble, and it is certain that for a woman of a high spirit she had allowed herself easily to be arrested” (*PL* 540). She struggles to convince herself that she should go back to her husband. “She had a husband in a foreign city, counting the hours of her absence; in such a case one needed an excellent motive. He was not one of the best husbands, but that didn’t alter the case” (*PL* 580). Isabel needs an “excellent motive” to remain in her conjugal life, a “motive” to convince herself. The solemnity of her vows might have been one of the motivations to release her from her anxious attempts and to repress her desire to disband her marriage, plus the fact that from early in the novel, her “infinite hope” is not doing “anything wrong.”

She had resented so strongly, after discovering them, her mere errors of feeling (the discovery always made her tremble as if she had escaped from a trap which might have caught her and smothered her) that the chance of inflicting a sensible injury upon another person. (*PL* 51)

Therefore, Isabel reflects upon the solemnity of her vows to release herself from the pain of her discovery. After her unfortunate marriage, she does not seek happiness, but merely tries to continue through life with the minimum of suffering, a remedy that Schopenhauer also offers to his readers. Schopenhauer argues that happiness is the absence of pain. He suggests some methods for managing suffering and one of them is that one must accept misfortunes. Although Isabel likes “to do everything for herself and has no belief in anyone’s power to help her” (*PL* 14), she comes to understand that “one must accept one’s deeds” (*PL* 488). So, she attempts to make good use of the only thing that she can control, her conjugal tie. Accordingly, she can never become free from the dilemma of her illusionary satisfaction without first acknowledging her mistake, considering the honour of her vows is the best she can do to reduce pain.

The way Isabel approaches and acknowledges the idea of will and desire parallels the thoughts of Schopenhauer. This is evident when she is introduced as a wilful woman and also when she acts upon her finding in the last scene. If she is to make the right choice at the end, to follow the “very straight path” (*PL* 591) and consequently to become the “consistently wise” woman, the narrator wants her to distinguish between the desire of freedom and reality. Otherwise, she should accept

the consequences of her decisions. Based on her earlier pursuit of desire, she is now conscious that endless desire extinguishes any possibility of happiness and freedom. She submits herself to the present situation for she knows nothing different will happen in life with Goodwood. It is, in fact, after obtaining this insight that Isabel realises in a different way from the past that “she had never been loved before” (*PL* 589). She had believed it, but now it is different because she is more aware of the will as the primary source of her acts and that of others. She had believed and trusted in Osmond’s love but it was just an illusion. Therefore, when she encounters Goodwood’s offer that “you don’t know where to turn. Turn straight to *me*” (*PL* 589), she does not know whether to go back to her husband or to accept the proposal. But finally she knows that there is “a very straight path” and that is to go back to her husband. The novel expresses the same strife that Schopenhauer has seen in nature, the struggle between endless desire and subsequent fulfilment where people have to minimise their natural desires for the sake of achieving a more tranquil frame of mind.

Egoism and Compassion

James observes the effects of egoism in his character: her crudity of taste and manners, misfortunes and her suffering. As the narrator says, “[one] could have made her colour, any day in the year, by calling her a rank egoist” (*PL* 53). Isabel’s egoistic character gives the novel a moral character. In so doing, he tries to reveal how one such as Isabel might find a release from such selfishness. The solution that he offers for such redemption is similar to what Schopenhauer examines in his essay

“On the Basis of Morality,” which considers the struggle between the various sufferings committed through egoism and the difficulty in ignoring oneself. As James tries to demonstrate the centrality of self-denial in the moral level of his novel, I will show that his approach to this level of resignation is made through the use of two major characteristics of humans, egoism and compassion. By using Schopenhauer’s notions of egoism and compassion, I will argue that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is an integral aspect of James’s heroine.

Towards the end of the novel, after Goodwood begs Isabel to leave Osmond, she reflects upon the misery that constitutes her life but returns to Rome to honour her marriage vows, no matter what suffering this would bring her. Isabel’s tension between ego and sympathy, the entrapment of the will, and her potential to escape from asceticism are significant points in the novel; they represent the artistic, moral and ascetic forms of awareness throughout the novel. Based on the moral fibre of James’s heroine, the novel creatively reaches for another Schopenhauerian theory. Indeed, it appears that Isabel’s sympathy and her potential to recognise her selfishness at the end facilitates a Schopenhauerian egoism. Egoism is considered by Schopenhauer as a natural affirmation of one’s will over another’s in order to obtain social superiority and influence: “egoism really consists in man’s restricting all reality to his own person, in that he imagines he lives in this alone, and not in others” (*WWR* 2: 507). The inability to ignore the self and not treating others as equals prevents such egoists from feeling sympathy or true compassion, “which is the basis of justice and morality” (*WWR* 2: 601-2). Accordingly, Schopenhauer asserts that

since the self is the means of spreading all evil acts in the world, the annihilation of the self for others is an accomplishment. In *The Portrait of a Lady*,

[Isabel] only had a general idea that people were right when they treated her as if she were rather superior. Whether or not she were superior, people were right in admiring her if they thought her so; for it seemed to her often that her mind moved more quickly than theirs, and this encouraged an impatience that might easily be confounded with superiority. It may be affirmed without delay that Isabel was probably very liable to the sin of self-esteem. (*PL* 50)

The above passage makes it suggestively clear that the narrator pities her belief that such superiority will do her much good because she is shown to be naive and to fall into the trap of deception set for her by pragmatic manipulators. She even sets her standards for choosing a mate based on her will for liberty. Accordingly, it seems that Isabel's will is the seat of her reasoning faculty. In accordance to this, Schopenhauer considers the will the central core of the reasoning faculty. In the case of Isabel, the will subdues her reasoning faculty and intellect. She appears to be a reasonable and intelligent person, in the way that no one is able to appeal against her understanding and reasoning frame but "her thoughts were a tangle of vague outlines which had never been corrected by the judgment of people speaking with authority. In matters of opinion she had had her own way, and it had led her into a thousand ridiculous zigzags" (*PL* 50). She is more or less conscious of her weakness, for she says, "I've not much control of my thoughts" (*PL* 97) but she is not actually aware of her own blind wilfulness. She is so immersed in her ego that it perverts her

intention for independence. She is intent on selecting a right suitor to enable her to control her own destiny while the possibility of the negative influence of the will is unfathomable to her. James has probably offered this volitional characteristic to Isabel to present how, finally, she will recognise and release herself from “the sin of self-esteem.”

To demonstrate James’s portrait of egoism and its remedy, it is valuable to acknowledge the link between egoism and compassion in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. For Schopenhauer, release from such enslavement to individual self-assertion and illusory satisfaction is provided by the faculties of reason, cognition and intellect; in confronting the will, these faculties are passive and unmotivated, and subsequently superficial.³¹ He believes that they may develop only when the individual moves away from his self-esteem. In his opinion, the will is the nature of one’s self, and the true self of a person can be identified through his will. In this procedure, as long as the fulfilment of one’s desire depends on the degree of its satisfaction, the fulfilment of desire and the will is impossible, because for each satisfied desire, there remains another needing to be satisfied, hence an individual’s suffering is endless. In this case, Schopenhauer believes that a person can overcome his suffering by denying the will. For him, ignoring all willing leads one towards self-denial and the acceptance of the other, even if this acceptance is against one’s wishes. He concludes that as the will always forces the individual into a trap of self-making, where one suffers more, what is therefore necessary for accomplishment is

³¹*WWR I*: 291-314

self-denial, which is a moral act. Building upon this point, I will find how the novel comes to represent a Schopenhauerian moral sense through its heroine's character.

In *The Portrait of a Lady*, James seems to consider that egoism as an immoral characteristic may lead to self-awareness and subsequently self-denial. Wegelin also affirms that “[Isabel’s] story is the story of her growing awareness” (69). She is James’s most complex character, selfish and unaware of her will, while also searching for her superiority and seeking to fulfil her desires. Simultaneously, throughout the novel the narrator emphasises her capacity for learning and finding the truth. She finds the truth of her perverted intention, the vulgarity hidden under Osmond’s generosity and her incapacity for good judgment. Her character’s development becomes more remarkable when the novel makes a genuine effort by presenting compromise as a solution to her unhappiness:

She was morally certain now that this feeling of hatred, which at first had been a refuge and a refreshment, had become the occupation and comfort of his life. The feeling was deep, because it was sincere; he had had the revelation that she could after all dispense with him. If to herself the idea was startling, if it presented itself at first as a kind of infidelity, a capacity for pollution, what infinite effect might it not be expected to have had upon *him*? It was very simple; he despised her; she had no traditions and the moral horizon of a Unitarian minister... . what was coming – what was before them? That was her constant question. What would he do – what ought *she* to do? When a man hated his wife what did it lead to? (*PL* 433)

Schopenhauer claims that a compassionate person experiences the suffering of another in the other's body. He believes that in this process, "we suffer *with* him and *in* him; we feel his pain as *his*, and do not imagine that it is ours" (*BM* 147). The above passage wonderfully presents her shift from lack of experience to getting experience. As she imaginatively considers Osmond's reaction, the emphasis is placed on the act of improvement of her moral vitality. Instead of regarding her anger towards her husband, she focuses on his anger at her. After she hears from the Countess, Osmond's sister, that he was engaged to another woman before, she does not make the decision to divorce; rather, she becomes more aware of her love and thought. It is through this finding that she concentrates on Osmond's view of her disappointment in marriage, rather than her awareness of it. This inner growth indicates Isabel's transition from self-absorption to sympathy, one of the richest and best-worked-out elements in the novel. In a miserable conjugal relationship with Osmond, Isabel sees herself as fundamentally a part of and involved in a suffering situation, where the struggle between egoism and compassion happens. James handles the subject with great subtlety and skill, and he leaves the possibility of divorce an option for Isabel. But by taking his moral consideration into account, we can see that her act is neither compromise nor based on obligation; rather, it is self-awareness and subsequently feeling sympathy for Osmond.

Genius and the Conflict Between Imagination & Experience

The echo of finer intellect, mind and thought is something that we hear often in the novel. The narrator pays considerable attention to Isabel's levels of thought. Early in the novel, we have a portrait of a highly intellectual woman whose intellect is under question by other characters such as Ralph and Mrs Touchett. At the same time that the novel insists upon Isabel's superior mind, it highlights the costs that she pays for such a belief. Many times she refuses others ideas for she believes they are unaware of the reasons that are known only to her. Based on the similar view, she dismisses Ralph's concerns and opposition regarding her marriage to Osmond. Apparently, James leaves the decision up to the readers to judge the degree of Isabel's intellect. In this section, I aim to show that Isabel's intellectual dilemma highlights Schopenhauer's consideration as to how one reaches the state of genius and what are the requirements needed to reach that level. Moreover, what is the role that imagination and experience play in the process? It appears that James focuses his own attention most acutely on this complex area when he tries to portray Isabel's wisdom.

Schopenhauer's fundamental theory for defining genius helps to interpret Isabel's character. His hypothesis is that, in many cases, people of lesser intelligence are deficient in interconnecting past and present events. This could be because they have suffered from a painful event in the past. In the case of genius, he believes that they have a normal functioning memory, the ability to interconnect past and present happenings. Early in the novel, we encounter a woman who lives in the present and

she does not “care about the past; [she wants] to see some of the leading minds of the present” (*PL* 140). Regarding this matter, Schopenhauer believes that women’s “reasoning faculty is weak” and belongs to “the present” (*Women* 44). It is this quality in Isabel that makes her act on the basis of what she sees in the moment, except when it comes to her marriage vows. As the narrator says sometimes she has to pay for this quality, “at important moments, when she would have been thankful to make use of her judgement alone, she paid the penalty of having given undue encouragement to the faculty of seeing without judging” (*PL* 32). Throughout the novel, there is no end for the conflict between present and past in Isabel’s mind. She likes “better to think of the future than of the past; but at times, as she listen[s] to the murmur of the Mediterranean waves, her glance took a backward flight” (*PL* 224). Although she is a fan of the present, she is profoundly immersed in her past. She is by no means conscious that her present demands are the leading principle of her past and her mind is engaged with the unfulfilled desires of the past.

The narrator tries to give the idea that Isabel possesses “a finer mind than most of the persons among whom her lot was cast,” but there remains some doubt about this. It is true that among “her contemporaries she passed for a young woman of extraordinary profundity; for these excellent people never withheld their admiration from a reach of intellect of which they themselves were not conscious” (*PL* 49). In actuality, it was only people’s general view that she had an admirable intellect. Moreover, it is not only the general public that is wrong about her intellect but also her paternal aunt, Mrs Varian. She once spreads the rumour that her niece is

writing a book because she believes that Isabel has the mind of a genius. Varian's impression of her niece is quite mistaken as Isabel never tries to write a book or ever had any such desire. As the narrator explains "she had no talent for expression and too little of the consciousness of genius" (*PL* 50). In another scene, this characteristic is also questioned by the other characters. In chapter five, Mrs Ludlow says to Mrs Touchett that Isabel's genius is a reason why "someone should take an interest in her," whereas for Mrs Touchett, if Isabel appears to be a genius; so far she has not yet seen "[Isabel's]special line [of ingenuity]" (*PL* 43). Also, Ralph's curiosity in the subject encourages him to ask Mrs Touchett:

‘Ah, if she’s [Isabel] a genius, we must find out her special line.
Is it by chance for flirting?’

‘I don’t think so. You may suspect that at first, but you’ll be wrong. You won’t, I think, in any way, be easily right about her.’ (*PL* 43).

Isabel's character is incomprehensible due to the contradiction between her inner nature and how it appears to society and the contradiction between being a person of knowledge or one who only seems to be knowledgeable. Isabel thinks that she knows a great deal of everything, like most American women, but "like most American girls she's ridiculously mistaken" (*PL* 43). She believes in herself as a person of intellect, and yet, she remains in a muddle in regards to herself. Isabel is the victim of other people's misconception. She has ceased to believe in herself and now she is unsure what to believe in. In other words, she endeavours to experience the old world (Europe) by her pre-imagination of it but she has no idea about "the

evil of the world” (*PL* 51). As far as she goes throughout the novel she encounters the truth of life more and more, and so she cannot link her former imagination with her present experiences. This fact is significant as it stresses the elements of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the novel.

Schopenhauer claims that genius “dwells on the consideration of life itself” and so the genius’s perspective becomes “vivid and firm” and thoughtful (*WWR I*: 188). In addition, “prerequisites for genius include the imagination (the ability to construct all experience out of personal experience)” (Sch., qtd. McCobb: 328). Presumably, these qualities of genius are not found in very many people but it is important to focus on Isabel’s deficiency of them as she is unable to set aside her own interests. Although the narrator introduces Isabel as the owner of a “finer mind” in her community, we should take into account that her mind acts in line with her will. In other words, her mind is subdued by the will.

Genius is the ability to leave entirely out of sight our own interest, our willing, and our aims, and consequently to discard entirely our own personality for a time, in order to remain pure knowing subject, the clear eye of the world; and this not merely for moments, but with the necessary continuity and conscious thought (*WWR I*: 185-6)

Isabel’s character is opposed to Schopenhauer’s definition of genius. She does not have the capacity of obtaining pure perception, by ignoring her own self and interests, in order to be free from the service of the will. I have described this deficiency in Isabel in the section on egoism. But there remains the question of how she can reach

that state of awareness and how this idea can be understood in the body of the novel.

Schopenhauer believes that

For genius to appear in an individual, it is as if a measure of the power of knowledge must have fallen to his lot far exceeding that required for the service of an individual will; and this superfluity to knowledge having become free, now becomes the subject purified of will, the clear mirror of the inner nature of the world. (*WWR I*: 185-6)

Isabel suffers from a lack of knowledge, so her mind figures out a way to receive a “larger perception of surrounding facts and to care for knowledge that was tinged with the unfamiliar” (*PL* 49). She is “very fond of knowledge” (*PL* 48) but she has a long way to go in achieving that knowledge. During her stay in America, she read literary works and magazines to fulfil the absence of her knowledge but now she prefers personal experience, “any source of information to the printed page” (*PL* 35).³² Here, James raises one of the most significant elements of the novel. The encounter of printed knowledge and experiential knowledge artistically points out the heroine’s growth and her release from the abstract world into actuality. This awareness and the way she comes to understand the reality aligns with Schopenhauer’s theory of experiential learning. According to Schopenhauer, the

³²Formerly, she had been able “with the help of some well-chosen volume, to transfer the seat of consciousness to the organ of pure reason” (*PL* 100), but after meeting Mrs Touchett, she has a change of heart and believes that by traveling to Europe she would gain far more knowledge than through her books. Dealing with the aspect of the price of theoretical and practical knowledge, James portrays numerous times Isabel’s interest and dependence to printed knowledge, “the foundation of her knowledge was really laid in the idleness of her grandmother’s house, where, as most of the other inmates were not reading people, she had uncontrolled use of a library full of books with frontispieces” (*PL* 24) or as the narrator says, “she kept her eyes on her book and tried to fix her mind” (*PL* 25). Hence, in the early chapters, we see that Isabel’s mind and character is merely formed through reading books, without any experience.

knowledge of a genius is not far from its imagination. Essentially, “the man of genius requires imagination, in order to see in things not what nature has actually formed” (*WWR 1*: 186) and this imagination does not “extend his horizon far beyond the reality of his personal experience, and enable him to construct all the rest out of the little that has come into his own actual apperception, and thus to let almost all the possible scenes of life pass by within himself” (*WWR 1*: 186). In other words, curiosity breeds desire for knowledge, imagination springs from knowledge of the world, and experience works to channel and limit the imagination and shape it from a wild, unbridled dream into a productive energy. That is what Schopenhauer means when he says that genius requires imagination, so one can see beyond the original concept and design that nature has created. It is then one’s personal experience that reigns over and channels the imagination so that does not extend very far beyond one’s reality, thus the imagination can remain useful, and not whimsical and possibly damaging; experience guided imagination can allow the genius mind to conduct “all the possible scenes of life” and let them “pass by within himself.” Based on this view, Isabel lacks two of the three necessities (imagination, knowledge and experience) that Schopenhauer considers as essential to genius. The heroine is a “young woman of imagination” (*PL 94*) but she has less knowledge and experience. What can she do to obtain pure knowledge? For Schopenhauer, the only answer is leaving out of personal interest, willing and goals. The kind of perception that James considers for his heroine not only undertakes this formulation but also the conflict between imagination and experience.

The struggle between imagination and experience plays a significant role in James's strategy and his solution to Isabel's curiosity for knowledge. Ralph considers that people are rich when "they're able to meet the requirements of their imagination" (*PL* 183). He knows that Isabel has a "great deal of imagination" (*PL* 183) and he really wants her to reach all her desires. "She wishes to be free, and [Mr Touchett's] bequest will make her free" (*PL* 183). To this end, Ralph wants his father to split the legacy into two equal halves and give her one. After providing the heroine an opportunity of reaching her imagination, James bases the tale on the fact that "Isabel will learn [the truth] when she's really thrown upon the world" and it would be very painful "to think of her coming to the consciousness of a lot of wants she should be unable to satisfy" (*PL* 184). He takes advantage of Schopenhauer's concept of genius by focusing on the conflict between Isabel's imagination and her experiences. James is highlighting the internal turmoil this woman faces when she is thrust upon the world and is awakened to the actuality that experience does not always join with imagination. We encounter a portrait of a woman who "wished to check the sense of seeing too many things at once and her imagination was by habit ridiculously active" (*PL* 32) but she comes to the realisation that experience differs from imagination, a contemplation with much suffering. She is aided by her imagination, allowing her to form standards that will enable her to choose her mate. The way that her imagination leads her towards marriage with Osmond creates the idea that imagination is mostly subversive, and it can ruin a person's life. Osmond's proposal is an opportunity of laying a foundation of knowledge in her. Having spent time with him, she realises

that her imagination about her husband was more active than accurate as to his real character. Shortly after experiencing life with him, she declares that “her imagination surely did her little honour” (PL 424). To the high cognitive value of learning, James regards experience as the primary necessities for reaching knowledge. This fact in the body of the novel helps the heroine to achieve a high ethical perception. It follows the idea that imagination on its own can have a subversive influence while the solution to the riddle of the world is possible only through experience and true knowledge.

Experience of Negative and Positive Freedom

Freedom is one of the major elements in James’s *The Portrait of a Lady*. In an age when American females were usually engaged or married, Isabel was somewhat ahead of her time in hoping for a marriage in which she could still be independent. She was very fond of her liberty and afraid of losing it, but does her return to Osmond at the end of the novel suggest that she has put an end to her eagerness for freedom? In my view, James’s novel, in its last scene, covers a different aspect of freedom which, through a Schopenhauerian approach, delivers a different insight into liberty. This perception of freedom has never been considered in connection with Schopenhauer’s view on the experience of freedom. Therefore, I will discuss his ideas in connection with Isabel’s action in the last scene.

For Schopenhauer, aesthetic experience has an ethical importance. He considers two sorts of experiences: first, experience of negative freedom and

secondly, experience of positive freedom. In negative freedom, the individual is in the service of the will, while in positive freedom, he or she frees himself from the servitude of the will. In positive freedom, the individual recognises the object in a non-egoistic manner. In fact, the self-consciousness gained from experience enables the person to change his or her behaviour and attitudes from a wilful state to a will-less state. In Schopenhauer's philosophy, rejection of the will is accomplished in two ways: either through personal experience of an extreme suffering that leads to loss of the will or through recognition of the essential nature of life, the will. Schopenhauer's principle is predicated on embracing a benevolent attitude for others while striving with a sharpened awareness of what would be in their best interest. This attitude is the initial element in the understanding of compassion. The most offensive part of Isabel's character arises from her egotistical quality, erroneous image of independency and her inability to overcome the self. "You could have made her colour, any day in the year, by calling her a rank egoist. She was always planning out her development, desiring her perfection, observing her progress" (*PL* 53). The ideal of freedom is motivated by Isabel's selfishness and "wilful" characteristic (*PL* 345). These two characteristics subordinate her imagination towards a deluded picture of freedom. But her ethical life forms through the same portrait. Isabel becomes conscious regarding the existence of the will behind her actions through her suffering in her miserable marriage. This realisation subsequently empowers her to ignore herself. Indeed, James presents a psychologically realistic character whose behaviour is a direct outgrowth of her self-

satisfaction, with her clashes resulting from the differences between her expectations and the reality of her surrounding environment.

There are a number of connections that Schopenhauer sketches between the positive experience of freedom and his ethic of compassion. He claims that “true loss is just as impossible as true gain in this world of appearance. Only the will exists: it, the thing in itself, is the source of all those appearances. Its self-knowledge and its consequent decision to affirm or to negate is the only event in itself” (*WWR I*: 207). If we take this passage into consideration, then we realise that Isabel’s final circumstance is to affirm or negate her will. But after gaining consciousness from her experience, she sees an ethical significance in refusing Goodwood’s offer of freedom. In other words, since her experience is the only way to attain an accurate understanding of the world in all its multiplicity, it seems that experience and suffering are the essential pre-conditions for making her ethical choice. Therefore, this particular consciousness gained by experience will prove to be of a moral significance in the novel.

James delineates this significant cognition of experience and freedom by presenting an inexperienced woman who is looking for liberty. He ends the novel by leaving the heroine between two options of freedom. It is in his conclusion, when Goodwood’s seductive words beseech Isabel not to return to her husband, that James releases the main point of his moral art. Goodwood hopes that Isabel would once more be persuaded by her longing for freedom and independence. Here, going back to Osmond must be a genuine option for Isabel, otherwise the choice of staying with

Goodwood can be only another imprisonment. Indeed, the last affairs between Goodwood and Isabel represent that “sexual fulfilment may depend on a complete relinquishing of a person’s freedom and independence” (Buelens, *Metaphor*: 5). James leaves the heroine free to choose between staying with Goodwood or returning to Osmond. Based on her previous experience Isabel chooses to free herself from the servitude of the will, a positive freedom. Clearly, there are actual pictures of freedom in her mind, but at that specific moment she is not the inexperienced woman of the early chapters. In the light of self-consciousness, she realises that she has the power to act in a less egoistic manner. Consequently, if the unconscious side of Isabel dominates, and she pursues her desire for a personal independence, then accepting Goodwood’s proposal will deliberately put her in another imprisonment, which represents her pursuit for negative freedom. But if the conscious side of her is to dominate, then we can consider her returning to Osmond as a positive freedom which suggests her moral consistency.

Freedom and Possession

The truth of marital possession is exhaustively explored in James’s novel. This idea is sophisticatedly depicted in Isabel’s character development throughout the novel, not only in her relationship with Osmond but also with other lovers. Schopenhauer in his essay on “Metaphysics of Love” pays great attention to the matter of possession in marriage. It appears that *The Portrait of a Lady* articulates such a view as well, the truth that marriage is in opposition to individual independence.

Schopenhauer believes that “the fundamental fault in the character of women is that they have no ‘sense of justice.’” This arises from their “deficiency in the power of reasoning” (*Women* 44). Regarding the limited reasoning power in women, he continues:

Woman is by nature intended to obey is shown by the fact that every woman who is placed in the unnatural position of absolute independence at once attaches herself to some kind of man, by whom she is controlled and governed; this is because she requires a master. If she, is young, the man is a lover; if she is old, a priest. (*Women* 51)

Schopenhauer had an unambiguous hatred and fear of women. As Thomas Grimwood states in “The Limits of Misogyny: Schopenhauer, ‘On Women’” (2008), “such ‘information’ is often purely hypothetical and speculative, rarely based on any substantial empirical evidence” (134).³³ This quality in some degree applies to Isabel’s attitudes. She always returns to her theory that a woman “ought to be able to live to herself, in the absence of exceptional flimsiness, and that it was perfectly possible to be happy without the society of a more or less coarse-minded person of another sex” (*PL* 53). It is this idea that comforts her in “being independent” (*PL* 52). But after receiving the opportunity for independence through the fortune of her heritage, she continues pursuing her ideal mate. Although Isabel insists on retaining her independence, she is simultaneously drawn towards her inescapable destiny,

³³ From the 1930’s and thereafter, Schopenhauer’s abhorrence of women has gone relatively unchallenged in philosophical literature. Biographers of Schopenhauer have recognised and criticised his misogynistic character, so my study uncover no new biographical data.

marriage. Thus, her unique desire for freedom turns out to produce possession in marriage.

Osmond is descended from a pretentious mother who wished to be known as the American Corinne. He appears delightfully negative and unconditional; as Madame Merle says of him, “No career, no name, no position, no fortune, no past, no future, no anything” (*PL* 197). Even with all her knowledge about him, she deceives Isabel to marry him. Osmond, with Merle’s assistance, encourages Isabel’s desires, in order to overcome other suitors, because her money is his main motivation behind this marriage. On the other side, one of the things that motivate Isabel is her unquenchable desire to be pleased. In the narrator’s words, “she married to please herself. One did other things to please other people; one did this for a more personal satisfaction” (*PL* 349). Shortly after their marriage, Osmond’s interest in his wife becomes a kind of possession and dominance. He sees her exclusively as an acquisition to be controlled and he wants to stifle her freedom. Hereafter, *The Portrait of a Lady* forms a notable contribution to the discussion of domination by an alternative view of mastery, as well as slavery. It is worth recalling Gert Buelens’s description of the final scene when Goodwood kisses Isabel, “the imagery of the scene is sensuous, yet it also clearly brings out the bound and unfree condition that giving in to such sensuality involves, a condition that is like being drowned, exposed to lightning and submitted to possession” (*Metaphor* 5). Indeed, Isabel has to “allow herself to be thus possessed by a man” (*Metaphor* 4-5). Osmond’s exploitative manner in marriage shows that by profitably possessing Isabel, then restricting her

into his own views rather than leaving her free to go after her desires, she is imprisoned by him instead of gaining more freedom. One of the significant elements of the novel is Osmond's authoritarianism; his authoritarianism urges Isabel not to go to England to see her cousin and also obliges his daughter, Pansy, to marry Warburton because of money. In fact, Osmond's egoistic love of authority crushes Isabel in what Ralph names "the very mill of the conventional" (*PL* 577).

Further, Osmond admires Isabel's mind but only when her thinking reflects back his opinions. This arises from his sense of possession and superiority. His ignorance of her separate identity, or mind, resembles Schopenhauer's belief that women lack objectivity of mind and that is why "they always stick to what is subjective" (*Women* 47).³⁴ Accordingly, he claims that a woman's sense of fairness is weaker than a man's because "their attention [is] fixed upon what lies nearest" (*Women* 44). Schopenhauer compares a woman in this respect to "an organism that has a liver but no gall-bladder" (*Women* 44). Osmond's manner easily presents this idea because he refuses Isabel's mind, and yet he is still slightly entertained by her imagination. He considers her mind as a small garden lying within the vast garden of his mind, although the narrator claims that Isabel has a sharp "mind of her own" (*PL* 432). In these conflicting layers, the reader should bear in mind that owning a sharp mind in Isabel is the quality that makes her "a prodigy of learning" (*PL* 49) while in another scene the narrator emphasises that she thinks that she knows "a great deal of

³⁴"This is most striking in regard to painting, the technique of which is as much within their reach as within ours; this is why they pursue it so industriously. Still, they have not a single great painting to show, for the simple reason that they lack that objectivity of mind." P.47

[everything]” (*PL* 43), but indeed she is unaware that there are many matters of which she has no knowledge. More contradicting information surfaces when James provides an access to Isabel’s memories of the first few years of her life with Osmond. We discover that she has “lived with [Osmond’s mind], she [has] lived in it almost – it appear[s] to have become her habitation” (*PL* 428). By conflating Isabel’s thoughts and theories with Osmond’s mind and “habitation” (*PL* 429), James reveals the reality that Osmond not only has the possession of her wealth but also Isabel’s mind and liberty:

Her mind was to be his – attached to his own like a small garden-plot to a deer-park. He would rake the soil gently and water the flowers; he would weed the beds and gather an occasional nose-gay. It would be a pretty piece of property for a proprietor already far-reaching. He didn’t wish her to be stupid. On the contrary, it was because she was clever that she had pleased him. But he expected her intelligence to operate altogether in his favour. (*PL* 432)

The relativity of such terms as “small garden-plot” and “deer-park,” which Osmond emphasises are inseparable, is characteristic of Schopenhauer in his treatment of a woman’s mind where he considers a woman as a liver without a gall-bladder and believes that she should constantly stick “to what is subjective.” Even at the catastrophic moment in which Isabel informs Osmond that Ralph is ill and she wants to meet him before his death, Osmond reiterates that they are “indissolubly united” as husband and wife. He has an ideal of what his wife “should do and should not do,” he tells her:

“She should not travel across Europe alone, in defiance of my deepest desire, to sit at the bedside of other men. Your cousin’s nothing to you; he’s nothing to us. You smile most expressively when I talk about *us*, but I assure you that *we, we*, Mrs. Osmond, is all I know. I take our marriage seriously; you appear to have found a way of not doing so.” (PL 536)

James reveals the true nature of matrimony through Osmond’s character in this passage. Osmond’s deliberate use of “Mrs. Osmond” states his belief of possession of Isabel, in every facet that one can be possessed. He self-consciously refers to Isabel as “Mrs. Osmond” during their verbal exchange, to demonstrate the loss of her former identity. James is remarkable in this instance of masculine superiority, as he boldly paints the strokes of the theme of possession in marriage. The novel shows Osmond’s claim of authority over Isabel, by seemingly stripping away even the right for debate, or discussion with him, all the while, cloaking his desire for control with flowery wording such as Osmond stating he “takes [their] marriage seriously” and his concern of her travelling across Europe alone. James boldly exhibits that Isabel is either naive, or has no free will of her own. Based on this assertion of marital unity and masculine superiority, Osmond plays a role of superiority, and labels Isabel’s idea of independence in marriage as superficial. Based on these passages and the idea of absolute authority in Osmond’s character and absolute submission in Isabel’s, it is possible to analyse the concept of possession by using Schopenhauer’s philosophy where he remarks that in the matter of consciousness women play an inferior role to men.

These images of superiority and inferiority between Isabel and Osmond which characterise their relationship can also be approached through Schopenhauer's elucidation of the egoist's urge for domination: he

either destroys or injures this other body itself, or compels the powers of that other body to serve *his* will, instead of serving the will that appears in that other body. ... Moreover, wrong manifests itself in the subjugation of another individual, in forcing him into slavery. (*WWR I*: 334-35)

This Schopenhauerian tenet appears in the novel when the narrator introduces Isabel as a person who wants others to treat her as a superior. As I will argue in the next section, it is the same quality in Osmond that helps Isabel to become conscious of her own will. Her refusal of Goodwood's and Warburton's proposals reveals Isabel's strong conviction that "she is the proprietor of herself" and "her decision to marry Osmond is [also] based on a desire to marry a man who will enable her to maintain this sense of self-proprietorship" (Flannery 38). But later James demonstrates that such a thing is impossible. Towards the end of the novel, after Isabel confronts the misery that composes her marriage, she dutifully reminds herself that Osmond is her "appointed and inscribed master":

[S]he gazed at moments with a sort of incredulous blankness at this fact. It weighed upon her imagination, however; constantly present to her mind were all the traditional decencies and sanctities of marriage. The idea of violating them filled her with shame as well as with dread, for on giving herself away she had

lost sight of his contingency in the perfect belief that her husband's intentions were as generous as her own. (*PL* 462)

From the beginning Isabel is afraid of custody in marriage. The idea of any marriage, whether to Warburton or Goodwood, upsets Isabel, who looks at matrimony as possession. Goodwood "seemed to deprive her of the sense of freedom" (*PL* 114). Warburton occupies a position that appeals to Isabel's imagination. "Great responsibilities, great opportunities, great consideration, great wealth, great power, a natural share in the public affairs of a great country" (*PL* 71) but he negates Isabel's mind and knowledge. Isabel feels that he thinks that she is a "barbarian ... and that [she has] never seen forks and spoons" (*PL* 70). That is the point that makes her disqualify him for she does not "need the aid of a clever man to teach [her] how to live" (*PL* 158). Before marriage Osmond treated her "so completely as an independent person" (*PL* 350) with a personal mind. Not long after marriage, she realises that she was deceived. Nevertheless, when in England Ralph asks her to stay instead of going back to Rome she says, "I should like to stay – as long as seems right" (*PL* 577). Not surprisingly, she knows now the fact that she is in possession of her husband and he is the "master of the house" (*PL* 370). James critically portrays the origin of freedom in relation with the other sex; and probably for the same reason his heroine does not see any freedom even in Goodwood's "act of possession" (*PL* 591) by the end of the novel.

Ghost or Crucial Suffering

The Portrait of a Lady carries a moral, psychological and philosophical intensity. One of these conceptual elements arises when James portrays the idea of a ghost in the novel. At the beginning of the novel, Isabel, as “a young, happy, innocent person,” insistently asks her cousin to show her the ghost in Gardencourt. Although she does not have the quality needed to see the ghost at the beginning of the novel, by the end, she has matured and has a clear understanding of life and the severity, and moral implications of her actions. Troubling questions then spring to mind: Is the ghost a personification of Europe or the epitome of European decadence? Might it be true that James had made a decision to create a straightforward ghost or evil scene? Whichever the case, the ghost lies deep in the body of the novel and puts its reflection in sharper focus. By considering Schopenhauer’s philosophy of suffering, my study will offer a new and alternate definition of the ghost in the novel. This discovery of a symbolic ghost may enable us to trace how James’s novel, in a broader moral obligation, responds to Schopenhauer’s view of morality. I believe that the portrait of the ghost in the novel is not merely correlative to a personification of Europe. To fully understand this embodiment of novel’s ghost, it will be helpful to first acknowledge Schopenhauer’s view of suffering.

Central to Schopenhauer’s doctrine of suffering of the world is the understanding of man’s link to the world through will. In his opinion:

If suffering is not the first and immediate object of our life,
then our existence is the most inexpedient and inappropriate

thing in the world. For it is absurd to assume that the infinite pain, which everywhere abounds in the world and springs from the want and misery essential to life, could be purposeless and purely accidental. Our susceptibility to pain is wellnigh infinite; but that to pleasure has narrow limits. ... Just as a brook forms no eddy so long as it meets with no obstructions, so human nature, as well as animal, is such that we do not really notice and perceive all that goes on in accordance with our will. ... On the other hand, everything that obstructs, crosses, or opposes our will, and thus everything unpleasant and painful, is felt by us immediately, at once, and very plainly. (*Parerga* 291)

With regard to this, our being or our existence in the world comes from the same source, the will. In addition, our acknowledgment of it not only increases our capacity for sympathy and generosity for others; rather, it creates a sense of belonging to the universe and wholeness. Consequently, our suffering is mitigated by our understanding of this being shared. The existence of the will behind Isabel's actions diminishes her consciousness and the power of intellect. Subsequently, she cannot have a vivid perspective of freedom and real life. She gets involved in a relationship which leads her towards suffering and unhappiness. Yet through her miserable conjugal life, she learns how to understand and have sympathy for the other. Since Isabel's knowledge comes through suffering, there remains a question: does knowledge play a significant role in her suffering and character? Moreover, is there any relationship between suffering and pleasure? If the answer is yes, can one's happiness be measured through suffering?

The easiest way to understand the interaction between knowledge and suffering is to have a look at the difference between the sorrow of humans and animals. According to Schopenhauer, “the happiness of any given life is to be measured not by its joys and pleasures, but by the absence of sorrow and suffering, of that which is positive” (*Parerga* 295). In this case, animals appear to suffer less than anyone. An overview of this idea is vital for measuring Isabel’s suffering in the novel. For Schopenhauer, the material basis of physical pleasure in man and animals is similar because it is restricted and is based on some instinctive needs but the prospect of knowledge is different. And accordingly, it “is true that [man] certainly has over the animal the advantage of really intellectual pleasures” but through this fact, the measure of pain increases in man (*Parerga* 293-96). Schopenhauer concludes that:

The animal’s life contains less suffering ... because its consciousness is restricted to what is intuitively perceived and so to the present moment. ... whereas man’s consciousness has an intellectual horizon that embraces the whole of life and even goes beyond this. ... [In consequence of this], the animal is the embodiment of the present; the obvious peace of mind which it thus shares frequently puts us to shame with our often restless and dissatisfied state that comes from thoughts and cares. And even those pleasures of hope and anticipation we have just been discussing are not to be had for nothing. Thus what a man enjoys in advance, through hoping and expecting a satisfaction, afterwards detracts from the actual

enjoyment of this, since the thing itself then satisfies him by
so much the less. (*Parerga* 296)

In accordance to this, the scale for measuring pain is knowledge and as knowledge increases, the person suffers more. Isabel does not have any specific knowledge of the old world and when she first encounters Ralph, she introduces herself as a person interested in knowledge. She is impatiently enthusiastic to know and experience new things in her environment. The narrator informs us that she is “too young, too impatient to live, too unacquainted with pain” (*PL* 54). Remaining true to Schopenhauer’s doctrine of suffering, the character of Isabel, because she is “too young” and also “unacquainted with pain,” is portrayed as having a long journey ahead of her before she is a knowledgeable person who has learned through suffering.

Isabel, from her early appearance in the novel, implores her cousin to show her the ghost but Ralph argues that “it is not a romantic old house, [and] you’ll be disappointed if you count on that. It’s a dismally prosaic one; there’s no romance here but what you may have brought with you” (*PL* 47). Some of the readers who suspect James might have decided to write a straightforward ghost or evil scene, may obtain a new view by an explicit look at Isabel’s dialogue where she claims that “the way to clinch the matter will be to show [her] the ghost” (*PL* 48). Accordingly, perhaps, James’s intention is closer to Robert Pippin’s interpretation that “the final identity of ghost or the final possession and revelation of secrets also typifies a resistance to someone else” (112). One of Osmond’s main functions in the novel is

to tame Isabel's egoism at the cost of her spirit and pride. The novel presents Osmond as a ghost opposed to what first Isabel thought of him:

He was certainly fastidious and critical; he was probably irritable. His sensibility had governed him – possibly governed him too much; it had made him impatient of vulgar troubles and had led him to live by himself, in a sorted, sifted, arranged world, thinking about art and beauty and history. He had consulted his taste in everything. (*PL* 262)

It was this taste in him that made him so different from everyone else and deceived Isabel. But as the novel goes on, the distinction between his true nature and her early image makes Osmond a ghost indeed. In this way, it is possible to assert that through Isabel's gained knowledge and experience now she comes to understand that the idea of "someone else" refers to her husband who will be the source of her future misery and the one who will represent the evil side of the world. When Ralph encounters Isabel's eagerness to see the ghost he tells her

‘I might show it to you, but you'd never see it. The privilege isn't given to everyone; it's not enviable. It has never been seen by a young, happy, innocent person like you. You must have suffered first, have suffered greatly, have gained some miserable knowledge. In that way your eyes are opened to it. I saw it long ago.’

‘I told you just now I'm very fond of knowledge,’ Isabel answered.

‘Yes, of happy knowledge – of pleasant knowledge. But you haven’t suffered, and you’re not made to suffer. I hope you’ll never see the ghost!’ (PL 48)

From this passage we recognise that a young unworldly girl who “had seen very little of the evil of the world,” with “no regular education,” a girl with no experience who is engaged “in the depths of her nature an even more unquenchable desire” of pleasure and freedom, a girl whose “imagination was by habit ridiculously active” (PL 32-51) cannot have a perspicuous comprehension of the real meaning of suffering or the real meaning of ghosts in an evil world. There is indeed something real about the ghost, but not simply as a demon because when Ralph hopes “[she’ll] never see the ghost!” she replies that:

‘I’m not afraid, you know’

‘You’re not afraid of suffering?’

‘Yes, I’m afraid of suffering. But I’m not afraid of ghosts. And I think people suffer too easily,’ she added.

‘I don’t believe *you* do,’ said Ralph, looking at her with his hands in his pockets.

‘I don’t think that’s a fault,’ she answered. ‘It’s not absolutely necessary to suffer; we were not made for that.’ (PL 48)

It is astounding that Isabel, even in her naive youth, could truly believe “it’s not absolutely necessary to suffer” and that “we were not made for that” because, as we see in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, one’s self-consciousness is possible only through suffering. Indeed, it is through suffering and experience that an individual can

achieve more knowledge about their surrounding environment. Further, this capacity in Isabel showcases her character and the lack of depth of her mind. James also reaffirms her deficiency of real world experiences. She cannot possibly understand nor have respect for what it really means to suffer, because she has not experienced the pain associated with suffering. But by the end of the novel, Isabel achieves the fullest recognition of her failure, her misunderstanding of the real ghost and suffering through her conjugal bound with Osmond. The closing chapter opens with Isabel's memory of what Ralph told her in "the first evening she ever spent at Garden-court, that if she should live to suffer enough she might someday see the ghost with which the old house was duly provided" (*PL* 578).

Finally, she apparently fulfils the necessary conditions of seeing the ghost and on the railway journey to England, she reverts to the prospect of enlarged suffering:

Wasn't it much more probable that if one were fine one would suffer? It involved then perhaps an admission that one had a certain grossness; but Isabel recognised, as it passed before her eyes, the quick vague shadow of a long future. She should never escape; she should last to the end. Then the middle years wrapped her about again and the grey curtain of her indifference closed her in. (*PL* 562)

In fact, she compensates for her hope and anticipation, and for her care and anxiety in choosing her desirable suitor. Meanwhile, we should add to our consideration that she pays for the lack of knowledge; this is what Schopenhauer refers to as the eventual reality of the thing-in-itself, as Isabel acts only on her will as the primary source of

her actions. Ralph as a philosopher is aware of “this sweet-tasting property of the observed *thing in itself* that was mainly concerned in [his] quickly-stirred interest in the advent of a young lady who was evidently not insipid” (*PL* 41). But Isabel as a young and immature person is unconscious of that, though as I argued in the section on compassion, finally, she learns submission to the will and the benefit of denying the self.

Suffering, with Isabel, “[is] an active condition; it [is] not a chill, a stupor, a despair; it [is] a passion of thought, of speculation, of response to every pressure” (*PL* 425). The traits of her suffering are mostly because she lives “too much in the world of [her] own dreams” and she is not “enough in contact with reality” (*PL* 216). She explicitly demonstrates the role of knowledge in suffering through the will. According to Schopenhauer, “*Physical* pain is already conditioned by nerves and their connection with the brain”; whereas “*mental* pain is conditioned by knowledge; and that it increases with the degree of knowledge.” He thus explains the whole relationship between will and suffering by saying that “the will is the string, its thwarting or checking the vibration thereof, knowledge the sounding-board, and pain the tone” (*Parerga*298). What is significant in Isabel’s character is that she is not suffering physically from Osmond’s violence; as the narrator says, “[I]t had not been physical suffering,” because “for physical suffering there might have been a remedy” (*PL* 429). The novel shows that Isabel suffers mentally rather than physically.

There is no doubt that the moral nature of the novel has much to do with the sight of the ghost. There are many revealing exchanges on the subject between Ralph

and Isabel which, throughout the novel, divulge unto us the aesthetic element in Isabel's fascination with the ghost of Gardencourt. Suffering becomes the material of tragedy and the raw material of art to achieve greater moral awareness. One of the major ironies of the novel is that Isabel, who has been so devoted to finding happiness, discovers that her images of happiness have been foolishly weaved by the lack of knowledge about the existence of pain. When Isabel has a vivid recollection of suffering, upon recalling her initial sighting of the ghost, it becomes clear that a greater portion of Isabel's knowledge has matured as a result of suffering, which allows her a better perspective of the ghost. What James has shown in Isabel, and increasingly as the novel progresses, is the power of the will in forming such suffering. With the culmination of Isabel's knowledge of Ralph's promise that she would see the ghost once she had experienced great suffering, the final identity of the ghost, which I argued was going to reflect a resistance of someone else, refers to Osmond's wilful superiority. Based on all of the above elements, the ghost can be consistently construed as a metaphor for the will. Isabel's will, a power that was unknown to her before her marriage, takes shape as she realises its truth through suffering and its ability to exist within the body of another, her husband.

Finally, it is possible to say that in writing *The Portrait of a Lady*, James fused his reading with elements of his personal life: the elements of German thought. Schopenhauer's allusions in James's novel are considerable, but as I have argued, the traces of Schopenhauerian ideas in his work are mostly indirect. There has been considerable critical discussion as to why the book ends in such a manner that it

leaves unanswered the reason for Isabel's return to her husband. This question has long been the subject of serious debate. As I presented the fact is not limited to the casual view of separation and divorce, and the fidelity of her promises; rather, James represents a myth of the excellence of art, an aesthetic, so thoroughly similar to the thoughts of Schopenhauer on morality and will. A Schopenhauerian thought resonates behind the novel's aesthetical construction, both through Ralph's expression of the real world and through Isabel's character. The expression of reality casts its brightest light through a Schopenhauerian question of "what is the thing-in-itself?" observable by Ralph and represented by Isabel's character. Moreover, it is a measure of James's moral achievement in the novel that he gives us a sense of redemption through self-denial and sympathy. Meantime, the ethical poles of the novel portray the two fundamental concepts of Schopenhauer: egoism and compassion. This influence, if not directly from Schopenhauer, is achieved indirectly by the use of the style which James learned primarily from Eliot's *Daniel Deronda*. But James's portrayal of Schopenhauer's ideas does not appear copied and pasted; rather, he develops and supports the thought in great detail. Isabel's ambiguous love for independence, her assumption of control over destiny, and the struggle between imagination, experience, and knowledge are consistent with Schopenhauer's elucidation of the experience of positive and negative freedom. Indeed, the novel represents an ominous world, where moral values are being superseded, where fulfilment of desires is dependent on self-awareness, and where the individual's knowledge is dependent on his experience and suffering.

CHAPTER FOUR

Schopenhauer in D. H. Lawrence's *The White Peacock*

In all [Lawrence's] reading he seemed to be groping for something that he could lay hold of as the guiding principle in his own life. There was never the least touch of the academic or the scholastic in his approach. What he read was to be applied to the here and now; he seemed to consider all his philosophical reading from the angle of his own personal need. (Chambers 112-13)

Living among the forces of provincialism and puritanism in late adolescence, D. H. Lawrence sought a philosophy that would liberate him from the middle-class morality and the boundaries of his era. He deeply desired a pathway that would lead him while he formulated his own ideas and personal needs, and he was exhilarated by the discovery of Arthur Schopenhauer in 1905 or 1906 by reading Mrs. Rudolf Dircks's translation of *Essays of Schopenhauer*. It becomes readily evident that Lawrence found some resolution to his tireless searching. In his first novel, *The White Peacock* (1911), by representing human nature and animals, he encapsulates key Schopenhauerian elements as one of the themes of his novel reflects the oppressive concepts of sexuality and marriage. This was a key topic for Lawrence because he realised that the traditional and conventional validations of the mid-Victorian standards for marriage had collapsed. Relationships between men and women were unsteady, *love* had many variable meanings and was frequently abusive. Marriage was unstable and it was not difficult to envision the day when the wealthy, powerful men would reach out to prostitutes in order to satisfy their personal needs

which they could not get at home. In such circumstances, Lawrence tried to consider new social and sexual arrangements that he and his contemporaries were exploring. Exposed to this oppression in the novel, the psychological effects can be observed when the characters begin to look to landscape to escape the reality of an evolving society that has imposed expectations and constraints on them. However, they find no recourse in nature as they realise their frustrations have followed them. They resort to acting from the basics of their nature in an attempt to process their emotions and to overcome the constraining atmosphere of society. Such attitude can be found in Lawrence's character, Annable who surrenders himself to his nature, or Cyril who tries to stay away from society's demands. Lawrence then proceeds to show the reality of human nature as will and its destructive tendencies. Moreover, Schopenhauer's name appears in the novel frequently and reveals the idea that his pessimism and despair greatly appealed to Lawrence. Several critics such as John Beer, E. H. Green, John Worthen and Daniel Schneider have explored Schopenhauer's prevalent influence on Lawrence's view of the world as will and idea. For instance, in *D. H. Lawrence: Nature, Narrative, Art, Identity* (2014), Beer's idea about Lawrence's "The Reality of Peace" (1917) is that "this essay, moreover, like 'The Crown', involved successive assertions concerning the principle of duality that Lawrence had come to see as basic for an understanding of the universe" (107). Lawrence adapted this basic idea from Schopenhauer's philosophy of the world as will and representation and this idea had a significant influence on his writings for a considerable time. My analysis differs from these previous examinations because it

concentrates on Lawrence's philosophical view of love and will through Schopenhauer's philosophy. In her article, "Schopenhauer and D. H. Lawrence on Sex and Love," E. H. Green shows the influence of Schopenhauer on Lawrence and makes a case for the differences in the basic attitude of these two authors towards the value of love and the will to live. She says, "the differences in the basic attitude of these two men towards sex is directly related to the difference in the value they place upon life and the will to live" (388). This basic attitude towards sex results in Lawrence's philosophy of wholeness, while it leads Schopenhauer to a theory of production. In Green's words, "the great difference between the two thinkers is that Lawrence believes this gulf (between the value of love and sexual instinct) may occasionally be bridged by the Holy Ghost within man that partakes of and thus reconciles the nature of both. Indeed, he makes 'some sort of fluctuating harmony' between the two the main aim of a man's life, whereas for Schopenhauer the two poles remain forever separate" (335-36). My approach, while intent on exploring this principal attitude of love, differs from her work in that it treats Schopenhauer as a source of inspiration for specific Lawrentian beliefs about love and human nature, and formed Lawrence's structure and strategy in his first novel. Tianying Zang's *D. H. Lawrence's Philosophy of Nature* (2011) is one of the recent criticisms which examines an affinity between Lawrence's view of nature and Eastern thought systems, particularly she represents a relationship between his understanding of such fundamental matters as nature's duality, man's nature, mind and body, life and death, and sexuality, with the classic oriental philosophies concerning nature, particularly

the ancient Taoism. I do not mean to deny the influence which Lawrence may have received from oriental philosophies, but I do wish to ask whether proclaiming Lawrence's indebtedness to Eastern philosophy in writing *The White Peacock* might entail blinding oneself to a fundamental Schopenhaurian structure immersed in this novel. Accordingly, my argument uses Schopenhauer's essays "On Women," "The Life of Species" and "Metaphysics of Love," plus his major work *The World as Will and Representation* to highlight Schopenhauerian terms in Lawrence's *The White Peacock*. To this end, rather than considering Lawrence's notion of the thing as idea and the dichotomy of the world, I concentrate on his understanding of Schopenhauer's concept of the will to live and love. I intend to explore the basic structure of Lawrence's novel and how it is indebted to Schopenhauer. Moreover, I will argue the frequency and degree in which Lawrence's thought process and attitudes can represent Schopenhauer's philosophy. My study addresses the congruence and differences between these two authors, and it shows how Schopenhauer's concept of love can expand the boundaries of the way we approach Lawrence's theme of union in his novels, especially *The White Peacock*. It draws a new perspective on Lawrence's notion of the sexual act and love, and how characters essentially reach a Schopenhauerian philosophy of the will to live rather than Lawrence's philosophy of wholeness, a higher level of love, and a divinity through the physical and spiritual partnership that the sexes may create by union. In other words, I will argue that even though *The White Peacock* characters long to experience Lawrence's philosophy of wholeness, all couples (excluding Tom and Emily) have

failed at reaching it. In particular, I will disclose that the lovers appear united for the sake of species and that the novel looks further into the future, placing value on the security of the generation.

Lawrence's Schopenhauerian Attitudes

An integrated view of Lawrence considers him as a poet, writer, psychologist and philosopher. It is possible to say that his didactic and expository works are the result of his creative imagination and feelings compounded with his formal reading and knowledge of philosophy. Lawrence himself leaves no doubt that his personal intention is the union of fiction and philosophy. He writes in his essay on "The Future of the Novel":

Plato's Dialogues, too, are queer little novels. It seems to me it was the greatest pity in the world, when philosophy and fiction got split. They used to be one, right from the days of myth. Then they went and parted, like a nagging married couple, with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and that beastly Kant. So the novel went sloppy, and philosophy went abstract-dry. The two should come together again, in the novel. (154)

In this truly prominent statement that philosophy and fiction "used to be one," Lawrence purposefully shows that his primary intention was to bring the two back together in his writing. He explains something necessary, at least about his goals if not his achievement. Even though Lawrence was thinking of Plato and other

philosophers, he was most heavily contemplating Schopenhauer. To realise the influence of Schopenhauer's concept of love and the will to live on D. H. Lawrence's views in writing his first novel, we need to devote closer attention to Lawrence's understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy of love to see if the novelist was possibly synthesising a range of philosophical ideas in *The White Peacock*.

Schopenhauer maintains that instinct works as the final concept of human acts. In all acts, the intellect is subordinated by the individual's desires and will. "The will," as Schopenhauer says, "is the strong blind man who carries on his shoulders the lame man who can see" (*WWI 2*: 421). According to him, under the conscious intellect is the conscious or unconscious will. Likewise, Lawrence considers the reality of actual being to be without conscious or, as he expresses it, man's knowledge is "hovering behind" the reality of things; indeed, Lawrence sees being or nature as the primary source of human acts (McDonald 431). Accordingly, he considers life and reproduction as the fluctuation of death.

Life shall continually and progressively differentiate itself, almost as though this differentiation were a purpose. Life starts crude and unspecified, a great mass. And it proceeds to evolve out of that mass ever more distinct and definite particular forms, an ever-multiplying number of separate species and orders, as if it were working always to the production of the infinite number of perfect individuals, the individual so thorough that he should have nothing in common with any other individual. (McDonald 431)

In fact, Lawrence combined Nietzsche's concept of the will to power as a dominant motive force behind forms with Schopenhauer's notion of the will to live.

According to Nietzsche's philosophy of nobility, the purpose of marriage and love is a development phenomenon. He believes that the best should marry only the best and love should be left for the lower classes. In Nietzsche's opinion, Schopenhauer was wrong and love is not merely eugenic, because the purpose of love is not only reproduction but development; "the superman," as Nietzsche explains, "can survive only by human selection, by eugenic foresight and an ennobling education; it is absurd to let higher individuals marry for love" (qtd. Durant 557). The perception of power and blood in the definition of love provided a definite link between Nietzsche and Lawrence, although for Lawrence ideal love is not separate from truth while for Nietzsche, as same as Schopenhauer, love is the phenomenon of will.

The relation of Lawrence to love as power is a replica of Nietzsche's concept. But Lawrence attached it to the truth of unity and the sense of safety, not only with Nietzsche's critique of the will to power, nor with the idealist contention of Schopenhauer that love is known only through the will to live. Although his theory was rejuvenated by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's work, his philosophy developed independently. To Lawrence, the relations between all things are a duality based on the elements of power and love; "love and power," as he states, "are the two, 'threat vibrations' which hold individuals together,... With power, there is trust, fear and obedience. With love, there is protection and the sense of safety" (qtd. Bolton, 2). Considering Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's attitudes towards love, Lawrence attempts to keep the balance between love as instinct and love as power. Lawrence's

view of noble love never neglects Schopenhauer's point that the primary purpose of people in love is the will to live. He insists that behind the blind will to live is also an "immortal will to become a "greater man," a will toward transcendence" (Schneider 10). To this end, he used Nietzsche's theory of the will to power to overcome Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will to live in order to develop a vital idea of union between the sexes. It is undeniable that the development of Lawrence's psychology, especially in his first novel, is mostly indebted to Schopenhauer's philosophy.

Lawrence's personal view of life and the world began to develop in 1905 or 1906 when he first read Schopenhauer from Mrs Rudolf Dircks's translation of *Essays of Schopenhauer* (1897/1903), while studying at the Ilkeston pupil-teachers centre.³⁵ Her work was a compilation of Schopenhauer's essays on thirteen different topics. Even if he had not read any other works by or about Schopenhauer, Lawrence gained significant exposure to his philosophy by reading Dircks's translation.³⁶ Jessie Chambers makes it clear that Schopenhauer's essay, "The Metaphysics of Love," had a great impact on Lawrence. She explains that "it was during his second year in

³⁵In reference to Lawrence's first reading of Schopenhauer, Eleanor H. Green cites this occurrence in her "Lawrence, Schopenhauer, and the Dual Nature of the Universe," by referring to the translation of *Essays of Schopenhauer* published in Newcastle: Walter Scott, 1897. In Rose Marie Burwell's "A Checklist of Lawrence's Reading," published in *A D. H. Lawrence Handbook* and edited by Keith M. Sagar in 1982, she cites another source of this translation dated 1903 by the same publisher. Furthermore, Schneider notes in "Schopenhauer and the Development of D. H. Lawrence's Psychology" that Lawrence first read Schopenhauer in 1905 or 1906, but he does not state where and from what source. In accordance to and based on the chronology of Lawrence's life and works, between 1902 and 1906, he was a Pupil teacher and a part-time student at Ilkeston Pupil-Teacher Centre, and later he became an assistant teacher at the British School, Eastwood. Therefore, it is possible that he used Dircks's translation of *Essays of Schopenhauer* published in 1903 rather than 1897.

³⁶This book includes thirteen essays by Schopenhauer. Dircks in her introduction to the translation of *Essays of Schopenhauer* says, "these essays are a valuable criticism of life by a man who had a wide experience of life, a man of the world, who possessed an almost inspired faculty of observation." With regard to my discussion, among these essays, the ones "On Woman," "Metaphysic of Love" and "The Metaphysics of Existence" seem more significant in Lawrence's writings.

College that Lawrence began to read philosophy” (Chambers 111). He also advised one of Jessie’s brothers to give her Schopenhauer’s essay for her birthday, and Lawrence read “The Metaphysics of Love” aloud to them:

He translated the Latin quotations in pencil in the margin ...
 This essay made a deep impression upon him ... He followed the reasoning closely, as always applying it to himself, and his own case ... He thought he found there an explanation of his own divided attitude and he remained under the influence of this line of reasoning for some time. (111-12)

With regard to Lawrence’s curiosity about Schopenhauer’s writings, Eleanor H. Green has attempted to illustrate the effect of this considerable exposure to Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Lawrence’s works.³⁷ In an article published in 1977, she argues that the German philosopher obviously made an impression on Lawrence; she states that “the most important idea Lawrence could have found in reading Schopenhauer’s philosophy is the concept of the duality of the universe as a world of empirical phenomena with no real existence and as an invisible world making up the essence of the universe or its true being” (*LS* 84). In her opinion, Lawrence could have been interested in Schopenhauer’s theory of the dichotomy of the world, which is based on practical experience and observation rather than reality.³⁸ Green claims that Lawrence developed and evolved Schopenhauer’s notion of duality from one novel to the next, “employing it to serve a variety of different functions depending on

³⁷ She speaks about this in two articles: “Lawrence, Schopenhauer, and the Dual Nature of the Universe.” *South Atlantic Bulletin*. Vol. 42, No. 4, Nov., 1977: 84-92. And “Schopenhauer and D. H. Lawrence on Sex and Love.” *DHLR*. Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1975:329-345.

³⁸Further explanation can be found in Eleanor H. Green’s “Lawrence, Schopenhauer, and the Dual Nature of the Universe.”

his needs” (*LS* 84). It is the changes in and development of this idea that she tries to examine in her article. However, my analysis of *The White Peacock* will show that Lawrence, prior to his first novel, was aware of Schopenhauer’s ideas about the nature of being or the kinds of existence. aware

Schopenhauer’s concept of the world as idea is reflected in Lawrence’s novels in order to illustrate how the nucleus of the universe is an unseen world, a hypothetical world, and a world that does not exist.³⁹ Several critics, including Mitzi M. Brunsdale, Daniel J. Schneider, Eleanor H. Green and Robert E. Montgomery have explored the existence of this idea in Lawrence’s works. For instance, Schneider states in *D. H. Lawrence: The Artist as Psychologist* that “a major part of Lawrence’s art can be regarded as a development from the Schopenhauerian antithesis between *will* and *idea*” (29). He cites from *The World as Will and Representation*, assuredly assuming that Lawrence had perused and contemplated this work. In *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer argues that the essence of the thing in itself is will or the will to live, which means that every object in the world represents a temporary manifestation. In fact, it is only exclusively in our personal thoughts that the world exists as we believe, but in reality, the world is without factual existence. This philosophy fascinated Lawrence. An example of such fascination is *The Trespasser* (1912). The story is based on Helen Corke’s diary of a holiday she spent with her music teacher, H. B. MacCartney (Siegmond in the novel) of the Carl Rosa

³⁹This idea is explored in depth by other critics, and since the concentration of my study is on love and the sexes, I will not take a broader view of Lawrence’s consideration on the world as representation. For more information see: Green’s “Lawrence, Schopenhauer, and the Dual Nature of the Universe.”

Opera Company, on the Isle of Wight.⁴⁰ At the start of *The Trespasser*, the protagonist Siegmund “might play with the delicate warm surface of life, but always he recked of the relentless mass of cold beneath, the mass of life which has no sympathy with the individual, no cognisance of him” (*Trespasser* 94). As the novel continues, the frozen nucleus of the world below the short-lived presence turns black in doom and atrocity. An example of such turning can be observed in the scene when Siegmund and Helena embrace each other passionately under the moonlight. Moonlight diffuses calm, and they begin to share harmony. After a long passionate embrace, Siegmund’s attention is caught by “the white transport of the water beneath the moon,” and they stand “folded together, gazing into the white heart of the night” (33-34). In the midst of their love affair they are imminently aware of the realisation that with the sun rising and a new day dawning they must part and the feeling of unity disappears. The moon appears to signify their separation and coldness in love. As the story comes to a close in absolute hopelessness and the annihilation of the main character, the force behind man’s being appears to be unconsciousness. Such an image can be seen in the conflict between Siegmund’s brain and body when he goes to bed:

Immediately, he lapsed into a kind of unconsciousness. He would have called it sleep, but such it was not. All the time he could feel his brain working ceaselessly, like a machine running with unslackening rapidity. This went on, interrupted

⁴⁰The original title of the novel was “The Saga of Siegmund,” and it is included with Wagnerian references because of MacCartney’s enthusiasm for *The Ring*. MacCartney played in Wagnerian performances at Covent Garden and in November 1911 Lawrence visited Covent Garden to listen to one of the Ring cycle he had not heard, *Siegfried*.

by little flickerings of consciousness, for three or four hours. Each time he had a glimmer of consciousness he wondered if he made any noise. ‘what am I doing? What is the matter? Am I unconscious? ... He wondered, and he tried to cast back to find the record of mechanical sense-impression.
(*Trespasser* 198)

This is clearly Schopenhauer’s world of the will. Schopenhauer asserts that an individual can perceive the true nature of the will throughout the body, which without any objects is offered to us in two forms. The first as an exterior thing acknowledged by our senses and secondly as an internal instantaneous happening. This internal experience in us which represents itself through feelings, desires and sufferings, that we affirm as “I am” is the will. Schopenhauer states that a “single thought” encapsulates his entire philosophy: “My body and my will are one” (119). Mankind experiences reality not merely of his own being but of all creation through his body irrespective of the mind. Siegmund’s retrospective view reveals a glimpse of the conscious mind relinquishing control to the automatic and primal systems operator, the unconscious mind. As he lies still in bed and slips in and out of consciousness, he is sometimes revived by “little flickerings of consciousness.” The passage suggests the precarious uncertainty of his condition, but the image also destroys conventional descriptions of thought and highlights the significant role of human nature, the will. Another example of this conflict between mind and body exists in *Sons and Lovers*. The astonishing universe for Paul seems only to be an imprisonment, as it was for Siegmund, even though he knows he must learn to adjust in order to live. For Paul seems to subscribe to Schopenhauer’s idea that “to be alive,

to be urgent, and insistent, that was *not-to-be*. The highest of all was, to melt out into the darkness and sway there, identified with the great Being” (SL 331). Paul’s development proceeds sequentially through skeptical questioning, mockery and agnosticism to an exposed, quasi-existentialist position at the end. He looks for the existence of a higher body when he sees himself a “prisoner of industrialism,” he wishes he was “like a dog in the sun. I wish [he thought to himself] I was a pig, and a brewer’s wagoner” (SL 114-15). These wishes come into his mind when he sees himself through others’ eyes (he thinks his manly manner is compromised by “living on his mother”), it hurts him, accordingly, he dreams to escape that misery of the universe by being part of unintellectual and instinctive nature.

The idea of the universe as representation becomes more significant in Lawrence’s later works because of the misery of the First World War. Schopenhauer’s division of the world as will and representation supplied Lawrence with an outline to explain his own hopelessness about the contemporary world. In a letter to Bertrand Russell in 1915, he writes about the unreality of things in terms that resemble Schopenhauer’s ideas:

Sometimes I am afraid of the terrible things that are real in the darkness, and of the entire unreality of these things I see. It becomes like a madness at last, to know one is all the time walking in a pale assembly of an unreal world - this house, this furniture, the sky and the earth - whilst oneself is all the while a piece of darkness pulsating in shocks, and the shocks and the darkness are real.
(*Collected*330)

As in Schopenhauer, the world becomes a representation of reality for Lawrence. The two phases of darkness and reality resemble the will and representation. Lawrence seems suspicious about the reality of what he sees in his surrounding environment, of the “terrible things that are real in the darkness.” Placing fear in the unknown darkness and in the unreality of that which he sees, Lawrence accepts his world as representation and further, he steps into madness as he believes that the reality of the thing is covered behind its vague representation and he is merely “walking in a pale assembly of an unreal world.” Accordingly, Lawrence “becomes a true Schopenhauer disciple, an ‘invisible man’ who only appears to exist in the phenomenal world through the use of clothes or masks, but whose true reality is elsewhere” (Green, *LS*: 91). Consequently, it is possible to say that Lawrence stumbled upon Schopenhauer at an age in which he was exploring and developing his identity, and the German philosopher struck a familiar chord within Lawrence.

Love and Sex in Lawrence’s Theory

It becomes increasingly evident that Schopenhauer’s “philosophically systematic, reticulated version of ideas ... remain more implicit in Lawrence’s more condensed and metaphoric style” (Montgomery 44). Lawrence’s style is notable for its intensity and its erotic sensuality; several of his works, including *The White Peacock*, are a study in failed and damaging relationships. He plumbs the depths of the difficulties, vulnerabilities, joy and cruelty that make up interpersonal affairs. In this process, Schopenhauer’s theory that the will is the primary motivating drive of all human activity caused Lawrence to take this fundamental point into consideration.

Lawrence's reflections on the idea of will ushered him inevitably, as we shall see, to emphasise, as Schopenhauer emphasised, the affinities of the doctrine of the will to live and love in relationships between his characters. Accordingly in this section, I aim to use Schopenhauer's views to explore the development of the idea of love and sex in Lawrence's writing. Examining this development of Lawrence's philosophy, I shall reveal that Lawrence emulated Schopenhauer's philosophy of love and the sexes to accentuate how sexual attraction springs from opposition rather than an intimate fondness between his characters. In order to look at the complete picture of relationships between Lawrence's characters and his early development, I will attempt not only to treat Schopenhauer as an inspirational element, but additionally, as a source of structure used in the development and refining of Lawrence's own concept of love and sexual instinct.

Lawrence "was one of England's most controversial literary figures: censors balked at his representations of sexual lives of men and women" (Becket 1). His novels work out his ideas against the conventionally dictated love relationship between men and women. In his Croydon years, he began to criticise mid-Victorian moral feelings and sexual shyness. 1911 was a year in which Lawrence "was trying to come to terms with divisions in his own nature and expectations; he had bound himself to a conventional engagement while simultaneously coming to believe that those in love naturally behaved unconventionally" (Worthen 301). With such a strong impulse, Lawrence was hungry for knowledge and in search of a philosophy that would release him from the mental restrictions of middle-class morality,

puritanism, and provincialism. In so doing, he turned towards Schopenhauer's philosophy, for Schopenhauer "seemed to fit in with his mood" (Chambers 111). "It must have been refreshing for Lawrence," as Emile Delavenay states, "to discover in a writer as respected as Schopenhauer the theory that sexual passion is the primary motivating drive of all human activity" (64). At this point it is appropriate to ask how Schopenhauer played a role in motivating Lawrence's attitudes and approach to love and sexual passion.

With regard to the deep impression that "The Metaphysics of Love" made upon Lawrence, it is important first to discover what Schopenhauer argues in this essay and later to see what Lawrence may have taken from that work and in what manner his idea stands against Schopenhauer's approach. In Schopenhauer's opinion, sex has a central meaning for most living beings in the world, man is not excluded in this process, and his demands in love are based on sexual desire. He argues in his essay that the force of sexual passion begins with the unborn child, and the intensity of this passion between partners is concentrated on their suitability to complement each other as parents of a healthy and vital child. In this case, sexual passion plays the most important role not because of the individual but because of the species which will consequently form a healthy generation. Therefore, "in the case of animals, the sexual impulse seeks its satisfaction without noticeable selection, whereas in the case of man this selection, in an instinctive manner independent of all reflection, is carried to such heights that it rises to a powerful passion. ... [That is because] the species alone has a characteristic significance"

(Sch., *WWR I*: 132). Accordingly, for Schopenhauer, the sexual instinct expresses the immortal side of the individual will to live. This philosophy provided Lawrence an alternative solution to stress sexual opposition rather than George Eliot's idea of personal affinity between characters and the sexes.⁴¹ However, Lawrence uses Schopenhauer's theory to represent companionship between the sexes. He describes the dynamic between two partners before there is a child, and he depicts how the relationship evolves as the couple conceives a child.

Lawrence's early ideas are based on Schopenhauer's theory of the will to live. In Schopenhauer's opinion, the purpose of love is to secure the continuation of the human race, and the will of the individual is a manifestation of the will of the species; accordingly, this gives a pathetic and sublime import to love affairs. As he argues in this particular essay, what attracts two lovers of different sexes towards each other is the will to live, which is based on physical qualities of loving, because the resulting child would physically or mentally inherit their qualities. In "The Metaphysics of Love," Schopenhauer argues that sexual selection between the sexes depends on what each mate lacks individually. We mate according to the will's specifications and thus obey the unconscious force which drives us to actively seek sexual partners who will raise our status and/or nullify any weaknesses for the sake of the next generation. Some of Lawrence's novels concentrate on such attractions in great detail. *The Rainbow* (1915) chronicles three generations of the Brangwen family living near

⁴¹In the second chapter, I argued in great detail that Lawrence emulated Schopenhauer's "The Metaphysics of Love" in order to emphasise sexual opposition rather than Eliot's personal affinity between the sexes. He achieved a comparable solution to reach his philosophy of wholeness.

Marsh Farm in Great Britain. It is as if the novel seeks further down the family tree to show the chaotic record of the love choices and the cultural or personal perspective behind each choice. Lawrence's ideas about the physical attraction between the sexes and their will familiarises readers with the traditional social roles between husband, wife, children, and parents. It seems that Lawrence aimed to make *The Rainbow* a novel about relationships, for it is manifest in the early title of the first chapter: "How Tom Brangwen Married a Polish Lady," which was later renamed "The Wedding Ring." Robert Montgomery also stresses that the primary theme of *The Rainbow* "is the idea of the opposites and their relation" (14). He continues:

Lawrence, however, is not content with mere recognition of the existence of the opposites. For him the great problem of both life and knowledge always was to grasp the relation between the opposites in such a way that one could see them as aspects of a whole and thereby avoid falling into a dualism that sundered the unity of life. (Montgomery 14)

A careful reading of the novel provides a vivid view of Lawrence's perception of the will-to-union and the will to individuality. The imagery in *The Rainbow* contains within itself a force that stimulates the articulation of this idea. For instance, Will's relationship with Anna is driven by the conflict between these two Lawrentian perceptions. Will's primal desire for "seeking his [own] pleasure" encourages him to seduce a woman in town, but because of his "half-hearted" efforts, he is not successful (*Rainbow* 218). He then dutifully returns home to his wife where his role in the union is required. Accordingly, "the oscillation of attraction and repulsion – a

longing for union and a resistance to union,” as Daniel Schneider says, “is precisely what we witness in much of *The Rainbow*, where the ‘sympathetic’ impulse to fuse with another person alternates with the ‘voluntary’ impulse to withdraw and hold oneself intact, independent” (7). Lawrence’s dependence on the cultural and philosophical idea of regeneration and his descriptions of love reflect his encounter with Schopenhauer’s philosophy of love and sexes in order to reveal that the origin of all relationships is not merely instinct of sex; rather, there exists a fundamental and concrete meaning and that is the idea of wholeness. In the following, I will disclose how he is subject to this idea and how he tries to break from it and move towards his own philosophy.

Schopenhauer’s “The Metaphysics of Love” claims that man is helpless because the will to live is the only immortal part of him. This was questioned by Lawrence in the margins of his copy: “is the ‘will to live’ the only immortal part?” (Montgomery 59). In Lawrence’s view, sexual passion is important, but it was not the origin of all other passions and activities. The originating point in his reasoning about the nature of sexual motivation, as Schneider says, is the idea that “each loves what he lacks” (*Schopenhauer* 4). Based on the interactions between characters in *The White Peacock*, he claims that for Lawrence “the love of what one lacks is more than a sexual desire” (*Schopenhauer* 4). Schneider summarises Lawrence’s idea:

It is also a desire to overcome separation or divorce from nature itself, from the whole of the cosmos. Man, confronted existentially by his awareness that he is merely ‘derivation,’ merely a fragment

of the whole, seeks to unite himself with the All (all that is 'Not-I') in the act of loving. His desire is not just to perpetuate the species but to be restored to the primal unity of nature. (*Schopenhauer 4*)

Indeed, Lawrence envisions a more harmonious purpose and sacred fulfilment to sex. According to Schopenhauer's despondent view, two individuals are suited as a couple when their qualities complement each other, with the basic goal of producing a child and nothing more. Indeed, they are not driven together by personal feelings or interests. Lawrence shows a direct interest in Schopenhauer's notion that people are driven together by the binding power of passion. Both writers believe that this force should be recognised as the true nature of the universe, for the will to live stands as the most powerful motivation behind the individual will to union. This magnetic pull should not be cloaked by the mask of physical appearance, which originates from our senses and our mental consciousness. The true nature of the universe, according to Schopenhauer, is contained in reproduction and is indifferent to whether the parents are "happy forever afterwards." From his point of view, it is a process without consciousness or the involvement of the intellect.

Schopenhauer believes that man's character is based on will and not intellect. If we want a thing, it is not because we have found reasons for it; we find reasons because we want it. "Nothing," Schopenhauer says, "is more tiresome and annoying than when we argue with a person with reasons and explanations, and take all the trouble to convince him, under the impression that we have to deal only with his *understanding*, and then finally discover that he *will* not understand; that we

therefore had to deal with his *will*" (*WWR* 2:226). Accordingly, to persuade someone, we need to deal with his will, desires and his self-interests. Hence, to Schopenhauer, love is blind because a man in love is led by sexual instinct; in his opinion, the sexual organ is the center of the will to live. Like Schopenhauer, Lawrence believes that the sexual urge in man is in constant opposition to his reasoning powers. As Lawrence later stated, "man need not sacrifice the intellect to the penis, nor the penis to the intellect. But there is an eternal hostility between the two, and life is forever torn across by the conflict between them" (*First*191). For Schopenhauer, the will to live in the individual remains separate from reason, whereas Lawrence wishes to foster a harmony between them. He stresses that the purpose of existence is individual and in metaphysical terms he remarks that "I only know there is but one origin, and that is the individual soul. The individual soul originated everything, and has itself no origin" (*Fantasia* 175). For Lawrence, man's intellect is constantly battling with his carnal urges and it is this very struggle which can cause distress within the soul. A brief indication of Lawrence's views on the relationship between intellect and the soul is provided by a passage in his long essay "The Education of the People" (1918). He argues that "the business of man is to become so spontaneous that he shall utter at last direct the act and the *state* which arises in him from his deep being [soul]: and finally, that the mind with all its great powers is only the servant of the inscrutable, unfathomable soul" (*Reflections* 108). Lawrence pushes the notion of spirituality a step further by approaching sex as a means of connecting with another soul. In this serenity, the soul gives man the ability to balance all opposing afflictions evenly with

their counter force, as power is balanced with sympathy, selfishness is countered with selflessness, and so on. Lawrence feels so strongly about this theory that man must balance his sensual side harmoniously with his reasoning faculty via the soul, that he considers that a terrible imbalance can occur from a separation of the two. Therefore, the soul sporadically bridges the crevice in man connecting the essence of the two. Schopenhauer interprets this scenario differently, arguing that a person's inability to reason in the restraint of his will leads him into indiscriminate sexual encounters. Accordingly, he concludes that love seldom brings happiness: "the satisfied passion oftener leads to unhappiness than to happiness. For its demands often clash so much with the personal welfare of the man or woman concerned as to undermine it" (*WWR* 2: 555). Schopenhauer asserts that it is beside the point as to whether passions are acted upon or not, as both actions can result in desolation. Lawrence agrees with Schopenhauer's belief that love leads to unhappiness more often than it leads to happiness. He states that "love ought not to be perfect. It ought to have perfect moments, and wildernesses of thorn bushes, which it has" (*Studies* 144). Lawrence writes that "the more individual the man or woman, the more unsatisfactory is a non-individual connection: promiscuity" (*Fantasia* 186). He holds the belief that an act of sex which is rooted purely in physical attraction is animalistic motion; when the soul is not present and engaged, the movement of the body becomes meaningless and lifeless. For him, promiscuity leaves the individual depleted and spiritually empty. Through this discussion, we see that the individual, by the objectification of the will, can desire or ignore only what his inner nature desires or ignores. Considering this

nature, man constantly carries within him a desire for immortality. According to Schopenhauer, to fulfil this desire the will-to-live becomes the primal impulse in forming a union between members of the opposite sex. However, for Lawrence the impulse seeks a higher meaning and intention. Indeed, by giving a spiritual dimension to the will doctrine and regarding this perspective that a committed relationship can bring satisfaction, fulfilment and new experiences, Lawrence approaches his theory of the will to wholeness.

The Will to Live or the Will to Wholeness

Although Lawrence agrees with Schopenhauer that sexual instinct is the basis of individual love affairs, he is more interested in finding a deeper meaning of love in the relationship between the sexes. He believes that there remains something more important than Schopenhauer's concept of the will to reproduce. Schopenhauer states that love is based on an illusion and that an individual falls in love just for the advantage of the species and not for personal improvement, but is the existence of species the initial goal of the sexes and is it responsible for the dynamic force between them? The purpose of this section is to discover Lawrence's idea in contrast to Schopenhauer's and to explicate the reason behind the novelist's approach. I will explicate the commonalities and differences between these writers in order to argue the significant role of the will-to-live in attracting the sexes towards each other, and the reason which inspires them to remain in unions.

Lawrence's central view begins with his consideration of the polarity between two opposites. "Reality" for Lawrence "exists only as a pair of opposites" (Hough 224), and this creates polarity between two opposite sides of a thing or the sexes. Such opposition in Lawrence's works can be seen in his portrait of nature and industry and in the mismatched couples that he puts together to highlight his view of dual attraction and polarity.⁴² In Lawrence's idea, dichotomy is a principle that is spread throughout the reality of this intrinsic world, subsisting in a variety of associations, and is recognised as pairs of opposites. It is through this opposition that a pure relationship forms or the "twoness into oneness takes place" (Lawrence, *Reflections*: 303). For instance, life is a combination of death and life, marriage is the union between male and female, and time is day and night or dark and light. Therefore, everything is compound of two opposites. In "The Reality of Peace" (1917), Lawrence states that "the two exist by virtue of juxtaposition in pure polarity ... the primary law of all the universe is a law of dual attraction and repulsion, a law of polarity" (*Reality* 692).⁴³ That assimilation, or levelling, is of the greatest importance in the grand harmonious scheme of things, and it is also a critical balance that must be understood and maintained in a union between the sexes. Montgomery describes Lawrence's vision of polarity as an influential point in his works:

It is this idea of polarity that is "the dynamic idea or metaphysic" at the heart of Lawrence's vision. The opposites

⁴²Lawrence also highlights his view of knowledge as suffering as only the ignorant couple is actually happy. This is also another pair of opposites, if we consider knowledge versus ignorance are in opposition to each other.

⁴³See Lawrence's "The Reality of Peace" in Edward D. McDonald's *Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D. H. Lawrence*.

which seem to sunder life into an irreconcilable dualism are in fact *polar* opposites, the two forces of a *single* power, like the positive and negative poles of a magnet. The opposing forces are seen in their essential unity, a unity that yet allows each to retain its own distinct identity. The two are one, the one is two. (15)

Accordingly, the dynamic force between the sexes comes initially from their own individual energy towards the opposite sex, and the two different singular powers attract each other for integration and balance into “their essential unity.” Both the positive and negative diametric positions draw together in order to conquer their own inadequacy, thereby obtaining total diametric equilibrium. This perspective closely represents Schopenhauer’s view on man and woman’s individuality as the opposite sexes, where both sexes approach each other in order to complete their own deficiency.

Schopenhauer argues that each individual seeks in the opposite sex what he or she is lacking in order “to complete the type of humanity in the new individual to be generated” (*Metaphysics* 124). He maintains:

The following is necessary for this neutralisation of which we are speaking. The particular degree of his manhood must exactly correspond to the particular degree of her womanhood in order to exactly balance the one-sidedness of each. Hence, the most manly man will desire the most womanly woman, and vice versa, and so each will want the individual that exactly corresponds to him in degree of sex. In as much as two persons fulfil this necessary relation towards each other, it

is instinctively felt by them and is the origin, together with the other relative considerations, of the higher degrees of love. While, therefore, two lovers are pathetically talking about the harmony of their souls, the kernel of the conversation is for the most part the harmony concerning the individual and its perfection, which obviously is of much more importance than the harmony of their souls – which frequently turns out to be a violent discord shortly after marriage. (*Metaphysics* 124)

In love or in the choosing of a mate, each person loves what she or he lacks. This idea became the catalyst for Lawrence's dramatization of the nature of sexual motivation between two persons. In my analysis of *The White Peacock*, in the section on "Physical Attractions," I have documented the idea of complementing what one lacks in the relationship between Lettie and George. I refer now to another instance of such view, *The Rainbow*, which is a great example of this notion. The novel is not merely a display of human sexuality with homosexual and heterosexual relationships; it is a search for integrity and wholeness through physical attractions. Physical passion leads Ursula into a lesbian relationship with her teacher and a passionate but ultimately doomed love affair with Anton. As the relationship between Ursula and Anton develops, she learns more about the interrelation between two partners of the opposite sex. Lawrence sets Ursula into a passionate relationship which stirs her spirit and causes her to feel a wide range of emotions, yet she remains stubborn and persists in her urge for freedom. Lawrence then pushes her further towards union by giving her the possibility of a child. It is only this thought of a new creation which finally halts her pursuit of independence. It is this thought of a child that causes her to

ponder, and then seek wholeness with Anton. Regardless of the path the lovers choose after their desire has come to realisation, both writers agree that the apex of this pleasure lies not within the desire itself, but within those final moments of reaching the pinnacle, the culmination of passion by achieving physical intimacy.

While for Schopenhauer the consummation of desire occurs in procreation, Lawrence believes that love, or sexual passion, creates the opportunity in which each partner can transcend his or her limited ego and discover more about the self and the other person in the process. He believes that two in love want more than one-dimensional satisfaction of their animalistic desires. In a letter to Gordon Campbell in September 1914, he wrote:

I believe there is no getting of a vision, as you call it, before we get our sex right: before we get our souls fertilised by the *female*. I don't mean the feminine: I mean the female. Because life tends to take two streams, male and female, and only some female influence (not necessarily woman, but most obviously woman) can fertilise the soul of man to vision or being. Then the vision we're after, I don't know what it is – but it is something that contains awe and dread and submission, not pride or sensuous egotism and assertion. ... I know, from the Egyptian and Assyrian sculpture – what we are after. We want to realise the tremendous *non-human* quality of life – it is wonderful. It is not the emotions, nor the personal feeling and attachments, that matter ... Behind us all are the tremendous unknown forces of life, coming unseen and unperceived as out of the desert to the Egyptians, and

driving us, forcing us, destroying us if we do not submit to be swept away. (*Letters 2*: 218)

Although Lawrence accepted the general premises of Schopenhauer, he disregarded some of his misogynistic views. Lawrence considers submission to the opposite sex a form of self-denial for men. While Schopenhauer views women's purpose as being entirely for reproduction, Lawrence regards them as complementary to man. He believes women's utility is not limited to the preservation of generations, but it is also for attaining the meaning of wholeness. He never felt that conjugal life destroys individuality. In his opinion, only by achieving a union can male and female fertilise each other's deficiency; man will be liberated from his "egotism and assertion" and the woman will realise her identity – they both achieve self-awareness. In other words, Lawrence feels that through a woman, a man can be "*re-born*, re-constructed" and consequently "free from oneself" (*Letter 2*: 115), and the same is true for a woman.

Thus, Lawrence appears to modify Schopenhauer's theory by seeing love as more than the physical and sexual desires of the individual and by considering a will greater than the will to live, a will to wholeness. In his opinion, "in love, a man, a woman, flows on to the very furthest edge of known feeling, being, and out beyond the furthest edge: and taking the superb and supreme risk, deposits a security of life in the womb" (*Axle 441*). In addition, Lawrence adds that what is truly important in a relationship is that both sexes "drive on to the edge of the unknown, and beyond" (*Axle 441*). Together they move beyond their clear lack of perfection as individual

beings, their isolated incompleteness. As a result of surrendering to each other in mind, body, and soul, the sexes reach the essence of unity and they re-emerge as one, as a being of completeness in union.

This idea of completeness in union can also be traced throughout *The Rainbow*. The novel emphasises the distinction of the will surrendering to unity and the entirely undivided conscious. In the first few chapters, Winifred wishes to create a new freedom and individuality by retaining her independence, by strongly resisting the will to marry. She is Ursula's bisexual physical instructor, teaching her about lovemaking and concurrently Winifred instils her own thoughts in Ursula. They share a brief and passionate relationship, but it fades when Winifred receives a proposal from Ursula's uncle, Tom. She realises she now has a deep desire to enter into a union and is betrothed to Tom. What is supremely important for Lawrence is to set man and woman together, and this is apparent throughout the novel as the narrator strongly encourages Ursula's independent will to surrender into unity by making her think she is with child. It is Lawrence's belief that neither man nor woman is complete in their individual being because they are halves in opposition, possessing a natural instinct, but through a blending, a union, they will reach a superior concept of individuality. On 2 June 1914, he wrote to his friend A.W. McLeod:

I think the only re-sourcing of art, re-vivifying it, is to make it more the joint work of man and woman. I think *the* one thing to do, is for men to have courage to draw nearer to women, expose themselves to them, and be altered by them: and for women to accept and admit men. This is the only

way for art and civilisation to get a new life, a new start. ...
Because the source of all life and knowledge is in man and woman, and the source of all living is in the interchange and the meeting and mingling of these two: man-life and woman-life, man knowledge and woman-knowledge, man-being and woman-being. (*Letters 2*: 181)

This is one of the reasons that *The Rainbow* particularly focuses on the individual's struggle with the matter of unity. Lawrence explores the most taboo subjects of his time: marriage, physical love, one family's sexual pursuits and the idea of wholeness. Initially, the narrator introduces Ursula as an inexperienced girl who is exposed to the world. She has a love affair with Anton Skrebensky, but she is haunted by her indecisive nature, and she dissolves the relationship by telling him she does not wish to be married ever. Soon after ending the relationship with Anton, she thinks she may be pregnant. Her new stark reality is that she is expecting a baby and sheer panic sets in. Ursula is now left with nothing but an emptiness, a loneliness, and a heavy despair that creeps into her soul. If she is in fact pregnant, her life no longer has any meaning, as she would relinquish the responsibility to herself in order to devote her energy to raising the child. With this new understanding of what she must do, Ursula is consumed with the instinct to protect and provide for this future child at all cost, even if that cost is her own desires and freedom. In this moment, she realises the depth of her newly found situation, the responsibilities involved with raising a child, and the grave mistake she made by refusing Anton's marriage proposal. She is angered by her own selfishness and undisciplined frolic with independence, as she sees that she never considered the possibility of finding peace, comfort, contentment, and

wholeness in marriage.⁴⁴From this epiphany, she decides to take the correct course of action and accept marriage. Ursula now recognises the benefit of self-denial, she suddenly begins to think of her mother in “a just and true light” that “she had not, in her arrogant conceit, insisted on creating life to fit herself. Her mother was right, profoundly right, and she herself had been false, trashy, conceited” (*Rainbow* 504); she will find satisfaction and contentment in Anton and thus she writes to him to express her eagerness for marriage. Accordingly, we see that Lawrence’s view of love never neglects Schopenhauer’s idea that the individual exists within the will, but he builds upon this point by stating that behind the blind will to live is a spiritual consideration, an immortal determination to become a “greater man” (Schneider, *Sch.*: 10). Consequently, in *The Rainbow*, Lawrence stresses an immortal will towards completeness, a will to union and wholeness. His heroine becomes capable of seeing how life has a deeper purpose than just leading the individual to chase after personal desires. There lies a deeper desire in our unconsciousness; the desire of an immortal will towards combination, a will to union and wholeness.

To support the idea of wholeness or completeness in union between man and woman, Lawrence argues that the universe starting in “one motionless homogeneity”

⁴⁴The individualistic spirit of the new generation, of which Ursula is a superb model, encourages the young heroine to remain independent and be cautious, shying away from the longstanding tradition of marital subjugation. Early in the novel, Ursula becomes a children’s teacher and she endures living on her own instead of giving up her studies and job for her love, Anton. While towards the end of the novel, she loses determination and interest in her academic attitudes and looks to Anton for marriage, “a great mood of humility came over her, and in this humility a bonded sort of peace. She gave her limbs to the bondage, she loved the bondage, she called it peace” (*Rainbow* 504). Lawrence nullifies the conflict between love and independence in Ursula’s case, as love-*and*-independence becomes love-*or*-independence.

must have been a “reaction” against “the vast homogeneous inertia” (*Work* 432). In this regard, Lawrence uses the same vocabulary as Schopenhauer, who states that “the original condition of every world that is formed into a globe cannot be rest, but motion,” a “centrifugal” resistance to “centripetal” force (Sch., *WWR I*: 148). Lawrence extends this idea by saying that a couple is “the ecstatic centre, the complete origin, the force which is both centrifugal and centripetal” (*Being* 455). In his essay “The Axle and the Wheel of Eternity,” he points out that the union between the male and female is something more than just physical sex as we call it in its narrowest meaning.⁴⁵ To him, the sexual act is for “leaping off into the unknown” (*Axle* 441) self. He considers movement and idleness as the essence of man’s and woman’s spirit; when the man and woman connect, male movement reacts against female idleness.⁴⁶ As Schneider says, it is the “reaction of spirit (or consciousness) against undifferentiated matter (or unconsciousness)” (*Schopenhauer* 10). Lawrence describes this reaction as the work of the axle and hub, with female idleness working like an axle on which a man “turns closely, producing his movement” (*Being* 444). In this reaction, the two become one, “as axle and wheel are one” (*Axle* 442). Hence, the transcendence happens when the eminent man and eminent woman give themselves to each other in order to form one union, becoming “two in one” and achieving their

⁴⁵*Phoenix*P.443

⁴⁶It may appear to represent an idea of misogyny when Lawrence refers to woman as idle, however, it is not meant to be derogatory. This notion he describes is abstract but attained by physical means, and Lawrence is simply showing the opposing but harmonious forces of male and female. While one aspect, the physical act of sex, can be described by these mechanical actions, it is the less important concept that I aim to illustrate. It is the aspect of the behaviour to two souls together that I am emphasising. The sexual act is meant to have both elements combined over and over again throughout the union. As the two bodies become one, so do the two spirits, and vice versa. Each time, the partners move closer together, their shared connection deepens, and further down the path into the unknown they move.

infinity. In this process, the female will-to-inertia joins the male will-to-motion to balance the will-to-differentiation and the will-to-union. For Lawrence, male individuality is not vanished or sacrificed in love; rather, the male achieves a superior individuality by “clasp[ing] as a hub the woman who shall be the axle, compelling him to true motion, without aberration” (*Being* 444). Consequently, against Schopenhauer’s view that a woman’s most significant responsibility is bearing and raising a child, Lawrence strongly believes that bearing a child is not a “woman’s significance”: “she bear[s] herself, that is her supreme and risky fate: that she drives on to the edge of the unknown, and beyond. She may leave children behind, for security” but she jumps off into “the unknown” (*Axle* 441) side of her individuality.

For Schopenhauer, the male acts to produce a third existence to secure his life and will, and to escape from death: “he is not acting in his own interest but in that of a third person, who has yet to come into existence” (*Metaphysics* 132). Lawrence takes an opposite position; he indicates that if a man’s work is only reproducing “he must produce it to some other than the woman of his body: as, in the same case, if a woman produce children, it must be to some other than the man of her desire” (*Being* 445). A man must seek a woman able to fertilise his soul so that “the motions travel out to infinity” (*Axle* 442); reciprocally, “his motion shall portray her motionlessness” (*Being* 444).

This is the desire of every man, that his movement, the manner of his walk, and the supremest effort of his mind, shall be the pulsation outwards from stimulus received in the sex, in

the sexual act, that the woman of his body shall be the begetter of his whole life, that she, in her female spirit, shall beget in him his idea, his motion, himself. When a man shall look at the work of his hands, that has succeeded, and shall know that it was begotten in him by the woman of his body, then he shall know what fundamental happiness is. Just as when a woman shall look at her child, that was begotten in her by the man of her spirit, she shall know what it is to be happy, fundamentally. But when a woman looks at her children that were begotten in her by a strange man, not the man of her spirit, she must know what it is to be happy with anguish, and to love with pain. (*Being* 444-5)

Thus Lawrence appears to have taken and modified Schopenhauer's notion that the aim of two in love is not only the will to live. He creates a new perspective: if a man is captivated and pursues a woman just for the purpose of reproduction, then "he rejoices, troubles, and suffers an agony like death which contains resurrection" (*Being* 445). In "Of Being and Not-Being," Lawrence considered that "the soul of the woman possesses the soul of the man, procreates it and makes it big with new idea, motion, in the sexual act" (*Being* 445). The actual beginning for the single male or female is uniting in matrimony, a sacred marriage that always was and always will be, without regard to any superficial anomalies that may or may not be. By uniting in an absolute intertwined marriage, a man and woman cease to become "one, one and one only, not two in one as with us, but absolute One, a geometric absolute, timeless, the Absolute, the Divine" (*Being* 463). The child that is the fruit of this unconditional and eternal union is welcomed with overwhelming love and happiness.

In summary, Schopenhauer states that the image, character, and stature of child is passed to him or her through the mother and father. Lawrence also seems to agree with his concept that parents are looking for complementary qualities in each other to produce a perfect and balanced child. Lawrence applied this theory in his life as well. Once he told Jessie in 1906 that “you’re not the complement of me, you don’t complement me in any way. Do you think you do?” (Chambers 136). He told her this when “Schopenhauer’s *Metaphysics of Love* exercised such a fascination over him.” As Chamber writes in her *Personal Record*, he seemed to find confirmation for his attitude in this passage:

Because the kernel of passionate love turns on the anticipation of the child to be born and its nature, it is quite possible for friendship, without any admixture of sexual love, to exist between two young, good-looking people of different sex if there is perfect fitness of temperament and intellectual capacity. (Chambers 134)

The passage reveals that Schopenhauer influenced him in the direction of regarding love as something purely physical. Lawrence questioned Jessie as to why she thought they remained in a relationship despite their differences. In agreement with Schopenhauer, he believes men look for women with great qualities to satisfy themselves and to secure the next generation. But the goal of this companionship is not restricted to the third individual; rather, the two aim to complete each other in union. Lawrence includes sections of Schopenhauer’s system of principles within his own ideology to create a meaningful notion for marital relationships. From the

beginning, Lawrence is far from condemning the will to live, and “he obviously resents sex being looked upon as a thing of shame. From his point of view, it is at times best to forget the individual and his petty interests and to experience something far deeper and more meaningful” (Green, *Sch.*: 339).

The White Peacock

D. H. Lawrence’s career as a professional novelist began after publishing his first novel, *The White Peacock*. He started the novel in 1906 under the working title of *Laetitia*. Finally, after rewriting the novel three times, it was published as *The White Peacock* in 1911. In a letter to Sydney Pawling in 1910, Lawrence describes his first novel as “a decorated idyll running to seed in realism” (*Collected* 67).⁴⁷ It is set in the Eastwood area of his youth, and is a first person narrative by Cyril Beardsall, one of his major characters. Although the novel lies deep in the nineteenth century, it is a transition between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, between traditional and modern life.⁴⁸ It includes a specific view of nature and the harmful influence of industrialisation on the countryside. Mark Schorer has already noticed this element in the background of *The White Peacock*. He believes that the novel is “a slow cultural convulsion ... in which the ancient pastoralism of the yeoman way of life yields to the new mechanization of the industrial way of life, and

⁴⁷As Montgomery says, “the idyll [Lawrence] apparently intended becomes, under the pressure of his personal and philosophical concerns, an elegiac lament for a lost world” (59).

⁴⁸This idea can be traced in Michael Squires’s “Lawrence’s *The White Peacock*: A Mutation of Pastoral” where he states that “what makes [*The White Peacock*] distinctive is that it begins as a nineteenth-century novel but ends on a dissonant, twentieth-century chord” (263-4). Another source of this view can be seen in Frank Connor’s *The Mirror in the Roadway* that *Sons and Lovers* “is particularly interesting because, though it ends as a novel of the modern type, it begins as one of the classical kind, made familiar to us by nineteenth-century novelists” (270).

in which, incidentally, a lovely landscape yields itself to an iron horror.” He continues by noting that “what was lovely and peaceful in that older life and landscape was Lawrence’s peculiar treasure; what was ugly and new, his special anathema.”⁴⁹ Most recently, Montgomery has similarly argued that “*The White Peacock* dwells obsessively on the bloody and cruel aspect of nature” (52). The bulk of such realism is concentrated on how an animal hunts and how humans hunt animals.

Though critics have concentrated mostly on the naturalistic theme of the novel, my study, while fully acknowledging the novel’s realism, focuses on the theme of love and marriage associated with human nature. An application of Schopenhauer’s theory of love and a Schopenhauerian approach towards *The White Peacock* offers the reader a vivid understanding of both Schopenhauer and Lawrence’s philosophy of love. This is an important point because, despite Montgomery’s claim that, in the case of Schopenhauer, “the question of influence [on Lawrence] is a vexed one” (73), the fact remains that Lawrence refers directly to Schopenhauer by name and mentions his specific works. As complex and thoroughly enigmatic as the novel may appear at first reading, my purpose is to show how it shares commonalities with three Schopenhauerian concepts: the world as will, the will to live and the idea of love. Both writers, one metaphysical and the other fictional, work from within an open philosophical narrative to portray the notion of a wilful world. Consequently, in the remainder of this chapter, I will examine

⁴⁹Introduction to *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*. New York: Modern Library Edition. P. ix-x

Lawrence's views on the relationship between the sexes. I argue that Lawrence, when writing *The White Peacock*, was aware that he was formulating a novel based on Schopenhauer's philosophy. The goal is clear from the language he uses, the dialogues that allude to Schopenhauer, the idea of life and death, the failed relationships of the novel, and how all the relationships contain unhappy, unsatisfied participants. Through all this, I argue that Lawrence's first novel inclines more towards a Schopenhauerian notion of the will to live rather than Lawrence's own claim of the will to wholeness.

Nature and the Will

In *The White Peacock*, Lawrence views the natural world as a fragment of human life. The opening lines present a serene scene of nature in which Cyril gazes at the millpond, recalling the "young days when the valley was lusty" and the fish were silvery and monks worked the land. He is watching a world "gathered in the musing of old age"; the peril of industrial development that will disturb the Nethermere valley is implied (*WP* 1). Another dynamic Lawrence illustrates is the place of animals in nature as the characters show no feelings for animals and slaughter them willingly. This image of violence in nature is elaborated on in *The White Peacock* and is intentionally utilised throughout the novel to represent the similarity between human and animal nature. Accordingly, I intend to examine, through Schopenhauer's philosophy, the connection between Lawrence's presentation of animal and human nature; and I will argue that the will is grounded in the characters' subjectivity. Building upon this argument, I will indicate Lawrence's consideration on brutal and

sexual nature of the human represents Schopenhauer's philosophy of instinct of sex. In my opinion, what makes Lawrence's work unique is the philosophical way he portrays the brutal side of nature in both animals and humans, while towards the end of the novel, he fully concentrates on the true nature of human sexual instinct.

In Lawrence's novel, the world of the will is the essence of all human activities and its instinctual side parallels that of animal nature. As the novel shows, some of these wilful activities of humans result in the swift growth of industry, which leads to animals' misery. In the novel, Lawrence is aware of Schopenhauer's theory of the will to live, and it plays a significant role in *The White Peacock* and in forming the acts between characters, their desires and their relationships, and even their interactions with animals. Lawrence's position comes extremely close to that of Schopenhauer's, that the will is the nature of all human beings. In Schopenhauer's philosophy, the sexual impulse is the concentration of human and animal nature. They both pursue the purpose of that impulse, fertilisation or impregnation. In this process, "the will does not need to be guided throughout by knowledge" (*WWR* 2: 512). Accordingly, Schopenhauer concludes that "the true being in-itself of every living thing lies primarily in its species" (*WWR* 2: 512). Lawrence's novel develops the characters' consciousness through the acknowledgment of this concept. Regarding this notion, Schopenhauer believes that the will is restless, endless, blind and irrational in its nature. These qualities of the will keep man and the world in constant suffering. Therefore, "as long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so

long as we are the subject of willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or peace” (*WWR I*: 196). Montgomery points out that Schopenhauer’s will is “red in tooth and claw” and is “eternally ‘hungry’” (*Visionary* 51). It is indeed this aspect of will that makes the world miserable and with an endless pain. Lawrence also supports this notion that life is hardship and anguish. As Chambers says, “[Lawrence] felt compelled to accept [Schopenhauer’s view of life] for lack of an alternative.”

He would tell me with such vehemence that nature is red in tooth and claw, with the implication that ‘nature’ included human nature. Yet when he heard the cry of a rabbit tracked by a weasel he would shiver in pain. His dominant feeling seemed to be a sense of hopelessness. (Chambers 112)

Taking Montgomery and Chamber’s separate descriptions of Schopenhauer and Lawrence into account, it seems that both writers were concerned with the objectification of the will in its highest stage. Lawrence embodies the novel with this element and he makes a substantial effort to show the destructive role of the will, as there is an ever-present desire “always wanting [and] craving,” therefore, there is “no lasting satisfaction” (*WP* 40), highlighting Schopenhauer’s point that there is no end for desire and eternal satisfaction is unachievable. Reiterating Schopenhauer’s world-view, *The White Peacock* leans obsessively towards a nature that is vicious and unfeeling. The unnerving squeals of the mutilated add a frightful and dark ambience to the novel and expose the reality of nature in both human and animals.

Although the primary Schopenhauerian allusion of the will arises in Lawrence's first novel, two years after writing *The White Peacock*, when he is more settled in his identity, more resolute in his beliefs, and more comfortable with his chosen path, Lawrence makes a powerful and assertive statement with regard to the concept he had used in his first novel. It is possible to say that he has a strong attachment to many elements of Schopenhauer's concept of the world as will when he states in a letter to Collings in January 1913:

The real way of living is to answer to one's wants. Not "I want to light up with my intelligence as many things as possible" – but "For the living of my full flame – I want that liberty, I want that woman, I want that pound of peaches, I want to go to sleep, I want to go to the pub, and have a good time, I want to look a beastly swell today, I want to kiss that girl, I want to insult that man." – Instead of that, all these wants, which are there whether-or-not, are utterly ignored, and we talk about some sort of ideas. (*Letters* 504)

Lawrence creates an image that brings to mind Schopenhauer's philosophy of the world as will. The traces of this Schopenhauerian concept, which he emphasises in his letter, primarily manifest in *The White Peacock* when Cyril says to George, "why don't you scheme forgetting what you want, instead of dreaming fulfilments?" (*WP* 58). Such forgetfulness appears impossible for George as he wants "to go on dreaming" (*WP* 59) about obtaining Lettie. Schopenhauer sees the essence of this endless search of dreams in the will; indeed it is the will acting as a master of the individual body. He argues that the will steers a person in one of two

directions: as an external object which is the result of discernment and an internal, immediate object of knowledge. The will is this internal response to a stimulus of our body which causes us to smell, taste and endure. In his view, a “single thought” encapsulates his undivided philosophy of “my body and my will are one” (*WWR I*: 102). Accordingly, it is not through the mind, nor reason, that humans gain knowledge about themselves and the world of nature around them; they come to this information by way of their body and feelings, as all forms aspire to one and the same will. The body, according to Lawrence’s interpretation, is the representation of will; subsequently, our emotions and desires are associated with the nerve system of the body instead of the mind. Therefore, Lawrence believes that mental activity is the effect of bodily activity. Based upon this theory, he wants us “to read a person’s character, not from his words, not even from his face, but from the shape and movement of his body” (Auden 482).⁵⁰ To this end, he systematically elaborates on what Schopenhauer suggests, since each man and woman in the novel is bound with the failure of his or her emotions, desires, thoughts and wilfulness.

In an effort to show the theory of reading one’s character from the movements of their body rather than their words, Lawrence portrays this idea in two different scenes in *The White Peacock*. Both of these scenes represent a conflict between Lawrence’s character, George, and nature. In the first scene, the narrator

⁵⁰Lawrence’s intrigue with haptics, which is simply tactile forms of communication, or human touch, and his enthusiasm in physical intimacy is noteworthy; it originates from a desire to restore emphasis on the body and re-balance what he perceived to be traditional culture’s slow process of over-emphasis on the mind. In other words, body was important to him, and he wished to re-balance the disproportion created by culture, a culture cantered on the mind and tradition, and neglecting the body.

describes a calm and peaceful environment where “not even a little wind flickered the willows of the islets [and the] water lay softly, intensely still” (*WP* 1) but this calmness is only brief, as George carelessly fingers at a bee’s nest, catching one of the disturbed bees and pulling its wings off, then destroying the nest; when he is finished he flings “the clustered eggs into the water” (*WP* 2). When Cyril insists “don’t tease the little beggar,” George excuses his act based on his impulsive thought that “it doesn’t hurt him--I wanted to see if it was because he couldn’t spread his wings that he couldn’t fly. There he goes--no, he doesn’t. Let’s try another” (*WP* 2). In the second scene, which comes close to the end of the novel, we encounter another instance where Lawrence urges the use of reading one’s actions rather than words, as the narrator describes a quiet evening next to the willow tree with a “small spring which trickled into a stone trough all pretty with cranesbill and stellaria hanging over, while long blades of grass waved in the water” (*WP* 228-29). George, who had finished his work, walked across to the spring, washed his hands and then he puts “his hand to the bottom of the trough, bringing out a handful of silt, with the grey shrimps twisting in it. He flung the mud on the floor where the poor grey creatures writhed” (*WP* 228). All of a sudden without thinking he explains that “it wants cleaning out” (*WP* 229). Accordingly, I believe that these scenes reveal two facts. First, George on a subconscious level, knows his action is wrong, and thus, he feels the need to justify his careless act of cruelty by offering that the spring “wants cleaning out.” Lawrence shows George is a weak man, beaten down and exhausted by his own will. Inside he is frustrated and miserable and these thoughts

are easily hidden from the world. However, Lawrence cautions in his theory of reading the body rather than the words, we should not place as much importance on one's words; we should read the actions of a man to see and understand what he is feeling and thinking. The second aspect of these two scenes reveal that when the individual is left alone with just his own impulsive thoughts and desires, when the presence of the mind and reasoning are non-existent, then the nature of his will always prevails, and a man will behave as an animal because that is the base, or the root, of his existence. Human beings are animals and when one only obeys his or her will, the divide between human nature and animal life disappears. The manner in which Lawrence depicts a character's nature echoes the reality of this animal side, and nature conveys the fact that when the will seduces a man from the right path, "it is his sensual nature – the animal part of him – which is at fault" (Sch., *Nature*: 11). In fact, human beings and animals spring directly from one source, as we see from George's actions.

Lawrence not only seems fascinated with creating such scenes and themes with regard to the brutality of the will, but also he aims to show how even his sensitive characters are affected by their apparently instinctual behaviour towards nature. Cyril, Lettie and Emily, constantly tremble with the fear of their crucial actions towards animals. It is the same fear that, when Mollie hurts a cat by swinging her round and knocking "her head against the wall" (*WP* 13), urges Lettie to ask Cyril, "isn't it cruel?—isn't it awful?" Then George asks, "do you mean me?" Lettie screams, "Not you in particular—everything! if we move the blood rises in our heel-

print” (WP 13). Indeed, she is referring to the entire human race. Contained within our every decision, our every action, there seems to be no escaping the reality that humanity is in constant discord with animal nature. Based on Lettie’s answer, it is possible to say that the truth of our foundation rooted in harshness is unavoidable, and yet, we are still caught off guard and fearful when our brutal nature is displayed through our actions. In his essay “Education of the People” (1918), Lawrence emphasises the inhibiting effects of fear by stating “if you can’t cure people of being frightened for their own existence, you’ll educate them in vain” (91). He advances the idea that if there are no major differences between man and beast, and both are an observable object of nature and equally able to experience distress and agony, then we must accept that whatever affects one, similarly affects the other. This turns sympathy for animals’ pain into a sort of moral act, but even Lawrence’s sensitive characters in *The White Peacock* are somehow involved in cruel killings. For the mine owner’s learned son, Leslie, who practically decapitates a rabbit “in his excitement to kill it,” the veil of civilisation is quickly shredded. Also, Emily furiously chases one of the sheep-killing dogs:

There, in the mouth of one of the kilns, Emily was kneeling on the dog, her hands buried in the hair of its throat, pushing back its head. The little jerks of the brute’s body were the spasms of death; already the eyes were turning inward, and the upper lip was drawn back from the teeth by pain ... She shuddered violently, and seemed to feel a horror of herself ... looking at herself with blood all on her skirt, where she had

knelt on the wound ... and pressed the broken rib into the chest. There was a trickle of blood on her arm. (*WP* 67-68)

The movement of this passage is instructive. It represents a tentative, even unconscious, recognition of Emily Saxton from the ugliness of the landscape that surrounds her and simultaneously helps her to find “a horror of herself.” These passages support the notion that the individual is, at times, incapable of understanding his or her beast-like nature; even civilised individuals are sometimes unaware of its existence. By using a range of characters and circumstances, Lawrence presents different forms of human and societal abnormality. He states that the formidable lure of one’s own will holds a person hostage; unable to break those ties, the will proves to be triumphant. Its victory, even over civilised characters (Cyril, Lettie and Emily), constantly emphasises the reign of the will over the individual being.

Love, Marriage and Species

In *The White Peacock*, Lawrence systematically elaborates on Schopenhauer’s “The Metaphysics of Love.” Each character in the novel is bound with the failure of his or her desires for love, marriage and species. These words – love, marriage, species – regularly arise throughout the novel and suggest that a state of ecstasy and supreme contentment is brought about through deeds of passionate devotion by the lover. But Lawrence reveals that such contentment and fulfilment cannot be had solely from a love relationship. For Schopenhauer, there remains a psychological concern behind the aspect of love and that is the perfection of the individual, a need to create a new

procreation. It must have been invigorating for Lawrence to find in a distinguished writer such as Schopenhauer, the bold and provocative notion that the true underlining force which propels all human activity is sexual desire. Accordingly, in this section, I concentrate more specifically on the concepts of love and marriage in the novel in order to disclose the idea that these notions incline more towards Schopenhauer's philosophy of propagation of a new generation rather than Lawrence's theory of polarity.

Schopenhauer argues that the desire of escaping from death is what forces man to give birth to a new individual built up out of their own self and their own belief. He expresses these ideas in "The Metaphysics of Love." Lawrence, having read that essay in 1906, was fascinated with Schopenhauer's notion of the will to live, and the influence of this theory can also be traced in *The White Peacock*. What emerges when studying the novel as a work on genetic love, or rather modified genetic love, is a matrix of two attitudes towards procreation.⁵¹ First, a sign of life is reflected in the occasionally harsh passages about death. The idea of life and death occurs "when death is just touching a plant," forcing nature into a "passion of flowering" (*WP* 28). Lettie tells George about this tragic mechanism of life, about the atmosphere in her home when she was born: "You don't know. There's always a sense of death in this home. I believe my mother hated my father before I was born. That was the death in her veins for me before I was born" (*WP* 28). The second attitude is a portrait of creating a complete child which will not lack any deficiency.

⁵¹What I call genetic love is based on Schopenhauer's consideration that love is just the propagation of a new generation.

For Lawrence's heroine, Lettie, most of "the things in life seem[s] worthless and insipid" and so she determines "to put up with it, to ignore her own self, to empty her own potentialities into the vessel of another or others, and to live her life at second-hand ... to abandon the charge of herself to serve her children" (*WP* 284). Lettie constantly thinks about bearing a child and transferring all her "potential" into that offspring. She gives her spirit through the process of creating a new being, as a mother can look down upon her child and in this new life see her own likeness, characteristics, positive or negative traits. Lettie wills to live through another's body and to escape death by creating a new being, and consequently becoming the servant of her new generation. It appears that as the author focuses on Lettie, he undertakes a Schopenhauerian premise that women "exist solely for the propagation of the race" (*WWR 1*: 312).

Schopenhauer remarks that all loving, "however ethereally," is rooted in the individual's sexual instinct, which takes its strength from the will to regeneration (*WWR 2*: 533). This abhorrence of love is articulated in Lawrence's novel. References to Schopenhauer and this idea appear in Lettie's character. She knows Schopenhauer very well and her dialogue alludes to him. When she walks with George across the grass in the field, she sarcastically says to him, "You, for instance – fancy *your* sacrificing yourself – for the next generation – that reminds you of Schopenhauer, doesn't it? – for the next generation, or love, or anything!" (*WP* 210). Lettie is being sarcastic as she asks George how he feels about being used. There is irony in her voice when she explains to George that all love is basically an illusion.

Taking Schopenhauer's view into account that individuals sacrifice themselves for the next generation, Lettie reminds George about the truth of love. Nature is mischievous in the method it uses to secure the next generation, and we think foolishly that it is love we are feeling. Indeed, she is quick to generalise the idea that the love one looks for is more than sexual desire or union: it is also a desire for the propagation of a new race. Soon after union, one confronts the awareness that one's incentive was merely based on perpetuation of the species. Lawrence thus appears to take seriously Schopenhauer's observation that the purpose of lovers in love is the will to produce or the will to live. Furthermore, Lawrence's character sees clearly that such sense in the act of love leads the individual towards his abolishment. In *The White Peacock*, the lovers imagine that their beloved will provide limitless satisfaction and contentment, while after marriage they realise the ugly truth that the act of union has destroyed their identity and distinctiveness, and they become pawns or servants of the female. It is the same feeling that makes George think that there is nothing "left for [him] to believe in" and in their "marital duel Meg is winning" (WP 301). He imagines that Meg wants him as a provider while Lettie, in hope to encourage him in staying in his conjugal life, reminds him that "you are necessary as a father and a husband, if not as a provider" but George still believes that he is a "servant" in his relationship (WP 301). Throughout the novel, Lettie and George find themselves trapped in the same scenario. She herself is truly a servant of the species. Her most significant task is that of bearing children, and she is wholly a loving and attentive mother.

Eventually, it is understood that Lettie has adapted to her changing life. “Living life at second hand,” she serves her son, who is “her work” and tolerates her husband:

Like a nun, she puts over her living face a veil, a sign that the woman no longer exists for herself: she is the servant of God, of some man, of her children, or may be of some cause. As a servant, she is no longer responsible for her self, which would make her terrified and lonely. Service is light and easy. To be responsible for the good progress of one’s life is terrifying. It is the most insufferable form of loneliness, and the heaviest of responsibilities. (*WP* 284)

The idea of wearing a “veil” as a “sign that the woman no longer exists for herself,” gives rise to the question: do all the female characters in Lawrence’s works lack individuality after they marry? Do they agree with Schopenhauer’s view which calls women a “subjection to [men]” (Sch., *Women*: 1), “a patient” companion? Lawrence’s third novel, *Sons and Lovers*, clearly explains that a woman does not need to compromise and tolerate her difficult situation in marriage. Mrs. Morel, after finding that her marriage with Walter Morel has led her to a low class status, drifts away from him but she never can make a clear break of him. This is in contrast to Lettie who learns to tolerate her husband and tries to be patient.⁵² Nevertheless, both Schopenhauer and Lawrence agree that a woman’s life after marriage should flow more quietly and gently in the service of species. Lawrence writes in the summary of

⁵²Such idea is also presented in the relationship between George and Meg. She is not happy with her husband when he begins to have dreadful drinking but she tolerates him. While his existence for her is like “having Satan in the house” or “a black tiger glowering at you,” she is sure that “nobody knows what [she’s] suffered with him (*WP* 292).

his third novel to Edward Garnett in November 1912 that Mrs. Morel's passionate love for her husband moves to her children after they are born, and as "her sons grow up she selects them as lovers" (*Letters* 477).⁵³ Mrs Morel has a disturbed view of love and care for the next generation, as she takes the life of servitude to her family further than it should go by later selecting her sons as lovers. She realises the matter and begins to die when her sons find their own loves and eventually leave her all alone. I believe, in this case, relinquishing herself to the care of children for the sake of species has doomed and destroyed not only her, but the sons as well. Accordingly, it is observable that the emphasis on the idea of devotion to the species remains a significant point in Lawrence's early works. The narrator in *The White Peacock* also states directly that Lettie is responsible for "the good progress of one's life," which is "the heaviest of responsibilities." Although this responsibility is terrifying and insufferable for Lettie and also results in the death of Mrs. Morel, Schopenhauer says, "[woman] pays the debt of life not by what she does but by what she suffers – by the pains of child-bearing, care for the child, and by subjection to man, to whom she should be a patient and cheerful companion" (*Women* 1).⁵⁴

⁵³As Lawrence says, "these sons are *urged* into life by their reciprocal love of their mother — urged on and on. But when they come to manhood, they can't love, because their mother is the strongest power in their lives, and holds them" (*Letters* 477). As soon as they come into contact with women, there is a split. The split kills the eldest son, William, and also make the younger one unable to stay in his relationships. Indeed, their soul stays with the mother and their body with the other women.

⁵⁴Although a woman's tasks during the time were serving her children and husband, and perhaps Schopenhauer's theory mostly formed by his observation of the time, by considering Lawrence's philosophy we can have a different approach towards this historical reality. Based on Lawrence's view of polarity, it is possible to say that a woman, to a certain degree, will relinquish part of herself for her children and husband if she chooses the right mate. In fact, Lawrence wants to emphasise on the importance that, if a woman chooses a good match for herself, then there is no anger, sadness, feeling of a loss of freedom, or a feeling of a loss of individuality after she marries. In accordance, a

In *The White Peacock*, both George and Cyril learn that most of a woman's energy is spent in the caring and nurturing of children, and it would appear they have less time and interest for their men. "Meg never found any pleasure in me as she does in the kids,' said George bitterly, for himself" (WP 278). And where Emily had been enthralled with Cyril, "her eyes searching mine, her spirit clinging timidly about me," discussing Strauss and Debussy, the "inarticulate delight" she finds in caring for Meg's baby leaves him "alone, neglected, forgotten, outside the glow which surrounded the woman and the baby" (WP 278). Through all this, the reader receives an important Schopenhauerian idea, namely the notion that "the first love of a mother, as that of animals and men, is purely *instinctive*" (*Women* 50). Lawrence also shows that a woman takes children on her side to overcome man's strength. This concern is fully articulated in Lawrence's text: "a woman who has her child in her arms is a tower of strength, a beautiful, unassailable tower of strength that may in its turns stand quietly dealing death" (WP 292). A greater presentation of this idea is given in the relationship between George and Meg. After the birth of George's daughter, Gertie, the gap between he and Meg grows, and he finds himself isolated, unable to communicate with her any longer. George acknowledges the fact that in marriage the man is the loser, for the woman "has the children on her side" (WP 301). Lawrence illustrates how the woman and child unite, at times, against the man; in a scene, Meg becomes increasingly concerned about George's use of alcohol, and as it

feeling of completeness and peacefulness in child-bearing and the care for her child and husband will remain with her.

becomes an addiction, her concern turns to disdain. She enlists their little daughter on her side in an effort to intimidate him into satisfactory conduct.

In *The White Peacock*, the male is killed by the female as soon as the purpose of fertilisation is achieved: “Lawrence’s natural analogue is the black widow spider or the praying mantis rather than the flying ant” (Montgomery 55). The female spider gives all her love to the child while ignoring the male who is “put away, quite alone, neglected, forgotten, outside the glow which surrounded the woman and her baby” (WP 277). Cyril ponders this when thinking about Meg and one of her children: “the mother’s dark eyes, and the baby’s large, hazel eyes looked at me serenely. The two were very calm, very complete and triumphant together. In their completeness was a security which made me feel alone and ineffectual” (WP 292). Although Cyril is not involved in a marital commitment, by seeing the relationship between Meg and her child, he can imagine how the companionship between mother and child can cause the man to drift away and lead to his isolation. These passages establish the impression that, in writing *The White Peacock*, Lawrence’s thought mirrors Schopenhauer’s idea that the males sacrifice themselves in love, and they will become disillusioned soon after the goal of propagation of the new generation is achieved. The primary reason behind man’s illusion, according to Schopenhauer, is that he is driven from the beginning by instinct rather than by rational reflection. In the first chapters of the novel, most of the male characters are entangled with an illusory love, only to later realise that after marriage and especially after the creation of a child, the reality behind their acts is something else. It is through their senses and

the experience of union with a woman that these male characters become more aware of their surrounding environment and achieve consciousness after finding that all their potential is sacrificed to woman and species. A significant example of this reality comes through Lettie's announcement, when she tells George that he is going to sacrifice himself for the "next generation" (*WP* 210) and not for love.

Physical Attractions

The White Peacock displays a physical attraction and tenderness between the male and female characters, and throughout the novel, body shape and physical experiences are detailed by the narrator. Every character in the novel has a list of attributes he or she desires in a partner. These attributes are more focused on physical characteristics than intangible virtues. Schopenhauer's notion of reproduction can be used to explain that these sensual encounters in the novel show that the sexes in love look for qualities that secure the well-being of the offspring. By using Schopenhauer's concept of physical qualities in love, I hope to explore the reality, or the truth, of how physical qualities in *The White Peacock* function to fuel the flame of physical attraction while simultaneously cloaking any weaknesses between the sexes. To be more precise, I will show how Lawrence uses Schopenhauer's concept of an innate physical attraction ranking mechanism to define the relationships between the sexes.

Lettie's qualities of beauty and intelligence make her attractive for her suitors. As the narrator says, "she was tall, nearly six feet in height, but slenderly formed. Her hair was yellow, tending towards a dun brown. She had beautiful eyes and brows, but not a nice nose. Her hands were very beautiful" (*WP* 15). It seems that Lawrence, in representing beauty, felt sympathy with Schopenhauer's ideas, and considered that some of them – like the qualities that the woman looks for in the man and the male looks for in the female, and the destructive role of beauty – afforded possibilities to develop his novel.⁵⁵ For Schopenhauer, a woman's beauty is a deceptive tool used by nature and has a powerful attraction over man, but it loses its fascination as soon as the will to live achieves its goal. Just as the female ant "bites off her own wings after the business of impregnation is over; they will be only a hindrance to her in the actual business of tending under the earth the new family she is to start," consequently the woman, for Schopenhauer, usually loses her beauty after one or two childbirths (*WWR* 2: 345). Thus, beauty is an illusion as "only the man whose intellect is clouded by his sexual instinct that could give the stunted, narrow-shouldered, broad-hipped and short-legged race the name of the fair sex; for the entire beauty of the sex is based on this instinct" (*Women* 46). By the sheer force of this instinct, women's beauty incapacitates the reasoning faculty of man; the tragedy is the loss of his loftier goals which are nullified through the act of wedlock:

⁵⁵This is observable from my earlier discussion of how beauty is an illusion and how it renders the male helpless "in love," and leads to marriage. Later, I disclosed how Lawrence knew that Schopenhauer was obsessed with the idea of marriage being a "howling discord" and how the man sacrifices his individuality. Moreover, I portrayed how Lawrence finds inspiration for further development of the storyline and the relationships between his characters from Schopenhauer's notion of the concept of love and the destructive illusion of beauty.

But the will of the species is so much more powerful than that of the individual, that the lover shuts his eyes to all the qualities repugnant to him, overlooks everything, misjudges everything, and binds himself for ever to the object of his passion. He is so completely infatuated by that delusion, which vanishes as soon as the will of the species is satisfied, and leaves behind a detested partner for life. Only from this is it possible to explain why we often see very rational, and even eminent, men tied to termagants and matrimonial fiends, and cannot conceive how they could have made such a choice. (*WWR* 2: 555)

Lawrence highlighted the above passage from “The Metaphysics of Love” in his copy of Schopenhauer’s *Essays* and “doubly underlined the description of marriage as most often ‘a howling discord.’ [He] was obsessed by the idea of the sacrifice of the individual in the marriage trap” (Montgomery 54). Moreover, in his novel, Lawrence announces the destructive role of beauty, with Leslie telling Lettie:

“Then just be comfortable. Let me look at myself in your eyes.”

“Narcissus, Narcissus! — Do you see yourself well? Does the image flatter you? — Or is it a troubled stream, distorting your fair lineaments.”

“I can’t see anything — only feel you looking — you are laughing at me — What have you behind there — what joke?”

“I—I’m thinking you’re just like Narcissus — a sweet, beautiful youth.”

“Be serious — do.”

“It would be dangerous. You’d die of it, and I — I should—”

(*WP* 86-87)

Of utmost importance in this dialogue is the connection that Lettie implies between beauty and death. Although her perspective is veiled with comic language, her focus upon the “dangerous” reality of beauty, especially after Leslie asks her to be “serious,” remains significant. In her final comment, Lettie acknowledges that Leslie may indeed become a victim of her beauty and it may cost him his life or freedom while he is not aware of it, a Schopenhauerian notion that man can easily be deluded by woman’s beauty. When Lettie emphasises “I-I should,” it shows that she is consciously aware not only of the deception of her beauty but of her own motivation, or desire, in choosing Leslie. She decides to select Leslie as her husband rather than George because she feels he is more compatible in wealth. This equates to him being the superior choice and more “agreeable” with her desires (*WP* 20-28). However, this aspect only remains until Leslie’s severe accident. His physical deformation repulses Lettie. Before the accident scene, Lawrence expresses the cruelty of the landscape, leaving the reader with an image of a black cat whose paws are snared in a trap as another female cat “shrugged her sleek shoulders, and walked away with high steps” (*WP* 12), a reaction similar to Lettie’s response to Leslie’s car accident.

The way that Lawrence’s characters approach one another echoes another Schopenhauerian theory, namely that the two in a relationship must neutralise each other like “acid and alkali” (*Metaphysics* 124). Considering the interaction between

“acid and alkali” and consistently applying this metaphor to humans, the male is the acidic and the female is the base, and as they join together, they neutralise one another to form the perfect balance and to overcome their deficiency. This is the basic principle of “Metaphysics of Love”: in an effort to produce dominant offspring “the two persons must neutralise each other, like acid and alkali to a neutral salt” to assimilate “the harmony concerning the individual and its perfection” (124). For Schopenhauer, an equilibrium exists to stabilise and separate the sexes; there is a precise extent, or degree, to which the male qualities need to be completely met, or matched, by the female qualities, in order to naturalise the sexes. In other words, the most virile of men will wish for the most sensual of women, and conversely, so that each person is sexually in accord with the other. Lawrence’s narrator concurs with Schopenhauer’s image of balance between the sexes when referring to the physical aspects of George and Lettie. He describes how Lettie becomes silent by seeing the movement of George’s body. When they walk across the standing corn, George takes off his hat, “his black hair was moist and twisted into confused halfcurls. ... he swung with a beautiful rhythm from the waist ... his shirt ... was torn just above the belt, and showed the muscles of his back playing like lights upon the white sand of a brook. There was something exceedingly attractive in the rhythmic body” (*WP* 47). The narrator also refers to how men compliment Lettie on her physical qualities, “some look at [her] hair, some watch the rise and fall of [her] breathing, some look at [her] neck” but as she says, “a few, - not you [George] among them, - look me in the eyes for my thoughts. To you, I’m a fine specimen, strong! Pretty strong! You

primitive man!” (WP 27). The irony in Lettie’s voice reveals a negative view that she holds of George. She makes him aware that she is fully aware that he only notices her body, her physical qualities. He is behaving with his primal brain and when she says “you primitive man,” it is the insult given from her, as a proper lady, to show her disapproval of his behaviour.

Furthermore, Lawrence’s *The White Peacock* notes the qualities that women look for in men. According to Schopenhauer, “it is chiefly the strength of a man and the courage that goes with it that attract them,”

for both of these promise the generation of robust children and at the same time a brave protector for them. Every physical defect in a man, any deviation from the type, a woman may, with regard to the child, eradicate if she is faultless in these parts herself or excels in a contrary direction. (*Metaphysics* 122)

In addition to the basic and generalized qualities of attraction, there exists a secondary level. This second consideration that Lawrence takes from Schopenhauer’s concept of love is the dependence of women on men’s physical traits. As men are not only evaluated by their strength and courage only, women further grade the physical qualities they find necessary for attraction. Through this theory, we reach the idea that there is a standard male physique that is considered universally attractive by the majority of women:

These include the masculine build of the skeleton, breadth of shoulder, small hips, straight legs, strength of muscle,

courage, beard, and so on. And so it happens that a woman frequently loves an ugly man, albeit she never loves an unmanly man, because she cannot neutralise his defects.
(*Metaphysics* 123)

As Lawrence develops the mannerisms and sometimes silent exchanges of the sexes, he visualises the sexual attractions between Lettie and George. In their first meeting, they follow the “critical way” (*Metaphysics* 126) that Schopenhauer considers proper at the first meeting between the sexes.⁵⁶ While dallying on the piano, Lettie almost censures George for showing his lack of culture. Then, as she lifts her eyes, she is mesmerised by his bare chest and arms.⁵⁷ He stares “at her with glowing brown eyes, as if in hesitating challenge,” and she returns “his challenge with a blue blaze of her eyes” (*WP* 15).

This detailed portrait of physical appearance discloses a Schopenhauerian thought immersed in the novel, that light-skinned individuals “are a deviation from the type and almost constitute an abnormality” (Sch., *Metaphysics*: 125). Individuals are thus captivated by mates with dark skin. George possesses this characteristic, as he has “a naturally fair skin burned dark and freckled in patches” (*WP* 1). Lettie is drawn by the colour of his skin and George, as well, has a weakness for her milky white skin. Their opposing eyes colour presents another element of their attraction to one another, as Lettie cannot help but to gaze upon

⁵⁶ In Schopenhauer’s critical way, the search for a mate is based on how far the mate would be able to fulfil the other’s deficiency. In other words, we subconsciously choose mates for their reproductive potential.

⁵⁷ As I showed earlier, this is not the only time that she is fascinated by George’s manliness and body. Throughout their walking in the farm, she feels talk-less when seeing “the muscles of his back” (*WP* 47).

George's brown eyes with her eyes of blue. Lawrence "vehemently" agreed with "Schopenhauer's opinion that a white skin is not natural to man [and] fair hair and blue eyes are a deviation from type" (Chambers 111). For Lawrence, "a brown skin is the only beautiful one" (Chambers 111). This idea is fully represented in *The White Peacock*. The subtle interaction between colours, the curiosity and appeal that exists between differing physical traits, and their role in love affairs among the characters points to a deep understanding of Schopenhauer's theory of the physical attraction between the sexes.

Neither Schopenhauer nor Lawrence apply boundaries to the physical qualities that women look for in men. Schopenhauer believes that the other aspects that a woman pays careful attention to when choosing a mate, aside from the manly appearance, is security. This material aspect is ranked highly in a woman's mind, and Lawrence fully represents this idea when Cyril wonders why his sister is going over to Leslie and what she sees in him in contrast to George. George Saxton, when it comes to physical attraction, is an ideal man for Lettie. He is a manly type, "stoutly built, brown eyed, with a naturally fair skin, burned dark" (*WP* 1), but she is not wholly interested in him. At this stage, one wonders why she seems unsatisfied with his manly characteristics, and thus, the question becomes what she is looking for in her future mate. Her method of choosing a mate parallels Schopenhauer's view, as she continues to rate both men simultaneously according to her specific list of attractive qualities. Lettie likes George, the son of a tenant farmer, and Leslie, who is a son of a mine-owner from a cultured and rich family.

She flirts with both of them until she makes the decision to marry Leslie Tempest for material gains and security reasons. Not long after her marriage to Leslie, she does not feel really happy and satisfied. “A subtle observer might have noticed a little hardness about her mouth, and disillusion hanging slightly on her eyes” (*WP* 283). She is fiercely unhappy with her existence; writing to Cyril that “she had nothing at all in her life, it was a barren futility” (*WP* 290). But on the other hand, when she puts it into perspective she concludes that she is “quite content” (*WP* 291). In choosing to marry Leslie over George, Lettie has gained money, social standing, and the security she sought. Although George was more attractive, Leslie was attractive enough, and he offered her more of the qualities she desired outside of physical appearance. Lettie had succeeded by marrying into her own class, and she developed into a fine lady of society where “she stood with her white hand upon the peacock of her cloak” as she had “discovered the wonderful charm of her womanhood” (*WP* 254). Although this manner of selection, admission of defeat, and learned toleration is not a new or unusual concept in marriage, this view was adopted by Schopenhauer and became an important part of his philosophy and consequently, Lawrence’s novel. Indeed, Schopenhauer insisted on the awkward reality that the force within humans which drives the individual towards the opposite sex is not love but the will to live. Like Schopenhauer, Lawrence was concerned with what attracted the sexes towards each other, but he did not limit his concentration on defining the force as an inherent drive within human beings to stay alive and reproduce; rather, as I argued previously, he argues that it is the will to

completeness that motivates people towards each other and bonds them together. It is the will to live that is always the initial driving force, motivating the sexes into relationships based on propagation and not wholeness. However, the characters involved are usually not aware it is happening. They assume they are choosing mates based on the desire for wholeness while this union is more like “a duel than a duet. One party wins and takes the other captive, slave, servant” (*WP* 301). Toward the close of the novel, as the couples finally begin to see what has happened, the idea of the world as suffering is displayed yet again. They are unhappy in their unions, having now realised that the will to live has accomplished its goal and that the will to wholeness, which seemingly motivates people towards union and essentially bonds them, makes no promise of happiness.

Agony

Lawrence’s *The White Peacock* pays a great deal of attention to the theme of suffering, with one of its chapters even entitled “The Dominant Motif of Suffering.”

The narrator proceeds to explain the conflict between modern and traditional life:

We laughed at the tyranny of old romance. We scorned the faded procession of old years, ... Were we not in the midst of the bewildering pageant of modern life, with all its confusion of bannerets and colours, with its infinite interweaving of sounds, the screech of the modern toys of haste striking like keen spray, the heavy boom of busy mankind gathering its beard, earnestly, forming the bed of all other sounds; and between these two the swiftness of songs, the triumphant tilt

of the joy of life, the hoarse oboes of privation, the shuddering drums of tragedy, and the eternal scraping of the two deep-toned stings of despair? (*WP* 281)

The confusion between these two poles, modernity and tradition, results in the characters' suffering. Furthermore, the characters' disillusionment after discovering the reality of marriage and the truth of the species also displays the concept of suffering. The importance of this notion was underscored by Schopenhauer, who argues eloquently that suffering is the result of human desiring, willing, craving and the way in which one may achieve knowledge about the surrounding environment. It is his belief that any being's life is to be measured by the lack of grief and anguish rather than his bliss and contentment. Considering this view then it becomes possible to say that animals seem to have a more pleasurable life than humans. But then Schopenhauer distinguishes physical pain or pleasure from the intellectual and wilful one. In the case of physical pain and pleasure, the material basis of both humans and animals is the same, therefore "in real physical pleasure man has no more than the animal, except in so far as his more highly developed nervous systems enhances the susceptibility to every pleasure but also to every pain as well" (*Parerga* 2:293). In the intellectual and wilful case, Schopenhauer emphasises the advantage of less suffering in animals life because their "consciousness is restricted to what is intuitively perceived and so to the present moment. ... whereas man's consciousness has an intellectual horizon that embraces the whole life and even goes beyond this" (*Parerga* 2:296). Regarding this idea, I aim to show that if Schopenhauer's philosophy was close to Lawrence's thoughts,

how might subjection to a particular philosophy assist us in having a vivid understanding of the idea of suffering and knowledge in *The White Peacock*?

The way that Lawrence's characters discover the truth of life is through their individual perceptions of reality and relationships with others. This truth is actualized through the body and feelings that they gain from their environment, which parallels Schopenhauer's philosophy of how we experience the reality of the world and shows the struggle between body and mind. Schopenhauer argues that mind and sexual nature are abstractions of the will, but at opposite extremes. For Schopenhauer, our mind is the echo of our will and the way we want something. It is neither through mind nor reason that we experience the reality of the world; rather, it is through body and feeling that we obtain knowledge of the environment. Lawrence gives an example of such confusion with his consideration of rational knowledge in the relationship between George and Lettie. In the initial encounter between the intellectual Lettie and the sexual George, the balanced circle of life is fragmented. The world and atmosphere of George's life seems peaceful and blissful until cultural and civilised thoughts offered to him by Cyril and Lettie confuse him. As George says to Lettie, "things will never be the same – You have awakened my life – I imagine things that I couldn't have done" (WP 116). Although Cyril and Lettie inhabit a beautiful pastoral world and "lived between the woods and the water all [their] lives," they create an anti-pastoral aspect in George by sharing their civilised and modern knowledge. For instance, when they are in a luxurious restaurant Lettie asks George to choose a meal. George who is confused by strange

dishes only orders some cheese, but they insist on something new, “complicated meats, ... tantafflins” (*WP* 25). He has no idea about it and is not sure if he would like it, “he couldn’t analyse the flavour, he felt confused and bewildered even through his sense of taste!” (*WP* 25). Despite being free from the typical demands of a cultured society, like traditional pastoral characters, Lettie and Cyril still inflict uneasiness on George with their cultural values and knowledge. They are modernized individuals in a pastoral setting and sharing their knowledge with George leaves him in pain: “there was a painful perplexity in his brow, such as I [Cyril] often pictured afterwards, a sense of something hurting, something he could not understand” (*WP* 30).⁵⁸ George’s torment is compounded through his embrace of modern ideologies, representing Schopenhauer’s notion that priori-knowledge “inflict torments in comparison with which all the sufferings of the animal kingdom are very small” (*WWR I*: 299).⁵⁹ Finding himself in a quandary and unable either to advance his thoughts or eradicate his knowledge, his body starts to decline. His obsessive thoughts destroy him as much as any opium. Schopenhauer believes that

⁵⁸Such antithetical aspect of pastoral happiness in George’s “aspiring mind” comes earlier in the novel, when George’s mind is innocent and unaware of the evil side of the world. His “good living and heavy sleeping” (*WP* 28) represents the ideal pastoral condition of the contented mind. But ambition and what the narrator later calls “the whole succession of chords” (*WP* 306) demolishes that innocent satisfaction. George crosses the borders of the valley of Nethermere and replaces “the glamour of our yesterdays” on the farm, which had come over him “like an intoxicant,” with the artificial pleasure of alcoholic intoxicants in the urban world (*WP* 239).

⁵⁹ According to Schopenhauer the individual has the priori-knowledge and posteriori-knowledge. Priori-knowledge approximates “sensuous perception” (*WWR I*: 77). In other words, our perception of an object proceeds from observations or experiences while posteriori-knowledge occurs through our body. This knowledge is not rooted in “the abstract and discursive, but in the perceptive faculty” (*WWR 2*: 75). In both cases, the material is the same in all minds, but the difference lies in “the perceiving apprehension, and does not originate in the abstract” (*WWR 2*: 75). The true spectator in life has an immeasurably untainted world view and is not limited to the abstract. His mind is not free to absorb the environment surrounding him without a kind of intuitive perception. In this process to avoid suffering and doubt, Schopenhauer recommends individuals leave the reasoning faculty behind and live “in the present” (*WWR I*: 35).

thinking can “wear out the body oftener and more than physical hardships” (*WWR I*: 299). Unfortunately, the same happens to George, who is a broken shell of a man by the end of the novel.

George is not the only one who struggles with modern thoughts. Lettie also encounters a similar destructive fate by thinking too much about modern ideas as the torment of this odd and convoluted modern life affect her own life. As the narrator says, during autumn, she was very “wilful. She uttered many banalities concerning men, and love, and marriage; she taunted Leslie and thwarted his wishes” because she sees him now in opposition to what she imagined about love, she “fancied they were very familiar” (*WP* 74). Therefore:

She, who had always been so rippling in thoughtless life, sat down at the window sill to think, and her strong teeth bit at her handkerchief till it was torn in holes. She would say nothing to me; she read all things that dealt with modern woman. (74)

Next to the fact that she is an imaginative and wilful person, the narrator emphasises that her knowledge is gained from modern books that deal “with modern woman,” the torment and conflict between her old-fashioned knowledge and that of the transitioning modern life. It is more significant that the novel does not limit the torment of knowledge and modernity to innocent and simple characters; rather, the narrator, Cyril, who is presented as an intelligent person with knowledge about everything, somehow suffers as well. He is powerless to discharge himself from painful self-awareness. He removes himself from the conflict between modernity

and tradition to ponder the grand charade, and he is left with a sense of stale neutrality. He has not yielded to Mother Nature, who has devoured the other males, yet he remains disconnected and isolated, apparently still longing to evade his “rooted loneliness” (*WP* 127).

An unanswered question lingers in the novel: are the bondage of society and the coils of blind nature escapable by anyone? can anyone flower? How can this be done? Cyril eventually finds composure and detachment; he is not imprisoned by blind nature or by societal expectations: marriage and then supporting and providing for wife and children. Lawrence’s characters all seem tormented by their knowledge and awareness, except for Emily’s husband Tom:

He was exceedingly manly: that is to say he did not dream of questioning or analysing anything. All that came his way was ready labelled nice or nasty, good or bad. He did not imagine that anything could be other than just what it appeared to be: - and with this appearance, he was quite content. (*WP* 308)

This passage reflects man in his simplest state of being, his animal nature. He is just a reaction to his environment, blissfully ignorant of the world outside of his direct path. In order to attain this calm nature, he questions nothing, ponders no abstract dream or desire, and superficially labels a thing either good or bad based on his rudimentary scale of judgement. In so doing, he happily sacrifices knowledge for contentment. This reveals the idea that lack of knowledge is the best remedy for suffering. In other words, if one knows less like Tom, he or she suffers less than the

one who knows more like George and Lettie and the conflict between new ideas and old ones.

A life brimming with agony is a main focus in the book, whether it is the piglets killed by their mother, the baby chickens caught on the fire while trying to stay warm, or someone like Lettie, whose choice is split between her intellect and soul. Lettie, “a seething confusion of emotion,” wishes to cause trouble between George and his spouse. Together, they spot a dead bird and she decides to torment George by saying it must have died trying to save its companion. A moment later she stages a funeral by burying the bird with dirt, singing about its demise after the battle. “Don’t you think life is very cruel, George: - and love is the cruellest of all?” (WP 210). The cruelty of love and its agony appears even when it encounters love between parents and offspring. Lettie’s fate follows Schopenhauer’s vision of “sacrificing yourself for the next generation” (WP 210). In the same chapter we encounter Lettie’s loss of individuality as she makes the decision to “abandon the charge of herself to serve her children” (WP 284). She discovers the truth that the weight of such a task is quite terrifying and gives her a sense of loneliness to realise she is responsible for another person’s life. Even as she showered them in a mother’s unconditional love, the painful reality remained that when children grow up, “either they would unconsciously fling her away, back upon herself again in bitterness and loneliness, or they would tenderly cherish her, chafing at her love-bonds occasionally” (WP 284). *The White Peacock* even represents the idea that procreation and love for children conveys the concept of suffering. Lettie indeed

grapples with the reality that this is her new life. She unwillingly accepts this new role as she immerses herself within the family unit, hoping to find herself once more.

As the novel details, Lettie is fully engaged in a Schopenhauerian quandary. In her union to Leslie, she is led by her will to raise a family and yet, in this instance, her rationality only produces a denial of herself in order to benefit her offspring. She partially agrees with life's agony, and she contemplates her likely present happiness with husband and children to withdraw from the depressing knowledge of life's pain. In Lettie's psyche, she has random clues to escape a Schopenhaurian dilemma. She tells George:

You never grow up, like bulbs which spend all summer getting fat and fleshy, but never wakening the germ of a flower. As for me, the flower is born in me, but it wants bringing forth. Things don't flower if they're overfed. You have to suffer before you blossom in this life. When death is just touching a plant, it forces it into a passion of flowering.
(WP 28)

Lettie's emphasis on the words flowering, blossom and death in her previous discussion with George, "when death is just touching a plant, it forces it into a passion of flowering," fully supports Schopenhauer's idea that individuals "attempt, when they are taking leave of life, to hand it over to someone else who will take their place" (*Emptiness* 40). This awareness was instilled in Lettie through her later suffering after marriage. In her opinion, life is suffering and one should suffer in

order to mature. Her thoughts point to a Schopenhauerian morality that maintains that through suffering one can find fulfilment and gain awareness. It appears that like Schopenhauer, Lawrence sees suffering as a struggle between self-unconsciousness and self-awareness.

By the end of the novel, Lawrence introduces another character, Annable, who is a gamekeeper, lives in Cambridge, and is a priest who wedded a woman. At this stage of his life he shuns anything to do with modern society because he places no value on it. He lives in the woods, engaged in tiring manual labour. His rugged and imposing frame, full of drive and determination, epitomises the inherent force of nature. His guiding principle is “be a good animal, true to your animal instinct” (*WP* 147). He boasts that his many offspring are as “natural as weasels ... bred up like a bunch o’ young foxes, to run as they would” (*WP* 131). Whereas most of Lawrence’s characters are stuck in limbo between modernity and nature, unable to escape this suffering, Annable seems the only one who has overcome the conflict between these two paths by choosing nature. It seems that Lawrence’s “dependence on the cultural innovations of the previous century, and his consequence entrapment in its social conventions” (Krockel 20) lead him to offer Annable’s way of living and his chosen path as an alternative solution to the matter of suffering in *The White Peacock*. Essentially, Annable keeps himself away from modern life; secondly, he acts on the basis of his nature. Acting upon his nature separates him from the misery or confusion that the other characters like George are entangled with in modern life.

Cyril finds himself extremely influenced by Annable and initially contemplates going back to a life in tune with the natural environment and desire. Unfortunately, the reality Annable faces is overshadowed by dark, unbearable and resentful emotions. His pregnant wife is heavily loaded with the responsibility of the eight children and facing near exhaustion. The exposition of Annable's family somehow parallels Schopenhauer's theory that "the generation and nourishment of the offspring, are to the individual of incomparably greater importance and consequence than everything else" (*WWR* 2: 510). This is perhaps one of the reasons that this character appears in the last chapters, and his lifestyle becomes a symbol of redemption from the agony of modern life. He goes on to say that nature protects species to safeguard the uninterrupted human race. Schopenhauer believes that it is a delusion for an individual to think that he or she may find eternity in the birth of species. Toward the end of "The Life of Species," he points out that the will-to-live "cannot attain to a better state or condition than its present one; consequently, with life, the constant suffering and dying of individuals are certain to it" (*WWR* 2: 560). Likewise, Annable's family life becomes a nightmare after his suspicious demise, and his family plummets into poverty. With no other choice, they return to the run-down section of the city and pilfer food in order to survive. Cyril is taken aback by the outcome, as he felt close to and admired Annable as a father figure. Then after quiet reflection he clearly states, "I suppose he did not know what he was doing, any more than the rest of us" (*WP* 185). This passage shows that even giving birth and following natural instinct cannot secure human life

from suffering, and in reality, nature only follows its primary goal, the survival of species.

Lawrence develops the Schopenhauerian idea to its logical conclusions around the final encounter of George and Lettie. George meets her in the evening when Leslie is not home. They both suffer from their marriage. George confesses to her that his “marriage is more of a duel than a duet” (*WP* 301). In the meantime, Lettie, by singing Wagner’s “Star and Eve,” shows her sympathy for George’s circumstance; “it was the music of resignation and despair” (301). Lawrence offers another remedy for her agony. She looks to relieve her pain by giving birth to a child: “I hope I shall have another child next spring, there is only that to take away the misery of this torpor. I seem full of passion and energy, and it all fizzles out in day to day domestics” (*WP* 290). Lawrence once again delineates the dependence of his heroine on the traditional role that society has placed on women to be mothers. Although from her first appearance in the novel she is introduced as a person with modern perspectives and some knowledge of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, still she seeks her redemption in offspring.

Summary of Findings

Lawrence’s first novel can be summarised as a compelling exploration of the estrangements of modern life as it focuses on relationships that are destructive, unfulfilled, and based on the propagation of a new generation. Lawrence

specifically alludes to Schopenhauer to express the failure of his characters and their pursuit of happiness. Trapped between intellect and will, every character's life culminates in a negative outcome. George dies like "a tree that is falling, going soft and pale and rotten, clammy with small fungi" (*WP* 324). Annable's sexual activities caused many children to be overlooked and maltreated. He finally commits suicide while discovering the fault of his own opinion on sexuality. Lawrence reunites certain characters, such as the conversations between Lettie and George, in order to portray their constant discord with intellect and sexuality after marriage. Indeed, he makes an effort to redesign Schopenhauer's analysis in order to explain that George's and Lettie's actual misfortune has nothing to do with their children, but in their inability to give birth to their own being. Although it corresponds to Schopenhauer's "Metaphysic of Love," *The White Peacock* also aims to create a sense of changing family life and relationships. Lawrence exploits the language and conventions of rural tradition to boldly showcase man's alienation from the natural world and, accordingly, he creates an overly harsh portrait of brutality in human and animal nature that ushers the novel towards its tragic conclusion.

Schopenhauer states that instinct works as the ultimate concept of human acts. In fact, instinct works where the individual is not able to understand, where the intellect is subordinated by the will. In this process, "the will is [like] the strong blind man who carries on his shoulders the lame man who can see" (*WWI* 2: 421). Indeed, under the conscious intellect is the conscious or unconscious will. Like

Schopenhauer, Lawrence considers the reality of just existing to be without consciousness or, as he expresses it, man's knowledge is "hovering behind" the reality of things; in fact, he sees being or nature as "devoid of knowledge" (McDonald 431). According to McDonald, Lawrence sees life and reproduction as an alternative way to overcome death. As McDonald puts it:

Life shall continually and progressively differentiate itself, almost as though this differentiation were a purpose. Life starts crude and unspecified, a great mass. And it proceeds to evolve out of that mass ever more distinct and definite particular forms, an ever-multiplying number of separate species and orders, as if it were working always to the production of the infinite number of perfect individuals, the individual so thorough that he should have nothing in common with any other individual. (431)

Lawrence's view of love never neglects Schopenhauer's point that the individual exists within the will. What distinguishes him is his opinion that, behind the blind will to live, is a spiritual consideration, an immortal determination to become a "greater man" (Schneider, *Sch.*: 10). It is this belief that motivates Lawrence to stress an immortal will towards completeness, a will to union and wholeness. *The White Peacock* reflects the great debate between materialism and vitalism.⁶⁰ Although the unions result in an unhappy accord, the strength of D.H. Lawrence's *The White Peacock* is that it portrays the intricate complexities of human interaction. It presents scenes and situations that affected and molded relationships and family life in early

⁶⁰This vitalism stresses ingenuity and meaningful, driven works as the method of progress. See Schneider's *The Consciousness of D. H. Lawrence: An Intellectual Biography*, on "Lawrence's Early Beliefs and Novels."

twentieth century England. He exposes his characters to a world evolving from industrialization and economic expansion, as they struggle to adjust to class issues, parenthood, and emancipation. Lawrence's elaborate descriptions paint a portrait of the "Old World" with all its beauty and the spirited energy of young people with ideas and passion for life, finding enjoyment in nature and each other's company.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

My study set out to offer a Schopenhauerian reading of Henry James's *The Portrait of a Lady* and D. H. Lawrence's *The White Peacock*. Throughout the study, I was driven by two goals. Initially, I aimed to examine the selected novels by considering Schopenhauer's philosophy of love, the will and morality, for the cognition of these Schopenhauerian theories provides a vivid background to have a new approach and different understanding of the novels. My second purpose was to discover the reason why the characters, especially the heroines, after recognising that their marriage was basically a mistake, still remained in their tormented relationships. In compare to former studies, I intended to criticise the destiny of these heroines by using Schopenhauer's philosophy. To achieve this purpose I drew the readers' attention to Schopenhauer's concept of freedom, possession, punishment, compassion and the will in James's novel, and to the notion of the will to live in Lawrence. It was through the examination of these four concepts that I have suggested what is the true

moral tendency of James's novel, and contended that it is impossible to read every one of these elements as a general statement on the prospect of modern liberty or a type of sincere affinity or love. I have also showed that Lawrence's early reading of Schopenhauer's "Metaphysic of Love", at a time when he was beginning to write his first novel, helped him to develop his philosophy of union between the sexes.

The Will and Knowledge

Schopenhauer's conception of the will provides the basis for a new philosophical approach to *The Portrait of a Lady* and *The White Peacock*. To show how this can be done, I have drawn attention to Schopenhauer's primary question, "what is the thing-in-itself?" In James's novel, Isabel's cousin, Ralph, who is introduced as someone possessed of philosophical knowledge, also raises the same question. A few lines later James endows Isabel's character with a significant potential for wilfulness. According to Schopenhauer, the will is the ultimate reality of the thing-in-itself. In Isabel, James wishes to draw a young American woman with a "strong will" and show her in the act of "affronting her destiny." She goes abroad with her "meagre knowledge" (51-2) in order to experience and gain knowledge in a practical way. Meagre knowledge in Isabel's character is the result of her inflated ideals and will. It is based on this quality that James intends to see what she will do and how she will distinguish between her knowledge and the will.

We learn through Schopenhauer's philosophy that where the will works freely and independently, then our faculty of reason can nevertheless appear and for the most part overcome influences adverse to the reason. In the early chapters, Isabel is an independent woman, refusing all her suitors in order to protect her freedom, but later she chooses Osmond in the hope that her marriage to him will guarantee her liberty. Her reasoning faculty works in parallel to her will and leads to her conjugal tie with Osmond. It is after the marriage that Isabel's character is said by the narrator to have attained a "higher degree" (416), to enable her to see the whole instead of the particular. Once she has lost independence and free will, Isabel's faculty of reason finds a chance to observe the world in a more realistic way; she judges herself and she sees the reality. James's novel seems elaborately designed to contend that liberty in marriage is a problem in such a modern world. It is almost as if James considered this problem to show how Isabel, a thoughtless and self-centred woman who did not have real knowledge of the world, could blossom into a noble woman by experiencing the reality of life through her marriage to Osmond.

Experience

When Schopenhauer argues that people act in accordance with their wills, indeed, he offers a great insight into the individual by drawing attention to the reality that life is not merely joy and pleasure, that there is also a dim and unpleasant side, that there is pain, suffering, deception and inhumanity. It is through this side that one may gain

knowledge. Isabel is involved in a relationship which leads her to hardship. James represents Isabel's ennui and desire for mastery and freedom while towards the end her desire for independence is crushed by her cold, self-centred and manipulative husband. Losing liberty, in its foundation, helps Isabel to become more conscious of her inner nature. In fact, Osmond's cold and self-centred behaviour urges Isabel onto a new finding. She discovers the truth of her nature in another person, her husband, and this acknowledgment comes to her through what Schopenhauer calls the course of experience and suffering.

The significance of the novel lies in its view of life as a teacher, which offers a chance to experience and to learn. Although this viewpoint is common to many James scholars, from my point of view the idea of life as a teacher is aligned with Schopenhauer's idea about the interaction between the will and experience. The most accurate way of describing the artistic conclusion of James's novel would be to say that in picturing Osmond, James puts into him Isabel's personality – highest ambition, drive to power and self-satisfaction – while through her matrimony she recognises the reality and danger of her inner absolutism. They are both two sides of the same coin, and indeed, James has touched upon certain fundamental aspects of egoism.

Freedom

James's moral solution for the redemption of egoism is in line with Schopenhauer's philosophy of compassion. The novel's conclusion recalls Schopenhauer's concept

of morality when a young American woman rejects the idea of divorcing her manipulative husband and returns to her utterly failed marriage rather than looking for a new life of happiness for herself. James invites us to see the value of independence and egoism in terms of what it really means; he shows that the sort of liberty this American woman is looking for is worthless, and the way she speaks about liberty has a great deal of emptiness in it. I argued that James wonders how his heroine would learn from the pressures that she creates for herself, and more importantly I indicated how this learning parallels Schopenhauer's philosophy. James indeed offers his character the liberty to choose the right path. He does not push her into a compulsory marriage and he wants her to be free, even financially from the beginning of the novel. In an effort to make her free Ralph asks his father to give her half of the bequest so that her being rich will keep her from marrying for money. By the conclusion of the novel she is not forced, but free to choose her path.

The heroine's final refusal endorses Schopenhauer's concept of negative and positive freedom. One of the technical points James considered in the writing of *The Portrait of a Lady* was, on the one hand, to keep the reader alert to Isabel's individuality and, on the other hand, to persuade the reader that she could achieve a sense of morality through recognition of her own character. This picture attracts the readers' thoughts to the absurdity of the heroine's claim of superiority. A woman who announces her freedom would finally be entangled in a form of confinement. More ambiguity arises when the heroine with all the problems in her relationship with her husband aims to return to him while she receives a new proposal that offers

her a life of passion and freedom. If Isabel by the end wills to return to her husband, it is because she knows that even in staying with Goodwood there is no independence. She has acknowledged that union without confinement and self-rejection is impossible, and the force behind liberty's image is nothing more than the destructive will. She knows that moving in line with the will for a personal and permanent freedom is a negative sort of freedom, while ignoring oneself for another can result in the joyful and positive form of freedom, a release from egoism. It is important for James what things are in their reality and how they are seen. James's main character strives for freedom and independence but she discovers that her idea of freedom can happen only through self-rejection and compassion for another on whom she must depend. The novel ends with the heroine's self-denial and her new insight into her husband's personality, and the idea that freedom in marriage will be largely a negative desire.

Taking into account James's moral view, it is possible to say that he prevents a tragic ending by offering merely a compromise solution. In so doing, death appeals also to that side of James's heroine that reflects her pursuit of independence and happiness. James sympathetically portrays this idea through his character's life. Isabel, a wilful woman, is moved chiefly by desire and passion. This characteristic allows James to create a character who consumes herself while trying to revitalise herself. It would actually seem that what James's novel reveals, is a Schopenhauerian recognition that only the death of desire can bring peace. In a

unique and unmatched composition, James creates a novel that in an artistic way teaches a moral fact, the truth of human nature and the value of selflessness.

Lawrence and Schopenhauer

Lawrence began *The White Peacock* with an initial attempt to restructure Eliot's plan of two couples and develop their relationships. Lawrence acknowledged and developed Eliot's idea of affinity in the relationship between the sexes by using Schopenhauer's view on the physical qualities of the relationship between lovers. Schopenhauer's theory of sexual affinity finds its primary roots in the idea of reproduction. In other words, the sexual affinity forms its initial steps from the physical qualities of two individuals; indeed, each seeks a mate who will neutralise his or her defect. In addition, the novel also focuses on the significant problems of the nineteenth century, the entrapment of social conventions and industrialisation. The dominant ideas and arguments in this novel are undeniably radical because they challenge the idea of modernity and mid-Victorian standards for marriage. Industrialisation is characterised as evil for it brings about all of the modern infrastructure (railroads, canals, mines, buildings, etc.) which are a plague on nature and the human psyche. The novel also advocates aristocracy and agrarian society as alternatives to democracy and capitalism. Among these themes, Lawrence's consideration of the relationship between the sexes appears more considerable and Schopenhauerian. Schopenhauer's philosophy played a dominant role in Lawrence's

attitudes and provided a framework with which to challenge conventional morality. He was in search of a theory in order to avoid a tragic ending as in Eliot's fiction and to overcome her idea of chemical affinities, accordingly, Schopenhauer's notion of sexual love lead him to a new perception of love (the idea of wholeness), but as I have argued, in *The White Peacock*, Schopenhauer's tragedy of reproduction is the primary concern of Lawrence.

The study of Lawrence's philosophy of love suggests a development of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will to live, the idea that love and marriage are not merely for the purpose of propagation; rather, they follow the goal of wholeness between the sexes. In other words, Lawrence believes that the sexes in love complete each other's deficiency to create a unity. Lawrence seems more motivated by Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will to live in writing his first novel rather than utilising his own theory. Schopenhauer's concept of love as a sexual attitude and desire – a consideration that forms the fundamental characteristic of his philosophy – was to become so important in Lawrence's thinking that a major part of Lawrence's concept of love and marriage can be regarded as a development of Schopenhauer's notion of sexual love.

I asked in the Lawrence chapter how subjection to a particular philosophy might assist us in having a vivid understanding of the idea of sexual love in *The White Peacock*. Lawrence's writings, especially in *The White Peacock*, can be taken as a working-out of the implications of Schopenhauer's views, a progression that concentrates on three important manifestations of Schopenhauer's philosophy of

love. First, Lawrence approaches the idea of sexual instinct which flourishes from physical qualities and attractions between the sexes. Second, he adopts Schopenhauer's idea that the ultimate goal of love is the propagation of the next generation, but revises this idea to make a more comprehensive meaning for love and union.

Sexual Oppositions

What seems more significant in *The White Peacock* is Lawrence's emphasis on the basic structure of relationships – regeneration, human nature and suffering. These are indeed the central thought behind Schopenhauer's essays "Metaphysics of Love" and "The Life of Species." He values Schopenhauer's use of the will to live as motivation for his characters' actions. Also the theme of the colours white, blue, brown, and darkness throughout the novel echoes Schopenhauer's philosophy. For Schopenhauer, "a white colour in the skin is not natural to man, but that by nature he has a black or brown skin, just as had our forefathers the Hindus; consequently, a white human being has never sprung originally from the womb of nature, and therefore there is no white race" (*WWR* 2: 547). Based on this idea he concludes that in love, nature attempts to return to dark hair and brown eyes as the archetype; accordingly, each individual also looks for the particular parts of the body the corrective of his own defects and deviations. The first we see of Lawrence's heroine, Lettie, is her white hand; then the whiteness of her face, as she tosses back her hood while grinning triumphantly at George, while Leslie bends down before her on his knees; when the three walk on, she throws her clothing into loose eloquence, and

there appears a slight glint of her breast, white like the moon. Once inside she allows her cover-up to “slide over her white shoulder and fall with silk splendour of a peacock’s gorgeous blue” over the arm of the sofa, while she stands “laughing and brilliant with triumph,” “her white hand upon the peacock of her cloak” (245). In her counterpart, we see George with brown eyes, with a naturally dark skin. He also has brown moustache and dark hair which raises Lettie’s admiration. This colour symbolism confirms my argument about Lawrence’s adoption of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of sexual love, in which the opposition between the sexes drives them together.

Lawrence not only considers Schopenhauer’s idea of colour in the area of sexual opposition but also his philosophy is aligned with Schopenhauer’s concept of physical qualities. According to Schopenhauer, “as a lesser degree of muscular strength in the woman is natural and regular, woman will, as a rule, give the preference to stronger men” (*WWR* 2: 547). Lettie admires George’s physique, she tells him he is “picturesque” and “quite fit for an Idyll”; he is “like some great firm bud of life” to her, in the narrator’s view (48). These passages reveal similarities between certain essential points in both Schopenhauer’s and Lawrence’s writings. For Schopenhauer, the individual is an irrational being guided by sexual instinct, which is unknown to him and motivates him to choose his or her mate based on physical qualities. Yet, despite her urbanity and superficial brilliance, Lettie’s modern and civilised world led her to choose Leslie for the sake of social ambition

and ignore her bucolic but *picturesque* lover. It is at this point that her wedlock to Leslie and rejection of her instinctive tie with George leads to her failure.

In Schopenhauer's philosophy, sexual instinct is the highest affirmation of life, the most important instinct which is given prominently to animals and it is also given to man. Considering the significant role of sexual instinct, his theory reaches the idea that "different phases of degeneration of the human form are the consequence of a thousand physical accidents and moral delinquencies" (*Metaphysics* 119). Accordingly, in selecting a mate, he suggests that everyone in the first place should infinitely choose and keenly desire those perfections which he himself lacks. In *The White Peacock*, we soon realise Lettie's failure is the result of ignoring the physical qualities as the primary standard of matrimony. Hence, despite a Schopenhauerian sexual love, she marries Leslie for social dignity. The tragedy lies in the fact that she is influenced by civilisation, and does not pursue her instinctive desire. She does not realise that marriage is regarded for the generation of children and their wellbeing.

Regeneration

The White Peacock's Schopenhauerian overtone (regeneration) reaches its climax after Lettie's and George's marriage. Lawrence provokes his readers into exploring Schopenhauer's idea of sacrificing the self for the sake of the next generation. For Schopenhauer, the species has a main priority for the individual; and yet when the

sexes think they are in love, in truth, they have sacrificed their life for the welfare of the species. Being used in marriage, George realises that he is only a servant in his relationship and according to Lettie, he has sacrificed himself for his children which reminds them of Schopenhauer's philosophy. The result of Lettie's marriage is very much the same as George's. She herself is actually a servant of the species. She realises that her most meaningful task is that of bearing children, and being a loving and attentive mother. In time, Lettie accepts her life as it has become. Lettie adapts to live life at second hand, to serve her son as her work and tolerate her husband. What happens in *The White Peacock* is a great internal struggle of the will, almost like a battle. At first, the characters obey their sexual desire, to propagate; as the novel continues, the characters are held prisoner, bound together in a united misery by their failed pursuit of wholeness. Once a child is created, the sexes seem unable to escape their union. Helplessly, they remain in their unhappy relationships in order to properly secure the next generation, while their thoughts and dreams peer always outward. It is in this moment that they reach a Schopenhauerian philosophy of the will to live as they realise it was the will that drove them together, and as they stay in miserable unions, it is yet again the work of the will to live, securing the future of the species.

Lawrence's Schopenhauerian view that the purpose of love is regeneration is more significantly expressed by the gamekeeper Annable. He is the one who serves Lawrence's moral purpose. Annable believes that people have to be a good animal, true to their animal instinct. He considers his children like birds or weasels, so long

as they are not human rot. Annable has an aversion to all symbols of culture and his primary concern is with the deterioration of mankind. In the narrator's view, "he did not know what he was doing any more than the rest of [them]" (185). It seems that Lawrence is endeavouring to alter Schopenhauer's principle in a manner to indicate that the tragedy does not lie in Lettie's, George's and Annable's future offspring, but only in their own inability to give birth to themselves. The tragedy of the misfortune of their vanished chance to achieve their own perfection is confined to their inability to separate from the limits of their individual ego and to reach the fullness of life by distinguishing each other's opposing qualities.

Revealing the idea of regeneration, the novel reveals another Schopenhauerian concept. For Schopenhauer, "the first love of a mother, as that of animals and men, is purely *instinctive*" (*Women* 50) and accordingly her attention is primarily focused on the security of her children rather than her man. George feels the same similarity in his relationship with Meg. She never found any pleasure in him as she does in her children. The relationship between mother and child brings about the same aspect for Cyril who is the wise witness of the events in the novel. When Emily is caring for Meg's baby, he feels alone and neglected by her and the baby. Apart from these observations, Lawrence's text on a woman's situation after marriage makes a concrete parallel with Schopenhauer's view that a woman in love uses the children on her side to overcome the man's strength. Similarly, Lawrence's narrator believes that "a woman who has her child in her arms is a tower of strength, a beautiful, unassailable tower of strength that may in its turns stand quietly dealing

death” (292). Remembering how a woman becomes increasingly concerned about a child, Lawrence highlights Schopenhauer’s theory that the tragedy lies in the characters’ failure to see the truth about love. Yet at this point the characters are unable to refrain from participating in that certain illusion (love) in which its primary purpose is to the advantage of the species.

Overall View

As we may conclude from this thesis, for Henry James and D. H. Lawrence, the most significant purpose of sexual selection is reproduction. *The White Peacock* and *The Portrait of a Lady* give us yet another perception that reproduction is a fundamental part of human nature, and acts with original force. Schopenhauer’s concept that the intellect can act only in a secondary and conditional manner manifests itself throughout the novels, where we see the sexual instinct is not impacted by knowledge in the same way knowledge can be overlooked by it. For both James and Lawrence, sexual selection appears unable to be eradicated as an element of the characters’ lives. Although this element may seem as a general element in all humans and a point that most novelists have considered in portraying their characters, the way that these two authors approach and indicate the idea of sexual selection between the sexes in the selected novels suggests that their philosophical view was aligned with Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

In my analysis of the novels, the reader can detect a Schopenhauerian attitude in combination with the didactic concern of the novelists' analysis of modern life. For instance in *The Portrait of a Lady*, the solution (self-resignation) that James offers to Isabel's wilful and egoistic character resembles Schopenhauer's morality. Lawrence's philosophy also considers a Schopenhauerian redemption for George's downfall by stressing a natural life in harmony with the cosmos. For Lawrence this natural life needed that men and women accept their natural, unwitting and energetic sexuality. This is precisely illustrated in the final scene of *The White Peacock* which is set in the countryside. We find George's young brother-in-law toiling in the cornfield. He has a zealous respect for life and declines to allow culture to impede his normal way of life. Cyril provokes George by saying "you ought to be like that," referring to how he once was rather than the alcoholic man who does not even remember himself or perceive any significance in life.

By considering Schopenhauer's philosophy, my study – apart from the social changes, capitalism, the changing gender relations and the situation of women in the nineteenth century – proposed a philosophical reading of James's and Lawrence's work. In a didactic way, the novelists tried to offer a moral solution for the quickly changing time in which they lived. One of the significant changes of this period was observable in the relationships between the sexes. Therefore, the existence of a philosophy that would criticise human nature and the relationship between the sexes was admirable. That Schopenhauer's concept of love had a considerable magnitude

for the novelists is confirmed by the fact that the primary motivation which manipulates the heroines' actions and ideas is sexual selection.

The ideas I have developed in this dissertation could have gone beyond the core arguments that relate Schopenhauer's philosophical insight to Henry James and D. H. Lawrence. The critical expansion of the present research can be realised by applying Schopenhauer's gender-specific polemics, which differentiated his outlook on women and sexuality in the age of the established ideologies of the enlightenment, to James's and Lawrence's other novels. In addition, adopting a Schopenhauerian ethical framework helps to achieve a better understanding of his period's socio-cultural priorities that he challenged as normative discourse and hallmark conduct that have been regarded and supported in his contemporary literature. To this end, a thorough examination of the historicity of roots and affiliations of Schopenhauer's philosophical thought, like compassionate morality, will be required, thus investigating the ways in which his philosophy had opposed or influenced some of the eighteenth-century literary works, whether novels or plays. Building further research on the influence of eighteenth-century material culture on Schopenhauer's philosophical taste can be another critical approach that unearths part of the origin of his value system. Decoding his reaction to his surrounding material world can pave the way to the contextualisation of the ethical theories he defended throughout his life. Employing this approach will facilitate the application of his ideas to literature.

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