Dunbar’s Challenge to Dynamic Metaphysics

Forbes, Graeme A (2016) Dunbar’s Challenge to Dynamic Metaphysics. Chronos: The Annual Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, . pp. 1-17. (In press) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Abstract

Dunbar, the character from Joseph Heller’s novel Catch-22, tries to extend his life by making it boring. I use Dunbar’s case to pose a challenge to those who think our phenomenology gives us reason to defend time’s passage as a metaphysical view. I argue that the reason phenomenology gives for us to defend time’s passage cannot be that our brains detect time’s passage, unless we take Dunbar’s metaphysics more seriously than it deserves. Instead we must resort to the ordinary practice of trying to make sense of things in order to reach such a metaphysically substantive view.

Item Type: Article
Additional information: Presented at the Pacific meeting of the Philosophy of Time Society in Vancouver 2015
Uncontrolled keywords: Philosophy of Time, Experience of Time, Catch-22, Dynamic View
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Graeme A Forbes
Date Deposited: 26 May 2016 13:36 UTC
Last Modified: 05 Oct 2017 15:09 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/55706 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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