(Re)tuning Statelessness

Academic knowledge production on Palestine and its people has been very resonant for decades. Yet, and despite the high frequency of production, some aspects of Palestine and Palestinians have not been investigated nor brought together thus far. This composition fuses three reverberations that accompany Palestinians living away from their homeland: statelessness, diasporisation, and (de)mobilisation. The dissertation is approaching the study of the Palestinian diaspora as a musical composition which has not been heard yet, for that the study of Palestinians as a diaspora is yet to generate audible sounds, the study of stateless diasporas in general still falls under the category of abnormal, an investigation of the Palestinian diaspora’s political mobilisation is nonexistent, and the study of Palestinian statelessness under a non-legal lens has been mute so far, leaving a wide gap deserving further investigation.

By studying the cases of Palestinian diasporisation in the heterogeneous settings of Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon, and fusing a set of methodological approaches including taxonomy of analysis, (participant) observation, exploring verbal and nonverbal communication via interviews, and examining space & material culture, this research aims to investigate the effects of statelessness on the shapes, intensities, and dynamics of diaspora organisation and mobilisation.

Investigating the heterogeneities of the Palestinian diaspora’s political mobilisation in the three studied cases echoed the criticality of the role of statelessness in homogenising what would otherwise remain heterogeneous due to the immense differences in the settings enabling or disabling movement. The effects of this statelessness, this absence of a backbone, touch various diaspora-specific elements including Palestinian-ness, historiographies, geographies, temporalities, autonomization, organisation, and mobilisation. All of which are aspects this composition investigates thematically by mapping theory to empirical findings.

Fusing statelessness, diasporisation, and political mobilisation can open alternative doors to understanding peoples belonging to homelands not enjoying a state status in the era of states, examples of which are Kurds, Circassians, and Roma, to name a few. It helps comprehend the actions of peoples attempting to embrace their homeland by mobilising for its causes despite being isolated from it. Furthermore, studying the abnormal is a way to understanding both abnormal and normal alike; therefore, studying the stateless diasporas can help in reaching to better understandings of the stateless and the state-linked diasporas.

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Submitted in July 2015 to The School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent.
(RE)TUNING STATELESSNESS

A Dissertation Presented

By

Nadine Hassouneh

To

The School of Politics and International Relations
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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(Re)tuning Statelessness

Abstract

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Dedication

To the heard but unseen …
To the felt but untouched
Acknowledgments

To all of you who stood by me …
To all of you who provided unconditional support …
To all of you who saved me from drowning …
To all of you who heard my attempts to make sense, & of course, nonsense …
To all of you who made me laugh …
To all of you who dried my tears … &
To all of you who went out of their ways to provide comfort …

To each and every one of you, I would like to tell you …

Your presence in my life is what made this bittersweet journey tolerable, possible, survivable, and attainable!

My gratitude to you is never ending …

Merci, Shukran, Thank You, Danke, Grazie, Salamat, Multumesc, Blagodarya, Hvala, Dankjewel.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Association Belgo-Palestinienne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAPD</td>
<td>Coordination Nationale d’Action pour la Paix &amp; la Démocratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDC</td>
<td>Le Centre National de Coopération au Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPALB</td>
<td>Communauté Palestinienne en Belgique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPBL</td>
<td>Communauté Palestinienne en Belgique et au Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Palestinian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCR</td>
<td>League Communiste Revolutionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPDC</td>
<td>Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPALB</td>
<td>La Maison Palestinienne en Belgique</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN GA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in Near East</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.
Chapter 1

Prelude to a Stateless Repertoire
Chapter 1
Prelude to a Stateless Repertoire

Conjoining the concept of diaspora to the concept of state is a fairly recent academic practice, for that the originator and paradigmatic case of the term diaspora, the Jewish diaspora, has existed with, as well as without, a state for thousands of years. “Indeed the term “diaspora” originated to describe the Jewish condition. In the 3500 years of the existence of the Jewish people, Jewish states have existed for roughly 1000 years. For some 1500 years the Jewish people existed as an exclusively diaspora community”\(^1\). In recent academic productions, as the following chapters will explain, it is noticeable that diasporas are perceived as either descending from a state of origin, or belonging to one, overlooking cases where states are not constituents of the diasporic equation, one example of which is the case of the stateless Palestinians in the diaspora.

The aforementioned paucity is accompanied by a similar paucity of studies on the political dimensions of diasporas \(^2\), particularly diaspora organisation and mobilisation, or in other words, movement. Despite the presence and production of various theories on social movements, diasporas have rarely been studied under that lens.

Academically, Palestine and the Palestinians are, and have always been, a topic of interest to scholars from all around the globe, but despite the evident interest, Palestinians have rarely been studied as a diaspora dispersed from its homeland \(^3\), and studies on the political mobilisation of the Palestinians as a stateless \(^4\) diaspora are nonexistent.

---

3 Further explained in Chapter 2
4 Stateless in this dissertation means without a state of origin as per Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*.
The following pages will witness the usage of various music and audio related terms and analogies, for that while researching the statelessness of the Palestinian diaspora, the concept of statelessness and its academic usages (or eliminations) sounded out of tune, resonating but in an atonal and limited manner, resulting in partial sounds and restricted echoes except in legal terms where statelessness is researched and has the ability to resound. Statelessness in terms of diasporas seemed to require retuning, as the title of this dissertation reflects and as the following sections will explicate. It was from this particular atonality that the dissertation adopted sound and music throughout its pages. Stemming from this reasoning, and along with the potential aesthetic accompaniments such an approach could lead to, music has been adopted and musical analogies have been developed.

As has been demonstrated via the table of contents of this dissertation, each chapter resonates a music related name accompanying its academic related theme. The dissertation started with a Prelude to a stateless repertoire; followed by an Arabesque style review of the literature; a Concerto resonating the methodological approaches taken throughout the research; an Intermezzo thoroughly introducing its cases; a Sonata that despite its echolessness, is still played by the cases studied; a Requiem to the historiographies, geographies, and temporal tonalities of the studied cases; an Etude introducing the recently developed concept of Autonomization; a Fugue introducing a theme and extending it to the cases studied; and finally a Postlude concluding the dissertation, also referred to as repertoire and composition.

Moreover, and in an attempt to further clarify the approach taken throughout this dissertation, each chapter draws parallels and analogies between the chapter’s music related title and its contents as will be demonstrated later in this chapter, as well as on the title page of each chapter.  

---

5 Excluding the Prelude and the Postlude due their self-explanatory nature  
6 Pages 16-26 provide definitions of the abovementioned musical terms
1.1 From Staccato to Legato

The sounds of the current literature on statelessness, diasporas, and mobilisation mostly resemble a staccato articulation-wise, where each sound is sharply detached from other sounds. Statelessness has been largely resonating via legal studies, Diasporas have been echoing via biblical studies, history, conflict studies, sociology, psychology, and migration studies among many, and Mobilisation has been mainly reverberating through studies on social movements and contentious politics. Rarely does the current literature connect the three sounds, an exception is Bahar Baser, who in 2010 stated her surprise “that scholars who work in social movement theory have not discovered what the generous research area of diaspora studies might offer to them or vice versa”. On some occasions though, scholars have tied two out of three sounds. In 2006, for instance, Gabriel Sheffer differentiated between state-linked and stateless diasporas, and pointed out the importance of further exploration on whether there exists a “basic difference between the strategy choices made by stateless diasporas and those made by state-linked diasporas”, thus opening the door to tying diasporas and statelessness. Similarly, Robin Cohen ties

---

7 In music, staccato refers to notes played as detached and separated from each other, while legato refers to notes played in a flowing and smooth manner
8 Bahar Baser, "Stateless Diasporas and Their Long-Distance Nationalist Activism in Host Countries: The Case of Tamils from Sri Lanka and Kurds from Turkey," in ECPR Fifth Pan-European Conference (University of Oporto and University Fernando Pessoa 2010).
another two sounds, those of diasporas and mobilisation when he notes that “where we could find extra work is the way in which diasporas become mobilised ... and whether they were successful, and why they were successful”. 10

Clearly, and as will be elucidated in the coming chapters, there exists a gap in making the currently audible staccatos into legatos (i.e. connecting the currently (and largely) disconnected sounds of statelessness, diasporas, and mobilisation). Stemming from this gap, the forthcoming chapters of this dissertation attempt to play the sounds of statelessness, diasporas, and mobilisation without separation: smoothly and connectedly, like a legato.

Accompanying the academic staccato of statelessness, diasporas, and mobilisation, is another staccato: a sound reverberating Palestinians. Surprisingly, and despite being “the largest (and oldest) refugee population in the world” 11 the study of Palestinians whether inside their homeland or in the diaspora has been limited to the legal and socio-economic, 12 surprisingly apoliticing the outcomes of one of the most political and politicised conflicts in today’s world, or as Bhattacharyya notes that there is “a lot of talk about Palestine without much attention to the situation of Palestinians”. 13

The inherited statelessness of Palestinians, their similarly inherited diasporisation, and their attempts at mobilisation are all dimensions that the current literature overlooks, and are all dimensions that the forthcoming chapters attempt to smoothly connect, thus turn from staccato to legato.

---

10 Oxford Diasporas Programme, Dr Alan Gamlen of Victoria University Wellington Interviews Emeritus Professor Robin Cohen of the University of Oxford About the Different Interpretations of the Word 'Diaspora', (2012).
12 Producing reports and horizontal studies as opposed to vertical studies
How and to what extent does statelessness affect the shapes, intensities, and dynamics of the Palestinian diaspora’s organisation and mobilisation is the main question that this dissertation is based on and answers, studying the cases of Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon.

Statelessness affects the organisation and mobilisation of the Palestinian diasporas regardless of their countries of settlement, legal statuses, and socio-economic conditions is the main hypothesis that the dissertation proves. It is important to note that further questions, hypotheses and identified gaps are presented per chapter in this thematically organised composition.

Before sampling the chapters composing the repertoire, it is crucial to establish and define concepts and terms on which it is based.

1.2 Terms & Concepts

1.2.1 Controversial Echoes of the term Diaspora

“The term diaspora is a provocation, people have to think in what respect is that true, and how is it true, and why is it not true ... The word diaspora still has the power to entice, to intrigue, to provoke, to interest people”.14

Why are you using the word diaspora? Why are you calling us a diaspora? Why not say refugees?15 16

While reading literature in Arabic, and communicating with Palestinians during fieldwork, it was noticeable that the echoes of the term diaspora are widely rejected among Palestinian scholars, politicians and individuals alike, whether inside Palestine or in the diaspora. To some, it echoes false notes when used in reference

15 Interview - Palestine General Delegation to the European Union, Belgium, and Luxembourg, 2 March 2012.
16 Interview - Hope-Espoir-Hoop Support Palestinian Students in Palestine, 27 February 2012.
to the Palestinians, generally from what it signifies of similarities with the Jewish diaspora. To others, it echoes recognition of the Palestinian diasporisation, which is an opposed idea in comparison to echoing an experience of people who were forced to leave their homeland and are unable to return to it (despite the similarities in echoes). To some others, and although the word diaspora has a strong implication of homeland and return, the word refugee makes the right sounds when referring to any Palestinian in the “shatat” (diaspora). This sound transmits the Palestinian adherence to the right of return, unlike the sounds the word diaspora are perceived to transmit.

One of the opponents of the use of the term diaspora was Edward Said, whom for a long period rejected the use of the term in reference to the Palestinians. In a conversation between Said and Rushdie, the latter asked the former [why he does not like] calling the Palestinians a diaspora, where Said responded by saying: “I suppose there is a sense in which, … we are “The Jews of the Arab world.” But I think our experience is really quite different and beyond such attempts to draw parallels. Perhaps its dimensions are much more modest. In any case the idea that there is a kind of redemptive homeland doesn’t answer to my view of things”, a view that he changed later in his life.

On the other hand, some scholars like Ibrahim Muhawi argue that the word diaspora (in its English form) is the perfect word to describe the tragic arrachement (extraction, pulling, tearing) of the Palestinians from their land and that the word

20 University of Oxford Informal Communication between author of dissertation and Robin Cohen at Rethinking Diasporas Conference - St Anne’s College, 1-2 July 2013. Consent to refer to informal conversation obtained from Robin Cohen by e-mail on 5 May 2015.
itself has a linguistic history that makes it stronger than other words including the Arabic version of the word diaspora, “shatat”.

It is crucial to note that the word diaspora in Arabic linguistically means shatat; dispersal. Most Palestinians do not oppose the term shatat in reference to their personal experiences of dispersal, but they do reject the word in reference to their collective being, as a diaspora. In other words, the Palestinians outside Palestine did experience, and do experience shatat/diaspora, but they are not a diaspora, they are refugees, exiles, or displaced people. To those who argue for this point, the terms refugees, exiles, displaced people are stronger and hold deeper meanings than the term diaspora.

1.2.1.1 Adopting Controversy

The undesirability of using the term diaspora by scholars working on Palestine and the Palestinians stems mainly from one source: the association of the word to the Jews. Such an argument is neither convincing nor satisfying because if the Jews in the diaspora found their homeland in 1948, the Palestinians in the homeland (along with their descendants) became a diaspora in the same year. Therefore when one party became capable of dropping the term, the other became capable of adopting it.

Another reason for adopting the term is the language the dissertation is written in. The term diaspora and what it holds of meanings and connotations in English mirrors the studied group more than the Arabic equivalent of diaspora, “shatat”.22 The literal translation of diaspora is shatat, while the translation of the term in the context of its original meaning is di-yas-bora (an Arabised version of the original word). Even if written in Arabic, this dissertation would have adopted the Arabised version of the word diaspora to dialogue with Arabic speakers and readers for that the term refugees has been twinned to Palestinians for too long opening the door to

22 The word diaspora translates to Shatat in Arabic, and it is also literally transcribed into Arabic alphabets and sounds like Di-yas-bora (due to the absence of the letter p, the letter b is used).
questions such as: would studying Palestinians under a different lens, that of diasporas, yield different results from those currently and previously present in literature?

Finally, diaspora in this thesis is used to entice, intrigue, and provoke as Cohen notes. The way the whole research was carried out aims at enticing, intriguing and provoking the reader and the writer alike. I do believe that using another word in reference to the Palestinians would have changed the focus of the research lens and would have echoed different sounds. Further explications on the term diaspora, its history, usages, and limitations are represented in Chapter 2 (Re)viewing the Review à l’Arabesque.

Definitions of the term diaspora are various and wide-ranging, and can be described as diasporised as Brubaker explains in his article The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. 23 The term has been defined and redefined, stretched and unstretched, and has been vulnerable to absorbing everything yet retaining nothing. 24 This dissertation uses Safran’s conceptualisation of diaspora where he classifies diasporas according to the following set of points:

- Dispersal from a center to two or more peripheral or foreign regions;
- Retention of collective memory, vision or myth;
- The belief that full acceptance by host country is not possible, resulting in alienation and insult;
- Regard for the ancestral homeland as the true and ideal home and place of final return;
- Commitment to the maintenance or restoration of safety and prosperity in the homeland;

- Personal or vicarious relations to the homeland in an ethno-communal consciousness.  

This definition, or conceptualisation, has been adopted due to the clarity of its dimensions and the similarity of the aforementioned dimensions to the Palestinian diasporic experience. An experience characterised by; dispersal from a centre to two or more foreign regions; a strong retention of a collective memory and myth; a belief (although varying in intensity) that full acceptance in the host country is not achievable; idealising the homeland and yearning for an atavistic return to it; commitment (even if emotionally) to the maintenance of the homeland; and conscious personal relations to the homeland. Defining the Palestinian diaspora based on categorising it as a victim diaspora, as Cohen categorises it for instance, has been deemed as a potential focus shifter. Similarly, defining the Palestinian diaspora as people dispersed from their original homeland, without further elaborations has also been deemed a potential focus shifter in terms of how this composition views the people it studies.

1.2.2 Echoes of the term Refugees

Prior to defining the Palestinian refugee, it is vital to define the Palestinian. In Article 5 of the Palestinian National Charter of which the same article also happens to be the principle (and principal) article of Palestinian-ness, the charter states that

“The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine or outside it - is also a Palestinian”

27 As in dictionary definitions of the term diaspora
Therefore, any Palestinian (as per the definition of the Palestinian National Charter) outside Palestine due to eviction is by custom a Palestinian refugee (Laj’i or Laje’e). This is clearly and widely evident in the Palestinian official and unofficial narratives whether written or verbal.

As will further be elaborated in Chapter 2 - (Re)viewing the Review à l’Arabesque, labels and definitions can have multiple meanings and interpretations, some of which stem from cultural diversity, linguistic specificities, and political goals among others.

The definition of a Palestinian refugee generally orbits around two main visions, internal and external. The former is how the Palestinians see themselves, and the latter is how the international community represented by the UNRWA sees them.

To Palestinians, the refugee status comes by default; there is no need for official definitions to grant such a status. Definitions of ‘refugee’ made by the UNRWA or any other international body or convention are insignificant to Palestinians. Any person of Palestinian origin not living and unpermitted to live in Palestine is a de facto refugee. The de jure refugee status is inconsequential for the Palestinians. They are aware that they have been excluded from international law related to refugees. For example, the Palestinians know by experience, not necessarily by theory, that “Palestinian refugees were discussed extensively throughout the drafting process of the UNHCR statute, the Refugee Convention, and the 1954 Statelessness Convention. The record of these discussions clearly reflects that Palestinians were presumed to deserve coverage under the refugee definition, to lack international protection, and to qualify for special protection from the UN. It is equally clear from these discussions that Palestinian refugees and stateless persons were excluded from the various instruments because their case was deemed unique and of such particular concern that the UN established a separate and special protection regime
for them”, the UNRWA in the case of the Palestinians.

The external definition of Palestinian refugees, represented by the UNRWA, is a definition of Palestine (as opposed to Palestinian) refugees who are “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict”.

It is critical to note two important points; firstly, the UNRWA does not mention the descendants of the refugees in their definition, but does serve them under its mandate. Secondly, the UNRWA only counts those Palestinians registered within its records. Other Palestinians in areas not served by the UNRWA are not considered Palestinian refugees even if they left Palestine along with others who are considered refugees according to the UNRWA itself.

Defining a refugee for the UNRWA was primarily targeted at finding a method to count the number of people it needs to aid. With time, and with the impasse on the reasons on which the agency has been established from the first place (aid and relief provider), UNRWA became the official provider of aid, relief, and refugee status to the Palestinians.

To add to the specificity of the Palestinian refugees, the convention that clarifies who and what a refugee is, excluded the Palestinians from its definition. The 1951 Refugee Convention establishing UNHCR defines a refugee as someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside

the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” 31.

Although this definition seems to fit the Palestinian case well, on the ground, Palestinian refugees have been excluded from it, as well as from the UNHCR as a whole (in most cases and particularly wherever the UNRWA operates). Article 1D of the 1951 Convention states that “This Convention shall not apply to persons who are present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance” 32. Similarly, the UNHCR statute’s paragraph 7.c further excludes the Palestinians by stating that “the competence of the High Commissioner . . . shall not extend to a person [w]ho continues to receive from other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance.” 33 Although the UNRWA’s mandate only covers Palestinians in a limited number of countries surrounding Palestine (of which Lebanon and Jordan are examples), and if elsewhere are covered by UNHCR, claims to a refugee status done by Palestinians in other countries have yielded “severely negative results” 34, and example of which is Belgium, the third case studied in this dissertation.

Most of the Palestinians in Belgium are citizens, most of those in Lebanon are refugees, and most of those in Jordan are Refugee Citizens 35. Given that untangling this politico-legal and to some extent linguistic knot is not the goal of this thesis, and that the cases studied in this thesis include Palestinians who are not considered refugees by the UNRWA, this thesis will use the word Diaspora to refer to the Palestinians outside Palestine (in the diaspora) whether they are de facto refugees (to themselves or to the world) or de jure refugees. Any citations made of Palestinians as refugees are to be understood through the abovementioned complex knot. Using

31 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
32 1951 Refugee Convention, n. 1 at 156
33 For further explanations refer to Akram, “Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications for a Just Solution.” Page 39.
34 For further explanations refer to ibid., Page 44.
35 A word used by Abdullah Nsour, the Prime Minister of Jordan, to refer to the Jordanians of Palestinians origin on 4 February 2014
the term diaspora was found to be the only way to comparatively study the Palestinians outside what they consider their homeland, it does not impose a status to the heterogeneous cases studied, for that some of the Palestinians studied are indeed de facto or de jure refugees, while others are self identified refugees, and a few others are neither.

1.2.3 Why the Palestinians?

What makes the Palestinian diaspora a special case? I have been asked. From my surprise, I had no coherent answer. Rewinding the question and the lack of a proper answer from my side, I started wondering what makes the person who posed the question think that a case necessitates specialness to make it worth studying and investigating. Indeed, cases can be special on some levels, but not all. What makes the Palestinian case one worth investigating is that the statelessness of this chosen group of people, which is also shared by other peoples from other locations and backgrounds like the Kurds and the Circassians for instance, is understudied and underrepresented in the current literature.

In addition to the gap - a propos researching the political dimensions of diasporas in general and Palestinians in particular - identified earlier in this chapter, the following set of points are what makes the Palestinians in the diaspora a curious case, and not necessarily a special one:

Firstly, being the diaspora of The Diaspora is a characteristic that the Palestinian Diaspora monopolises. No other diaspora resulted from the founding of the state of The Diaspora, namely Israel. What makes The Diaspora (the Jewish Diaspora) so special? some would ask. The briefest answer would be that the word diaspora has been primarily used to refer to it.

Secondly, holding the record for the largest and oldest refugee population in the world entails refugee and exile experiences that are a step (or maybe steps) ahead of other diasporas. A few years shy of 70 years of irreversible exile and dispersal is not a
number seen in other cases (in today’s world). In times of hardship, duration is critical.

Thirdly, being considered a “special case”, and governed by a body other than that which governs all other refugees is also a special (even if not positively) characteristic. It is worth mentioning that the Palestinian refugees do not fall under the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) but under the mandate of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency).

Fourthly, which was the only answer that I managed to give when I was asked about what makes the Palestinian diaspora a special case; the inability and impossibility of access (even for tourism) to the homeland is out of the ordinary, again, not necessarily special.

A person calling him/herself a Palestinian, originating from Palestine, who lived and experienced Palestinian-ness is not allowed to enter his/her homeland unless he/she holds a passport of a country on good terms with Israel (on both governmental and popular levels) or applies for a visa from the embassy of Israel. The former is not as smooth as it sounds. Having an Arabic (worst Palestinian) last name guarantees trouble at border control. The latter is not an option to the majority of Palestinians for multiple reasons including normalisation, humiliation, ideology and so on. Rejection of visa applications is one more reason. It is worth mentioning that an Israeli visa stamped on any passport assures a ban on entering countries like Lebanon and Syria, and also guarantees problems with other Arab and Muslim states. In case the visa is externally attached to a passport and can easily be detached, the secret services of the abovementioned countries have no difficulties finding it out.
1.3 Chapter Preview

Music is the wine that fills the cup of silence

Robert Fripp

Academic silence is a very long rest in the atonal stateless stave, and is also one avertable complication of statelessness. Taking a synesthetic approach* to understanding and explicating the effects of statelessness on the Palestinians in the diaspora, this dissertation resorts to music and auditory imagination prior to and throughout each chapter, for that “when the ear is captivated, the mind follows”36 for both the writer and the reader alike.

Most surprising is not the fact that most members of the Palestinian diasporas are forcibly isolated from what they consider their homeland, but that despite their attempts to voice their demands (revolving around return, sovereignty, Jerusalem as a capital to the future Palestinian state) and no matter how loud they are, they remain unheard by what they refer to as the homeland, which is generally perceived as one despite its clear divisions. As if they are echoless. Mute to the ears of the homeland, echoless to the ears of its proxies, yet cacophonous to their own ears.

Diasporic experiences in general can be characterised as dissonant, for their potentiality to lack harmony. Being in one place yet belonging to another can sound dissonant to some members of a diaspora. Similarly, being in one place yet yearning to be in another can sound dissonant to others. Diasporic experiences of the stateless, on the other hand, can be characterised as cacophonous, for their aptitude to lead to a guaranteed uproar on any, some, or all levels of existence: mental, physical, social, economic, political and legal. Being in one place yet belonging to another that at the time being does not exist, or never existed is not easy to process, and generates noise when compared to the cases of being from one place yet living

* From syn and aisthesis, Joined Perception – in this case lexical and auditory (or music and words)
in another. Similarly, being from one place yet yearning to return to another one that does not exist and/or not being allowed to it leads to an uproar in one or many levels of existence, producing a cacophonous experience of this existence. This research focuses on the stateless Palestinian diaspora’s organisation, mobilisation and lived experiences, which are all affected by the cacophony of statelessness. Overall, the organisation, mobilisation, and experiences of the Palestinian diaspora resemble an orchestra without a maestro, without a conductor capable of unifying, directing, setting tempos, and shaping sounds of the ensemble(s).

Attempting to understand the sound a cacophony produces, as opposed to living its harshness, requires rearranging its components to make the discordant mixture of sounds as placidly audible as possible, when and if possible. Throughout rearranging the components of the Palestinian diaspora’s cacophony, each heard component was tuned into an audible, independent yet integrated part of the whole composition, thus creating a Stateless Palestinian Repertoire featuring and combining different moods, tonalities, and styles that cover the whole dissertation piece. Acknowledged is the absence of some sounds, for that a composition has to end and must have a postlude, and acknowledged is the possibility of composing opuses at later stages.

As with all scores, this collection commenced with a *Prelude, to a Stateless Repertoire*, that sets and explores the mood of the compositions, and introduces recurrent motifs and ideas. Consequently, the composition goes into its first component, titled *Re)viewing the Review à l’Arabesque*. This section features various “melodic, contrapuntal, and harmonic” sounds where the timbres of epistemology, anthropology, ontology, and sociology can be heard. Following the Arabesque is a *Concerto Metodologico* that represents a “cycle of several contrasting” sounds that are “integrated tonally and ... thematically”, followed by an imaginary break intended at setting the scene to the upcoming components, an *Intermezzo Ostinanto* for its persistence and recurrence throughout all the compositions. This component demonstrates the lived past and present of the Palestinians experiencing this existential cacophony. This break facilitates
comprehending and listening to the notes and compositions preceding and following it. With the conclusion of the intermezzo commences a Sonata, but an *Echoless Diasporic Sonata*, one where the sound of the diaspora’s performance produces no echo. Despite its oddness, this echoless-ness plays the role of a rest (in music), which is as important and as critical in transmitting the sound as a note with an echo. Concluding this Sonata introduces a *Requiem to Tonality*, a necropolis to “tonal” temporality, geography, and historiography and is followed by an *Étude on Autonomization and Statelessness*, where a piece is composed for purposes of practicing the newly developed Autonomization technique.

Preceding the *Postlude* is a *Stateless Fugue Movement I, II, III* where a “subject theme [social movements] is introduced and then extended and developed through some number of successive”³⁷ cases.

**Chapter 2: (Re)viewing the Review à l’Arabesque**

**Arabesque**: “a short piece of music featuring various melodic, contrapuntal, or harmonic decorations”.³⁸

**Analogy** – a short piece that resembles an Arabesque in featuring and using various melodic (in terms of the sounds it transmits), contrapuntal (in terms of contrasting the main elements of the current literature), and harmonic (in terms of its use of various pitches and styles to resonate) elements.

This chapter reviews the review via echoing various melodic, contrapuntal, and harmonic sounds; it investigates the question of the Palestinians in general and those in the diaspora in particular via an epistemological gaze at the knowledge production process in general, and the limited knowledge produced on the Palestinians as a diaspora in particular ³⁹. The thematic presentation of the dissertation allows gazing at knowledge epistemologically which proved to be of

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³⁷ References to aforementioned upcoming in following section
great importance to the dissertation as a whole in terms of critical and analytical thinking and writing.

This chapter is eclectic in its nature, it introduces different aspects of the conflict that diasporised the cases studied and does so via pointing out, in a story telling manner, the similarities between different temporalities of both conflicting parties, the past of the Jews and the present of Palestinians. It investigates the zoomorphism practiced by both parties in the present, along with the gendered and genealogical perspectives of the inanimate, such as the land. The chapter also investigates the past and the present of the knowledge produced on diasporas, and how most prominent definitions and classifications of diaspora focus on the questions of who, how, and why, when questions such as when and where could be of added value.

(Re)viewing the Review à l’Arabesque is mainly built on the idea of studying the abnormal to better understand the normal. It studies the abnormality of the silent knowledge production on stateless diasporas, and the abnormality of producing rhetoric of pro and anti when producing knowledge about the conflict that diasporised the cases studied. It also studies the abnormality of structuring and contextualising knowledge around states when statelessness exists now and has existed before, and studies the abnormality of apoliticising the politicised in terms of labels and labelling. It questions the abnormality of the absence of sufficient publications on the outcomes of a conflict that defines justice and is a litmus paper to what is right and what is not.

Finally, this chapter sounds like an Arabesque; it produces various melodic, contrapuntal, and harmonic elements, which play substantive roles in the sounds that the following chapters produce.

**Chapter 3: Concerto Metodologico**

**Concerto:** “a piece of instrumental music that contrasts a solo instrument or a small
group of solo instruments with the main body of the orchestra" and is typically a cycle of several contrasting movements integrated tonally and often thematically. Analogy – a piece that contrasts a small group of sounds (represented in reverberations of heterogeneity, positionality, presentation, triangulation, and considerations) with the main body of the larger group of sounds (represented in the sound of studying the organisation and mobilisation of a stateless diaspora) via performing a cycle of several contrasting yet thematically and tonally integrated sounds.

As critical as a methodology is to answering a research question, as critical as the fusion of various methodological approaches is to arriving to the answer. This dissertation studies the absent, the silent, and to make the absent present, and the silent audible, the approaches taken to answer the research question and prove its hypothesis, stated earlier in this chapter, are various and encompassing yet integrated tonally and thematically.

Firstly, the chapter investigates heterogeneities in an attempt to later investigate homogeneities. It sets the bases to study components of social movements (political opportunity, mobilising structures, and framing processes) with the lens of components of diaspora groups (core members, rear guards, and all national members) and does so in light of statelessness. Secondly, the chapter acknowledges and reflects upon positionality and knowledge, by acknowledging the self to the self first and foremost, and then to the studied group. Thirdly, the chapter clarifies what being in the field means and entails whether pre, during, or post fieldwork, on both physical and mental levels. Fourthly, the chapter introduces its method of triangular investigation via its utilisation of various data collection instruments (taxonomy, (participant) observation, semi-structured interviews, space and material culture), and data analysis instruments (progressive focusing, dialoguing with data). Fifthly, this chapter “lays down the laws of pitch” of methodological/ethical

considerations, which range between personal obligation and institutional research ethics. Sixthly and finally, the chapter concludes by explicating the blend of personal and situational challenges and limitations from deeply rooted to temporal, and how and if such challenges and limitations were managed and overcome.

Therefore, this Concerto Metodologico chapter sounds like a concert for that it is a piece that contrasts a relatively small group of sounds with the larger group of sounds to be found throughout the repertoire, and thus, performs a cycle of several contrasting yet thematically and tonally integrated sounds.

Chapter 4: Intermezzo Ostinato

Intermezzo: “a musical interlude in a larger composition or a piece of music in itself” 43. Ostinato: “a short melodic, rhythmic, or chordal phrase repeated continuously throughout a piece or section while other musical elements are generally changing” 44.

Analogy – an interlude to set the scene, to imagine and hear the unseen, containing short yet stubbornly present phrases continuously repeated throughout the piece, and reverberating throughout the repertoire.

This chapter echoes the heterogeneities of the Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon, and sets the base to investigate potential homogeneities at later stages of the dissertation. Studying the mobilisation of the stateless (or even mobilisation in general) requires investigating the pasts and presents of the stateless, not only in political terms but also in terms of their socio-economic conditions and their everydayness in the present as well as in the past.

The chapter intends to take the reader on a voyage through the sounds of Palestine and Palestinians in the diaspora, stopping to hear the sounds of the troubled pasts of

44 "Basic Glossary of Musical Forms."
the Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon, without hearing the same for the Palestinians in Belgium which further proves the heterogeneities of the cases chosen to answer the main research question. The chapter then stops at Present Representations of Palestine and Palestinians in the three studied countries, then stops once again at the echoes of the past (of Palestinians) in the present, where it investigates the Palestinians as a stateless minority in Belgium, a seamless majority in Jordan, and as stateless and status-less refugees living in politicised spaces of exception in Lebanon. All accompanied by visual representations to facilitate the imagination of the voyage.

The chapter concludes with a presentation of the Palestinian ostinati; aspects of Palestinian-ness that are stubbornly repeated throughout the piece and the repertoire alike, despite the many heterogeneities.

Finally, this chapter plays the role of an interlude accompanied by ostinati, to set the scene and see the unseen of Palestinians in the diaspora.

**Chapter 5: Echoless Stateless Sonata**

**Sonata:** “an extended piece for an instrumental soloist with or without instrumental accompaniment” 45.

**Analogy** – an extended piece for the echoless Palestinian diaspora, in isolation, without accompaniment.

To understand how the absence of a state affects diaspora mobilisation, it is important to understand the role(s) of states in this type of mobilisation. The chapter is based on the hypothesis that the absence of a state affects the shapes of diaspora mobilisation by the homeland, and limits the shapes of diaspora mobilisation in the host country.

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Echoless Stateless Sonata transmits the muteness of the Palestinians to the ears of the homeland and demonstrates that an absence of a functioning state (in line with today’s concept(s) of states) affects (and paralyses to a certain extent) the homeland’s abilities and capabilities to embrace its diaspora and thus mobilise it. It also introduces the schizophrenic inversions practiced by Palestinians in the diaspora towards their homeland, where Palestine is considered a state and a yet-to-be state depending on the situation and occasion. Another inversion surfaces in the perceptions of Israel and occupation. The chapter then dives deeper and illustrates the (limited) options the Palestinian’s homeland has in order to achieve the mobilisation of its diaspora, in addition to the difficulties and barriers it faces before doing so. The following section investigates the shapes of mobilisation the Palestinian diaspora auto-utilises without the presence of the homeland (state) as a maestro leading the orchestra.

The roles of diasporas in conflicts is then examined and applied to the case of statelessness, and in particular Palestinian statelessness. This section is based on the hypothesis that the role(s) a diaspora can play vis-à-vis a homeland conflict is affected by statelessness. It argues that not all diasporas can be classified as peace makers, peace wreckers, or voluntarily none, for that some diasporas can be involuntarily none an example of which is the unrepresented (by the homeland) Palestinian diaspora. In light of this absence of representation, the chapter then investigates a phenomenon that will be named permutation, which occurs in two out of the three studied cases, where host countries operate and take roles of the homeland within the host country. All the above mentioned is accompanied by the investigation of the Palestinian proxies that claim and tend to play the role of the missing state.

Therefore, the Palestinian diaspora’s mobilisation attempts resemble a diasporic sonata, an echoless one though, played without instrumental accompaniment and in isolation from the homeland.
Chapter 6: Requiem to Tonality

Requiem: “a musical composition honouring the dead”\textsuperscript{46}.

Analogy – a composition honouring the Palestinian tonality.

Understanding a diaspora, its organisation, and mobilisation requires an understanding of its realities: historiographies, geographies, and temporalities. This chapter is based on the hypothesis that statelessness affects such realities to Palestinians in general (on the level of historiographies) and to the Palestinians in the diaspora in particular (on the levels of geographies and temporalities). The hypothesis is divided into three sub-hypotheses: Firstly, historiographies require a state to institutionalise histories. Secondly, the geographies of the stateless Palestinians living in exile are affected by their compulsory physical disconnection from the homeland. Thirdly, statelessness affects the temporalities (and perceptions of past, present, and future) of those living in exile whether pre or post their diaspora.

The chapter introduces the making of the Palestinian historiographies and the significance of institutionalised national narratives and roles of states in creating modes of historical narratives. It also investigates two crucial aspects of the Palestinian history: its silence, and its silencing, and how both lead to what Said refers to as “political silence” where Palestinians do not know what to talk about or for whom and thus “talking with different voices, none of them their own”\textsuperscript{47}.

The diasporic Palestinian geographies are then introduced, presenting the imagined, reproduced, and replicated geographies of the Palestinians in the diaspora while differentiating and contrasting the production of place and space. The maze of temporalities is then investigated, clarifying the Palestinian circuits of time

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
the past stops at 1948’s Nakba, and the present starts with the Nakba and extends to
the now, to today.

The following section explicates the many symbols and symbolisms of Palestinian
realities where there is no “dominant theory of Palestinian culture, history, society”
and where “Palestinians cannot rely on one central image”\(^48\), making the Palestinian
realities centreless and atonal, thus the title of the chapter, Requiem to Tonality.

**Chapter 7: Étude on Autonomization & Statelessness**

Étude: “a piece written for purposes of practicing or displaying technique”\(^49\).
Analogy – a piece written for purposes of practicing a newly developed
Autonomization technique.

Understandings of conflict narratives and structures autonomise in diaspora
settings\(^50\). Yet, this *Autonomization* can be paralysed by a diaspora’s statelessness
leading to similar outcomes across various cases. This chapter is based on the
hypotheses that conflict narratives and structures autonomise in diaspora settings,
and that *Autonomisation* (despite its clear presence on the ground) is paralysed by
statelessness leading to similar mobilisation causes and outcomes across Palestinians
in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon.

The chapter illustrates the various shapes of *Autonomization* that occur among the
Palestinian diaspora in the three studied cases, starting with the conceptual
pluralisation of Palestine, thus creating Palestines, one of which is where the process
of Autonomization of conflict narratives and structures occurs (Palestine for
Palestinians in the diaspora), and the rest of which are sources and concept
generators to this autonomised Palestine. The chapter then maps Palestine (the

\(^49\) "Basic Glossary of Musical Forms."
\(^50\) Élise Féron, *Diaspora Politics: From "Long Distance Nationalism" to Autonomization*,
ed. Dirk and Sezgin Halm, Zeynep, Migration and Organized Civil Society - Rethinking
National Policy (Routledge, 2012).
conflict, the narratives and more) to the three studied cases (in terms of organisation, survival strategies, and mobilisation) proving their heterogeneity yet also proving the homogeneity of causes and outcomes of organisation and mobilisation.

This chapter sounds like an étude for that it is written for the purpose of practicing a new technique, namely Autonomization, as well as adding the stateless component to this newly developed technique.

**Chapter 8: Stateless Fugue Movement I, II, III**

**Fugue:** "a contrapuntal form in which a subject theme ("part" or "voice") is introduced and then extended and developed through some number of successive imitations" 51.

**Analogy** – a contrapuntal form in which the theme of social movements is introduced and then extended and developed to include the stateless social movements through the three cases studied.

Studying diaspora organisation and mobilisation necessitates studying the Political Opportunities, Mobilisation Structures, and Framing Processes of a diaspora in its host country. The chapter argues that, and investigates how, statelessness affects diaspora mobilisation regardless of case-specific heterogeneities. It studies an understudied case of diaspourisation (stateless diaspora and stateless diaspora mobilisation) through a lens that is usually left out when investigating diasporas, that of social movements theory. On the level of Political Opportunities, the chapter hypothesises that statelessness overshadows the political opportunities offered by each host country in terms of organisation and mobilisation outcomes. On the level of Mobilisation Structures, the chapter hypothesises that despite the differences between the mobilisation structures of the three studied cases, statelessness necessitates leaning towards the formation of narrow mobilisation structures while

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51 "Basic Glossary of Musical Forms."
attempting to work on a wide range of goals. On the level of Framing Processes, the chapter hypothesises that such processes are also affected by statelessness in terms of the methods used for framing a critical yet absent component of Palestinian-ness, Palestine.

Finally, this chapter sounds like a Fugue, where the theme of social movements is introduced and then developed through successive imitations to include all cases studied.

**Chapter 9: Postlude to a Stateless Repertoire**

The postlude of this dissertation is antiphonal in its nature, it responds to, harmonises and complements the introduction chapter. The chapter thematically identifies gaps, limitations, and opportunities for further research in parallel to summarising chapter-based findings. It also applies the same on a more generic/broad level, and concludes by posing questions that can further enrich the understandings of Palestinian diasporisation and mobilisation.

**1.4 Contribution to Knowledge: Between Filled Gaps and Identified Limitations**

*It is not once nor twice but times without number that the same ideas make their appearance in the world.*

*—Aristotle*

Contribution to knowledge without reliance on existent knowledge is impossible, and arriving to an idea that no one ever thought of is rare. The knowledge already produced and the gaps already present on the multiple aspects that this dissertation studies are what contributed to its emergence and materialisation. It might be the first written piece combining the various aspects it

52 Answers responsively to the introduction
attempts to tie together, but it is probably not the first time that someone thinks of achieving such a tie, be it towards Palestinians or towards other similar diasporic groups.

This composition attempts to fill in the gaps identified during the process of research, some of which are generic and some case specific. Similarly, in each of its chapters, this dissertation attempts to fill a gap, or gaps in order to contribute to the knowledge already present, the same knowledge the whole composition relies on.

Akin to the organisation of this dissertation, the following section will present the gaps identified thematically, per chapter.

(Re)viewing the Review à l’Arabesque identifies epistemological gaps a propos statelessness and diasporas, and particularly Palestinian statelessness and Palestinian diasporas. It also attempts to fill context-specific gaps in terms of culture and language, for that as will be explained in the chapter, most of the academic knowledge production on Palestinians has been (and is still being) born in the west, involuntarily deprived of cultural and linguistic contexts.

The Concerto Metodologico contributes to knowledge in its reliance on various methods of data collection and analysis in order to arrive to a relatively unique understanding of diaspora statelessness. It fuses the infrequently utilised aspects of socio-cultural and linguistic anthropology, sociology, and ethnography to the frequently utilised socio-economic and politico-legal aspects of studying Palestinians in general. It also sets the basis to the investigation of similarities and divergences of the same diaspora in different settings in order to draw parallels, which is an investigation rarely practiced especially in literature on Palestinians. This chapter is a concerto of the tangible and the intangible, the seen and the felt, which are all forms it embraces to achieve its goal, an approach not yet present in studies on Palestinians. Finally, this chapter contributes to knowledge in its identification of the limitations and challenges faced during research and fieldwork. It opens the doors for further research on the same topic, or other similar topics.
Despite not filling a gap per se, *Intermezzo Ostinato* fills an imaginative gap when it takes the reader on a sensory journey to the Palestinians pasts, presents, and everydayness. The identification of this imaginary gap proved to be critical in the identification of other gaps in other chapters, for that just as theories are bases to research; lives of the researched are bases to proving or contesting theories.

**Echoless Diasporic Sonata** contributes to knowledge on two different levels; Firstly, it investigates how homelands not enjoying a state status see (or not) their diasporas, a gap identified in the literature largely revolving around states and nation-states. Secondly, it contests the categorisations of diasporas as peace makers, peace wreckers, both, and selectively none, proposing a fourth category: involuntarily none.

Attempting to investigate the acentric realities of the stateless Palestinians in the diaspora is what *Requiem to Tonality* contributes to knowledge through. This chapter investigates the atonality of the Palestinian historiographies, geographies, and temporalities, and link it to statelessness, an investigation that has not previously seen light in terms of statelessness.

The **Etude on Autonomization and Statelessness** is based on a newly developed concept, *Autonomization*, and is applied to a case that it has not been applied to earlier. Thus, contributing to knowledge through a recent contribution to knowledge and via a new set of cases, namely that of Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon.

The **Stateless Fugue Movement I, II, III** applies social movements theories to a case that has not been studied under such a lens before. Moreover, this chapter investigates the effects of statelessness on components of social movements; political opportunity, mobilisation structures, and framing processes, which is also an investigation not applied to Palestinian earlier.
As for the generic gap, as explicated earlier in this chapter, it is represented in the lack of studies tying Palestinians as a stateless diaspora to political mobilisation.

*The acknowledgment & recognition of errors is a virtue*

*Arabic Proverb*

As will be further explicated in Chapter 3 – Concerto Metodologico, absolute knowledge is unattainable because an absolute individual does not exist. Acknowledged are the limitations, and acknowledged are the gaps reverberating in this composition. “We have different eyes. Different souls. And that’s just the way it is ... we want to know different things”53, therefore, the way things were heard and seen in this composition are not the only ways of hearing and seeing.

The styles, theories, and methods of data collection and analysis chosen for the composition of this repertoire all have their inherent limitations, for that nothing in this world is devoid of cons and pros.

Due to limited time and space, thoroughly comparing the stateless Palestinian diaspora to other similar diasporas is a limitation of this composition and an opportunity for further research on the topic. The same applies to thoroughly questioning the basis of Palestine-related religious beliefs and the strong and indisputable belief that Palestine will be liberated before judgement day (further explained later in this dissertation). The effects of such beliefs on organisation and mobilisation (or demobilisation) have not been investigated. Investigating whether the duration of the Palestinian experience has any psychological effects on the belief in the idea of mobilisation is also a scope-related limitation of this research. The same applies to the potential effects of September the 11th attacks and the Arab turmoil of 2010-onwards on (de)mobilisation. Such events may have played a role in shifting the attention from mobilising for Palestine (and as Palestinians) to mobilising for defending Islam (and as Arabs and Muslims).

Although this research attempts to cross-cuttingly investigate the Palestinian gendered comprehensions of reality, there still is room for a thorough investigation of such realities whether linguistically or from other dimensions.

Finally, just as the limitations and gaps of previous studies helped in materialising this piece of research, this is for hoping that the limitations and the gaps identified in this composition develop into a base for further research and knowledge production.

Following this prelude introducing the Stateless Repertoire is an Arabesque, a short piece where the literature will be viewed and reviewed in a melodic, contrapuntal, and harmonic way.
Chapter 2
(Re)viewing the Review à l’Arabesque

Arabesque: “a short piece of music featuring various melodic, contrapuntal, or harmonic decorations”. ⁵⁴
Analogy – a short piece that resembles an Arabesque in featuring and using various melodic (in terms of the sounds it transmits), contrapuntal (in terms of contrasting the main elements of the current literature), and harmonic (in terms of its use of various pitches and styles to resonate) elements.

Metronome⁵⁵: Epistemological gaze at the silent aspect of knowledge production

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⁵⁵ Pulse of chapter, to maintain a steady tempo
Chapter 2
(Re)viewing the Review à l’Arabesque

This composition resembles an Arabesque in that it consists of various melodic, contrapuntal, and harmonic decorations. It echoes various academic melodies, counterpoints diverse scholarship, and produces an assortment of harmonic elements in order to translate what is written to what can be (imagined as) audible.

Simplicity is about subtracting the obvious and adding the meaningful.  

In vain have you acquired knowledge if you have not imparted it to others.

Complicating the complex is a habitual peculiarity of human beings that makes comprehending the complex, and on some occasions the straightforward, strenuous or unattainable tasks. This chapter, in harmony with the whole dissertation, attempts to embrace simplicity to facilitate knowledge sharing of a complex and complicated topic with complex and complicated factors and players. It also attempts to reduce the effects of academic dissonance in order to achieve auditory lucidity.

As previously explained, and in an attempt to facilitate the reading and writing processes, the organisation of this dissertation is thematic in its nature, where each chapter is an outcome of the combination of theory and empirical data. This clearly means that the literature is reviewed and discussed thematically, and within each chapter, which provides an opportunity to epistemologically gaze at related knowledge and its production within this chapter that resembles a Literature Review.

57 Rabbah, Deuteronomy (c. 450 – 900) Page 151.
The writing and presentation style of this chapter is eclectic, in its dictionary definition not its philosophical one, where some historical facts and positions are written in the style of storytelling with a prologue and epilogue, and where ideas are derived from a diverse array of sources. The obvious and the frequent are subtracted, while the silenced and the overlooked are added, making the following sections a point of convergence to anthropology, epistemology, ontology, and sociology among others.

In the following pages, the conflict that led to the diasporisation of the cases studied will be introduced in an untraditional manner. Following the brief introduction to the conflict, the literature imbalance will be epistemologically reviewed, mapping and contrasting the abundances and scarcities present within the field of knowledge production in general and diaspora studies in particular, and consequently critiquing the present and identifying the absent to unearth and plant seeds in the holes present in this particular field of knowledge.
2.1 “Home is where you are not and where you cannot be”  

This is a story of a land that thousands of years ago had children called Jews living on its promised and fertile soil and producing its children: The Children of Israel.

One day, the strong Babylon arrived, and some of the children were scattered away and separated from their mother. Later, the strong Rome arrived, and the remaining children, despite their revolts, were also dispersed to various destinations. The fertile mother was deprived of producing, and due to their dispersal, her children were deprived of what they considered home ...

The children became a Diaspora ...
The children yearned for Aliyah.  

This is a story of a land that decades ago had children called Palestinians living on its holy soil and calling it their homeland.

One day, Zionism knocked on its door, accompanied by powerful friends. The host and the visitors talked, but the language used was incomprehensible and thus unaccepted by the former. Following the talks, the homeland got divided, disputed, and fought over leading to the dispersal of the children on various occasions and to various destinations, and to fertility problems for the mother ...

The children became refugees ...
The children yearned for Awda  

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59 Return in Hebrew
60 Return in Arabic
61 Written by the author of this dissertation
It can be argued that comparing the similarities between the past of Jews and the present of Palestinians is anomalous in a conflict where differences are the focal point, but in cases where respecting differences is lacking, disregarding similarities is an impediment to understanding the conflict itself, especially when both parties orthodoxy trust that their pasts will produce their futures.

Before critically reviewing the literature on the research topic it is crucial to critically review the conflict that gave birth to the cases studied in this dissertation; namely the Palestinian diaspora. Literature on the conflict per se is numerous and originating from various parts of the world. Legal, social, historical, economic, biblical, political, and amalgamations of some or all of the above, are dimensions of the conflict covered by authors. Pro and anti are features encircling this conflict along with what is written, spoken, heard, and felt about it, making it the conflict of conflicts, at least in our today’s world, and turning it into a reference and a source of identification of what is right and what is not, and what is just and what is not. “Palestine has become the acid test of human conscience”62 for various parties, not only the Palestine that Palestinians call their homeland or the Palestine the land that Israelis also call their homeland, but to the whole world, in what seems like a phenomenon of Palestinisation of the globe and globalisation of Palestine.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one where Palestinians believe it is their battle, Israelis believe it is theirs, Arabs believe fighting the battle is the source of regaining their collective dignity, globalised Jews and Muslims (and sometimes Christians although ignored in narratives) believe it is their holy duty, and people of the world believe that it is the litmus paper of principles, rights and justice, making the conflict a truly global phenomenon (or phenomena given the Kafkaesque and different interpretations) that cultivates, frames, and mobilises not only resources, but emotions 63 as well, not only from allies, but also from citizens of allies and non allies alike.

62 Speech made by Mr Asaf Ali, Delegate to the United Nations from India, 1947
A descriptive review of the conflict’s timeline, numbers, and figures does not suit the approach taken in this dissertation. Instead, the following section will try to avoid the deadlock of pro and anti - for that each side believes in its rightness - by focusing on the shared distresses the homeland and the conflict are imposing on both sides, whether inside or outside the disputed land, now, in the past, or in the future. A cul-de-sac in the conflict accompanied by a cul-de-sac in approaching and understanding it does not serve anyone or anything but the dehumanisation of what each side considers ‘the other’.

To humanise the other, it is crucial to explore what the other perceives as human, or how the other forms genealogical links with the inanimate, and thus genders as masculine or feminine. In the case of Israel and Palestine, the practice of gendering is deeply rooted and reflected (practically and linguistically) in gendering the land (discussed below), symbols, experiences, and temporalities (briefly discussed here and thoroughly discussed later in this dissertation).

Up until the Jewish male fertilised the land of Israel in 1947/8, the land of Palestine, the mother, was responsible for the reproduction process. It was reproducing legitimate Palestinians until it was raped by Israel. Since its rape, the mother’s inability to reproduce legitimate children, for that a raped female is estranged, turned it from fertile to sterile for that reproducing illegitimate children stains its honour and dignity. From then onwards, this raped mother remained one, but the duty of producing Palestinians shifted towards the father. Palestinian-ness is passed from fathers to children, and having a Palestinian father guarantees the right to being called Palestinian.

Or to put it in Joseph Massad ‘s words “In sum, while the land as a mother was responsible for the reproduction of Palestinians until 1947, the rape disqualified her from this role. It is now fathers who will reproduce the nation. Territory was

65 Ibid.
66 Refer to Articles 4 and 5 of the PLO’s Palestinian National Charter of 1964
replaced by paternity ... [S]ince the rape, it [the land as a mother] can no longer be relied upon to reproduce legitimate Palestinian children” 67.

What has to do with Palestine as a fertile mother has been feminised, and because of the version of a ‘feminine’ she became, symbols related to it became feminised while symbols related to fighting to regain it became masculinised. For example, Resistance as a masculinised symbol is usually visually depicted in a male figure, accompanied by weaponry and showing strength and willpower. On the other hand, visual depictions of Palestine are usually reflected in pictures of yelling mothers, grandmothers in tears, dead children in the arms of their mothers, chained children, and demolished houses and olive trees. Thus being in the diaspora is an automatically feminising experience, because being in the diaspora entails the inability to fight to regain Palestine 68. Palestine itself is the weak, raped, aching and ailing mother awaiting the powerful and solid masculine to pull it up to its feet again.

It is worth logically noting that although the mother is always considered feminine, the feminine is not always a mother. The mother, if fertile, can reproduce and produce a nation, but a feminine cannot, so feminising an already female mother, is equivalent to depriving her from the reproduction of people and nations. Likewise, emasculating and/or feminising the diaspora experience are equivalent to depriving it from the ability to defend its nation.


68 The author’s analysis is backed by comparisons with literature on the Jewish diaspora as well as writings on the Palestinians in the diaspora (refer to Joseph Massad). The fedayine in Jordan and Lebanon, on the other hand, are not part of today’s diaspora(s), the one studied in the dissertation. Nonetheless, reference to them has been made in Chapter 4 as background information.
The Dream of Tomorrow, which also happens to be the reality of the past in the Palestinian temporalities, (further explicated in chapter 6) is what the painting above depicts. Palestine is represented in the body of a Palestinian mother figure resting to make the exact shape of the full map of historic Palestine with her traditional dress. She is surrounded by her loving children, the children of Palestine from everywhere, flowers, birds, and peace, and represents strength (clenched left hand), fertility (children surrounding her), and prosperity (flowers and orange trees). The red needlework on her dress shows a drawing of the Dome of the Rock surrounded by names of Palestinian cities and villages (Ludd, Nablus, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Nazareth … etc) and words (patience, love, tomorrow …etc).

Palestine of the now, of today, is different though (also further explicated in chapter 6). She is mostly depicted as alone, sad, mourning, crying, or ailing such as in Caricatures 1 and 2 below. The caricatures also reflect the importance of symbolism in and for today’s Palestine where the Palestinian mother in Figure 2.2 is crying Palestine through crying its flag, whereas the face of the Palestinian mother in Figure

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2.3 makes the shape of Historic Palestine. The Palestinian Kefiyyeh, one of the most utilised and observed symbols amongst Palestinians is present in both drawings.

Figure 2.2: Palestine – Hisham Shamaly

Figure 2.3: In Remembrance of Land Day – Hisham Shamaly

The previously stateless Jewish diaspora went through a comparable although more sexual conceptual experience than the Palestinian one explicated above where “the mythical aspiration to return to Zion was seen in terms of reuniting sexually with their mother ... their reunification would bring about the rebirth of the son, who in turn would give his mother new life and redeem her from suffering under a foreign occupier”.\(^72\) Currently, the Israeli Jewish masculine is reunited with his Promised Land, and both are enjoying the (re)birth of the fertile mother.

On the other hand, and for the sake of broaching the subject of dehumanisation, and comparing the dehumanisation of the human and the humanisation of the inanimate, practices that distort the reality of being are many, and gendering the land and its symbols is just one example, for that where land and symbols are gendered, fellow humans are characterised zoomorphically. Upon many, “the grandchildren of monkeys and pigs”\(^73\) is a way of describing Israelis/Jews, “cockroaches”\(^74\) and “crocodiles”\(^75\) is a way of describing Palestinians. Such manifestations of zoomorphism are not monopolised by national figures, but are shared between different peoples within the given societies, alongside others, elsewhere, who consider the cause their own, and especially Muslims and Jews.

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73 A sentence widely used in Palestinian and Arab spoken narratives in reference to Israelis, observed during speeches following uprisings and escalations. It is also depicted in photos where faces of Israeli presidents or politicians are replaced by heads of pigs and/or monkeys. The phenomenon is very widely practiced to an extent where religious clerks discuss it and issue fatwas around it where the main argument revolves around whether to use “grandchildren of monkeys and pigs” or “brothers of monkeys and pigs”. A Google search using the aforementioned sentences yields numerous depictions of the abovementioned.
74 An example of which is Raphael Eitan’s (at time Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces) famous statement “When we have settled the land, all the Arabs will be able to do about it will be to scurry around like drugged cockroaches in a bottle.” Found on BBC News, “Former Israeli Army Chief Drowns,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4034765.stm. Accessed 1 March 2015
75 An example of which is Ehud Barak’s statement in the Jerusalem Post on 28 August 2000 where he states that "The Palestinians are like crocodiles, the more you give them meat, they want more". Found on Mona Baker, http://monabaker.com/quotes.htm. Accessed 1 March 2015.
What this conflict clearly conveys is that both parties are creative in dehumanising each other and humanising the inanimate, making the realities of those living it very different from the realities of those observing from afar. Undeniably, such practices are not peculiarities of every single individual, but are nonetheless widely observed between the conflicting parties, their peoples, and people sympathising with either/or.

To make the land a mother is to create genealogical bonds with it, which entails lineage and history, and thus possession. Both conflicting parties, each of which officially and unofficially declared its independence and ownership of that bloody and contested piece of land, have claimed the right to the promised land of holiness. Israel was granted and declared establishment and independence in 1948 where Palestine declared its independence in the same year. Forty years later, in 1988, Palestine re-declared its independence making it an independent non-state seeking international recognition and later settling for a Non-Member Observer State status in 2012. In both cases, the warring parties neglected the fact that other people already exist/existed in the land, and where one party ideologically believes in (contested) slogans stating that the land was “a land without a people for a people without a land”76 the other also ideologically believes in (contested) slogans revolving around eradicating the Jews by “throwing the Jews into the sea”77 because they do not belong to the land.

This genealogical bond was doubtlessly bonded with religions, and accompanying this gendered and zoomorphic existence comes the perceived and believed holiness of the land. The Holy Land of the Abrahamic religions has been a terra sancta of conflict for the past decades, where its holiness was unsuccessful in bringing about peace. It is a land where temporalities of sacredness (and interpretations of sacredness) clash, with the biblical distant past, present, and future clashing with the

76 For further clarifications on the widely used slogan and its usage refer to Diana Muir, ""A Land without a People for a People without a Land"", Middle East Quarterly 15, no. 2 (2008).
77 For further clarifications on the widely used slogan refer to Moshe Shemesh, "Did Shuqayri Call for "Throwing the Jews into the Sea"?", Israel Studies 8, no. 2 (2003).
Quranic future. The Jewish Promised Land of the past is the Jewish land of the present and is determined to remain the Jewish land of the future, while the Palestinian Holy Land of the past and future is determined upon the eradication of the Jewish land’s present and future. In other words, given its lack of present, and to reclaim its past in the future, the Palestinian Holy Land necessitates effacing the present and future of the Jewish Promised Land. It is worth noting that being Holy and being Promised are fixed, it is being a Holy Land and a Promised Land that leads to clashing.

The centuries old Jewish Promised Land has been fulfilling its promise intermittently and the decades old Holy Land has been a holy home to Palestinians also intermittently. It is a land where divine intervention(s) has been and is awaited by both parties. It is a land where death is life, and death is holy, and is a land where battles between the clashing parties are of various shapes, not all accomplishing death of course, but battles where parties compete on who is better in fighting bloody existential, digital, psychological wars via symbolic, structural, direct, and even epistemic forms of violence, and where understandings of concepts of win and lose are difficult to process for the bystander. Even narratives, in this conflict, are at war, which is reflected in the literature written by authors from both sides, as well as outsiders, where narratives turn into rhetoric of ideologisation. A vast number of the literature written in Arabic or by Arab (or Muslim) authors share emotionally and ideologically loaded terms and concepts, making referring to such sources similar to referring to journalistic articles published by government-owned newspapers. Academically written narratives flowing from the ‘west’ tend to take a more unbiased stance, in most cases, making referring to such sources possible. What the predominant ‘western’ academy and institutions lack is context, especially linguistically and culturally, as well as the absence of the decolonisation of understandings and perceptions, or as Scheurich noted “Our current range of research epistemologies —positivism to postmodernisms, poststructuralisms— arise out of the social history and culture of the dominant race, . . . these epistemologies

reflect and reinforce that social history and that social group and this has negative results for the people of color in general ...”⁷⁹ which is an epistemological and methodological gap this dissertation aims to fill.

This section started with storytelling of the past and will conclude with storytelling, but of the present, leaving the true story open ended for that as Frank Herbert said, “there is no real ending. It’s just the place where you stop the story”⁸⁰.

This is still a story of a land that thousands of years ago gave birth to children called Jews and decades ago delivered children called Palestinians ...

It is still a story of a land disputed, fought over, and killed in the name of ...

It is still a story of a land where holiness continues to be a motivation for un-holiness ...

It is still a story of a land that has dispersed children, and offspring in exile ...

It is a land of humans with very similar experiences fighting and dehumanising each other ...

It is a land of people suffering from similar feelings of ultimate fatigue despite allowing their prides to reflect otherwise ...

It is a land where approval and advocacy do not matter, for that each party sees rightness in its own shadow ...

It is a land where warring parties are saying the same things in different languages, voices, and fashions ...

It is a land possessed by the narcissisms of a warring duet ... and it is a land tenured by two unwilling to compromise parties ...

It is a land that maybe belongs to neither⁸¹

⁸⁰ Frank Herbert and his wife Beverly in an Interview with Willis McNelly, 3 February 1969.
2.2 Literature Imbalance Review: When Abundance meets Scarcity

To study the abnormal is the best way of understanding the normal.  

If normal exists, and if the presence of states and state-linked diasporas is the norm in research, then arriving to a better understanding of this extensively observed norm requires the study of the currently scarcely researched contrary; the absence of states and consequently stateless diasporas. Studying the abnormal not only helps in understanding the normal, but also contextualises what is considered abnormal, at least in the field of research, to some, and normal, at least in its everydayness, to others.

Startlingly, and using the language of medicine and laboratories, literature on stateless diasporas is severely ‘deficient’ while literature on state-linked diasporas is approaching ‘toxicity’, making literature on both ‘insufficient’, either as a result of scarcity or that of abundance. The insufficiency of the abundance is represented in the occurrence and recurrence of similar theories on various aspects of diasporas. It must be acknowledged though, that such theories, when mapped against empirically analysed cases, do yield novel results that enrich the field of diaspora studies in general. On the other hand, the insufficiency of the scarcity is manifested in the lack of theories and past studies on a dimension that could yield novel results on both the theoretical and the empirical levels, and subsequently enrich and revive the literature on state-linked diasporas, and give birth to literature on stateless diasporas.

Such an epistemological absence is no doubt perplexing, and leads to questioning the construction and production of knowledge. The fact that not all diasporas belong

81 Written by the author of this dissertation
82 For example refer to Essential Psychology: A Concise Introduction, ed. Mark Davies Philip Banyard, Christine Normal, Belinda Winder (Sage Publications Ltd, 2010). Page 312.
to states has been acknowledged by some scholars such as Gabriel Sheffer in his book *Diaspora Politics At Home Abroad* \(^{83}\), and is after all a straightforward and logical observation. Therefore, it is not the absence of the facts that is hindering research, but it is the absence of voicing and producing such apparently clear-cut facts that is doing so in a case that could be diagnosed as high degree myopia, or homonymous hemianopsia. The question that mechanically comes next is a simple why?

### 2.2.1 Producing Knowledge & Discourse

*Who can say or write what to whom in what situations? Who has access to the various forms or genres of discourse or to the means of its production?* \(^{84}\)

*... research is as much the product of the society that enables it, as of the individuals who author it.* \(^{85}\)

Societies produce individuals (and vice versa), individuals produce research, and both individuals and societies produce knowledge and discourse. To function, the society-individual-discourse production process requires power, and namely symbolic power, or symbolic capital to quote Bourdieu, that “acts as a societal force ‘behind’ discourse” not only in, or through it. \(^{86}\) This symbolic capital is enjoyed by symbolic elites such as academics, writers, journalists and so on. Societies that produce symbolic elites who enjoy world wide renowned symbolic capital are usually knowledge societies whom if studied under the lens of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, are on the top of the pyramid enjoying self-actualisation. Such symbolic elites are the ones who can *say or write*, the ones who have access to various forms of knowledge and discourse and to the means of the production of such knowledge and discourse. Not unexpectedly, such elites would have no or limited capital if they were located elsewhere, where a society struggles to achieve psychological, safety,

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\(^{83}\) Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad.*  
\(^{85}\) David Dorling on WORLDMAPPER Initiative  
or belonging needs. Therefore, what can be widely observed in today’s world, is the production of knowledge and discourse by the elites of knowledge societies, not only on topics related to their own societies and people, but also on topics related to societies who are still struggling to satisfy basic needs. Conceptually, this sounds fine and even righteous, in practice though, such a process can be consciously and/or unconsciously marred by politics, ideology, status quos, and simple differences in mentalities and perceptions. Moreover, this process is decisive given that the producers of discourse and knowledge have the power to in addition to power over production.  

In “Whose Knowledge Matters?” Hans Weiler argues that the contemporary discourse on knowledge, especially in North America and Europe, suffers from multiple deficits one of which is its failure to “address the political conditions and consequences of the production and use of knowledge – in other words, it is largely oblivious to the politics of knowledge”. With knowledge comes power, and similarly, with power comes knowledge, and both are connected by “a relationship of reciprocal legitimation – i.e., knowledge legitimates power and, conversely, knowledge is legitimated by power" to an extent where knowledge became a force of legitimising state power.

The following section commences with the notions of states and “nation states” rooted in Euro-Western politics, and explores how the invention and implementation of such concepts affects scholarship, makes the state a norm, and makes whatever is not a state an overlooked exception.

89 Ibid., Page 3.
90 Ibid.
2.2.2 States of Knowledge

Thinking past or beyond the nation-state in academic work is always a challenge, much of what we study concerns the nation and the nation-state more generally ... our work is structured, organised, and contextualised around the nation-state.  

Nations are not (necessarily) states, states are (made) nations, and Nation States are Nations within States and States of Nations. This is how some regions/peoples of today’s world perceive it, but this is not how all regions/peoples of the world live it.

The notions of nation and state are nowhere near conceptual clarity. Nations do exist without states, and stateless nations such as Palestinians, Kurds, and Tamils among others do exist in today’s world. States on the other hand, seem to be made nations even if they were originally not, making states automatic nations, an example of which is the United States of America. Similarly, some states are multinational states, an example of which is the United Kingdom.

Confusingly and for decades, defining the concept of nation required the utilisation of the concept of state as Weil stated: “there is no other way of defining the word nation than as a territorial aggregate whose various parts recognize the authority of the same State” 92. Similarly, Deutsch defined a nation as “a people who have hold of a state” 93 while Hertz noted that “every state forms a nation and every citizen is a member of the nation” 94. This definitional confusion leads to believing that both nation and state are two sides of the same coin, and that the definition of state without doubt includes the word nation. 95 This belief cannot be more erroneous. The definitions of the word state stress on the political organisation of societies, the

institutions of a government, its power, territories and borders, and its sovereignty, with no mention of nation although for example debts, health insurance and identities are national, not *statal*, given that an adjective for state does not exist. At the present time, hardly any state is nationally homogeneous and hardly any discourse or narrative adapted itself to reflect the above-mentioned. The same can be applied to adapting discourse and scholarship to the existence of stateless nations and peoples, a notion rarely touched upon in current literature especially regarding diasporas originating from such homelands.

Gazing at diasporas through a pair of Euro-Western (not to say Eurocentric) spectacles means perceiving that diasporas originate from states (or nation-states), which is indeed widely practiced and easily observed in today's scholarship on diasporas. Regarding diasporas as peoples of a state happening to be in another state for whatever circumstance is as naïve as regarding diasporas as homogenous groups. Some nations never had a state (nor a nation-state) in their homeland, such as the Kurds and the Circassians, some never even aspired for sovereignty like the Romani (Roma) people. Such diasporas continue to be diasporas, but that does not necessarily mean that the way they are perceived and studied (if and when it happens) is the way they perceive themselves and their needs.

In today's scholarship that is varnished with modernity, globalisation, and western dominance, topics that lack the privilege of the abovementioned are mostly underlooked and overlooked, and if recognised, are barely thoroughly or contextually touched upon in what resonates a whisper in face of a roar.

Shapin and Schaffer note that:

> “the history of science [one can add social] occupies the same terrain as the history of politics. First, scientific practitioners have created, selected, and maintained a polity within which they operate and make their intellectual

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96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., Page 51.
product; second, the intellectual product made within that polity has become an element in political activity in that state; third, there is a conditional relationship between the nature of the polity occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity". 98

Similarly, the history of social sciences, in this case that of International Relations, occupies the same terrain as the history of politics, where intellectuals create, select, and maintain a polity within which they operate and make their intellectual products, in this case the state (or the nation state). This product, the ‘state’, becomes an element in the political activity of the state; therefore the ‘state’ becomes an element of activity of the state, and thus state-ness becomes a conditionality of relations between the powerful polities occupied by intellectuals and other polities, or non-polities.

2.2.3 The Power of Categorising and Labelling

*The ways we think and talk about a subject influence and reflect the ways we act in relation to that subject* 99

Tens of thousands of books and journal articles have been authored on the Israeli Palestinian conflict, sometimes referred to as the Arab Israeli conflict, the most renowned of which saw light in knowledge societies.100 Thousands of publications targeted the Palestinian refugees, a term that has been used to refer to Palestinians

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and their descendants, for decades. International agencies and organisations have been providing relief, aid, and development to Palestinians within and outside Palestine. A number of states hosted negotiations, agreements, and meetings between representatives of both sides of the conflict. Not a single media outlet in the world has not dedicated time or space to cover this conflict. Many labels have been created, recreated, used, and reused, whether consciously or unconsciously, to refer to aspects related to the conflict; Palestine, Israel, West Bank, Gaza, the Occupied Territories, occupation, Jews, Israelis, diaspora, Palestinians, Arabs, refugees are few examples of labels that are inherited from one generation to the other without questioning whys or wherefores.

Labels, Roger Zetter says, “do not exist in a vacuum. They are the tangible representation of policies and programmes, in which labels are not only formed but are then also transformed by bureaucratic processes ... In this way, labels develop their own rationale and legitimacy and become a convenient and accepted shorthand”\(^{101}\). Given the nature and scope of this thesis, the refugee label will be focused upon, leaving the rest of the labels for potential future research. Clearly, labels are not neutral, neither for the bestowing party, nor the claiming party.\(^{102}\) Where one party may utilise a label to depoliticise, the other may utilise the same label to self-victimise, and where one party sees a tangible meaning to a label, the other sees a symbolic or metaphorical meaning to it \(^{103}\). Such is the example of the term refugee, which was excessively used by governments and authorities in the past, and has been replaced by other labels such as asylum seekers, forced immigrants and so on given the politicised nature of refugee.\(^{104}\) What is attention grabbing with refugee, is that although as a label it is highly politicised, it apoliticises its holder. It implies that a person is neither here nor there, unable to practice rights here, nor there, in a state of on hold, or in rest as in music. On the other hand, some people themselves prefer to label themselves as refugees, for what it carries from

\(^{102}\) Ibid., Page 186.
\(^{103}\) Ibid., Page 173.
\(^{104}\) Ibid., Page 174.
connotations of victimhood and potentials of return. Such is the case of many of the Palestinians in the diaspora studied in this dissertation, who oppose any label other than refugees. One would wonder why the Palestinians insist on being labelled as refugees, which leads to flipping back the pages of history, to search for whom firstly and officially utilised this term in reference to the Palestinians. Palestine refugees\textsuperscript{105}, (as opposed to Palestinian, which is a choice of word worth analysing) are “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict”\textsuperscript{106} stated the UNRWA decades ago. In today’s contemporary era, “national governments are the dominant power in forming, transforming and politicizing the label ‘refugee’, not NGOs and humanitarian agencies as in the past”,\textsuperscript{107} a change not enjoyed by Palestinians due to the lack of state, and despite labels being formed and reformed, the label refugee has accompanied the Palestinian like a conjoined twin whether by Palestinians themselves, by policies labelling them, or by authors writing about them.

Books written on the Palestinian diaspora can be counted on the fingers of the hands\textsuperscript{108}, unlike the thousands of books written on Palestinian refugees, the same can be applied to journal articles\textsuperscript{109} where Palestinians are usually accompanied by the term, or label, refugees. Zetter notes that it is “the process of labelling as much

105 Palestine Refugees is the term used on UNRWA’s English language webpage, while a term translated into Palestinian Refugees is used on UNRWA’s Arabic language webpage. Accessed 20 August 2014.
106 UNRWA Definition
as the labels themselves which are of significance ... labelling is a process of stereotyping which involves disaggregation, standardization, and the formulation of clear cut categories”. What does the process of labelling Palestinians as refugees lead to on the ground, in practice? Labels have “powerful political meanings. They are a crucial index of differing assumptions and contradictory political interests surrounding the designation refugee ... labels like refugee appear benevolent, neutral and obvious” , another contradiction between the label and its holder. The label refugee in reference to Palestinians and others seems like a political status that is non-political. As if the process of labelling is based on politics, while its holders are distanced from politics, or as Zetter phrases it “delinking case from story”. Along with this benevolence and neutrality comes the type of national and international reactions and perceptions towards refugees, what type of aid do they receive? Are they in situations where emergency relief is required? Or is development sufficient? Are they direct outcomes of conflicts of their homeland or do they require aid as long-term incomers to their host land? All the above mentioned is affected by the label, a label that also affects the type and amount of funding those working on and with refugees receive.

The label refugee reflects that the person (or group) cannot be anything but a passive recipient, awaiting donations and aid. It emits inability (if not disability) and lack of agency, whereas the term diaspora (not yet a label for Palestinians) reflects active participation, involvement, and the ability to take matters in one’s own hands. What can be observed within the Palestinian diaspora (in addition to accepting being in the diaspora but refusing being called a diaspora for what it denotes of weakening the “cause”), is that they act as refugees in terms of self-victimisation for what it brings from feelings of victimhood, needless to say, and also for what it promises of a better future, but also simultaneously act as a diaspora in terms of involvement and activity and in terms of everydayness. The only exception, as will be elucidated later in this dissertation, would be the Palestinians in Lebanon, whose everydayness

111 Ibid., Page 59.
112 Ibid.
is that of refugees, although their temporalities and overall experiences are those of diasporas. To Palestinians, refugee means no compromise vis-à-vis land and return and despite its correlation to victimhood, it reflects steadfastness and resistance, while diaspora denotes compromise, elasticity, and selling the cause 113.

So where to one party (policy makers and label givers) the political label refugee denotes benevolence, neutrality, and apoliticisation of label holders, to the other party (the Palestinians) it reflects resistance, strength and victimhood. What both parties have in common is contradiction, which is mirrored in how both perceive each other.

So what does the dominant literature say about diasporas? And how does the process of labelling and categorising affect the perceptions of and on diasporas? The following section explores the many definitions of the term diaspora, and via relating the term to the Palestinian experience(s), identifies a gap in Diaspora studies that is ought to be filled in order to better understand the heterogeneity of diasporas, and consequently in the following chapters, investigate the criticality of the presence of a state in the maintenance, organisation, and mobilisation of diasporas.

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113 For examples, refer to footnotes 15 and 16
2.2.4 Esē Diaspora en Pasais Basileias Tēs Gēs

Envision the globe ... Locate what the world calls the west

Once upon a time, there was a native Greek seed planted in the woods of the west ...
Its first root; its radicle, emerged and started absorbing water from its surrounding soil ... The plant grew into a fruitful tree called Diaspeirein ...

Despite its Greek origin, the people of the land, and for decades, mostly grafted Diaspeirein with Bnei Yisra’el (Jewish) and sometimes with Ellines (Greek) and Hayer (Armenian)

For a while, the tree was abandoned, and in attempts to keep it alive, the people of the land started whip grafting it with 'Black African', Chinese, and more ... Shortly after, Diaspeirein blossomed ...

After repeated grafting and overwatering, Diaspeirein started wilting and lost it leaves ... The people of the land recommended to limit the watering and grafting, and built a protective fence all around it ... Diaspeirein blossomed for a short while then was hit by a drought taking it back to its pre-fencing state.

Ever since then, the same trend occurs and recurs with people from the land and elsewhere offering different recommendations ...

This is the story of the term Diaspora.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} Thou shalt be a dispersion in all kingdoms of the earth (Deuteronomy 28:25)
\textsuperscript{115} Written by the author of this dissertation
Speiro-dia in its Greek origin, To Sow Over in its literal translation, the word Diaspora is widely believed to have first appeared in its current form in the translated to Greek- book of Deuteronomy in the Old Testament in reference to the Jewish people, and also used in reference to the dispersal of Aeginetans by Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War.

Up till the late 1960s, the term Diaspora had no reserved spot in The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences and was (and relatively still is) mainly linked and related to the Jewish exile outside the Holy Land, Eretz Israel. In 1975, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defined Diaspora as “the settling of scattered colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile” and as “the area outside Palestine settled by Jews” or as “the Jews living outside Palestine or modern Israel”. Up till its 1993 edition, the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defined the term as “the dispersion of the Jews among the Gentile nations” and also as “all those Jews who live outside the biblical land of Israel”. In its 1993 edition, the dictionary added “the situation of people living outside their traditional homeland” to its definitions of the word Diaspora.

The term has been of interest to scholars from various fields of the academy, including Anthropology, History, Geography, Political Science, Literature and Languages, Music, and Arts amongst many others, leading to the production of a wide array of definitions each serving the fields and cases studied.

Throughout the years, various scholars have attempted defining the word diaspora, some coming up with very specific definitions, others keeping their definitions

broad and encompassing. Some resorting to extracting definitions by referring to historical examples or setting those as a focal point, others introducing definitions related to what is now called Modern Diasporas. Some classifying diasporas per given criteria, others keeping the classification simple and criteria-less.

In general, most have included dispersion, trauma, exile, nostalgia, return, and (imagined) homeland into their definitions. With this amalgam of definitions, the term has shifted from very narrow to very wide, and turned into a sponge that absorbs everything yet retains nothing which led some scholars to return back to the narrowness of the term, going back to square one. This phenomenon has been occurring and recurring for a few decades so far, where the tree analogy introduced above fits to the situation of the term diaspora.

After being a term mainly used in reference to the Jewish Diaspora, the term started attracting authors writing on other Diasporas like the Armenian and Greek. In that stage, definitions were simple and straight forward, especially vis-à-vis the Jewish Diaspora, where the term was defined for example as Jews living outside Israel. In later stages, the term appealed to scholars studying other peoples who share the “scattering” experience of the abovementioned examples. As a result, the term became linked to an assortment of adjectives the most common of which are listed here to demonstrate the extent to which the term has stretched; voluntary, involuntary, economic, political, victim, labour, imperial, trade, cultural, entrepreneurial, religious, state-linked, stateless, historical, modern, incipient.

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119 For example Stéphane Dufoix, Diasporas (Berkeley: University of California, 2008). Pages 59-60.
120 Refer to Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction.
121 Refer to Michel Bruneau, Diasporas (Montpellier: GIP Reclus, 1995).
122 Refer to Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad.
and conflict generated \(^{123}\). Other classifications surpass adjectives and step into processes and modes, such as that of Dufoix \(^{124}\) where he proposes four modes of classification: Centroperipheral, Enclaved, Atopic, and Antagonistic, Sheffer’s Age Factor \(^{125}\), Iwanska’s classifications of Core, Rear Guard, and All Other members based on roles and actions \(^{126}\), and Medam’s Crystallised and Fluid classifications based on degrees of cohesiveness and dynamism of a given diaspora. \(^{127}\)

What most prominent definitions and classifications seem to focus upon are questions of *who*, *how*, and *why*, when questions such as *when* together with *where* can be of added value to diaspora studies. Focusing on the former is a risky exercise for that it, by design, facilitates the homogenisation of diaspora(s) leading to a *diasporisation* of the term not very different from the *diasporisation* of the people. Looking into the when and where can yield results that demonstrate how homogeneous diasporas are, especially if studied empirically, which could thus yield additions to the field, theoretically. This by no way implies that the first set of questions (who, how, and why) is of no value, but it means that adding the when and where can constitute another all encompassing set that could result in an added value, especially if new elements such as power for instance are included with the question of where.

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125 Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*.
2.2.4.1 Critiquing the Present, Identifying the Absent

*Diasporas are not just there. They are not simply collections of people, communities of scattered individuals bound by some shared history, race, or religion, or however we want to break down the definitions and classifications. Rather, they have a relation to power. They emerge in relation to power. This power is both external to the diasporic subject and internally formative.*

In recent years, scholars started critically evaluating the term diaspora and all that revolves around it. Such scholars base their critiques and criticisms on definitions, scopes, approaches, neutrality towards what some see critical aspects to understanding diasporas, utilisation of the term, and tendencies to homogenisation. Eleni Sideri, for example, questions the innate opposition implanted in the etymology of the term diaspora, and notes how the word itself is double-edged with *dia* meaning dispersion and *sprio* meaning sowing the seeds, which reflects stability and stasis, thus reflecting dispersion and stability at the same time. This approach opens doors to ontologically understand the (ontologically uncertain) diasporic experience and the nature of being, existing, and becoming; dimensions which happen to be cornerstones of being in the diaspora. The experience of being in the diaspora is not one characterised by dichotomies, it is not always about homeland or host land, nor about nostalgia or trauma, nor about imagined or real, it is about the overlapping of multiple factors, geographies, temporalities, and beings. The zone where here and there, us and them, past and future, and then and now overlap is what should be focused upon to understand and de-homogenise diasporas. What can be applied to one diaspora does not necessarily correspond to all diasporas, therefore, Cho’s proposition that diaspora should be considered as a *condition of subjectivity* rather than an *object of analysis* is persuasive, for that a diaspora

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130 Cho, "The Turn to Diaspora." Page 11.
does possess, is affected, and emerges upon power (or not), desires, beliefs, experiences, feelings and perspectives.

Another very significant critiqued aspect, especially by postcolonial and diaspora critics, is temporalities. Most prominent literature on diasporas seems to ignore that just as members of a diaspora are dispersed, so are their temporalities. The past is not always history, and history is not always part of the past. The present is not always in the now, and can be constituted of more past than present. Similarly, the future can be desired as a mirror image of the past, or that of history. (Refer to Chapter 6 for further explanation)

The temporalities of diasporas are not disconnected and straight forwardly understood as past, present, and future. The temporalities of diasporas overlap and interlock which is an angle that should be considered when studying diasporas for that understanding the interlocked diasporic temporalities could lead to understanding the diasporic present, which is the most studied temporality in our present day literature.

The practice of defining the term diaspora has also been criticised for what it leads to from classification and categorisation 131 of people in a cataloguing manner. Resisting this practice is Jane Fernandez, who frames the diaspora by unframing it, which means that diaspora “can only be managed meaningfully if we understand that it is in itself an open-source and that any attempt to limit its scope or its definition transgresses the boundaries of both its conceptual and epistemological framing”132 and notes that given that diaspora “is derived from the idea of a scattering of seeds ... the concept must be allowed to take root, transplant, cross-fertilize, rather than fossilize”. 133 Similarly, Olivier Ferrando notes that diaspora, as a concept “should not be approached in substantialist terms as a static bounded entity

131 Ibid., Page 14.
133 Ibid.
exhibiting a range of archetypical diasporic traits. It should rather qualify the
dynamic interaction between the stakeholders” 134 and stakes one can add.

On another rather interesting note, Mishra, in his book titled Diaspora Criticism
concludes that definitions of diasporas have been represented as “class-neutral,
gender-neutral and generational-neutral ethnic blocs that uncritically project home
and host countries as homogeneous territorial entities” 135, which is true despite
Sheffer’s attempt at hinting to an Age Factor that can fall within the generational
category. Another aspect that Sheffer touches upon but does not thoroughly
elaborate on is diaspora statelessness, which is a dimension rarely touched upon in
diaspora studies 136 despite it being an aspect that would lead to better
understanding of state-linked diasporas in addition to learning more about the
stateless of them. Statelessness can affect the cornerstones of the diasporic
experience, and failing to consider statelessness in studying the stateless is a
deficiency worth diagnosing and thus treating, and is also a tone worth being played
accompanied by a sustain pedal* instead of a sostenuto pedal.

2.2.5 The Palestinians: the diaspora of The Diaspora

Palestinians do not always fit easily into contemporary
theoretical frameworks. In an era of postcolonial
studies, they remain firmly in the grip of modern
colonialism. 137

For the Palestinian diaspora, “ironically and tragically, the midwife was the
homecoming of the Jewish diaspora” 138, making the Palestinian diaspora the

* Sustaining and undamping all notes played on a piano not only the ones played when
the pedal is depressed as it is the case with the sostenuto pedal
137 Peteet, "Problematising a Palestinian Diaspora." Page 631
138 Robin Cohen, "Diaspora and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers,"
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 72, no. 3 Ethnicity
diaspora of The Diaspora. Diaspora for Jews denoted return, while diaspora for most Palestinians (scholars included) denotes abandoning return, leaving the world of scholarship with only a few references on the Palestinian diaspora 139, and flooding it with references on Palestinian refugees. Although the term diaspora “does not mean abrogating the necessity to change the Palestinians’ situation outside their home country, but rather emphasize the importance of analyzing the relationship between this population, their host-lands and homeland”140, Palestinians still prefer the temporary nature of the term refugee for what it reflects of hope and return.

Dispersed across the world in what can be referred to as “Musharradoun” in Arabic signifying being displaced, expelled, dispersed, extorted, and left without homes, lands, and rights, or Apatride in French, usually signifying being dispersed as an outcome of war, is the condition of the Palestinians both in the diaspora and within what they call historic Palestine.

Being a Palestinian, in general, is a strenuous existence; it is a melange of statuses and feelings (in exile, refugees, displaced, diasporised, stateless among others). On the one hand, Palestinians experienced (and some still experience), directly and indirectly “tasharrud”141 as a result of wars. On the other hand, they also experience being refugees emotionally and by experience, and not necessarily by law or by fact. For that to peoples who are strongly attached to land, being forced away from the (home)land is an emotional experience marred by pain and suffering. They are also experiencing living in exile, for in practice, those outside the homeland are practically in exile, unable to return. Correspondingly, Palestinians outside Palestine live in what is considered “shatat”, diaspora. All such experiences are parts of the Palestinian lexicon, and can be referred to at the same time, in one single conversation. Complicating this already strenuous existence is the perception of

141 Noun of Musharradoun
Palestine, by Palestinians. The perception that Palestine exists and yet does not exist, that an occupier exists and yet does not exist makes comprehending the existence of Palestine and Palestinians a very complicated task to the self and to others, in what appears to be a case of existential schizophrenia.

This case of schizophrenia does not only affect the existence of Palestine and the Palestinians, it also affects the way they are studied and perceived. The study of Palestinians has been taking place under the lens of the term refugees, which undoubtedly results in producing legal, economic, and administrative reports and papers overlooking the sociological nature of being away, dispersed and scattered from the homeland, which is a dimension the term diaspora covers. Seldom have scholars viewed the Palestinians as a diaspora, and often have (Palestinian) scholars bonded the concept of diaspora to the acceptance of dispersal. It is true that Palestinians do not fit easily into theoretical frameworks, but it is also true that insisting on referring to a single framework reflects lack of novelty. Over 60 years of producing the same narratives and lexicons is ought to transform and the same applies to changing this particular sound that has been resonating for all these years, not for the sake of resolving the conflict of conflicts, but for the sake of viewing it along with its outcomes from new angles, with new spectacles, and new sounds which is what this dissertation attempts on achieving.

143 For example refer to Basma Kodmani in La Diaspora Palestinienne
2.3 Mind(ing) the Gap(s)

Silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history in the final instance).  

Minding the gap means preventing the potential of falling into it. A procedure that requires identifying the gap first and foremost, and then finding an appropriate way to surpass it. The aim of this dissertation, via its review of the literature, is to mind the gaps identified in the current literature followed by finding the most appropriate ways possible to fill and surpass such gaps, keeping in mind the time frame and scope of the overall research.

Gaps identified in this chapter have been allocated into two main areas: literature and context. As explicated earlier in this chapter, and commencing with gaps in the literature, research into statelessness and stateless diasporas is surprisingly lacking, thus producing a sizeable gap. Studying the absent to comprehend the absent along with the present is what this dissertation aims at doing via studying statelessness to comprehend statelessness and offer new perspectives to understanding its contrary, state-ness. Another widely observable gap in the current literature is represented in the short supply of works authored on Palestinians as a diaspora (or as diasporas), which is startling given the academic and non-academic coverage the conflict that led to the scattering of this diaspora is granted now, and has been granted for years.

On the contextual level, gaps are manifested in the absence of culturally and linguistically sensitive studies on the Palestinian diaspora. This by no means belittles the available literature, contrarily, this is an attempt to add to what is already there, for that without viewing and reviewing the already published, additions cannot be

145 Please note that Chapter-Specific gaps are identified and discussed per chapter as a result of the thematic presentation of the dissertation
made. Another gap that this research aims to fill is mirrored in critiquing the currently presented temporalities of diasporas as independent units of analysis divided into past, present, and future when temporalities of diasporas can be as diasporised as diasporas themselves. Questioning the neutralities present in diaspora studies, especially in terms of homogenising diasporas class wise, generation wise, and gender wise is another gap this research aims to fill by looking into the importance (or lack) of such factors in the case of the stateless Palestinians. Finally, the major gap that requires filling is a gap that can be qualified as mute, the echoless gap of silence, and to some extent blindness, towards studying certain groups and peoples. The production of historical silence vis-à-vis the stateless started at the moment states were created and appreciated, making states the norm and the ultimate fact, thus overlooking the contrary or the different. This initial moment was followed by another moment; that of fact assembly, represented in producing archives of praise and consent towards the concept of a state and nothing but the state. That moment of praise and consent was followed by a moment of retrieval in the form of uncontested narratives of state, which finally led to the production of the historical moment of producing history, the history of states, which in its turn produces the present; the present of states.

If a composer is to create music for the abovementioned (written) sounds, the melodic components would be the sounds produced by Home is where you are not and cannot be accompanied by sections of the Literature Imbalance Review; the contrapuntal would be in the echoes of the sections on Literature Abundance and Scarcity accompanied by Critiquing the Present, Identifying the Absent; and the harmonic would be decorated by the rest of the elements of the Literature Imbalance Review, making an Arabesque style composition.

Until then, the following chapter will compose another set of written sounds, namely a Concerto Metodologico, where the methodology used for conducting this research is thoroughly explicated contrasting small sounds with the main body of the larger sounds.
Chapter 3
Concerto Metodologico

Concerto: “a piece of instrumental music that contrasts a solo instrument or a small group of solo instruments with the main body of the orchestra”\(^{146}\) and “is typically a cycle of several contrasting movements integrated tonally and often thematically”.\(^{147}\)

Analogy – a piece that contrasts a small group of sounds (represented in reverberations of heterogeneity, positionality, presentation, triangulation, and considerations) with the main body of the larger group of sounds (represented in the sound of studying the organisation and mobilisation of a stateless diaspora) via performing a cycle of several contrasting yet thematically and tonally integrated sounds

Metronome: Fusion of various methodological approaches to facilitate answering main research question and per-chapter sub-questions

\(^{146}\) NAXOS, "Classical Music Home > Musical Terminology > Glossary > Definitions".
\(^{147}\) "Concerto." Accessed 8 December 2014.
Chapter 3
Concerto Metodologico

3.1 Methods to Understanding Diaspora Statelessness

This composition resembles a Concerto in that it is a piece that contrasts a small group of sounds with the main body of the larger group of sounds via performing a cycle of several contrasting yet thematically and tonally integrated sounds.

“Verbal and nonverbal activity is a unified whole, and theory and methodology should be organized or created to treat it as such”.\(^{148}\)

Kenneth L. Pike

The Palestinians, whether in Palestine/Gaza/West Bank/Israel/The Occupied Territories or in the diaspora, have been a topic of interest to many researchers. From legal to economic to political to sociological, researchers and for decades have been studying the phenomena of Palestine and the Palestinians. Labels (refugees, exiles, diaspora), tables, figures, charts, numbers, statuses (stateless, citizens), and histories have been the main outcomes of most studies, and apart from Edward Said, only a few scholars attempted introducing anthropological dimensions to research on Palestinians, and especially the socio-cultural & linguistic aspects of it, to the combination of the politico-legal and the socio-economic.

This dissertation aims to understand the effects of statelessness on the mobilisation and organisation of the Palestinians in the diaspora. Do mobilisation and organisation require a centre? A state? What are the shapes, intensities, dynamics and approaches of mobilisation and organisation of the stateless Palestinians? To answer the abovementioned questions, this research studies three examples of the Palestinian diaspora; the diaspora in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon. The reasons on which the decision of selecting the three cases was based is explicated later in this chapter. Further elaboration on each case can be found in Chapter 4 – Intermezzo

Ostinato. Although the cases were studied in parallel, i.e at the same time, each case was treated as a single case, with its unity respected, before engaging in a cross case comparison and analysis, for that each case has its own unique melody. The time dimension was prospective in its design in order to look at events as they occur.

### 3.2 Topic in a Nutshell

Diaspora, Statelessness, Organisation & Mobilisation are the foci of this research. Literature on Diaspora only recently\(^{149}\) started differentiating between stateless and state-linked diasporas as potentially different diaspora groups in terms of strategies, tactics, and organisation. However, very few scholars, until today, have investigated the mobilisation alongside the organisation of such stateless diasporas, which is the core of this research. The Palestinian diaspora has been stateless \(^{150}\) for a duration a few years shy of 70, and their mobilisation in light of their statelessness has not been investigated thus far.

What are the effects of statelessness on the mobilisation and organisation of the Palestinians in the diaspora is the main question that this research aims to answer. What are the effects of statelessness on Palestinian realities in terms of historiographies, temporalities, and geographies? And what is the relationship between statelessness and Palestinian-ness are sub questions that in one way or the other were necessary to investigate, to answer the main question.

In order to answer the main question, literature on social movements and literature on diaspora have been the main sources of theory. Within the literature on social movements, Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Cultural Framings resembled a spine to investigating the interrelation between the mobilisation and organisation of the Palestinian diaspora, with Cultural Framings playing the role of axons linking Opportunities to Organisation & Mobilisation.

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149 Refer to Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*.
150 Stateless here refers to the absence of what the Palestinians call their homeland, historic Palestine.
From literature on Diaspora, diaspora group organisation & mobilisation and relations with host country and homeland have been referred to in order to complement theories on social movements.

3.3 The Theory-Topic Connection

Thorough explications of the theories applied throughout this research are found throughout the dissertation given that it is of a thematic nature. Nonetheless, the following section pre-introduces the main theories in order to clarify the theory-topic connection and therefore link it to the methods used across the dissertation.

3.3.1 Social Movements

Political Opportunities, theoretically speaking, are the structures of opportunities and the constraints facing social movements. How do political opportunities to the stateless Palestinian diaspora look like? And how important are those opportunities in their mobilisation and organisation? What is the relationship between the openness of the host country’s political system and the type and intensity of diaspora activities? Does repression in host countries affect diaspora action? Is the stability of the relationship between host country and homeland elites of any importance? Does the type of opportunity represented affect the form of mobilisation? How strong is the cultural component on opportunity? Is access to party systems and policy decisions a channel to direct and indirect participation? Is the capacity of policy implementation high or low? Is there a conflict structure facing the structure of opportunities, and therefore limiting its capacity to mobilise?

All the abovementioned questions stem from theories on political opportunities and which such theories help to unfold and answer.
Mobilising Structures, denoting to the formal and informal forms of organisation available to people willing to “mobilise and engage in collective action”\textsuperscript{151} are another factor that facilitates investigating the research question. Mobilising structures are the “agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action which include particular “tactical repertoires”, particular “social movement organizational” forms, and “modular social movement repertoires”\textsuperscript{152}. What shapes do the mobilising structures of the Palestinians in the diaspora take? What does their formal and informal organisation look like? Does it exist? Is it affected by statelessness? What leads to collective action and how? What do organisations promote, defend, and/or pursue. And how do such objectives draw potential participants? If mobilisation = the quantity of resources collectively controlled X probability of delivery, and if organisation = netness X catness,\textsuperscript{153} and if mobilisation = f(organisation),\textsuperscript{154} how does a centre-less stateless diaspora organise to mobilise? The questions above also stem from theory, and are of importance to answering the research question.

The axon to understanding the two above-mentioned factors is Framing Processes, which is a collective process of interpretation and social construction located between opportunity and action. For this factor to lead to mobilisation, people need to be both “aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem. Lacking either one or both of these perceptions, it is highly unlikely that people will mobilize even when afforded the opportunity to do so”.\textsuperscript{155} How does the Palestinian framing process look like? What does it include and what does it exclude? Are the Palestinians optimistic along with

\textsuperscript{152} John D. McCarthy, \textit{Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing}, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996). Page 141.
\textsuperscript{155} Doug McAdam, \textit{Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes. Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements}. Page 5.
their aggravation? What is the importance of time in the framing process? Did the Palestinian framing process change over time? Is it more strategic now than it was before? Those questions and more are answerable by theory and empirical data on framing processes.

3.3.2 National Diaspora Groups: Core, Rear Guards, and the Rest

Diaspora groups have been classified and categorised since the 19th century (Refer to Chapter 2), and diasporas were mainly classified around two questions: How people left their homeland and Why, voluntary/economic or involuntary/political. With the passage of time and further studies on Diasporas, scholars such as Robin Cohen started introducing new classifications (Victim, labour, imperial, trade, and cultural).156 Another classification is that of Gabriel Sheffer who divides Diasporas based on what he calls Homeland Status and Age Factor. Under Homeland Status, Sheffer further divides the classification into State-linked, and Stateless, of which the Palestinians are examples. Further classifications and explications can be found in Chapter 2.

In order to apply theories to cases and link diaspora to mobilisation and organisation, the framework of Alicja Iwanska and Yossi Shain in identifying the major groups within a diaspora will be employed. According to Shain and Iwanska, diaspora groups are identified on three major levels depending on their roles and (potential) activities. The Core Members, who are the active members of the exile organisation. The Rear Guards, who are the prime targets of mobilisation by the Core Members, they consist of loyalists to the organisation who at one point were part of the organisation but for one reason or the other drifted away. Refugees, according to Shain,157 fall under this category. And All National Members are those whom the organisation believes can be mobilised when needed and include overseas students, emigrants and their descendants, and citizens of other countries that can

156 Refer to Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction.
lobby for the homeland from the country of residence.\textsuperscript{158} Therefore, throughout this dissertation, the Core Members refer to the Actors, the Organisations who organise and mobilise, and in this case the Civil Society Organisations. Rear Guards are the active targets of organisation and mobilisation efforts, i.e. the participants in diaspora activities. Finally All National Members, are all those who originate from Palestine (and consider themselves Palestinians) and do not necessarily participate in diaspora activities. Figure 3.1 shows the different identifications of the diaspora group.

To recapitulate, this research studies social movements and specifically political opportunities, mobilising structures, and cultural framing (framing processes) in order to understand the whys and wherefores of diaspora organisation and mobilisation through the lens of Core members, Rear Guards, and All National Members of a diaspora group. The Palestinian statelessness is the flash that lights this framework. See Figure 3.2 below.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., Pages 52 – 55.
3.3.2.1 Civil Society Organisations: Escaping the Unequivocalness & Homogeneity

“Actual civil societies are complex associational universes involving a vast array of specific organizational forms and a wide diversity of institutional motivations. They contain repression as well as democracy, conflict as well as cooperation, vice as well as virtue; they can be motivated by sectional greed as much as social interest. Thus any attempt to compress the ideas of civil society into a homogenous and virtuous stereotype is doomed to fail.” 159

Analogous to various terms, the term Civil Society holds a lot of definitions and explanations on its shoulders. Also analogous to various terms, Civil Society is deprived of culture specific contexts and is mostly perceived in unequivocal, homogenised and what appears to be static ways when the concept itself varies from one place and space to another. In its simplest forms, Civil Society is known as

the Third Sector of society 160, neither the state nor the market; it is what falls between state, market, and individuals.

Scholars and organisations alike have been defining the term according to their visions, for example The World Bank utilises the term Civil Society to refer to “the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations”. 161

Similarly, the World Health Organization states that “Civil Society is seen as a social sphere separate from both the state and the market. The increasingly accepted understanding of the term civil society organizations (CSOs) is that of non-state, not-for-profit, voluntary organizations formed by people in that social sphere. This term is used to describe a wide range of organizations, networks, associations, groups and movements that are independent from government and that sometimes come together to advance their common interests through collective action.” 162 Various other organisational definitions fall under similar lines, such as that by the EU and that of the African Development Bank. 163

What such definitions neglect is the heterogeneous nature of states and markets, as well as the diversity in understanding the term Civil Society and its components. For

instance, Jordan\textsuperscript{164} and Lebanon\textsuperscript{165}, two of the cases studied in this dissertation, consider political parties components of the Civil Society whereas most definitions exclude them. On the other hand, the third case study, Belgium, does not classify political parties as civil society organisations. Nonetheless, some Belgian political parties such as Parti Humaniste and Parti Socialiste are active participants in Global Justice Movements (including that of Palestine), and thus operate on the civil society level in parallel to their main political roles. Therefore, this dissertation takes into consideration the activities and events organised by such political parties for that their operation as parties does not deny their operation as Social Justice Movements, and thus, civil society organisations.

Such definitions, usually stemming from the “west” or based on “Western” principles are employed “as if their meaning were universal and unequivocal”\textsuperscript{166} and as if, by default, all people belong to states and are active participants in open markets. In experiences of other parts of the world, such organisations have existed for decades without being labeled as Civil Society Organisations or NGOs as some would interchangeably call them\textsuperscript{167}. Collectivities working to alleviate poverty or to enhance lives have been existent for many years. Religious or faith-based organisations have also been operating for centuries without being labeled as CSOs or as NGOs. The same can be applied to health, education, social, legal and other shapes of organisations. The “civil society” in such parts of the world does not necessarily aim for democracy, good governance, or rule of law. Instead, each part has its own needs and own visions dependant on the context(s) it operates in. Along


\textsuperscript{165} For example refer to Antoine Masarra in The Lebanese Organization for Civil Activities OPAC, \textit{Handbook on the Roles and Impacts of Civil Society Organisations on Their Local and National Surroundings} (OPAC, 2013). Page 8.


with the entrance of international organisations to the fields of the rest of the world, narratives similar to those utilised in the West started surfacing; narratives where terms and concepts are stripped of their cultural contexts and copied & pasted to the donor’s goals and vision. “They [the international organisations] come to us with their jargon and cultural misunderstandings, they look into women’s or children’s rights when we barely have rights to start with. We cannot work, we cannot own, we cannot move freely, we do not have proper education. So we decided to start our own NGO, where we target our community’s real needs not what the international community dictates”.

The boundaries of what constitutes the Civil Society nowadays blend into each other making categorising what is what, who is who, and why this not that, a complicated task. What is perplexing though are the attempts of apoliticising CSOs when they operate under political systems and are largely funded by state-led donors, intergovernmental organisations, or donors with certain political ideologies or agendas. Figure 3.3

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168 Interview - Ahlam Laje’e at Shatilla Refugee Camp, 9 July 2012.
Figure 3.3 The Field of CSO Operations between States, Local CSOs, International CSOs, and Donors

For the above-mentioned blurriness of the roles of Civil Society Organisations and the problems with defining it, this thesis uses the term Civil Society Organisations to refer to “actors [promoting themselves as] working ... to reduce societal harms and increase societal benefits. They aim to improve social cohesion; increase levels of economic and social development; reduce the burdens of poverty, ill-health and inequality; promote the interests of marginalized groups [including political interests]; extend the protection of social, civil and political rights; ... and provide services such as health, education and other forms of community development”. 170 Therefore, and to reflect the heterogeneity of Civil Societies depending on contexts, Civil Society Organisations were divided into the following categories based on the results of taxonomy (refer to Annex B):


170 Ibid., Page 8.


3.4 *Echoing a Piano*: Cases of Palestinian Statelessness: Heterogeneity to Investigate a Potential Homogeneity

“The piano keys are black and white but they sound like a million colours in your mind” wrote Maria Cristina Mena\(^{171}\), and researching the Palestinian Diaspora’s mobilisation and organisation resembles the two coloured piano keys; they sound like a million heterogeneous colours in one’s mind.

Exploring the effects of statelessness on the Palestinians in the diaspora requires a thorough investigation of this heterogeneous category that from the outside seems enormously homogeneous. Selecting the cases to be studied was based on multiple factors that could test the hypothesis of this research (that statelessness affects the Palestinian diaspora’s mobilisation and organisation despite their location, circumstances, statuses, and generations). The past and present of Palestinians in each of the three cases is presented in Chapter 4, where the analysis also includes socio-economic and politico-legal statuses of Palestinians in each of the countries.

Physical distance from homeland, culture and language in host country, homeland/host country relations, type & openness of political system, state’s capacity and practice of repression, socio-economic and politico-legal statuses of Palestinians, numbers in host country, and generation of Palestinians have all been considered during the selection process. Table 3.1 below summarises the main variations taken into consideration while selecting the cases.

In the past, it was argued that geographical location and physical distance from the homeland affect mobilisation, scholars such as Shain and Sheffer have challenged

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this view.\textsuperscript{172} To further challenge this argument, two of the cases proposed, Jordan and Lebanon, are bordering the \textit{homeland}, while the third case is located outside the continent of the \textit{homeland}. Similarly, linguistic & cultural similarity between homeland and host country can be considered facilitators of mobilisation and organisation, in this research two of the three cases enjoy general similarities in culture and language.

Host country/Homeland relations are of importance for studying social movements and diaspora mobilisation and organisation. The choice of the cases took into consideration the host country relations with the homeland including diplomatic ties with, and recognition of Palestine, in addition to the recognition of, and ties with Israel due to the nature of the Palestinians \textit{homeland}.

The openness of the political system is considered a dimension impacting how collective action is structured.\textsuperscript{173} Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon vary in openness and thus were chosen to test the hypothesis. The same can be applied to state capacity and practice of repression. The variations in socio-economic and politico-legal statuses, numbers, and generations of Palestinians in the host countries have also been taken into account to test whether such variations are constants or do have an effect on mobilisation and organisation in practice.

\textsuperscript{172} Refer to Shain, \textit{Frontiers of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation State}. Pages 51 and 77, and Sheffer, \textit{Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad}. Page 98.

\textsuperscript{173} Doug McAdam, \textit{Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes. Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements}. Page 10 in reference to Kriesi and Tarrow.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographical Proximity</strong></td>
<td>Far</td>
<td>Bordering</td>
<td>Bordering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture &amp; Language</strong></td>
<td>Different</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>Similar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Political System</strong></td>
<td>Constitutional Monarchy</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Openness of System</strong></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity &amp; Practice of Repression</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High (depending on occasion)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-Economic Statuses of Palestinians</strong></td>
<td>Mostly Middle Class</td>
<td>Various Classes</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politico-Legal Statuses</strong></td>
<td>Participating citizens with full rights</td>
<td>Participating citizens with full rights</td>
<td>Non-Participating Palestinian Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>De Facto Status</strong></td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Refugee Citizens</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Numbers</strong></td>
<td>±4000</td>
<td>± 3 Million</td>
<td>± 500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generations</strong></td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; – 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; – 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Host Country/Homeland Relations (Diplomatic Ties)** | Present: Embassy in Jerusalem
Embassy in Brussels | Present: Embassy in Amman
Consulate in Gaza
Liaison Office in Ramallah | Semi-Present: Embassy in Beirut
No Embassy in ‘Palestine’ |
| **Host Country/Homeland Recognition of Palestine Recognition of Israel** | Palestine not fully recognised
Israel recognised | Palestine recognised
Israel recognised | Palestine recognised
Israel not recognised |
| **Host Country/Homeland Ties with Palestine Ties with Israel** | Present
Present | Present
Present | Present
Absent |

Table 3.1: Comparison of Cases
3.5 Striking a Triangle: Reflections on Positionality

“The triangle is by no means a simple instrument to play”\textsuperscript{174} said James Blade. It is an instrument that can produce expressive and subtle tones. The same applies to positioning the self in a research project; it is by no means a simple instrument to play (or mechanism to execute). It can produce subtle and expressive sounds, but it can also produce the opposite if not played correctly.

“The researcher’s relationship with the group to be studied must be fully acknowledged and described”. \textsuperscript{175}

Acknowledging and describing the relationship between the researcher and the group to be studied is critical in research, and so is describing the positionality of the researcher to one’s self and to others, for positionality can take more than one shape at the same time. In the following section, the researcher acknowledges her position vis-à-vis the researched topic, as well as the researched group.

3.5.1 Acknowledgement: Who Am I?

To some, using \emph{i} instead of \emph{We} in presenting research might be inappropriate or indigestible. To others it works vice versa. Some prefer the use of the \emph{passive voice} (including myself), but due to the personal nature of the below, \emph{i} will be used because \emph{We} does not exist, and using the \emph{passive voice} will make the process of writing and its outcomes unpleasant.

Studying one’s own people, culture, history, and politics, is a very sharp double-edged sword. On one hand, one can easily understand, and is by default aware, of the \emph{what, when} and \emph{who}, but on the other hand one can easily fall into the trap of taking the \emph{why} and \emph{how} for granted. Challenging the \emph{why} and \emph{how} was a hard-hitting process that reserved a place in the challenges and limitations section at the end of this chapter. Difficulties in presentation might also arise due to the researcher’s background or upbringing. What the researcher considers common sense and general knowledge does not necessarily mean the same to others. At the primary

stages of researching this topic, I must acknowledge, the flexibility of my identity was not so clear or evident to me. With time, and with observing and interviewing the Palestinians in the diaspora, this flexibility started to manifest itself clearly. Although I do acknowledge that half of me is of Palestinian origins and thus I can understand what being a Palestinian means and is, my flexible identity has decided to settle elsewhere. Somewhere where the identity is that of a curious researcher and observer who gives no weight to origins, but a lot of weight to the satisfaction of her curiosity. I have frequently noticed that I use they instead of we when referring to the Palestinians, and it was only then that I realised that my curiosity is bigger than my origins or background when it comes to research, even if not everyone sees it.

3.5.2 Trust and Inclusion: Who Am I to the Palestinians?

“What one knows and expresses is often mediated by where one stands, by the language one speaks, by the name one bears, by whose trust one can earn...”

While in the field, I discovered that three main identifiers revealed who I am to the Palestinians in the three countries studied: my last name, dialect, and nationality. In Jordan, my last name, which sounds clearly of Palestinian origins, was similar to a diplomatic passport. No visas required. In Belgium, my Jordanian Arabic, and particularly Ammani dialect, which is very similar to the Palestinian dialect, played a major role in being considered “one of them” and being automatically admitted into the group. In Lebanon, a combination of the last name and nationality (it is common knowledge to Palestinians all around the world that roughly half of the Jordanians are of Palestinian origins) were sufficient for the Palestinians in Lebanon to deduce my “Palestinian-ness”.

It is worth mentioning that trust was granted by default and no effort was put into gaining it. The abovementioned can be some of the main explanations of this unquestioned trust, in addition to the apparent lack of affiliation to any party or group, being a female, and being a student researching “her own people”. The

sensitivity of the topic has not therefore been a barrier.

“Going to the camp committee meeting? ... it is from this way” I was asked (and told) while walking through one of the camps in Beirut. This simple question by a Palestinian refugee sitting on a plastic chair sipping tea from a frequently seen type of glass, old and no longer transparent, led me to ask myself further questions. Do I look like I am going to that meeting? Do I look like a Palestinian? Do I look like a camp inhabitant? Did he think that I am a Palestinian refugee from another camp in Lebanon? Why was he so sure that I am heading to the meeting? Why didn’t he even stop me to say who are you given that entrance to Palestinian camps is, in principle at least (although exception apparently exist), not allowed to foreigners (i.e anyone without a Palestinian refugee ID or a Lebanese passport)? How come he considered me one of the participants when he did not even talk to me?

Then again, while visiting two other camps in Sidon and Tyre in the South of Lebanon, another set of questions started hopping in my head. How come did this happen? How come did I enter the most dangerous and out-of-law camp in Lebanon without even being asked for an ID? How come did I pass two checkpoints without a single question? Did intentionally wearing all-black clothes although it was extremely hot and humid play a role in blending into the style of the women in the camp? Did being a female spare me from unwanted questions and interrogations? Was the headscarf a passport to access, for a change? Did carrying no handbag, no camera, no recorder, no notebook, no mobile phone mean anything to the soldiers and guards? Answering those questions was not an easy task until I started talking, casually, to camp inhabitants. “What would you like to drink?”, “What would you like to eat?”, “How is life in Jordan?”, “We are all living the same pain (in reference to the pain of being away from the homeland)”, “May God bless you and may you finish your studies soon”, “Where does your family originate from in Palestine?”, “I know xyz from this family” and a lot more. It can be argued that some of such questions or statements can be directed towards anyone visiting a camp, but the sense of belonging to the same origin and collective memory and pain is reserved for Palestinians only and it is sensed during the conversations or via body language including kissing and hugging. The willingness to go out of the way to organise an
impromptu meeting with someone working in an NGO and the willingness of that person to actually meet me was astounding. The same can be applied to the willingness to thoroughly go through every single corner of a camp, and explain its significance and history. Seems that Mourid Barghouti’s “The fish, even in the fisherman's net, still carries the smell of the sea”\textsuperscript{177} was applicable in this situation, for that even when I was in no way intentionally mentioning nor hinting about my partly Palestinian origin, the Palestinians still sensed it, or smelled it.

In Belgium, sending an email to the head of the Palestinian community in Belgium and Luxembourg explaining what I am doing and asking for an interview was enough to add my name and email to the mailing lists of the community and other parties. It was not only being immediately added to the list that surprised me, but the encouraging response from the head of the community where he was thanking me for the “scientifically valuable project”, sending me articles that he previously wrote about the Palestinian diaspora in Belgium, and facilitating communication with him that was a stronger surprise. From there and since then, knowing about the diaspora’s events and activities throughout Belgium became as easy as checking the inbox, and being considered “one of them” was as easy as speaking one single sentence in \textit{Ammani} Arabic, which largely resembles versions of the Palestinian dialect.

As for Jordan, where it is estimated that half of the population is of Palestinian origin, being born and raised there was all I needed to be considered “one of them”. Such identifications are automatic in Jordan, the last/family name does its job with no further requirements.

\textsuperscript{177} Mourid Barghouti, \textit{Manteq Al Ka'inaat (Arabic) Logic of the Beings} (Amman: Dar Al Mada, 1996).
3.6 Playing an Accordion: Presentation

3.6.1 Acknowledge Knowledge: What is Knowledge?

“The most important aspect of writing is allowing it to write back”

Contribution to knowledge is one important dimension of research. On most occasions, such contributions to knowledge seem to necessitate rigidity, factuality, tangibility, and adherence to preset standards and measures. This research unorthodoxly necessitates the inclusion of impressions, sensory perceptions, grief, trauma, and emotions within its folds. “Academic writing is only one kind of writing” states Elizabeth Dauphinee 179, and in order to explicate the effects of statelessness on the Palestinians and on their mobilisation and organisation, another type of writing is required in addition to adhering to the basic standards of academic writing; one which weaves the intangible into the tangible, 180 one that allows writing to write back.

“It is important that we all pay attention to the presence or absence of love and affection in our scholarship – at all stages of the production of our scholarship. If it is not there, it is important to ask ourselves why and what we should do about it. If it is there, we owe it to our readers to show it, to enable them to evaluate its role in the nature of our work.” 181 The amount and type of unconditional, and sometimes blind, love that the Palestinians studied have for their homeland is owed to be shown in this research, because it is from their love that I have extended the patience and courage to dive deeper into the studied topic.

It is argued that practitioners of fieldwork “need to convince us [the readers] ... not

180 For examples of such approaches refer to ibid. And to Patricia Hill Collins’ Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, Routledge, 1999
merely that they themselves have truly “been there”, but ... that had we been there we should have seen what they saw, felt what they felt, concluded what they concluded”. In an attempt to convey what has been experienced, seen, and felt in the field, images and visualisations are present throughout this dissertation. On the same lines, this dissertation, in some of its sections, resorts to epigraphs written in a story-telling style. This approach, and its style, is an outcome of what I have felt during conducting this research as partly-Palestinian, and as a human being saturated with the traditional explanations of Palestine and the Palestinians.

3.6.2 Thematic & Cross-Cutting Presentation

An accordionist utilises two hands, the right for playing the melody on buttons, and the left for playing the preset and bass buttons. Similarly this section, and all components echoing it throughout the Repertoire infuse the empirical melody (played by the right hand), with the theoretical presets (played by the left hand), creating a unique audible and sensed melody combining both.

The intertwining of the axes composing this research necessitated taking a thematic and cross-cutting approach in presenting the dissertation. Given that the dissertation is based on a variety of academic fields, theory and empirical findings are entwined in order to facilitate the writing and understanding of the chapters of this research, and stemming from the importance of some elements in all aspects of research, this dissertation will take a cross-cutting approach into understanding elements such as Gender, Palestinian-ness, and Statelessness.

As the dissertation already demonstrated, studying the Palestinian diaspora and its mobilisation are approached musically and audibly, where titles and some subtitles are constituents of musical terminology in general, and where references to sound, analogies, and reverberations are found throughout this composition. As explained earlier, this approach was adopted in an attempt to generate sounds to a composition that has not been heard yet. This approach was deemed to be a good accompaniment to the thematic nature of presentation of this dissertation, for that where topics are thematic, musical analogies are too.

3.7 Stroking a Goblet Drum: Being: In the Field – Pre, During, & Post

A Goblet Drum produces three different sounds: striking, high-pitched, and closed, which is very similar to the sounds the mind hears when conducting fieldwork in all its stages and phases, pre, during, and post.

“Field researchers are oriented to the environment of study by the guidebooks, agents, and signposts of academic disciplines – thus, scholarly texts, other researchers, and written histories of the region to be visited are the basic currency of exchange that orients the researcher and often predetermines what or whom the researcher will investigate”.  

Being in the field is both physical and mental, it starts with the preparations and imaginations of the field to be visited, and might end upon return; it is physical when one is actually in the field, body and soul, and mental during, pre, and post fieldwork. In that sense, field research largely corresponds to tourism, where a tourist prepares the itinerary based on guidebooks, agents, signposts of travel and tourism, as well as written experiences of other travelers.

Due to the nature of the study conducted in this dissertation, referring to guidebooks written by authors who are members of the group studied, or those who descend from the same background and culture was not possible. The reasons behind this is the absence of literature by Palestinian (or even Arab) authors on what being in the studied field denotes, and because literature written by non-native speakers largely lacks the cultural context which is a critical element in understanding the Palestinian statelessness.

Apart from mapping the field for CSOs, events & activities and potential interviewees, no reference to guidebooks or academic signposts has been made. Creating mental images and taking impressions about what might be seen or observed during fieldwork was considered to be a possible yielder of bias, especially in Lebanon and Belgium. In Jordan, the country where I was born and raised, the reverse of the above was attempted by questioning every given that came to my

183 Dauphinee, New Approaches to Conflict Analysis: The Ethics of Researching War. Page 42.
mind prior to, during, and after fieldwork. Questions of who, why, when, where, how, and what not only touched the observed groups and the analysis of the data collected, but also touched, and at some points shook, my identity.

During fieldwork, it was proven to me that each of the studied countries has its unique settings, with differences outnumbering similarities. In Belgium, observing activities and conducting interviews necessitated and allowed the use of a camera, a recorder, and a notebook, partly because of the tsunami of symbols used and partly due to the use of multiple languages during events. In Jordan, a recorder has been used and easily accepted by interviewees, while observing events did not require a camera given that the language, dynamics, and demands of the observed are something that I have grown up hearing and seeing. My duty in that phase was to question what I grew up taking for granted. Out of the unique settings, Lebanon was the most unique. Neither a camera, nor a recorder, nor a notebook was used on the spot. Using any of such items automatically gives the impression of “outsider”, “CSO researcher”, “foreigner”, “adventure tourist”, and similar identifications. Memory was the only method of documentation between being in the camps and arriving to the car to note all observations. The notebook was also used for interviews because the recorder was not a welcomed gadget in the eyes of the interviewees from CSOs. Existential insecurity, factional clashing, and lack of basic rights such as that of expression can be explanations to that phenomenon.

Residing in both Belgium and Jordan depending on term dates facilitated immersion into the field during those periods. Visiting Lebanon for fieldwork was planned in the early stages of the PhD due to the potential and unexpected implications of the situation in Syria on Lebanon, and the time-bomb-like situation of Lebanon itself. Prior knowledge of Lebanon and the Lebanese way of living (although this might sound like stereotyping) helped in saving time and effort in scheduling interviews and planning fieldwork. Everything can change anytime; a suicide bombing or a car bomb targeting a high-level government official can turn the whole country upside down. An attack can lead to the same as well. This was made clearer to me when I started sending e-mails to organise interviews and started receiving
responses of “when you arrive to Lebanon, call us and we will organise then”. Such lived uncertainties also affect the possibility of accessing Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and prior planning does not guarantee anything on the ground. What matters are the hours, minutes or seconds prior to going to the field.

Leaving the physical space and place of the field does not necessarily mean the end of fieldwork. In this research, the post-fieldwork stage has been critical, especially in the case of Lebanon where some symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder were surfacing throughout a period that extended up to a year. The amount of pain, grief, poverty, restrictions, congestion, and misery were too much to handle, absorb and digest in a shorter duration. Symptoms of intrusive memories including flashbacks and nightmares were something that I have experienced during the first months after fieldwork, while symptoms of avoidance and intentional emotional numbing started appearing later. Writing about Lebanon was an impossible task during that period. After absorbing what has been seen, felt, and heard, the task became doable. This period following the actual being in the field was the period of detaching the personally emotional experience from the academically enriching one. With regards to the post fieldwork stage in Belgium and Jordan, and although not as traumatic and demanding as in Lebanon, the stage has been of great importance to the understanding of the dynamics of mobilisation, the representations of Palestinian-ness, and the understanding of symbolism in both cases.

3.8 Playing a 5 Strings Violin: Triangular Investigation - Instruments of Data Collection & Analysis

The 5 strings violin consists of five strings with unique pitches each of which has a sound of its own. When playing a piece consisting of all its strings, such a violin can produce a harmonious performance. The same applies to triangulation, in this case the triangulation of 5 different sounds (methodologies) – mapping, observing & participating, interviewing, studying space & material culture, and progressive focusing – which if played together produce a harmonious and solid piece of work.
3.8.1 Data Collection Instruments

3.8.1.1 Mapping: Taxonomy of Organisations

Collecting data on and from three different cases required utilising various forms of data collection instruments. The first of which required mapping all Civil Society Organisations working with and within the Palestinian circle in the three studied countries. Taxonomy of organisations was produced and includes multiple levels of concepts that serve the processes of data collection and analysis. The taxonomy includes the following (Table 3.2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taxonomy of Organisations</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Sub-Categories</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of Civil Society Organisations Involved)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Differentiating between types of CSOs is of importance vis-à-vis their perception by the public. E.g: Preference of term NGO (including charities and specialised institutions) over CSO (which implies “Western”) in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Charities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Solidarity Movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Specialised Institutions such as Religious, Cultural, Relief &amp; Aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Image</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of Website, Brochures, Newsletters, Leaflets ...etc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Images can reflect the organisation’s beliefs and positions. E.g: Images &amp; Logos containing historic map of Palestine reflect certain positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Colours Used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Images Used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Logo &amp; Slogan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Selection of Words</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Languages Used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Domain Name</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organisational Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td>Besides the evident importance of looking into goals, the methods of achieving goals is either present or absent which can in turn lead to assessing whether goals are words or actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Palestine/Palestinians related Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities &amp; Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cultural</td>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency of activities is of importance to map which organisations are the most active in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td>Type of activities is of importance in analysing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political ...etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Frequency &amp; Variety</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>What activities and projects are deserving organisation and mobilisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Who does the Organisation Support</td>
<td>Sources of support can define types of activities E.g: Organisations receiving budgets/aid from the international community tend to organise certain types of projects such as Rights and Law related.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In what forms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Who Supports the Organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How is the Organisation maintained (donations, volunteering, membership fees)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Networks</th>
<th>Assessing networks can help in assessing influence of organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Who does the Organisation Network with and where</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In what areas/fields</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>The background of organisations can help in understanding the reasons behind their initiation and thus their organisation and mobilisation efforts and limitations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• History</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Date of Establishment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number &amp; Background of members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Location of main offices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number &amp; location of branches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Taxonomy of Organisations

Data collection was commenced by the abovementioned tool, which after its completion facilitated the subsequent application and utilisation of the rest of the tools including Observation, Participant Observation, and Interviews. Table 3.3 demonstrates the Instruments of Data Collection used throughout the research, and Figure 3.3 demonstrates the methods of data collection per Category of Diaspora Group.
### Instruments of Data Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxonomy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Observation</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Structured Interviews</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of Material Culture</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Instruments of Data Collection

Figure 3.4: Data Collection per Category of Diaspora Group
3.8.1.2 The Unknown of the Known: Observing & Participating

“Observation is a fundamental and highly important method in all qualitative inquiry ... [It] entails the systematic noting and recording of events, behaviors, and artifacts (objects) in the social setting chosen for study”.

“Participant observation is both an overall approach to inquiry and a data-gathering method ... Immersion in the setting permits the researcher to hear, to see, and to begin to experience reality as the participants do ... this immersion offers the researcher the opportunity to learn directly from his own experience. Personal reflections are integral to the emerging analysis of a cultural group, because they provide the researcher with new vantage points and with opportunities to make the strange familiar and the familiar strange”.

Along with the importance of observation comes a set of efforts that the researcher has to endure to achieve the purpose of observation, which is the comprehension of the roots and complexities within natural social settings. Discomfort, ethical issues, attention to microscopic details to comprehend larger images, and self-representation are some of such efforts. Correspondingly, dangers are not detached from observation, whether from afar or by participation. Some fields are occupied with unexpectedness such as the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, while others can be relatively expected due to the relatively low potential of danger such as the fields in Belgium and Jordan.

Observation and Participant Observation have been considered as essential elements in understanding the effects of statelessness on the mobilisation and organisation of the Palestinian diaspora on multiple levels of this research. On the Core Members level (CSOs – Organisers), observation has been employed to help answer the questions this research poses. Participant Observation has been excluded primarily due to the difficulty/impossibility of being physically present in the three locations at the same time (for example during commemorative events), and secondly for reasons pertaining to potential harm inflicting on the researcher. Being

perceived as affiliated to one organisation or the other and thus affiliated to one party or the other (especially when none are of interest to the researcher) imposes more limitations and challenges on the outcomes of the research and researching this topic than the absence of participant observation.

On the Rear Guards Members level (Targets of Mobilisation), observation, and participant observation depending on location and time, have been employed. The advantages of being perceived as belonging to the group studied facilitated participant observation and allowed access to data and information that would not have been accessible otherwise. Parallel to participant observation was observation, this approach was taken in order to map, compare, and triangulate what is seen and practiced in the field, and what is written and said about the field.

On some occasions, where long-duration of participant observation was expected to be dangerous and not very possible, such as that in refugee camps in Lebanon, observation was dominant over participant observation. Similarly, observation and participant observation have been practiced around the All National Members group.

For numbers and figures regarding observation of Activities & Events and Organisations, refer to Tables 3.4 and 3.5 below. The reasons behind the disparity in numbers are country specific and are explicated in later chapters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Organised Activities and Events</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Observation of Palestinian Diaspora’s Activities and Events in the period between 1st quarter of 2012 and Early 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Organisations</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5: Observation of Organisations working within Palestinian Diaspora in the period between 1st quarter of 2012 and Early 2014
3.8.1.3 Interviews: Exploring Verbal & Non-Verbal Communication

“Nonverbal communication and speech combined often interact in a way that increases Verstehen, with nonverbal communication (e.g., facial expression, hand gesture) clarifying the meaning of words spoken, and words clarifying the meaning of nonverbal communication”.

Data collection via interviews has been reserved to the Core Members of the studied groups i.e the organisers, the CSO representatives, for that they were considered to be the most influential and well informed about the organisations they represent in addition to being experienced in organising diaspora activities and events. For those reasons, the interviewed could be considered as “elites”. Although interviewing such people may be demanding due to their experience in being interviewed, and their tendency to steer the interview process, such types of interviews nonetheless, usually yield data of good quality, and knowledgeable responses straight to the point. Expectations of saturation, due to previous knowledge of the Palestinian diaspora’s narratives, led to excluding the Rear Guards (Targets of Mobilisation) from the interviewing process, and the same can be applied to All National Members.

The interviews were of a semi-structured nature for the flexibility such interview styles enjoy. Limiting “elites” to structured interviews was found unsuitable due to what such styles may cause of irritation and domineering of the interviewed, and thus the choice of semi-structured. The interviewed were chosen with reference to the Taxonomy of Organisations based on mixed sampling, including stratified purposeful (to facilitate comparison), opportunity (to adapt to the unexpectedness in some fields), and maximum variation sampling methods (to assure heterogeneity among different people, settings, and times). Interview questions were written in both Arabic and English, and used throughout the interview depending on the language the interviewed is fluent in, or prefers. The interviews were either recorded (by consent) or noted (also by consent) depending on the interviewee’s preferences.

The interview questions aimed at inquiring about the intensity, shape and dynamics of organisation and mobilisation, the barriers and/or facilitators to organisation and mobilisation, methods of communication with potential participants, time, reasons and goals of establishment of organisations, who the organisations support and are supported by and how, and other similar questions.

Parallel to recording answers and speech, the interviewing process also took into consideration nonverbal communication for what it could add to the analysis of data. It was also taken into consideration because understanding the nonverbal communication of the interviewee could prevent certain unnecessary situations, which is very probable when discussing sensitive topics, such as that related to voicing opinions about Palestine and the Palestinians. It is worth noting that the cultural and linguistic similarities between the interviewed and the interviewer played a key role in this process. The modes of Nonverbal Communication taken into account during the interviewing process are divided into four. Firstly: proxemic, which denotes communicating attitudes via the use of interpersonal space. Secondly: chronemic, which includes the observation of the pace of speech and the duration of silence in conversations with interviewees. Thirdly: kinesic, which requires paying attention to posture and movement. Fourthly: paralinguistic, which takes into account the volume and pitch of the interviewed.

Although not all observed and noted nonverbal communication modes were of critical importance to the overall data analysis, nonetheless, issues such as the presence of hegemonic masculinities, group-scepticism, and insecurity were observed via such modes.

Twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted (equally) across the three studied countries. For interview grids, refer to Annex E.

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3.8.1.4 Space & Material Culture

“The things we make reflect our beliefs about the world; the things around us affect the way that we understand the world. There is an unending circularity to this that implies less a circle and more a kind of wheel moving”.

Lance Winn

Material Culture consists of written texts, artefacts and evidence that “in all its forms represent gendered, cultural, social, and political construction ... its interpretation holds a key to the meaning of the underlying lived cultural group or person”.

Via Material Culture, the “belief systems – the values, ideas, attitudes, and assumptions – of a particular community or society, usually across time” can be understood and analysed.

Throughout this dissertation, material culture was an important source of collected data. Objects, documents and artefacts have been subject to questions of who made them and why? What do they mean and how did they end up meaning so? Where are they located and does their location contribute to their meaning?

Booklets, leaflets, drawings, walls, newspapers, spaces & places, clothing, houses, signs, flags among other examples of what is seen in the spaces of what people build/make, use, or live in have been considered as data. This approach eliminated the probability of taking objects that are seen with the naked eye for granted, which could hold a more significant and deeper meaning than expected to the studied group and to their existence. Material culture has been collected in the places and spaces of the field during fieldwork, from organisations, and through virtual techniques via websites and online sources.

188 Anthony Onwuegbuzie, "Innovative Data Collection Strategies in Qualitative Research." Page 719.
3.8.2 Data Analysis

3.8.2.1 Progressive Focusing: Dialoging with Data

“Throughout the study, I also wrote conceptual memos to myself to help sort out my findings. Usually no more than a page long, they represented theoretical insights that emerged from my engagement with the data in my field notes. As I gained tenable hypotheses and propositions, I began to listen and observe selectively, focusing on those events that I thought might bring me alive to my research interests and concerns. This method of dealing with the information I was receiving amounted to a kind of a dialogue with the data, sifting out ideas, weighing new notions against the reality with which I was faced there on the streets and back at my desk”.

The more one dialogues with the data collected via interviews, observations and documents, the more one’s perspective becomes hermeneutic. The complex interaction between written, spoken, and seen data requires progressive focusing for what it permits from refinement. The analysis of data during this research consisted of three main stages. The first is literal, where the text leads the understanding. The second is reflexive, where the personal orientation shapes the focus and interpretation of the text. The third is interpretive, where the personal interpretations of the text are constructed. This trio, or dance as Miller and Crabtree refer to it, shows how the text and the interpreter take turns in leading the analysis up until the interpreter constructs an analysis of his/her own based on both being led, and leading. This analytical procedure seeks to embrace the settings and the people to its folds, and not base analysis on sets of predefined measures. The stages of data analysis take place on the spot, along with data collection. This process is demanding and requires a triangulation of analysis within the triangulation of methods. It is worth noting that Tacit knowledge; a “sense of

191 “Progressive focusing is the process by which a qualitative analyst interacts with the data and gradually refines her focus”. Russell Schutt, Investigating the Social World - the Process and Practice of Research (Boston: University of Massachusetts, 2012). Page 322.
understanding of social processes that reflects the researcher’s awareness of participants’ actions as well as their words, and of what they fail to state, feel deeply, and take for granted facilitating the process of data analysis during the research process.

A mix of methods was applied to help understand the effects of statelessness on the Palestinian diaspora’s mobilisation and organisation. The data collected via fieldwork and documents were subjected to multiple forms of analysis as Table 3.6 shows. Each of the below-mentioned methods facilitated the understanding of a particular dimension, or dimensions, of the research. Some methods were applied throughout the whole research process, while some were reserved for chapters where their application would be of added value. Most methods were applied on the three studied cases with the exception of Netnography, which was reserved to Lebanon due to difficulties in accessing the field at all times.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mixed Qualitative Methods of Data Analysis</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Critical) Discourse Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiotics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual Sociology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netnography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6: Data Analysis Methods

Discourse Analysis alongside Critical Discourse Analysis, which is “a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” 194 were important methods in the analysis of fieldwork data and documents. Similarly, and due to the hypersymbolisation of artefacts and words within the cases studied, Semiotics, which is the science of the life of signs in society,

that also includes the study of symbolism and metaphor among others, played an important role in understanding diaspora mobilisation and organisation.

Parallel to the analysis of *Semiotics* was the analysis of *Narrative*, which is “any study that analyses narrative materials, which can range from ‘naturally occurring’ narratives to oral life stories collected for research purposes to written narratives found in the private, public or political realms”.195 This method proved to be valuable throughout the research process on private, public and political realms.

*Visual Sociology*, “creating a record of the social world with photography. This creates the possibility of “observing” the social world through photographs and films and of interpreting the resulting images as a text”196 was a method of analysis that captured the still, the unspoken of the studied groups. It captured what the studied group took for granted, or is used to, and thus, does not comment about. An example of the abovementioned would be walls, barbed wires, posters and symbols embracing Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

Due to difficulties in frequently accessing the field in Lebanon, participant observation was not a dominant form of data collection. Therefore, *Netnography* accompanied observation in an attempt to triangulate the data. Netnography is “the use of ethnographic methods to study online communities”.197 This has been applied to the community of the Palestinians in Lebanon where analysing social media, an important tool in their mobilisation and organisation, was of great benefit to the research. The selection and observation of sources was based on triangulation of social media sources in order to verify the data. Pages of media, official camp communities, and CSOs were all observed before an event was considered a source of analysable data. The selection of pages was also made after observing all available

197 Ibid., Page 335.
pages and analysing the type of content available on each. Correspondingly, advice was taken from previously known camp inhabitants who organise and mobilise/are organised and mobilised via such pages. It is worth noting that communicating and organising via social media is the most utilised method in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. This phenomenon can be understood in light of the following: Firstly, the Lebanese media in all its shapes does not cover the news of Palestinian camps unless the incident is of high scale accompanied by casualties and outlaws. Secondly, the Palestinians in Lebanon are not capable of initiating their own radio, satellite channel, or newspaper due to their economic circumstances. Thirdly, telecommunication costs in Lebanon in terms of text messages and calls are high. Fourthly, costs of installing wireless Internet connection at homes is more reasonable to the camp inhabitants than costs of making calls, sending texts, or printing flyers to organise or mobilise.
3.9 *Qanun*: Considerations: Between Personal Obligation & Institutional Research Ethics

The *Qanun* is a multi-stringed instrument that “lays down the law of pitch for other instruments”\(^{198}\) and the following considerations section also lays down the law of research, and how it will sound to the researcher and researched, throughout the dissertation as a whole.

“Obligation is not anything I have brought about, not anything I have negotiated, but rather something that happens to me. Obligations do not ask for my consent. Obligation is not like a contract I have signed after having had a chance to first review it carefully and to have consulted my lawyer. It is not anything I have agreed to be a party to. It binds me. It comes over me and it binds me … I cannot send myself an obligation. I find myself obliged but I cannot oblige myself, no more than I can tell myself something I do not know”.\(^{199}\)

“As a concept, ‘research ethics’ refers to a complex set of values, standards and institutional schemes that help constitute and regulate scientific activity. Ultimately, research ethics is a codification of ethics of science in practice. In other words, it is based on general ethics of science, just as general ethics is based on commonsense morality”.\(^{200}\)

As it is the case with ethics in general, research ethics constitutes of both “personal and institutional morality”.\(^{201}\) In this dissertation, the personal dimension of research ethics is referred to as *Personal Obligation* for that inner obligation can stand in the face of unexpected or sudden changes while preset universal ethics seem to be rigid and inflexible in addition to not fully taking cultural contexts and distinctions into consideration. The research process necessitates the presence of empathy and interpretation,\(^{202}\) therefore applying the universal to the local and vice versa is not deemed as convincing or realistic. Despite the drawbacks, which might include bias, research in humanities and social sciences is distinguished and enriched by the

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198 "Maqam World".
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid., Page 8.
researchers views on a society. A number of considerations have been respected throughout the research process of this dissertation. Table 3.7 below lists the considerations that stemmed from both personal obligation and institutional research ethics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations: Between Personal Obligation &amp; Research Ethics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect human dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect integrity, freedom &amp; right to participate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent harm &amp; suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform research subjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain free &amp; informed consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect individuals’ privacy &amp; close relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict re-use and limit storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for values &amp; motives of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear role definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for vulnerable groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7: Personal Obligations & Institutional Research Ethics

Research can be a source of advancing human life and its understanding, and at the same time a source of threatening it. Researching sensitive topics and collecting sensitive material about researched groups is a responsibility, and sometimes a burden, that a researcher has to carry on his/her shoulders during the research and after it. The case of the Palestinian diaspora is not different. When researching people living in long-term grief, pain, hopelessness and helplessness, a researcher finds a lot of experiences to respect, and a lot of situations to prevent. Human dignity is one of the first subjects to respect. The whole experience of being away from the homeland and not being able or allowed to return to it is a source of dishonor and disgrace to the Palestinians, their dignity is negatively implicated by this lived experience. Understanding this and preventing discussing issues that could and would be considered as disrespectful have been a way of respecting the human dignity of the researched group. Standing for the national anthem was another way, given that the flag is tightly related to the dignity, struggle, cause, and existence of

203 Ibid.
204 Source of data ibid.
the Palestinians. Death does not bring human dignity to an end, for example, in Lebanon, paying respects to the souls of those who passed away waiting to return to their homeland was also another way of respecting the human dignity of the Palestinians, both dead in the graveyard and alive standing beside me. The abovementioned can be seen as examples of culture-specific understanding of human dignity.

The **integrity, freedom, and right to participate** in the study were also respected. Giving the researched group an impression that they are being observed, their actions analysed and interpreted has been avoided due to the sense of degradation it may hold. Walking around events and activities with notebooks and recorders was not practiced. Instead, and given the common trend in today’s life, notes were typed on the mobile phone when and if possible. Needless to say, the same was not done during speeches and meetings because it is not proper behaviour. Observations of events and activities were not targeted to individuals, but rather to groups, specifically group dynamics. Thus, intruding on personal freedoms was prevented and demanding permission to participate was not required.

“Researchers bear a responsibility for ensuring that their research subjects are not exposed to suffering”.\(^{205}\) It is well known that suffering does not stop at the physical, but extends to the mental and psychological. Causing **harm and suffering** to the researched group has been prevented by avoiding personal questions and by giving room to the researched to voice his/her opinions, needs, stories, concerns and else. Coming from the same culture and understanding the history of the studied group facilitated the avoidance of sensitivities.

Moreover, informing the researched group of where, how, why and whom is doing what is an ethical obligation, on both personal and institutional levels. Free and **Informed consent**\(^{206}\) forms were written in both Arabic and English, and sent, with no pressure, to the potential participants prior to interviews. The same forms were

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205 Ibid., Page 12.
206 The form was approved by Supervisors and Ethics Supervisor
printed in hard copies and taken to the interviews in case the interviewee missed reading the attachment or lost the email somehow. On the form, the project was introduced, the stage of research stated, and information about the researcher’s background and contact details were furnished. The confidentiality, possibility of anonymity, and voluntary nature of participation in the study were stated clearly and in bold, and the option of withdrawing from the study at any stage was also given in the same way. “Observations conducted in public spaces, on streets and squares, can usually be carried out without informing those concerned”. Therefore, informed consent for public activities was not required, thus not acquired.

Respecting privacy and preventing interference and exposure is also one important obligation and ethical consideration. For example, interviewees’ political and religious opinions were kept private, and no pressure was put on any of the interviewees to reveal any of his/her opinions. Confidentiality has also been respected, and any information about private lives or private experiences has been kept classified. Other confidential material has been anonymised.

Another obligation is the restriction of the re-use of any identifiable data collected. All identifiable data collected during research is kept in a password secured location and stored data is to be deleted once the purpose of the data collected is served.

The values and motives of the researched group have been respected partly via understanding their culture and norms, and partly via documenting, with exhaustive arguments, any motives the researcher analyses and attributes to the group. A recurrent example would be respecting the values and beliefs of some male interviewees in not shaking hands with females (upon arrival and departure). The motives behind such an act are seen as religious and at some points cultural, and are respected to prevent embarrassment or false starts. If the researcher was not from the same region or was not aware of the issue of shaking hands, irrational or false motives might have been ascribed to the researched group or individual.

Clear role definition is another obligation that the researcher has to foresee and implement. It is not an easy task when observation includes participation, due to potential friendships or kinships between the researcher and the researched group. Overcoming this complex relationship between the researcher as a researcher/the researcher as a person and the researched took the shape of straightforwardness. When discussing a topic that could potentially be used in research, the researcher made it clear to the other person that what he/she is saying could be used in the research, and if verbal consent was given, the researcher would consider utilising statements made by the researched.

Researching a vulnerable group requires being considerate to the needs of the researched. “Vulnerable and disadvantaged individuals and groups will not always be equipped to defend their own interests in respect of researchers. Accordingly, researchers cannot take it for granted that ordinary procedures for eliciting information and consent will ensure individuals’ self-determination or protect them from unreasonable suffering”. 208 None of the interviewees demanded anonymity, but at the same time most of the interviewees showed signs of existential insecurity. Therefore, after weighing the pros and cons of including names and positions, and to prevent potential suffering of participants, it has been decided that anonymity will be granted to all interviewees. The observed public speakers will be named due to the public and open space nature of their being.

208 Ibid. Page 22.
3.10 A Blend of Personal and Situational Challenges & Limitations: From Deep-Rooted to Temporal

“The acknowledgement & recognition of errors is a virtue”. 209

The advantages that the researcher enjoys with regards to researching the Palestinian diaspora are both deep-rooted (such as language proficiency and cultural understanding) and temporal (such as being located in 2 out of 3 of the studied cases, and being able to access the 3rd without visa requirements). Similarly, the challenges and limitations faced by the researcher were both deep-rooted and temporal. Some stem from decades ago and are still blossoming, and some surfaced a bit before or during the research process.

3.10.1 Deep-Rooted Challenges & Limitations

Inherent and deep-rooted challenges & limitations are not easy to deal with. Attempting to understand why and how they have been conceived, how they thrive and how they still survive requires navigating from one academic field to another. In this thesis, it also required steering from one language and culture to the other.

Researching the Palestinian Diaspora’s statelessness and mobilisation & organisation has been embraced with inherent linguistic, religious, sociological, political and cultural challenges and limitations. Some of the limitations turned into challenges, and some challenges turned into limitations. The first hurdle faced was Schizophrenic Framing, although it could be argued that such framing is justified and that what the Palestinians experienced/are experiencing leads to such a phenomenon, the Framing of Palestine and anything that revolves around it shows symptoms of schizophrenia (in its broad sense). For instance, Palestine seems to be a state to its stateless people, Palestine exists while Israel does not, Palestine is occupied but the occupier is not acknowledged, Palestinians demand liberation from

209 A well known Arabic phrase
an occupier that is not recognised, the Palestinians living in the diaspora oppose being called a diaspora, but do not mind being referred to as living in the diaspora. The abovementioned and other examples have been frequent occurrences throughout the research process. Trying to understand the causes and translate them into words has been a challenge given that such framing touches upon official and unofficial narratives, formal and informal activities, written documents, organisation, and mobilisation.

Another hurdle was the blurry self-identification of Palestinians. The vastness of potential positionalities any Palestinian in the diaspora can locate him/herself into has been a source of complication during the collection and analysis of data. For instance, a Palestinian in Jordan can be a Jordanian, a Palestinian, an Arab, a Muslim, a Christian, a refugee, a citizen, a victim, a betrayer, a supporter of Hamas, a supporter of Fatah, a supporter of no one, all depending on the situation and circumstances. The same can be applied to a Palestinian in Belgium (adding Belgian), and similar positionalities can also be applied to a Palestinian in Lebanon (excluding a citizen and adding a security threat). Overcoming this hurdle required the introduction of Palestinian-ness and the extensive observation of Palestinians on multiple occasions.

Religious beliefs are barricades and limitation when it comes to understanding the religious importance of Palestine to the Palestinians (in addition to its importance to Arabs, Christians, Jews, and Muslims). According to Islamic (or maybe one should say Muslim) beliefs, Palestine will be liberated before judgment day. It is unclear where the source of this belief exactly comes from, but there are two locations that scholarly supporters of this belief refer to if and when the topic is discussed with them. The first is a verse in the Quran that does not explicitly state the abovementioned belief but was interpreted to mean so. The second is a Hadeeth (reported deeds and saying of the Prophet), which is categorised as a weak hadeeth due to the uncertainty in either the chain of authorities who reported it, or due to the questioned reliability of the text itself. It is important to note that the general public believes in the abovementioned but lacks the information of where the belief
comes from. Confirming the sources required contacting a cleric at the General Ifta’a Department of Jordan, the department responsible for issuing fatwas, which also consisted of being humiliated as to why this question is being asked and why the topic is being questioned. Upon asking the cleric to confirm whether those are the sources he replied: “isn’t that enough for you? What more do you want? One is from the Quran and one is from the Hadeeth. Not enough?”. Another of the barriers is the phenomenon of reliance and dependency on God even when human intervention is possible and required (Tawaakol) as opposed to trust in God (Tawakkol). Along with the certainty the Palestinians have that Palestine will be liberated comes the reliance and dependence on God to do so. Thus, potential mobilisation efforts can be affected in a way or another by the religious beliefs of the culturally Muslim Palestinians. The effects of the abovementioned on the researched topic have not been assessed due to limited time and space, and in order to prevent the deviation from main topic.

The duration of the Palestinian experience and displacement whether in its lived or historical sense is also a limitation and an aspect that was not assessed throughout the research due to limited time and space, and also due to difficulty in assessment. Instead, the historiographies and temporalities of the stateless Palestinians have been investigated.

Gendered comprehension of reality has also been a challenge, questioning masculinities and femininities falls under the same lines of questioning religion; a taboo. Understanding where such comprehension stems from has proved to be a very tough task for that it is a field where religion, culture, language, customs & traditions and politics merge together to form a subject that deserves a separate research topic. Nonetheless, this thesis, cross-cuttingly, does attempt to link gendered comprehensions to the overall research topic, even if modestly.

The ever lasting over politicisation and over symbolisation of Palestine has been challenging. Differentiating between what is done on purpose and based on thorough understanding, and what is done by habit and repetition in addition to
understanding what comes by default and what does not has been a strenuous task. Repetitive observation of small and big details in events and activities has been the utilised way around this challenge.

The *globality* of the Palestinian cause as The just cause that anyone believing in justice can adopt has also been a challenge and especially in Belgium where the cosmopolitan nature of the country and particularly Brussels made participation in events related to Palestine open for everyone (including Europeans and Arabs). Distinguishing between Palestinians and other Arabs (mainly North Africans) via dialects, last names, and clothing styles was an instrument used to accurately (as much as possible) collect data about the studied group primarily and about others peripherally.

Another issue that might be (or not) of importance is the aftermath of 9/11 on the Palestinians both as Arabs and Muslims, and whether the repercussions of 9/11 shifted the priorities of Palestinians to defending their image as Muslims and Arabs first then demonstrating their Palestinian-ness. This dimension, which could be of relevance, has not been assessed.

Other expected but inherent challenges were primarily translations of words in contexts, and secondly numbers and census. Translating a word from one language to the other requires the inclusion of culture and understandings into the translation. This task was time challenging because it necessitated exhaustive clarifications and explanations. Numbers and census, an ever-inherent challenge when researching certain areas, Palestine & Palestinians included, was also a challenge during the research process. Relying on numbers has been prevented during research and presentation, and an average of rough estimates was utilised.

### 3.10.2 Temporal Challenges & Limitations

Temporal challenges and limitation have a particular characteristic, which is that when they hit, they hit hard. There is no prelude sufficient enough to prepare one to
expect and foresee them. It is only when they occur (or shortly after), that their impact surfaces. Whereas the past is critical in the deep-rooted challenges & limitations, the present and the near future are the temporalities of the temporal ones.

Being in the field, where one should expect the unexpected, is full of temporal challenges and limitations. No matter how prepared one is, surprises have to occur, and recur. Upon commencing fieldwork in Belgium, the most democratic of the countries in the case studies, a challenge that I was not expecting started to surface. Anti-Semitism a term that I am aware of but not accustomed to was mentioned on several occasions. The background of the term is not something that I grew up with and was not coined in the region I originate from, and thus had not expected. Some non-Palestinian interviewees believed that certain shapes of mobilising for Palestine are equivalent to anti-Semitism in the eyes of the authorities, such as the case of the president of the now dissolved International Union of Parliamentarians for Palestine who stated that he himself and the activities of the union he was heading were considered a threat to national security and a form of anti-Semitism. 210 It is crucial to note that such statements were mentioned only by Westerners. Whether this claim affected the mobilisation and organisation of Palestinians by Western Organisations or not has not been assessed in this dissertation because the most active organisers with the most Palestinian participants were of Palestinian or Arab backgrounds; which is the angle that this dissertation focused upon most.

The hardest hitting challenge encountered during fieldwork was the shock of witnessing the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. An experience that left a scar that took too long to stop bleeding, and therefore too long to start writing about. The presence of AK47s across the camps, the possibility of being attacked or shot due to internal camp violence that may erupt any time, the fact that being in Lebanon itself should be accompanied by expectations of being a casualty of a suicide bombing, a car explosion, or an attack, were of no value compared to

210 Example Interview - President of the International Union of Parliamentarians for Palestine iupfp, 13 February 2012.
witnessing the camps. The idea of being susceptible to death held more mercy than the idea of being alive waiting for death, which is what the Palestinians in refugee camps have to live with. “Overcoming” the shock required a long duration, and writing about it was a challenge for a year.

Up until I discovered that my curiosity is bigger than my origins or background, asking myself the why and how questions when observing the Palestinians organisation and mobilisation in Jordan has been challenging. The why and how were taken for granted for many years, and had to be questioned promptly during research. This process was not free from self-doubt and anxiety especially when surrounded by people to whom the why and how are taken for granted and discussing the matter is out of question. Accusations of being weird and odd were endless, and questions similar to “why do you think this way?” were also endless.

Another limitation that has not been assessed in this dissertation is the effects the Arab turmoil may have had on the intensity and shape of activities organised by the Palestinians. Was what happening in other Arab countries on the minds of the Palestinians during organising and mobilising? Was the overall situation encouraging or discouraging mobilisation? Did the so-called ‘broken barrier of fear’ affect the Palestinians in the diaspora as it claims to have affected the Arabs in their countries? Did it deviate the attention of Palestinians in the diaspora from Palestine to other issues?

Needless to say, each chosen tool and instrument whether in the data collection and analysis processes, theory selection, and methods utilised during the research process, has its limitations and challenges. Acknowledged are such limitations, and acknowledged is the liability to err. Absolute knowledge is unattainable because an absolute individual does not exist. “We have different eyes. Different souls. And that’s just the way it is ... we want to know different things”. 211 Therefore, the way I saw, understood, analysed and learned things is not the one and only way.

3.11 Contribution to Knowledge

Claiming that this dissertation is a novelty would be similar to amplification, for that it is based on previous researches from different fields of knowledge, and utilises collection and analysis methods that already exist. Nonetheless, the components and approaches to understanding and analysing the effects of statelessness on the mobilisation & organisation of the Palestinians in the diaspora could be considered relatively unique and could be applied to other cases of statelessness. This relative uniqueness can be attributed to the methodology and instruments used in collecting and analysing data throughout the research, which allowed the incorporation of socio-cultural and linguistic anthropology, sociology, and ethnography to the socio-economic and the politico-legal, which is not common practice during investigating diasporas, and especially the stateless of them. Moreover, investigating the similarities and divergences of the same diaspora in different and varied settings in order to draw parallels can be considered another attribute, for that it has not been common practice among investigators of diasporas either. What is more common in today’s scholarship is vice versa, investigation to identify differences.

On the other hand, embracing knowledge in its multiple forms including the tangible and the intangible, the seen and the felt, was an eye opener that allowed understanding the topic in a high zoom lens. Applying such an approach to investigations on diasporas could result in novel findings, and could lead to new answers to frequently posed questions.

Finally, the limitations and challenges faced during the conduction of this research can be sources of further research on the topic, and bases to a better understanding of diasporas in general, and diaspora mobilisation and organisation in particular.

If a composer is to create music for this piece in particular, it will sound like a Concerto contrasting small sounds with larger sounds with the utilisation of a Piano, a Triangle, an Accordion, a Goblet Drum, a 5 String Violin, and the law-setting Qanun.
Until then, the following chapter will compose another set of (written) sounds, namely an Intermezzo Ostinato setting the scene to, and opening room for, the imagination and hearing of the Palestinian current and previous diasporic experiences and existence.
Chapter 4

Intermezzo Ostinato

Intermezzo: “a musical interlude in a larger composition or a piece of music in itself”.  

Ostinato: “a short melodic, rhythmic, or chordal phrase repeated continuously throughout a piece or section while other musical elements are generally changing”.  

Analogy – an interlude to set the scene, to imagine and hear the unseen containing short yet stubbornly present phrases continuously repeated throughout the piece, and reverberating throughout the repertoire.

Metronome: A journey to Palestine and Palestinians, to the pasts and the presents.

213 "Basic Glossary of Musical Forms."
Chapter 4: Intermezzo Ostinato

4.1 A Voyage through the sounds of Palestine & Palestinians

Before reading the rest of the compositions in the Stateless Repertoire, it is worth listening to a composition that sets the scene to what will be coming next. An Intermezzo, but an Intermezzo Ostinato for that its components persistently accompany this composition from its beginning to its end, even if only in the background, and similarly accompanied and still accompanies the Palestinian cacophony. The Palestinian ostinato is also accompanied by persistent transgenerational images and imaginations that despite the pain they inflict, move stubbornly yet smoothly from one generation to the other, and are reflected in the everydayness and reasoning of Palestinians. Commencing with the intermezzo and moving to its ostinati components, this chapter will take the reader through a journey to the past and the sounds it echoes on the present by first briefly drawing the picture of what Palestine was before its people became a diaspora, their homeland’s histories with their host countries, and their present as diasporas living in lands other than what they consider their homeland. It is worth mentioning early in this chapter that despite sharing the same past, the cases studied are heterogeneous and each has its own notes and resonances, thus the variation in length concerning each case in the coming sections. For example, the confinement of the Palestinians in Lebanon within the walls of refugee camps makes the echo of their experiences louder and necessitates longer explanations than the freely moving Palestinians in Belgium. The same applies to the troubled histories of Palestinians or Palestinian organisations in Jordan and Lebanon, which also necessitate explanation despite the absence of such histories for the Palestinians in Belgium.
A brief on names, ownerships & all that resonates in between:

Palaestina Prima, Palaestina, Palestine, Filastin. Names given by Byzantines, Romans, Greeks & Latin, and Arabs respectively to the area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River 214. Clear border bound references to the land under the name Palestine have occurred as early as mid 5th century BC by Herodotus. Although the history and origin of “Palestine” is widely contested and debated, the name Palestine, or Filastin in Arabic is what the Palestinians have been using to refer to their land, and the word Palestinians is what they have been using to refer to themselves. It is also a name that the Jews of the early 20th century used to refer to the land they call home and were promoting travel and return to.

214 Khalidi Walid, Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876-1948 (Institute of Palestine Studies, 2010). Page 27.
Since A.D 70, the ‘Holy Land’ has been a stop and a resort to multiple empires and civilisations. Rome and Byzantium, Islam and The Umayyads, The Abbasids, The Crusades, The Mamelukes, The Ottomans and lastly The Zionists. But it was only
around the 1900’s that the land became the terrain of the dispute known nowadays as the Israeli Palestinian Conflict or the Arab Israeli Conflict among other names. Commencing in the 1900’s, the holy land along with its surrounding lands has also witnessed numerous shapes of mandates, occupations and rebellions. Between 1918 and 1935, Palestine and the Palestinians saw the end of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the British Mandate where the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration, the Aliyah, and clashes between Palestinians and Jews were key features. The following years up till 1939, and in response to British declarations, recommendations, papers, and killings, were marked with various phases of rebellion, commencing with strikes and escalating to violence. In the years between 1940 and the Nakba of 1948, the Jews affirmed their existence in Palestine and were organised and structured to handle what Ben Gurion foresaw as the Zionist struggle in Palestine. The UN Partition Plan of 1947 was also an outcome of this period, where the UN partitioned the land into 56.47% for a Jewish state, and 43.53% for a Palestinian state. The Palestinians, and by considering the difference between 100% of what they call Palestine and 43.53% of it rejected the proposed Partition Plan. On that same year, 1947, Britain decided to terminate its mandate on Palestine in May of 1948. On 15 May 1948, the state of Israel was declared; the Nakba (Catastrophe) of the Palestinians started, and continues till today constituting the Palestinian present that stretches from 1948 onwards, and the diasporisation of the Palestinians to neighbouring countries (Figure 4.2) and later to various locations and destinations commenced. This research studies the Palestinian diasporas in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon, and will thus focus on the past and lived experiences of the aforementioned in conveying the image and making the sounds of diasporisation seen and heard to the writer and the reader alike.

215 Ibid., Pages 241-244.
Figure 4.2: Flow of Palestinian Refugees to neighbouring countries— Courtesy of Palestineremembered.com
4.2 Sounds of Troubled Pasts

From ‘Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan’ to ‘Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine’

Figure 4.3: West Bank Annexation
Courtesy of Chronicle of the Middle East and North Africa
http://fanack.com/countries/jordan/history/annexation-west-bank/

Upon the 1948 Arab Israeli War and the annexation of the West Bank, Jordan witnessed an increase in both its population and its size. Around a hundred thousand Palestinians were expelled from the West Bank to Jordan (the East Bank) increasing its population from 375 000 to 485 000, in addition to around 785 000 who were inhabiting its newly annexed West Bank, thus adding to a total of 1 270 000 people\textsuperscript{216}; a ± 300% increase from what it was prior to 1948’s Nakba. The influx of Palestinians into the East Bank did not stop then, the 1967’s Naksa led to the expulsion of a new wave of Palestinians increasing the percentage of Palestinians in

the East Bank to 60% \(^{217}\) (although contested due to weak documentation) all of which were represented by the government of Jordan who fiercely opposed the establishment of any body planning to claim the representation of Palestinians\(^{218}\). In 1964 however, Jordan hesitantly supported the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), who back then had no intentions in solely claiming the representation of Palestinians. Within a few years of its establishment, the PLO started making demands (compulsory military service for instance) on the sovereign Jordan in what the Jordanian government perceived as competition over the representation of Palestinians, and as an attack on its sovereignty given that PLO guerrillas were launching attacks on Israel from its sovereign territory. Nonetheless, and despite their presence since the early 1950s, such guerrillas mainly represented by the PLO’s Fateh alongside PFLP (The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) only gained momentum during the 1968 Al Karameh battle between Jordan (including the guerrillas) and Israel following an Israeli operation on the small town of Al Karameh home to the refugee camp where the guerrillas were stationed. Both parties on Jordan’s side (military and guerrillas) agreed on victory, but they unsurprisingly disagreed on whom was the reason behind this unprecedented victory over Israel, each claiming to be the hero. In the wake of this long awaited victory, joining the guerrilla groups also called Fida’iyyeen (Self Sacrificers) became a dream to thousands of Jordanians of Palestinian origins \(^{219}\). A dream that challenged Jordan’s sovereignty and military independence leading its government to unleash a full fledged campaign against the guerrillas who were “accused of ‘provocations’ leading to what came to be known as Black September\(^{220}\) in 1970.

\(^{217}\) Ibid., Pages 34-35.
\(^{218}\) For example the General Palestine Government in Gaza and the Higher Palestine Organisation in Cairo and Damascus
\(^{219}\) Undoubtedly, the PLO has played critical political roles to the diasporic Palestinians in the past, especially when the PLO itself was in the diaspora, as it was the case when the PLO was situated in Jordan or Lebanon. But after the PLO’s expulsion from both countries consecutively, its popularity and importance began to decrease, and this has been evident during fieldwork where to my surprise, none of the interviewees and none of the observed events referred to the PLO.
The (denied)\textsuperscript{221} civil war between the Jordanian military and the PLO guerrillas was won by the Jordanian military given its knowledge in the divisions within the lines of the guerrilla groups operating on its territories, which facilitated the launch of an ideological attack on the PLO and its subgroups. The guerrillas’ marginalisation of Jordanians from their mobilisation and organisation was a strategic mistake exploited by the Jordanian government to its advantage where it accused the guerrillas of wanting to build a “state within a state”\textsuperscript{222} or “turn Jordan into a Palestinian state”.\textsuperscript{223} Since then, the popularity of the \textit{Fida’iyyeen} started to fade, and their “arrogance and harassment”\textsuperscript{224} became intolerable to the population. They “drove noisily around Amman in jeeps with loaded weapons, like an army of occupation; they extorted financial contributions from individuals, … they disregarded routine traffic regulations, failed to register and license their vehicles, and refused to stop at army checkpoints … their very presence in Amman, far from the battlefield, seemed like a challenge to the regime”\textsuperscript{225} which yet again, the regime managed to take advantage of by intense media campaigns.

Not only did Black September’s violence claim thousands of lives\textsuperscript{226}, but it also demolished buildings and damaged infrastructure, and extended to symbolic forms of violence when the Jordanian government destroyed the \textit{Tomb of the Unknown Martyr} erected by the PLO in 1970, erasing all references to the \textit{Fida’iyyeen} and their period. The violence did not end at symbolic, for that as “an act of final revenge on the part of the Palestinians”\textsuperscript{227} a guerrilla group calling itself

\textsuperscript{221} Denied because it is not referred to as a civil war, but is given other names like September War and Black September
\textsuperscript{223} Massad, \textit{Colonial Effects: The Making of the National Identity in Jordan}. Page 241
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid. Page 242.
\textsuperscript{227} Massad, \textit{Colonial Effects: The Making of the National Identity in Jordan}. Page 245
Black September assassinated Wasfi al-Tal, then Prime Minister of Jordan, during a visit he was making to Cairo in November 1971. 228

In 1988, around forty years after the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan, the Jordanian position towards the establishment of a Palestinian entity representing Palestinians transformed from opposition to surrendered acceptance. Hussein of Jordan had been going through rough times, which climaxed at the Arab League summit in Algiers in 1988 where he was “isolated, frustrated and impotent. For him the Algiers summit resolutions 229 were the last straw and a major encouragement to disengage from the West Bank”. 230 In the aftermath of the Algiers summit, Hussein undertook practical steps to disengagement starting with the abolishment of the Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, to the termination of a West Bank development plan, to dissolving the Chamber of Deputies and thus terminating representations from the West Bank. On 31 July of the same year, Hussein of Jordan finally addressed the nation in a televised speech where he officially announced the disengagement from the West Bank. 231 Hussein concealed the element of surrender and defeat with an account of altruism where he described the disengagement as “a series of measures to enhance the Palestinian national orientation and highlight the Palestinian national identity; our goal is to benefit the Palestinian cause and the Arab Palestinian people”. 232 From that day on, the Hashemite slogan stating that “Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan” was replaced by “Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine” 233 without forgetting to remind those concerned that disengagement from the West Bank does not mean disengagement from the peace process, and that disengaging from managing people under occupation does not mean disengaging from the Palestinian people and the Palestinian problem.

Until today, Jordan remains a player in the peace process, is still engaged with the Palestinian people, and is playing the role of a God Father to the Palestine Question.

228 For more on the section as a whole, refer to ibid. Pages 233 – 245.
229 Resolutions affirming the right of Palestinians to an independent state under the PLO’s leadership
231 For further details refer to Chapter 22 of ibid.
232 Ibid., Page 464.
233 Ibid., Page 463.
Lebanon: From Temporariness to Permanence

Ever since their expulsion in 1948, the Palestinians in Lebanon’s refugee camps and their surroundings “held an ambiguous legal and political position”\(^{234}\). The absence of defined legal and political identities within the Lebanese authorities’ frameworks has led to the social, economic, political, and legal isolation and marginalisation of the Palestinians on the Lebanese soil. The Lebanese authorities and people alike welcomed the Palestinians seeking refuge in Lebanon assuming that the duration of their stay in camps scattered across Lebanon would be temporary. Upon the unexpected stretch in temporariness and the absence of solutions to the refugee issue, the Palestinians established a resistance movement in the Southern parts of Lebanon, the location in which they were situated when they started launching guerrilla raids on Israel. Israel from its side attacked and bombarded Lebanon as a response. Fouad Chehab, the President of the Lebanese Republic back then subjected the camps to “tight military control, which led to the 1969 “uprisings in the camps” against the Lebanese security forces”.\(^{235}\) The tense phase ended upon the signature of the Cairo Accords between the Lebanese state and the PLO in November 1969. The Accord “redefined the regulations governing refugees in Lebanon … [and] gave Palestinians the right to employment, to form local committees in the camps and to engage in armed struggle”.\(^{236}\) The year after, the PLO relocated to Lebanon after its ousting from Jordan, and started operating on the Lebanese soil extending support to the Palestinian refugees. Beginning 1975, the year that witnessed the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, the central Lebanese authority started suffering from weakness while the PLO’s “political and military power continued to grow”\(^{237}\) until its expulsion in 1982 following Israel’s invasion of

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Lebanon. Again, as it was the case when it was located in Jordan, the PLO was accused of building “a state within a state” and challenging Lebanese sovereignty in parts of the country, particularly the south, leading as well to the annulment of the Cairo Accords by the Lebanese President Amine Gemayel in 1987, and consequently, to the isolation of Palestinians. Yet again, the ousting of the PLO and all its institutions from Lebanon did not mean the end of its loyalists operations on the Lebanese territory. The Palestinian forces headed north and east, a move that gave foundation to the Lebanese Amal militia to wage an open war on all remaining Palestinian loyalists across camps in Lebanon leading to what was named War of the Camps in the late 1980s. By 1990, the Lebanese Civil War was over and the Lebanese state focused its efforts on rebuilding the destroyed country without focusing on the camps that turned into “spaces to contain Palestinians until the peace talks produce some final resolution”.

The abovementioned brief histories do not claim to be all-inclusive. Instead, they are brief presentations to demonstrate how the past echoes into the present, and are considered crucial because of the sounds they transmit in the present Palestinian cacophonies.

As for the third case study, Belgium, it is worth noting that there are no sounds resonating from a troubled past. The past of the Palestinians in Belgium commenced in the 1960s when the first wave of Palestinians arrived to Belgium for studies or as a stop prior to continuing their journey elsewhere in Europe. Thus, when compared to the pasts of the Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon, the past of those in Belgium is fairly younger and shorter, and undoubtedly free of violent clashes and conflicts with the host country’s regime and people. This difference in pasts further demonstrates the heterogeneity of the cases studied.

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238 Ibid.
4.3 Present Representations

In light of their statelessness, Palestinians in the studied cases are not represented by what they call Palestine, their homeland. Instead, each host country has its own dynamics and own relations with the homeland. For example, the Palestinian General Delegation to Belgium (which is also the delegation to Luxembourg and the EU) called by Palestinians ‘the embassy’ is a body that lobbies for certain Palestinian demands, participates in certain Palestinian events and activities, and is only responsible for ratifying and renewing documents for Palestinians in Belgium. Not all Palestinians can benefit from the services of ‘the embassy’, which is only capable of serving, although within limits, Palestinians who hold identification documents from Palestine represented by the Palestinian Authority 240. ‘The embassy’ has no power to issue visas to anyone willing to visit the homeland, and such a will has to go through the embassy of Israel (to those not holding the Belgian citizenship yet, or those who are Palestinian only in origin).

Representing Belgium in what Palestinians consider the homeland is an Embassy located in Tel Aviv, Israel 241 and a Consulate General in Jerusalem 242 where visas can be issued. The former does not serve Palestinians, the latter does to those capable of reaching it. To those incapable of reaching Jerusalem, which applies to the majority of Palestinians, those residing in the West Bank can apply through a Visa Application Centre in Ramallah, and those residing in Gaza are required to complete and mail their applications to the Consulate General in Jerusalem and await further information on further procedures 243. Despite sounding technical, the abovementioned is noted to clarify how statelessness has its effects even on the locations and services provided by embassies and consulates.

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240 Interview - Palestine General Delegation to the European Union, Belgium, and Luxembourg. 2 March 2012.
241 Belgium in Israel is the description given to the embassy on its website.
242 Belgium in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Territory is the description given to the consulate on its website.
243 For further information, refer to http://countries.diplomatie.belgium.be/en/jerusalem/
On the unofficial country level representation, and from what has been observed during fieldwork in Belgium, one organisation is dominant in representing Palestinians over other similar organisations. The Communauté Palestinienne en Belgique et au Luxembourg (CPBL) is the party responsible for organising most events related to Palestine and Palestinians (with the highest Palestinian participation) where it organised and co-organised 5 out of 8 observed events. The rest of the events were organised by Belgian organisations and parties working on different issues one of which is the Palestinian cause.

Some Palestinian led organisations in Belgium cooperate and cosponsor events, such as CPBL and ABP, and on some occasions Intal (refer to Annex A for further data), and some compete and cosponsor trouble. One of the competitors to CPBL is the Communauté Palestinienne en Belgique (CPALB) and its sister organisation La Maison Palestinienne en Belgique (MPALBEL), who accuse the CPBL of being funded and steered by ‘the embassy’ represented by its ambassador (whom they do not appreciate, at least on a political level) due to the presence of the address of the embassy on the official registration certificate of CPBL and due to the resemblance in name between the CPBL (Belgium and Luxembourg) and the embassy’s general delegation also to Belgium and Luxembourg. “They [the sceptic Palestinians in Belgium, and in particular those loyal to CPALB] think we belong to the embassy. They accuse us of being supported and funded by the embassy because the address on our registration certificate is the same as the embassy’s address ... and because our names resemble each other. Belgium and Luxembourg is in our name, and also in the embassy’s name. The embassy offered us its address to facilitate our registration process, not because it wants to own us. We should be thankful for the gesture”, said one of the founding members of CPBL in Brussels. Very clearly depicted in Belgium are factional schisms accompanied by a strong desire to garner monetary aid, power and authority, where one party transgresses the events organised by

244 Observed during the 11th Palestinians in Europe Conference at Collège Saint Michel – Etterbeek, Brussels on 18 May 2013, where members of the CPBL were sceptically reproached and questioned by members of CPALB on the reasons behind the absence of the ambassador and representatives of the embassy from attending the conference. 245 Interview - La Communauté Palestinienne En Belgique Et Au Luxembourg, 16 June 2012.
another to distribute posters and leaflets, or to argue and fight. “There you go”, said a Fatah loyalist before handing me an A4 paper with the logo of Fatah, part of its charter in Arabic and English, and signed by what is called “Fatah – Belgium Section”.

In Jordan, the dynamics are very different, proving how heterogeneous the cases studied are. As described earlier, the relationship between Jordan and Palestine is long and intricate. Jordan plays the role of the God Father to Palestine and to its people, the Palestinians (whether in the homeland or in the diaspora), as well. Representing Jordan in Palestine are liaison offices in Ramallah and Gaza, and representing Palestine in Jordan is an Embassy. It is worth noting that offices, consulates, embassies are used interchangeably when talking about Palestinian representations in general, despite the reasons behind the differences in naming and labelling.

246 Observed during a protest on Saturday 18 May 2013 at Place du Luxembourg between 14:00 – 16:00 where Fatah loyalists were distributing leaflets and posters in an event they have not organised nor sponsored.
On the country level presentation, and unlike in Belgium where the country level is unofficial, the Department of Palestinian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represents the Jordanian Palestinians in refugee camps in Jordan. Those residing outside camps are represented as Jordanians by the Jordanian government. Both the abovementioned are and can be represented by the UNRWA as well.

Missing in Jordan are clear depictions of organisations representing the Palestinians as a diaspora. Further explications on this point are found throughout this chapter and other chapters of this dissertation.

![Diagram of Present Representations in Jordan](image)

Figure 4.5: Present Representations - Jordan

The representation of Palestinians in Lebanon is another proof of the heterogeneity of the Palestinian diasporas and the dynamics that surround them.
An embassy of Palestine in Lebanon (previously a PLO representation) does exist, and is responsible for consular tasks excluding visa issuance, but in what is explained as a rejection of normalisation with Israel, an embassy of Lebanon in Palestine does not exist, making the relationship limited and one-sided. Within the Lebanese government, there exists a committee called the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. This committee addresses the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in coordination with the UNRWA, the PLO, and the organisations (CSOs and NGOs) of the International Community. Despite its official status, this committee’s attempts and capabilities in addressing the situation of the Palestinian refugees in the camps of Lebanon are minimalist for various reasons, the main of which is the politics of Lebanon as a whole.

Parallel to the dialogue committee, is a separate and detached in-camp structure of representation called the Popular Committee. Despite its name, it is neither popular in terms of popularity, nor popular in terms of being from and to the people. Each camp has its selected, as opposed to elected, popular committee appointed by faction leaders based on political ideologies and old-boy networks, and thus, creating further schisms between the ideologically divided Palestinians in Lebanon.

In their everydayness though, the campizens are governed by multiple layers all functioning in the place of a missing state (Figure 4.7), the first of which is represented in shadows of political factions and showing (or not) loyalty to them. Loyalty, or its absence, affect the everydayness of the Palestinians in Lebanon and shape their mobility within camps during the night time for instance, where party loyalists occupy certain areas and fix curfews, and where trespassing areas of the opposing party can lead to violent clashes and shootings.

Loyalty (or its absence) also plays a role in who receives (or does not receive) monetary support from whom (usually the affluent Fatah) for what motives (usually survival and continuity of Fatah) and by playing what roles (usually guarding Fatah

247 For further details refer to Chapter 3 of Diana Allan, *Refugees of the Revolution: Experiences of Palestinian Exile* (Stanford, California Stanford University Press, 2014).
related offices or buildings for a monthly salary of around 300USD, a fortune to inhabitants living in severe economic hardships). “They [Fatah loyalists] live in Fatah offices, they sit and sleep there, they play cards, smoke cigarettes, and at the end of the month they get a salary of 300USD, it cannot get any better, and they are doing nothing. They are protected by Fatah and they are paid a monthly salary”, stated a politically active inhabitant of Ein El Hilweh 248 and added, “on top of the protection and monetary support, they are prioritised when sick or in need of medicine or hospitalisation” 249 Therefore, showing no loyalty to any party affects the camp inhabitants abilities to secure basic needs such as diagnosis, medication, or financial aid if and when sick.

The second layer that affects the Palestinian everydayness is represented by the selected (as opposed to elected) Popular Committees and Security Committees, responsible for bureaucratic procedures like managing electricity subscriptions, facilitating house rental agreements, organising neighbourhoods, and maintaining law and order in refugee camps.

The third layer is that of the UNRWA and Local NGOs who support Palestinians in schooling and clinics, as well as on the socio-economic level such as Inaash, The Palestinian Arab Women League, Association Najdeh, Beit Atfal Al Sumoud, Islamic Union for Palestinian Students, Shahid (witness), and Ahlam Laje’e among others. (Refer to Annex B)

The fourth layer, with the least capacity in influencing the everydayness of Palestinians is represented in the International NGOs and donors. All the abovementioned are surrounded as separate entities and as a whole by factors ranging from host country politics, to homeland politics, to relations with neighbouring countries, to the past and present of the host country making the situation in the camps, whether lived or governed, as complicated as the government and politics of the host country. It is worth noting that all the factors and players surrounding and eclipsing the inhabitants of the camps are treated with scepticism and perceived with frustration where for example the eligibility of financial/medical aid for Palestinians by the UNRWA only applies to those under 60

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248 Interview - Politically Active Inhabitant of Ein El Hilweh 24 March 2015.
249 Ibid.
years of age in cases of chronic illnesses. As if by sixty, one must be long dead and thus, requiring no aid and suffering from no chronic illnesses. The same applies to NGOs whether from within the camp or from outside, where the Palestinians (including some Palestinian NGOs) are frustrated from the disregard for local needs and sceptic about the agendas of such organisations. “All those Hamas or Fatah led NGOs, and even international NGOs have their own agendas. And we do not believe in them” said one of the founders of Ahlam Laje’e at Shatilla Refugee Camp in Beirut.

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Figure 4.6: Present Representations - Lebanon

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251 Discussed during Interview - Ahlam Laje’e at Shatilla Refugee Camp. Where the interviewees, a group of young men who started an independent NGO, expressed their frustration at the agendas of Fatah or Hamas-led NGOs and the inconsiderate narratives of the International NGOs which ignores primary needs and focuses on secondary and tertiary needs.
4.4 Echoing the Past – Living the Present

4.4.1 Belgo-Palestinian: A Stateless Minority in Belgium

Ranging from as low as 800 to as high as 4000, the first wave of Palestinians arrived to Belgium in the 1960s when a few dozens of Palestinians decided to settle in Belgium while on their way to Germany. During the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, Belgium witnessed a second wave of arrival, where Palestinians headed to Belgium to pursue academic studies, most of which left Jordan after the previously mentioned Black September and part of which returned to Jordan or elsewhere after graduating. The third wave consisted of Palestinians from both Syria and Lebanon fleeing the Lebanese Civil War that started in 1975 and the Israeli invasion of

253 Interview - Palestine General Delegation to the European Union, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
Lebanon in 1982. A fourth wave resulted from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (where a number of Palestinians took refuge in earlier decades) and the expulsion of the Palestinians from Kuwait as a response to Yasser Arafat’s alignment with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Moreover, waves of Palestinians continue to hit the shores of Belgium upon unrest or war wherever they are living, such as the Palestinians who decided to seek refuge in Belgium after the second intifada, or those who escaped Gaza or Syria in 2014 and earlier. It is worth noting that not all the Palestinians who took refuge in Belgium stayed in it. To some it was a stop before heading towards other western countries, to others it was a stop before returning back to where they came from, namely Jordan, Lebanon or Syria. Most of those who settled either married Belgians and thus acquired the Belgian citizenship, or were granted asylum.

It is very critical to note that in addition to being scarce and unsystematic, academic productions on the socio-economic and political dimensions of Palestinian diasporism, especially in Belgium, are still in their infancy and limited to horizontal studies, and that at the time of completing this dissertation, only one source of such data was available from the Palestine International Institute, whose researchers attempted to collect data through multiple meetings with Palestinians in Belgium. “The objective was to establish a database of all members of the Palestinian community in Belgium, with their names, addresses, professional and academic data, etc. Unfortunately, this initiative faced several obstacles such as suspicions, internal conflict, political preferences and other reasons” states the publication/report which also adds that “After no less than 13 meetings in Brussels during the period between July 2003 and November 2004, the author of this report could only conclude that the probability of ever getting full and accurate data of the current circumstances is almost non-existent. Several Palestinians who do possess credible information and personal details about Palestinian individuals and families residing in Belgium are reluctant to cooperate, hiding behind the ‘privacy’ argument and the fact that they do not know whether these individuals wish to be identified for personal or political reasons”. 254

254 Institute, *The Palestinian Community in Belgium*. 
As the backgrounds of the Palestinians in Belgium vary so do their socio-economic as well as politico-legal conditions. According to the currently solely available study on the Palestinians in the diaspora, by the Palestine International Institute, an institute that aspires (or aspired upon its initiation) to “Bind Palestinians in Diaspora and Expatriates to the Homeland”, the Palestinian community in Belgium does not consist of many academics, lawyers, physicians, businessmen, artists or entrepreneurs. Most Palestinians are “blue collar” workers and some are unemployed and live on aid by the Belgian government. No data or evidence is available on Palestinians holding political positions or involved in national politics.

A propos the legal conditions of the Palestinians in Belgium, and apart from the ones already naturalised, some are without papers, and others are asylum-seeking refugees. According to Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, The Belgian Office des Etrangers registers the Palestinian asylum seekers under different categories; Palestinians from Palestine, inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon of Palestinian origins, Stateless Persons, or Persons with “Un-established” Nationality. According to the Belgian Refugee Council’s legal advisor (Council also known as La Comité Belge d’Aide aux Refugiés/ Het Belgisch Comite voor Hulp aan Vluchtelingen), the Palestinians with no nationality are registered under “unknown” nationality, which applies, but is not exclusive to, Palestinians from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, or any person of Palestinian origins without a nationality. A Palestinian with a Jordanian nationality, therefore, is considered Jordanian. This applies to all the abovementioned without differentiating between those registered with the UNRWA, and those who are not. The Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons estimates, but cannot provide exact

255 Interview - Palestine International Institute 20 December 2011. where the interviewee explicated how difficult the mission was given that there is no central unit unifying the Palestinian diaspora
257 Ibid., Page 31.
numbers, that the Palestinians make 50% of all the people who fall under category “unknown”. It is also important to note that collecting accurate data on Palestinians has not been common practice for decades, and that commissions and councils are only recently debating introducing new methods to ensure the collection of detailed data, an example of which is the aforementioned Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons whom will start to process and provide data differently starting 2016 onwards.259

Although the Palestinians in Belgium reside in what can be called a democratic state, fear, scepticism, and distrust are very apparent features that can be felt during the observation of organised activities and also through casual conversations with the Palestinians. Phrases like “I will end up in jail because of you”, “those are from (name of faction), this is how they think” and “he is from x place in Palestine, and I do not trust those from x” among others are very common sentences that do not surprise the ear. Masculine competition260, which sometimes turns violent both verbally and physically, is intense among the Palestinians in Belgium, especially that of competition between opposing groups. A meeting organised by the Communaute palestinienn en Belgique et au Luxembourg ended with a violent fight between the organisers and their ideologically dissimilar and resource-competing opposing group, the Communaute palestinienn en Belgique, where chairs and tables were broken and the police was called to the location 261. It is worth noting that the opposition between groups largely resembles that present within the homeland including Pro Fatah – Abbas, Pro Fatah – Dahlan, Pro Hamas, and Pro PFLP.

In order to create an image of the Palestinian presence, this following section takes the reader on a journey to the representations of Palestine, Palestinians and Palestinian-ness in Belgium.

259 “Interview - Legal Advisor at Belgian Refugee Council”. 14 February 2016
260 Demonstrated by rough talk, stares, and puffed up body language such as those observed during the “65eme Anniversaire de la Nakba” between Pro Fatah demonstrators and others on Saturday 18 May 2013 at Place Luxembourg -Brussels
261 Meeting held on the 16th of June 2013 between 15:00 – 18:00 at 12 Avenue de la Couronne – Brussels. A similar incident also happened in 2009.
The Palestinians residing in Belgium are scattered across the country but mainly centred in Brussels the capital, and then Liege towards the east of Belgium. Most of the activities and events organised and participated in by Palestinians are held in Brussels with a few held in Liege. Correspondingly, the Question of Palestine in general is a hot topic in Belgium and various Belgian organisations and parties such as Intal, Coordination Nationale d’Action pour la Paix et la Démocratie CNAPD, League Communiste Révolutionnaire LCR, Parti Humaniste, Parti Socialiste, CNDC 11.11.11, Comité Verviers-Palestine, and more (refer to Annex A and B) organise and mobilise citizens throughout the year.
Figure 4.8: A banner by the group of citizens of Brabant Wallon stating “Just Peace in the Middle East”, Gathering for Gaza, Place Flagey, Brussels - 24 November 2012

Figure 4.9: Flags of Intal in a Gathering for Gaza in Place Flagey, Brussels - 24 November 2012
Perceived as Middle Eastern, Arabs, or Muslims, the Palestinians in Belgium are keen on representing themselves as Palestinians originating from and representing Palestine first and foremost. This eagerness is demonstrated in their use (and sometimes overuse) of symbols such as the Palestinian flag and its colours, the map of historic Palestine, and the kefiyyeh among other symbols. The same keenness applies to the maintenance of their folklore and art by decorating their organised events with folkloric dances, clothing, and dishes.

Figure 4.10: Palestinian girls dressed in the Palestinian flag during a Rassemblement de solidarité – “Sauvage aggression contre Gaza” on the steps of Bourse, Brussels – 16 November 2012
Figure 4.11: In the Lens of Mustafa Awad: Palestinians during Land Day celebrations in Brussels 2012

Figure 4.12: Palestinians holding and waving Palestinian flags during an “Assemblment Pacifique à l’Occasion du 64eme année de la Nakba du Peuple Palestinien”, Rond Point Schuman, Bruxelles – 15 May 2012
Figure 4.13: Circulated poster to 65th Anniversary of the Nakba at Place du Luxembourg, Brussels - 18 May 2013 showing Palestinian flag and refugees in transfer in the background.

Figure 4.14: Poster to “Discover the other face of Palestine” event in Liege – 13 September 2012.
4.4.2 Jordan: A Seamless Stateless Majority in Jordan

“The Palestinians in Jordan had been awarded Jordanian citizenship more than four decades earlier, and since then relations between East Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin had grown more complex at every level—social, economic, and familial”. 262

“... once the Palestinians achieve their right to statehood, Jordanians of Palestinian origin will at last have the right to choose where they want to live. Those who want to be Palestinian citizens and move to Palestine will be free to do so, and all of our citizens who choose to stay in Jordan, whatever their background or origin, will remain Jordanian citizens”. 263

Jordan; a country of around 6 million inhabitants, where the Jordanians of Palestinian origins constitute what is thought to be 50% 264 of the population, has been home to Palestinians mainly since 1948’s Nakba. What is meant by home here is a place where most Palestinians are Jordanian nationals, are entitled to whatever a Jordanian of Jordanian origins is entitled to, and have the same rights as the other half of the population. From all neighbouring countries with high populations of Palestinians, Jordan was the only country that did not consider naturalisation to be a threat to the Palestinian Right of Return and it is the only country (along with Syria to a certain extent, Syria of pre 2010) between its neighbours where the Palestinians have a hybrid identity 265 (on some occasions discussed below, even Jordanians have a hybrid identity).

When communicating with a Jordanian, one cannot necessarily tell whether the person is originally Jordanian or originally Palestinian. The dialect (especially in

265 Interview - Refugees, Displaced Persons and Forced Migration Studies Center, 16 January 2012 where the interviewee stressed on hybridity in the open questions
Amman where most Palestinians live) is not a dividing factor, and neither are the places of residence (the majority of Palestinians live outside camps), external looks or the socio-economic statuses. Even where the dialect changes, people can also change their dialect from ‘Ammani’ to something ‘tougher’ or more ‘masculine’. This practice is widely noticeable between males (although also practiced by females), where when inside their houses they use one dialect and when outside they use another. What is important to note is that this practice is not monopolised by Jordanians of Palestinian origins, but is also practiced by Jordanians of Jordanian origins. Another point worth noting is that there are indeed Jordanians of Palestinian origins who still willingly reside in refugee camps, but are a minority (unlike those in Lebanon) and live in open space camps surrounded by quarters with identical living conditions (and are not surrounded by walls and barbed fences like in other countries).

266 This is not the case in Lebanon for example, where most Palestinians live in dire conditions in refugee camps.
267 Willingly as in they have the option and the right to move to anywhere they find suitable outside the camp.
268 Up to 18% of the Jordanians of Palestinian Origins still reside in camps whereas the other 82% reside elsewhere. Mahmoud Al Aqrabawi, General Director of the Department of Palestinian Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Jordan on Al Jazeera, "Al Iqtisad Wal Nas (Economy and the People/ Economy and the Society)," in Conditions of the Palestinian Refugees in Jordan (2013).
Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan were established following two central years for the Palestinians: 1948 after the Nakba, and 1967 after the Naksa (Table 4.1 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post 1948's Nakba</th>
<th>Post 1967's Naksa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Zarqa [1949]</td>
<td>Souf [1967]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid [1950]</td>
<td>Prince Hussein [1967]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madaba [1956]</td>
<td>Baqaa [1968]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marka (Schneller) [1968]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Talbieh [1968]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jerash [1968]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hittin [1968]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Source: UNRWA and On the Margins 269

Walking through the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan is like walking in the areas surrounding them. There are no checkpoints, no walls and fences, no discrepancies between inside and outside the camp, and no aggressive representations and symbolism of Palestine. One can occasionally see, here and there, a flag, a picture of the Dome of the Rock, a map of Palestine, but this is not present on a 360 degrees head turn. Representations of Palestine can be seen through the names of shops, car garages, and grocery stores among others. Names of villages, towns, cities, mountains, valleys, last (family) names, and sites can be read while passing through the camp areas. This is also present in other areas, and is not exclusive to the camps.

Figure 4.16: Streets named after Palestinian cities (Jaffa, Gaza, Nablus, Lod) – Amman, Jordan
Figure 4.17: Streets named after Palestinian cities (Qalqilya, Rafah, Beersheba) and the Palestinian Village Lifta – Amman, Jordan

Figure 4.18: Streets named after Palestinians – Amman, Jordan
Figure 4.19: Shops named after Palestinian cities Upper Left: Lod Apartment Hotel, Upper Right: Al Jaleel Waters, Bottom Left: Jerusalem (Al Quds) Paints, Bottom Right: Al Quds Falafel. Amman, Jordan

Figure 4.20: Welfare Associations named after Palestinian cities and villages Up: Lifta Welfare Association Bottom: Lod Welfare Association Amman, Jordan
Official offices of different Palestinian factions are not present in camps, although verbal loyalty to different factions mainly divided by Fatah and Hamas does exist. The Palestinians in Jordan are not represented by the government(s) in Palestine; but are represented by Jordan and its government.

Schooling, health care and relief & social services are provided by the UNRWA to registered refugees within and outside the camps. Not all Jordanians of Palestinian origins are registered with the UNRWA though, but that does not mean that they are denied the abovementioned services. Such services are provided to Palestinians inside and outside the camps via both the public and the private sectors.

The right to ownership, inheritance of property, education, health care, membership to unions, political participation, and practicing all professions are granted to all the Jordanians of Palestinian origins. In some fields like business and commerce in addition to a multitude of industries, the Jordanians of Palestinian origins have the edge over those of Jordanian origins such as the case of the Arab Bank, one of the largest financial institutions in MENA, founded by a Palestinian in Jerusalem back in the 1930s and now headquartered in Amman. Another example is that of Nuqul Group, a conglomerate of companies owned and run by a Jordanian of Palestinian origins.

Jordanians of Palestinian origins have been playing major roles in the politics of Jordan. They hold positions as members of Parliament in both Houses; Senate and Representatives, as well as Ministers (such as Umayyah Tukan minister of Finance, Nasser Judeh Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriate Affairs,\(^{270}\) Amin Mahmoud former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, and Rajai Dajani former Minister of Interior Affairs), and even as Prime Ministers (such as Suleiman Al Nabulsi between 1956 and 1957, Ahmad Tukan in 1970, Kassim Al Rimawi in 1980, and Taher Al Masri in 1991).

\(^{270}\) All examples are from the current (2015) cabinet.
The questions of “Who is Jordanian? Who is Palestinian? What constitutes ‘Jordanniess or Palestinian-ness’?” are questions that do not have direct nor simple answers in Jordan. In other countries such as Lebanon or Syria, those questions especially the first two of them (if they read Who is Lebanese? or Who is Syrian? vs. Who is Palestinian?), would be easy to answer; the Palestinians are those people living/residing in Lebanon/Syria without being Lebanese or Syrian. In Jordan, this answer is insufficient. There are no direct or simple answers because Jordan is a country where on some occasions all Jordanians can turn into Palestinians, and on others all Palestinians can turn into Jordanians. The hybridity works in both directions. A football match between Jordan and Uzbekistan or Jordan and Uruguay was capable of turning the Jordanian population and despite their origins into Jordanians wearing a red Kefiyyeh (traditional head and shoulder wear) and supporting their national team. A participant in a talent program called Super Star, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, was capable of earning votes from Jordanians again despite their origins and was also capable of letting Jordanians take the streets until after midnight to celebrate her triumph. A similar case occurred in 2012 when a Palestinian from Gaza won the title of Arab Idol, which took Jordanians to the streets, celebrating the win of the Palestinian contestant yet waving the flag of Jordan.

Figure 4.21: Jordanians Celebrating
Courtesy of Khaberni.com 22 June 2012

The aforementioned were not rare occasions of hybridity or shifting in identity, but they are common and frequent even on daily basis. The same applies at times of conflict escalation in ‘Palestine’ where Jordanians of all backgrounds mobilise to donate money, clothes, blood ... etc, and where the Jordanian flag is waved beside the Palestinian one. “It is evident and observable that donations, in multiple forms, from Jordanians despite their origins, increase in times of conflict escalation in Palestine and during holy months and occasions” stated a representative of Al Munasara Islamic Zakat Committee.  

Despite the brightness of the picture reflected by observing Palestinians in Jordan, sensing that one is not “Jordanian enough” is something that the Palestinians in Jordan face, generally in the form of “narcissism of small differences” even if in jest.

273 Interview - Al Monasara Islamic Zakat Committee for Palestinian People 3 January 2012. It is worth noting that the same applies to the organisation of activities and communication with potential participants.

The Palestinians in Jordan, who are also Jordanians, do endure what can be called differential treatment in some circumstances. Although not stated or declared, positions in the civil service (public sector) appear to be mostly reserved to Jordanians of Jordanian origins. There are some exceptions of course, but the majority of the civil servants are of Jordanian origins. This does not require a study of origins and backgrounds to prove, it only requires a simple look at the last (family) names of civil servants, for that knowledge of which family descends from where is very common. The same can be applied to military and judicial positions.

Moreover, the seamless hybridity that Jordanians of both origins enjoy can become very visible (as opposed to seamless) during matches between local teams. Matches between the long-time rivals Al Wihdat (a football club founded in Al Wihdat Camp in the 1950s) and Al Faisali (a club perceived as the one for Jordanians of Jordanian origins although it consists of players from both origins) rarely end without clashes, whether verbal or physical.

4.4.3 Stateless & Statusless: Stateless & Status-less: Palestinians in Lebanon

“For these Palestinians, the pain associated with their expulsion and the decades of living in exile is being aggravated by the systematic discrimination they suffer in Lebanon. The life is being choked out of their communities, forcing the young and healthy to seek jobs abroad and condemning the rest to a daily struggle for survival”.

“Much of the discriminatory treatment Palestinians face is rooted in their statelessness, which has been used by the Lebanese authorities to deny them equal rights”.

277 Ibid., Page 4.
The Forgotten People, a name the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon use to refer to themselves, and to their existence. Estimated between 435,000 and 470,000 refugees (and in some sources 500,000) in a country of 4.5 million, the Palestinians constitute a bit over 10% of the population of Lebanon.

The majority of the Palestinians in Lebanon fled Palestine during the 1948 war (most of them without their documents and without anything but what was on them), the 1967 war, and from Jordan following 1970/1971’s Black September. Fleeing war, the Palestinians inhabited camps (and later camp surroundings) spread across Lebanon. Some of which were already built by the French government for the Armenian refugees who fled to Lebanon and neighbouring countries following the Armenian Genocide in the early 1900s.

Four generations of Palestinians have been inhabiting 12 camps and their surroundings in extremely dire conditions where they are considered, by the Lebanese government (and sometimes the people), as a security threat and a destabilising factor to the confessional framework of Lebanon where politics is governed by proportionality and political offices are reserved based on religion. In order to clarify why the Palestinians are considered a destabilising factor, it is worth going into details about the confessionalism of Lebanon. In a country where 18 different sects, religious communities, and sub-religions subsist, any influx of one sect or religion guarantees an immediate sectarian imbalance, which in its turn affects proportionality and thus representation in office.

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279 The only place where a Palestinian in Lebanon can represent a country, in this case Lebanon, is in football teams, where each Lebanese football team can recruit at least one player of Palestinian origins. Discussed at Interview - Palestinian Institution for Youth and Sport in Beirut, 10 July 2012.
Christian Maronite is the President of the Lebanese Republic, Sunni Muslim is its Prime Minister, Shi’a Muslim is its Speaker of the Parliament (also referred to as President of the National Assembly), a Druze is its Chief of the General Staff in the Lebanese Armed Forces, and a ratio of 1:1 (Christian:Muslim) is for its members of Parliament, all according to the Lebanese National Pact of 1946 and the Taif Agreements of 1989. On the other hand, the majority of the Palestinians who took refuge to Lebanon, the country of the 18 sects, were Sunni Muslim with a minority of Christians. Most Christians were given the Lebanese nationality and most Muslims were given a special Palestinian Refugee ID Card.\textsuperscript{282} The argument has repeatedly fell in the lines of: Naturalisation leads to resettlement, and resettlement leads to the renouncement of the Palestinian Right to Return. As for why this logic is not applicable to all Palestinians the answer would be why not naturalise Palestinian Christians to close the gap between the ratio of Muslims and Christians (a lot of which are in the diaspora), which has been ranging between 60:40, 40:60, and 55:45 since the 1930s?

\textsuperscript{282} Palestinian refugees are treated as a special category of foreigners, those who do not carry documentation from their country of origin and are thus denied basic rights such as the right to own and inherit property and the right to work in all professions. The aforementioned is explicated as reciprocity.
Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon

Figure 4.23: Map of Lebanon – Palestinian Refugee Camps [Source: UNRWA]

The methodology chosen to study the topic of the dissertation includes thorough investigation of visualisations, impressions, and visual sociology. Therefore, the section below is meant to take the reader on a journey to the Palestinian refugee camps, to imagine the lives of the Palestinians living in Lebanon.

From highest population to lowest population, the following section will introduce the camps, their inhabitants and their conditions based on data collected from the UNRWA, Academic sources, and fieldwork conducted in Lebanon in 2012. It is worth noting that there are Palestinian settlements, usually near camps, which are not classified as camps, and there existed other camps that were destroyed either by Israeli forces during the many confrontations between Israel and Lebanon or by clashes between the Lebanese Army and militias within camps.

Ein El Hilweh – Saida [Towards South of Lebanon]

A temporary in theory permanent in practice poverty and misery stricken house to 40 000 – 100 000 Palestinian refugees and their descendants Ein El Hilweh: Sweet Spring in English although it is nowhere near sweet nor spring, is a 1 km² camp set up in 1948 to accommodate Palestinians fleeing from the North of Palestine, namely from cities and villages such as Amqa, Al Simireh, Al Nahr, Al Sofsaf, Al Tireh, Hitten, Manshieh, Ras Al Ahmar, Saffouriyyeh, Shaab and Tarshiha.

Starting 1952, when UNRWA began its operations in the camp, tents have been gradually replaced by concrete shelters some of which still have metal sheet roofing until today.

During the Lebanese Civil War, many Palestinians from other camps were displaced to Ein El Hilweh making it the biggest camp in Lebanon, population-size wise. It also became home to the displaced Lebanese of the Israeli Grapes of Wrath Operation in 1996 and home to some Lebanese and Syrian workers who find house rental prices affordable there. It is worth mentioning that Ein El Hilweh is the most politicised and volatile camp in Lebanon and has been witnessing deadly clashes and conflicts since its early days. It is also considered a zone of lawlessness,

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284 Roberts, Palestinians in Lebanon Refugees Living with Long-Term Displacement. Page 201. Numbers vary according to source with UNRWA stating 47 500 refugees and refugees stating over 80 000.
especially by the media, because the Lebanese army is not allowed into the camp due to the high risk on life.

Inhabitants of Ein El Hilweh generally work as casual workers in construction, as cleaners, or at workshops\textsuperscript{286}. The rest run their own in-camp ‘businesses’ such as car repair, electronics repair, barbershop, grocery store, butchers and so on\textsuperscript{287}. There are 8 UNRWA schools one of which is a secondary school in the camp, but the high number of dropouts and the quality of teaching renders the schools inutile. Students drop out from school because they prefer to take advantage of their time and learn some craft or profession that can support them and their families in both the present and the future. “What will he [his son] get out of school? At least by working as a hairdresser he will gain experience, money, and he will guarantee his future”, \textsuperscript{288} states a father of a 15 year-old boy.

The entrance to the camp welcomes its inhabitants and any visitor planning to enter the camp for whatever reason, with a hand written sign of “No Entry for Foreigners” surrounded by flags of Palestine and its factions, pictures of Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas and of martyrs, maps of historic Palestine, drawings and statements referring to the right of return and many other colourful depictions of Palestinian-ness. The entrance, which also happens to be an exit, is heavily guarded firstly by a Lebanese army checkpoint (and this is where the Lebanese army stops its operations), where cars are inspected, IDs are checked, and people are investigated, and secondly by a checkpoint controlled by the camp which does the same job as the first one. Cars are checked on the way in, on suspicions of smuggling arms in, and on the way out for the same reason to the other direction.

The several storey houses built wall to wall from all directions, or in best cases several centimetres away from each other, make natural light a luxury in Ein El Hilweh. A trip to Ein El Hilweh at noon and in summer necessitated a human version of \textit{tapetum lucidum} (superior night vision) in order to see where one was stepping

\textsuperscript{287} Fieldwork in Lebanon – Ein El Hilweh July 2012.
\textsuperscript{288} Informal conversation with an inhabitant of Shatilla camp, originally from Ein El Hilweh Camp 9 July 2012.
and heading. Not only is natural light a luxury, electricity is also a very expensive luxury that requires two different sets of generators; one for night use, and the other for day use. If one wonders if those generators do what they are supposed to do, the answer would be no. Electricity cut-offs are as common as the marks of helplessness on the faces of the inhabitants of Ein El Hilweh. Water as well is a luxury, where in some cases inhabitants live without water supply for weeks.

Compared to the alleyways branching from main roads, the main roads in Ein El Hilweh are spacious to an extent they can fit one car, and sometimes a human being on either side. All streets whether main or branches are decorated with dangling wires and cables from all directions and the camp itself is surrounded by barbed wires placed on cement walls which further reduces the ability to look up to the sky and make sense of the meanings of the words space and freedom, at least in sight.

**Rashidieh – Tyre [South of Lebanon]**

Home to around 27 500 Palestinians, Rashidieh Camp was partly built in the 1936 to house Armenian refugees. The part that was built in the 1930s is what is now called the “old camp”. In 1963, UNRWA built the “new camp” to accommodate the increasing number of Palestinians taking refuge in Rashidieh, especially those who were evacuated from a camp called Gouraud in Baalbeck, eastern Lebanon.

With only one heavily guarded entrance, which is also the only exit to the camp, Rashidieh is the closest camp to ‘home’, to Palestine, with only 23 km separating it from the ‘Palestinian’ borders. The Lebanese Civil War of the 1980s heavily affected the Rashidieh Camp, hundreds of shelters were destroyed and thousands of inhabitants were (re)displaced.

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Given its location on the shore of Tyre, the camp inhabitants commonly work in seasons, in both agriculture and construction. Employment opportunities are very limited. There are 4 UNRWA schools in Rashidieh, including one secondary school, and dropout rates are not more appealing than those in Ein El Hilweh, for the same reasons; survival is a priority.

Although the pathways can only accommodate one car, the streets and alleyways in Rashidieh give the feeling of being more spacious, mainly due to the horizontal expansion of the camp unlike Ein El Hilweh’s vertical expansion. The sky is not meshed with a lot of electricity cables although they do exist at a much smaller scale, and the view of the sea gives an additional sense of space and openness in a camp heavily surrounded by cement blocks and exclusively reserved for refugees. Foreigners are not allowed into the camp and the Lebanese army guarding the checkpoint are quite serious about it. The location of the camp in terms of its geographic proximity to the ‘homeland’ and Israel could explain the seriousness.

Electricity and water are available for the inhabitants of Rashidieh, but a sewage system is not. This is very clear upon entrance to the camp where in some places the sewage odour restricts oxygen intake.

Depictions of Palestine in Rashidieh lean towards Fatah/PLO although very few depictions of Hamas do exist. Slogans about the Right to Return decorate the camp walls, and so do pictures of Yasser Arafat and to some extent Mahmoud Abbas. Pictures of martyrs and of religious sites, maps of historic Palestine and flags can also be seen in a 360 degrees view.

Nahr El Bared – Tripoli [North of Lebanon]

In the case of Nahr El Bared, using the present tense has an atonal ring to it. Using the past tense has the right one. Destroyed in 2007 during the conflict

between Fatah Al Islam and the Lebanese Armed Forces, Nahr El Bared was home to about 27,000 Palestinians who fled to the nearby Baddawi Camp escaping bombardments during a 3-month siege on their camp. The camp was almost fully destroyed or damaged beyond repair, and reconstruction by the UNRWA supported by International Donors has been able to replace homes of roughly 300 families out of 6000. 291

Nahr El Bared was established in 1949, to accommodate Palestinians fleeing from the northern part of Palestine. Being located near Tripoli, and thus near the Syrian borders, made Nahr El Bared a commercial hub from local passersby 292 and travellers. Perceived as wealthy conservatives by other Palestinians, 293 the inhabitants of Nahr El Bared lived on passing trade at their souq (market) and surrounding shops. 294

**Burj Al Shemali – Tyre [South of Lebanon]**

Constantly ground for clashes between rival political groups in addition to clashes with UNRWA staff, Burj Al Shemali, also called the camp of the Martyrs, and the camp of Thalassemia due to high numbers of inhabitants diagnosed with the disorder, is the most spacious camp between all Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Currently stretching on 13 km², the camp was established in 1948 and is home to 19,500 Palestinians.

Unemployment is very high in Burj Al Shemali, and most of those who do work are limited to agriculture (specifically lemon), construction, manual labour, and domestic help. 295

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291 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
294 Ibid.
295 UNRWA, "Where We Work".
As other camps and areas of southern Lebanon, the camp was affected by the Lebanese Civil War, and repair to damaged infrastructure is still underway. Shelters in Burj Al Shemali are built with concrete, although there are still shelters with zinc roofing spread across the camp. The inhabitants of Burj Al Shemali enjoy the privilege of electricity, water, sewage system and even storm water drainage systems. In addition to being privileged space wise, the children and youth of Burj Al Shemali have the luxury of spending time and learning at a large community centre in addition to six other smaller centres providing services and activities to the youth of the camp.

Of course life is not as good as it sounds in Burj Al Shemali. In 1982, Burj Al Shemali was a target of Israel’s aerial phosphorus bombs, which killed around 100 Palestinians and burned many others. Inhabitants of Burj Al Shemali are reminded with their pain every time they see the memorial erected for those killed in the attack, in addition to the daily reminders of poverty and unemployment. Barbed wires, dangling cables and vertical expansion of buildings are also features that this camp shares with Ein El Hilweh, although on smaller scales.

**Beddawi – Tripoli [North of Lebanon]**

Beddawi camp was home to 16 500 Palestinians before the influx of the inhabitants of Nahr El Bared to it during the 2007 conflict, where its population doubled over few nights. The Camp was established in 1955 to accommodate Palestinians also fleeing from northern Palestine, as it is the case with most Palestinian camps in Lebanon.

Unemployment is a feature of this camp too, although it is hit harder given that many Palestinians fled towards it during the Nahr El Bared crisis. To those who

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296 Ibid.
297 88% of inhabitants live below poverty line
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCdbG4nGCpU at 1:18
are fortunate enough to work, salaries are very low and basic living expenses are hardly covered. 299

Even though Beddawi stretches over one km², some of its main streets have room for two cars and sometimes along with a parking car on either side. Alleyways and branches of streets are very narrow, where a car can barely make its trip from one side to the other. Electricity cables hanging from building to building and from side to side do exist in this camp, but they look a bit tidier, and they do a worse job in meshing natural light than those in other camps.

The camp is divided into four areas; A, B, C, D where buildings range from zinc roofing to proper cement or stone houses and all areas are supplied with water, electricity, sewage systems and even storm water drainage. 300

**Burj Al Barajneh – Beirut**

Located in the suburbs of Beirut, near Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, Burj Al Barajneh Camp was established in 1948 to accommodate Palestinians fleeing from Galilee. Sitting at 375000 m² 301, Burj Al Barajneh is overpopulated with 16 000 – 20 000 inhabitants living in it. With arms and weapons in their hands, some of the unemployed spend their days and nights sitting in the streets, chatting, smoking, and drinking coffee or tea. The employed generally work as casual labourers in construction sites, sewing in factories, or as domestic helpers.

The camp is heavily covered in posters, pictures, slogans and flags and is also decorated with electricity cables hanging in all directions. Its old sewage system leads to muddy streets all year long and flooding during winters. Moreover, water salinity in Burj Al Barajneh is the highest amongst camps in Beirut, and it ranges between 12,000 – 19,000 mg/litre, at least 12 times over drinkability levels. 302

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narrow streets in Burj Al Barajneh led to the popularity of scooters as methods of transport, where scooters shoot like falling stars wherever the eye sets.

**Al Buss – Tyre [South of Lebanon]**

Al Buss is a small square shaped camp located in the middle of a city in Tyre. It was primarily built in 1939 for the Armenian refugees, and in the 1950s the Palestinians from Acre were displaced to it while the Armenians were moved to another area.

Given its strategic location, the camp that is home to around 9000 Palestinians is supplied with water from the city/municipality. Also due to its strategic location, the camp is supplied with electricity, and therefore, there are no electricity cables hanging between buildings. Within the camp, building is horizontal, giving the small camp an impression of spaciousness. Although the camp is not fully circulated by barbed wire like other camps, Al Buss is partially decorated with barbed wires from one side, while tight security control is responsible for the other three sides.

Just like the rest of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, Al Buss is hit by unemployment and those who are lucky to work do so seasonally and casually.

**Shatila – Beirut**

Probably the most internationally known camp of all Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon because of its 1982 massacre where over 2000 people were killed during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Situated in Beirut, Shatila was established in 1949 and it accommodates 8,000 303 – 18,000 304 Palestinian refugees on an area of

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The camp witnessed multiple episodes of conflicts, attacks, and wars and has been devastated and destructed with its inhabitants displaced on many occasions. Shatila and its surroundings are home to ruins that can be seen up till this day, and locating the borders of Shatila is a very tough task. Everything seems to look the same, whether inside the camp or around it. In addition to its Palestinian population, Shatila is home to the same number of people from various countries mainly Lebanon and Syria.

Environmental health conditions are extremely bad in this camp, where many shelters are marked with humidity and dampness along with open drains. The salinity of water is also very high, ranging between 7,000 – 12,000 mg/litre, to an extent where faucets, drains and cutlery oxidise and rust. Furthermore, water and sewage are mixed due to poor water and sewage systems.

The camp has wider streets than some of the other refugee camps. Electricity cables hanging from all directions and to all directions are also a feature of this camp, and so are posters, slogans and flags. Although building in Shatila is vertical in its aim, natural light is present although not excessively and not everywhere. Additionally, the absence of fences and walls makes it possible to look to the sides and see a glimpse of light.

**Wavel (Al Jalil) – Baalbeck [East of Lebanon]**

Named after a French General called Wavell, and from a French army barracks spot to a refugee shelter, Wavel became home to Palestinian refugees in 1948, following the Nakba. The name Wavel was changed to Al Jalil, in reference to

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308 Palestine TV, "Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp."
309 Ibid.
Galilee, where most of its residents are originally from. It is also called the Denmark camp due to the large numbers of its inhabitants who found refuge in Denmark.

Stretching on 42300 m², Al Jalil Camp is home to around 8 000 Palestinians who live in very dire economic conditions. Housing conditions are not much better, especially in the long winter where heating is expensive beyond capabilities and cold is harsh in the rural valley where the camp is located. Although this camp was fortunate enough not to have witnessed any consequences of the civil war, but that does not make it a better place to live in. The army barracks, which still house Palestinians, lack proper ventilation and natural light. Unemployment and student dropout rates are high, and school aged children work in gas stations and car garages to support their families.

Mieh Mieh – Saida [Towards South of Lebanon]

Located on a hilly area, Mieh Mieh camp accommodates around 4 500 Palestinians. In 1991, and during the civil war, around 15% of what the Mieh Mieh of 1954 looked like, was destroyed; shelters were demolished and people were displaced.

Surrounded by wires and guarded by the Lebanese army and the camp army, the camp interior, although a bit more spacious at least to the eye, is very similar to other camps; full of slogans, maps, flags, and pictures. Men in the camp are heavily armed, and weapons can be seen in the hands of the young and the old. Employment, when it exists, is generally in areas such as casual construction, embroidery, and domestic help.

313 Fieldwork: Mieh Mieh 7 July 2012.
Dbayeh – Beirut

With around 4,000 inhabitants, Dbayeh; established in 1956 is one of the smallest Palestinian camps in Lebanon which also witnessed large scale destruction and violence during the civil war. It is located in an area also called Dbayeh, where its name derives from, an area where most of the population is Christian. Unsurprisingly, Dbayeh’s population is also Christian, unlike elsewhere, where camps are home to everyone.

Compared to other camps, Dbayeh is more spacious and better rehabilitated. Houses generally do not exceed two storeys, therefore, natural light is guaranteed. The “Dream Camp” is another name for Dbayeh. Dbayeh is a dream to Palestinians of other camps for the space and order its inhabitants enjoy, but what those desiring Dbayeh do not seem to be aware of is that the inhabitants of Dbayeh suffer heavily from very high unemployment, making the dream camp not so much of a dream to its people especially that they are living in severe economic hardship.

Mar Elias – Beirut

Welcoming visitors with a board stating that it was established in 1952 and is 93 km away from the Palestinians Borders, Mar Elias camp was founded by the Mar Elias Greek Orthodox convent and is the smallest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon with an area that does not exceed 5,400 m². The number of Palestinians living in Mar Elias is somewhere around 600 where the few employed men and women occupy jobs similar to those of their counterparts in other camps: as casual labourers, in sewing factories, or as cleaners. According to UNRWA, this camp in particular has “a high incidence of chronic diseases” such as diabetes, hypertension and cancer.

319 Ibid.
Unlike most other camps, forces are not visible neither around nor in Mar Elias, which is home to main shadows of the Palestinian factions where they all have offices. This is observable inside and outside the camp, where flags of all factions and pictures of martyrs from all factions decorate building walls and camp walls, and where the offices of factions can be seen spread across the camp.

For a comparison of situations in camps, refer to Table 4.2 below.
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<th>Small Shelter Size</th>
<th>Poor Housing Conditions</th>
<th>Bad Environmental Health</th>
<th>High Unemployment</th>
<th>Poor Living Conditions (Socio-Economic)</th>
<th>Water Shortages</th>
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Table 4.2: Camp Comparison

√ As per UNRWA √ Additional Observations during Fieldwork

Due to the nature of the closed camp spaces, the following section will go into further details about landscapes and their contestation and politicisation, for that this specific aspect is exceptionally monopolised by the case of Palestinians in Lebanon, and do not apply to the cases of Belgium in Jordan.
4.4.3.1 Lebanon: Landscape Politicisation in the Palestinian Camps of Exception

“For sixty years, the space of the refugee camps ... was treated as a space of exception and an experimental laboratory for control and surveillance. This state of exception was not promulgated by any one sovereign. Many actors involved in the different modes of governance have been contributing to the suspension of law in this space under the cover of laws and regulations themselves”. 320

Although the abovementioned quote originally refers to the Palestinian refugee camps in the Palestinian Territories, this quote also fits the situation of those in Lebanon. The Palestinians in Lebanon live as a stateless people in a state that does not represent them nor protect them. They live as Palestinians in Lebanon, but are neither part of Lebanon nor part of Palestine. Many actors are involved in various methods of “governing” and non-governing of the Palestinian camps. The Lebanese state, since 1969, isolated itself from governing the Palestinians residing in its camps, making the camps spaces of exception, where no state intervenes and no law rules. This isolation of the Lebanese state facilitated the overflow of official and underground “governing” bodies into the camps. UNRWA plays the role of the official governor in issues related to welfare, aid, education and so on, while shadows of different Palestinian political factions present in Lebanon compete on the role of “governors” even if unofficially. From those usually clashing political factions are Fatah and Hamas, among others who are less dominant (such as Islamic Jihad, Palestine Liberation Front, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). All those factions promote the same constants (Right of Return, Palestinian State, and Jerusalem as a capital to Palestine), the divergence, nonetheless, occurs in the process of articulating the ways of achieving those constants 321 and displaying them. Some promote revolutionary

nationalism and some promote martyrdom. All factions demand a state. Some contradict their own messages and mix between 1948 and 1967 borders, and some are more rigid referring to the 1948 borders only. Similarly, all demand return. Some instrumentalise return depending on the situation and location, while others identify return as a key despite situation and location. Some refer to Jerusalem and East Jerusalem interchangeably while others only refer to Jerusalem when discussing the capital of the future Palestinian state.

Given that the Palestinians in refugee camps in Lebanon have restricted options of where and how to live, and given that the space that they can occupy and grow in is closed and limited, the landscape of this space becomes a “space of communication, competition and contestation, a medium through which Palestinian factions attempt to articulate and reproduce their power and influence, and one open to disparate readings and interventions by oppositional groups and ordinary people”.

Living in closed spaces that represent, maintain, and reproduce Palestine, the landscape of such closed spaces becomes a space of contestation. A space where organisation and mobilisation are outcomes of the mobilisation of the public memory that is a result of the politicisation of the landscape.

Walking around camps in Lebanon reminds one of paintball, on concrete though. Walls, shops, roofs, and anything that a poster can be hung on, anything that can be written on is decorated with slogans, flags, mottos, pictures, drawings, paintings, and symbols. The most dominant pieces of artefacts are flags of Palestine (par excellence), Fatah, and Hamas, the map of historic Palestine, the return key, the Dome of the Rock, words and slogans on return, state and liberation, pictures of martyrs and pictures of Yasser Arafat. The most dominant factional clashing occurs between Fatah and Hamas where camps are fields for flag wars (or war(ring) flags in

322 Ibid. Page 71.
this case) between Yellow (Fatah) and Green (Hamas). Other forms of landscape and space-evident factional clashing do exist, but flags are the loudest and clearest.

The meaning and interpretation of flags and murals is ought to be analysed via the camp’s lens. Such flags and symbols are used by Palestinians (and other diasporas or refugees) elsewhere, but the besiegement of the camps is not present elsewhere. Its specificity is reserved to the Palestinians in Lebanon (and not Palestinians elsewhere). As Neil Jarman states in reference to murals in Northern Ireland:

As such they are more artefact than art. As artefacts they are produced to be seen at fixed sites and in specific locales, and an extension of their significance is generated by a semiotic dynamic which involves the images taking meaning from their location and the location in turn having a differing significance because of the paintings. As images they are always open to multiple interpretations, but as artefacts in public space they are also open to multiple forms of use, re-use and abuse. As images they always have had a functionality: as propaganda, as rhetoric, as ideological and symbolic markers etc., but as artefacts their use is potentially more varied.323

Such artefacts reproduced by the politicisation of the landscape play various yet critical roles in the formation of narratives, rhetoric, identification of self (Palestinian-ness), contestation and clashes between different parties and factions, and the mobilisation of the memory of Palestine, and even affect daily lives. Different areas across camps are decorated with flags of factions in reference to the dominance of one faction over the other. Trespassing can lead to armed clashes and casualties among which some are fatalities. Therefore, such artefacts act as a life insurance policy on some occasions. It is important to point out that the majority of the Palestinians living in the camps have never been to Palestine. This majority can be called the post-Nakba generation as Adam Ramadan frames it where he clarifies

via Hirsch that this generation is one of “postmemory born into a society dominated by narratives that preceded their birth”. 324 This post-Nakba generation acquires its narrative from various sources, one of which is the landscape. Therefore, a powerful portion of mobilising the public memory of what Palestine was, is, and will be in the closed spaces of the camps stems from the landscape. “The power of the landscape is not that it literally tells the Palestinian story – no Palestinian will stop to read the entire history of the Palestinian people or the full manifesto of Fateh painted on a wall. The landscape has a ‘rhetoric’ ”325 which can be brought back with a glance at its components.

Messages, whether written, drawn, painted, hanged or placed are a prevailing characteristic of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. What makes them stand out is that they are restricted to the borders of the closed space camps. For clarification purposes, the pictures below illustrate such messages in multiple refugee camps in Lebanon. It is important to note that all camps have similar messages, thus not all camps are displayed below.

Figure 4.24: Mar Elias Refugee Camp Wall

Figure 4.24 taken of Mar Elias refugee camp in Beirut, Lebanon. The picture is of the exterior wall of the camp where the return key, the map of historic Palestine, and a woman covered by the Palestinian flag are decorating the wall and communicating with the Palestinians and non-Palestinians alike despite the different interpretations. On the pavement the sentence “Our love [of Palestine] is a genetically inherited disease” is written in an artistic way on the artefact.
Figure 4.25 from the same camp, also reflects the same exterior wall as the picture above. In red, the poster reads “The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, State .. Return and National Unity” topped with the logo of the Front, which is constituted of the map of historic Palestine placed in the middle of a star and topped with a rainbow with the colours of the Palestinian flag. To its right is a poster with the picture of Yasser Arafat in the centre, surrounded by Palestinian heroes/martyrs who are in turn surrounded by the Palestinian flag, which makes a frame to the poster. This style of posters communicates one word, Fatah. On top of the building is “The Symbol” as called by many Palestinians, Yasser Arafat. If there is anything that unites the different factions, it is the symbolism of Arafat. Beside this picture of Arafat are flags. Of Palestine, and of Fatah.
Figure 4.26, of Mar Elias camp as well is of a very symbolic poster, full of meanings and messages signed by Fatah. On the right hand side “We will return despite the injuries [in reference to pain], the land is ours, Jerusalem is our capital, and return is our goal”. Right next to the text is Abu Ammar (Yasser Arafat), known from the way he used to put his Kefiyyeh. Abu Ammar’s face is replaced by the sunset, the map of historic Palestine in the shape of a lit candle and a dove surrounding it. The message conveyed in this very dense yet simple drawing revolves around the following: In your memory and for the Palestine that you spent your life fighting for, the peaceful sunset will cover Palestine like a candle lit over Palestine from the river to the sea on a windless day. On the left of this dense drawing is the flag of Palestine, which is looked over by a woman crying loss.
Figure 4.27 is from Bourj Al Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut. On the left of the image, behind the electricity cables and water pipes is a drawing of the Dome of the Rock surrounded by verses from the Quran. Such drawings and images stress on the religious significance of Palestine as a whole and Jerusalem in particular.

326 Courtesy of Tom Charles, Contributor at Jadaliyya
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/contributors/48505
Figure 4.28 reflects a mélange of symbols, a normal site in Palestinian camps in Lebanon. In the centre is The Symbol, Arafat surrounded by pictures of martyrs, colours of the Palestinian flag and the Dome of the Rock.

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Figure 4.29 above, the number, importance, and dominance of the Palestinian flag is clearly represented. The Symbol is centering the flags and “With you, the chains will eventually break” written below.

328 Courtesy of Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/photo_galleries/middleeast/201092792844223326.html
Figure 4.30 is of houses in Ein El Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon where even between alleyways and passages, flags and posters are present. This reflects the importance of politicising the landscape as well as reflecting the contestation of and in camp space.

Figure 4.31: Bourj Al Shemali Refugee Camp
Courtesy of Angela Corrias *Chasing the Unexpected*

330 Figure 4.31, of Bourj Al Shemali camp in Tyre, Lebanon, where one of the main roads is decorated with a drawing of the Dome of the Rock and a verse from the Quran surrounded by the logo of the Islamic Jihad. Once again, a reminder, in the landscape, of the religious importance of Palestine and Jerusalem.

Figure 4.32 above, from Beddawi camp in Tripoli, Northern Lebanon shows how graffiti and posters on walls is a continuous practice, where old drawings and posters are constantly replaced by new ones. Symbols of Hamas leaders and martyrs cover the wall, also in a display of landscape politicisation and contestation.

331 Courtesy of Tanya Traboulsi, Tadamon, http://www.tadamon.ca/post/780
Figure 4.33, in white, “Hamas welcomes you in Ein El Hilweh Camp” topped by a banner by Islamic Jihad saying “In Remembrance of Al Nakba, Victory has one sole route ... Unity and Resistance”. This picture is a clear display of how contestation and competition by different parties occurs in camps, and how space, although limited, can become highly politicised.

4.5 The Palestinian Ostinati

Sounds that reverberate in the Palestinian ears are several and situational, except for some, which happen to be enduring and encompassing. Throughout research and fieldwork, the following sounds were identified as ostinati, for that they have been repeated in the same voice at the same pitch over and over again despite the heterogeneity of the cases.

The first of which is the sound of the word *Refugee*, which is preferred, by Palestinians in the diaspora, over any other label including diaspora. The existence of the Palestinians in today’s world depends on their self-identification as refugees and their remembering and imagination of themselves or their ancestors as refugees forced to leave their homes and live in tents in the past. The diaspora’s everydayness and reasoning revolve around the melodies of this self-identification, and questioning or challenging the dissonance of this sound reserves a place as a taboo in most cases, and guarantees heated and usually one sided debates in others.

![Palestinian Refugees in Souf Refugee Camp in Jordan – Courtesy of UNRWA](image)

Figure 4.34: Palestinian Refugees in Souf Refugee Camp in Jordan – Courtesy of UNRWA
The second repeated sound in this section and throughout the Palestinian repertoire is the sound of *Historic Palestine, which reflects the Palestinian Tasharrodd*, and the manner in which granting rights for one part of the conflict meant denying the rights of the other part. Despite the belief that Historic Palestine still belongs to the Palestinians, and despite using the map of historic Palestine in all observed events and activities, Palestinians do acknowledge that the map is currently ‘infected’ by ‘cancerous cells’ that have been spreading through the body of Palestine since 1948. Further explanations on this phenomenon are found throughout the dissertation.

Figure 4.35: Belgian Supporters - Picture taken on Saturday 18 May 2013 – 65th anniversary of the Nakba, in front of the European Parliament, Place du Luxembourg, Bruxelles
The third ostinato is one of the obvious and easily identified sounds in this intermezzo; the sound of the memory of the *Nakba* which is one of the very loud sounds in this stateless repertoire and which affects the temporalities, historiographies and geographies of the Palestinians (further explained in Chapter 6). The experienced or imagined scene of walking through routes and mountains with their home keys (return keys) and necessary belongings to reach safe destinations in neighbouring lands is one that is deeply rooted in the Palestinian memory. The *Naksā* is another ostinato that hides behinds the Nakba, it does resound on its own nonetheless.

Figure 4.36: Tasharrud
Courtesy of palestineremembered.com
Figure 4.37: Return Key among other key chains – 18 May 2013, 11th Palestinians in Europe Conference, Théâtre Saint Michel, Bruxelles
The last of the ostinanti is the stubborn naming of Palestine as Palestine, despite what the Palestinians refer to as occupation. Palestine does exist, the occupation also exists, but Israel does not. This phenomenon is further explicated in later chapters. This phenomenon can be observed in maps of Palestine used by Palestinians or worn around necks, with the name of Palestine engraved in the middle of or next to the historic map.

Figure 4.38: Map of Palestine with the words “All of Palestine – Land is non-negotiable” – Mar Elias Camp Beirut, July 2012
What has been seen and heard throughout this Intermezzo Ostinato resonates the differences and similarities of the Palestinian diasporas’ pasts and presents. In an image infused trip, this chapter mirrored the practice of Palestinian-ness in the studied countries showing how being a Palestinian in Belgium is politicised at least in appearance, where the demonstration of Palestinian-ness reaches appearance. The same does not apply to Palestinians in Jordan, where Palestinianness is apoliticised and where Palestine and its symbols are absorbed by the surrounding, present in shop names, street names, logos and more. As for the case of Palestinians in Lebanon, it has been made clear that this isolated slice of Palestinians is the most politicised of the studied cases, where politicisation reaches the landscape and everydayness despite being surrounded by barbed wires and walls.

The effects of the abovementioned on the frequency and dynamics of organisation and mobilisation is to be demonstrated in the coming chapters of this repertoire, but for the time being, Palestinian-ness in Belgium can be seen as an attempt to stand out from other peoples the Palestinians are linked to: Arabs and Muslims. Palestinians-ness in Jordan does not necessitate proving, the Palestinian identity is hybrid in a hybrid surrounding. As for Palestinian-ness in Lebanon, Palestinian-ness is a proof of existence.
Yet, and despite the differences, the Palestinians in the three studied cases show pure similarities in their ostinati, which resonate in the stateless Palestinian diasporic experience despite location and situation.

This composition resembled an Intermezzo Ostinato in that it played the role of an interlude in a larger composition. It is an Ostinato because it consists of stubbornly present phrases that are continuously repeated throughout the piece, as well as reverberating throughout the repertoire.

If the sounds of this chapter are to be converted into music, the Pasts and Presents of the Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon will make the melody and rhythm of the interlude, while Refugeedom, the sound of Historic Palestine, the
Nakba (accompanied by the Naksa), the return key, and Palestine will make the Ostinati to this Intermezzo.

Until the written words turn into audible sounds, the following chapter will present a sonata. One that is unheard by the target audience.
Chapter 5: Echoless Diasporic Sonata

*Sonata:* “an extended piece for an instrumental soloist with or without instrumental accompaniment”. 333

*Analogy* – an extended piece for the mute Palestinian diaspora, in isolation of their homeland, with faint background accompaniment played by sympathisers.

*Metronome:* What are the roles of states in diaspora mobilisation and how does statelessness hinder the diaspora mobilisation attempts by a homeland without a home state?

*Hypothesis:* Absence of a state affects the shapes of diaspora mobilisation by the homeland, and limits the shapes of diaspora-led mobilisation in host countries.

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Chapter 5
Echoless Diasporic Sonata

This chapter resembles a Sonata in that it is an extended piece without instrumental accompaniment, which perfectly echoes the sounds of Palestinian-ness without the instrumental accompaniment of their homeland, echoing a lost tune accompanied by perplexed notes, mute to the nonexistent state, and instrumental to its existent proxies.

5.1 Echoless Diasporic Sonata

From the beginning, in 1948, Palestinians were to have two agencies devoted exclusively to them: the UNCCP entrusted with a complete international protection and resolution mandate, and UNRWA, whose job was to provide food, clothing and shelter. Thus were Palestinians regarded to have been taken care of, the charter of the UNHCR (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees founded in 1950) had a special clause excluding the Palestinians from its mandate. When it became clear that the UNCCP was unable to resolve the Palestinian conflict, its funding was substantially truncated, which incapacitated it in its role as protector. Within four years, Palestinians were left without this international protection provided by the UNHCR to all other refugee groups around the world. They had no agency to intervene on an international level and no access to the International Court of Justice. The protection gap has never been closed, not least because the absence of any legal framework has been very convenient to the power politics behind negotiations. Under the guise of fiscal prudence, a major refugee case was maneuvered outside international law, where it has remained parked for decades.  

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Sir, the Palestinians are “absentees” only because you do not allow them to be present. And those of us who are present are considered absent.336

To states, diasporas may be instruments to fulfilling ambitions (political, foreign policy, and economic among many), they can also be threats, especially in cases where diasporas support opposition groups and movements. To Diasporas, homelands are backbones to existence. In ordinary cases, the relationship between diasporas and homelands is one with mutual benefits. States, represented by governments and politicians, can mobilise diasporas to win in elections, ensure the flow of remittances into the homeland, lobby in host countries for various reasons and causes, and other similar motives. Diasporas, on the other hand, may need their state to feel secure (although in some cases the state becomes a source of insecurity such as the case of the Hutus of the Rwandan diaspora, and on other occasions diasporas extend security from their unified whole, and not from a state), at least existentially, to have roots in and ties to a country of origin, to sense that even when abroad and far away, they can return to what they call home. In exceptional cases, like in the case of statelessness of diasporas337, this relationship between states and diasporas loses its initial shape (Figure 5.1). In such cases, states and diasporas cannot directly enjoy the abovementioned relationship, which leads to the naissance of new forms of indirect relations, if any, between the two sides. The way (non)states338 see diasporas, and the way diasporas see states is affected by this absence of state. The lived experience of diasporas in host countries is also influenced by this lack of a defined and recognised homeland. Being confined to staying far from home has its shadows on the stateless diaspora’s experience, and also has its shadows on host countries and the way they contain and perceive the stateless.

337 Another exceptional case, besides statelessness, is that of the state-opposing Rwandan (Hutu) Diaspora fearing return to the homeland.
338 (Non)states in this context means homelands that do not and cannot operate as states (in protection and representation of territory and peoples for instance) despite having governments and governmental bodies, and are not internationally recognised as sovereign states.
5.2 How States See Diasporas

“Diasporas are now the vehicle for foreign policy ambitions, nation states want to get hold of their diaspora”.

Robin Cohen

Engaging Diasporas via formal institutions has become a widespread practice by homelands, or origin states. Multiple types of diaspora institutions established by origin states to “address diaspora issues” are found in both host countries and homelands. Ministries, sub-ministries, quasi-governmental institutions, national or local institutions are the main pathways to formalising diaspora engagement.

So, why engage diasporas? And why establish formal institutions to do so? Throughout the decades, diasporas have played key roles in homeland affairs.

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339 Title source adopted from “States Seeing Diasporas”, Session A of Rethinking Diasporas Conference 1-2 July 2013, University of Oxford, UK
340 Programme, Robin Cohen and Khachig tôLôLyan in Conversation.
Whether via remittances or investments, philanthropic contributions or tourism, peace building/keeping/making or nation and governance building and rebuilding, conflict perpetuation, escalation, diffusion or prevention, development, or democracy, diasporas have been role players in the affairs of their homelands and have for long held one of the keys to change in the homeland, whether to the better, or to the worse. Thus the popularity of the concepts of diasporas as peacemakers and/or peace wreckers.

Different perspectives and frameworks explicate why states establish and maintain diaspora institutions. Studies mainly explain this practice on the basis of three perspectives:\textsuperscript{343} Rationalist, Constructivist, and Institutionalist, which in other terms correspond to Interest driven, Values driven, and International Norms driven respectively.\textsuperscript{344} Gamlen at Al. name the perspectives as Tapping, Embracing and Governing. Tapping is when “states deploy diasporas as strategic assets in power struggles through conflict and diplomacy” and when “states tap diaspora funds, networks and skills for cooperative gains”. Embracing is when the “autocratic/right wing rulers reclaim lost members of the ethnic nation or democratizing states recognize external citizen rights and duties”. Governing is when “Diaspora engagement [is] diffused through related states, aid donors and migration-related international organizations”. \textsuperscript{345}


\textsuperscript{345} Ibid.
To states, as Khachig Tölolyan argues, Diasporas are seen as deliverers of two main state-centred goals: money and lobbying. The uncertainties, complexities and mobilities of diasporas and their connection to other concepts are overlooked.  

Similarly, scholars have explicat the methods that states undertake to facilitate diaspora participation. Vertovec, for example, notes that some states “reach out to engage the political interests of diaspora populations. Making provisions for dual citizenship and/or nationality is one way for countries to reach migrants” and facilitating the presence of “special forms of representations in governments or ... special ministries for diasporas” as it is the case of Croatia where three electoral district seats are reserved for diasporic Croats. He also adds that “numerous governments offer their nationals abroad special foreign currency accounts, incentives or bonds for expat investment, custom or import incentives, special property rights, or privileged access to special economic zones”.  

Others like Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen divide the role of states into two, state of origin and state of residence. Where the state of origin “may engage in mobilising efforts abroad through outreach policies aimed at countering dissidence and mobilizing loyalty among emigrant and refugee groups” and where some homeland governments resort to exerting pressure on host country governments to limit diaspora activism. On the other hand, Ostegaard-Nielsen explains that resident countries also have roles, and do practice turning a blind eye to some diaspora activities that fall within the resident country’s “bilateral and multilateral relations with the country of origin”.

346 Khachig Tölolyan in Programme, Robin Cohen and Khachig Tölolyan in Conversation.
350 Ibid., Page 8.
What can be extracted from the available literature is that an origin state, or a state called the homeland, always exists, and is always capable of playing a role in the shape it chooses and finds suitable. What the literature does not seem to cover are the situations where states of origin do not exist anymore, like in the case of Palestinians, or yet, as in the case of Kurds.

What happens if the diaspora is from a ‘state’ (according to the diaspora itself) that is not really a state (to most of the world and to the international community)? Who engages such a diaspora and how? Who establishes diaspora institutions and why? What roles does the homeland play, who and what is the homeland in such cases? and can it play any role(s)?

Before answering the abovementioned questions, it is critical to take a look at how ‘Palestine’, both by its PLO and by its Hamas dismissed government\textsuperscript{351}, sees its diaspora, which can be summed in one word: Refugees. No matter their country of settlement, citizenship status, or generation, individuals of Palestinian origins living outside Palestine are all considered refugees living in the diaspora, but who surprisingly are not considered to constitute a diaspora. Palestinians who are dislocated and displaced within the contested land of Israel/Palestine are also considered refugees. Thus, lumping those inside and those outside under the same umbrella. The Palestinian government(s) claims to struggle for the right of return of its refugees but is always faced by the same hurdle: the lack of a state to officially do so. Return of refugees where? The Historic Palestine of 1948 (the one that most Palestinians in the diaspora believe to be the historic, present, and future Palestine), or the Palestine of the West Bank and Gaza (the territory of Palestine to the Palestinians inside Palestine and some recognisors of Palestine in the International Community)? This lack of state resembles a very complex knot that requires unravelling, but first of all, it is worthwhile to unravel the ‘state’-state imbroglio.

While observing the Palestinian narrative, both formal and informal, and especially in Arabic, one is faced by the State vs. ‘State’ imbroglio. In the Palestinian and to

\textsuperscript{351} For instance, Hamas has a division named Division of Refugee Affairs – Hamas DRAH and the Palestine Liberation Organisation Refugee Department PLORD
some extent Arab logic, Palestine is a state in its past, present, and future existence, but it is a ‘state’ (with reservations) in its present capabilities and capacities because it is deficient and occupied. Until today, the map of Palestine in most Arab school and university textbooks is the full map of historic Palestine, the same applies to the maps used in diaspora activities in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon. Stating that Palestine does not exist falls on the same lines of blasphemy for most Arabs (Palestinians included) to whom Palestine is (a) sacred (land).

The only way to explain this imbroglio is by resorting to analogies. The analogy in this case is *Inversion*. This is by no means an offence or a criticism. It is a mere description of something that was observed and is practiced, probably rightly given the similarly inverted and cacophonous reality, or realities.

The section below intends to create a mental and acoustic image(ination) of some basic yet very intricate conceptual understandings of what it means to be Palestinian and to have Palestine as a homeland. To be in a constant situation that allows the “‘I’ to speak for the ‘we’”, and how complicated it is to operate in an acentric

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and atonal state of existence. *Interval Inversion*\(^{353}\), à la Palestinienne, is demonstrated by repetitive occurrences of inverting that can be mainly summarised as follows:

1\(^{st}\) Inversion: Palestine is a ‘state’ – Palestine is a state.

Even if on a superficial and powerless level, it has a president, ministers, and ambassadors. It has a government (or even better governments), ministries, and embassies. It even has its own flag, national anthem, laws, and police force, making it, at least from the perception of a bystander, seem like a state. But when one observes the roles and effectiveness of the abovementioned state and its institutions, Palestine seems to be a limited and restricted ‘state’.

When talking about Palestine, Palestinians and their government(s) alike juggle between ‘state’ and state refusing ‘state’ when they are using state, and rejecting state when they are referring to ‘state’. Such is the case of many Palestinians including officials like Leila Shahid\(^{354}\) who diplomatically uses both state and ‘state’ depending on the occasion and its audience. For instance, on some occasions the ambassador states that Palestine is “a state that does not exist yet” as it is the case when she represents herself as a representative of Palestine \(^{355}\), on other occasions the ambassador stresses the fact that she is a representative of the state of Palestine, for example when the TV5 presenter presents her as a representative of the Palestinian Authority. When this particular point was discussed with an embassy diplomat during an interview on 2 March 2012, the diplomat stated that the variations in referring to ‘Palestine’ depend on the audience. The same applies to words such as country and occupied territories. Thus, inverting both depending on what sounds more tonal and acoustically lucid at the occasion. A lack of both ‘state’ and state is out of question. This constantly practiced inversion leads to confusion and has its tolls on all aspects of the Palestinian existence.

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353 The difference between two or more pitches is flipped upside down, creating another sound from the same notes
354 The General Delegate of Palestine to the EU, Belgium, and Luxembourg
2\textsuperscript{nd} Inversion: Israel does not exist – Palestine exists – An Occupier exists.

To many Palestinians, and especially those in the diaspora, Israel does not exist. Saying the word Israel in Lebanon for example, is sufficient to put a person in problems that rarely end well, instead, Israel is replaced by “the Jews”.

The maps and drawings of Palestine are all of historic Palestine in the activities of the Palestinians in the three studied countries. Such maps can be seen decorating all the activities and events of the Palestinian diaspora not only in the countries studied in this dissertation, but also elsewhere.

What is puzzling is that at the same time that Israel does not exist, Palestine is occupied, and should be liberated. One would wonder, who occupies it in the opinions of the Palestinians? And liberate it from what and whom if there is nothing called Israel?

Again, the Palestinian imbroglio resonates another inverted sound, that of the inexistence of Israel, existence of Palestine, and existence of an Occupier.

Returning to the questions posed earlier in this section, what happens when there is no state to formalise diaspora institutions? Does the ‘state’ represented by its proxies still perform as a state by establishing its own version of institutions? Does the homeland wait for, and expect money and lobbying from its diaspora? Can it embrace the abovementioned frameworks and consider its diaspora a strategic asset in its power struggles? Does it tap its diaspora funds, networks and skills? Can it reclaim its lost members and recognise the rights and duties of its ‘citizens’ outside? And can it diffuse diasporic engagement hand in hand with aid donors and international organisations? Is it capable of offering dual citizenship (when it can barely call its own people citizens), proposing special forms of representation (when it is not representative nor represented as a government of a state), offering special foreign currency accounts (when it no longer has a currency of its own and the currencies it uses are foreign)? To answer the questions above, the Palestinian diaspora and ‘state’ institutions as well as various Palestinian proxies are mapped against the Palestinian statelessness.
The Palestinian proxies represented by the PLO, its no longer interim by-product of Oslo Palestinian Authority, its ruling Fatah, its long time contender Hamas, and the PFLP among others all refer to refugees in both their spoken, and written narratives. Refugees are referred to in attempts to strengthen political and/or ideological positions, mainly only rhetorically. The complications and complexities of the proxies are not only evident in terms of what they decide to hear, or instrumentalise, but also in what they are, as well as who they are. Whereas Hamas and other parties are fairly easy to identify, the PLO, the PA, and Fatah are not. For instance, the PLO has no official website, yet has a Facebook page that refers to Fatah under the About tab. On the same lines, the PA has no official website, yet its ministries do, an example of which is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who has a dead link to what is referred to as the Department of Refugee & Expatriate Affairs. When searched for via any given search engine, the results lead to the PLO’s Refugee Department. Despite the very clear presence of such proxies and divisions, the diaspora, and via its organisation and mobilisation, still produces sounds directed for a homeland as opposed to to a homeland. In cases when the diaspora is directing its voice to the homeland, the homeland is seen as one, Palestine, overlooking, or denying, the presence of such proxies.

The loudest of the proxies in terms of making references to Palestinian refugees as they are preferably labelled are the PLO and Hamas, the aims and goals of which are further elaborated below.

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the “sole legitimate representative of Palestinians”⁴⁵⁶ as it describes itself, activated its Refugee Department in 1996. Its main aims are as follows:⁴⁵⁷

- Raising awareness to the Refugee Question, and defending any resolutions pertaining to it

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⁴⁵⁶ PLO slogan
• Reworking, identifying, and adjusting the relations between the PLO Refugee Department and all parties with direct relation to the issue of refugees
• Participation and partnership in negotiations on displaced persons and refugees
• Collaborating with the Arab League and Arab countries hosting Palestinian refugees
• Building bridges with donor states
• Dealing with refugee camps, whether formal or informal, across all Arab countries

On the other hand, and as proof of the internal disputes between Fatah and Hamas, Hamas, The Islamic Resistance Movement has its Division of Refugee Affairs that was established in 2001. The Division’s vision lies in its aspiration to be the leader in defending the rights of Palestinian refugees to return and compensation. Their message is:

• Preservation of the Palestinian refugees’ historical, political, economic, and cultural rights
• Improvement of conditions of refugees
• Coordination and collaboration between local, regional and international parties
• Contribution to finding and creating the right conditions to enable the return of refugees to their towns and villages

Very present are the goals and aims, very absent are the hows, and very unambiguous is the absence and intangibility of achievements. Both institutions are still functioning on what can be seen as idealistic levels without clarifying how the goals are to be achieved. What can also be observed through comparing the aims and messages of both institutions and their lack of agency on the ground, is that they identify no method of communication with the refugees (whom mostly do not know

358 Division of Refugee Affairs - HAMAS, "About,"
of their existence\textsuperscript{359}). For instance, there is no “subscribe to our newsletter” option on the websites of both institutions, nor is there a “demand more information” option. The websites only list bullet points that are barren to any Palestinian interested in becoming involved or interested in knowing more. Moreover, the establishment of both institutions, despite their inability to achieve any of their advertised goals, feeds the decades long conflict between both parties, and satisfies their willingness to represent themselves as the defenders of the refugees’ right of return. What refugees and what rights when they do not even have a national registry or census of the Palestinians in the diaspora is apparently not a question they pose to themselves, at least not overtly.

Given that ‘formal’ proxy institutions have been established, examples portrayed above (thanks to Oslo and its aftermath), how can the Palestinian institutions engage their diasporas? And how can the Palestinian diaspora who is practically isolated and unwillingly remote from Palestine play a role in homeland affairs?

From the main roles diasporas play a propos homeland, the Palestinians have a very slim niche. Being out of the equation, physically away, with no chance of return even for a visit along with not being represented by the government of the homeland leave little options for the Palestinian diaspora. Philanthropic contributions (and remittances to a lesser extent), although limited and although flowing to victims not to political subjects, are the most frequently used channel of diaspora-homeland interactions. Although remittances can go from diaspora to homeland like it is the case with the diaspora in Belgium and Jordan who still have family ‘back home’ in some cases, it can be different in other cases. Remittances can go from the diaspora to wherever those who left the homeland are residing. For example, in the case of the Palestinians in Lebanon, camp inhabitants receive remittances (more likely philanthropic contributions) from family and relatives who migrated to the ‘west’. Therefore, remittances and contributions are not sent to the homeland, partly

\textsuperscript{359} It was concluded from fieldwork that the diaspora rarely knew about the existence of Refugee Divisions or Departments.
because those living in the diaspora lack financial means, and partly due to the lack of familial ties and connections to the homeland.

On the level of political participation, the stateless Palestinian diaspora has no right to participate in homeland politics making it impossible to contribute to nation building, governance rebuilding, democracy and development. The Palestinians in the diaspora are not considered Palestinians except in origin. Any official documents, from the homeland, proving Palestinian-ness rarely exist. Any role that an individual of Palestinian origins can play vis-à-vis homeland politics is nonexistent. As a result, the economic becomes the political to the Palestinians. Remittances and contributions become political statements, especially during times of conflict escalation at the homeland.

Moreover, the inability to neither represent nor be represented by the homeland inhibits any possibility of peace building/making/keeping. The issue of the Palestinian refugees has not been discussed in, or has been pushed until later stages of, most peace agreements between Israel and Palestine. The only place where the refugees are excessively mentioned is in the Palestinian narrative, which can arguably be classified as rhetoric, sometimes an empty one. Even conflict perpetuation or escalation is not an option to the Palestinians in the diaspora especially at the time being, for that it can be argued that Palestinians in the diaspora did play a role in conflict escalation even if indirectly, such as during Black September in Jordan and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the 1970s, where the diaspora fought proxy wars. The diaspora’s issue is usually not part of the peace treaties (even when it is, “their fates are [un]decided for them behind closed doors”\textsuperscript{360}), not part of Palestine itself, not represented by what they call their homeland, and cannot even access their homeland. This in itself paralyses their efforts to mobilise and organise.

Should they consider themselves Palestinians? They do. Can they pressure political parties and play a role in elections? They cannot. They cannot play in the same orchestra; they can only hear the echoes of what is played at and by the homeland.

\textsuperscript{360} Allan, Refugees of the Revolution: Experiences of Palestinian Exile. Page 10.
from afar. As for their echo, the echo(es) they produce while organising and mobilising in the diaspora, it is lost after reaching an unknown destination.

When corresponding the case of the Palestinian diaspora to the perspectives of what drives states to engage their diasporas, namely Tapping, Embracing, and Governing, the effect of statelessness on the Palestinians and on their stateless ‘state’ comes to the surface. Starting with Tapping; it is where states engage their diasporas as “part of foreign policy, to cultivate allies and compete for power”361 and where diasporas are seen as development agents, whether via relieving unemployment levels at home, are sources of remittances, investment, trade or tourism. To the Palestinian ‘state’, considering the diaspora part of its foreign policy, or a route to ally cultivation and power competition is not within the state’s capabilities. It is a route to proxy power competitions though, between the various self-proclaimed representatives of Palestine and the Palestinians. The ‘state’, and although its ruling party claims that it is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinians (including the diaspora), is practically incapable of taking this role because it is not a state neither in theory nor in practice, and it does not have the power or status to claim its own people. Even remittances, which seem to be a common practice of diasporas in general, and although it seems to be the sole option to the Palestinians, is not as common in the case of the Palestinian diaspora studied, contributions are more common, especially at times of conflict escalation. Including contributions to support orphans, donate blood, rebuild destroyed houses, hospitals and schools, sending food packages, and contributing in sending medical equipment and staff.

The Palestinians who arrived to Lebanon decades ago fled as families, leaving little or no relatives behind. To those Palestinians, familial links and connections to the homeland are not present. “Familial ties to Palestine for the Palestinians in Lebanon are either scarce or nonexistent, because they fled as families, mostly leaving no one behind” said an interviewee from Terre Des Hommes in Sour – Southern Lebanon362.

362 Interview - Terre Des Hommes (Tdh) in Sour, 11 July 2012.
To those who fled to Jordan, the case is similar but not as extreme. Some diaspora members still have extended families and relatives in Palestine, but usually know them by name and nothing more. This is very applicable to the 3rd and 4th generation Palestinian diasporas in particular. As for those who fled to Belgium, some fled from Palestine itself, but most fled from other destinations. Therefore, a large portion of the Palestinian diaspora is predominantly a diaspora of the Palestinian diaspora, and not a diaspora of Palestine. So remittances do not necessarily go to the direction of the homeland, they go to the direction of diaspora presence.

As for diaspora trade with homeland, this option is of great complexity given the Israeli control of all water, land, and air borders of what the Palestinians call Palestine. Palestinians in Gaza for instance have resorted to smuggling using the continuously bombed and rebuilt underground tunnels due to tight Israeli and Egyptian control. The same can be applied to investment, which is not appealing in a country surviving on aid and donations, and highly susceptible to destruction. Let alone restrictions to access. There have been recent appeals by Palestinian businessmen urging the diaspora to invest in the homeland, but it is worth noting that even when interest in investment in the homeland is present, the application and implementation is extremely problematic and discouraging.

Tourism on the other hand is not an option to the Palestinians in the diaspora. In case of the Palestinians in Jordan, visiting their homeland, if possible from the first place, requires a visa from the Embassy of Israel. Such a visa is very difficult, practically and psychologically, to obtain, and even if granted, the aftermath of having an Israeli visa on a passport is usually dire, making it very difficult to access counties like for instance Lebanon or Syria with an Israeli stamp. To those with passports from western countries, and although access to Palestine via Israel is possible, the journey is not as simple or smooth as expected. The Israeli border control has the right to detain, question, and deport whomever it considers a ‘threat’. It also has the ability and capability of performing background checks and thus identifying the origin of the traveller. As for the Palestinians in Lebanon, visiting their homeland is only possible through (day)dreaming given the lack of passport or travel documents to those campizens.
Therefore, from all the shapes of Tapping that a country can exploit, it is only remittances on a small scale and philanthropic donations at a larger scale, that the Palestinians in the diaspora can take part in, not because the state is encouraging it, but because Palestinians feel that it is a duty if and when possible, in addition to it being the only way to make a political statement in the shape of an economic one. Trade, Investment, Tourism, Foreign Policy, and Ally Cultivation are all options that are not open to the mute (to the homeland) stateless Palestinians.

The next perspective is Embracing and it is where states embrace the diaspora as a lost part of the nation-state\textsuperscript{363} or as a potential player in the promotion of democratisation. It is also where regimes open their doors to their exiled peoples and recognise their rights and duties. Mapped against the Palestinian diaspora, the Embracing perspective is unachievable mainly because the ‘state’ cannot embrace its diaspora given that it is not a state. Stating that the diaspora is a lost part of the nation-state is doable and is actually practiced by the Palestinian government(s), and the Palestinians themselves, but embracing that lost portion is not on the cards for the time being. The current ‘state’ is incapable of representing what it considers (even if only rhetorically) its own people. Embracing, the Palestinian way, resembles a one sided long distance embrace performed by the Palestinians towards their isolate (noun) homeland.

The third and last perspective is Governing; it is where the emergence and significance of diaspora institutions is “more (less) likely when mimetic, coercive and or normative processes are more (less) pronounced: when states with geographic proximity adopt or upgrade diaspora institutions; when states with similar cultural or colonial heritage do the same; when states participating in similar economic or political blocs do the same; when states engage a similar mix of international political actors and organisations for advice”\textsuperscript{364} This perspective is also difficult to assess for that the emergence of such institutions is possible, in fact, they already exist in Palestine and some of its neighbouring countries, but their emergence is of

\textsuperscript{363} "Explaining the Rise of Diaspora Insitutions." Page 8.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid., Page 11.
no tangible importance because the Question of Palestine is unlike other questions present in today’s world, and the obstacles such institutions face due to the absence of a state are larger than their existence and capacities. Moreover, the mere fact of considering the diaspora as refugees (whether by the ‘state’ or by the diaspora members themselves) is a hindrance. Refugees are victims, and governing refugees is a process that is put on hold until the refugee experience is over.

What can be concluded from the abovementioned is that the Palestinians in the diaspora and their homeland each marches to the beat of its own drummer, (although homeland proxies do distort and instrumentalise some of the sounds emitted by the diaspora in what resembles the chicken and the egg causality dilemma) performing an echoless sonata directed to an unresponsive homeland.

### 5.3 Diasporas & Conflicts

*Having disappeared in 1948, Palestine left the stage. This was the visible part of the drama. Another part – invisible, underground – would take shape in the midst of Palestinians, in their flesh, as it were. To escape the drowning, to rescue their land ... the refugees would gamble everything on taking it with them, gradually becoming the temporary replacement of their homeland ... they would live as if they were everything – Palestine and Palestinians, a people and its land ... with Palestine travelling around on the shoulders of its children.*

Since two decades, scholars have been, and still are, arguing that diasporas matter in international conflict. Scholars like Cochrane, Swain, and Baser for instance argue that “Diaspora groups not only promote conflicts but can also have positive political impacts on the peacemaking process through human rights advocacy and

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consciousness-raising activities among the host land public and decision makers.” While others argue otherwise. Starting with Yossi Shain in the 1990s to Paul Collier in the early 2000s and followed by Hazel Smith and Paul Stares after mid 2000s, scholars have been questioning whether diasporas are peacemakers, peace wreckers, or both (depending on conflict stages and phases), heterogenising cases yet homogenising diasporas and giving the impression that diasporas are obligatorily positioned as either/or/and peacemakers/peace wreckers. This is not meant as a criticism, instead it is meant as an acknowledgment, for that without the aforementioned classifications, anomalies cannot be identified. Few scholars such as Virginia Bouvier – who argued that some diasporas, the Colombian in her case study, were reluctant to play any role in the multifaceted conflict in their homeland – have touched upon the possibility that some diasporas do not fall under any of the constantly studied and argued for classifications. However, even when diasporas are seen as neither peacemakers nor peace wreckers, they are considered to have done so willingly, out of choice, as Hazel Smith frames it in her findings section of Diasporas in International Conflict from the book Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace Wreckers? “Diasporas can be both peace-makers and peace-wreckers in conflict and, significantly, can choose to play neither role.” It is not only Smith that categorises diasporas into three, but most literature on diasporas and conflicts practices the same, where diasporas are seen as either agents promoting development and peace, peace wreckers and breakers, or both simultaneously. Despite the multiple attempts at understanding different aspects and dimensions of diasporas, such as Smith’s proposition at comprehending historical contexts, organisational structures, conflict backgrounds, interests and efforts, and political structures at host country and in homeland, the literature in general still seems to overlook the agency-less leverage-less agents, those incapable

367 Smith, Diasporas in International Conflict. Page 10.
369 Refer to Smith, Diasporas in International Conflict.
of playing the roles of breakers and/or makers; those whom the above is independent of their categorisation.

Leverage as per Zartman and Touval is derived from five main sources: persuasion, extraction, termination, deprivation, and gratification.

The first source, persuasion, is the ability of the concerned party to present an alternative to conflict continuation. The second source, extraction, is where the concerned party is capable of extracting appealing positions from the conflicting parties.

The third source, termination, is when the mediating party has the power to withdraw from the process of mediation. The fourth source, deprivation, is the ability to deprive one party or the other of resources. Finally, the fifth source, gratification, is the capacity to add resources to the outcome of the mediation efforts.

Applied to diasporas, the aforementioned sources can be portrayed as follows: Persuasion and extraction lay in the diaspora’s ability to persuade a conflicting party (or the conflicting parties) to move in a proposed direction, whether it is towards peace or towards conflict. Termination and Deprivation are reflected in the diaspora’s capability to end or halt their role, as peace breakers or makers, and to stop all shapes of economic support to homeland, for instance. Finally, diasporas can portray their ability to gratify the mediation process by adding resources, of many sorts, to its outcomes. For the reasons mentioned above, countries and leaders try to keep their diasporas interested in their homeland matters, on both political and financial levels. Yet again, aren’t there any leverage-less third parties who cannot initiate nor take part in mediation? There are. Isn’t mediating effectiveness “constrained by the circumstances of each adversary, the adversary relations, and

the historical context”?  

It is. Writing on Diasporas as Third Party Mediators, Baser and Swain note that “the level of influence of the diaspora is highly dependent on various factors that have to do with its size, motivation, power and its influence in the homeland. Furthermore, the political environment both in the homeland and the hostland matters significantly since both have an effect on the organizational structure and influencing power of the diaspora”.  

This chapter, along with other chapters in this dissertation, seeks to add another dimension to the above; the presence of a homeland in light of the absence of a home state, and its effects on the diaspora’s abilities and capabilities to organise, mediate, and voice their standpoints. Through this added dimension, this research intends to fill a gap represented in studying home states while overlooking homelands without states, which is a gap clearly present in the current literature on the topic.

In their working paper, and after thoroughly reviewing the literature on diasporas and conflicts, Pirkkalainen and Abdile ask the following: “how do the activities carried out by diaspora groups in the name of conflict resolution and peace building actually affect the dynamics of conflict and peace?” which is a valid question for diasporas that fall under the previously mentioned categories (peacemakers, wreckers, both) but what do we call those who are unwillingly neither? Don’t they exist? If, arguably, all diasporas have opportunities to mobilise at one stage of the conflict or another, does it automatically mean that all diasporas enjoy agency? Is opportunity without agency sufficient in influencing conflict?

Therefore, the same question cannot be applied to those who are compulsorily neither (as opposed to those who are selectively neither), a similar question can be posed though: can activities carried out by such diaspora groups in the name of conflict resolution and peace building (or the contrary) affect the dynamics of conflict and peace?

Answering this question will take into account Bercovitch’s advice where he notes that “the best way to conceive of the role of diasporas in conflict is to think of the

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various phases or stages of a conflict, and then to evaluate the possible role diaspora may play in each phase\(^3\)\(^7\)\(^5\).

Diasporas engage in the conflicts of their countries of origin via several main channels, political, economic, and military (some scholars like Bercovitch add socio-cultural), in addition to transfer of knowledge, skills, and know-how, \(^3\)\(^7\)\(^6\) and their engagement, especially the financial/economic side of it, is regarded as a source of conflict perpetuation as Collier argues, or as a source of stabilisation and transformation as Zunzer argues.\(^3\)\(^7\)\(^7\) Similarly, lobbying is another method of diaspora engagement in conflicts, be it in the host country or the international arena, such as the Jewish diaspora/lobby particularly in the USA, and the Kurdish diasporas\(^3\)\(^7\)\(^8\) especially in Europe. One other method is military engagement, which is not as common today as it was decades ago. Examples of military engagement are vast and include the engagement of Palestinian refugees (in neighbouring countries) with the PLO’s military trainings and activities back in the 1960s.

On the other hand, scholars argue that not only countries of origin are affected by conflicts, but host countries can also be affected through importations of conflicts, as it is currently the case with the Syrian conflict and the Syrians settling or taking refuge in host countries around the world, where pro and anti (regime, opposition, others) Syrians demonstrate, compete, and clash.

It is true that diasporas, along with regional and international bodies and organisations generally have interests in a given conflict, and it is true that the abovementioned parties are usually seen (and see themselves) as political actors who can play different roles at different stages of a conflict, aiding in its

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378 Refer to Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).
management or facilitating its continuation. Not all diasporas who have interests in their homeland conflict can be seen as political actors with the ability to impact though, for that interest alone is not sufficient. Bercovitch states that:

“Knowledge of the factors affecting conflict and its management can contribute to a more constructive expression of a conflict ... Such knowledge is predicated upon an understanding of the nature of the conflict, the issues in contention, the features of the parties involved and, above all, how different factors, dimensions and actors may influence the structure of a conflict and its dynamics”379

To explore the (lack of) impact of the Palestinians on the conflict that made them a diaspora, it is significant to map the abovementioned to the case(s) studied. To do so, a set of questions is to be answered:

1. Who are the conflict parties?
2. What are the conflict issues?
3. What are the conflict dynamics?

Who are the conflict parties?

It is clear to anyone following the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that it is a conflict that seems to belong to everyone, yet to no one. Primary, secondary, and tertiary parties have been claiming and reclaiming the conflict and the ability to influence its outcomes to an extent where the conflict turned into a political marketing strategy used in election campaigns, during terms of office, and on many more occasions. Naming the parties of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might sound like stating the obvious, but what it also does is that it states and demonstrates how it is a conflict that is claimed by many and denied to many.

The primary players in the conflict are the Israelis and Palestinians. Very obvious at

the first glance, but what is not very obvious is that not all the Palestinians are players, for that the millions in the diaspora are isolated from participating in the homeland’s hymn. What is also not very obvious is that all Israelis within or outside Israel, and the millions of Jews willing to (and capable of\(^{380}\)) participate in the hymn are players in the conflict.

The secondary players in the conflict are vast and sometimes gyratory, depending on various factors that include but are not limited to geopolitics, economics, power, presence of and interventions in other conflicts, and timing, among much more. For the past few decades of this almost 7 decades old conflict, the USA and various Arab countries, especially those neighbouring Israel/Palestine (such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon), have been relatively long-standing secondary players (whether positively or negatively) despite the systoles and diastoles.

Other tertiary parties include The Quartet (EU, UN, USA, Russia), and any interested party, at one time or the other.

What are the conflict issues?

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one where the disposition of the conflict swings between various natures, the tangible and the intangible. It can be perceived as purely religious (Muslims and Jews)\(^{381}\), ethnic (Arabs and Israeli Jews), and territorial (Israel and Palestine). It can also be perceived as all of the above, and only rarely, surprisingly, perceived as an existential conflict. The diasporisation of the Palestinians starting 1948 was an outcome of the then recent existence of Israel, and Israelis. It was not because Israelis were Jews, given that Jews and Palestinians lived peacefully side-by-side earlier in time, and it was not ethnic given that the land of historic Palestine was a land of multiple ‘ethnicities’ for multiple decades.

It is a holy conflict, not only a religious one, where one party believes that the holy land was its godly promise, and the other followed suit in its holy\textit{fication} (or holy\textit{fiction}). It is also a\textit{territorio}-existential conflict given that territory substantiates existence in this nation-state era.

\(^{380}\) The use of capable of stems from the inability of some Jews to play roles due to oppression or discrimination at their countries of residence.

\(^{381}\) Surprisingly, Christians are usually excluded from the equation.
This is how it commenced, and this is how it continues, and other auxiliary natures have been used and abused to further glorify and justify the existential holiness of the land and its people.

What has been explicated above does not deny the fact that the conflict itself became a bearer of other conflicts, impregnated with deformed sub-conflicts for decades so far. The sub-conflicts, derived from the main conflict, vary in their natures mirroring religious, ethnic, economic, resource-based, and security-related conflicts among many, all of which are in isolation of the Palestinian diaspora.

**What are the conflict dynamics?**

Each conflict has its own dynamics and own cycle(s), consisting of all or some of the following: latency, emergence, continuation, escalation, violence, termination, de-escalation, relapse, and/or restructuring.\(^{382}\)

Prior to mapping the patterns of influence of diasporas to phases of conflict, it is important to keep in mind the difference between the main conflict that diasporised the Palestinians (the holy-territorio-existential side of the conflict as explicated earlier in this chapter), and the sub-conflicts that recur in what the Palestinians call, and are isolated from, their homeland (the structured/symbolic/cultural/direct violence resonating the economic, ethnic, religious, resource-related, security-based ... etc). The initial conflict emerged right before 1948 and has escalated, re-escalated, continued and *plateaued* since. Within the original conflict are sub-conflicts that occur and recur orthodoxy every few years. It is central to note that despite the closeness of all sub-conflicts to the hearts of the Palestinians in the diaspora, such sub-conflicts do not directly affect them and were not the reason behind their diasporisation. What the Palestinians in the diaspora suffer from is being voiceless, isolated, unrepresented by their homeland, and thus, stateless. They do not suffer from being deprived from freedom of movement within their own land (despite

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suffering from absence of freedom to entre homeland), water, electricity, or any other stake sufferable by the Palestinians in Palestine. What both parties share is the desperation to exist, but due to statelessness cannot share the same ways of proving this existence.

According to current literature, diasporas can play various roles throughout the various stages of conflicts. During the latent stage of conflict, and on political and diplomatic levels, diasporas can mobilise to lobby and influence governments, international organisations, public opinions, and civil society organisations. On the economic level of the same latent stage, and in an attempt to prevent the emergence of a conflict, diasporas can support parties who consider themselves deprived of resources, forcing such parties to reconsider engagement in conflict. Another possibility open to diasporas at this stage is facilitating the emergence of conflict by remittances directed towards parties willing to pursue a conflict. Needless to say that diasporas can be both positive and negative influencers at the same time, and can also selectively decide to remain neutral, as per the current scholarship. As previously mentioned, what the literature seems to overlook are the cases where diasporas cannot play, as diasporas, any of the abovementioned roles. On the political and diplomatic levels of the latent stage, and in reference to the activities organised by the studied cases (which happen to target the conflict and its sub-conflicts), it has been demonstrated that the stateless Palestinian diaspora suffers from issues related to mobilise as who? As Palestinians? How when Palestine and its governments do not represent them? How can they wreck or make peace when they are not even part of the equation? The same applies to economic measures. How can Palestinians in the diaspora contribute resources to a party that does not represent them in order to prevent the emergence of a conflict that they cannot take part in, neither positively nor negatively? And who is the Palestinian diaspora to the Palestinian governments to lead them to reconsider engaging in conflict? Are they anything but a “refugees’ card” waved whenever the occasion allows as has

383 For examples refer to Bercovitch, "A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution." in particular, and Smith, Diasporas in International Conflict. in general
384 The same applies to the cases where (divided) diasporas play all the roles simultaneously, or play no role at all.
been frequently done? All the aforementioned questions do not repudiate the fact that the Palestinians in the diaspora do indeed practice their Palestinian-ness and try to force themselves into the equation by organising and mobilising, but not because their homeland urges them to do so, but because they carry a huge burden represented in the sense of responsibility to keep Palestine alive (yet in isolation from Palestine) to themselves first and foremost, and to the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent Stage</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Monopolised by governments or intergovernmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>Monopolised by diplomatic missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Mostly directed towards individuals on the level of philanthropic donations and remittances to a lesser extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Influence (lack of) of Palestinian Diaspora on Latent Stages of Conflicts

Moving to the escalation stages of a conflict, which are also stages where diasporas can play influential political, economic, and even military roles. These stages include conflict emergence and continuation and are fields of clashes and violence. On the political level, diasporas can lobby host governments and international organisations, can promote boycotting the other party’s produce (which is a measure followed by the Palestinians (as well as non-Palestinians) in Belgium. Examples include Osez le Boycott, BDS News, Boycott from Within, and Démasquez les oranges de l’occupation)\(^{385}\), it can also lobby its local representatives, demonstrate, and carry any (re)action acceptable by and accepted in the host country. On the economic level, diasporas can send remittances to governments or other groups in attempts to facilitate the escalation or continuation of the conflict in the homeland. On the military level, diasporas can offer weaponry, personnel, and guidance, a current example of which is the Syrian and Kurdish diasporas. The Palestinian diaspora, not represented by and in its homeland, and in isolation from accessing it, is limited in options. The military level is not possible due to the absence of Palestinian borders and border control. An alternative has been possible

\(^{385}\) All of which held or participated in BDS events in Belgium.
(in the pre Oslo and pre Cairo Agreement eras) in Jordan and in Lebanon when the Palestinian parties recruited combatants in the diaspora as opposed to diasporas supporting combatants in the homeland. The economic measures can be explained in the same manner they were explained above, in the latent stages. As for the political measures, it is the one level where the Palestinians in the diaspora attempt activity and mobilisation through, the most applied of which are the BDS campaigns in Belgium. The other possibilities are also applicable, but are faced with the usual obstacle of being unrepresented by what they call their homeland due to their homeland’s statelessness and inability to represent its citizens let alone its diaspora.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Escalation Stage</th>
<th>Attempts are indeed made, but the sound mostly arrives to no destination. Calls are made for a homeland not to a homeland.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Philanthropic contributions and remittances are usually sent to individuals and not to parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Was been possible at one point in time, especially pre-Oslo and pre peace treaties and agreements, but it is not the case anymore.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: Influence (lack of) of Palestinian Diaspora on Escalation Stages of Conflicts

The following stage, at least logically, is de-escalation and termination, where diasporas can play political roles in mediating and appealing to international bodies and homeland elites to aid with conflict resolution activities. It is not possible, for the time being, to explore this stage given that it has not been reached in the initial conflict that diasporised the Palestinians. It is possible, nonetheless, to discuss this stage in reference to sub-conflicts, very shortly though, because the diaspora is yet again out of the equation of termination, just as it is out of the equation of prevention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Termination Stage</th>
<th>N/A yet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 5.3: Influence (lack of) of Palestinian Diaspora on Termination Stages of Conflicts

For conflicts that terminate, the termination stage is followed by a post conflict stage, where diasporas can play political, economic, and socio-cultural roles. On the political level, diasporas can take part in building the civil society and promoting ‘democratic’ ideas related to equality, human rights, freedom of speech and so on. Diasporas can also financially support the homeland in rebuilding for
example, which is practiced by the Palestinians in the diaspora not because they are asked to do so, but because they feel they are obliged to do so in light of the lack of other options and possibilities. On the socio-cultural level, diasporas can work on promoting idea(l)s such as truth and reconciliation, and justice. Yet again, Palestinians are isolated and are out of the equation of all the above, except for what nurtures their Palestinian-ness, their only option, rebuilding homes, hospitals, and schools after the many destructive sub-conflicts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post Conflict Stage</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Rebuilding via personal/individual initiatives, or via initiatives originating at host countries (and host country organisations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Cultural</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4: Influence (lack of) of Palestinian Diaspora on Post Conflict Stages of Conflicts

Bercovitch notes that “few situations threaten the basic structure of the diaspora-homeland relationship more acutely than conflict – hence the very significant influence diasporas may exercise on a conflict. This is why it behooves us to understand how diasporas affect conflict”.

Bercovitch identifies three possible influences by diasporas; positive, negative, and neutral (in line with the literature’s categorisations of peace-makers, peace-wreckers, and selectively none). What this chapter attempts to add is that another dimension exists besides positive, negative, and neutral, a restrained, limited, influence-less one; an echoless one.

Despite the echolessness, the diasporas of the studied cases organise and mobilise in

* Contents of tables further explicated in Chapters 7 and 8
attempts to make their voices heard, in attempts to prove their Palestinian-ness, and in attempts to keep their cause alive at least within their own hearts and minds.

As can be extracted from the above, the Palestinian diasporas in the studied cases are extremely limited on options, despite their attempts, when the matter is related to political influences, military influences, and socio-cultural influences. The only area where Palestinians in the diaspora willingly play a role is the economic, directed towards individuals and non-governmental organisations. Palestinians in the diaspora support extended family members, village members, or any Palestinian affected by destruction in the homeland. Such portrayals of support are usually not channeled through the government for it does not represent them, and the absence of other forms of influence is also affected by the lack of a state representing and being represented by its diaspora. This absence of state gives birth to unique phenomena on many levels. Discussed below is the Homeland-Host Country permutation witnessed in Jordan and in Lebanon.

5.4 Homeland – Host Country Permutation

With the absence of a functioning Palestinian state, responsible for its people inside and outside what it considers its territory comes occurrences that are somewhat out of the ordinary, the loudest of which is what can be called a permutation as per the world of sound and music. What is out of the ordinary in the case of the stateless Palestinians and the stateless Palestine is that two of the three host states studied take the role of the homeland, via departments and divisions concerned with Palestinian affairs within their own governments in their own countries. Jordan for example has a Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas Lebanon has a Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), previously known as Palestinian Refugee Affairs, which operates under the Lebanese Republic’s Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
From analysing the tasks of Jordan’s Department of Palestinian Affairs, one notices that it is covering up or replacing a state that ceases to exist. Its official policies include:

- Providing full support to the Palestinian brothers and sisters in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, in addition to supporting their National Authority. This is done by coordinating all official efforts of divisions and ministries working in this field and thus, being the hub where all data and information is located.
- Following all developments related to the Palestinian Cause, on both regional and international levels, via participating in meetings, conferences, talks and negotiations.
- Supervising and providing services to Refugee Camps in Jordan.
- Developing local refugee communities by setting up projects that ameliorate living standards and alleviate hardships.
- Cooperating and coordinating with UNRWA on multiple levels such as services and policy making.

As for the Department’s functions and rights/powers, the DPA is responsible for:

- Monitoring, studying, and analysing matters related to Palestinian affairs, whether inside Palestine or outside of it.
- Monitoring Palestinian affairs on Arab, Islamic, and International levels.
- Participating in the activities of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian committee to support the steadfastness (Sumoud) of the Palestinian people.
- Coordinating between UNRWA and all ministries and governmental divisions and departments.
- Monitoring UNRWA institutions in Jordan.

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387 "Department of Palestinian Affairs," http://www.jordan.gov.jo/wps/portal!ut/p/b1/jZHbCojAEIafpQeImXVXXS_NzHOWlbZ7EwYhggeChr7Vgm6Spu7ge8_DAMSBDGopRHCf1MzyK5811X5qPuublZdGpfcingeeQS573EMQtSMxFrRTDQFiAmA4396x7N9ZsaIPPZ0DGz_jFI7StGmc_oCxoijgj_GnI1xKO_KSE5iTJ8hltlYoqYEZgoKhfRgfPSNHBVhMVlU01uh501BwIvQZNF1X_Kdaw9fv2Bq1sNvFrGbOZJ5xWizdFYGkh/d4/d5/L2dBSEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/?nameEntity=Department%20of%20Palestinian%20Affairs. Accessed 9 December 2013.
• Coordinating with ministries and specialised units with regards to the organisation of movement of people across bridges to and from Jordan, in addition to working on solving the issues that arise during this process

In addition to the abovementioned, “any project carried out by international NGOs [concerning Palestine or the Palestinians] has to obtain the DPA’s approval”. 388

What the above resonates is that the Department of Palestinian Affairs serves various purposes, one is playing the role of the God Father to the Palestinian Cause, another is handling the issues of the Palestinians in Jordan, and lastly being the centre and the hub of Palestinian affairs which in practice is tangible given the roles Jordan played and still plays in peace talks and attempts at de-escalation.

As for the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, its mandate includes “providing Palestinian refugees in Lebanon with the conditions to live in dignity, prosperity, security and harmony with their environment until they are able to enforce their right of return as stipulated in United Nation’s Resolution 194 and the Arab Peace Initiative”. 389 The LPDC also supports the Palestinian Right of Return in accordance with UN GA Resolution 194.

Although the Committee in Lebanon is not as involved in the Palestinian affairs as the DPA in Jordan is, but it can also be extracted that Lebanon is taking the responsibility of the Palestinians, even if partially. Lebanon is demanding the application of 194, and it is working on providing better living conditions to the Palestinians living on its soil. It is also Lebanon that established the LPDC not Palestine. It is true that governments usually lobby for external affairs that have internal dimensions, but it is not common practice that governments of host countries establish such departments or divisions.

As has been explicated throughout the chapter, the Palestinians in the diaspora are echoless and restrained on options. Their organisation and mobilisation attempts, and despite their direct relation to what happens in the homeland, are independent of and from it. Even their ability to take part in the conflict that diasporised them is compromised due to their statelessness, their non-belonging (at least officially) to their homeland. This involuntary isolation turns philanthropic to political in attempts to prove Palestinian-ness to Palestine, and to keep Palestine alive despite its ailments. Therefore, even when there is no maestro (homeland) leading the Palestinians in the diaspora, the Palestinians still make their own sounds, derived from yet independent from, the sounds the maestro is surrounded with. This chapter also illustrated how the absence of a maestro facilitates (or maybe necessitates) its replacement, where two of the three studied countries showed clear indications of homeland-host country permutation in which the host country replaced the homeland in diaspora affairs, negotiations, wellbeing, and more.

Although non-reflective by the main target audience; the homeland, the Palestinian diasporic sonata is still played, and is as important as any other audible composition, for that being echoless necessitates finding alternatives, later illustrated in this repertoire.

The following chapter, Requiem to Tonality, will reverberate another sound of Palestinian Statelessness, the sound of acentric realities affecting historiographies, geographies and temporalities; a composition honoring the demise of Palestinian tonality.
Chapter 6
Requiem to Tonality

Requiem: “a musical composition honouring the dead”
Analogy – a composition honouring the Palestinian tonality

Metronome: What effects does statelessness have on diasporic realities in terms of historiographies, geographies, and temporalities?

Hypotheses: For historiographies to be institutionalised, a state must not be absent. Physical disconnection from an un-established homeland changes the shapes of geographies. Statelessness distorts the perceptions of time; past, present, and future.

Chapter Six
Requiem to Tonality

This composition resembles a Requiem in its nature; it honours the dead Palestinian tonality that took along the tonalities of historiographies, geographies, and temporalities with it.

6.1 Acentric Realities: Historiographies, Geographies, and Temporalities of the Stateless

Do we exist? What proof do we have? The further we get from the Palestine of our past, the more precarious our status, the more disrupted our being, the more intermittent our presence. When did we become “a people”? When did we stop being one? Or are we in the process of becoming one? What do those big questions have to do with our intimate relationship with each other ...? 391

What we never understood was the power of a narrative history to mobilize people around a common goal ... and because of the collective Palestinian inability as a people to produce a convincing narrative story with a beginning, middle, and end Palestinians have remained scattered and politically ineffective 392

Edward W. Said

What roles do historiography, geography, and temporality play in mobilising people? Are history and narrative cornerstones to Diaspora organisation? How can exclusion from a place turn that place into a component of personal and collective identity? And do open wounds belong to the past or to the present?

This chapter will answer the aforementioned questions by studying the effects of statelessness on historiographies, geographies, and temporalities. This dissertation

argues that collective Diaspora organisation and mobilisation requires a state, a centre, and this chapter intends to explore the (in)ability of a (non)state to produce and document its history and narrative, its (in)capability of representing its people despite their dispersion in different spaces and places, in addition to its (in)ability to maintain a chronological order of time.

It is indispensable to define the cornerstones of the title’s components, as they will be used throughout the following pages. Commencing with Historiographies; according to dictionaries and encyclopaedias, Historiography is the writing of history in general and “especially the writing of history based on the critical examination of sources, the selection of particulars from the authentic materials, and the synthesis of particulars into a narrative that will stand the test of critical methods”. 393 Geographies on the other hand is a term that “refers not only to the geographic relocation of people but also to the creation of spaces and forums in which they reconstitute their communities and memories”. 394 Finally, Temporalities, derived from temporal, means of or related to a sequence of time.

Throughout this chapter, the term Palestinian-ness will be used to refer to an identity anchored to a land, one that desires and longs for returning to Palestine. It is an identity in-progress and in-waiting where both personal and collective dignities are tightly linked to a sense of loss of place, dispossession and exile. Al Huwiyyah (identity) in Arabic means an individual’s / a collective’s absolute truth/reality and fundamental qualities. A person’s Huwiyyah is perceived as real when his/her identity is actual and tangible (proved on paper and in practice both to the self and to the other) and not only symbolic. To use the term Palestinian Identity in reference to the Palestinians in the Diaspora would mean that the members of the Diaspora enjoy being Palestinians and belonging to Palestine on paper, with proof and evidence.

Moreover, Palestinian-ness is used instead of Palestinian Identity because the former is compatible with the sporadic Palestinian historiography and temporality, while the latter is somehow misleading and gives the impression that the Palestinian identity is shaped, uninterrupted and unaffected by being ‘eternally’ remote from Palestine. Palestinian Identity as a term also gives the connotation that the Palestinians in the Diaspora have a state to return to if and when they want to, are allowed to hold its passport, to participate in its politics, to be represented in and by it, or even have the right to call it ‘home’. On the other hand, the word Palestinian-ness reflects that being a Palestinian in the Diaspora is “a journey without end. There is no point of arrival except through returning to the homeland … Palestinian-ness [therefore] is constituted through and in an endless – but not aimless – journey”. 395 Concisely, Palestinian Identity is based on something tangible, while Palestinian-ness is based on the lack of that something.

On the same lines of translating terms and concepts from Arabic to English, it is worth noting that in English, the Arabic word Al Watan means homeland, home, native land, soil, the land of ancestors, and country. It is also worth mentioning that the love of Al Watan is entrenched in the Palestinians in particular and Arabs in general to a degree where it is believed to be a cornerstone of faith 396 and is considered a person’s heart and soul.

The western notions of nation and state are not existent in Arabic. The words nation and state both translate to Dawlah 397. In the following sections, the word national narrative in the Palestinian context means the narratives of the Watan (Al Sard Al Watani/Al Riwaya Al Wataniyyah). Therefore, Palestine as a Watan exists, and lives within each person. Palestine as a country (Watan/Balad) also exists. What does not exist is Palestine as a Dawlah (State/Nation). In conclusion, this chapter argues that

396 (Hobb Al Watan Eaman – Loving the Watan is part of faith)
397 Dawlah: a country with a government in which the peoples are subject to a sovereign political, economic and social system
due to the lack of a state to generate narratives, the Palestinians construct narratives of the Watan, which happen to take the shape of national narratives.

The chapter will start by questioning whether the historiography of the stateless is affected by the absence of a centre, namely a state. Followed by questioning the rationale behind the silent and silenced history of Palestine. The second section of this chapter will examine the geographies of the stateless, and whether those geographies are constituted of place and space, or include other elements that compensate the absence of a centre. The third section of this chapter will study the temporalities of the stateless and how statelessness causes intermittences to and distortions of time and representations of the past, present, and future. In the fourth section of the chapter, the symbolism of Palestinian realities is investigated and linked to the Palestinian historiographies, geographies, and temporalities followed by concluding notes, and thus composing a requiem; to the diasporic Palestinian tonality.
6.2 The Historiography of the Stateless

This section aims to introduce the significance and functions of national narratives by relating historiography to the state (or the lack of it). National narrative as a concept has been used throughout the literature in different ways. In practice, national narrative has been confused with nationalism and often instrumentalised and symbolised for nationalistic goals. However, in its simplest sense, national narrative is “the story that a (national) collective tells about itself. It tells the individuals constituting the nation (and anybody else who is interested) who they are, what comprises their past (the national, common one), the structure of their characteristics as a collective and where they are heading – that is, how they should act in the political realm”. Undoubtedly, one single national narrative does not exist anywhere in the world, but few coherent national narratives do exist, mostly in nations where the nation is narrated into existence and being in both time and space. One of the main tasks of a national narrative is to “construct and reinforce the unity of a nation”. If and when attaining this quest comes near to impossible, coercion by both inclusion and/or exclusion is practiced by states in order to maintain their ‘national unity’, which according to Bhabha is an “impossible unity”. Nonetheless, nations influenced from within and without continue to produce and reproduce narratives because it is through these narratives that the past and the nation along with its peoples are either confirmed or denied existence.

For political scientists, the significance of a national narrative comes from its ability to mobilise groups to attempt political change, and provide “deep and lasting insights into the need and methods of change ... narratives may inspire social movements but, more precisely, the dissemination and expression of narratives

400 Ibid., Page 82.
401 Ibid., Page 83.
measure the extent and political success of social movement participants”. The absence of a significant narrative can lead to the contrary.

Sources of national narrative are vast and diverse, spanning from official to biographical and picturesque. Films, literature, texts, images and albums, folk tales, biographies, and history books among others can be constituents of national narratives. On the ground, the most accessible source of national narrative is schoolbooks, and in particular history books. In cultures where literary materials are produced and read, literature can be considered another accessible source of national narrative.

According to Alessandro Portelli, narrating the nation in the form of history-telling consists of three different modes. The three modes are: the institutional mode which is located in the space of the nation or the state in reference to its government and politics (government, political parties … etc); the communal mode which is “the community in a local space and uses the first person plural” (community and neighbourhood); the personal mode, which is used by the individual when referring to his/her home/pace using first person singular (family and individual) (Refer to Figure 6.1). According to Portelli, the distinction between the three modes does exist, but “history-telling is precisely the art of combining the modes into meaningful patterns.”

So, what happens when there is no defined state to combine the aforementioned modes into meaningful patterns? And what happens when the experience of the three modes does not occur in the same place and space?

To answer the aforementioned questions, the following section will look into the Palestinian narratives, which in practice are a combination of patriotic words and symbols and not national narratives per se.

According to Doumani, the Palestinian narratives mostly revolve around two binaries: erasure/affirmation and colonisation/resistance. The former is “obsessed with identity politics and often assumes things that ought to be explained, such as how the Palestinians became a people and what their relationship is to place”, and the latter is a reflection of the political confrontation with Israel “and often perches on the moral high ground of victimhood”. By analysing the Palestinian narratives, Doumani links narrative and political mobilisation and concludes that “for these reasons [the orbiting of Palestinian narratives around the two aforementioned binaries], neither narrative genre can lay the foundation for a new mobilizing
political language informed by sensitivity to social and cultural practices that produce and transform what it means to be a Palestinian”. 406 What Doumani calls binaries is observed on the ground where the narratives of the Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon revolve around erasure/affirmation as for example 407 “there is nothing called Israeli vs. Palestine is my land and my great great grand parents were born and buried there, show me one Jew who has grandparents born and buried in Palestine”. And colonisation/resistance as for example “God damn them, they took (and sometimes raped) our lands and forced us out of our homes, they are killing our elderly, women, and children vs. what can we do? we are forgotten people no one cares about us. But one day, it will all end ... nothing stays as it is. If I do not see Palestine being liberated, my son will. And if my son does not witness its liberation, his children will. This is why we make children, to continue with our struggle”.408

What can be extracted from observing and analysing the Palestinian discourses is that the narrative dominating the discourses is one of historic loss and tragedy, one that reflects the existential uncertainty of Palestine and thus, the Palestinians. The absence of Palestine as a state with instruments and institutions hindered the development of a narrative exempt from uncertainty and victimhood. As a result, the Palestinian historiography in general is most often a counter-narrative to Israel’s historiography, it works in one direction409 and can be categorised as defensive, which in its turn gives birth to defensive nationalism, 410 defensive Palestinian-ness and defensive existence.

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407 Chapter 7 will elaborate more on the sociological analysis of Diaspora members with regards to narrating their existence and experiences.
408 A widely used argument by Palestinians, heard in multiple observations of events and interviews. For example: During a discussion in “an evening with Elia Suleiman, cineast” – 12 March 2013, Bruxelles.
6.2.1 The Palestinian History: Between Silenced and Silent

For Palestinians, telling stories about life both before and after the creation of the state of Israel has been and continues to be a difficult task. Because they have neither a state that represents them nor an official narrative of critical historical moments, Palestinians lack the narrative power of a unified founding myth that justifies their existence as a collective. 411

Keith W. Whitelam introduces his book The Invention of Ancient Israel, The Silencing of Palestinian History by stating that “the history of ancient Palestine has been ignored and silenced by biblical studies because its object of interest has been an ancient Israel conceived and presented as the taproot of Western civilization” 412. What Whitelam attempts to articulate in his book is that the ancient Palestinian history should be considered a subject of its own, and that it should be detached from what he calls the “grasp of biblical studies” 413. During his research on ancient Palestinian history, which exists only as a “backdrop to the histories of Israel and Judah”, Whitelam was faced by the fact that very few courses on the history of ancient Israel were taught in History or Ancient History departments. Instead, the majority of courses were taught in departments of Religion or Theology. Correspondingly, as per Whitelam, Palestinian history “lacks substance and even existence” in Western institutions 414. In parallel to looking at the Palestinian history under a “Western” lens, one should also look at the making of Palestinian history in the “East”, and specifically Jordan and Lebanon, which are two of the three case studies explored in this thesis. Palestine is indeed declared in textbooks, syllabi and national narratives, not as an independent entity though, but as a means for glorifying and praising the accomplishments of the aforementioned countries

413 Ibid., Page 2.
414 Ibid., Pages 3 – 4.
whether in supporting the Palestinians or in fighting the “injustices of Israel and the Zionists”.

The importance of texts (which do not enjoy high positionality and significance in the case of Palestine) is pertinently illustrated by the following from Edward Said’s Orientalism:

A text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual, and arising out of circumstances …, is not easily dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of academics, institutions, and governments can accrue to it, surrounding it with still greater prestige than its practical successes warrant. Most importantly such texts can create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it. 415

The problem with the Palestinian history is that it is focused on the recent history rather than recent and ancient histories. The historiography of Palestine mostly embraces the history of dispossession and exile and then halts. On other infrequent occasions, the history of Palestine is coupled with the history of Greater Syria or later to the Arab or Islamic histories in general. The same can be applied to the naming of the historical Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is called the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the Middle East conflict among other names that exclude “Palestine”. Palestine seems to belong to anyone but the Palestinians. Especially those remote from Palestine, those in the Diaspora.

The construction of history in both its oral and written forms is a political act that requires a “permission to narrate” 418, as Said puts it in his book The Politics of

416 Whitelam, The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History. Page 7
417 Ibid., Page 11.
Dispossession. A number of scholars attempted to attain that “permission to narrate”, such as Said himself, in addition to Tarif Khalidi and Lila Abu Lughod\textsuperscript{419} and most recently Walid Khalidi in his photographic history of the Palestinians pre 1948\textsuperscript{420}. Although their attempts have been relatively constructive, the echoes of their works were not loud enough. One would wonder why? One reason is that a prerequisite to the conceptualisation and representation of history is the institutionalisation of it, which is not possible in the case of Palestine due to the absence of an authoritative and functional institution. One of the outcomes of this lack of authoritative institution is the lack of an authoritative text\textsuperscript{421} to represent it. This absence also resulted in the rise of “many local and individual accounts of history”\textsuperscript{422} and narratives.

On the ground, the silencing of the Palestinian history is also tangible in school curricula, and particularly in history books. History books in Jordan and Lebanon are the field where practices of silencing Palestinian history and sounding of the glorious and heroic Jordanian and Lebanese histories are at play. Most Palestinian refugees in both countries attend UNRWA (The United Nations Relief and Works Agency) schools where they study local (Jordanian and Lebanese) textbooks. What happens on the ground in such schools, and particularly those in Jordan, is that the history of Palestine (in addition to the Palestinian cause, struggle, and resistance) is taught in informal and unconventional methods, silently and behind closed doors. “The teachers at our UNRWA school did not teach us anything about Palestine through textbooks, but that doesn’t mean that we were not taught about Palestine. We were raised on the love of Palestine and Palestinian-ness through the spoken word, during our morning assemblies, during our daily prayers, via the stories we were told by the


\textsuperscript{420} See Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876-1948.

\textsuperscript{421} Davis, \textit{Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced}. Page 124
members of staff”. Of course this unconventional practice is not free from fear and insecurity, and any efforts to internally institutionalise such methods (in addition to commemorating Palestine) are faced with governmental interventions that could potentially lead to ‘legal’ accountability.

Therefore, and due to multiple reasons, the Palestinian history has been silenced (deliberately or unintentionally), whether due to facing the stronger bible-based history of Israel, due to the inability of scholars to resonate louder than the already existing literature on Israel and reclaim Palestine’s ancient past, or due to the lack of Palestine as a state to institutionalise its own history and create its own narrative. But what about the Palestinian adherence to the history of victimhood, loss, exile and dispossession? Is that an outcome of the “silenced” history or even existence? Or is it an outcome of what Said calls “Political Silence”?

“It is unusually common to find people who will not talk about Palestine. “Political silence,” in the case of the Palestinians, has meant not knowing to whom or for what to talk, and therefore talking with different voices, none of them their own”. The Palestinian “cause” for instance, is a major constituent of the Palestinian history, narrative and even existence. What one notices is that this “cause” lacks an adequate, operational, systematic and coherent definition and therefore lacks the ability to politically organise individuals.

In a talk between Salman Rushdie and Edward Said, Rushdie mentions that Said criticises “the lack of any serious efforts to institutionalize the story [of Palestine], to give it an objective existence” where Said elaborated that it was “strange that no narrative of Palestinian history has ever been institutionalized in a definitive masterwork”. Correspondingly, Palestinians lacked the tools to develop a national

423 Informal conversation with graduate of an UNRWA school in Jordan – 5 November 2012
425 Ibid., Page 27.
426 Ibid., Pages 118-119.
narrative based on museums, education and media among others. Instead, they were confined to verbalise bits and pieces of their stories.\(^{427}\)

What complicated, and still complicates the mission of institutionalising Palestinian history and narrative is that Palestinians themselves do not speak about their history. Some, especially the younger generation in the Diaspora, simply due to lack of knowledge, and others, like the older Palestinians who witnessed 1948 or 1967, because it is painful and is still agonising to remember and articulate. In most cases, when anyone from the latter group is requested to speak about his/her experience, signs of discomfort and even pain come to the surface. As the prominent Palestinian scholar Ghada Karmi notes in her memoirs, “no one spoke about the circumstances that had prompted our departure or explained the history and politics of it”.\(^{428}\) Some even feel ashamed to share their experiences, and would rather not make them permanent, or pass them from one generation to the other. What is worthy of note is that this shame is felt by the individuals and by the collectives alike. The Palestinians carry the burden of Palestine on a personal level. They are not only Palestinians, they are also Palestine. They speak on behalf of the Palestinians, and on behalf of Palestine. If Palestine cannot represent them or embrace them as Palestinians, they represent it, and embrace it. As one well-known Palestinian song says, *I have chosen you as my home, lovingly and willingly. I have chosen you as my home, openly and secretly.*\(^{429}\)

Palestinians therefore, “lack the state power that educates and molds its citizenry and creates and propagates hegemonic narratives about the state and nation that have been so effective in creating and maintaining them.”\(^{430}\) What happens in this case is that the Palestinians themselves start creating discourses and narratives of unity to sustain their Palestinian-ness and maintain their existence.

\(^{429}\) Acknowledged is the existence of Palestinian individuals who do not care about Palestine and Palestinian-ness, and who have lives that do not revolve around Palestine.
Although they appear to be strenuous, such attempts to sustain existence and visibility include repetition of particular stories. It is how Palestinians preserve their Palestinian-ness. By repeating the same stories over and over again. Such stories include which village a person is originally from, how his/her grandfather fought the “Jews”, and stories of dispossession (tasharrud). “My mother was born in Nazareth, my father was born in Jerusalem...” Edward Said told Rushdie, “the interesting thing is that there seems to be nothing in the world which sustains the story: unless you go on telling it, it will just drop and disappear.”\textsuperscript{431}

Lastly, and extracted from the above, it can be concluded that the Palestinian narrative “is not a narrative, in which scenes take place seriatim, but rather broken narratives, fragmentary compositions, and self-consciously staged testimonials, in which the narrative voice keeps stumbling over itself, its obligations, its limitations”.\textsuperscript{432}

6.3 Imagined, Reproduced and Replicated Geographies

\textit{Usually a man lives in a certain place in the world, but for the Palestinian the place lives in the man.}

(Widely used Palestinian proverb)

Geography, as utilised by Said, is “a socially constructed and maintained sense of place”.\textsuperscript{433} Excluded from their homeland – the place they have no right to reside in, and in most cases enter –, Palestinians create a space of their own in the Diaspora, a Palestinian space outside Palestine where they can experience their land anchored, territory-based Palestinian-ness. And it is by the creation of that diasporic

\textsuperscript{432} Said, \textit{After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives}. Page 38.
\textsuperscript{433} "Invention, Memory, and Place." Page 180.
space, that the Palestinians produce a replicated version of the homeland, in what will be called a diasporic place.

The distinction between Place and Space is blurred and has been the subject of research for many scholars particularly geographers. The definitions of Space and Place used in this chapter are those of Marie-Laure Ryan, who in her work focuses on Space and Place from a lived narratology point of view, which is found suitable for the purpose of this chapter. Ryan distinguishes between space and place based on two sets of oppositions; movement and rootedness, as well as freedom and security.

Place to Ryan, is a concrete environment that has its own unique character and hosts a network of interrelated things. Place has boundaries and involves a community and a lived experience, and is shaped by history. Whereas Space is open and infinite, it is an abstract collection of points separated by certain distances, an empty container for discrete objects, and is anonymous. Unlike place, space is timeless. Therefore, Place can be seen as something concrete with borders and boundaries, something real “can be pointed to on a map, lived in, visited, or empirically experienced in an obvious way”. Whereas Space can be seen as something with no limits, something felt, somewhere in which place is practiced. Figure 6.2: Space-Place Dyad.

It is worth mentioning that the significance of place to individuals and collectives comes from the intimate connection between place and ancestors. It is the source of narratives about the homeland, whether by bemoaning a lost place or rejoicing an extant one. Additionally, “place or a sense of place” is a “powerful source of

436 Ibid.
collective identity”. The significance of space on the other hand comes from the possibility to practice and reproduce place within it. Moreover, spaces are “discursive and constructive” and are “target of emotional identification”.

In the case of the Palestinians in the Diaspora, who are mostly excluded from their place (homeland), and who often resort to imagination to ‘experience’ their place of origin, the experience of place and space does not look like a dyad. Instead, a third component is added to this dyad, to make it a ‘triad’ of Place, Space, and Place again (Figure 6.3). The first place is the imagined one, the Palestine they hear about, see in pictures, and watch on television. Some of the Palestinians actually lived in that place before their Diaspora, and some others have never set foot in it. The second place is the Diasporic place. It is what the Palestinians create in the spaces they live in, their Diasporic spaces where the place that they long for “remains alive through time and space”. Due to the “impossibility of sitedness”.

of Palestine to most of the Palestinians in the Diaspora, this Diasporic space is not exempt of imaginations and symbolism. It is where perceptions of unity, Palestinian-ness, and the place called Palestine are born, raised and maintained.443

The way Palestinians maintain Palestine as a place in the Diaspora is by inquiring from each other where in Palestine they come from. This inquiry sometimes takes the form of an interrogation where a simple answer is not considered sufficient.

When asked where they come from, Palestinians usually answer by referring to the name of the city, town or village their parents come from, or the places where their parents were born. “My father is from Jerusalem, and my mother is from Ramallah” or “My father is originally from Nablus but he was born in Tulkarem. My mother’s family comes from Hebron, but she was raised in Lod”. Following

cartographically locating one’s Palestinian-ness on the map of Palestine, the full map of historic Palestine no doubt, questions about when and how the family left Palestine start to flow like a stream. “So, when did they leave Palestine? 1948 or 1967? Where did they go first? Aha ... and then? Ok ... and do you still have family in Palestine? To which the answer is usually “not direct family, but relatives of relatives whom I do not know”. Have you been to Palestine? ... Silence ... followed by a very shy and ashamed no”. 444 Silence conquers the interrogation after this last question. The flashback to the place called homeland is brought to a standstill. This is where the saying “in a landscape where all the signs of picturesque nature lead to politics, politics leads to silence” 445 fits best.

The light is then immediately shed on the Diasporic space, which consists of representations of and reflections on dispossession, exile, and agony. With expressions of acute sadness, questions and phrases such as the following start to flow: “We Palestinians are alive only because of the absence of death”, “We are counting our days to leave this world”, “will we ever get to see Palestine before we die?”, “will we witness the day in which Palestine will be liberated?” along with other similar remarks and questions. It is after this phase of agonising that the replicated image of Palestine, namely the Diasporic Place begins to emerge. What is worth noting is that Palestinian-ness has been and continues to be “a land-based identity ... the Palestinians have particularly anchored themselves to the land” 446 and have a “conscious and profoundly political sense of place”. 447 Being in the Diaspora, Palestinians are unable to experience their land-based identity. Therefore, they try to replicate their land within their lived spaces in the Diaspora. This is evident in refugee camps and Palestinian homes, where every symbol that represents Palestine

444 Observation of Diaspora conversations and interviews with Diaspora members for example during “Un grand de solidarité avec le people palestinien”, (Brussels – Belgium 9 June 2012).
446 Davis, Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced. Page 221.
is present. Starting from the Keffiyeh⁴⁴⁸, embroidery, pictures of sacred sites in Palestine, map of historic Palestine, flag, and so on. The representations of statelessness and Palestinian-ness in the Diasporic Place will be further discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

Thus, as Figure 6.3: ‘Triad’ of Palestinian Geographies reflects, it is manifested that the “Palestinian life is scattered, discontinuous, marked by the artificial and imposed arrangements of interrupted or confined space, by the dislocations and unsynchronized rhythms of disturbed time.”⁴⁴⁹

6.4 The Maze of Temporalities

*It is not that the interrelations between objects occur in space and time; it is these relationships themselves which create/define space and time.*⁴⁵⁰

*The Nakba is an ongoing project, we do not commemorate the Nakba ... we live it.*⁴⁵¹

In its simplest sense, time is “the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future regarded as a whole”.⁴⁵²

However, in practice, time can suffer from disorientation, and the past, the present and the future can conquest one another. In his book *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Other*, Johannes Fabian argues that time is “a carrier of

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⁴⁴⁸ Traditional Arab head wear, usually made from a squared cotton scarf and worn by men.
⁴⁵¹ Haneen Zoabi, “Un grand jour de solidarité avec le peuple palestinien”, (Speech, Brussels – Belgium 9 June 2012).
significance”. On the same lines, Henry Rutz argues that the “representations of time become ideologies that legitimize the exercise of power”. 

The circuits of time for the Palestinians in the Diaspora are constituted of past, present and future, just like time is defined. However, what makes the Palestinian circuits of time unique is that the Palestinian present is not portrayed only in the now. Although when Shlomo Sand used the word “1948 Syndrome” he was not referring to the Palestinians, but to the Israeli conscience, the same word can be applied to the Palestinian ‘present’. The “1948 syndrome” affects the Palestinian ‘present’. The present starts (as opposed to started) in 1948 and stretches until the Palestinian ‘now’, and it is not only the Palestinian ‘present’ that is defined by the Nakba of 1948, but also the Palestinian existence and consciousness. What is also distinctive in the temporality and historiography of the Palestinians is that 1948 is very much part of the Palestinian history, but it is by no means part of the Palestinian past. What the Palestinians lost in 1948 is not found yet, and what they wished for back in 1948 has not come true yet. Namely, state (sometimes referred to as land) and return consecutively. Therefore, the wound of 1948 is still open; it has not turned into a scar yet. It is still bleeding, and it is still awaiting a remedy. The signs of this injury are reflected and reproduced on the everydayness of the Palestinian existence, and especially when Palestinians in the Diaspora come together. Whether they are commemorating 1948’s Nakba, 1967’s Naksa, the 30th of March’s Land Day, the 17th of April’s Prisoners Day, the 29th of November’s International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinians ... or celebrating their culture and folklore, the Palestinians constantly and repeatedly remind themselves of the open wound, to an extent where it seems that it became a routine that does not necessarily result in the expected amount of pain such an open wound would or should cause. Without this constant and repetitive reminder that signifies

the ‘present’, the Palestinian existence, along with Palestinian-ness are at risk of turning into scars that with time will be removed or effaced.  

What is also remarkable in the Palestinian ‘present’, and although it spans from 1948 till the ‘present’, is that it denies the actual present, the now of the homeland, namely the existence of Israel. The existence of an Occupier is not denied, but the existence of Israel is. Many Palestinian scholars and speakers stressed on the importance of acknowledging the (present) existence of the state of Israel as a strategy to face occupation, but only a few (mainly inside Palestine and not in the Diaspora) have adopted this strategy. Using the word Israel when referring to the occupied lands is sufficient to cause an intense and instantaneous clash. Instead, most Palestinians in the Diaspora refer to Israel as “The Jews – Al Yahoud”, “The Zionist enemy – Al Adouw Al Suhyouni”, “The Zionist entity – Al Kayan Al Suhyouni” among other names, which gives the impression that the Palestinians are still on the verge of 1948, and in particular before the establishment of the state of Israel.

The intolerability of the Palestinian present obliges the Palestinians in the Diaspora to lead deferred lives, on-hold and in waiting. Nels Johnsons called the Palestinian society a “liminal body” and an “anti-structure defining its presence in terms of its past and its future in terms of inversions of normality and with reference to what it has lost.”

Hisham Sharabi, a Palestinian intellectual living in the Diaspora, translates the Diaspora liminality in the following; “I left the country in 1949 but in reality I did not


emigrate. Migration means uprooting and the start of a new life. But I never cut my roots from the homeland and I did not start a new life. My roots stayed implanted in the soil I was so far away from. Until today I am a stranger in this country in which I spent the most part of my life”. In words, Sharabi expresses what all Palestinians in the Diaspora feel in their hearts, namely the rootedness to and in the homeland. He also depicts the temporalities of the Palestinian realities, namely the on-hold present of the Diasporic experiences of the Palestinians. Sharabi then continues by saying: “Every morning in summer and fall I sit on the balcony overlooking our small garden and smell the perfume of the flowers... close my eyes and imagine that I am smelling the roses in Akka. And when I pick a leaf off the green thyme ... and roll it between my fingers I smell its perfume and I see myself in the mountains of Lebanon, at Suq al-Gharb and higher ... And in summer, at the seashore of Virginia, everything that surrounds me, the water of the sea, the sand of the beach, the distant horizon and the air full of the smell of the sea, all that is turned into images and sensations I remember from the seashores of Jaffa, Akka and Beirut”. In the aforementioned, Sharabi illustrates the Palestinian images of the past, beautiful, ideal and experienced with all the senses. He then voices his thoughts about his reality by saying: “The reality I have been living here for the last forty years is not in my possession. I am like the traveler whose heart is full of longing since the minute he lost the coast of his country from his sight. And he lives a transitory life, his suitcases always packed, awaiting the hour of return”. Again, Sharabi reflects the Palestinian on-hold present and longing for return to Palestine, to the past.

So, if the Palestinian past does not include the past seven decades, what could it include? Contrary to the Palestinian ‘present’, the Palestinian past does belong to the past. What the past does not include is the history of Palestine, the history of struggles and wars. This side of history belongs to narration. The Palestinian past is glorified, romanticised and idealised (as can be seen in Sharabi’s account above), similar to how history looks like in history books of many states. The

459 Acre in Arabic. A previously Palestinian now Israeli coastal city in the north of the country.
past consists of senses, of images, colours, smells, emotions, sounds, and flavours. A large number of poets and songs touch the senses, especially the pleasant of them. The scent of lemon trees, the flavour of coffee, the smell of soil, the taste of bread and of olives, the tweeting of birds are all excessively used in many poems and by many poets. As Mourid Barghouti expresses: “pain is like a burden on the poem because its constant presence means that it’s chronic, and all that is chronic, from inflammation of lungs to inflammation of rhymes, is boring”.461 This chronic diagnosis belongs to the present, not to the past.

As for the future, represented first and foremost by return to Palestine (whether actual return or in principle), it is atavistic: “relating to or characterized by reversion to something ancient or ancestral”.462 Reverting to historic Palestine, the full map of Palestine without Israel, the ability to return to the villages Palestinians left in 1948, 1967 or later. The future is when the Palestinian honor and dignity are reestablished and restored by returning to the homeland.

6.5 Symbolism of Palestinian Realities

The Palestinian stories and words thus turn into symbols of identity and existence. Those symbols can also be seen as ideographs463 or condensation symbols464, in the language of Rhetoric theorists such as McGee and Graber respectively.

For a word or a story to be considered a condensation symbol, it has to be “well-connected” in terms of context. According to Kaufer and Carley, three parameters make up the linguistic “well-connectedness”. First, Situational Conductivity, which refers to “the capacity of a linguistic concept both to elaborate and to be elaborated by other concepts in a particular context of use”. Second, Situational Density, which

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464 Graber, Doris A. Verbal Behavior and Politics (University of Illinois Press, 1976)
refers to “the frequency with which a linguistic item is used in relation to others, within a delineated context and social group”. Third, Situational Consensus, which refers to the “extent to which a concept is elaborated in similar ways across a given population in a given context”.\textsuperscript{465} To be a condensation symbol, a word has to be high on at least one of the abovementioned dimensions. Table 6.1 below embodies eight categories of condensation symbols as described by Kaufer and Carley.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Conductivity</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buzzwords</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnant Place-Holders</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emblems</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Symbols</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allusions</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Words</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factoids</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Types of Condensation Symbols \textsuperscript{466}

\textit{Buzzwords}, high in situational conductivity and low on density and consensus are unclear foggy labels mainly of words that are used occasionally and are understood in different ways. \textit{Pregnant Place-Holders} on the other hand are high on both conductivity and density, and low on consensus. Pregnant Place-Holders have a longer ‘shelf life’ than buzzwords mainly because they are used more frequently, more densely. \textit{Emblems}, the third type of condensation symbols is high on conductivity and consensus, but low on density. An example on Emblems is academic citation. The fourth type is \textit{Standard Symbols}, high on all three, conductivity, density, and consensus. Those symbols are “the concepts that best represent an entire web of meaning”\textsuperscript{467} making them the most rich of condensation symbols. The term Standard Symbols was first coined by an anthropologist called

\textsuperscript{466} Ibid., Page 206.
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid., Page 209.
Edmund Leach⁴⁶⁸, who believed that Standard Symbols are vital for the evolution of a common culture via language. The fifth type of condensation symbols are *Allusions*; low on both conductivity and consensus, but high on density. *Stereotypes* are the fifth type, and they are high on density and consensus, and low on conductivity. They can be seen as allusions that have become widely agreed upon and used. The last two types of condensation symbols, namely *Ordinary Words* and *Factoids* are self-explanatory.

Understanding a word’s degree of connectivity (conductivity, density, and consensus) is relative depending on the audience. To each word there exists “insider reference” connectivity and “outsider reference” connectivity. The former refers to the group concerned with what is being said, and the latter refers to the group that is ‘watching from the outside’. Naturally, insider references are not one homogeneous group but can be multiple groups. The same goes to outsider references.⁴⁶⁹

What has been observed throughout fieldwork in Belgium, Jordan and Lebanon, is that the Palestinians, as an “insider reference(s)” have been internalising the historical dispossession and existential insecurity of Palestine, and as collectives, are acting as if they themselves were Palestine. There is no Palestine to represent them, so they turn into Palestine to represent their Palestinian-ness. There is no documented history or established narrative to do them justice, so they resort to symbolism and images to produce a history and a narrative of what they or their families experienced as a result of 1948’s Nakba or 1967’s Naksa. All that represents the Palestinians is a standard symbol, high on conductivity, density, and consensus.

Table 6.2: Standard Symbols in Palestinian Diaspora Context. What is worth elaborating on is that “Palestinian” is indeed one of the symbols, but the reason for it being in the table is twofold, primarily the sense of Palestinian-ness by the self, and secondly the definition of “Palestinian” by the others. This is especially relevant

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⁴⁶⁸ See Edmund Leach, Culture and Communication: The Logic By Which Symbols Are Connected, (Cambridge University Press, 1976)
to the Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon. As one Palestinian living in Jordan answered when asked: “What do you consider yourself to be, Jordanian or Palestinian?” he answered: “Even if I wanted to feel Jordanian, they [the Jordanians of Jordanian origin] will not let me feel so”.470 The boundary of the ‘Other’ “reinforces the articulation of Palestinian-ness”.471

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine/Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Map of historic Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>Dome of the Rock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Black and White Kefiyeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Handhala 472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionism/Zionists</td>
<td>Flag of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance &amp; Struggle (Sumoud - Nidal)</td>
<td>Pictures of political figures, martyrs &amp; prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees / Exile</td>
<td>Yasser Arafat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>Black, Green, Red and White (Flag colours)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlements</td>
<td>Victory sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>Olive Tree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return</td>
<td>Clenched Fist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Return Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Embroideries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: Standard Symbols in Palestinian Diaspora Context

The numerous and scattered symbols above are the most dominant symbols in the Diasporic experience, all of which are symbols as well as constituents of the individual and the collective, the cultural and the societal. Additionally, and due to the lack of state-led representation of Palestine and the Palestinians, the “well connected” symbols above represent Palestinian historiographies (history and narrative), geographies (Place, Diasporic Space, Diasporic Place), and temporalities (past, present, future).

470 Informal conversation with a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, who left Palestine after the Naksa and settled in Jordan. (March 2013)
472 A Palestinian Defiance Symbol - a cartoon character by Naji Al Ali
As Edward Said wrote in his *After the Last Sky*

We have no dominant theory of Palestinian culture, history, society; we cannot rely on one central image (exodus, holocaust, long march); there is no completely coherent discourse adequate to us, and I doubt whether at this point, if someone could fashion such a discourse, we could be adequate for it. Miscellaneous, the spaces here and there in our midst include but do not comprehend the past; they represent building without overall purpose ... Without a center. Atonal.\(^{473}\)

6.6 Concluding Notes

In music, atonality means the absence of a key, or a tonal centre. In that sense, a piece of music composed without a focus on a central tone is referred to as atonal. On the same lines of atonality, one question arises; can the Palestinian Diaspora realities be considered atonal due to the lack of a key, a centre?

The conclusion of this chapter is represented in the image below. A translation of the chapter into musical symbols is utilised to convey the message of atonality in the context of realities of the Palestinian Diaspora.
Figure 6.4: The Atonality of Diaspora Realities
Figure 6.4 above represents the atonality of the Palestinian Historiography, Geography and Temporality. The Palestinian experience is similar to the staff above in that it lacks a key, a reference. What gives a passage a subjective sense of arrival and rest is absent. The passage starts with the past, which is perfectly ordered, romanticised, idealised and glorified. The Palestinian past, which started at an undefined time and stretched till 1948 consists of land, Palestine (The Place), and senses including olfactory, auditory, gustatory, visual and somatosensory. Following the past came an end (End Bar), which disconnected the idyllic past from the agonizing present. The Palestinian present started in 1948 and has been ongoing ever since. The wound of exile and exclusion from the place is still open and deep, and has not been treated yet. This wound represents the Palestinian Historiography, both in history and narrative. The history of Palestine is not present in the past. Instead, it is present in the present. The present, and because it has been extending for decades now, has turned into a painful and chronic routine of awaiting. The present of a life in exile within the Diasporic Space and Place, a life on hold that so far is not capable of seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. While in this long present, the Diaspora imagines and desires a future although it is nowhere to be seen. This desired and imagined future is a replica of the past, an atavistic replica of Palestine pre 1948, the return of, and to, full historic Palestine. The full map as the Palestinians know it. The passage ends there, return is the final destination.

What can be extracted from the above is that in the context of the Palestinian Diaspora, starting with the historiographies, there exists a sort of narrative discontinuity. The narratives of the past are discontinuous with and disconnected from the narratives of the present. The same goes to the history of Palestine, which started with the beginning of the present, in 1948. The history of ancient Palestine is not part and parcel of the Palestinian past, or the Palestinian present. Maybe it has not been born yet, and maybe it passed away without being noticed. As for the geographies, there exists a physical disconnection and exclusion within the

A triad of Palestinian geography (Palestine: The Place, Diasporic Space, Diasporic Place). The same can be applied to *temporalities*, which are characterised as sporadic and broken, as demonstrated above.

Accompanying this passage of discontinuity and disconnectedness is a factor that has no duration, represented by the staff in Figure 6.4 above, the journey of Palestinian-ness, the journey without an end where the distortions of geographies and temporalities are diagnosed but not treated, and where the severity of symptoms immobilises the patient.

“A void, felt by every Palestinian, has been altered by an event into a discontinuity. And the difference between void and discontinuity is crucial: One is inert absence, the other is disconnection that requires reconnection.” 475 This void resulted from the dispersal of Palestinians from Palestine, the void of an inert absence of the right to be in a place. Living in the Diasporic Space and replicating Palestine in the Diasporic Place with no possibility to return is what alters this void into discontinuity. It is where the present is disconnected from the past, and the present diasporic geographies are detached from the past and desired geographies.

Lacking a state, a centre to represent itself and represent them, the Palestinians suffer from the absence of a written history based on a critical examination of sources and a generation of weaving particular aspects of history into a narrative. Also lacking is the ability to reconstitute a Palestinian community / Palestinian communities within different spaces and places because Diasporic spaces and places are isolated from Palestine, the place. Accompanying the above is the inability to maintain a chronological sequence of time that can put the Palestinian realities in a graspable order of past, present, and future.

Acentric and accompanied by atonality, the Diaspora realities are faced by barriers and challenges that shape its concepts and understandings of organisation.

and mobilisation, practices and members, actions and inactions as well as its identities and identifications. The following chapter is an Étude on Autonomization and Statelessness. It applies a recently developed concept to the case of the Palestinian diaspora, and studies the implications of statelessness on the concept itself.
Chapter 7:
Étude on Autonomization & Statelessness

Étude: a piece written for purposes of practicing or displaying technique.476
Analogy – a piece written for purposes of practicing a newly developed technique

Metronome: How is Autonomization in the understandings of conflict narratives and structures in the diaspora affected by the absence of a state?
Hypothesis: Statelessness is able to paralyse the outcomes of the Autonomization process.

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476 "Basic Glossary of Musical Forms."
Chapter 7
Étude on Autonomization and Statelessness

7.1 Autonomization & Statelessness

Autonomization is a concept that “stresses the fact that the process of “transportation” in another completely different location often implies a deep change both in conflict narratives and in conflict structures”.477

Conflicts are importable, exportable, transferrable, and transportable across boundaries and communities, and so are their understandings. When transported and transferred across borders, conflict comprehensions undergo transformations in narratives and structures478, which in turn influence how those concerned, in this case diasporas, perceive and react to events. Certain aspects of conflicts are imported from the place of birth of the conflict, and become operation manuals on how to epitomise a conflict and all that is related to it. Therefore, components of a conflict that transport from one location to another are subjected to processes of importation in addition to parallel processes of Autonomization. Importations of conflicts mainly occur on two levels; firstly and mostly on discursive/symbolic levels and secondly and rarely as demonstrations of imported tensions and violence between sides of a conflict 479. Autonomization on levels such as the cultural, political, and social on the other hand, takes shapes that are as heterogeneous as diasporas, and is mirrored in further more heterogeneous manifestations and reactions to conflicts, organisation of diaspora movements and activities, and mobilisation for such activities. In this chapter, the multiple heterogeneities of the multiple cases studied are accompanied by a single statelessness, which will be the cornerstone to exploring how this statelessness affects the Autonomization of the conflict understandings, and how it reflects upon diaspora organisation and mobilisation.

477 Féron, Diaspora Politics: From “Long Distance Nationalism” to Autonomization. Page 72.
478 Ibid., Page 72.
479 Ibid., Page 64.
In the following section, the concept of Autonomization is applied to the understandings, organisation and mobilisation of the Palestinian diaspora in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon, and is mapped against similar occurrences in the homeland and elsewhere when suitable.

7.2 Conceptual Autonomization:

7.2.1 Pluralising Palestine: the Stateless State

More heterogeneous than the manifestations and dynamics of the Palestinian diaspora(s) and their organisation and mobilisation are the understandings and manifestations of Palestine, or Palestines, in plural. A state, an occupied territory, a country, a nation, and more, are some identifications and definitions of Palestine. The perceptions of Palestine are multilayered, with yet more layers within each layer of the multilayers. There is a Palestine for Palestinians in ‘Palestine’, and another one for Palestinians in the diaspora, and yet another one for Arabs and Muslims which Palestinians happen to be part of, and one more Palestine for everyone; the Global Palestine. Indubitably, the abovementioned categorisations are suitable in view of organisation and mobilisation, action and reaction. Other Palestines can be identified depending on who, why, what, when, and how Palestine is viewed.
The stateless Palestinians in the diaspora are people who have no right to have rights in what they consider and call their homeland. The absence of this basic right makes them ipso facto stateless regardless of their locations and statuses. Even Palestine is affected by having no right to rights as a state. Whether it is considered a state or not, it is lacking a state identity due to its de facto statelessness. Defined, state identity is “the set of beliefs about the nature and purpose of the state expressed in public articulations of state actions and ideals,” and “the corporate and officially demarcated identity linked to the state apparatus.” Altoraifi defines state identity as the “state’s perception of what role it should play and what status it should enjoy

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among other states”\(^483\). From all the abovementioned definitions, which are a drop in the ocean of definitions available in the literature, it can be clearly seen that Palestine as a state, as it is sometimes considered by both its politicians and its people alike, is short of having a clear set of beliefs about its nature and purpose, especially with regards to state actions. The situation of the Palestinian state, country, land, territory among other labels is short of clarity in terms of purpose and actions. If the state identity is born from the state apparatus, then Palestine again is suffering chronically from the lack, in practice and in solid terms, of such an apparatus. In terms of what role Palestine believes it should play and what status it should enjoy amongst other states, this definition too is not applicable. Many of the roles Palestine (as a state or as a ‘state’, as Fatah or as Hamas) believes it should play are roles that it cannot play\(^484\), and the status that Palestine believes it should enjoy amongst other states is nowhere near granted, not even within Palestine itself for that Palestine’s self-understanding is incomprehensible and spasmodic not to say (rightly) schizophrenic, and has been so for decades.

When abstracting the self-understanding of Palestine, it is observable that Fatah and Hamas have opposing understandings of what Palestine is and should be. Where Fatah seems to accept the Palestine of 1967 (although not on all occasions), Hamas seems to be determined to reject it; where Fatah on most occasions acknowledges the existence of Israel (not always as a Jewish state), Hamas wholly rejects its existence\(^485\), where a government and its ministries exist, a state does not; where Palestinian embassies, ambassadors and delegations exist, Palestine does not. Moreover, if Palestine believes it should play a role, for example, in granting return


\(^{484}\) The ultimate goals shared by different parties in Palestine are represented in the Palestinian constants: Return, Jerusalem as a capital (although sometimes Fatah refers to East Jerusalem unlike Hamas who constantly refers to Jerusalem as a whole), and statehood (sometimes referred to as sovereignty). Despite the similarity in goals, different parties have different views about how to reach them.

\(^{485}\) Reference here is made to Hamas as a collective, not as individuals, for that some Hamas individuals have more lenient stances.
or repatriation to its refugees, which on paper it believes it does\(^486\), the lack of state
halts it from doing so. If Palestine believes it should play a role in determining its
future, the lack of a state also prevents it from doing so. Examples of this sort are
numerous, and are all opposed by the lack of a state. The status that Palestine
believes it should enjoy among other states is also problematic, for example, where
some states consider it a state, others consider it an occupied territory, some
consider it an occupied territory and a state (mostly Arab countries), and yet others
do not acknowledge its existence in any form. This too, is not for Palestine to decide
upon. What happened when Palestine, and therefore its identity, ceased to exist is
that Palestine pluralised; it became anything but one.

On the way to its pluralisation, Palestine underwent processes of Autonomization in
terms of understanding what Palestine is, what demands are being/are to be made
in relation to Palestine and its cause, and how such demands are made. With
reference to Figure 7.1 above, the outcomes of the Autonomization of Palestine can
be divided into 4 (see Table 7.1 below). It is important to note that the pluralisation
of Palestine is also accompanied by a pluralisation in positionality. Members of a
diaspora can be positioned in more than one layer of the pluralised Palestine. For
instance, a Belgian of Palestinian origins can be positioned in 3 out of the 4 layers
(excluding Palestinians in Palestine), and a Palestinian taking refuge in Lebanon can
be positioned in 2 layers (excluding Global Palestine and Palestinians in Palestine).
The position a member decides to locate her/himself in is dependent on a plethora
of reasons, including but not limited to personal, circumstantial, situational, and
temporal.

The first\(^487\) of the Palestines can be seen in what is called Global Palestine. It is
Palestine to all those who believe that the Palestinian cause is a just and a noble one,
and to those who believe and take part in what is sometimes referred to as the
Global Justice Movement. In general, this category demands justice, mainly via
international courts and tribunals such as the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, or via

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\(^{486}\) Palestinian institutions led by both Fatah and Hamas both believe so

\(^{487}\) First for explanation purposes only
BDS campaigns especially in countries where BDS is not a by-default-occurrence (such as Belgium, and unlike Jordan and Lebanon), or via calls for implementation of UN Resolutions and the Rule of Law. It is important to note that organisations functioning under this layer can also function within, and affect the shapes and dynamics of, other layers, an example of which is the Association Belgo-Palestinienne ABP which targets Palestinians via sponsoring Palestine related events for Palestinians, and also Belgians and other Europeans by BDS campaigns, debates, and talks. Participants within this layer can also be active participants in other layers. Examples of this layer are the 2014 worldwide demonstrations in support of Gaza where most demands were justice-related, freeing Gaza and Palestine, demanding ICC for Israel, or accusing it of War Crimes against Palestinians. It is undeniable that this layer attracts people from different ideologies and backgrounds and is a fertile ground for ‘extremists’ and fighters of other battles. An example of the fertility of this layer was represented in the presence of ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) flags and Syrian flags in a Stop Bombing Gaza march in Brussels.  

The second of the Palestines is the Palestine for Arabs and Muslims, where the comprehension of Palestine mainly revolves around the holiness of the land and the uniqueness of Palestine and its cause, in addition to it being considered the source of dignity to all those who fall under the classification of Arab and Muslim. Demands made by this layer mainly concern liberation from the ‘Jewish’ or ‘Zionist’ occupation and mainly instrumentalise religion and text interpretations. Examples on this layer are demonstrations or protests in solidarity with Palestine by Arabs and Muslims, such as the demonstrations in Khurtoum following the Gaza-Israel conflict of 2014, where protestors echoed Islam-related slogans such as Allahu Akbar (God is Great). Similar demonstrations were held in Malaysia, and elsewhere. The narrative used by members of this layer is strong, not in terms of its effectiveness but in terms of the

488 Stop Bombing Gaza march, organised by various Belgian CSOs in Brussels on the 27th of July 2014.  
489 The Palestine-Arab dignity link is observable in activities such as cultural and artistic, and is fed to Arabs from a very young age via scholastic activities. For example We Are All Arabs grade 6 end of year assembly at Amman National School on 13 May 2015 where children sang for Palestine and Arab patriotism and linked regaining dignity to regaining Palestine.
words selected, such as End Israel, Death to Israel and similar slogans. This layer usually gains its momentum upon extremely violent and deadly escalation in the conflict, and upon events that lead to large numbers of casualties and destruction. This second Palestine can accompany the first Palestine in its activities, especially large-scale events, and the differences in approaches can be observed via the naked eye through slogans, signs, and flags, also observable in Arab and ‘Muslim’ diasporas’ participation in Support Gaza demonstrations and marches in London, Paris, or Berlin for instance.

The third Palestine is Palestine for the Palestinian Diaspora, and although it might appear to resemble the abovementioned Palestine in some of its demands, on the ground, this layer appears to be more peaceful, or less “radicalised” in other words. This layer has been demanding return, liberation, and a state for decades. Palestine to this layer is the full map of historic Palestine, and most activities and events organised and participated in by this layer are related to remembrance days and solidarity events. Within this layer, the country of settlement of the diaspora plays a decisive role in shaping the methods and strategies used to make demands. For example, in addition to organising cultural activities and events just like their counterparts in Jordan and Lebanon, some Palestinian organisations in Belgium resort to raising awareness about BDS campaigns, a strategy mainly implemented by members of Global Palestine. Statelessness in this layer is evident in the way diaspora organisations and members plead for Palestine, and not to it. The process of Autonomization occurs in this Palestine in particular. It is in this layer, Palestine to Palestinians in the diaspora, that the understandings of the conflict and its narrative autonomise from those in the homeland.

490 Observable on walls in various Arab countries including Jordan, one of the cases studied, although such statements are immediately effaced or covered by authorities.
The fourth Palestine is Palestine for Palestinians in Palestine, those who reside in the Palestinian territories and Israel. Within this layer, the understanding of Palestine varies depending on narrative and occasions, but in general, Palestine to this layer is that of 1967, especially the lived Palestine, not the wished for Palestine. The demands made by members of this layer revolve around rights, freeing prisoners, halting the construction of settlements, and contestations against the wall, most of which, with the exception of freeing prisoners, are demands that the members of Palestine for Palestinians in the Diaspora, and Arabs and Muslims rarely touch upon. The methods and strategies used by this category consist of resistance (peaceful and violent) and remembrance & solidarity events. On many occasions, it is from this layer’s methods and strategies that the diaspora imports ideas and implements them as travelling forms of solidarity. Moreover, this layer is a fertile ground for the creation and maintenance of narratives, symbols and symbolisms.

Finally, it is important to note that the layer on which an organisation operates is what defines its narratives, demands, activities, and participants, and that a factor such as year of establishment is of no vital importance to the ways an organisation operates. It is also important to note that what organisations advertise on their websites and manifestos does not necessarily reflect what is doable and what is practiced on the ground. For that the data collected and analysed from CSO websites and leaflets rarely corresponded to the data collected through the observation of their activities and events.

491 Differences between both are not denied, but are not thoroughly explained due to space and scope limits
492 Observed alongside observing diaspora activities
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Understanding</th>
<th>Main Demands</th>
<th>Most Utilised Methods/Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Palestine</td>
<td>Just/noble cause, Part of the Global Justice Movement</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>- Target range of hierarchical structures associated with capitalism, imperialism, and so on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Call for justice via international courts and tribunals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Call for implementation of resolutions and rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- BDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs &amp; Muslims</td>
<td>Holy Land (land of Church of Nativity, Church of Sepulchre, Al Aqsa Mosque), The one &amp; only cause, Dignity of all Arabs</td>
<td>Liberation from ‘Jewish’/’Zionist’ Occupation</td>
<td>- Call for the end of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Denounce USA (the supporter of Israel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Diaspora</td>
<td>Historic Palestine</td>
<td>Return, Liberation, State</td>
<td>BE: Demonstrations, Cultural Activities, Remembrance Days, BDS, Justice via international courts and tribunals, calls for implementation of resolutions and laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JO: Remembrance Days, Target range of hierarchical structures associated with capitalism, imperialism, and so on, denounce USA and call for end of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LEB: Demonstrations, Remembrance Days, Solidarity events, Cultural Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians in Palestine</td>
<td>Palestine of 1967 (mostly)</td>
<td>Rights, Prisoners (referred to as captives), Wall, Settlements</td>
<td>Resistance (Intifadas, Demonstrations, Protests) and Non Violent Resistance (demonstrations, marches, weekly protests, Boycott)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Remembrance &amp; Solidarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Palesstines Explicated
7.2.2 Conflictual Conflict

The dilemma between Palestine and the Palestinians is one where Palestinians acknowledge Palestine when Palestine itself is in practice not acknowledged, and the collision between Palestine and its wanted liberation is one where Palestine is occupied but its occupier is not acknowledged.

The relationship between Palestinians in the diaspora and the concept of Palestine is imbued with disconnections and dissociations accompanying emotional attachments and temporal clashes (Figure 7.2). The Palestinians in the diaspora are an outcome of a conflict that occurred more than sixty years ago. This old but still ongoing conflict is not one that the diaspora can be vocal (to the homeland) in, for that Palestine, their homeland, does not represent them, and Israel, what they consider their main rival, is a place they cannot access and thus cannot have a direct conflict with. In other terms, the outcomes of the conflict (the Palestinians in the diaspora) are isolated from being part of it, and cannot be players in what they consider a very fundamental and internalised component of their being. With this isolation comes Autonomization, which reflects how the same conflict is comprehended in various ways depending on various circumstances, for example where the Palestinians in the diaspora are isolated from the main conflict, the Palestinians in Palestine are integrated to it. One example of the Autonomization in understanding the conflict and thus reacting to it is represented in the members of the diaspora, who are in conflict with the idea of the current Palestine (West Bank & Gaza, or 1967 Palestine), they are also in conflict with who the occupier is; there is a conceptual clash between Jews, Israelis, Occupiers, Zionists and more similar names. The idea of the right of return is not unbound to conceptual clashes either. When asked if they would return to Palestine if they had the opportunity, a lot of Palestinians in the diaspora (especially like the ones in Jordan and Belgium), and although return is a recurrent demand in all their events and activities, state that it is the thought of being able and allowed to go back, when and if they want, that matters, and not whether they will actually return or not. Yet another clash surfaces

493 Note that the diaspora can be and are on some occasions vocal to the external ears, not to the ears of the homeland.
when the question of return where? is discussed. A lot of lands now belong to Israel, and returning to what is now Israel is out of question. Therefore, the Israeli Palestinian conflict, which the Palestinian diaspora is an outcome of, is a conflict that the diaspora is in conflict with on the conceptual level and thus reflected in narratives.

Being in conflict with the conflict, in denial of being stateless in practice, leads to the production and Autonomization of understandings, which affects the three studied cases and is then reflected in their mobilisation approaches, organisation methods, objectives, and claims.
7.2.3 Gendering Being: Place & Time in the Diaspora

Not only Palestine and the conflictual conflict autonomise in the diasporic settings, the gender of being in place and time also autonomises. Before explicating how this happens, it is first worth explicating, even if briefly, the Arab(ic) understandings of gender.

“Things are originally masculine. Things are feminised afterwards. Therefore, the masculine comes first ... the masculine is lighter [phonologically and pronunciation wise, as the feminine requires a suffix]. It is firmer”.494

Whether the abovementioned is an outcome of pre-Islamic customary or social structures and traditions that continued into Islam, an outcome of Islam itself, or a combination of both is not the question that this section will be answering. It can be none of the above if it is a reflection of the language’s characteristic of conciseness and succinctness, or if it is an outcome of traditionalised norms and ideals495, as opposed to traditional, or if it is the natural aftermath of post colonialism, or simply a result of following the lead of European nationalism. Research into this particular domain in a Palestinian and Arab context is rare, and questioning the source of the dominance of masculine over feminine usually leads to futile cultural-linguistic-religious debates.

In a patriarchal society where comprehensions of certain concepts (such as nationalism) are gendered, problematising and questioning gender and gendered comprehensions becomes a major problem and challenge. Manifestations of masculinities and femininities are generally taken for granted in a non-reflexive habitual form, which in its turn leads to the reproduction of patriarchy and the (re)construction of gendered understandings and representations, or to put it in Ann McClintock’s words “if nationalism is not deeply informed by an analysis of gender

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494 Sibawayh c. 760-796, prominent linguist and grammarian of Arabic Language
power, the nation-state [in this case one can say nation] will remain a repository of male hopes, male aspirations, and male privilege”. 

When looking at anything related to Palestine, whether to the Palestinians inside Palestine or in the diaspora, one can undoubtedly see a list of dominant words and symbols that the Palestinian national and nationalist narrative(s) tend to utilise frequently and across all sources of communication from visual to verbal. The list, which seems to function as a directory divided into a gendered masculine-feminine theme contains verbs like rape, violate, desecrate, displace, dispossess, struggle and so on. Such narratives are not new or unique to the Palestinians, although the language is, the early Zionist narrative has been utilising the same ‘directory’. Land has been the mother to Jews, the mother that Jews should return to, where the return of the Jewish male resembled fertilising the feminine land and thus reproducing new life. It is the directory used by peoples seeking a nation, whether of theirs or one to colonise or ‘develop’, and it is the same directory used by the European colonials and to a certain extent anti-colonials “although anti-colonial nationalist agency defines itself in opposition to European nationalism, [however] it does not escape implication in the same narrative”.

On the level of general nationalist narratives on Palestine, the homeland and its diaspora seem to be marching to the same beat. Nonetheless, both diverge on the specific levels of being/place and time where the process of Autonomization in the diaspora takes place feminising being (in the diaspora) and also feminising the diaspora’s present. (Table 7.2)

498 Massad, "Conceiving the Masculine: Gender and Palestinian Nationalism." Page 468.
Degrading, humiliating, and feminising is the way Palestinians left their homelands decades ago. Shameful, undignified and also feminised is their inability to return to their homelands to defend it and fight for their “cause”. Being in one host country or the other, enjoying one status or another are independent of the abovementioned. The experience (whether physical or emotional) of being displaced, living in the diaspora, and deprived a homeland is a feminising one, just as it was for the feminised Jewish diaspora, and unlike how it is for the masculines living in the homeland (thus Autonomization). Anita Shapira argues that the viewing of the Jewish diaspora (between 1881 - 1948) as helpless and submissive compared to the bold and brave Jews in Palestine (pre-Israel) feminised the image of the diaspora and masculinised the image of those already settled in what became Israel. The same applies to today’s Palestinians, both in what they call their homeland, and in the diaspora.

It is worth noting that this feminisation of being in the diaspora, unable to defend and return home, mainly touches the collective diasporic-Palestinian masculinity, which in its turn touches the individual/personal masculinity during the process of internalisation, and thus leads to the production of nationalised/nationalist masculinities easily observable via the naked eye. Having the “honour” to have a martyr brother, father, son, or cousin, or having a son in Israeli prisons is considered a stamp of heroism and masculinity. It is as if the martyr, in and by his (for he is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomization</th>
<th>Homeland</th>
<th>Diaspora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being (in the)</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time (for the people of the)</td>
<td>Past: Masculine</td>
<td>Past: Masculine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present: Masculine</td>
<td>Present: Feminine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Future: Masculine</td>
<td>Future: Masculine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Autonomising Being & Time

499 Note that as has been previously explicated in Chapter Six – Requiem to Temporality, the Palestinian diaspora’s present started in 1948, the time of the diasporisation of Palestinians. Thus, 1948 is not part of the diasporic past, it is part of the diasporic present.
usually demonstrated as a masculine male) death, reclaims his masculinity, and the masculinity of the whole family or community (and on some occasions it extends to larger scopes like region and nation). Similarly, it is the Palestinian prisoner, in his prison, who maintains the strength, steadfastness, power, and honour of the family. Such manifestations of masculinity do not stop at males, but are extended to consider a female prisoner a hero, a symbol of courage and valour, which happen to be some of the ultimate symbols of masculinity. A female throwing stones during the Intifada is perceived as “equivalent to 100 men”, or a “sister of [true/real] men”. Therefore, an act of courage by a female becomes associated to masculinity and manliness, again, in a non-reflexive internalised habitual way, and as Connell and Messerschmidt put it “masculinity is not a fixed entity embedded in the body or personality traits of individuals. Masculinities are configurations of practice that are accomplished in social action and, therefore, can differ according to the gender relations in a particular society.”

On the temporal level, and from observing the Palestinian diaspora, it can be seen that the concepts of past, present, and future are gendered just as actions and understandings are. The present: that of being in the diaspora, of defeat, waiting, helplessness, statelessness, *tasharrud*, hopelessness among others, autonomises into feminised. The past and future: those of glory, prosperity, homeland, stability among others, remain masculinised. The masculinised desires carried from the past and aiming to the future are contradicting the feminised emotions of the present. For the Palestinians in Palestine, the present is not feminised at all; instead, the steadfastness (sumoud) practiced in the present is the ultimate representation of masculinity, even death is masculinised given that it is opposed to humiliation by the enemy. “Death but not humiliation” is a slogan frequently used between Palestinians, for that death seems to be masculinising while humiliation seems to be feminising. Once again, challenging or questioning understandings of masculinities and femininities is not welcomed in such societies, thus the use of “seems to” as

502 Sayings widely utilised by Palestinians and Arabs
opposed to “is”. For that there is no method or previous literature to prove the abovementioned.

Following the aforementioned conceptual representations of Autonomization, the section below investigates Autonomization on the organisation and mobilisation levels where objectives and claims are made.

7.3 Stateless Autonomization: Organisation and Mobilisation

Comprehensively inspecting the political dimension of the phenomenon of diasporas is lacking in the available literature, as Sheffer notes “there has been a noticeable lack of in-depth studies and comprehensive theoretical and comparative discussion of the political dimension of the diaspora phenomenon”\textsuperscript{504}. In his book Diaspora Politics at Home Abroad, Sheffer intends to fill in this gap by investigating and theorising the political dimension of Diasporas. Referring to Sheffer’s work among others, this section will investigate and address the political dimension of the organisation and mobilisation of the Palestinian diaspora in light of its statelessness; another dimension the current literature is lacking, in addition to exploring how statelessness leads to the Autonomization of organisation and mobilisation, for that just as conflict dynamics and narratives transport and take different shapes in different settings, so do the organisation and mobilisation of diasporas of conflict.

7.3.1 Autonomizing Organisation

How and why do diasporas organise? What factors help/hinder organisation? When do diasporas become engaged in homeland matters? Are questions this section seeks to answer via referring to the currently available literature and mapping it against the cases studied.

According to Sheffer, Diasporas organise for two main reasons, “firstly; to promote the well-being, and ensure the continuity, of their communities in their host

\textsuperscript{504} Sheffer, \textit{Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad}. Page 5.
countries, and secondly; to increase their ability to extend support to beleaguered homelands and other Diaspora communities of the same national origin”.  

To achieve the abovementioned, Diaspora organisations function on five different but interconnected levels. First: the domestic level within host countries, where diaspora organisations work on issues related to their internal affairs in addition to issues related to their relations with the political and economic institutions of the host country. Second: the political and economic within the region: the regional level. Third: the global level, the interactions between the organisations and global organisations (UN, ILO, IMF, WB) in addition to fourth and fifth parties interested in the affairs of a specific diaspora. Fourth: interactions with sister/similar organisations on the level of the entire diaspora. Fifth: diaspora-homeland relations via governments/public institutions.

On each of the five above-mentioned levels, the diaspora functions occur on three categories: Maintenance, Defence, and Promotion & Advocacy. Figure 7.3 clarifies the relationship between the levels and categories. Maintenance includes fundraising and administration of social, economic and cultural functions (in schools, religious institutions, universities, centres, hospitals ...etc), Defence refers to physical defence of diaspora members if and when needed, in addition to securing personal, political, and social rights via political and legal activities (such as lobbies), while Promotion and Advocacy functions on cultural, political, and economic levels and is ground for recruitment of new members, and raising ‘ethnic’ awareness and sense of identity. The majority of promotional activities take the shape of the cultural, and are held to increase membership, strengthen ties and connections between diaspora members, increase the visibility of a diaspora, and create ties with homeland. As for elaborate advocacy activities, Sheffer notes that such activities are carried by the well-organised and rich diasporas to “increase the acceptance of the general

505 Ibid., Page 26.
506 Ibid., Pages 173-174.
507 Ibid., Page 174.
508 Ibid., Page 175.
diaspora phenomenon and tolerance of specific diasporas and their respective homelands”.

“As a rule, the more firmly established and the richer the community, the more elaborate and comprehensive its organizations become. The fact of being a long-established and rich community does not mean only the availability of financial resources for organization and action. It also means that the scope of the community’s interests will expand, which will tend to bring easier access to powerful segments in host societies and governments”. Aﬄuence, nonetheless, is not a prerequisite to the establishment of diaspora organisations or to their effective operation. What can be considered more important than aﬄuence are experience, hard work, and determination of leaders and members alike. All the above does not mean that a diaspora is deemed to fail in organisation if it is neither firmly established nor rich. In such cases, enthusiasm, zeal, and resourcefulness prove to be as important as firm establishment and richness.

509 Ibid.
510 Ibid., Page 178.
511 Ibid., Page 179.
In making parallels between the afore-presented theories and the cases studied, it becomes clear that the differences and similarities between the three cases also reach this element, the same can be applied to how each of the three studied cases autonomises depending on its setting. The reasons for which diasporas organise as per Sheffer are to promote the wellbeing of the diaspora in the host country, and to support people of/in the homeland and other members of the same diaspora elsewhere. Observing the Palestinians in the diaspora yields the following results: as for the promotion of wellbeing in host countries, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon monopolise the list. Organisation of activities related to the collective wellbeing of the Palestinians in camps is present and mostly revolves around basic rights (such as work and ownership, rights which Palestinians in Lebanon are stripped of), and disapproval of restrictions on movement by Lebanese army forces on entrances and exits of camps. Examples include Anera, Welfare Association, and The Institution of Social Care & Vocational Training. The diaspora in Belgium and Jordan has not shown
any organised activities related to promoting the community’s wellbeing. Such activities do exist, but not on an organisational level, instead, on an individual personal level. As for the extension of support to people in homeland, and elsewhere in the diaspora, observation during and prior to conducting this research shows that the former plays a major role (even if occasionally and as a reaction to blockades, invasions, attacks, escalations) in the Palestinian diaspora’s organisation. The extension of support to homeland has been noticed to be dominant within the diaspora in Belgium and Jordan, an explanation would be their economic statuses (middle class and mixed) in comparison to those in Lebanon who face economic hardships. A recent example of this occurrence would be the Rescue Gaza campaigns (following the violent escalation between Hamas and Israel) filling newspaper pages in Jordan. As for supporting Palestinian diaspora communities elsewhere, this aspect is paralysed by the lack of connections and the lack of a centre to connect the diasporas to occur frequently, and has been absent up till 2013/2014 when the Palestinians of the Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria were facing starvation. Only then, diasporas in the three studied countries, as well as elsewhere started organising (although shyly and limitedly) activities to support the Palestinians in Yarmouk.

In reference to Sheffer’s diaspora functioning levels, this section compares theory to practice of diaspora organisations across the three studied cases. Commencing with the Domestic level, it can be concluded that this level is blank on an organisational level in Belgium and Jordan, although present on personal and individual levels, and present in Lebanon, although futile due to the fact that the Lebanese government does not represent Palestinians on the Lebanese soil, thus working on issues related to their relations with the political and economic institutions of Lebanon, the host country, is not possible. The Palestinians in Lebanon live in spaces of exception and are treated as exceptions, thus, what affects a Palestinian at one camp, most probably affects other Palestinians in other camps. The same cannot be applied to Palestinians in Belgium and Jordan, who (mostly) enjoy the status of citizens, and are scattered all across their country of settlement without the presence of closed spaces, and enjoy the possibility, in theory, of working on their socio-political issues with their host country’s government, which
does not happen in practice because they are considered citizens of the host country represented and representing it.

Secondly, organisation on the political and economic of the Regional level, which is present in all three cases, but in different shapes and dynamics. Organised Palestinian events in Belgium regularly target the EU institutions on a political, rather than economic level, by organising protests in front of the European Commission or Parliament examples of which are the 15 May 2012 assemblment at the Schuman round-about in front of the European Commission, and the 18 May 2013 manifestation in Place Luxembourg across the European Parliament where protestors called for freeing Palestine, the application of all UN resolutions, national unity, and demanded European countries to take on their historic responsibility, as well as calling Arab leaders “villainous” 512. In Jordan, functioning on the regional level looks vague, where political demands are made to a collective called Arabs (and sometimes Muslims), Arab leaders, or Arab governments. Organised activities in Lebanon look partially similar to those in Jordan when it comes to the regional level, where demands are usually targeted at the vague parties mentioned above. Additionally, Palestinian organisations in Lebanon function on the economic of the regional level, where aid and relief are main reasons of organisation in the hardship stricken closed space camps in Lebanon.

On the third level of functioning, the Global, it can also be seen that depending on the settings, each case has its own methods of operation. Diaspora organisations in Belgium adopt indirect communication in their attempts to interact with global bodies such as the UN, via referring to unapplied UN resolutions. Such attempts are not steered directly at the UN, instead, attempts made are targeted towards EU institutions (reaching the global via the regional) 513. In Jordan and Lebanon, the UNRWA seems to either duopolise (along with the Jordanian government) or

512 Refer to annex for further details.
513 Such as the protest in front of the European Commission on 15 May 2012 (Refer to Annex).
monopolise (in the case of Lebanon) any interactions on the global level. Thus, other diaspora organisations do not function on this level.

On the fourth level of functioning, the Entire Diaspora, the centrelessness and statelessness of the Palestinians becomes key. Functioning on this level is generally absent due to the absence of a hub, a centre, connecting all the Palestinians together. The operation of organisations working on Palestine related issues is random, targeting what is visible to the eyes, unable to target or learn of what is far from sight (for instance the Palestinian diasporas in Jordan and Lebanon have nothing in common but origin), and although some organisations in Belgium attempt and succeed in working with sister/similar organisations on the local or regional (EU) level, the same cannot be applied to the entire diaspora level such as the Palestinians in Europe Conference (Refer to Annex A).

On the level of diaspora-homeland relations, statelessness again is key. The relationship between the Palestinian diaspora and organisations, and the homeland is not an ordinary one, resembling a one-sided platonic love story, very existent emotionally, but from one side only, the people in the diaspora.

What Palestinians consider their homeland does not and cannot represent them, and thus building relationships between the diaspora organisations and the government(s) or public institutions in Palestine is not likely.

Thus, what can be concluded is that statelessness affects each functioning level in different ways depending on the setting, where on levels connecting the diasporas to each other and to their homeland statelessness is key, and on other levels a less prominent one. On the domestic level, statelessness is directly related to the inability of being considered a Palestinian residing in a host country. Instead, one is considered a citizen of Palestinian origins (in Belgium and Jordan) and a stateless refugee (in Lebanon), which automatically hinders any attempts to organise and work on issues with governments of host countries based on Palestinian-ness. On the regional level, statelessness is represented in the confusion of who to appeal to and considering oneself what? In Jordan and Lebanon, this confusion is manifested
in the vagueness of targets of appeals. In Belgium it is represented in the vagueness of who is appealing to the EU and as what? As Palestinians or as Belgians? On the global level, especially in Jordan and Lebanon, the lack of a state representing its diaspora leads to the monopolisation and duopolisation of interactions, not between diaspora organisations and global organisations, but between global organisations (UNRWA and other global organisations) together (as it is the case in Lebanon), or between global organisations and governments of host countries (as it is the case in Jordan). In Belgium, this level functions indirectly, via regional organisations like the EU. On the 4th and 5th levels, Entire Diaspora and Diaspora-Homeland, statelessness is key, in that it affects the functioning, as a whole, of all three cases where the diaspora organisations are affected by the lack of a centre and lack of ties with the homeland. Therefore, this one-sided platonic love story between Palestinians, including organisations, and the homeland is shaped by statelessness and functions accordingly.

Within the levels explicated above, the functions of the diaspora organisations fall into three main categories: Maintenance, Defence, and Promotion & Advocacy. Within the cases studied, Maintenance plays the major role where administration of cultural, economic, social activities in centres, religious institutions, academic institutions … etc is most dominant. The category of Defence is absent, while the category of Promotion & Advocacy is confined to the cultural.

The Palestinian diaspora organisations are neither firmly established nor notably rich, attempts to the establishment of such organisations have always been faced with hurdles the toughest of which is the inability to actually achieve any tangible results on the ground, in light of the main demands of the Palestinians (return tops the list, followed by liberation and state). Experience, determination and hard work are also of great importance in regards to diaspora organisation effectiveness. Due to the nature of the Palestinian question, determination, from both leaders and

514 Observed during speeches by Belgians of Palestinian origins on various occasions. Such as Palestine: Pour une Intifada Légale et Citoyenne (Palestine: For a Legal Citizen Uprising) 22 October 2013 at Théâtre National & KVS – Brussels, Belgium.
members, is only practiced on the emotional personal narrational level, but ceases to stretch beyond that. Hard work, especially by organisations is observed, but is faced by stronger factors stemming from the type and shape of demands and hopes of the Palestinians (for example return, liberation, and a capital are not in the hands nor capabilities of organisations). The same can be applied to experience, which exists, but is faced by a cul-de-sac. Table 7.3 below summarises the differences and similarities in organisation between the three cases studied, thus, displaying Autonomization on the organisational level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organise</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To promote well-being/ensure continuity of communities</td>
<td>On Individual Levels (such as networking with employers and logistic help)</td>
<td>On Individual Levels (such as financial help and support of extended family members or people from same village)</td>
<td>On Diaspora level (refugees in camps) Mostly regarding basic needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase ability to extend support to homeland and Other diaspora members in other countries</td>
<td>Financial support to people in Homeland, especially during escalation of conflict.</td>
<td>Financial support to people in Homeland, especially during escalation of conflict.</td>
<td>Limited in terms of support to Homeland, due to hardship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recently (2013/2014) support to inhabitants of Yarmouk camp in Syria (although minimal, but present)</td>
<td>Recently (2013/2014) support to inhabitants of Yarmouk camp in Syria (although minimal, but present)</td>
<td>Support to Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk Camp (in Lebanon, within Palestinian camps, and in Syria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of Organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Weakly Present, limited &amp; futile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Present mostly on Political Levels (EU level)</td>
<td>Present mostly on Political Levels (Arab and Muslim world levels)</td>
<td>Present on Political and Economic Levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Attempts to reach UNRWA and 4th/5th</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNRWA and 4th/5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN parties</td>
<td>UN parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora-Homeland</td>
<td>Diaspora cannot participate in homeland politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Characteristics of Organisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firmly Established</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Experience**

Present but leads nowhere. Experience is a result of repetition of demands, needs ... etc for decades, and not a result of trial and error that leads to change in approaches and implementations.

**Hard Work**

Observed on the ground, but directed towards unreachable goals and demands.

**Determination of Leaders & Members**

Determination is insufficient when it is faced with stronger factors. The absence or presence of determination is not decisive.

**Enthusiasm & Zeal**

Lacking in general, helplessness and hopelessness prevail.

**Resourcefulness**

Not observed. Demands very rigid, obstacles very strong.

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Table 7.3: Comparison of Theory and Practice of Organisation

7.3.1.1 Survival Strategies of Diaspora Organisations

In light of the impeding effects of statelessness on the functioning of diaspora organisations, the question of how the autonomised Palestinian diaspora organisations survive arises. In order to answer this question, it is important to refer to theories on diaspora organisation survival strategies, commencing with strategies practiced on the internal level then moving to the external level.

Parallel to the levels and functions of diaspora organisations come the survival strategies organisations adopt and adapt to in order to ensure their continuation. Strategies range from simple to compound, and from internal to external, and vary in usage across times and groups. For example encouraging national holidays and festivals, in addition to fostering patriotic activities is one form of survival strategies that can be investigated across most diasporas regardless of their origins and homeland statuses.

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Attempts made by organisations to close the us/them gap, where us refers to the people inside the homeland (insiders), and them refers to those who left, and are sometimes seen as shameful traitors (the diaspora) is also another form. This form can be observed across the Palestinian diaspora, where the diaspora believes (and are made to believe) that they share similar demands as the Palestinians in the homeland, when in practice their demands autonomise and divert on many occasions as explicated earlier in this chapter.

Other strategies are more complex and emerge due to the absence of consistency in ideologies or a lack of history of effective organisation. In such cases, organisations resort to articulating vague or broadly stated goals to cover up their weakness, which to the organisation itself could attract more support. The dangers that ambiguity and the lack of credibility and cohesion could inflict on the organisation are not prioritised in such cases. Such a strategy is usually accompanied by amplification of (fictional on some occasions) goals, and achievements. A very recent example of such a strategy was utilised by the Global March to Jerusalem (GMJ), which aims to mobilise people to stand in solidarity with Palestine and protect Jerusalem via yearly marches to Jerusalem from countries bordering Palestine.

Similarly, an organisation can resort to the instrumentalisation of symbols to invoke “emotional identification” among its members and potential members. This last strategy of survival is very common across diasporas in the phase of

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517 Shain, *Frontiers of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation State*. Page 36

518 The GMJ states the following on its website “We aim to make this march a turning point in the nature of the confrontation, with the occupation having to face millions of protesters and demonstrators demanding Freedom for Palestine and its capitol Jerusalem. We will make a renewed true effort towards ending the occupation through peaceful national movements inspired firstly by our convictions, secondly by the justice of our cause, and thirdly by the spirit of the Arab spring revolutions and the determination of young people who were able to overthrow dictatorships. Especially now that the nations have realized the magical effect of the people’s will to make the impossible possible”.

“erosion of the hope of return”. Within such diasporas, organisations heavily use flags, songs, poetry, and the likes as instruments of survival through tying the diaspora to the past and implanting a sense of guilt towards the present of the homeland. This particular strategy is widely used across Palestinian organisations in the diaspora.

On the external level, i.e strategies targeted towards outside sources, organisationsassign vital significance to foreign support and to the recognition of the international community. Shain suggests a set of questions that need to be explored in order to analyse this strategy. “How many international patrons enhance the struggle of political exiles? What determines those patrons’ policies in their interaction with exile organizations? What tactics do political exiles employ to encourage international support, and what obstacles are they likely to confront?” Recognition usually stems from two segments; the first are governments, including intergovernmental organisations, and the second is the civil society, including transnational nongovernmental organisations, national organisations, media, and private organisations and individuals. The form of recognition granted to organisations usually takes the shape of diplomatic and operational aid, but the presence of both forms does not guarantee that recognition is not equivalent to lip service that feeds the fictional desires of organisations, and supports them even if psychologically. This can be clearly seen within the Palestinian organisations in the diaspora, where the UN recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer state in late 2012 was seen as a victory although not proven on the ground thus far. This recognition by the UN, who is also blamed for not implementing its GA Resolutions such as 194 on many occasions, was enough to boost the morale of the Palestinian diaspora organisations in Belgium and lead them to hang nine Palestinian flags in addition to the flag of the UN in celebration of the vote where one or two flags would have been very visible from every angle. Similar reactions were observed in

520 Ibid., Page 60-61.
521 Ibid., Page 110.
522 Ibid., Page 111.
523 Event held on 1 December 2012 – Liege, Belgium.
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, where Palestinians celebrated in the streets by dancing and singing.

Returning back to Shain’s questions, the number of international patrons that enhance the struggle of Palestine and the Palestinians is significant, the capability of this number in face of powerful states is not. The host countries, the region, and the international community determine the policies of patrons’ interaction with organisations, obstacles are present on each level, which makes effective interaction (and not mere lip service) difficult to achieve. The tactics used to encourage support from the international governments and the civil society take multiple shapes, and so do obstacles: in Belgium, the main targets are the EU and rarely UN, and the main tactics used are reference to UN Resolutions, and Europe’s “historical responsibility” towards Palestine and the Palestinians. In Jordan and Lebanon, the targets are vague and broad, including the region as a whole along with its leaders, where the tactics mainly revolve around victimisation, Arab nationalism/patriotism, and religious significance of the Palestinian cause and land. The obstacles faced in the three studied countries, and although differing in dynamics and shapes, all stem from the absence of a state in today’s world of states and nation-states, and the power of Israel and its allies. Nonetheless, Palestinian diaspora organisations (and members of the diaspora) continue to mine support and especially from governments and intergovernmental organisations, for when all doors are closed, psychological and symbolic support in the form of lip service can encourage steadfastness.

Accompanying organisation is mobilisation with its unique methods and properties. The following section investigates mobilisation and maps it against the cases studied.

### 7.3.2 Mobilisation of the Stateless

Mobilising groups is a path not clear from difficulties, and mobilising centreless stateless groups is even a coarser path due to the lack of key elements that facilitate and shape the dynamics of mobilisation. The Palestinians in the diaspora, namely those in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon are no exception to the abovementioned. Despite the heterogeneity in their compositions, opportunities,
everydayness, statuses and generations, the Palestinians in the diaspora have been homogeneously and chronically affected and infected by their decades long statelessness.

So what is mobilisation? What are its shapes? What are the factors affecting its occurrence? And what incentives are of importance to the (potentially) mobilised are questions the next section will answer.

Mobilisation, according to Tilly, is “the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life” and is “the process of creating movement structures and preparing and carrying out protest actions which are visible movement “products” addressed to actors and publics outside the movement" according to Rucht.

Defensive, offensive, and preparatory are ways in which mobilisation occurs. Commencing with defensive mobilisation, this type refers to a reaction to an outside threat, where members of a group gather to fight the enemy in one shape or another. This mobilisation approach, compared to the other two clarified below, challenges the assumption that mobilisation is predominantly a top-down occurrence. Offensive mobilisation on the other hand is mostly top-down, where a group gathers in response to opportunities leading to interests. Lastly, preparatory mobilisation occurs when a group gathers its resources in anticipation of opportunities and threats in the future. As it is evident, such a type is clearly more top down than the abovementioned types. Both offensive and preparatory mobilisations require forethought and active inspection of the surroundings, even if outside the group itself, and are very similar except in timing, present for the former or future for the latter. Mapped against the cases studied, it is clear that the shape of mobilisation of the Palestinians in the diaspora is defensive in that it sounds like the enemy is being fought, although not physically, but mentally and emotionally.

Any small or large action a Palestinian does is directly related to resistance. Listening to patriotic songs and wearing Kefiyyehs for example, are signs of steadfastness and resistance according to Palestinians (in Palestine and in the diaspora), and are methods of facing the enemy by existing and surviving. Also an attribute of Palestinian diaspora mobilisation is that it is reactive in its nature; reactive to events and dates (escalation of conflict, hunger strike of prisoners, remembrance of Nakba, commemoration of Land Day, and so on). For example, when looking at the titles/names of organised activities in the three cases studied, one can easily observe “in support of prisoners on hunger strike”, “on the occasion of Nakba”, “on the occasion of Naksa”, “in solidarity against the aggression on Gaza”, “gathering for Gaza” and “day of solidarity” in Belgium, as well as “you are not welcome, Obama”, “in solidarity with prisoners”, “in remembrance of the Nakba” and “in remembrance of Land Day” in Jordan, and “in solidarity with Al Yarmouk camp”, “in remembrance of Palestinian martyr day”, “day of solidarity with the Palestinian people”, in remembrance of Naksa”, “in remembrance of Nakba” and “in remembrance of Land day” in Lebanon. 526

Other factors affecting the shape of mobilisation are the power and wealth of groups, the mobilisation of the powerless and the poor tends to start in a defensive mode, while it starts in an offensive mode in the cases of the powerful and rich. 527 It is evident that the Palestinians are powerless vis-à-vis returning to their homeland, liberating it, or even being part of it. This powerlessness overshadows wealth and its importance, for that although some Palestinian groups in the diaspora have considerable amounts of wealth, this wealth cannot help in alleviating the strong sense of powerlessness.

On the other hand, and regardless of power and wealth, incentives are a prerequisite to mobilisation. Rewards and benefits of nationalism are customarily offered by regimes to citizens. Such rewards include “citizenship, pride of belonging to a national community, national awards and decorations, and perhaps even a share in

526 Refer to Annex A
Such incentives are not applicable to the stateless Palestinians, for that citizenship is a long sought dream, belonging to Palestinians is absent in practice and on paper although present in minds and (re)actions, and participating in the determination of the national future is not possible for that the Palestinians are not yet considered nationals of what they consider their nation. The effectiveness of incentives is dependent on the needs of the members or the members to be, and the degree of sacrifice expected from them. What Palestinians need, apart from their standard constants, is official being. Etzioni classifies the ways of producing compliance into three; coercive force, economic control over material resources, and normative control through what he calls manipulation of symbols. According to Etzioni, most organisations use all three methods, but rely heavily on one, depending on the nature of organisations. In the case of Palestinians, organisations do not have but one option out of three, the last; what Etzioni calls manipulation of symbols, which is heavily relied on and utilised (Refer to Chapter 6 – Section on Symbolism of Palestinian Realities). The first two options are not applicable, for that coercive force needs force to start with, and economic control requires power and authority, and both are facilitated by the presence of a powerful centre, an established state.

In many cases, material rewards by organisations are limited which in its turn leads organisations to rely on the voluntary commitment of members generated by intangible rewards (solidarity, commemoration ... etc) and instrumentalisation of symbols. This can also be applied to the Palestinians, who mostly and most of the times ‘gain’ intangible rewards from mobilising and participating in events. An exception, it can be argued, would be those Palestinians in Lebanon who mobilise to gain material benefits from shadows of Palestinian political parties, but such participants believe to be affiliated to, and work for one party or the other, which makes this material reward synonymous, at least to them, to a paycheck.

529 Ibid., Page 56.
530 Ibid., Page 57.
On a more rudimentary level, the mere fact of a nation granting its citizenship to someone is expected to be translated into gratitude in return for “protection”. Citizenship and Nationality, and what both entail from representation, voting, and rights, are often associated with “a sense of nationalism and patriotism ... [They are like] a source of national community pride and a primary symbol of solidarity with and obligation to a wider community with which the individual shares cultural and political existence”.\footnote{Shain, 	extit{Frontiers of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation State}. Page 147.} To the Palestinians, citizenship is not the generator of gratitude, for that Palestinian citizenship and nationality are not privileges the Palestinians in the diaspora enjoy. Despite the lack of citizenship, nationality, protection and obligation to and from Palestine, the Palestinians remain Palestinians in the definition of their own dictionaries. Although this lacking element does not stop Palestinians from being Palestinians, it does stop them of making use of this being. Their statelessness, their official non-belonging to Palestine is a demobilising and debilitating factor that handcuffs them, and forces them to react instead of act.

At times where the homeland is at war, especially with another state/nation, this war becomes a magnetic force of mobilisation dependent on national loyalty and patriotism. In the case of the Palestinians, the homeland has been at war, with escalations and de-escalations that look like a heart rate monitor, and this war, especially in its escalations, has been a magnetic force of mobilisation translated to organised solidarity events. The aforementioned is translated in the activities organised by Palestinians around certain dates related to the war and its outcomes. Nakba, Naksa, Land Day, Refugee Day, Day of Solidarity with Palestinians, Prisoners Day among other days are dates that ensure the continuation of the magnetic force of the long lasting war. Simultaneously, this long lasting war proved to have a demobilising effect on diaspora mobilisation during the absence of intense escalations, where Palestinians await certain dates to commemorate certain days, and where occasional but limited in devastation leaps from de-escalation to
escalation pass like a breeze since seeing death and dead bodies not exceeding the tens became a frequent and regular scene.

The process of diaspora mobilisation whether with the presence of rewards or not can be rough. It is highly possible that different forms of limitations hinder the process, the first of which is that the world of Diaspora communities and Diaspora organisations is nowhere near united. Internal divisions and conflicts in addition to divisions and conflicts in homelands “divert energy from the attainment of the ultimate group goal”. Diaspora organisations can claim that self-determination and presence on homeland soil are crucial to their operation and functioning. Members of a Diaspora might only make do with unreachable dreams and targets. The presence or lack of ties to the homeland regime and governmental institutions, the possibility of visiting the homeland, the status of the homeland, and the perception that the homeland is willing to negotiate for and embrace its Diaspora all play decisive roles in the mobilisation or demobilisation of Diasporas and organisations.

7.4 Statelessness: The Paralyser of Autonomization

As explicated earlier and summarised later, stateless diasporas are deficient in essential organisation and mobilisation options, which thus – and in attempts to adapt to the status quo - leads to Autonomization. The three studied cases illustrate the effects of statelessness on Autonomization and its outcomes, and demonstrate how the mere idea of political mobilisation is in itself demobilising for it is a reminder of the chronic hopelessness and helplessness the stateless Palestinians suffer from, which is in turn reflected in the types of activities organised in the diaspora, and the targets of such activities. An exceptionally clear indicator of statelessness is the fact that the Palestinian diaspora does not plead to (but pleads for) its homeland in any of its organised activities, (for instance with regards to return to homeland) (as can be seen in table 7.4 below), for that the homeland is

533 Ibid., Page 38.
practically nonexistent, and the government of the homeland is not (and cannot be) representative of its diaspora. Therefore, the centreless diaspora resorts to directing its reactive demands towards EU institutions in the host country, as it is the case in Belgium, unspecified or regional governments, as it is the case in Jordan, and to the unspecified but mostly to no one, as it is the case in Lebanon. It is important to note that making demands to random, unspecified, or no parties is existent across all studied cases, an indicator of lack of centre. Examples of this phenomenon in Belgium include: “support prisoners hunger strike”, “free prisoners”, “Free free Palestine”, “Palestine in our blood and soul”, and “1,2,3 Palestine free” in solidarity with prisoners or solidarity with Gaza against aggression events. The same is observable in Jordan where shouts are made in reference to Arab or Western leaders, but no demands to a particular party in the homeland are made. As for Lebanon, demands to a particular party are made, to the Lebanese authorities, only in reference to the living conditions in camps. The prevalence of reactive solidarity and remembrance activities in the three studied cases despite the different settings and opportunities presented to each case (as will be explained in chapter 8) is a pointer to the effects of statelessness on resorting to defensive approaches of organisation and mobilisation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Participants From</strong></th>
<th><strong>Belgium</strong></th>
<th><strong>Jordan</strong></th>
<th><strong>Lebanon</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Palestinian &amp; Arab Diaspora Global Justice Sympathisers</td>
<td>Jordanians of both Origins</td>
<td>Palestinians in Camps</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<th><strong>Jordan</strong></th>
<th><strong>Lebanon</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutions &amp; Random</td>
<td>Mainly not specified, and sometimes to Arab governments</td>
<td>No one, and rarely Arab governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

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<th><strong>Jordan</strong></th>
<th><strong>Lebanon</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity &amp; Remembrance</td>
<td>Solidarity &amp; Remembrance</td>
<td>Mostly Remembrance &amp; Solidarity in addition to Cultural, Educational,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Location</strong></th>
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<th><strong>Jordan</strong></th>
<th><strong>Lebanon</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly in Brussels</td>
<td>Across Jordan, but mostly in Amman</td>
<td>Camps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Direction</strong></th>
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<th><strong>Jordan</strong></th>
<th><strong>Lebanon</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event Place</td>
<td>Mostly in the neighbourhood of Embassies of Israel and USA, or Professional Unions Complex</td>
<td>Camps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4: Organised Diaspora Activities & Events

As explained earlier in this chapter, Autonomization is an outcome of transportation of a conflict’s narratives and structures from one setting or location to another. Diaspora organisations and groups consciously and/or unconsciously adapt to their settings and surroundings in attempts to reach their desired goals via available tools and instruments. Every diaspora organisation strives to find the right equation that results in mobilisation and consequently goal achievement. The three studied cases within this dissertation are good examples of Autonomization, and are better examples of how statelessness affects the outcomes of understandings, organisation, and mobilisation despite Autonomization. On some levels, the diaspora as a whole autonomises from the original conflict narrative and structure, on other levels, each case study autonomises on its own, creating a unique case influenced by its unique settings. On the level of comprehending and formulating the conflict, it can be concluded that transportation, in both its shapes; importation and Autonomization, was present. Using the official narrative to officialise being as
Palestinians from Palestine is one imported aspect, the symbolisation of Palestine to prove its existence and keep it, along with Palestinian-ness, alive is another, and finally the masculinisation and familialisation of participation to satisfy and compensate cultural understandings of gender roles is the third, a topic worth further research in future projects.

On the conceptual level, the diaspora autonomises in yet another three shapes; pluralising Palestine is the first, where the understandings of Palestine, the demands made by diaspora members and organisations, and the strategies and methods used to reach desired goals can be divided into four layers (Global Palestine, Palestine to Arabs & Muslims, Palestine to Diaspora, and Palestine to Palestinians in Palestine). Being in conflict with the original conflict is the second autonomised aspect, where the Palestinians in the diaspora, the outcomes of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, are unable to be part of it, which leads to conflicting understandings of the conflict, its players, its past, and its future. Thirdly, feminising diaspora being and temporality is another aspect that the diaspora autonomises. In parallel to the masculinised image of being in the homeland, defending it and fighting its battles, comes the feminised image of being in the diaspora, unable to do what one thinks s/he should be doing to defend the homeland. The same applies to the temporalities of the diaspora, where the present to the people in the homeland is masculinised by their manifestations of steadfastness, the present for those in the diaspora is feminised by their manifestations of their helpless and powerless wait.

On the level of organisation and mobilisation, it has been shown earlier in this chapter that the main reasons diasporas organise can be affected by statelessness despite the uniqueness and Autonomization of each case and its settings. The same can be applied to the levels of functioning of diaspora organisations (domestic, regional, global, entire diaspora, diaspora-homeland), where Autonomization is clearly present, but statelessness proved to be stronger by yielding the same organisational-outcomes across all three cases (Mostly Solidarity & Remembrance). Similarly, and despite the apparent Autonomization from homeland, the categories on which the Palestinian diaspora organisations function (Maintenance, Defence, and Promotion & Advocacy) are affected by statelessness, leading to functioning on
a politicised Maintenance level and a culturalised Promotion level, leaving Advocacy for governments (Jordan) and diplomatic representations (Belgium), and not CSOs. Also despite differences between the cases and the homeland, and between the cases themselves, some variables became independent as a result of statelessness; such variables include firm establishment, wealth, experience, hard work, determination, enthusiasm and resourcefulness, all of which are affected by the lack of a centre, the lack of a way to represent or be represented by this absent centre.

In spite of all the abovementioned, Palestinian diaspora organisations, regardless of their effectiveness or efficiency, succeed in surviving, although many indicators seem to point otherwise (refer to Table 7.3 sections on Levels of Organisation and Characteristics of Organisation). Such organisations mobilising around a state that in practice does not exist resort to simple and complex strategies on the internal and external levels. Celebrating and commemorating national holidays and remembrance days is an approach widely utilised by Palestinian organisation for the amount of pride and pain, consecutively, it awards to participants. Celebrating the Land Day for instance is sufficient to generate and mobilise feelings of belonging, rootedness, and existing, which Palestinians seek desperately due to their existocide. On the other hand, commemorating Al Nakba or Al Naksa for example, is sufficient to generate and mobilise feelings of pain, sadness, and anger that Palestinians also seek, to fulfil their duties in considering themselves Palestinians.

Closing the us/them gap also plays a critical role in the survival of organisations that target people who strive to be considered as one, especially the Palestinians in the diaspora. Being a Palestinian through one’s own beliefs and yet not being Palestinian through any other source is a hard to process fact, therefore, any attempts which make the existence of Palestinians easier to process is very welcomed. Similarly, the articulation and amplification of vague goals and outcomes feeds the desire to savour a long awaited victory. The understanding of victory in such cases becomes irrational and illogical, where despite the death of 600 Palestinians in 2 weeks of the 2014 Hamas-Israel Conflict, the Palestinians still considered killing 20 Israeli soldiers a victory. The comprehension of victory follows a religiously interpreted pro rata rule.
in such cases, where numbers are granted more importance than souls because some souls are considered martyrs while others are not, all for the sake of proving existence as Palestinians and as Palestine.

To mobilise a crowd is to incite it, and to each crowd is an equation leading to its incitement. The Palestinian diaspora crowd is one that is mobilised in a defensive mode, in reaction to some (usually) extreme event. Defensive here is not physical though; it is psychological, mental, and emotional, for that physical defensiveness is not an option for a diaspora detached from what it calls its land. This bottom up approach of mobilisation is an approach taken by powerless and poor groups, part of which is true of the Palestinian diaspora, and part of which is not, consecutively. The Palestinians are examples of powerlessness in terms of defending the homeland, returning to it, being part of it, or simply being represented by it, making any attempts of offensive or preparatory based mobilisation unlikely.

The next chapter will investigate the organisation of the Palestinian Diaspora in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon, and the mobilisation modes employed by the actors and political entrepreneurs within the three countries. In summary, following this Étude on Autonomization and Statelessness is a Stateless Fugue consisting of three (social) movements and overshadowed by all previous compositions in this repertoire.
Chapter 8:
Stateless Fugue Movement I, II, III

**Fugue:** "a contrapuntal form in which a subject theme ("part" or "voice") is introduced and then extended and developed through some number of successive imitations". ⁵³⁴

**Analogy** – a contrapuntal form in which the theme of social movements is introduced and then extended and developed to include the stateless social movements through the three cases studied

**Metronome:** In what ways does statelessness affect diaspora mobilisation in three different settings with different Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes?

**Hypotheses:** Statelessness overshadows diaspora mobilisation despite clear heterogeneities in Political Opportunities, dictates following particular Mobilising Structures, and has its toll on Framing Processes.

⁵³⁴ "Basic Glossary of Musical Forms."
Chapter 8
Stateless Fugue Movement I, II, III

8.1 Movements to the Stateless: Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes

A Fugue is what best resembles this chapter, where the theme of social movements is introduced and then extended and developed to include the stateless social movements through the three cases studied.

It is surprising that the scholars who work in social movement theory have not discovered what the generous research area of diaspora studies might offer to them or vice versa. At a first glance one might argue that there are significant differences between social movements and diaspora movements. However it is also hard not to see the commonalities. Diaspora movements share many characteristics with social movements and digging deeper in the social movements literature might actually help analyze diaspora activism in a more systematic way.  

Diasporas are elements of and in a host-country’s society, and their mobilisation depends largely on the shape of the host-country’s political, economic, legal, and social systems. Perceiving Diasporas as irrational long-distance nationalists and thus excluding them from social movement literature and theories is ought to be reconsidered, for that belonging is not felt nor understood in the logic of either/or, it is not static, nor is it measurable. Belonging is not always exclusive to one country or the other, and the rationality versus irrationality argument should not apply when what is being talked about or researched are feelings and not figures and numbers. The same applies to labelling (not to say stereotyping) diasporas, particularly the conflict-generated ones as “Peace Wreckers” or “Peace Makers”, for

535 Baser, "Stateless Diasporas and Their Long-Distance Nationalist Activism in Host Countries: The Case of Tamils from Sri Lanka and Kurds from Turkey." Pages 6-7.
536 Swain, "Stateless Diaspora Groups and Their Repertoires of Nationalist Activism in Host Countries." Page 60.
that some of them (such as some of the stateless diasporas present in our today’s world) are wrecked by the conflict and are even excluded from being wreckers (or makers) as explained in Chapter 5. Therefore, excluding Diasporas from literature on social movements is like diasporising the already diasporised, although academically this time.

Definitions of Social Movements are vast, and listing all possible definitions is out of the scope of this research. Nonetheless, the section below briefly goes through a couple of definitions for the sake of clarifying how closely related social movements and diaspora movements are, and how diaspora movements can be easily considered as a subsection of social movements. Defined, Social Movements are “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” 537 as per Diani and Bison. A Social Movement to Wilson is “a conscious, collective, organized attempt to bring about or resist large-scale change in the social order by non-institutionalized means”.538 What can be observed in the abovementioned definitions, that do not happen to differ a lot in content from other unlisted definitions, is that they can apply to Diaspora Movements. Therefore, it is surprising that both fields have not been fused earlier except in few cases such as in Baser and Swain539, Adamson540, and Sökefeld541. Combining both fields can prove enriching to both Social Movement and Diaspora Studies, in addition to opening a new door to investigating both fields as one, and analysing the outcomes of such a process.

539 Swain, "Stateless Diaspora Groups and Their Repertoires of Nationalist Activism in Host Countries."
The dissertation in general, and this chapter in particular study an understudied category of Diasporas; the stateless, whose “political activity is [often perceived as] much higher ... as compared to other types of diasporas, especially if they are united around an idea of secession and/or there is an on-going conflict in the homeland”. This is done through an also understudied lens; social movements. Therefore, if stateless Diasporas’ political activities are seen as much higher than other categories of Diasporas, then applying and combining social movement theories to such a group is even more cogent. This chapter, and due to the cases it studies, and in particular the stateless Palestinians in the closed refugee camps of Lebanon, will be investigating an unstudied aspect of statelessness and social movement; that of statelessness combined with rejection, restriction, and exclusion from basic rights and needs, and will investigate if and how the abovementioned affect the dynamics and outcomes of stateless social movement. This chapter resonates a Fugue in its composition and sound, where the subject theme (social movements) is introduced and then extended and developed throughout 3 cases of successive imitations based on the subject theme.

8.2 Social Movements of the Stateless

Scholars have tended to study only one aspect of a movement. The challenge, of course, is to sketch the relationships between these factors [Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes], thus yielding a better understanding of social movement dynamics... There exist many relationships between our three factors. Which one becomes relevant depends upon the research question of interest.543

The affirmation of importance to national political systems and the Political Opportunities (or constraints) such systems offer in the study of social movements is

543 Doug McAdam, Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes. Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements. Page 7.
common practice. Shain and Barth concluded that the “basic nature of the hostland regime determines the ability of a diaspora to organise influence; indeed, it determines the ability to organise at all”. Such affirmations, although revolutionary when first put into practice, are short of yielding an inclusive reflection of what happens on the ground, and how it happens.

This dissertation, as explicated earlier on, aims at identifying heterogeneities in order to investigate a potential homogeneity. In other words, identifying differences in the lives and dynamics of movement of Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon to investigate similarities in the effects of statelessness on the organisation and mobilisation of the three aforementioned groups. In order to achieve the aim, it is critical to include multiple factors in the analysis of Palestinian diaspora social movements and not solely resort to political opportunities. Therefore, and to arrive to a better understanding of social movement dynamics, Mobilising Structures and Framing Processes are indispensable additions to the Political Opportunities factor.

So what are Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes? Sidney Tarrow defines Political Opportunities as “consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements”. Stemming from Resource Mobilisation theory and the Political Process Model comes the second factor; Mobilising Structures, which refers to the “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action”. Finally, “mediating between opportunity, organization, and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation embodied in Framing Processes. (Figure 8.1)

544 Ibid. Page 2 Examples include Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Hanspeter Kriesi, Herbert Kitschelt, Ruud Koopmans, and Jan Duyvendak
546 Sidney Tarrow, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structure of Social Movements," in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996). Page 54.
547 Doug McAdam, Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes. Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements. Page 3.
548 Ibid., Page 5.
Figure 8.1: Relationship between Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes

Following the brief introduction of the components of Social Movements and their importance in investigating the cases studied in this dissertation, theory and collected empirical data are mapped against each other in order to arrive to a comprehensive analysis of Political Opportunity, Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes of the Palestinian diaspora's mobilisation and organisation.

8.2.1 Is Political Opportunity an Opportunity?

Is the presence of Political Opportunity always an opportunity? Do members of stateless diasporas, hybrids, and the unrepresented, perceive opportunities as such? Does opportunity to the abovementioned change the dynamics and shapes of mobilisation from one host-land to the other? Where do theory and practice meet and where do they diverge in such cases? All those questions and more will be investigated throughout the following section that introduces theory, and maps it against what happens on the ground in the cases of Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon.
In a mission to conceptualise Political Opportunity, scholars such as Kriesi and Tarrow have identified multiple dimensions that impact the structuring of collective action. The dimensions act as signals emitted on multiple levels and are summarised as follows:

- The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system
- The stability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity
- The presence of elite allies
- The state’s capacity and propensity for repression

A change in any of the signals of the aforementioned dimensions can encourage mobilisation and can be perceived as an opportunity, “but the form the mobilization takes is very likely to be affected by the kind of opportunity presented”. Various theorists and scholars have various views on which signals lead to opportunities and which signals are of importance in creating opportunities. It is worth noting that it is not in the scope of this research to prove who is right and who is not, nor to go through the abundant literature on the topic. Instead, this section investigates whether what is considered an opportunity is always one.

When studying Social Movements through Political Opportunities, scholars have focused on few or all of the aforementioned dimensions. Tarrow, Kriesi, and Rucht focused on the first three dimensions, while McAdam and Brockett focused on all four. Scholars such as Donatella della Porta merged the first and the last dimensions explaining that “state repression is really more an expression of the general receptivity or vulnerability of the political opportunity structure, rather than an independent dimension of the same”. Eisinger on the other hand, in comparison to the first point, states that movement is likely in “systems characterized by a mix of

549 Ibid., Page 10.
550 Ibid.
open and closed factors\textsuperscript{552}, therefore, it is not the relative openness or closure of the system, but the mix of open and closed factors that yields movement.

Lacking from all the abovementioned points, especially to those studying social movements solely via political opportunities, is a very critical component; namely culture. Gamson and Meyer have noticed this gap and noted that “opportunity has a strong cultural component and we miss something important when we limit our attention to variance in political institutions and the relationships among political actors”.\textsuperscript{553}

On a relevant note, Dieter Rucht coined the term Context Structure in place of Political Opportunity, in an attempt to connote more than just the political context of a movement. Context Structure according to Rucht denotes “the factors in a movement’s environment which facilitate or limit the building of specific movement structure, resource collection, and eventual carrying out of protest activities”.\textsuperscript{554} Rucht argues that the Political Opportunity Structure suffers from deficiencies in the following areas: 1) lack of clear definition of the word structure, 2) the concept best fits to explain movements that focus on political power although in some cases, the focus should be on cultural and social factors besides the political factor, 3) the concept seems to deal with stable opportunities (especially in cross-national perspectives) while opportunities may swiftly change in other perspectives such as the national, and 4) scholars deal with opportunities as “objectively existent rather than socially constructed”.\textsuperscript{555}

The Context Structure of a social movement is constituted of 3 basic dimensions; the cultural, social and political contexts where the cultural context is the “attitudes and

\textsuperscript{554} Rucht, "The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structures: A Cross-Movement and Cross National Comparison." Page 188.
\textsuperscript{555} Ibid. Page 189.
behaviors of individuals who may (or may not) provide support such as money, organizational help, or participation in protest events”. The social context is the “embedding of social movements in their social environment including 2 aspects; 1) social milieus and networks which either facilitate or restrict the forming of collective identity and the building of movement structures, 2) the overall social stratification or class structure of a society”. Lastly is the political context, which refers to the interaction between social movement groups and the authorities and counter-movements.\(^556\)

According to Rucht, social movement scholars have focused on the third dimension only, the Political Context, which he divided into 4 variables: \(^557\)

1. Access to the party-system and policy decisions – formal and informal channels to influence political decisions via direct or indirect participation
2. Policy implementation capacity – the power of authorities to implement adopted policies regardless of internal or external resistance, can be measured on a scale ranging from high to low
3. Alliance structure – the configuration of allies which may provide substantive or symbolic support for the movement
4. Conflict structure – the configuration of opponents which have the capacity to limit social movement mobilization.

Following the briefing on theories and different perspectives on what makes and what is lacking from Political Opportunities, mapping the theories to empirical data is timely. Table 8.1 below demonstrates the similarities and differences between the three studied cases. Further elaborations on the data presented in Table 8.1 below are found throughout the chapter.

\(^556\) Ibid., Pages 189 – 190.
\(^557\) Ibid., Pages 190 – 191.
### Table 8.1: Dimensions of Political Opportunity

(1-4 Kriesi 1991 and Tarrow 1994 & 5-7 Rucht)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components from Various Theories on Social Movements</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Stability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Presence of elite allies</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 State's capacity and propensity for Repression</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Context Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cultural Context</th>
<th>Social Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Scepticism towards providing support due to the presence of other opposing factions/ideologies and Palestinian representation in Belgium</td>
<td>Scepticism towards engagement in organisation and events in general, due to potential repression and oppression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Social milieus &amp; networks</td>
<td>Embedded within camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate forming collective identity, weak for building movement structures</td>
<td>Facilitate forming collective identity, weak for building movement structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall social stratification &amp; class structure</td>
<td>Mix</td>
<td>Mix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7</th>
<th>Political Context</th>
<th>Access to party systems and political decisions</th>
<th>Policy implementation capacity</th>
<th>Alliance structure</th>
<th>Conflict structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Possible but unlikely</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Present but minimally</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Impossible</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Present Internally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

558 Refer to Doug McAdam, *Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes. Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements.* Page 10.
8.2.2 Political Opportunities: Manifold & Intricate

Manifold political aspects as well as cultural and social ones affect Political Opportunities. Detaching politics from cultural and social aspects when analysing organisation of movements is a deficiency, especially when comparing three heterogeneous cases in three different settings. The three studied settings in which opportunities to organisation and mobilisation of Palestinians in the diaspora occur, are more intricate than the heterogeneous diaspora itself. A fusion of theories and academic standpoints towards political opportunities is utilised to understand the effects of settings on the mobilisation of the stateless Palestinians.

8.2.2.1 Belgium: Restrained Opportunity

Living in an open political system, where diffusion of power between regions is practiced and where the stability of the broad set of elite alignments is minimal, the Palestinians in Belgium practice their citizen rights without the presence of repression or oppression by the state. Opportunity to organise and mobilise is vast given that the capital of Belgium happens to be the capital of Europe where European Union institutions operate and decisions on world issues are made. Allies to elites in Belgium are present (such as the Council of the EU working on the Middle East Peace Process, the Parliament of Wallonia working on BDS, the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with Palestine working to enforce a clear position on Palestine), but indirectly, for that linking between the Palestinian demands and the Belgian elites is the diplomatic representation of Palestine in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the EU. When observed, this diplomatic representation mimics the role of a state in making demands, holding talks, and lobbying, where the embassy officials forging alliances and mediating between Palestine and Belgium, and between Palestinian elites and Belgians elites.

With regards to Rucht’s Cultural Context, members of the Palestinian diaspora in Belgium prefer showing support in the form of networking rather than in a monetary form. Scepticism, lack of trust, and fear from intentions of other fellow Palestinians seem to steer the interaction between members of the diaspora, especially males. “They think that we are after harming them, they think we are putting them under surveillance, they still have the homeland mentality of being scared all the time. We are not ghouls, we are here working for them” said a Palestinian diplomat in Brussels.  

Support in the form of organisational help is restricted and limited to a handful of members, and the same can be applied to participation in movements/events, where the same organisers and the same participants have repetitively showed up to observed events. On the level of the Social Context, the social environment that the Palestinians in Belgium live in embeds social movements, (Belgium in general and Brussels in particular witness protests and demonstrations regularly and are considered a basic right for citizens), and Palestinian organisers have taken full advantage of this aspect while planning activities and actions, adhering to Belgian laws and issuing permits before organising and mobilising. There are social milieus and networks that facilitate forming a collective identity, although not only Palestinian, but includes Arab and Muslim at some points, but these milieus and networks fail in building movement structures for that imported divisions prevail. Although social stratification is observable in Belgium, and especially in large cities, the Palestinians are not stratified because of their Palestinian-ness, but because of their Arab-ness and on some occasions Muslim-ness.

Politically, although most Palestinians in Belgium are Belgian citizens and can practice their rights, the interaction between movements and authorities is minimal, and when present, is done via the diplomatic representations mentioned earlier.

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560 Discussed during an interview with a Palestinian diplomat in Brussels on 2 March 2012. It is important to note that this scepticism also affects participation in events and activities.

561 For example refer to the facebook page of the Palestinian diplomat in Brussels Hadi Shebli, who frequently posts about the Delegation’s efforts and outcomes.
When present versus counter-movements (competing factional movements in this case), interaction takes the form of verbal and/or physical violent conflict.\textsuperscript{562}

In theory, it is possible, although unlikely, to access party systems and political decision. The structure of alliance occasionally provides symbolic support (depending on an activity and who organises it an example of which is the Palestinians in Europe Conference where no ‘allies’ were present). On occasions where symbolic support is absent, the ability of opponents to try to limit social movement mobilisation becomes possible, although limited at the verbal level, where members of competing factional/ideological ‘movements’ mostly threaten and criticise on social media channels, and rarely take it to other levels that can hinder mobilisation. (Table 8.2)

\textsuperscript{562} For example: the verbal and physical clash between CPBL and CPALB discussed earlier in this dissertation. And the verbal (and also symbolic) clash between loyalists of different factions during a protest on 18 May 2013 at Place du Luxembourg – Brussels
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Outcome/Shape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Elite Allies</td>
<td>Absent for Palestinians Minimal/Occasional for General Delegation of Palestine</td>
<td>Gives more power to the General Delegation of Palestine making it the only mediator between Palestine and the EU in general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Broad Set of Elite Alignments in polity</td>
<td>Unstable due to the complex Belgian political system</td>
<td>Alignment of General Delegation with polities on EU level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Repression</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Frequent public demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestinians organised by Belgians and Palestinians alike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Context</td>
<td>Scepticism towards providing support due to the presence of other opposing factions/ideologies and Palestinian representation in Belgium</td>
<td>Providing support is limited to the also limited networking level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Social Context                                | Embedded                                                               | Numerous Palestine related activities and events (such as recurrent and weekly meetings and demonstrations in front of Bourse in Brussels, or the Rassemblement pacifique et silencieux en soutien à la Palestine, or Stille Wake: Vrouwen in ‘t Zwart. |}

**Social Milieus & Networks**

- *Facilitate* forming collective identity, *weak* for building movement structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Stratification/ Class Structure</th>
<th>Mix</th>
<th>Palestinian-ness, represented in Palestinian symbols is strong and very visible in organised activities and events, but this collective identity is not sufficient to build movement structures.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Context</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Access to Party System not likely and not currently present, while access to political decisions, when</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Party Systems &amp; Political Decisions</td>
<td>Possible but unlikely due to low number of Palestinians in Belgium and also due to the blue collar natured jobs</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Implementation Capacity</td>
<td>of Palestinians</td>
<td>present, is monopolised by the General Delegation of Palestine. The same applies to potential policy implementations, and alliance structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Structure</td>
<td>High in theory, Low in practice</td>
<td>Conflicts in the case of Palestinians in Belgium take the shape of factional clashing and usually resemble the divisions in the Homeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Structure</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2: Political Opportunity for Palestinians in Belgium

From what has been detailed above, it is clear that opportunities do exist, despite the absence of change in any of the dimensions [Table 8.1 - 1 to 4]. The Context Structures, and especially the embedding of social movements in the environment is an opportunity for organisation and mobilisation in Belgium, and can be considered the reason why Palestinians organise events and activities despite their small numbers (±4000) and despite the results that can be defined as futile when compared to the large and diverse demands (such as freeing Palestine, freeing prisoners, ending the occupation, and the application of UN resolutions).

During the period between the first quarter of 2012 and early 2014, 9 observed activities were organised by organisations claiming that they are representing the Palestinians in Belgium, such as ABP and CPBL. Out of the 9 activities and events, 5 were in solidarity with (Rassemblement spécial en soutien aux prisonniers palestinien dans les prisons israéliennes, Un grand meeting de solidarité avec le people palestinien Rassemblement de solidarité – sauvage aggression contre Gaza, Gathering for Gaza, and International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinians), and 4 were in Remembrance of (Rassemblement Pacifique a l’Occasion du 64eme année de la NAKBA du Peuple palestinien, 65eme Anniversaire de la Nakba, 11th Palestinians in Europe Conference organised around Nakba day, and Pour un intifada legale et citoyenne). Demands were multiple and manifold in most of the events, steering the events from cultural to ideological to political to socio-economic to humanitarian to
legal ... etc. Organisers were cooperating together for the sponsorship and mobilisation for events, which was evident through e-mail communications and organisation flags used during the observed events, such as the flags of ABP, Intal, Egalité, and other leftist parties.

8.2.2.2 Jordan: Favourable with Obstacles

Indeed the Jordanians of Palestinian origins are hybrids, and indeed they identify themselves as both Jordanians, and Palestinians. Being numerous, represented by and representing Jordan, the Palestinians in Jordan are considered the luckiest of those who originate from Palestine and live in an Arab country, and when it comes to Political Opportunity (theoretically speaking), they are surrounded by favourability despite the presence of obstacles.

The Jordanian institutionalised political system is moderately positioned between openness and closure, depending on the issue at stake and on surrounding circumstances. Issues like freedom of speech and expression, for example, are new yet limited occurrences in Jordan, especially after the Arab uprisings of 2010/2011. Prior to those years, such freedoms were restricted, heavily. On the other hand, issues related to participation of Jordanians from all background in politics has been practiced for decades, making the Jordanians of Palestinian origin active players in politics making in Jordan. For example, Jordanians of Palestinian origins are active members in several political ‘parties’ such as the Islamic Action Front, the Arab Baath Socialist Party (Jordan), the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party, the Arab Progressive Baath Party among others, as well as members of parliamentary blocs such as the Independents, and the Reform blocs in the current Jordanian parliament.

Elite alignments within Jordan are present although on basis far from party affiliation. Political parties are an occurrence that can also be considered recent, given that their rise only occurred in the 1990s, and given that the culture and idea of parties is yet to be deeply embedded within the society as a whole. Electing members of parliament is usually based on ties, familial (including tribal) or friendship, and is rarely based on party or affiliation. Such a practice can be
explained by the single person single vote to single candidate system of elections in Jordan. Therefore, elite alignments do exist, but are not strong enough to play a role in mobilisation. On the other hand, and as a result of the weak elite alignments, elite allies are the common form of opportunity. Given the closeness of Palestine to Jordanians of both origins, elites routinely act as, and are considered allies. The field of elite generation and presence is mainly the Parliament, where the flag of Palestine has been waved and the flag of Israel has been burned on many occasions. Oppression and repression have been an aspect of criticism towards Jordan, usually by the west, and until 2010/2011, the Jordanians felt oppressed and repressed in practice, even if the reflected showed, and still shows, otherwise. For example, the largest (although not currently represented in the government) opposition “party”, the Muslim Brotherhood, have been “facing difficulties and fierce opposition from the government in attempts to weaken the Brotherhood movement” and a lot of its members have been “laid off their jobs because of their political orientation”. In addition to that, the movement has been “denied the right to initiate NGOs and even lead sermons at mosques”. 563 It is also worth noting that repression is not only practiced on Jordanians of both origins, but also extends to (suspected) activists from neighbouring countries including Palestine, giving the Jordanian Intelligence (Mukhabarat) its “we are one of the best in the world” status. The Mukhabarat can tirelessly interrogate the same (suspected) activists, despite their origins, on a daily basis for months, and have the authority to ban whomever they find suspicious from entry to Jordan, in cases where the interrogated is not Jordanian. “It was incredible, here were these Jordanians, who were supposed to be our allies and supporters, squeezing me as hard as they could for information about Fatah. For two months they never left me alone … Today they won’t let me back into Jordan” 564 says Bassam (a Palestinian from the shabab of Balata), who later moved to Iraq and stated, “I felt free. I could go wherever I liked. It was nothing like Jordan” 565. What

563 Interview - Islamic Action Front (Jabha) 22 December 2011.
565 Ibid.
happened to Bassam a few decades ago still happens to others from similar and different backgrounds and origins.

On the Context Structure of Political Opportunity, commencing with the Cultural Context, providing financial support to organisations working especially with and on Palestine is the most dominant form of support. Donations, financial adoption of orphans from Palestine, and aid during and after eruptions of violent conflict between Palestine and Israel are the practiced form of Cultural Context. For example campaigns to adopt orphans from Palestine, or campaigns to support or rebuild Gaza, and so on.

As for the Social Context, the culture of social movements is not embedded in the society, and is a recent practice as stated earlier, social milieus and networks are existent especially on the level of forming a collective identity, and absent on the level of building movement structures. The overall social stratification and class structure is a mélange, making otherness not easily and clearly felt, and othering not easily and plainly practiced. The Political Context is also situated on a moderate level, where access to party systems (or its available equivalent) and political decisions is possible and likely, policy implementation capacity is unlikely due to geopolitics and issues pertaining to power and aid, and alliance structure present especially on symbolic levels, and conflict structure absent. (Table 8.3)

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566 The latest of many demonstration of the un-likeliness of policy implementation capacity was when a Jordanian judge of Palestinian origins was shot dead by an Israeli soldier on the borders between Jordan and Israel/Palestine, which led to Jordanians of both origins protesting for days to the ousting of the Israeli ambassador from Amman, to no avail.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Outcome/Shape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Elite Allies</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Political elites such as Members of Parliament act as allies to potential &quot;movements&quot; and non-movements related to Palestine and Palestinians (usually those in ‘Palestine’ not in Jordan) turning Palestine into a topic that belongs to everyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Broad Set of Elite Alignments in polity</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Possibility of forming long term alignments or long term plans is low due to the constant cabinet shuffles and House of Commons dissolutions thus leading to short term plans if present at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Repression</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Which leads to minimal organisation and mobilisation, in addition to minimal participation. Repression also leads to the birth of non-movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Context</td>
<td>Scepticism towards engagement in organisation and events in general, due to potential repression and oppression</td>
<td>Providing support is limited to the monetary, which does not necessitate political mobilisation and organisation, instead takes a low key high impact path e.g. increases during escalations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Context</td>
<td>Minimally embedded with restrictions</td>
<td>Leading to limited and sporadic attempts to political mobilisation usually reactive in nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Milieus &amp; Networks</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine-ness is deeply embedded within the society with no need for proving it (as it is the case in Belgium and Lebanon). The social milieus and networks are weak in terms of movement structures because movements are not ultimate goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Stratification/ Class Structure</td>
<td>Mix</td>
<td>Otherness is minimal, proving Palestinian-ness is not a necessity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Context</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Party Systems &amp; Political Decisions</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Makes access or its absence similar in potentiality to lead to desired outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Implementation Capacity</td>
<td>Low due to geopolitics, power and aid considerations</td>
<td>Which gives an air of futility to attempts of organising and mobilising given that people do not expect neither a change nor an impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Structure</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Members of Parliament are main allies and are those who provide symbolic support to people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts Structure</td>
<td>Absent on level of opponents, but very present in terms of repression and oppression by authorities</td>
<td>Which leads to non-movements and no movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.3: Political Opportunity for Palestinians in Jordan

From what has been detailed above, the chances of mobilisation seem to be favourable despite the obstacles faced. In practice, and although two of the dimensions (Table 8.1 – from 1,2,3,4) have changed, the political opportunity has not led to any large-scale demonstration of political mobilisation, for that during the period of observing activities and events to utilise in this research, 7 activities related to Palestine took place, 4 of which were reactions to current events and were of small-scale (Obama you are not welcome, In solidarity with prisoners twice, and for return), and 3 of which were in commemoration and remembrance (in remembrance of the Palestinian Nakba, in remembrance of Al Naksa, in remembrance of Land day). All events were marked with multi-messages and multi-demands, and many were results of un-organisation, or randomness. (Annex A further clarifies the abovementioned)
Non-movements, might be the right term to utilise in reference to the social movement of Palestinians in Jordan. Such a characteristic is not shocking when paralleled to the diaspora’s organisation in a relatively repressive and enormously unresponsive environment.

Defined, non-movements are:

“collective action of dispersed and unorganized actors ... made and realized mostly through direct actions, rather than through exerting pressure on to authorities to concede—something that the conventionally-organized social movements (like labor or environment movements) usually do. In a sense, the non-movements emerge as an un-articulated strategy to reduce the cost of mobilization under the repressive conditions. They may also emerge under non-repressive but unresponsive governments when the collective and open protests of the subaltern groups may fall on to deaf ears of authorities and adversaries⁵⁶⁷

8.2.2.3 Lebanon: The Demise of Political Opportunity, The Birth of an Alternative

What is the significance of political opportunity to stateless campizens, the ‘personas nullius’? Does the presence or absence of such opportunities affect their organisation and mobilisation or change its shape? When considering the Palestinians in Lebanon as a case study, one is forced to bear in mind that the Palestinians are physically included in Lebanon, but practically excluded from it. Holding no identification linking them to their host country, the Palestinians in Lebanon carry a Refugee ID that barely guarantees their basic needs and rights. The right to participation in Lebanese politics is lacking, and has been lacking ever since the Palestinians settled in Lebanon. Nonetheless, mapping theories on Political

Opportunity against Lebanon, despite the fact that it is not representing the studied group, is crucial for mapping the birth of camp-derived alternatives that mechanically affect Social Movements.

The relative openness or closure of the Lebanese political system is moderate, consisting of a mix of open and close depending on the issue at hand, leaning towards closure in issues related to religion, and openness in issues relating to freedom of speech and expression. Its elite alignments are far from stable, and swing in all directions depending on current issues and temporalities, intensifying around elections and conflict, where ‘enemies’ become allies, and vice versa. The exclusion of the Palestinians from Lebanese politics makes the presence of elite allies impracticable, but elite allies with the idea of Palestine and its cause are present considering that Israel is Lebanon’s ‘enemy’ mainly because of the occupation of Palestine. Lebanon is one of the countries that witnessed large-scale protests and demonstrations especially upon the assassination of the late Rafic Al Hariri in 2005. Since then, frequent demonstrations and protests were peacefully carried out (along with some that turned into violent) with minimal repression.

To the Lebanese citizens, Rucht’s Cultural context is present, and so are the Social Context and Political Context, although with limitations relating mostly to geopolitics. On the other hand, to the Palestinians inhabiting camps in Lebanon, and within camp borders, the Cultural Context exists in the form of organisational help and participation in protests, the Social Context is embedded within camps where demonstrations and protests are common and sometimes impromptu occurrences. Lacking is the Political Context, both vis-à-vis Lebanon and vis-à-vis what Palestinians consider their homeland. Access to party systems and political decisions is practically and theoretically impossible given that the Palestinians in Lebanon are neither represented by Lebanon, nor by Palestine, and the formation of alliance structures suffers from the same. The presence of opponents able to limit mobilisation is irrelevant given that mobilisation is generated and practiced behind the fences and walls of camps, places that the Lebanese authority does not control. So, how do Palestinian refugees adapt with their statelessness in a state? And how do they
mobilise despite their exclusion from opportunities present at their host-land? (Table 8.4)
8.2.2.4 Coping with Statelessness in a State: Forming the ‘State’ of Palestinian Refugees in the Palestinian Camps of Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension (vis-à-vis Lebanese Authorities)</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Exclusion &amp; Absence Leads to</th>
<th>Outcome Components from Various Theories on Social Movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence of elite allies</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Formation of elites and allies on other levels, in other places</td>
<td>Creation of allies between elites of camps (i.e Members of Popular Committees) &amp; creation of ties to allies outside camps (e.g. Fatah, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood Parties ...etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Broad Set of Elite Alignments in polity</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Formation of broad sets of elite alignments within camps</td>
<td>The occurrence of stable loyalties and affiliations to parties and shadows of parties not practically representing the Palestinians in Lebanon. Fatah, Hamas ... etc Present on level of Popular Committees and their affiliates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Repression Not Affected by presence or absence</td>
<td>Formation of alternative forms of Repression and control</td>
<td>Moderate despite the presence of heavily armed groups, in-camp enforcement of curfews, murders and killings by affiliates to one movement/party or the other which can be considered forms of Repression of the other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Context Structure**

<p>| Cultural Context | Absent | Birth of in-camp support systems | Camp inhabitants seek support in organisation, participation in protests, and minimally monetary support from each |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Context</th>
<th>Not Possible</th>
<th>Embedding Social Movements within Camps instead of within host country</th>
<th>Campizens organise frequent and simultaneous protests and demonstrations across different camps.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embedding of Social Movements in Environment</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>Facilitates Formation of Collective Identity &amp; Affects Building Social Movement Structures</td>
<td>Being excluded from social milieus and networks of host country leads to facilitating the formation of a collective identity of the Palestinians, as Palestinians and as others Affects the goals and targets of social movements. Inward goals and targets (solely in-camp instead of towards authorities of host country).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Milieus &amp; Networks</td>
<td>Stratified vis-à-vis Lebanese Citizens. If compared, Palestinians fall under ‘lower class’</td>
<td>The sense of otherness in Lebanon (on one more aspect), the sense of sameness among each other</td>
<td>Helps in maintaining informal as well as formal social structures, and helps in coping with the lived situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Stratification/Class Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Stratification/Class Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Structure</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Birth of alternative ‘party systems’</td>
<td>Minimal Access (by members of Popular Committees) to a camp-based system, where the committees mimic parties in terms of (s)elections and making political decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Party Systems &amp; Political Decisions</td>
<td>Impossible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As previously mentioned, theories state that a change in any of the first four dimensions (Table 8.1 - 1,2,3,4) can encourage mobilisation, and also state that the form mobilisation takes is likely to be affected by the presented type of political opportunity. To the Palestinians in the camps of Lebanon, change has been minimal, especially since the PLO leadership left Lebanon in 1982. Nonetheless, mobilisation disguised in a political attire, has continued to occur throughout the following years. Most mobilisation attempts in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon revolve around Remembrance and Commemoration of preset dates in Palestinian history, usually agony (Nakba, Naksa, Land Day, Martyr Day ... etc). 34 out of 43 observed organised events and activities in the camps of Lebanon were of remembrance and
commemoration of the state they once owned and will once return and return to (Refer to annex E for further details). Being unrepresented in Lebanon or Palestine, i.e stateless, has led to a unique form of movement, one that rarely contains any demands. There is no party representing the Palestinians in Lebanon, and no state claiming their belonging to it, therefore, there is no body to demand from. Although Palestinians are aware of the fact that they are not represented by, and do not represent, neither their host country nor their homeland, they still organise and remember Palestine, for that keeping Palestine alive in any shape is what keeps them alive and gives them hope under the dire circumstances of their everyday lives. Demonstrations of this can be seen through the Return Key painted all around camps and the life-on-hold aspect of Palestinian-ness. It is worth noting that a lot of Palestinians, and especially the elderly, await return to Palestine, and have been waiting for decades, counting the days. Such people die believing that the return day will come, and that they will witness it. Another category of people consists of those who are hopeless with regards to the question of Palestine, and consider themselves alive due to “lack of death” or alive “counting days”, not days until return, but days until death. Central to being stateless is this polarisation between hopelessness and attachment and the manifestations of interrelation between the two different poles. Such demonstrations are reserved for the Palestinians in Lebanon, who are living without being (excluded from being and are forced to living) for that they struggle to satisfy their basic survival needs.

568 Such comments are very common and were frequently observed during fieldwork in Lebanon and Jordan.
8.3 Structuring Stateless Mobilisation

This section aims at unfolding how mobilising structures for the Palestinians in the three studied countries look like, how such structures are chosen, and how they are affected by the settings surrounding them. By doing so, this section will be examining the variation of and diversity in, as well as similarities in the mobilising structures of the studied cases.

Mobilisation structures consist of and are generated on multiple levels, ranging from informal to formal and encompassing structures present in everyday life like family and friends, stretching to organisations, unions, committees and associations, passing by hybrid structures situated in between both poles, like religious groups, teams ...etc. (Figure 8.2)

![Figure 8.2: Informal to Formal Mobilising Structures](image)

It is worth noting that when studying the mobilising structures throughout this dissertation, the Formal forms of the structure are focused upon, for that the scope of the research mainly revolves around Civil Society Organisations and the
Palestinian Diasporas as groups not as individuals. Nonetheless, it is also worth mentioning that on the Informal level, the level of the basic structures of everyday life, everything related to Palestine and Palestinian-ness is highly politicised. This politicisation is reflected upon and is observable on the Hybrid level as well, especially in Prayer Groups. No Friday sermon or group lesson during escalations of conflict in Palestine passes without politicising religion (or religionising politics) for instance. Palestinians and those sympathising with their cause seem to survive on this politicisation of being. Politicisation is their oxygen especially on the Informal and Hybrid levels. Whether this overpoliticisation on the first two levels affects the outcomes of the third level is a question worth further sociological and psychological research.

Moving back to mobilising structures, John McCarthy defines them as

“the agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action which include particular ‘tactical repertoires’, particular ‘social movement organizational’ forms, and ‘modular social movement repertoires’... and the range of everyday life micromobilization structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated: these include family units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and element of the state structure itself”.569

An assortment of points is of importance for understanding mobilising structures. For example, coherence is key with regards to mobilising structures, which includes “coordination between the various separate mobilizing structures that make up a

569 McCarthy, Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing. Page 141.
functioning movement. Similarly, the “range and diversity” of structures (isomorphism) that make up a movement is crucial, ranging from narrow to diverse, and the goals and tactics employed by movements to achieve such goals are critical in determining reactions from members, as well as bystanders.

Mapping theories to empirical data resulted in both similarities and differences between the cases studied. (Table 8.5)

In terms of coherence of mobilising structural organisation, on the ground, it is divided into two, consistency and formation of a unified whole. Consistency is something that the Palestinians and whoever organises and mobilises them are forced to be specialists in. Demands have been consistent for decades, and approaches have been images of each other despite sometimes-apparent differences. Wherever they are, whatever activity is organised and participated in, state, return, and liberation, along with the frequently echoed demand of Jerusalem as a capital, are the constants. In practice, and although such constants are unanimously agreed upon, Palestinians fall short of forming a unified whole except in terms of Palestinian-ness, because despite the consistency in demands, this consistency revolves around something that does not exist. The absence of a centre, a state, to which Palestinians can connect to is critical in terms of organisation and structures.

As for coordination between different and separate mobilising structures, the three studied cases vary widely on this level. Coordination appears to be a natural occurrence in Belgium (such as coordination between CPBL and ABP) where different organisers plan and attend the same events, some of which are shared. The same is not true for Jordan, where the organisation of events seems to be closer to unplanned reactions than to organisation. Each organisation reacts on its own, and

571 Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing. Page 145.
572 Doug McAdam, Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes. Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements. Page 341.
coordination between different and separate mobilising structures is rare. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood reacts on its own, the professional unions react on their own (as one body) and so on. The only occasion where coordination can be observed is via events organised by leftists (or leftist ‘parties’). There is no straightforward and simple answer to why this happens, but explications might range from limited numbers of members/affiliates/loyalists per party to the (self) perception that leftist parties in fact constitute the opposition and thus operate jointly. As for Lebanon, the exclusion and closed space setting of Palestinians and Palestinian led organisations means that most organisations operate in various Palestinian camps across Lebanon, which in turn leads to coordination between different branches of the same organisation (mobilising structure), and sometimes between separate mobilising structures, although the former is dominant. The most observed examples are those of shadow-parties, such as Fatah organisations across different camps, or Hamas, or others.

Yet despite the aforementioned heterogeneities in the shapes and dynamics of coordination, mobilising structures within the three countries tend to lean towards the formation of narrow structures attempting to achieve structural aspirations via diverse demands and goals. Organisations working with/on Palestinian issues advertise and are structured on a wide range of goals despite their inability to satisfy most of such goals. Such occurrences are observed through the organisations’ websites, especially under sections such as Who We Are and What We Do, where organisations, especially those in Jordan and Lebanon, seem to advertise a very wide array of goals that appear to be lip service when compared to what they (can) do on the ground.

On a similar note, following the theories from Tilly and Harrison White before him, it is important to examine the Catness (Category-ness) and Netness (Network-ness) of a given group, where Catness refers to “the strength of a shared identity in a group and to the sharpness of social boundaries that comprise all those who share a
common characteristic(s)”, and Netness refers to the “density of networks among group members that link them to each other by means of interpersonal bonds”. Applying Catness and Netness to the cases of the Palestinian diaspora studied in this dissertation, it is observable that Catness is significantly strong in terms of shared identity in a group. Palestinian-ness is a very strong demonstration of being and existing that is portrayed in everydayness as well as during occasions and events. Few are the Palestinian houses that do not contain either an image, a flag, a picture, an artefact, or a souvenir directly related to Palestine. Micromobilisation whether it is considered political or emotional is a dominant feature in the case of the Palestinians, especially those in the diaspora. In terms of sharpness of social boundaries that includes all those who share being of Palestinian origin, the sharpness varies within the studied cases. In Belgium, the sharpness is weak, let alone marred with scepticism and distrust very loud to an extent the unspoken becomes heard. In Jordan, this sharpness is moderate, mostly dependent on the village, or the city, members of the group originate from. A lot of Palestinian and Palestine-related associations are formed based on region or area of origin, each village or city has its association, and in some occasions each family (extended family depending on last name) has its own association. This can be explained by the presence of a large number of Palestinians in Jordan, and to their hybrid identity that makes their social boundaries moderately sharp. In Lebanon on the other hand, social boundaries are very strong, which is not surprising given that the Palestinians there mostly live in closed camps, and organisations mainly operate within the borders of such camps, therefore in closed communities and are thus excluded from the host society.

The density of networks among Palestinians that links them together in terms of interpersonal bonds also varies among the three studied cases; weak in Belgium, moderate in Jordan, and strong in Lebanon as a coping mechanism to survive living in dire circumstances in the camps, this is demonstrated within each camp, where inhabitants of the camp, or campizens, have been inhabiting the same geographical

spot, along with neighbours from the same extended family or same village back home for decades. Without strong interpersonal bonds, living would be intolerable. Walking through the alleyways of camps, one can easily and around the clock observe families, relatives, neighbours, women, men, and children sitting outside drinking tea and chatting, or cleaning and cutting vegetables (to be used for preparing meals) together. Camp inhabitants seem to know each other not only by looks, but also by name, and always greet each other and invite each other for lunch, tea, or coffee.

For movements to become forceful and effective in mobilisation, McAdam points six obstacles movements face that must be surmounted. **Attracting new members** is the first, which is an obstacle the Palestinian movements struggle with. Almost seven decades after the Nakba and numerous failures and defeats in achieving goals and demands, attracting new members to join any movement related to Palestine has proven to be a challenge especially in Belgium and Jordan, where the numbers of and variation in Palestinian participants is relatively low. Some theorists say that any failure in social movement mobilisation can “alter the shape and likelihood of future collective action” and that such failures demoralise organisations as well as individuals. This is true in the case of Palestinians, especially those in Jordan where the optimism of will has been replaced by the optimism of wish.

In general, what affects the ability to attract new members also affects the ability to **sustain the commitment of members**. This does not happen to be the case for the Palestinians in Belgium and Lebanon, but is the case for those in Jordan. Commitment to Palestinian organisations and activities feeds Palestinian-ness and

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starves otherness in Belgium and Lebanon, whereas it is not a necessity to the hybrid Palestinians of Jordan who have the benefit of calling themselves both Palestinians and Jordanians together. In all studied cases, attracting Palestinian bystanders has been and is weak, although existent. Attracting bystanders on the global level, especially in Belgium, has been successful, for that Global Justice Movements including organised BDS campaigns and large demonstrations have been recurrent occurrences.

Generating favourable media coverage whether to organised activities or to current events is an advantage the Palestinians in Jordan enjoy. Making up roughly half of the population, and living in a country where the Question of Palestine is central to its government and politics, the Palestinians can easily access media and generate coverage. They even own TV and radio channels (such as Ro’ya TV), and are chief editors in newspapers (such as Addustour) for example. The opposite applies to those in Belgium and Lebanon, where in the former the Palestinians are a very minuscule minority (even when organisers contact Arab media, they rarely show up)\(^{576}\) who can barely generate presence to organised activities, and in the latter Palestinians although constituting 10% of Lebanon’s ‘population’ are isolate of Lebanon and its media outlets unless what is covered is related to outlaws hiding in camps or clashes between camp inhabitants and the Lebanese army. Otherwise, camps are a fertile ground for documentaries and sporadic news reports. To the Palestinians in Lebanon, media coverage is equivalent to social media coverage by and to camp inhabitants, where news is shared and broadcast via such platforms, and where camps have pages such as “[Camp Name] Press Centre” administered by camp inhabitants where they post news, obituaries, events, wedding invitations and the like.

The ability to restrain options of opponents is a problematic component when mapping it to the Palestinians studied, for that the main opponent (to Palestinians), Israel, is out of reach. The Palestinians in the diaspora, and just as they are detached

\(^{576}\) CPBL Organisers have been including the media in all their emailed communications, but the media failed to show up to the vast majority of events.
and disconnected from their homeland, are also detached and disconnected from what they consider their ultimate enemy. Opposing Israelis (as individuals) is not practiced in Belgium where Israelis are present, and inapplicable in Jordan and Lebanon where Israelis are not overtly present. The opponent component thus, takes another shape, an imported one, very similar to the one in the homeland, which also includes Fatah and Hamas loyalists, or other parties, and it is on this level that opponents can cause problems to each other, especially in terms of competition (whether on power, authority, resources, or other). This is absent in Jordan though, where opposition only occurs on levels of elections in the Professional Unions Complex, but do not result in restraining options. In Belgium, this opposition is clear and although does not result in restraining options, can be a hindrance especially when opposition turns into violent verbal or physical clashing. Lebanon is the most extreme of cases when it comes to the ability to restrain opponent options, for that opponents are armed, usually heavily, curfews are enforced, and shootings and killings are not rarities. As a result of the aforementioned, it is noticed that some camps lean towards loyalty to Fatah, while others lean towards Hamas (or other parties). Rare are the camps that demonstrate a balance between presence and power of parties, and nonexistent are the camps where symbolism to one party or the other is not manifested even before entering the camp.

As for the ability to shape public policy and state action, the three studied countries and despite the aforementioned differences, lack this ability. Numbers do matter in some circumstances, like that in Belgium where Palestinians do not exceed 4000 individuals. Although a lot of protests are carried out in front of European institutions like the Parliament or the Commission, such events are not large in terms of numbers nor well-organised enough to attract sufficient attention. Being excluded from the government and politics of Lebanon makes this ability a terminal inability to Palestinians living there, shaping public policy and state action is out of question. In Jordan, and although numbers and actions can be sufficient depending on situation, geostrategic and political interests are the priority, limiting any ability

577 One of the observed events was even organised in front of the European Parliament on a Saturday.
to shape public policy and state action when it comes to Palestine and the Palestinians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coherence of mobilising structural organisation</strong></td>
<td>Consistency Present</td>
<td>Consistency Present</td>
<td>Consistency Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forming a Unified Whole with Palestine &amp; Palestinians Absent unless in terms of Palestinian-ness</td>
<td>Forming a Unified Whole with Palestine &amp; Palestinians Absent unless in terms of Palestinian-ness</td>
<td>Forming a Unified Whole with Palestine &amp; Palestinians Absent unless in terms of Palestinian-ness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination between different and separate mobilising structures</strong></td>
<td>Present within Belgium Especially between CPBL and ABP.</td>
<td>Very Limited</td>
<td>Present between branches of organisations in different/multiple camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Range &amp; diversity of structures that make up movement (isomorphism)</strong></td>
<td>Narrow Structures with Diverse &amp; Large Demands, and Wide Range of Goals</td>
<td>Narrow Structures with Diverse &amp; Large Demands, and Wide Range of Goals</td>
<td>Narrow Structures with Diverse &amp; Large Demands, and Wide Range of Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Catness</strong></td>
<td>Very Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Very Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netness</strong></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ability to attract new members</strong></td>
<td>Minimal (same faces in most events and activities) with a few European additions</td>
<td>Minimal (unless inside universities, where students change and faces change)</td>
<td>Minimal (same camp inhabitants mobilise and are mobilised)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ability to sustain commitment of members</strong></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak to Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ability to generate favourable media coverage</strong></td>
<td>Weak although attempts are continuously made (emails to TVs stations)</td>
<td>Strong especially online media</td>
<td>Weak (except for social media pages related to camps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ability to mobilise bystanders</strong></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ability to restrain options of opponent</strong></td>
<td>Not Applicable in terms of main opponent. Applicable in terms</td>
<td>Not Applicable in terms of main opponent</td>
<td>Not Applicable in terms of main opponent. Applicable in terms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of competition (CPB and Al Bayt Al Filisteeni) usually takes violent forms whether verbal or physical

Ability to shape public policy and state action

Numbers & actions not sufficient to reach public policy or state action

Although numbers and actions can be sufficient depending on situation, but geostrategic interests are the priority E.x: Judge

Excluded from being part of state and thus public policy

Table 8.5: Mobilising Structures to Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon

### 8.4 Framing the Absent

*Movements are actively engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers ... They frame, or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.*

Framing Processes are “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action”. Framing Processes are located between Political Opportunities and Mobilising Structures, and the shape of such processes affects the overall collective (in)action of a certain group. For effective Framing, a group must be aggrieved and optimistic together. Aggrieved about an aspect(s) in their lives, and

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580 Doug McAdam, *Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes. Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements.* Page 6 in reference to David Snow’s original definition.
optimistic that collective action will lead to redressing the problem.\textsuperscript{581} When associated to the cases studied, it is clear that Palestinians are aggrieved, since decades, about an aspect(s) in their lives (occupation, being refugees, living in camps, feelings of otherness, statelessness, injustice … among a lot more), but what Palestinians in general seem not to have is optimism in the present. Optimism about the future, the distant future, (by Palestinians inside and outside the homeland as well as Arabs and (culturally) Muslims) is extremely strong, demonstrated in the belief that Palestine will be liberated before judgment day according to interpretations of Holy Scriptures. Despite what can be called pessimism of the present, the Palestinians still organise and mobilise, even if within certain limits and borders, for that participating in Palestine related activities and events is how Palestinian-ness thrives, and is how the sense of being and existing is bred.

In order to conceptualise Framing Processes, scholars such as Mayer Zald resorted to clustering. Zald’s conceptual cluster includes culture, ideology and strategic framing. Culture represents the “shared beliefs and understandings, mediated and constituted by symbols and language, of a group or a society”. Ideology on the other hand represents “the set of beliefs that are used to justify or challenge a given social-political order and are used to interpret the political world”. Finally, Frames are “the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and suggest alternative modes of action”.\textsuperscript{582}

On the Culture level, and despite the heterogeneity of the Palestinian diaspora studied, this level is almost homogenous in terms of beliefs and understandings, symbols and language. The three studied cases share liberation, state, and return as constants and recurrent beliefs, present in all organised and non-organised activities, accompanied by the belief in the holiness of the land, and the ‘brutality’ of the ‘Zionists’. Understandings about what Palestine is and who Palestinians are are also shared between Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon. Palestine is historic

\textsuperscript{581} Ibid., Page 5.
\textsuperscript{582} Mayer N. Zald, "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing " in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996). Page 262.
Palestine, the full map of Palestine without the presence of Israel, and a Palestinian is any person with Palestinian roots mainly from the paternal side. Carrying another nationality does not efface Palestinian-ness, and living elsewhere does not eradicate the right to return to historic Palestine. Similarly, the same symbols and artefacts can be observed in all three cases, even chants and shouts are surprisingly similar despite the difference in language in the case of Belgium, where chants are mostly in French, and in addition to chants leaning towards utilizing the language of human rights such as “Children of Gaza, Children of Palestine, it is humanity that is being assassinated”, or demanding the establishment of an International Human Rights Observation Commission, demanding an unrestricted access of humanitarian aid to Palestinians, and also the proclamation of Palestinian rights granted by the UN, all of which are observations made during fieldwork in Belgium (Refer Annex A for further data on the specifics of the abovementioned observations).

On the Ideology level, and although the set of beliefs used to justify and understand what is happening in the world of Palestinians seems alike from the exterior, it is not so from the interior. The aggrieved Palestinians are governed by a set of ideologies ranging from passive to aggressive. The Palestinians in Belgium demonstrate through their activities and spoken words that their Ideology is one of Liberation. Liberation in this case can mean liberation of Palestine of 1948, and liberation of Palestine of 1967. This aforementioned variation depends on the occasion, speakers, invitees, attendees and so on. When the speakers and the attendees are ordinary (position wise) Palestinians, the framing of Liberation leans towards 1948 Palestine, and in cases where the speakers and attendees are a mix of Palestinians and people from elsewhere, the framing leans towards 1967. The same can be applied to the status of Palestine, state, country, other. In the case of Palestinians in Jordan, the ideology seems to be a mélange of Liberation with a hint of armed struggle, especially to believers in martyrdom. Palestinians in Lebanon are situated on the other end of the spectrum where the ideology is that of Struggle first and foremost. Flags of armed factions of Palestinian political parties decorate the camps, and the narrative of such parties dominates the everydayness of many campizens.
On the level of Frames, where metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive signals are used to create actions, the Palestinians rely heavily on visuals and visualisation in addition to the auditory. Images, pictures, and sound (songs, speeches, anthem ... etc) are the number two metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues following number one; the Palestinian flag. The Palestinian national anthem, a room with Palestinian flags (plural), images of holy sites, pictures of leaders and martyrs, pictures of olive trees, old women, the return key, images of children and the elderly are sufficient to render and cast behaviour and events both in an evaluative mode and alternative modes of actions. A picture of an injured or dead woman or child leads to evaluating the current mode of (in)action, and leads to alternative action. The same can be applied to an image or video of a house in Palestine being demolished by an Israeli bulldozer, a child shot dead in the arms of his/her father, a woman hugging her olive tree refusing its uprooting, pictures of prisoners on a hunger strike and so on.

Instrumental for movements and action is media, and media framings. Three ways of instrumentalising media for the benefit of movement have been identified by Kielbowicz and Scherer; 1) Media are important in reaching to, acquiring approval from and mobilising potential participants 2) media can link movements with political and social actors 3) media can psychologically support members and potential participants. In the case of the Palestinians, media is indeed instrumental, but being exposed to media that has been repeating the same information and news for decades so far (as old as the Palestinian statelessness) can play a demobilising effect instead of an actually mobilising one. Such framings and discourses made by the Arab media (the media most Palestinians follow religiously) and by people on the media has been fed to Palestinians for years, and has been utilised by the Palestinians themselves for years as well, to an extent where the discourses turned into empty rhetoric, or to what Hirschmann calls rhetoric of

reaction." It is only after escalations or deadly conflicts in the homeland that the media react and shift their attention to the old yet new story of the Palestinians with 24-hour coverage of death, blood, corpses, and misery. This rhetoric became the default on the level of media, of organised activities and events, and even on the level of personal communication and conversation, and became the rhetoric of framing and mobilising. The utility of such rhetoric deserves to be questioned and revised, and can be further researched at later stages and projects.

Hirschman’s rhetoric of reaction revolves around three central themes; jeopardy, futility, and perverse effects. Jeopardy means jeopardising achievements by attempting some change; futility refers to the futility of any action and the waste of time and resources an action would yield; and perverse effects means that the action itself will make things worse rather than better. All three themes can be applied to Palestinians, especially futility for that after almost 70 years of the same demands, same goals, same approaches, all accompanied by the lack of tangible (and intangible) results, Palestinians sense and experience the futility of what is said and done about Palestine and Palestinians.

As apparent, the rhetoric of reaction shows signs of pessimism. To counter its pessimism, movement activists employ a type of rhetoric called the rhetoric of change, which is meant to be more optimistic. Examples of the rhetoric of change are very present in patriotic songs and slogans across the studied cases, for instance, “we are returning (as opposed to we will return) … we left as a small family and are coming back in millions” is an example on Opportunity from Jordan. Similarly, on the urgency level in Belgium, an email sent by CPBL prior to the “Urgence Gaza 2012” manifestation on 24 November 2012 Place Flagey Brussels – Belgium where the mobilisation email was covered with images of bombings of Gaza and the smoke filled Gazan sky, andbannered with the colours black, white, and red.

585 Media that Palestinians follow religiously such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya.
586 From Global March to Jerusalem on 7 June 2013 Sweimeh – Jordan.
In Lebanon, an example on Novel Possibilities is reflected in “Today’s Youth .. Tomorrow’s Hope”, the slogan of the Palestinian Institution for Youth and Sport, which promotes sports and physical activities to facilitate return to the homeland via the maintenance of good health and fit bodies. Countering jeopardy by conveying urgency and emphasising on the risk of inaction, opposing futility by convincing the crowds to grasp the opportunity for it will not last long, and contrasting perverseness by promising novel possibilities. This counter tactic, particularly the urgency aspect of it, is also observable in the case of Palestinians in the studied cases, but such a tactic is only applied as a reaction to a very pressing current event (war, conflict escalation, massacre and so on) and is not utilised only to demonstrate what a movement or action demands and wants, but also to the anger individuals feel and need to express one way or another.

In conclusion, summarising and comparing the shapes of the components of Social Movements is fundamental for understanding the dynamics of movements of the Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon. Starting with the Political Opportunity component in Belgium, it is clear that even when all else is fixed or missing, the social context is sufficient in yielding movement. None of the dimensions (relative openness/closure of political system, stability of broad set of elite alignments, presence of elite allies, and state’s capacity and propensity for repression) has changed to the Palestinians living in Belgium, but the Social Context component that Rucht proposed to fill the gap of focusing only on political aspects of movements was critical in the movement of Palestinians. The practiced fact that social movements are embedded in the culture of Belgium has been a mobilising force that led to organising multiple events including protests despite all the unchanged dimensions and missing links to authorities and elites. In Jordan, although 2 out of 4 dimensions of Political Opportunity have changed right before/during the study of the Palestinians in Jordan, this change was not sufficient to yield any movement beyond the usual non-movements. As for Lebanon, and despite being totally excluded from

Political Opportunity, the Palestinians demonstrated that they are totally keen on organisation and movement.

In terms of Mobilising Structures, the three studied cases demonstrated different structures, various divergences, but nonetheless the same inability to create change neither in their host countries, nor in their homeland.

More complexly affected by the duration of the Palestinian experience and by the sensed (including heard and seen) are the Framing Processes, where signs of pessimism and futility are largely observed. Urgency in Palestinian terms only suits severe escalation at homeland. The 3 to 4 constants that Palestinians in the diaspora share and include in all events and activities do not fall under the urgent category, for that the duration of this non-urgency has extended to almost 7 decades, and other urgencies have regularly occurred and recurred every few years.

As has been explained earlier, this chapter sounds like a Fugue, and if it is to be turned into audible music, its theme would be made of the sounds of social movements which will then extend and develop to three successive imitations, those of the Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and finally Lebanon. Following this Fugue is a postlude, concluding the composition and concluding this repertoire.
Chapter 9:

Postlude to a Stateless Repertoire
Chapter 9
Postlude to a Stateless Repertoire

9.1 Postlude to a Stateless Repertoire

In an imaginatively audible journey, this composition took the writer and the reader through the echoes of Palestinian diasporisation in three different host countries enjoying distinctive settings and dynamics. Each of the host countries resonated (and resonates) its own unique sounds in the cacophonous Palestinian existence, and it is from that cacophony that this dissertation extended its sounds and echoes by combining different moods, tonalities, and styles to turn the inharmoniousness of stateless diasporisation into sounds that are hopefully placidly audible.

Studying the effects of statelessness on Palestinian diaspora mobilisation was the key to this dissertation. The aforementioned was done via utilising a variety of methodological approaches that set the rhythm to the investigation in an attempt to capture as much sounds and voices as possible given the time and space limits. Acknowledged are the limitations and acknowledged are the gaps in this composition.

Despite the heterogeneous and diverse sounds the Palestinian diasporisation resonates and echoes, that same Palestinian diasporisation still resonates a set of identical and homogeneous sounds. The homogeneities investigated throughout this dissertation are many, and the following section is meant to intermix the sounds of all the homogeneities represented in the chapters of this composition, leaving the demonstration of heterogeneities to other sections of this chapter. The Palestinian diaspora homogeneities can be divided into two interconnected levels: Homeland and Movement. Commencing with the Homeland level, the studied diasporas share the inability to impact or influence their homeland (as it is seen by them; as one) and its proxies, being unrepresented by what they consider their homeland, despite willingly and unofficially representing it, mutes the diaspora
voices to the ears of the homeland, and is instrumentalised by the homeland’s proxies. Unaccounted for as a diaspora of their particular “state”, the studied diasporas also share their disconnection from other Palestinian diaspora groups, due to the lack of a centre, a hub, that all diaspora activities can go through and branch from. The absence of a state also has it tolls on the historical narrative production process and distorts the temporalities of the people of the land, thus forcing the stateless Palestinian diaspora to live in acentric realities despite their country of settlement, and thus, deforming their historiographies, geographies and temporalities. Finally, while diasporas make demands to and for their homelands, the stateless Palestinian diaspora (and probably other stateless diasporas, a topic worth further research) is restricted to making demands for a homeland.

On the other level, Movement, the studied cases share their inability to be part of the conflict that diasporised them, they are forcibly excluded from the conflict that plays the role of a cornerstone to their being. Thus, turning the philanthropic into political in times of intense political unrest and escalation at the homeland. What all studied cases surprisingly share is their organisation around solidarity and commemoration contexts, in reaction to events or dates (Annex D), using the same rhetoric of reaction and sharing the same levels of aggrievement and optimism in a futuristic (atavistic) divine intervention. Paralleling the ease of forming a collective Palestinian identity in the diaspora is the ease of forming a collective scepticism in diaspora activities and members, and the minimal abilities in attracting new Palestinian members and mobilising new Palestinian bystanders despite country of settlement and despite heterogeneities. It is worth noting that this dissertation, and due to time and space limits, did not study the abilities of Palestinian organisations and International organisations in attracting new non-Palestinian members. The former summary of homogeneities is only intended to reacquaint the reader with what has been investigated throughout the research before delving into the findings of each chapter, which will be done in the following sections.
9.2 Thematic Antiphonal Response

In parallel to the antiphonal nature of the introduction and conclusion, where the introduction poses questions and the conclusion answers back, the following section will thematically tie the notes of each chapter, mapping the findings and arguments of each core chapter to both the case of Palestinians, and to the wider field of knowledge.

*If the question of “how states see diasporas” has been investigated in the current literature, why doesn’t the question of how non-states (cannot) see diasporas follow its lead?*

Clearly depicted in the current literature on diasporas is the state bias that leads to studying diasporas, diaspora activities, diaspora institutions, diaspora roles, and diaspora organisation and mobilisation under a state lens, leaving a huge gap in the study of diasporas under a lens lacking a state focus, and forgetting questioning how homelands without a state see their diasporas, and whether they can see them. The same applies to classifying diaspora - homeland relations, where diasporas are seen as wreckers, builders, both, or selectively none leaving aside a category that does exist in our world, the one that is none but forcibly not selectively.

Chapter 5, **Echoless Diasporic Sonata**, the first of the core chapters of this dissertation, argued that the irreversible separation of a diaspora from its homeland, due to the homeland’s inability of embracing its diaspora (given its institutional dysfunctionality in light of its non-state status) forces such stateless diasporas to march to the beats of their own drummers, without a maestro, without a state. On the same lines, statelessness paralyses the homeland’s abilities and capabilities of mobilising its diaspora as part of it, in terms of Tapping, Embracing, and Governing. Thus, turning the diaspora’s act of willfully contributing in philanthropic donations

588 For examples refer to Alan Gamlen, "Explaining the Rise of Diaspora Institutions; Vertovec, "The Political Importance of Diasporas - Working Paper No. 13 "; Ostergaard-Nielsen, "Diasporas and Conflict Resolution - Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?; Smith, Diasporas in International Conflict.
into a political one that feeds Palestinian-ness and the continuation of Palestine. Contributing in such cases is not necessarily derived from and facilitated by the centre, the homeland, but it is derived from the people even if without material/political return. The emotional and psychological are fulfilling in such cases of forced isolation. What this reflects is that the absence of a state facilitates and increases pecuniary giving steered by auto-mobilised (self-imposed mobilisation) individuals not by a mobilising home state. It also turns the diasporic individual into the homeland, functioning as a homeland and thus the concept of diasporas as homelands. The whys and wherefores of this sub-conclusion are worth further psychological and psychosocial research.

Similarly, statelessness, and in particular the Palestinian statelessness limits, not to say paralyses, what the Palestinians in the diaspora can do towards their homeland’s protracted conflict(s). Academically, diasporas have been classified into peace makers, peace wreckers, both, or voluntarily none. Investigating the Palestinian diaspora’s statelessness dictates that some diasporas cannot be and cannot choose to be either, isolating any attempts of organisation and mobilisation in the diaspora from the homeland. Making such stateless diasporas unheard, echoless, fruitless towards the homeland.

Out of the ordinary and worth further research on similar cases is the homeland-host country role reversal, or permutation as the chapter calls it, where two of the studied host countries cover up for the absence of a home state (to the diaspora) by institutionalising the presence of the Palestinian diaspora through governmental departments and committees, further distancing, silencing, and isolating the diaspora from its homeland by “owning” and representing its cause. Not surprisingly, the two cases where permutation occurs are Jordan and Lebanon, the two Arab countries hosting Palestinians since their 1948 Nakba. Whether this occurrence is an outcome of “Arab nationalism and patriotism”, cultural proximity, large numbers of hosted Palestinians, (geo)political or other factors has not been investigated.
Why are the realities of diasporas studied in an undiasporised way, as if the diasporas were diasporised, but their realities remained centric? And isn’t that a quick recipe to deforming already deformed realities?

What the current literature tends to do is to study diasporised lives in a systematic and centralised way, positioning the past in the past, the present in the present, and the future in the future when such temporalities can be as diasporised as diasporas; especially the stateless of them. The same applies to diasporic geographies, which are studied in terms of homeland and host country when diasporic geographies can be produced, reproduced and replicated. Historiographies are another dimension that seems to be studied in a centralised way when investigating diasporas, considering diasporas part of a state capable of institutionalising its history and historical narrative; an exception to which is the Jewish diaspora which was and still is investigated in biblical terms, and is not necessarily centralised to a state, but still centralised.

Chapter 6, Requiem to Tonality, the second of the core chapters in this composition investigated the atonality of the geographies of the absent home state and the present host state, as well as investigating the atonality of the Palestinian temporalities of the past and the present. The chapter argued that on its way to complicate organisation and mobilisation, statelessness distorts temporalities and geographies, and discontinues and disconnects the historiographies of the stateless Palestinians. It argued that the acentric realities of the Palestinians living in the diaspora lead the Palestinians to operate in a present that is as old as their Nakba of 1948 while living in a triad of Place (Palestine) – Space (Diaspora) – and yet another replicated Place (Palestine), all accompanied by the absence of an institutionalised/official historical narrative capable of unifying Palestine and the Palestinians around a central symbol.

The chapter concludes that Palestinian-ness is a keyless staff; it has no preset duration or time signature, it is open ended and atonal. Its past stopped when Palestine as a state ceased to exist in 1948; its present is ongoing, where Palestinians are living on hold and in waiting, carrying the open and bleeding wound of 1948.
along; its future is atavistic, a replica of the place pre-1948, making the temporalities of the Palestinians in the diaspora a collection of times revolving around a number, suffering from a Palestinian version of the “1948 syndrome”. It is worth noting that despite divergences that this dissertation does not investigate, the abovementioned also applies to Palestinians within the homeland, where the past also stopped at “1948” unifying those within the homeland and those in the diaspora around a single matter, or various matters one of which is the timing of the past. Similar exceptional phenomena are shared by diasporas of genocides, such as the Armenian, Rwandan, and Circassian diasporas who are unified with the people of their homelands on “1915”, “1994”, and “1864” consecutively, thus challenging the long distance nationalism argument which claims that the past stops at time of migration.

Therefore, the chapter argues that studying the Palestinians requires investigating the symptoms of the “1948 syndrome”, it requires studying how the acentric realities of the Palestinians in the diaspora affect their understandings of the present, and what can be done in this present, including organisation and mobilisation.

What remains to be done in this particular domain is to thoroughly investigate the realities of Palestinians in Palestine and map them against those of Palestinians in the diaspora. On an even more appealing level, further research is required on comparing between the acentric realities of Palestinians and realities of others stateless diasporas, keeping in mind the ultimate goal of diasporas; re-establish a state like the Palestinians, establish a state like the Kurds, or not interested in a state like the Roma. This opens room for investigating whether statelessness in itself is what causes acentricity, or whether it is the idea of the stateless re-establishing a state that leads to such atonal realities.

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589 Refer to Sand, *The Invention of the Jewish People.*
Homogenising diasporas re-diasporises them, and heterogenising diasporas autonomises them. But can statelessness re-homogenise the autonomised?

Chapter 7, Étude on Autonomization and Statelessness, applied the recently developed concept of Autonomization to diaspora statelessness. Academically, stateless diasporas are autonomised from state-linked diasporas, not due to Autonomization, but due to absence of thorough studies about this particular category. The chapter (and the dissertation) argued that just as stateless diasporas are a category worth investigating on its own, the Autonomization of this category is worth investigating on its own in light of statelessness.

Whether stateless or state-linked, diasporas’ conflict narratives and conflict structures change with the change in settings. This change is accompanied by one related to how diasporas perceive and react to homeland (events) within their host countries, taking shapes that are as heterogeneous as diasporas.

The chapter based its argument on the chapter preceding it, that in light of its acentricity and its inability to maintain a tonality in terms of historiographies, geographies, and temporalities, Palestine pluralises into Palestines, where the autonomised Palestine produces setting-specific dynamics that nonetheless extract and import other dynamics not only from the homeland, but also from the other Palestines. The same process of Autonomization also touches upon gendering time and being in a place, where the past is masculinised, the present is feminised, and where being in the homeland is masculinised, being in the diaspora is feminised.

Despite the Autonomisation in reasons for organisation, and levels of organisation, the cases studied, and despite their clear heterogeneity, showed a striking similarity in characteristics of organisation reflecting the effects of the absence of a centre, a state to lead the orchestra.

In light of lack of tangible incentives and upon investigation of the cases studied, the Palestinian diaspora organisation and mobilisation have proved to be; bottom-up and defensive in nature due to the lack of a top-down approach led by an institution.

590 Féron, Diaspora Politics: From "Long Distance Nationalism" to Autonomization.
on top; intangible in goal achievement given that goals like return, liberation, state and others on the same lines are difficult (not to say impossible) to achieve on a centreless diaspora level; and very symbolically led in attempts to revive, and counter the erosion of, the hope of return.

The chapter proved the applicability of the concept of Autonomization on stateless diasporas, but while doing so, also proved that statelessness itself can affect the outcomes of Autonomization, re-homogenising some of its outcomes, such as outcomes on subjects of organisation and mobilisation (in terms of topics, titles, headers), re-homogenising the heterogeneous diasporas to operate under the banners of solidarity and commemoration despite the clear depictions of Autonomization on other levels.

Remaining to be done via further research is investigating gender in a more systematic way, not only shyly, as the chapter did. Also to be done is studying the role of statelessness on gender and gendered understandings, for that further understandings of the aforementioned could yield clearer results in terms of how and what autonomises. Comparing the Palestinian statelessness to other cases of statelessness is also a gap worth filling. It is from filling this gap that the effects of statelessness on mobilisation will be further clarified, especially when compared to stateless diasporas who have different pasts and different presents, and aspire to different futures, such as the Kurds for example.

Is Political Opportunity an Opportunity?
Are Mobilising Structures mobilising?
Can Framing Processes remain strategic and conscious?

Researching social movements reveals that the study of such movements depends on the study of Political Opportunities as a main dimension, followed by Mobilising Structures and Framing Processes. What the literature does not delve into is whether an opportunity is always perceived as one for the people concerned, and whether Mobilising Structures can yield the opposite results and become demobilising structures. On the same lines, the current literature views Framing Processes as
strategic and conscious without questioning whether time and duration play a role in changing those two definitional aspects. 591

Chapter 8, Stateless Fugue Movement I,II,III, applied social movement theories to diaspora movements in an attempt to “help analyze diaspora activism in a more systematic way”592, and thus merged two fields of knowledge into a surprisingly absent one. It also studied an understudied category of diasporas, the stateless Palestinians, in the understudied lens of social movements. The chapter proved that even studying social movements is biased towards states and citizens of states, and overlooks those who are living in but are excluded from a state such as the status-less Palestinians in Lebanon, those who are independent of Kriesi and Tarrow’s dimensions, and also independent of Rucht’s context structure (as explicated in the chapter). Such a case in this study of Palestinians led to the naissance of coping strategies in light of their exclusion, proving that opportunity given from the state that excludes them is insignificant, and that the absence of opportunity can actually lead to increased mobilisation and organisation instead of the reverse. Which is clearly proved in the large number of events organised in the Palestinian refugee camps scattered across Lebanon. On the same lines of Opportunity, taking the example of Palestinians in Jordan, the chapter argued that even when opportunity is favourable, and when theory expects movement, practice does not necessarily demonstrate so. Factors beyond the political are of importance as well, an example of which is the absence of the need to prove Palestinian-ness through political action despite political favourability, an angle that the dissertation touches upon but indeed deserves further research. As for the case of Palestinians in Belgium, where Opportunity is relatively restrained, the embedded-ness of Rucht’s Social Context seemed to be the motivator to organisation and mobilisation, despite the absence of change in Kreisi and Tarrow’s dimensions which facilitate movement. A curious question worth an answer is the

591 For example to Doug McAdam, Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes. Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements.
592 Baser,"Stateless Diasporas and Their Long-Distance Nationalist Activism in Host Countries: The Case of Tamils from Sri Lanka and Kurds from Turkey." Pages 6-7.
applicability of western theories (theories produced in the west under a western lens) to non-western cases, and whether the mutations observed in the theory/reality dichotomy in Lebanon and Jordan in particular is the result of this application; a question that can lead to theorising non-western cases in a novel way, and later on comparing and mapping western theories with non-western ones when studying the same non-western cases.

The chapter argues against Shain and Barth’s conclusion that the “basic nature of the hostland regime determines the ability of a diaspora to organise influence; indeed, it determines the ability to organise at all”. Instead, in some cases like that of the Palestinians, it is the homeland’s absence that determines the ability to organise influence and it is not the hostland’s regime that always determines the ability to organise at all. Even when diasporas organise and mobilise in the hostland, as was demonstrated in the chapter through the examples of Palestinians in Belgium, Jordan, and Lebanon, their mobilisation was paralysed by the absence of a centre, a state, thus shifting popular mobilisation to organisational mobilisation where the General Delegation of Palestine in Belgium, the UNRWA and the Jordanian Government, and the UNRWA and shadows of Palestinian political parties seem to be the organisations with relative “impact” due to their recognition and their ability to make themselves heard to others.

The Mobilising Structures of the three studied groups are a combination of similarities and differences. All studied structures seem to be consistent and revolving around an absence, yet all are unable to form a unified whole with Palestine and all Palestinians, which is a phenomenon that can be explained by the importance of the absent (state) for becoming one. All structures studied share narrowness accompanied by stubbornly present diverse and large demands through a wide range of goals. What all structures share as well is their inability to attract new members and bystanders where similar organisers are responsible for organising events, and similar faces attend organised events. The aforementioned

593 Yossi Shain, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory." Page 463.
might be explained by the importance of the nature of demands (possible versus impossible) and the potentially demobilising effects of the duration of the conflict that led to diasporisation. Shared between the cases is their inability to restrain options of opponents, because all happen to be in isolation of what they consider their opponent, Israel. Instead, competitors on power become fierce opponents such as the case of CPB and CPBL in Belgium and Fatah and Hamas in Lebanon.

Alongside the similarities in the Mobilising Structures of the three studied cases come differences and divergences that make similarities even more questionable and pressingly demand finding the common denominator between the cases. On the levels of coordination between various mobilising structures, the cases vary widely and range between strong to limited. The same applies to netness (networkness between Palestinians in the same host country), the ability to generate favourable media coverage and the ability to shape public policy and state action, all of which are factors that should play pivotal roles in mobilisation attempts. Which they do not, as demonstrated in the chapter, where the case theoretically expected to yield minimum mobilisation attempts yielded the maximum, namely Lebanon, and the case expected to yield maximum mobilisation attempts yielded the minimum, namely Jordan, deserving further research on whether the size factor plays a significant role, whether positively or negatively, and how so.

As for the arguably conscious and strategic efforts to frame common understandings - Framing Processes - the case of the Palestinians poses the question to whether consciousness is (or remains) a prerequisite to framing, or whether the strategic aspect is a vital one when the duration of the framed spans for decades, suggesting that a time/duration aspect should be added to what already constitutes Framing Processes (Culture, Ideology, and Frames). The Palestinian Framing Processes are indeed characterised by aggrievement and optimism, but the Palestinian optimism is not in the capability of collective action to redress their problems, rather in another sort of optimism, one relying on divine intervention. On the cultural level, the Palestinian framing processes in the three studied cases are alike, with shared understandings and beliefs conveyed via shared symbols and a shared language, homogenising them in culturally framing the absent. On the Ideological level, the
Palestinians share the what, the ideology of full historic Palestine and the right to return to it, yet they do not share the how, the ideology of how to achieve so (ranging from passive in Belgium to aggressive in Lebanon, with Jordan located in between). In terms of Frames, the three cases are relatively homogeneous, revolving around the absent and how the absent affects the present of Palestinians inside or outside Palestine.

The role of media framing in the Palestinian Framing Processes has proved to be instrumental in its demobilisation, where Palestinians suffer from media saturation and fatigue to an extent where they seem to have grown immune to scenes of blood and injured or dead bodies unless the casualties jump the hundreds. The same media fatigue affects the media itself, where only high numbers of casualties deserve media coverage. The Palestinians and their conflict have been headlines for too long, and the framings used by Palestinians have also been rhetorical for too long; empty rhetoric though, as explained in the chapter. Begging is the question of whether a time factor should be added to the Framing Processes in cases where organisation and mobilisation have been revolving around the same issues with the absence of tangible results for decades.

What could be a great addition to this chapter is a comparison between how different diaspora groups in the same host country perceive Political Opportunity and act upon it. For instance, it would be enriching to compare how the Syrians and Armenians in Lebanon, the Syrians, Iraqis, Armenians, Chechens, and Circassian in Jordan, and the mélange of diasporas in Belgium act upon Political Opportunities in their host countries. The same applies to Framing Processes, where comparing the Framing Processes of the aforementioned examples keeping the time factor in mind could yield knowledge enriching outcomes.

Another gap in this chapter in particular and the dissertation in general can be filled through studying the informal form of the Palestinian Mobilising Structures and linking it to the other two forms; Hybrid and Formal to investigate how each form affects the others.
Therefore, and in reference to the research question steering this composition which asked: *how and to what extent does statelessness affect the shapes, intensities, and dynamics of the Palestinian diaspora’s organisation and mobilisation*, and following the aforementioned thematic summaries of findings, the answer would sound as follows:

- Statelessness restricts and limits mobilisation in the case of the Palestinian diaspora to a self-imposed duty of making politicised monetary/philanthropic donations to the homeland and its people, usually upon conflict escalation(s).
- Statelessness leads to the homogenisation of the types of organised activities and events across different diaspora settings, resulting in the dominance of commemorative and solidarity themes regardless of location of the diaspora, and the political opportunities open to it.
- The sense of statelessness overshadows Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes when intensities of mobilisation and organisation are concerned.
- Statelessness orients mobilisation towards an absent, and directs the mobilisers and the mobilised to making unachievable demands in attempts to turn the absent into present.

### 9.3 Palestinian Trio

In a conflict between perceptions of legitimacy and authority via *filiation* or *affiliation* as Said deployed, the Palestinians in the diaspora as well as the Palestinian organisations mobilising and attempting to mobilise them. At the time Palestinians lost their homeland they were *filiated* to Palestine, i.e. authority and legitimacy were derived from “an inherited, natal, dynastic or hierarchical structure, tradition, or idea” which they still are on some levels such as Palestinian-ness. The time at which Palestinians are trying to “regain” or re-establish their homeland is a

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time of affiliation, i.e. legitimacy is “forged by the subject ... by way of work”, \textsuperscript{596} but at which the subject itself, Palestine, lacks authority and legitimacy.

Similarly, at a time where homelands embrace their diasporas, Palestinians embrace their homeland and impose their belonging to it despite its non-belonging to them, turning the homeland to what Said called a consciousness. Turning Palestine into a consciousness is not a surprising process, especially in light of the unclosable gap between intense emotions and severe inability to take action.

The outcomes of this postlude can be divided into three different yet harmonious sounds, making what sounds like a trio of statelessness, diaspora, and country of settlement or host country.

**Statelessness**

Statelessness in the Palestinian diasporisation means:

- Acentricity of realities on historiographic, geographic and temporal levels. Therefore, statelessness is not only de jure or de facto, it can and does take other shapes and it does touch upon comprehensions of existence.
- It also means echolessness and the inability to impact or influence the homeland, where diaspora organisation and mobilisation are not sourced from the homeland, but sourced from the diasporic location (despite what might seem like similarities upon comparison). Therefore, mobilisation itself does not necessitate the presence or absence of a systematically functional state; it is the outcomes of organisation and mobilisation that are affected by this absence or presence of a mobilising state. Thus, the absence of a state can be a disabler and a paralyser so long it negatively affects the outcomes of mobilisation attempts.

\textsuperscript{596} Ibid.
• The statelessness of Palestine leads to the statelessness of the Palestinian existence. Therefore, studying the Palestinians as refugees or as a diaspora without adding the statelessness element probably leads to incomprehensive understandings. A vertebrate existence, with a backbone, is different from an invertebrate existence.

• Despite the heterogeneities in diasporas and diasporic experiences, statelessness can play a role of a homogeniser.

• Facilitation of the hyper-politicisation of all that is of direct or indirect relation to Palestine for that the Palestinian diaspora is not perceived as a political subject and cannot practice political roles in the homeland. Thus, politicising the surroundings while being forcibly apoliticised.

**Diaspora**

Diaspora to the Stateless Palestinians denotes:

• Turning the *I* into the *We*, and turning to *Homeland* into the *Me*.

• A location of existence, but not necessarily a form of movement. Palestinians, as has been explicated throughout the dissertation, do not mind being a peoples living in the diaspora, but do mind being called a diaspora. Thus, making them refugees, the term of preference, living in the diaspora, living as a diaspora, and (not) moving like refugees.

• Isolation, not only exile.

**Country of Settlement**

The country of Settlement or the Host Country to Palestinian movement is:

• Opportunities present at countries of settlements are not necessarily an enabler facilitating movement, as the case of Jordan has proved, where favourability did not lead to increased movement.
• Can be a heterogeniser of diasporic experiences (as opposed to the homogenising statelessness), as has been illustrated via the comparison of the three studied cases, where despite the various homogeneities, the diasporas still enjoyed country-specific heterogeneities on various levels.

• Can be a hybridiser of a diaspora and its cause, as the case of Palestinians in Jordan proved, where despite the large sized Palestinian diaspora residing in Jordan, and the theoretical favourability of producing movement, the diaspora did not show any signs of increased mobilisation.

• Can take over the roles of the homeland in its absence despite duration, as the governmental bodies initiated by both Lebanon and Jordan have demonstrated and for decades.

• Can be insignificant to the movement of a diaspora, as the case of the isolated Palestinians living in closed spaces within refugee camps across Lebanon proved, which theoretically was expected to yield minimal results but in practice yielded maximum movement when compared to the other cases studies.

Palestinians are a heterogeneous diaspora group, living in a homogeneous experience of statelessness. They have been mutely (vis-à-vis homeland) and fruitlessly organising and mobilising in heterogeneous settings some enabling movement, some insignificant to it. Surprisingly, and despite the aforementioned heterogeneity, the Palestinians in the diaspora rely on homogeneous strategies and dates revolving around the presence of a homeland to represent, to turn to a we instead of an it, and the absence of a home state to be embraced by. Yet, despite or thanks to what can be called a Palestinian existential clash, and as this research has shown, Palestinians in the diaspora still organised (and organise), and did not give up despite what Said refers to as a very hard to espouse “continually losing cause” in a “marginal existence, with no center to it”, where he also notes that he has “not

598 Ibid., Page 114.
met a Palestinian who is tired enough of being Palestinian to give up entirely”. 599
The question that logically follows given that “Palestinian-ness is brought about because of a loss” 600 is: how would Palestinian-ness look like when and if a Palestinian state is established or re-established?
Until then, the following section poses more questions ... all awaiting answers.

9.4 The Quest for Cadence

Finally, this composition will pose a series of questions in a quest for a cadence to conclude this postlude and introduce further preludes.
Are the Palestinians seeking a state, a status, or are they seeking a state-linked status? As is clear, and as has been clarified throughout this composition, being a Palestinian in the diaspora is neither contested nor challenged, it is being a Palestinian from Palestine, and in particular Historic Palestine, that is both contested and challenged. It is identifying the tangible and existing Palestinian self with the intangible and non-existing Palestine that forces both sides to resonate on two unparallel and nonintersecting frequencies. Therefore, maybe what should accompany this composition that echoes the effects of statelessness on mobilisation is a composition that resonates the effects of statelessness on Palestinian-ness.

In a further quest for a cadence, is what the Palestinians in the diaspora are seeking for a state of mind first and foremost followed by the traditional and current definitions of state? Is it about what the Palestinians in the diaspora can or cannot do, or is it about what they can or cannot be? Or is it both? Would an international recognition of (one) Palestine solve a problem or create a new one to peoples awaiting for a divine intervention to regain all of what they have lost in 1948, not part of it?

599 Ibid., Page 122.
Until this quest to a cadence is achieved, further preludes should and are to be played. Until then, this composition remains an opus in yet many opuses to come on statelessness, diasporisation, and movement.
Annex
Annex [A]

- Observed Activities & Events – Belgium: Pages 359 - 363
- Observed Activities & Events – Jordan: Pages 364 - 366
- Observed Activities & Events – Lebanon: Pages 367 - 372
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Language and Method of Communication</th>
<th>Recipients &amp; Frequency</th>
<th>Demands</th>
<th>Organisers</th>
<th>Event Language</th>
<th>Slogans &amp; Chants</th>
<th>Flags &amp; Posters</th>
<th>Leaflets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 May 2012, 17:00-18:00, Bourse, Bruxelles</td>
<td>French &amp; Dutch E-mail</td>
<td>Once 61 e-mail addresses</td>
<td>-Respect of International Conventions on Prisoner Rights -Freeing all non-condemned prisoners -Freeing all child prisoners -An International Human Rights Observation Commission -BDS</td>
<td>COCAB, PTB, Intal, Mouvement Citoyen Palestine, Egalité, Association Belgo-Palestinienne, La Communauté Palestinienne en Belgique et au Luxembourg</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>-Free Prisoners -Stop Occupation -Boycott Israel -Israel Criminal -Free Political Prisoners -Long Live Palestine -Solidarity with Palestinian People -Resistance from Bruxelles to Gaza -Support the Prisoner’s Hunger Strike</td>
<td>Flags: Egalite Abp Belgian Palestinian JOC BXL</td>
<td>Boycott Apartheid Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 2012, 12:30 - 14:00, Rond-Point Schuman, Bruxelles</td>
<td>Arabic &amp; French E-mail</td>
<td>3 Times 87 24 140</td>
<td>-Application of all UN Resolutions -Demand European Countries to take on their historic responsibility</td>
<td>La Communauté Palestinienne en Belgique et au Luxembourg</td>
<td>French &amp; Arabic</td>
<td>-Free Free Palestine -Long Live Palestine -Free Palestinian Prisoners -Solidarity with Palestinian People -Resistance -Zionists, Fascists, Terrorists -Children of Gaza, Children of Palestine, It is humanity that is being assassinated -Palestine in our blood and souls -National Unity -We are going to Jerusalem, to become martyrs -Arab leaders are villainous</td>
<td>Flags: Egalite Palestinian Marwan Barghouthi-Prisoner Posters: UN RES 194 Palestinian Prisoners Al Nakba Posters</td>
<td>Boycott Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Language(s)</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Organiser</td>
<td>Sponsors &amp; Supporters</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday 9 June 2012</td>
<td>14:00 – 19:00</td>
<td>l'Espace Magh, Bruxelles</td>
<td>French &amp; Arabic</td>
<td>Cultural Activity + Political speeches by invitees from Palestine</td>
<td>La Communauté Palestinienne en Belgique et au Luxembourg</td>
<td>Delegation of Palestine in Belgium &amp; Luxembourg And La Mission de la Ligue des pays Arabes a Bruxelles</td>
<td>3 Times 153 86 102</td>
<td>Arabic &amp; French with direct interpretation via headsets AR-FR &amp; FR-AR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 November 2012</td>
<td>16:30</td>
<td>Bourse, Bruxelles</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Once Undisclosed Recipients</td>
<td>Plate-forme Charleroi-Palestine Also Present: Intl ABP CNAPD (Coordination National d'Action pour la Paix et la Democratie) LCR (Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire)</td>
<td>Free Free Palestine -Long Live Palestine -Solidarity with Palestinian People -Resistance -Zionists, Fascists, Terrorists -Children of Gaza, Children of Palestine, It is humanity that is being assassinated -Palestine in our blood and souls -Boycott Israel</td>
<td>Plate, forme Charleroi-Palestine</td>
<td>Flags: Palestinian Abp LCR 100% Gauche Posters: I &lt;3 Gaza Maps of Historic Palestine</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Once Undisclosed Recipients</td>
<td>N/A Posters of Palestinian Flag Statements Regarding Gaza, The creation of a Palestinian State With Jerusalem as Its capital Liberation of Prisoners Right of Return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday 24 November 2012, 15:30, Place Flagey, Bruxelles Gathering for Gaza</td>
<td>French, Dutch, English E-mail</td>
<td>Once 48</td>
<td>Immediate cessation of bombings and raids on Gaza Unrestricted access of humanitarian aid The lifting of the Gaza blockade</td>
<td>Main Organiser: Association Belgo-Palestinienne</td>
<td>Dutch, French and some English</td>
<td>-Boycott Israel -Solidarity with Palestinian People -Israel kills Palestinian children -1,2,3 Palestine Free -Children of Gaza, Children of Palestine, It is humanity that is being assassinated</td>
<td>Flags: Islamic Ideology flag Intal PVDA-PTB (Marxist/Communist/Leninist Ideology) Partie Humaniste LCR Partie Socialiste Chengethe world COM AC</td>
<td>Pins with logo Of the protest Advertisement Material for Future events Related to Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Time/Day</td>
<td>Event Title</td>
<td>Proclamation</td>
<td>Recipients</td>
<td>Type of Sign</td>
<td>Flags</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday 1 December 2012, 13:30 - 20:00, Espace Georges Truffaut, Liege</td>
<td>French &amp; Arabic E-mail</td>
<td>8 Times 120 119 48 48 48 181 205</td>
<td>Undisclosed Recipients</td>
<td>Proclamation of Palestinian rights granted by the UN</td>
<td>ABP, CPBL, Centre Culturel Arabe en Pays de Liege, Comite Verviers-Palestine</td>
<td>Mostly French, Some Arabic</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Flags: 9 Palestinian flags UN flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday 18 May 2013 14:00 – 16:00 Place du Luxembourg, Bruxelles</td>
<td>Arabic &amp; French</td>
<td>Twice Undisclosed Recipients</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>La Communauta Palestinienne en Belgique et au Luxembourg in collaboration with ABP de Liege, GUPS, le comite Palestine Verviers, le comite pour une paix juste au proche orient du Luxembourg</td>
<td>Signs were in French</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Flags: Palestinian Fatah Al Asifa Mapuche Posters: Posters of Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas on Dome of the Rock-Jerusalem/Palestine Map</td>
<td>Fatah Leaflet About Nakba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday 18 May 2013,</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Main theme = Return</td>
<td>Palestinian Return Centre - UK</td>
<td>Arabic No Slogans or Chants but Narrative in general was similar to the Hamas narrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00 onwards, Theatre Saint Michel – Etterbeek, Bruxelles</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestinian Return Centre - UK</td>
<td>Arabic No Slogans or Chants but Narrative in general was similar to the Hamas narrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th Palestinians in Europe Conference 2013 Brussels</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestinian Return Centre - UK</td>
<td>Arabic No Slogans or Chants but Narrative in general was similar to the Hamas narrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuesday, 22 October 2013,</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Once Undisclosed Recipients</td>
<td>For a legal and citizen-lead intifada</td>
<td>Festival Des Libertes</td>
<td>English &amp; French with direct translation N/A</td>
<td>Palestinian refugees Q &amp; A Journal of Palestinian Refugee Studies Volumes 1 and 2 Map of villages of Nakba Return of the Palestinians : At the heart of the issues Global March to Jerusalem 7 June 2013 (Naksa) Map of Ancient Palestine</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Festival Des Libertes, Theatre Nationale – Bruxelles</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Once Undisclosed Recipients</td>
<td>For a legal and citizen-lead intifada</td>
<td>Festival Des Libertes</td>
<td>English &amp; French with direct translation N/A</td>
<td>Palestinian refugees Q &amp; A Journal of Palestinian Refugee Studies Volumes 1 and 2 Map of villages of Nakba Return of the Palestinians : At the heart of the issues Global March to Jerusalem 7 June 2013 (Naksa) Map of Ancient Palestine</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine: pour une intifada legale et citoyenne</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Once Undisclosed Recipients</td>
<td>For a legal and citizen-lead intifada</td>
<td>Festival Des Libertes</td>
<td>English &amp; French with direct translation N/A</td>
<td>Palestinian refugees Q &amp; A Journal of Palestinian Refugee Studies Volumes 1 and 2 Map of villages of Nakba Return of the Palestinians : At the heart of the issues Global March to Jerusalem 7 June 2013 (Naksa) Map of Ancient Palestine</td>
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</table>

Observed Activities & Events – Belgium
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Demands</th>
<th>Organisers</th>
<th>Slogans &amp; Chants</th>
<th>Flags &amp; Posters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thursday 21 March 2013</strong>&lt;br&gt;Opposite US Embassy, Amman&lt;br&gt;Obama, You are not welcomed</td>
<td>Denouncing the US position towards Israel&lt;br&gt;Denouncing US crimes in Iraq and Palestine&lt;br&gt;Demanding closure of US Embassy in Amman</td>
<td>Leftist and Communist Parties</td>
<td>-Down with Imperialism&lt;br&gt;-Obama, you are not welcomed in Jordan&lt;br&gt;-No for US intervention in Jordanian affairs&lt;br&gt;-Wherever you go, you destroy (referring to the US)&lt;br&gt;-Killers of Palestinian and Iraqi children are not welcomed</td>
<td>Flags: Jordanian Party flags&lt;br&gt;Posters: US flag (which was burned in front of the embassy)&lt;br&gt;Posters: -The land of Palestine is for Palestinians and the Right of Return is Sacred&lt;br&gt;-Whoever visits the Zionist entity is not welcomed on our land (referring to Obama)&lt;br&gt;-You buy Israel’s tanks and bombs – Not welcome here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tuesday 2 April 2013</strong>&lt;br&gt;Near Kalouti Mosque, Embassy of Israel neighbourhood, Amman&lt;br&gt;In Solidarity with Prisoners</td>
<td>Unity of all Arab countries in face of the Zionist Project until the liberation of all Palestine (historic Palestine)</td>
<td>Activists - Individuals</td>
<td>Posters: -Solidarity is in actions, not in words&lt;br&gt;-No Zionist Embassy on Jordanian land&lt;br&gt;-Pictures of Prisoners and Martyr-Prisoners</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Wednesday 10 April 2013</strong>&lt;br&gt;Opposite Palestinian Embassy, Amman&lt;br&gt;In Solidarity with Prisoners</td>
<td>Facilitating travel and travel documentation for an ailing prisoner called Rania Al Saqqa</td>
<td>Activists - Individuals</td>
<td>Arab governments are decorative only, the real governments are the US and Israeli embassies</td>
<td>Flags: Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Organizers</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wednesday 15 May 2013</td>
<td>Opposite UN Offices, Amman</td>
<td>Halting the imprisonment of Palestinian journalists and ex-prisoners by</td>
<td>Ministry of the Palestinian Prisoners</td>
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<td>In remembrance of the Palestinian Nakba</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>Affirmation of the Arabness of Palestine, from the sea to the river (i.e. Historic Palestine) Entrenching and rooting the Right of Return</td>
<td>Palestine Committee Sons of Al Shataat</td>
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<td>Flags: Palestinian, Jordanian, Israeli (which was burned)</td>
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<td>Posters: 65 Years and Palestine is still the topic</td>
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<td>Amman is suffering with Jerusalem</td>
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<td>The Palestinian Nakba is a Nakba to all Arabs</td>
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<td>Long Live Palestine, Saddam Hussein’s Love</td>
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<td>We will never forget</td>
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<td>Return Key</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday 17 May 2013, Near Al Karama Statue, Jordan</td>
<td>Return, and Right of Return Condemning Israeli attacks on Islamic holy sites in Palestine and Al Aqsa Mosque</td>
<td>Activists, Youth Movements &amp; Political Parties</td>
<td>How much did you sell Palestine for? (asking Leaders)</td>
<td>Flags: Jordanian, Palestinian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Date: Friday 7 June 2013 | Activity: Solidarity with Palestinians via mobilizing the international community | Supporter: Naqabat [Professional Associations Complex] | People demand liberation of Palestine | Flags: | Jordanian, Palestinian, Muslim Brotherhood  
Posters: | We will return. Together we safeguard Al Quds (Jerusalem) |
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protect Jerusalem</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine, the land of grandfathers, the land of graves of Jews</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Putting an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land</td>
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| Date: Friday 30 March 2013 | Activity: Solidarity with Palestinians via mobilizing the international community | Supporter: Naqabat [Professional Associations Complex] | People demand liberation of Palestine | Flags: | Jordanian, Palestinian, Muslim Brotherhood  
Posters: | We will return. Together we safeguard Al Quds (Jerusalem) |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Near Baptism Site (close to borders), Jordan</td>
<td>Protect Jerusalem</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine, the land of grandfathers, the land of graves of Jews</td>
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<tr>
<td>In remembrance of Land Day</td>
<td>Putting an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global March to Jerusalem 2012</td>
<td>Liberation and Free Palestinian State</td>
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<th><strong>Observed Activities &amp; Events – Jordan</strong></th>
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<td>Organisation</td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Committee – Ein El Hilweh</td>
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<td>Beit Atfal Assoumoud (BAS)</td>
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<td>Beit Atfal Assoumoud (BAS)</td>
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<td>Al Rashidiyyeh KG</td>
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<td>Nahr Al Bared Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beit Atfal Assoumoud (BAS)</td>
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<td>Deir Yassin Secondary</td>
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<td>School – Al Buss</td>
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<td>Nahr Al Bared Centre</td>
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<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Union Bourj Al Shamali</td>
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<td>Islamic Resistance - Hamas</td>
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<td>Islamic Resistance - Hamas</td>
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<td>Bourj Al Barajneh KG</td>
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<td>Bourj Al Barajneh Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beit Atfal Assumoud (BAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dreams of a Refugee Association (Ahlam Laje’e)</td>
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<td>Dreams of a Refugee Association (Ahlam Laje’e)</td>
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<td>Unknown Organiser (Camp Committee?)</td>
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<td>Najdeh Association – Najdeh Centers</td>
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<td>Al Aqsa Group</td>
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<td>Beit Atfal Assumoud (BAS) – Beddawi Center</td>
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<td>Palestinian Youth Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiple Palestinian Factions</td>
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<td>Najdeh Association</td>
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<td>Asqalan School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiple Factions in Al Jaleel Camp</td>
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Observed Activities & Events – Lebanon
Annex [B]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Main Organisations Working on Palestinian Issues</th>
<th>Pages</th>
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**LEBANON – Main Organisations working on Palestinian Issues**

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Socio-Economic = Educational/Literacy/Sports/Recreational  
Cultural = Identity/Embroidery/Folklore & Dance  
Health = Primary/Psychological/Disability/Child Health  
Gendered = Women as primary beneficiaries/ Women as targets  
Legal = Civil/Social/Refugee Rights  
Religious = Religious Ideology/Interfaith Relations/Religious Practices  
Political = Resistance/Ideology/Right of Return/ Fighting Zionism ... etc
## BELGIUM - Main Organisations working on Palestinian Issues

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<th>Education</th>
<th>Mobilisation &amp; Solidarity (Demonstrations and Remembrance Days)</th>
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Annex [C]

Analysis of Taxonomy versus Organised Activities
## Analysis of Taxonomy versus Organised Activities

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| Organised Activities by Organisations and Parties working on Palestinian Issues |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Observed Activities | 9 | 7 | 43 |
| **1st Quarter of 2012 – Early 2014** | | | |
| **Types of Activities** | In Solidarity with = 5 | In reaction to then current events = 4 | In Solidarity with = 5 |
| | In Remembrance = 4 | In Remembrance of = 3 | In Remembrance = 34 |
| **Multi-Message/Multi-Demand Events** | 3 | All | No demands in general, no one to make demands to. Similar to human versions of Terra Nullius, Persona Nullius |
| (in terms of slogans, chants, posters ... etc) | | | |
| **Most Common Organisers** | La communauté palestinienne de Belgique et de Luxembourg | Leftist & Communist ‘Parties’ | Shadow Offices of Fatah |
| | Association Belgo-Palestinienne | Professional Associations Complex | Bait Atfal Al Sumoud |
| | | Random | Ahlam Laje’e |
Annex [D]

List of Palestinian Remembrance Days
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 January</td>
<td>Palestinian Martyr Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 March 1976</td>
<td>Palestinian Land Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April</td>
<td>Palestinian Prisoners Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 1948</td>
<td>Nakba Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 June 1967</td>
<td>Naksa Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 September 1982</td>
<td>Sabra &amp; Shatila Massacre Remembrance Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 November</td>
<td>International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Palestinian Remembrance Days & Days of Solidarity
Annex [E]

Interview Grid
### Semi-Structured Interviews: Interview Grid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question Theme</th>
<th>Question on</th>
<th>Question Purpose is to investigate</th>
<th>Question could lead to answering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical/Background</strong></td>
<td>Year of establishment</td>
<td>To investigate when an organisation was established</td>
<td>Whether an organisation was established as a result of conflict escalation or following certain years or dates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Locations</td>
<td>Whether organisation has branches in different locations</td>
<td>Areas of operation and coverage. Size of organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Founder(s) of organisation</td>
<td>The organisation’s ideology if founder is linked to any certain ideology</td>
<td>Orientation of organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process of establishment</td>
<td>Whether the processes establishment and initiation were smooth or otherwise</td>
<td>Country specific socio-legal-political opportunities or barriers in terms of establishment and operation of organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural</strong></td>
<td>Goals and Vision</td>
<td>Investigate whether goals and visions remained the same since establishment</td>
<td>Organisation was faced with difficulties and obstacles in achieving goals and maintaining vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fields of work</td>
<td>Organisation’s areas and fields of work</td>
<td>Whether organisation has wide or narrow goals achieved by fields of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Support comes from external/internal parties/bodies</td>
<td>Sources of support could mean affiliation to certain parties or certain orientations Goals and vision could be linked to those of collaborators (e.g. Collaboration with Fatah or Hamas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>What parties the organisation works with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisation &amp; Mobilisation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Activities and events</strong> (times of organisation and mobilisation)</td>
<td>Investigate what basis events and activities are organised on</td>
<td>Organised activities and events are reactions to certain dates and events or actions “to or against”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Membership procedures</td>
<td>Whether membership to organisation is easy or complicated</td>
<td>Types of membership (paid, voluntary ...etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication methods</td>
<td>How organisation communicates with members and potential participants in its activities and events</td>
<td>Types and methods of communication with members and potential participants and thus ability to broadcast or advertise event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Investigate extent of participation in organised events</td>
<td>Rough numbers of participants can be indicators of whether participation is embedded in the culture of country or not. Can also be indicators of oppression and thus fear of participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Open Questions</strong> (to give the interviewee an opportunity to openly comment on topics that might be critical to his/her work)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status of the Palestinian cause</strong></td>
<td><strong>Future of Palestine</strong></td>
<td><strong>Right of Return</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Any other comments or remarks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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