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Behavioral conformity in games with many players

Wooders, Myrna, Cartwright, Edward, Selten, Reinhard (2006) Behavioral conformity in games with many players. Games and Economic Behavior, 57 (2). pp. 347-360. ISSN 0899-8256. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:54268)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006

Abstract

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to that of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such conformity can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few societies, each consisting of similar individuals playing similar strategies. In this paper we characterize a family of games admitting the existence of such equilibrium. We also introduce the concept of ‘crowding types’ into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player—those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others—and his tastes. With assumptions of ‘within crowding type anonymity’ and ‘linearity of taste-types’ we show that the number of societies can be uniformly bounded.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 24 Feb 2016 14:27 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 17:01 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/54268 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Cartwright, Edward: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
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