Democracy at crossroads: A focus on Central Europe (M. Blatný, P. Radkiewicz, K. SkarīyĔska, P. Szarota)

G. V. Caprara, M. Vecchione / Democracy through ideology and beyond: The values that are common to the right and the left

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M. Antonini, B. Barbieri, M. Giacomantonio, L. Mannetti / Trust and expected costs as antecedents of citizens’ motivation to participate in public policymaking

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K. Millová, M. Blatný, M. Jelínek / Factors of positive social functioning in the context of transforming societies: Results of the Brno Longitudinal Study on Life-Span Human Development

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EDITORIAL

DEMOCRACY AT CROSSROADS: A FOCUS ON CENTRAL EUROPE

The aim of this special issue of Czechoslovak Psychology is to commemorate the conference „What’s Next for Democratic Capitalism? Social and Systemic Problems of Central European Democracies” held in Warsaw in November 2014. The conference was organized by the Institute of Psychology of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Psychology Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences. It brought together approximately 100 participants from 13 European countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, UK, and Ukraine. This number included not only psychologists, but also sociologists, political scientists, and economists.

The ultimate goal of the conference was to sum up and discuss the past 25 years of system transformation processes in Europe. This international project also aimed to identify common problems and barriers to the development of democracy and market economies in Europe, and to explain the causes of regional differences on both psychological and systemic levels. The oral papers were grouped into six thematic sessions: 1) Social problems of democratization; 2) National identities and nationalisms; 3) Market economy and market failure; 4) Mentality and attitudes toward democracy and capitalism; 5) Social and political attitudes, lifestyles, and well-being; and 6) Social and political problems of contemporary capitalism.

This special issue of Czechoslovak Psychology is not meant to be a standard volume of conference proceedings, but rather a collection of invited papers inspired by the main conference theme. We believe that these twelve submissions offer a unique – multinational and interdisciplinary – perspective on current social and political transformations in Central Europe.

Marek Blatný
Piotr Radkiewicz
Krystyna Skarżyńska
Piotr Szarota
DEMOCRACY THROUGH IDEOLOGY AND BEYOND:
THE VALUES THAT ARE COMMON TO THE RIGHT
AND THE LEFT
GIAN VITTORIO CAPRARA, MICHELE VECCHIONE
Sapienza University of Rome

ABSTRACT
Previous findings have shown that individual differences in basic values (e.g., universalism, power) and core political values (e.g., equality, free enterprise) account for substantial variation in political preferences. The present study goes beyond earlier studies that focus exclusively on values differences among voters of opposite ideologies. It addresses what is common across voters in basic values and core political values, taking into account their order importance across 15 countries from 4 continents, including polities whose pathways to democracy have been quite different. Self-direction among basic values and equality and civil liberties among political values ranked highest in most countries, independently of voters ideological orientation. This accords with the ideals of democracy as the political system that aims to grant all citizens equal respect and free expression of their personality.

Key words: ideology, values, left-right

ISSUE
Ideologies usually refer to different world views carrying competing interpretations and prescriptions about how life should be lived and society should be governed. In political science, ideologies have been viewed mostly as configurations of ideas and attitudes whose elements are bound together by some forms of constraint or functional interdependence (Converse, 1964). In political psychology, they have been viewed mostly as cognitive devices to structure political knowledge that are convenient for both politicians and voters to match political offer and political preferences (Jost et al., 2009).

Most of research has focused on beliefs and priorities, their degree of coherence, and the extent to which they constrain political behavior. In reality, when shared by groups of individuals, political ideologies do not serve only as heuristic devices to orient in political matters, but also provide a sense of belonging that is crucial to distinguish the us and the others, the in-groups and the out-groups, the allies and the adversaries.

Likely the function of political ideology extends much beyond the mere organization of political knowledge as ideological identification satisfies citizens’ needs for social inclusion and self-realization, concurring significantly to define their personal and social identity. Thus it may occur that different platforms can be traced to the same ideology across different polities as contingent opportunities and constraints make salient different issues and priorities.

Acknowledgements: This study involves secondary analysis of data that have been collected as a part of the cross-national project by several colleagues of other countries: Paul Bain (Australia), Gabriel Bianchi and Eva Vondrakova (Slovakia), Jan Cieciuch and Zbigniew Zaleski (Poland), Hasan Kirmangolu and Cem Baslevent (Turkey), Jan-Erik Lonnqvist and Markku Verkasalo (Finland), Catalin Mamali (U.S.), Jorge Manzi (Chile), Vassilis Pavlopoulos (Greece), Tetyana Posnova (Ukraine), Harald Schoen and Christian Welzel (Germany), Jo Silvester (UK), Shalom H. Schwartz (Israel), Carmen Tabernero and Maria Giovanna Caprara (Spain), and Claudio Torres (Brazil). We thank our colleagues for making the data available.
Among established democracies political opinions have been traced to a unique ideological dimension opposing left and right and liberal and conservative, being dominant the former in US and UK, and the latter in continental Europe and most other democracies. In reality, this mostly concern western democracies that derive from common traditions of political thought, that find their premises in the European enlightenment and that lead to view democratic institutions as the ones that grant citizens either the liberty to voice their opinions and the equality of respect and treatment before the law.

Since the time of French Revolution, the ideals of liberty, equality and solidarity stayed at the core political changes that opposed authority, hierarchy and obedience and that spread democracy over the world. Since then change vs. conservation has been the major cleavage of ideological divisions between the left and liberal leaning towards change and the right and conservative towards conservation.

Yet, distinctions between right and left largely diversified over time and across countries in concomitance with the different trajectories to democracy of various polities and with the need to accord the pursuit of original ideals to the pressures, the constraints and the opportunities of contingent political orders. Different combinations of ideals and programs have made difficult to identify the distinctive features of platforms that often converge on common policies while it proved impossible to trace the heterogeneity of meanings associated to left and right to one single attitude dimension (Feldman, Johnston, 2014).

Nevertheless, empirical findings attest to the role that traditional ideologies still play in making sense of political discourse and offer as citizens show an intuitive understanding of traditional ideological cleavages despite the different meanings that may be assigned to the same poles across countries and within countries across times. Indeed, left/right and liberal conservative self placement continues to represent the best predictor of voting through which citizens of western established democracies give voice to their personal leanings and aspirations and orient themselves in the complex world of politics.

Thus ideological divisions have survived the dilution of their original distinctiveness. All modern democracies have become more free and egalitarian as the rights to voice one’s opinions and to claim equal respect and treatment before the law have been extended to all citizens. Likewise, few would contend the need to grant all citizens the right to achieve decent conditions of life by having access to basic health services, education, and work opportunities. As the pressure of contingencies has pushed right/conservative and left/liberal into pragmatic convergences the heterogeneity of meanings resulted to be an asset other than a limitation of ideology to the extent that it allowed ideology to serve as an effective device with which citizens may combine believing and belonging and navigate through politics.

Likely left and right, as liberal and conservative, should be viewed as social constructions whose validity should be assessed in accordance to ecological other than psychometric criteria. Their value, in fact, derive from the function they exert with regard to both to believing and belonging. On the one hand, political ideology may serve as a compass to orient citizens into the political world. On the other hand, it may serve as signature that attest to ones’ personality and social status. In this regard the common tendency to divide the social world between us and them, has been further reinforced by political systems in which citizens have to choose between coalitions in government and at the opposition and by the media that constantly remind and redefine what is distinctive of left and right and what and of conservative and liberal.

This, however, does imply that what has been repeatedly found in support of traditional ideological cleavages in established democracies may necessarily occur in polities whose trajectories to democracy have been quite different. One may doubt that left and right make much sense in recent democracies that rest upon world views and ideals about human rights, citizens’ virtues and government of society than are quite different from the ones that have been at the core of western political thought. Likewise, one may doubt that left and right may serve as a device to organize political knowledge, to match political preferences with political offer, to create consensus among partisans, to form coalitions and to be effective in opposition, in the same ways even among countries that share similar ideals world views and cultural heritages but whose itineraries to democracy have been different.
We believe that left/right and liberal/conservative ideology may still serve democracy to the extent that they allow citizens to voice and share their preferences, to assess alternative political offer and to exert control over the performance of their representatives. To capture the content of and the meaning of left/right and liberal conservative ideology in different polities and across different times, however, requires to address the interrelated set of needs and beliefs that stay at the core of citizens ideological self placement. In this regard notable progress has been made in recent years.

In the past ideological identification and self placement was mostly a matter of belonging and social ascription, as citizens’ social milieu, their education, their work, their income and religion accounted for most of their political preferences. Today, instead, ideological self placement it is primarily a matter of free choice largely driven by pattern of interrelated values and beliefs about how society should be governed in the pursuit of common good. The more citizens are able to appropriate the political discourse, the more they bring their individuality to the fore, thus reversing the traditional ‘top down’ path of influence from political elites to voters.

Ultimately it is citizens’ unique organization of affect, cognitions and habits that, taken together, can make sense of their experiences and choices also in the realm of politics. Indeed, findings have shown that political preferences can be traced to an interrelated set of beliefs that are grounded in people traits and values (Caprara, Zimbardo, 2004). Whereas personality traits have proved to account for political preferences more than traditional socio-economical variables, like income and education, basic values have proved to mediate entirely the influence of basic traits on political preference (Caprara, Vecchione, Schwartz, 2009). Likewise, individual differences in the importance assigned to basic values and more specific political values accounted for most of ideological orientation across diverse polities, with political values largely mediating the influence of basic values on voting (Schwartz, Caprara, Vecchione, 2010).

The distinctive values of the left and the right

The validation of a theory that identifies a comprehensive set of basic personal values and the near universal structure of relations among them has been among major achievement of recent years in social psychology (Schwartz, 1992, 2006). This theory posits 10 basic values that from universal requirements of human condition: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security.

These values can be traced to two opposite clusters of values: openness to change values include self direction and stimulation and oppose conservation values, that include conformity, tradition and security. Self transcendence values include universalism and benevolence and oppose self enhancement values, that include power and achievement.

Previous studies have shown that basic values account for a significant portion of variance of political preferences across polities as voters accord their preferences to parties or coalitions whose leaders and policies they perceive as likely to promote or protect their own personal values. Furthermore, it has been shown that there is a consistency across countries in connecting conservative preferences to conservation and self-enhancement values, and in connecting left and liberal preferences to self-transcendence and openness to change values. At the same time, it has become clear that the influence that basic personal values may exert on political choices may significantly vary across contexts, depending on historical and cultural contingencies and priorities, on the different political offer, and on the different rhetoric of political parties and leaders. Differently from what observed in longer established democracies, for example, the effect of basic values on political orientation was found to be weak or null in post-communist countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia (Piurko, Schwartz, Davidov, 2011).

Basic personal values are abstract beliefs that transcend specific situations and that may take different expressions in diverse and concrete circumstances and across different contexts. Likely they correspond to general principles and standards of judgment that do not determine behavior directly, but may operate through the mediation of beliefs and values that are more proximal to the various contexts of life. As political discourse typically revolves around issues related to government and society organization, specific political values may operate as mediators between basic values and political choices.
Converse (1964) viewed political values as “a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs” (p. 211). Feldman (1988) pointed to political values as principles that underlie specific attitudes, preferences, and evaluations about the sphere of politics, thereby giving them some degree of coherence and consistency.

In general political values have concerned the priorities that government should assign to policies and resources’ allocations, in the pursuit of a just society, and individual differences in political values have been extensively used to account for variations in policy preferences, voting behavior, and ideological identification.

Earlier findings (Schwartz, Caprara, Vecchione, 2010) have shown that basic values account for a substantial portion of variance in a set of values that stay at the core of current political debates of most countries, like law and order, traditional morality, equality, free enterprise, civil liberties, blind patriotism, and acceptance of immigrants. Valuing equality, civil liberties, and accepting immigrants led to accord with policies with policies that emphasizes solidarity, tolerance of diversity, equality, and social justice. Valuing free enterprise, traditional morality, military intervention, blind patriotism, and law and order, by contrast, led to voting for the right. This accords with policies that encourage a free market economy with minimal government intervention, favor law and order over free expression and diversity, emphasize traditional family values, build on nationalism, and favor demonstration of military might. As expected, the causal link between basic values and voting was indirect and fully mediated by core political values.

In a subsequent study (Schwartz et al., 2014), similar patterns of correlations between core political values and basic values were found to be remarkably similar across several non-communist countries (Brazil, Finland, Chile, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Spain, UK and US). A systematic association between basic values and core political values also emerged in the post-communist countries (Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine), although with not negligible exceptions and variations with respect to that seen for the non-communist countries. To give some examples, correlations of military intervention with conservation values were positive in non-communist countries, but near to zero in post-communist societies. Correlations between equality and conservation values were negative in the non-communist countries, and positive in the post-communist countries. On the contrary, correlations of free enterprise with conservation values were positive in the non-communist countries, and negative in the post-communist countries.

In reality, the exceptions we found in the pattern of correlations between basic values and political values parallel notable exceptions in the pattern of correlations found between basic values and ideological self-placement and voting. Indeed, the positive correlation of self-enhancement values with right and conservative voting in post-communist countries like Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine, contrasts with the negative or nil correlations found in post-communist countries (research report, unpublished).

**Aim of the present contribution**

The focus on individual differences let completely unexplored what left and liberal could have in common with right and conservative. In reality, the study of ideological similarities in the domain of values in no less important than the study of ideological diversities to better understand the status of democracy. The similarities, in fact, can tell us more than the diversities about the common principles upon which democracy can function and progress.

The aim of the present contribution is to examine the commonalities in basic values and core political values between left/liberal and right/conservative voters. To achieve this goal, we relied upon the data from 15 different countries.

**METHOD**

**Participants and procedures**

This study involves secondary analysis of data taken from a cross-national project on the role of values in shaping political preferences (Caprara et al., 2015; Schwartz et al., 2014; Vecchione et al., 2015). The project involved fifteen countries: Australia,
Brazil, Chile, Germany (East and West), Greece, Finland, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. A representative national sample was obtained in Australia and Germany. In the other countries, researchers enlisted university students to gather the data among members of the adult population. The same instructions were used for administering the instruments in all countries. Questionnaires were administered online in Australia and Finland and by telephone in Germany. In the other countries, written self-reports were obtained. Table 1 presents the characteristics of the samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>Mean age (SD)</th>
<th>Mean years of education (SD) a</th>
<th>Median household income b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>36.1 (13.9)</td>
<td>16.6 (3.6)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>34.1 (9.0)</td>
<td>19.1 (4.1)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>43.3 (13.4)</td>
<td>15.8 (4.2)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>40.1 (13.2)</td>
<td>16.2 (4.3)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>53.7 (16.4)</td>
<td>14.6 (4.4)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>41.9 (12.0)</td>
<td>15.3 (3.5)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>38.6 (12.7)</td>
<td>15.6 (3.0)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>38.7 (13.9)</td>
<td>15.3 (3.7)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>36.6 (13.0)</td>
<td>15.1 (3.0)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>47.7 (14.6)</td>
<td>14.4 (3.3)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>37.7 (13.2)</td>
<td>11.4 (3.3)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>41.1 (12.6)</td>
<td>14.0 (3.3)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36.7 (12.1)</td>
<td>14.2 (2.9)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>32.6 (14.4)</td>
<td>14.0 (2.2)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. a Include compulsory years of schooling; b Income was measured with the following scale: 1=very much above the average of your country, 2=above the average, 3=a little above average, 4=about average, 5=a little below the average, 6=below the average, 7=very much below the average.

Brazil, Chile, Germany (East and West), Greece, Finland, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. A representative national sample was obtained in Australia and Germany. In the other countries, researchers enlisted university students to gather the data among members of the adult population. The same instructions were used for administering the instruments in all countries. Questionnaires were administered online in Australia and Finland and by telephone in Germany. In the other countries, written self-reports were obtained. Table 1 presents the characteristics of the samples.

**Measures**

**Ideology.** Ideology was measured in each country through two distinct indicators. The first was a self-placement item on the left-right scale: “In political matters, people sometimes talk about and “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” Alternatives were ranged from 1 (Left) to 9 (Right), without intermediate labels. Participants who scored from 1 to 4 on the left-right scale were classified as left-wing voters. Participants who scores from 6 to 9 were classified as right-wing voters.

The second indicator was a self-placement item on the liberal-conservative scale: “In political matters, people sometimes talk about conservatives and liberals. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” Alternatives ranged from 1 (Extremely conservative) to 7 (Extremely liberal). Participants who scored from 1 to 3 on the liberal-conservative scale were classified as liberal voters; participants who scored from 5 to 7 were classified as conservative voters.

**Values.** The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz, 2005, 2006) measured basic values. The PVQ includes 40 short verbal portraits of different people matched to the respondents’ gender, each describing a person’s goals, aspirations, or wishes.
that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For example, “It is very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being” describes a person who holds benevolence values important. Three to six items measure each value. For each portrait, respondents indicate how similar the person is to themselves on a six-point scale, ranging from “not like me at all” to “very much like me.” We infer respondents’ own values from the implicit values of the people they consider similar to themselves. Studies in seven countries supported the reliability of the PVQ for measuring the 10 values (Schwartz, 2005). Psychometric properties of the PVQ in the present samples were reported in a previous study by Vecchione et al. (2015; see also Schwartz et al., 2014).

Core political values

We measured eight core political values by adopting the scale developed by Schwartz et al. (2014; see also Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione, 2010). In Israel, accepting immigrants and military intervention were not included. As Schwartz et al. (2014) wrote, immigration items have a different meaning in Israel than elsewhere, given an official policy and public discourse that encourages Jewish immigration from around the world. Moreover, the constant state of military threat in Israel and the frequent engagement in wars give a different meaning to the military intervention items. Differently from Schwartz et al. (2014), economic security was included as an additional political value. This concerns the importance assigned to job and income guarantees by all citizens.

Each political value was measured from two to three items. Examples of items (with the corresponding value in parentheses) are: “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed” (equality), “There should be more incentives for individual initiative even if this reduces equality in the distribution of wealth” (free enterprise), “It is extremely important to defend our traditional religious and moral values” (traditional morality), “The police should have more powers so they can protect us better against crime” (law and order), “It is unpatriotic to criticize this country” (blind patriotism), “The right to individual freedom is inviolable and has to be maintained at all cost” (civil liberties), “People who come to live here from other countries generally make this country a better place to live” (accepting immigration), and “Going to war is sometimes the only solution to international problems” (military intervention), “The biggest threat to our country is the collapse of our economy” (economic security). Responses ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Details on the psychometric properties of the scale were presented in Schwartz et al. (2014).

RESULTS

Commonality across countries in basic personal values of rival voters

As a preliminary analysis, the mean importance ratings of the ten values was averaged across the 15 samples (N = 8,041), without distinguishing between left/liberal and right/conservative voters. We found that universalism, self-direction, and benevolence were rated as most important, followed by security, conformity, hedonism, and achievement. Stimulation, tradition, and power were rated as least important. The Spearman rank correlation between this pattern and the pan-cultural normative baseline (i.e., the value hierarchy found among school teachers in 56 nations, see Schwartz, Bardi, 2001), was .92 (p < .001). This suggests that the order of importance of the 10 values observed in the present sample is highly similar to the one commonly observed around the world.
Table 2 Mean ratings and corresponding ranks for the ten basic values among left (or liberal) and right (or conservative) voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Left (or liberal) voters</th>
<th>Right (or conservative) voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 The two basic values with highest mean scores in each country by left (or liberal) and right (or conservative) voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Left (or liberal) voters</th>
<th>Right (or conservative) voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1. Self-direction (4.77)</td>
<td>1. Self-direction (4.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Universalism (4.53)</td>
<td>2. Security (4.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1. Self-direction (5.12)</td>
<td>1. Self-direction (4.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Universalism (4.99)</td>
<td>2. Benevolence (4.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1. Universalism (5.17)</td>
<td>1. Benevolence (5.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Benevolence (5.04)</td>
<td>2. Universalism (5.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1. Universalism (5.06)</td>
<td>1. Universalism (4.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Self-direction (4.72)</td>
<td>2. Self-direction (4.72)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1. Self-direction (5.07)</td>
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<td>2. Universalism (5.12)</td>
<td>2. Security (5.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany – West</td>
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<td>1. Self-direction (5.06)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2. Universalism (5.12)</td>
<td>2. Benevolence (5.05)</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>1. Self-direction (4.78)</td>
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<td>2. Security (4.66)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2. Benevolence (4.71)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1. Benevolence (4.48)</td>
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<td>2. Self-direction (4.45)</td>
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<td>2. Security (4.50)</td>
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<td>2. Universalism (4.70)</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>1. Security (5.20)</td>
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<td>2. Security (5.18)</td>
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<td>2. Universalism (4.23)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Universalism (4.69)</td>
<td>2. Benevolence (4.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1. Self-direction (4.69)</td>
<td>1. Benevolence (4.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Benevolence (4.57)</td>
<td>2. Self-direction (4.68)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Mean ratings are in parenthesis
To investigate whether a similar pattern is replicated among voters with different ideological orientations, the value hierarchy was examined among leftist/liberals, and rightist/conservatives voters, considered as separate groups. Table 2 reports the mean importance ratings, and the respective ranks, of each value. We found that right and conservative voters rated benevolence most important, self-direction second, and universalism third. Left and liberal voters rated universalism most important, benevolence second, and self-direction third.

As can be observed from Table 2, the mean ratings of the first three values were rather close in both groups. The Spearman rank correlation for the order of importance of the 10 values observed in the two groups was .91 ($p < .001$). These results indicate that the order of importance of basic values was similar across voters with different ideological orientations.

Table 3 reports the pair of values with the highest scores of importance among left/liberal and right/conservative voters. In most countries self-direction is among the two values that scored highest in importance for both left/liberal and right/conservative voters.

In Australia, Brazil, Germany (East and West), Israel, Ukraine, and the UK, self-direction values are the most important, regardless of voters’ political orientation. Left-wing voters in Poland and the US and right-wing voters in Greece and Italy also rated self-direction most important.

Universalism and benevolence are values more frequently distinctive of the left, but are also found among those rated as most important for the right in several countries. Specifically, universalism was the value type rated most important among both left- and right-wing voters in Finland, and among left-wing voters in Chile, Greece, Italy, and Spain.

Benevolence was the value type rated most important among both left- and right-wing voters in Slovakia, and among right-wing voters in Chile, Poland, Spain, and the U.S.

Security was ranked first among voters of the right in Turkey, and second among right voters in Australia, Greece and Italy. In Turkey it was rated second among the left voters.

The other values (i.e., conformity, tradition, hedonism, stimulation, achievement, and power) were never rated among the two most important values in all countries.

In most countries (Italy, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, Finland, Chile, Greece, US, Spain, Germany), power was the least important value for both left/liberal and right/conservative voters. Power appeared at the bottom of the value hierarchy also among left-wing voters in Australia, and among right-wing voters in Poland and Brazil. In few cases, tradition was ranked as the least important values. This happened among both left- and right-wing voters in Israel, among right-wing voters in Australia, and among left-wing voters in Poland and Brazil.

**Commonalities across countries in core political values of rival voters**

As we did for basic values, we first calculated the mean ratings of each core political value by combining the data across countries and voters. Results showed that equality, civic liberties, and accepting immigrants were the political values with the highest mean score, followed by economic security, traditional morality, and law and order. The lowest scores were obtained by free enterprise, blind patriotism, and military intervention.

Table 4 shows the mean ratings of the nine core political values among left/liberal and right/conservative voters, combined across countries. In both groups, the two highest scores were attributed to equality and civil liberties, respectively. The third highest score was attributed to accepting immigrants by left/liberal voters, and to traditional morality by right/conservative voters. Spearman rank correlation for the
nine political values observed in the two groups was .93 ($p<.001$), suggesting that left/liberal and right/conservative voters exhibited a remarkably degree of similarity in their political value ratings.

The two political values to which left-wing (or liberal) and right-wing (or conservative) individuals assigned the highest score in each country are shown in Table 5. We found that in 8 countries equality and civil liberties form the pair of political values with the highest scores, among both left-liberal and right-conservative voters.

For both groups of voters, equality is the most important value in Brazil, Chile, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and Turkey. Civil liberties, instead, is the most important value in Finland and Ukraine for all voters. In Australia, accepting immigrants and equality are the most important values for all voters. In UK and the US, equality and civil liberties obtained the highest score only among liberal voters. Specifically, equality was rated as most important by UK liberal voters, whereas civil liberties was rated as most important by US liberal voters. Conservative voters of both countries, by contrast, scored highest in traditional morality.

In most countries, the least important political values for both left/liberal and right/conservative voters were military intervention (Chile, Greece, Italy, Poland, Turkey, Ukraine, Slovakia, Turkey) and blind patriotism (Australia, Brazil, Germany, Finland, UK).

**DISCUSSION**

Findings from earlier studies attest to the current validity of left (or liberal) and right (or conservative) ideologies to orient citizens into the political world, and to predict their political preferences. Indeed, ideology still plays an important function in creating consensus, in sustaining collective action around the order of priorities, and in binding the action of politicians to the realization of their promises. This despite the pressure of contingencies that push left and right to converge into pragmatic governmental coalitions, and to dilute their traditional distinctiveness.

Also earlier findings have shown that left (or liberal) and right (or conservative) choices are associated to significant individual differences in voters’ values. Basic values have proved to account for significant portions of variations in ideological self-placement and voting across polities that differ widely in their pathways to the establishment of democracy.
These findings lend support to a model that posits basic values at the basis of ideological orientation, that turns into political choices through the mediation of political values. Whereas basic values correspond to the principles that guide people in life, political values correspond to the forms that those principles take contingently in response to the constraints and opportunities of situations. Likely self-enhancement and conservation values predispose to endorse political values and platforms that prioritize security, tradition, order, and power, which accord with concerns of right and conservative ideologies. Self-transcendence and openness to change values, instead, predisposes to endorse political values and platforms that prioritize solidarity and tolerance of diversity, which mostly accord with the ideals of left and liberal ideologies.

This, however, does not exclude that the pattern of relations may significantly vary across countries with different political histories, in particular when comparing established democracies with post-communist democracies communist countries. Rather, one should

### Table 5 The two political values with highest mean scores in each country by leftist/liberals and rightist/conservatives voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Leftist/liberals participants</th>
<th>Rightist/conservative participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1. Accept immigrants (3.93)</td>
<td>1. Accept immigrants (3.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Equality (3.83)</td>
<td>2. Equality (3.47)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1. Equality (4.26)</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.79)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Civil Liberties (3.89)</td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1. Equality (4.33)</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.57)</td>
<td>2. Traditional morality (3.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1. Civil liberties (4.07)</td>
<td>1. Civil liberties (3.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Equality (3.79)</td>
<td>2. Equality (3.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/Germany</td>
<td>1. Equality (4.16)</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Accept immigrants (3.88)</td>
<td>2. Traditional Morality (3.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/Germany</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.98)</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Accept immigrants (3.94)</td>
<td>2. Traditional Morality (3.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1. Equality (4.36)</td>
<td>1. Equality (4.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.90)</td>
<td>2. Traditional Morality (3.71)</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.83)</td>
<td>1. Equality (4.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.38)</td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1. Equality (4.18)</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.88)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (4.05)</td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.73)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.71)</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.64)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.62)</td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.52)</td>
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<td>1. Equality (3.69)</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.66)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2. Civil liberties (3.58)</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.50)</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>2. Civil Liberties (4.10)</td>
<td>2. Traditional morality (4.10)</td>
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<td>2. Equality (3.77)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1. Equality (3.91)</td>
<td>1. Traditional morality (3.71)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Accept immigration (3.72)</td>
<td>2. Civil liberties (3.41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1. Civil liberties (3.77)</td>
<td>1. Traditional morality (3.79)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Equality (3.66)</td>
<td>2. Civil Liberties (3.62)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Mean ratings are in parenthesis.
not underestimate the diversity of attitudes that can stay at the back of left and right ideological self-placement in countries that carry a different political legacy, have to manage different contingencies, and have to cope with different challenges. In this regard, the study of individual differences in personality can be particularly useful to understand how people think and behave in politics, and thus to better understand either the sources of divisions and the opportunities of integration and union that at personal and collective levels should be mobilized in the pursuit of common ideals and achievements.

Along this reasoning, a better understanding of what is distinctive in different world views, ideals and policies that claim to pursue the common good can be extremely fruitful. It may allow to reduce conflicts and to turn divisions into synergies, where diversities can complement each other. To this aim, however, to acknowledge and value commonalities is no less important than to highlight diversities. Thus, the present study goes beyond earlier studies that have focused on what distinguishes right conservative and left liberal voters in the domain of basic and political values. Indeed, focusing on the rank-order in importance ratings (basic values) or agreement (political values) reported by left/liberal and right/conservative voters, proved to add information beyond that which can be attained by comparing single values’ means and correlations.

Among basic values, we found that left/liberal and right/conservative voters share a similar value hierarchy. Self-direction, in particular, was the value ranked as most important by both groups in the majority of examined polities. This accord with findings of Welzel and Inglehart (2005) that point to autonomy of thought and action as particularly congenial to Democracy and, as such, highly valued through all the ideological divide.

Self-transcendence values were also largely prioritized by voters across most countries, although with not negligible differences between right and left voters. Left/liberal voters, in fact, tended to prioritize universalism, namely the value that is consistent with an open view of communion and thereby the pursuit of all mankind’s welfare. Right/conservative voters, instead, tended to prioritize benevolence, namely the value that is consistent with an inclusive view of communion and thereby to caring being focused primarily on the good of the family and people one knows and likes.

With regard to political values, equality and civil liberties were prioritized over the other values in the majority of examined polities across voters with different orientation. This shows that right-conservative and left-liberal voters are not so distant from each other on the importance assigned to values that have been crucial for the advancement of democracy.

Equality is the value under which the advancement of democracy is attested by the extension to all citizens of the rights for equal respect, equal opportunities to growth and carry a decent life and equal treatment on behalf of government. Whereas equality has been a major source of differences between left and right in the past, today few would argue against the need to grant all citizens adequate resources to protect their health and to cultivate their education as well as adequate labor conditions where to express and develop their talents.

Civil liberties is the value under which nowadays the legacy of rights to freedom of thought accord with the change in habits and customs carried by modernity in the domain of ethics and individuals rights.

Power, blind patriotism, and military intervention were the lowest ranked values by all electorate across polities further attesting to the decline of values that were prominent in authoritarian regimes.

Although caution is needed in interpreting results mostly derived from samples of convenience, it is remarkable to observe the substantial commonalities among voters...
that traditionally have been portrayed as partisans of alternative views of social order and government. Basic values and political values that underlie traditional ideologies not only appeared less distant than in the past, but often converge. Viewing at the past, likely it has been the alternation between left and right that has moved the pendulum of politics towards the appropriation of larger space of freedom and decisional power on behalf of citizens, and towards a major concern for political institutions to extend to all the rights to live a life that is worth of living. Viewing at the future, it is likely that the extension of democracy will further extend people demands for self-determination in concomitance with their greater awareness of their rights to the full expression of their personalities.

In this regard it is desirable that future studies will further clarify the extent to which right/left and liberal/conservative ideologies will continue to serve as convenient devices to orient citizens in politics. One can’t exclude that the common appropriation of values that stay at the core of democracy may further take advantage of competing ideologies to the extent that they may serve to nurture the democratic discussion and to activate virtuous circles in which the pursuit of shared values may benefit from the diversity of political platforms.

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WHAT’S NEXT FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?
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ABSTRACT
The main idea of deliberative democracy (originating in the writings of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas) is that citizens will consciously and effectively participate in a unique form of a group discussion (called the deliberative debate). Participation in a deliberation requires numerous sophisticated intellectual and social skills on the side of the citizen.

The purposes of the paper are following. First, to make a few clarifications concerning studies on deliberative debates. Second, briefly comment on the current state of the research in the field emphasizing the contribution of Polish scholars. Particular attention is paid to attempts to measure the quality of group discussions. Typology of different modes of working out group recommendations is presented.

The argumentation presented throughout the paper leads to the conclusion that even advanced attempts to initiate deliberative debates in real life conditions rarely lead to truly deliberative behaviours of disputants. Thus, the idea of „deliberative education” seems to emerge as a future prospect for deliberative democracy.

Key words: deliberative debate, deliberative education, group dynamics

INTRODUCTION
One of the suggestions as to how to regulate relations between representatives of divergent social groups in a way that would maintain their equal status, mutual respect, preserving authenticity and autonomy originates from the ideas of deliberative democracy. This thread of thought has gained scientific interest in the last two decades, inspiring numerous theoretical analyses in the fields of political philosophy and theory (for example Ackerman, Fishkin, 2004; Dryzek, 2000; Mansbrigde, 2010; Regh, 2000). It has also initiated empirical research in the fields of political science (Steiner et al., 2004), sociology (Fishkin, Luskin, 2005; Gastil, Deess, Weiser, 2002), linguistics (Holzinger, 2004; Landwehr, Holzinger, 2009) and psychology (Mendelberg, 2002; Karpowitz, Mendelberg, 2007; Reykowski, 2006; Wesołowska, 2007; 2010). The interest in the ideas of deliberative democracy stems from the fact that it offers meaningful advice on how to improve the functioning of contemporary democratic systems. This improvement can be accomplished through the dissemination of deliberative debates as procedures for decision making and conflict resolution at various levels of social life.

The purposes of the paper are following. First, to make a few clarification concerning studies on deliberative debates. Second, to comment briefly on the current state of the research in the field emphasizing the contribution of Polish scholars. And finally, indicate how the idea of “education for deliberative democracy” emerged as a future prospect on the background of the previous work.

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THE IDEA OF DELIBERATIVE DEBATE

The idea of deliberative debate is rooted in the philosophical writings of John Rawls (1971) and Jürgen Habermas (1984). Its most pragmatic formulation is depicted in the model developed by Amy Gutmann and Denis Thompson (1996). According to that model, the deliberative debate refers to the group process of searching for an agreement through discussion in which individuals participate free of any external pressures, following the principles of equal status and mutual respect. Distinctive of this form of communication is an open presentation of disputants’ positions concerning a discussed issue, accompanied by rational argumentation and justification. The disputants attempt to understand the essence of the discrepancy between their stances and try to find a commonly acceptable solution. The core idea of a deliberative debate is the mutual justification that participants should offer to support and explain their positions in the discussion. The justification should extend beyond narrow self-interest, take into account the public good and obey the so called reciprocity principle. “Reciprocity holds that citizens owe one another justifications for the mutually binding laws and public policies they collectively enact. The aim (...) is to help people seek political agreement on the basis of principles that can be justified to others who share the aim of reaching such an agreement” (Gutmann, Thompson, 2002, p. 156).

‘What’s the innovation of deliberative democracy?’— one might ask. ‘Different variations of group discussions have been a part of decision making processes for ages’. Examples of various group discussions are debates, Oxford-style debates or impromptu debates. A debate takes place when two people (or teams) who have different opinions, come together to advocate and defend their positions. It is usually a competition (or a contest) between two sides: who can present better, more convincing argumentation for his own position and against the opposite position. Sides do not propose any alternative solution nor come up with a compromise that both could accept. A debate is a contest that can be won by one side only. Oxford-style debate is a very formal and competitive format in which a clearly formulated thesis is discussed. The discussion is led by a moderator. It starts with the presentation of the thesis. The proponents of the thesis sit on one side of the room and their opponents sit on the opposite side. The undecided audience sits in the middle. The disputants take turns in presenting their arguments. They can not ridicule, insult or offend the opponents. The final decision is made by voting. Impromptu (extemore, “off the cuff”) debate is relatively informal. The topic is given to the participants 20 minutes before the debate starts and the format is simple: representatives of each side speak for five minutes each, alternating sides (taking turns). Then, 10 minutes is allowed for open cross-examination of the issue and a five-minute break after that. Following the break, each team gives a four-minute rebuttal.

The differences between deliberation and other forms of debates can be summarized on the following dimensions. (1) A deliberation requires cooperation of both sides in working towards agreement while a debate is a competition. (2) The questions for a deliberation are formulated as open-ended problems (such as “what can be done in order to improve …?”), and the participants are asked to come up with such recommendations that they all can approve of. For a debate, a thesis with two alternative options is formulated in advance and the sides have to either defend it or prove it wrong. (3) In a deliberation, the precise rules of cross-examination of an issue are given. Namely, the disputants should take on the main perspective of public good and common interest as their main frame of reference. While arguing, they should try to apply the reciprocity principle. Reciprocity principle means that disputants try to use
argumentation that could be understandable and acceptable by their opponents. In a debate formal rules refer only to the procedure and not argumentation. (4) The difference is also in the expected final result. Deliberation aims at working out of a new quality or integration of divergent perspectives. The debate results in an informed choice of one alternative out of two predefined options.

Advocates of deliberative democracy claim that deliberative debates have evident advantages over other types of group decision making, such as voting with a majority rule, bargaining or reaching a compromise; all of which result only in a partial satisfaction of the needs of the involved parties. The following benefits of deliberative debates are mentioned in the literature: shaping informed preferences of participants (Fishkin, Rosell, 2004; Sturgis, Roberts, Allum, 2005), moral accommodation (that is, acknowledgement of the moral value of stances or views opposed to one’s own), reaching a reasonable consensus, legitimacy of collective decisions (Knight, 1999), building knowledge and competence (Burkhalter, Gastil, Kelshaw, 2002), positive transformative effects on attitudes (Sulkin, Simon, 2001), fostering democratic values and attitudes (Dryzek, Braithwaite, 2000), and promoting democratic participation (Gastil, Deess, Weiser, 2002). Moreover, a deliberative debate is recommended as a special remedy for severe problems that a democratic system faces, such as the peaceful coordination of society composed of social groups differing in worldviews, identities and interests (Regh, 2000).

The concept of deliberative democracy has its convinced supporters, as well as sceptics. The latter argue that a deliberative debate is a project impossible to put into practice because it requires the participants to have sophisticated sociocognitive competencies. In order to truly participate in deliberative debates the disputants should critically reflect on their own beliefs and values, attempt to understand the perspective of other people, be able to make a rational analysis of a problem, consider alternatives, have the ability as to attentive listening and clear self-expression, display a cooperative approach, show mutual respect and treat each other as equals (Reykowski, 2006).

All of the above enumerated are very demanding competencies. They are learned mainly during the formal education process and trained through the practical experience of constructive discussions. It leads to the question of deliberative debate feasibility, namely is it possible to carry out in real life conditions a group discussion that would meet demanding standards of deliberative debate? This question instigated numerous empirical investigations.

"EMPIRICAL TURN" IN THE STUDIES OF DELIBERATION

The deliberative democracy ideal was conceived by its founding fathers as a theoretical model of how to reform democratic systems. Early interest in the idea remained at the theoretical level of analysis. Over time however it evolved form a "theoretical statement" into a "working theory" which assumptions were tested in both experimental and real-life settings. The major research questions asked were: (1) To what extend the ideal of deliberative debate is feasible in real life conditions? (2) What outcomes would deliberative debates produce (in terms of attitude changes, quality of final decision)? (3) How do institutional arrangements influence the course of deliberation?

I would like to stress that we have a Polish contribution to the empirical study of deliberation which represents a variety of empirical approaches applied in this field of studies. In the chronological order we a had a quasi-experimental study on citizen deliberation in the quasi-experimental project “Psychological prerequisites and consequences of deliberative functioning in political groups” conducted by the team
of psychologists in Warsaw in the years 2004-2007 (Reykowski, 2006; Wesołowska 2007, 2010). In 2009 we had the first deliberative poll in our country focused on the question: “What should be done with the National Stadium in Poznań after Euro Football Championship?” organized in cooperation with Center of Deliberative Democracy of Stanford University (Siu, Przybylska, 2010). In 2012 the on-line deliberative poll took place in which Warsaw students were discussing the quality of university education organized by Center for Deliberation affiliated at Institute of Sociology of Warsaw University (ed.uw.edu.pl/sd/). The most recently, in 2014 a series of focus group interviews following a deliberative format were conducted. Their topic was „Parents’ expectations and concerns about education toward maturity in primary and secondary schools” (Institute for Educational Research, IBE).

Let me elaborate more on the first of these initiatives because it aimed at answering the crucial for deliberative democracy questions: (1) Would it be possible to foster a deliberative debate in a group of citizens as described by theoretical models? (2) What other courses (if not the truly deliberative debate) can citizen discussions assume under conditions meant to bring about deliberation?

The research followed a quasi-experimental design. Parents of school-aged children discussed issues of sex education in state schools in small groups of 7 to 13 people. Parents volunteered to take part in a discussion and were assigned to discussion groups at their convenience. This resembles the natural arrangement of citizen discussions – when participants decide whether they want to participate or not.

The experimental procedure attempted to implement the assumptions of the theoretical model of a deliberative debate. Group discussions were facilitated by a properly trained psychologist following a scenario prepared in advance. The facilitator introduced the group task, set the agenda for the discussion and introduced the group norms. Participants were told to let each other speak freely, listen carefully to each other, treat each other with respect and avoid potentially insulting phrases. The facilitator intervened in situations when any group norm was violated. To implement the perspective of the public good, participants were encouraged to analyze the controversial issue collectively and to work out a common set of recommendations regarding sexual education for state schools in Poland. To stress the importance of the task, disputants were informed that recommendations would be presented to the Ministry of Education. They were told that the aim of the discussion was “the collective comprehension of the problem and finding the fairest solution which would as far as possible consider divergent points of view”. The subjects were also asked to “try to understand in which respects their opinions differed and what they had in common.” The whole task was placed in an institutional framework of the Polish Academy of Sciences suggesting neutrality, objectivity and a scientific approach. When group recommendations were made, the facilitator wrote them down.

Sex education in public schools (embracing topics of contraceptives and abortion) is a controversial political issue in Poland. Opinions on such issues are an important part of political discourse and reflect the ideological cleavage of Polish society with conservative views represented by one side (mainly reflecting Catholic Church teaching) and liberal-secular views by the other. Attempts to change the legal regulations concerning abortion in Poland generated many social conflicts and manifestations. Even members of parliament (whom we expect to be experienced in discussing controversies) displayed difficulties in finding constructive agreements on the problem of abortion). Issues regarding public education should undergo deliberation because they affect many people and might generate moral and cultural conflicts that have no clear policy solutions.
Issues concerning sex education were discussed in 20 groups with a total of 195 participants (including 151 women). There were 18 persons with elementary or vocational education, 111 persons with high school education and 66 persons with university degrees. 152 of the participants were between 25 and 45 years old. Each debate lasted for about an hour and a half, was video recorded and then transcribed. In total, there were almost 30 hours of recordings and over 1100 pages of transcription to analyze.

The conclusions of the above described research as well as of other investigations of “empirical turn” are following. Deliberative ideals when they are set as normative standards for discussion and its context have positive influence on real-life communications such as: observable quality of real discussions, positive subjective evaluations of the course of the discussion by its participants (in terms of respect, hearing different opinions and being listened to) and working out some sort of group common stance. But the normative standards of deliberative debate don’t make miracles. Striking deviations from the desirable mode of interaction still happen (despite attempts to set normative standards). Attempts have been made to describe these alternative modes of interaction. They require tools (procedures) for analyzing the quality and features of group discussion processes. Two such procedures will be presented and compared in the next section, namely Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Swiss-American of Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli and Steiner (2003) and Assessment of Deliberative Process (ADP) developed by Wesołowska (2010).

**ASSESSMENTS OF DELIBERATIVE DEBATES QUALITY**

In the most widely used instrument (DQI) deliberative quality is measured by interpreting if and in what intensity speech acts satisfy the conditions of Habermasian Discourse Ethics, mainly respect, justification and public good perspective. DQI is a methodological hybrid: the speech acts are evaluated by qualitative measures (judging if they fulfill deliberative criteria) and on the basis of that they are ascribed numerical codes. The codes can be summarized and averaged for the whole discussion to form an index, or indexes can be created for discussions of different issues, or for representatives of different political parties.

The author of this paper made another attempt to grasp the quality of deliberation by developing measurement that is called ADP (Assessment of Deliberative Process). The differences between the DQI and ADP are summarized in table 1.

**Table 1 Summary of differences between Discourse Quality Index (DQI) and Assessment of Deliberative Process (ADP)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>DQI (Steiner et al. 2004)</th>
<th>ADP (Wesołowska 2010)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>Parliamentary discussions</td>
<td>Citizen deliberation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theoretical framework</td>
<td>Discourse Ethics by Habermas</td>
<td>Model by Gutmann &amp; Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of analysis</td>
<td>Speech acts in the context of previous acts</td>
<td>Speech acts in the context of previous acts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>• qualitative evaluations</td>
<td>• qualitative evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• computing summary index</td>
<td>• search for similar profiles of interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final outcome</td>
<td>Comparative measurements</td>
<td>Typology of group processes of working out an agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As table 1 presents DQI and ADP can be compared on the following dimensions. DQI applies to analysis of parliamentary discussion (which are usually prepared in advance, contain elaborated argumentation) and for this reason it is based on theoretical formulation of discourse ethics by Habermas. ADP is meant to capture the quality of citizens discussion in real life conditions which are more spontaneous and reactive to previous speakers. For these reasons the deliberative debate model by Amy Gutmann and Denis Thompson was chosen as its theoretical framework. In both measurements the unit of analysis are speech acts in the context of previous acts. The final outcome of DQI application is a comparative measurement which allows for comparison of quality of discussions in various institutional settings (such as plenary parliament session versus commission working groups discussion). The final outcome of ADP application is a typology of group processes of working out group recommendation (based on observation of similar configurations of participants behaviours while solving different controversies).

ADP application to the data from the empirical project “Psychological prerequisites and consequences of deliberative functioning in political groups” (described above) allowed for the classification of a vast majority of disputants observable behaviours (as fulfilling or violating the deliberative debate criteria). It led to the following conclusions on the feasibility of citizen deliberation and its quality.

Moments when group functioning was close to the deliberative debate ideal were very rare: only 8 cases out of 101 analyzed situations when a controversy was raised in a group forum. In the remaining majority of situations, groups employed different strategies of coping with differences of opinions and in most of them managed to work out a group agreement.

These strategies involved various configurations of behaviors derived from the theoretical model. This leads to answering the second question as to what other courses a citizen discussion can take under those conditions meant to bring about deliberation. Observations of similar patterns of interactions in numerous attempts to deal with opinion differences in various groups gave rise to the idea that there may be three main types of group strategies which were manifested in different forms:

1. strategies of conflict avoidance (when a group attempts to go around an articulated opinion difference without even trying to resolve it),
2. strategies of enforcing a solution (when one or both sides of a conflict try to pass their own point of view as the whole group’s recommendation),
3. strategies of conflict resolution (which relies on the attempts of both sides of a conflict to work out together an agreement which would address both sides’ expectations).

In the analyzed material, two ways in which groups tried to avoid conflict were observed. The first could be called ‘suppressing the differences’ because it prevented the expressed difference of opinion to escalate into an open confrontation. Suppression was accomplished through suggestions to finish the discussion, emphasizing time constraints, warning that a continuation of a discussion may result in a quarrel or indicating that the problem is unsolvable. In some instances the group minority was openly discouraged to elaborate on its stance. The group ceased the discussion of the controversial issue and moved on to another topic. Substitutive topics comprised generally socially acceptable matters or trivial questions marginal to the main controversy.

The second form of conflict avoidance was named ‘looking for similarities’. This refers to situations when a group looked for commonality or common ground which could serve as the basis for formulating some recommendations without actually
substantially analyzing the core of articulated differences. Quite often it was done through story telling. The disputants took turns in relating their personal experiences connected in some way with the discussed controversy. The main characters in the stories were the disputants themselves or members of their families. In addition to recounting the course of events, the narrator revealed personal emotions which accompanied it. A story told by one person triggered another story told by one of the listeners (recounting an event in some ways similar to the first story). Thus, a chain of stories developed in a group. Quite frequently it concluded with a statement of the commonality of experiences, concerns, needs or motives in the group. It sometimes resulted in noticing some common social category that all the disputants belonged to.

In strategies of conflict avoidance most of the deliberative debate criteria enumerated in the ideal model were not met. Participants obeyed the principle of respect towards others and their views; there were no instances of insulting behaviors. But this was certainly not the analytical, rational, argumentation-based approach to a controversial issue. The core of the controversy was approached only on its surface. There were no justifications, no reason giving and sometimes not even elaborations of different positions. The illustration of conflict avoidance strategy revealed with the application of ADP is presented in the Appendix (controversy nr 2).

The second type of group strategies that could be observed in our material was enforcing a solution. It assumed three forms: ‘persuasion’, ‘polemics’ and ‘fight’.

‘Persuasion’ refers to situations in which one side of a conflict was much more active than the other and tried to force its own position to represent a whole group’s recommendation. This was done through presenting arguments to support a given point of view, its advantages and benefits of implementation. The persuaders also pointed to disadvantages and potential threats of implementing an alternative solution. They supported and elaborated upon each others’ statements. The rest of the group restrained itself to merely signaling a difference of opinions without presenting its details. This means that some (although biased) analysis of a controversial issue was presented in a group forum, but the criteria of reciprocity and cooperation were not met.

In ‘polemics’ both sides tried to persuade each other to accept their own solution through communication and argumentation. Each side presented justifications of its own proposal, pointed to the advantages and benefits for its acceptance. Both sides asked each other questions and acquired an alternative point of view in detail. Disputants indicated disadvantages, difficulties with the implementation and potentially harmful results of the implementation of the solutions different from their own. Sometimes they applied a reciprocity principle in argumentation. Thus different points of view underwent some analysis in a group forum, but the sides did not co-operate in finding a commonly accepted solution. The discussion relied on mutual attempts to convince opponents that “our” solution is better than theirs. The illustration of polemics revealed with the application of ADP is presented in the Appendix (controversy nr 1).

In some cases ‘polemics’ led to a reformulation of a discussed problem: a new perspective was presented or attention was called to other important aspects than the ones that had been discussed so far. It sometimes included an indication that the discussed controversy was only one aspect of a more sophisticated, multidimensional phenomenon or that more general dilemmas were the core of the controversy.

The last form of enforcing solution, namely ‘fight’, describes a situation in which both sides openly communicated their stances and revealed their basic assumptions and worldviews. After finding a significant discrepancy between them, one side started questioning or diminishing the value and legitimacy of the opposite worldview. The
antagonistic side referred to opponents’ views as morally wrong, socially detrimental or too removed from real life. At least one side of the conflict used discriminating or insulting expressions referring to the other side. Thus, the deliberative criteria of respect and equal status of alternative worldviews were violated. Open communication in ‘fight’ resulted in different ways of understanding a controversial issue and different proposals of solving it being presented in the group forum. The illustration of fight strategy revealed with the application of ADP is presented in the Appendix (controversy nr 3).

The further course of ‘fight’ depended on the reaction of the attacked side. There were cases when the attacked side continued a discussion in a respectful manner, presented argumentation supporting its own stance or suggested organizational solutions which could potentially satisfy expectations of both sides. Sometimes the attacked side called the normative context of a discussion (formulated in the aim and rules given by the facilitator) and demanded respectful treatment for itself. In a few situations the attack was reciprocated with a counterattack.

The strategy of conflict resolution in our material was displayed in two ways: ‘negotiation’ and ‘common consideration’. ‘Negotiations’ were those situations when both sides tried to work out a commonly accepted recommendation through a mutual exchange of concessions. Both sides presented their points of view and learned their opponents’ opinions. After becoming acquainted with them, the participants attempted to argue while using the adversaries’ ideas (fulfilling the reciprocity principle). They searched for a compromise or an organizational solution which would not violate different worldviews and values. Different proposals of organizational solutions were presented and justified in a group forum and then underwent some analysis. Different ideological options were considered as having equal status but were clearly differentiated. Groups applying this strategy managed to work out a common recommendation if at least one of the sides decided to modify its initial stance or if one of the sides managed to propose an innovative organizational solution. This type of strategy met numerous criteria of a deliberative debate: namely argumentation, reciprocity, analytical approach and cooperation. What it lacked to meet the ideal was the effort to integrate different ideological options.

The second type of conflict resolution strategy, namely ‘common consideration’, relied on both sides’ cooperation in working out a group recommendation through an analysis of different proposals and the ideas supporting them. The analysis was applied to other participants’ ideas as well as to one’s own together with their justifications. Some controversial issues were formulated as open questions and posed in a group forum for thorough consideration. Participants learned stances different than their own and their rationales. They searched for similarities or for superior values which would embrace all of them. Different ideological options and proposals of solutions were articulated. A group applying this type of strategy was able to work out a shared recommendation if at least one of the sides had cognitive capacities sufficient enough to detect similarities and common ideas in divergent stances. A recommendation was accepted if the sides decided that it enabled the realization of values of personal importance to all of them. This type of strategy was the closest to the ideal deliberative debate but unfortunately very rare.

These results of empirical studies of deliberation in real life conditions are in line with numerous other observations: Williamson and Fung (2004, p. 3) summarize their survey of different opportunities for public deliberation already incorporated in the U.S. government practice stating that “there is huge variation in the quality of deliberation within the venues that aim to produce it.”
CONCEPTUAL WIDENING OF DELIBERATION MODEL

Clash of the normative ideal with reality resulted in conceptual widening/enrichment of a theoretical model from purely rational communication (where premises are linked to conclusion by the rules of logic) to accommodation of diverse modes of interaction such as story-telling or personal narratives. The most spectacular work in this field is the study by Jurgen Steiner on deliberation in deeply divided society of Columbia where the conflict was so severe that it resulted in war (Jaramillo & Steiner, 2014). The authors organized discussion groups of decommissioned ex-combatants from left and right sides on the topic “how to make progress in peace process?” The researchers attempted to investigate the question of what group dynamics contribute to deliberation raise or fall.

The research strategy relied on identifying situations after which the quality of discussion either went up or down adopting qualitative interpretative approach. The concept of Deliberative Transformative Moments (DTM) resulted from these analysis. DTMs can be sometimes brief and not elaborated speech acts that improve the quality of discussion: by putting it back on the main track or summarizing what previous disputant said, introducing an important perspective, or encouraging opponents to interact. There can also be speech acts that transform the level of deliberation from high to low such as offensive statements, irrelevant comments or incoherent, confusing statements which make the continuation of meaningful discussion difficult. The researchers showed how narratives revealing personal stories can transform a discussion from a low to a high level of deliberation (or have the opposite effect). These results subscribe to the increased attention to personal stories in deliberative literature with claims being made that the conceptualization of deliberation should encompass these alternative forms of communication (Black, 2008; Ryfe, 2006; Young, 1999).

Widening the deliberative debate model too much to embrace varied interaction would loose its innovative character I stressed out at the beginning of this paper. Not every group discussion or exchange deserves to be called the deliberative debate. Thus too much of a conceptual widening may reach a dead end. Alternative direction for continuation of work on deliberation should focus on educational programs and techniques designed to foster deliberative capacities in citizens. This direction is called “deliberative education” or “deliberative pedagogy” (Roth, 2008; Alfaro, 2008).

DELIBERATIVE EDUCATION

So far the theory of deliberative democracy was based on the assumption that the deliberative skills would develop naturally/organically through the act of participation, mainly through modeling and non-obtrusive facilitation. Direct references to Jean Piaget conception of cognitive development can be found in the writings of deliberative democracy founding fathers John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and Amy Gutmann (quoted in Griffin, 2011, p.6) Human development is conceived as a process best encouraged by providing environments, situation in which a person will encounter new environment. For example the teacher provides information and allows the children to discuss what they believe to be right or wrong.

The alternative account of development that potentially offers more suitable foundation to deliberative democracy would be social constructivism as represented by Lev Wygotsky. According to this account higher mental functions (such as perspective taking, inductive reasoning), are socially acquired and mediated by “cultural tools” that are present and common in a given society. The development is dependent on the context of society and culture in which it continues. Thus if we want to train deliberative competences in citizens we should pay attention to the cultural tools that are provided in the process of their education from early ages (Griffin, 2011).
Deliberative education, in short, is ‘education for civic engagement and decision making citizens’ in which two processes play a major part: discussion and choice (Alfaro, 2008). The general model of deliberative education consists of the following key elements: (1) increasing the variety and frequency of interactions among students, (2) creating temporary and task oriented groups of students, (3) explaining the idea of deliberation, (4) arranging deliberation about two common kinds of problems: social interactions themselves and academic controversies at the core of each discipline (Parker, 1997).

**CONCLUSION**

The argumentation presented throughout the paper leads to the conclusion that even advanced attempts to initiate deliberative debates in real life conditions rarely lead to truly deliberative behaviours of disputants. As the research quoted indicate the citizens attempt to work out group recommendation through other modes than deliberative debate (such as story telling, polemics, persuasion, enforcing a solution or fight). Widening the deliberative debate model as to embrace such modes would lead to losing its innovative quality. The answer to the question of this paper “What’s next for deliberative democracy?” would be “deliberative education”. This means creating learning environments that model deliberative behaviours, introducing deliberative debates as educational tools in formal education system with the purpose of fostering deliberative skills and competences in future citizens. The interest in the idea of deliberative education has grown in the recent decade (for example Claxton, 2008; Englund, 2011; Shaffer, 2014; Wesołowska, Soloma, 2012; 2014) It reflects the conviction that deliberative functioning is a set of skills which cannot be activated by single, short-term intervention but need planned and long-term strategy of education.

**REFERENCES**


**ADP analytical categories**  
*The categories correspond to the assumptions of Gutmann and Thompson theoretical model of deliberative debate*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADP analytical categories</th>
<th>Controversy 1: 'who is mainly responsible for sexual education?'</th>
<th>Controversy 2: 'how to tackle issues of contraception at school?'</th>
<th>Controversy 3: 'how to tackle issues of abortion at school?'</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position: school</td>
<td>Position: family</td>
<td>Position: abortion is a difficult woman's decision</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Position: present only natural methods of family planning</td>
<td>Position: present all sorts of contraceptives</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Position: abortion is murder</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY: POLEMICS</th>
<th>STRATEGY: CONFLICT AVOIDANCE</th>
<th>STRATEGY: FIGHT</th>
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1a) A disputant articulates his / her own position on a discussed issue.
1b) A disputant provides a practical reason to support his / her position.
1c) A disputant provides an ideological justification for his / her position.
2) A disputant asks a question concerning his / her opponent's position.
3) A disputant presents counterarguments to the opponent's position.
4) A disputant presents his / her argumentation following 'the reciprocity principle'.
5) A disputant attempts to analyze the problem and / or proposals of its solutions.
6) A disputant obeys the principle of respect towards opponents and their ideas.
7) A disputant encourages others to cooperate.
8) A disputant accepts the analysis of a controversy from a common good perspective.
9a) A disputant accepts equal status of different ideological options.
9b) A disputant accepts individual freedom of choice of a worldview.
10) A disputant modifies his / her initial position.
11) A disputant searches for a superior (or more general) perspective of looking at ideological controversy.

"+" – the behavior was observed in the group resolving the controversy
"0" – the behavior was NOT observed in the group resolving the controversy
"-" – clear violation of the criteria was observed
TRUST AND EXPECTED COSTS AS ANTECEDENTS OF CITIZENS’ MOTIVATION TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC POLICYMAKING

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ABSTRACT
Objectives. The present study aimed at testing whether costs, trustworthiness of government, and expected voice could predict citizens’ willingness to get involved in participatory governance processes. Participants and setting. Research participants were one-hundred and ninety-two volunteer students of Sapienza University of Rome, 66% female. Hypotheses. We hypothesized both main effects of trust (positive) and expected costs (negative) and an interactive effect of the two variables on citizens’ willingness to participate. We also expected voice to be a mediator of such an interaction effect on willingness to participate. Statistical analyses. A 2 (costs) by 2 (trust) ANOVA was applied both to manipulation checks and to motivation to participate. Following this, we performed a bootstrap mediated moderation analysis (Hayes, 2013). Results. Motivation to participate was significantly affected by trust, in fact participants in the high trust condition, were more willing to participate ($M = 3.84$, $SD = .91$) rather than those in the low trust condition ($M = 3.31$, $SD = .99$). Also, a main effect of costs emerged, with low costs inducing higher motivation to participate ($M = 3.73$, $SD = .92$) than high costs ($M = 3.41$, $SD = 1.03$). More importantly, these effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between costs and trust: while in the high trust condition costs did not affect willingness to participate, in the low costs condition they made a significant difference. Finally, mediated moderation analysis showed that that expected voice was responsible for the impact of the trust by costs interaction on motivation to participate. Limitation. The main limitation of the study concerns generalizability of its results across populations of different ages and occupation.

Key words: citizens’ participation, policymaking, costs expectations, trust in government, voice effect

INTRODUCTION
The importance of citizens participation within governance processes has currently gained wide attention, both in academic discourse and actual practice. Analysts have used theoretical constructs such as deliberative democracy or participatory democracy to analyze the scope and limitations of people’s participation in the process of governance, through a review of the traditional democracy theories. Effective participation by all stakeholders at local levels of government and reduction of social exclusion and political apathy have come to be viewed as a necessary condition for promoting good governance and a cohesive society.

The shift of focus towards new horizontal governance models (as opposed to the traditional vertical ones) in recent years highlights a fundamental need to reconceptualize public sector. In this regard, participatory governance practices (Edwards, 2002; Lovan, Murray and Shaffer, 2004; Osmani, 2007) are aimed to provide non-government actors, both individuals and organizations, with a means
to genuinely and actively be part of the process of developing policy. Such processes have taken hold as intermediary spaces that readjust the boundaries between the state and its citizens, establishing new places in which participants from both can engage each other in new ways.

Therefore new deliberative institutions seek to colonize the state power by transforming the interfaces between local citizens and higher levels of government where citizens are viewed as an integral part of governance processes and their active involvement is considered essential in the substantive decisions facing a community.

ADVANTAGES AND PITFALLS IN PARTICIPATION

Citizens’ participation in governance processes is largely recognized as a valuable process (Nylen 2002; Buchy and Race 2001). The arguments in favor of enhancing citizen participation frequently focus on the benefits of the process itself as stated by King and Stivers (1998), suggesting that improved citizen participation could stop the deterioration of public trust evidenced by widespread hostility toward government entities.

Citizen involvement is intended to produce better decisions, and thus more benefits for the entire society (Beierle, 1999). Irvin and Stansbury (2004) suggest a list of advantages, distinguishing between those concerning citizens and governments. Both citizens and governments are likely to learn from each other, the former becoming citizen-experts, understanding technically difficult situations and seeing holistic, community-wide solutions, while the latter would also benefit from receiving education on specific community groups’ positions. Also, both citizens and governments may have the chance to improve their persuading skills on the other part in order to achieve acceptance of its own instances.

However, a number of authors claimed that participatory governance practices are not always rational nor exempt from critical issues. As one of the authors remarked (Antonini and Fini, 2011), one of the most common problems concerning public participation is to effectively encourage citizens to concretely participate in policymaking (and to political life in general) and it is not unusual for citizens to still staunchly refuse to get directly involved in policymaking. Participation is inevitably selective and it may occur that some individuals recognized as relevant participants are considered to be part of the citizenry, while those excluded are left without a voice, without a way to express their involvement and enact their citizenship (O’Neill, 2001; Turnhout, Van Bommel and Aarts, 2010). Furthermore, participation may repress differences requiring citizens to achieve consensus that is considered to be a robust basis for high quality and legitimate decisions (Innes and Booher, 2003).

In sum, when given the opportunity to participate in policymaking one cannot automatically assume that citizens will chose to do so. Declining rates of citizens’ participation mean on one hand fewer opportunities for state and local governments to understand the needs and concerns of their constituents, on the other hand less participation enhances itself a cleavage between citizens and politicians in a situation of big changes.

The present study aimed at assessing whether expected costs and benefits, and factors related to the quality of the relationship between citizens and their public administration, such as trust toward the administration and perceived voice, can affect citizens’ motivation to participate in public policymaking.
Before describing the experimental study, in the following section we will briefly review literature concerning these variables.

**The rational choice explanation of citizens’ participation**

Rational choice scholars have typically approached people’s motivation to participate in politics (i.e., voting) adopting models based on pure self-interest (e.g., Aldrich, 1993; Downs, 1957; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996; Ledyard, 1981; Palfrey, Rosenthal, 1985) and expected value (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Feather, 1982) thought in terms of collective action. According to such a perspective, political participation could be considered as the result of a rational costs-benefits evaluation.

Social movement research has typically viewed the motivation to participate as a function of the individual as well as collective costs of participation (Klandermans, 1984, 1997; Oberschall, 1980; Opp. 1989, 2001; Stürmer and Simon, 2004). Perceived material or psychological costs of participation can reduce public willingness to participate: those are usually related to energy level (Fishkin, 1997), economic loss and time investment (Abelson et al., 1995; Grant, 1994). Similarly, benefits include not only material advantages but also psychological and social ones: satisfaction (Hirschmann, 2002), sense of belonging and social status rewards (Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996).

Although the costs approach seems useful to precisely grasp the individual determinants of willingness to get engaged, on the other hand such a rational-choice approach paints an over-individualistic picture. Therefore, only focusing on individual advantages and drawbacks may not provide an exhaustive framework leading to ignore how people’s decisions are influenced by their relationship with the administration government as well as the extent to which they believe their voice will be heard.

**Trust in government as a tenet of participation**

Within public policymaking it is often the government that encourages citizens to participate. In this type of participation processes where governments reach out to their citizens, it is necessary that citizens trust their government administration in order to get actively involved. Thus, as trust in authority is an important psychological antecedent of collective behavior (e.g. De Cremer and Van Vugt, 1999; Tyler, 1989; Van Vugt and De Cremer, 1999), we will take into account the role of trust in predicting citizens’ motivation to participate in public policymaking.

In contemporary political debates and scientific literature on the subject, there is a growing recognition on the part of administrators that decision-making without public participation is ineffective. Although trust in government is a nebulous and contested notion (Goldfinch, Gauld and Herbison, 2009), it is inevitably important in democratic society, because democracies rely on the voluntary compliance of citizens to authorities’ rules (Lenard, 2008). In terms of government actions or behaviour, trust in government can encompass whether one expects a government will act more-or-less in one’s and/or the public’s interest; and/or more-or-less legally, legitimately and ethically; as well as perform its jobs adequately (Nooteeboom, 2002). Basically, a trustworthy government is one whose procedures for making and implementing policy meet prevailing standards of fairness and which is capable of credible commitments.

Furthermore, trustworthiness is also a central tenet of the extent to which citizens accept or reject decisions taken by a decision makers (Terwel et al.,
People who know that an authority is trustworthy are more likely to accept the decision taken by the authority than people who know that the authority is untrustworthy. Therefore, one can assume that citizens’ trust in public authorities is necessary in order to achieve public consent for political decisions and more in general trustworthiness provides a government a stable context where achieving public decisions will thus be easier than in a distrusting atmosphere.

Although controversial outcomes have emerged from studies on the relationship between perceived trust in institutions and participation, evidences support the idea that citizens’ participation can only be developed on the basis of a reciprocal trust between people and institutions (Alford, 2001; Orren, 1997; Uslaner and Brown, 2005; Mannarini, Fedi and Trippetti, 2010). From a rational point of view (Perry and Wise, 1990) citizens are likely to trust their government only to the extent they believe that it will act in their interests, that its procedures are fair, and that their trust of the state and of others is reciprocated. This is the condition necessary to produce behavioral compliance with government demands even when individual’s costs somewhat exceed individual benefits and even in the absence of strong ideological convictions that make costs totally irrelevant (Levi, 1998).

Therefore, building on the claim of a number of authors that trust should elicit more participatory behavior than distrust (Almond, 1989), we will assess the impact of trust on citizens’ engagement. Specifically, we hypothesize that trustworthiness should foster citizens’ involvement in participatory processes, since the more trustworthy citizens perceive government to be, the more likely they are to comply with its demands (e.g., Levi, 1989, 1997; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Tyler, 1989, 2006). Also, we expect that when citizens trust their administration government costs will not be relevant in determining their willingness to participate. In fact, in a condition of trustworthiness, costs may be thought as necessary individual losses in order to achieve superordinate collective goals.

**Voice effect and participation: when citizens’ opinions matter**

Voice effect is explained by presuming that a person given an opportunity to express his/her views will believe that voice will help controlling the outcomes of a decision-making process and that these expectations will lead to higher procedural fairness judgments (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). People value voice because it suggests that their views are worthy of hearing and procedures that accord people status in this way are viewed favorably. Thibaut and Walker (1975) articulated a psychological model to explain procedural preferences suggesting that the distribution of control between participants and the third party is the key procedural characteristic shaping people’s views about both fairness and desirability.

Furthermore, several experimental and theoretical works introduced the voice effect into the analyses of participation showing interesting results. Earley and Kanfer (1985) reported that voice-based participation in earlier rather than later stages of decision making has a stronger, more positive impact on satisfaction and performance. Similarly, Lawler (1975) suggested that having a voice is not only a way of being active within the decision-making process: in his view, voice evenly overlaps with participation, which means that expressing one’s own opinion is the only way for participating in decision-making.

Thus, we expect that the extent to which citizens anticipate that their opinions will influence the final decision, that is expected voice effect will at least partially mediate the impact of costs and trust on citizens’ willingness to participate.
Summarizing, we hypothesized both main effects of trust (positive) and expected costs (negative) and an interactive effect of the two variables on citizens’ willingness to participate. Moreover, we also expected voice to be a mediator of such an interaction effect on willingness to participate.

Participants and design
Research participants were one-hundred and ninety-two volunteer students, 66% female, M_age between 20 and 40 years old (measured on an 20 year-interval scale on 4 points, M = 2.07, SD = .687). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions of a 2 (High vs. Low trust) x 2 (High vs. Low expected costs) between subjects design. Willingness to participate in policymaking was the main dependent variable.

Procedure and manipulation of independent variables
After being given an informed consent, participants were told the purpose of study was an examination of participatory governance engagement. Then, participants were given the prompt of the study: firstly participants were asked to read a scenario and try to identify with it, subsequently they should respond to a number of questions. Accordingly, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions (High vs. Low costs and High vs. Low trust in government), manipulated through asking them respectively:

High costs: **Try to imagine that regardless your personal interest for the project, you will realize that participating will entail high costs. A large amount of time will be asked to all participants so that you will have to withdraw your work, study or family and personal commitments; moreover, it may occur that clear and exact decisions as well as consent with other participants will be hard to achieve. Lastly, it may occur conflicts with other participants that may reflect into your everyday life. These costs (as well as others that you may imagine), will be a necessary effect of such a participation.** This manipulation was adapted from previous research examining the costs-benefits of political participation (Wandersman et al., 1987).

Low costs: **Try to imagine that regardless your personal interest for the project, you will realize that participating will entail low costs. A little amount of time will be asked to all participants so that you will not have to withdraw any of your work, study or family and personal commitments; moreover, you will be supported in achieving clear and exact decisions as well as consent with other participants. Lastly, it may occur that relationships with other citizens will benefit from such experience. Any possible costs, (as well as others that you may imagine) will thus be limited as possible.** This manipulation was adapted from previous research examining the costs-benefits of political participation (Wandersman et al., 1987).

High trust: **moreover, the administration government has a good reputation, having shown across years a great care for citizens’ need: his political model is particularly connected with society’s needs which represent a set of guidelines for political action aimed to satisfy citizens’ needs.** This manipulation was created for the purpose of this study.

Low trust: **moreover, the administration government has not a good reputation, having shown across years a lack of care for citizens' need: his political model is not particularly connected with society’s needs, appearing more aimed to respond to the political concerns rather than to satisfy citizens’ needs.** This manipulation was created for the purpose of this study.
After being given the scenario, participants were asked to try to keep focusing on such a scenario while responding the subsequent set of questions.

MEASURES
Finally, motivation to participate, manipulation check of trust, expected costs and voice were measured.

- **Willingness to participate**: specifically participants responded two questions (1 not very much, 5 very much) measuring their likelihood to engage in the participatory governance process highlighted within the scenario. (1) “Imagining to be one of the people described in the scenario, I would be willing to participate in policymaking as proposed by the depicted administration government”; (2) “whether the depicted administration government would be real I would be happy to engage in such a policymaking project” ($\alpha = .77$).

- **Expected costs manipulation check**: participants were asked to think about their expected difficulties and costs involved in political participation on a 5-point scale (1 not very much, 5 very much): (1) “The feeling of frustration from lacking “real” results from participation”; (2) “The need to give up personal and family members for participation”; (3) “Interpersonal conflict with others during participation”; (4) “Any other kind of costs you imagine” ($\alpha = .828$). These questions were adapted from previous research examining costs of political participation (Wandersman et al., 1987).

- **Trust manipulation check**: participants then completed two-questions measuring trust in the government on a 5-point scale (1 not very much, 5 very much): ‘To what extent do you trust the administration government?’ and, ‘To what extent do you consider the administration government to be trustworthy?’ ($\alpha = .96$). These questions were adapted from previous research examining trust in authorities (de Cremer and van Vugt, 1999).

- **Voice**: participants completed one item measuring voice on a 5-point scale (1 not very much, 5 very much): “In the light of the proposal received by the administration government, participating could be a chance to voice my own ideas”.

RESULTS

**Expected Costs Manipulation check.** A 2 (High vs. Low costs) x 2 (High vs. Low trust) ANOVA on costs revealed the expected main effect of costs’ manipulation, $F(1, 188) = 19.01, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$. More personal costs were expected in the high ($M = 3.91, SD = .70$) rather than in the low costs condition ($M = 3.44, SD = .81$). The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of Trust, $F(1, 188) = 5.91, p = .02, \eta^2 = .03$, indicating that when high trust was induced participants expected less costs ($M = 3.55, SD = .74$) than in the low trust condition ($M = 3.80, SD = .82$). No other significant effects emerged.

**Trust Manipulation check.** A 2 (High vs. Low costs) x 2 (High vs. Low trust) ANOVA was conducted on the score of perceived trust toward the administration. The main effect of trust, $F(1, 188) = 75.78, p < .001, \eta^2 = .29$, confirmed the adequacy of the manipulation. More specifically, participants in the high trust condition reported higher scores ($M = 3.41, SD = .78$) than those in the low trust condition ($M = 2.48, SD = .69$). No other significant effects emerged.

**Motivation to Participate.** The 2 (High vs. Low costs) x 2 (High vs. Low trust) ANOVA on motivation to participate highlighted a main effect of trust, $F(1, 188) = 14.90, p < .001, \eta^2 = .07$, indicating that participants in the high trust condition
were more willing to participate ($M = 3.84, SD = .91$) than those in the low trust condition ($M = 3.31, SD = .99$).

Also, a main effect of expected costs emerged, $F(1, 188) = 5.35, p = .02, \eta^2 = .03$. Inspection of means revealed that motivation to participate was more pronounced in the low expected costs condition ($M = 3.73, SD = .92$) rather than in the high costs condition ($M = 3.41, SD = 1.03$).

More importantly, these effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between expected costs and trust, $F(1, 188) = 3.93, p = .049, \eta^2 = .02$. As can be noted in Figure 1, in the high expected costs condition, participants were willing to participate especially when they were in the trust condition ($M = 3.82, SD = .98$) rather than distrust ($M = 3.03, SD = .98$) the administration government, $F(1, 188) = 17.46, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$. When costs were expected to be low, motivation was relatively unaffected by trust, $F(1, 188) = 1.72, p = .19$.

Simple effect analysis within the trust conditions showed that the manipulation of costs only affected participants motivation when trust was low, $F(1, 188) = 9.74, p = .002, \eta' = .05$, with high expected costs leading to reduced motivation ($M = 3.03, SD = .98$) as compared to low expected costs ($M = 3.61, SD = .93$). Expected costs did not affect participants motivation when trust was high ($F < 1$).

**Figure 1** Motivation to participate as a function of trust and costs

**Mediated Moderation Analysis.** Voice was highly correlated with motivation to participate ($r = .58, p < .001$). Building on this association, we wanted to test whether voice could mediate the impact of the interaction between trust and expected costs on motivation. To test for the mediated moderation we first regressed motivation to participate on the interaction between our independent variables. As can be noted in Figure 2, the interaction had a significant impact on motivation to participate, $\beta = .13, t = 1.98, p < .05$. However, after controlling for voice, the interaction between trust and expected costs was not significant anymore, $\beta = .03, t = .56, p = .55$. This result suggests the presence of a full mediation.
The significance of the indirect effect was tested by mean of a bootstrap mediated moderation analysis (Hayes 2013). The 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect of the interaction did not include zero (Lower = .14; Upper = .73), indicating that the indirect effect was significant.

**DISCUSSION**

The general purpose of this study was to test whether previous findings concerning participation in collective action could be extended to a diverse type of participation, specifically within participatory governance. More specifically, we expected a rational variable, such as expected costs, would interact with a more relational variable, such as trust in government, in predicting citizens’ willingness to participate.

Results highlighted a main effect for both costs expectations and trust in government, with high costs reducing willingness to participate and high trust increasing it. Moreover, these variables interacted in predicting citizens’ willingness to participate. That is, when citizens trust their administration government they are willing to get engaged within policymaking regardless of costs, but when they do not trust the administration they are motivated to participate only if they expect low costs for the participation.

Furthermore, results revealed that voice mediated the interaction between expected costs and trust on willingness to participate. Such a result highlighted that citizens’ engagement is primarily driven by the expectation that their own opinion will be taken into account and will have an impact on the final political decision (expected voice).

Concerning the limitations of the present study, firstly we are aware that a sample of students may not be compared to an enlarged population. Indeed, it is possible to imagine that the effect of a costs manipulation may be different for another type of population. Secondly, as part of the literature on civic engagement focuses on groups processes (Simon, 1998; Stürmer and Simon, 2004), we believe that further studies could interestingly analyze the relation between collective identification processes and the variables used in our study (see for example Antonini et al., in press).

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**Figure 2** Mediated moderation analysis

In brackets is the direct effect of the interaction between the independent variables on willingness to participate after controlling for voice. Note: * = p<.05; **= p<.01
Lastly, this study may imply some practical suggestions for public Administrations who want to increase citizens’ participation. Trusted governments can design participatory practices without worrying too much about how costs while, low-trusted ones must necessary design participation focusing on low costs for citizens. Finally, both types of administrations might try to construct communication campaigns by means of which citizens perceived voice is increased, since our results show that voice is the ultimate determinant of citizens’ willingness to participate.

REFERENCES


POLITICIANS AND CITIZENS: COGNITIVE AND DISPOSITIONAL PREDICTORS OF APPROVAL OF AGGRESSION IN POLITICAL LIFE

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ABSTRACT
This article presents a study aimed at testing the relations between specific schemata of the social world (pro-aggressive normative beliefs about aggression in everyday life, social Darwinism, and political cynicism) and dispositional aggression on the one hand, and the level of approval of aggression in politics, on the other hand. On the basis of data collected using face-to-face interviews, conducted on a representative random sample of adult Poles (n = 971), Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was performed. The SEM analyses showed the direct effect of dispositional aggression on the outcome variable (acceptance of aggression in politics) which disappeared when specific schemata of the social world were added to the model. Pro-aggressive normative beliefs turned out to be the most influential mediator of the relation between dispositional aggression and outcome variable. The impact of social Darwinism was smaller, and political cynicism seemed to be weakest (but significant).

Key words: approval of aggression in politics, normative beliefs about aggression, social Darwinism, political cynicism, dispositional aggression

SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
In recent decades European politicians have decidedly not been a highly valued or well liked social group. Post-communist societies, having undergone deep system changes, are characterized by a high level of social and political cynicism. A significant element of this characteristic is distrust of politics and politicians, and especially those people who are in power (Leung, Bond, 2004; Leung et al., 2002). Kwok Leung and Michal Bond, who studied beliefs about human nature and social relations in 41 countries, showed that post-communist societies do not believe politicians and also more frequently reject the notion that political leadership is based on charisma and values. They explain this as an effect of frequent disappointment and cynicism from the side of politicians. In Polish society cynical thoughts about politics and politicians have also been salient throughout the past 25 years of democratization. In the spring of 2014, 81.5% of adults Poles thought that “politics are only an absolute game of power and money” and 64.8% believed that “people who go into politics are usually egoists who are hungry for fame and money”. Only 16.7% of respondents agreed that “politics serve the people in a democracy” (Radkiewicz, Skarzyńska, 2014). It can therefore be said that the negative image of politics and politicians remains despite change of the political system.

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The consequences of the negative image of current politics and politicians include the distrust of democratic institutions, moral delegitimization of the entire current political and economic order (system), and also social and political passivity (Skarżyńska, 2011; Skarżyńska, Henne, 2012). We might also suspect that a cynical view of the social and political world leads to hostility and acceptance of various forms of aggression directed towards politicians.

THE ROLE OF DISPOSITIONAL AGGRESSION AND SCHEMATA OF THE SOCIAL WORLD IN APPROVAL OF AGGRESSION IN POLITICS

In our study we look for some predictors of acceptance of different acts of behavioral aggression in political life. The term “aggression” refers to a wide spectrum of interpersonal behavior. It is defined as “any behavior intended to harm another individual who is motivated to avoid being harmed” (Bettencourt et al., 2006). Aggressive behavior is distinguished from high levels of trait (dispositional) aggressiveness. The latter identifies people who are prone to hostile cognitions and angry affect as well as a readiness to engage in physical and verbal aggression (Bettencourt et al., 2006; Buss, Perry, 1992). Trait aggressiveness is measured with a self-report assessment, such as the Buss-Perry Questionnaire (Buss, Perry, 1992). In democratic context acts of political aggression are inherently illegitimate, but “the specter of political violence haunts even the most stable democracies” (Kalmoe, 2010, p. 2). In contemporary Poland acts of physical aggression are extremely rare: a few physical attacks on party-members or their offices have happened in the last years. But we can observe a permanent hate speech in media (television, radio and internet), in Parliament and also in everyday talk. Political extremists are more tolerated in Polish society than in other European countries (Jasińska-Kania, Skarżyńska, 2009). In the macro-level approach we can see political aggression as the result of strong polarization of the political scene and strong political conflict between the main parties. Polish political leaders use violent political rhetoric (metaphors of war and fighting) and such behaviors can increase support for political aggression among citizens (Fosterling, 2005; Kalmoe, 2010).

In our approach to political aggression, we concentrate on some psychological predictors of approval of different forms of aggression in political life. On the bases of several studies we can assume that social support for political aggression is a significant predictor for propensity to commit acts of political violence, though other factors related to anti-social behavior almost certainly intervene to move citizens from violent attitudes to aggressive behavior (Crick, Dodge, 1994; Fosterling, 2005; Frączek, 2002; Huesmann, Guerra, 1997). So, acceptance for political violence indirectly identifies individuals (respondents) with a higher propensity for engaging in violent political behavior. Individual disposition (propensity) to aggression is associated with acceptance of aggressive behavior in everyday life. Some earlier studies have found a significant but rather weak relation between trait aggressiveness and individual acceptance of observed interpersonal aggression (Huesmann, Guerra, 1997; Slaby, Guerra 1988). There are probably some other variables that mediate the relation between individual propensity for aggression and individual acceptance of interpersonal aggression. This is the reason why the current study focused not only on trait aggressiveness (individual propensity for aggressive behavior in everyday life), but also on latent mental structures that can be associated with acceptance of political aggression, such as cognitive schemata or abstracted general beliefs about the social world and politics.
Normative schemata – self-regulating beliefs about the appropriateness of aggression in everyday life - play an important role among these social beliefs (Guerra, Nucci, Huesmann, 1994; Huesman, Guerra, 1997; Kirwil, 2012). These normative schemata may stimulate or inhibit aggressive behavior and may also affect emotional reactions to other aggressive behavior and lead to approval or disapproval of political aggression. Normative beliefs about aggression influence responses in novel situations (that require controlled processing) as well as in familiar situations (in which cognitive processing is more automatic) (Huesmann, Guerra, 1997).

Two other cognitive schemata that should lead to acceptance of aggression in politics are a negativistic social worldview, called Social Darwinism (Duckitt, Birum, Wagner, du Plessis, 2002; Skarżyńska, Radkiewicz, 2011), and political cynicism (Boski, 2009; Leung, Bond, 2004; Skarżyńska, 2015). Social Darwinism is a belief set expressed in the conviction that, when dealing with people, one must take into account only one’s own good, to be ruthless and vindictive, and to treat people as objects to be used for as long as they are useful. Power and money are more important than honesty and respect for social rule of reciprocity. Only those people who lack compassion, those who know how to take advantage of others, only the fittest, and those most adopted to life in the “social jungle” will survive. This kind of belief appreciates aggression in social and political life as a successful strategy of achievement of important life-goals in the “social jungle”, and also as a defensive reaction to the “dangerous and threatening life in social jungle” (Hawkins, 1997; Sidanius, Pratto, 1999; Skarżyńska, Radkiewicz, 2011).

Political cynicism is a set of negative beliefs about politics and politicians, expressed in the opinion that democratic politics are mainly a cynical game for power and money, and not about values; politicians are egoistic, they don’t care about common social good and treat political opponents not as rivals but rather as enemies. The struggle for power and one’s own interest are more important and more salient than political competition and looking for social consensus. Aggression towards political enemies is accepted as a successful form of struggle for power and realization one’s own (or the party) interests. This kind of belief is divergent from the understanding of democratic politics proposed by theoreticians and researchers of democracy (Dahl, 1998; Post, 2006; Sartori, 1994; Schumpeter, 1995). As mentioned above, such cynical beliefs about the democratic politics of today are widespread in Poland. A few of the reasons for this state of affairs are the sharp and clearly articulated conflict between political elites, polarization of the political scene, and the significant social and ideological divisions in society (Wasilewski, 2010).

Normative beliefs about aggression in everyday life, social Darwinism, and political cynicism are associated with trait aggressiveness as well as with acceptation of interpersonal aggression. So, we can expect that all of these cognitive schemata mediate the relation between dispositional aggression on the one hand, and an approval of aggressive behavior in political life, on the other.

The aim of the study presented in the article is to find empirical answer for the following questions:
1. What is the level of approval of aggression toward politicians and between political opponents in Polish society?
2. What are the relations between individual level of approval of aggression in political life and schemata of the social world, meant as: a/ normative beliefs about aggression is everyday life; b/ belief in antagonistic nature of the social relations – social Darwinism; c/ political cynicism?
3. What is the relation between dispositional aggressiveness and approval of aggression in politics?
4. Do these social schemata mediate the effect of dispositional aggression on approval of aggression in politics?

We expected that the level of approval of aggression in political life would be positively related to the specific schemata of the social world, i.e. pro-aggressive normative beliefs, social Darwinism and political cynicism (hypothesis 1), and would also be positively related to dispositional aggressiveness (hypothesis 2). We also hypothesized that pro-aggressive normative beliefs, social Darwinism, and political cynicism mediate the effect of individual dispositional aggressiveness on approval of aggression in political life (hypothesis 3).

METHOD

Participants
The sample consisted of 971 adults (aged 18+), with 43.6% men and 56.4% women. Of the respondents, 17.1% had primary and lower education, 21.5% vocational, 35.6% secondary and postsecondary, and 25.8% higher education. It is fully representative of a random sample of the Polish adult population in terms of sex, age, education level, place of residence and region. The specification of the sample, the respondent sampling, and the field study were all conducted by CBOS (leader in the field of public opinion research and a member of ESOMAR, the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research).

Procedure and Measures
The study was based on face-to-face interviews using a Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI), that ensured individual randomization of the item order within each multiple scale. Respondents had to fill in a number of scales measuring their beliefs and level of acceptance of different aggressive behaviors towards politicians. The research was conducted in the two last weeks of September 2014.

Approval of aggression in political life was measured with three following scales:

1/ Approval of Aggression towards Politicians (Scale 1): 5-item Likert scale with 4-point agree-disagree responses (Skarżyńska, 2013). The items tap support for threats against politicians, using verbal and physical aggression. Examples: “Insulting the politicians is...”, “Taking out one’s anger on the politicians and verbally abusing them in public is...”, “Saying that Polish politicians these days are thieves, murders, traitors is...”. The Cronbach’s alpha amounted to $\alpha = 0.78$.

2/ Approval of Aggression towards Politicians who Hurt the Country (Scale 2): 5-item Likert scale with 4-point agree-disagree responses (Polish version the Support for Political Violence Scale, Kalmoe, 2010). The items tap support for threats against political leaders, politically-motivated property violence, and use of physical force against government in situation perceived as politicians hurting the country. Examples: “When politicians are damaging the country, citizens should send threats to scare them straight”, “Sometimes the only way to stop bad politicians is with physical force”. The Cronbach’s alpha amounted to $\alpha = 0.85$.

3/ Approval of Aggression between Politicians (Scale 3): 5-item Likert scale with 4-point agree-disagree responses (Skarżyńska, 2013). The items tap support for different kinds of aggression (verbal and physical) between politicians and their political opponents. Examples: “The use of physical force by politicians to stop their political opponents is...”. The Cronbach’s alpha amounted to $\alpha = 0.70$. 


Normative beliefs about aggression – defined as individualistic standards about acceptability of aggressive behavior – were measured with the shortened NOBAG Scale (Huesmann, Guerra, 1997), adopted to adults (Kirwil, 2012). This 8-item Likert scale measures general beliefs about appropriateness of different aggressive behaviors in everyday life. Each item is evaluated on a 4-point acceptation scale. Examples: “It is OK to say mean things to other people”, “It is OK to take your anger out on others by using physical force”. The scale is highly reliable: Cronbach’s α = 0.87.

Aggression as a personality trait (dispositional aggression) – was measured with The Aggression Questionnaire (Buss, Perry, 1992). This 29-item questionnaire showed internal consistency and stability over time. Factor analysis yielded 4 scales: physical aggression (examples: “If somebody hits me, I hit back”, “I have become so mad that I have broken things”), verbal aggression (examples: “My friends say that I’m somewhat argumentative”, “I often find myself disagreeing with people”), anger (examples: “I have trouble controlling my temper”, “When frustrated, I let my irritation show”), and hostility (examples: “I’m sometimes eaten up with jealousy”, “I’m suspicious of overly friendly strangers”). Each item is evaluated on a 5-point scale. Reliability of the Aggression Questionnaire is high: Cronbach’s α = 0.85.

Social Darwinism was measured with the 15-item competitive and antagonistic worldview scale developed by Duckitt and collaborators (Duckitt, Fisher, 2003). Each item was evaluated on a 6-point scale. Examples: “If you need to be vindictive and ruthless to achieve your goals, that is what you should do”, “We live in a world that knows no mercy, and you sometimes have to behave mercilessly”. The scale is sufficiently reliable: Cronbach’s α = 0.75.

Political Cynicism was measured with a 10-item balance Likert scale (Skarżyńska, 2013). Each item was evaluated on a 5-point scale. Examples: “Politics are an unfair game that is only about power and money”, “Most democratic policies serve the greater good of the citizens” (reverse-coded). The scale is sufficiently reliable: Cronbach’s α = 0.73.

Social-demographic variables: age, sex, education level, and place of residence were also controlled.

RESULTS

The results section is divided into three parts. The first is a general descriptive analysis of the population of Poland regarding the level of approval of aggression in politics. The next section presents a set of hierarchical analyses regressing different measures of approval of aggression in politics on the specific cognitive schemata of the social world (normative beliefs about aggression in everyday life, social Darwinism, political cynicism) after initial control for socio-demographic factors. Finally, the potential links between dispositional aggression and approval of aggression in politics will be tested. We will use structural equation modeling in order to find out whether this relationship can be shown as mediated by the specific schemata of the social world.

Approval of aggression in politics: Distributions and descriptive statistics

Table 1 depicts inter-correlations among three outcome variables. As one can see, all of the indices have considerable positive links (r from .32 to .56) with almost identical standard deviations. Based on sample mean values, it can be concluded that the level of approval of aggression in politics is rather small in Polish society. Beyond such a general conclusion it is also worth noting that the most disapproved acts of aggression concern aggressive behavior between politicians, while aggression directed against politicians from citizens/voters is being perceived as relatively more justified.
The approval of aggression in politics – as it is defined by the three measured aspects – forms a quite homogeneous phenomenon. However, it does not mean that the social approval of all the studied acts or manifestations of aggression is equally widespread. Some of them are more often accepted, while others seem to be subject to a clear social taboo. These specific differences were depicted in Figure 1, which shows

Table 1 Measures of approval of aggression in politics: Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approval of…</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min. – Max.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggression in politics (1) (scale 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>1–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression between politicians (2) (scale 2)</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>1–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression towards bad politicians (3) (scale 3)</td>
<td>.50***</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>1–4</td>
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Note. *** p ≤ .001

The approval of aggression in politics – as it is defined by the three measured aspects – forms a quite homogeneous phenomenon. However, it does not mean that the social approval of all the studied acts or manifestations of aggression is equally widespread. Some of them are more often accepted, while others seem to be subject to a clear social taboo. These specific differences were depicted in Figure 1, which shows

Figure 1 Approval of specific acts of aggression in politics
approving responses with reference to separate acts of aggression considered by the three outcome variables.

Comparisons of the responses concerning specific acts of aggression show considerable differences as to their approval. While ‘Insulting the politicians’ or ‘Saying that the Polish politicians these days are thieves, murderers, traitors’ is accepted by, respectively, 21.4 and 17.7% of the respondents, behaviors such as ‘The use of physical force by politicians to stop their political opponents’ or ‘Hitting, elbowing or throwing objects at politicians’ is accepted by, respectively, 2.7 and 2.4% of respondents. In general, respondents seem to be much more inclined to approve verbal than physical aggression. Roughly, the group approving different forms of verbal aggression amounts to about 15%, while the group approving different acts of physical aggression is at about 5%.

**Cognitive schemata of the social world as predictors of approval of aggression in politics**

The initial step in this section was a look at descriptive statistics of the indices measuring cognitive schemata of the social world. Mean values in Table 2 point out rather low acceptance of aggression in everyday life (M = 1.42) and of Darwinian beliefs about the nature of the social world (M = 2.49). These statistics clearly contrast with a very high level of beliefs about the cynical nature of politics (M = 3.45). The general picture of politics in the perception of Polish society appears as full of injustice, self-interest, ruthlessness etc. However, such a negative view of politics cannot be seen as closely related to acceptance of normative aggression ($r = .07$; $p \leq .05$) or to Darwinian social beliefs ($r = .11$; $p \leq .01$).

**Table 2 Cognitive schemata of the social world: Inter-correlations and descriptive statistics**

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<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min. – Max.</th>
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<td>Normative Beliefs about</td>
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<td>Aggression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>1 – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Darwinism (2)</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td></td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1 – 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Cynicism (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>1 – 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.***$p \leq .001$*** $p \leq .01$ *$p \leq .05$

Table 3 shows three regressions of approval of aggression in politics (for each of the three measures) on the set of predictors including normative beliefs about aggression in everyday life, social Darwinism, and political cynicism. Hierarchical regression analysis was applied in order to control the cumulative impact of the socio-demographic factors (gender, age, education, and place of residence). Therefore, socio-demographic factors were put into the equation first, and the main predictors were added in the second step.

At first, one may note that the set of socio-demographic variables does not contribute considerably to either of the three outcome variables’ variance. Only the effect of sex appear to be statistically significant: women are slightly less prone than men to approve of aggression in politics. The increase of the model’s fit ($R^2$ Change) evoked by adding the main predictors is quite considerable and similar for all the outcome variables. Depending on the form of approval of aggression in politics, $R^2$ rises from .18 to .23% over and above the socio-demographic variables. However, individual predictors do not share equal contribution to such an impressive increase of $R^2$. Undoubtedly, the most predictive power is revealed by normative acceptance of aggres-
sion in everyday life (β from .30 to .36). The positive effect of social Darwinism appears (β from .17 to .22) in second place, and at the end the positive effect of political cynicism should be mentioned (β from .04 to .18).

In conclusion, we confirmed that one can see different forms of approval of aggression in politics as a more general political attitude clearly influenced by some specific cognitive schemata of the social world. Considering the set of studied predictors, this approval is highest when accompanied by general acceptance of using aggression in everyday life and, to a lesser degree, by a Darwinian view of the social life. The impact of cynical view of politics, as presumably more context-dependent and reactive to current politics, seems to be least significant.

**Cognitive schemata as mediators of the relationship between dispositional aggression and approval of aggression in politics**

As we expected, dispositional aggression (M = 2.13; SD = .55) appeared to be significantly associated with the approval of aggression in politics (for scale 1, 2 and 3, respectively, r = .25, .23 and .19; all significant at p ≤ .001). In order to test whether this relationship can be shown as mediated by the set of specific schemata of the social world, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) methodology was used. Apart from correcting for the attenuating effects of measurement error, it first of all allowed us to test a general complex model that included (a) both independent and outcome variable expressed as the latent variables and (b) the whole set of potential mediators.

The SEM analyses were performed in two steps by IBM SPSS Amos 21.0. First, it included only the direct effect of dispositional aggression on approval of aggression in politics. With 13 degrees of freedom, it turned out to have a satisfactory goodness of fit (CFI = .961; TLI = .917; SRMR = .054; RMSEA = .071), and a substantial size of the direct effect (β = .31; p ≤ .001). In the next step the indirect effects of dispositional aggression on the outcome variable were added in the form of three media-
tors: normative beliefs about aggression, social Darwinism, and political cynicism. With 30 degrees of freedom, the goodness of fit in the mediation model appeared slightly less satisfactory but still acceptable (CFI = .920; TLI = .880; SRMR = .054; RMSEA = .079). The mediators reduced the size of the direct effect to non-significant ($\beta = .04; p = .27$), meaning that the impact of dispositional aggression on the approval of aggression in politics should be seen as almost fully indirect, i.e. mediated by some specific schemata of the social world. It is worth noting that inclusion of the mediation paths increased the $R^2$ of the outcome variable from .09 to .50. In other words, when the approval of aggression in politics is expressed in the form of a latent variable, the model of mediation can explain as much as 50% of its total variance.

Statistics in Figure 2 point out normative aggression in everyday life as the most influential mediator of the relation between the independent and outcome variable. The impact of social Darwinism is smaller, and that of political cynicism seems to be decidedly weakest. Nevertheless, when tested with Sobel’s test for their statistical significance, all of them turned out significant ($t = 7.76, 6.15, \text{and } 3.6$, respectively; $p \leq .001$).
For a final summary we may look at the Proportion Mediated (PM) which indicates what proportion of the total effect is mediated by the intervening variable(s) (c.f. Fairchild, MacKinnon, Taborga, Taylor, 2009). In general, the PM index tells us that the cumulative indirect effect of the set of three mediators contributes 87% to the total effect of dispositional aggression on the outcome variable. However, this remarkable contribution is not shared evenly by individual mediators. Therefore, the PM calculated separately show partial mediation of normative aggression in everyday life, social Darwinism, and political cynicism on the effects of dispositional aggression on approval of aggression in politics amounting to 51%, 28%, and 8%, respectively.

CONCLUSION
The results of our study show that the level of approval of aggression in politics is rather small in Polish society. However, some acts of manifestation of aggression in politics are accepted more often than other forms of aggressive behavior. In general, respondents seems to be much more inclined to approve verbal than physical aggression. The same tendency was found in other studies conducted in Poland (Kirwil, 2012) and in the USA (Kalmoe, 2010).

Approval of aggression in politics turned out to be independent of socio-demographic factors (age, education level, place of residence), except for the small correlation with gender, showing slightly lower aggression approval expressed by women than men. So, in that sense, the level of approval of aggression in politics is a “democratic” phenomenon: it is equally distributed in Polish society.

As we expected, the level of approval of aggression in politics appeared to be clearly influenced by some specific cognitive schemata: normative pro-aggressive beliefs (general acceptance of using aggression in everyday life), a Darwinist world view, and a cynical view of politics. Dispositional aggression also appeared to be significantly associated with the approval of aggression in politics, but its role is mediated by the set of specific schemata of the social world. The results of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) showed that the impact of dispositional aggression on the approval of aggression in politics is fully indirect, i.e. it is mediated by the above mentioned, specific schemata of the social world. Normative beliefs about aggression in everyday life turned out to be the most influential mediator. This result confirms the role of such normative beliefs in regulation of social attitudes towards aggressive behavior, pointed out in previous research (Huesmann, Guerra, 1997; Kirwil, 2012; Slaby, Guerra, 1988).

The impact of social Darwinism appeared to be smaller, and the effect of political cynicism was the weakest (but still statistically significant). These results suggest that social attitudes towards aggression in politics are rooted in a relatively stable general normative beliefs that are formed early and an individual worldview rather than in a cynical view of politics, which is presumably more context-dependent and reactive to current politics. Nevertheless, political cynicism, largely and clearly articulated in the society, seems to be important for the political atmosphere in the country and it leads not only to higher approval of aggression in politics, but also to political passivity, moral delegitimization of the political status-quo, and political aggression (Caprara, 2008; Leung, Bond, 2004; Skarżyńska, 2015). The variables taken into account in our SEM analysis explained 50 percent of the outcome variable (approval of aggression in politics). So, there are some others variables that can influence the level of approval of aggression in politics. We suppose that some contextual factors (for instance, relationships between the citizens and evaluated politicians), as well as ideological preferences of respondents, can have an impact on evaluation of aggression in politics.
REFERENCES


FACTORS OF POSITIVE SOCIAL FUNCTIONING IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSFORMING SOCIETIES: RESULTS OF THE BRNO LONGITUDINAL STUDY ON LIFE-SPAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT
The aim of the study was to predict adaptive social functioning in terms of career stability in middle adulthood based on personality and socio-economic variables from childhood/adolescence and early adulthood. 83 people have participated in an ongoing longitudinal study started in 1961 (54% women). Personality traits were measured by means of Maudsley Personality Inventory at the age of 16 years. Socio-economic variables included information about parental socio-economic status and the participants’ highest education. Career stability was established using Life History Calendar method. We distinguish two adaptive career lines (stable and changeable) and one non-adaptive career line (unstable). We have identified expected but not significant influences of socio-economic status on career stability: stable career is more frequent among people with higher education while unstable career line is more usual among people with lower education. We have found also intergenerational continuity in both dimensions of socio-economic status: education and occupation (parental SES and participant’s SES). As the only personality predictor of type of career line we have identified extraversion in adolescence: changeable career is more frequent in extraverts, while unstable career is more frequently seen in introverts.

Key words: social functioning, transforming societies, longitudinal study, personality, socio-economic variables

INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the interest of researchers in the field of lifelong development has turned increasingly to the adaptive side. Systematic research of successful development appeared in the 1990s (see Baltes, Baltes, 1990). Nowadays, successful development has become a multidisciplinary area that draws inspiration not only from developmental psychology but also from positive psychology, social psychology, health psychology or from sociology.

Successful development is often seen as ‘the maximization of gains and the minimization of losses’ (Baltes, Staudinger, Lindenberger, 1998, p. 1030); as maintaining balance between various characteristics, such as primary and secondary control (Schulz, Heckhausen, 1996) or assimilation and accommodation (Brandstädter, 1998). Successful development is related also to continued growth and development in old age (Ryff, Keyes, 1995), to good health and functioning (Rowe, Kahn, 1997) or to effective functioning in society (see Helson, Wink, 1987).

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Current empirical research distinguishes between two aspects (criteria) of successful development: external (objective, social) and internal (subjective, psychological) criteria (Baltes, Carstensen, 2003; Pulkkinen, Nygren, Kokko, 2002). External criteria that refer to adaptive social functioning are indicated by fulfillment of developmental tasks or adjustment to social norms. Among them is often used family socioeconomic status (Caspi et al., 1998), career stability (Pulkkinen, Nygren, Kokko, 2002), academic achievement (Damian et al., 2014) or absence of risk behavior (Pulkkinen, Feldt, Kokko, 2006). On the other hand, internal criteria that refer to adaptive psychological functioning are indicated by well-being and related constructs such as life satisfaction, meaning in life, self-esteem or self-efficacy (Baltes, Carstensen, 2003; Pulkkinen, Caspi, 2002). Subjective and objective characteristics of successful development are interrelated (Hawkins et al., 2009): career instability and particularly unemployment, considerably reduce well-being, life satisfaction and self-esteem (Kokko, Pulkkinen, 1998; Rönkä, Pulkkinen, 1995). Conversely, better education, higher socioeconomic status and good occupational status contribute to higher levels of well-being (Lai, Cummins, 2013; Schieman, Van Gundy, Taylor, 2001).

Successful development is also partly determined by the society in which the individual’s life is set. This is represented especially by social institutions (political, social cultural or educational systems) and a broader socio-cultural context (Titma, Tuma, 2005). A unique opportunity for research on macrosocial influences is provided by societies in political, economic or cultural transition. Change of a society’s condition can lead to a change on the individual level (Elder, Giele, 2009; Silbereisen, Tomasik, 2008). Macrosocial factors significantly influence both psychological and social characteristics of successful development. In societies in transition this leads to principal differences in individual experiences of the young generation and the generation of their parents (Silbereisen, Tomasik, 2008; Titma, Tuma, 2005).

Macrosocial transitions tend to affect the social dimension first (Silbereisen, Pinquart, Tomasik, 2010). Research in post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe has shown that the downfall of communism led to significant macrosocial changes: increase in divorces, emergence of single households (Silbereisen, Pinquart, Tomasik, 2010); unemployment influenced career stability (Mickiewicz, 2010), particularly among the young population (Roberts, 2001). Relatively rapid changes also occurred in the age at marriage or leaving the parental home (Silbereisen, Tomasik, 2008). In comparison, changes in adaptive psychological functioning appeared very slowly and gradually (Silbereisen, Pinquart, Tomasik, 2010).

However, macrosocial changes in the 1980s and 1990s in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have brought not only negative changes, but also positive ones such as free choice of study or free travel abroad (Klicperová, Feierabend, Hofstetter, 1997). The influence of macrosocial changes on individual successful development depends also on a person’s age. The most extensive losses usually occur in elderly people (Hofäcker, Buchholz, Blossfeld, 2010). In contrast, young people in their 20s or 30s could use the new social situation to improve their lives: they were at the start of their careers; it was much easier for them to change career direction, start their own businesses or work abroad (Titma, Tuma, 2005).

These findings suggest that successful development has to be studied only in the context of a concrete culture and society. In the transitional society we have to be careful what characteristics we define as indicators of successful development. Many of them can be affected by macrosocial changes. While these variables are surely an important focus of longitudinal studies in relatively stable societies (Pulkkinen, Nygren, Kokko, 2002), it is always advisable to ask what information value they would...
have in societies which have gone through such fundamental social, economic and/or political changes as Central and Eastern European countries have in the past twenty years (see Schaie, Elder, 2005).

Current study

Research on human development in a changing society faces many pitfalls. The number of cross-sectional and especially longitudinal studies dealing with the influence of macrosocial changes on human development is still relatively small. With few exceptions, research is currently prevailing in post-communist countries (Silbereisen, Tomasik, 2008; Titma, Tuma, 2005). Many of these studies are moreover rather sociologically oriented. Our study is based on a longitudinal study running since 1961 in Brno (Czech Republic). Unlike many other psychological longitudinal studies that deal with influences of macrosocial change, our research focuses on various psychological and social characteristics such as temperament and personality, well-being, values, socioeconomic status or career stability.

Our first aim was to predict positive social functioning in terms of career stability in middle adulthood based on personality and socio-economic variables from childhood, adolescence and early adulthood. As an indicator of adaptive social functioning, we used career stability because it adequately reflects developmental tasks of adulthood – integrating the individual into society through work and acceptance of social norms. Unstable career line may be connected to higher probability of problem behavior and psychological distress (Pulkkinen, Ohranen, Tolvanen, 1999). Stability of career line that indicates successful integration into society through work is used also in other longitudinal studies of successful development (e.g., Pulkkinen, Nygren, Kokko, 2002).

Career stability research shows that personality traits play a substantial role. At present, there are a large number of studies dealing with the relation between career and adult personality. Relations between personality and subjective and objective career success were visible throughout adulthood (Judge et al., 1999; Ng, Feldman, 2014), particularly between low neuroticism, high emotional regulation and stable career (Pulkkinen, Ohranen, Tolvanen, 1999). Other studies point to the relation between career stability and high agreeableness (Wille, deFruyt, Freys, 2010) or high extraversion, especially in women (Pulkkinen, Ohranen, Tolvanen, 1999). Unstable career, specifically in the context of long-term unemployment, is associated with high neuroticism (Rönkä, Pulkkinen, 1995) and higher openness to experience (Wille, deFruyt, Freys, 2010; Carless, Arnup, 2010). In these studies personality traits such as extraversion and neuroticism repeatedly appear as correlates of successful social functioning (career stability). We would like to know whether they will also apply in the longer term aspect. Therefore, our first hypothesis was that career stability in middle adulthood would be connected to personality traits in adolescence (extraversion and neuroticism).

Other important source of successful career orientation is academic functioning (such as school achievement or motivation) (Kokko, Pulkkinen, Lyrya, 2008). This can affect attitudes toward work, job seeking or the incidence of long-term unemployment (Pulkkinen, Nygren, Kokko, 2002). Regarding these finding, our second hypothesis is connected to academic achievement. We assumed that higher education would be connected to successful social functioning indicated by career stability.

Our second aim was to look on intergenerational continuity in socioeconomic status (levels of education and occupation), due to the fact that our participants were at the beginning of their family and work adult life, when significant macrosocial
changes took place in the Czech Republic (Velvet Revolution in 1989; the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993). Other studies exploring intergenerational stability in similar conditions discovered a significant gap between generations before and after the transition (Silbereisen, Tomasik, 2008; Titma, Tuma, 2005). These studies are often based on comparison of socioeconomic status (education and occupation) of parents (generation before) and participants (generation after macrosocial change). In our study these data were also available. Therefore, we were interested also in intergenerational continuity. We would like to know whether intergenerational discontinuity is also manifested in our sample, especially in the area of occupational status.

**METHOD**

**Sample**

The original longitudinal study titled ‘The psychological development of school children coming from different social environments’ was carried out by the Institute of Psychology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic between 1961 and 1980. At the start, the study counted 557 children born between 1961 and 1964 (50.1% girls). During the longitudinal study, the dataset suffered from attrition as expected. Out of the original number of 557 subjects, less than 350 were examined at the age of 16. The decrease of subjects at the age of 16 years was caused by the transition from primary school to secondary school.

In the follow-up study, the original participants were approached with a request for participation in the follow-up project. The first wave of research took place between 2001 and 2005; data were obtained from 83 subjects (mean age at first contact, 39.7 years, 48 women). A detailed description of the sample in terms of demographic characteristics can be found in the study by Blatný, Jelínek and Osecká (2007). The Life History Calendar method was administered in a separate session. This fact is reflected in the different number of respondents (N = 74, 41 women) in the corresponding analyses and different mean age of respondents (42.42 years). The second wave of investigations within the adult population was done in 2011, when 76 people participated in the study (44 women, mean age 48.1 years).

**Instruments**

**Parents**

Parental socioeconomic status was indicated by their education and occupational status. Information about parents’ education was obtained at the participant’s birth and was evaluated for mothers and fathers separately. According to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED; Czech Statistical Office, 2008) we classified parental education into four groups: 1 = university education; 2 = high school with school leaving exam; 3 = high school without school leaving exam; and 4 = basic education.

Information about parental occupation was obtained when participants were 10 years old. Occupational status was classified by modified Erikson-Goldthorpe social class scheme (EGP; Katřínáč, 2005) into three groups: 1 = highest level of occupational status; 2 = middle level of occupational status; and 3 = lowest level of occupational status.

**Adolescence**

At age 16, personality characteristics were measured using the Maudsley Personality Inventory (MPI) (Eysenck, 1959). Reliability in terms of internal consistency for
extraversion and neuroticism scales found in our sample is satisfactory (Cronbach’s $\alpha_E = .68$; Cronbach’s $\alpha_N = .86$).

**Adulthood**

For objective life events we administered Life History Calendar (Caspi et al., 1996, modified by L. Pulkkinen, University of Jyväskylä, Finland). This method was used to obtain retrospective information about important events from the respondent’s life. Two dimensions were taken into account when identifying significant life events: time (chronological) and thematic (parallel) level.

Using the data from Life History Calendar we created a variable characterizing the respondents in terms of a lifelong career line (measured in 47–49 years). We classified respondents’ career lines as stable, unstable or changeable (similar to Pulkkinen, Ohranen, Tolvanen, 1999). We evaluated the stability of a career from 27 years of age, to better compare people with different levels of education. A stable career is characterized by a job in the same field without periods of unemployment. Changeable careers occur among people who interrupted their careers to study or left to take care of a household (care for children, parents, etc.). If they work in the same field, they often change jobs. An unstable career is characterized by high variability of jobs together with employment outside the field of attained education. In this group, periods of unemployment longer than 6 months can occur (not associated with waiting to start a new job).

Information about level of education and occupational status led to the formation of indicators of participants’ socioeconomic status in adulthood. Using data from Life History Calendar, we evaluated the level of education and occupation of participants in adulthood (measured in 41–45 years). Similar to parental education, we used modified ISCED classification (Czech Statistical Office, 2008): 1 = university education; 2 = high school with school leaving exam; and 3 = high school without school leaving exam. No participant had basic education. For occupational status we used modified EGP classification again (Katrňák, 2005): 1 = highest level of occupational status; 2 = middle level of occupational status; and 3 = lowest level of occupational status.

**Methods of analysis**

Relations between stability of career line and education as well as relations between parental socioeconomic status and participants’ career stability were described by Multinomial logistic regression analysis. In the context of regression analysis, we used the bootstrapping method (1000 samples, percentile based confidence interval). For measuring intergenerational (dis)continuity between parental and participants’ socioeconomic status (education and occupation) we used nonparametric correlational analysis – Kendall’s Tau-b.

**RESULTS**

In the first step of the data analysis, we analyzed the relationship between stability of career line and adolescent personality traits (see Table 1). Extraversion in 16 years was a significant predictor of career line. Using Multinomial logistic regression we found that the significant personality predictors of career stability include only extraversion. The results show that extraversion in adolescence might play an important role in prediction of stability of career line in middle adulthood. Higher level of extraversion increases the likelihood of the career being changeable, compared to unstable. Also parental socioeconomic status plays a significant role in participants’ career line –
especially father’s education and mother’s occupation that were different for stable and unstable career line. On the other hand, the relationship between stability of career line and one’s own education and occupation was nonsignificant. Therefore, we can accept our first hypothesis (connection of career stability and adolescent personality traits) but our second hypothesis (connection of own education and career stability) could not be confirmed.

Table 1 Prediction of professional career type at age 50 based on the characteristics of personality characteristics in adolescence, education and parental socioeconomic status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>predictor</th>
<th>(\chi^2(2))</th>
<th>significant paired comparisons (p &lt; 0.05)</th>
<th>B(SE)</th>
<th>exp(B)</th>
<th>95% confidence interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>extraversion</td>
<td>6.85*</td>
<td>changeable vs. unstable</td>
<td>.29 (.13)</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>(1.04; 1.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neuroticism</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>father's education</td>
<td>18.30**</td>
<td>stable vs. unstable</td>
<td>-3.97 (1.99)</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>(.00; 0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>father's occupation</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mother's education</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mother's occupation</td>
<td>11.94*</td>
<td>stable vs. unstable</td>
<td>6.75 (2.72)</td>
<td>850.39</td>
<td>(4.12; 175692.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** .01 level of significance; * .05 level of significance
Level of significance of overall model is acceptable \(\chi^2 = 45.63; \text{df} = 28; p = .02; \text{Cox and Snell pseudo } R^2 = .56; \text{Nagelkerke } R^2 = .64\).

We further focused on intergenerational continuity between parental and participants’ socioeconomic status indicated by the level of education and by occupational status. We found intergenerational continuity in both dimensions of socioeconomic status. In the dimension of education it was \(\tau_b = .23\) (with father’s education; N = 69) and \(\tau_b = .40\) (with mother’s education; N = 71), both at the level p < .01. In the dimension of occupational status it was \(\tau_b = .19\) (with father’s occupational status; N = 63) and \(\tau_b = .21\) (with mother’s occupational status; N = 64), both at the level p < .05. Regarding these results we cannot accept our third hypothesis about low intergenerational continuity.

DISCUSSION
In comparison with other longitudinal studies exploring the area of social functioning conducted in more stable societies (e.g. JYLS; Feldt et al., 2005), we have found differences mainly in the career area: The results of our study suggest that occurrence of changeable career line was more frequent in our sample and it was understood in more positive terms. Other studies connect extraversion with stable career line (Kokko, Bergman, Pulkkinen, 2003), but our results indicate the relation between extraversion and changeable career.

One of the possible explanations could be the macrosocial changes occurring in the Czech Republic at the end of 1980s and early 1990s: In 1989 it was the so-called “Velvet Revolution” that is connected to downfall of the communist regime in former Czechoslovakia and in 1993 it was the dissolution of Czechoslovakia to become the Czech Republic and Slovakia. At this time our participants were in their young adulthood – establishing their careers and families. Therefore they were much more sensitive to their social environment than in other stages of life (Silbereisen, Chen, 2010). In the work context, societal changes led to the transformation of industry and privatization of state companies (Svejnar, 1999). These changes have contributed signifi-
cantly to the diversification of career trajectories that were quite uniform before the “Velvet Revolution” of 1989. People got a chance to experiment more – to establish their own businesses, work abroad and try new, unusual or previously untested professions (Krebs, 2007). Also, our participants perceived the year 1989 as a significant source of change, particularly in relation to entrepreneurship, life abroad or to free entry to the monastic order (Pilátová-Osecká, 2003).

Despite these important macrosocial changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s that occurred in the Czech Republic, we have found intergenerational continuity in both dimensions of socio-economic status. Unlike other longitudinal studies that focused on social adaptation (Silbereisen, Tomasik, 2008; Titma, Tuma, 2005) we have not found a significant difference between parental and participants’ level of education and occupation. Our results are more inclined to the so-called ‘Matthew effect’ (Damian et al., 2014): children with better educated parents with high occupational status have the opportunity to develop their skills and talents in various extracurricular activities or have more supportive learning environments. These children tend to internalize the higher aspirations of their parents, especially regarding education level and occupational success (Caspi et al., 1998; Dubow et al., 2006; Pulkkinen, Feldt, Kokko, 2006). One of the reasons for this stability could be that no significant changes in the educational system appeared in the Czech Republic (for comparisons see the former educational systems in West and East Germany) (Vondracek et al., 1999).

In research on people living in a changing society, researchers often find that the family environment plays a less significant role in life course development than human agent factors (such as aspirations or self-efficacy) (Titma, Tuma, 2005). We, on the other hand, have found intergenerational continuity also in the influence of parental education on their children’s career lines. These results are more similar to stable societies where the influence of family background is more significant (Caspi et al., 1998; Damian et al., 2014).

LIMITATIONS

The limitations of the study stem from the relatively low number of subjects for whom the necessary data for analysis of hypothesized relationships were available. Although the research sample was quite large at the beginning of the longitudinal study (over 500 children), we managed to contact only a relatively small portion of the original sample in adulthood. The sample attrition rate was, apart from standard factors, definitely affected by the long time span between the end of the original research (in middle adolescence of the respondents) and the initiation of the new follow-up study in middle adulthood. The relatively low number of respondents to some extent limits the validity of the conclusions made on the basis of inferential statistics procedures. In connection with sample attrition a self-selection bias occurred. Participants in the follow-up study had a slightly higher level of intelligence in childhood and adolescence in comparison with people who didn’t enter the new study, in terms of personality traits however, no differences between these two groups were found.

In our study we were limited also by areas studied especially in the original study (childhood and adolescence). Especially in the area of adaptive social behavior in adolescence (risk or problem behavior) we had not available any data. Our model of adolescent predictors of adult social adaptive functioning was therefore limited only to personality characteristics and level of education.
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International Journal of Behavioral Development, 27, 134-144.
MATERIALISM, SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ENTITLEMENT: INTERPLAY BETWEEN MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONING

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ABSTRACT
In the current paper, the relationship between materialistic aspirations (fame, money and image) and psychological entitlement (active, passive and revenge) is examined. Additionally, the possible mediating role of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being are considered. SEM analysis conducted on Polish students sample ($n = 153$) revealed that materialism was positively related to psychological entitlement. The relationship between materialism and active entitlement was partially mediated by higher hedonic well-being, the relationship between passive entitlement and materialism was fully mediated by higher social well-being and the relationship between revenge entitlement and materialism was direct and unmediated by subjective well-being. These findings are discussed in reference to the culture of materialism and narcissism in relation to Central and East European (CEEU) cultural context.

Key words:
materialism, subjective well-being, entitlement

ISSUE
According to Kasser and Ryan (1993), fulfilment of important life goals results in increased life satisfaction. Intrinsic life goals, such as like self-actualization or spirituality, are positively related to subjective well-being (SWB), whereas the relationship between extrinsic goals, like pleasure or money, and SWB is more complex (Martos, Kop, 2012; Rijavec, Brdar, Miljković, 2006; Skarżyńska, 2003; Zawadzka et al., 2015).

Among extrinsic life goals, the ‘materialistic triad’ - comprised by fame, wealth and image – attracts researchers’ particular attention (Kasser, 2002). These materialistic goals, in addition to materialism or the importance of possessing goods in life (Richins, Dawson, 1992), are associated with decreasing levels of life satisfaction (Kasser, 2002) and increasing levels of psychological entitlement (Twenge, Campbell, 2009). The current paper focuses on the examination of relationships between the materialistic triad, SWB and entitlement. We distinguish between hedonic and eudaimonic well-being (Deci, Ryan, 2008; Waterman, 1993) and focus both on cognitive and affective components of hedonic well-being (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, Giffin 1985). Social well-being is regarded as important aspect of eudaimonic well-being (Keyes, 1998; Keyes, Schmotkin, Ryff, 2002). Therefore,
we pay particular attention to the idea that materialism results in higher expectations toward others as expressed in entitlement and by it could decrease SWB. Further, we differentiate between healthy and pathological forms of entitlement (Lessard et al., 2011; Tomlinson, 2013), as we adopt three-dimensional model of entitlement, conceptualizing active, passive, and revenge forms of the concept (Piotrowski, Żemojtel-Piotrowska, 2009; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2015a). We assume that if the expectations toward others are realistic (i.e. healthy entitlement), then SWB increases. Conversely, if the expectations are unrealistic and exaggerated (i.e. pathological entitlement), then SWB decreases, especially in relation to the social functioning of the individual.

Materialism and Subjective Well-being

Subjective well-being is a broad phenomenon (see Kim-Prieto et al., 2013 for review). Deci and Ryan (2008) proposed a distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic understanding of SWB. Hedonic well-being is based on pleasure and positive emotional balance, while eudaimonic well-being is based on self-realization, searching for the meaning in life and being important part of the society (Ryff, 1989; Ryff, Singer, 2013). Positive interpersonal relationships represent one of the core dimensions of psychological well-being in Ryff’s model (1989). Keyes (1998) proposed social well-being as a key part of eudaimonic well-being and further developed the theory and measurement of this part of SWB. Social well-being resulted in positive evaluation of self in social contexts (Keyes, 1998).

Life satisfaction is included by some scholars within the hedonic concept of subjective well-being (e.g. Deci, Ryan, 2008; Diener et al., 1985), yet others posit it to be the outcome of hedonia and/or eudaimonia (e.g. Boski, 2009; Sirgy, 2012). In the current study, we regard life satisfaction as a cognitive component of hedonistic well-being (Diener et al., 1985). According to Kasser (2002), materialism is negatively related to life satisfaction. However, pursuit of extrinsic goals is not always negatively related to lower life satisfaction. In former communist countries or less affluent societies, for example, extrinsic goals are unrelated or positively related to life satisfaction (see Zawadzka et al., 2015 for review).

Inconsistent findings on the relationship between materialism and SWB have many possible sources. One of them is related to conceptualisation of SWB. Typically, SWB is operationalized as a life satisfaction (see Hudders, Pandelaere, 2012 for review). Satisfaction with life is a cognitive component of SWB. However, the affective component is also important (Diener et al., 2010). Since materialism is related to social motives (Fitzmaurice, Comegys, 2006), especially to status consumption (Eastman et al., 1997; Roberts, 2000), social well-being represents another aspect of human functioning where negative or positive impact of materialism could manifest itself.

Materialism seems to be destructive not only for life satisfaction, but also for social relations, since it is related to egoistic behaviors or even greed (Belk, 1988; Kasser, 2002). Materialistic extrinsic goals are self-oriented and intrinsic, like community-oriented interests or affiliation are other-oriented, which is especially important for having satisfying relations with others (Grouzet et al., 2007; Schwartz, 1992). Froh et al. (2011) found contrasting results between gratitude (as example of intrinsic goals) and materialism (as expression of external goals) in relation to life satisfaction and social integration. However, the negative relationship between materialistic aspirations and social integration was indirect. This study suggests that materialism could not affect social well-being directly.
Materialism and Psychological Entitlement

One of materialism’s dark sides is a higher level of psychological entitlement (Twenge, Campbell, 2009), which is defined as a sense that individual is entitled to more and deserves more than others (Campbell et al., 2004). Twenge and Campbell (2009) assumed that materialism is related to lower life satisfaction and a higher level of narcissistic entitlement. Psychological entitlement is positively related to competitive behaviours, egoistic attitudes in romantic relationships, and narcissism (Campbell et al., 2004). However, this relationship seems to be limited to pathological narcissistic entitlement, since it is based on unrealistic demands, which is contrary to psychological or healthy entitlement, as it is based on positive self-esteem and realistic expectations toward others (Ackerman, Donellan, 2013).

Generally, analyses of the relationship between materialism and entitlement suffer from oversimplifying the concept of entitlement. Apparently, there are many forms of entitlement and the most recent research has begun to adopt a more complex understanding of this phenomenon (Lessard et al., 2011; Tomlinson, 2013; Žemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013) or at least to admit this complexity (Ackerman, Donellan, 2013). In the current research, we adopt a multidimensional model of entitlement as a set of three attitudes: active entitlement, passive entitlement, and revengefulness (Žemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013, 2015b). This model includes both healthy and adaptive forms of entitlement (i.e. active and passive) related to self-worthiness and self-assertion (active entitlement) with expectations about community based on social solidarity norms (passive entitlement) and maladaptive, vindictive forms based on exaggerated and fragile self-esteem (revenge entitlement). Active entitlement is defined as the promotion of self-interest and self-reliance in achieving life goals. It is positively related to psychological entitlement as described by Campbell et al. (2004), but is less pathological, as it is not related to Neuroticism (Žemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, 2011) and egoistic attitudes towards romantic relationships (Žemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, Baran, 2014). Passive entitlement is based on the belief that other people and institutions have certain obligations toward the self. It demonstrates the social solidarity norm (Žemojtel-Piotrowska, Piotrowski, 2011a). Revenge entitlement is an expression of the protection of self-interest in situations where other people violate it (Žemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013).

Materialism, Subjective Well-being, and Entitlement

The current research employed SEM modelling to examine paths between materialistic goals, hedonic well-being, social well-being and entitlement. To date, limited research has been conducted that examines relationships between the sense of entitlement and SWB, and all have been conducted in the of the workplace (Cooklin, Rowe, Fisher, 2007), sex differences (McGann, Steil, 2006), or child and adolescent behaviours (Rothman, Steil, 2012). Recent research indicated the absence of a negative relation between healthy forms of entitlement (i.e. active and passive) and hedonic well-being (it was positive for active entitlement and insignificant for passive), and confirmed a negative relationship in relation to revenge entitlement (Žemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013, 2015c). A positive relationship between materialism and entitlement was also detected (Žemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013). For this reason, we expect direct positive relationships between materialistic aspirations and active and revenge entitlement (Hypothesis 1). Since our study is conducted in Poland, which is a post-transitional and materialistic society, we predicted a positive relationship between materialistic goals and hedonic well-being (Hypothesis 2a). The same is assumed for social well-being, since fulfilment of materialistic goals in a materialistic society could be positively re-
lated to status building and satisfaction with own position in society (Hypothesis 2b). As such, we assume that healthy forms of entitlement are positively related to hedonic well-being. More precisely, active entitlement is predicted to be positively related to hedonic SWB (Hypothesis 3a) and passive entitlement to be positively related to social well-being (Hypothesis 3b). Revenge entitlement is predicted to be negatively related to hedonic and social well-being (Hypothesis 3c). Finally, we assume an indirect effect of materialism on entitlement via hedonic and social well-being for active entitlement (Hypothesis 4). Concurrent with earlier research (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013), no relationship between passive entitlement and materialism was identified and it is possible that this result will be replicated. Because prior research was based on different methodology (general attitude toward possessing goods), it is also possible that a positive relationship between materialistic aspirations (including also fame and image) and passive entitlement will be established. However, it could be conditioned by the mediating role of social well-being (Hypothesis 5), in pursuit of materialistic (i.e. extrinsic) aspirations could increase social well-being in a materialistic society and, ultimately, result in higher expectations toward others based on positive perception of one’s own position within a social group. We do not expect a direct relationship between hedonic well-being and passive entitlement, since passive entitlement is not an expression of personal dissatisfaction (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013).

METHOD
Participants
One hundred and fifty-three students from Gdansk University (psychology and computer sciences) and the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Poznan (psychology) participated in the current study. Participants included 74 men and 79 women ranging in age from 18 to 47 years old ($M_{age} = 21.68, SD = 3.54$). Students participated voluntarily.

Procedure and Measures
Participants completed the questionnaires in two separate sessions in order to effectively mask the purpose of the study. In the first session, participants responded to a set of items related to personality. These included the Entitlement Questionnaire (EQ) and several other methods, not reported here. In the second session, which was conducted two weeks subsequent to the initial session, items related to SWB and materialism were completed. Initially, students were asked to sign a form indicating their individual student numbers received at the beginning of studying. To protect confidentiality, these data were ultimately destroyed in order to ensure anonymity for participants. Since the EQ measures personality traits and, as such, have high stability over time, this relatively long delay did not affect the results.

Materialism. To measure materialism levels, we used the Aspirations Index (Kasser, Ryan, 1993; Polish adaptation Zawadzka et al., 2015), items referring to wealth, fame, and image. In each case, a single is measured by five items describing particular life goals (e.g. To be very wealthy; To effectively hide the effects of aging; To be known by many people). Participants were asked how important a particular goal is for them, to what extent they believe that they have chance to attain this goal, and to what extent they have already attained this goal. Participants answered on 7-point scale, from 1 – definitely no, to 7 – definitely yes. To determine the materialism level we calculated one global score for all materialistic goals by averaging scores for particular aspirations. Reliability of scale was .78 (Cronbach’s alpha).
Hedonic Well-being. In order to measure subjective well-being, we used the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, Tellegen, 1988, Polish adaptation Brzozowski, Watson, Clark, 2010) to examine affective component of SWB and Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985, Polish adaptation Juczynski, 2001) to examine cognitive components. Next, we used one combined indicator of SWB, since in preliminary analyses they were significantly correlated and a higher-order EFA with a one-factor solution allowed for explanation of 51.17% of the variance, we had no separate predictions for affective and cognitive components of SWB as separate variables. The reliability of the composed indicator was .51 (Cronbach’s alpha).

In the present study, the 20-item version of the PANAS was implemented. The PANAS Scale consists of 20 adverbs describing emotions. Ten of these are related to positive affectivity, and ten to negative affectivity. In order to measure general affect, participants were asked to indicate how they “usually tend to feel.” Responses were ranked on a 5-point scale (from 1 – never to 5 – very often). The SWLS consists of 5 items, each measuring general satisfaction with one’s life. In present study, we used it as a measure of the cognitive aspect of SWB. Participants answer the questions on a 5-point scale (from 1- I disagree to 5 – I agree). Scale has demonstrated high validity and reliability (e.g. Diener et al., 1985).

Social Well-being. The Social Well-Being Scale (SWBS; Keyes, 1998, Polish adaptation Karaś, Najderska, Cieciuch 2013) was used as a measure of social functioning. This 33-item scale serves as a measure of social well-being, defined as self-assessment of an individual’s social functioning. Participants answer questions on a 5-point scale (from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree). Reliability of the scale was .79 (Cronbach’s alpha).

Entitlement. To measure entitlement attitudes, we used Entitlement Questionnaire (EQ, Piotrowski, Żemojtel-Piotrowska, 2009). In current study, we used a 15-item form, with 5 items per each type of entitlement as defined earlier (i.e. active, passive, and revenge, exemplary items are for Active Subscale (AE): I deserve the best; It is necessary to claim what you deserve; I often demand to be treated properly; for Passive (PE): Everybody has the right to expect help from the state when in need; Disadvantaged persons deserve institutional help; The state should take care of the livelihood of the poorest; Revenge (RE): Someone who hurts me cannot expect my sympathy; I have difficulty forgiving harm done to me; I don’t forgive the wrongs I have suffered), as it was successfully validated in Poland and internationally (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2015, 2015a). Participants answered questions on 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 – definitely disagree, to 6 – definitely agree. The validity of scale is confirmed (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 2013; 2015b). Reliabilities of scales measuring AE was .81, PE .90 and RE .82 (Cronbach’s alpha) respectively.

RESULTS
Statistical Analyses
We constructed a model to estimate structural path coefficients between constructs. Materialism, subjective well-being, and social well-being were represented as average scores for total scales since the number of participants did not allow for examining more complex model. We allowed for correlations between three subscales of the entitlement questionnaire and for correlations between hedonic and eudaimonic (social) well-being.
**Structural Model**

In the structural model, we predicted social well-being (SocWB) and hedonistic well-being (HWB) with materialistic aspirations, active and revenge entitlement (see Figure 1). We expected a positive relationship between active entitlement and HWB (and possibly – SocWB) and a negative relationship between revenge entitlement and SocWB (and possible – HWB). Finally, we expected indirect effect materialism on passive entitlement by SocWB.

The proposed structural model fits the data well, meeting popular cut-off criteria: .05 for standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) for good fit and .08 for adequate fit and with comparative fit index (CFI) equal .95 for good fit and .90 for adequate fit (Lance, Butts, Michels, 2006). The model fit indices for structural model presented at Figure 1 are as follows: $\chi^2 (4) = 7.33 \ p = .120$, CFI = .978, RMSEA = .074 (90% confidence interval [.000 .157]), $p_{close} = .258$, SRMR = .041. They could be assessed as good.

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Impact of Materialistic Aspirations on Entitlement.** Congruent to Hypothesis 1, materialism directly affected both active entitlement ($\beta = .26, \ p < .001$) and revenge entitlement ($\beta = .26, \ p < .001$), but did not directly affect passive entitlement ($\beta = .00, \ n.s.$). However, total effects for materialism on three dimensions of entitlement were all positive, congruent with Hypothesis 1, 4 and 5. Total effects of materialism on active entitlement is moderate ($\beta = .35$), but total effects for revenge entitlement ($\beta = .14$) and passive ($\beta = .07$) are weak.

**Impact of Materialistic Aspirations on SWB.** Results supported Hypothesis 2a, as materialism was positively related to HWB ($\beta = .23, \ p = .003$), similar to findings obtained in other post-communist countries. Congruent to Hypothesis 2b, materialistic goals were also positively related to SocWB ($\beta = .20, \ p = .011$).

**Impact of Subjective Well-being on Entitlement.** Congruent with Hypotheses 3a and 3b, active entitlement was directly and positively related to HWB ($\beta = .26, \ p < .001$) and passive entitlement was directly and positively related to SocWB ($\beta = .31, \ p < .001$). Hypothesis 3c was supported only partially, as revenge entitlement was strongly negatively related to social well-being ($\beta = -.51, \ p < .001$) and unrelated to hedonic well-being ($\beta = .00, \ n.s.$). Positive aspects of entitlement were positively related to both aspects of subjective well-being and to the more dysfunctional aspect, as well, or negatively to SocWB.
Materialistic Aspirations, Subjective Well-being and Entitlement. In an effort to determine whether hedonic and social well-being are significant mediators of the relationship between materialistic aspirations and active and passive entitlement, we used Process macro for SPSS (Preacher, Hayes, 2008). Results for mediational analyses with the bootstrapping procedure are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Indirect effects of materialistic aspirations on active and passive entitlement, mediated through hedonic and social well-being

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Materialism → Hedonic Well-being → Active Entitlement</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materialism → Social Well-being → Active Entitlement</td>
<td>-.22 (-.50, .05)</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism → Hedonic Well-being → Passive Entitlement</td>
<td>-.25 (-.59, .08)</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism → Social Well-being → Passive Entitlement</td>
<td>.76 (.39, 1.13)</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Results obtained by bootstrapping procedure (n = 1,000), with 95% confidence intervals presented in parentheses.

Congruent with predictions of the mediating effect of HWB, a relationship between materialistic aspirations and active entitlement was detected (IE = .49, p < .001) and, as a result, the total effect of materialism on active entitlement was moderate (β = .35, p < .001). Materialistic aspirations affected active entitlement both directly and indirectly, via HWB, supporting Hypotheses 1 and 4. Relationship between materialistic aspirations and passive entitlement was fully mediated by SocWB (IE = .76, p < .001), supporting Hypothesis 5.

DISCUSSION
The current study aimed to examine interrelations between materialistic aspirations, subjective well-being (both hedonic and eudaimonic), and entitlement. First, our findings support the thesis about the positive relationship between materialism and entitlement. Furthermore, similar to other Eastern and Central European (CEEU) countries, we found a positive relationship between materialistic aspiration and well-being. This positive relationship was related both to hedonic well-being and to social well-being. Finally, we found that the relationship between materialistic aspirations and healthy forms of entitlement was mediated by subjective well-being.

Our findings could be seen as unexpected at first glance. Twenge and Campbell (2009) argued that focus on materialism among American youth results in higher levels of entitlement and this, in turn, results in higher dissatisfaction. However, the Polish (and CEEU as a whole) cultural context could set different conditions for the attainment of materialistic goals, as noted in research conducted in former post-communist countries (Zawadzka et al., 2015). In comparison, the US is a post-materialistic and affluent country focused on materialistic aspirations that could be socially undesirable, costly and related to higher social competition and envy (Froh et al., 2011). On the other hand, post-communist countries are materialistic and focused on economic development (Inglehart, 2000). For this reason, if individuals are successful in their attainment of materialistic goals, it could result in higher hedonism and a better social position that is reflected in higher social well-being. Finally, we based our assumptions on a three-dimensional model of entitlement, which assumes the
existence of healthy (i.e. active and passive) and unhealthy (i.e. revenge) aspects in formulation of expectations toward others. For this reason, everything that enhances people’s positive self-evaluation and happiness, as reflected in the attainment materialistic goals, could in turn enhance active pursuit toward achieving one’s own goals and promote self-interests (i.e. active entitlement). The same seems to be true for passive entitlement, since higher expectations toward others could stem from positive evaluation of the social environment, including trust toward others and positive evaluation of one’s own position in society. For this reason, individuals who successfully attain materialistic goals have higher social well-being and they are more prone to formulate expectations toward other people and institutions.

In our study, materialism was positively related to passive entitlement only indirectly, as this relationship was fully mediated by social well-being. However, materialistic aspirations have some social costs, as they are directly related to revenge entitlement. This finding supports the thesis formulated by Twenge and Campbell (2009) that focuses on the ways in which materialism can be socially costly.

CONCLUSION

Our study was conducted on a student sample, which is probably more affluent and successful than the average person in Polish society. For this reason, the generalization of obtained results to other age cohorts is problematic. This study was also cross-sectional in character. For this reason, any casual predictions cannot be fully justified and the current findings should be treated as preliminary. Despite these limitations, obtained results are consistent with findings obtained by other researchers in Eastern European context. Current study does not offer explanation what is the process responsible for such relationship. However, complex relationships between materialistic aspirations, entitlement, and SWB supplement this picture. Materialistic aspirations are not only profitable for individuals, but they have some costs, namely revenge entitlement. These results suggest that attainment materialistic aspirations could be associated with competition and over-protection of self-interest. Further studies could employ more overt measures or evaluated behavioural manifestations of entitlement, like expectations of higher salaries (among working adults) or higher degrees (among students), selfish functioning in romantic relationships and many others. On the other hand, successful attainment of materialistic goals could positively influence self-esteem or feeling of agency, which supports adaptive strategies for promotion of self-interest and achieving other, not only materialistic, life goals.

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WHAT SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY MAY MEAN WHEN WE KNOW HOW DEMOCRACY IS COLLOQUIALLY UNDERSTOOD

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ABSTRACT
Research carried out in states where democracy is not strongly established shows that democracy is sometimes understood in a way that is incompatible with its dictionary definitions. The subject of this article is the ways of understanding democracy in Poland in times of democracy consolidation. The results of psychological and sociological research carried out in Poland since 1993 till 2010 are presented. It was found that besides the way of understanding democracy compatibly with its dictionary definition, democracy was colloquially understood as a welfare state. Democracy also turned out to be understood as a religious state or a state cultivating national values. These colloquial meanings might combine with each other (e.g. democracy as welfare religious state). Data suggest that prevalent ways of understanding democracy might be dictated by the current shape of the political scene. Ways of understanding were discovered to be very weakly dependent on parameters of social position and demographic variables. The diversity of ways of understanding democracy was explained firstly by the substantial complexity of democracy itself making it difficult to grasp, and secondly by prevalent subjective notions of a “good state”. It may be said that the study of support for democracy – in order to be valid – should take into consideration the colloquial that democracy is understood by ordinary people.

Key words: democracy consolidation, ways of understanding of democracy, support for democracy, welfare state, religious state

ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND ITS UNDERSTANDING
In survey studies respondents are often confronted with questions such as „What do you think about ‘X phenomenon’?” or „How do you evaluate ‘X phenomenon?’” Answers to questions of this kind can be reasonably interpreted as long as the subjective ways of understanding ‘X phenomenon’ by respondents and researcher are identical. In their research arsenal, the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) and Social Diagnosis Project have the following questions (statements to which respondents take a stance): „Democracy has an advantage over other forms of governments”, „Sometimes undemocratic governments can be more desirable than democratic governments”, „For people such as me, it is not relevant whether the government is democratic or undemocratic”. These statements are systematically applied (see CBOS, 2003, 2010; Czapiński, Panek, 2009, 2011). Based on the answers to these questions, conclusions about support for democracy in Poland and its eventual changes are formulated. Furthermore, it turns out that democracy systematically meets with lesser or greater, yet mass support. However, the functioning of democracy in Poland is not so enthusiastically evaluated (CBOS 2010, p. 3), and we cannot forget that people can understand commonly used abstract concepts (such as democracy) in different ways and even in a way that is contradictory to its dictionary definition (see Rosenberg, 2003, 2010).
Ward, Chilton, 1988). That is why we have to be extremely cautious when formulating conclusions based on the mentioned questions. We must first precisely look at different, including colloquial, ways of understanding democracy. Let us focus on a few problems concerning its exact defining.

If we observe that in colloquial language the term „democracy” can have different meanings, then it is impossible not to notice that it also has different meanings given by, as one could think, specialists, scientists and politicians. It is worth remembering that scientists focus mainly on analyzing different existing forms of democracy and the different meanings ascribed to them, while politicians create these different forms and meanings. As we know, democracy is – etymologically – the power of the people. At this point caution is recommended. In his critical analyses of six ways of understanding the term people, G. Sartori aptly notes that democracy could mean totalitarianism based on some of those understandings (Sartori, 1998). Authors distinguish many forms of democracy: liberal, direct, participatory, social, radical, cosmopolitan, deliberative, and others (see Dryzek, 2004; Kurki, 2010, Norris, 2011; Reykowski, 2007; Wasilewski, 2007). A few axial features of democracy are also being distinguished (see Dryzek, 2004; Norris, 2011; Payne, 2009; Sartori, 1998), but will not be brought up here for obvious reasons. It is pointed out that two flagship values of democracy – freedom and equality – are in opposition. J. Thomassen explains the uneasy cohabitation between them by citing their different historical roots, as they emerged in different times and places. Freedom was an axial value of the English revolution, and for the French revolution it was equality (Thomassen, 2007). It is no wonder that the category of essential contestability is being applied to democracy given its many traditions, forms, and understandings. L. Whitehead states that essential contestability „in general refers to the idea that a term can have many meanings at a given moment of time” (Whitehead, 2002, p. 14). According to J. N. Gray, essential contestability means that concepts are not only contested in a historical sense, but that in principle it is impossible to conclusively decide on the correct application of the concept (Gray, 1977, p. 338). Prevailing over terminological confusion, M. Kurki tries to explain democracy using the terms pluralization and contextualization. He points out that the observed variety of forms of democracy and meanings of this concept results from the social, historical and political conditionings in which particular democratic systems emerged and exist (Kurki, 2010). J. Keane expressed similar thoughts in his indigenization theory, according to which democracy inevitably adapts itself to the specific local conditions in which it develops (Keane, 2009; according to Norris, 2011, p. 148). At this point, the results of A. Schedler’s and R. Sarfield’s research should be mentioned. They observed a phenomenon of support for the abstract term of democracy with rejection of the empirical core of liberal democracy, and distinguished a few kinds of „adjective democrats”: intolerant, paternalistic, homophobic, and excluding (Schedler, Sarfield, 2007).

Analysis of ways of understanding democracy is not a separate and strongly based trend in research conducted by Western authors living in democratic countries. This seems equally understandable as the lack of research concerning understatement of the term „clear air” in countries without natural environment contamination. Empirical findings concerning ways of understanding democracy appeared as an aside to research on acceptance or support for democracy, especially when more sophisticated measures than simple survey methodology were applied (see Canache, Mondak, Seligson, 2001). A second source of inspiration are democracies that were born in recent decades. So-called post-communist countries seem to be especially popular research areas. We will focus on systematic research concerning ways of understanding democracy conducted in Poland in the further part of this article. Comparisons of
residents of Eastern and Western Lands of united Germany require special attention. R. Rohrschneider conducted extensive research on German residents and members of parliament. According to him, general support for rules of democracy was similar in both parts of the country. However, in some specific terms (e.g. tolerance or pluralism acceptance) Western Germany transcended over Eastern parts. This difference also concerned members of parliament (R. Rohrschneider, 1999). The understanding of democracy in Eastern and Western Lands were studied by R. I. Hofferbert and H. D. Klingerman. They observed that eastern Germans regarded definitional attributes of welfare state as discriminants of democracy more often than western Germans. In other words, their understanding of democracy as „protection of socio-economic conditions” was stronger (Hofferbert, Klingerman, 2001).

Research conducted in Russia between 1998 and 2003 by E. Carnaghan is also of particular interest. She applied a method of intensive ethnological interviews to a small group consisting of 60 persons. Her interest was not so much in the representativeness of the respondents as in the most accurate recreation of their course of thinking. It turned out that the political thinking of her respondents was characterized by significant fluency and ductility. The author formulated the following conclusion: “not only can we not be sure that respondents mean what researchers mean when they talk about democracy, we cannot even be sure that they mean what they say they mean” (Carnaghan, 2011, pp. 690-691).

A specific kind of race can be noticed in studies of democracy. On the one hand, scientists have struggled for years with the complexity of the term and phenomenon of democracy, and people’s colloquial representations about what democracy is. On the other hand, politicians are an eternally living and everlasting source of the high and constantly growing level of this complexity. In this field, politicians from the so-called real socialism camp are especially responsible for it. Another name for this camp was „people’s democracy”, though it is commonly known that it had little in common with democracy and especially the „power of the people”. Let us remember an interesting linguistic experiment attributed to Mao Zedong. He claimed that the order brought by him to China, obviously called democracy, has an advantage over Western liberal democracy. The latter is usually described as „power of the people”, while China’s system was „power for the people”. In other words, democracy was used to define an autocratic state that posed as a welfare state and took away its citizens responsibility for themselves, their community and country. This definition is supposedly derived from the Confucian tradition of China (see Norris, 2011, Shi, 2000), but today it bears mainly the mark of newspeak. M. Guida describes a different modification of the meaning of democracy shared by chosen Turkish Muslims. Their „concept” includes elections and representative institutions, but there is no place for pluralism, tolerance, and citizenship (Guida, 2010), which makes place for a special meaning of democracy concept.

This elaboration is not based on any theory. We will try to conduct an empirical investigation to identify the ways of understanding democracy and their changes during the time of transformation and system consolidation of democracy in Poland.

COLLOQUIAL WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY.
POLISH STUDIES
First psycho-social research
The ways of understanding democracy by Poles were first studied in 1993. This was precursory research, so it requires a little more attention. J. Reykowski, the leader of this research project, justified its necessity as follows: „To understand the attitudes
towards democracy and behaviors towards it, it is necessary to know how this concept is represented in the minds of so-called regular people, because the fate of democracy is ultimately up to them” (Reykowski, 1995, p. 23).

The selection of the sample was purposive – the project’s authors intended to investigate persons who were contrasted on the dimensions of: financial situation (good-bad), political commitment (active-passive), and education (high-low) (see Chmielewski, 1995). As for measuring the ways of understanding democracy, J. Reykowski’s original D Scale was applied. It consisted of 54 characteristics of the socio-political system. One third of them were definitional features of a democratic system, called democracy’s markers. The rest of them were nonspecific terms (e.g. describing other, indifferent to democracy social orders) that characterized undemocratic systems. Every characteristic was evaluated on a 4-step scale (0 – had nothing to do with democracy, 3 – best defines democracy).

Factor analysis revealed four basic colloquial meanings of the democracy concept. These were (we use the original terminology):

- „Efficient welfare state” (17.3% of explained variance) – e.g. Protection of worker’s businesses, Protection of pensioners and retired people, Medical care for everyone
- „Democratic relations (values)” (1.8% of variance) – e.g. Majority takes into account minority laws, Jews and Ukrainians – Polish citizens – same rights as Poles, Those who have advantage cannot impose their opinion
- „Democratic institutions” (6.5% of variance) – e.g. Free elections, State consequently obeys the law, Independent courts
- „Ideological state” (4.3% of variance) – e.g. Youth raised in the spirit of religion, Dominance of Christian values, Traditions of „Solidarność” are nurtured, Reliance on national traditions (Reykowski, 1995, p. 29–30)

The most general conclusion was that “... people differ when it comes to the subjective meaning that they attribute to democracy...” (Reykowski, 1995, p. 51). Furthermore, it turns out that “... political freedom is a desirable system feature mostly for those who feel that under these conditions they can „control the situation”; those who do not have this feeling expect something different from the system – protectiveness.” (1995, p. 52). Subjective or colloquial ways of understanding democracy that do not demonstrate compliance with dictionary definitions deserve special attention. „A second form (of understanding democracy – „welfare state” – K. K.) depends on treating democracy as a system that has to guarantee every member of society basic rights and decent standards of living” (1995, p. 52). However, the most interesting way of understanding democracy was identifying it with an undemocratic, closed and ideologized system. This indicates that the term democracy can be used to describe a system that not only has little in common with democracy, but is also antidemocratic.

**Continuation of research with the use of the D Scale**

Further research using J. Reykowski’s D Scale was conducted by K. Jaśko and M. Kossowska (2008) in 2007, a time at which democracy was already consolidated in Poland.

Using factor analysis, the authors distinguished three ways of understanding democracy. Items loaded with a strength >=.30 were taken into account when interpreting factors. The first factor might be interpreted as „autocratic national-catholic welfare state”. The second factor, „state of law”, loaded the so-called markers of democracy, descriptions of democratic institutions, and values. The third one was „national-catholic state”. Another matter is also worth mentioning: despite the fact that the authors assumed the existence of several distinct ways of understanding democracy, they – it is not clear why – calculated the value of Cronbach’s α for the whole...
D Scale, which consists of diagnostic statements for all – supposedly distinct – ways of understanding democracy. The value of Cronbach’s $\alpha$ amount to .91 (Jaśko, Kossowska, 2008, p. 249), which means that all ways of understanding democracy – contrary to the primal assumption – were highly correlated. This result supports the use factors as indices of ways of understanding democracy.

At this point it is impossible to arbitrate the basis of differences among the results of research using the D Scale in 1993 and 2007. However, one issue is beyond any doubt. Since the beginning of the system transformation, democracy has been understood by Poles in several ways. Let us stress that some of these ways are in strict opposition to dictionary definitions of democracy. The proposed above reinterpretation of K. Jaśko’s and M. Kossowska’s results seems to indicate that some patterns of understanding democracy detected by J. Reykowski became mixed or articulated more strongly.

During the last decades, research was also conducted on representative samples by the reputable Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS).

**Research on support and ways of understanding democracy conducted by CBOS**

Before we present the results of research on ways of understanding democracy, let us introduce some data related to Poles’ attitudes towards democracy based on direct questions in which the term „democracy” was used *explicitly*. CBOS conducted this research for many years on representative samples, which allows for observation of changes over time. Let us concentrate on reports coming from the twenty first century. One of the systematically asked question was: „Do you agree or disagree with the statement that democracy has an advantage over every other way of government?” In 2006–2010, the percent of people who agreed (definitely or moderately) was between 66 and 72 percent, while those who did not agree were between 13 and 17 percent (there were also people who did not have an opinion or refused to answer this question).

Another question repeated in CBOS’s surveys was: „Do you agree with the statement that undemocratic governments can sometimes be more desirable than democratic ones?” In 2002–2010, the distribution of responses for this question was subject to major fluctuations. 31–52 percent of respondents agreed with it while 30–48 percent did not.

If we treat these casually presented results seriously we should say that two thirds of Polish citizens support democracy, around half of them see the advantages of undemocratic ways of governance, and that the “Polish way” of democracy meets with disapproval. We will return to this issue in the summary of this article.

Researchers from CBOS were clearly aware of the significance of studying ways of understanding democracy and took on the task. They confronted their respondents with the question „Which of the listed features do you find important in recognizing a country as democratic and which are unimportant?” and then asked for an evaluation of several dozen features concerning the functioning of state, society, authorities, etc. (CBOS: 2010, p. 15). Research of this kind was conducted in 2003 and 2010, and factor analyses were performed for each research wave. The authors obtained such ways of understanding democracy as: „Rule of law, civic liberties”, „Egalitarian welfare state”, „Liberalism, self-governance, freedom of choice”, and „Collectivism”. Some variability and stability in the results is worth noting. Significant differences seemed to rely on the fact that the „Rule of law” factor transferred into fourth place in 2010 while the „Prosperity, egalitarianism, welfare state” factor moved into first position.
This could mean that „prosperity and welfare state” was a more distinctive designa-
tum of democracy in Pole’s consciousness in 2010 than it was in 2003. Conversely,
this could apply to „Rule of law”. The last place was permanently occupied by the „Collectivism” factor, which bears some marks of populism.

The choice of statements in this research requires special attention. Firstly, these statements were connoted with positive or neutral affect. Secondly, different forms of democracy predominated other kinds of statements – those describing un- or anti-
democratic systems were not included. Researchers did not give their respondents a chance to reveal ways of understanding democracy that were the opposite of it. There-
fore, they distinguished at most colloquial ways of distinguishing different forms of
democracy (from a number of statements that were less or more – but mostly more – accurate markers of democracy).

OWN RESEARCH

Method of measuring ways of understanding democracy

The method applied in both studies was patterned on J. Reykowski’s original D Scale,
but it was significantly shorter. We used 12 statements, four for each distinguished
way of understanding democracy:
– democracy as a democratic state (markers of democracy):
  • Everyone can publicly express (his/her) beliefs.
  • Majority takes into account minority’s laws.
  • Every citizen has the same electoral laws.
  • There are many political parties with different programs.
– democracy as a welfare state:
  • The state provides for decent living conditions for everyone.
  • The state guarantees education for everyone who wants it.
  • Everyone is allowed to benefit from healthcare.
  • The state helps the poor and those who earn less money.
– democracy as a religious-national state:
  • In raising children, religious commandments are being obeyed.
  • Polish Catholic traditions are being nurtured.
  • For all Poles, the nation is the supreme value.
  • Poland is truly independent.

The listed statements were randomly mixed in the questionnaire. In the correspond-
ing part of the interview, a pollster read the following instruction: „It is sai d that for
many years around the world, including Poland, democracy prevails. There are, how-
ever, discussions and arguments about what a democratic system really is. We ask you
to tell us what, according to you, democracy is. I will read different statements and ask
that you tell me if they correctly and accurately characteraze a democratic state. We
can speak of democracy if…” At this point a pollste r read four statements, noted the
answers, repeated „We can speak of democracy if…”, read the next four statements ,
etc. The procedure of repeating these parts of the instruction was included to remind the
respondents of the aim of the research and to avoid e.g. evaluating the statements in light
of the current situation in Poland. Respondents marked their answers using the standard
scale: „I definitely do not agree – I do not agree – I agree – I definitely agree”.

The first study was conducted on a representative sample consisting of 1522 adult
Poles. It was carried out by the Social Research Laboratory (PBS). The second study
was conducted in 2010 on a representative sample of 800 persons by 4P Research
Mix. CAPI procedure was used in both studies.
RESULTS
To discover ways of understanding democracy – in compliance with existing tradition – we performed factor analysis with Varimax rotation. In the research from 2002, the determinant value was .023 and KMO measure statistic was .867, which allows us to recognize this solution as reliable. Obtained results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Results of factor analysis on ways of understanding democracy in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matrix of rotated components*</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state provides for decent living conditions for everyone</td>
<td>.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone can publicly express his/her beliefs</td>
<td>.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state guarantees education for everyone who wants it</td>
<td>.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority takes into account minority’s laws</td>
<td>.699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In raising children, religious commandments are being obeyed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone is allowed to benefit from healthcare</td>
<td>.699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Catholic traditions are being nurtured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every citizen has the same electoral laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For all Poles, the nation is the supreme value</td>
<td>.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state helps the poor and those who earn less money</td>
<td>.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland is truly independent</td>
<td>.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are many political parties with different programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of explained variance</td>
<td>29.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The solution presented in Table 1 explained 59.91% of variance, with the first factor mostly loading items diagnostic for democracy understood as a welfare state. It also loaded the „Majority takes into account minority’s laws” statement with comparable strength, which seems to also express a care for those endangered by helplessness. The other two items loaded by the first factor expressed values of national community. This factor can be interpreted as “democracy as a communal welfare state”. The second factor mostly loaded items expressing religious norms and values and the item „For all Poles, the nation is the supreme value”. It seems that it could be interpreted as ”democracy as a religious-national state”. The third factor – loading three of the four markers of democracy – was „democracy as democratic state”; however, this was with the addition of nation worship.

We tested whether the distinguished ways of understanding democracy depend on an individual’s location in the social structure. It turned out that understanding democracy as a communal welfare state does not depend on sex (F(1, 1520) = .01, ns.), age (r = -.02, ns.), education (F(9, 1512) = .79, ns.), father’s education (F(9, 1512) = 1.24, ns.), income of household (r = .05, ns.), or income per capita (r = .02, ns.). It slightly depends on the size of place of residence (F(5, 1516) = 3.64, p < .005, \( \eta^2 = .01 \)), and was the strongest in small cities (20-50 thousand residents). Understanding of democracy as a religious-national state was stronger among women (F(1, 1520) = 11.55, p < .0001, \( \eta^2 = .05 \)), elderly persons (r = .17, p < .0001), less educated persons, (F(9, 1520) = 9.05, p < .0001, \( \eta^2 = .05 \)), persons having less educated fathers (F(9, 1520) = 8.85, p < .0001, \( \eta^2 = .05 \)), persons having less household income (r = -.12, p < .0001) and income per capita (r = -.13, p < .0001), and persons living in villages and in smaller cities (F(5, 1516) = 18.77, p < .0001, \( \eta^2 = .06 \)). Understanding democracy as a democratic state was stronger among men (F(1, 1520) = 2.52,
p < .001, $\eta^2 = .02$), persons with better education ($F(9, 1512) = 4.5, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .03$), persons having better educated fathers ($F(9, 1512) = 2.52, p < .01, \eta^2 = .02$), persons having larger income in household ($r = .12, p < .0001$) and per capita ($r = .09, p < .005$), and persons living in larger cities ($F(5, 1516) = 3.22, p < .005, \eta^2 = .01$). We did not observe any connections between this kind of understanding of democracy and age ($r = -.04, ns.$).

Table 2 Results of factor analysis on ways of understanding democracy in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matrix of rotated components*</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The state provides for decent living conditions for everyone</td>
<td>.588</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone can publicly express his/her beliefs</td>
<td>.758</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state guarantees education for everyone who wants it</td>
<td>.592</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority takes into account minority’s laws</td>
<td>.515</td>
<td>.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In raising children, religious commandments are being obeyed</td>
<td></td>
<td>.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone is allowed to benefit from healthcare</td>
<td></td>
<td>.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Catholic traditions are being nurtured</td>
<td></td>
<td>.791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every citizen has the same electoral laws</td>
<td>.724</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For all Poles, the nation is the supreme value</td>
<td>.543</td>
<td>.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state helps the poor and those who earn less money</td>
<td></td>
<td>.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland is truly independent</td>
<td></td>
<td>.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are many political parties with different programs</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of explained variance</td>
<td>29.73</td>
<td>27.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of factor analysis performed on data from 2010 are presented in Table 2. The determinant value was .006 and KMO measure was .911, which also allows us to recognize this solution as reliable.

The presented two-factor solution explained 56.92% of variance. It turned out that the first factor mostly loaded every marker of democracy, but also items diagnostic for welfare and national state. Let us call this factor „democracy as a homely democratic state”. The second factor mostly loaded items expressing religious norms and values, and secondly items diagnostic for welfare state and the statement „Poland is truly independent”. This factor could be interpreted as „democracy as a religious-welfare state”.

As previously, we tested relationships between ways of understanding democracy and indicators of individual’s location in social structure. It turned out that understanding of democracy as a homely democratic state did not depend on sex ($F(1, 798)= 1.56, ns.$), age ($r = -.07, ns.$), education ($F(6,793) = 1.95, ns.$), income ($r = -.04, ns.$), income per capita ($r = .04, ns.$), or place of residence ($F(7,792) = 2.55, ns.$). The only significant relationship was between this way of understanding democracy and father’s education ($F(6,793) = 5.03, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .04$), but this result is hard to interpret. Understanding democracy as a religious-welfare state turned out to be stronger among women ($F(1, 798) = 6.55, p = .01, \eta^2 = .01$) and less educated persons ($F(6,793) = 3.63, p < .001, \eta^2 = .03$). There was no relationship between this way of understanding and age ($r = -.06, ns.$), father’s education ($F(6,793) = 1.5, ns.$), income of household ($r = -.08, ns.$), income per capita ($r = -.01, ns.$), or size of place of residence ($F(7, 792) = 2.43, ns.$).

It may be worth noting that in the given time frame of this research the best explained ways of understanding democracy were those dominated by religious norms and values.
SUMMARY

The presented results of research conducted in Poland show a significant variety of ways of understanding democracy. The first imposing conclusion may be that Poles’ representations of what democracy is can sometimes be very distant from dictionary definitions. It turned out that the most popular way was understanding democracy as a welfare state. This is supported by the number of factors (results of factor analyses) interpreted in this way and the percent of explained variance by these factors, which can be read as the power of organizing content concerning ways of governing democratic order. This was also noticeable in the CBOS research (especially in 2010), in which markers of welfare state predominated among statements evaluated by the respondents. As we mentioned earlier, seeing democracy as a welfare state is a phenomenon characteristic for post-communist countries in which the democratic system is not strongly rooted. However, it is hard to decide whether it should be assigned to the legacy of a rightly passed system or perceived difficulties of the transformation process.

In research conducted using J. Reykowski’s D Scale (and its mutations), it turned out that democracy can be understood as an undemocratic system that is dominated by a monosystem of national or Christian values. Moreover, in our research it turned out that understanding democracy as a democratic system was systematically “enriched” by national content. It is worth asking whether this formula of colloquial understanding of democracy is a feature of the Polish socio-political mentality. Wide cross-cultural research could answer it.

We observed that more or less accurate ways of understanding democracy, i.e. those in which markers of democracy predominated, occurred more often among persons located higher or in more beneficial positions in the social structure. These results bring us close to answering a question about sources of inaccurate ways of understanding democracy. This attempt will be preceded by a short introduction. It is commonly known that democracy as polyarchy (see Dahl, 1971) is an incredibly complex system and comprehending it requires well-developed, or as P. Norris would call it, enlightened political knowledge (Norris, 2011, p 152). J. Reykowski showed that the immanent feature of democracy is existence of antinomies (e.g. majority-minority, conflict-consensus, autonomy-obedience, law-conscience). Cognitive coping with these antinomies is possible when an advanced level of cognitive development is achieved, i.e. the ability to coordinate opposite perspectives, achieving an operational or more preferably systemic level of cognitive development (Reykowski, 1993). People with larger cultural capital were closer to an accurate understanding of democracy, while people with smaller cultural capital coped with understanding democracy differently. This exemplifies that people understand democracy as far as they are able. Unable to deal with the cognitive requirements imposed by democracy, they chose options that were simpler, clearer, devoid of nuances, and sometimes closer to populism. They most frequently identified democracy with a welfare state or national-religious state (or both altogether).

Let us also remember that for many people the process of democratization was a painful or even traumatic process for quality of life (see Sztompka, 2000). The experience of deprivation could have led to a narrowing of their cognitive perspective, hindering the recognition of democracy’s nuances and fostering simpler solutions. It seems that deficits of cultural capital on the one hand and of economic capital on the other can make this process significantly harder. It is worth noticing, however, that it seems a great simplification to attribute the level of support for democracy only to whether one is a winner or a loser (see Blais, Gelineau, 2007).
Broadly speaking, the way that a person/Pole understands democracy has several sources. Democracy as an abstractive term or slogan has support from the majority of society, and presumably – in its opinion – describes a just, fair, and safe arrangement of a state. However, when an individual cannot cognitively cope with the principles of democratic functioning they are forced to make simplifications. In this case the easiest way is to refer to standards of normal or ideal conditions. The first case was described by Rosenberg, Ward, Chilton (1988). They noticed that less politically sophisticated Americans perceived democracy as a system that they saw every day. When it is not clear whether outside our window there is democracy, we are left with an idea/standard of ideal condition, what we consider as „just, fair, or safe arrangement of state”.

In other words, individual knowing/believing that democracy is good while being unable to fully comprehend it makes a specific projection and associates this term with an arrangement of state that is assess as just, fair, and safe. This perfectly fits the welfare state „power for the people”, realization of proven through the years, i.e. conservative values or applying populistic „brigand Janosik strategy”. Therefore, we can take a risk and express the statement that in conditions lacking democratic traditions, every form of governance could be called “democratic” as soon as it is perceived as just, fair, and safe. This sentence sounds banal but it could have remarkable consequences. We know of many examples in which the banner of democracy is carried by advocates of un- or antidemocratic order.

It seems that it is worth considering one of the presented results. In 2010, our own research revealed two ways of understanding democracy: „democracy as a homely democratic state” and „democracy as a religious-welfare state”. These ways relate to two dominant political projects that are responsible for deep polarization of the political scene in Poland. The first one was proposed and implemented by the Civic Platform and the second propagated by Law and Justice (and their acolytes) as The Fourth Republic of Poland. In the first, values and democratic procedures were emphasized but there was also a place for national sentiments. The second project mainly proposed a centralized welfare state and commitment to conservative and therein Christian values. The presented results show an interesting and perhaps unknown to this day phenomenon. It is obvious that polarization of the political scene can set preferences and political tastes. Now, it turns out that it could also be responsible for the structure/content of political concepts in the colloquial mentality of citizens. This result could be treated as a contribution for reflections on ways of understanding democracy and their variability.

The article seems to have a rather pessimistic resonance – the term „democracy” can have many meanings including those that are simply undemocratic. In addition, as we mentioned when presenting data from CBOS, the evaluation of democracy in Poland is not very positive (see Czapiński, Panek, 2011, p. 283). As a matter of fact, the evaluation of democracy in Poland is not as bad as direct declarations expressed in surveys seemingly indicate. Let us look at the following lists. As we already know, in 2010 CBOS presented a list of features that was used to investigate the defining of a system as democratic. These eight are the most important markers of democracy in the opinion of respondents (markers of welfare state are in bold):
- equality before the law (3.88)
- assurance of equal chances for education for children from all families (3.88)
- selection of the best for ruling the country (3.86)
- protection of personal liberties (3.86)
- government care for prosperity of citizens (3.81)
- freedom of expressing views and self-organization (3.79)
– financing of medical care, science, culture by the government (3.79)
– government assurance of decent living conditions for the poorest (3.73) (CBOS, 2010, p. 19).

It turned out that half of the most „important for recognizing a country as democratic” attributes were markers of a welfare state. CBOS researchers presented the same list of features to the respondents, asking them about the degree of realization of these characteristics in Poland. The list of the eight most popular features in this ranking was as follows (markers of democracy are in bold):
– freedom of choosing a place of residence at home or abroad (3.41)
– freedom of expressing beliefs and self-organization (3.05)
– a possibility of choice between political party programs (2.99)
– submitting to the will of the majority by the minority (2.99)
– activity of citizens in public life (2.95)
– protection of personal liberties (2.90)
– responsibility of the government for economic life (2.74)

This time, it turned out that among the eight most efficiently realized characteristics there were seven markers of democracy. The whole thing seems to present itself as follows. Poles realize that many markers of democracy are realized in Poland. It does not, however, have a significant influence on their evaluation of democracy in Poland because, according to them, democracy is primarily a welfare state and welfare state markers did not appear on the list of well realized features. At this point we could refer to the previously cited conclusion of Ellen Camaghan.

One of the reasons why researchers were interested in ways of understanding democracy was a phenomenon of acceptance or support for democracy. At the end, let us remember an already cited sentence which could be a motto of this article: „To understand the attitudes towards democracy and behaviors towards it, it is necessary to know how this term is represented in the minds of so-called regular people, because the fate of democracy is ultimately up to them” (Reykowski, 1995, p. 23).

REFERENCES


**PREDICTORS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN POLAND: GENDER AND PERIOD EFFECTS IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION**

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KRZYSZTOF KANIASTY  
*Indiana University of Pennsylvania (USA) & Institute of Psychology, Polish Academy of Sciences*

**ABSTRACT**

The present study examined gender and generation differences in political participation of Poles twenty-two years after the collapse of the communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe. Participation in various political activities (both electoral and legal non-electoral behaviors) was assessed in a nationwide random sample of 400 adults interviewed face-to-face in their homes at the end of 2011. A hierarchical regression analysis, that induced several relevant predictor variables, revealed a strong main effect of age and a significant Gender X Age interaction. Participation in political activities increased with age for both genders, but a clear gender gap of lower political participation among women emerged prominently in late middle adulthood (among respondents over 57 years of age). The levels of overall political participation among younger and middle-aged Poles were similarly low for both genders. In general, the youngest respondents, those entering their political lives during the post-communist transformation, were less politically active than middle-aged and older age citizens.

**Key words:** political participation, gender gap, generation effect, period effect, post-communist Poland

**INTRODUCTION**

People’s participation in a country’s politics is vital for democracy to flourish. Most often, the construct of political participation is referred to as a wide spectrum of political activities (e.g. Lamprianou, 2013; Skarżyńska, 2002) aimed at engaging citizens in the political process and influencing the actions and policies of governing bodies. Studies investigating political participation in a variety of countries and political systems frequently note a systematic difference between genders, labeled as a “gender gap” (e.g. Norris, 2004; Inglehart, Norris, 2000).

Sociologists and political scientists examining electoral behavior suggest that women engage in different forms of political participation than men. This so-called “traditional gender gap” can be described in the following ways: women vote less frequently than men; women routinely vote more frequently for conservative candidates whereas men tend to cast their votes more often for political left candidates (although recently, a slow reversal of this pattern has been observed in developed countries); women less often join organized political parties and men more often hold prominent positions in political organizations; and when evaluating political campaigns, women...
pay more attention to „compassion issues” (e.g., pro-choice/pro-life, welfare and educational concerns) than to „tough issues” (war on crime, military spending) (see Bernstein, 2005; Hill, 2003; Norris, 2004; Norris, Inglehart, 2000; Whitaker, 2008). These gender differences in political behavior are typically explained by socialization factors based on culturally sanctioned gender stereotypes presenting politics as a male dominated sphere of life. Relevantly, women usually express less interest in politics, exhibit lower political self-efficacy, and their attention to „compassion issues” is attributed to shared emotional fate as citizens of lower socio-political standing in society (see Bernstein, 2005; Hill, 2003; Studlar, Allister, Hayes, 1999).

Studies of voting behavior conducted in Poland within the first decade following the collapse of the communist system (1989–2000) also documented the presence of „the traditional gender gap” (Siemieńska, 2003). However, data collected ten years later by Oniszczenko, Jakubowska and Stanislawiak (2011) showed that women between the ages of 18 and 24 years exhibited higher levels of liberal social and moral attitudes than women within ages 36 and 64 years, as well as all men, regardless of their age. Both age groups of women expressed similar attitudes toward economic issues and supported state interventionism in the country’s market process. Thus both generations of women revealed leftist orientation in the economic domain, yet differed along the liberal-conservative dimension in terms of their preferences concerning social and lifestyle issues. Interestingly, there were no generational (i.e., age) differences among men in their socio-political attitudes.

Oniszczenko et al.’s (2011) investigation uncovered generational difference in ideological and political preferences among Polish women. The observed pattern of results suggested that a historically significant process of systemic transformation in Poland may have exerted the most influence on ideological consciousness of the youngest generation of women. The political and economic transformation of post-communist Poland continues; hence, the question of similarities and differences in political participation of Poles is very relevant a quarter-century after the 1989 (partly free) parliamentary elections. Do the levels of political activism differ between women and men? Do the levels of political activism differ across ages?

Polish democratic transformation resulted in a change of the societal and political condition of women (for more see, Oniszczenko et al., 2011). In its doctrine, the preceding communist system offered gender egalitarianism, but in reality it functioned only in the domain of employment. The presence of women in the labor force was pervasive but simply because the salaries of their working husbands were not sufficient to maintain one-income households. The “gender pay gap” was evident, and female gender discrimination in social and political spheres was accepted because it was sanctioned by patriarchal and catholic cultures of female subjugation (Domański, 1999; Siemieńska, 2003).

A striking example of male domination in sociopolitical life in Poland was the absence of any women during the negotiations known as the “Polish Roundtable Talks,” although 50% of activists in the Solidarity (“Solidarność”) opposition were female (Radiukiewicz, 2010). There were practically no feminist organizations in Poland until 1990, and the awareness of feminist ideas among Polish women was low at the onset of the democratic transformation (Siemieńska, 2003). Now, after 25 years of dramatic political and social changes, the feminist movement is very prominent and issues of gender equality are publically debated. Consequently, there is a greater sense of empowerment and a larger representation of women in high echelons of political organizations and government, both at local and national levels. At the time of this writing, for example, the prime minister of Poland is a female and several women are
heads of major ministries and cities. Taking under consideration this dedicated concern for gender equality in contemporary Poland, it may be reasonable to suggest that the gender gap in political participation among younger Poles, who were politically socialized along with the transformation, may be disappearing (i.e., hypothesis 1).

Political science and sociological work informs that the nature of political involvement and activism often reflects specific generational experiences directly associated with ideological milieus and historical events influencing the lives of their contemporaries. This shared political context reflected in similar political preferences and behaviors of a generation is referred to as a “generation or period effect” (e.g. Norris, 2003; Schatz, 2002). The post-1989 changes in Poland have been a salient and long-lasting economic, social, and political evolution that, throughout significant alterations of life conditions, could have also influenced political consciousness and activity across different age cohorts collectively witnessing and participating in these processes. Hence, particularly interesting is the question of whether age or generational effects on political involvement among contemporary Poles could have aligned along differential political socialization processes operating during the bygone era of the totalitarian communist regime versus the ongoing period of democratic and free market economy transformation.

The transformation to democracy in Poland changed the lifestyle of its citizens, including their system of values, attitudes toward work, family, social connections, and money (e.g. Jasińska-Kania, Marody, 2003; Jasińska-Kania, 2013). Demands for retraining, expectations for growth of professional skills, threats of unemployment, and greater complexity of health care and retirement systems contrasted starkly with the relative plainness and stability of the offerings of the ex-communist governments. Poland’s membership in the European Union introduced large segments of the Polish population to uncharted territories of social, political, and cultural diversities (e.g., Czapinski, Panek, 2011; Domanski, 2010; Jakubowska, Kaniasty, 2014a).

A direct consequence of these benefits and liabilities of transformation is that the youngest post-1989 generation has been socialized within a diametrically different political reality from that of their parents and grandparents who reached their adulthood and/or older ages under a communist regime. Following these lines of description of the contemporary political context in Poland, it may be reasonable to propose that the gender gap in political participation could be moderated by the generation (i.e., period, age) effect. In other words, political behavior of younger females and males may differ from the political participation of their older counterparts due to the dramatic ideological and economical divergences in their life experiences (i.e., hypothesis 2).

Present investigation of the role of gender and age in explaining political participation and activism among Poles will consider psychological factors that are less often examined within sociological and political science frameworks. Prior studies with Polish citizens that investigated various predictors of political participation suggest, for example, that moral legitimization of actual economic and political systems, positive beliefs about the world, and low levels of perceived threat are associated with greater participation in political life. On the other hand, moral delegitimization of a political system, negative beliefs about the world, and propensity of see the word as dangerous are associated with lower political participation (Skarżyńska, 2012a, 2012b; Skarżyńska, Henne, 2012).

Our earlier findings (Kaniasty, Jakubowska, 2014) showed that subjective evaluations of the influence politics exerted on people’s lives (i.e., stress appraisals of political events) affected their satisfaction with life and other indicators of psychological well-being. The challenges resulting from the political and economic transforma-
tion undoubtedly presented themselves as potential stressors, both as loses and gains, that may have a facilitating and/or inhibiting influence on the levels of political engagement. Although there are many ways of coping with stressors, two overarching strategies are used (Lazarus, Folkman, 1984). People may adopt a problem solving approach whereby they engage in activities aimed at removing or reducing the source of stress (e.g., demands for increasing the minimum wage, appeals for health care or educational reforms); in the political milieu, such action would entail more political action and protest. Conversely, people may adopt emotion-focused coping strategies attempting to reduce the negative emotional responses associated with stressors. Such a defensive stance might lower political activity and is likely to be accompanied by psychological egocentrization and venting. Anxieties and distress ensuing from disadvantaged life circumstances may be buffered by collective political activity and/or reframing one’s political standing in a society, resulting in differential levels of political self-efficacy, interest in politics, or direct engagement (e.g., Fromm, 1965; Hobfoll, 1998; Kruglanski, et al, 2009). Therefore, in addition to examining the roles of gender and age and their joint effect on political participation, the present study will account for a number of psychological predictors of engagement in political life such as, the presence of life stressors, satisfaction with life, as well as various psychological resources assessed purposely within the context of politics (e.g., political interest, political self-efficacy, sense of anomie, subjective stress appraisals of political events). These factors were shown as relevant for predicting political participation, political attitudes, and social-psychological well-being in earlier analyses with this data set (Jakubowska, Kaniasty 2014a; 2014b; Kaniasty, Jakubowska, 2014) and are only included in the present analyses to help examine the gender and generation/period influences on political participation in the most conservative manner.

METHOD

Sample
A nationwide random sample of 400 adults was selected using a probability quota sampling strategy and interviewed face-to-face via CAPI method (computer assisted personal interviewing) in respondents’ homes in November and December, 2011. The average length of the interview was 35 minutes.

Participants were 53% female (n = 210) and the mean age of the sample was 44.54 (SD = 16.36, range 18 – 86). Fifty three percent of the sample attained elementary or vocational education (n = 210), 31% completed high school or a few years of post-high school education (n = 124), whereas 16% of respondents reported receiving a college degree (n = 65). Our sample was also representative of respondents’ place of residence in terms of population size: 38% of participants lived in villages (n = 150), 24% in towns up to 50,000 in population size (n = 95), 16% resided in cities with up to 200,000 inhabitants (n = 65), and the remaining 22% of the respondents lived in larger cities with a population size greater than 200,000 (n = 90).

Political participation: The outcome variable
The index of political participation was created based on a sum of affirmative responses to 14 dichotomous (Yes/No) questions sampling a variety of political behaviors. Three items asked about routine and cyclical electoral behaviors (voting in presidential, parliamentary, and local elections), whereas the remaining items concerned legal non-electoral political participation (i.e., running in parliamentary elections, running in local elections, signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, membership in a
major party, membership in a trade unions, attending public forums with politicians, signing protest letters, writing protest letters, participating in legal strikes, membership in a fringe party not represented in the parliament; see Jakubowska, Kaniasty, 2014b). The scores of the actual index of political participation utilized in the present analyses ranged from 0 to 8 because the frequency of engaging in more than 8 political behaviors was very minimal (i.e., values between 8 and 14 were collapsed into one category). The sample mean was 2.91 (SD = 1.60; Mdn = 3.00).

Predictors of political participation

Four sociodemographic factors were included in the main analyses. Our focal variables were respondents’ gender (0 = male, 1 = female) and age, which was scored in years. Additionally, respondents’ educational attainment was classified into 4 levels, and the place of their residence (i.e., population size) was grouped into 5 categories.

Two variables assessed the perceived stressfulness of respondents’ lives. Perceived stress, defined as the degree to which respondents appraised various situations and demands in their lives as exceeding their ability to cope, was assessed by 2 items from the Perceived Stress Scale (PPS; Cohen, Kamarck, Merlitztein, 1983; “In the last 30 days, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle your personal problems?”; “In the last 30 days, how often have you felt that things were going your way?”; r = .40). Answers were scored on a 5-point scale (0 = never, 1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = very often; M = 1.64, SD = 0.68).

The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) was used to assess respondents’ global cognitive judgments of satisfaction with their lives (Diener, et al., 1985). A sample item is: “I am satisfied with my life.” Responses to this Likert-type items ranged from “1” (= strongly disagree) to “7” (= strongly agree). In the present sample, the average SWLS score (the sum of 5 items) was 18.76 (SD = 5.11) and its alpha reliability coefficient was .81.

Five predictor variables reflected psychological resources within the context of politics. Interest in politics was measured with one item: “People have different levels of interest in politics. How much are you interested in politics? (1 = not at all - I am practically not interested in it, to 5 = a great deal, I pay careful attention to almost everything that is happening in politics). Answer options “4” and “5” were recoded into one category (M = 2.64, SD = 0.90).

Political self-efficacy was measured by a 9-item revised Sociopolitical Control Scale (SPCS-R, Peterson et al., 2006). Two examples of items are: “I would rather have a leadership role when I’m involved in a group project;” “It is important to me that I actively participate in local issues.”. The statements were answered using a 5-point Likert-type response option format (1 = definitely disagree, 3 = neither disagree nor agree, 5 = definitely agree). The score of the scale represented the mean of items (M = 3.32, SD = .60), and it had a reliability coefficient of .80.

Sense of anomie, generally defined as feelings of alienation, normlessness, distrust, and meaningless, were assessed with a 4-item scale (see Korzeniowski, 2002). The items were modeled on questions from various frequently used scales of alienation and anomie (e.g., Dean, 1961; Srole, 1956). A sample item is: “The only thing one can be sure of today is that there is nothing one can be sure of” (1 = definitely disagree to 4 = definitely agree). The internal reliability coefficient of the average score (M = 2.64, SD = .65) on this scale was .80.

Stress appraisals of political events were assessed with The Warsaw Appraisal of Political Stress Inventory (WAPSI), developed as a general measure of perceptions or appraisals of the degree to which ordinary and public political events are judged as
taxing or burdensome (Kaniasty, Jakubowska, 2013; 2014). A list of 24 political life stressors was created to represent potentially stressful events of varied duration, severity, and scope. The inventory incorporated events that could be considered as: traumas (e.g., “possibility of a foreign terrorist attack”), life change events (e.g., “elections”), chronic stressors (e.g., “the widening of the gap between the rich and poor”), macro system stressors (e.g., “economic crisis”), nonevents (e.g., “inability to solve national health care issues”), and hassles/irritations (e.g., “lies of politicians”). The instructions asked respondents to express their judgments about the extent to which listed political events unfavorably or favorably influenced their own personal lives and the life of the country. Respondent answers were scored on a 7-point scale (from –3 to +3) and were subsequently recoded so that the high (positive) score would indicate a more unfavorable (negative) appraisal of political events. The combined average of the 48 items referring to the negative influence of political events to the self (24 questions) and the country (24 questions) was 1.61 (SD = .83, Cronbach alpha = .97).

Defensive behaviors index was created based on 6 dichotomous (Yes/No) items that referred to excessive behaviors aimed at protecting oneself and family against the possibility of experiencing serious consequences of a politically-laden event (e.g., “I avoid foreign travels because of a possibility of terrorist attack,” “I keep a stock pile of food in case of food price increases,” “I keep my savings in foreign currency in case of economic crash in Poland”). The index of defensive behaviors was recoded to have a range of 0 to 4 (M = 1.64, SD = .68).

RESULTS

A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to examine relative contributions of 11 predictor variables and the Gender X Age interaction in explaining the variance in political participation. All predictor variables accounted together for 27.00% of the variance in political participation, $F_{(12, 387)} = 11.96, p < .001$, adjusted $R^2 = .25$. The first block of a hierarchical regression included the two focal predictor variables, gender and age, and two control variables, education and place of residence. These variables explained 6.2% of the variance in respondents’ reports of their political participation behaviors, $F_{(4, 395)} = 6.50, p < .001$. (When both gender and age were entered together in the first step on the model, the amount of the variance they explained equaled to 3.4%, $p < .001$).

The influence of gender approached the routine .05 level of statistical significance ($p = .064$). Men engaged more often in political participation than women. Older age was significantly associated with greater participation in political activities (Table 1). Persons with higher educational attainment reported more political activity, as did respondents who resided in more populated communities.

The influence of two life stressfulness measures, perceived stress and satisfaction with life, was statistically significant and explained an additional 3.9% of the variance in political participation, $F_{(2,393)} = 8.47, p < .001$. Respondents who perceived more stress in their lives in the last 30 days engaged in political activity less frequently. The score of satisfaction with life was not significantly associated with the outcome variable.

Five psychosocial resources relevant for the context of respondents’ political activities explained together 16% of the variance, $F_{(5, 388)} = 16.74, p < .001$. Not surprisingly, respondents who had more interest in politics and/or expressed higher levels of self-efficacy reported a higher frequency of engaging in political participation. Persons whose appraisals indicated that common political events exerted negative influence on their lives and the life of the country were also involved in politics to a greater
Likewise, people with higher score on the index of defensive behaviors were more politically engaged. The Beta coefficient for sense of anomie was negative and approached statistical significance \( (p = .072) \).

In the final step (Block 4), the term for the join effect between gender and age (i.e., a cross-product of the centered constituent measures) was entered and its contribution to the explanation of the variance in political participation was statistically significant, \( \Delta R^2 = .010, F (1, 387) = 5.47, p = .020 \). The interaction was plotted and statistically explored using the PROCESS tool for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). The values for age used in the plot were based on values corresponding to 10, 25, 50, 75, and 90 sample percentiles. As seen in Figure 1, the level of political participation increased

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**Table 1** Predicting political participation: Results of a hierarchical regression analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Block 1</th>
<th>Block 2</th>
<th>Block 3</th>
<th>Block 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence (population size)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived stress</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with life</td>
<td></td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political self-efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of anomie</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stress appraisals of political events</td>
<td></td>
<td>.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defensive behaviors</td>
<td></td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interaction between Gender and Age</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with age (i.e., main effect) for both genders. This effect was statistically significant for males \((t = 4.76, p < .001)\) but only approached statistical significance for females \((t = 1.84, p = .066)\). As routinely described in the literature, the gender gap of lesser political activity among females emerged as statistically significant, beginning with the age of 56.6 years \((t = -1.97, p = .05)\; \text{values shown in Figure 1: age 58, } t = -2.04, p = .042, \text{ age 67, } t = -2.30, p = .022). Men in their mid-fifties or older engaged in more political activities than their female peers.

Inspection of Table 1 shows that, when all predictors were included in the model, the following variables had statistically significant Beta coefficients for predicting political participation: age, interest in politics, political self-efficacy, defensive behaviors, and, of course, the gender by age interaction.

**Supplementary Analyses**

Two additional regression analyses using the same model were conducted with two indices of political participation as outcome variables that separated electoral behaviors (range 0-3, \(M = 2.33, SD = 1.03\), value of 3 for 65% of the sample) and non-electoral behaviors (range 0-4, \(M = .56, SD = 1.10\), value of 0 for 73% of the sample). In the regression model predicting voting behavior, the following variables were statistically significant in the final block: age \((\beta = .16, p = .001)\), perceived stress \((\beta = -.18, p < .001)\), interest in politics \((\beta = .12, p = .022)\), political self-efficacy \((\beta = .12, p = .027)\), sense of anomie \((\beta = -.09, p = .049)\), and stress appraisals of political events \((\beta = .28, p < .001)\). The interaction between gender and age was not statistically significant.

In the regression model predicting non-electoral political behaviors the following variables were statistically significant in the final block: age \((\beta = .15, p = .002)\), place

![Figure 1 Interaction between age and gender](image)

*(Based on values at sample percentiles of 10, 25, 50, 75, & 90)*
of residence ($\beta = .09, p = .053$), political self-efficacy ($\beta = .31, p < .001$), stress appraisals of political events ($\beta = -.14, p = .049$) and defensive behaviors ($\beta = .22, p < .001$). The join effect between gender and age was also statistically significant ($\beta = -.10, p = .027$) and it revealed the same pattern of regression lines as the one presented in Figure 1. The gender gap in political participation involving activities other than common voting emerged among respondents the later part of middle adulthood.

Although the results of regression analyses clearly showed a strong main effect of age on political participation, for descriptive purposes only, we also conducted post hoc multiple mean comparisons. This was an additional attempt to unearth the “generation or period effect” in our data. When considering the distribution of age, our sample opportunely divided into three relevant age groups: young people between ages of 18 and 33 years ($n = 127$), people ranging between ages of 34 and 53 (early middle age to middle age, $n = 142$), and people older than 54 years of age (late middle age and older age, $n = 131$). The youngest group basically grew up during the post-communist transformation in Poland (the oldest respondents in this group were 10 years old in 1989), the middle age group entered their adulthood before the onset of post-communist transition (in 1989 their ages ranged between 11 and 30 years), and the oldest group included respondents whose entire early adulthood spanned during the reign of the communist regime (the youngest respondents in this group were 31 years old in 1989). The Tukey HDS tests revealed that the youngest group was significantly lower on the total score of political participation ($M = 2.55, SD = 1.54$) than both older groups. The middle age and older age groups were not statistically different from each other ($M = 3.01, SD = 1.53; M = 3.15, SD = 1.69$; respectively). A follow-up one-way ANOVA analysis showed a significant linear trend, $F(1,397) = 9.07, p = .003$, suggesting that, as age increased, the participation in various political activates increased proportionately.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

Results of the present study that analyzed data collected in the fall of 2011 provided some support for the “generation or period effect” in political participation of Poles. The youngest respondents, entering their political lives during the post-communist transformation, were less politically active than middle aged and older citizens. These findings are congruent with those reported by other Polish investigations (e.g., Szafraniec, 2011). Furthermore, our results are also consistent with empirical accounts of lackluster political engagement of youngest generations that have been observed in other countries (e.g., Putman, 1996; Twenge, Campbell, Freeman, 2012; Zukin, et al., 2006). However, the strong linear trend observed in Poland is definitely different from curvilinear relationships between age and political involvement found in analyses of political participation in western democracies. In those countries, citizens in the middle age group were shown to be politically more active than both younger and older generations (e.g. Norris, 2003; Schatz, 2002).

Any generational variance is usually explained in terms of specific conditions and demands associated with different developmental stages of life. In the case of Poland, however, these differences seem to be a direct result of the democratization process that began in 1989, which has been a concurrent backdrop in the lives of young people. The lower level of political participation among our youngest participants may indicate their low level of moral legitimization of political system in Poland (cf. the system justification theory, e.g., Jost, Banaji, Nosek, 2004).

Skarżynska’s (2012) analyses on a representative sample of Poles documented that evaluations of Poland as “the best country to live in” increase with age. Favorable
attitudes toward Poland are concomitant with moral system legitimization and collective authoritarianism expressed as a belief that cohesion and goals of a national group supersede individual needs. On the other hand, among young Poles, perceived favorability of their homeland as “the best place to live in” is lower, as is the level of moral system legitimization. Consequently, younger people exhibit lesser beliefs that authorities serve the interests of citizens, that collective resources are distributed justly, and/or that the government and its agents represent the entire nation. These unfavorable assessments of the political milieu in Poland could be one of the reasons why many young Poles are reticent to involve themselves in politics and prefer to focus on more hedonistic and egocentric aspects of life (Szafraniec, 2011). It remains to be seen whether this lack of political involvement among Polish young adults is a result of the post-communist political transformation or if it simply represents a more universal disinterest in political and civic life observed also in established democracies (e.g., Howe, Strauss, 2000; Twenge et al., 2012).

The main goal of the present study was to examine both gender and age differences in political participation. The pattern of results clearly showed that the gender gap in political participation was dependent on the generation effect (i.e., period, age). Systematic empirical assessments show that political participation in Poland is low in comparison to other post-communist countries (Czapiński, Panek, 2014). For example, on average only 46% of eligible voters in Poland participate in parliamentary elections whereas voter turnout in other European new democracies ranges around 76% to 82% (Cześniek, 2007). Nevertheless, the present study documented that participation in political activities increased with age for both genders, but a clear gender gap of lower participation among women significantly emerged in late middle adulthood. The levels of overall political participation among younger and middle-aged Poles were similarly low for both genders. It is important to note that this particular gender difference did not emerge when electoral behavior was examined. In this respect, our results are congruent with research findings concerning voting behavior in established democracies such as the USA, UK and other western European countries (e.g., Hill, 2003; Inglehart, Norris, 2000). According to these studies, the gender gap at the voting booths exists no longer.

Men in their mid-fifties engaged more in legal non-electoral political activities than women. Again, this finding should not be surprising because it likely reflects the consequences of historically engrained, and potentially culturally universal, stereotype of female disinterest and lower competence in politics. Moreover, at this stage of their lives, men typically have more resources at their disposal than women, such as more money, time, or status, and less interpersonal obligations, and it may simply be easier for them to increase their involvement in politics. The cultural stereotype of politics being a male domain and greater availability of men may make them attractive targets for recruitment into politics in their later years.

It should be noted, however, that we do not claim that our findings necessarily suggest that women in later life are disengaging from political activities. In this study, women from the older age groups were more politically involved than both younger women and men. Indeed, the lack of gender gap among younger Poles may speak very little about an improvement in gender egalitarianism of that generation. Rather, our findings distressingly showed that both younger females and younger males are equally reticent to engage in the political life of their country beyond a simple act of voting. This, of course, is not only a Polish problem.
REFERENCES
HOW WE SEE THE INGROUP SOMETIMES REFLECTS HOW WE SEE OUTGROUPS: MIRRORING OF NATIONAL STEREOTYPES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

1. Objectives. The aim of our study was to examine mirroring in national stereotypes of five Central European countries. Mirroring describes a phenomenon whereby people rate their ingroup characteristics as opposite to characteristics typical of a relevant outgroup.

2. Sample and setting. 2,241 participants from Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Slovakia rated their national ingroup stereotype and outgroup stereotypes of the four other countries on the National Character Survey (NCS, Terracciano et al., 2005).

3. Hypothesis. Mirroring will occur primarily against dominant Germany.

4. Statistical analysis. We compared each of the national ingroup stereotypes with the corresponding national outgroup stereotypes. Profile agreement was calculated as an intraclass correlation (ICC) across the 30 NCS scales.

5. Results. The results showed a clear presence of mirroring in the three Slavic but not in the two Germanic countries. Mirroring was most pronounced on traits mapping onto the fundamental dimensions of social perception – Agreeableness/warmth and Conscientiousness/competence. However, participants contrasted their ingroup against outgroup stereotypes also on Neuroticism, Extraversion and Openness to Experience.

6. Study limitation. The correlational design did not allow for conclusions about stages of stereotype formation at which mirroring occurs. Follow-up studies can examine mirroring using experimental design.

Key words: mirroring, national stereotypes, Five Factor Model, Stereotype Content Model

Clustering people based on their group membership is one of the inherently human propensities (Tajfel, 1978). Once people are assigned to – in a given context relevant – social groups, activation of stereotypes – characteristics typical for given groups – ensues (Devine, 1989). The content of group stereotypes can be influenced by several mechanisms. Beliefs about groups’ typical characteristics are partially formed as a result of comparison with other relevant groups (Kervyn et al., 2008; Realo et al., 2009; Terraciano et al., 2005). The aim of our research was to determine mechanisms shaping the content of ingroup stereotypes in contrast to relevant outgroup stereotypes. We focused on the mirroring effect whereby ingroup stereotype is rated as opposite to outgroup stereotypes. Employing the Five Factor model for ratings of stereotypes, we examined the dimensions on which mirroring occurs.

TWO THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR RESEARCH ON STEREOTYPE CONTENT

In psychological research, stereotypes describing traits typical for a social group are usually studied within two conceptual frameworks. The first, a social psychological one, represents the Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Cuddy, Fiske, Glick, 2007; Fiske...
et al., 2002). The SCM contains two fundamental dimensions of social perception, namely warmth and competence ascribed to different extent to ingroup and outgroups. These two dimensions are predicted by intergroup competition – or the lack of it – resulting in perceived warmth and status differences resulting in perceived competence. The SCM postulates that ingroups and various outgroups fall within different cells based on the four combinations of high and low levels of warmth and competence. The combination of high warmth and high competence is typically reserved for ingroups. Outgroups receive more ambivalent stereotypes – positive on one dimension but negative on the other (e.g., elderly as high on warmth and low on competence; rich as low on warmth and high on competence), or are stereotyped as low on both dimensions (e.g., welfare recipients).

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The other, a personality psychology framework for studying stereotypes, is based on the Five-Factor Model (FFM; Digman, 1990; McCrae, John, 1992). The FFM is widely accepted hierarchical model of personality traits ordered into dimensions commonly labeled Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness to Experience (O), Agreeableness (A) and Conscientiousness (C). Within FFM, stereotypes are defined as personality traits attributed to typical representatives of a certain social category (e.g., nation, gender, age).

**MECHANISMS SHAPING INGROUP STEREOTYPE CONTENT**

In the “Personality Profiles across Cultures” project, participants from 49 cultures rated their national ingroup stereotypes and national stereotypes of a typical U.S. citizen (Terracciano et al., 2005). The results showed that Canadian participants rated a typical Canadian as agreeable but not assertive, in an exact opposite to how they rated a typical U.S. citizen (i.e., disagreeable and assertive). Thus, in certain personality characteristics, Canadians contrasted their national stereotype to how they perceived U.S. citizens. Realo et al. (2009) compared ingroup stereotypes rated by participants from six countries in the Baltic Sea Region with their views on a typical Russian. Their study determined a similar tendency to contrast national ingroup stereotypes with Russian outgroup stereotypes in Estonia, Lithuania and Finland. Contrasting ingroup stereotypes to outgroup stereotypes was termed mirroring (Realo et al., 2009; Terracciano at al., 2005).

A systematic differentiation between stereotypes of two distinct groups was recorded also within the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002). While dominant groups are perceived as high on competence but low on warmth, subordinate groups are perceived as low on competence but high on warmth. This effect was coined compensation (Kervyn et al., 2008; Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Judd, 2010) whereby two social groups are perceived as opposite on the two basic dimensions of social perception. In other words, when rating two social groups, people tend to perceive one of the groups as high on one dimension (e.g., competence) and low on the other dimension (e.g., warmth). Employing a compensatory mechanism, the other group is then viewed as low on the first dimension (i.e., competence) but high on the other (i.e., warmth).

Up until now, there has been surprisingly little effort to interrelate the two theoretical frameworks for study on content of stereotypes. Despite this lack of comparison, we believe that both frameworks share several important assumptions. Within the Five-Factor Model, facets of Agreeableness (A) and Extraversion (e.g., E1: Warmth) correspond to warmth that maps onto the quality of interpersonal relations. Facets of Conscientiousness (e.g., C1: Competence) correspond to competence that relates to fulfilling of tasks and duties. At the same time, we believe that in a complex perception of social groups other dimensions than just warmth and competence might play a
role. In order to capture a more nuanced view of ingroup and outgroup characteristics, we employed the Five Factor Model with five basic dimensions on which groups can be assessed. This way, we can examine compensation on the two dimensions as part of a more general phenomenon – mirroring – on the Five-Factor dimensions.

THE PRESENT RESEARCH
In the present study participants from five Central European countries (Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Slovakia) rated their ingroup national stereotypes and outgroup national stereotypes of the other four countries. For the first time, the current research employed a full ingroup – outgroup design whereby participants from all involved groups rated all other groups comprised in the given study. This way, our research surpasses the design of previous studies that used a criterion of a single dominant country against which ingroup stereotypes were contrasted (e.g., Realo et al., 2009; Terracciano et al., 2005). This comprehensive approach allowed us to determine conditions under which mirroring occurs in ecologically valid settings of relations between five existing groups.

METHOD

Participants
Altogether, 2,241 university students (75% women) from five Central European countries (Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, and Slovakia) rated national ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. The Austrian sample consisted of 396 students, age range 18–65 years (M = 25.02, SD = 7.20; 75% women); the Czech sample of 726 students, age range 18 – 54 years (M = 23.16, SD = 4.98; 75% women); the German sample of 329 students, age range 18 – 63 years (M = 23.73, SD = 5.00; 70% women); the Polish sample of 281 students, age range 17 – 53 years (M = 22.7, SD = 3.64; 86% women) and the Slovak sample of 509 university students, age range 16 – 66 years (M = 24.39, SD = 6.58; 76% women).

Procedure and Materials
The National Character Survey (NCS, Terracciano et al., 2005) was used for the ratings of national ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. NCS consists of 30 bipolar items intended to parallel the facets of the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R, Costa, McCrae, 1992). For example, a facet of Neuroticism, N3: Depression, was assessed by asking how likely, on a five-point scale, a typical country representative is depressed, sad and pessimistic versus content and optimistic. Six items represent each of the five major dimensions of personality traits (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness). The NCS was already available in Czech, German, Polish, and Slovak (Terracciano et al., 2005). The questionnaires were administered online. All participants completed the NCS five times for their ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. In each subsample, respondents first rated a typical member of their own country and subsequently typical country representatives of the remaining four countries presented in a random order.

Data Analysis
Using the profile-correlation approach, we first compare the whole profiles of ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. Based on the overall differences between ingroup and outgroup stereotypes, we adopt a more in-depth approach and focus on relevant characteristics on which mirroring occurs. In order to eliminate spurious correlations called
the “generalized other” (Cronbach, 1955) all NCS stereotype scores were converted into T-scores ($M = 50$, $SD = 10$) using mean scores and SDs of national stereotype ratings from 3,989 participants in 49 different cultures (Terracciano et al., 2005; for more detail about standardization see Hľebíčková, Graf, 2014). Profile agreement was calculated as an intraclass correlation (ICC) across the 30 facets, using the double-entry method (Griffin, Gonzales, 1995) with the $p$-value based on the non-doubled n of 30. Double-entry intraclass correlations are similar to Pearson’s correlations but besides profiles’ shapes they are also sensitive to differences in profile elevation, and scatter, thus being more conservative than Pearson’s r (McCrae, 2008). Internal consistency, factor structure and interjudge reliability of the NCS ingroup and outgroup stereotypes are provided in Hľebíčková and Graf (2014) and Graf, Hľebíčková, Petrjánošová and Leix (2015).

RESULTS
In order to determine the presence of mirroring, we compared the profiles of national ingroup stereotypes of five Central European countries with four outgroup stereotypes as rated by participants from the same countries (e.g., we contrasted Austrian ingroup stereotype rated by Austrian participants with Czech, German, Polish and Slovak outgroup stereotypes rated by Austrian participants). Mirroring of ingroup and outgroup stereotypes shows in negative intraclass correlation (ICC) between two stereotypical profiles. We found seven significant negative ICC (out of twenty; see Table 1). All of the significant ICC were present in the three Slavic countries where participants mirrored their national stereotypes against other Slavic or the two Germanic countries.

Table 1 Intraclass correlations between five national ingroup stereotypes and corresponding national outgroup stereotypes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingroup stereotypes:</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.45*</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>-.36*</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.40*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.66***</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>-.40*</td>
<td>-.50**</td>
<td>-.36*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. All stereotype ratings were standardized using international norms (Terracciano et al., 2005). ICCs indicating mirroring are printed in italics.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

The most distinctive evidence of mirroring showed in the Slovak subsample. Slovak participants rated their ingroup stereotypes in contrast to how they rated Czech, Austrian and German stereotypes. With respect to stereotypes of the two Germanic countries, Slovak participants rated their ingroup stereotype as higher on Warmth (E1), Openness to Fantasy (O1), Openness to Feelings (O3) and all facets of Agreeableness (A1–A6) (see Figure 1). On the other hand, Slovak participants perceived typical Germans and Austrians as less neurotic (N), more assertive (E3) and conscientious (C) in comparison to a typical Slovak. Similarly to typical Germans and Austrians, Slovak participants perceived typical Czechs as less neurotic, less agreeable and more assertive than typical Slovaks (see Figure 1).
Czech participants mirrored their national ingroup stereotype against Austrian and Slovak outgroup stereotypes in all characteristics of the Five-Factor Model (see Table 1 and Figure 2). A typical Austrian and Slovak were perceived as less neurotic (N), more extraverted (E), more open to experience (O) and more agreeable (A). A typical Austrian was also rated as more conscientious (C) than a typical Czech. Thus, Czech participants ascribed socially undesirable characteristic to their typical country representative while ascribing socially desirable traits to representatives of the two neighboring countries, comparable in size.

Polish participants mirrored their ingroup stereotype against the two Slavic, but not Germanic countries (see Table 1 and Figure 3). Mirroring against the two Slavic neighbors occurred on three out of five stereotypical dimensions. While Polish participants perceived Polish, Czech and Slovak stereotypes similar with respect to
levels of Extraversion and Conscientiousness, in the three other characteristics they rated Czech and Slovak outgroup stereotypes in more socially desirable way. Typical Czechs and Slovaks were perceived as less neurotic (N), more open to experience (O) and more agreeable (A).

Austrian ingroup stereotypes correlated positively with German outgroup stereotypes. Austrian participants perceived their own country stereotypes and stereotypes of the other German speaking country as similar while the three Slavic countries did not represent relevant groups for comparison. Similarly to Austrian subsample, also German participants did not feel the need to draw a firm line between ingroup and outgroup stereotypes, as shown in no evidence for mirroring in either of the German speaking subsamples.

**DISCUSSION**

In our study, we compared national ingroup and outgroup stereotypes of five Central European countries. We found the mirroring effect of national ingroup stereotypes against national outgroup stereotypes in three countries – the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. The Slovak subsample demonstrated the most pronounced pattern of mirroring. Slovak participants rated Slovak ingroup stereotype in contrast to how they rated outgroup stereotypes of the two Germanic countries and their Czech neighbors. Independent Slovakia was founded in 1993 and probably still is under the construction of national identity where differences between ingroup and relevant outgroups might be exaggerated in strive for group distinctiveness (Brewer, 1999; Plchťová, Lášticová, Petrášová, 2009). Although the Czech and Slovak Republics were established as independent successor states of the former Czechoslovakia at the same time, the more intense need of Slovaks to delimit themselves against the neighboring countries can be also due to other factors. The position of Slovakia in the Central European region is rather marginal. Slovakia is geographically located in its most Eastern part, moreover, it belongs to relatively smaller European countries. Similar characteristics apply to Estonia in the Baltic Sea region where the mirroring was most
notable in comparison with other Baltic Sea countries (Realo et al., 2009). This means that mirroring is to be expected in groups that have stronger need for distinctiveness.

The other two countries where we found mirroring were the Czech Republic and Poland. Our results suggest that mirroring occurs in lower status groups (e.g., post-communist countries with lower economical standards, new EU members). Following this argument, German and Austrian participants living in countries with developed and stable democratic political system and higher economic prosperity did not polarize their ingroup stereotype against any of the compared four countries. Even the fact that Austria is a relatively small country did not contribute to Austrian participants’ need to contrast their ingroup stereotype towards the world power in the region – Germany. On the contrary, Austrian participants rated Austrian ingroup and German outgroup stereotypes as converging, which represented the only positive profile correlation in the full ingroup-outgroup design of five countries. Future research can examine whether the tendency of Austrian participants to see their ingroup in accordance with German outgroup holds even if other, perhaps for Austrian participants more relevant countries are used as point of reference for ratings of ingroup stereotypes. Similarly, future studies can examine whether mirroring in German participants occurs when more relevant groups, such as other world powers, constitute the context for meaningful intergroup comparison.

Although Germany is a dominant European power, Czech and Polish participants did not mirror their ingroup stereotype against German outgroup stereotype either. The ground for the lack of mirroring against Germans was the tendency of Czech and Polish participants to ascribe negative characteristics to their ingroup stereotype. As a result, the low level of Agreeableness/warmth was to be found not only in the German outgroup stereotype but also in the Czech and Polish ingroup stereotypes. Thus in our study, the pattern of mirroring did not follow predictions of intergroup bias (Hewstone, Rubin, Willis, 2002) – ascribing positively perceived personality traits to ingroup (i.e., ingroup favoritism) and negatively perceived personality traits to outgroups (i.e., outgroup derogation).

In our research we attempted to interconnect the two theoretical accounts dealing with content of stereotypes – the five factor model and the stereotype content model. The mirroring of Slovak ingroup stereotype against Austrian and German outgroup stereotypes followed the pattern predicted by the compensation mechanism described within the SCM framework (Kervyn et al., 2010). Slovak participants rated their ingroup stereotype as higher on warmth/Agreeableness and lower on competence/Conscientiousness. At the same time, they rated outgroup stereotypes of both wealthier countries as high on competence/Conscientiousness and low on warmth/Agreeableness. On the other hand, the subsamples from the Czech Republic and Poland did not show the full pattern of differentiation predicted by the compensation mechanism. Czech and Polish participants coming from less affluent countries contrasted their ingroup stereotypes against the more affluent Germany on Conscientiousness. However, participants from both countries did not compensate for the lack of ingroup competence with higher levels of warmth. Thus, based on economic indices, Czechs and Poles acknowledged the prominent position of Germany in the Central European region. On the other hand, ingroup derogation present in Czech and Polish samples when participants rated ingroup stereotype low not only on competence but also warmth did not allow for the compensation mechanism to occur.

The stereotype content model predicts the level of competence and warmth based on group status and competition between groups. Nevertheless, status and competition can be more easily estimated in groups considered within SCM: the unemployed, the rich, housewives or ethnic minorities. It is more difficult to infer the status of dif-
ferent countries with similar level of economic prosperity where other factors such as history come into play. It is even more difficult to assess the level of competition between nations in situations where no overt conflicts are taking place. Compensation, representing an extension of SCM, occurred only in limited number of cases in our research on national stereotypes. Our results indicate that mirroring might be a more general mechanism yielding valid predictions about group differentiation beyond the compensation mechanism.

Another reason for the lack of compensation might be a different design used in our study where participants simultaneously rated five groups, unlike previous research where only two groups were rated simultaneously (Kervyn et al., 2008, 2010). The simultaneous rating of more than two groups might not accentuate the opposing traits typical for comparison between two specific groups to the same extent as two-group design, thus weakening the compensatory mechanisms. Furthermore, participants rated stereotypes on more differentiated FFM-based characteristics that do not represent only two main dimensions of social perception, possibly leading to a less distinct pattern as compared to compensation found in previous research.

The basic dimensions of social perception represented by Agreeableness and Conscientiousness in our study served participants as relevant dimensions for contrasting ingroup and outgroup stereotype. However, in our data, mirroring was present also on other dimensions of FFM, namely Openness to Experience and Neuroticism. Neuroticism contrasts adjustment or emotional stability with maladjustment of emotional instability. In our study, mirroring occurred on Neuroticism when ingroup stereotypes were rated as more neurotic than outgroup stereotypes. In line with prediction drawn from ingroup favoritism, one would expect that Neuroticism as a negative characteristic will be rather ascribed to outgroups than one’s ingroup. Finding the opposite in our and other studies (Terracianno, McCrae, 2007) might be due to the fact that people have more opportunities to witness signs of negative emotions in ingroup members based on daily interactions with them as compared to relatively more scarce contact with outgroup members.

In order to summarize the outcomes of our study, we found mirroring of national ingroup stereotypes in three out of five countries under study. Thus, it is not a universal mechanism always shaping the content of ingroup stereotypes. The tendency to contrast the ingroup stereotype against outgroup national stereotypes was present in groups with lower social status and weaker economic indices. Past studies have identified mirroring only in countries that differentiated themselves from a dominant neighbor (i.e., Canada against the U.S. in Terracciano et al., 2005 or Baltic Sea countries against Russia in Realo et al., 2009). Our research showed that mirroring is not confined to cases where people wish to draw a firm line between representations of their ingroup and one dominant outgroup relevant for comparison.

Furthermore, our study showed that mirroring, as compared to compensation, is a broader mechanism influencing the content of ingroup stereotypes on other than just two dimension of social perception. Our results confirmed that there are other dimensions on which participants systematically differentiate their ingroup from relevant outgroups. Neuroticism was to higher extent ascribed to ingroup stereotype than outgroup stereotype in the three Slavic countries, resulting in systematic mirroring on this dimension. In a similar way, ingroup stereotypes were rated low on Openness to Experience as compared to outgroups, showing in mirroring on Openness in the Slovak, Czech and Polish sample. Tentatively, we can expect that different groups will mirror their stereotypes on different dimensions based on the broader background of particular intergroup settings created by history, politics, geography or economics.
However, more research employing FFM for ratings of group stereotypes in different settings is needed in order to formulate more general conclusions regarding the occurrence of mirroring in stereotype ratings.

REFERENCES


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DIFFICULT NEIGHBORHOODS:
WRESTLING WITH THE HISTORY OF POLISH – GERMAN AND POLISH – RUSSIAN RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT
This paper reports three studies on Polish - German and Polish - Russian relations in the context of their difficult history (World War 2 and communist oppression), as well as process of reconciliation between the nations. The paper addressed questions and hypotheses on mechanisms responsible for constructive coping with the past, through apologies by the perpetrators and forgiveness on the side of their former victims. Bilateral relations with Poland’s’ neighbors had opposite trajectories after World War 2. In case of Germans, initial hostility was slowly transformed into friendship and cooperation in European Union and NATO. At the same time, reparations to victims of the Nazi were paid by Germany. Based on earlier literature it has been hypothesized that their apology, if seen as genuine, will facilitate forgiveness and dissociate intergroup forgiveness from perception of ingroup harm. The opposite trajectory characterizes Polish - Russian bilateral relations, where communist rule and oppression were depicted as friendship. We hypothesized that such situation would lead to cynicism and thus hinder forgiveness and empathy.

Research findings (Study 1) reflect these developments: Germans are seen as more remorseful and are more forgiven than Russians. In order to inspect the relationship between remorse and forgiveness, a study that followed an experimental design was conducted. Its results suggest that the effect of apologies and their sincerity was found in study 2 as facilitating factors to forgiveness felt by Poles’ also, the impact of the magnitude of harm was buffered by these conciliatory moves by German leaders. Study 3 concerned a situation of insincere reconciliation in Polish-Russian relations. Results show that such situation leads to cynicism and inhibits forgiveness, as well as compassion toward victims from the other nation.

Key words:
intergroup forgiveness, cynicism, intergroup reconciliation, apology, World War 2

Neighboring nations often have difficult relations, because their history is filled of wars and transgressions against each other. Poland and her largest neighboring states, offer a good exemplification of this thesis. Germany and the Soviet Union became aggressors against Poland in September 1939, marking the outbreak of World War II. Many atrocities, including crimes against humanity were committed by each of the occupants. However, during the seventy years since the end of WWII these two countries went in opposite directions in their relations with victims, including Poland. Germans became pacifists, trying to amend the past wrongs, by paying reparations and reconciling with their victims. Russians, on the other hand, created an empire by annexing many small Eastern European nations, and transforming many other countries of the region to satellites of the Soviet Union. The communist system was labeled friendship and cooperation, but it so existed only as a surface propaganda. Twenty

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five years after the fall of communism, Russians have not yet admitted having com-
mitt ed crimes against the neighboring nations, let alone apologized for them. In the
current paper we show how these two ways of addressing the past influence will ing-
ness to forgive the former enemies, and attitudes toward them.

Emotional effects of intergroup transgressions

We have learned, from Social Identity Theory, that people tend to perceive themselves
through membership in different groups. Such auto-categorizations are important for
individual identity while intergroup relations evoke strong emotions. For example, if
one nation becomes a victim of other’s transgressions, the individual may feel threate-
ned and therefore fear appears. Also, members of a victimized group are likely to be
angry with the aggressors and they want to retaliate (Brown, Wohl, Exline, 2008).
These negative emotions and action tendencies may last even for decades and accross
generations.

However, with time, such feelings may subside leaving place for forgiveness, which
is often defined in terms of letting go of negative emotions and willingness to retaliate
(Hanke, 2009). It also diminishes prejudice against the former transgressor, and may
lead to pro-outgroup behaviors, such as acceptance of outgroups’ losses and suffering
during the conflict (Tam et al., 2008).

Are apologies and remorse facilitators of intergroup forgiveness?

Based on Western philosophy and research on psychology of interpersonal conflict
and reconciliation, it has been assumed that offering apologies by a transgressing
group should lead to intergroup forgiveness. However, thus far researchers have
failed to obtain unanimous confirmation of this assumption (e.g. Philpot and Hornsey,
2008). The most interesting study in the field was conducted by Philpot and Hornsey
in 2011. These authors asked participants, if the historical transgressor has apologized.
Answers to these questions were inadequate, and, more importantly, did not influence
forgiveness. The only result reported was on perceived outgroup remorse, which was
a strong predictor of intergroup forgiveness. Also, evaluation of the apologies proved
to be important: their genuineness correlated with more outgroup remorse and inter-
group forgiveness.

Earlier studies on intergroup apologies were often conducted in reference to small-
er transgressions, and in a different sociopolitical context. This means that the groups
in question did not necessarily share a common border or have had a long complicated
history which is commonplace for nations in Europe. Also, country-states that share a
land border have more need for cooperation, as well as have more tools for exercising
power (and transgress) against each other. Therefore their process of reconciliation
may be harder and encompass more variables. The psychology of reconciliation be-
tween Poland and its neighbors: Germany and Russia is so dificult to study, because
the harmful facts to which this process must refer cover the tragic events of WWII:
from its day one to its very end.

Intergroup reconciliation in context of Polish-German relations

Germans have committed many atrocities and crimes against humanity during World
War 2 against Poles. In the first decades which followed, the two nations remained at
distance and bitterness; the wounds were fresh and Polish grievances remained largely
unanswered. Germany, on the other hand, did not come to terms with the loss of its
Eastern territories and population expulsions.
However, since the fall of the Communism, the situation has changed dramatically. Germans recognized the permanent character of the border with Poland, issued official apologies, and paid financial reparations to former slave laborers of the Third Reich. This reconciliation process coincided with Poland accession to the European Union, where the two nations have become active partners in all domains of social life. This context is essential for the current research probing the difficult past. Hanke (2009) shows that such positive closure of the past, facilitates intergroup forgiveness on the societal level. We may also discuss effects of apologies on individual attitudes.

Our aim is to study the chain process whose starting point is German apology for the harms inflicted on Poles while forgiveness granted by Poles is its end result. So far we have shown, how repent may influence forgiveness, but up to date researchers seemed to omit the problem of interaction between perception of ingroup victimization and outgroup remorse, as well as their impact on forgiveness.

The path postulated above may suggest that in order to forgive, a group has to forget about harms it has experienced from the hand of another. However, often it is not the case: the outgroup is forgiven, but ingroups suffering is still remembered. In our opinion it is possible, because remorse allows the victims to see current outgroup as transformed and therefore different from the transgressor. Therefore we may expect an interaction between perception of harm inflicted by the Nazi and Germans remorse: relationship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness should appear only if Germans are not seen as remorseful (hypothesis 1).

Polish-Russian relations: From mock friendship to open animosities

While seventy years after the end of WWII, Polish-German relations are exemplary of a successful reconciliation, and constructive cooperation, the developments in Poland’s relations with Russia point to the opposite direction. Starting from their officially declared communist friendship covering up Soviet despotic dominance and transgressions, the neighbors moved (i) through some attempts towards reconciliation during the Gorbachov-Yeltsin transformation, corresponding with the collapse of communism, to (ii) a freeze changed into (iii) an open animosity along the fifteen years of Putin’s leadership.

The political context of the current conflict in Ukraine is essential for understanding the dramatic change in Polish - Russian bilateral relations (ranging from economic sanctions to cancellations in cultural exchange). This conflict is also of importance for the return to antagonistic interpretations of historical events centered around World War II, such as: the joint aggression of USSR and Germany’s against Poland, in 1939; the atrocities like Katyń murder; the meaning of the 1945 victory over the Nazi, and its aftermath. Interpretations of these events are largely incompatible of both sides: Russia did not apologize for crimes committed by NKVD and the Red Army. They rather claimed that they had liberated East European nations and were their friends. Russia has not been regretful for the post-war Stalinist dictatorship forcefully induced upon nations of the region, either.

For decades, the alternative version of history was communicated unofficially, through the narratives of family, friends, and opposition groups. We posit, that the discrepancy between propaganda (words) and reality (deeds) is the origin of cynicism (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, Chemonges-Nielson, 2004), which arises along as a tendency to seek hostile or egoistic motives behind all, even seemingly friendly and helpful behaviors (Więckowska, Boski, 2007). This way of explaining the world is also related to low interpersonal trust (Singelis et al., 2003). As research on intergroup forgiveness suggest, trust is positively related to forgiveness. Therefore we may expect that social cynicism is negatively correlated with intergroup forgiveness (hypothesis 3).
The act of forgiveness changes attitudes toward the transgressing party from enmity to more positive ones, as well as to charity behaviors (see McCullough, Tsang, Emmons, 2004). Therefore we may expect that Poles who have forgiven Russians, care more for Russian victims of World War 2 (hypothesis 4).

Overview of current studies

Intergroup forgiveness has its roots in history of relations between groups: past transgressions, and remorse that may have followed. In the current studies we show how these two elements may influence current relations between formerly conflicted nations. In study 1 we show differences between perception of Russians and Germans in reference to magnitude of injustices inflicted upon Poles, as well as their remorse and Polish willingness to forego the negative emotions. In Study 2, we further explore problem of remorse showing how its genuineness may influence forgiveness, and harm-forgiveness relationship. In Study 3, based on Polish-Russian relations, we demonstrate the mechanism of cynicism in Polish-Russian/Soviet relations, adversely affecting forgiveness and empathy.

STUDY 1: POLISH – GERMAN AND POLISH – RUSSIAN RELATIONS AS SEEN THROUGH THE LENS OF SURVEY STUDIES

Research questions and hypotheses

Our first study addressed problem of perception of Germans and Russians in light of the past harms and reconciliation. We wanted to compare Poles’ opinions on the magnitudes of transgression and remorse of their two neighbors.

Participants

The study was performed on a nation-wide sample of 1006 Poles, age 18–79 (M = 43.34, SD = 15.22), 49% male. Participants were interviewed using a computer survey platform and recruited using a nation-wide panel Ariadna (with over 80 000 registered verified users), rewarding respondents for the participation with points that could be exchanged for gifts.

Measures

Magnitude of harm was measured with 3 items asking about existence and severity of transgressions against Poles committed by Germans and Russians. Both scales proved to be reliable (α = .69).

Perceived remorse was measured by 8 questions addressing different behaviors of the transgressing nations (i.e. “Germans have apologized for their crimes”, “Russians have paid reparations to their victims”). It was reliable both for Germans, and Russians (α = .89).

Forgiveness towards Germans was assessed with 4-items scale (i.e. “I have forgiven Germans for atrocities of World War 2”, “We should forgive Germans for atrocities of World War 2”, “We should put aside negative feelings toward Germans that are caused by World War 2”, “I have forgiven Germans their past transgressions”). Respondents assessed on a 5-point scale, to what degree they agree with these statements. The items formed a reliable scale (α = .88). In order to measure forgiveness toward Russians, we used the same questions substituting “Russians” for “Germans” and they concerned Katyn murderer instead of World War 2. This scale was also reliable: α = .89.

All variables were measured on scale from -2 (not at all) to +2 (a lot).
Results and discussion

As the main goal of the current study was to determine differences between perceptions of history of harm and reconciliation in Polish-German and Polish-Russian relations, we have conducted a series of t-tests for dependent variables. As it can be seen in Figure 1, both neighbors of Poland are seen as having inflicted large harms to Poles ($M = 1.43$ for Germans and $M = 1.25$ for Russians). However, contrary to the expectations, respondents saw Germans as source of more harm than Russians ($t_{1005} = 8.63; p < .001$). At the same time descendants of the Third Reich are seen as more remorseful ($t_{1005} = 22.39, p < .001$). What is interesting, participants were not sure if the German remorse was sufficient (the mean $M = 0.14$ did not differ significantly from 0), whereas Russian attitude was seen as unsatisfactory ($M = -0.55$). At the same time participants were more willing to forgive the Western than the Eastern neighbors of Poland ($M = 0.60$ and 0.17 respectively).

Figure 1 Magnitude of harm, remorse and willingness to forgive – comparison of attitudes toward Germans and Russians

In the next step, we have conducted a series of correlations between measured variables. Their results that are shown in Table 1, stand in line with our predictions: magnitude harm is moderately negatively related to perceived outgroup remorse ($r = -.24, p < .001$ for Germans and $r = -.21, p < .001$ for Russians) and forgiveness ($r = -.20, p < .001$ for Germans, and $r = -.18, p < .001$ for Russians). Forgive and perceived remorse are strongly positively related to each other ($r = .49, p < .001$ for Germans, and $r = .52, p < .001$ for Russians). Interestingly, the same measures used for different contexts correlate strongly with each other.

Table 1 Correlations between measured variables

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Notes: $N = 1006$
Results for Germans are above the diagonal and for the Russians below.

Results of the current study show that Germans are seen as having inflicted more harm upon Poles than Russians, but at the same time, they are seen as remorseful and Poles are more forgiving towards them. It seems that remorse plays crucial role in
forgiveness, since it is a strong correlate of forgiveness in case of both transgressing groups.

**STUDY 2. ROLE OF APOLOGIES IN OVERCOMING HISTORICAL ENMITY**

**Hypotheses**

In Study 1 Germans were seen as having committed worse crimes against Poles than Russians, but at the same time, they were more forgiven. They were also seen as more remorseful. This suggests that outgroup remorse plays an important role in letting go of past harms and resentments.

Inconsistency in earlier research does not allow us to formulate a hypothesis concerning a direct effect of apology on intergroup forgiveness. However, genuineness of the act, as well as general attitude of the transgressing group seem to influence the process of getting from harm caused resentment to intergroup forgiveness. Based on earlier literature, we have also asked the question about relationship between ingroup harm and outgroup remorse in the reconciliation process. If the magnitude of required remorse is proportional to the magnitude of harm, remorse should mediate the relationship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness (hypothesis 1). As we have argued, there is another possibility: that outgroup apology breaks the relationship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness (hypothesis 2).

**Method**

Participants were instructed to read a short text before answering questions concerning their perception of Polish-German relations. To trigger knowledge about apology, they read fragments of speech by the German chancellor Merkel, where she accepts responsibility of Germans for the atrocities of the Nazi era. In a non-apology condition students read a text about peace treaty of Gorlitz signed by Germany and Poland in 1950, where blame or war atrocities were not mentioned.

After the manipulation, participants answered a series of questions that referred to the read text. Three items addressed problem of genuineness of apology (α = .60). A higher value denotes more genuine repent. Next, participants answered questions used in Study 1 concerning their perception of intergroup harm (α = .63), and forgiveness (α = .90) as in Study 1. Also perceived outgroup remorse was measured. As earlier, this scale did not address a single act, but rather a general attitude of Germans. This scale also proved reliable (α = .84).

**Participants**

The study was conducted among 158 students of Warsaw University and University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Poznan. Participants were 19 to 40 years old (M = 24.07; SD = 5.98). Majority (56%) of the students were women.

**Results**

*Effects of reading about apology.* In the first step we checked effects of reading about Germans’ apology using a series of t-tests. In Figure 2, which summarizes the results, we can see that indeed speech of Chancellor Merkel was seen as genuine and was better evaluated than the peace treaty (t_{155} = 9.38, p < .001). However, the acceptance of blame had no effect on perception of general attitude of Germans (t_{155} = -0.56, p > .05) or forgiveness (t_{155} = -0.32, p > .05). There was also no effect of manipulation on perceived harm inflicted upon Poles by the Nazi (t_{155} = 0.152, p > .05).
Analysis of mediation. In the next step we were interested in relationships between variables by conducting a series of correlations. Their results suggest that genuineness of repent correlates with perception of outgroup remorse ($r = .36, p < .001$) and intergroup forgiveness ($r = .32, p < .001$), but not with magnitude of harm ($r = -.14, p > .05$). Also, forgiveness was related to perception of harm ($r = -.35, p < .001$), and to Germans’ remorse ($r = .50, p < .001$).

We hypothesized that perception of outgroup remorse should mediate the relationship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness. Since perception of harm is not related to evaluation of apology, the latter variable cannot be considered a mediator of the relationship between perceived ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness. Also general outgroup attitude is not a significant mediator ($CI = [-.25 ; .05]$. Thus results falsify hypothesis 2.

Moderating role of outgroup conciliatory behaviors. The last hypothesis in the current study concerned the effects of outgroup remorse on the relationship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness. In order to verify it, first we have conducted analysis of correlations for both groups separately. As table 2 shows, correlation between magnitude of harm and intergroup forgiveness differs between groups ($r = -.47; p < .001$ for peace treaty, and $r = -.25, p < .05$ for speech of Merkel). In order to check if the difference is significant we used procedure designed by Hayes (2012). It shows that the assignment to group significantly moderated the relationship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness ($\Delta R^2 = .02, F_{1,153} = 4.02, p = .047$).

Table 2: Correlations between variables in 2 conditions

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<tr>
<td>Genuineness of apology</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.34**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harm</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.47***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remorse</td>
<td>.59***</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>-.25*</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>–</td>
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Notes. Above the diagonal are results of the group that read about the peace treaty N = 80. Below the diagonal are results for the group that read speech of Angela Merkel. N = 78
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Discussion
In Study 2 we show that an act of penance itself does not foster forgiveness. Its perception as genuine, on the other hand, plays an important role in evaluation of outgroup remorse and intergroup forgiveness. This results may explain differences between
results obtained in earlier studies: if apology is seen as insincere, it does not foster intergroup forgiveness.

However, appearance of apology had an effect on the relationship between ingroup harm and intergroup forgiveness: when participants were reminded of Germans apologies, evaluation of injustices committed by the nation had less influence on willingness to forgive.

STUDY 3. FORGIVING KATYŃ AND COMPASSION WITH SOVIET SOLDIERS' WAR MEMORIALS

Hypotheses

We have already discussed that with the lack of positive evidence of remorse from the Russian side, it should be more likely to find negative predictors of Polish forgiveness and compassion. We have concentrated on two constructs of intergroup relations: discrepancy between propaganda, and reality and cynicism. Our theory predicted that this discrepancy (between the objective and experienced) should predict the level of cynicism in reciprocal relations. The linkage was expected more relevant on the subordinate side of such dyadic relationship; which was Poland in that case. Next, cynicism should hinder the forgiveness-compassion potential among the victims’ descendants (hypotheses 3 and 4). We consider cynicism as a mediator of the negative historical experience (word-deed discrepancy) on humane orientation to the former perpetrators.

Measures

We asked Poles to evaluate bilateral relations with Russians in five decades of the second half of the 20th century, ending with the first years of the 21st. The propagandist and reality aspects were separately assessed with fifteen bipolar seven point scales (e.g. fair - unfair; mutually profitable - exploitative; friendly - hostile). Results found a huge gap between the propagandist upbeat and the experienced facets of reality during the Stalinist period, diminishing gradually towards the end of the Communist era and during transformation (see: Boski et al., 2009).

Cynicism was measured with the use of well-known photographs of their time, portraying interactions of public figures from the two countries (politicians, sport champions, astronauts). Inner dialogues were assigned to those characters’ minds, reflecting friendly or cynical (ulterior) motives. An example of the latter dialogue, taking place between secretary Leonid Brezhnev being welcomed in Warsaw by his counterpart, Edward Gierek follows:

B: A good attempt of yours, Gierek! These Polacks greet me as a Russian tsar, which is as it should be; and they have enough brains to know who their real boss is!

G: OK., Leonid looks to be content with this mockery which I have staged for him, so he should melt down at the bargaining table, later today.

The expected relationship between reality discrepancy and cynicism was strongly confirmed both at group level along the time frame (decades) and at the level of individual measures: the wider the reality gap open, the higher the cynicism.

For the purpose of this paper, two measures related to forgiveness and intergroup compassion were selected from the original dataset. The first one was derived from the thoughts and feelings associated with Katyń massacre and lie. The two highly

1 Study 3 was conducted over 10 years ago and was partially reported in Boski, Bilas-Henne, and Więckowska (2009) but the findings referring to forgiveness and compassion (empathy) appear in this paper for the first time.
correlated items were: “I feel a need to forgive them”; and “There is a need for our move: We forgive you and we ask for your forgiveness”. The other variable was based on measures of feelings and thoughts regarding the Warsaw cemetery-mausoleum honoring Soviet soldiers who gave their lives fighting the German troops on Polish soil\(^2\). A scale of thirteen positively worded items had a high reliability (\(\alpha = .87\)); e.g.: A spiritual link, praying for their souls; Brotherhood in arms and solidarity; Gratitude towards the Soviet soldiers.

**Results**

A mediation model was proposed such that reality discrepancy and cynicism were expected to be negative predictors of Katyń forgiveness, which in turn was expected a positive predictor of compassion (empathy) related to the military mausoleum. Results of the mediation model are presented in figure 3. They are highly supportive for our theoretical reasoning.

![Figure 3 A mediation model of influence reality discrepancy, cynicism and forgiveness toward Russians on compassion in Polish – Russian relations](image)

Notes: N = 302; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t = tendency

All three mediation paths from Reality Discrepancy to Red Army Cemetery Compassion are significant. Reality discrepancy is particularly effective as the origin predictor of all other variables. Still, cynicism mediates its impact on war memorial compassion, including the double mediation through Katyń forgiveness (\(CI = [-.008 ; -.0002]\)). Thus, our hypotheses 3 and 4 are clearly confirmed. The distortion of a harmful historical reality brings about high levels of cynicism which inhibits positive humane tendencies among Poles. Also, forgiveness for harm afflicted to own group, is a condition for compassion towards outgroup’s victims.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

Intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation has become an emerging topic in political, cross-cultural, and historically oriented psychology. This pull factor does not come from within psychology, but it constitutes a response of academic circles to sui generis political processes. Our statement bears many important implications. The most important of them is the necessity of considering cultural – historical context in any study which sets comparative goals. Thus, we are facing a true dilemma: comparisons broaden our conceptual horizons and the level of generalization; but at the same time, comparisons may be difficult or impossible, because context variables make them so. Essential for these contextual variables are political acts of apology and remorse; symbolic gestures by political leaders that push the process of reconciliation to the citizens who become participants in our studies.

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\(^2\) This is one of difficult symbolic problems left as a legacy of communism in Poland and in other post-communist countries. There exist strong political tendencies to remove these monuments from the public space, where they served the purpose of manifesting Soviet dominance. War memorials are usually spared in such debates, though.
Polish – German and Polish – Russian relations could be seen as an ideal situation for this kind of research. Yet, our three studies have clearly shown that any direct comparison is impossible at this time, because political process in both cases swerved in different directions. We have witnessed a progressed process of reconciliation between Germany and Poland; the two neighbors became close allies in many European and world issues. The two-way road between Berlin to Warsaw is fast, easy and non-eventful. At the same time, the distance between Moscow and Warsaw has been extended in all possible dimensions. Alliance, however limited has been replaced by open antagonism. The conflicting present time froze the difficult and unsolved past.

Our research findings reflect these general considerations. With Germany, real acts of penance expressed by political leaders, and their perception as genuine, contribute to Poles’ forgiveness, and diminish the negative impact of harm on forgiveness. This process can be seen as a sound base for relationship improvement. Yet, close cultural distance between Poland and Russia (House et al., 2004; Boski, 2009) should not be overlooked either.

REFERENCES

THE GEOPOLITICS OF ROMANIAN MIGRATION
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ABSTRACT
The research is focused on the analysis of the migration phenomenon in Romania, in terms of the geopolitical effects it has produced. Migration from Romania is relevant given its size; currently about 13% of the population is outside the country. This situation is the result of the events of the past 25 years: the opening of borders in early 1990, traveling visa-free in Schengen areas granted to Romanian citizens in early 2002; Romania’s accession to the European Union in 2007; the total elimination of labour market restrictions for Romanians, beginning January 1, 2014. These steps have generated specific patterns of migration: immediately after 1990, there was ethnic migration, economic migration started after 1995, and economically unmotivated migration, which we call cultural aspiration migration, started after 2010. The article explores the effects of Romanian migration in quantitative, demographic, economic and political terms. Migration flows and their direction are highlighted quantitatively and demographically. From an economic point of view, we considered the positive and negative aspects of Romanian migration. As a benefit, we note the phenomenon of remittances and the positive effect on GDP. A drawback is represented by the negative effects on the social security system. Politically, we highlighted the influences of Romanian migrants in setting the political scene in the country. The findings show that Romanian migrants have a significant role in shaping Romanian realities. Their influence is significant both economically and politically. The research uses statistical data provided by the Eurostat, World Bank and National Institute of Statistics.

Key words: migration, geopolitics, transition, social problems, democratization

INTRODUCTION
In 1899 Rudolf Kjellén introduced the concept of geopolitics in scientific language. In over 100 years of existence, geopolitics went through some of the most complicated experiences, but remained at the same time one of the most flexible sciences. Geopolitics, while continuing to be considered an extended method, as a study "commissioned" by political interest, gradually comes out of these patterns and becomes a support for possible solutions to about all issues raised by politics. Seen initially as the study of the relationship between power and territory, it gradually began to also include economic, social, cultural, and demographic aspects. The recent dynamics of geopolitical science approaches is also accentuated by the current socio-economic and political context. We live in a world marked by profound changes. Within only 70 years humanity has experienced a range of changes in all aspects. The end of the Second World War resulted in a bipolar world governed by a set of relatively well-defined international relations. Instead, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the geopolitical map knows great changes. International relations are dominated by intense dynamics, hegemonic entities interchange and the bipolar world becomes, at least for now, multipolar. This new world has changed in the last 25 years not only in its demo-
graphic composition but also in terms of borders, number of states, etc. For example, in 1990, in Europe, there were 39 states. In 2014, there were 50 recognized sovereign states. To these are added six more territories partially recognized. From 1980 until 2012, the continent’s population increased from 695 million to 742 million inhabitants (Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, 2013). The number of immigrants has grown significantly over the past 25 years. For example, 50 years ago, the share of foreign born on the overall population in Germany and Spain (two of the favorite current destinations for migrants) was below 1% (Dustmann, Frattini, 2011). At present, however, this level is of 14.5% in Germany and 13% in Spain. By comparison, the US had a level of 13.6% in 1900, and currently the level is 12.5%. In fact, for a long time, Europe was only a source of migrants. Since the 1500s, migration flows were mainly directed from Europe to America, Africa, Asia and Oceania. (Altman, 1995; Heffernan, 1995; Lucassen, 1995; Tinker, 1995). Subsequently, the nineteenth century is marked by flows to Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA, migrants coming mainly from Britain, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden (Ferenczi, 1929; Massey, 1988). Migratory movements were slowed by the First World War, the Great Depression of the late 20s and then the Second World War (Massey, 1995). The direction changes in the 60s, Europe becoming a destination, but mainly for non-European citizens. The phenomenon was caused primarily by the disappearance of overseas colonies held by Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. These countries are the main destinations of migrants coming to Europe. The largest groups come from outside Europe, about 1.8 million people from North Africa, Indochina (former French colonies), 1 million from the colonies in Africa held by Portugal and about 300,000 from the former Dutch colonies in the East Indies. A smaller number of migrants come to Europe from the former British and Belgian colonies in Africa (Emmer, Lucassen, 2012). To these migration flows is added migration for work, especially to Germany. This country, with a diminished active population after the Second World War encouraged migrants coming for work. In the 60s came mostly Turks and, to a smaller number, Serbs. In fact, the Serbs are the only nationals of a communist country who during the Cold War had the right to free movement. At that time, the movement of persons on the route east-west was restricted because of the ideological asymmetries that dominated the two military-political blocs. The only population movements on this route (except Serbs, mentioned above) were those of illegal migrants, i.e., those who illegally crossed the border of communist states in order to reach the West.

The phenomenon acquires new features in the 90s when Europe became marked by intense migratory intracontinental flows. The geopolitical and social context created after the fall of the Berlin Wall significantly shaped migration, opening the possibility of movement of people from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. The fall of the Iron Curtain allowed the free movement of population from Eastern Europe to the West. Subsequently, the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the war in Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1994 have led to new waves of migration. The phenomenon, somewhat timid at first, due to more restrictive legislation conditions, accelerated with EU enlargement and the liberalization of the labour market for its citizens. The continuous increase in the number of migrants has made it become an important phenomenon of current social realities in Europe.

For example, 70% of the population immigrated to Ireland comes from other EU countries. This level is 21% in the UK, this country still maintaining a high level of immigrants from South Asia (about a third). At the same time, for example, 2.7 million people left only from Romania, or nearly 13% of the population (Eurostat, 2014).
This paper examines international migration in Romania in terms of geopolitics. The discussion about a geopolitics of migration is absolutely grounded, especially if we assume that migration is a fundamental dimension of demographic, economic and political dynamics. In addition, the extent of the phenomenon, just at European level, in the past 25 years reinforces the need for a discussion about the geopolitics of migration.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The role of migration in geopolitical analysis is addressed in several studies, significant and recent being those made by Grosfoguel (1997), Tesfahuney (1998), Nagel (2002), Hyndman (2012). Although these studies are not focused on the situation in Europe, for example, Grosfoguel analyzes the relation between migration and geopolitics in the Caribbean, Tesfahuney explores the relationship between mobility, racism and geopolitics, and Nagel focuses on the problem of assimilation policies, the idea of the interdependence between migration and geopolitics clearly emerges. Initially, migration, approached in terms of geopolitical logic, was seen as a phenomenon that can affect the stability and security of a state. In fact, Western Europe immigration is perceived by some authors as an “invasion” (de Haas, 2008; Hyndman, Mountz, 2008; Tesfahuney, 1998). Approachsed in terms of race, gender and class, immigration in Europe is often considered a threat to the economic, political and social development of the continent (Mamadouh, 2012). Of course, these approaches are not absolute; there are countless views that treat migration positively, such as those made by Taylor (1999) or León-Ledesma, Miguel, and Matloob Piracha (2004). They emphasize the role of remittances as a positive effect on the economy of countries of origin. Whatever the approach, it is clear that migration can be considered a barometer of geopolitics (Hyndman, 2012). Putting migration in relation to geopolitics is easiest through the population. One of the important dimensions of geopolitics is the population. A territory without population means nothing. Migration means population, not only in terms of quantity (either surplus or too little), but also in terms of quality (human capital). From Auguste Comte who said that “demography is destiny”, we thus identify the important role of migration in any geopolitical equation. The role of population and implicitly of migration in configuring the geopolitical map can also be decrypted from other studies focused mainly on the idea of quantification of geopolitical dimensions. Migration determines the policy and population changes, generated also by migration, affect the power of a state. In this way, the term “Druckquotient” introduced by geopolitician Alexander Supan (1924) is well known. In geopolitical, it expresses the demographic pressure exerted on a country by its neighbors. Migration affects in terms of demographics both the country of destination and the country of origin. Therefore, demographic pressure is influenced by migration. In fact, migration represents a loss (in population) for some and a gain (in population) for others (Weinar, 2014).

The idea of geopolitics of migration may sound strange for many people in the EU. One of the most recent works that address the geopolitics of migration is that of Roderick Parkes (2015). Migration is considered a form of ideological and cultural cross-border interaction. It highlights the fact that migration has become an object of geopolitical competition. Migration is seen as a triumph of economic interdependence on territorial order.

In this research, we treated geopolitics of migration through three dimensions: demographic, political and economic. We felt that these three dimensions give value to the concept of geopolitics. We analyzed the demographic, economic and political effects produced by migration from Romania.
THE GENESIS OF ROMANIAN MIGRATION. DEMOGRAPHIC AND GENERAL SOCIO-POLITICAL ASPECTS

Until 1989, Romania was not an important reference on the map of European or international migration. The only significant population movements, by the time mentioned, were those posed by migration especially from Transylvania to the New World. It should be noted that this happened in the second half of the 1800s. At that time, Transylvania was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Therefore, migration from Transylvania to North America was part of a larger phenomenon that occurred in the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire and which amounted to almost 4.5 million people. Between 1875 and 1914 (Egyed, 1970), around 250,000 people left Transylvania, given that the population of the entire province was 4.8 million.

However, some interesting migratory phenomena occurred during the communist period. We are referring to asylum seekers and the departure of ethnic Germans and Hebrews. With the establishment of the communist regime in Romania, the western border (with former Yugoslavia, led by a socialist regime still allowing the free movement of persons) became the only point through which those who wanted to escape from the communist camp could leave the country. There are no accurate statistics on the extent of this phenomenon. It is supposed that over 16,000 Romanians tried to flee across the border only between 1980 and 1989, 12,000 of whom were caught (Steiner, Magheți, 2009). Therefore, this is not a far-reaching phenomenon but rather one with a political and emotional impact.

Another phenomenon is the departure of ethnic Germans from Romania. A more special form of migration, if we consider that many of them left as a result of governmental agreements between Federal Germany and Romania. The communist regime in Bucharest charged a fee for each ethnic German who was to leave the country. The fee was paid by the German Government. Secret negotiations between Romania and Germany have resulted in about 230,000 Saxons and Swabians leaving the country from 1962 to 1989 (Banu, 2011). The same format was used for the departure of Hebrews from Romania. According to official Israeli data, between 1950 and 1990, in Israel established 242,827 Hebrews coming from Romania, all of them being sold by communist governments of that time (Ioanid, 2005).

Graph 1 Migration flows, Romania 1990–2012
Source: Eurostat, Immigration by five year age group, sex and citizenship
In 1989, Romania put an end to a period of 40 years of communism. Like the other countries of the former Eastern bloc, democracy also brought the much-needed freedom of movement. Gradually, migration from Romania becomes a widespread social phenomenon being subject. At the same time, to conditioning inherent to political dynamics.

Immediately after 1990, there is a migration boom in Romania. The dynamics of migration, starting with 1990, is shown in Chart 1. According to Eurostat (2014), for the period 1990-2010, the flow of migrants from Romania only to EU countries ranged from 30,092 in 1997 (the lowest level) to 555,797 in 2007 (the highest level).

Freedom of movement first set in motion the German or Hungarian ethnic population. With existing support networks through relatives or friends, they chose to leave the country immediately after 1989. 60 thousand Germans left Romania only in 1990, followed by another 15 thousand in 1991. These numbers have also been supplemented by yet many other Romanians who already had relatives in foreign countries (who ran/ left abroad during the communist period). Thus, in the first stage, we dealt with family reunification migration and ethnic migration. This has substantially changed the ethnic map of Romania’s population, as can be seen in Table 1.

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<th>Table 1 Romania’s population by ethnicity</th>
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<td>Other groups</td>
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Source: Romanian Census 1992, 2002 and 2011

The ratio changes only by 1993–1994, when immigrants become majority ethnic Romanians. However, this happens amid the general decrease in the volume of immigrants (see Chart 1) and amid the appearance of travel restrictions and the elimination
Another important moment in the geopolitics of Romanian migration is the travel visa-free in the Schengen area starting January 1, 2002. This is also the moment that marks the beginning of massive migration from Romania. The upward trend is maintained until the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008. In addition, with the Romanian’s accession to the EU, the development of new (easier) policies for the movement and labour of Romanian citizens is strongly emphasized in 2007 (see Chart 1). Basically, with Romania’s integration into the European Union, labour migration becomes the most significant. From a country that for a long time has not stood out either as a major source nor destination for migration, after 2000, in the overall pattern of intra-European migration, Romania has become one of the main suppliers of migrants.

The full liberalization of the labour market for Romanian citizens starting January 2014 is the most recent moment with effects on Romanian migration, but perhaps also the one with the deepest geopolitical significance. The fear of an invasion of Romanian immigrants generated extensive reactions in the media in many countries. The most significant are the British press media campaigns such as that of the Guardian entitled “Don’t Come to England” or the recent documentary (2015) released by Chanel 4 entitled “The Romanians Are Coming”. However, the total liberalization of the labour market has not generated significant flows of Romanian migrants. The explanation is that the Romanian migration pattern is changing. If in the 90s there was ethnic migration, and in 2000 there was labour migration, now we can rather speak of a cultural aspiration migration. The reasons for leaving are not ethnic or economic but rather social and cultural. Those that leave are not necessarily economically motivated, but socially and psychologically. It is the general dissatisfaction towards social reality first and only secondarily to the economic aspects.

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF ROMANIAN MIGRATION

Probably, politically, one can observe how important the psychological and emotional dimension is for the behavior of Romanian migrants. Given that currently about 13% of the Romanian population is abroad, it is almost impossible that this will not generate effects on the political environment in Romania. Electoral moments are most evident in this regard. Although the presence of Romanian migrants at the vote, relative to their total, is not very high (between 5% and 10%), the effect which they cause, however, is significant (Table 2). For example, the diaspora vote is heavily oriented towards right-wing parties (Central Election Bureau of Romania, 2009, 2014), even when the migrant is in countries with leftist governments. The problem starts from realities perceived rather than real. This is due to the fact that left politics in Romania is assimilated with the former communist party. Therefore, in the migrant’s view on the political reality there are two conflicting plans: left, which means communism and right which means Western welfare. Given that elections are won at little difference (0.68% in 2009 and 9.01% in 2014, see Table 3, col. 4), the percentages of votes coming from the diaspora and heavily oriented to the right (idem, 2009; 2014) acquire importance. Basically, both in 2009 and in 2014, the diaspora decided the winner.

The political effect of the Romanian migrant is also amplified by the role of the social network and the influence exerted by the migrant on the country. Migrants who left before 1990 or immediately after have not developed strong relationships with those who remained in the country. Besides, being an ethnic or family reunion migration, their social network in Romania was modest. After 2000, however, we are
dealing with migration for work. This meant that only a member or few members of the extended family initially went abroad to enhance the income of the family but there was an important network of friends and relatives left in the country. Thus, the link between migrants and those left at home is very present, moreover becoming increasingly tight. The growing technological development contributes greatly to these aspects. Forms of virtual interaction such as Facebook or Skype make the connection between Romanian migrants and those at home very easy. Ten years ago, the possibility of communicating by phone was extremely difficult (in financial terms). Currently there are telephone companies that offer alternatives focused on the needs of Romanian migrants: free or very cheap calls to/from Italy/Spain etc. These aspects highlight the dependency relations between those who left and those at home and facilitate the circulation of influences. In Romanian culture, the person who moves to the city (either to study or just to work) is regarded positively. The opinion of the person who left is considered more grounded because he/she is better informed, more educated, knows more, and is taken into account. The same logic is applied to the influences exerted by the diaspora in the country. Their opinion is taken into account by those at home because they “know the world, democracy, have access to information” etc. It is hard for the person who stayed at home, usually an elder (parent, grandparent) to resist the influence exerted by the young emigrant.

In this context, the diaspora’s political influence is major, not only in terms of turnout to vote but especially through the influence they exert on those left at home.

**ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ROMANIAN MIGRATION**

Economic analysis, as part of geopolitical analysis, is closely related to the economic structure, its interdependencies, resources, and population. Economic networks of migrants introduce a very complex dimension in geopolitical analysis. Economies are interdependent and political borders may sometimes conflict with economic ones. Economic implications of migration analysis take into account the dynamics of work force, the economic wellbeing of migrants, their relations with the country of origin, etc. One of the main dimensions of current Romanian migration is labour migration. Therefore, it has a direct economic dimension. Work force mobility generates both positive and negative effects on Romania or destination countries. The immediate positive effect at home takes the form of remittances. Their value is not at all negligible, sometimes reaching 4 – 4.5 of GDP (Table 3). The flow of remittances to Romania comes in a proportion of about 81% from the EU, which it is significant only in 4 cases (Italy, Spain, Hungary and Germany). The first two countries of destination of Romanian mobile workers in the EU give almost 59% of all remittances incoming on official channels in Romania (World Bank, 2014).

Despite the change in Romanian migrant flows after 2007 (see Chart 1), Romania is the 4th remittance receiving country in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, with an average value of $3 billion annually (after Ukraine, Russia and Tajikistan).
Table 3 highlights the value of remittances sent to Romania by Romanian immigrants in the period 2003–2013, and the percentage of GDP represented by them.

Regarding the destination of remittances, there are no relevant statistical data for Romania. There are studies (Orozco, 2003) showing that approximately 80% of remittances are used for basic household consumption, and between 5-10% are used for investment in human capital (education, health, nutrition). The difference may include: purchase of land, housing, etc., often seen as migrant assets, a small portion is spent on social and cultural events, for the payment of loans, savings, and a very small part in creating productive activities. It is dificult to assess the role of remittances in long-term economic growth. Given, however, the important share they have in Romania’s GDP (see Table 3), we can say that the country’s economy is sensitive to European economic dynamics.

Although remittances do not solve social crises, they act as a safety net for a large number of families. Undoubtedly, they represent the positive dimension of migration for Romania. But this phenomenon is accompanied by one with a negative dimension, namely the migration of skills or the phenomenon of brain drain. For Romania, there is no data on the extent of this phenomenon. There are no very precise statistics on the number of Romanian specialists, on socio-professional categories, who chose to go abroad but only general data on which one can infer the magnitude of the phenomenon. For example, only after 2007, over 15,000 physicians left. The state has invested about 3.5 billion Euros (Romanian College of Physicians, 2015) in their training.

But the major negative dimension of migration, economically speaking, is the reduction of the tax base. The existence of a large segment of the economically active population who emigrates affects the tax base, revenues to the state budget and, especially, the sustainability of social security systems. Migration affects the financing of social security systems by reducing the mass of taxpayers. A recent forecasting (Panzaru, 2015) shows that the sustainability of pensions for old age pensioners will disappear in 2015 (in 2020, only 87% of pensions will be supported) and in terms of total number of pensioners, the system is already deficient, since in 2010 only 80% of the pension could be supported directly from revenues received as contributions from taxpayers. The ratio of income received and expenditure on pensions will reach 0.41 in 2060, i.e., only 41% of the pension will be paid. Under these conditions, the number of taxpayers should be supplemented with nearly 1.5 million in 2015, about 2.5 million in 2025–2030 (when the peak volume of pensioners will be recorded) and more than 3 million in 2055–2056 (when the population employed and the number of taxpayers will record the most dramatic decrease). Only some of them may come from the active population (in terms of increasing employed population), but the vast majority will have to be ensured through migration.

Although, on the short-term and from an economic point of view, migration can have positive effects, for example by reducing the potential candidates for unemployment aid and the increased flow of money from abroad in the form of remittances, on the long-term, economic and social risks are major.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bill. €</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% GDP</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank and own calculation
CONCLUSIONS

Europe currently absorbs 2 million migrants every year, more as a proportion of the population than any other part of the world, including North America. Even if we are dealing with a mixed migration – refugees and labour migration – the latter prevails. Labour mobility has both positive and negative effects on the countries of origin or destination. It is difficult to balance these aspects and assess the extent to which labour migration has produced benefits or not. For example, European Commission assessments consider that immigration “contributed significantly to employment growth in the EU in recent years” (Platonova, Urso, 2010, p. 257) Thus, within the preceding onset of the economic crisis (2000–2007), according to European Commission estimates, migrants from third countries contributed to an increase in the employed labour force with almost 3.7 million people, representing about a quarter of its total growth (idem, p. 260). Between 1994 and 2004, Spain has created over 6 million jobs, of which one third was occupied by migrants. Norway has created about 250,000 jobs between 2000 and 2008, almost half of which being occupied by migrants.

This influx of people changed the configuration of Member States population more than birth rate and mortality. But the effects are not only economic. Migration links countries through their economies and cultures and facilitates the mobility of ideas and cultural values. Migration affects the individual and national cultural identity of both migrants and their hosts (Triandafyllidou, 2001, p. 89). Migration changes the size, ethnicity and age structure of populations; it alters the cultural, religious and linguistic composition of societies; and enriches or impoverishes the social and economic strata of society (Castles, 2000, p. 12).

In this picture of European migration, Romania is one of the major suppliers of migrants. Therefore, Romania provides an excellent research opportunity in international migration. Analyzing Romanian migration can identify the socio-economic and political effects of migration, both in the country of origin and in the country of destination.

From an economic point of view, the main advantage of the migration of Romanians is reflected in increased value of remittances. Given the significant share of remittances in GDP, we can undoubtedly say that these are resources used for development and growth. On the other side, however, we are dealing with the negative effects of migration on the social security system. The existence of a large segment of the economically active population who emigrate affects the tax base, revenues to the state budget and, especially, the sustainability of social security systems.

Politically, the role of migration is undeniable. Culture and the experience of migration has contributed to the country’s political scene reconfiguration. The new Romanian diaspora consists of those who went to work after 2000. The main feature of this new diaspora is that it is more tied to the country, in almost simultaneity coordinates. This diaspora has learned democracy in the West and now becomes more active and willing to speak on politics in Romania. In addition, the experience of the West does not belong only to the actual migrant, but (indirectly) belongs to his/her entire social network. Technological development and technology enables sharing migration experiences with those left at home and therefore facilitates the circulation of ideas and influences.

On the other hand, Romanians abroad have a specific profile, are more critical of the situation in Romania, and sanction any aspect not only by view but also by attitude.

Beyond the quantitative aspects of Romanian migration, the phenomenon also has a pronounced qualitative side. The presence of migrants in the European space
generates specific public agendas. Thus, the discussion on the presence of immigrants, including Romanians, puts in opposition the projects to restrict access to the labour market of immigrants and the European Commission paradigm that prohibits Member States to discriminate against its own citizens, “and those of other member countries”. Although discussions have not yet generated effects on the immigrant status in any of the EU countries, this debate is a good example of how the issue of migration (legal and illegal) can turn into a meta-problem with ample economic, social and societal reverberations.

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During his 2011 address to the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) annual meeting in San Antonio, Jonathan Haidt stressed that the whole discipline of social psychology has become a “tribal moral community”, with its own taboos and danger zones. He claimed that psychologists today are much more homogeneous in terms of political ideology than in the 1960s, the great majority of researchers aligning with the liberal left and almost no one sympathising with the conservative right (Haidt, 2011).

Interestingly, empirical studies reported left wing skew among psychologists as early as in the 1960s. Among academic psychologists of that time, 78% held left-wing ideologies, whereas 22% defined themselves as Republican (McClintock, Spaulding, Turner, 1965). Current research on the topic (Jussim et al., in press) suggests that the left-right ratio in current psychology is even more unbalanced, reaching the proportion of 10:1.

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The only existing empirical study of the population of personality and social psychologists (Inbar, Lammers, 2012) was based on two surveys of 774 members of the SPSP, a professional association comprising mainly American social psychologists. The results of the study confirmed that only 6% of SPSP members declared conservative political opinions. The study has been criticised for several methodological shortcomings (e.g. Skitka, 2012), such as a lack of adequate representativeness for the studied population. Obviously, a study performed on a sample that includes more than 80% of Americans is not representative of the global population of personality and social psychologists.

The authors of recent alarming articles about “liberal bias” in modern psychology (Jussim et al., in press; Duarte et al., in press) suggest that a hostile workplace atmosphere and direct discrimination may be key reasons for the disproportionately high number of liberals among academic social psychology.

Another potential explanation for the left-wing skew among social and personality psychologists points to the specificity of research practices in academia, and the observation that it reflects liberal goals and values (Prentice, 2012). Sociologist Robert K. Merton (1942), who analysed the specificity of academic work, defined four institutional imperatives that comprise the ethos of contemporary science: universalism, communism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism. This list of values clearly suggests the link between scientific codes of conduct and the values typical of the political left (cf. Tetlock, Mitchell, 2015). Potentially, this could contribute to the self-selection process that might ultimately create a liberal skew in personality and social psychology.

In this article we would like to suggest that the discussion on the “liberal bias” is based on an American-centric perception of the field of social psychology, negating the character of the field in the other parts of the world. Additionally, we would like to propose an alternative explanation for the dominant political ideologies in personality and social psychology, derived from the concepts of distinction (Bourdieu, 1984; Zarycki, 2014) and social identity processes (Tajfel, Turner, 1986) among people of high socio-economic status.

IDEOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS AMONG EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUALS

Sociologists studying the cultural habits of Eastern European intellectuals, the intelligentsia, stress the fact that highly educated members of post-communist societies tend to form a distinctive cultural elite that reproduces the existing structures of dependence (Warczok, Zarycki, 2014; Zarycki, 2014). Contrary to the Western intellectuals who support socially critical alternatives to the dominant discourse about politics and economy, the Eastern European intelligentsia tend to play the role of interpreters of the dominant discourse, promoting capitalist ideologies even when using the same concepts as their American or Western European colleagues (Warczok, Zarycki, 2014).

This strategy allows Eastern European intellectuals to create a distinction between themselves and lower socio-economic groups in their society, being at the same time at the forefront of the Westernising discourse in their countries. The rapid transition from communism into a free market economy left large sections of these societies disenfranchised, and encouraged the emergence of regional populist and nationalist movements (Schields, in press). In opposition to this process, Eastern European intelligentsia stressed their commitment to capitalist reforms and democratic political order. This affected also academic practices in social sciences: Western social researchers often seemed dissident in terms of politics and critically analysed existing political practices; whereas academics from Eastern Europe became part of the cultural elite in their countries, often appear-
ing as governmental experts, engaged in the corporate world and acting as interpreters of the rapid transition (Bilewicz, Olechowski, 2014; Warczok, Zarycki, 2014).

Based on this observation we assume that, contrary to the observations of Haidt (2011), Eastern European social psychologists are more conservative in terms of the economy, thus supporting free market capitalism rather than welfare state solutions. In this respect, Eastern psychologists differ from their Western counterparts – who would prefer a rather unidimensional left-wing ideology, combining a welfare-state economy with progressive social worldviews. Such a divergence would correspond to the different relationships observed between social and economic dimensions of conservatism in Western and Eastern societies (e.g. Duriez, Van Hiel, Kossowska, 2005). Whereas in the West the two are usually positively correlated (those who endorse traditional values and norms supporting a free market economy), this is not the case in Eastern Europe. In their policy programmes Eastern European right-wing parties combine social conservatism either with state interventionism or pro-capitalist views. Conversely, left-wing parties associate cultural liberalism with support either for a welfare state or a free market economy.

In order to test our prediction, we decided to perform a cross-cultural study of social psychologists in four countries: two countries in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (Poland and Hungary), and two countries in the English-speaking West (the United States of America and United Kingdom). Furthermore, we investigated if reluctance to express one’s political views in public is related to political ideology across the compared countries.

**SURVEY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGISTS**

The survey was conducted at the beginning of October 2014 in four countries. We targeted participants in two Western capitalist countries (the USA and the UK) and two post-Communist Eastern European countries (Poland and Hungary). The respondents were contacted via mailing lists of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (US), the British Psychological Society [social psychology section] (UK), and the Polish Society of Social Psychology (Poland). In the case of Hungary, snowball sampling was employed.

**Respondents**

One hundred and forty-two individuals participated in the study. Data from ten respondents, who indicated areas of interest different to social or personality psychology, were excluded from analysis. The remaining sample included 132 participants: 52 from the USA (57% female), 22 from the UK (76% female), 32 from Hungary (55% female) and 26 from Poland (33% female). In all countries we included both senior faculty, as well as graduate students.

**Measures**

Political orientation was measured by two items, which tapped different dimensions of ideology. The social issues item read: “What are your political views with regard to social issues (such as religion, gender roles, abortion or homosexuality)?”. Partici-
Participants indicated their responses on a 10-point scale, ranging from $1 = \text{progressive/liberal}$ to $10 = \text{traditional/conservative}$. The economic issues item read: “What are your political views with regard to economic issues (such as taxes or welfare state)?”. The response scale ranged from $1 = \text{I support state interventionism}$ to $10 = \text{I support free market economy}$.

Reluctance to publicly display one’s political opinions was assessed by a single item: “Are you reluctant to express your political views to your colleagues for fear of negative consequences?”. Participants answered on a 10-point scale, ranging from $1 = \text{not at all}$ to $10 = \text{very much}$.

RESULTS

East-West differences in political ideology

A two-way mixed-design analysis of variance tested the differences in social and economic opinions between psychologists from Western (USA and UK) and Eastern European (Hungary and Poland) countries. Cultural area (East/West) served as the between-subjects factor; political views (social issues/economic issues) were treated as the within-subject factor. The results are presented in Figure 1.

As revealed by the results of two-way mixed-design ANOVA, both the effect of cultural area, $F(1, 130) = 83.95, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.39$, and the effect of political views, $F(1, 130) = 104.99, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.45$, were significant. Social psychologists from Eastern countries adhered more to conservative ideology ($M = 4.72; SD = 1.71$) than their counterparts from Western countries ($M = 2.51; SD = 1.02$). Furthermore, participants reported more conservative attitudes with regard to economic ($M = 4.68; SD = 2.39$) as compared to social issues ($M = 2.28; SD = 2.08$). The main effects were qualified by a two-way interaction, $F(1, 130) = 5.78, p = 0.018, \eta^2 = 0.04$. The difference between Eastern and Western countries was more pronounced for the economic, $F(1, 130) = 65.82, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.34$, than the social dimension of political attitudes, $F(1, 130) = 23.02, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.15$. In other words, social psychologists from Hungary and Poland exceeded psychologists from USA and UK predominantly in terms of economic conservatism ($M_{\text{East}} = 6.24; SD_{\text{East}} = 2.18; M_{\text{West}} = 3.46; SD_{\text{West}} = 1.76$). The difference regarding social issues had the same direction ($M_{\text{East}} = 3.19; SD_{\text{East}} = 2.68; M_{\text{West}} = 1.57; SD_{\text{West}} = 1.01$) but lower magnitude. The gap
between economic and social views proved to be higher in Eastern, \( F(1, 130) = 71.36, \ p < 0.001, \ \eta^2 = 0.35 \) than Western countries, \( F(1, 130) = 34.99, \ p < 0.001, \ \eta^2 = 0.21 \). Social psychologists from Western countries declared more ideologically coherent views than their counterparts from Central and Eastern Europe.

**Expression of political views**

In order to assess if ideology predicted unwillingness to display one’s political views in public, we performed a series of linear regressions, separate for each country. Whereas social and economic conservatism were entered as predictors, reluctance to express one’s political views publicly served as a dependent variable.

In most cases, political ideology did not explain variability of the reluctance to express political views. The only exception was Poland, where economic conservatism (support for a free-market economy) positively predicted unwillingness to display one’s views among other social and personality psychologists, \( b = 0.63, SE = 0.21, \ p = 0.008 \).

**Comparison with nation-wide surveys**

In order to compare economic views held by social psychologists with the opinions prevalent in their countries among people differing in socio-economic status, we used data from the European Values Survey 2008 (EVS, 2010). The fourth wave of EVS was conducted in 47 countries, including Hungary, Poland and the UK (EVS, GESIS, 2010). Since the EVS does not include participants from the USA, we had to limit our comparisons to social psychologists coming from three European countries (two Eastern European and one Western European). The following figures are based on weighted EVS data.

Neither question included in the EVS questionnaire exactly matched the item we used to assess psychologists’ economic views. Thus, we selected the semantic differential question \( (1 = \text{individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves}; \ 10 = \text{the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for}) \) as a proxy\(^2\). For the purpose of current comparisons, responses were recoded so that high scores reflected more conservative views.

Figures 2–4 combine the results of both studies. Whereas the left vertical axis reflects the response scale used in our study of personality and social psychologists, the right vertical axis refers to the EVS answer format. The EVS responses are presented for five groups distinguished on the basis of annual household income. Horizontal lines reflect the means for social psychologists in specific countries.

The EVS data revealed a positive correlation between economic conservatism and income in all analysed countries \( (r_{\text{Hungary}} = 0.11, \ p < 0.001, \ N = 1255; \ r_{\text{Poland}} = 0.14, \ p < 0.001, \ N = 1081; \ r_{\text{United Kingdom}} = 0.14, \ p < 0.001, \ N = 1079) \) — such that the lowest income groups expressed most left-wing economic opinions. Combining the results of our study with EVS data shows that the relationship between the economic views of social psychologists and society in general differs across countries. In the UK, social and personality psychologists exhibited higher support for state interventionism than other social groups. This finding conforms to the notion of social criticism prevalent among Western intellectuals.

In contrast, Hungarian psychologists proved to be more in favour of a free market economy than the general public, regardless of the economic status of the latter. This result is in line with our hypothesis assuming a pro-capitalist ideology of the well-educated groups in post-Communist countries. The economic attitudes of Polish social

\(^2\) Due to the differences between measures used in the EVS and the current study, the following results should be interpreted with caution.
psychologists were more conservative compared to the views of low-status groups, but more progressive than the ideologies held by the highest-status segments of society. Nevertheless, both Polish and Hungarian psychologists supported a free market economy to a greater extent than the disadvantaged sections of their societies.

DISCUSSION
This survey of social psychologists in the East and West revealed significant differences between Eastern-European and Western social and personality psychologists. Respondents from Hungary and Poland were more conservative than their counterparts from the USA and the UK, especially with regard to economic issues.
A small and unbalanced sample size constitutes the main limitation of the study. A larger and more systematically collected sample would allow the formulation of more justified generalisations – similar to the findings of Inbar & Lammers (2012). Nevertheless, the study provides initial evidence about the political differences between Eastern and Western social psychologists.

Our study supports Inbar and Lammers’ (2012) argument that the number of social psychologists who are conservative in the social domain is relatively smaller than the number of economically conservative psychologists (supporters of an unconstrained free market economy). What is more, we have shown that this discrepancy is even more pronounced in Eastern Europe – here social psychologists would express moderately conservative economic opinions, whereas their social opinions would tend to be liberal.

The visible difference in the attitudes of East-European and West social psychologists could be attributed to differences in the political role of intellectuals in their countries. In that respect, psychologists form a part of the Eastern European intelligentsia – a cultural elite of the region that holds values and worldviews that support existing power structures (Warczok, Zarycki, 2014) and attach themselves to the ideology of “Westness”, represented as freemarket economy and rapid systemic transition (Zarycki, 2014). Comparison of social psychologists with the income-defined segments of their society shows that in the post-communist Eastern European countries (particularly in Hungary) the economic opinions of social psychologists resemble the opinions held by the upper-middle and upper classes of these societies. Such economic opinions create a clear distinction between social psychologists and low-income groups in these societies, as the poorest Poles and Hungarians clearly support left-wing economic solutions (that is, state interventionism in the economy).

Conversely, social psychologists in the West seem to maintain left-wing liberal worldviews in both domains, economic and political. This reflects the findings observed in other studies of this professional group (Inbar, Lammers, 2012). On the other hand, our comparison of British social psychologists’ economic opinions with the opinions of different segments of British society shows that the economic views of

Figure 4 Economic views of social psychologists and society in general (UK)
The horizontal line reflects the mean for social psychologists. Bars represent sections of British society differing in annual household income.

![Economic views of social psychologists and society in general (UK)](image)
social psychologists resemble those visible in the middle classes of British society.

Quite interestingly, although Polish psychologists supported a free market economy more than their Western counterparts, they preferred to conceal their right-wing economic opinions to avoid the negative reactions of others. It is possible that psychologists in Eastern Europe are aware of the prevalence of left wing and liberal ideology in American psychology (Haidt, 2011; Inbar, Lammers, 2012). This awareness might lead to some form of self-censorship when communicating with other psychologists. At the same time, their own private economic attitudes tend more towards the right-wing, thus supporting the unconstrained free market economy and opposing welfare state solutions. Haidt (2011) and Duarte et al. (in press) called for a more politically diverse field of social psychology. Our research shows some initial evidence that the political diversity is already there: it can be found in other countries than United States of United Kingdom. What is missing, is the class diversity. Political ideologies of psychologists in all studied countries resemble the ones of upper and middle classes of their respective societies, rather than the ideologies of low-status groups. It would require further research to examine how such class homogeneity of psychology affects their research interests and practices.

REFERENCES


