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The radical closure of Gaza serves here as an extreme example of a process of isolation and immiseration of national enemies that is deeply rooted in Israeli ideology and practices of state formation. I use encystation to reveal the dual meaning of the term—that of radical isolation of diseased elements and that of protecting a fetus within a womb—and to show how the two meanings connect with respective Israeli policies toward Palestinians and Jews. I suggest in closing that the Oslo Accords have put in place mechanisms for the future imposition on West Bank Palestinians of the same containment currently afflicting Gaza.*

Introduction

Cyst: 1. Biology. A thin walled hollow organ or cavity in an animal body (or plant). . .
2. Pathology. A closed cavity or sac of a morbid or abnormal character. . . . 3. Biol. or Cryptogamic Botany. A cell or cavity containing reproductive bodies, embryos, etc. . . .

(Oxford English Dictionary)

A cyst is a closed sac, having a distinct membrane and division compared to the nearby tissue. Basically, a cyst is a cluster of cells that have grouped together to form a sac (not unlike the manner in which water molecules group together, forming a bubble); however, the distinguishing aspect of a cyst is the cells forming the “shell” of such a sac, being distinctly abnormal (in both appearance and behavior) when compared to all surrounding cells for that given location. It may contain air, fluids, or semi-solid material. Once formed, a cyst may sometimes resolve on its own. Whether a cyst that fails to resolve may need to be removed by surgery will depend on what type of cyst it is and where in the body it has formed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyst).

As I write in January 2015, the Egyptian government under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is completing the extension from five hundred to one thousand meters of a free-fire buffer zone at the Egyptian-Gazan border. This erstwhile construction (which involves the destruction of at least twelve hundred*

* I want to express my appreciation to Helga Tawil-Souri and Dina Matar whose forthcoming Gaza as Metaphor (London: Hurst Publishers, 2015) provided the original impetus for writing this paper (a version of which will appear in their book).
houses in Rafah) consolidates the process of closure of Gaza, which the military regime inaugurated soon after coming to power, canceling the previous government’s policy of permanently opening the Rafah crossing to movement in and out of Gaza. Al-Sisi’s buffer zone links up with the “shell” Israel has—since its early efforts at walling Gaza in 1991—built up around the whole of Gaza, incorporating palisades, fences, three-hundred-meter buffer zones (these expropriating Gazan land unlike their Egyptian equivalents that are on Egyptian territory), naval blockades, air space closure, and sealed gates. Israel has, with the connivance of Egypt, literally enclosed the population of Gaza within a sac; this short essay will examine the metaphorical implications of that “encystation”—metaphorical implications with deep historical roots and very literal consequences.

Encystation is the process of enclosing within a cyst and the encirclement of Palestinian communities within the territories over which Israel claims sovereignty is indisputably an act of quarantining “matter” held to put the surrounding social body at risk. Although Israel, as now Egypt, claims that walling is a matter of security (the prevention of Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians in the former case, the prevention of Salafist entries into Egyptian territory from Gaza in the latter), encystation is—at least in the Israeli instance—a long-standing practice that works to very different ends on both the Palestinian and Israeli populations. In this short paper, I will use the term encystation rather than Frederick Boal’s “encapsulation” and Mary Douglas’s “enclavement” as encystation brings a metaphorsics of the body into my descriptions of political practices and, in so doing, resonates with discourses of infection and disease, as well as of propagation and growth, both of which are deeply embedded in Israeli conceptions of national self and other.

The Question of Borders

The use of the metaphor encystation to describe Israeli practices draws on the idea that the “shell” surrounding encysted materials is analogous to the walls Israel erects to divide Israeli and Palestinian populations. Walling is an act of asserting and enforcing borders, and an examination of the concept of border in Israeli discourse enables us to assess differences in the practices of walling as they are applied to Gaza, the West Bank, and Palestinians in Israel, as well as both Israel proper and Israeli settlements.

The concept of border has been both central to, and multivalent in, Israeli practice and discourse since the early days of the state, as Adriana Kemp has shown in her study of the role of the border and of military border violations in the shaping of Israeli identity. Kemp contends that “the territorialist idiom of settlement, which presented the boundary as the ultimate symbol of state sovereignty, did not take root in the Israeli mind. The army gradually initiated practices which transferred activity to the other side of the border . . . [so that] the breaching of the border became a symbolic practice, a genuine territorial ritual, which had the effect of both trivializing the border and instilling a sense of lordship over the territories across the lines.” Kemp details cross-border violations in the period when the West Bank was in Jordanian hands (although a favorite Israeli destination for the incursions of that period was Petra, well to the east of the Jordan River). In the period she discusses (1949–57), border crossings by the Israeli military were designed to punish Palestinian communities for allowing attempts to access Israel by refugees (who, for the most part, were trying to return to houses and properties from which they had been
forced out in the course of the 1948 war and subsequent so-called mopping-up operations): crossing of the lines by the Palestinians was portrayed as a “gross violation of the armistice agreements” and was called infiltration. However, when border-crossing became a habit of the Israeli army, even if unacknowledged, it was known as “routine security measures” and depicted as part of the attempt to achieve what was termed border discipline. Michel Warschawski, in his excellent On the Border, writes that “in May 1966, while out hiking with some friends, I wound up in Jordan without knowing it, and it was an Israeli patrol that brought us back to the railway zone, an extraterritorial zone, and made us get on the next train. None of us even questioned then what an Israeli patrol was doing inside Jordanian territory.”

The “frontierist” conception of borders that Kemp claims characterized Israeli attitudes toward state and sovereignty following the 1948 war is still in play in Israeli state policies not only toward Lebanon and Syria but also with regard to the illegally occupied territories of the West Bank, the Golan Heights and (until recently) the Gaza Strip. In all these places, the state establishes settlements, builds roadways and other infrastructural facts on the ground, and maintains the citizenship of extraterritorial settlers. Settlements are simultaneously “walled in” to protect them from surrounding Palestinian communities, and connected—by Jewish only bypass roads—to Israeli territory so as to in effect superimpose a continuous Israel over West Bank Palestine.

At the same time, Palestinians are always susceptible to being “walled off” from their surroundings. This is strikingly manifest in the operations of the so-called Border Police, a police unit under the command of the Israeli military that is supposed to patrol borders as well as ports and airports. In practice, the Border Police go into operation wherever Palestinians confront Israelis in what the authorities perceive as a political manner.

When Ariel Sharon’s 28 September 2000 ostensible visit to Haram al-Sharif (which provoked the second intifada) sparked demonstrations in Arab towns and cities within Israel’s 1949 borders, it was the Border Police that was sent into the Galilee to suppress these, at the cost of thirteen Israeli Arabs, that is, Palestinians, shot dead. Borders, whether those drawn by the separation wall or those of Israel’s self-styled “closed military areas” that any officer can declare at whim, pertain to Palestinians, and are erected wherever and whenever a Palestinian is seen to impinge upon or question Israeli sovereignty over the land. As is evidenced by Israel’s incursions into Gaza and the West Bank to assassinate activists or arrest government ministers, as well as its numerous invasions of Lebanon, and most recently its (18 January 2015) air strike on the Syrian Golan Heights, a similar logic operates: Arabs must remain passive and in place while the Israeli military can go anywhere it wants to ensure that quiescent immobility.

If borders for Israelis exist in large part for what Kemp calls the “symbolic practice” of breaching them, how then does one discern the limits of the land of Israel? This question concerns not only the legal rights of settlers to benefits accruing from Israeli citizenship, which are refused their Arab neighbors in the occupied territories. It also has extraterritorial applications. Israel’s Law of Return 5710-1950 promises that “every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh [an immigrant],” which in practice has come to mean that any person claiming to be a Jew, either by descent or conversion, is granted automatic citizenship as well as guaranteed housing, full tuition for language and university education, and significant discounts on cars, appliances, and other
 aids to settlement. Beyond, however, easing aliyah [immigration], the Law of Return implies that, by virtue of being Jewish, Jews outside Israel are in effect always-already Israeli citizens.

In line with the effective extension of Israeli state sovereignty this guarantee of automatic citizenship entails, Israel has, in the past few years, intervened in cases in which Jews were on trial for crimes committed outside of Israel, as though these were cases in which its own citizens were being tried by a foreign state. It has also organized massive so-called rescue missions in Iraq, Iran, and Ethiopia to take Jewish citizens of other countries out of those countries and ostensibly resettle them in Israel. If Israeli sovereignty is extensible to anywhere Jews exist, then there are in effect no borders constraining Israel’s population.

Gaza and the West Bank are clearly delineated by borders, marked by the aforementioned eight-meter-high wall as well as buffered and ditched fences (effectively sealing the territories to Palestinians but leaving them permeable to military assault from Israel and, in the case of the West Bank, to the free movement of settlers). The logics of encystation operate differently in the two cases, however, and I will investigate the operative and conceptual differences between the two applications by examining the relevance to both Gaza and the West Bank of the concept of the sovereign exception.

**Sovereign Exception**

The Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, in *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, speculates on the extraterritoriality of persons excluded from the conceptual and legal domain of the nation-state within which they nonetheless live. Unlike the diasporic extraterritoriality of persons or communities belonging to a national collectivity but located outside national territory (such as Israeli settlers or Jews outside Israel), the “outside inside” that Agamben examines is exemplified by the situation of detainees in Guantanamo Bay. These who “do not have the status of Prisoners of War, they have absolutely no legal status. They are subject now only to raw power; they have no legal existence.” These detainees, who Agamben explicitly compares with Jews in the Nazi camps, are held within the embrace of the state but without the protection that state affords its citizens:

The exception that defines the structure of sovereignty is . . . complex. Here what is outside is included not simply by means of an interdiction or an internment, but rather by means of the suspension of the juridical order’s validity—by letting the juridical order, that is, withdraw from the exception and abandon it. The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule. The particular “force” of law consists in this capacity of law to maintain itself in relation to an exteriority. We shall give the name relation of exception to the extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion.

As was the case for those imprisoned in the concentration camps at the core of Agamben’s argument, the withdrawal of the juridical order from the Palestinians, so to speak, behind the wall, is not a matter of disregard but one of dehumanization (the production of what Agamben terms bare life, which can be defined as “life exposed to death” at the hands of sovereign violence).
The enclosed populations that result are carefully regarded—profiled, branded with identity cards, confined to specified areas, tracked—while simultaneously being denied the rights or legal status accruing to citizens of the incorporating state. The encysted are brought far more under the control of the state than its citizens but, rather than enjoying protection by the state correlative to that control, stand in constant risk of extermination by it.

For Agamben, this construction of an inside (the sovereign juridical order of the state) by the inclusion of an excluded population (the threatening other) is a central rhetorical (and practical) move by modern sovereign powers. This interiorization of a national exteriority not only provides its citizenry with evidence of the protective power of the state but simultaneously establishes that state’s demands to increase its power over, and reduce the rights of, that citizenry on the grounds that the incorporated other presents a threat.14

Yehouda ShenHAV and Yael BerDA, Israeli scholars of the bureaucracy of occupation, commend the analytic grip of the concept of sovereign exception, but query its apparent lack of a genealogy (or ahistoricism) and, in rectifying that, show how it evolved in British colonial practice under Lord Evelyn Cromer in Egypt and Lord George Curzon in India, and also how its application by the British and later the Israelis changed from the Mandate period until the wake of the second intifada. Constant to the sovereign exception’s colonial application is the assumption of the potentially violent irrationality of the colonial subject and the consequent necessity of revealing colonial sovereignty to that subject as “a phantom organ that manufactures miraculous decisions, but that conceals the locus of the decision making process, the inner working of its machinery, and its criteria of judgment.”15 That sovereignty, in other words, manifests itself as a simultaneously illegible and irresistible power. In the contemporary Israeli instance, racialized profiling of the Palestinian is “based on an all-powerful instant classification as security threat . . . relying on the belief that inside every Palestinian—regardless of age, residence or profession—hides the ghost or demon of a Palestinian terrorist.”16 Earlier instances of profiling acknowledged that inherent violent irrationality but they were accompanied by different strategies for bringing it under control.

Historically, the face that the sovereign exception shows to the subject population will very much depend on that population’s perceived use value. As Neve Gordon shows, Israeli policy between the 1967 occupation and the first intifada was that of employing “numerous forms of control to craft an economically useful Palestinian society while reducing the inhabitants’ political aptitude.”17 With the first intifada, Israel radically curtailed its dependence on Palestinian labor and simultaneously withdrew from managing Palestinian civil life, shifting “the governing paradigm . . . to control of the Palestinian population seen from the single vantage point of Israel’s security.”18 Although orders were given to the military to avoid killing civilians, Israel emphasized its sovereignty over the Palestinians through “the implementation of the entry-permit regime and the pervasive practice of incarceration, torture and beatings in order to repress the population’s political aspirations.”19 However, with the second intifada, “Israel adopted a new approach toward the Palestinians which rendered them, in many respects, expendable . . . In place of the politics of life that had characterized the occupied territories until the second intifada, a politics of death slowly emerged. The paradigmatic practice of this new politics is the extrajudicial execution which in contrast to incarcerations or even torture does not intend to shape or alter Palestinian behavior,
but to do away with “recalcitrant” individuals.” Gordon notes the escalation of killings of Palestinians after September 2000 (the number of Palestinian fatalities during each year of the second, or al-Aqsa, intifada was more than all of those killed during the first twenty years of the occupation), an escalation highlighted by Israel’s savage attacks on Gaza in 2008–9, 2012, and 2014 (dubbed Operations Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, and Protective Edge; see JPS 151, 167, and 173). Concurrent with the institutionalization of assassinations and other forms of extermination of Palestinian militants was a policy of weakening the general population so as to sap its will to resistance, as infamously spelt out by prime ministerial aide Dov Weissglass in 2006. Based on Defense Ministry research into minimal daily caloric needs, the new policy would take the Gazan population to the edge of, but not into, starvation—“the idea,” Weissglass said, “is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger.”

The path mapped here between valuing a subject population as a labor pool and judging it expendable and collateral to the extermination of resistance activities traces the development of Israeli policy toward Gazans from surveilled incorporation to the isolated “bare life” of the camp.

A Matter of Degree

I initially assumed that there was a qualitative difference between the walling of Gaza and that of the West Bank insofar as the encystation of Gaza seemed much more brutal and all-encompassing than that of the West Bank. Gaza’s wall tightly encysts a population that is exclusively Palestinian and the area is, aside from military incursions, closed to Israelis. Israeli policies, not to mention invasions and bombardments, have effectively destroyed the economy, radically restricting the provision of water, electricity, and, as mentioned above, food. The expendability of the Gazan population was made very clear in Operations Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, and Protective Edge through Israeli willingness to destroy occupied apartment blocks in putative pursuit of Hamas or Islamic Jihad militants as well as, on 1 August 2014, the decision to raze an entire neighborhood, killing its inhabitants, so as to preempt the feared incarceration of a captured Israeli soldier. The West Bank wall appears to operate according to a different logic in drawing a border between Israel and the West Bank (a border that massively violates the 1949 armistice line but only so as to expropriate Palestinian territory) and allowing, within that border, a significant degree of mobility as well as the supply of (mostly Israeli) goods and services to West Bank Palestinians. What Gordon refers to as the politics of death is not there endemic; although assassinations and targeted killings—both at the hands of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and militant settlers—are far from infrequent, collateral damage is nowhere near as extensive as it is in Gaza. However, further investigation of the implications of post-Oslo developments has shown that Israeli policies are fundamentally the same for both areas but that Gaza is further along the road to encystation and bare life than the West Bank. The difference is temporal rather than qualitative.

Oslo II (1995) divided the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) into three administrative divisions: Areas A, B, and C. Area A was designated as being under full civil and security control by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and closed to Israelis other than Israeli security forces on raids against militants. Joint Israeli and Palestinian policing would take care of security concerns in Area B, although all civil issues (water, electricity, sewage, health provision, education, and so
forth) pertaining to Palestinians living in Area B would be the exclusive concern of the PA. Area C was placed under full Israeli security and civil control. The Interim Agreement, signed by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat under the aegis of the U.S. president, Bill Clinton, stated that areas B and C would, aside from concessions to be negotiated, be handed to full Palestinian control in the wake of the permanent status agreements. In the subsequent two decades, no moves toward any agreement over permanent status have been reached and, insofar as it is evident that Israeli state policy is to ensure that no such moves can occur, it is important to investigate the status quo of areas A, B, and C.

Area A, under full civil and security control of the PA, makes up no more than 3 percent of the West Bank, and is effectively the territories occupied by the major cities: Bethlehem, Jericho, Ramallah, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, Jenin, Nablus and 80 percent of Hebron (the remainder of which is designated settler property). East Jerusalem, annexed by the Israelis in 1980, is not included, and although the agreement referred to the cities and their “surrounding areas,” the latter are continually being encroached on and expropriated by settlement expansion, road-building, and the declaration of closed military zones. In the Bethlehem district, the wall has voraciously bitten off olive groves and agricultural lands right up to the edges of the inhabited areas. The aquifers underlying the region have been tapped by the Israelis for supplying water to Jerusalem and the surrounding settlements, and Palestinians are not allowed to draw from them. Although Israeli civilians are legally forbidden from entering Area A (which impedes not only contacts between Israeli peace activists and Palestinians but also economic interaction—supply and services—between the two populations), settlers and soldiers make frequent incursions into the regions.

Area B makes up 24 percent of the West Bank and contains some 450 Palestinian villages and their surrounding lands. In this region, civil affairs are purely the concern of the PA while what is termed security is the joint concern of the PA and the Israeli military. The protocols, appended to the interim agreement, point out, however, that “the [Palestinian] Council will assure responsibility for public order for the Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.”

The PA, in other words, polices the Palestinian population but steps aside to make way for intervention by the IDF when Palestinian activities are seen to threaten Israelis or Israel’s security concerns; such activities include responses by Palestinians to attacks by settlers on individuals or communities and civilian resistance to settlement expansion onto Palestinian lands. Settlements, nominally restricted to Area C, frequently expand into Area B, expropriating private lands for building or cultivation and sparking local resistance that is then suppressed by the IDF.

Area C is by far the largest portion of the West Bank, making up approximately 73 percent of the whole. Some 68 percent of this is allotted to settlements and their lands, 21 percent is designated as closed military zones, and 8 percent is dedicated as nature reserves. The entire region is under Israeli civil and security control, but the civil administration applies solely to the 341,000 resident settlers leaving a substantial majority of the 300,000 Palestinians who live there without connection to the water network, blocked from building by restrictions on Palestinian construction, and deprived of basic amenities such as schooling and medical facilities. Palestinian movement through Area C
is fiercely monitored and restricted by a permit system, permanent and so-called flying checkpoints, roadblocks, and settler-only roads.

In effect, despite the impression that the West Bank is “encysted” as a unit within the apartheid wall (the Palestinian term) or separation barrier (the Israeli one), the facts on the ground reveal that the region is itself shattered into a multitude of discontinuous Palestinian cysts encompassed by Israeli territory under the sovereignty of a combination of Israeli state military and armed settlers. As the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) argued strongly already in May 2006, it is difficult to any longer speak of the West Bank as an entity: “A combination of checkpoints, physical obstacles and a permit system has effectively cut the West Bank into three distinct areas. . . . Within these areas further enclaves have been created—also bordered by checkpoints and roadblocks—that has led to one Palestinian community being isolated from its neighbour.”28 Here the vast majority of the 2,731,052 resident Palestinians live amid 341,400 settlers29 on 27 percent of the land with only 3 percent of that territory under complete civil and security governance by the PA. The speed and efficiency with which Israeli troops are able to impose full closure on the cities and towns of the West Bank was first demonstrated during the reconquest of the West Bank in the course of the second intifada of 2000, while the militarization of Areas B and C by a combination of the IDF and settlers renders the villages in those regions highly susceptible to expulsions in the event of Israeli perceptions that they, or Palestinians in general, pose heightened security threats. The current state of affairs, in which right-wing nationalist provocations by Israel threaten to spark a third intifada, could well bring about such actions at any time, especially in the light of Israeli saber-rattling toward Iran and the general tumult of the Middle East. Were that to happen, the situation of Gaza could easily be reproduced in the urban areas of the West Bank with open warfare on an encysted population swollen by refugees flooding into the cities of Area A from the villages of Areas B and C.

What I have sketched above might be seen as an apocalyptic scenario, and there are forces at play—even though they appear to be fairly muted in the current Israeli climate—which are working against its possibility. It is important, however, to stress that the groundwork is very much in place to allow its enactment when Israeli politicians judge that the time is right. Gaza, like the Gazan population, has been judged expendable by Israel; its groundwater is salinated and heavy with pollutants and it does not have the biblical aura that makes the Zionist Judea so desirable to religious ethnonationalists. It would be difficult—politically, practically, and ideologically—to do with the people of the West Bank what has been done with those of Gaza (so many of whom are themselves refugees, or descendants of refugees, from the ethnic cleansing of the territory that became 1949 Israel) but this may simply be a matter of waiting for the opportune moment. At present, escalating outward migration, particularly of those with the potential to build a viable Palestinian entity to counter Israel’s project,30 is quietly carrying out the labor of politicide while the encirclement and etiolation of those that remain work to fragment the sense of national community, replacing aspirations for self-determination and national sovereignty with the simple will to survive. The question of whether and when Israel will opt for surgical intervention depends on many factors, but the equipment for removing the cyst is already at hand.
Imperial Sovereignty

I return, in closing, to the concept of encystation. Like the term border in Israeli discourse and that of extraterritorial, which I have used in this paper, cyst has a double meaning: it is both a closed sac in which morbid matter is quarantined so as to protect the surrounding body and a “cell containing an embryo” that provides a defensive membrane within which that fetal entity can develop until it has grown sufficiently strong to emerge into the world outside. It is in the latter sense that Israel, as a homeland for the Jewish people, was conceptualized by Herzl and the late nineteenth-century Zionist pioneers who saw the land as a place distant from Europe and its anti-Semitism where Jews, weakened by centuries of discrimination, could shelter while developing into what Herzl termed “real men.”

Unsurprisingly, as a protected space within which a people could shelter and grow strong without encountering debilitating competition and challenges, Israel’s founders envisaged not only the need for strong defenses against an “outside” but also means for ensuring that any internal challenge to the development of sovereignty would be contained, expelled, or destroyed.

Modern-day Israel, which—with its massive army, its nuclear capabilities, and its high-tech economy—certainly has entered forcefully into the global community of mature states, nonetheless still conceives of itself as a protective womb for a fetal people. As a result it encysts non-Jewish populations within the territory over which it imposes de facto sovereignty, refusing them even the semblance of self-determination, while simultaneously extending its protective wall outward so as to encompass and protect all the members of a globally distributed ethnoreligious population it sees as its concern. Like the United States which, with the demise of the Soviet Union, assumes its right to celebrate its power to defend its citizens and its interests everywhere, Israel has, with its victories over the antagonisms against which it established itself, become unrestrained in its will to sovereign power both within and beyond its borders. It is hardly surprising that this sovereign power becomes, in effect, genocidal against populations such as those within the cyst of Gaza that Israel’s religio-nationalist ideology increasingly defines as inferior, threatening, and expendable.

About the Author
Glenn Bowman is a social anthropologist who has carried out fieldwork in the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank (largely in Bayt Sahur) since 1983. His recent work investigating the practices of walling discussed in this paper, as well as intercommunal relations between Muslims and Christians around shared sacred sites, is explored in “Sharing and Exclusion: The Case of Rachel’s Tomb,” Jerusalem Quarterly 58 (2014), pp. 30–49.

ENDNOTES

1 The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserts unequivocally that “it cannot be clearly stated that the Palestinians’ right to freedom of movement must take precedence over the right of Israelis to live” (http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il, accessed April 2011, since removed).

3 The analogy applies whether these be buffered bulldozed strips of twenty to forty meters in width, containing two three-meter barbed-wire-topped fences, a ditch, another fence with electronic movement sensors, two raked sand “trace strips,” and a paved patrol road, or eight-meter-high stretches of concrete wall crowned with smoked-glass windowed watchtowers protected by ditches, patrol roads, and supplementary fences. Other “walls” may be mobile, such as the “closed military areas” declared by the IDF or Border Police to seal off sites of real or potential confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians.

4 Tarek Ibrahim, in Behind the Walls: Separation Walls between Arabs and Jews in Mixed Cities and Neighborhoods in Israel (Nazareth: Arab Association for Human Rights, 2005), documents the growing popularity in Israel proper (behind the Green Line) of municipalities and developers constructing (without the consent of the Palestinian communities) four-meter-high concrete walls between Jewish and Arab communities. Case studies are presented from Caesarea, Lydda, and Ramla.


6 Kemp, “Politics of Location,” p. 87.


13 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 18.


17 Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 206; see also Avram Bornstein, Crossing the Green Line: Between the West Bank and Israel (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). Gordon notes that during this period “Israel invested considerable resources in closely monitoring the nutritional value of the Palestinian food basket in order to ensure that its policies were decreasing Palestinian susceptibility to disease and making inhabitants more useful in economic terms” (pp. 207–8).

18 Shenhav and Berda, “Colonial Foundations,” p. 338. Israeli policies of curtailing its dependence on Palestinian labor and importing immigrant workers to replace it undermines parallels between Israel and South Africa. South Africa’s apartheid regime, and the neoliberal systems that have replaced it, reflect that country’s dependence on black labor; Israel, in the wake of the first intifada, no longer needs its Palestinian population, and this puts that population at greater risk than simple exploitation.
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19 Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, p. 206; see also Baruch Kimmerling, Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War against the Palestinians (London: Verso, 2003).


23 Only 2 percent of promised interim withdrawals from 13 percent of the West Bank were carried out after the Wye River Memorandum, and they were reoccupied during Operation Defensive Shield.

24 Whereas the Oslo Accord of 1993 designated 316.9 square kilometers of the West Bank as Area A, the subsequent Oslo II Agreement (1995) reduced this to 96.3 square kilometers. (http://www.arij.org/atlas40/media/18.jpg, see also http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/maps.htm.


32 This position is elaborated by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Zionist leader and founder of the clandestine anti-British militant organization, Irgun, in his 1923 manifesto for a Jewish state, “O Zehlnoi Stene (The Iron Wall—We and the Arabs),” Rossyeyt, 4 November 1923, http://www.marxists.de/middleeast/ironwall/ironwall.htm. See also The Iron Wall (We and the Arabs); see also Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Allen Lane, 2000).

33 See Kimmerling, Politicide, 2003.