Civilianizing Civil Conflict:

Civilian Defense Militias and the Logic of Violence in Intra-State Conflict

Govinda Clayton

The University of Kent

Andrew Thomson

Queen’s University Belfast

We are grateful to Kristian Skrede Gledisteh, Håvard Hegre, Erik Melander, two excellent reviewers and the editorial team at International Studies Quarterly for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.

Corresponding author – Govinda Clayton: G.Clayton@kent.ac.uk
Abstract

This paper examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. Civilian defense forces are a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identification, leading to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase in rebel violence against civilians and overall intensification of conflict. A statistical analysis of government and rebel violence against civilians from 1981 to 2005 and a qualitative assessment of a civilian defense force operating in Iraq from 2005 to 2009 offer strong support for our theoretical claims. These findings provide further insight into pro-government militias and their effects on violence. They also have wider ethical implications for the use of civilian collaborators during civil war.

Key Words: Pro-Government Militias, Civilian Defense Forces, Counterinsurgency, Civil War, Conflict Intensity, One-Sided Violence, Violence against Civilians.
How does the delegation of security and counterinsurgent roles to civilian militias influence civil war violence? Between 2005 and 2009 Coalition forces in Iraq recruited Sunni tribal members to undertake security and combat operations. The Sons of Iraq militia program helped the Coalition defend local communities from insurgents, and played a pivotal role in the stabilization of Iraq (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012: 19-20; Smith and Macfarland 2008: 42-48). The “Sons” offer a pertinent example of a civilian defense force, a unique form of pro-government militia. These groups are composed mainly of civilians who undertake intelligence and limited combat roles to extirpate insurgents from their community. In comparison, other militias are often more mobile, composed of a wider range of recruits (e.g. ex-servicemen, criminals, conscripts), and undertake a variety of different roles (e.g. offensive operations, election agitation, private security). Between 1981 and 2007 almost a quarter of the 83 states that mobilized a pro-government militia delegated some responsibility to a civilian defense force. From Iraq to Colombia, Angola, and the Philippines, civilian defense forces are a regular feature of civil war. However, despite the frequency with which they operate, empirical research has yet to develop a sufficient understanding of how civilian militias affect civil violence.

We argue that since civilian defense forces contain members of the local population, they possess unique knowledge of the people within the communities in which insurgents and their sympathizers hide. This local knowledge allows the militias and their state patron to more effectively and selectively target insurgents. However, using civilians to identify
insurgents provokes a response from the rebels, who retaliate by targeting the local population to deter future defections and re-establish control. This drives a wedge between insurgents and the local population, increasing rebel violence against civilians. More effective incumbent targeting, increased rebel violence against civilians, and insurgent fragmentation triggered by the increasingly hostile environment lead to more deadly civil war.

We test our arguments with a nested mixed method research design (Lieberman 2005). We use a negative binomial regression model to analyze recently released data coding the presence of all militias operating globally between 1981 and 2005, and counts of civilian fatalities undertaken by rebel and government forces. Following Lieberman’s “model testing” small-N approach, we then offer a case analysis of civilian forces in Iraq. We use this case to clarify our method of conceptualization and more convincingly rule out rival explanations (Lieberman 2005: 440-442). Together, the results strongly support our claims.

We therefore offer important conceptual and empirical contributions to the growing collection of work centered on the effects of pro-government militias (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2015; Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger 2015; Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014; Schubiger 2012; Stanton 2015). While most studies tend to examine state delegation of violence as a means to avoid accountability, we make broader claims about patterns of civil war violence. In so doing, we provide a contribution to emerging debates on insurgent defection, side-switching and splintering (e.g. Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012; Cunningham 2013, 2014; Staniland 2012, 2014). By highlighting the role of civilian collaborators in the maintenance of political order, we also speak to ongoing debates.
concerning the use of social networks in imperial conquest (e.g. Macdonald 2014), as well as developing states’ governance strategies (e.g. Ahram 2011; Belge 2011; Holden 2004; Thomson 2011; Tilly 2003). We show that while it is common to use civilians as a source of information on insurgents, doing so leads to increased insurgent targeting of civilians and more deadly civil conflicts.

From a policy-making perspective, this presents significant ethical implications for those considering implementing such divisive strategies. Supporting civilian militias increases incumbents’ ability to identify insurgents and establish control, but we suggest that incumbents need to protect civilian groups to offset the pernicious effects of placing them at the center of armed conflict.

The Effects of Pro-Government Militias

Pro-government militias are organized armed groups aligned with the government (national or subnational) but not identified as members of the conventional armed force (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013: 250). Most studies on the effects of militias focus on the relationship between pro-government militias and human rights violations. Informal militias (i.e. those not officially linked to the state) provide incumbents a means to off-load “dirty work” and plausibly deny extreme methods used to target opponents and civilians (Campbell 2002: 13-14; Cohen and Nordas 2015; Huggins 1991). Unofficial militia groups are therefore strongly associated with human rights abuses and civilian targeting (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2015; Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014; Raleigh 2012).

Previous research reveals how militias support weak state institutions (e.g. Ahram 2011; Klare 2004: 120-121). Militias offer incumbents governing weak institutional structures a cheaper method to engage insurgents (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2011: 6-7).
In this way a state’s creation and/or collaboration with militias provides a non-traditional means of consolidating power (Ahram 2011: 14-15). However, weak states often lack the ability to control militia violence (Barter 2013: 20; Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014). Therefore, rather than violence occurring because states are unwilling to control militias, violence can also occur when the state is unable to exert sufficient control over a group (Mitchell 2004: 46-50).

Finally, a third body of literature discusses the role that militias can play in assisting incumbents to overcome the “identification problem” (Kalyvas 2006: 108-109; Lyall 2010: 15). The “identification problem” arises from the challenges of identifying insurgents within a civilian population (Galula 1964: 55-57; Kalyvas 2006: 89-91; Kilcullen 2010). In the absence of reliable intelligence, incumbents must choose between inaction and the adoption of indiscriminate forms of violence (Kalyvas 2006: 147-149). Given the obvious problems associated with inaction, a lack of reliable intelligence more commonly leads to indiscriminate violence. This approach is often counterproductive, as it alienates the very people the incumbent is attempting to win over to their side (Downes 2008). Research suggests that militias can provide local information on insurgents that allows the state to apply violence more selectively (Kalyvas 2006: 107; McClintock 1992: 251-252; Peic 2014; Jones 2012: 15-17).

**Types of Pro-Government Militias**

Despite highlighting key effects produced by pro-government militias, existing accounts fail to adequately distinguish between different types of militias and the unique roles they may perform. A lack of cross-national data has largely prevented the effective categorization of militia forces, and limited analysis of the effects associated with different
forms of militia groups. One exception is the work of Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2013: 251-253), who distinguish between militias in relation to their link with the state, categorizing groups as either “informal” or “semi-official”. Mitchell, Carey and Butler (2014) draw on this typology, adopting a principal-agent framework to argue that groups informally linked to the state have a stronger negative effect on human rights violations.

However useful the informal/semi-official distinction, it does not tell how differences in factors such as the recruitment base and mode of operation can impact conflict processes. Examination of a broader range of factors, such as their relationship with rebel organizations (Barter 2013), will enable a deeper understanding of the effects of militias. For instance, it is not clear why militias are better than conventional incumbent forces at separating the insurgents from civilians. Militias often have a similar membership composition and operational parameters as state forces (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013). Some groups comprise off-duty military or police, offering no distinct advantage for gaining information. Recent literature has made some in-roads in discussing pro-government militia heterogeneity, but has yet to delineate the varied nature of these actors and their impact on civil war dynamics (Ahram 2014; Barter 2013; Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013). This paper seeks to contribute towards a better understanding of the impact pro-government militias have on civil war dynamics by focusing on the effects of one particular sub-set of militia, civilian defense forces.

**Civilian Defense Forces**

Civilian defense forces are a well-established type of pro-government militia in counterinsurgency thinking (Galula 1964: 82-94; Jones 2013: 15; Melintock 1992: 247-249) and an increasingly recognized category amongst civil war scholars (Barter 2013; Fumerton
and Remijnse 2004; Peic 2014). This work highlights a number of clear criteria that help to define civilian defense forces. Firstly, they are recruited mainly from civilian populations. Unlike non-civilian defense forces composed of off-duty policemen/military, ex-servicemen, or other conscripts with some level of military training, civilian defense forces are composed mainly of civilian groups from within areas contested by the incumbent and insurgent forces. Secondly, such forces remain within their recruitment areas. Unlike mobile fighting forces that cross from one area to the next, they are static. This, along with their civilian status, means that recruits in civilian defense forces typically live in their own homes rather than reporting to a barracks. Thirdly, civilian defense forces perform “defensive” tasks. This means they also undertake intelligence, security, and limited combat roles concerned with the protection of their local areas from insurgents, both extirpating insurgents from their own communities and denying access to insurgents from outside. This differentiates civilian defense forces as we define them from militias that actively target a variety of opponents across wide areas, or groups who perform other roles within their local community that are not connected to an insurgency.

In sum, civilian defense forces are a form of pro-government militia that harnesses the active participation of civilians (and defected members of an insurgency) in a counterinsurgency effort taking up sedentary, defensive roles. Civilian defense forces are conceptually best contrasted to “death squad”-style militias composed of military-trained personnel that operate according to military-style command structures, roaming large areas in active search of insurgents or other opponents, such as “death squads” in Latin American during the Cold War (see Table I) (Mazzei 2009: 4-10). We also conceptually contrast civilian defense forces from vigilante police forces due to the specific counterinsurgent role that defense forces take. Rather than identifying common criminals and cattle thieves or
enforcing specific legal codes (such as sharia law), a civilian defense force’s role is primarily to defend the community from insurgents. Civilian defense forces are a historically common feature in irregular wars ranging from the “civil defense patrols” in Peru and Guatemala to Turkish Village Guards and Filipino Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units.

Non-civilian defense forces vary considerably in their composition, operational parameters, and context and thus do not represent a single category. The multiple sub-categories of non-civilian defense forces are beyond the scope of this paper. For instance, non-civilian defense forces operate in a variety of contexts with diverse operational parameters, ranging from personal guards, to security forces operating in non-civil war settings, such as the “Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps” which protected business interests in China, to military organized state-led groups such as the “White Eagles”, a Serbian militia responsible for various attacks during the dissolution of former Yugoslavia (Mitchell, Carey, and Lowe 2013). In other words, while civilian defense forces exhibit particular characteristics in a counterinsurgent context, the non-civilian defense force category captures a variety of pro-government militias.

Table I: Civilian Defense Forces vs. Non-Civilian Defense Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civilian Defense Forces</th>
<th>Non-Civilian Defense Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>- Any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Often ex-military conscripts, off-duty personnel, mercenaries and foreign fighters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of operation</td>
<td>Local (area of recruitment)</td>
<td>- No primary geographic focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Often mobile operating across large territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- May operate locally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Overcoming the Problem of Identification

Members of local communities generally know who individual insurgents are, or at least which residents are more likely to hide them. Militias formed of local residents and insurgent defectors are therefore able to readily identify local insurgents and those that support them (Kalyvas 2006: 107; Lyall 2010). Other forms of militia, such as mobile informal groups, often operate away from their villages of origin and are thus not privy to inside information in the same way. Therefore the ability to reduce the problem of identification is unique to civilian defense forces. We see this as part of a wider effort on behalf of states to make their citizenry “legible” (Belge 2011). In addition to this intelligence function, leveraging civilian defense forces inherently serves as a political tool to increase civilian support for the incumbent.

The formation of a civilian defense force is therefore likely to fundamentally alter state violence in civil war. Previous research shows that the nature (selective versus indiscriminate) of violence is a function of control and the access to information that this provides (Kalyvas 2006: 202-209). According to this theory, as the level of control exerted by a belligerent increases, the likelihood that that actor will employ indiscriminate violence diminishes. Control is inextricably linked to the levels of support for that actor and the amount of information it has. As active and passive support for an actor increase, so do the chances for collaboration, such as through furnishing intelligence. Greater access to local knowledge through local militias enhances the state’s ability to selectively target their
opponents and increase their control over local populations. Indeed, Peic (2014) shows that states employing civilian defense forces are more likely to defeat an insurgency, due to the local information they can provide. Thus by helping to reduce the problem of insurgent identification and enhancing levels of state control, we expect the presence of civilian defense forces to significantly decrease indiscriminate government-sided violence. From this discussion we derive our first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: *The presence of a civilian defense force reduces indiscriminate state violence against civilians.*

**The Wider Effects of Civilianizing Warfare**

However, the advantages that an incumbent gains from the presence of civilian defense forces produce the opposite effect for insurgents. Civilian defense forces inherently oppose the rebels, reducing their ability to evade detection and maintain control of local populations. As incumbents persuade the civilian population to actively engage in actions against the insurgents (e.g. a security role, denying insurgents sanctuary and entering combat against them), they drive a wedge between the rebels and civilians. The defection of civilians from the insurgents to the incumbents diminishes insurgent control and increases the likelihood of indiscriminate insurgent violence (Kalyvas 1999: 269, 276; 2006: 224-226). For as many studies on insurgent violence against civilians argue, faced with hostile civilians and a declining level of control, insurgents respond violently, employing more indiscriminate forms of violence where they have weaker levels of control (Downes 2007, 2008; Eck and Hultman 2007; Raleigh 2012; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2010). In other words, we expect that the incumbent’s leveraging of a civilian defense force will produce an increase in insurgent
attacks towards the civilian populations that no longer support them. This leads to our second hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 2:** *The presence of a civilian defense force increases indiscriminate rebel violence against civilians.*

Delegating tasks to civilian groups can also polarize local communities, producing higher levels of violence as incumbents and insurgents seek to gain the active (rather than passive) support of the community. Civilians become participants in the civil conflict, actively supporting and collaborating with either the insurgents or the incumbents. Research indicates that in this environment people use these outlets to settle personal feuds, increasing inter-civilian violence and the overall number of fatalities (e.g. Kalyvas 2006: 376).

In addition, a civilian defense force can reduce the cohesion of insurgent movements. Faced with an incumbent that is better equipped to identify insurgents, and a population that is hostile to insurgent demands, the probability of insurgent defection is increased (Kalyvas 1999: 275-277). As Staniland (2014: 40-49) argues, counterinsurgents are able to diminish insurgent cohesion by starving insurgents of local support and incentivizing side-switching to the incumbent cause. The possibility of side-switching poses a serious threat to the strength and stability of the insurgency, and requires the group to focus violent attention on actual and potential defectors within their organizations and supporting populations (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Lyall 2010; Staniland 2012). Ethnic cleavages and other social networks pervading insurgent groups can exacerbate this process (Lyall 2010; Staniland 2014: 97). In this way the emergence of civilian defense forces can turn the insurgency in on itself, increasing the use of violence within insurgent groups as well as towards its civilian support base (as in hypothesis 2).
In this respect, we argue that the initiation of a civilian defense force intensifies violence within civil conflict. The cumulative effect of the increased ability of incumbents to target insurgents, increased insurgent targeting of civilians, insurgent infighting, and the general process of civilianizing civil conflict, is likely to produce an increase in the violence overall. From this discussion we can derive our final hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: *The presence of a civilian defense force increases the overall fatalities during civil war.*

**Research Design**

To test our hypotheses we apply a nested mixed-method research design (Lieberman 2005). We first assess our arguments using statistical analysis. Having completed the primary analysis we then follow Lieberman’s (2005: 440-442) model testing small-N approach and assess the case of the self-defense militia in Iraq (2005-2009).

**Dependent Variables**

To evaluate hypotheses 1 and 2 we examine data on the use of one-sided violence in civil conflict (Eck and Hultman 2007). This data provides a count of (intentional and direct) killings of civilians by both government and rebel agents between 1989 and 2005.\(^1\) The data

\(^1\) Using data at the yearly level of aggregation does have limitations. Often incidents of one-sided violence are not centrally planned and thus should perhaps theoretically be analyzed as individual forms of political violence (Schneider and Bussmann 2013). However, disaggregation to the event level has the disadvantage of limited comparability and presents additional data challenges, not least the lack of geo-coded militia data (Raleigh 2012). Similarly, aggregating the conflict fatalities or including an averaged count of fatalities across a conflict discards important detail that is held at the conflict year. In particular, cases that feature civilian defense forces
only captures a sub-set of civilian conflict deaths, excluding a range of factors such as unintentional killings, indirect deaths, and extrajudicial executions. Thus whilst our previous discussion spoke broadly about violence, our statistical analysis focuses only on the most deadly subset of violence in which civilians are deliberately and directly targeted by governments or non-state groups.

Hypothesis 1 makes claims relating to government violence against civilians. Our dependent variable in our first analysis is thus the count of civilian deaths produced by the state in each conflict year. This produces 529 country-year observations. Hypothesis 2 focuses on insurgent violence against civilians. Our dependent variable in this analysis is a dyadic indicator recording the count of civilians killed by each rebel group in a civil conflict year (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). This results in 820 dyad-year observations, including 203 rebel groups in 114 conflicts, across 70 states. Finally, tend to exhibit important within-case variations that would be lost in an aggregate conflict episode analysis. We therefore prefer the yearly counts of one-sided violence to alternatives such as event or aggregated conflict analysis.

2 In our analysis of government violence we assess the number of fatalities attributed to the state in a conflict year. As a robustness check we sum the number of state fatalities with the deaths attributed to six non-state groups that are included with the UCDP data as independent actors but also classified as pro-government militias, and the results remain consistent. We also exclude Rwanda in 1994 as this is an extreme outlier. However, when we include the Rwandan case, or include a dummy variable for this case, the effect of civilian defense forces remains the same.

3 In our analysis of rebel violence we assess only those cases in which a rebel movement is in contest with a state actor, and exclude all other dyads involving non-state groups.
hypothesis 3 focuses upon the total fatalities in civil conflict. The dependent variable in this analysis is the number of battle-related deaths in each conflict year (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005), which results in a population of 615 conflict years.4

Independent Variable

To operationalize civilian defense forces we draw upon the pro-government militia database (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013). This cross-national database captures the presence of pro-government militias by applying a uniform coding scheme to publically available news sources. Pro-government militia is defined as “a group that is identified by sources as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or sub-national), that is not part of the regular security forces, is armed, and has some level of organization” (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013: 252). The dataset identifies 331 pro-government militias active between 1981 and 2007. In addition to the raw data, the pro-government militia dataset is complemented by an online relational database that provides the primary news sources used to code the data. Using this material we code civilian defense forces as militia groups that meet the following coding criteria5:

(1) Participants: the group is composed mainly of civilians.

(2) Area of operation: forces remain within the neighborhood, village, or region/department from which they were recruited. Members remain in their own homes rather than reporting to a centralized operational base.

4 A full list of descriptive statistics is available in supplementary appendix I

5 For more information on coding procedure see supplementary appendix II
(3) Defensive role: civilians mobilize for neighborhood/village security and limited
defensive capabilities against insurgents. This can include intelligence gathering and
denunciations of insurgents and insurgent sympathizers present or living in the area
of operation. It can also include direct combat with insurgents in expelling members
of the insurgency from the civilian defense force community or denying insurgents
access.

For coding civilian defense forces within the existing database (Carey, Mitchell, and
Lowe, 2013) we relied primarily on the online database news sources used to code the
original data. On the rare occasions when we had insufficient information within the existing
online database sources, we undertook additional research into the characteristics of the
group using major news sources (e.g. BBC World Service, The Guardian). We
systematically reviewed all 331 entries for the 3 essential civilian defense force criteria. We
only classified groups that met all three criteria as civilian defense forces. Given the relative
clarity of coding criteria for civilian defense forces, identifying the requisite characteristics
was straightforward in most cases. For example, media descriptions of the Rondas
Campesinas in Peru describe their intended purpose as “to enable the campesinos [farmers]
to defend themselves against Sendero” (The Guardian 1984 as cited in Mitchell, Carey and
Lowe Online Database 2013). Descriptors such as “local” “villagers” “self-defense”
“defending their own communities” “grassroots”, amongst many others served as key initial
indicators of groups likely to fulfill all the criteria.

\[\text{6\ We undertook research using Lexis Nexis.}\]

\[\text{7\ Checks for inter-coder reliability showed at least 95\% consistency between coders.}\]
In total, 50 of the 331 pro-government militias met all three criteria and we coded each of these as civilian defense forces.\textsuperscript{8} We capture the presence of a civilian defense force using a dummy variable, with all country years in which a civilian defense force was present coded as 1, and 0 in all other cases.\textsuperscript{9}

\textit{Controls}

We include a number of controls to account for potentially confounding variables and competing arguments. Firstly, we include indicators of key state characteristics that have been shown to influence the dynamics of civil violence. We expect that democracies are more prone to suffer rebel violence against civilians, whilst autocracies more likely to involve high intensity violence and government targeting of the civilian population. To account for this we include a measure of regime type taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2006). The dynamics of violence within a state are also closely related to economic development. States with a stronger economic base are better equipped to protect their population from rebel assaults and less likely to require violence to gain civilian collaboration. To account for this we include a lagged indicator of GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002). States that contain large populations and inaccessible terrain are more

\textsuperscript{8} For a full list of civilian defense forces see supplementary appendix III. For some descriptive analysis of key civilian defense force characteristics see supplementary appendix IV.

\textsuperscript{9} We follow the pro-government militia database and consider all militia forces that share a similar organization and political basis as part of the same group. This approach means that in more than 75% of cases there is only ever one civilian defense force operating within a state. As a robustness check we replaced our dichotomous independent variable for a count variable indicating the number if independent groups within a state, there is no significant difference in our results.
challenging to control, which could increase the likelihood of one-sided violence. We control for this relationship by including the natural log of the state’s population (Gleditsch 2002) and the logged percentage of mountainous terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Finally, we include an indicator of the size of a state’s excluded population (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). We expect higher levels of exclusion to increase all forms of violence.¹⁰

We also include controls to account for key conflict characteristics. Firstly, to ensure that our results are driven by civilian defense forces, and not pro-government militias more generally, we control for other militias that are “informally or “semi-officially linked to the state (Mitchell et al. 2014). As we discuss above, other militias (e.g. non-civilian defense groups) can take a variety of forms. Yet in the absence of clear conceptual categories for other sub-sets of militia, controlling for other groups in relation to their link with the state offers the most theoretically meaningful method.¹¹ We include an indicator of incompatibility, based on the belief that conflicts fought for control of the state are more often of a high intensity and involve civilian targeting. We include an indicator of conflict

¹⁰ We do not include country-fixed effects on account of the low level of within-case variation on our independent variable (e.g. 85% of conflicts in the dyadic dataset always or never feature a civilian force). For cases in which an explanatory variable is partially time invariant, the inclusion of unit dummies eliminates ‘too much’ cross-sectional variance and would severely bias our estimates (Plümper, Troeger and Manow 2005: 330-334; Huber and Stephens 2001).

¹¹ We also run the analysis using a dichotomous variable to account for the presence of all other militia groups. Our main findings remain consistent regardless of the approach adopted. We include the disaggregated measures of other militias as they offer additional theoretical insights.
duration that records the number of years since the start of the conflict episode. Over time we expect a reduction in all forms of violence. To capture the distribution of capabilities within a conflict we include a ratio of the number of all rebel forces operating within the state’s territory to the total number of government troops (Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012). We expect relatively stronger rebellions to increase the overall conflict severity, but have only a minor effect on the violence against civilians (Wood 2012). We include the natural log of the total number of battlefield deaths in each conflict year (for the analysis of civilian deaths) (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005) as conflicts of a greater intensity might be more likely to involve violence against civilians. Further, we include the log-transformed count of civilian killings perpetrated by the opposing actor in each of the civilian violence models. We expect increased government or rebel violence to lead to an increase in their opponent’s use of repressive force (Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012). We also include our own measure to account for the presence of a peacekeeping operation that based on previous research we expect to reduce the use of all one-sided violence (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013). Finally, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the conflict actor perpetrated one-sided violence in the previous year to account for potential problems of temporal dependence.  

Statistical Analysis

12 For the analysis of rebel violence the ratio measures the individual rebel organization in relation to the number of government troops (Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012).

13 See robustness checks for a number of alternative specifications.
We present the statistical results in Tables II, III and IV. As all three dependent variables are counts of fatalities we estimate negative binomial regression models. Table II includes the analysis that assesses hypothesis one (government violence), Table III, hypothesis two (rebel violence), and Table IV, hypothesis three (conflict intensity). All results support our hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1 posited that the presence of civilian defense forces helps governments reduce the problems associated with insurgent identification. We argued that local civilian militia would increase the ability of the state to selectively target insurgents, lowering the use of indiscriminate violence against their civilians. The analysis provides strong support for this claim.

Model 1 assesses the effect of a civilian defense force on one-sided government violence whilst controlling for potentially confounding state characteristics. As expected, the civilian defense force variable is negative and statistically significant. This effect remains consistent when we add controls that account for the conflict context (Model 2).
Table II: Binomial Regression Models – Government Violence against Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government Violence (State Controls)</td>
<td>Government Violence (Full Model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Defense Force</td>
<td>-0.895*</td>
<td>-1.156**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
<td>(0.430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>-0.098**</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (t-1)</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (l) (t-1)</td>
<td>0.166†</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous terrain (l)</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Excluded Population</td>
<td>1.312*</td>
<td>2.335**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.660)</td>
<td>(0.818)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Militia</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.575*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-official Militia</td>
<td>-0.457</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Incompatibility</td>
<td>-1.066*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.484)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>-0.066***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Relative Capacity</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity (l)</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Violence</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
<td>-0.485</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.431)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Violence Dummy (t-1)</td>
<td>2.225***</td>
<td>2.433***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.382)</td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>1.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.798)</td>
<td>(4.595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>2.581***</td>
<td>2.460***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Likelihood</td>
<td>-1443.185</td>
<td>-1409.5903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust Standard errors (clustered on conflict) in parentheses

† p < 0.10  * p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001. (t-1) = Lagged Variable. (l) = Logged Variable
Table III: Binomial Regression Models – Insurgent Violence against Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(3) Rebel Violence (State Controls)</th>
<th>(4) Rebel Violence (Full Model)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian Defense Force</strong></td>
<td>0.653*</td>
<td>0.914**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
<td>(0.310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>0.101*</td>
<td>0.141**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (t-1)</td>
<td>-1.063***</td>
<td>-0.956***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.237)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (l) (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous Terrain (l)</td>
<td>-0.354**</td>
<td>-0.298*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Excluded Population</td>
<td>2.856**</td>
<td>0.828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.054)</td>
<td>(0.788)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Militia</td>
<td>-0.973*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.426)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-official Militia</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.420)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Incompatibility</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.471)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>-0.039*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Relative Capacity</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity (l)</td>
<td>0.504***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Violence</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
<td>0.672†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.374)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Violence Dummy (t-1)</td>
<td>2.302***</td>
<td>1.981***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>11.25***</td>
<td>5.750*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.623)</td>
<td>(2.739)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>2.821***</td>
<td>2.524***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Likelihood</td>
<td>-2011.1747</td>
<td>-1898.0088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust Standard errors (clustered on dyad) in parentheses
† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. (t-1) = Lagged Variable. (l) = Logged Variable
To examine the substantive effect of the relationship between civilian defense forces and state targeting of civilians we estimate predicted values. The results show that the presence of a civilian defense force reduces the predicted number of state killings of civilians from 66 to 22, a reduction of 67%. This finding strongly supports the argument underpinning hypothesis 1: when states recruit civilian defense forces, their ability to effectively target insurgents reduces the intensity of state violence against civilians.

The control variables perform broadly in line with prior research. Militias informally linked to the state significantly increase government violence, suggesting that the capacity to overcome problems of identification is unique to civilian defense groups, and extending previous research that links informal groups and state human rights abuses. Autocratic institutions, a larger ‘excluded’ population, and a history of civilian targeting each significantly increase the likelihood of government violence, whereas increased conflict duration and government incompatibilities reduce the likelihood of one-sided government violence.

Moving to the second phase of analysis, hypothesis 2 predicted that the formation of civilian defense forces would increase rebel violence against civilians. We argued that insurgents are more likely to target civilians when they actively signal their collaboration with the state by forming a civilian defense force. The results depicted in Table III offer firm support for our claims. As with the prior analysis, we first assess the influence of civilian

14 Predicted values generated using the CLARIFY package in STATA 12 (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All control variables were held at their mean or modal values assuming that the actor perpetrated some form of one-sided violence in the previous year.
defense forces whilst controlling for state characteristics (Model 3). We then include additional controls to account for the conflict context (Model 4).

In all models the civilian defense force variable produces a positive and statistically significant effect on the use of rebel violence against civilians. As predicted by hypothesis 2, the presence of a civilian defense force appears to refocus the targets of insurgent violence, increasing the insurgent’s incentives to target civilians. Substantively, the presence of a civilian defense force increases the predicted number of insurgent killings from 63 to 153, an increase of 143%. This effect is consistent across all specifications including both state and conflict controls.

The analysis also produces a number of findings that broadly support our theoretical claims. The intensity of one-sided rebel violence is lower within autocratic and economically strong states, and those that contain less inaccessible terrain. This suggests that states which are unfavorable to insurgency have lower levels of insurgent control and thus an increased likelihood of rebels targeting civilians indiscriminately.

Other control variables also perform in accordance with our expectations. High intensity civil conflicts, in particular those with a history of one-sided violence, are more likely to suffer intense levels of rebel violence. A more significant “excluded” population increases the level of rebel violence, and conflict duration has a negative effect on insurgent violence. Informal militias again have the opposite effect to civilian defense groups, significantly reducing insurgent violence against civilians. This finding points to the inefficiency of state-sponsored attacks against civilians, for the violent actions of informal groups appear to reduce rebel reliance on violent methods to foster domestic support.
### Table IV: Binomial Regression Models – Conflict Intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(State Controls)</td>
<td>(Full Model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian Defense Force</strong></td>
<td>0.928 (**) 0.287</td>
<td>1.231 (***) 0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.135 (0.235)</td>
<td>0.020 (0.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (l) (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.162 (0.111)</td>
<td>0.120 (0.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous terrain (l)</td>
<td>0.133 (0.129)</td>
<td>0.096 (0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Excluded Population</td>
<td>1.397 (^*) (0.580)</td>
<td>1.139 (^*) (0.474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Militia</td>
<td>0.690 (***) (0.197)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-official Militia</td>
<td>-0.178 (0.222)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Incompatibility</td>
<td>-0.221 (0.234)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>-0.042 (***) (0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Relative Capacity</td>
<td>0.354 (***) (0.079)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
<td>0.057 (0.329)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.204 (***) (2.201)</td>
<td>5.718 (***) (1.709)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>0.555 (***) (0.072)</td>
<td>0.293 (***) (0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Likelihood</td>
<td>-4534.208</td>
<td>-4220.492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust Standard errors (clustered on conflict) in parentheses

\(\dagger p < 0.10\) \(^* p < 0.05\), \(** p < 0.01\), \(*** p < 0.001\)

(t-1) = Lagged Variable
(l) = Logged Variable

The final hypothesis predicted that the presence of a civilian defense force would increase the overall fatalities in civil conflict. The combined effect of increased numbers of state-sided participants, more effective targeting of the insurgency, and “softer” rebel...
civilian targets, we argued, increase the overall intensity of war. The results are presented in Table IV. As with the prior analysis, we first control for state characteristics (Model 5), and then include additional conflict controls in a fully specified model (Model 6). In both models a civilian defense force has a strong positive and highly significant effect on the number of battle-related fatalities. As expected, the delegation of security roles to a civilian defense force appears to significantly increase the severity of civil war violence. Substantively, the presence of a civilian defense force increases the predicted number of fatalities by 241%, rising from 220 to 751 predicted deaths.

The other significant analysis largely supports previous work. The relative strength of a rebel force is shown to have a positive effect on the intensity of civil conflict. Conflicts are more likely to assume a conventional nature and violent character when rebel forces grow to match the size of the state. As with the prior analysis, “excluded” groups increase the overall intensity of a conflict, while a longer duration decreases the severity of the violence. Informal groups increase the overall fatalities in a civil conflict; presumably their broader range of targets, wider geographic focus, and more offensive remit inflame civil strife.\footnote{Predicted values reveal the conflict-intensifying effect is greater for civilian defense groups than for other militia.}

Taken together, the results highlight the utility in disaggregating between forms of violence in civil war. As our theoretical discussion predicted, civilian defense forces produce quite different effects on government, rebel and overall civil violence. In line with previous literature, we find varied effects for a number of our controls. Informal militias, compared to
civilians, have the opposite effect on one-sided violence,, significantly increasing government violence, but reducing insurgent violence against civilians. Militias that are semi-officially linked to the state do not have a significant effect on any form of violence. These groups tend to most closely approximate conventional armed forces, and it is therefore perhaps not surprising that conflicts involving semi-official groups are not clearly distinguishable from those involving only conventional forces. Democratic states are more likely to suffer rebel violence against civilians, whilst non-democratic states are more likely to undertake government-led violence. The nature of the regime has little effect on the overall conflict severity. Economic development decreases the likelihood of all forms of violence against civilians, but only significantly reduces rebel-led violence. A greater excluded population increases all forms of violence significantly. Mountainous terrain significantly reduces the likelihood of rebels targeting civilians, but has no real effect on any other form of violence. More generally we have shown that the relative strength of a rebel force has a positive effect on the intensity of civil conflict, but does not, however, produce a significant effect on the likelihood of either government or insurgent violence against civilians. This supports previous research that has shown that changing the balance of power within a conflict, rather than specific power configurations, is the key driver of civilian violence (Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012). Increased conflict intensity is more likely to produce government and rebel targeting of civilians, but the effect is only significant for rebel violence. It appears that one-sided violence is not a reciprocal process, as neither government nor rebel violence has a significant effect on the intensity of their opponent’s attacks. Increased conflict duration reduces the likelihood of all forms of violence. Finally, as we would expect, a history of rebel or government violence strongly increases the likelihood of the same actor subsequently targeting civilians.
Robustness Checks

To ensure that our results are robust we change a variety of model specifications and rerun the estimates.\(^\text{16}\) Firstly, to ensure that we have not omitted any other key variables, we rerun our analysis including a number of additional controls that previous research suggests might influence the dynamics of civil violence. We add controls for: multiple rebel groups, democratic aid dependence, distance to the nearest democracy, the size of conflict area, ethnic fractionalization and the presence of natural resources. Our results remain robust in all model specifications.

Secondly, including a lagged dependent variable to account for temporal dependence can sometimes lead to inconsistent estimates (Achen 2000; Brandt and Sandler 2012). To evaluate how robust our findings are against alternative estimation approaches, we rerun the analysis using (i) dummy variables to account for one-sided violence in the previous 2, 3, and 5 years; (ii) a count of fatalities in the previous 1, 2, 3 and 5 years; (iii) the “year” variable to account for any linear time trend; (iv) year-fixed effects to account for a time trend and common shocks; (v) a count of the years since the last fatality (along with square and cubic terms);\(^\text{17}\) finally, (vi) we removed all temporal controls. Our results are robust regardless of the method used to account for temporal dependence.

\(^{16}\) The data, replication materials, and output from all the robustness checks are available on the International Studies Quarterly Data Site - [http://www.isanet.org/Publications/ISQ/Replication-Data](http://www.isanet.org/Publications/ISQ/Replication-Data), or from the authors website.

\(^{17}\) This is a modified version of the methodology suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010) for binary models.
Thirdly, using the conflict/dyad year as the unit of analysis also increases the likelihood of a small selection of conflicts biasing the results. We therefore rerun the analysis excluding the most deadly civil conflict years. Our key findings are robust even when the most deadly years of civil conflict and civilian targeting are removed from the analysis. However, taking yearly measurements of fatality counts over the course of a conflict also risks artificially reducing the standard errors by inflating the number of observations. To ensure that our findings are not biased in this manner, we assess the effect of civilian forces on one-sided violence across conflict episodes. The results complement our prior analysis, suggesting that the presence of a civilian defense force during a civil war reduces the likelihood of the government targeting civilians, but increases the likelihood of one-sided rebel violence.

Finally, civilian defense forces could quite feasibly be the result rather than the cause of violent contexts. To account for potential endogeneity, we undertake matching to pair

---


19 Cases in which civilian defense forces were present in some but not all of the conflict years are challenging to assess using the conflict episode. To overcome this, we use a number of different measures, including a ratio variable capturing the number of years in which the militias were present relative to the total conflict years; a dummy variable indicating if a civilian defense force was in all, 75% or 50% of the conflict years; and a dummy variable indicting the presence of a civilian defense force at any point during the conflict. The effect is largely consistent across the different measures.
observations that featured a civilian defense force with similar observations without a
civilian defense force. This process removes observations without civilian defense forces
that have no analogue amongst the cases in which a civilian defense force was active.\textsuperscript{20} By
preprocessing our data in this manner we are able to assess the effect that civilian defense
forces have independent of the conflict dynamics that might be more likely to produce such
groups. We identify pairs using the MatchIt package in R, adopting 1:1 nearest neighbor
matching with replacement (Ho et al. 2006). This produces 189 pairs of control and
treatment observations from the original sample of 529 conflict years, and 266 pairs of
control and treatment observations from the original sample of 820 conflict dyad years.\textsuperscript{21}
Our analysis of the matched dataset produces additional support for our hypothesis, as once
again civilian defense forces produce a strong and significant effect in the hypothesized
direction for all three forms of violence. This adds further support to our theoretical claims
and helps to address confounding explanations related to endogeneity.

Case Analysis: Iraq

For a deeper assessment of our causal argument we undertake a ‘model testing’ case
analysis (Lieberman 2005). We focus on civilian defense forces in Anbar province, Iraq
(2005-2009). Civilian defense militias formed here, and one of the regions in which they

\textsuperscript{20} For more information on matching see Ho et al. 2007; Lyall 2010.

\textsuperscript{21} Balance tests reveal that these pairs are closely matched, meeting or exceeding the standard for variance. For
example, all variables receive a value of $\leq 0.25$ for standardized bias (e.g. the difference in the means of the
treated and control groups, divided by the standard deviation of the treated group); this is considered a “good
match” (Ho et al. 2007, 23fn15).
were most active. It therefore represents an appropriate case to assess the internal validity of our argument.

Sunni Militias and Coalition Violence

In 2004 Coalition forces largely lost control in Anbar. Hampered by problems associated with insurgent identification, Coalition military action was largely ineffective and regularly resulted in civilian casualties (Macdonald 2014: 201). For example, in 2005, Coalition forces were responsible for approximately 500 civilian fatalities in Anbar province alone. This is perhaps best exemplified by the violent retaking of Fallujah and the Haditha incident (What Happened in Haditha? 2008).

The situation changed towards the end of 2006 when US military commanders harnessed the shifting alliances of Sunni tribes that had independently begun to defect from the insurgency (McCary 2009). This “Sunni Awakening” saw local Sunnis assume responsibility for security in their community. US forces officially supported the Awakening in September 2006 with the establishment of the Anbar Awakening Council (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012: 19-20; McCary 2009; Montgomery and McWilliams 2009). In 2007, the US established the Sons of Iraq program to institutionalize these Sunni militias. With US support the “Sons” expanded rapidly, involving over 100,000 militias at its peak. By 2008 more than two-thirds of Iraqi provinces contained Sons of Iraq, each “Son” receiving $300 monthly as salary for their services (Bruno 2008; SIGIR 2011).

Information from the “awakened” militias allowed Coalition forces to effectively focus their military firepower on insurgents, reducing civilian fatalities and increasing the

---

22 Originally titled the “Concerned Local Citizens” – reflecting its local defense orientation.
effectiveness of the 2007 US troop surge (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012; Clayton and Thomson 2014: 929; Macdonald 2014: 212-214). Figure I depicts the effect of the militias using the number of incidents a month in which the Coalition forces killed at least one civilian in Anbar province. The problems associated with insurgent identification are evident in the early phases of the counterinsurgency. From January 2005 until the formation of the Awakening Council in September 2006 (represented by the dashed vertical line) each month produced on average 12 incidents and 32 civilian deaths. While there were cases of side-switching during this time, the US military did not capitalize on information gains through these groups until the formation of the Awakening Council. By the second half of 2007, incidents were down by 50% and civilian deaths were reduced to an average of 4 a month.

![Figure 1: Incidents with a Civilian Death Perpetrated by US-Led Coalition Forces](image)

Figure 1: Incidents with a Civilian Death Perpetrated by US-Led Coalition Forces
Whilst violence against civilians declined, the Coalition’s ability to target insurgents increased. The Iraq war logs (released on Wikileaks) reveal that insurgent kills rose to an average of 200 a month in the period following the Awakening.\textsuperscript{23} According to official military figures, the combination of the Awakening and the subsequent surge led to a 25% rise in insurgents killed from 2006 to 2007 (Cordesman and Davies 2008; 525-526). Moreover, anecdotal evidence contained in military reports details how Sunni tribal militias gathered intelligence to aid the US military in more selectively targeting insurgents (Ahmed 2008: 7; Koloski and Kolasheki 2009: 41-53; Smith and Macfarland 2008). According to a US military report, “Local citizens knew most of the members of their communities and could easily pick out those who did not belong. They knew which neighbors were tacit or active supporters of insurgent groups. They knew who could provide timely and accurate information on insurgent activity, and they gave the squadron commander vital human intelligence essential to success” (Koloski and Kolasheki 2009: 41-53). The Sons denounced enemies and rid the areas of foreign fighters (i.e. Al-Qaeda), but also provided “a great deal of intelligence on members of insurgent groups, many of whom were members of their tribes” (Ahmed 2008: 7). For example, the number of insurgent weapons caches Coalition forces found in Anbar province went from 692 in 2004 to 1,222 in 2006 and then up to 2,111 between January and September 2007 (Cordesman and Davies 2008: 522).

\textit{Civilianizing the Iraq War}

\textsuperscript{23} The only period in which insurgent kills were higher in Anbar province was the battle for Fallujah in November/December 2004. See, the Iraq War Logs 2010.
The formation of civilian defense groups also affected the targets of insurgent violence. According to military accounts, insurgents responded to the civilian defense forces by targeting tribal leaders and civilians who had made the switch (as well as those who were contemplating it) in attempts to punish them for their abdication and deter future defections (Finer and Nickmeyer 2005; Long 2008; Smith and Macfarland 2008: 49).

This is supported by evidence on the number of insurgent attacks that produced at least one civilian death. As Figure II shows, this trend began during 2005 as Sunni tribes started to defect from the insurgency (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012: 19-20; McCary 2009; Montgomery and McWilliams 2009). Insurgent attacks peaked in the month in which local tribal groups formed the Awakening council. Insurgent attacks continued in high numbers for the following year as numerous tribes realigned against their former allies. During the year that followed the Sunni Awakening, 195 insurgent attacks produced 637 civilian deaths. This was the most deadly year for civilians in Anbar province.

US Major Smith and Colonel Macfarland describe how members of the insurgency “attempted to intimidate future recruits by murdering and desecrating the body of a local sheik who had been instrumental in our early push at recruiting tribe members into the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces]” (Smith and Macfarland 2008: 49). The remaining insurgent blocks targeted tribes who had made the switch, as well as those who were contemplating it, to condemn their abdication and deter future defections (Finer and Nickmeyer 2005; Macfarland 2008: 48-50; Smith and; Long 2008; ). Indeed, insurgents assassinated Sheik Sattar Al-Rishawi, one of the progenitors of the Sunni awakening and the Sons of Iraq program, in 2007. Many Sons of Iraq members and those civilians who played a role in the Sunni awakening became victims of insurgent retribution.
Conflict Intensification

As an aggregate effect, the emergence of Sunni militias increased violence overall. Evidence from the Iraq war logs illustrates the severity of the violence in this period. The total fatalities (e.g. coalition, civilian, and insurgent) grew quickly with the formation of Sunni militia, increasing the average fatalities from 162 a month at the start of 2005, to an average of 289 in the six months following the Awakening. As we already discussed, the enhanced Coalition targeting of insurgents coupled with increased rebel violence towards civilians intensified the conflict. In addition, interviews of Sunni civilians, militias and former insurgents point to the important role that insurgent fragmentation played in this process (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009: 66 and 91). The Awakening split the
insurgency and those supporting it, pitting “flipped” tribal militias against foreign al-Qaeda elements and often members of their own tribes who still sympathized with or were active in the insurgency. For example, one Iraqi interviewee (as cited in Montgomery and McWilliams 2009: 102) related that “Some people from al-Qaeda changed their faces. They are in the Awakening now. They didn’t join us because they believe we are good, but to protect themselves. They saw who’s winning, so they were with the Awakening. But when al-Qaeda was in, they were with al-Qaeda.” Colonel Macfarland (as cited in Montgomery and McWilliams 2009: 178) described this process: “One by one, the local tribes are beginning to flip from either hostile to neutral or neutral to friendly.”

As this process unfolded, infighting ensued. For example, one Sheikh described how at one point not all members of his tribe had defected from the insurgency, and this produced infighting within his own tribe as well as with al-Qaeda (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009: 81). He further described how both sides sought to punish defection in this period (Montgomery and McWilliams 2009: 91-94). The formation of the Awakening Council was a “tipping point” in this regard: “Soon after the council ended, tribes began an independent campaign of eradication and retaliation against [al-Qaeda] members living among them” (Smith and Macfarland 2008: 49).

In summary, the “awakened” militias and Sons of Iraq were effective in locating insurgents. This helped the US military to effectively target insurgents, and reduced civilian fatalities. However, the militias provoked a response from insurgents, who retaliated against local communities in an attempt to punish defection and regain control. The Sunni realignment also caused defections and fragmentation within the insurgency, and drove a
wedge between the local populations and the insurgents, intensifying the civil conflict but eventually choking the latter out of the area.

Conclusions

In this paper we argue that civilian defense forces are a unique type of pro-government militia and that such groups have specific effects on patterns of violence in civil war. We provide evidence to show that civilian defense forces decrease incumbents’ use of indiscriminate violence, but increase insurgent violence. We also demonstrate that by making civilians the center of the irregular war effort, civilian defense forces increase the overall fatalities in civil conflicts (at least in the short-run). This underscores the significance of civilian support and control in determining the type and level of violence in civil war (Kalyvas 2006). Specifically, in accordance with existing research on one-sided violence against civilians, we find further evidence that actors tend to resort to indiscriminate violence where their level of control is weak (Downes 2008; Eck and Hultman 2007; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Linsay 2004; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2010; Zahar 2000).

This paper contributes to the emerging body of literature centered on the effects of pro-government militias (Ahram 2011; Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2011, 2015; Peic 2014; Stanton 2015). We offer one of the first systematic investigations into the effects that militias have on the dynamics of civil conflict. In doing so, we also develop further insight into different types of pro-government militias and why and how states make use of these differences. More generally, our arguments have implications for the understanding of insurgent group fragmentation (Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012; Driscoll 2012; Staniland 2014). While previous research stresses ethnic
divisions (Lyall 2010; Staniland 2012), we highlight the importance of civilian support (passive and active) to insurgents in explaining insurgent in-fighting.

Finally, from a policy-making stand point this paper supports the established view that civilians in counterinsurgent roles can provide an effective strategy to separate the insurgents from the local population (Galula 1964; Jones 2012; McClintock 1992; Peic 2014). However, it opens significant normative questions given the effects that it is predicted to have on the dynamics and intensity of violence. From a more critical perspective, civilian defense forces are tantamount to a divide-and-rule- tactic, whereupon the delegation of security and coercion of civilians polarizes local relationships by forcing insurgents to respond to those that are now actively against them. Indeed, developing states often use civilian cleavages in this way to mute resistance to processes of state formation (Ahram 2011; Bakke 2015; Holden 2004; Thomson 1994; Tilly 2003). Similarly, conquering powers have traditionally used local collaborators in this manner within broader social networks of domination, often to the detriment of local populations (Macdonald 2014). Our findings therefore inform military debates on the effectiveness of civilian defense forces (Jones 2012), and provide evidence to show that incumbent forces that wish to use such tactics in the future should consider the serious ethical issues involved in placing civilians at the center of violence.

This is part of an interesting and understudied set of dynamics in the logic of violence in irregular wars. While we have revealed some significant insights into the effects of civilian mobilization into militia groups, further research is required to assess the effect of other types of militia groups.
References


*Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability* edited by Bruce B. 

Links to Militias and Accountability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* April (Online first): 
1-21.


Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-Government Militias. *Journal of Peace 
Research* 50(2) March: 249-58.


Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min. (2010) Why do ethnic groups rebel? 

Clayton, Govinda and Andrew Thomson. (2014) The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend… 
the Dynamics of Self Defense Forces in Irregular War: The Case of the Sons of Iraq. 
*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37(11): 920-935.


