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Understanding the Developmental Decline in Helpful Bystander Responses to Bullying: The Role of Group Processes and Social-Moral Reasoning

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Abstract

Within this thesis the challenge of reducing bullying among children and adolescents in schools is reviewed (Chapter 2). The focus of this research was to examine the developmental decline in prosocial bystander responses to bullying (when a “bystander” is an individual who witnesses the bullying incident). To do so, a “developmental intergroup approach” (cf. Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Rutland, Killen & Abrams, 2010) was applied to the context of bystander intentions. This approach suggests that intergroup factors such as group membership and identification, group norms, intergroup status and social-moral reasoning influence attitudes and behaviours during childhood and adolescence (e.g., Abrams, Rutland & Cameron, 2003; Rutland & Killen, 2011; Chapter 3). The present research examines whether this approach could shed light on why, with age, children become less likely to report helpful bystander intentions when faced with bullying and aggression among peers (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006).

Three studies were conducted, following an experimental questionnaire-based design (e.g., Abrams, Palmer, Rutland, Cameron & Van de Vyver, 2013; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Chapter 4). Study 1 (Chapter 5) showed support for examining group membership and group identification, group norms and social-moral reasoning) when understanding the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses. Two hundred and sixty 8-10 year olds and 13-15 year olds read about an incident of intergroup verbal aggression. Adolescent bystander intentions were influenced by norms and perceived severity of the incident. A significant moderated mediation analysis showed that the level of group identification among participants partially mediated the relationship between age and helpful bystander intentions, but only when the aggressor was an outgroup member and the victim was an ingroup member. Moral (e.g., “It’s not right to call them names”) and psychological (e.g., “It’s none of my business) reasoning differed by age and intention to help the victim or not.
In Study 2 (Chapter 6) the role of intergroup bystander status and type of bystander response was manipulated. Two types of bystander norm (attitudinal and behavioural) were measured along with an exploratory examination of perceived leadership. Participants (N=221) read about an incident of verbal aggression where a bystander (who belonged to a high- or low-status group), either helped or walked away from an incident of verbal aggression. Helping bystanders were viewed more positively than those who walked away, but no effect of status on bystander evaluations was observed. However, moral reasoning was prioritised for high-status compared to low-status bystanders, regardless of their bystander behaviour. Additionally, bystander response (but not status) moderated the relationship between the behavioural norm and perceived leadership qualities.

To further examine the role of norms a norm for helping versus not getting involved was manipulated in Study 3 (Chapter 7). Participants (N=230) read about deviant ingroup and outgroup bystanders who observed an incident of intergroup verbal aggression. Group membership was either school group or ethnicity (ingroup British and outgroup Travellers). Not only were participants sensitive to the group membership of the bystander, but they evaluated those who transgressed a helping norm more negatively than those who transgressed a norm not to get involved. Importantly this study also showed, for the first time, that children and adolescents are aware of group-based repercussions (e.g., social exclusion) if they do not behave in line with group norms.

The studies presented within this thesis show strong support for considering group processes when examining the developmental decline in bystander responses to bullying and aggression and developing age-appropriate anti-bullying interventions. Further implications for theory, practitioners, policy and future research are discussed (see Chapter 8).
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Chapter 1

General Introduction

Within this general introduction the issue of bullying among children and adolescents in schools is briefly introduced, and the important role that “prosocial” bystanders can play in reducing bullying incidents is highlighted. Importantly, a developmental decline in prosocial bystander responses has been shown in previous research, yet little is known about why this might be. The need for an intergroup approach to understand this developmental decrease in helpful bystander responses is described. The aim of this thesis is to further understand the developmental decline in prosocial bystander intervention by adopting an intergroup perspective. This involves examining whether the developmental decline is driven by predictors derived from social developmental psychological theory. Summaries of theoretical and empirical chapters are presented, along with key findings.

Bullying and Aggression

School-based bullying and aggression is a problem that occurs worldwide (Smith & Shu, 2000), with numerous detrimental effects being present for those who experience it as well as those who witness it (Rivers, Poteat, Noret & Ashurst, 2009). Experiencing and witnessing bullying has a negative impact on an individual’s well-being, learning, and the school community (Nansel et al., 2001; Nishina & Juvonen, 2005). Reducing bullying is therefore a pertinent issue for those who experience it as well as the wider peer group and school environment. Examining the prevalence and reduction of bullying in primary and secondary schools has been a focus of psychology research for decades (for a review, see Hawker & Boulton, 2000). However bullying is still a major problem across schools internationally (Smith, Cowie, Olafsson & Liefooghe, 2002), suggesting that a new approach is required to help further our understanding of how best to tackle this issue (see Chapter 2 for a review).
Bystanders

In recent years, researchers have moved away from the traditional focus on the bully and victim, and towards the role of the “bystander”; an individual who is neither the bully nor victim, but a witness to the bullying incident (Atlas & Pepler, 1998; Salmivalli, 2010). Early research on the roles of child and adolescent bystanders faced with bullying episodes at school suggests that bystanders engage in numerous responses to bullying, including helping or “defending” the victim (Salmivalli, Lagerspetz, Bjorkqvist, Osterman & Kaukiainen, 1996; see Chapter 2 for a review). More recently, researchers have suggested that encouraging bystanders to help peers could lead to an overall reduction in school-based bullying such as name-calling (Aboud & Joong, 2008). Indeed, children and adolescents typically report disapproval of bullying. Yet research shows that bystanders are unlikely to help the victim, and this lack of helpful intervention becomes increasingly likely with age (Rigby & Johnson, 2006). The research presented within this thesis builds on this relatively new field of research, and takes a new direction, by applying an intergroup approach to understanding the role of peer bystanders.

The relatively well-established developmental decline in helpful bystander responses is a key focus of the present thesis. As helpful bystander behaviour can help challenge and prevent bullying behaviours among peers (Aboud & Joong, 2008) it is vital to understand when and why children and adolescents defend bullied peers. Determining the developmental changes or contextual characteristics that drive this age trend could shed light on the conditions necessary for helpful behaviour among different age groups. This has consequent implications for psychological research, as well as for the creation and effectiveness of anti-bullying programmes for children of different ages.
An Intergroup Approach

Until recently, anti-bullying research took an interpersonal approach (e.g., by examining personal characteristics of the bully or the victim) to understand how bullying might be tackled (e.g., Olweus, 1993). However, it is now widely acknowledged that peers are an important part of bullying episodes (Salmivalli et al., 1996). As such, group-level variables such as anti-bullying attitudes and classroom expectations (Salmivalli & Voeten, 2004) are increasingly explored, showing that children and adolescents draw from social cues to inform their bystander behaviour (see Chapter 2 for a review). Yet, this research does not specifically shed light on why, from childhood into adolescence, a decrease in prosocial bystander responses to bullying episodes is observed. However, predictions could be made regarding this developmental decline based on existing intergroup and social identity theories of child development (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Duffy & Nesdale, 2012).

Therefore the present thesis takes a novel intergroup approach to examine factors that influence the developmental decline in bystander helping. To do so, three theoretical frameworks are drawn upon: social identity development theory (SIDT; Nesdale, 2004; 2008), the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD; Abrams, Rutland & Cameron, 2003) and social-moral reasoning from a Social Domain Theory (SDT) perspective (Killen, 2007). These three frameworks stem from social identity traditions (Tajfel & Turner, 2004) and can be considered as complementary to each other (Rutland, Killen & Abrams, 2010; Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Nesdale, Killen & Duffy, 2013; see Chapter 3 for a review).

Based on these frameworks it is hypothesised that group membership (e.g., of the aggressor, victim or bystander), group norms (i.e., group expectations for attitudes and
behaviours), and group status (e.g., the relative social standing of different bystander groups) will influence age differences in helpful bystander responses. Additionally, these intergroup considerations will influence the way in which children’s bystander responses are justified (their “social-moral reasoning”). Studies have shown that, with age, children become more aware of these intergroup processes, which consequently affect their attitudes and behaviours towards peers in social contexts (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams, Palmer, Rutland, Cameron & Van de Vyver, 2013; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams and Killen, 2014). However, this approach has not yet been applied to the investigation of age trends in bystander responses to bullying.

**Verbal Aggression**

In the present investigation, the intergroup approach is applied to the examination of intergroup verbal aggression, or “name-calling”. This behaviour involves, for example, nasty names being targeted by one group member towards a member from another group (e.g., Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). Specifically, the studies presented examine the effect of various intergroup factors on the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses to intergroup verbal aggression. Verbal aggression is selected as the focal bullying behaviour operationalised in the studies presented in this thesis for a number of reasons. First, it is the most frequently experienced form of bullying (Smith & Shu, 2000; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). Second, it can be considered a difficult form of bullying for authority figures to detect and can therefore be considered a behaviour that could particularly benefit from bystander intervention (see Chapter 2 for more detail). Third, researchers highlight the importance for examining bullying-specific behaviours to increase reliability and validity of findings (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006; see Chapter 4 for a review of measures).

**Aims of the Thesis**
The aim of this thesis is to draw on intergroup theory in order to further understand the developmental decline in prosocial bystander responses to verbal aggression. This involves testing how group membership, social identification, group norms, intergroup status and social-moral reasoning influence children and adolescents’ bystander responses differently (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Nesdale, 2008). Examining developmental differences in bystander responses from an intergroup perspective is important for three key reasons: 1) it will further develop researchers’ understanding of when and why children and adolescents respond prosocially to an incident of bullying; (2) it will have important theoretical implications: the research will test predictions derived from the stated social developmental theories in a new domain, thus developing the application of these theories; (3) it will have practical implications, as the findings will highlight conditions that foster helpful bystander behaviour. This information will be useful for policy-makers, educators and practitioners when designing and implementing effective anti-bullying strategies.

Three studies, conducted with participants from two age groups, form the basis of the empirical chapters presented within this thesis. Each empirical study experimentally tests the effect of one or more intergroup variables on the likelihood of reporting prosocial bystander responses to an incident of verbal aggression. Specifically, how these variables influence younger and older participants’ responses differently is examined (see Chapter 4 for methodological considerations).

Thesis Overview

Chapter 2 introduces the issue of bullying, highlights the importance of tackling bullying and the relevance of examining bystander responses in order to do so. The prevalence of different forms of bullying, and the implications of bullying for children and adolescents’ well-being, is outlined. A review of the role of bystanders during bullying
episodes in schools is presented. Age and gender differences in bystander responses are presented. Following this, individual characteristics and “group-level” factors that have been shown to influence bystander behaviours are reviewed; showing the relevance of examining group-level influences on children’s bystander behaviour. This chapter concludes that a new approach is required in order to fully understand the developmental decline in prosocial bystander responses to incidents of bullying.

Chapter 3 introduces the developmental intergroup approach and its relevance for the study of developmental differences in bystander responses. Three theoretical frameworks are presented: social identity development theory (SIDT; Nesdale, 2008), the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD; Abrams et al., 2003), and social-moral reasoning from a social domain theory (SDT) perspective (Killen, 2007; Turiel, 1983). A review of each theory is presented, showing the relevance of each for understanding developmental differences in children’s interpretations and evaluations of social interactions. Moreover, this chapter reviews how these theories are complementary; applying them in concert can strengthen hypotheses. Predictions drawn from these theories are applied to the present context of developmental differences in bystander responses to bullying.

Chapter 4 presents methodological considerations for examining bystander responses among children and adolescents during bullying episodes. The strengths and weaknesses of key bystander intervention measures are reviewed, including: observational (Craig & Pepler, 1997); self-report (Gini, 2006; Jones, Manstead & Livingstone, 2009; Rigby & Johnson, 2006); peer-nomination (Salmivalli et al, 1996; Sutton & Smith, 1999); and mixed methods (Monks, Smith & Swettenham, 2003). The usefulness and relevance of employing an experimental design to examine the effect of intergroup factors on the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses is shown. This review concludes as to the most appropriate methodological design and measures of bystander response for use in the present studies.
Chapter 5 presents Study 1. This study presents an initial examination of the role of intergroup factors on the developmental decline in prosocial bystander intentions. Participants (N=260) aged 8-10 and 13-15 indicated their bystander responses to an incident of intergroup verbal aggression. Group membership is experimentally controlled so that the participant either reads about an ingroup aggressor and an outgroup victim, or an outgroup aggressor and ingroup victim. Social identification and group norms for bystander behaviour are also measured. Results show that a developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions exists. This age trend is moderated by the perceived group norm; when older participants think there is a stronger norm for helpful bystander intervention, their helpful bystander intentions also increase. A moderated mediation analysis shows that social identification mediates the relationship between age and prosocial bystander intentions, but only when the victim is an ingroup member. Age differences in social-moral reasoning are also observed, showing that younger participants focus on moral concerns when justifying their bystander response (e.g., She is being really horrible; it’s not nice for that person to be called names); and older participants focussed on psychological concerns (e.g., It’s none of my business).

Chapter 6 presents Study 2. Within this study, intergroup status is experimentally controlled to examine the effect of high and low status group memberships on developmental differences in evaluations of peer bystanders. Participants (N=221) aged 9-10 and 13-14 read about a low-status group of friends and a high-status group of friends. A verbal aggression scenario was presented where a bystander (from the low- or high- status group) either helped or walked away from the bullying episode. Building on Study 1, participants’ evaluations of peer bystander behaviours are reported in addition to participants’ own bystander intentions. Two types of group norm and leadership qualities are also measured. Prosocial bystander behaviour was rated most positively, but this did not differ according to the intergroup status of the bystander or across age groups. However, social-moral reasoning showed that
participants were more likely to focus on moral reasons when evaluating the high-status bystander, suggesting that status brings a sense of moral obligation. An examination of norms showed that older children were less likely to report that peers would help victims compared to younger children. Older children also saw actual behavioural intervention as less likely than non-intervention. Behavioural norms were also important for perceptions of leadership.

When the bystander did not help, if this behaviour is perceived normatively, then the bystander is seen to hold more leadership qualities compared to when it is not seen as normative.

Chapter 7 presents Study 3. Building on the important role of norms observed in Study 1 and 2, a controlled examination of the role of peer-group norms for bystander behaviour was conducted. Participants (N=230) from two age groups (8-11 or 12-14 years old) are shown a group of ingroup members and a group of outgroup members. The ingroup norm is manipulated to be either a helping norm, or a non-helping norm. The group context is also varied so that the group memberships of bystanders is either ingroup and outgroup school or ingroup British and outgroup Travellers. Participants were asked to evaluate a bystander from the ingroup and another from the outgroup who deviated from (i.e., go against) their respective group norms. For the first time, expectations regarding group-based repercussions for deviant bystander behaviours are investigated. Participants’ reasoning about their evaluations of ingroup and outgroup bystanders, as well as the acceptability of group-based repercussions for deviant bystanders, is also examined. Findings showed that the group norm affected participants’ evaluations of ingroup and outgroup bystanders; transgressing a helping norm was viewed more negatively than transgressing a norm not to help.

Furthermore, it was seen as more acceptable for the group to exclude a bystander who transgressed the norm to help. Findings also suggested that group-based repercussions for deviant ingroup bystanders are relatively more OK than those for outgroup deviant
bystanders. An effect of the group context was also shown, both across evaluations and social-moral reasoning, thus demonstrating the importance of examining bystander intervention when different group memberships are relevant.

Chapter 8 summarises the findings of this thesis in relation to the thesis aims and prior research. The theoretical and practical implications are explored. Limitations and directions for future research are also highlighted. It is concluded that the intergroup approach to the study of bystander intervention is valuable and makes an important contribution to our understanding of the developmental decline in prosocial bystander intentions among young people.
Chapter 2

Tackling Bullying in Schools: The Role of Bystanders

Bullying and aggression in schools is a widespread, international concern that has numerous short and long term negative consequences for young people (Smith, 1999). For decades researchers have examined children and adolescents' experiences of bullying in order to understand effective ways of reducing the problem. Early research focused on bullying as a dyadic relationship between the bully and victim, and interpersonal factors (e.g., personal characteristics of the bully or victim) were examined in order to understand how to reduce the experience of bullying and aggression in schools (Rubin, Bukowski & Parker, 2006). More recently, however, researchers have highlighted the important role of the peer group during bullying incidents (Gini, 2006; Salmivalli, 2010). Observational studies demonstrate that peers are present during the majority of bullying incidents, and that when "bystanders" defend the victim they can help reduce or halt the bully's actions (Pepler & Craig, 1995). Within this chapter, research on the prevalence of school-based bullying and aggression in schools is presented, and the role of peer bystanders during bullying episodes is reviewed. Furthermore, an examination of research that shows how peer bystanders could be instrumental in reducing bullying behaviour among peers is presented. Finally, a summary outlines the type of bullying and bystander behaviour of concern for the current research thesis.

Bullying and Aggression in Schools

Bullying in schools is considered an international problem which has increasingly received attention from academic researchers over the past few decades (Carrera, DePalma & Lameiras, 2011; Smith et al, 2002). Also referred to as aggressive behaviour and peer victimization (e.g., Duffy & Nesdale, 2012; Hawker & Boulton, 2000), “bullying” has been assigned numerous definitions; but it is typically agreed upon that "bullying" is an intentional and repeated aggressive behaviour that is targeted at an individual "victim" who is not easily
able to defend themselves (Espelage & Swearer, 2003; Smith, 2004) (refer to Chapter 4 for a thorough review of "bullying" definitions).

The prevalence of bullying in schools is difficult to determine as definitions and measures of bullying are variable across studies (Rigby & Bortolozzo, 2013; refer to Chapter 4 for a review). Yet, a consensus among researchers suggests that bullying and aggression is a frequent occurrence among all school aged children and adolescents. Data collected across different countries suggests that approximately one third of schoolchildren are victims of bullying (Rivers et al, 2009; Smith, 1999), and almost three in four children witness bullying at school (Rivers et al, 2009; Salmivalli et al., 1996). Moreover, frequency rates vary according to the type of bullying or aggressive act. One study conducted in the USA asked participants to report their experience of being bullied or bullying in the past 2 months: 20.8% were involved in physical bullying (i.e., hitting, pushing, kicking), 53.6% in verbal bullying (i.e., name-calling, teasing), 51.4% in relational bullying (i.e., social exclusion and spreading rumours), and 13.6% in cyberbullying (Wang, Iannotti & Nansel, 2009). Additional studies suggest that verbal bullying is the most common form of bullying experienced, closely followed by relational bullying (i.e., social exclusion, gossip and spreading rumours) (Scheithauer, Hayer, Petermann & Jugert, 2006; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). One study conducted in the UK showed that name-calling at school was experienced by 75% of victims (Smith & Shu, 2000).

Not only is bullying a prevalent issue, but the negative impact on young people is well-documented. Bullying can lead to short and long term physical and psychological negative consequences for those who directly experience it, as well as others around them (Nansel et al., 2001; Nishina & Juvonen, 2005; Rivers, 2012; Smith, 1999). For example, “victims” can experience reduced self-esteem, depression, anxiety, loneliness and social withdrawal. Bullying also impacts on educational experiences, as well as contributing to
other physical, psychological, and psychosocial maladjustments (Cappadocia, Pepler, Cummings & Craig, 2012; Hawker & Boulton, 2000). In extreme cases, experiencing bullying or victimization can result in suicide (Rigby & Slee, 1999).

Research has also shown that those who engage in bullying behaviour are increasingly likely to experience psychiatric problems, difficulties maintaining relationships, and are also more likely to develop substance abuse problems (Cook, Williams, Guerra, Kim & Sadek, 2010). Recently, those identified as being vulnerable to the negative impact of bullying has broadened to include those young people who merely witness bullying among peers, despite not being directly involved in the bullying incident. These individuals are often referred to as “bystanders” (Salmivalli, 2010). The effect of bullying on bystanders has shown to be partially dependent on their age and a result of how they respond to the bullying scenario; negative consequences include fearfulness, anxiety, feeling helpless, social withdrawal, guilt, and impairments to concentration and learning ability (Rivers, 2012).

Given the evidence concerning the numerous negative consequences for those children and adolescents involved in bullying incidents, both directly and indirectly, it is perhaps unsurprising that bullying has received so much attention from researchers. Thirty years of research focused on understanding bullying suggest that it is an international problem and further research is required to determine how best to tackle this issue in schools (Frisen, Jonsson & Persson, 2007; Nansel et al., 2001). The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to identify key factors that ultimately contribute to the reduction of bullying in schools, specifically via bystanders to bullying.

Previously, research efforts to tackle bullying have concentrated on identifying interpersonal factors that could lead to a reduction in bullying. That is, researchers have focused on the personalities of bullies and victims, and the dyadic relationship between them,
by examining the motivations behind bullying behaviours and the reactions of victims (e.g., Frisen et al., 2007; O’Brien, 2011; Veenstra et al., 2007; Watson, Fischer, Andreas & Smith, 2004). For example, Olweus (1993) showed that boys who bully have an aggressive personality style, whereas boys who are victimized are physically weak, timid and anxious. Although the findings of this research are valuable, researchers now acknowledge the necessity of widening our understanding of bullying by moving away from the bully, victim, and bully-victim dyad approach. Instead, there is a call for research to acknowledge the diversity of experiences held by young people (e.g., as bullies, victims, bully-victims, bystanders, etc.). This will further researchers’ understanding of bullying in schools (Espelage & Swearer, 2003; Salmivalli et al., 1996) and feed into whole-school interventions to tackle bullying.

In recent years researchers have adopted a “group” approach to bullying and returned to the concept that bullying is a process that involves the wider peer group, suggesting that the presence of the peer group during bullying incidents must also be considered as part of anti-bullying efforts (Espelage & Swearer, 2003; Gini, 2006; Long & Pellegrini, 2003; Olweus, 1978; Pikas, 1975; Rodkin & Hodges, 2003; Salmivalli, 2010). Atlas and Pepler (1998) suggested four key points for consideration in order to understand the process of bullying: (1) individual differences of the bully and the victim, (2) the bully-victim dyad and the interactive processes between them, (3) the presence of others, namely peers and teachers, and (4) the social context of the bullying episode. By acknowledging that bullying and aggression towards others typically involves more than the aggressor and victim alone, anti-bullying research has expanded its focus from the dyadic relationship between the bully and victim to incorporate the wider peer group and social ecology when trying to understand how bullying among children can be prevented (e.g., Gini, 2006; Salmivalli, 2010). With this revised focus in mind, research increasingly considers the role of peers who are present.
during a bullying incident but who are not directly involved (i.e., they are not the bully or the victim, but a witness) and are most commonly referred to as “bystanders” (Salmivalli et al., 1996). Importantly for the present thesis, researchers have suggested that bystanders are key to anti-bullying strategies, and have the potential to cease bullying incidents (e.g., Atlas & Pepler, 1998), and even prevent them altogether (e.g., Aboud & Joong, 2008).

**Peer Bystanders: The Roles They Play**

Transcending the traditional view of a bystander typically “standing by” or being inactive when faced with an emergency (Latane & Darley, 1968; Rivers, 2012) research shows that bystanders during bullying incidents have the potential to respond in a number of ways (Salmivalli et al., 1996). With a focus on peers within the school classroom, Salmivalli et al (1996) developed the peer-report Participant Role Questionnaire (PRQ) as one of the first investigations of different behaviours peer bystanders may exhibit when faced with general bullying episodes among peers.

Participants indicated how each child in their class, including themselves, typically responded to bullying incidents. They were asked to consider bullying as a combination of negative, aggressive behaviours targeted towards a classmate. Fifty items that tapped into different types of bystander responses to a bullying incident were included within the PRQ, collectively forming 5 subscales describing distinct bystander responses. These included: Bully (i.e., active, leader-like bullying behaviour); Reinforcer of the bully (i.e., laughing, inciting, providing an audience for the bully); Assistant of the bully (i.e., active bullying in a “follower” manner); Defender of the victim (i.e., supportive, consoling, active efforts to stop bullying); and Outsider (i.e., doing nothing). Items within each bystander subscale achieved high reliabilities ($\alpha > .80$); in addition to those identified as bullies and victims, researchers were able to assign participant roles to 87% of participants. The most frequently identified roles were Outsider, Reinforcer and Defender. In addition, gender differences were observed,
showing that girls were more likely to be described as Defenders or Outsiders, and boys more likely to be described as Reinforcers or Assistants to the bully. Importantly, this study was one of the first to acknowledge the many different responses that bystanders may exhibit when faced with general bullying episodes, and offered an insight into how these bystander behaviours are perceived and valued by the classmates who nominated their peers into a bystander role.

Observational research in the classroom (Atlas & Pepler, 1998) and on the playground (O’Connell, Pepler & Craig, 1999; Pepler & Craig, 1995) has also shown how different bystander responses are exhibited during incidents of aggression and bullying. In one study, where 80 episodes of bullying were observed, Atlas and Pepler (1998) found that peers were present during 85% of bullying episodes in the classroom; 32% of the time peers actively participated in the bullying episode. The remainder of the time peers were present but not actively involved. Bystander intervention was coded as socially appropriate (i.e., helping the victim, reporting the bullying to a member of staff, directly asking the bully to stop, speaking directly to the victim) or socially inappropriate (i.e., threatening or physically assaulting the bully). Observations showed that peers were present during 51 out of 60 bullying episodes recorded, but intervened to stop the bullying during only 14% of the episodes. Thus, in addition to corroborating the variation in bystander responses found by Salmivalli et al (1996), Atlas and Pepler (1998) also demonstrated the lack of helpful bystander responses exhibited by children in this study.

A separate observational study examined children’s bystander responses on the playground. O’Connell et al (1999) observed the bystander responses of five to twelve year old children, identifying when a peer joined in with the bully actively (physically or verbally abusing the victim), passively (looks on for more than 5 seconds but not intervening; or leaves) or when they intervened to support the victim (in a verbal or physical way to distract
the bully). “Active” bystanders were present 20.7% of the time; “passive” bystanders were present 53.9% of the time; and bystander intervention occurred 25.4% of the time. One interpretation the authors gave for the high proportion of “active” bystander behaviour (i.e., supporting the bully) is that peers may view the bully as a higher status individual within the peer group and therefore bystanders may see the bullying episode as an opportunistic means of increasing their own social standing by reinforcing the bully’s actions. Interestingly, O’Connell et al (1999) also identified a developmental trend for older children to spend more time reinforcing the bully, a finding which supports earlier research (Rigby & Slee, 1992).

Early research on bystander roles therefore shows variation in bystander behaviour, illustrating that a bystander does not always “stand by” (Rivers, 2012). Indeed, researchers have identified a number of bystander roles, thus providing support for the importance of examining the role of the wider peer group during bullying incidents (Salmivalli, 2010). Importantly, this early research shows that bystanders do not always support or “defend” the victim of bullying. However, when they do help bystanders can be very effective at reducing the bullying (e.g., Aboud & Joong, 2008; Pepler & Craig, 1995). Subsequently, researchers have suggested that increasing the number of prosocial bystanders would help to create a school norm for helpful bystander intervention, and consequently reduce incidents of bullying (Aboud & Joong, 2008). These findings suggest that it is important to investigate underlying factors that influence the likelihood of helpful bystander intervention when faced with an incident of bullying. The studies presented within this thesis therefore focus on identifying the predictors of helpful bystander responses in order to shed light on when bystanders can be effective at tackling bullying among school-aged peers.

Developmental Differences
A developmental decline in helpful bystander behaviour has been reported across studies (Menesini et al., 2007; Pepler & Craig, 1995; Rigby & Johnson, 2006). Typically studies show that, with age, helpful or “defender” bystander responses decline. One study, conducted by Rigby and Johnson (2006), investigated developmental differences in the types of bystander responses exhibited by children and adolescents. Participants included 200 students from primary schools and 200 students from secondary schools in Australia. In this study young people gave self-report bystander responses after they watched a video depicting bullying. They found that primary school students reported higher levels of intended bystander intervention in comparison to secondary school students. When reporting on their past interventions to help victims (on a 1-5 scale, where 1=never and 5=often), 13.7% of primary school students, compared to 7.7% of secondary school students, reported that they had often intervened. A similar pattern emerged for participants who reported that they had never intervened to help victims in the past, with 14.2% of primary school students indicating this, and 24.6% of secondary school students responding in this way.

Rigby and Johnson (2006) suggest these findings may be due to an increase in actual bullying behaviour as children transition into secondary school, alongside an increased awareness of the risk of being victimized. They also suggest that as children get older they may have a stronger sense that problems should be rectified by the bully and victim themselves - without the help of others - and that the ecological climate of secondary schools may be conducive to this assumption.

More recently, Trach, Hymel, Waterhouse and Neale (2010) conducted a cross-sectional review of 9397 students aged 9 to 18 who had reported witnessing bullying in order to determine age and gender differences in bystander responses. Participants were asked to indicate how frequently they engaged in a number of different bystander responses. Highly correlated items (Pearson’s r > .60) were combined and averaged into composite categories,
creating a total of 12 bystander response categories. These included: Talked to an adult; Helped the victim; Told the bully to stop; Talked to the bully’s friends; Walked away; Ignored or avoided the person(s) who bullied; Did something to distract the person(s) who bullied; Got friends to help solve the problem; Got friends to get back at the person(s); Stayed home from school; Talked to another teen/youth about it; Did nothing.

Findings showed that there were age differences in 8 out of 12 bystander responses. Older students were less like to report that they “Told the bully to stop” or “Talked to an adult” compared to younger students. Older students were more likely to indicate that they “Walked away”, “Got friends to get back at the bully” and “Did nothing”, compared to younger students. There were no age differences in reports of “Talked to the bully’s friends”, “Ignored or avoided the bully”, “Distracted the bully” and “Stayed home from school”. This cross-sectional review of age differences supports earlier findings (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006), by showing that younger students are more willing to report positive, prosocial bystander responses in comparison to older students, who more likely indicate inactive or retaliatory responses.

Although only a few studies have examined age trends in bystander responses (see also, Trach, Hymel, Gregory & Waterhouse, 2011) they consistently support the notion that a developmental decline in helpful bystander responses exists. However, this research is limited in that it does not tell us why we might observe these differences and what variables might influence the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses. The studies presented within this thesis therefore extend existing research by focussing on the drivers of these developmental changes.

Gender Differences
Although gender differences are not a key focus of the present study – and research findings regarding gender differences in bystander behaviour is mixed – awareness of gender as a social group is an important aspect of children’s social development. Research continually shows the influence that gender has on children’s social interactions (Leman & Tenenbaum, 2011) and thus it is necessary and relevant to consider whether gender affects the bystander responses of children and adolescents.

Reported gender differences in bullying behaviour have followed the view that boys typically engage in more aggression and bullying than girls (Underwood & Rosen, 2011). However, it has been argued that these findings are in part due to a focus on physical aggression, which has in turn resulted in a reduced research focus on the role of girls during bullying incidents (Card, Stucky, Sawalani & Little, 2008). When reviewing different types of bullying incidents, Wang et al (2009) highlights that girls are increasingly viewed as more involved in relational (“indirect”) bullying than boys, and boys more involved in physically aggressive (“direct”) bullying than girls. However, gender differences in bullying are not always consistent across studies; one meta-analysis showed that although boys perpetrate more direct aggression, there are no gender differences regarding indirect aggression (Card et al., 2008). Considering these gender variations in bullying behaviour, it is possible that some gender variation may be present in bystander behaviour.

Some studies have shown that girls, in the position of the bystander, report higher “defender” and “outsider” behaviours and boys report higher “reinforcer” and “assistant of the bully” behaviours (Caravita, DiBlasio & Salmivalli, 2009; Salmivalli et al., 1996; Salmivalli & Voeten, 2004). Trach et al (2010) examined gender differences alongside age trends as part of their cross-sectional review of 9 to 18 year old bystanders. Gender differences were found to interact with age for six of the bystander responses; across all age groups, girls were more likely to report that they “Helped the victim”, “Got friends to help
solve the problem”, and “Talked to another teen/youth” than boys, suggesting that girls engage in more prosocial responses to bullying than boys. However the youngest boys (aged 9-11) were more likely to indicate that they “Distracted the bully” and “Ignored or avoided the bully” compared to girls and older boys; suggesting that girls and boys of different ages may engage in different bystander strategies in order to challenge the bully. However, younger boys were more likely to indicate that they “Did nothing”, compared to girls. Furthermore, reports of “Did nothing” among older students (aged 13-15) did not differ by gender. Trach et al’s (2010) results add to this mixture of gender findings by showing that boys and girls were equally likely to report inactive bystander responses, such as walking away or ignoring the bullying.

A further study has shown that children (aged 8 to 14) do not perceive that help from peers would differ by gender (Menesini et al., 1997) and self-reported behaviours also showed no gender differences within this study; although girls reported more empathy towards the victim this was not associated with increased bystander intervention (Menesini et al., 1997). Thus, findings for gender differences in bystander responses are inconsistent; possibly girls are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviour than boys, but this may be affected by age and could differ depending on the type of bullying the bystanders are faced with. Thus, gender of participants is recorded within the studies presented within this thesis in order to investigate whether the gender of bystanders has any influence on helpful bystander responses to an incident of bullying.

Predictors of Bystander Behaviour

Despite research showing a low likelihood of children and adolescents helping bullied peers (Atlas & Pepler, 1998; O’Connell et al, 1999), it is not necessarily the case that children and adolescents approve of bullying behaviour. Regardless of children’s overwhelmingly passive or “reinforcer” bystander responses, attitudes towards victims are generally positive
(Rigby & Bortolozzo, 2013) and children tend to approve of bystander intervention by peers (Menesini et al., 1997; Rigby & Slee, 1993). This suggests that although children might want to help bullied peers, there are a number of reasons why they might not.

Since the early research on bystander roles during bullying (e.g. Atlas & Pepler, 1998; Salmivalli et al., 1996), the role of bystanders has become well-established and researchers have turned their attention to trying to identify what predicts helpful bystander behaviour. This has resulted in research that brings together interpersonal factors (such as individual characteristics and motivations of bystanders) alongside environmental factors (such as expectations within the classroom) to examine when bystanders help bullied peers and when they do not (Cappadocia et al., 2012; Caravita, DiBlasio & Salmivalli, 2009; Gini, Albiero, Benelli & Altoe, 2008; Salmivalli & Voeten, 2004; Sutton, Smith & Swettenham, 1999).

For instance, recent research has examined the role of individual differences, empathy and self-efficacy, in predicting helpful bystander responses to bullying. Cappadocia et al (2012) recruited one hundred and eight 8-16 year old children attending summer camp. Participants indicated how often they had witnessed social, physical and verbal bullying in the past 3 weeks, and how they had responded to these incidents. Empathic concern regarding bullying and victimisation, social self-efficacy (competence and assertiveness during social situations) and attitudes towards the bully and the victim were all measured. Results showed that a higher level of social self-efficacy was associated with increased reports of bystander intervention among girls. Additionally, among boys, a higher rate of empathic concern for the victim was associated with higher reports of intervention; and boys with negative attitudes towards the bully were also more likely to intervene.

Gini et al (2008) showed similar findings, although these were not gender-specific. In Gini et al’s (2008) study high levels of empathy were positively related to bystander helping
and passive bystander behaviours, whereas social self-efficacy was positively associated with helping and negatively associated with standing by. These findings show important differences in bystander behaviour as a result of individual characteristics. The researchers suggest that training to improve empathy and self-efficacy could improve defender behaviour. However, these findings do not account for the potential impact of the wider peer group.

However, studies are increasingly examining group-level influences in addition to individual differences on bystander behaviour. One such study was conducted by Pozzoli and Gini (2010). They examined both individual differences (attitude towards the victim, feelings of responsibility when faced with bullying among peers, and coping strategies) and group-level effects (perceived peer pressure) on young adolescents’ helping and outsider (passive) bystander behaviours. In line with previously observed developmental trends, older participants were less likely to intervene to support the victim. Pro-victim attitudes were positively associated with defending behaviour and negatively associated with bystanders who did not get involved. Additionally, higher reports of personal responsibility were positively correlated with bystander helping, and lower reports of personal responsibility were associated with increased passivity, but coping strategies did not predict bystander responses. Furthermore, not only did they find that perceptions of peer pressure for intervention significantly predicted defending behaviour, but Pozzoli and Gini (2010) found that this variable predicted defending behaviour more strongly than the remaining individual difference variables. This shows that perceptions of peer pressure, and behaviour in line with peer expectations, are particularly important among this early-adolescent age group. These findings clearly highlight the importance of group-level considerations when examining predictors of bystander responses.
Another study that reinforces the value of examining environmental factors is that by Poyhonen, Juvonen and Salmivalli (2012). They showed that in addition to self-efficacy, outcome expectations (e.g., that it might decrease bullying; might make the victim feel better; might increase one’s social standing), and how much students valued these outcomes (“outcome values”), had differential effects on 9-11 year-old participants’ bystander roles.

Indeed, outcome expectations and outcome values both had stronger effects on bystander responses compared to self-efficacy. Results showed that defending behaviour was associated with positive outcome expectations coupled with high values for defending; expecting a positive outcome for the victim whilst simultaneously valuing that outcome was associated with more defending. Additionally participants indicated that if they thought their peer group status might be improved, they were also more likely to defend peers. However, the outcome value placed on status was not linked to defending; arguably as those students who are already seen as popular will not gain anything further from defending (Caravita et al., 2009; Poyhonen et al., 2012). These findings suggest, similarly to the results of Pozzoli and Gini (2010) that the expectations of the broader peer group influence the helpful responses of bystanders alongside individual factors.

Further developing the evidence for the effect that group-level factors can have on bystander responses, one study investigated classroom expectations. Salmivalli and Voeten (2004) investigated whether classroom –level influences (“shared standards about behaviours that are rewarded or sanctioned by the peers in the classroom”, p. 256) can encourage or prevent a bystander from engaging in helpful responses to peer bullying. In line with other research (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006), findings showed that defending behaviour decreased with age among 9 to 12 year old participants. With regard to classroom-level expectations regarding bullying behaviours, a low anti-bullying expectation in the classroom predicted the bystander role of reinforcing the bully. Age differences in classroom expectations were also
observed. These differences showed that older children’s classrooms held weaker anti-bullying expectations; suggesting that it was more acceptable to be involved in bullying behaviours, and less acceptable to engage in anti-bullying responses as you get older. This study highlights the importance of examining the effect of social factors on helpful bystander intervention in addition to the individual characteristics of helpful bystanders when trying to determine what makes a helpful bystander.

Overwhelmingly, research has either examined age differences in bystander behaviours (e.g., Rigby and Johnson, 2006; Trach et al., 2011) or predictors of prosocial bystander behaviour (e.g., Gini et al, 2008; Pozzoli & Gini, 2012; Salmivalli & Voeten, 2004). However no research has explicitly examined what causes the observed developmental decline in helpful bystander responses to incidents of bullying in schools. Therefore, the key focus of the present study is to identify what factors drive the age trend in helpful bystander responses to bullying, and why these differences are present between children and adolescents. As well as theoretical implications, the findings of this research will have practical implications also: identifying the specific factors that influence helpful bystander responses among children and adolescents could pinpoint how best to encourage helpful bystander intervention among different age groups. Potentially, these findings could lead to anti-bullying programmes that are tailor-made for different age groups; showing schools and practitioners how best to facilitate helpful bystander responses at different ages.

Summary

To date, anti-bullying research has shown that the wider peer group plays a key role during incidents of bullying and aggression in schools (Gini, 2006; Salmivalli, 2010). Furthermore, bystanders have the potential to engage in numerous responses when faced with bullying and aggression among peers (Salmivalli et al., 1996). When bystanders respond helpfully by supporting the victim of the bullying incident they can be incredibly successful
at halting and preventing the bullying incident (Aboud & Joong, 2008; Craig, 1993). Indeed, researchers believe that bystanders could play a vital role in setting an anti-bullying precedent among their peers by making bullying unacceptable (Aboud & Joong, 2008; Salmivalli, 2010). However, children and adolescents rarely intervene to support bullied peers (Atlas & Pepler, 1998), and this lack of intervention has been shown to increase with age (Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Salmivalli & Voeten, 2004). Therefore, in order to maximise the success of peer-driven anti-bullying strategies it is important to understand what promotes and inhibits prosocial bystander responses across childhood and into adolescence.

This chapter has outlined the detrimental and international issue of bullying in schools and introduced the beneficial role that helpful peer bystanders can play in reducing school-based bullying and aggression. A concerning developmental decline in helpful bystander responses has been highlighted, along with a review of research that has identified the influence of both individual differences and group-level processes on different bystander responses. Importantly, the lack of information regarding why a developmental decline in helpful bystander responses exists has been identified, and the question of what influences helpful bystander responses at different ages has been raised. The studies presented within this thesis directly examine this issue.

Implications for the Present Studies

The initial aims of the research presented in this thesis are (1) to further investigate the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses to bullying incidents, and (2) to identify the factors that influence this developmental decline. This research will therefore have both theoretical and practical implications, as the findings will inform practitioners how best to motivate students to help bullied peers.
Age range rationale. As previously highlighted within this chapter, the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses indicated in research to date has focussed on childhood through to adolescence. However, to the author’s knowledge, no research explicitly examines why this developmental decline exists, and what factors influence it. The age range of participants focussed upon within this thesis was selected based on existing research. Rigby and Johnson (2006) found age differences when comparing primary school students to secondary school students; Trach et al (2010) observed developmental variation among 9 to 18 year old participants; Salmivalli and Voeten (2004) reported a developmental decline in helpful bystander responses across 9 to 12 year olds. Moreover, researchers who do not examine age differences per se, but examine factors that influence prosocial bystander responses tend to examine either upper primary school aged participants (e.g., Poyhonen et al., 2012) or early adolescence (e.g., Gini et al., 2008). Thus, in line with existing research, the studies presented within this thesis focus on two distinct age ranges – older childhood (aged 8 to 11 years old) and early adolescence (aged 13 to 15 years old).

Verbal aggression rationale. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, bullying and aggression takes many forms (Hawker & Boulton, 2000). Moreover, children and adolescents may experience different forms of bullying more frequently than others (e.g., relational bullying and cyberbullying is more common among older children) (Rivers & Smith, 1994). Indeed, different forms of bullying might also encourage different bystander responses. Therefore it is important for interpretation of findings that a concrete example of bullying is provided that will not be open to subjective interpretation among participants (Carrera et al., 2011; see Chapter 4 for a broader overview of this issue).

Moreover, when examining age differences in children and adolescents’ responses to bullying it is important for the validity of the research that participants across the age range
are able to relate to the type of bullying they are presented with (see Chapter 4 for more detail on this issue). Consequently, the same scenario of a specific form of bullying (verbal aggression) will be employed across both age groups. Verbal aggression (e.g., nasty name-calling) is the most frequent form of bullying experienced by both children and adolescents (Scheithauer et al., 2006; Smith & Shu, 2000; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002), with one study conducted in the UK indicating that 3 out of 4 participants had experienced verbal bullying (Smith & Shu, 2000). Verbal aggression is not only one of the most frequent forms of bullying experienced, but it also has been shown to have hugely detrimental effects on those who experience it (e.g., Aboud & Joong, 2008; Smith & Shu, 2000; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). It is therefore important to examine how this form of bullying can be tackled. Verbal aggression is also easily perpetrated away from authoritative figures and is therefore difficult for teachers and practitioners to detect. Consequently, identifying ways in which helpful bystander behaviours might be promoted when faced with verbal aggression is especially beneficial for young people and their school communities.

**Theoretical framework.** The following chapter (Chapter 3) presents a novel, “intergroup” approach to examine the issue of young people’s bystander intervention in bullying scenarios. Specifically, three established social developmental theories are outlined and predictions based on these theories are applied to the current research questions: understanding the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses. This theoretical framework considers the importance of social group membership, social group identification (e.g., Nesdale, 2008), social group norms and social-moral reasoning (e.g., Rutland et al, 2010; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013) for developmental changes in children’s social interactions. Within Chapter 4, the methodological challenges of examining bullying, bystanders and the intergroup approach will be presented, culminating in a rationale for the methodological design employed within this thesis.
Chapter 3

A Developmental Intergroup Approach to Understanding Developmental Changes in Bystander Responses to Bullying

Past research has primarily examined interpersonal or "group" approaches when investigating how aggressive and bullying behaviour can be reduced in schools, either by focussing on the bully, victim or bystander (see Chapter 2 for a review). Although informative, these approaches neglect "intergroup" factors (e.g., the importance of social "ingroup" and "outgroup" memberships) and do not explicitly examine why developmental trends in bystander behaviour are observed. The present chapter highlights the relevance of exploring developmental differences in bystander intentions from an "intergroup" perspective. That is, one that considers the role of group membership, group norms, and social-moral reasoning (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013). Reviews of social-developmental research which takes an intergroup approach to understanding developmental differences in children’s attitudes and behaviours towards peers are presented. Specifically, this chapter reviews social identity development theory (SIDT; Duffy & Nesdale, 2012; Nesdale, 2008), the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD; Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams, et al., 2013), and social-moral reasoning from a social domain theory (SDT) perspective (Killen, 2007; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013). This chapter demonstrates how these complementary theoretical perspectives can be integrated to offer a new approach to understanding children and adolescents’ bystander responses to incidents of bullying and aggression. Specifically, the empirical and theoretical evidence from the aforementioned intergroup approaches will be outlined and applied to the context of bystander responses, in order to predict when and why a developmental decline in bystander helping intentions is observed.
Moving Forward: From an Interpersonal to an Intergroup Approach

Traditionally, research examining ways of reducing bullying and aggression among children and adolescents has focused on individual differences regarding personality traits (an "interpersonal" approach) in order to understand and identify ways of managing victims’ experiences and bullying behaviour (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Rubin, Bukowski & Parker, 2006). More recently researchers have recognised the important role of the peer group when aggressive acts and bullying occurs in schools (a “group” approach). The acknowledgment that bullying is a social act that most often occurs in group contexts has led to research that focuses on the role of children present during bullying incidents (e.g., Salmivalli et al, 1996). Moreover, studies have begun to examine social factors that might influence children’s bystander behaviour, such as classroom norms, teacher expectations, or a bully's desire for higher status in the peer group (see Salmivalli, 2010, for a review; also refer to Chapter 2). This thesis extends the interpersonal and group approaches further, by drawing from developmental "intergroup" theory and empirical evidence in order to understand additional factors that may encourage or prevent children and adolescents, as bystanders, from helping peers who are victims of bullying and aggression.

Further justification for examining children’s bystander responses to bullying from an intergroup perspective stems from research on adult bystander intervention during emergency situations. Research has highlighted the important role of group identity for adults’ bystander responses. Levine and colleagues draw from Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Social Categorisation Theory (SCT) to show how a sense of shared group identity can facilitate helping behaviour during emergency contexts (e.g., Levine & Crowther, 2008; Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005; Levine & Manning, 2013). Study findings show that bystanders who identify with the same social group that the victim belongs to are more likely to help than bystanders who do not share this “group identity” (Levine et al., 2005).
Moreover, findings have shown that the classic “bystander effect” (i.e., where the presence of more bystanders leads to less helpful bystander intervention; Latane & Darley, 1968) is not entirely supported. Research, from a social identity perspective, has shown that increased numbers of bystanders can both help and hinder the likelihood of helping, depending on whether the bystanders identify with the victim (increased helping) or do not (decreased helping) (e.g., Levine & Crowther, 2008; Levine & Manning, 2013). Based on this research it is therefore plausible that social identification plays a role in children’s helpful bystander responses. In line with the adult bystander intervention literature, the current research examines bystander responses to bullying through an intergroup lens, drawing on developmental theory to inform predictions.

**An Intergroup Approach**

The intergroup approach is different to interpersonal and “group” approaches, in that it considers social group membership (e.g., gender, ethnicity, nationality), and children’s awareness of group dynamics, in order to understand children and adolescents' attitudes and behaviours in social contexts (e.g., Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013). Although the importance of interpersonal research for the understanding of children's attitudes and behaviours is widely acknowledged, some researchers question the assumption that incidents of aggression or bullying are always invited by a victim's personality traits, as interpersonal approaches might propose. Research conducted from an intergroup perspective suggests instead that, in some instances, children and adolescents' understanding of group membership and group expectations drive children's consequent evaluations and reactions towards others (Killen & Rutland, 2011). Consequently it is vital that the intergroup approach is considered in order to fully understand children’s social interactions. Killen, Mulvey and Hitti (2013) illustrate this point with the example of a child being excluded by peers from an activity because they are Muslim (group membership) being very different, in terms of experience and consequences,
in comparison to when the child is excluded because they are shy (individual differences).

Application of the intergroup perspective in order to understand children and adolescents' attitudes and behaviour towards peers in different social contexts has, to date, focused primarily on incidents of social exclusion. The present research draws from the empirical and theoretical evidence conducted in the context of bullying, aggression, and social exclusion, in order to comprehend how the intergroup perspective can be applied to children and adolescents' bystander behaviour during incidents of verbal aggression (e.g., name-calling; refer to Chapter 2).

**Bullying and Aggression**

Children's responses to intergroup incidents of bullying and aggression has received much attention in the social and developmental psychology literature in the past ten years (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier & Ferrell, 2009; Duffy & Nesdale, 2012; Killen & Rutland, 2011; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; Nesdale, 2004, 2007; Rutland, 2004). Collectively this research demonstrates how important it is to consider the development of children’s attitudes and behaviours within a social context as reflective of intergroup processes. However, the intergroup approach has not been applied to the examination of developmental variation in children’s bystander responses to incidents of bullying and aggression. This chapter presents a review of three complementary social-developmental theories, namely social identity development theory (SIDT; Duffy & Nesdale, 2012), developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD; Abrams et al, 2003), and social-moral reasoning (Killen, 2007). These theories draw on an intergroup approach to explain developmental variation in children’s attitudes and reasoning about bullying behaviours (e.g., aggression and social exclusion) among peers. The aim of this theoretical review is to demonstrate how these intergroup theories can be applied to further our understanding of the
developmental decline in children’s and adolescents’ helpful bystander responses to intergroup verbal aggression among peers.

One form of aggression – verbal aggression – was chosen so that validity and application of findings across age groups would be more accurate (Espelage & Swearer, 2003; Vaillancourt et al., 2008; see Chapter 4 for a review). Thus, verbal aggression (name-calling) was selected as the focal bullying behaviour within this thesis as it is the most prevalent form of bullying experienced by both children and adolescents (Smith & Shu, 2000). Moreover, intergroup verbal aggression is incredibly detrimental for those who experience it (Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002), yet is difficult for authority figures to detect. Thus, verbal aggression is a problem behaviour for schools and bystanders could play a key role in challenging it (Aboud & Joong, 2008; see Chapter 2).

Theories developed within the context of bullying, aggression, and social exclusion demonstrate how children and adolescents evaluate social acts differently depending on: (1) the group memberships and social identification of group members involved; (2) the norm for the group (i.e., expectations for group member’s attitudes and behaviours); and (3) an understanding, which increases with age, of how group membership and group norms influence the ways in which peers might evaluate and respond to social situations (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). Furthermore, an examination of the way in which children reason about their understanding of social exclusion has highlighted the different circumstances under which children and adolescents consider incidents such as social exclusion to be acceptable (e.g., Killen, 2007). Indeed, investigating how children and adolescents reason about social situations has been shown to be a vital part of examining developmental variation in children’s responses to social situations involving peers from different social groups (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013).
The intergroup approaches taken by Social Identity Development Theory (SIDT; Nesdale, 2004), the model of Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics (DSGD; Abrams et al., 2003), and the social-moral reasoning framework based on Social Domain Theory (SDT; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983), have contributed greatly to our understanding of the development of children’s attitudes and behaviours during social interactions, including bullying, acts of aggression, and social exclusion (Rutland et al., 2010). These three theories are complementary; many core tenets cross over, with empirical evidence for one theory often demonstrating support for the other. For example, in Ojala and Nesdale’s (2004) first examination of childhood bullying from a SIDT perspective, explicit support is found for the, then recently published, DSGD model (Abrams et al., 2003). It can therefore be considered a strength to focus on these three theories collectively to inform our understanding of the development of children’s bystander responses when faced with incidents of bullying.

Within this chapter a review of each of these theories will be presented alongside empirical support for the intergroup approach to understanding children's social interactions. Thereafter a collective summary of the theories will be presented, integrating their key concepts for the examination of children’s social interactions from an intergroup perspective. Moreover, the relevance and importance of their application to the examination of children and adolescent's bystander intentions during intergroup incidents of verbal aggression will be presented.

**Social Identity Development Theory: Group Membership, Group Norms and Group Status**

**Group membership.** Peer group membership is incredibly important to children, who demonstrate an interest in friends and social groups by age five or six (Nesdale, 2007). Furthermore, children seek to be included in peer groups, see themselves as more similar to ingroup than outgroup members, display ingroup preferences, and derive self-worth from
their group memberships (Bigler, Jones & Lobliner, 1997; Nesdale & Flessor, 2001; Verkuyten, 2001). Therefore, considering the importance of social group memberships to children, it is plausible that intergroup factors such as group membership and group norms play a key role in children's bystander responses to incidents of aggression and bullying among peers.

Social Identity Development Theory (SIDT; Nesdale, 2004) draws from a social identity perspective in order to understand how children’s intergroup attitudes, behaviours and prejudice develop. This framework has been readily applied to investigate children’s attitudes towards peer aggression (Duffy & Nesdale, 2012; Nesdale & Scarlett, 2001; Ojala & Nesdale, 2004). Social Identity Theory (SIT) posits that during social situations individuals regard each other as belonging to particular social groups or categories and this in turn influences peoples' evaluations of, or attitudes and behaviours towards, others (Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Turner, 1975). As well as categorising others, individuals categorise themselves as members of groups in order to achieve a positive social identity that they are motivated to sustain. Part of achieving a positive social identity involves making comparisons between the group(s) that an individual belongs to (ingroup) and the groups that an individual does not belong to (outgroup/s), whereby the ingroup and ingroup members are evaluated more positively compared to the outgroup and outgroup members. As part of the self-categorisation process, individuals encompass the values, attitudes, and behaviours that are typical for the ingroup (Turner, 1975). SIDT was derived from the social identity perspective in order to specifically understand these processes with regard to the development of children's attitudes and behaviours within social situations.

SIDT proposes four phases for children's social development. First, before age 2 to 3, children experience the undifferentiated phase, whereby visible indicators of social group membership, such as age, gender, weight, or skin colour, are not noticed by children. Second,
at approximately 3 years old, children experience the social group awareness stage whereby visible indicators and consequent group membership becomes noticeable, and children begin to differentiate themselves from others. Consequently children are able to identify how similar they are to others and categorise themselves accordingly (Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, Kiesner & Griffiths, 2008). After the recognition of group memberships and differentiation, the third phase - ingroup preference - is initiated. Children learn to associate more with those they see as similar to them, and perceive these similar children as different to other children. Consequently children behave differently when with friends in comparison to non-friends. During this phase children evaluate ingroup members more positively that outgroup members, and by school-age most children display ingroup preferences based on gender, shared activities and ethnicity (Nesdale, 2007).

In some instances ingroup preference becomes outgroup hostility (e.g., negative attitudes or behaviour), which is the fourth and final phase of the SIDT model. This phase involves an ongoing concern for the ingroup while also focusing on the outgroup, whereby rather than simply preferring ingroup members, outgroup members are actively disliked and possibly subjected to negative behaviours, such as prejudice, discrimination, aggression or bullying (Nesdale, 2004, 2007; Nesdale et al., 2008). However, SIDT proposes that entering the phase of outgroup hostility is not inevitable. It is only likely if either: outgroup hostility is an expectation of the ingroup; the child displays strong ingroup identification; the ingroup believes they can improve their status, or individual ingroup members believe they can improve their status, if they display outgroup hostility; or if the ingroup perceive the outgroup to be a threat (Duffy & Nesdale, 2012).

**Group norms.** As well as group membership, another essential component of SIDT is the awareness of group norms. Group norms are expectations for attitudes and behaviours that group members should behave in accordance with (Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). SIDT
suggests that group norms can mobilise children to move out of phase three (ingroup preference) and into phase four (outgroup hostility), and that aggressive behaviour is more likely when there is an ingroup norm for aggression or exclusion in comparison to when these behaviours are considered anti-normative (i.e., the norm is to be prosocial or inclusive) (Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Ojala & Nesdale, 2004). As such, SIDT posits that the emergence of outgroup hostility is a result of children's social environment rather than their specific age. Instead, SIDT suggests that children's understanding of how social groups work (coined "social acumen") increases with age and experience as a result of social interactions with peers and other social groups. SIDT argues that these experiences influence children's interpretations and consequent reactions within new social contexts (Nesdale, 2004, 2007). Moreover, with experience, children are more able to understand the appropriate attitudes and behaviours within a given context, depending on who is present within that situation, what is expected of them, and what the desired outcome of the interaction is (Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). According to SIDT predictions, it is therefore possible that awareness of, and adherence to, group norms play an important role in the developmental differences observed in children’s helpful bystander intervention.

Numerous studies have examined childhood aggression and bullying from the SIDT perspective, offering extensive empirical support for the importance of group membership, ingroup identification, and group norms for children's attitudes and behaviours in these contexts (e.g., Duffy & Nesdale, 2009, 2010, 2012; Nesdale et al., 2008; Nesdale, Maass, Durkin & Griffiths, 2005; Nesdale, Griffiths, Durkin & Maass, 2005; Nesdale, Milliner, Duffy & Griffiths, 2009; Ojala & Nesdale, 2004).

To test the idea that bullying is a group process, an initial study examined the role of social identity and group norms on children's attitudes towards bullying (Ojala & Nesdale, 2004). Ten-to-twelve year old boys participated in the study, which involved reading a story
about two male characters and the groups to which they belonged. One character belonged to the ingroup, "the dudes", who were popular and well-liked. This description was chosen in order to encourage participants to identify with the ingroup. The second character belonged to the outgroup, the "try hards", who were an unpopular, rejected group. The behaviour of the ingroup member and the norms for the ingroup, were manipulated to vary along different dimension: (1) the behaviour and norms of the ingroup (bullying vs. fairness), (2) outgroup similarity to the ingroup (similar vs. different), and (3) the ingroup character's behaviour towards the outgroup character (bullying vs. helpful). The ingroup “bullying” norm involved teasing, hitting and pushing, whereas a contrasting description was provided in the “helpful” norm condition. Participants were asked to evaluate the ingroup character and to rate the extent to which the ingroup would like the ingroup character to be a part of their group.

Findings showed that participants liked the ingroup character significantly more when he helped rather than bullied a different outgroup member, however there was no difference in liking when he helped or bullied a similar outgroup member. This lends support to social identity predictions, as it suggests that bullying an outgroup member is only justified when the outgroup member presents a threat to the ingroup identity. Furthermore, evidence for the importance of adhering to group norms was found; the ingroup character was more likely to be accepted by the ingroup when he followed the ingroup norms (i.e., he bullied when the norm was to bully, or he helped when the norm was to help). These findings demonstrate the relevance of group dynamics for children's attitudes and behaviours during a bullying incident, and it is therefore plausible that children may report non-helpful bystander responses to bullying incidents based on group norms for not helping bullied peers. More generally these findings show that children, at a relatively young age, have nuanced responses to outgroup members that are dependent on group membership and variables.
related to group membership. This study shows that children differentiate between outgroup members based on subtle, yet complex and highly specific, group-based characteristics.

A later study extends findings from Ojala and Nesdale (2004) by examining the role of peer group norms (outgroup dislike and rejection vs. outgroup liking and inclusion) on children’s intentions to bully (Nesdale et al., 2008); thus demonstrating how SIDT can be applied to children's behavioural intentions during intergroup contexts. Seven and nine-year old male and female children were recruited in order to track developmental changes in adherence to norms and consequent bullying intentions. Findings from Nesdale et al. (2008) demonstrated further support for the consideration of group norms in children’s evaluations during intergroup bullying contexts.

Firstly, participants preferred their ingroup over the outgroup even when the ingroup norm was for outgroup disliking and exclusion. Secondly, a main effect for group norms on bullying intentions was observed. Group members with a norm for outgroup dislike and exclusion expressed more bullying intentions than those group members with a norm for outgroup liking and inclusion. In addition, the type of norm interacted with type of bullying intention (indirect or direct) and age. With regards to bullying intentions, younger children (aged 7) showed no differences in reports of indirect bullying when the ingroup norm was for outgroup dislike and exclusion compared to ingroup liking and inclusion, but significantly more direct bullying was reported when the ingroup had a norm of outgroup dislike. The opposite pattern was found for older children (aged 9); whereby bullying intentions were higher for indirect rather than direct bullying when the ingroup norm was for outgroup dislike and exclusion in comparison to outgroup liking and inclusion.

These results strengthen the argument that bullying is not necessarily the outcome of individual differences between an aggressor and a victim, but that intergroup processes play a
vital role when understanding children’s bullying intentions. In addition, these differences point to the importance of examining developmental trends. In this study, although both age groups were prepared to report intentions to engage in indirect bullying more than direct bullying, older children display lower intentions to engage in indirect bullying in comparison to younger children. Nesdale et al. (2008) suggest that this could be because the perceived severity of indirect and direct bullying varies with age. Alternatively, it could be due to older children being more aware of the unacceptability of engaging in indirect bullying. Yet, the older children’s indirect bullying intentions were influenced by the group’s norm, highlighting how they will be more likely to engage in this type of bullying if their group encourages and condones it.

The effects of group norms on children’s bullying intentions reinforce the value of examining norms within children’s responses to social experiences. Furthermore, this study demonstrates the relevance of SIDT when investigating children’s behavioural intentions, suggesting that findings for SIDT in the bullying context could be extended to the examination of bystander intentions.

The previous empirical examples of support for SIDT in the bullying context (Nesdale et al., 2008; Ojala & Nesdale, 2004) have focused primarily on attitudes towards bullying or aggression, and intentions of bullying, as driven by children’s understanding of group processes. Recently however, research by Jones and colleagues has focused on how the theory of SIDT might be used to explain children’s bystander responses to bullying (Jones, Bombieri, Livingstone & Manstead, 2012; Jones et al., 2009, Jones, Manstead & Livingstone, 2011, Jones, Livingstone & Manstead, 2012). Jones et al. (2009) extends the research conducted by Nesdale and colleagues on children's attitudes towards bullying and bullying intentions, by drawing on SIDT to understand children’s bystander responses (or “action tendencies”) to bullying.
In one study, Jones et al. (2009) showed that intergroup factors such as group membership, group identification and group norms, affect group-based emotion, which in turn predicts 9-11 year old children’s bystander responses to a bullying incident. The findings from this study showed support for the usefulness of employing SIDT to explain variations in emotions which consequently predicted children’s bystander responses. However, this study did not examine the direct influence of group membership, identification and norms on children’s bystander responses – or how these influences might differ across age groups. Yet the relevance of examining intergroup factors, such as group identification and group norms, for bystander responses has been further supported by research in different contexts (Jones et al., 2011; Jones, Bombieri et al., 2011), and more recently with different age groups.

Using a similar methodology to Jones et al. (2009), Jones et al. (2012) asked 7-to-8 and 10-11 year olds to report group-based emotions and action tendencies in response to a bullying scenario (younger children read about a victim reading a nasty note; older children read about a victim reading a nasty text message). Although age interacted with group identification (among low identifiers, younger children were higher than older children), no age differences were reported for children's action tendencies or the influence of group norms. Although the direct effect of intergroup factors on children's specific bystander intentions was not examined in these studies, these initial findings demonstrate the importance of further investigating age and intergroup factors in the context of children’s bystander intentions when faced with bullying episodes.

**Group status.** SIDT may also provide a theoretical basis for understanding the role of status in bystander intentions during intergroup bullying contexts. SIDT research has examined how the relative status of ingroup and outgroup members influences children’s attitudes and cognitions towards ingroup and outgroup members. Drawing on social identity theory predictions Nesdale and Flesser (2001) investigated when intergroup status
differentiation (i.e., preference for one group member over another, based on that group member’s group status) occurs, and whether it changes with age. Among five and eight year old children, Nesdale and Flesser (2001) manipulated intergroup status by assigning participants to a group that was either lower ability (“good” drawers) or high ability (“excellent” drawers) in the context of an intergroup drawing competition. They showed that children liked their ingroup more than the outgroup, that they were aware of status differences between groups, and that this impacted their group-related attitudes. To elaborate, participants who were in the lower status group had comparatively lower liking towards their own group; and when the possibility of moving groups was presented low-status group members wanted to move groups more than high-status group members did. It is argued that this preference for higher status group membership is indicative of social identity desires to maintain a positive group identity. This study therefore shows that not only are children sensitive to group status, but this also informs their evaluations of others.

Another study, conducted by Gini (2006), examined intergroup status among older participants (13-year old boys and girls) in the context of an intergroup bullying incident while playing basketball in the school gym. High status group members were described as those who were good at sport and had won the last school championship; low status group members were described as not good at sport. The group's role, as a bully-group or victim-group, was also manipulated. Findings showed that participants preferred their ingroup when it was a victim-group compared to the bully-group. Additionally, the high-status outgroup was blamed for their behaviour more than any other group. Drawing from SIDT predictions, Gini (2007) argues that victimization could be perceived as group-threat, leading participants to bolster their ingroup identification, thus strengthening ingroup preferences and outgroup derogation.
These studies show the relevance of intergroup status for children and adolescents’ evaluations of others. Importantly, higher status groups have been shown to be evaluated more favourably, with members of lower-status groups also demonstrating a desire to be a part of the higher-status group (Nesdale & Flesser, 2001), and higher status groups are also potentially viewed as holding a social responsibility towards others (Gini, 2006). These findings suggest that intergroup status could be a relevant consideration for bystanders, when choosing how to respond to incidents of intergroup bullying. Notably, developmental differences have not been detected in relation to status (Nesdale & Flesser, 2001) so both children and adolescents may be influenced by differences in intergroup status.

Summarising SIDT. When consolidating these findings, it is apparent that SIDT offers valuable predictions about the role of social group membership, group norms and group status during intergroup contexts, such as children's bystander intentions, and their evaluations of bystander behaviour. For example, when in the position of bystanders children's intentions or evaluations of bystander actions will be predicted by the bystander’s social group affiliations and their social group's norm. Moreover, in line with previous research (Nesdale and Lawson, 2011; Ojala & Nesdale, 2004), we would expect to see a stronger adherence to social group norms with age, regardless of the positive or negative valence of the group's expectations for members. Furthermore, it is possible that children and adolescents might evaluate bystander behaviours more positively or negatively according to the intergroup status of the bystander’s group.

The present investigation of children and adolescents' bystander responses during incidents of verbal aggression builds on SIDT by testing its predictions in a new domain; previously SIDT has been tested in relation to bullying behaviour and attitudes, whereas the present research extends this further by applying to participants’ own bystander intentions (Study 1) and evaluations of bystander behaviour (Study 2 and 3). Therefore, the present
examination of bystander intentions could further develop the implications of SIDT for intergroup behaviour, and further develop the examination of SIDT predictions into adolescence.

**Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics: Processes Underlying Children's Intergroup Attitudes and Behaviour**

Another theoretical model that provides a useful framework for understanding the role of group membership and group norms in children’s bystander intentions to bullying is developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD; Abrams et al., 2003). The model of DSGD examines developmental differences in children’s evaluations of others according to their group membership and their adherence to expectations dictated by the group, referred to as “norms” (Abrams et al., 2003). To date, DSGD has only been applied to children’s attitudes towards, and evaluations of, inclusion and exclusion of peers. As social exclusion by peers is considered a form of bullying or aggression it is contextually similar to the present examination of bystander intentions during intergroup name-calling incidents. As such, it stands that DSGD may also be relevant when examining children and adolescent's own bystander intentions, and how they evaluate others' bystander actions, during incidents of intergroup name-calling.

DSGD, although complementary to SIDT, is conceptually different to SIDT in that it focuses on the processes that may lead to children preferring their ingroup or derogating the outgroup in different contexts (Levy & Killen, 2008). Thus, DSGD has been particularly informative for understanding when and why children may exclude their peers during social situations, and could offer a valuable insight into when and why certain bystander responses are seen as more appropriate, and when developmental differences in bystander intentions may be observed.
The DSGD model draws from research conducted with adults using the subjective group dynamics (SGD) model (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). Similarly to social identity development theory, the SGD model draws from a social identity theory tradition, which highlights the importance of group membership for individuals, and the maintenance of a positive ingroup identity (Abrams, Marques, Bown & Henson, 2000; Abrams et al., 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Research under the SGD framework has shown that group members endeavour to uphold positive ingroup distinctiveness as well as support for ingroup norms. Consequently, judgments of both ingroup and outgroup members are affected by their relative group membership, and their behaviour in line with the prescribed group norms.

Prescribed group norms ("prescriptive norms") are those that define expected attitudes and behaviours of others, and can result in a pressure for group members to conform (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). Furthermore, prescriptive norms can be oppositional or generic in nature. Oppositional norms (sometimes referred to as "group-specific", e.g., Killen, Rutland, et al., 2013) are those that exist when an ingroup and an outgroup hold different or competing objectives. Essentially, supporting one group’s norms infers rejection of the other group’s norms. Importantly, supporting your own group’s norms (ingroup norm) is viewed as positive and “normative”, as it maintains the group’s identity and social positioning. Rejecting your own group’s norms is viewed as negative and “deviant”, as it is disruptive to the group’s identity. Thus, evaluations of group members may vary depending on their ingroup-outgroup status, but also their adherence to, or deviance from, their own group’s norm. This can result in more positive evaluations of normative ingroup members and deviant outgroup members in comparison to deviant ingroup members and normative outgroup members (Abrams et al., 2003).

Generic norms refer to prescriptive norms that apply more generally within society and are therefore relevant for both ingroup and outgroup members. Therefore, evaluations of
ingroup and outgroup normative and deviant members form a different pattern when in an oppositional, compared to a generic, norm context. In the case of generic norms, group members will prefer normative ingroup and outgroup members above deviant ingroup and outgroup members. This can be observed as a stronger differentiation in evaluations between normative and deviant ingroup members compared to normative and deviant outgroup members, known as the “black sheep effect” (Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). These findings demonstrate the importance of group membership and the relative norms of the group, as well as the negative outcomes attributed to those who deviate from prescriptive group norms, such as social exclusion (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison & Viki, 2005).

The model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD) proposes that children's awareness of group dynamics changes across childhood (Abrams et al., 2003; 2009). First children are able to demonstrate preferences between groups (intergroup biases) when evaluating others, later they are able to demonstrate preferences for members within a group (intragroup biases) dependent on whether the members conform or deviate from the group's norms. Therefore the model suggests that as children get older they become more familiar with prescribed group norms, consequently using their understanding of group norms to make evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members who do, or do not, adhere to their group's norms.

Evidence for the applicability of the DSGD model during incidents of bullying (specifically social exclusion) has been demonstrated in multiple studies. For example, Abrams et al (2003) tested the developmental proposition of subjective group dynamics with children aged 5 to 11 years old. Based on previous findings (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron & Marques, 2003) they predicted that older children would more strongly differentiate between normative and deviant group members. Furthermore, the evaluations of how acceptable a
normative and deviant target would be to other members of each group (termed "differential inclusion") would mediate the effects of age on children's evaluations of ingroup and outgroup normative and deviant targets (termed "differential evaluation").

In the context of the 2002 World Cup Football Finals, national identity was made salient. English children were instructed to evaluate English (ingroup) and German (outgroup) football teams, and a normative and deviant supporter of each team. The normative England supporter provided positive statements about the England team, whereas the deviant England supporter provided a positive statement about the German team, "When Germany play well, I always clap and cheer". Targets from the outgroup German team, displayed the same normative and deviant statements, but in relation to their own team. Participants reported their ingroup identification, intergroup bias, target typicality, perceived same-group inclusion and other-group inclusion, and participant evaluations of each target (ingroup normative, ingroup deviant, outgroup normative, outgroup deviant). Abrams, et al (2003) supported the predictions of a developmental framework of subjective group dynamics; for both age groups children favoured the ingroup, demonstrating an ingroup bias. However, as children got older their evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members reflected the member's adherence to the ingroup norm of loyalty, whereby ingroup normative and outgroup deviant were more positively evaluated than the ingroup deviant or outgroup normative. These findings have been replicated across numerous studies and demonstrate the importance of group membership and group norms for understanding children and adolescents' changing attitudes and behaviours (see Abrams & Rutland, 2008).

Recent research with children has also demonstrated how evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members can differ when the norm is generic (Abrams et al., 2013). In the context of a summer fair, participants read about an ingroup or outgroup school where everyone valued student participation at the summer fair, as they would be helping charity and the
school. In this instance, younger participants showed preference for normative members, but with age participants demonstrated the "black sheep effect". That is, as children got older they showed greater differentiation between evaluations of ingroup members (with normative ingroup members being evaluated more preferentially than deviant ingroup members) in comparison to outgroup members. These studies (Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams et al., 2013) demonstrate how group membership, group norms, and the type of norm, are relevant for understanding developmental trends in children's responses and evaluations of incidents that occur in their social worlds. Therefore, in order to apply the DSGD model to children and adolescents' experiences as bystanders during intergroup instances, it is necessary that the present research consider the role of group membership, group norms, and type of norms, and how these factors may influence bystander intentions or evaluations differently according to the age of participants.

**Summarising DSGD.** Based on the DSGD model, in the present research we might expect children to act differently towards their peers when in the position of a bystander due to reasons that become increasingly relevant with age, including: the social group memberships of others involved in the incident (e.g., the aggressor, victim and other bystanders); the normative expectations of the respective social groups; as well as adherence or deviance to these norms. Thus, examining bystander intentions within the DSGD framework may shed light on the age differences currently observed among child and adolescent bystanders (e.g., the decrease in helpful bystander behaviours), whereby bystander intentions are influenced by the understanding of group dynamics (e.g., group norms, expectations and repercussions).

The model of DSGD shows us that although younger children are more aware of generic norms and expectations (e.g., you should be kind to one another), they are less able to "tap into" group-specific norms (e.g., my group says we shouldn't play with people from
other groups), when making evaluations and judgments of peers. Bringing together previous research that demonstrates a developmental decline in reports of helpful bystander behaviours in response to incidents of bullying and aggression (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Trach et al., 2010), and findings from the model of DSGD, it is possible that older children are less likely to perceive group-specific norms for helping bullied peers. Furthermore, adolescents’ normative expectations could instead dictate that you should not help peers who are being bullied or subject to aggression (e.g., Aboud & Joong, 2008). As such we might expect younger children to report more helpful bystander intentions, or positive evaluations of bystander behaviour, based on generic expectations of prosociality. In contrast older children may adhere more readily to group-specific expectations of non-intervention. This prediction highlights the potential role of norms for the developmental decline in children’s helpful bystander responses.

**Social Domain Theory: Social-Moral Reasoning about Intergroup Judgments**

The social domain theory (SDT; Turiel, 1983) examines children and adolescents’ social-moral reasoning about social situations. This has provided great insight into how children interpret and evaluate social interactions of an intergroup nature (Killen, 2007; Killen, Sinno & Margie, 2007). Within this thesis the framework of SDT is extended to the intergroup context of bystander intentions in order to examine how children and adolescents reason about, and justify, their bystander intentions during incidents of name-calling.

Examining children and adolescents’ reasoning about a reported belief, action, decision or judgment allows researchers to delve further into children's interpretation of their social world. Specifically, it tells researchers what aspect of a social situation children are focussing on when justifying their positive or negative evaluation of that same social encounter (Killen, 2007). Social Domain Theory (SDT) offers a framework for understanding how children reason about social interactions, suggesting that there are three distinct
"domains" that children focus on when reasoning about a situation: moral, social-conventional, and psychological (Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 2006; Turiel, 1983). The moral domain refers to justice, others' welfare or experience of harm, or fairness and rights; the social-conventional domain involves social group expectations and regulation that lead to effective group functioning, and includes customs, traditions, rules and conventions; the psychological domain incorporates personal issues (i.e., those that are not perceived to be regulated by others) and matters of individual choice. Over the last ten years, researchers have begun to examine the influence of intergroup processes from the perspective of SDT, in the context of peer-based social exclusion (e.g., Abrams et al., 2013; Killen, Margie & Sinno, 2006; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen, 2007; Killen et al., 2013; Malti, Killen & Gasser, 2012; McGlothlin & Killen, 2005).

While much of earlier research stemming from SDT has shown that very young children draw on the moral domain, for example acknowledging that it is wrong to be mean or cause harm to others (e.g., Killen, 1991; Smetana, 1995), Killen and Stangor's (2001) study was one of the first to examine children's evaluations of, and reasoning about, social exclusion in an intergroup context (although see Theimer, Killen & Stangor, 2001). Killen and Stangor (2001) predicted that children's evaluations about social exclusion are dependent on two forms of reasoning; moral beliefs about how the act is wrong, and social-conventional (social-conventional) beliefs about how the act influences group functioning. As children's understanding of social-conventional issues have been shown to change with age; for example, younger children will focus on social uniformity and rule systems (e.g., It's wrong to call a teacher by their first name because there's a rule about it), and older children will focus on social standards and understanding of group expectations and group functioning (e.g., It's wrong to call a teacher by their first name because the other students might think of them as a peer instead of someone with authority and higher status), Killen and Stangor
(2001) proposed that children's understanding and evaluations of social exclusion requires them to coordinate the moral wrongfulness of exclusion with social-conventional expectations such as group functioning, group identity, and group stereotypes.

To examine these predictions participants aged between 7 and 13 were asked to reason about exclusion in the intergroup context of gender or ethnicity, two highly salient group memberships for children and adolescents. Participants evaluated either (1) a straightforward exclusion context, whereby a group of children are considering excluding an individual from their peer group for stereotypic reasons (e.g., a boy in a ballet class might make the other children feel uncomfortable); (2) a multifaceted context where participants were presented with two individuals, one who conformed to the stereotype and one who did not, and asked to indicate which should join their group; this would result in the other individual being left out. Participants either read that the two individuals were equally qualified to join the group (e.g., a boy and a girl who are equally good at ballet) or that the two individuals were unequally qualified (e.g., the girl is better at ballet than the boy). They first indicated how "alright" or "not alright" it was to exclude the individual from the activity; second, who they would pick to include; third, their reasoning for their selection; and fourth, how bad they thought excluding that individual would be.

As is typical for analysing children's open-ended reasoning about intergroup social exclusion from the social domain perspective, a coding framework was created based on previous categories and piloting of the coding system. Categories that have a frequency of below 10% are removed from the final coding framework. For this study, "prosocial" (e.g., you should include someone to be nice), "individual merit" (e.g., a person who is good at something deserves to be in the club), and "stereotypic beliefs" (e.g., boys aren't good at ballet) were removed. This left three subcategories within the moral domain: "fairness and rights" (e.g., it wouldn't be fair to exclude him), "equal treatment" (e.g., everyone should be
treated the same), and "equal access" (e.g., boys should have the chance to do ballet because they usually don't get to do it); and three subcategories within the social-conventional domain: "social conventions" (e.g., the other kids would think John is strange if he takes ballet), "group functioning" (e.g., admit the one who is more qualified because the club will know more and work much better as a group together), and "group identity" (e.g., the girls will feel uncomfortable if a boy is on the club). Participants’ responses are then coded by two independent coders in order to achieve reliability of at least Cohen's $\kappa = .80$ on 25% of the data points (Killen & Stangor, 2001).

Findings showed that, in the straightforward exclusion context, children and adolescents judged that it was wrong to exclude a child from the activity and mostly employed moral justifications to justify their evaluations; no age or gender differences were present. In the multifaceted contexts participants still employed more moral than social-conventional reasoning but this was higher in the equal, compared to unequal qualifications, context. Moreover, with age, children became increasingly sensitive to social-conventional issues when presented with the unequal qualification context, drawing on mostly group functioning reasons to justify the exclusion of the target individual.

Overall, this study showed that, with age, children employ different reasoning strategies in order to understand instances of intergroup exclusion. When social exclusion is straightforward, children and adolescents view it as morally wrong. Yet when exclusion is multifaceted, older children showed that they increasingly draw on social-conventional reasons to understand when exclusion may, or may not, benefit the group. This was particularly the case for the unequal qualifications condition; older children were far more likely to select the more qualified individual, regardless of their stereotyped or non-stereotyped association with the group.
Taken together, these findings reiterate the importance of examining children's reasoning about social acts from a developmental and intergroup standpoint. They demonstrate how, although children are able to interpret when a negative social act (in this case, social exclusion) is wrong or unfair, with age, exclusion can be seen as more legitimate when it results in more effective group functioning. Furthermore, this study builds upon the evidence presented by social identity development theory and developmental subjective group dynamics, by providing further evidence that group membership alone is not necessarily a priority for children's decision-making about social interactions; the legitimization of exclusion was observed in the present study regardless of whether the individual in question was perceived to "fit" with the group (i.e., to be in line with stereotypic expectations or not).

Killen and Stangor's (2001) study emphasizes the importance of examining how children and adolescents reason about intergroup instances of social exclusion, in order to understand age differences, and when negative social acts might be considered more legitimate. Furthermore, it provides evidence that children's evaluations of social interactions do not result from a hierarchical understanding of the separate domains (i.e., moral, social-conventional, personal), but that different forms of reasoning can occur simultaneously alongside each other. As such, children's reasoning can be seen as context-dependent (also see Mulvey et al, 2014). Moreover, as an initial investigation, the study raised questions as to why there are age differences present. What are older children adhering to differently in comparison to younger children? Killen (2007) recognises the importance of drawing on the social identity research tradition in order to further our understanding of the roles of group norms and group knowledge for children and adolescents' evaluations of, and reasoning about, intergroup exclusion.
Recent research has combined predictions from the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD) and SDT in order to examine the role of group norms for children and adolescent's reasoning about intergroup exclusion. Killen, Rutland et al., (2013) aimed to identify whether children's reasoning about social group dynamics is influenced by moral, social-conventional (social-conventional) or psychological (personal) concerns; whether children's justifications for exclusion of peers are influenced by different types of group norm (e.g., generic, wider social-conventional group norms vs. smaller group-specific norms that may not be adhered to by wider society); and to identify any developmental differences in children's use of reasoning in these different normative contexts. Furthermore, the authors were interested in examining at what age children were able to demonstrate "theory of social mind"; whereby the individual is able to differentiate between their own judgment and the group's judgment in a given situation, thus demonstrating an advanced awareness of group dynamics.

Participants from two age groups were asked to evaluate ingroup and outgroup members who deviated from their own group’s norm. The type of group norm was manipulated to determine whether evaluations of deviance to group-specific or generic norms differed. Demonstrating support for the DSGD and the importance of group norms for children's evaluations of peers, findings showed that the normative context was the most important factor for participants when evaluating deviant group members. Specifically, participants evaluated deviant group members more positively when they were deviating from a group norm that was not in line with broader generic norms. In addition, deviant behaviour was viewed as more acceptable when these broader generic norms were in the moral domain (equality) in comparison to the social-conventional domain (wearing group shirts).
Further support for developmental changes in children's interpretations of social interactions was found, such that younger children focused more on generic norms than group-specific norms when responding to items, whereas group-specific norms were more important for adolescents across both the moral and social-conventional contexts. This is in line with DSGD predictions, and shows that older children more readily adhere to the normative expectations of their ingroup, over and above broader generic norms, even when those norms are moral in nature. Moreover, older children were more likely than younger children to evaluate ingroup deviants more positively when their deviant behaviour had the potential to result in favourable outcomes for the group, demonstrating older children's ability to infer group-based preferences.

With regards to children and adolescents' reasoning about their evaluations and preferences, differences were also observed; older children were more able to weigh up normative expectations of their group alongside the expectations of the broader group, and identify when conforming or deviating from contrasting norms may pose different challenges, particularly within the moral domain of equality. Taken together with the finding that older children were more able to differentiate between their own preferences and the preferences of the group, it appears that adolescents draw on their social experiences to inform their reasoning and evaluations of normative and deviant ingroup and outgroup peers. For example, adolescents were more likely to choose an outgroup member over an ingroup member, when the outgroup member displayed a preference in line with the ingroup norm. However, personal preferences for the unequal outgroup member were lower in comparison to perceived group preferences.

This suggests that, although older children are more aware of group norms and the repercussions for group members when they deviate from ingroup norms, they still consider moral reasons of fairness when displaying their own intergroup preferences. These findings
are indicative of older children having a more advanced theory of social mind, which can inform their interpretation of group-based preferences, but also impact on their own display of preferences at an individual level. Ultimately this study provides further evidence as to the importance of examining children's understanding of social situations, dependent on different normative contexts, and additionally shows how children and adolescents' reasoning about their evaluations of peers during social interactions can flesh out what we understand of their evaluative judgments.

To date, only one other study has examined participants’ reasoning about bystander intentions to incidents of intergroup name-calling, using a modified SDT framework. Aboud and Joong (2008) invited a sample of third (8-9 years old) and sixth grade (11-12 years old) students to provide a rationale for and against intervening as bystanders. One of the few clear findings from this study is that psychological reasoning (i.e. references to autonomy and personal choice) was more common among older children. In line with Killen and colleagues’ research, this suggests that in the bystander context, younger children focus primarily on moral reasoning, whereas older children are more multifaceted in their interpretations of incidents, and are able to focus more on social-conventional and psychological components of the social interaction. Although this study presents an initial insight into the relevance of examining bystanders’ social-moral reasoning it is not clear how these findings relate to helping versus non-helping bystander responses. Moreover, the modified version of the SDT framework is not in line with more established social-moral reasoning frameworks (Killen, 2007; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; Mulvey et al., 2014), therefore reliability of these findings is questionable. These limitations are addressed in the studies presented within this thesis, thus providing a more thorough examination of social-moral reasoning about bystander response decisions.
Summarising SDT and social-moral reasoning. Examining how children reason about their evaluations or peers or their decision-making in social contexts can help to determine what concerns are prioritised when judging peer attitudes and behaviours. As is evidenced by the preceding empirical examples, the application of SDT has clear relevance for understanding intergroup social exclusion (Killen et al, 2007; Killen, 2007). Findings from these studies are in line with predictions of SIDT and DSGD showing that, with age, children become increasingly aware of intergroup factors and provide comparatively more social-conventional reasoning compared to their younger counterparts (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen, Rutland et al, 2013; Mulvey et al, 2014).

Regarding developmental trends, studies show that older children who are presented with an incident of social exclusion are less likely to provide a negative evaluation of the act compared to younger children. Moreover, older children are more likely to engage in multifaceted reasoning when justifying their evaluation of an act of exclusion. For example, despite the excluded individual being upset (moral reasoning), it might be OK to exclude them if they are preventing the success of the group (social-conventional reasoning) (Killen, 2007; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013).

Thus, examining children and adolescents’ social-moral reasoning allows researchers to tease out the precise aspect of the social situation that participants focus on when justifying evaluations, whilst simultaneously considering intergroup factors for children’s evaluations. When applying this framework to the investigation of developmental trends in helpful bystander intentions, examining social-moral reasoning could tell us more than examining evaluations alone. For example, participants could indicate that as a bystander they would help a bullied peer. However, without knowing the motivations for this decision – or how intergroup factors such as group membership effect these motivations - it would be harder to effectively tailor interventions to promote further helpful bystander responses. Additionally,
justifications for choices not to help a bullied peer could indicate what types of concerns should be highlighted in anti-bullying interventions. According to research conducted to date, it is possible that children and adolescents will highlight different motivations behind their bystander decisions (e.g., Killen, 2007; Mulvey et al., 2014).

As well as group membership influences, findings from Killen et al., (2013) show that specific group norms (i.e., those belonging to the bystander group) could affect participants' judgments and reasoning about the appropriateness of the bystander behaviour. Based on these earlier findings, developmental trends the effect of group-specific bystander norms could be observed, whereby older children may adhere more readily to group-specific norms (e.g., not getting involved; see Chapter 2 for findings on age-typical bystander responses). Potentially then, these developmental differences in norm understanding could result in different evaluations of the bystanders, and consequently different reasoning motivations. The intergroup SDT approach could therefore be incredibly beneficial when attempting to understand when and why children and adolescents help peers who experience bullying.

**Bringing Social-Developmental Intergroup Theory Together**

Social identity development theory, the model of developmental subjective group dynamics, and social-moral reasoning from a social domain theory perspective combine to inform researchers as to why developmental differences in children's understanding of intergroup contexts can be observed. Together, empirical evidence stemming from these three approaches provides a clear rationale for the consideration of intergroup factors in children's evaluations of peers, and decision-making about their social world. These three theories collectively draw from a social identity tradition, whilst offering explanations for the developmental differences identified between children and adolescents. Therefore they have valuable applications for understanding the age decline currently observed, but unexplained, in children and adolescents' bystander responses to incidents of verbal aggression.
Specifically, these theories inform us of the important roles of group membership and social identification, group norms and social-moral reasoning, for children's evaluations of peers in the social context (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013).

Recently Rutland, Killen and Abrams (2010) have argued for the importance of examining children's attitudes and behaviours from an intergroup perspective, by investigating how group identity and group norms, and the development of moral beliefs such as fairness, inclusion, equality and justice, interact in children's evaluations of the social world. They argue that, with age, group membership and group functioning becomes increasingly influential upon children's moral beliefs, thus effecting their consequent evaluations of different social events, and the peers involved in them. This process, that integrates traditions of social psychology through social identity theory and developmental psychology through the social domain approach, has been coined the "social reasoning developmental" (SRD) perspective (Rutland et al., 2010). Essentially, the SRD perspective allows predictions from the DSGD model and the SDT framework to complimentarily inform what we know of children's understanding of the social world. Although a new approach, recent empirical evidence has begun to demonstrate the validity of the SRD perspective (cf., Abrams et al., 2013; Killen, Rutland, et al., 2013; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013); findings to date suggest that integrating the aforementioned theoretical approaches can strengthen research on children and adolescents’ social interactions.

The SRD approach does not specifically incorporate the social identity development theory. However, SIDT and DSGD are both grounded in social identity theory and they both emphasize the importance of group membership, group norms, and understanding of group functioning for children's evaluations of peers. In addition, the SIDT has more often been tested in the context of intergroup bullying and aggression, making it contextually relevant to combine with the SRD approach for this thesis. Moreover, initial
research has combined predictions from SIDT and SDT to examine six and nine year olds' attitudes towards an intergroup act of aggression, when the participant is in the position of a bystander, or "observer" (Nesdale et al., 2013). The study examined the role of group membership and group identification, as well as the extent to which the ingroup aggressor's behaviour towards an outgroup victim was perceived to be right or wrong (moral judgment). The aim was to identify whether the group membership of the bystander (ingroup member vs. an independent observer) influenced the moral cognition employed, and the bystander attitude (i.e., to what extent should the group exclude the aggressor), to a relational or directly aggressive act.

Findings showed that the group membership of the bystander influenced responses, including the attitude towards the aggressor and the moral judgment of the act, across both age groups. For example, ingroup bystanders liked the aggressor more, perceived their behaviour to be less morally wrong, and were less likely to think the aggressor should be excluded from the ingroup (although it must be acknowledged that overall, the aggressive act was perceived negatively). Furthermore, in comparison to older children, the younger participants considered the aggression to be more morally wrong, reported lower favourability ratings of the aggressor, and thought more strongly that the ingroup should exclude the aggressor. Nesdale et al., (2013) emphasise the role of “social acumen” (understanding of group membership and group norms) in the age differences reported. With age, children become more aware of group expectations and repercussions, and their responses might reflect their understanding of the ingroup's norms. However, normative behaviours were not measured or manipulated in this particular study, so it is difficult to draw conclusions about the key role of group norms for developmental differences in bystander responses.
Despite this, Nesdale et al., (2013) highlight the relevance of social identity development theory, group memberships and moral judgment, for children's decision making in the bystander context. Furthermore, alongside findings from intergroup social exclusion (e.g., Abrams et al., 2013; Killen, 2007; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013), these research areas highlight the necessity for research that examines the effect of social experience, understanding of groups ("social acumen"), and group norms on children and adolescent’s bystander responses. The studies presented within this thesis address each of these areas. Unlike Nesdale et al (2013) the research presented within this thesis examines which intergroup factors lead to helpful bystander intentions; how the effects of intergroup factors vary across a broader age range; and how children and adolescents reason about both their own bystander intentions, and the chosen behaviours of other peer bystanders.

**Summary**

The “intergroup” approach encompasses predictions from three social developmental theories, namely social identity development theory (Duffy & Nesdale, 2012; Nesdale, 2008); the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD; Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams et al., 2013), and social-moral reasoning from a social domain theory (SDT) perspective (Killen, 2007; Turiel, 1983). Collectively, these theoretical frameworks suggest that, to fully understand children’s social interactions, intergroup factors must be taken into consideration. These factors include group membership, group norms, intergroup status, and social-moral reasoning (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013).

Importantly, the intergroup perspective offers predictions regarding developmental differences in children’s and adolescents’ interpretations of social episodes. Research has shown that, with age, children become increasingly aware of the importance of behaving in line with group norms (e.g., Nesdale et al., 2008; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). Moreover, with age, children become more aware of the complexities of group expectations, and the potential
result of challenging ingroup norms, compared to behaving in line with them (Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams et al., 2009). These complexities translate to the ways in which older participants tend to reason about their evaluations of peers (e.g., Killen, 2007; Killen, Rutland, et al., 2013; Mulvey et al., 2014), with studies showing that older participants are more likely to draw on multiple concerns when justifying evaluations of peers during intergroup contexts.

Despite the overwhelming support for intergroup influences being present in the social development of children and adolescents, this approach has not yet been applied to examine developmental differences in helpful bystander responses when faced with incidents of verbal aggression. However, the theoretical review presented above highlights key predictions which can inform the present research question.

**Implications for Present Research**

The studies presented in this thesis are informed by the proposition that examining intergroup factors derived from SIDT and DSGD, alongside those of SDT, can shed more light on the conditions required to encourage helpful bystander intentions. This in turn can edify researchers and practitioners as to how intergroup factors affect developmental differences in bystander responses. In the intergroup context of an incident of verbal aggression, the social dynamics of the situation (e.g., the person being called names is not in my social group; this situation is nothing to do with me and my friends; my group think it's important to help others; if I get involved what will my group think of me?); and identifying children's moral beliefs about the act itself (e.g., name-calling is wrong; people should help those in need) are important factors for consideration. Combined, these considerations draw upon the moral acceptability of the act, the social group memberships of those involved, group norms, and an individual's ability to infer group preferences and outcomes. Considering the tenets of the social-developmental approaches described within this chapter,
the examination of children and adolescents' bystander responses is a relevant and meaningful context for extending and applying these theories, in addition to understanding the considerations held by young people when faced with incidents of aggression or bullying among peers.

Three studies testing the predictions of SIDT, DSGD and SDT are presented within this thesis. Study 1 (Chapter 5) manipulates the role of group membership (ingroup or outgroup school) and measures social identification and group norms. Developmental changes in helpful bystander intentions, and social-moral reasoning about these intentions when faced with intergroup verbal aggression are also measured. Study 2 (Chapter 6) extends the SIDT approach further by examining the role of intergroup status and bystander response on participants’ subsequent evaluations of a bystander faced with an incident of verbal aggression. Social-moral reasoning about these evaluations is also measured. In addition, two types of peer-group norms (an expectation norm and a behavioural norm) are measured to determine how normative different bystander behaviours are viewed to be, and what age differences might be present within this.

Study 3 (Chapter 7) provides a novel inter-ethnic group context (Traveller or British) in addition to a school intergroup context (ingroup or outgroup school). The group memberships of the aggressor, victim, bystander and participant are all controlled, and group-specific norms are manipulated (in line with DSGD and SDT) to examine the causal effect of norms on participants’ evaluations of bystanders who may challenge their group’s norm. Social-moral reasoning is also examined, along with developmental differences. Additionally, study three examines whether participants perceive that deviant bystander behaviours (i.e., those that challenge the group’s norm) as likely to invite negative repercussions (e.g., social exclusion) from the peer group.
Chapter 4

Methodological Considerations in the Study of Bystander Responses

A range of methodologies have been employed to measure children and adolescents’ bystander responses to incidents of bullying at school. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the appropriate methodology in order to test the aims of this thesis. This will involve reviewing the most commonly-employed methodologies to examine: (1) measures of bystander responses to incidents of verbal aggression, and (2) measures used to test the effect of intergroup variables on developmental differences in bystander responses. The strengths and weaknesses of the following measures and techniques will be reviewed: observation (Atlas & Pepler, 1998; O’Connell et al, 1999); self-report (Gini, 2006; Jones et al, 2009; Nesdale & Scarlett, 2004; Rigby & Johnson, 2006); peer-nomination (Salmivalli et al, 1996; Sutton & Smith, 1999); and the use of multiple measures (Monks et al, 2003). Examples of experimental research methods and their use in examining the influence of intergroup factors on children and adolescents’ attitudes and behaviours will also be presented. Following these reviews, the value of examining influences on bystander intentions will be reiterated. This chapter concludes by summarising the method employed in the studies presented within this thesis.

Chapter Overview

Within this chapter the strengths and weaknesses of different measures of bystander intervention among children and adolescents, in response to incidents of bullying and aggression, are reviewed. This review will form the rationale for the methodology and measures employed within the present thesis. First, a critical review of key bystander response measures will be presented, including: observational studies (Atlas & Pepler, 1998; O’Connell et al, 1999), self-report measures (Gini, 2006; Gini et al, 2008; Jones et al, 2009; Rigby & Johnson, 2006), peer-nomination (Salmivalli et al, 1996; Sutton & Smith, 1999), “mixed methods” (where more than one bystander response measure is employed) (Monks et
al, 2003), and experimental designs (e.g., Nesdale et al., 2008; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013). Next research that emphasises the importance of examining bystander responses to a specific bullying incident, rather than general bullying episodes, will be presented (Espelage & Swearer, 2003; Vaillancourt et al., 2008). Third, the benefits of examining bystander intentions will be reviewed (Nesdale et al., 2008). Finally, the methodological design employed in the studies within this thesis (experimental and self-report) will be summarised.

**Measuring Bystander Responses**

Although the present thesis focusses on children’s bystander responses to verbal aggression (see Chapter 2), the majority of studies examine bystander responses to bullying more generally. Consequently, for the purpose of this review, measures of bystander responses to both specific and general bullying episodes will be included.

**Observation**

Early research employed observational methods to shed light on when peers, as bystanders, are also involved in bullying situations. Observational studies typically involve trained researchers observing participants on the playground (Pepler & Craig, 1995) or in the classroom (Atlas & Pepler, 1998). This is achieved by employing video and radio recording materials, followed by independent coding of peer involvement with bullying episodes. For instance, Atlas and Pepler (1998) used this technique to study the involvement of peers and teachers during the bully-victim interaction. Coders identified “bullying” by whether actions in the classroom met a range of criteria (i.e., power balance, intention to harm, victim distress; refer to Chapter 2); this included both direct and indirect bullying behaviours. Twenty-eight hours of recordings were collected, from which 70 bullying incidents were identified. Peer bystanders were present during 85% of bullying incidents; their behaviour was also coded as being socially appropriate (informing an adult or talking directly to the
bully or victim) or socially inappropriate (trying to prevent the bullying in an aggressive manner).

One strength of observational studies is that they are high in external validity (Pepler & Craig, 1995). They are able to provide an interesting insight into actual bystander behaviour, as opposed to attitudes or intentions alone. Additionally, observational research can lead to further study through more systematic and experimental research designs. However, this is also a key limitation of observational designs. To date, observational research has inferred what might influence bystander responses, but has not explicitly identified factors which can causally affect different types of bystander response.

Additionally, although it has been suggested that social desirability is reduced within observational measures, participants are still typically aware that their behaviour is being recorded (Atlas & Pepler, 1998; Craig & Pepler, 1997). Indeed, Pepler and Craig (1995) identified presentational concerns among older children (aged 11 to 12). Younger children were far less likely to react to video and audio equipment employed to monitor them. It was suggested that this was because they are not capable of prolonged self-monitoring (Pepler & Craig, 1995). Considering the focus of examining developmental trends within the present thesis, it is important that measures employed to accurately test bystander responses to bullying will not confound potential age differences in findings.

Peer Nomination

Salmivalli and colleagues have developed a peer nomination paradigm to measure the “roles” of children and adolescents who are present during bullying incidents (e.g., Karna, Voeten, Poskiparta & Salmivalli, 2010; Salmivalli et al., 1996; Salmivalli, Huttunen & Lagerspetz, 1997; Salmivalli, Lappalainen & Lagerspetz, 1998; Salmivalli & Nieminen, 2002; Salmivalli & Voeten, 2004; Salmivalli, 2010). This entails measuring past bystander
behaviours from the perspective of peers. Participants are provided with a definition of bullying, based on the criteria of repetition, intent to harm, and imbalance of power (e.g., Olweus, 1994). Participants then evaluate (on a 3 point scale) how well each child in their class fits a number of “participant roles” that are present during a bullying context.

The descriptions of participant roles are collapsed into the roles of: bully (starts bullying; makes the others join in with the bullying; always finds new ways of harassing the victim); reinforcer of the bully (comes around to see the situation; laughs; incites the bully by shouting, "show him/her!"); assistant of the bully (joins in the bullying when someone else has started it; assists the bully; helps the bully, maybe by catching the victim); defender of the victim (comforts the victim or encourages him/her to tell the teacher about the bullying; tells the others to stop bullying; tries to make the others stop bullying); and outsider (is not usually present in bullying situations; stays outside the situation; doesn't take sides with anyone). Collectively, these items form the Participant Role Questionnaire (PRQ), developed by Salmivalli et al (1996). Children within the sample are considered to hold a particular participant role if they score above the mean for that item. For each participant, the role that they are most frequently ascribed by fellow classmates is the role that the researchers assign them. This methodology can therefore inform researchers as to the most frequent participant roles an individual engages in, as observed by peers. Other measures are often included in peer-nomination studies. Typically correlations with other indicators of behaviour, such as empathy, self-efficacy, or classroom expectations are then examined (e.g., Poyhonen et al., 2012; Salmivalli & Voeten, 2004).

Salmivalli and colleagues suggest that peer-nomination procedures are more accurate than asking individuals to indicate their own bystander responses (i.e., through self-report). Peer nomination is also more accurate than asking teachers to nominate students for bystander roles (Monks et al., 2003). However, it is also acknowledged that peers might not
always know who in their class fits each type of bystander role. To help address this limitation Sainio, Veenstra, Huitsing and Salmivalli (2010) adapted the peer nomination technique to evaluate the victim's peer nominations of defenders in their class. Participants were given a bullying definition. If they then indicated that they had been bullied they were asked to nominate who had defended them. Asking participants to report who had defended them rather than whether or not they had been defended was considered more valid by the research team and is one way of reducing the limitations of peer-nomination techniques.

Unlike observation, peer nomination procedures allow for larger samples of students to participate. Additionally, peer nomination methodologies allow researchers to investigate the associations between individual and social factors on different types of bystander roles. For example, Salmivalli and Voeten (2004) investigated the roles of age, gender and anti-bullying attitudes, finding that defending the victim decreased with age, and defending or staying outside of bullying situations was associated with moral disproval (refer to theoretical Chapter 2 for more detail). Although the correlational design prevents causal links from being identified within single studies (Gini et al., 2008), large-scale longitudinal intervention projects have successfully incorporated this measure into their investigations (e.g., Karna et al., 2011).

However, the peer nomination technique presents some weaknesses. As part of the peer nomination procedure, researchers ask participants to reflect on previous experience of peers’ bystander behaviour in response to a criteria-based definition of bullying (e.g., as intentional, repeated, with a status imbalance; Olweus, 1994). Peer nominations therefore rely on classmates’ ability to 1) be present when a bullying episode occurs; 2) accurately identify the incident as bullying; and 3) recognise the bystander roles within these episodes. Consequently, a bystander who discretely and anonymously reports a bullying incident will likely go unnoticed; as could subtle incidents of bullying (Obermann, 2011).
Indeed, studies conducted among both children (Guerin & Hennessy, 2002) and adolescents (Vaillancourt et al., 2008) show that the general definition of “bullying” that is frequently employed in peer nomination studies is very subjective. For example, participants consider verbal bullying, physical bullying, social exclusion, psychological bullying, and taking things as forms of bullying behaviour but are unlikely to report that bullying is intentional, must be repeated, or requires a physical imbalance (Guerin & Hennessy, 2002; Vaillancourt et al., 2008). Vaillancourt et al (2008) showed that using bullying definitions led to under-reporting of bullying behaviours. This directly affects participants’ reporting of peers’ bystander responses, as if there is no bullying incident to respond to then there is no bystander response.

Differences in children and adolescents’ interpretation of bullying (e.g., Monks & Smith, 2006; Smith, et al., 2002), along with children’s inability to detect more subtle forms of bullying behaviour, could also directly influence age differences in bystander responses when a definition is employed instead of a specific form of bullying behaviour (Smith & Levan, 1995; Smith, Madsen & Moody, 1999). Additionally, the use of a general bullying definition assumes that each bystander nominated responds in similar ways regardless of the type of bullying or aggression that they witness. This is a problem for the application of findings as it suggests that motivators of defending behaviour would be similar when faced with any form of bullying, which other researchers have found is not the case (Lean, 1999, in Rigby & Johnson, 2006).

Peer nomination procedures may also present difficulties when conducting research across age groups. As peer nominations often require classmates to nominate each other this technique may be more accurate among primary school children, where students are taught and interact mostly with one set of classmates. Reports would be less accurate in secondary school settings where students typically have different classmates depending on the subject.
they are being taught. It would therefore be harder for participants to have a reliable understanding of peers’ actions. Indeed, employing this measure might lead participants to draw more upon assumptions about classmates’ behaviour. This might still achieve a general consensus among participants, but it would not necessarily reflect reality.

Restrictions for application of findings are also present with the peer-nomination methodology. Despite the bystander roles themselves being clearly constructed and defined, they do not allow participants to indicate that bystander responses for a peer might vary depending on the bullying context (see Salmivalli et al., 1996). Peer nomination procedure also does not allow for a peer to engage in more than one bystander role. It is feasible that participants might be a “defender” one day, and an “outsider” the next. Bystanders may even change strategy during an incident; for example, if an initial response is unsuccessful. Using this measure might then prevent accuracy of identifying contextual and environmental factors that could influence different bystander responses beyond individual characteristics.

Self-Report

Another methodological technique commonly used with children and adolescents is the use of self-report measures. In the context of bystander roles, this involves the participant indicating their past bystander responses (Trach et al., 2011; Trach, et al, 2010), their intended bystander response (Jones et al, 2009; Rigby & Johnson, 2006), or their attitude towards members involved in a particular social interaction (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams et al., 2009; Nesdale et al., 2013). Some researchers have employed this technique in conjunction with bullying definitions. This involves a criteria-specific definition of bullying (e.g., that bullying is repeated, intentional, and involves a status imbalance; Olweus, 1994) being given to participants before they are asked to indicate how often they have engaged in different bystander responses (e.g., Trach et al, 2011; Trach et al, 2010). Other researchers
employ self-report measures after the presentation of a scenario depicting a specific form of bullying or aggression (e.g. Gini, 2006; Jones et al, 2009; Rigby & Johnson, 2006).

One example of the use of self-report measures is the study of Trach et al (2010). With a sample of 9397 participants aged 9 to 18 Trach et al (2010) examined bystander responses to four forms of bullying: physical, verbal, social and cyberbullying. The 65% of participants who reported being a bystander to a bullying episode in the past year were asked to rate how frequently they had engaged in 16 different bystander responses. Due to the number of bystander responses provided, Trach and colleagues attempted to reduce the types of bystander responses indicated by using factor analysis. As factor analysis did not provide distinct factors, items that were highly correlated were averaged into composite indicators of bystander behaviour. The combined types of bystander response included: “talked to an adult”, “helped the victim”, and “told the bully to stop”. Nine of the items did not correlate with one another and were analysed separately, leaving 12 bystander items in total. These 12 bystander responses were analysed for age, gender and experience of bullying and victimisation differences separately (see also Chapter 2).

A second study conducted by Trach et al (2011) asked a sample of over fifty thousand participants aged 13 to 18 to complete a questionnaire using a self-report technique, following the same procedure as Trach et al (2010). A factor analysis showed that 7 items tapped into reports of previous “prosocial” bystander intervention. These included: told the bully to stop, talked to the victim afterwards, helped the victim, talked to the bully, got friends to help solve the problem, talked to the bully’s friends, distracted the bully. Four items tapped into the bystander response to tell an adult: talked to an adult at school, reported it to an adult at school, talked to an adult at home, stayed home from school. Three items indicated “passive” bystander responses: walked away, ignored or avoided the bully, did nothing. Two remaining items loaded across the remaining factors: talked to another student,
got friends to get back at the bully. Composite measures of each type of bystander response (prosocial, tell an adult, passive) were then used as part of a cross-sectional analysis on the effects of age, gender and differences in experiences of being a bully or victim.

The value of the self-report methodology employed by Trach and colleagues is that they allow for participants to indicate their engagement in numerous bystander roles. However, the use of a general bullying definition presents the same difficulties for this procedure as for the peer nomination technique employed by Salmivalli and colleagues (Guerin & Hennessy, 2002; Obermann, 2011; Vaillancourt et al., 2008).

Rigby and Johnson (2006) also used self-report measures. However, they emphasise the importance of measuring a clearly defined bullying situation when measuring bystander responses. Instead of a bullying definition, they presented participants with cartoons depicting a physical bullying episode in the presence of bystanders. This bullying-specific scenario methodology was selected in order to provide a realistic real-life situation that bystanders may experience when faced with a bullying episode, which might not be achieved by a bullying definition alone (Rigby & Johnson, 2006). Two hundred participants from primary and secondary schools in Australia viewed the videotaped scenario. They were shown pictures of bystanders who objected to the bullying (supporting the victim), supported the bully, or were ignoring what was happening. Participants indicated whether they would also behave in the same way as these bystanders. Response options included: I certainly would, I probably would, I’m really unsure, I probably would not, and I certainly would not. A strength of this specific measure is its neutrality in presenting positive and negative responses to bullying, potentially reducing social desirability concerns (Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Salmivalli et al., 1996).
A key strength of self-report methodologies is that, unlike peer-nominations, participants are reporting on their own past behaviours or bystander intentions. Quite reasonably it could be assumed that individuals are more knowledgeable of their own bystander experiences than the experiences of peers. Indeed, asking participants to indicate their own intentions, attitudes or evaluations regarding a certain situation is frequently employed in research on children’s social-moral reasoning (e.g., Killen et al., 2012; Mulvey et al., 2014; Nesdale et al., 2013; refer to Chapter 3 for more detail). Asking participants to provide self-reports also enables them to provide justifications for their responses. These justifications help pinpoint the motivations behind responding in a certain way, which can be particularly valuable when informing research, policy or school-based interventions (Killen et al., 2007). In contrast to peer nomination procedures, this technique can shed light on the motivations behind participants’ own bystander responses.

A further strength is the way in which self-report measures are used as a dependent variable when examining predictors of bystander behaviour (e.g., Trach et al., 2010; Trach et al., 2011). Additionally, self-report measures could more accurately identify age trends across different age groups than some other measures of bystander intentions. It is possible that the accuracy of age differences in bystander responses is higher when participants are indicating how they would respond to a specific form of bullying, as prevalence of different forms of bullying can vary with age (Wang et al., 2009).

The main criticism of self-report methods is the capacity for socially desirable responses (Salmivalli et al., 1996). Despite finding positive correlations between both peer and self-nominations on the Participant Role Scale (PRS) Salmivalli et al (1996) interpreted that there was a higher prevalence rate on self-report measures among positively perceived bystander roles and lower rates among less desirable roles, in comparison to peer nomination measures, as an indicator of self-serving bias. However Rigby and Johnson (2006) found only
a small correlation between bystander intentions and social desirability existed when using self-report.

Rigby and Johnson (2006) suggest that social desirability presents a minor influence, and that other factors present during bullying instances are more likely to prevent bystanders from engaging in helpful behaviour. Moreover, they posit that employing a bullying-specific paradigm as opposed to a general bullying definition can help overcome the potential for socially desirable responses (Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Salmivalli et al., 1996). They argue that this gives participants a better ability to weigh up the costs and benefits of different bystander responses in these specific situations. Therefore participants might not be as concerned about social desirability in their self-report bystander responses to specific bullying incidents as they are more able to appreciate that helping a bullied peer could be challenging (e.g., a risk of becoming the victim, or not knowing how to help) (Rigby & Johnson, 2006).

**Multiple Measures**

In an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of individual bystander measures, some researchers have employed multiple measures in order to accurately tap into bystander responses during bullying episodes. In earlier research on bystander responses multiple measures were more common. For example, Salmivalli et al (1996) employed both peer and self-reports to validate their study on bystander roles. Although associations between the two measures were present, discrepancies also existed, leading some researchers to concentrate on employing single techniques. However, in order to overcome the criticisms of individual measures researchers sometimes employ multiple measures so as to improve the validity of findings (Monks et al., 2003; Obermann, 2011).
Obermann (2011) employed both peer-nomination and self-report measures in one study of bystander responses during bullying episodes. She found that both self-reported and peer-nominated bullies increasingly responded as unconcerned bystanders. In comparison those who were identified as victims were increasingly likely to undertake a defending bystander role. Importantly, Obermann (2011) found that there are a higher number of self-reported defenders in comparison to peer-nominated defenders. She states that it is unclear whether this is due to self-report bias and social desirability or whether peer-nominations under-identify defenders due to cases of subtle intervention and helping that are not easily observed.

Another example of employing mixed measures is that of Monks et al (2003). They examined the level of agreement between peer, self and teacher bystander nominations, finding benefits and limitations for each method. Firstly, peer nomination was less prone to social desirability bias and allowed for the probability that peers are more aware of bystander responses than teachers. As this measure required classmates to nominate each other for the bystander roles, up to thirty nominations could be made within one class, thus increasing reliability. However, Monks et al (2003) found that children mainly nominated friends into roles, still presenting possible bias. Self-reports enabled participants to report bystander and bullying experiences, including those where a teacher or classmate may not be present. However, as previously highlighted, this method is open to social desirability bias, where aggressive roles may be underrepresented and prosocial roles may be overrepresented. Teacher reports have been found to be reliable when measuring bully and victim roles; yet with increasing reports from students that teachers are not present during bullying incidents, or are not told about bullying incidents, it is difficult to know how reliable they are for indicating the bystander roles among children (also see Atlas & Pepler, 1998). Particularly in secondary schools this may be an unreliable or inaccurate measure of bystander responses, as
children can be taught by numerous members of staff. Indeed, this criticism also applies to peer nomination measures, as at secondary school children’s classmates may vary depending on the subject taught.

Monks et al. (2003) also examined the relationship between bystander ratings gathered using peer-, self-, and teacher-reports of engagement in bystander roles. They determined that agreement is highest when participants nominate class aggressors (bullies). Agreement between peer and self-reports were also high for victim and defender roles, whereas teachers show lower agreement with both peer and self-reports in this instance. Limitations within the peer nomination technique were observed in that peers were more likely to nominate a classmate they liked for any of the roles. However this could just be because they are more aware of friends’ experiences compared to non-friends. Furthermore, low consistency in nominations were reported across the four month period. Monks et al. (2003) conclude that peer and self-reports have significant agreement for defender roles, but that peer and teacher-reports, as well as teacher and self-reports, do not have a strong enough agreement.

These studies acknowledge that bystander responses could be best measured using mixed methods in order to overcome the limitations of single measures (Monks et al., 2003). Yet even when multiple measures are employed, inconsistencies between them are evident (Barhight, Hubbard & Hyde, 2013). It therefore seems most appropriate to employ the technique that is most beneficial to the aims and design of the study being conducted. Therefore, within this thesis, a scenario of bullying-specific behaviour (i.e., verbal aggression) will be presented to participants, followed by a self-report measure of bystander responses. This technique overcomes limitations that are presented by peer-nomination measures when examining trends across age groups. Additionally, by asking participants to indicate their own responses, it is possible to examine other variables related to this, such as
their social-moral reasoning for a given response (see Chapter 3 for a review of social-moral reasoning).

**Experimental Methods**

The majority of research examining bystander intervention uses observation or self-report surveys, utilising a cross-sectional or longitudinal design. Not much research has been conducted to date using experimental paradigms to study bystander behaviour and bullying (although see Jones et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2012; Nesdale et al., 2013). However, research using experimental paradigms to study group processes and peer relations more broadly may be useful for the current research. Experimental designs have the advantage of allowing researchers to manipulate or control variables. This enables researchers to examine causal effect of variables on, for instance, children’s interpretations of social interactions. Thus, experimental designs are increasingly employed (Gini et al, 2008; Jones et al., 2009; Mulvey et al., 2014; Nesdale et al., 2013). For example, participants might be allocated to different conditions to determine whether reports of bystander response are a direct result of being in a particular condition. In this way, experimentally testing the effect of variables on bystander responses can provide a more reliable understanding of the processes that influence bystander responses compared to other methodological designs.

Research utilising an experimental design usually provides a picture-based scenario where a specific bullying episode among peers is presented to participants. Different aspects of this scenario can be manipulated in order to test related research questions, for example group membership, social norms, and bystander responses (e.g., Duffy & Nesdale, 2009; Gini et al., 2008; Jones et al., 2009). This is followed by a self-report questionnaire about the incident, allowing researchers to measure participants’ bystander responses to the incident (e.g., Jones et al., 2012). Through this methodological design researchers have been able to
investigate the influence of a number of variables on different bystander behaviours to bullying, including: attitudes towards victims and students’ sense of safety in school (Gini et al., 2008); group norms and group-based emotions (Jones et al., 2009); and intergroup status (Nesdale & Scarlett, 2004).

One example of a study that employs an experimental design to test intergroup influences on bullying intentions is that by Nesdale et al (2008). This study tested predictions derived from social identity development theory (SIDT; Duffy & Nesdale, 2012; see also Chapter 3), in the context of bullying. Nesdale and colleagues randomly assign participants to a social group. In an adaptation of the minimal paradigm context (where groups are created for the purpose of the study) participants were randomly assigned a group membership (ingroup) and informed that they were involved in an intergroup drawing competition against another group (outgroup) and group norms were manipulated. Participants’ level of identification with the social group was measured in order to show that this is a meaningful group context to participants. The group norm is then varied across conditions. For example, one group of participants read that their group did not like other groups and would not include outgroup members in their activities (i.e., a norm for outgroup dislike and rejection). A second group of participants read that their group did like other groups and liked to include outgroup members in their activities (i.e., outgroup liking and inclusion). Nesdale et al (2008) wanted to observe whether this difference in group norm affected children's intentions to bully (Nesdale et al., 2008).

Bullying intentions were measured using three scenarios that contained hypothetical social situations within an intergroup context. A scale was presented so that participants could indicate the likelihood they would also engage in the bullying behaviour described in the vignette. Evidently, the experimental procedure was carefully controlled in order to test subtle differences during intergroup contexts.
Experimental methods have also been employed to examine predictions of the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD) (Abrams et al., 2003) and social domain theory (SDT) (Killen, 2007; see also Chapter 3). One study combined predictions from both DSGD and SDT (Killen, Rutland et al., 2013) to determine the effect of group membership and type of group norm (i.e., moral or social-conventional) on participants’ evaluations of group members who did or did not adhere to their group’s norm. Participants from two age groups read a total of four scenarios about social exclusion incidents. The content of these scenarios was manipulated in order to test differences in evaluations of group members. Two scenarios were presented in a social-conventional context, where the generic norm was to wear an assigned group t-shirt and the group-specific norm was to not wear the t-shirt. Another two scenarios were presented in a moral group context, where the generic norm was to divide money equally between the ingroup and an outgroup, and the group-specific norm was to divide money unequally in favour of the ingroup. Participants were introduced to an ingroup and an outgroup. The group norms varied for the ingroup and outgroup members, depending on the condition participants were assigned to.

Participants evaluated a deviant member from the ingroup and a deviant member from the outgroup (e.g., an ingroup and outgroup member who did not adhere to their group's norm). They also provided a reason for their evaluation of the deviant group member. Participants then reported who they thought the group should include (e.g., the deviant ingroup member vs. the normative outgroup member), who they would prefer to include, and a reason for each of their responses.

The experimental design enabled Killen, Rutland et al (2013) to determine how group norms and group membership directly affected participants’ evaluations of members who deviated from these group norms. This example shows how experimental methods can be used to examine very specific influences on children’s and adolescents’ responses to social
situations. By determining precisely what affects children’s evaluations, researchers can reach more concrete conclusions as to how to improve or influence negative evaluations.

**Measuring Intentions**

A key criticism of some self-report measures of bystander response and scenario-based paradigms is that participants indicate what they think they would do - their intentions - if they were in the hypothetical situation, rather than what their actual bystander behaviour is (e.g., Salmivalli et al., 1996). This criticism extends to experimental designs, which typically draw on scenario-based paradigms and self-report measures of evaluations and attitudes. Although it is important to acknowledge that measuring intentions is not the same as measuring actual behaviour, it is also important to recognise that measuring attitudes or intentions has great value. Understanding the nuanced influence of different variables on children and adolescents’ social interactions is vitally important to the present research context. Indeed, measuring intentions has enabled researchers to contribute to the growing evidence showing the influence of group based factors in guiding the responses of bystanders (Gini, 2006). Moreover, experimentally measuring intentions alleviates the challenge of manipulating variables in real-life situations where practical and ethical limitations may present themselves.

In addition, researchers highlight the predictive value of behavioural intentions for actual behaviour (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Duffy & Nesdale, 2012; Nesdale et al., 2008; Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Smith & McSweeney, 2007). Indeed, research has shown that intentions are one of the strongest predictors of actual behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). This reiterates the importance of examining predictors of intentions when measures of actual behaviour are not available. Supporting the value of examining intentions, in the context of prosocial behaviour, research has shown that adult intentions for charitable giving predict actual
charitable donations four weeks later (Smith & McSweeney, 2007). Moreover, a recent study on adolescents’ bystander responses has shown that bystander intentions are predictive of actual bystander behaviour. After participants indicated their intention to intervene when faced with a name-calling incident, they were then asked to monitor an online chat room. Increased reports of helpful bystander intentions predicted the likelihood of intervention in the chat room (Abbott & Cameron, 2014a).

Moreover, examining intentions has the additional benefit of providing schools with information about specific forms of bullying behaviours, as it is within reason to expect that bystander responses would vary as a function of bullying type (Lean, 1999; in Rigby & Johnson, 2006). Indeed, examining intentions within an experimental design allows researchers to examine particular research questions and test hypothesis that they would not otherwise be able to study. Yet, it remains important that researchers employing experimental designs consider the potential differences between intentional and actual bystander responses, and develop new practices in order to show further support for their association (e.g., Kozlov & Johansen, 2010).

**General Methodological Concerns: Bullying Definitions**

Importantly, researchers highlight that when asking participants about bystander responses to bullying it is imperative, for the validity and application of findings, that the participant is able to accurately identify the behaviour that they are being asked to consider and respond to (Espelage & Swearer, 2003; Vaillancourt et al., 2008). Although no universal definition of bullying exists, a general consensus within the research literature suggests that the term "bullying" refers to behaviours that hurt or harm another person; they are behaviours that are intentional; they can be physical or psychological, and repeated over time (Monks & Smith, 2006). Additionally, there is a power imbalance between the perpetrator and the target, which can be social, psychological or physical, making it difficult for the victim to
defend themselves (Olweus, 1994; Rigby, 2002). These criteria of bullying behaviours (i.e., intention, repetition, imbalance of power) are present in many of the bullying definitions given to children and adolescents participating in studies on bullying and bystander behaviours (e.g., Karna, Voeten, Poskiparta & Salmivalli, 2010; Sainio, Veenstra, Huitsing & Salmivalli, 2010; Salmivalli & Voeten, 2005; Whitney & Smith, 1993; see also Chapter 2).

However, researchers have recently argued that when measuring bystander responses to bullying, a broad definition of “bullying” may lead to inaccurate reports of bystander response (Espelage & Swearer, 2003; Vaillancourt et al., 2008).

Questions have been raised as to whether broader bullying definitions serve to restrict the reliability and application of anti-bullying research (see Carrera et al, 2011; Espelage Bosworth & Simon, 2001; Smith, 2004). It appears that a simple way of overcoming potential misinterpretation of bullying by participants is to focus on specific forms of bullying behaviour rather than a criteria-based definition (Arora, 1996; Rigby & Johnson, 2006). In order to achieve reliable results, it is vital that specific forms of bullying are referred to when examining bystander responses. This would allow researchers to investigate differences in responses due to the specific type of bullying or aggression. Additionally, bullying-specific methods would provide more accurate results regarding how to encourage helpful bystander responses to specific problem behaviours in schools. Consequently, the studies within this thesis focus on bystander responses to incidents of verbal aggression, or “name-calling”, the most common form of bullying among both children and adolescents (Smith & Shu, 2000; see Chapter 2 for a review).

**Summary**

A number of different bystander measures and methodologies are employed to determine bystander responses to episodes of bullying. The measures reviewed within this chapter (i.e., observation, peer nomination, self-report, multiple methods) bear their own
strengths and weaknesses. Atlas and Pepler (1998) utilised the observational technique in order to provide insights beyond those of self-report, enable validation of self-report findings, and to bring to light bystander behaviour during bullying incidents that may well be excluded from self-report information. However, observational research is time-consuming, expensive, and it is not always possible to be covert or to achieve enough observation data to provide reliable and representative findings (Frey, Hirschenstein, Edstrom & Snell, 2005).

Peer nomination techniques have been considered more reliable than both observational and self-report methodologies due to the number of nominations that can be achieved within a class and their resistance to social desirability effects (Salmivalli et al., 1996; Salmivalli & Voeten, 2004). Peer nomination is commonly used to investigate associations with other variables, but can lack the experimental design that is required to manipulate variables and determine causal relationships with variables. Despite this they offer a welcome insight into bystander roles to general bullying incidents, and have frequently been used to inform school policies and large scale interventions (e.g., Karna, Voeten, Little, Poskiparta, Kaljonene & Salmivalli, 2011). Importantly, a limitation of the accuracy of this methodology is that it relies on all classmates’ presence during bullying episodes in order to be accurate; this is particularly difficult to achieve among secondary school participants who do not have fixed classes.

Self-report measures of bystander intentions appear to be the most appropriate technique for examining causal effects of group-based variables on bystander responses (e.g., Gini, 2006; Gini et al., 2008). Although open to social desirability effects (Salmivalli et al., 1996), research has shown that an indication of bystander responses via self-reports are often associated with findings from peer-nomination techniques (Monks et al., 2003; Rigby & Johnson, 2006), despite achieving higher scores on arguably more “socially acceptable” bystander responses (i.e., the role of defender; Salmivalli et al., 1996). However, when
comparing self-report and peer nomination techniques, the argument that higher scores on self-report measures are due to social desirability have been disputed. Some researchers have suggested that, instead, peer nominations for defending behaviours might be lower than self-reported defending because classmates are not able to be present at all bullying incidents. However, to reduce the potential for socially desirable answers, producing scenarios and contextually relevant examples of bullying behaviours, such as specific forms of bullying within a school environment, are advised (Rigby & Johnson, 2006).

A further concern of self-report measures and, more generally, experimental methods, is that they measure attitudes or intentions rather than actual behaviours (Salmivalli et al., 1996). Indeed, actual behaviours can be difficult to measure, both practically and ethically, when in the context of responses to bullying among peers. Research has not only identified the predictive power of intentions for behaviour more generally (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Smith & McSweeney, 2007), but also in the context of bystander responses (Abbott & Cameron, 2014a). Considering the relevance of intentions for behaviour, it is incredibly valuable to understand the motivators and inhibitors of prosocial bystander intentions.

**Implications for Present Studies**

The review of bystander response measures presented within this chapter highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the main measures used in the field. It is important to consider these strengths and weaknesses in the context of the present thesis. The aim of this thesis is to examine the effect of intergroup factors on the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses to bullying. Therefore it is important that measures of bystander responses, and the bullying scenario itself, should be suitable for both age groups. Additionally, it must be possible to test the effect of intergroup variables on bystander responses, and examine developmental differences within this. Therefore the current research
utilised an experimental paradigm and asked young people to report their bystander intentions.

Peer-nomination techniques are not suitable for secondary school children, therefore self-report was used. In order to overcome previous limitations of this technique and to increase reliability, a specific form of bullying behaviour was outlined, and children’s anticipated bystander response to this was measured (Guerin & Hennessy, 2002). Bystander responses to a specific form of bullying (verbal aggression) was measured. Verbal aggression was selected because it is the most common form of bullying experienced by both children and adolescents (Smith & Shu, 2000; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002; also refer to Chapter 2).

A second aim of this thesis is to examine the effect of intergroup variables on developmental differences in bystander responses. In order to measure the causal effect of intergroup variables an experimental method is most appropriate because this allows the careful manipulation of different aspects of the bullying scenario. Previous research adopting this method typically involves presenting a scenario where different factors (e.g., group membership) have been manipulated and asking participants to evaluate the scenario, or indicate how they might respond to it. Experimental methods have been shown to effectively identify the role of intergroup factors in the context of evaluations, attitudes and intentions to bully (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; Nesdale et al., 2008). Thus, as well as measuring bystander intentions, the present thesis employs experimental methods to examine the effect of intergroup factors on bystander intentions. As well as measuring the effect of intergroup factors on participants’ own bystander reports, this allows for the effect of intergroup factors on participants’ social-moral reasoning about their bystander responses to be examined.
Employing hypothetical scenarios and self-report measures typically involves the participant providing their own response or intention to the incident. As previously highlighted, measuring bystander intentions is not the same as measuring actual bystander behaviours (Salmivalli et al., 1996); although intentions are a very strong predictor of behaviour (Abbott & Cameron, 2014a; Smith & McSweeney, 2007). However, to strengthen the current research, as well as their own bystander intentions, participants’ evaluations of bystanders who respond in different ways were measured (Study 3).
Chapter 5

The Developmental Decline of Helpful Bystander Intentions: Group membership and Group Norms

This study draws on predictions from the developmental intergroup approach (e.g., Rutland et al., 2010; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; see Chapter 3) to examine the relevance of intergroup factors (group membership, social identification, group norms and social-moral reasoning) in explaining the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses to intergroup bullying (i.e., the aggressor and victim belong to different social groups). Participants (N= 260) aged 8-10 and 13-15 years from the South East of England completed a questionnaire that measured bystander intentions following an incident of intergroup verbal aggression. Participants either read about an ingroup school aggressor and an outgroup school victim, or an outgroup school aggressor and an ingroup school victim. Results showed an association between older participants perception a stronger norm for helpful bystander responses and an increase in participants’ helpful bystander intentions. Perceived severity of the incident also affected bystander intentions among older participants only. A significant moderated mediation analysis showed that the level of ingroup identification among participants partially mediated the relationship between age and helpful bystander intentions, but only when the aggressor was an outgroup member and the victim was an ingroup member. Younger participants employed more moral reasoning than older participants, and older participants employed more psychological reasoning than younger participants. Different forms of reasoning were also associated with bystander intentions to intervene or not intervene.

1 The data presented in this study has been submitted to the British Journal of Developmental Psychology (Palmer, Rutland & Cameron) as part of a revise and resubmit. The author also acknowledges that the data from the ingroup aggressor/outgroup victim condition was collected as part of Sally B. Palmer’s Masters by Research (Study 3; N = 147). This data has been combined with new data collected as part of this PhD (the outgroup aggressor/ingroup victim condition: N = 113) and reanalysed together. The combined data analysis is presented within this chapter.
Helpful Bystander Responses and the Intergroup Approach

When faced with incidents of aggression and bullying among peers, children and adolescent bystanders tend to remain passive or inactive (Atlas & Pepler, 1998; Salmivalli, 2010), and this inactive behaviour increases with age (Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Trach et al., 2011). Yet when young people intervene to help they can be very effective at de-escalating the episode - or stopping it entirely (Aboud & Joong, 2008; Craig & Pepler, 1997). Thus, understanding when and why children and adolescent bystanders helpfully intervene is imperative if schools are to promote helpful responses from peers as a means of reducing bullying.

The present study builds on previous interpersonal and group-focussed research on bystander behaviours (see Chapter 2 for a review). Within this study, a developmental intergroup approach (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; see Chapter 3 for a review) is applied to the problem of a developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions. This approach brings together social identity development theory (SIDT), the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD) and social domain theory’s (SDT) social-moral reasoning framework to examine developmental differences in children’s attitudes and behaviours (see Chapter 3 for a review). The current study presents a novel investigation into the importance of intergroup factors when interpreting developmental variations in children and adolescents’ bystander intentions.

Group Identification, Group Norms and Developmental Trends

The importance of an intergroup approach for understanding children and adolescents’ attitudes and behaviours has been well-established in the contexts of social exclusion (e.g., Abrams et al, 2003; Killen, Rutland et al, 2013) and peer aggression (e.g., Nesdale, 2004; Nesdale & Duffy, 2009; Nesdale et al, 2013). This research has shown the
importance of peer group membership and a shared group identity for the development of children’s attitudes and behaviours (Nesdale & Flessor, 2001; Verkuyten, 2001). When children identify strongly with their ingroup they are more favourable towards that group. In comparison, children can become more negative in attitudes and behaviours directed towards outgroup members (Duffy & Nesdale, 2012).

A recent study showed the importance of group membership when evaluating a peer’s aggressive behavior; finding ingroup members, compared to “third party” observers, were more positive towards ingroup aggressors (Nesdale et al., 2013). In this study Nesdale and colleagues found that, when comparing 6 and 9 year old children, older children were more negative towards the aggressor and were more likely to think the aggressor should be excluded from the group as a result of their behaviour. It is therefore possible that when children strongly identify with their ingroup, and an ingroup member experiences aggression and bullying, ingroup bystanders may be more likely to report helping intentions towards the ingroup peer compared to an outgroup peer. Indeed, research on adult bystander intervention has shown that a sense of shared group identity is associated with increased helping behaviour (Levine et al., 2005). Taken together with Nesdale et al.’s (2013) findings, which show that the shared group membership of bystanders and aggressors are important for children’s attitudes towards the aggressor, the present study tested the importance of group membership and social identification for children and adolescents’ bystander intentions when faced with aggressive bullying.

In addition to the importance of group membership, peer group influence strengthens in importance through adolescence as individuals become more concerned about being socially excluded by other peers and more susceptible to peer group pressure (Brown, Clasen, & Eicher, 1986; Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2010; Killen & Rutland, 2011; Steinberg & Monahan, 2007). Research from a developmental intergroup perspective shows how peer
group norms affect children's and adolescents' judgements of peers from the ingroup and outgroups (e.g., Abrams et al., 2013; Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Killen, Rutland et al, 2013).

Group norms are the expected attitudes and behaviours for group members (i.e., that ingroup members should be loyal). Ultimately, group norms are the glue that holds the group together, and adhering to them helps social groups maintain a positive social identity (Abrams et al., 2007; see Chapter 3). From middle childhood, children are more able to distinguish between ingroup members who conform to group norms, and those that deviate from them (Abrams et al., 2013). Importantly for the present study, the ability to perceive the importance of group norms for group functioning develops with age (Abrams et al., 2003; Duffy & Nesdale, 2012). That is, as children get older, they are more adept at understanding how adhering to group expectations is imperative for the functioning of the group (Abrams et al., 2013; Nesdale, Zimmer-Gembeck & Roxburgh, 2014).

It is therefore possible that children and adolescents’ bystander responses are increasingly shaped by their understanding of relevant group norms for their behaviour. Plausibly, the developmental decline in helpful bystander behaviour (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Trach et al., 2011) could, in part, be explained by an awareness of group membership and group norms. The present study builds upon developmental intergroup research to determine the effect that group membership, ingroup identification and perceived group norms have on children and adolescents’ bystander responses.

Social-Moral Reasoning

Stemming from social domain theory (SDT), examinations of children’s social-moral reasoning has provided a valuable insight to children’s interpretations of transgressions and social events (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983; see Chapter 3 for a review). To date, this approach has been applied to investigate how children and adolescents evaluate and judge decisions to exclude others for reasons related to group membership, including ethnicity,
gender and sexuality (Horn, 2003; Killen, 2007; see Chapter 3 for a review). Exploring children’s social-moral reasoning about social interactions shows what concerns children and adolescents’ prioritise when justifying their attitudes or evaluations within challenging social contexts (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Rutland et al, 2010).

To date, research has shown that from a young age, children are able to acknowledge that social exclusion is wrong. This is a form of “moral” reasoning (e.g., they might get upset; Killen, 1991; Smetana, 1995). However, with age, children become more aware of the multifaceted nature of social interactions (e.g., the relevance of group membership and group norms; Killen, 2007) and are more likely to prioritise other reasons for their judgments. For example, they are more likely to condone exclusion by drawing on group-based, “social-conventional” justifications (e.g., they are not part of our team) or references to personal choice by employing “psychological” reasoning (e.g., I don’t know how I can help) (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Killen & Stangor, 2001; see Chapter 3 for a review). It is possible that the developmental decline in prosocial bystander intentions is a result of the bystander interpreting the bullying episode in a certain way. For example, by focussing less on the moral aspect of the incident (e.g., it is harmful or wrong), and more on the social-conventional (e.g., that person is not part of my group; my group don’t want to get involved) or psychological domains (e.g., I don’t know how to help). Applying the social-moral reasoning framework to bystander decision-making would highlight the concerns or issues that children and adolescents focus upon when justifying their intentions to help (or not help) a bullied peer. These findings could further illuminate the triggers that might lead to prosocial bystander responses.

**Perceived Severity.** Previous research on social exclusion has also suggested that with age, incidents of social exclusion are perceived as less severe (Killen & Stangor, 2001). To build on this finding, a measure of perceived severity was also included in the present
study. Social exclusion research suggests that a developmental decline in perceived severity of intergroup verbal aggression might be observed, which could be related to the developmental decline in prosocial bystander intentions between childhood and adolescence. Furthermore, to emulate the design of previous research (see Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen, 2007) the intergroup verbal aggression scenario in the current research was varied to be either group-specific (i.e., due to the victim’s group membership) or interpersonal (i.e., not explicitly due to the victim’s group membership). In line with findings from Killen and Stangor (2001) it is possible that intergroup verbal aggression that is specifically targeted at the victim’s group membership will be perceived as more severe than interpersonal verbal aggression, and therefore children and adolescents will be more likely to express bystander intentions to intervene in a group-specific compared to a non-group-specific name-calling scenario.

**Study Summary, Aims and Predictions**

The present study takes a novel intergroup approach to understanding the developmental decline in prosocial bystander responses from childhood to adolescence, by examining the effect of group membership, ingroup identification, group norms for bystander behaviour, and social-moral reasoning on prosocial bystander intentions. The group membership context selected for the present study is ingroup school and outgroup school. Previous research shows that this group membership is meaningful for children and adolescents (e.g., Abrams, Rutland, Cameron & Ferrell, 2007); it can therefore provide a baseline insight into the importance of intergroup factors for developmental changes in bystander responses.

Participants are drawn from two age groups (8-10 years old and 13-15 years old) so as to emulate previous research that has examined differences in bystander responses based on age (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Trach et al., 2011; see Chapter 2), and as the importance
of intergroup factors such as group norms, become increasingly relevant after middle childhood, and strengthen in importance during adolescence (Abrams et al., 2003; Duffy & Nesdale, 2012; Nesdale, Zimmer-Gembeck & Roxburgh, 2014; see Chapter 3 for a review).

A scenario-based questionnaire depicts an incident of intergroup verbal aggression where the school group membership of the aggressor and victim is experimentally manipulated (ingroup aggressor/outgroup victim vs. outgroup aggressor/ingroup victim); and verbal aggression is either targeted at the victim’s group membership (group-specific) or is not (interpersonal), as part of a between-participant experimental design (refer to Chapter 4 for methodological rationale). Participants indicated their level of ingroup identification, the bystander norm among students their age, perceived severity of the incident, own bystander intentions, and social-moral reasoning about their decision to intervene or not intervene.

The present research has three key aims. First, in line with previous research we expect to observe a developmental decline in prosocial bystander intentions (“defending” behaviour) as children move into adolescence (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Trach et al., 2011).

The second aim is to examine the influence of intergroup factors on the developmental difference in bystander intentions. These factors include ingroup identification, group membership and social group norms for prosocial bystander behaviours. In line with the model of DSGD and SIDT, it is predicted that ingroup identification will be particularly important for older participants’ bystander intentions when the victim shares the same group membership as the participant. This would be observed as a mediated moderation. Additionally, group norms will be more important for older children’s bystander responses. This will be observed as an interaction between age and group norm, such that
older children with a stronger perceived norm for helping will report higher prosocial intentions than same-aged participants with a weaker perceived norm.

A third aim of the study is to examine how severe participants’ perceive the verbal aggression to be. It is predicted that overall younger participants will view the incident as more severe than older participants; however, when older participants perceive the verbal aggression as more severe they will be more likely to report prosocial bystander intentions compared to when they do not see the incident as severe (an age x perceived severity interaction). Based on ratings of perceived severity in the social exclusion context (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001), it is predicted that perceived severity will interact with the type of verbal aggression (i.e., group-specific vs. interpersonal). Specifically, when verbal aggression is also targeted at the victim’s group membership (group-specific), older participants will be perceive the incident as more severe compared to younger participants (who will see both forms of verbal aggression as equally severe). This will lead to an increase in older participants’ prosocial bystander intentions.

The fourth aim of this study is to examine children and adolescents’ social-moral reasoning regarding their bystander intention to intervene or not intervene. It is predicted that moral reasoning will be most frequently referenced. However, an age x reasoning interaction will show that younger children employ moral reasoning relatively more than older children, and older children will employ psychological reasoning relatively more than younger children, as has been observed in previous research (e.g., Aboud & Joong, 2008; Horn, 2003; Killen, 2007). It is anticipated that the type of reasoning will also vary according to type of bystander response. Moral reasoning will accompany prosocial bystander responses to intervene and psychological reasoning will accompany bystander responses not to intervene.
Method

Participants

Participants were 260 children and adolescents from the south-east of England from two age groups: younger (N=110, 42.3%, range= 8 to 10 years, M=8.77, SD=.67) and older (N=150, 57.7%, range=13 to 15 years, M=13.73, SD=7.15), evenly distributed across gender (Female N=132, 51%). Participants were from lower to middle class socioeconomic status areas and were majority White British (90%; White Other 5%; Black British 2%; Asian British 3%).

Design

The present study followed a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Scenario type: Group-specific vs. Interpersonal) x 2 (Aggressor-Victim membership: Ingroup aggressor/Outgroup victim vs. Outgroup aggressor/Ingroup victim) between-participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to the following conditions: Ingroup victim/Outgroup aggressor (N=113, 56.5%), Outgroup victim/Ingroup aggressor N=147, 43.5%); Group-specific verbal aggression (N=131, 50%), Interpersonal verbal aggression (N=129, 50%). The key dependent variables were participants’ bystander intentions following a scenario of intergroup verbal aggression and social-moral reasoning about the decision to intervene or not intervene. Predicted mediators included perceived norms for bystander behaviour and perceived severity of the aggressive incident.

Measures

Ingroup identification. Participants rated three items, adapted from Verkuyten and Thijs (2002) e.g., “I see myself as a [name of ingroup school] pupil”, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. The 3 items achieved a reliability of α=.79. Therefore
participant’s responses across these three items were averaged to create a composite measure of ingroup social identification.

**Intergroup verbal aggression scenario.** Participants were introduced to gender-matched students; one from their school (named “Boy/Girl A”) and another from a fictional outgroup school (named “Boy/Girl B”). Participants were then presented with a realistic intergroup scenario of verbal aggression:

> “Imagine that it is the end of the school day at [ingroup] School. You’ve been told that it is time to go home. All the children at [ingroup] School are leaving the school to go home. Boy/Girl A is with his/her friends from [ingroup] School. He/she is standing near the school gate, and Boy/Girl B walks past. Boy/Girl B doesn’t say anything to Boy/Girl A, and Boy/Girl B isn’t looking at Boy/Girl A or his/her friends.”

Participants then read how Boy/Girl A engaged in verbally aggressive intergroup name-calling towards Boy/Girl B. Half the participants read about group-specific verbal aggression (e.g., “You’re so boring and stupid! Everyone knows how boring and stupid Meadow Park pupils are! No one likes you because you’re from Meadow Park!”), and half heard about interpersonal verbal aggression (e.g., “You’re so boring and stupid! Everyone knows how boring and stupid you are! No one likes you!”).

To aid participants’ understanding, participants also saw a pictorial representation underneath the scenario in the form of a line-drawing of Boy/Girl A with a speech bubble containing text, facing a line-drawing of Boy/Girl B (see Chapter 4 for methodological rationale).

**Perceived severity of the intergroup name-calling act.** Based on previous items (Killen & Stangor, 2001), participants were asked, “How bad do you think it is for Boy/Girl A to call Boy/Girl B names because he/she is from a different school?” Responses were recorded by circling a number on a 1 (not bad at all) to 6 (very, very bad) Likert scale.
Reasoning about bystander intentions. A dichotomous measure of intended bystander intervention was included, followed by a justification item. Participants read, “Do you think that you would tell Boy/Girl A that s/he should not call Boy/Girl B names?” Response options included “yes” or “no” and were coded as intentions to "Intervene" or "Not intervene" respectively. One hundred and sixty-nine participants indicated that they would intervene (65%). Participants then indicated why they chose their response by writing their reason on dotted lines.

Coding and reliability. The framework employed to analyse participants’ justifications was based on categories drawn from social domain theory (Smetana, 1995; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen, 2007; Killen, Rutland et al, 2013) and the outcome of pilot testing (see Appendix A: Social-Moral Reasoning Coding Framework). An additional domain, "Prudential reasoning", concerning self-protection and self-preservation (e.g., Smetana & Asquith, 1994) was also identified and included within the framework. Thus, the final framework consisted of six subcategories of the general codes Moral, Social-conventional, Prudential, and Psychological (see Table 1.1 for subcategories and examples). These categories were all used more than 10%.

Proportional data was used to analyse the participants’ use of the coding categories (see Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen et al., 2012; Chapter 3 for coding procedure). For example, when participants employed reasoning that fell into one category only, it was assigned a 1; partial use of a category was assigned .5 (for example, if a participant employed both moral and social-conventional reasoning, each relevant category would be assigned .5 each); no use of a category was assigned 0. The data were independent for coding purposes, such that participants could use all, partial or none of the reasoning codes; thus reducing concerns regarding the interdependence of the data. The coding was conducted by two
independent coders. Inter-rater reliability was conducted on 25% of the justification responses (N=65), achieving 90% agreement, Cohen’s $\kappa=.88$.

Table 1.1.
Social-moral reasoning categories, subcategories in italics, and examples of participant responses within each category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator inflicting harm</td>
<td>“Because it’s a form of bullying”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“It is not a nice way to treat other people”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality and fairness</td>
<td>“Because everyone is important, it doesn’t matter what school you go to”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy and perspective-taking</td>
<td>“Because it might not matter to that girl but she will probably feel hurt inside”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social-conventional</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social expectations and outcomes</td>
<td>“If I did not tell [the perpetrator], she would keep calling [the victim] names”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prudential</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-preservation</td>
<td>“Because if I got involved it would be me that would get bullied as well as [victim]”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal choice</td>
<td>“Because it's none of my business, I don't want to get involved”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note. All categories used more than 10%; both positive and negative references to each category are included within each category.

**Group norm to intervene.** Participants read, “If they heard this happen too, how many school children from your school do you think would tell Girl/Boy A that they should not call Girl/Boy B names?” Responses were indicated on a 5 point scale ranging from “none of the children” (1); to “almost all of the children” (5). Each point was accompanied by a pictorial representation of stick figures, increasing from zero stick figures above “none of the children” and 28 stick figures above “almost all of the children” (scale adapted from Abrams et al, 2008, “group-inclusion” measure).

**Helpful bystander intentions.** Participants’ bystander intentions were assessed using a measure based on previous research (see Jones et al., 2012; Palmer & Cameron, 2010; Trach et al, 2010). Participants indicated their intention to engage in a number of bystander behaviours on a 1 (not very likely) to 7 (very likely) scale, including: How likely is it that you would tell a teacher or member of staff?; How likely is it that you would tell a friend or member of your family?; How likely is it that you would stand up to Boy/Girl A for Boy/Girl B?; How likely is it that you would ignore the situation? Bystander intention to ignore the name-calling act was negatively correlated with the remaining items (ps<.01), so was reverse-coded. These 4 items achieved a reliability of $\alpha=.69$. These items were averaged into a single composite measure of helpful bystander intentions.

**Procedure**

Loco Parentis, informed opt-out parental consent and informed verbal consent from participants was obtained for all participants taking part in the research (see Appendix A: Ethics Approval and Measures for Study 1). The researcher introduced the questionnaire and told participants, “I’m interested in finding out how you think you would respond in different situations that might happen in your school. You will read about an incident that might or
might not happen in your school, and then there will be some questions about it.” Participants were informed their answers were confidential, told that they did not have to participate if they did not want to, that they could stop at any time without reason, and given an opportunity to ask questions. All participants completed the questionnaire on their own in a classroom setting. Questionnaires were randomly assigned, but gender-matched. Teachers and research assistants were available to help students if any comprehension difficulties arose.

Upon completion participants were thanked, verbally debriefed, given the opportunity to ask questions, and took a debrief letter home. Although no references to bullying were made within the questionnaire, during the verbal debrief participants were reminded of the support available in school if they had any concerns regarding bullying.

Data Analytic Plan

To determine whether any gender differences were present for prosocial bystander intentions a univariate ANOVA was conducted. Prosocial intentions do not differ according to participant gender, $F (1, 259) = 3.53, p=.06, \eta^2=.01$ ($M_{male} = 4.22, SD=1.69, M_{female} = 4.58, SD = 1.34$). Consequently, gender was included as a control variable in all analyses.

To determine if age (younger vs. older), group norm to intervene, perceived severity or social identification predicted bystander helping intentions, these factors were entered into the first step of a regression table. To examine the prediction that age and norms would interact on prosocial bystander intentions, a moderation analysis was performed using model 1 of the PROCESS macro for SPSS, with 5000 bootstraps (Hayes, 2012).

To determine whether group norms, perceived severity and ingroup identification mediated the relationship between age (IV) and prosocial bystander intentions (DV), a parallel multiple mediation model was tested using the PROCESS macro for SPSS with 5000 bootstraps (model 4, Hayes, 2012). We also examined whether the Aggressor-Victim group
membership (i.e., ingroup aggressor/outgroup victim vs. outgroup aggressor/ingroup victim) moderated the mediating effect of social identification on age (IV) and prosocial intentions (DV) using the PROCESS macro (model 8); and tested the prediction that type of verbal aggression (group-specific vs. interpersonal) would moderate the mediating role of perceived severity on age and prosocial intentions (model 8).

In order to examine developmental trends in children’s reasoning about their bystander intention to intervene or not, a 2 (Age: younger/8-10 year olds vs. older/13-15 year olds) x 2 (Intention: Intervene vs. Not intervene) x 2 (Aggressor-Victim membership: Ingroup aggressor/Outgroup victim vs. Outgroup aggressor/Ingroup victim) x 4 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Prudential, Psychological) ANOVA was conducted with repeated measures on the reasoning variable, and gender as a covariate. This approach is in line with previous examinations of children’s social-moral justifications (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen, Rutland et al, 2013) and is robust to the problem of empty cells (see Posada & Wainryb, 2008). A review of analytic procedures for these types of data indicated that linear models with repeated procedures (particularly ANOVA) are preferable to log-linear analysis especially when using a within-participants design (see Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001).

Results

Preliminary Analysis

See Table 1.2 for correlations, means and standard deviations for key study variables. Before predictions could be tested, it was important to check that participants identified with their school ingroup. The measure of ingroup identification was submitted to a one-sample t-test with a mid-point test value of 4, and showed that participants scored significantly above the mid-point, $t(257)=16.92, p<.001$ (M=5.38, SD=1.31). This demonstrates that participants
identified with their school ingroup and shows that school group membership was a salient and meaningful intergroup context for participants.

To check for effects of between-participant variables on bystander intentions, a 2 (Age: younger/8-10 year olds vs. older/13-15 year olds) x 2 (Aggressor-Victim membership: Ingroup aggressor/Outgroup victim vs. Outgroup aggressor/Ingroup victim) x 2 (Type of verbal aggression: Group-specific vs. Interpersonal) between-participant ANOVA was performed with helpful bystander intentions as the dependent variable. Only age achieved significance, $F (3, 258) = 41.45, p < .001, \eta^2 = .34$ (Aggressor-Victim membership: $F (1, 258) = .08, p = .78, \eta^2 < .001$; Type of verbal aggression: $F (1, 258) = .08, p = .78, \eta^2 < .001$). Therefore, data were pooled across the aggressor-victim membership and type of verbal aggression variables for the remaining analysis.

Table 1.2
Bivariate correlation matrix for key study variables, along with means (M) and standard deviations (SD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Perceived norm</td>
<td>-.391**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Perceived severity</td>
<td>-.446**</td>
<td>.269**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ingroup identification</td>
<td>-.297**</td>
<td>.286**</td>
<td>.261**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Prosocial bystander</td>
<td>-.574**</td>
<td>.389**</td>
<td>.488**</td>
<td>.307**</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *correlation is significant at $p < .05$, **correlation is significant at $p < .01$. Predictors of Helpful Bystander Intentions
Age, ingroup identification, group norm, and perceived severity were entered into the first step of a regression model, with prosocial bystander intentions as a predictor. Results showed that age (β = -0.37, t (4, 254) = -6.44, p < .001), perceived group norm for intervention (β = 0.159, t (4, 254) = 2.98, p < .01), and perceived severity (β = 0.263, t (4, 254) = 4.84, p < .001) predicted helpful bystander intentions. Ingroup identification did not achieve significance (β = 0.09, t (4, 254) = 1.65, p = .101). In line with predictions, these findings showed that age negatively predicted helpful bystander intentions; a perceived norm to intervene positively predicted helpful bystander intentions; and perceived severity positively predicted helpful bystander intentions.

Moderation Analysis

To determine whether perceived norm, perceived severity, or ingroup identification interacted with age on bystander intentions, three separate moderation analyses were conducted using the PROCESS macro (model 1). Age and norms significantly predicted helpful bystander intentions independently (ps < .05). As predicted, perceived norm to intervene significantly interacted with age on helpful bystander intentions, B = 0.42, SE = 0.13, t (3, 253) = 3.38, p = .0008. Simple main effects showed that norms were related to bystander intentions among older children only (effect = 0.45, SE = 0.09, t (3, 253) = 4.99, p < .0001) (younger children: B = 0.03, SE = 0.09, t (3, 253) = 0.33, p = .74). Among the older age group, with increasing perception of a social norm to intervene, likelihood of helpful bystander intentions increased. In contrast, there was no relationship between perception of a norm to intervene and helpful bystander intentions in the younger children.

The interaction was also examined by testing the relationship between age and bystander intention among those with weaker and stronger perceptions of a social norm to intervene. When the norm was weaker, the relationship between age and bystander intentions
was significant: older children reported lower bystander intentions compared with younger children ($B = -2.10$, $SE = .24$, $t (3, 253) = -8.90$, $p<.0001$). When a stronger perceived norm for helping was reported, the relationship between age and helpful intentions was still evident, but weaker ($B = -.10$, $SE = .23$, $t (3, 253) = -4.42$, $p<.0001$). To summarise, findings showed that strength of perceived norm for intervention only effected older children’s helpful bystander intentions. When the perceived norm to intervene is stronger, older participants report higher prosocial bystander intentions compared to when the perceived norm to intervene is weaker (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1. The moderating role of norm for older participants’ helpful bystander intentions.

A moderation of age x ingroup identification and age x perceived severity on helpful bystander intentions was tested. Age x ingroup identification did not interact ($B=.21$, $SE = .12$, $t (3, 253) = 1.70$, $p=.09$). For perceived severity, the earlier main effect observed in the regression analysis becomes non-significant ($p=.48$) when the interaction term (age x perceived severity) was also examined. Age x perceived severity significantly interact ($B = .32$, $SE = .15$, $t (3, 255) = 2.15$, $p=.03$). Simple main effects showed that perceived severity
was related to helpful intentions among older children \((B = .45, SE = .08, t (3, 255) = 5.71, p<.0001)\) but not among younger children \((B = .13, SE = .12, t (3, 255) = 1.08, p=.28)\).

Among the older age group, with increasing perception of severity, likelihood of helpful bystander intentions increased. The interaction was also examined by testing the relationship between age and bystander intention among those with weaker and stronger perceptions of severity. Younger participants reported higher helpful intentions than older participants when perceived severity was weaker \((B = -1.87, SE = .28, t (3, 255) = -6.60, p<.0001)\), and when it was stronger \((B = -1.09, SE = .21, t (3, 255) = -5.09, p<.0001)\). To summarise, findings showed that the strength of perceived severity only predicted older children’s helpful bystander intentions: When perceived severity is stronger, older participants report higher helpful bystander intentions compared to when perceived severity is weaker (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2. The moderating role of perceived severity for older participants’ helpful bystander intentions.
Mediation Analyses

To determine whether norms, perceived severity or ingroup identification explain the relationship between age and helpful bystander intentions, a parallel multiple mediation model was run using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 4 with 5000 bootstraps), controlling for gender. The dichotomous variable age (younger vs. older) was entered as the IV, with prosocial bystander intentions as the DV. As this is a parallel mediation model the order in which the mediators were entered into the model is irrelevant and ignored by PROCESS (Hayes, 2012).

Table 1.3
Statistics for the individual effects of each predictor variable on prosocial bystander intentions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>LLCI</th>
<th>ULCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (younger vs. older)</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-6.41</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
<td>-.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived norm</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>&lt;.005</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived severity</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup identification</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (controlled)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Degrees of freedom for t-test: df1=5, df2=249. All statistics rounded to 2 decimal places.

Findings showed that the perceived norm to intervene (indirect effect = -.19, SE = .07, LLCI = -.36, ULCI = -.06) and perceived severity of the incident (indirect effect = -.35, SE = .11, LLCI = -.58, ULCI = -.14) both significantly mediated the relationship between age and prosocial bystander intention, as indicated by the absence of a zero between the lower (90%)
and upper (95%) level confidence intervals. Ingroup identification was not a significant mediator (indirect effect = -.08, SE = .05, LLCI = -.20, ULCI = .01) (see Table 1.3 for the coefficients for the individual effects of each variable on the prosocial bystander intentions (see also Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.3. Mediation of age and helpful bystander intentions through perceived norm to intervene. Unstandardised regression coefficients are provided along the paths, with error terms in parentheses. Note. \(c'\) = direct path, \(c\) = indirect path. * = \(p<.0001\), ** = \(p<.005\), *** = no zero between LLCI and ULCI.

Figure 1.3 shows how age negatively predicts helpful bystander intentions (direct path); that age negatively predicts the perception that other peers of the same age will intervene; and that the perceived norm to intervene positively predicts helpful bystander intentions. When accounting for the mediating role of norms, the beta coefficient significantly reduces, while remaining negative. This shows that when participants perceive a norm to intervene, the developmental decline in bystander intentions is reduced. Similarly, Figure 1.4 shows that age negatively predicts the perceived severity of the incident; and that perceived severity positively predicts helpful bystander intentions. When accounting for the mediating role of perceived severity, the beta coefficient significantly reduces, while remaining negative. This shows that when participants perceive the incident as more severe, the developmental decline in bystander intentions is reduced.
Figure 1.4. Mediation of age and helpful bystander intentions through perceived severity of the incident. Unstandardised regression coefficients are provided along the paths, with error terms in parentheses. Note. \( c' = \) direct path, \( c = \) indirect path. * = \( p<.0001 \), ** = \( p<.005 \). *** = no zero between LLCI and ULCI.

**Moderated Mediation: Group Membership on Group Identification**

Although preliminary analysis showed that group membership of the Aggressor/Victim did not directly affect prosocial bystander intentions, it was predicted that Aggressor/Victim group membership would moderate the mediating effect of in-group identification on the age and bystander intention relationship. Specifically, it was predicted that if in-group identification is strong and the victim is an ingroup member, participants may be more likely to report helping intentions in comparison to when the victim is an outgroup member and the aggressor is an ingroup member. To test this hypothesis, a moderated mediation (model 8) was performed using the PROCESS macro for SPSS, with 5000 bootstraps, controlling for gender.

Findings showed a significant mediation of age and helpful bystander intentions through ingroup identification, \( B = -.85, SE = .31, t (252) = -2.70, p = .007, LLCI = -1.47, ULCI = -.23 \). The predicted moderation mediation effect was found since conditional effects showed the mediation effect was only significant for participants in the condition where an outgroup aggressor targeted an ingroup victim (conditional indirect effect of X on Y when
ingroup aggressor/outgroup victim = -.23, SE = .10, LLCI = -.45, ULCI = -.07; when outgroup aggressor/ingroup victim = -.07, SE = .05, LLCI = -.20, ULCI = .00, ns). This finding shows how group membership and ingroup identification work in concert: social identification partially explains the relationship between age and helpful bystander intentions only when the victim shares the same group membership as the bystander.

**Moderated Mediation 2: Type of Verbal Aggression on Perceived Severity**

Although preliminary analysis showed that type of verbal aggression did not directly affect prosocial bystander intentions, to test the prediction that the type of verbal aggression (group-specific vs. interpersonal) would moderate the mediating role of perceived severity on age differences and prosocial bystander intentions, a moderated mediation (model 8) was computed in PROCESS using 5000 bootstraps. Type of verbal aggression did not predict perceived severity (B=.50, SE=.47, t (255) = 1.07, p = .29) and did not interact with age on perceived severity (B=-.34, SE=.28, t (256) = -1.19, p = .23).

**Social-Moral Reasoning**

To examine differences in type of reasoning about the decision to intervene or not, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted with repeated measures on the reasoning variable, and gender included as a covariate.

Within-participant effects showed a main effect of reasoning (F (1, 242) = 15.15, p<.001, \( \eta^2 = .06 \)). Pairwise comparisons showed that moral reasoning was most frequently employed, and more so than all other forms of reasoning (all ps<.001). The use of social-
conventional reasoning was significantly lower than moral and psychological reasoning (both ps < .05) but not different to the use of prudential reasoning (p = .83). Psychological reasoning was employed less frequently than moral, but more frequently than social-conventional and prudential reasoning (all ps < .005; see Table 1.4 for means and standard deviations).

Table 1.4

Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) in parentheses for use of social-moral reasoning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Social-conventional</th>
<th>Prudential</th>
<th>Psychological</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.54 (.50)</td>
<td>.13 (.33)</td>
<td>.08 (.27)</td>
<td>.21 (.40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two 2-way interactions were also observed. One between reasoning and bystander intention of the participant (F (1, 242) = 147.67, p < .001, \( \eta^2 = .38 \)), and the second between reasoning and age (F (1, 242) = 18.76, p < .001, \( \eta^2 = .07 \)). To examine these interactions further, individual 2 (Age: younger/8-10 year olds vs. older/13-15 year olds) x 2 (Intention: intervene vs. not intervene) x 2 (Aggressor-Victim membership: Ingroup aggressor/Outgroup victim vs. Outgroup aggressor/Ingroup victim) univariate ANOVAs were examined, within each level of reasoning. Statistics from these analyses are only reported if they involve age or intention.

**Moral reasoning.** Between-participant effects showed a main effect of age on moral reasoning, F (1, 242) = 17.29, p < .001, \( \eta^2 = .07 \). Younger participants employed more moral reasoning (M = .74, SD = 43) compared to older participants (M = .39, SD = .49). A main effect of bystander intention (F 1, 242) = 76.03, p < .001, \( \eta^2 = .24 \)) showed that participants who reported the intention to intervene employed more moral reasoning about their decision (M = .73, SD = .44) compared to those who intended not to intervene (M = .16, SD = .37).
Social-conventional reasoning. Between-participant effects showed a marginal effect of intention ($F(1, 242) = 3.01, p = .08, \eta^2 = .01$), whereby participants employed more social-conventional reasoning when intending to intervene ($M = .16, SD = .36$) compared to when they would not intervene ($M = .07, SD = .26$). A marginal interaction between age and intention ($F(1, 242) = 3.04, p = .08, \eta^2 = .01$) was examined within each level of age. Pairwise comparisons showed that younger participants were marginally less likely ($M = .10, SD = .30$) to employ social-conventional reasoning compared to older participants ($M = .21, SD = .41$) when reasoning about the intention to intervene ($p = .06$). Although these are marginal interactions, they support predictions from social exclusion research (e.g., Abrams et al., 2012) and precede findings from Study 3 that further develop the relevance of social-conventional reasoning for children and adolescent’s bystander decision-making.

Prudential reasoning. A main effect of intention was observed ($F(1, 242) = 48.29, p < .001, \eta^2 = .17$). Participants with no intention to intervene employed more prudential reasoning ($M = .24, SD = .42$) compared to those whose intention was to intervene ($M = .01, SD = .08$).

Psychological reasoning. A significant main effect of age ($F(1, 242) = 17.76, p < .001, \eta^2 = .07$), intention ($F(1, 242) = 33.05, p < .001, \eta^2 = .12$) and an interaction between age and intention ($F(1, 242) = 4.89, p < .05, \eta^2 = .02$) were observed. Older children employed psychological reasoning more than younger children, and those who intended not to intervene employed more psychological reasoning than those whose intentions were to intervene. Pairwise comparisons across age groups showed that psychological reasoning was employed more by older children regardless of intention ($ps < .05$). When comparing across intentions, pairwise comparisons showed that within each age group psychological reasoning was employed more when intentions were not to intervene, compared to intentions to intervene ($ps < .01$) (see Table 1.5 for means and standard deviations). This finding shows that
psychological reasoning (e.g., It’s none of my business; I don’t know how to help) accompanies non-intervention more than intervention intentions, and is more prominent in older children’s bystander judgements.

Table 1.5
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) in parentheses for effects of age and intention on psychological reasoning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention not to intervene</th>
<th>Intention to intervene</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>.24 (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older</td>
<td>.55 (.50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Pairwise comparisons show all means presented above are significantly different to one another (p<.05).

**Reasoning summary.** Results show that participants prioritise moral reasoning when making decisions following an incident of verbal aggression. Age and intention differences are significantly present when participants employ moral or psychological reasoning about their bystander intention. Most notably, younger participants employed more moral reasoning (i.e., I would tell her to stop it because she is being really horrible, and it's just not fair) than older participants, and moral reasoning was employed more when reasoning about decisions to help compared to decisions not to help.

Conversely, psychological reasoning (i.e., because you wouldn't want to get involved) was employed more by participants (of both age groups) when intentions were not to intervene. In addition, older participants employed this form of reasoning more than younger participants. Social-conventional (i.e., she would get told off for calling her names; because otherwise you’d be on the wrong side) and prudential (i.e., because if I got involved it would be me that would get bullied as well as girl B) reasoning were used comparatively less
frequently, but trend in the direction of being employed more when participants intend not to intervene, and social-conventional reasoning was used proportionally (but not significantly) more by older participants compared to younger participants. Group membership of the aggressor and victim had no effect on the type of reasoning employed by participants.

**Discussion**

This is the first study to examine the role of intergroup factors (see Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland et al., 2010) to examine the developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions when faced with incidents of intergroup verbal aggression. These findings make an original contribution to this research area by demonstrating some of the psychological processes that underpin the developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions for helping victimized peers in an intergroup context.

For the first time, the relevance of ingroup norms for the developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions was highlighted; when older participants thought peers from their age-group were more likely to intervene (i.e., a stronger ingroup norm) their helpful bystander intentions were higher. In addition, a higher perception of severity among older participants was also related to higher helpful bystander responses. This demonstrates that these factors are key for older participants’ bystander-response decision-making.

Additionally, two partial mediations of the relationship between age and helpful bystander intentions by both the perceived group norm and severity of the name-calling act were observed. Moreover, ingroup identification mediated the relationship between age and helpful bystander intentions but only when the aggressor was outgroup and the victim was an ingroup member (observed as a moderated mediation). Finally, an examination of children and adolescents’ social-moral reasoning showed that developmental trends were also present in participants’ rationales for their bystander intentions.
The first mediation analyses showed that with age participants thought peers in their
group were less likely to intervene helpfully, and in part this belief explains the reports in
lower prosocial bystander intentions among adolescents. A second mediation analysis
showed that perceived severity of the name-calling act mediated the relationship between the
participant's age and helpful bystander intention. With increasing age participants perceived
the name-calling to be less severe, and this in turn meant they were less likely to report
helpful bystander intentions. A test for moderated mediation showed the importance of
ingroup identification for older children’s prosocial bystander intentions, but only when the
victim was a fellow ingroup member (and the aggressor was an outgroup member).

In line with research on adult bystander intervention that shows the relevance of
ingroup identification for helpful bystander intervention (e.g., Levine et al., 2005), these
findings indicate that ingroup identification is relevant for older children’s helpful intentions
when an ingroup victim is targeted, and that group norms and perceived severity also have
effects on adolescent bystander responses. They make clear that considering the interplay
between group-membership, norms and perceived severity of the aggressive incident is
imperative when thinking how to promote more helpful bystander behavior during
adolescence.

This is the first time children's bystander reasoning has been examined in response to
a scenario of intergroup verbal aggression. As has been shown in research on children’s
reasoning about intergroup social exclusion, younger children prioritised moral reasoning
significantly more than adolescents (e.g., Killen, Rutland et al., 2013). In addition, a trend for
adolescents employing comparatively more social-conventional reasons for their bystander
intentions was observed, and results showed that adolescents also prioritised psychological
reasoning more than younger children. In addition, moral reasoning was employed more
when participants intended to intervene, and psychological reasoning was employed more
when participants did not intend to intervene. These findings are consistent with research on intergroup social exclusion showing that as children get older they weigh up multiple concerns to inform their interpretations of social incidents (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; Duffy & Nesdale, 2012), and also show that a moral motivation appears to be most strongly linked to prosocial bystander intentions.

Taken together, these findings advance our understanding of when (e.g., moderators) and why (e.g., mediators and social-moral reasoning) children and adolescents help ingroup and outgroup peers who experience verbal aggression in an intergroup context. Importantly, results reiterate the relevance of examining the developmental decline in helpful “defender” bystander responses from an intergroup perspective. In particular, the importance of studying intergroup factors (group membership, ingroup identification, group norms and social-moral reasoning) when explaining the relationship between age and helpful bystander intentions is shown. These intergroup factors, together with perceptions of severity, highlight that intergroup factors influence adolescents’ intentions to help a bullied peer. Results suggest that, in comparison to their older counterparts, younger children may view prosocial bystander behaviour as the most morally appropriate response to engage in, regardless of what they observe their peers doing.

These findings build on the existing research that shows the relevance of intergroup processes for children and adolescents’ social interactions (see Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Fitzroy & Rutland, 2010; Killen & Rutland, 2011; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; Nesdale, 2008), and extends it further by applying to the examination of bystander intentions during incidents of intergroup verbal aggression.

Limitations and future directions

Group membership of the victim and aggressor moderated the role of social identification in explaining age differences in bystander intentions. However, due to the
design of the present study it is difficult to disentangle whether participants’ bystander intentions are explained by participants’ affiliations with either the aggressor, the victim, or a combination of both. Recent research has compared attitudes towards aggressors from both ingroup and “third-party” group perspectives (Nesdale et al., 2013). Therefore future studies could consider varying the group memberships of aggressors, victims, and bystanders in alternative ways to further develop our understanding of the role of group membership on bystander responses.

Interestingly, no effects for type of verbal-aggression (group-specific vs. interpersonal) were observed. Predictions based on childhood social exclusion research (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001) indicated that group-specific verbal aggression (i.e., verbal aggression that was directly targeted at group membership) might lead participants to perceive the incident as comparatively more severe than interpersonal verbal aggression. As this effect was absent, so too were any effects of type of verbal aggression on helpful bystander intentions. It is probable that, due to the explicit intergroup nature of the questionnaire (i.e., all participants were introduced to an ingroup member and an outgroup member, even if they were assigned to an interpersonal verbal aggression condition), all participants perceived the verbal-aggression as group-motivated, even when it was not explicitly so. An additional interpretation for why no differences in type of verbal-aggression were observed, whereas differences have been observed in group-specific versus interpersonal social exclusion scenarios (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001), is that verbal aggression may be viewed as more overtly unacceptable compared to social-exclusion. Thus, participants viewed both types of verbal aggression as equally unacceptable as it was harder to interpret instances when verbal aggression might be OK.

School group membership has been employed meaningfully in intergroup research before (e.g., Abrams et al., 2007), and in the present study all participants strongly identified
with their school ingroup. However, this type of ingroup membership might lack the high/low status-differentiation that may be more common in other social groups. Thus, different findings might be observed should the social group membership be, for example, gender, ethnicity, race or nationality (Abbott & Cameron, 2014b). Possible reasons for this could include changes in perceptions of severity, or differences in perceived group norms (e.g., most children are aware that calling someone names because they belong to a different ethnic group is viewed as explicitly unacceptable). Future research could examine different group memberships (see Chapter 3 and Study 3) and the role of intergroup status (see Study 2) as predictors of bystander responses.

Results showed the importance of perceived group norms for adolescents’ helpful bystander intentions. This measure specifically tapped into the behaviours that participants’ expected others at their school to engage in, should they also be presented with the same scenario of intergroup verbal aggression. It would be interesting to further examine the importance of norms for children and adolescents’ behaviours. This could be done by examining the predictive influence of different types of norms (e.g., what other peers think should be done vs. what other peers actually do; Abbott & Cameron, 2014b) on bystander intentions (see also Study 2). An alternative way of determining the influence of group norms would be to manipulate the group norm for bystander behaviour. This would allow for experimental control over the types of group-norms children and adolescents’ might be faced with when deciding the appropriate bystander response (see also Study 3).

Finally, the present study focussed on participants own bystander intentions. As was highlighted in Chapter 4, this is necessary in order to experimentally control variables so as to identify factors that influence prosocial bystander intentions. However, an additional means of examining developmental differences in bystander responses could be to ask participants to evaluate peer bystander behaviour. This would also allow for the manipulation of type of
bystander behaviour, which could be an additional indicator of expectations for acceptable peer bystander responses (see Study 2 and 3). Furthermore, examining evaluations of bystander responses in this way may shed more light on the intricacies behind adolescents’ social-moral reasoning (see Study 3).

**Conclusion**

To conclude, this original study has taken the first steps in showing the important application of an intergroup perspective when examining the developmental decline in bystanders’ prosocial intentions about an intergroup incident of verbal aggression. This is a unique approach to an under-researched topic within the peer relations and developmental intergroup relations literature. This study has uniquely identified key psychological factors in the developmental decline of bystander intentions to intervene; namely the importance of group norms, the interplay between group-membership of targets and ingroup-identification, perceived severity of the name-calling act, and how children and adolescents differ in their social-moral reasoning about intergroup incidents of bullying.

The findings of this study highlight the importance of considering intergroup factors in addition to interpersonal research on promoting helpful bystander responses. Furthermore, our findings suggest that promoting a group norm for helpful intervention when faced with intergroup name-calling, combined with an emphasis on the severity of the act and a moral obligation to treat all peers fairly during intergroup peer interactions could be an effective strategy aimed at promoting bystander intervention within schools and the wider community.

Study 2 tackles limitations highlighted in the present study. First, it controls the group membership of the bystanders to examine a novel intergroup context. As part of this new design, intergroup status is controlled for to determine whether a low or high status group membership has an effect on how participants evaluate peer bystanders. Additionally, Study 2 extends the current research by measuring two types of norms for bystander responses; an
evaluative norm and a behavioural norm. This will enable us to determine what type of bystander response is interpreted as most acceptable (evaluative norm) and whether this differs to the bystander responses children and adolescents actually observe from peers (behavioural norm).

Furthermore, the next study examines participants’ evaluations of bystanders who engage in different bystander responses in addition to measuring participants’ own bystander intentions. This allows the same experimental control over variables of interest (e.g., intergroup membership and status), while also manipulating type of bystander response (e.g., helping or walking away), which is not possible when measuring participant bystander intentions alone. Finally, stemming from the current study’s examination of norms and identification of their importance for helpful bystander behaviours, Study 2 will measure perceptions of leadership skills among bystanders of high and low status who help or walk away from an incident of verbal aggression. This will provide more insight on how influential bystanders of different group status, and who demonstrate different bystander behaviours, might be viewed by peers.
Chapter 6

Evaluating Peer Bystanders: The importance of bystander response and intergroup status

The present study builds upon findings from Study 1 by examining the importance of intergroup status and type of bystander response for children and adolescents’ evaluations of peer bystanders. Two-hundred and twenty-one students from primary (Year 5; N = 122; M = 10 years, 1 month) and secondary schools (Year 9; N = 99; M = 13 years, 5 months) in South East England completed a questionnaire. Participants read about a low-status and high-status group of peers, and an incident of verbal aggression where a bystander (who belonged to a high- or low-status group), either helped or walked away from an incident of verbal aggression. Participants evaluated the bystander and provided a reason for their evaluation. They also indicated how normative they thought the bystander’s behaviour was (either helping or walking away) and rated the bystander on measures of leadership. Participants indicated their own bystander intentions. Findings showed that the bystander was evaluated more positively when they helped, compared to when they walked away, but there was no effect of status on evaluations. Social-moral reasoning showed that moral reasoning was employed more for high-status than low-status bystanders, regardless of their bystander behaviour. Additionally, moral reasoning was employed more when the bystander helped than when the bystander walked away, and social-conventional reasoning was employed more when a bystander walked away compared to when they helped. Further support for a developmental decline in participants’ own bystander intentions was observed. Finally, the type of bystander response moderated the relationship between the behavioural norm and leadership qualities. Implications are discussed.
Bystander Status and the Intergroup Approach

Social identity theory posits that individuals prefer to be members of high-status rather than low-status groups, as this helps to maintain positive social distinctiveness (Turner, 1975). Research on children’s attitudes during intergroup interactions shows that group-evaluations are influenced by the group’s relative status, to the extent that when mobility between social groups appears to be an option, lower-status group members wish to change groups more than higher-status group members do (e.g., Nesdale & Flesser, 2001). This suggests that higher-status groups are perceived more positively, even by low-status group members. The role of intergroup status has not yet been explored in relation to bystander responses. However, one study on intergroup status and bullying attitudes showed that a bully-group was preferred when they were high-status compared to low-status (Nesdale & Scarlett, 2004). Yet, another study showed that high-status outgroup members who bully were blamed more than other low-status groups who bully, suggesting an extra layer of social responsibility is assigned to groups with higher social-standing (Gini, 2006; refer to Chapter 3 for more detail).

The present study is the first to examine the role of intergroup status for bystander responses and consequent peer evaluations. To date, research on the effect of bystander status during bullying incidents has been investigated in the interpersonal context of bystander roles (e.g., defender, outsider; Caravita, Gini & Pozzoli, 2012; Obermann, 2011), or as a form of popularity (e.g., Li & Wright, 2013), but not explicitly in an intergroup context. Findings have shown that children who receive more “like-most” nominations from peers also receive more “defender” nominations (Poyhonen et al, 2010; Monks, Ruiz & Val, 2002); but it is not known whether popularity is caused by defending, or whether defending leads to a higher perceived status within the peer group. The present study brings together research from intergroup (bystanders from high vs. low status groups) and interpersonal (popularity of
bystanders and type of bystander response or “participant role”) perspectives (see Chapters 2 and 3) to examine how peers evaluate bystanders who either belong to a high-status group (popular) or low-status group (unpopular). To do this, participants are presented with two groups of similarly-aged children. One group is described as being “popular” (high-status) and the other is described as being “unpopular” (low-status). The bystander belongs to either the high-status or the low-status group.

**Type of Bystander Response: What is Normative?**

A second aim of the present study is to examine how young people interpret peer bystander responses. The bystander responses of interest in the present study are to help (i.e., prosocial, assertive or defending behaviour) or to walk away (i.e., not getting involved, outsider). Although research demonstrates children’s overwhelmingly negative attitudes towards bullying (e.g., Gini et al, 2008), increasingly studies show evidence for a developmental increase in passive or ignoring bystander responses (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Trach et al., 2011; refer to Chapter 2). These two lines of research thus present conflicting developmental stances. One way to understand this conflict further is to look more closely at how young people’s evaluations of bystanders - alongside their own bystander intentions - are affected by the characteristics of bystander intervention. One way to achieve this is by carefully manipulating type of bystander response, and other characteristics of the episode, to examine which bystander behaviours are most valued by children and adolescents. To determine this level of “value” we ask participants to evaluate bystanders based on their status and their bystander action, but also indicate how normative the behaviour is for the peer group.

In Study 1 it was shown that perceptions of normative bystander behaviour help explain the developmental decline in participants’ prosocial bystander intentions. Researchers
have suggested that the type of bystander response exhibited by children could influence what peers perceive to be a “normative” or expected reaction in a given context, potentially acting as a cyclical process (e.g., Aboud & Joong, 2008; refer to Chapter 2). According to the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD; Abrams et al., 2003; see Chapter 3) from middle childhood children’s attitudes towards, behaviours within and evaluations of, social interactions are influenced by relative group-norms and expectations. Social identity development theory (SIDT; Nesdale, 2008; also see Chapter 3) supports this notion, stating that children use their understanding of group norms and expectations when justifying their decision-making in social contexts. Moreover, this accruement of “social acumen” which informs children and adolescents as to the “appropriate” response in a given context develops with experience. Thus, it is important to examine which type of bystander response (e.g., to help or walk away) is perceived as normative, and whether developmental differences exist in this perception, as this could shed further light on the developmental decline in bystander helping responses.

Social-Moral Reasoning

In order to further understand how children and adolescents interpret appropriate bystander responses (i.e., why they evaluate a helping bystander more favourably than one who walks away – or vice versa) the present study includes a measure of participants’ social-moral reasoning about their evaluations (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Rutland et al, 2010). Examining participants’ judgments from a social domain perspective (see theoretical chapter two) allows us to determine whether children and adolescents prioritise different factors (e.g., helping someone in need [moral reasoning] versus representing one’s group accurately [social-conventional reasoning]) when evaluating others’ bystander behaviours. Thus, building on Study 1, the present study examines children’s social-moral reasoning about their evaluations of a bystander (who is either from a low or high status group, helps or walks
away) to determine whether participants are primarily focussed on moral, social-conventional or psychological factors when making their evaluations (see Chapter 3).

**Bystanders and Leadership Qualities**

Increasingly charities (e.g., Cybermentors; BeatBullying; Anne Frank Trust) are building anti-bullying programmes focussed on the training of student “ambassadors” or “mentors”. These ambassadors are typically secondary school-aged students who are offered training in how to provide support to peers who are bullied, thus acting as a role-model for peers. A few studies have evaluated the success of these programmes (cf., Banerjee, Robinson & Smalley, 2010; Thompson & Smith, 2011), but it is not known whether these ambassadors have the capacity to create social change among their peer groups (i.e., by instilling a norm for helpful bystander intervention). Research on leadership among children and adolescents is limited (e.g., Day, 2011; Murphy & Johnson, 2011) but studies report that peer leaders can establish normative behaviours among their peer group, thus shaping the attitudes and behaviours of their group members (Miller-Johnson & Costanzo, 2004; Sheppard, Golonka & Costanzo, 2012). In the context of the present research, examining the “type” of bystander that attains leadership ratings (e.g., high or low status, one that helps or walks away) could further inform the success of ambassador programmes in schools.

A key proponent of leadership is that the leader is typical of the group, in that they accurately represent the group's identity, attitudes and behaviours (Haslam & Platow, 2001; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). In adult research, leaders who are viewed as typical are also evaluated more favourably as they help to maintain the values and norms of the group. To examine leadership within the present study, measures previously employed with adults were reviewed and adapted (Avolio, Bass & Jung, 1999; Geyer & Steyrer, 1998; Judge & Piccolo, 2004); Jung & Sosik, 2002; Leicht, Crisp & Randsley de Moura, 2013). This measure was then employed to examine whether the group status of a bystander (e.g., a
bystander from a low-status group compared to a bystander from a high-status group, or their bystander action (to help or walk away), influenced ratings of leadership skills. Determining whether perceived group norms also feed into leadership ratings may also shed light on when prosocial bystanders might be most effective at encouraging prosocial behaviour among peers. As leaders can be particularly influential at reinforcing or changing behavior within their social group (cf., Scheepers, Branscombe, Spears & Doosje, 2002), investigating the circumstances under which peer bystanders are viewed as having leadership qualities could indicate what types of bystander responses are most frequently endorsed by peers, and whether - and when - group status plays a role in this process.

**Study Summary, Aims and Predictions**

The present study examines the effect of bystander intergroup status (high vs. low) and bystander response (to help or walk away) on children and adolescents’ evaluations of a peer bystander who is faced with an incident of verbal aggression in a scenario-questionnaire format. Bystander intergroup status and type of bystander response were manipulated in a between-participant design. Social-moral reasoning regarding bystander evaluations, perceived norms, participants’ own bystander intentions, and perceived bystander leadership qualities were measured, alongside the presence of developmental differences within these variables.

The aim of the present study is to extend findings from Study 1 in four key ways. First, by operationalising the intergroup context in a novel way; by examining how participants evaluate peer bystanders who belong to a group of high or low status. In line with social developmental theory (e.g., Nesdale & Flessner, 2001; Nesdale & Scarlett, 2004) it is anticipated that a main effect of bystander status on evaluations will be observed.
Second, participants will be asked to evaluate a bystander who either helps or walks away from an incident of verbal aggression. This allows us to test whether peer bystanders are evaluated more or less positively due to their bystander action. This would be observed as a main effect of bystander response on evaluations. This also allows us to test whether participants believe it is more important to be prosocial, or to be from a high-status group. It is predicted that a bystander action x bystander status interaction on evaluations will be observed.

Third, the present study examines two types of norms: an evaluation norm (whether other students in the school would approve of the bystanders’ response; e.g., Sierksma, Thijs & Verkuyten, 2014), and a behavioural norm (whether other students in the school actually do behave in the same way). In line with research on children and adolescents’ negative attitudes towards bullying and aggression (e.g., Nesdale, et al., 2008) it is anticipated that there will be a main effect of bystander response on normative evaluations: bystanders who help will be perceived as more normative than those who walk away. Additionally, in line with research on children and adolescents’ bystander intentions (e.g., Trach et al., 2011) and the findings of Study 1, it is predicted that with age, participants will perceive the helpful bystander response as less behaviourally normative (an age x bystander response interaction).

Fourth, a measure of perceived leadership qualities is included in the present study as a means of testing whether children and adolescents perceive a certain bystander response (i.e., to help or walk away), or a certain type of group membership (i.e., low or high status) as indicative of leadership qualities, and thus the potential to sway the peer group’s bystander attitudes and behaviours. To examine perceptions of bystander leadership in more detail an exploratory path analysis of the predictive relationship of key study variables upon perceived leadership qualities will also be conducted.
Finally, in line with the broader aims of this thesis, developmental trends in children’s evaluations of bystanders, their social-moral reasoning about their evaluations, and their own bystander intentions are examined. An age x bystander status interaction is predicted: as children get older the status of the bystander will become more important in participants’ evaluations, whereby popular bystanders will be judged more favourably than unpopular bystanders, regardless of their bystander action. In line with findings from Study 1, developmental trends in social-moral reasoning are also anticipated: younger participants will prioritise moral reasoning comparatively more than older participants; younger participants will employ social-conventional reasoning comparatively less than older participants; and older participants will employ psychological reasoning comparatively more than younger participants. Lastly, a developmental decline in own prosocial bystander intentions is predicted.

Method

Participants

Participants were two-hundred and twenty-one students (Female=53%, Male=47%) from a “younger” age group at a primary school (year 5; N = 122, age range = 9 years 6 months to 10 years 5 months; M = 10 years, 1 month) and an “older” age group at a secondary school (year 9; N = 99, age range = 12 years, 6 months to 13 years, 5 months; M = 13 years, 5 months). Participants were from lower to middle class socioeconomic status areas and were majority White British (= 93%; White Other = 2%; Black = 2%; Asian = 1%, Other = 2%).

Design

The study followed a 2 (Age: younger/9 years old, older/13 years old) x 2 (Target bystander status: Unpopular, Popular) x 2 (Target bystander response: Help, Walk Away)
between-participant design. See Table 2.1 for details of the distribution of participants across cells. Dependent variables were evaluations of the “target” bystander, participants’ own bystander intentions, and perceived evaluative and behavioural peer norms for bystander behaviour and leadership ratings.

Table 2.1
The distribution of participants (N) across the study design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target bystander status</th>
<th>Help</th>
<th>Walk Away</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>N =55</td>
<td>N =55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>N =56</td>
<td>N =55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measures and Procedure

Refer to Appendix B for all ethical documents and measures. Participants were presented with a gender-matched questionnaire booklet containing experimental manipulations and measures, presented in the order outlined below. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions.

Status of bystanders. In order to manipulate the intergroup context, all participants were introduced to two “bystanders” and their groups of friends. One of the bystanders is the “target bystander” (i.e., the bystander who is presented within the story as exhibiting a bystander response), and the second bystander is an “additional bystander”, presented to maintain the intergroup context. The two bystanders and their groups of friends are gender-matched and are characterised as being either a high-status (popular) or low-status (unpopular) individual. For the high-status bystander participants read:
This is [bystander] and her/his group of friends. [Bystander] and her/his friends are cool. They know how to have a laugh. They like good music and are into sport. Other kids also think they're cool. Often they're talked about as the "popular group".

For the low status bystander condition the opposite descriptions were provided:

This is [bystander] and her/his group of friends. [Bystander] and her/his friends are not cool. They don't really have a laugh - they like unusual music and are not into sport. Other kids don't think they're cool. Often they're talked about as the "unpopular group".

After each bystander and their group of friends was introduced, a manipulation check asked participants which group each bystander belonged to. Two participants failed to provide a response, so along with participants who failed the manipulation check (high-status bystander N = 1, low-status bystander N = 10) a total of 13 participants (younger N = 10, older N = 3) were removed from the data file for all further analyses (remaining N = 208).

**Verbal aggression scenario.** Participants were instructed to read the following gender-matched scenario of verbal aggression which was accompanied by a cartoon figure of the aggressor and victim on a school playground:

At lunchtime, once the students have eaten in the school hall they go outside on the playground. [High-status bystander] and her/his friends, and [low-status bystander] and her/his friends, are out on the playground too. One lunch time a student called [aggressor] starts saying nasty things to a different student called [victim]. [Aggressor] calls [victim] names, threatens her/him, and makes fun of her in front of everyone on the playground. [Aggressor] and [victim] are in [high-status bystander] and [low-status bystander] 's year group, but [high-status bystander] and [low-status
bystander] don’t really know them. This has happened before – [aggressor] calls
[victim] horrible names, and threatens and teases her/him in a nasty way. [Victim]
ever says anything back - s/he just stands there looking at the floor. There are no
teachers around, and [aggressor] has never got into trouble for it before.

The scenario was designed to tap into the constructs of bullying that have previously been
outlined by researchers (i.e., intention, repetition, imbalance of power; Monks & Smith,
2006; Olweus, 1996; Rigby, 2002) while also being specific to the type of bullying (i.e.,
verbal aggression) in order to increase the validity of the measure (refer to Chapter 4 for
more detail).

**Target bystander response.** Participants then read about the target bystander's
response. All participants are introduced to two “bystanders” and their peer groups. The
status and the behaviour of the target bystander (i.e., the bystander that the participant reads
about in the verbal aggression scenario) varied depending on the condition the participant has
been randomly allocated to. Participants in the high-status bystander condition read about the
high-status bystander's response, and participants in the low-status bystander condition read
about the low-status bystander's response. The other bystander in the story becomes the
“additional bystander”. Participants were asked about the additional bystander but, as the
additional bystander’s response to the verbal aggression scenario was not indicated, these
responses have not been examined. Thus, participants only ever read about the target
bystander’s response to the aggression incident (either to help or walk away). In the
bystander-helping condition participants read:

> [Target bystander] says to her/his friends, “I’ve had enough of this.” S/he goes over
to where [aggressor] and [victim] are standing and says calmly to [aggressor], “This
isn’t on. You’re being totally out of order. Just leave her/him alone.”
In the bystander-walk-away condition participants read:

(Target bystander) says to her/his friends, “Come on, let’s go.” [Target bystander] and her/his group of friends walk away from the playground.

**Bystander evaluation.** Participants were instructed to indicate how much they liked the target bystander on a Likert scale of 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much), where each point on the scale was accompanied with an emoticon face, ranging from a large frown at 1 to a large smile at 5.

**Social-Moral reasoning.** To examine participants' reasoning about their target bystander evaluations an open-ended "Why?" question was included in the protocol, after the evaluation of the target bystander was provided. The framework employed to analyse participants’ reasoning was based on categories drawn from social domain theory (Smetana, 1995; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Rutland et al., 2010; Killen et al., 2012) and the outcome of pilot testing (see Appendix B: Social-Moral Reasoning Coding Framework). The final coding framework consisted of 8 subcategories of the general codes Moral, Social-conventional and Psychological (see Table 2.2 for subcategories and examples), as these codes were all used more than 10% for evaluations. Prudential reasoning was removed from remaining analyses as it was used less than 10% (only 1.9%).

As with previous research (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; Study 1) proportional coding was applied to participants’ reasoning. For example, if a participant employed moral reasoning then a 1 was placed in that category and a 0 in each of the remaining categories. If a reason crossed over two categories than a .5 was placed in each respective category, with zeros being entered into categories that were not used. This reduces concerns regarding the interdependence of the data. The coding was performed by two
independent coders, with inter-rater reliability being conducted on 25% of the justification response (N = 55, achieving 89.1% agreement, Cohen’s κ = .875).

Table 2.2
Social-moral reasoning categories, subcategories in italics, and examples of participant responses within each subcategory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Example Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggressor inflicting harm</td>
<td>“No one should get bullied”; “No one likes a bully”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality and fairness</td>
<td>“It's not fair [the victim] got talked to like that”; “It’s unfair and he’s had enough”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy and perspective-taking</td>
<td>“Because she felt sorry for [the victim] and wanted [the perpetrator] to stop”; “If I was in that situation I would want someone to help me”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosocial behaviour</td>
<td>“It’s nice that he stood up for someone and helped them”; “She didn't help the girl, she just stood there and watched her”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social-conventional</th>
<th>Example Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social expectations, outcomes and authority</td>
<td>“Because it will carry on if no one stands up”; “If someone doesn't [help] no one will”; “Tell a teacher because it'll be the right thing to do”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group status and loyalty</td>
<td>“Because he is really popular [high status] he doesn't care about the others”; “Because he doesn't want to be seen helping out unpopular [low status] people”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological</th>
<th>Example Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal choice</td>
<td>“They want to stay out of the way because it’s not their argument”; “They didn’t want to have anything to do with it”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity and personality</td>
<td>“Because she is jealous of the things she has”; “Because she didn’t know them and only cared about her friends”; “She ignored her as she didn’t know her”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All categories used more than 10%; both positive and negative references to each category are included within each category
Perceived school norms. (1) Evaluation norm: Participants were first asked, “What do you think other students at the school would think of how [the Target bystander] acted?” Participants indicated their answer on a 1 to 5 scale (where 1 = They think it was very bad, 2 = They think it was a little bad, 3 = They think it was neither good or bad, 4 = They think it was quite good, 5 = They think it was very good. This is a measure of normative evaluations (i.e., the evaluations that participants’ perceived other students to hold). (2) Behavioural norm: To examine whether participants perceived any bystander norms due to the bystander status or action, participants were then asked, ”How likely is it that other students would have behaved in the same way as [Target bystander]?” Participants indicated their answers on 1 to 5 scale (where 1 = No other students would behave like that, 2 = A few other students would behave like that, 3 = Quite a lot of other students would behave like that, 4 = Most other students would behave like that, 5 = All other students would behave/think like that). This is the behavioural norm.

To interpret findings regarding perceived school norm accurately it is important to reiterate that the score for the norm is the level of participant’s perception that the students in their school would respond or think in the same way to the name-calling incident as the target bystander in the story. The target bystander in the story acted differently depending on the condition the participant was assigned to. If the participant was assigned to the bystander helping condition and they scored a 5 on the behavioural norm scale, this would indicate that the participant perceived other students in their school to help when in the position of a bystander. If a participant in helping condition indicated a score of 1 on the scale then it would show that the participant perceived other students in their school would not help when in the position of a bystander.

Perceived leadership qualities of the target bystander. Until now, leadership scales have been developed primarily for research with adults, and the complexity is not suitable for
research with children. For the present study adult leadership measures were adapted for use with the current sample. Based on the Multi-Factor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ; Avolio, Bass & Jung, 1999; Jung & Sosik, 2002), research on core-transformational leadership (Geyer & Steyrer, 1998) and Judge and Piccolo’s (2004) descriptions of transformational leadership, a number of leadership items (21 in total) were developed to form a measure of leadership for children within the present study. These items were revised after consultation with two primary school teachers, ensuring that they would be comprehensible for young children.

The final leadership scale consisted of 13 items (see Appendix B: Example Questionnaire Measures), and achieved a reliability of Cronbach’s $\alpha = .87$. Examples of items include: [Target bystander] is a very confident member of the un/popular group; People in the un/popular group look up to [target bystander]; People in the un/popular group like [target bystander] because s/he understands how they feel; [Target bystander] can change the way the un/popular group thinks about things; [Target bystander] listens to what each person in the un/popular group needs. Participants indicated how much they agreed with the statement, from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much). The items were averaged into a single composite item labelled "bystander leadership qualities".

**Participant bystander intentions.** Participants were asked to indicate their own bystander intention, should they find themselves in the same situation as the one depicted in the name-calling scenario. Participants indicated their likelihood of engaging in seven different bystander responses: Don't get involved and walk away; Don't get involved and watch; Tell [aggressor] to stop being mean; Help [victim] in another way; Talk to [aggressor] afterwards; Talk to [victim] afterwards; Report to a teacher or member of staff. Participants indicated their bystander intentions on a scale of 1 (Definitely would not respond in this way) to 5 (Definitely would respond in this way). The first two items (Don't get involved and walk
away; Don't get involved and watch) were positively correlated with each other, but negatively correlated with the remaining positive or “prosocial” bystander intentions (see Table 2.3 for correlation matrix, means and standard deviations). These negatively-correlated items were reverse-coded and submitted to reliability testing along with the remaining five items, achieving a good reliability of Cronbach’s $\alpha = .67$. Therefore, in line with earlier research (Jones et al., 2012; Palmer & Cameron, 2010; Palmer, Rutland & Cameron, under review; Trach et al, 2010; Study 1) these seven items were collapsed and averaged into a composite score of “prosocial bystander intentions”.

**Ethical Considerations**

Consent was obtained for all participants through Loco Parentis, informed opt-out parental consent and informed verbal consent from participants (refer to Appendix B: Ethics Approval and Measures Employed). Participants were reminded that any responses given were confidential; that participation was voluntary and that they could stop at any time and did not need to give a reason for not continuing. All participants were invited to ask questions. The questionnaire was completed by participants individually within a classroom. Teaching staff and trained research assistants were on standby to support students with any comprehension difficulties, or required clarification on what a question was asking.

When the questionnaires were complete participants were thanked for their assistance, given a verbal debrief and a debrief letter to take home, and invited to ask questions about the research. As with all studies conducted as part of this thesis, no references to bullying were made within the questionnaire, but as part of the debrief participants were reminded of the support available in school if they had any concerns regarding bullying.
Table 2.3

Correlation matrix for participant bystander intention scores along with the means (M) and standard deviations (SD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Don’t get involved and walk away</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Don’t get involved and watch</td>
<td>.204**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tell [aggressor] to stop being mean</td>
<td>-.139*</td>
<td>-.236**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Help [victim] in another way</td>
<td>-.177*</td>
<td>-.197**</td>
<td>.279**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Talk to [aggressor] afterwards</td>
<td>-.105</td>
<td>-.077</td>
<td>.322**</td>
<td>.273**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Talk to [victim] afterwards</td>
<td>-.174*</td>
<td>-.112</td>
<td>.242**</td>
<td>.354**</td>
<td>.268**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Report to a teacher or member of staff</td>
<td>-.220**</td>
<td>-.428**</td>
<td>.241**</td>
<td>.306**</td>
<td>.174*</td>
<td>.167*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *correlation is significant at the p<.05 level, ** correlation is significant at the p<.01 level
Table 2.4

Correlation matrix for main study variables along with the means (M) and standard deviations (SD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Year group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gender</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Target bystander status</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Target bystander response</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Target bystander evaluation</td>
<td>-.151*</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.532**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Evaluative norm</td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.529**</td>
<td>.666**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Behavioural norm</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>-.224**</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Prosocial bystander intention</td>
<td>-.325**</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>.183*</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Leadership</td>
<td>-.124</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.453**</td>
<td>.597**</td>
<td>.562**</td>
<td>-.095</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *correlation is significant at the p<.05 level, ** correlation is significant at the p<.01 level
Results

Preliminary Analysis

Refer to Table 2.4 for correlations, means and standard deviations for the main study variables. Gender did not significantly correlate with any other variable so was controlled for throughout analyses.

Evaluation of Target Bystander

A key aim of the present study was to examine how participants’ evaluations of a bystander differs by age, and as a function of group status (i.e., high or low) and bystander response (i.e., helping or walking away) to an incident of verbal aggression. To examine this aim a 2 (Age: younger/9 years old, older/13 years old) x 2 (Target bystander status: High, Low) x 2 (Target bystander response: Help, Walk Away) ANOVA was conducted, with target bystander evaluation as the dependent variable.

Tests of between-participant effects showed a main effect of age, F (1, 206) = 6.36, p = .01, $\eta^2 = .03$, and a main effect of bystander response, F (1, 206) = 79.11, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .23$. Contrary to predictions, no main effect of status was shown, F (1, 206) = .18, p = .67, $\eta^2 = .001$, and no interactions were observed (all other ps>.05). Means and standard deviations showed that younger participants evaluated the target bystander more favourably (M = 3.58, SD = 1.35) than older participants (M = 3.20, SD = 1.11). Additionally, bystanders who responded helpfully were evaluated more positively (M = 4.08, SD = 1.08) compared to bystanders who walked away (M = 2.74, SD = 1.06). These findings suggest that the behaviour of the bystander is a crucial element in participants’ evaluation decisions, and shows that bystander status is not relevant when evaluating bystanders who help or walk away from an episode of bullying.
Social-Moral Reasoning

A further aim of the current research was to determine whether participants’ social-moral reasoning about their evaluations of the target bystander differed as a result of the participant’s age, bystander’s status or response of the target bystander. To examine this aim a 2 (Age: younger/9 years old, older/13 years old) x 2 (Target bystander status: High, Low) x 2 (Target bystander response: Help, Walk Away) x 3 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological) mixed design ANOVA was conducted, with repeated measures on the last factor. Gender was included as a covariate.

Within-participant effects showed a significant main effect of type of reasoning, $F(2,396) = 9.67, p<.001, \eta^2 = .05$. Similarly to the main effects of reasoning shown in Study 1, moral reasoning ($M = .46, SD = .49$) was employed significantly more than social-conventional ($M = .13, SD = .33$) ($p<.001$) and psychological reasoning ($M = .32, SD = .45$) ($p<.001$), and social-conventional was employed significantly less than psychological reasoning ($p<.001$). Type of reasoning also interacted with target bystander status, $F(2,396) = 3.40, p=.03, \eta^2 = .02$, and separately with target bystander response, $F(2,396) = 3.65, p=.03, \eta^2 = .02$. Pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine the simple main effects of these interactions further.

To examine the reasoning x status interaction, pairwise comparisons were conducted first on status (high vs. low) within each level of reasoning. A significant difference between status levels was found when participants employed moral reasons when evaluating the bystander ($p=.03$); less moral reasoning was employed when reasoning about evaluations of the low-status bystander ($M = .39, SD = .47$) compared to the high-status bystander ($M = .54, SD = .49$). No significant differences were observed between levels of target bystander status for the use of social-conventional ($p=.91$) or psychological reasoning ($p=.08$).
When comparing types of reasoning within each level of status: when reasoning was about low-status bystanders moral reasoning was employed more than social-conventional (p<.001) but no differently to psychological (p = .91); additionally, social-conventional reasoning was employed less than psychological (p<.001). When reasoning about high-status bystander evaluations, moral reasoning was employed significantly more than social-conventional (p<.001) and psychological (p=.001); social-conventional was employed less than psychological (p=.02). These comparisons show that reference to moral and psychological domains are employed at similar rates when reasoning about low-status bystanders only; however the use of moral reasoning is higher when the bystander is high-status (see Table 2.5 for means and standard deviations for the reasoning x status interaction). This interaction shows that participants focus on different concerns when justifying their evaluations about a high-status bystander compared to a low-status bystander. Indeed, when justifying high status bystander evaluations, participants focussed more on moral concerns compared to when they justified evaluations of low-status bystanders, regardless of these bystanders’ behaviours (e.g., both when the bystander helped and when they walked away).

Table 2.5
Reasoning about target bystander: means (M) and standard deviations in parentheses (SD) for the reasoning x status interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unpopular</th>
<th>Popular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.39 (.47)</td>
<td>.54 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.14 (.34)</td>
<td>.13 (.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.38 (.47)</td>
<td>.27 (.44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To examine the reasoning x bystander response interaction, pairwise comparisons were first conducted to compare each type of bystander response (i.e. to help or walk away) within each level of reasoning. Findings showed that moral reasoning was employed more when participants reasoned about a bystander who helped versus a bystander who walked away (p=.01). Social-conventional reasoning was employed marginally more when participants reasoned about bystanders who walked away, compared to those who helped (p=.06). The use of psychological reasoning did not differ for bystanders who helped compared to those who walked away (p=.71).

Table 2.6
Reasoning about target bystander: means (M) and standard deviations in parentheses (SD) for the reasoning x response interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Helping</th>
<th>Walking away</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.55 (.48)</td>
<td>.38 (.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.09 (.28)</td>
<td>.18 (.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.31 (.32)</td>
<td>.33 (.47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When comparing types of reasoning within each type of bystander response, when reasoning about bystanders who walk away, moral reasoning was employed more than social-conventional (p=.002) but no differently to psychological (p=.62), and social-conventional reasoning was employed less than psychological (p=.01). When reasoning about bystanders who helped, moral reasoning was employed significantly more than social-conventional (p<.001), more than psychological (p=.005), and social-conventional was employed less than psychological (p<.001) (see Table 2.6 for means and standard deviations for the reasoning x
response interaction). The key finding here is that, although moral reasoning (i.e., a focus on the victim or prosocial behaviour) is still prioritised when reasoning about both bystander actions, social-conventional reasoning is employed marginally more when the bystander does not help. These findings show that evaluations of helpful bystanders focussed on moral concerns comparatively more than evaluations of bystanders who walked away. Whereas, social-conventional reasons were employed more when participants justified their evaluations of participants who walked away, rather than when they helped.

Perceived Bystander Norms

To examine which bystander was seen as most normative two 2 (Age: younger/9 years old, older/13 years old) x 2 (Target bystander status: High, Low) x 2 (Target bystander response: Help, Walk Away) between-participant ANOVAs were conducted, first with the evaluation norm as the dependent variable and then with the behavioural norm as the dependent variable.

Evaluation norm. A predicted main effect of target bystander response, F (1, 206) = 77.36, p < .001, \( \eta^2 = .28 \), was superseded by an interaction between age and target bystander response, F (1, 206) = 3.90, p = .05, \( \eta^2 = .02 \). As predicted, pairwise comparisons of type of response showed that the evaluative norm was stronger (i.e., when participants perceived others’ were more likely to approve of the target bystander’s response) when the target bystander helped compared to walking away, across both younger and older age groups (both ps < .001).

When comparing age groups within each type of bystander response, comparisons showed that younger and older participants significantly differed in their scores when the bystander helped only (p = .013; bystander walk away p = .78). Descriptive statistics showed that when the bystander was described as helping the victim, younger children were more
likely to indicate that other students in their school would think this was a good response, compared to older children (refer to Table 2.7 for means).

**Table 2.7**

Scores for normative evaluations: means (M) and standard deviations in parentheses (SD) for the age x bystander response interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Helping</th>
<th>Walking away</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>4.42 (.94)</td>
<td>2.79 (1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older</td>
<td>3.87 (.88)</td>
<td>2.85 (1.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Behavioural norm.** Similarly to responses on the evaluative norm measure, a main effect of target bystander response on the behavioural norm (i.e., whether participants perceived others were likely to engage in the same behaviour as the target bystander) was found, $F (1, 204) = 12.35, p = .001, \eta^2 = .06$. This was also superseded by an interaction between age and target bystander response, $F (1, 204) = 7.88, p = .005, \eta^2 = .04$. As predicted, pairwise comparisons of bystander response within each level of age group showed that the behavioural norm for each type of behaviour was significantly different for older participants only ($p < .001$) but not younger participants ($p = .60$). Descriptive statistics showed that older participants saw not helping as more typical of other students’ behaviour compared to helping. This builds on the research showing a developmental decline in participants’ own bystander intentions. Younger participants perceived the behavioural norm to be similar to the behaviour of the bystander regardless of whether they helped or walked away (refer to Table 2.8). When comparing each age group within type of response, pairwise comparisons showed age differences in perceptions of a behavioural norm only when the bystander helped.
(p = .02) but not when the bystander walked away (p = .12). In line with research on participants’ own bystander intentions, younger participants were more likely to think that the bystander who helped reflected behavioural norms for helping, compared to older participants (see Table 2.8).

Table 2.8
Scores for behavioural norm: means (M) and standard deviations in parentheses (SD) for the age x bystander response interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Helping</th>
<th>Walking away</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>2.8 (1.22)</td>
<td>2.89 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older</td>
<td>2.34 (.63)</td>
<td>3.32 (.80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predictors of Leadership Qualities

A fourth aim of the present study was to examine which factors predict perceived leadership qualities of the target bystander. As the examination of leadership qualities of bystanders is a novel research area, an initial exploratory analysis was conducted to determine the predictive value of the key variables. This exploratory analysis involves a series of regression analyses. Once a variable has been included as an outcome variable it is not included in remaining regression analyses. Predictor variables analysed included: age, gender (0=male, 1=female), bystander action (1=Walking away, 2=Helping) and status (1=Low status, 2=High status), bystander evaluation (1=Negative to 5=Positive), evaluative norm (1=Not like the target bystander to 5=Like the target bystander) and behavioural norm (1=Not like the target bystander to 5=Like the target bystander). First, the key variables were inserted as predictors into a multiple regression model, with leadership qualities as the
outcome variable. Bystander evaluation ($\beta = .37, t (178) = 4.46, p < .001$) and evaluative norm ($\beta = .23, t (178) = 2.77, p < .01$) were the only variables to significantly predict leadership qualities (all other $p$s > .05).

The second stage of this exploratory analysis involved determining what factors might predict bystander evaluation and evaluative norm (as these were the only two significant predictors of leadership qualities). Age, gender, bystander action and status, and behavioural norm, were entered as predictors into two separate regression models, where either bystander evaluation or evaluative norm were the outcome variables. Evaluative norm was also included as a predictor in the model where bystander evaluation was the outcome measure.

When bystander evaluation was the outcome variable, results showed bystander evaluations were negatively predicted by age ($\beta = -.11, t (196) = -2.12, p < .05$), positively predicted by bystander response ($\beta = .22, t (178) = 3.43, p = .001$) and positively predicted by the evaluative norm ($\beta = .55, t (178) = 8.87, p < .001$). When the evaluative norm was entered as the outcome variable, findings showed it was positively predicted by bystander response ($\beta = .29, t (196) = 4.68, p < .001$) and marginally positively predicted by the behavioural norm ($\beta = .09, t (196) = 1.74, p = .08$). To determine what predicted behavioural norm, this variable was then entered as an outcome variable and the remaining variables included as potential predictors. Behavioural norm was negatively predicted by bystander responses ($\beta = -.23, t (198) = -3.34, p < .001$).

This exploratory analysis (see Figure 2.1) show different relationships between the key variables and suggests that age, bystander responses and evaluative norms simultaneously predict bystander evaluations, which in turn predict leadership. Additionally, evaluative norms directly predict bystander leadership qualities, which in turn are predicted
by bystander response and (marginally) by the behavioural norm. Bystander status did not predict leadership qualities.

A second set of analyses was performed to examine the role of norms and perceptions of leadership. Although not yet examined in the context of bystander responses, research has shown that group norms can influence the perception of leaders (e.g., Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques & Hutchison, 2008). Based on this research and the findings from the initial exploratory analysis, a further test was conducted to determine whether participants perceived bystander leadership as harmonious with perceptions of a normative bystander, and whether this varied as a function of bystander status or response. This allows us to test when precisely norms might play a role on perceptions of leadership in the bystander context.

Two multiplicative moderation models were tested using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 3, 5000 bootstraps; Hayes, 2012). First, the evaluative norm was entered as the predictor (X) and leadership (Y) as the outcome variable. Bystander response (M) and bystander status (W) were input as moderators, and gender was controlled for. Interestingly,
the evaluative norm did not directly predict leadership ($\beta = .64, SE = .41, t (177) = 1.57, p = .12, LLCI = -.16, ULCI = 1.44$), suggesting that even if participants believe that their peers approve of the bystander’s response this is not enough to suggest the bystander holds leadership qualities. Indeed, results showed that none of the predictors or interaction terms reached significance (all $p$s > .05).

Next, behavioural norm was entered as the predictor ($X$) and leadership ($Y$) as the outcome variable. Bystander response and status were input as moderators, and gender was controlled for. Results showed that bystander response ($\beta = 2.85, SE = .98, t (174) = 2.91, p = .004, LLCI = .92, ULCI = 4.79$), behavioural norm ($\beta = 1.16, SE = .53, t (174) = 2.19, p = .03, LLCI = .12, ULCI = 2.21$), and an interaction between the bystander response and behavioural norm ($\beta = -.84, SE = .33, t (174) = -2.52, p = .01, LLCI = -1.50, ULCI = -.18$) achieved significance, but a three-way interaction between behavioural norm, bystander response and bystander status did not reach significance, $\beta = -.34, SE = .22, t (174) = -.36, p = .72, LLCI = -.24, ULCI = .17$.

![Graph](image.png)

**Figure 2.2. A two-way interaction between behavioural norms and bystander response on perceived leadership qualities.**
To examine the simple main effects of the two-way interaction, a second model was computed in PROCESS. First the behavioural norm (X), bystander response (M) and leadership qualities (Y) were entered into a new model allowing for one moderating variable only, (model 1; Hayes, 2012). The $R^2$-increase due to the interaction achieved significance ($R^2$-change = .04, $F (1, 178) = 10.47$, $p=.001$), and results showed that the behavioural norm predicted leadership qualities when the bystander walked away ($B = .20$, $SE = .07$, $t (178) = 2.76$, $p = .006$, LLCI = .06, ULCI = .35) but not when the bystander helped ($B = -.14$, $SE = .08$, $t (178) = -1.84$, $p = .07$, LLCI = -.29, ULCI = .01). As can be seen in Figure 2.2, when the bystander walks away and this behaviour is seen as less normative of the peer group, perceptions of leadership are lower compared to when the bystander walks away and this behaviour is seen as more normative – then perceptions of leadership are comparatively higher.

To determine whether type of bystander response predicted leadership qualities at each level of the behavioural norm (i.e., when it was weaker/-1 SD and when it was stronger +1 SD), an additional model was tested. This time bystander response was the predictor (X), behavioural norm was the moderator (M) and leadership qualities was the outcome variable (Y). Findings showed that when the behavioural norm was weaker, helpful bystanders were seen as holding more leadership qualities relative to those that walked away ($B = 1.10$, $SE = .15$, $t (178) = 7.33$, $p < .0001$, LLCI = .81, ULCI = 1.40) and when the behaviour norm was stronger, the same was true; helpful bystanders were still seen as holding more leadership qualities compared to those that walked away ($B = .40$, $SE = .15$, $t (178) = 2.63$, $p = .009$, LLCI = .10, ULCI = .71).

In the present context, this analysis shows that leadership qualities are ultimately assigned based on prosocial behaviour – the more helpful you are then the more likely you will be seen to hold leadership qualities; however behavioural norms are particularly
important in the perception of unhelpful bystander behaviours. The present analysis shows that if a bystander is unhelpful and this behaviour is perceived normatively, then comparatively more leadership qualities of the target bystander are perceived. This finding further points to the importance of norms in children and adolescents’ interpretations of bystander responses.

**Participant Bystander Intentions**

A final aim of the present study was to determine how age, target bystander status and response affected the prosocial bystander intentions of the participant. A developmental decline in participants’ own bystander intentions was predicted. However it is not known what the effects of reading about another bystanders’ group status or bystander action would have on participants’ own bystander intentions. To examine these potential effects a 2 (Age: younger/9 years old, older/13 years old) x 2 (Target bystander status: Unpopular, Popular) x 2 (Target bystander response: Help, Walk Away) between-participant ANOVA was conducted, with prosocial bystander intentions as the dependent variable and gender included as a covariate. Findings showed only a main effect of year group, $F(8, 191) = 21.85, p < .001, \eta^2 = .11$. Younger participants reported significantly higher prosocial bystander intentions ($M = 3.99, SD = .66$) compared to older participants ($M = 3.54, SD = .65$). Two separate one-sample t-tests were performed (with 2.5 as the test value) to determine whether these means were statistically higher than the mid-point of the 1 to 5 prosocial bystander intention scale. Results confirmed they were: younger participants, $t(98) = 22.58, p < .001$; older participants, $t(92) = 15.54, p < .001$. Consistent with the findings from Study 1, older participants report lower prosocial bystander intentions compared to younger participants. This finding did not interact with the status or action of the bystander.
Discussion

The present study experimentally manipulated intergroup bystander status (high vs. low) and type of bystander response (to help or walk away) to examine the effect on children and adolescents’ evaluations of peer bystanders when presented with verbal aggression among peers. This is the first study to experimentally control the behaviour and intergroup status of bystanders to determine the effect on evaluations of bystanders and peers own bystander intentions. This study further builds on existing research by also examining how children and adolescents reason about their bystander evaluations, and how indicative of leadership status and response-type the bystander is perceived to be.

The findings from the present study extend those from Study 1 in a number of ways. First, the present study built on the earlier operationalization of an intergroup context by examining how participants evaluate peer bystanders who belong to a group of high or low status in an experimental design. Second, the present study’s experimental design also allowed for the testing of whether peer bystanders were evaluated more or less positively due to their bystander action. This adds an extra dimension to our understanding of the bystander responses that children and adolescents value. In line with predictions, findings showed that helpful bystanders were evaluated more positively than those that walk away, but - contrary to expectations - the group status of the bystander was not important for participants’ evaluations.

Third, the present study extends the examination of the role of group norms in study one by examining two types of norms: an evaluation norm and a behavioural norm. Importantly, we showed that these two types of norms are conceptually different and are associated with different bystander evaluations, dependent on the response of the bystander and age of the participant. In line with research on children and adolescents’ negative attitudes towards bullying and aggression (e.g., Nesdale et al, 2008) we found that bystanders
who helped were seen as more normative than those who walked away. Additionally, in line with research on children and adolescents’ bystander intentions (e.g., Trach et al., 2011) and the findings of Study 1, we found that, older participants perceived the helpful bystander response as less behaviourally normative compared to younger participants.

Fourth, the present study expands on what is known about children and adolescents’ leadership roles, which are understudied per se (e.g., Day, 2011), but particularly in the context of bystander intervention. These findings are the first to examine leadership in the context of bystander responses to bullying and aggression, and could shed more light on the role of bystanders as leaders. An exploratory path analysis showed a complex relationship between variables, indicating that leadership qualities are predicted by the evaluative norm, which in turn is predicted by the behavioural norm. Bystander evaluations (how positively or negatively the bystander was viewed by the participant) also directly predicted leadership. However, these evaluations were predicted by age and type of bystander response. Additional analysis highlighted the important role of behavioural norms in children’s perceptions. These findings highlight the numerous considerations presented to children and adolescents when evaluating peer behaviour, and how these considerations are also influenced by age.

Finally, in line with the broader aims of this thesis, developmental trends in children’s evaluations of bystanders and their social-moral reasoning about their evaluations were examined. In line with findings from Study 1, developmental trends in social-moral reasoning were also observed. Extending these earlier findings, results showed that interpretations of bystander evaluations are effected by the status of the bystander. Findings showed that more moral reasoning was employed when bystanders were high-status; potentially, higher status bystanders are perceived as having a stronger moral obligation to help peers, due to their group status. Additional findings showed that more social-conventional reasoning was employed when evaluating a bystander who walked away compared to a bystander who
helped. This shows that group-related considerations are in place when justifying evaluations for bystanders who do not engage in helpful behaviour. These findings and implications are discussed further below.

**Bystander Evaluations**

In line with predictions, results showed main effects of age and bystander response on participants’ evaluations of the bystander. Younger participants were more favourable towards the target bystander compared to older participants, and bystanders who helped were favoured above those who walked away. This finding ties in with reports of anti-bullying attitudes among children and adolescents (e.g., Gini et al, 2008), and shows that helping behaviour results in more favourable attitudes towards a prosocial bystander. However, differences in evaluations according to intergroup status were not observed, either as a main effect or interaction. Participants, of both ages, did not take into consideration the high or low status group membership of the bystander. It had been predicted that bystanders from a higher-status social group might be viewed more favourably overall, and this could have buffered them from any negative evaluations that could result from not helping a bullied peer.

It is possible that the conceptualisation of status was not relevant enough for participants, and that they did not perceive popularity as indicative of higher social standing. Although manipulation checks would suggest that participants did correctly identify unpopular bystanders as “unpopular”, and popular bystanders as “popular”, it is possible that these social group indicators are not as indicative of high or low status among contemporary youth. Another interpretation is that this effect was not observed as the participant was not assigned as a member to either the low or high status bystander groups. As such they could be considered a “third-party observer” (cf. Nesdale et al, 2013). Being a third-party observed might prevent the participant from identifying with the bystander “peers” presented to them.
Previous research (e.g., Gini, 2008; Nesdale & Flessner, 2001; Nesdale & Scarlett, 2004) has assigned the participant to either the low or high-status group, thus allowing for ingroup identification salience. With the conceptualisation of group status as low = unpopular and high = popular, it would have been difficult to assign participants to these groups as part of the experimental manipulation. Future research should therefore replicate the present study using a different manipulation of status. For example, employing a minimal group paradigm (e.g., low and high-status teams) and assigning participants to each group to ensure social group identification (as in Study 1).

**Social-Moral Reasoning**

Similarly to findings from Study 1, moral reasoning (e.g., No one should get bullied; If I was in that situation I would want someone to help me) was employed more than any other type of reasoning. Indeed, the findings from this study build on Study 1 by showing that moral concerns are prioritised when evaluating peer bystanders, as well as considering their own bystander intentions. This finding also supports that of existing research (e.g., Killen, 2007), and positively demonstrates that, overall, both children and adolescents are aware of the harmful implications of verbal aggression, and therefore view “prosocial” bystander behaviours as a moral issue.

The second most frequent form of reasoning was psychological (e.g., They want to stay out of the way because it’s not their argument), which was employed significantly more than social-conventional (e.g., Because he is in the popular group he doesn’t care about the others). Interestingly, a main effect of bystander status showed that participants employed more moral reasoning when justifying their evaluation of popular bystanders compared to unpopular bystanders. It is possible that high-status, popular bystanders are seen as more morally obligated to help bullied peers due to their social standing. In contrast, unpopular
bystanders might be seen as more at risk of repercussions; potentially their social group status protects them from negative evaluations associated with not helping peers.

In addition, a main effect of bystander action showed that moral reasoning was prioritised foremost across both helping and walking away responses. However, the use of social-conventional reasoning was marginally higher when bystanders walked away. This suggests that participants rationalise a bystander’s action not to help by drawing on information about that peer’s group membership (i.e., Because he doesn't want to be seen helping out unpopular people). These findings add weight to the interpretation that popular-helpful bystanders might be evaluated more positively than unpopular-helpful bystanders due to the perception of a moral responsibility for higher status group members (also see Gini, 2007). However, it also suggests that participants might have assumed the group memberships of the aggressor and victim to be high and low-status, respectively. Indeed, research has shown that bullies can be viewed as higher status within the peer group (e.g., Cillessen & Borch, 2006; De Bruyn & Cillessen, 2006). This may have led to participants assuming more responsibility on the part of the high-status bystander challenging an ingroup aggressor, and more concern for the low-status bystander who tried to support an ingroup victim and could experience repercussions as a result. It is difficult to know if this interpretation is accurate, as aggressor and victim group memberships were not controlled; thus, future studies should ensure all character group memberships are controlled, in addition to affiliating a membership with the participant, to ensure the intergroup context is clear.

**Normative Expectations**

Building on the findings from Study 1, the present study examined the presence of two types of norm: an evaluative norm and a behavioural norm. As predicted, a main effect of bystander response was observed for each type of norm; overall, helping was seen as more
acceptable to peers and more behaviourally normative of peers. However, both norms interacted with age. When indicating how much other students in the school would approve of the behaviour (evaluative norm) younger participants thought more students would approve of helping compared to older participants, but no age differences were present between evaluative norm ratings for walking away. When considering the behavioural norm, older participants thought it would be more likely that peers their age would walk away compared to help. These findings support the results of Study 1, suggesting that older children do not expect peers to help as readily as younger children do. Importantly, the finding that older students’ expectations regarding evaluative and behavioural norms for walking away differ (i.e., they are more likely to actually see not helping happen than approve of not helping) suggests that the decision-making behind bystander responses is a far more complex process for adolescents compared to children. Consequently, the present study reiterates the importance of examining developmental differences in perceptions of norms for bystander responses.

**Leadership Ratings**

“Bystanders as leaders” is a novel concept that has not received empirical attention in research on promoting prosocial bystander responses among children and adolescents faced with bullying incidents. As charities and schools are increasingly training school “ambassadors” to lead anti-bullying programmes in school, this is a relevant avenue of research to explore to determine whether certain bystander behaviours are seen to be “leader-like”. Thus, the present study undertook an exploratory examination of key study variables to determine which factors fed into participants’ perceptions of leadership. Prosocial bystander responses appeared to be the starting point for perceptions of leadership, but this relationship was indirect; the helpful target bystander led to more positive evaluations of the bystander, which in turn led to an increase in perceptions of leadership. Additionally, bystander response
negatively predicted the behavioural norm, and the behavioural norm positively predicted evaluative norms, which in turn predicted leadership qualities.

Upon further examination, the behavioural norm was moderated by bystander response: when a bystander walked away from the bullying incident and this was seen to be a normative behaviour among peers, leadership ratings were higher than when it was not seen as a normative behaviour. This finding demonstrates that when a leader engages in a “walking away” bystander response, they could further perpetuate the same inactive bystander behaviour among peers, thus preventing children and adolescents from challenging peer aggression. Not only is this the first time that bystanders have been rated for leadership qualities, but this is the first study that depicts the important interplay between behavioural norms and perceived bystander leadership qualities, and other predictive factors.

These findings highlight the importance of further examining the role of “bystanders as leaders,” and indicate that perceived leadership qualities are, in part at least, a result of the normative context that bystanders act within. Future research should also examine different types of leadership; for example, in adolescent samples two types of leadership have been shown to be indicative of different behaviours. A conventional leader (a “model” leader who is also favoured by adults) is typically more prosocial and rated more favourably by peers, whereas a deviant leader (unconventional and risky) has been shown to be more influential within the peer group (Farmer & Rodkin, 1996;). This suggests that charities might be more successful at challenging bullying and aggression in schools if they integrate the promotion of a whole-school approach (i.e., challenging norms of inactivity) into anti-bullying programmes, whilst also encouraging “deviant” leaders to pave the way for assertive bystander behaviour.

Limitations and Future Directions
A key limitation of the present study was the conceptualisation of low- and high-status group membership as unpopular and popular peer groups. Although attempts were made to accurately conceptualise “popularity” and “unpopularity” (following Closson, 2009), past research has shown how “popular” peers can be seen by participants as synonymous with “bullies”, and it is peers high in “social acceptance” that correlate with higher defending behaviour scores (Li & Wright, 2013). Within the present study design the group membership of the bully and victim were not specified, as such there was scope for participants to assume their group membership, and the relationship with the bystander group membership. Indeed, in some participant reasoning responses there was reference to unpopular target bystanders standing up for “their friend” (the victim). Thus, to fully test how children and adolescents evaluate peer bystanders based on their group memberships and intergroup status it is necessary to control the group memberships of every target involved in the scenario (i.e., bully, victim, bystander) so that the participant can more reliably interpret the intergroup context.

The present study built on findings from Study 1, providing additional support for the role of norms when evaluating peer bystanders. Future studies could manipulate the norm for bystander behaviour to determine whether there is a causal relationship with bystander evaluations (see Study 3). As can be seen from the results of the present study, together with findings from Study 1, younger participants appear to advocate a prosocial “moral” helping norm among same-aged peers, whereas older participants appear to advocate an inactive “psychological” non-helping norm. Manipulating norms to reflect these age-related values could shed more light on their interplay with bystander responses.

Furthermore, experimentally controlling group membership and group norms may result in an increase in participants’ use of social-conventional reasoning (i.e., references to group membership, group norms and loyalty); it is probable that increasing participants’
salience to the group context by aligning their group membership with that of the other bystanders may increase the salience of relevant intergroup concerns, both when making rating ingroup and outgroup peer-bystanders, and when reasoning about their evaluations.

**Conclusion**

The present study offers an insight into how different bystander behaviours are evaluated by peers, and how relative group-status and specific bystander responses might influence these evaluations. Importantly both evaluations themselves, and reasoning about these evaluations, showed that prosocial behaviours are predominantly favoured by children and adolescents. However, further research is required in order to identify the way in which intergroup factors facilitate prosocial responses during childhood and adolescence. The present study examined the role of two types of perceived norms and demonstrated how these differed by age. This reiterates the importance of norms for children and adolescents’ bystander evaluations. However, more concrete findings in relation to the influence of group membership and group-specific norms on children and adolescents’ bystander behaviours could be established in a controlled experimental design.

Study 3 will extend the findings of Study 2 by examining the role of in and out-group memberships (across two types of intergroup context: school and ethnic-group) and the effect of a group-specific norm to help or not to get involved on children and adolescents’ bystander evaluations and intentions. Furthermore, in response to limitations of the current study, Study 3 will control the group memberships of the aggressor and victim characters, and assign participants to a relevant group membership to ensure affiliation with group members in the scenario (as in Study 1).
Chapter 7

Intergroup Norms, Deviant Bystanders and Social-Moral Reasoning

The present study sought to shed further light on the role of group membership and group norms for the developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions. This study builds on Study 1 and Study 2 by manipulating the group memberships of the aggressor, victim and bystander, as well as the ingroup and outgroup norms. This allows us to examine how these variables affect children and adolescents’ evaluations of peer bystanders who deviate from their group’s norm. Two hundred and thirty students from years 5 and 6 at primary school (N=126, M = 9 years 11 months) and years 8 and 9 at secondary school (N=104, M = 12 years 9 months) in South East England participated in this study (45% female). Participants were presented with ingroup members and outgroup members, along with group-specific norms (i.e., to help others with their problems vs. not getting involved with other people’s problems). Group membership was either in the context of ingroup and outgroup school members (“School context”) or ingroup British and outgroup Traveller members (“Ethnic-group context”). Participants read about, and evaluated, a “deviant” ingroup bystander and an outgroup bystander, both whom had transgressed their respective group’s norm. Participants’ evaluations of deviant bystanders was sensitive to the group membership of the bystander (i.e., ingroup or outgroup), the type of group-norm that was transgressed, and the group context. An examination of social-moral reasoning showed that participants reasoned differently about ingroup compared to outgroup evaluations. This study also showed that children and adolescents are aware of the group-based repercussions that bystanders who challenge the group’s norm might face.

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2 This study was conducted in collaboration with Prof. Melanie Killen (University of Maryland, USA), and Dr. Aline Hitti (Tulane University, USA). The collaboration was supported by an ESRC funded Overseas Institutional Visit to the University of Maryland during Spring 2013.
Group Membership, Group Norms, and Bystander Deviance

Studies that have drawn on social identity development theory (SIDT) and the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD) have shown the importance of group membership and group norms for children’s evaluations of peers (see Chapter 3 for a review). Children tend to evaluate ingroup members more favourably than outgroup members, as this serves to reinforce a positive social identity (Nesdale, 2007). However, from middle childhood, children also adhere to group-specific norms when constructing attitudes, behaviours and judgments of their peers (Abrams et al., 2003; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013). Furthermore, research has shown that group norms become increasingly important with age, when evaluating ingroup and outgroup peers (Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). Studies have shown that children favour ingroup peers who behave normatively (i.e., their attitudes and behaviours are in line with the group’s expectations). In contrast, children derogate ingroup peers who behave deviantly (i.e., they go against the group’s expectations) (Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams & Rutland, 2008). However, research has shown that outgroup deviants are viewed more favourably when compared to ingroup deviants, as outgroup deviance can inadvertently strengthen the ingroup’s identity (Abrams et al., 2013).

The present study examines children and adolescents’ evaluations of a deviant ingroup and outgroup’s bystander behaviour. The group membership of aggressors, victims, bystanders and participants are controlled for, as are the respective group’s norms. This allows us to determine whether children and adolescents are sensitive to intergroup norms when considering effective ways of challenging bullying or aggressive behaviour among peers. Importantly, research has shown that deviant ingroup behaviour can result in negative evaluations, whereas deviant outgroup behaviour can result in positive evaluations (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; see Chapter 3 for a review). However, it has not yet been examined whether this pattern of evaluations are ascribed to ingroup and outgroup deviant bystanders.
As part of this examination of deviance, the present study considers whether young people believe that deviating from group-specific norms for bystander behaviour can result in negative evaluations, or group-based repercussions, for deviant peers. Findings from Study 1 and 2 showed that older children are less likely to report helpful bystander intentions; it is possible that this decline in helpful bystander intentions is influenced by perceptions of peer group norms. When examining participants’ reasoning about their decision to intervene or not intervene (Study 1), younger children focus on helping and older children focus on not getting involved. The present study examines this further by experimentally controlling group-specific norms about bystander behaviour. Taking findings from Study 1, together with Aboud and Joong’s (2008) suggestion that bystander behaviour may reflect peer group norms, the present study operationalised group norms as either helping or not getting involved. Therefore, this study extends the developmental research on intergroup deviance conducted to date by (1) applying to a bystander context and (2) examining participants’ awareness of group-based repercussions, as a result of deviating from group norms.

**Group Based Repercussions**

When examining what inhibits bystanders from responding to bullying incidents studies have focussed on factors such as self-efficacy, empathy with the victim, or attitudes towards bullying (e.g., Gini et al., 2008; see Chapter 2 for a review). Some researchers have suggested that passive bystander responses might be due to concerns for one’s own welfare; for example, being targeted by the bully themselves (Hazler, 1996; Lodge & Frydenberg, 2005). Yet this topic is understudied, and to our knowledge no one has examined whether bystander’s reluctance to help might be a result of repercussions from the group.

Research on developmental differences in children’s intergroup attitudes towards deviant group members has shown that ingroup peers who deviate from their own group’s
norms are often derogated by group members (see Chapter 4 for a review). That is, ingroup members who deviate from their group’s expectations are viewed more negatively compared to ingroup members who conform (i.e., behave “normatively”). In comparison, outgroup deviance can be evaluated relatively more positively (e.g., Abrams et al., 2013). This is because both ingroup normative behaviour and outgroup deviance can help reinforce a positive ingroup identity (Abrams et al., 2000; Abrams et al., 2003).

The present study adapts a paradigm employed in existing research to examine whether group based repercussions are a meaningful concern for children and adolescents in the position of a bystander. Killen and colleagues (e.g., Hitti, Mulvey, Rutland, Abrams & Killen, 2014; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti., 2013; Mulvey et al., 2014) examine group inclusion within their studies. This involves the presentation of a scenario, e.g., “The groups need to decide who can join their club. There is only room for one more member. They have to choose who to invite to join. [Reminds the participant of the group norm]. Who should this group invite?” (p. 1510-1511; Mulvey et al., 2014). Following the scenario the participant is instructed to indicate whether they would include a deviant group member or a different group member. The present study adapts this measure to examine group-based exclusion of a deviant bystander. This is a subtle way of examining whether participants believe that deviant bystander behaviours are subject to negative repercussions from group members.

Social-Moral Reasoning

Research drawing from social domain theory (SDT) has shown that children and adolescents’ interpret intergroup incidents of social exclusion differently (Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; see Chapter 3 for a review). For example, younger children tend to focus more on moral reasons when evaluating incidents of social exclusion (e.g., it’s mean, unkind, not right), whereas older children also attend to social-conventional (e.g., the group said it was
OK, they shouldn’t go against the group) or psychological reasons (e.g., they can do what they want to do). Indeed, research shows that older children report “multifaceted” reasons when interpreting or evaluating incidents of social exclusion (Horn, 2003; Killen, 2007). That is, although older children are able to recognise when something is morally right or wrong, they are increasingly likely to focus on additional concerns when making judgments of peers (Killen, Rutland et al., 2013).

Study 1 and 2 showed, for the first time, that social-moral reasoning was relevant when examining the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses to incidents of intergroup verbal aggression. In line with earlier research, younger children prioritise moral reasoning both when reporting their intentions to intervene (Study 1) and when evaluating other bystanders that are not directly affiliated with the participant (Study 2). In contrast, older children prioritised psychological reasoning (Study 1 and 2), and were marginally more likely to employ social-conventional interpretations when justifying their decision not to intervene (Study 1). Furthermore, research on social exclusion has shown a comparatively higher use of social-conventional reasoning among adolescents (e.g., Abrams et al., 2013; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013), and more so than psychological reasoning. In these studies, group membership and group norms were experimentally manipulated to determine the causal effect on children’s evaluations. Although Study 1 and 2 controlled group membership of the bystanders, group norms were not experimentally manipulated. Making the group membership of the aggressor, victim, bystanders and participant unambiguous and salient, while experimentally controlling ingroup and outgroup norms for bystander behaviour, allows for a more rigorous test of group membership and group norms. This allows us to determine the consequent effect of group membership and norms on participants’ evaluations of deviant peer bystanders and their social-moral reasoning.
**Group Context**

DSGD and SIDT suggest that displays of ingroup bias is consistent across a variety of group membership types including school group membership, nationality, ethnicity, teams and “minimal groups” (i.e., those with no historical meaning) (Abrams et al., 2003, 2013; Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). Recently research has shown how adolescents are aware of the group context when making judgments about intergroup exclusion (Horn, 2003; Mulvey et al., 2014). Mulvey and colleagues have recently shown that adolescents attend to the type of group context when their decision-making references the social-conventional domain; whereby school group membership results in greater ingroup bias compared to gender group membership. These findings suggest that older children attend more to the type of group context, and any meaning that might be attached to that group membership, compared to younger children. Mulvey et al.’s (2014) study is one of the first to compare across different types of group memberships in the context of social exclusion. The present study builds on this research, and extends Study 1 and 2, by comparing evaluations of bystanders who deviate from group norms in an intergroup school context, and an ethnic-intergroup context.

The ethnic-intergroup context chosen was British ingroup members versus “Traveller” outgroup members. “Traveller” is an umbrella term that broadly applies to people of Gypsy, Roma or Traveller identity (Lloyd & Stead, 2001). Travellers have been identified as an ethnic group, and have been included as such in the national census since 2011 (Commission for Racial Equality, 2006). There are approximately 120,000 to 300,000 Travellers living in the United Kingdom, a number in the population comparable to other ethnic minority groups such as Bangladeshi and Chinese (Commission for Racial Equality, 2006; van Cleemput, 2010).
Arguably, Travellers are one of the most stigmatized groups in British society, with authors highlighting the concern that an “acceptable hatred” is targeted at members of this ethnic group, exacerbated by negative portrayals in the media (Monbiot, 2003; van Cleemput, 2010). In 2003 the Department for Education and Schools (DfES) reported that Gypsy Traveller children are recognized as being “the most vulnerable minority ethnic group in the English education system” (Derrington, 2007, p. 357). In one qualitative study, all participants (N = 18) reported experiences of racist name-calling, and some reported experiencing other forms of bullying, such as physical aggression (Lloyd & Stead, 2001).

Although the population of South East England is majority White British, there are a significant number of Gypsy Travellers residing in the area (Jenkins, 2010). Consequently, operationalizing the ethnic intergroup context as British ingroup and Traveller outgroup is meaningful and relevant for the participants in the present study.

**Study Summary, Aims and Predictions**

The present study builds on Studies 1 and 2 by examining participants’ evaluations of deviant bystanders. In addition, the present study examined participants’ awareness of group-based repercussions for deviance, in the form of social exclusion. Participants were presented with an intergroup name-calling scenario. A number of variables were experimentally manipulated; the group membership of the aggressor (ingroup), victim (outgroup) and bystander groups (ingroup or outgroup), as well as the group norm (to help with other people’s problems vs. not getting involved) and the group context (school group vs. ethnic-group context). This allowed us to determine the effects of these variables on: (1) participants’ evaluations of deviant bystander behaviour; that is, bystander behaviour that challenges the bystander’s group norm; (2) participants’ evaluations of the acceptability of group-based exclusion as a result of deviant behaviour; (3) the type of social-moral reasoning
employed to make decisions about evaluations and acceptability of social exclusion; (4) participants’ own bystander intentions.

**Developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD) hypotheses.** When evaluating ingroup deviance, a main effect of age is predicted. With age, ingroup deviant bystanders will be judged more negatively, in line with DSGD predictions.

**Normative context hypotheses.** There will be a main effect of norms on both ingroup and outgroup bystander evaluations. Specifically, deviance to a helping norm (i.e., the bystander does not want to help) will be evaluated more negatively than deviance to a non-helping norm (i.e., the bystander wants to help), as prosocial behaviour is also a generic moral norm (e.g., Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011).

**Social-moral reasoning hypotheses.** It is predicted that younger children will focus on moral reasoning when evaluating the deviant bystander. It is predicted that older children will be significantly more likely to prioritise social-conventional and psychological reasoning for their evaluations, compared to younger children. Furthermore, moral reasoning will be prioritised by younger participants when evaluating the social exclusion scenario, whereas social-conventional and psychological reasoning will be prioritised by older participants.

Broad predictions can also be made about the effects of evaluations and type of norm, based on findings from Killen, Rutland et al. (2013). When the norm is not to help and the deviant bystander is rated as Not OK, social-conventional concerns will be prioritised (e.g. a focus on group functioning). When the deviant bystander is rated as OK, moral concerns will be prioritised (e.g., a focus on victim welfare). However, when the norm is to help and the deviant bystander is rated as Not OK, both moral and social-conventional concerns will be focussed upon. When the deviant bystander is rated as OK, it is arguable that more psychological concerns will be presented.
**Group context hypotheses.** Recent research has shown that adolescents may attend to the group context (e.g., the types of social groups involved) when reasoning about their evaluations of peers (Mulvey et al., 2014). Based on the findings from this recent research, it might be expected that older participants are likely to focus on social-conventional reasoning for evaluations more when the group context is school membership, and less when the group context is ethnicity.

**Own bystander intentions.** Building on previous findings (Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Study 1, Study 2) a developmental decline in own prosocial bystander intentions was predicted.

**Method**

**Participants**

Two hundred thirty students from Years 5 and 6 across three primary schools (N=126, ranging from 9 to 11 years of age, \(M_{\text{age}}=9.93\) years, \(SD=.61\)) and Years 8 and 9 at one secondary school (N=104, ranging from 12 to 14 years of age, \(M_{\text{age}}=12.86\) years, \(SD=.69\)) in South East England participated in this study (45% female). Students were from predominantly middle-lower socioeconomic status areas. The majority of the sample identified as White British (86.4%). Other ethnicities identified include White Polish (1.8%), Gypsy/Roma/Traveller (2.2%), Black or Black British (2.6%), Mixed race/Dual Heritage (2.2%) and Other (4.8%).

**Design**

The study followed a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Ingroup/Outgroup norm: Ingroup helping/Outgroup not helping vs. Ingroup not helping/Outgroup helping) between-participant design. Dependent variables
included evaluations of the ingroup bystander and outgroup bystander, acceptability of ingroup exclusion and outgroup exclusion, and social-moral reasoning about the bystander evaluation and exclusion evaluation. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. Fifty-two percent of participants (N = 120) were assigned to the school outgroup target condition, and 47.8% of participants (N = 110) were assigned to the Traveller outgroup target condition³. Regarding the ingroup/outgroup norm condition, 51.3% were assigned to the ingroup helping/outgroup not helping condition (N = 118) and 48.7% were assigned to the ingroup not helping/outgroup helping condition (N = 112) (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1. Participant assignment (by age group) to each experimental condition (outgroup target membership and type of group norm)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group norm</th>
<th>Younger</th>
<th>Older</th>
<th>Younger</th>
<th>Older</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup helping/ Outgroup not helping</td>
<td>N=30</td>
<td>N=30</td>
<td>N=30</td>
<td>N=28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup not helping/ Outgroup helping</td>
<td>N=31</td>
<td>N=24</td>
<td>N=30</td>
<td>N=19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Materials

Participants were instructed to complete a questionnaire booklet containing the following information and measures (see Appendix C: Ethics Approval and Measures Employed).

³ Note. Any students identifying as Gypsy, Roma or Traveller were assigned to the school condition (group norm condition assignment was still random).
**Group assignment.** Participants were told that they belonged to a group of same-gender peers (i.e., male participants read about male peers, female participants read about female peers); this information was accompanied by line-drawings of the group of peers. In the school condition, these peers were dressed in the same colours as their school uniforms. Participants assigned to the ethnic-group condition saw black and white print images. In order to enhance group identification participants were instructed to select a name for their group, choose an event for their group to attend at the end of the school year, and select a symbol to represent their group (Killen, Rutland et al, 2013).

Participants were then introduced to another group of four members accompanied by line-drawings; either a fictional outgroup school (wearing opposing school colours) or a group of Traveller friends, depending on outgroup target condition.

**Intergroup bias manipulation check.** To ensure that the basic tenets of social identity theory were met (i.e., that the ingroup was favoured above the outgroup) ingroup bias was measured by asking “How much do you like being a member of your friendship group, from [ingroup name]?” and outgroup bias was measured by asking “How much would you like to be a member of the other friendship group, from [outgroup name]?” Participants responded on a 1 to 6 scale (1=Don’t like at all, 2=Don’t like much, 3=Don’t like a little, 4=Like a little, 5=Like quite a lot, 6=Like lots). Intergroup bias was calculated by taking the mean score of ingroup bias (M = 5.27, SD = .81) and subtracting the mean score of outgroup bias (M = 3.05, SD = 1.42) (as in Abrams et al., 2009). A negative score (of up to -6) shows bias towards the outgroup and a positive score (of up to +6) shows bias towards the ingroup. Two separate one-sample t-tests (with a mid-point of zero) showed that intergroup bias was present across both group contexts. For the school group context, participants reported ingroup favourability (t (117) = 13.19, p <.001), with a mean ingroup bias of 2.11 (SD =
For the ethnic group context, participants reported ingroup favourability (t (104) = 15.03, p < .001), with a mean ingroup bias of 2.33 (SD = 1.58).

**Ingroup identification manipulation check.** To ensure that participants identified with the social group they were assigned to participants indicated their responses to the following questions; “I see myself as an [ingroup member]”, “I feel really good about [others] from [ingroup]”, “I am glad to be a [member of ingroup]”, on a 1 (Not at all) to 6 (Lots) scale (e.g., Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). When submitted to reliability testing the three items achieved satisfactory reliability (Cronbach’s α = .65) and were aggregated into a composite (averaged) variable. A one-sample t-test showed that participants scored significantly above the mid-point (3.5) on this measure, t (221) = 34.00, p = .00 (M = 5.14, SD = .72) and therefore identified with their ingroup, thus showing that participants found the intergroup context meaningful.

To examine whether social identification differed according to group condition assignment (ingroup school vs. ethnic ingroup), an independent t-test was conducted, with group membership as the grouping variable. This test was significant, t (220) = -3.48, p = .001, showing that, although those in the school group condition identified with their ingroup school (M = 4.99, SD = .75) participants in the ethnic-group condition identified comparatively more strongly with being British (M = 5.32, SD = .65).

**Group norm manipulation.** Participants read information about the ingroup and outgroup norm for bystander behaviour. From herein, information was counterbalanced; 51.8% of participants read about the ingroup before they read information about the outgroup, and 48.2% of participants read about the outgroup before they read about the ingroup. If assigned to the ingroup helping/outgroup not helping condition participants read:
In the past your group has said that it is important to help with other people’s problems. In the past, if your group has seen other people having problems they try to get involved with them. Your group thinks it’s important to get involved, and to help other people sort out their problems.

This was accompanied by the line-drawings of the group members and a reminder arrow pointing to the drawing stating, “Your group: [Name of ingroup] group of friends”. Participants then read about the other group norm, e.g.:

In the past, their group has said that it is important not to interfere with other people’s problems. In the past, if their group has seen other people having problems they try not to get involved with them. Their group thinks it’s important not to get involved, and to let other people sort out their problems.

This was also accompanied by the line-drawings of the group members with a reminder arrow pointing to the drawing stating, “Their group; [Name of outgroup] group of friends”. If assigned to the ingroup not helping/outgroup helping condition then these descriptions were made relevant to the respective group.

**Group norm manipulation check.** A manipulation check ensured that participants understood which norms belonged to each group. Participants were reminded to make sure that they read the information in the boxes by the pictures. They were then asked: “What does YOUR group say they should do if they see that other people have problems?” Options included, “Try not to get involved but let other people sort out their problems” or “Try to get involved to help other people sort out their problems”. Participants were instructed to circle the answer they agreed with. This information was then repeated with reference to THEIR group. Eight participants (3.5%) failed the manipulation check; consequently, their data was removed from all analysis (including earlier reliability and social identification tests).
**Verbal aggression scenario.** Participants were then presented with a story. They read:

“It's the end of the school day and everyone is on the school playground. Your group is there. Students from the other school are walking past, so the other group of friends is there too.”

The following information was presented with reference to the ingroup and ingroup norms (if in counterbalanced condition: ingroup first) or with reference to the outgroup and outgroup norms (if in counterbalanced condition: outgroup first. For ease of presentation the measure shall be described as counterbalanced condition: ingroup first.

Participants were reminded of their group (with the picture of the four ingroup members accompanied by a descriptive arrow) and their group norm, which varies dependent on condition assignment. Following on, participants read:

Then, in front of your group and the other group, you see something happening with 2 other students, one from your school and one that you recognise from their school.

Participants then viewed line-drawings of one student acting in a verbally aggressive manner towards another student. Across the school and ethnic-group conditions, the aggressor is always an ingroup member with a gender-neutral name, and the victim is always an outgroup member with a gender-neutral name. Smaller pictures of the ingroup and outgroup members were displayed above the aggressor/victim characters to reiterate both groups’ presence at the incident. Descriptive arrows pointed to each character, bearing their name and their group membership (i.e., [ingroup member] from your school; [outgroup member] from their school). Beneath the drawings a scenario of verbal aggression was described:

A student called [aggressor], who is from your school, starts saying nasty things to a different student called [victim] who is from the other school. [Aggressor] calls [victim] names,
threatens [victim], and makes fun of [victim] in front of your group of friends and the other group of friends. Although they are at different schools, [aggressor] and [victim] are in the same year group as you. This has happened after school before – [aggressor] calls [victim] horrible names, and threatens and teases [victim] in a nasty way. Other than your group and the other group there doesn’t seem to be anyone else around.

As with Study 1 and 2, the scenario was designed to meet the criteria included in bullying definitions (Monks & Smith, 2006), removing the assumption that teachers would deal with the incident (Atlas & Pepler, 1998) whilst also being specific to one form of bullying; verbal aggression. In addition, the scenario experimentally controlled the group memberships of all “characters” involved.

Bystander deviance. Participants were then informed that a member of their group wanted to go against the group. In the group norm condition: ingroup helping/outgroup not helping, participants read about a deviant bystander who challenged this group norm:

[Ingroup bystander] who is in your group from [ingroup], wants to be different from the other members of your group. [Ingroup bystander] says your group should not get involved, but that your group should let [aggressor] and [victim] sort out their own problems.

Evaluation and social-moral reasoning about the deviant bystander. Participants were then asked to indicate their own judgment of the deviant bystander. First participants read: “Do you think [ingroup bystander], who is from your group but thinks that your group should not get involved, was OK or not OK to do what they did?” Participants were given the options “OK” and “NOT OK” and instructed to circle one answer. This item was employed as an independent variable as part of the social-moral reasoning analysis. Following this, participants saw a 6-point scale (where 1=Really no OK, 2=Not OK, 3=Kind of not OK, 4=Kind of OK, 5=OK, 6=Really OK) and were asked to indicate “How OK or not OK was
[ingroup bystander?” by circling a point on the scale. This item was employed as a dependent variable within the evaluation analysis (both items adapted from Killen & Stangor, 2001; Mulvey et al., 2014).

Participants' were then asked to provide a reason for their evaluation (OK or not OK) of the ingroup and outgroup bystanders. They responded to a "Why?” question after their evaluation score (OK or not OK) was indicated. As in Study 1 and 2, a social-moral reasoning framework based on categories drawn from social domain theory was employed to code participants’ reasons (Smetana, 1995; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Rutland et al., 2010; Killen, Rutland et al., 2013)4. The final coding framework (see Appendix C: Social-Moral Reasoning Coding Framework) consisted of 9 subcategories of the general codes Moral, Social-conventional and Psychological (see Table 3.2 for subcategories and examples). These codes were all used more than 10% for evaluations.

As with previous research (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen et al., 2012; Study 1 and 2), proportional coding was applied to participants’ reasoning about their bystander evaluations. For example, if a participant employed moral reasoning then a 1 was placed in that category and a 0 in each of the remaining categories. If a given reason was relevant to two categories, .5 was placed in each respective category, with zero being entered into the categories that were not used. This reduces concerns regarding the interdependence of the data (e.g., Posada & Wainryb, 2008).

**Likelihood of bystander exclusion.** To examine whether deviant bystanders might face group repercussions for going against the group’s norm, participants read the following

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4 Grateful thanks Professor Killen at the University of Maryland, USA, and Dr Aline Hitti at Tulane University, USA, for their thoughtful commentary and assistance with the development of the coding framework for the current study.
information about their group. The excerpt below would be shown when the ingroup norm is to help:

The next day your group meets up at lunchtime and decides they don't want to invite [ingroup bystander] to sit with them. It was because [ingroup bystander] didn't want to help out [victim], when in the past your group has tried to help out with other people's problems.

Participants then evaluate the group’s exclusion of the deviant bystander: “Would it be OK or not OK for your group to decide that [ingroup bystander] can't sit with them?” Participants circled either “OK” or “NOT OK”. Participants were then asked “How OK or not OK is it?” and responded on a 6-point scale (1=Really not OK, 2=Not OK, 3=Kind of not OK, 4=Kind of OK, 5=OK, 6=Really OK).

**Counterbalanced information.** The questionnaires were counterbalanced across group memberships. In counterbalanced version 1 (ingroup first, outgroup second), participants were presented with all information and questions about the ingroup deviant bystander first and the outgroup deviant bystander second. In counterbalanced version 2 (outgroup first, ingroup second) this was reversed.
Table 3.2.
Social-moral reasoning categories, subcategories in italics, and examples of participant responses within each subcategory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prosocial behaviour:</strong></td>
<td>Because Sam is not sticking up for himself so other people should; She is helping other people; Because he was trying to help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other’s welfare, empathy and perspective-taking:</strong></td>
<td>Because bullying is nasty to people; Because I’ve been in their position before and it’s not nice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equality, fairness and rights</strong></td>
<td>Because everybody should be treated the same no matter what race/ethnicity you’re from. That is discrimination or racism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Social-conventional**

| Social and school expectations | Because Alex is out of order; Because no one should be bullied |
| Group membership, norms and loyalty | She doesn't want to help cos she thinks like their group not her group; Because it seems like Jo is betraying them; He is going against his own group |
| Authority                      | Because she will be in trouble and won't bully Sam again |

**Psychological**

| Self-preservation              | Because you might get called names and you might have a fight |
| Personal choice                | Because it is what you think individually that matter; Because he tried to help but it's none of his business |
| Familiarity and personality    | I would like Jo because of his enthusiasm; She cares about others and is kind; It doesn't mean we can't be friends and not listen |

Note. All categories used more than 10%; both positive and negative references to each category are included within each category.
**Participant bystander intentions.** Participants were asked to indicate how they would respond to the incident of verbal aggression. Participants read, “There are a number of different ways people might respond if they saw [aggressor] calling [victim] names. Please tell us how likely it is that you would respond in the following ways.” Participants were asked to respond to seven items on a 1 to 5 scale (where 1=Definitely would not, 2=Probably would not, 3=In the middle, 4=Probably would, 5=Definitely would). The bystander items were: Don’t get involved and walk away; Don’t get involved and watch; Tell [aggressor] to stop; Help [victim] in another way; Talk to [aggressor] afterwards; Talk to [victim] afterwards; Report to a teacher or member of staff. This was adapted from previous research (Jones et al., 2012; Palmer & Cameron, 2010; Palmer, Rutland & Cameron, under review; Trach et al, 2010) and includes the same measures employed in Study 1 and 2 (also refer to Chapter 4).

As in Study 2, the first two items (Don't get involved and walk away; Don't get involved and watch) were positively correlated with each other, but negatively correlated with the remaining “prosocial” bystander intentions (see Table 3.3 for correlation matrix, means and standard deviations). Following procedure in studies one and two, the negatively-correlated items were reverse-coded and submitted to reliability testing along with the remaining five items. This achieved a reliability of Cronbach’s $\alpha = .61$. Therefore, in line with earlier research (Jones et al., 2012; Palmer & Cameron, 2010; Palmer, Rutland & Cameron, under review; Trach et al, 2010) these seven items were collapsed and averaged into a composite score of “prosocial bystander intentions”.
Table 3.3

Correlation matrix for participant bystander intention scores along with the means (M) and standard deviations (SD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Don’t get involved and walk away</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Don’t get involved and watch</td>
<td>.176**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tell [aggressor] to stop</td>
<td>-.089</td>
<td>-.107</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Help [victim] in another way</td>
<td>-.171*</td>
<td>-.200</td>
<td>.233**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Talk to [aggressor] afterwards</td>
<td>-.138*</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>.231**</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Talk to [victim] afterwards</td>
<td>-.104</td>
<td>-.176**</td>
<td>.278**</td>
<td>.424**</td>
<td>.258**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Report to a teacher or member of staff</td>
<td>-.100</td>
<td>-.295**</td>
<td>.245**</td>
<td>.241**</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.245**</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *correlation is significant at the p<.05 level, ** correlation is significant at the p<.01 level
Procedure

Consent. Informed parental consent was achieved by sending opt-out letters home to parents at least two weeks before the study commenced. The school’s headteacher acted in Loco Parentis for students, also giving informed consent. Upon introducing the questionnaire booklet to participants, verbal consent was received from each student. Participants were also informed that their information was confidential, anonymous (initials and birth dates were given to create an anonymous code), and that they could stop at any time without having to give a reason. Participants were given the opportunity to ask any questions before the study commenced (refer to Appendix C: Ethics Documents).

Questionnaire booklet. Participants from the younger age group either worked one-to-one with a trained researcher, or in small groups of no more than six participants per researcher. Older participants worked in class groups. The lead researcher delivered all ethical information and introduced the study to participants, e.g.:

You are going to see pictures of some students and read a little bit about them. Then you will answer some questions about these students. We are interested in finding out what children your age think about things students do. There are no right or wrong answers. This is not a test. No one will see your answers, and we do not put anyone's name on any questionnaire booklets.

For all age groups, the first few pages of the questionnaire booklet were read through together. This enabled the lead researcher to ensure all demographic information was included, and any questions could be asked regarding ethnicity. Participants in the ethnic-group condition were told that they would read about people who identified as Travellers. They were then provided with an additional description that was read out to them (adapted from Gloucestershire County Council, 2013):
When thinking about what race/ethnicity means you might think about the colour of your skin, the country you live in, or the country you or your parents were born in. Some people, such as Irish Travellers and Roma Gypsies, belong to a bigger group called Travellers. This is their race/ethnicity. These days, some Travellers live in the same place and some Travellers don’t. Travellers generally have their own special traditions and rules.

The lead researcher then gave an example of how participants would answer questions. Participants were shown a 1 to 6 scale and informed that, “When you see this type of line on the booklet [scale presented] this means you will be asked to circle the number that matches your answer to the question. For example, if someone likes pizza quite a lot then they would circle the 5, just like in the example below.” Participants were also verbally informed that, “Most of the questions in the booklet can be answered like these ones, but some can be answered by writing what you think on the lines afterwards.” Participants were reminded to “write what they think”, work on their own, not to look at their neighbours’ answers, and to put their hands up if they had any questions. Upon completing the questionnaire booklet, participants were thanked for their participation, were fully verbally debriefed, asked if they had any questions about the work they had done, and given a debrief letter to read and to take home.

**Data Analytic Plan**

**Deviant bystander evaluations.** The first set of analyses will examine the effect of age, group norms and group context on participants’ evaluations of ingroup and outgroup deviant bystanders. First a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Ingroup norm: Ingroup helping vs. Ingroup not helping) between-participant univariate ANOVA will be conducted on evaluations of the ingroup deviant bystander.

Second, a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2
(Outgroup norm: Outgroup helping vs. Outgroup not helping) between-participant univariate ANOVA will be conducted on the evaluations of the outgroup deviant bystander.

Social-moral reasoning about bystander evaluations. To examine how participants justify their evaluations of ingroup and outgroup deviant bystanders, two separate repeated measures ANOVAs will be conducted. The first will examine how participants reason about evaluations of the ingroup deviant bystander in a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Ingroup norm: Ingroup helping vs. Ingroup not helping) x 2 (Bystander evaluation: OK vs. Not OK) x 3 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological) ANOVA, with reasoning as the repeated measures variable. The second ANOVA will follow the same 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Outgroup norm: Outgroup helping vs. Outgroup not helping) x 2 (Bystander evaluation: OK vs. Not OK) x 3 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological) design, again with repeated measures on the reasoning variable.

Social exclusion evaluation. The third set of analyses will examine whether participants evaluations of group-based repercussions (i.e., social exclusion from the group) differ according to age, type of norm, and group context. First a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Ingroup norm: Ingroup helping vs. Ingroup not helping) between-participant univariate ANOVA will be conducted on evaluations of group-based exclusion of the ingroup deviant bystander. Second, a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Outgroup norm: Outgroup helping vs. Outgroup not helping) between-participant univariate ANOVA will be conducted on participants’ evaluations of group-based exclusion of the outgroup deviant bystander.
Social-moral reasoning about exclusion evaluations. The fourth set of analyses was conducted to examine how participants justify their evaluations of group-based exclusion of the ingroup and outgroup deviant bystanders. Two separate repeated measures ANOVAs will be conducted. A 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Ingroup norm: Ingroup helping vs. Ingroup not helping) x 2 (Exclusion evaluation: OK vs. Not OK) x 3 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological) design will be employed, with repeated measures on the reasoning variable. The second ANOVA will follow the same 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Outgroup norm: Outgroup helping vs. Outgroup not helping) x 2 (Exclusion evaluation: OK vs. Not OK) x 3 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological) design with repeated measures on the reasoning variable.

Results

Preliminary Analysis

Refer to the correlation matrix (Table 3.4) for correlations and descriptive statistics for the key study variables. Gender did not correlate with any other key study variables and, as there were no predictions for gender, this variable was controlled for throughout analyses.

Bystander Evaluations

Ingroup deviant bystander. Tests of between-participant effects showed that evaluations of the ingroup deviant bystander differed according to age (F (1, 221) = 4.48, p = .04, η² = .02), group context (F (1, 221) = 12.00, p = .001, η² = .05), and type of norm (F (1, 221) = 42.57, p <.001, η² = .17). In line with predictions, descriptive statistics showed that
Table 3.4 Correlation matrix, means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for key study variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.Gender</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.Group membership</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.Norm condition</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.Bystander intention</td>
<td>-.273**</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.Ingroup bystander evaluation</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>-.096</td>
<td>.354**</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.Ingroup exclusion evaluation</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>-.185**</td>
<td>-.221**</td>
<td>-.372**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.Outgroup bystander evaluation</td>
<td>-.158*</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>-.289**</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>-.176**</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.Outgroup exclusion evaluation</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>-.102</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.137*</td>
<td>-.361**</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *correlation is significant at the p<.05 level, ** correlation is significant at the p<.01 level
younger participants (M = 3.83, SD = 1.66) evaluated the ingroup deviant bystander more favourably than did older participants (M = 3.44, SD = 1.47). Ingroup deviant bystanders in the school group context (M = 3.97, SD = 1.57) were evaluated more favourably than ingroup deviant bystanders in the ethnic-group context (M = 3.30, SD = 1.58). Those who deviated from the ingroup’s norm not to help (M = 3.92, SD = 1.53) were evaluated more favourably than ingroup bystanders who deviated from the group’s norm to help (M = 2.75, SD = 1.16).

**Outgroup deviant bystander.** Tests of between-participant effects showed a main effect of type of outgroup norm (F (1, 220) = 31.03, p < .001, η² = .13). A two-way interaction between group context and type of norm (F (1, 221) = 12.87, p = .001, η² = .06) on the evaluations of the deviant outgroup bystander was also observed. To examine the two-way interaction pairwise comparisons were conducted. These showed that when the outgroup norm was not to help, evaluations differed across group context (p = .001). Descriptive statistics showed that evaluations of school outgroup bystanders who deviated from the norm not to help (i.e., they wanted to help) were higher (M = 4.88, SD = 1.25) than the evaluations of Traveller bystanders who wanted to help when the norm was not to help (M = 3.98, SD = 1.48) (see Figure 3.1). This difference was non-significant when the outgroup norm was to help (p = .07; school context: M = 3.07, SD = 1.46; ethnic group context: M = 3.57, SD = 1.54).

Pairwise comparisons also showed that evaluations of outgroup deviant bystanders differed when comparing the type of norm that was deviated from within the school group context (p < .001) but not the ethnic group context (p = .18). Descriptive statistics showed that school outgroup bystanders who deviated from the norm not to help (i.e., they wanted to help) were evaluated more positively than those who deviated from the norm to help (also see Figure 3.1). These findings suggest that participants pay less attention to the normative context when evaluating ethnic-outgroup bystanders (i.e., Travellers).
Figure 3.1. A graph showing the interaction between group context and type of outgroup norm on the evaluations of the outgroup deviant bystander.

Social-Moral Reasoning about Evaluations

To examine how participants reasoned about their evaluations of ingroup and outgroup bystanders who challenged their group’s norm, two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted; one on the evaluations of the ingroup bystander and one on the evaluations of the outgroup bystander.

Reasoning about evaluations of ingroup bystander. To examine how participants reasoned about their evaluation of the ingroup bystander a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Ingroup norm: Ingroup helping vs. Ingroup not helping) x 2 (Bystander evaluation: OK vs. Not OK) x 3 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with social-moral reasoning as the repeated measures variable.

Unlike findings from Study 1 and Study 2, tests of within-participant effects showed no main effect of reasoning, $F (2, 406) = .354, p = .70, \eta^2 = .002$ (Moral: M = .35, SD = .47;
Social-conventional: $M = .33$, $SD = .46$; Psychological: $M = .30$, $SD = .46$). However, type of reasoning interacted with: age, $F(2, 406) = 5.90$, $p = .003$, $\eta^2 = .03$; evaluation, $F(2, 406) = 27.22$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .12$; group context, $F(2, 406) = 4.29$, $p = .014$, $\eta^2 = .02$; and type of ingroup norm, $F(2, 406) = 15.44$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .07$. Higher-order interactions were observed between reasoning x evaluation x group ($F(2, 406) = 6.50$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .03$) and reasoning x evaluation x norm ($F(2, 406) = 5.35$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .03$). First the simple main effects for the two way interactions are examined, followed by simple main effects for each three-way interaction.

Table 3.5. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for age x reasoning interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasoning</th>
<th>Younger</th>
<th>Older</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.29 (.44)</td>
<td>.42 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.29 (.44)</td>
<td>.37 (.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.40 (.49)</td>
<td>.20 (.40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reasoning x age.** Pairwise comparisons of the reasoning x age interaction showed, surprisingly, that older participants employed more moral reasoning compared to younger participants ($p = .02$). Unexpectedly, no age differences were present for the use of social-conventional reasoning ($p = .255$). However younger participants reported significantly higher psychological reasoning compared to older participants ($p = .001$). When comparing the use of different types of reasoning within each age group, pairwise comparisons show that younger participants employ each type of reasoning similarly (all $ps < .05$). In contrast, older participants employed both moral and social-conventional reasoning significantly more than psychological reasoning ($ps > .05$), but no differently to each other ($p = .53$). These age differences contrast to those observed in Study 1 and 2 (see Table 3.5 for descriptive
statistics), and suggest that children of both ages may employ multifaceted reasoning when evaluating intergroup bystander behaviours.

**Reasoning x evaluation.** Pairwise comparisons of the reasoning x evaluation interaction showed that each type of reasoning was employed significantly differently, depending on whether the participant evaluated the ingroup deviant bystander as OK or Not OK (all ps<.001). Moral reasoning was employed more when the deviant behaviour was viewed as OK; social-conventional reasoning was employed more when the deviant behaviour was viewed as Not OK; and psychological reasoning was employed more when the behaviour was viewed as OK. The use of each domain (moral, social-conventional, psychological) was then compared within each level of evaluation. When participants evaluated the deviant ingroup bystander as Not OK, social-conventional reasoning was employed more than moral and psychological (both ps <.001). References to moral and psychological reasons did not differ (p=.62). When participants evaluated the bystander as OK, moral and psychological reasons were given proportionally more than social-conventional (both ps<.001), but did not differ to each other (p=.54) (see Table 3.6 for descriptive statistics).

Table 3.6. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for evaluation x reasoning interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not OK</th>
<th>OK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.20 (.40)</td>
<td>.48 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.53 (.50)</td>
<td>.15 (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.22 (.41)</td>
<td>.38 (.49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reasoning x group.** Pairwise comparisons showed when the deviant bystander was a school ingroup member moral reasoning was employed less than when they were a British
ethnic-ingroup member (p=.01). Social-conventional reasoning did not differ according to the
group context (p=.58). Psychological reasoning was employed more when justifying the
evaluation assigned to the ingroup school member than the British ingroup member (p=.01).
Within each group context reasoning only differed for British ingroup members, and not
school ingroup members (all ps >.05). When evaluating British ingroup members moral
reasoning was employed more than psychological reasoning (p=.01) but no differently to
social-conventional reasoning (p=.55). The use of social-conventional reasoning was also no
different to psychological reasoning (p=.06); moral and social-conventional reasons were
given more frequently than psychological (see Table 3.7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasoning x ingroup norm.</th>
<th>School ingroup</th>
<th>British ingroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.31 (.46)</td>
<td>.39 (.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.28 (.44)</td>
<td>.38 (.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.38 (.49)</td>
<td>.22 (.41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pairwise comparisons showed that, when justifying
evaluations of the deviant ingroup member (i.e., they went against the group’s norm), moral
reasoning was employed more when the norm not to help was transgressed compared to when
the norm to help was transgressed (p<.001). Social-conventional reasoning did not differ
according to the type of norm that had been transgressed (p=.13). However, psychological
reasoning was employed more when the norm to help was transgressed compared to when the
norm not to help was transgressed (p<.001). Pairwise comparisons of reasoning domains
within each level of norm were then examined. When the bystander transgressed the norm to
help, psychological reasoning was employed more than social-conventional (p=.03) and
moral (p=.001). The use of moral and social-conventional reasoning did not differ (p=.27).

When the bystander transgressed the norm not to help, moral reasoning was employed significantly more than psychological (p<.001), but no differently to social-conventional (p=.46). Social-conventional reasons were also given more than psychological (p=.001) (see Table 3.8 for descriptive statistics).

Table 3.8. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for norm x reasoning interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ingroup helping</th>
<th>Ingroup not helping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.18 (.38)</td>
<td>.53 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.37 (.48)</td>
<td>.29 (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.42 (.49)</td>
<td>.18 (.38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reasoning x evaluation x group.** The reasoning x evaluation x group interaction was then examined. As both evaluation and group interacted with type of reasoning independently of each other (see previous analysis) pairwise comparisons were first conducted again within each level of each of these variables.

When comparing the school context to the ethnic-group context, within each level of reasoning and evaluation, pairwise comparisons showed significant differences only when participants rated the bystander as OK (Not OK ps > .05). When the bystander is evaluated as OK, participants in the ethnic-group context (i.e., read about a British deviant) employed more moral reasoning than those in the school context (p <.001), and those in the school context employed more psychological reasoning than those in the ethnic-group context (p = .001). Social-conventional reasoning did not differ across contexts (see Table 3.9 for means and standard deviations).
When comparing the different types of reasoning within each level of group and evaluation, social-conventional reasoning is employed more than both moral (school $p = .04$; Traveller $p < .001$) and psychological reasoning (school $p = .01$; Traveller $p < .001$) by participants who think the bystander is Not OK, in both the school and the Traveller contexts. However, when participants think the bystander is OK, participants in the school context employ more psychological reasoning than any other type ($ps < .01$), whereas participants in the Traveller context employ more moral reasoning than any other type ($ps < .01$).

Table 3.9. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the reasoning x evaluation x group context interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasoning</th>
<th>Not OK</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>OK</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.24 (.43)</td>
<td>.17 (.37)</td>
<td>.35 (.47)</td>
<td>.67 (.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.46 (.50)</td>
<td>.59 (.49)</td>
<td>.17 (.37)</td>
<td>.11 (.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.23 (.42)</td>
<td>.22 (.41)</td>
<td>.48 (.50)</td>
<td>.22 (.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When comparing evaluations of OK and Not OK within each level of reasoning and group context, differences were observed in the school context for social-conventional and psychological reasoning ($p < .001$) and the Traveller condition for social-conventional and moral reasoning. These comparisons showed that in the school context, social-conventional reasoning was employed more when the bystander was evaluated as Not OK compared to when they evaluated them as OK. In contrast, psychological reasoning was employed less when the bystander was evaluated as Not OK compared to when they evaluated them as OK. In the Traveller context, participants employed more social-conventional reasoning when the
bystander was evaluated as Not OK compared to OK, and more moral reasoning when the bystander was evaluated as OK compared to when they were evaluated as Not OK (see Table 3.9; see also Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.2. A graph showing the interaction between reasoning and evaluation of the ingroup deviant bystander for the school ingroup condition only.

Figure 3.3. A graph showing the interaction between reasoning and evaluation of the ingroup deviant bystander for the ethnic ingroup condition only.
**Reasoning x evaluation x norm.** As predicted, an interaction was observed between evaluation, norm and type of reasoning. As both evaluation and norm interacted with type of reasoning independently of each other pairwise comparisons for this analysis were conducted again within each level of each of these variables.

To examine the reasoning x evaluation x norm interaction pairwise comparisons were first conducted by comparing the different types of norm within each level of evaluation and reasoning. When participants thought the bystander was Not OK, only psychological reasoning differed according to the group norm transgressed by the bystander (p = .02). When participants read an ingroup bystander transgressed the group norm to help (i.e., they did not want to get involved) and participants rated that this as Not OK, as predicted participants employed more psychological reasoning compared to when they transgressed the norm for not helping (see Table 3.10 for means and standard deviations).

Table 3.10. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the reasoning x evaluation x type of norm interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not OK</th>
<th>OK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ingroup norm</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to help</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.19 (.39)</td>
<td>.23 (.41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
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<td>.07 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not to help</td>
<td>.16 (.37)</td>
<td>.13 (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.63 (.47)</td>
<td>.20 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.71 (.46)</td>
<td>.33 (.48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When participants evaluated the bystander as OK, the use of moral (p<.001) and psychological (p<.001) reasoning differed depending on the group norm that was being transgressed. More moral reasoning was employed to explain evaluations of ingroup bystanders who transgressed the norm not to help compared to when they transgressed the norm to help. As predicted, results show that participants focus more on moral reasons (i.e., prosociality, victim welfare) when the bystander helps compared to when they do not help. In contrast, more psychological reasoning is employed when evaluating ingroup bystanders who transgress the norm to help (i.e., by not helping) compared to those who transgress the norm not to help.

When examining evaluations and reasoning within each type of norm; if the ingroup norm was to help, the use of moral reasoning did not differ when comparing participants who thought that deviating from that norm (i.e., by not helping) was OK or Not OK (p = .62). As expected, participants referenced social-conventional reasons more frequently when they thought the deviant behaviour was Not OK compared to when they thought it was OK (p <.001). In contrast, psychological reasoning was used more frequently when participants thought the deviant behaviour was OK, compared to when they thought it was Not OK (p<.001). This shows that when bystanders go against a helping norm, those who evaluate this behaviour as OK focus on psychological reasons (i.e., they can have a different opinion); whereas those who evaluate it as not OK focus on social-conventional reasons (i.e., they are being disloyal to the group) (see Figure 3.4)

When the group norm was not to help or get involved in other people’s problems, moral reasoning was employed significantly more when participants thought the bystander’s deviant behaviour (i.e., helping) was OK compared to when they thought it was not OK (p <.001). Whereas social-conventional reasoning was employed more when bystanders thought
helping behaviour (i.e., going against the group norm) was not OK, rather than when they
thought it was OK (p < .001). The use of psychological reasoning did not differ across
evaluations (p = .18). This shows that participants focus on moral reasons when prosocial
bystander behaviour is exhibited and perceived as acceptable, whereas they focus on social-
conventional reasons when prosocial bystander behaviour is exhibited and seen as not
acceptable (see Table 3.10 for means and standard deviations; also see Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.4. A graph showing the interaction between reasoning and evaluation of the ingroup
deviant bystander who transgresses the ingroup norm: To Help.
Interim summary. Findings for how children and adolescents’ reasoned about their evaluations of deviant bystanders showed that, unlike Study 1 and 2, there was no main effect of reasoning. This shows that multiple concerns were held by participants when justifying their evaluation of the ingroup bystander. As expected, a developmental trend in the use of reasoning was observed. But, contrary to predictions, moral reasoning was referenced more by older participants, and psychological reasoning was referenced more by younger participants. This is the opposite trend found in Study 1.

Type of reasoning varied according to the evaluation participants assigned the deviant ingroup member. In line with predictions, when the ingroup bystander’s deviant action was evaluated as OK moral reasoning was prioritised (i.e., concerns for the victim). Evaluations of Not OK were associated with social-conventional reasoning (i.e., concerns for group functioning and loyalty). Interestingly, type of reasoning also varied according to group-context. When participants were reasoning about the British ingroup bystander they focussed...
on the moral domain more than when reasoning about a school ingroup bystander, suggesting that moral concerns might be heightened in more sensitive intergroup contexts. Moreover, when reasoning about a British ingroup member, both moral and social-conventional concerns were equally high, and both were focussed on more than psychological concerns. No differences in the use of reasoning were observed across evaluations of the ingroup school bystander.

Reasoning also interacted with type of norm. When ingroup members transgressed the helping norm (i.e., they did not want to help), psychological references were made most frequently (i.e., autonomy, self-preservation), followed by social-conventional, then moral reasons. However, when the ingroup member transgressed the norm not help (i.e., they helped), moral reasoning was employed most frequently, followed by social-conventional and lastly psychological.

Two three-way interactions were also observed. Reasoning, evaluations and group-context interacted, showing that moral reasons were referenced more when the British bystander was evaluated as OK compared to when the ingroup school bystander was evaluated as OK. In contrast, psychological reasons were referenced more for ingroup school bystanders evaluated as OK compared to British bystanders evaluated as OK. When the bystander was evaluated as not OK, social-conventional reasons were employed evenly across both group contexts, and more than other forms of reasoning.

Reasoning, evaluations and type of norm also interacted. These findings showed that when the bystander deviated from the norm to help (i.e., they wanted to help) and this was rated as OK, participants justified their evaluations by focussing on moral concerns more than when transgressing this norm was rated as Not OK. When transgressing the norm not to help is seen as OK, psychological reasons are most frequently referenced (i.e., autonomy and
personal choice). However, as was predicted, across both type of norms social-conventional reasoning is employed more frequently when the bystander is evaluated as Not OK.

**Reasoning about evaluations of outgroup bystander.** To examine how participants reasoned about their evaluation of the outgroup bystander a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Outgroup norm: Outgroup helping vs. Outgroup not helping) x 2 (Evaluation: OK vs. Not OK) x 3 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with social-moral reasoning as the repeated measures variable.

As with evaluations of the ingroup bystander, no main effect of reasoning was present for the outgroup bystander evaluations, $F(2, 400) = 1.61$, $p = .20$, $\eta^2 = .009$ (Moral: $M = .36$, $SD = .46$; Social-conventional: $M = .28$, $SD = .42$; Psychological: $M = .31$, $SD = .46$). Similarly to evaluations of the ingroup bystander, type of reasoning interacted with: evaluation, $F(2, 400) = 8.24$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .04$; age, $F(2, 400) = 3.28$, $p = .04$, $\eta^2 = .02$; group context, $F(2, 400) = 4.77$, $p = .009$, $\eta^2 = .02$; and type of outgroup norm, $F(2, 400) = 16.70$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .09$. Again, as with evaluations of the ingroup bystander, a three-way interaction was observed between reasoning x evaluation x norm ($F(2, 400) = 12.13$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .06$). In addition, a three-way interaction was observed between reasoning x evaluation x age ($F(2, 400) = 3.49$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .02$). A higher-order four-way interaction between reasoning x evaluation x age x norm ($F(2, 400) = 5.06$, $p = .007$, $\eta^2 = .03$) was also found. Simple main effects of the two-way, three-way and four-way interactions are presented below.

**Reasoning x evaluation.** Pairwise comparisons showed that participants employed social-conventional and psychological reasoning about the bystander differently, depending on the evaluation they gave ($Moral\ p=.54$). Social-conventional reasons were given more
frequently when evaluating the outgroup bystander as Not OK compared to when they were evaluated as OK (p<.001). In contrast, psychological reasoning was employed more when the bystander was evaluated as OK compared to when they were evaluated as Not OK (p=.002).

Table 3.11. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for reasoning x evaluation interaction for the outgroup deviant bystander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not OK</th>
<th>OK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.30 (.45)</td>
<td>.41 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.38 (.47)</td>
<td>.21 (.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.25 (.43)</td>
<td>.36 (.48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When comparing the use of reasoning within each level of evaluation; when participants thought the bystander’s deviance was Not OK their reference to different reasoning domains did not differ (p>.05). When the participants thought the outgroup bystander’s deviance was OK they prioritised moral and psychological reasoning similarly (p=.18). Both moral (p=.02) and psychological (p<.001) were employed more than social-conventional reasoning (see Table 3.11 for means and standard deviations).

Table 3.12. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for reasoning x group context interaction for the outgroup deviant bystander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Outgroup school</th>
<th>Traveller</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.35 (.46)</td>
<td>.38 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.24 (.40)</td>
<td>.27 (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.39 (48)</td>
<td>.22 (42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Reasoning x group.** Pairwise comparisons showed that only psychological reasoning differed according to the group context (p=.001) (Moral p=.09; Social-conventional p=.54). Psychological reasoning was used more by participants when reasoning about outgroup school members, compared to Traveller group members. Within each group condition, comparisons across reasoning were also examined. When reasoning about outgroup school bystanders, references to moral and social-conventional concerns were similar (p=.89). Both moral (p=.04) and social-conventional reasoning (p=.05) were employed less than psychological reasoning. When reasoning about the Traveller bystander, moral reasoning was higher than psychological (p=.04) but no different to social-conventional (p=.43). The use of social-conventional and psychological reasoning also did not differ (p=.21) (see Table 3.12).

**Reasoning x norm.** Pairwise comparisons showed that moral reasoning was used more when the outgroup deviant transgressed the norm not to help, compared to when they transgressed the norm to help (p<.001). The opposite pattern was observed for psychological reasoning; psychological concerns were raised more when the outgroup deviant transgressed the norm to help compared to when they transgressed the norm not to help (p<.001). The normative context did have an effect on the use of social-conventional reasoning (p=.08). Next the use of the reasoning domains within each normative context was compared. When the outgroup norm was not to help moral reasoning was employed more than psychological (p<.001), but no differently to social-conventional (p=.22). Social-conventional was also employed more than psychological (p=.02). When the outgroup norm was to help, moral reasoning was employed significantly less than psychological (p<.001), and no differently to social-conventional (p=.48). Social-conventional reasoning was also employed less than psychological (p=.001) (see Table 3.13).
Table 3.13. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for reasoning x type of norm interaction for the outgroup deviant bystander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not to help</th>
<th>To help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.53 (.46)</td>
<td>.19 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.29 (.29)</td>
<td>.26 (.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.15 (.36)</td>
<td>.48 (.50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reasoning x evaluation x age.** As a two-way interaction between reasoning x evaluation has already been examined, to examine this three-way interaction pairwise the interaction between reasoning and evaluation were compared across age groups. When evaluating the outgroup deviance as OK, no developmental differences in the use of reasoning were observed (all ps>.05). When evaluating the outgroup deviance as Not OK, somewhat surprisingly, younger participants used less moral reasoning than older participants (p=.001). No other differences among these comparisons were observed (p>.05).

Table 3.14. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the reasoning x evaluation x age interaction for the outgroup bystander condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Younger Not OK</th>
<th>Younger OK</th>
<th>Older Not OK</th>
<th>Older OK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.19 (.39)</td>
<td>.39 (.48)</td>
<td>.44 (.50)</td>
<td>.43 (.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.41 (49)</td>
<td>.22 (.40)</td>
<td>.35 (.44)</td>
<td>.19 (.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.30 (.46)</td>
<td>.33 (.47)</td>
<td>.19 (.39)</td>
<td>.38 (.48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, when examining within each level of age, interactions between reasoning and evaluation were observed. For younger participants moral reasoning was employed more when evaluating the outgroup bystander as OK than when evaluating them as Not OK (p=.03). In contrast, younger participants employed more social-conventional reasoning when evaluating the bystander as Not OK compared to when they evaluated them as OK (p=.006). Across evaluations, no differences in psychological reasoning were observed for younger participants. For older participants, the use of moral reasoning did not differ across evaluations (p=.18). Social-conventional reasoning was employed more when evaluating the outgroup bystander as Not OK compared to OK (p=.02). Psychological reasoning was employed more when evaluating the outgroup bystander as OK compared to Not OK. These findings show that, across these age groups, different considerations are taken into account when making evaluations about outgroup bystanders (see Table 3.14, Figures 3.6 and 3.7).

Figure 3.6. A graph showing the interaction between reasoning and evaluation of the outgroup deviant bystander among the younger participants only.
Reasoning x evaluation x age x norm. To examine the four way interaction, first comparisons across the age groups were explored to determine any developmental trends. When the outgroup bystander was evaluated as not OK, age differences were observed when the outgroup bystander transgressed the outgroup norm not to help (i.e., they wanted to help the victim). Older participants focussed on moral reasons more, when evaluating the deviant helpful bystander as not OK, compared to younger participants ($p < .001$) (e.g., it’s right to help but they should let them sort it out themselves; because helping someone doesn’t always make it better). In contrast, younger participants focussed more on social-conventional reasons compared to older participants, when evaluating the deviant helper as not OK ($p = .048$) (e.g., the others didn’t want them to do this). No other age differences in reasoning were observed across these comparisons (see Table 3.15 for descriptive statistics).
Table 3.15. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for four way interaction between reasoning x outgroup bystander evaluation x age x norm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasoning</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Not OK</th>
<th>OK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norm to help</td>
<td>Norm not help</td>
<td>Norm to help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>.27 (.45)</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>.34 (.45)</td>
<td>.60 (.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>.26 (.44)</td>
<td>.73 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>.36 (.45)</td>
<td>.33 (.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>.38 (.48)</td>
<td>.13 (.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>.26 (.44)</td>
<td>.10 (.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the age groups, types of reasoning were prioritised differently. When the outgroup bystander transgressed the outgroup norm not to help and participants rated this as not OK, younger participants employed social-conventional reasoning more than moral (p < .001) and more than psychological reasoning (p = .04). Older participants employed moral reasoning similarly to social-conventional (p = .21) but more than psychological (p = .008, all other ps > .05). When the outgroup bystander transgressed the outgroup norm to help and participants rated this as not OK, no age differences in type of reasoning were observed across younger or older participants (ps > .05, see Table 3.15).

When the outgroup bystander transgressed the outgroup norm not to help and participants rated this as OK, younger participants employed more moral reasoning than both social-conventional (p < .001) and psychological (p < .001); social-conventional and psychological reasoning were employed at similarly lower rates (p = .91). Older participants also employed more moral reasoning than both social-conventional (p = .002) and
psychological (p < .001), and again social-conventional and psychological reasoning were employed at similarly lower rates (p = .42). When the outgroup bystander transgressed the outgroup norm to help and participants rated this as OK, younger participants used psychological reasoning more than moral (p < .001) and social-conventional (p = .03), but moral and social-conventional were not significantly different to each other (p = .08). Older participants followed the same pattern, employing psychological reasoning more than both moral and social-conventional (both ps < .01) (see Figure 3.8 and 3.9).

**Interim Summary.** As with evaluations of the ingroup bystander, there was no main effect of reasoning on evaluations for the outgroup bystander. However, reasoning interacted with evaluations. Participants focussed more on social-conventional concerns when evaluating the outgroup bystander as Not OK (i.e., they’re going against their group) compared to when they thought their behaviour was OK. This is the opposite trend to that observed with ingroup deviant bystanders. Additionally, when evaluating outgroup bystanders as OK, psychological concerns (i.e., It’s their choice) were focussed on comparatively more than when they were evaluated as Not OK. Both of these findings are in contrast to the findings for reasoning about evaluations of ingroup deviance. These differences in reasoning suggest that motivations behind evaluations differ for ingroup and outgroup bystanders.

Reasoning also differed according to the group context. Psychological reasoning was employed more for outgroup school bystanders than Traveller bystanders. Instead, moral and social-conventional reasoning was used most for Travellers. In addition, when the outgroup deviant transgressed the norm not to help (i.e., they wanted to help), moral reasoning was used more compared to when they transgressed the norm to help (i.e., they did not want to get involved). In contrast, psychological reasoning was employed more when the norm was to
help. This is the same pattern of findings observed for reasoning about the evaluations of deviant ingroup bystanders.

An interaction between reasoning, evaluations, and age showed that younger participants employed more moral reasoning when evaluating the deviance as OK, compared to not OK. However, they employed more social-conventional reasons when evaluating the deviance as Not OK. Older participants employed moral and psychological reasoning similarly when rating the outgroup deviant as OK, but social-conventional reasoning more when evaluating the deviance as Not OK. This finding shows that both younger and older participants weigh up concerns differently when justifying their evaluations of outgroup bystanders. The four-way interaction between reasoning, evaluations, age and norms built on these findings further; showing that when the outgroup norm was not to help, but only when participants rated this as Not OK, younger participants employed social-conventional reasoning more than moral and psychological. However, older participants employed moral and social-conventional similarly, but more than psychological.

**Bystander Social Exclusion**

To examine whether participants believed that group-based repercussions exist for ingroup or outgroup bystanders who deviate from their respective group’s norm for bystander behaviour, two univariate ANOVAs were conducted; one on evaluations of the ingroup excluding the deviant ingroup bystander, and one on evaluations of the outgroup excluding the deviant outgroup bystander.
Figure 3.8. The interaction between age and type of reasoning when the bystander transgresses the outgroup norm not to help and the act is evaluated as “OK”.

Figure 3.9. The interaction between age and type of reasoning when the bystander transgresses the outgroup norm not to help and the act is evaluated as “Not OK”.

**Evaluations of ingroup social exclusion.** A main effect of type of ingroup norm was observed, $F(1, 221) = 15.03, p = .007, \eta^2 = .03$. Descriptive statistics showed that ingroup
deviant bystanders who deviated from the ingroup helping norm were evaluated more negatively (M = 2.59, SD = 1.43) than those who deviated from the ingroup norm not to help (M = 2.05, SD = 1.31). Both of these scores are below the mid-point of the exclusion-evaluation scale, showing that overall participants viewed social exclusion of the ingroup bystander by the ingroup was not acceptable. However, when deviating from the ingroup norm to help (i.e., by not wanting to help) group-based social exclusion of the ingroup bystander was viewed as relatively more acceptable than when the ingroup bystander deviated from the ingroup norm not to help.

**Evaluations of outgroup social exclusion.** As with evaluations of ingroup social exclusion of the ingroup deviant bystander, a main effect of type of outgroup norm on evaluations of outgroup social exclusion of the deviant outgroup bystander was also observed, F (1, 221) = 4.28, p = .04, η² = .02. Descriptive statistics showed that when the outgroup bystander deviated from the group norm to help (i.e., they did not want to help) social exclusion was seen as relatively more acceptable (M = 2.28, SD = 1.43) than when the outgroup bystander deviated from the group norm not to help (M = 1.92, SD = 1.22).

**Social-Moral Reasoning about Bystander Exclusion**

To examine how participants reasoned about the exclusion of ingroup and outgroup bystanders who challenged their group’s norm, two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted; one on the exclusion acceptability ratings of the ingroup bystander and one on the exclusion acceptability ratings of the outgroup bystander. Gender was controlled across all analyses.

**Reasoning about ingroup bystander exclusion.** To examine how participants reasoned about the acceptability of the ingroup’s exclusion of the ingroup bystander a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Ingroup norm:
Ingroup helping vs. Ingroup not helping) x 2 (Exclusion evaluation: OK vs. Not OK) x 3 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with social-moral reasoning as the repeated measures variable. As with earlier reasoning analysis there was no main effect of type of reasoning, F (2, 402) = 2.03, p = .13, $\eta^2 = .01$. Two way interactions between reasoning x type of norm (F (2, 402) = 3.305, p = .04, $\eta^2 = .02$) and reasoning x evaluation of exclusion rating (F (2, 402) = 7.32, p = .001, $\eta^2 = .04$) were observed.

**Reasoning x norm.** Simple main effects of the reasoning x norm interaction were examined first. When the ingroup norm was to help, reasoning about the exclusion of the ingroup deviant bystander was more social-conventional than moral (p = .02). The use of social-conventional reasoning did not differ to the use of psychological reasoning (p = .09). A closer look at the reasoning examples suggests that reasoning about the group-based exclusion of a deviant bystander, who does not help when the group says they should, focusses on group-based disloyalty and group-functioning (social-conventional) or the bystander having the personal decision to sit where they want (psychological). Interestingly there are fewer comments on potential harm to the bystander (moral) (see Table 3.16).

When the group norm was not to help, moral reasoning was higher than psychological reasoning (p = .02), but the use of moral reasoning was no different to social-conventional (p = .50). This suggests that participants are equally likely to reason about the acceptability of exclusion by focussing on the bystander’s preceding “prosocial” behaviour (moral) or group-disloyalty (social-conventional). Furthermore, moral reasoning was employed more when the ingroup bystander helped (when the norm was not to help) compared to when they did not help (when the norm was to help) (p = .02). However, the use of social-conventional and psychological reasoning did not differ across norm conditions (both ps > .05; see Table 3.16 for descriptive statistics).
Table 3.16. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the reasoning x type of norm interaction, when reasoning about the exclusion of the ingroup deviant bystander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasoning Type</th>
<th>Ingroup norm to help</th>
<th>Ingroup norm not to help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.26 (.44)</td>
<td>.53 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.37 (.48)</td>
<td>.29 (.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.37 (.48)</td>
<td>.17 (.38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.17. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the reasoning x exclusion evaluation interaction, for reasoning about the exclusion of the ingroup deviant bystander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasoning Type</th>
<th>Not OK</th>
<th>OK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.44 (.50)</td>
<td>.50 (.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.27 (.44)</td>
<td>.63 (.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.29 (.45)</td>
<td>.21 (.41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasoning x evaluation of exclusion. Pairwise comparisons showed that participants were more likely to draw on moral reasoning when the bystander’s exclusion was rated as not OK compared to when it was viewed as OK (p = .007). In contrast, social-conventional reasoning was employed more when participants rated the exclusion as OK compared to not OK (p < .001). No differences were present for psychological reasoning (p = .434). Among those participants who rated the exclusion of the ingroup bystander as not OK, they employed moral reasoning significantly more than both social-conventional (p = .001) and psychological (p = .003) reasoning. Social-conventional and psychological reasoning did not differ (p = .71). Among participants who rated the exclusion of the bystander as OK, social-conventional reasons were drawn upon more frequently to justify this rating compared to
both moral (p = .01) and psychological (p = .007) reasoning; the use of moral and psychological reasoning were no different to each other (p = .97) (see Table 3.17 for means and standard deviations).

**Interim summary.** Findings showed that, when the group norm was to help, reasoning about group exclusion focussed more on social-conventional than moral concerns. Although this did not interact with evaluations, a separate interaction between reasoning and evaluations showed that, when exclusion of the ingroup deviant was rated OK social-conventional reasoning was focussed upon. When their exclusion was rated as Not OK, moral concerns were the focus.

**Reasoning about outgroup bystander exclusion.** To examine how participants reasoned about the exclusion of the outgroup bystander a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Outgroup norm: Outgroup helping vs. outgroup not helping) x 2 (Exclusion evaluation: OK vs. Not OK) x 3 (Reasoning: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with social-moral reasoning as the repeated measures variable. Unlike earlier reasoning analysis in this study there was a main effect of type of reasoning, F (2, 408) = 5.28, p = .005, \(\eta^2 = .03\) (Moral: M = .49, SD = .49; Social-conventional: M = .26, SD = .43; Psychological: M = .23, SD = .41). In line with the analysis on reasoning about ingroup bystander exclusion, a two way interaction between reasoning x evaluation of exclusion was observed (F (2, 408) = 6.86, p = .001, \(\eta^2 = .03\)). This was superseded by a three-way interaction between reasoning x norm x evaluation of exclusion, F (2, 408) = 7.71, p = .001, \(\eta^2 = .04\).

**Reasoning x exclusion evaluation.** Pairwise comparisons showed that participants drew on moral reasoning more when they rated outgroup exclusion as Not OK compared to when they viewed it as OK (p = .001). Social-conventional reasoning was given more when
justifying the exclusion as OK compared to when it was seen as Not OK (p=.007). No differences in the use of psychological reasoning was observed across evaluations (p=.61). When examining the use of reasoning within each level of evaluation, participants who rated the exclusion of the outgroup member as Not OK used significantly more moral than both social-conventional (p<.001) and psychological (p<.001) reasoning. Social-conventional and psychological reasoning rates did not differ (p=.89). When rating the exclusion as OK, no differences in the use of reasoning were observed (all ps>.05) (see Table 3.18).

Table 3.18. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the reasoning x exclusion evaluation interaction, for reasoning about the exclusion of the outgroup deviant bystander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasoning</th>
<th>Not OK</th>
<th>OK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.52 (.49)</td>
<td>.29 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.24 (.41)</td>
<td>.41 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.22 (.41)</td>
<td>.24 (.43)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Reasoning x norm x exclusion evaluation.** Simple main effects of this three-way interaction showed that when the outgroup norm was not to help, moral reasoning was used more when the participant rated the outgroup exclusion of a deviant bystander as not OK, compared to when participants viewed the exclusion as OK (p <.001). This suggests that participants focus on the outgroup bystander’s prosocial transgression when evaluating the potential exclusion of them from the group. In contrast, social-conventional reasons were referenced more when the bystander who transgressed the norm not to help was viewed as OK compared to not OK (p = .02), showing that participants focus on the outgroup bystander’s group disloyalty to rationalise the acceptability of their exclusion. In line with predictions of social identity theories, this could inadvertently boost the positive identity of ingroup members. Psychological reasoning was also used relatively more when the bystander
was viewed as OK compared to when they were viewed as not OK (p = .05) (see Figure 3.10). When the bystander was excluded after transgressing the group norm to help, no significant differences in reasoning across exclusion evaluations were observed (all ps > .05) (see Table 3.19 for means and standard deviations) (see Figure 3.11 for comparison).

Table 3.19. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the reasoning x norm x acceptability of exclusion interaction, when reasoning about the exclusion of the outgroup deviant bystander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norm to help</th>
<th>Norm not to help</th>
<th>Norm to help</th>
<th>Norm not to help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>.40 (.48)</td>
<td>.63 (.47)</td>
<td>.43 (.51)</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-conventional</td>
<td>.25 (.41)</td>
<td>.23 (.40)</td>
<td>.35 (.49)</td>
<td>.54 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>.33 (.46)</td>
<td>.14 (.33)</td>
<td>.17 (.39)</td>
<td>.38 (.48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When comparing the use of different types of reasoning within each type of norm and exclusion evaluation, pairwise comparisons showed moral reasoning was employed more than social-conventional (p < .001) and psychological (p < .001), but social-conventional and psychological did not differ (p = .07) when the no-help norm was transgressed and participants viewed their exclusion as not OK. When the help-norm was transgressed and participants evaluated their exclusion as not OK, the use of each reasoning domain did not differ (all ps > .05).
Figure 3.10. The interaction between reasoning and exclusion evaluation when the group norm is Not To Help.

Figure 3.11. The interaction between reasoning and exclusion evaluation when the group norm is To Help. NB. Pairwise comparisons show no significant differences in reasoning according to evaluation (psychological p=.08).
When the no-help norm was transgressed but participants evaluated the bystander exclusion as OK, social-conventional reasoning was employed significantly more than moral reasoning (p = .02), but no differently to psychological (p = .39). When the help-norm was transgressed and participants evaluated the exclusion as OK, each type of reasoning was referenced similarly (p > .05) (see Table 3.19 for means and standard deviations).

**Interim Summary.** Similarly to evaluations of ingroup exclusion, participants focussed on moral reasoning when evaluating the outgroup exclusion as Not OK. When evaluating the exclusions as OK, social-conventional concerns were referenced. The three-way interaction between reasoning, evaluations and norms, showed that the focus on moral reasoning when the exclusion was rated as Not OK when the outgroup norm was not to help (i.e., the bystander helped). When the norm not to help was seen as OK, social-conventional reasons were focussed on comparatively more. This shows that, for outgroup bystander exclusion, moral reasoning is used to justify positive evaluations of bystanders who are “prosocial” deviants.

**Participant’s Prosocial Bystander Intentions**

To determine whether the developmental decline was present in participants’ own prosocial bystander intentions, and whether this was influenced by type of norm or group context, a 2 (Age group: Younger vs. Older) x 2 (Group context: School vs. Ethnicity) x 2 (Outgroup norm: Outgroup helping vs. Outgroup not helping) univariate ANOVA was conducted, with prosocial bystander intentions as the dependent variable, controlling for gender. In line with previous studies, a main effect of age was observed, F (8, 216) = 37.14, p<.001, η²= .15, showing that younger participants reported higher prosocial bystander intentions (M = 4.13, SD = .65) compared to older participants (M = 3.50, SD = .88; p <.001). No other interactions were observed.
Discussion

This novel study builds on Study 1 and 2, and extends previous research (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams et al., 2013; Mulvey et al., 2014) by experimentally controlling the group memberships of those involved in an incident of verbal aggression, along with the group membership of the participant, ingroup and outgroup norms, and the intergroup context, in order to examine the effect on children and adolescents’ evaluations of ingroup and outgroup bystanders who deviate from their group’s norms for bystander responses. We also present an examination of whether group-repercussions exist for ingroup and outgroup deviant bystanders; this is the first study to examine this issue.

The findings presented within this chapter develop those from Study 1 and 2 in a number of ways. In line with predictions, results demonstrate the importance of group norms for evaluations of bystander behaviour, and for the perceived acceptability of exclusion from the peer group as a result of transgressing the group norm. As predicted, the group-specific norm effected participants’ bystander evaluations, exclusion evaluations, and social-moral reasoning about these evaluations of ingroup and outgroup deviant bystanders. These findings demonstrate the causal effect of norms. Additionally, as predicted, evaluations of ingroup deviant bystanders became more negative with age. These results build on findings from Study 1 and 2, by showing that adolescents judge deviant ingroup bystander behaviour more harshly than children; that children and adolescents are aware of group norms and refer to these norms to inform their evaluations of peer bystanders; and that ingroup bystanders are particularly sensitive to social exclusion as a repercussion for deviant bystander behaviour.

Additionally, extending previous research (Mulvey et al., 2014), findings showed the relevance of group context for participants’ bystander evaluations. Results showed that participants paid particular attention to group context when evaluating outgroup bystanders. Group-context differences in evaluations were found to interact with norms, suggesting that
both children and adolescents take into account different contexts of group membership when evaluating group members. Indeed, participants were more favourable towards outgroup deviant targets in the school group context compared to the ethnic-group context.

Furthermore, participants’ social-moral reasoning about their evaluations of the deviant bystanders varied. For the ingroup deviant, younger and older children prioritised moral and social-conventional reasoning differently, showing that both age groups employed multifaceted reasoning to justify their evaluations of ingroup bystanders. Although an age difference was predicted, the trends for using moral and social-conventional reasoning were opposite to the direction hypothesised. The group context also interacted with evaluations and reasoning; showing differences in the use of social-conventional and psychological reasoning when evaluating an ingroup school or British ingroup deviant. These differences in social-conventional reasoning were expected (Mulvey et al., 2014); however, the differences in psychological reasoning were not. Additionally, findings showed that the type of norm that the ingroup bystander transgressed, along with whether participants evaluated the transgression as OK or not OK, resulted in different uses of moral and social-conventional reasoning.

In contrast, reasoning about outgroup bystander evaluations showed a four-way interaction between age, evaluation, norm, and type of reasoning, but not the group context. This was driven by age differences in reasoning when transgressing the norm Not to Help was seen as OK. Here, older participants focussed more on moral concerns, whereas younger participants focussed more on social-conventional reasoning for their evaluations. These findings suggest that outgroup evaluations might be more complex than ingroup evaluations, particularly when group-norms might challenge broader, generic norms.
A fourth novel finding that builds on the results shown in Study 1 and 2, as well as extending research conducted on social exclusion (e.g., Abrams et al., 2013; Killen, Rutland, et al., 2013; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013), shows that participants are aware of - and to a certain extent expect - repercussions for deviant group members. As predicted, participants overwhelmingly thought social exclusion of a bystander who transgressed group norms was not acceptable. However, when bystanders transgressed a group norm to help, social exclusion was seen as relatively more acceptable than when they transgressed a group norm not to get involved. In addition, and in line with our DSGD hypothesis, exclusion of ingroup members was viewed as relatively more OK by participants than the exclusion of outgroup members.

Finally, supporting previous research findings (see Chapter 2; Study 1; Study 2), a developmental decline in bystander responses was observed. However, group norms and type of group context had no effect on participants’ own bystander intentions. These findings are discussed in more detail below, along with implications, study limitations and future directions for research.

**Bystander Evaluations**

Evaluations of ingroup deviant bystanders differed according to age. As was predicted by the model of DSGD (Abrams et al., 2003), older participants are more negative about ingroup deviance compared to younger participants. DSGD suggests that this is because, as children get older, they become more aware that ingroup deviance can threaten the ingroup’s identity (e.g., Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Nesdale, 2007). Participants’ evaluations were also sensitive to the type of norm that the ingroup bystander was deviating from. Deviance was seen as more negative when the bystander deviated from a prosocial norm (i.e., the group said to help and the bystander did not want to), rather than when they deviated by behaving
prosocially (i.e., the group said not to get involved and the bystander wanted to help). This suggests that participants might be adhering to a wider external influence on norms, such as the broader expectations of society (e.g., Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). Indeed, findings show that it is not just deviance itself that can result in negative evaluations, but also the specific type of deviance presented.

Both ingroup and outgroup evaluations were also sensitive to the group context. Findings showed that deviance of British ingroup bystanders was evaluated more negatively than deviance of school ingroup bystanders. The group context was also important in participants’ evaluations of deviant outgroup members. For outgroup bystanders, the effect of norms was only present for school outgroup members. However, when the norm was Not to Help and the outgroup bystander chose to help, the Traveller bystander was evaluated far more negatively than the outgroup school bystander. Mulvey et al. (2014) have shown that adolescents can be sensitive to the group context, when evaluating or judging peers in intergroup situations. However, this is the first time that the group context has been shown to effect participants’ evaluations of ingroup and outgroup bystanders.

It is possible that participants view the ethnic-group context as more serious than the school-group context (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001; Study 1). This might explain why, overall, deviant bystanders in the ethnic-group context are viewed more negatively compared to the deviant bystanders in the school-group context. Indeed, British ingroup bystanders who do not help (when the norm is to help) are transgressing a prosocial group norm as well as a generic prosocial norm, in a context where an ingroup member is targeting verbal aggression towards an outgroup victim. In this group context the verbal aggression can be viewed as racism, so it is possible that British bystanders are being negatively evaluated as they not only transgress a prosocial group norm and a prosocial generic norm, but are also failing to stop an ingroup aggressor from racially abusing another individual; this could damage the ingroup’s
positive identity in numerous ways (Nesdale, 2007). Although the outgroup Traveller bystander is also transgressing a prosocial group-norm and generic norm, their affiliation with the Traveller victim might be an additional “protective” factor, preventing them from being viewed more negatively.

**Social-Moral Reasoning about Bystander Evaluations**

Participants were asked to provide a reason for their evaluation of the ingroup deviant and the outgroup deviant. When reasoning about the ingroup deviant, an interesting age difference was observed. Contrary to previous research on developmental differences in use of reasoning (e.g., Killen, 2007), when evaluating deviant group members younger participants employed more social-conventional reasoning (e.g., focus on group loyalty, group membership, group norms) compared to older participants, and older participants employed more moral reasoning (e.g., focus on prosocial behaviour, perspective-taking, fairness, rights) compared to younger participants. However, overall younger participants employed each type of reasoning similarly, whereas older participants employed moral reasoning more than social-conventional or psychological. This finding suggests that younger children also have a multifaceted understanding of social situations and the group dynamics involved, at least in the context of bystander deviance and verbal aggression. Indeed, this may be why developmental trends in evaluations were not observed: as both younger and older age groups are attuned to the intergroup context and the social considerations it presents.

Participants’ reasoning about their evaluation of the ingroup deviant bystander also varied according to type of evaluation and group context, and type of evaluation and group norm (two separate three-way interactions). When the ingroup bystander behaviour was evaluated as not OK, social-conventional reasoning was used more than moral and
psychological, across both group contexts. This suggests that participants focus on ingroup disloyalty as the reason for their evaluation. However, when the deviant behaviour was evaluated as OK, participants in the school context employed more psychological reasoning, which focusses on personal autonomy (e.g., they can do what they like), whereas participants in the ethnic-group context employ more moral reasoning, which focusses on prosocial behaviour and fairness (e.g., they were trying to help). These findings reiterate the important role that group context can play when interpreting intergroup scenarios (Mulvey et al., 2014).

Another important factor in participants’ evaluations of ingroup members was the type of group norm that was being transgressed. A reasoning x ingroup evaluation x norm interaction showed that when the norm was to help, social-conventional reasons were employed more when the bystander was seen as not OK compared to when they were seen as OK; again suggesting a focus on group-based disloyalty as the reason for negative evaluations. In contrast, psychological reasoning was used more when the deviant behaviour was seen as OK, showing that participants are aware that within groups people might have different opinions, and sometimes this might be acceptable. When the group norm was not to help, moral reasoning was used more when the behaviour was seen as OK compared to not OK; this shows a focus on the prosocial action of the deviant bystander. In contrast, social-conventional reasoning was used more when participants evaluated the action as not OK compared to OK. These findings show that participants focus on moral reasons when prosocial bystander behaviour is exhibited and evaluated favourably, whereas participants focus on social-conventional reasons when prosocial bystander behaviour is exhibited and negatively evaluated.

Importantly, these findings show that evaluations of ingroup members are rationalised by the group context and the group norms that are relevant during the intergroup scenario. This lends further support for researching bystander scenarios from an intergroup perspective,
as findings show that both children and adolescents are aware of these group dynamics, and use them to inform their evaluations, and reach decisions. Importantly, when ingroup members are viewed negatively it is typically because they have challenged the ingroup, whereas deviance is more acceptable when it supports a broader generic or moral norm. Thus, findings suggest that participants are more tolerant of ingroup deviance when the transgression involves prosocial behaviour.

When reasoning about evaluations of the outgroup deviant bystander no differences in group context were observed. However, a four way interaction between reasoning, evaluation, age and type of norm was observed. Findings showed that age differences in negative evaluations were driving the interaction: older participants focussed on moral reasoning when the deviant outgroup bystander was evaluated as not OK, while also transgressing the norm not to help (i.e., they want to help). Younger participants focussed on social-conventional reasons for their evaluation as not OK. This is a similar pattern to the age trends observed when reasoning about ingroup bystanders. In comparison to evaluations of ingroup bystanders, although similar age and reasoning patterns are present, group context is not taken into account when reasoning about evaluations of outgroup bystanders.

**Social Exclusion of the Bystander**

Research on social exclusion has examined whether participants evaluate the exclusion of peers by a group as acceptable (e.g., Killen, Rutland et al., 2013; Mulvey et al., 2014; Richardson, Hitti, Mulvey & Killen, 2014; Rutland et al, 2010), but does not examine social exclusion as a potential repercussion for group members who exhibit deviant bystander behaviour. The present study asked participants to indicate how OK or not OK it would be for the group to tell the deviant bystander that they could not sit with them at lunchtime. Results showed that although participants viewed social exclusion as overwhelmingly
unacceptable, this interacted with the type of norm that was being transgressed. Exclusion was seen as relatively more acceptable when the bystander transgressed a group norm to help, compared to when they transgressed a group norm not to help. This suggests that deviant but generically prosocial bystander behaviour is less likely to invite negative repercussions compared to deviant unhelpful bystander behaviour, potentially as deviating from the group by helping demonstrates adherence to a wider accepted generic norm for prosociality.

Descriptive statistics also suggest that, in line with DSGD predictions, exclusion of ingroup deviants was comparatively more acceptable than exclusion of outgroup deviants who challenged the same norm. However, this relationship was not statistically examined due to the within-participant nature of the norm variable (i.e., when participants read the ingroup had a norm to help to they automatically read the outgroup had a norm not to help). Future research should treat this variable as a within-participant factor.

Social-Moral Reasoning about Social Exclusion

When examining participants’ reasoning about the ingroup bystander’s exclusion, evaluations that indicated the exclusion was OK were justified using social-conventional reasoning (references to group-based disloyalty). Whereas when the exclusion was viewed as not OK, participants justified this evaluation by focussing on moral reasoning (e.g., they only tried to help so it’s not fair to tell them not to sit with them). This finding shows that, for ingroup members, bystander exclusion is justified by focussing on the negative impact the transgression has had on the group. Whereas ingroup bystander exclusion is less likely to be approved of by its group members if moral reasons are focussed upon. When considering moral reasons, participants might be focussing on the bystanders’ prosocial behaviour, or the negative impact that exclusion can have on an individual. Either way, this finding suggests
that ingroup participants who focus on morality when making their decisions are less likely to endorse repercussions for group-based deviance, such as social exclusion.

The present study also examined reasoning about group-based exclusion of the outgroup bystander. When the group norm was not to help, moral reasoning was used more when exclusion was viewed as unacceptable compared to when it was viewed as acceptable. Essentially, the outgroup bystander was behaving prosocially, albeit against the outgroup norm; but when this prosocial behaviour was viewed as unacceptable (not OK), participants focussed on moral reasons. It is possible that this moral focus is on the transgression behaviour itself (i.e., because they helped), rather than the act of transgressing group-based norms. It would be interesting to examine group-norms that do not cross into moral (i.e., our group likes to help) or psychological domains (i.e., our group doesn’t like to get involved) to see if the same patterns in reasoning are observed.

In contrast, social-conventional reasons were focussed on comparatively more when the bystander who transgressed the norm not to help was evaluated as OK compared to when they were evaluated as not OK. These findings show an almost opposite trend to reasoning about the ingroup evaluations, where moral reasons accompanied positive evaluations, and social-conventional reasons accompanied negative evaluations. It is possible that, as the participant is an ingroup member, the ingroup norm is encroaching onto participants’ reasoning about the outgroup bystander’s exclusion. As each participant was presented with an ingroup norm and the opposite outgroup norm, outgroup deviants actually support the ingroup’s norm, and this might be why the change in reasoning is observed; even though outgroup bystanders are transgressing their own group norm and that might not be OK from an outgroup perspective, the outgroup deviant is behaving in line with ingroup norms, and this knowledge may impact on participants’ reasoning of outgroup exclusion. Re-examining
the impact of ingroup and outgroup norms as a between-participant variable might shed more light on participants’ evaluations based on their own group’s expectations.

**Developmental Trends**

In line with earlier research and predictions (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Trach et al., 2011; Study 1, Study 2) participants’ own prosocial bystander intentions declined with age. This finding did not interact with the group context or the group norm, but continues to demonstrate that a developmental decline in bystander intentions is observed.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

The present study sheds light on the importance of examining group norms, group context, and repercussions from the group, when investigating children and adolescents’ evaluations of ingroup and outgroup bystanders. In the current design, participants were asked to evaluate an ingroup deviant bystander and an outgroup deviant bystander who challenged one of two types of norms. This allowed us to investigate whether norms are important for children’s decision-making in a bystander context, and whether deviating from a peer-group’s norms can have a negative impact on how these “deviant” bystanders are evaluated. One limitation of this design is that it does not allow for the full testing of DSGD predictions; without the ingroup and outgroup normative targets it is difficult to determine whether ingroup or outgroup deviants would be evaluated more or less positively than their normative counterparts. Future research could replicate the current study by focussing on normative group members. This might also shed more light on developmental differences in evaluations of normative and deviant bystanders.

As well as including normative bystanders, it would be beneficial to include an additional condition whereby the group memberships of the aggressor and victim are varied.
Study 1 showed that group membership of the aggressor and victim moderated the mediating relationship that social identification had between age and prosocial bystander intentions. Therefore, it is likely that evaluations of ingroup bystanders would vary if it were an ingroup victim who was being targeted, compared to when an ingroup aggressor is bullying. Additionally, one might expect social-moral reasoning to be effected by this change in group dynamic, as ingroup member victimization could threaten the ingroup’s sense of stability (e.g., Gini, 2006; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001; see Chapter 3).

A further limitation of the present study is the conceptualisation of group norms. This operationalization of ingroup and outgroup norms had a causal effect on participants’ evaluations of group members who challenged these norms, along with social-moral reasoning and evaluations of exclusion. However, as participants read about both the ingroup norm and the outgroup norm (and these were always opposite to each other) it made it difficult to compare directly across targets (e.g., to compare an ingroup bystander who transgressed a helping norm to an outgroup bystander who transgressed the same norm). Future studies could include type of norms as a between-participant variable, thus clarifying which type of norm is attended to when making judgments.

Future research could also compare different types of group-specific norms. Recently, researchers have compared group-specific (peer group) to general norms (school group) in the context of inclusion and exclusion (Nesdale & Lawson, 2011), moral norms to social-conventional norms (Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Mulvey et al., 2014), and social exclusion in the context of generic norms (Abrams et al., 2013). The present study selected group norms based on findings from Study 1 and Study 2, which showed that participants reasoned about their own bystander intentions distinctly; either focussing on moral reasons (i.e., it’s good to help) or psychological reasons (i.e., I shouldn’t get involved). However, future research could vary the nature of the group-specific norms, and/or examine whether the
presence of a generic norm (in addition to the group-specific norms) alters the valence of evaluations assigned to those who are normative or deviant to these norms. Studies that examine norms in this way could shed more light on whether school or social-conventional (generic) norms can have a positive impact on peer-group norms when the peer-group norm is for non-helpful or passive bystander responses to bullying; and whether group-specific and generic norms may have a cumulative impact on children’s evaluations of peer bystanders.

Building on recent findings (Mulvey et al., 2014) the group context was shown to be meaningful in the present study, effecting both bystander evaluations and social-moral reasoning about these evaluations. Examining bystander responses across different group contexts and different types of aggression would further develop the present research; children and adolescents’ are faced with a plethora of bullying incidents where different knowledge or information might be activated in addition to a general understanding of group dynamics. In the present study it is possible that evaluations in the ethnic-group context were influenced by participants’ interpretations of the incident as racist, which might be considered more severe than verbal aggression targeted at another person simply because they are from another school. Research has shown that children and adolescents are aware of stereotypes about different group memberships, and that these play a role in their evaluations (e.g., Killen, 2007; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013); future research could also include a measure of stereotypes in their examination of bystander responses, as well as varying the type of bullying context.

**Conclusion**

The present study extends Study 1 and 2 by reiterating the importance of group norms for children and adolescents’ bystander evaluations by showing their causal effect, specifically when the bystander deviates from the group norm. Results showed that the group norm influences participants’ evaluations of ingroup and outgroup peers, their reasoning
about their evaluation decisions, and the perceived acceptability of social exclusion as a repercussion for transgressing group norms. In addition, the present study highlighted the importance of examining bystander evaluations across different group contexts; potentially, participants draw on their knowledge of the specific group involved, as well as their general knowledge of group dynamics, in order to decide what bystander behaviour is warranted and acceptable.

This study lends further support to the importance of understanding intergroup factors when trying to understand how to support young bystanders to respond helpfully when faced with bullying and aggression at schools. Findings suggest that practitioners would benefit from focussing students on moral concerns (i.e., prosocial behaviour, fairness, justice, equality, welfare) when encouraging helpful bystander responses; this may result in less negative evaluations of peers who do not behave in line with group expectations, as well as reduce the likelihood of social exclusion as a result of deviating from group norms.
Chapter 8

General discussion, Conclusions and Future research

Within this general discussion a review of the aims of the current research will be presented. Then, a brief overview of the key findings will be provided, followed by findings specific to each study within this thesis. Limitations of the future research will be identified, along with key avenues for future research. The implications and practical applications of this research will be demonstrated before overall conclusions are made.

A Summary of the Aims of the Present Research

The aim of the present research was to further examine the intergroup factors that influence the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses to bullying incidents in schools. This focus is in response to previous findings that suggest promoting prosocial bystander behaviours among children and adolescents could help reduce bullying in schools (e.g., Aboud & Joong, 2008). Importantly, helpful responses to bullying have been shown to decrease with age (Rigby & Johnson, 2006; Trach et al, 2010). However, this developmental decline is little understood. Identifying what variables influences this developmental trend is therefore required in order to inform researchers, as well as anti-bullying strategies employed in primary and secondary schools. To date, researchers have focussed on the influences of interpersonal (i.e., individual personality characteristics) and “group-level” (i.e., social, environmental) factors on bystander responses. Yet this research has not shed any further light on the developmental differences in bystander intervention.

To address this limitation of current bystander research the present thesis examined the developmental decline in bystander responses from a novel intergroup perspective. The intergroup approach highlights the roles of group membership, social identification, group norms and social-moral reasoning for understanding children and adolescents’ social
interactions (Duffy & Nesdale, 2012; Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013, 2013; Rutland et al., 2010). Three theoretical frameworks formed the basis of intergroup predictions regarding the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses: social identity development theory (SIDT; Nesdale, 2008), the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD; Abrams et al., 2003) and social-moral reasoning (Killen, 2007). Although it has been acknowledged that these three theories complement each other (e.g., Killen, Mulvey & Hitti, 2013; Nesdale et al., 2013; Rutland et al., 2010), the present thesis is the first investigation to combine predictions from all three frameworks in order to examine the developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions to incidents of intergroup verbal aggression. Thus, findings presented within this thesis extend current research by applying a theoretical framework to a new social context in childhood and adolescence.

The present research examined helpful bystander responses to incidents of intergroup verbal aggression. This is the most commonly experienced form of bullying among children and adolescents (Smith & Shu, 2000; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002), and arguably one that would benefit greatly from prosocial bystander intervention, mainly because it can be so difficult for teachers to detect. Importantly, examining bystander responses to specific forms of bullying and aggression can result in more accurate, reliable information about bystander response rates (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2008; Vaillancourt et al., 2008). Findings can then be applied more readily within school environments.

The present research findings make a novel contribution to the literature on helpful bystander intervention in a number of ways. Primarily, findings show the importance of further understanding the developmental decline in helpful bystander intervention. Moreover, the studies within this thesis demonstrate the relevance of applying an intergroup approach to examine this issue. Therefore, not only does this research provide an important insight into why this developmental decline is observed, but it also shows how intergroup theory on
social development can be applied to illuminate new social contexts (i.e., the role of bystanders faced with intergroup verbal aggression). Therefore, these novel findings make a unique theoretical contribution to the research on promoting helpful bystander responses, whilst also presenting practical implications and considerations for promoting helpful bystander intervention among children of different ages.

A Review of Findings

Key Findings

Across the studies presented within this thesis, a developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions was evident. This is consistent with previous research, and underlines the importance of examining the factors that are driving this developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions. Furthermore, the intergroup approach to examining developmental variation in bystander responses was shown to be very insightful and brought forth useful findings that go some way to explain the observed developmental decline. Group membership, social identification (Study 1) and group norms (Study 1, 2) influenced age differences in reports of helpful intentions. Findings showed that group norms and the intergroup context influenced evaluations of ingroup and outgroup bystanders who challenged their group norms (Study 3). Additionally, analyses of social-moral reasoning showed that children and adolescents attend to different concerns (i.e., moral, social-conventional, psychological) when justifying their own bystander intentions (Study 1), as well as their evaluations of peers (Study 2 and 3). Importantly, the intergroup status of the bystander also influenced social-moral reasoning (Study 2), as did the type of norm and the group context (Study 3). Findings relating to each study are described in turn below.
Study One

The findings of this study illustrated the importance of group membership and social identification in the developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions. The group membership of the aggressor and victim in the verbal aggression scenario was controlled as part of an experimental design. Findings showed that social identification mediated the negative relationship between age and helpful bystander intentions, but only when the verbal aggression scenario involved an ingroup victim and an outgroup aggressor. This suggests that for older participants only, increased social identification was associated with higher reports of helpful bystander intervention for an ingroup victim.

Study 1 also measured perceived bystander norms for helping. In line with predictions, results showed an association between older participants’ perceptions of a stronger helping norm and an increase in helpful bystander intentions. As expected, younger participants were not influenced by group norms; they reported higher helpful intentions regardless of the norm. Findings also provided the first examination of social-moral reasoning in the context of intergroup bystander responses. Moral reasoning (i.e., a focus on victim welfare, fairness and rights) was employed more when justifying intentions to intervene; in contrast, psychological reasoning (i.e., a focus on autonomy and personal choice) was employed more when justifying intentions not to intervene. In addition, as predicted, younger children prioritised moral concerns, whereas older children prioritised psychological concerns. This demonstrated, for the first time, the relevance of examining social-moral reasoning when in the position of a bystander. Additionally, reasoning findings support the contention of social domain theory’s approach to social-moral reasoning; with age, more multifaceted reasons are drawn upon to justify decisions.
Findings from Study 1 support the utility of examining the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses from an intergroup perspective. It showed that as children get older they become more concerned with the group membership of the victim, when that group membership is also particularly meaningful to the bystander. Importantly, findings also showed the relevance of group norms for understanding age differences. Younger “bystanders” were not influenced by the absence or presence of a group norm for helping; whereas a norm for helping was related to an increase in helpful bystander intentions from older participants. Study 2 builds on this examination of norms, as well as the role of other intergroup variables, namely intergroup status.

**Study Two**

This study builds on the findings of Study 1, and further demonstrates the relevance of norms for the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses. Two types of norm were examined in Study 2; an evaluative norm and a behavioural norm. In addition, Study 2 also examined the role of intergroup status. Intergroup status of the bystander was experimentally controlled, as was the bystander behaviour. This allowed us to test whether helping or non-helping bystander responses were evaluated more or less positively, and whether this differed by age. Furthermore, participants’ evaluations of peer bystanders as well as their own bystander intentions were measured. A novel examination of leadership skills among bystanders of high and low status who help or walk away from an incident of verbal aggression was also provided.

As expected, analyses showed that bystanders were evaluated more favourably when they helped the victim compared to when they walked away. Although the group status of the bystander did not directly influence evaluations of the bystander, when examining the social-moral reasoning participants employed to justify their evaluations, different reasoning was
used when evaluating high and low status bystanders. Moral reasoning (i.e., a focus on victim welfare) was employed more when reasoning about a high-status bystander compared to a low-status bystander, regardless of their bystander behaviour. This suggests that although evaluations of bystanders might not be influenced by their status, group-status is still attended to when justifying evaluations. Regarding social norms, older participants were less likely to indicate that peers their age would think that helping the bystander was a good response (evaluative norm). Moreover, older participants were less likely to think that the helping was an expected behavioural norm among their peer group.

Norms also fed into perceptions of bystander leadership qualities. An exploratory path analysis showed that the behavioural norm positively predicted the evaluative norm. This means that when participants thought peers their age would behave in the same way as the bystander, they were also more likely to think peers would approve of this behaviour. This in turn predicted perceptions of bystander leadership qualities. Moreover, the behavioural norm was shown to predict leadership qualities when the bystander walked away, but not when they helped.

Study 2 therefore provided an insight into how different bystander responses are viewed by children and adolescents, and how relative group-status and specific bystander responses might influence positive and negative evaluations of bystanders. Importantly both evaluations themselves, and reasoning about these evaluations, showed that prosocial behaviours are predominantly favoured by children and adolescents. As the role of norms showed consistent developmental trends across both Study 1 and 2, Study 3 provided a thorough test of the effects of norms on bystander evaluations.
Study Three

Study 3 built on the findings in Study 1 and 2 that showed the relevance of examining the role of different norms for children and adolescents’ bystander responses. To do this, group-specific norms were experimentally tested, thus providing a more rigorous test of group-norms. As in Study 1, the group memberships of the aggressor (outgroup), victim (ingroup) and bystander (one ingroup and one outgroup bystander) were controlled. Participants were either told that their group had a norm to help and the outgroup had a norm to “not get involved”; or the group norms were reversed. Participants were introduced to an ingroup and outgroup bystander who deviated from their respective group’s norm. Importantly, we also examined evaluations based on the intergroup context, and compared ingroup and outgroup school membership with ethnic- ingroup and outgroup membership. As well as evaluations about the “deviant” bystanders, the potential for group-based repercussions for challenging group norms were observed. A further aim of this study was to examine whether children and adolescents’ reasoning differed as a result of the normative context.

Findings from Study 3 developed those from Study 1 and 2 in a number of ways. Results showed that the group-specific norm affected participants’ bystander evaluations, exclusion evaluations, and social-moral reasoning about an ingroup and outgroup member who went against their respective group’s norm for bystander behaviour. Findings also showed that adolescents evaluated deviant ingroup bystander behaviour more negatively than children. Moreover, both children and adolescents were aware of group norms and referred to these norms to inform their evaluations of peer bystanders. Developmental differences in social-moral reasoning about evaluations were found; for example, younger and older children reasoned about their evaluations of the ingroup deviant evaluations differently. Unexpectedly, younger participants focussed more on the social-conventional domain, and
older participants focussed more on the moral domain. Study 3 showed that, even if children and adolescents develop similar evaluations of peers, different concerns motivate these evaluations.

Findings also highlighted, for the first time, the importance of examining bystander responses in different intergroup contexts. Both children and adolescents were sensitive to the group context, for example evaluating the ethnic-outgroup bystander (i.e., a Traveller) more negatively than the school outgroup bystander, when they transgressed a norm not to help.

A further novel finding from Study 3 was that children and adolescents perceived group-based repercussions may be present for bystanders who do not behave in the way prescribed by their group. Importantly, findings showed that participants did not approve of social-exclusion from the group as a repercussion for the bystander’s behaviour. However, it was seen as relatively more acceptable for an ingroup bystander to be excluded compared to an outgroup bystander. It was also more acceptable to exclude a bystander who transgressed a prosocial norm (to help) than one who transgressed by being prosocial (i.e., helped when the norm was to walk away).

Implications

Theoretical implications. Together, these findings reiterate the importance of examining intergroup factors in order to fully understand bystander responses, and the broader bullying context, in schools. Previously, developmental intergroup research has focussed on the contexts of social exclusion (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams et al., 2013; Killen et al., 2012; Mulvey et al., 2014) or attitudes towards bullying more generally (e.g., Nesdale et al., 2008; Nesdale et al., 2013). The research presented here is the first, to my knowledge, to draw on intergroup theories to understand developmental trends in bystander
intensions. The implications of the current findings for further informing and developing these intergroup theories are outlined below.

The intergroup theories that were drawn on are: social identity development theory (SIDT; Nesdale, 2004), developmental subjective group dynamics (DGSD; Abrams et al., 2003; Abrams & Rutland, 2011), and social-moral reasoning from a social domain theory (SDT) perspective (Killen, 2007) in the domain of bystander intentions. Predictions from these theories were applied in order to further understand developmental differences in bystander responses. The current findings not only inform the theory itself but also how it applies to the bystander context. There are also implications for researchers working in bystander behaviour as the findings shed new light on the factors that are driving the relatively well-established developmental decline in bystander behaviour in bullying incidents. To demonstrate the theoretical implications of the present findings, SIDT and DSGD will be reviewed together as they share predictions regarding the relevance of group membership, intergroup status and group norms for children’s responses to social interactions. Although drawing from the same intergroup approach as SIDT and DSGD, implications for social-moral reasoning will be described separately as it is primarily concerned with identifying children and adolescents’ justifications for their chosen responses, rather than the response itself.

Social identity development theory (SIDT) and the model of developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD) state that meaningful group memberships are important in childhood and adolescence (Abrams & Rutland, 2011; Nesdale, 2008). The current research has found evidence that group membership is important for young people's bystander intentions in a bullying context and this could explain in part the developmental trends observed. In Study 1 it was found that social identification mediates the relationship between age and helpful bystander intentions but crucially only when the victim of verbal aggression
was an ingroup member (Study 1). In line with research on adult bystander intervention (e.g., Levine et al., 2005; Levine & Manning, 2013), these findings suggest that older bystanders must identify strongly with their victim’s group membership in order to help them. Ingroup bystanders must also feel a strong sense of identity with their group for prosocial responses to kick in. This is consistent with SIDT and DSGD predictions and shows that they also apply in the context of bystander intentions in bullying contexts.

Both SIDT and DSGD suggest that group-specific norms guide young people’s attitudes and behaviours towards other peers and with increasing age and experience young people are more aware of the importance of maintaining a positive social identity and behaving in line with norms (e.g., Nesdale & Duffy, 2012). This thesis finds support for this idea in a new domain (i.e., bystander responses). The findings of Studies 1 and 2 were consistent with SIDT and DSGD and show that group norms also play an important role in the bystander context. Specifically, the results showed that older bystanders place a high importance on group norms for informing their helpful bystander response. Developmental subjective group dynamics predictions also posit that attitudes towards a fellow ingroup member are positive while they behave in line with group norms, but become negative if the group member deviates from the group norms. In contrast attitudes towards an outgroup member are more positive when they deviate from their respective group norm, but are negative when the outgroup member behaves in line with the outgroup’s norm. Study 3 tested the evaluations of ingroup and outgroup bystanders when they both deviated from their group’s norm. Due to the design of this experiment it was not possible to directly compare evaluations of ingroup deviance to outgroup deviance, although a trend for favouring outgroup deviance showed initial support for this hypothesis. Thus, this suggests that the DSGD model’s predictions about evaluations of deviants may hold in the bystander context.
Unexpectedly however, group norms did not affect children and adolescents’ evaluations differently (Study 3). This could be due to the type of group-specific norms (i.e., helping) employed in Study 3. Developmental subjective group dynamics has typically examined group-specific norms for loyalty. In these contexts, a normative group member would like their team and cheer for their team. A deviant member would like their team but also clap and cheer for the other team (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003). As the prosocial group-specific norm employed in Study 3 is also held by wider society (as a generic norm), it is possible that age trends were overridden due to the generic nature of the norm. Indeed, in one study, evaluations of outgroup deviance to a generic norm did not differ across participants aged six to 12 (Abrams et al., 2013). Instead, developmental variation in evaluations was a result of increased negativity towards deviant ingroup members combined with decreased positivity towards normative outgroup members. Thus, the current findings are consistent with the DSGD model, showing that age differences may be less apparent for generic norms around bystander intervention.

In Study 3 results also suggested that young people may be weighing their bystander behaviour in light of competing and sometimes conflicting peer-group and generic norms. It is possible that bystanders are more readily influenced by a combination of peer-level and generic expectations for bystander behaviour, and attend to both when responding to bullying incidents. This has been suggested by SIDT (e.g., Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). As aforementioned, DSGD predictions have been examined in relation to generic norms or group-specific (“oppositional”) norms, but not both together. Examining the influence of both types of norms on developmental differences, as well as examining both normative and deviant responses, may shed further light on the present findings.

The current research further informed and extended the DSGD and SDT frameworks by examining perceived acceptability of group-based repercussions of deviant bystanders.
This novel application of the DSGD and SDT frameworks showed further support for the examination of intergroup processes in the context of children and adolescents’ bystander responses. The present findings showed, again in line with SIDT and DSGD predictions, that social exclusion of an ingroup deviant member was relatively more acceptable than that of an outgroup deviant member. Moreover, social exclusion repercussions were perceived as more acceptable when bystanders challenged the norm to help compared to when they challenged the norm not to help. This demonstrates a possible double standard for participants; when the group holds a prosocial norm they are relatively more likely to approve of the social exclusion of a deviant group member.

Participants’ social-moral reasoning about their own bystander intentions, or their evaluations of other bystanders, was examined from a SDT perspective (Killen, 2007; Turiel, 1983). Examining how children and adolescents justify their evaluations has helped researchers understand how these evaluations are made. Findings have typically shown that participants draw from moral (welfare, fairness, rights), social-conventional (norms, group functioning) and psychological (autonomy, personal choice) domains. It is proposed that a focus on one domain above another is associated with differences in evaluations or judgements (Smetana, 1995). Therefore, understanding the concerns prioritised by an individual who engages in helpful bystander responses could highlight which concerns should be raised to increase helpful bystander responses among others.

Previous research has shown that children focus primarily on the moral domain when evaluating transgressions as not OK (e.g., Killen, 2007). In contrast, adolescents are more aware of the “multifaceted” nature of transgressions and are increasingly likely to draw on social-conventional or psychological concerns to evaluate transgressions as OK. The present research showed support for this prediction. Study 1 showed that older children were more likely to engage in psychological reasoning, and also employed more psychological reasoning
to justify their bystander intention not to intervene. In contrast, younger children were more likely to engage in moral reasoning, and also employed more moral reasoning to justify their helpful bystander intentions. Studies 2 and 3 built on this finding and presented a more nuanced insight into children and adolescents’ reasoning. For example, participants employed more moral reasoning when evaluating high-status bystanders compared to low-status bystanders, suggesting that higher-status peers hold a moral obligation to help bullied peers – at least in comparison to lower-status peers. These findings suggest that the examination of children’s justifications using a social-moral reasoning framework are particularly useful in further examining why justifications might arise for their bystander responses.

The current research is also the first to examine the impact of intergroup status on social-moral reasoning about bystander responses. The finding that moral reasoning was employed more so for higher-status peers (than lower-status peers) extends the socio-moral reasoning theory by highlighting the additional role of status in shaping children’s reasoning. Furthermore, a number of other important and novel findings emerged from the study of participants reasoning.

For example, although Study 1 showed that older participants employed more psychological reasoning and younger participants employed more moral reasoning, in Study 3 adolescents employed more moral reasoning and children employed more social-conventional reasoning. This finding suggests, contrary to social-moral reasoning predictions, that both children and adolescents are sensitive to the multifaceted nature of bystander behaviour, and this is influenced – in part – by the specific intergroup situation (e.g., type of group-norms and the group-context). More generally, this finding highlights the need to further examine young people’s social moral-reasoning about bystander behaviours across different bystander responses and bullying episodes. Additionally, these findings suggest that
more study on the applicability of this theory in a variety of social contexts is required, as the original predictions made by the theory may not apply to every situation.

Importantly, overall DSGD, SIDT and SDT have provided very valuable predictions to guide and interpret findings in the present research. Not only does the present research support numerous predictions of these developmental intergroup approaches to understanding children and adolescents’ bystander intervention, but they also show how nuanced the considerations of bystanders can be. Continuing to acknowledge the relevance of intergroup processes when examining the bystander context could shed further light on the applicability of the theoretical framework outlined in this thesis.

**Practical implications.** The present findings provide important insights for anti-bullying policies and programmes. A key finding across the studies in this thesis is the importance of intergroup norms for predicting developmental differences in children and adolescents’ bystander behaviour. Furthermore, intergroup norms also predict how both children and adolescents interpret and evaluate intergroup bystander contexts. Increasingly civil servants are drawing on behavioural insights to inform policy-making. Indeed, one such important behavioural insight is social norms (Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, King & Vlaev, 2010). In 2010 Dolan and colleagues synthesised the behavioural insights research (drawing from social psychology and behavioural economics) for policy-makers. This research has shown how social norms can help to “nudge” behaviour to benefit local communities (e.g., increasing recycling behaviour or social action). The current research offers an important contribution to this behavioural insights field as it shows that intergroup norms could also be used to inform anti-bullying policies and develop anti-bullying projects. This may be particularly relevant for the Department of Education.
Findings from this thesis present a number of important considerations for practitioners. First, the developmental decline in helpful bystander intentions reiterates that current anti-bullying interventions are not as effective among older participants as they could be. Indeed, although schools make substantial efforts to tackle bullying among peers, the present findings suggest that particularly older children do not perceive helpful bystander responses as an expected bystander response to bullying (Study 1 and Study 2). This suggests that adolescents in particular could benefit from bullying-reduction programmes with a focus on promoting prosocial bystander behaviours.

As adolescents in our studies readily attended to different types of norms to inform their bystander responses (Study 1, 2 and 3), instilling norms for prosocial bystander behaviour amongst adolescents may influence their likelihood of engaging in helpful bystander intervention. Importantly, the present research findings suggest that a focus on promoting prosocial behaviour is necessary at the peer-group level in addition to the school level. This highlights the need for schools to take a “whole-school” approach, not only encouraging teachers to support prosocial intervention, but also creating training programmes for students to complete within their immediate peer group, so that prosocial bystander norms can be fostered.

Findings from the social-moral reasoning analysis also show that bystander intentions and more positive evaluations of bystanders were affiliated with moral reasoning. That is, helpful bystander responses were justified by concerns for the victim, treating others’ fairly, and behaving prosocially. The finding that higher-status bystanders were also associated with moral reasoning suggests that instilling a sense of moral obligation among children and adolescents could help boost their helpful responses. Encouraging a sense of moral obligation may be particularly beneficial among adolescents. Furthermore, reinforcing this sense of moral obligation through the support of the peer-group when trying to instil prosocial norms
(e.g., combining moral obligation with group loyalty or group functioning concerns) could be a more effective way of creating and maintaining prosocial behaviours through a sense of moral obligation (i.e., to the peer group, rather than the victim).

Social-moral reasoning and specific evaluations about bystander behaviour were also sensitive to the group context. So as to create successful strategies to promote prosocial bystander responses, schools should be aware that children and adolescents’ decision-making is informed by an understanding of the specific group memberships at play. These findings reiterate that successful anti-bullying strategies cannot be “one-size-fits-all”. Instead, the processes and concerns that children and adolescent bystanders have to consider when choosing to help a bullied peer are incredibly complex and context-specific. Our findings suggested that, for example, the ethnic-outgroup victim would be more negatively evaluated than an outgroup school member who engages in the same behaviour. Evidently, it is important that schools are aware that different intergroup bullying contexts raise different challenges for bystander intervention, so as to support those who want to help peers without fear of repercussions.

The present research findings reiterate the importance of examining the specifics of bullying scenarios in order to illuminate the concerns and challenges faced by young people who witness bullying. Understanding the nuanced trends in children and adolescents’ bystander responses and interpretations of bullying incidents will help create interventions targeted at specific prosocial motivators for specific contexts. Of course, these many considerations attended to by children who are bystanders is also the challenge of reducing bullying. This thesis provides a focussed insight into how we might achieve this in schools by focussing on intergroup concerns.

Limitations and Future Directions
Operationalization of variables. Contrary to predictions, the intergroup variables of status (Study 2) and intergroup norms (Study 3) did not interact with age on the evaluations of bystanders. In Study 2, intergroup status was operationalised by assigning groups low status (unpopular group identity) or high status (popular group identity) memberships. A lack of differentiation between high and low status group bystander evaluations could be due to the overwhelmingly positive evaluation that prosocial bystander behaviours resulted in. It is possible that the bystander behaviour (i.e., to help or walk away) was the primary concern of participants when evaluating the bystander behaviour, and status did not impact upon their evaluation. Therefore, this the behaviour itself drove differences in evaluations. It is also possible that social identification with low or high status bystanders would have influenced the effect of intergroup status on participants’ evaluations. However, as social identification with the high and low status groups was not explicitly examined, we do not know how accurate this interpretation is. To address this limitation in Study 3, social identification with ingroup and outgroup members was measured. However, intergroup status and its effects on developmental changes in bystander responses remains an important variable to examine; particularly in the advent of creating anti-bullying ambassadors at schools. Therefore, future examinations of bystander’s intergroup status should ensure a meaningful group context, and potentially employ alternative conceptualisations of status (i.e., not levels of popularity).

In Study 3, although the type of group norm consistently affected variables such as bystander evaluations, exclusion evaluations and social-moral reasoning, intergroup norms did not influence developmental differences in bystander evaluations. This was surprising as research has consistently shown the increasingly relevance of norms with age on children’s evaluations, including findings of Study 1. However, this could be due to the type of group-specific norms employed. Participants were told that their group either had a norm “to help” or a norm “not to get involved”. Quite likely, these group-specific norms also tap into broader
generic norms. In particular, helping others in need is a pertinent norm in society, which children are taught from a very young age. Possibly, participants were unable to disentangle group-specific norms from generic norms for behaviour; thus resulting in an effect of norm on bystander evaluations rather than an effect of norm on developmental differences in bystander evaluations. Future studies should operationalise different group-specific norms for bystander behaviours, whilst also measuring the impact of generic norms – such as expectations of teachers or schools (e.g., Nesdale & Lawson, 2011).

Methodological issues. The use of self-report measures of bystander intentions in an experimental design was appropriate for the current research for a number of reasons (see theoretical chapter 3 for a review), to examine the aims of the present research. This method allowed the causal relationship between variables to be examined, as aspects of the bullying scenario could be manipulated. Additionally, this method allowed an examination of the complex issues that children and adolescents are concerned with when justifying their own bystander intentions and also their evaluations of others. However, this technique and design necessitates the measurement of young people’s bystander intentions. It is important to acknowledge that self-reported intentions may not reflect young people’s actual bystander behaviours, should they find themselves in a situation similar to the scenario provided. However, research has shown that intentions are key predictors of actual behaviours (Ajzen, 1991), both in the context of prosocial behaviour (Smith & McSweeney, 2007) and bystander intervention (Abbott & Cameron, 2014). However, it is important that future research should examine the developmental decline in bystander intervention using behavioural measures as well as intentions, in order to examine this more fully (Monks et al., 2003). Causal findings observed in the present study could also be validated by employing longitudinal designs. This could be a valuable way of determining the influence of both interpersonal, group-level and intergroup factors on bystander responses.
A further methodological issue concerns the social-moral reasoning frameworks. In the process of conducting this research, it became apparent that while examining reasoning in terms of broad domains helps identify key trends in children’s evaluations, examining reasoning in this way might miss subtle variations in the effect of variables on specific categories within the domains. For example, focussing on prosocial behaviour – “It’s right to help people” - (moral) may be a result of different concerns than focussing on victim welfare – “They’ll be upset” - (also moral). Moreover, difficulties are presented when examining moral issues that also cross into the social-conventional domain. Study 3 presented such a challenge by having a group-specific norm for helping, a moral concern. Thus, this “group-specific” norm tapped into both moral and social-conventional issues. As such it was not always possible to determine whether an evaluation such as “Because they helped”, was moral (due to the prosocial component) or social-conventional (a direct indicator of the group-norm). In order to further understand the complex trends in social-moral reasoning observed in the current research, and in general, it might be beneficial to “strip down” the domains further, when examining the nuanced response to specific intergroup contexts. This would allow researchers to pinpoint the precise consideration process bystanders go through when choosing their bystander response.

**Helpful bystander responses.** The present research was concerned with identifying factors that influence the developmental decline in helpful bystander responses. Based on previous research, the measure employed to determine bystander intentions tapped into a number of different “prosocial” bystander responses. However, multiple helpful bystander strategies could be employed within one bullying episode; indeed, some may be more likely than others. As such, although creating a composite variable of prosocial bystander responses informs us as to when general helpful behaviour is exhibited, it might be that certain helpful bystander responses are easier to engage in than others (e.g., telling a teacher or adult may
not result in group-based repercussions, whereas telling the bully to stop could). Indeed, it might be the case that the influence of intergroup factors on bystander responses varies across not only helpful bystander responses, but a variety of bystander responses (e.g., aggressive bystander behaviour, bully-supportive behaviour, passive behaviour). Examining the relevance of intergroup factors on various bystander responses will help develop our understanding of the application of this theory in the bystander context.

**Different forms of bullying.** Bullying scenarios were presented to participants in order to measure their bystander responses to the incident. A specific form of bullying - verbal aggression - was selected as the focal bullying behaviour. A scenario depicting this form of bullying was presented to participants as research has shown this can result in more reliable reports of bystander intentions (Rigby & Johnson, 2006; see also Chapter 4). Additionally, it can reduce age confounds being presented as a result of age-related interpretations of general bullying definitions (e.g., Guerin & Hennessy, 2002; Vaillancourt et al., 2008). However, although employing a bullying-specific scenario can result in more reliable reports of bystander responses, it is quite possible that bystanders respond differently to different forms of bullying (e.g., Lean, 1999, in Rigby & Johnson, 2006). As such, the present research findings might not be replicated across different bullying contexts. Future research should therefore examine the effect of intergroup factors in the context of multiple bullying situations. For example, cyberbullying is increasingly focussed upon by anti-bullying researchers and charities, due to its prolific nature among young people (Ybarra, Boyd, Korchmaros, & Oppenheim, 2012). Testing the role of intergroup factors within an online domain could further extend the applicability of intergroup predictions for bystander responses to online aggression.

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5 Different forms of bystander response were measured in Study 1 (see Appendix A) but did not form part of the present analysis.
**Group contexts.** Within this thesis a number of group contexts were examined: Study 1 presented ingroup and outgroup school members; Study 2 presented high and low status group members; and Study 3 compared evaluations of ingroup and outgroup school members to evaluations of ethnic ingroup and outgroup members. Studies have shown that examining intergroup processes in the context of school group memberships is relevant and meaningful (e.g., Abrams et al., 2009; Study 1). However, Study 3 shed light on the variability in bystander evaluations and social-moral reasoning when bystanders belong to different group memberships. These differences observed as a result of group context suggest that children and adolescents are sensitive to the specific group membership. Thus, any additional information they may hold about a particular group or group member (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes) could influence participants’ bystander evaluations (e.g., Mulvey, Hitti & Killen, 2010). In the context of social exclusion, previous research has shown that young people reference stereotyped knowledge to inform their evaluations and judgments about individuals’ group memberships, particularly in situations where little other information about the individual is presented (e.g., Horn, Killen & Stangor, 1999). Thus, future research should consider the importance of group-contexts in the examination of intergroup influences and bystander responses and measure previous knowledge and stereotypes held to determine whether group-based stereotypes can positively or negatively influence bystander intervention.

**Gender differences.** No specific predictions regarding gender were made in the present thesis. This is partly because gender differences in bystander intervention is mixed (refer to theoretical chapter one for a review), and partly because gender does not appear to affect intergroup influences or the use of social-moral reasoning. Indeed, across all three studies presented within this thesis gender did not appear to correlate with any dependent variables and was therefore controlled across analyses. However, this lack of findings could
be due to the gender-matched scenarios that were presented to participants. This meant that female participants only read about incidents of bullying between females and female bystanders, and male participants only read about incidents of bullying between males and male bystanders. However, particularly in co-educational schools, although peer groups might in some cases group together by gender, it is more than feasible that bullying could occur across gender, and that both male and female bystanders would be present.

A study conducted among adult bystanders showed that gender, along with group size, affected bystander intervention. Levine and Crowther (2008) showed that increasing the number of bystanders encouraged female intervention to help female victims, but only when the bystanders were women and not when they were men. In contrast, increasing the number of male bystanders did not influence bystander intervention to help male victims. Whereas when the victim was female, male bystanders were more likely to intervene when more women were present. It is important that future research considers the effects of gender, for example by varying the genders of aggressor, victim and bystander(s). Indeed, examining stereotypes or gendered expectations might also shed light on potential gender differences in bystander intervention.

**Changing norms.** The studies presented within this thesis have consistently shown the impact of group-specific norms for developmental differences in bystander responses (Study 1 and 2), as well as the direct influence of norms on evaluations of bystanders (Study 3). Indeed, as shown in Study 3, findings for bystander evaluations and exclusion evaluations support intergroup theory predictions that deviance to group norms can be negatively perceived. Thus two avenues for future research are proposed: 1) to examine how current bystander norms can be changed or prosocial bystander norms can be effectively implemented in schools, and 2) to identify how negative evaluations and repercussions of
bystanders who challenge pre-existing group norms can be overcome, and help to facilitate a new norm for bystander intervention.

A more thorough examination of bystanders as “leaders” may be a first step to examining these proposed areas of research. As outlined in Chapter 6, child and adolescent leaders have the potential to change norms among their peers, and set new standards for behaviour (Miller-Johnson & Costanzo, 2004; Sheppard et al., 2012). Furthermore, research with adolescents has shown there to be two types of leaders: conventional and deviant. Conventional leaders take proactive roles among school communities and are viewed favourably by teachers whereas deviant leaders are more likely to take risks in the group, and are better at setting new norms (Miller-Johnson et al., 2003). Possibly, identifying “deviant” group leaders among children and adolescents could be a route to establishing new bystander norms.

The role of emotions. Although it was not a focus of the current thesis, researchers have shown the relevance of emotion in driving children’s bystander responses. In intergroup contexts, feelings of empathy have been shown to predict adolescents’ helpful bystander intentions towards outgroup members (e.g., Abbott & Cameron, 2014). Furthermore, Jones and colleagues (2009) have shown how group-based emotions (e.g., pride, shame, guilt and anger) are related to different types of bystander responses. However, these studies (Abbott & Cameron, 2014; Jones et al., 2009) do not examine the role of emotion in explaining the developmental decline in prosocial bystander responses. Marrying these findings with research from the “happy victimiser paradigm” (i.e., the attribution of positive emotions to victimisers; Malti, Gasser & Buchmann, 2009; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013) could be a route to examining both the role of emotion and intergroup factors when explaining the developmental decline in prosocial bystander responses to bullying and aggression.
It seems that young children believe the victimiser is “happy” in their act of wrongdoing (i.e., they derive a pleasure from victimising), whereas older children increasingly attribute negative emotion to the victimiser (Malti & Kretteanauer, 2013). Although it has not yet been examined, children’s interpretations of the victimiser’s motive may well inform their consequent bystander response. Among young children research has shown that their cognitive ability (i.e., theory of mind and perspective taking) informs their emotion attribution to the victimiser (e.g., Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Krettenauer Malti & Sokol, 2008). However, across adolescence, moral motivations become increasingly complex. Researchers suggest that “external” moral motivators influence early adolescent’s attribution of emotion and that these become internalised further with age (Krettenauer et al, Colasante, Buchmann & Malti, 2014). It may well be the case that an increased understanding of group processes from middle childhood into adolescence forms part of these “external” motivators (i.e., it is recognised that the victimiser, particularly in the context of aggression, is acting to boost group status or conform to group norms). Examining the attribution of emotions to bullies and the consequent effect on bystander behaviours could shed more light on the complex interplay between emotion, group processes and developmental differences in prosocial bystander responses.

Summary

The three empirical studies presented within this thesis provide a novel investigation of the developmental decline in helpful bystander intervention by applying an intergroup approach to examine this issue. Importantly, support is found for the importance of group membership, social identification, group norms and social-moral reasoning in understanding age differences in bystander responses. Furthermore, this research has valuable implications for the application of developmental intergroup theory to novel social contexts. Additionally, it highlights key areas for further investigation, including a closer investigation of gender
differences in prosocial behaviour, the effect bystander “leaders” can have on promoting prosocial norms, and the role of emotions for prosocial bystander intentions. Ultimately, findings from this thesis can help inform age-appropriate strategies for promoting helpful bystander behaviour among peers, and reducing bullying incidents in schools.
References


international comparison. Child Development, 73, 1119-1133. doi: 10.1111/1467-8624.00461


Appendix A

Ethics Approval and Measures Employed for Study One

Ethics Approval

APPROVAL BY PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE [20122244]

The following research project has been approved by
The Psychology Research Ethics Committee

This project requires a valid CRB check in addition
to this approval. It is your responsibility to provide
it to the School office before you begin collecting data.

Date: 2012/02/06
Code: 20122244

Applicant details:
Name: Sally Palmer
Status: PhD Student
Email address: sbp@kent.ac.uk

Title of the research:
Investigating developmental trends of bystander intervention action and reasoning in name-calling situations: Part 2 - The effect of group membership

When carrying out this research you are reminded to
* follow the School Guidelines for Conducting Research with Human Participants
* comply with the Data Protection Act 1998
* refer any amendments to the protocol to the Panel

Please keep this form in a safe place. You may be asked to present it at a later stage of your study for monitoring purposes. Final year project students and MSc students will need to submit a copy of this form with their project.

You can log in at [http://www.kent.ac.uk/psychology/technical/ethics/index.php](http://www.kent.ac.uk/psychology/technical/ethics/index.php) to copy or print pregenerated handouts for this study.
Head teacher consent form

Investigating children’s bystander responses to name-calling amongst peers

Researcher: Sally Palmer
Research Supervisors: Dr Lindsey Cameron & Professor Adam Rutland

☐ The above study has been fully explained to me and I have had the opportunity to ask questions.

☐ Parents/guardians of each child participating in this study have been fully informed about the nature of the research by letter sent home to parents/guardians on [date]

☐ Parents/guardians have been given a reasonable period of time (1 week) to withdraw their child from participating in the study.

☐ I am willing to act in loco parentis in regard to consenting children whose parents have not contacted me, into the study.

Name of Head teacher............................................................................................................................................................
Date..................................Signed...........................................................................................................................................................

Researcher................................................................................................................................................................................................
Date..................................Signed...........................................................................................................................................................

Contact details:
Sally Palmer
Researcher, School of Psychology, University of Kent
sbp3@kent.ac.uk
01227 824048

Copies:
1. For Head teacher
2. For Researcher
Dear Parents /Carers,

My name is Sally Palmer and I am a PhD research student at the School of Psychology, University of Kent. I am currently working on a project investigating how children think they might respond if peers are involved in bullying and name-calling situations. We hope the findings from this research will have implications for reducing bullying in schools.

[Headteacher] and [Vice Principal] have kindly given me permission to work with children in year 4 and 5. This would involve your child completing a short questionnaire; including an imaginary scenario and some questions about how they think pupils they might respond. The questionnaire takes about 15-20 minutes to complete, and would be conducted in accordance with teacher’s advice and timetables so as to minimise disruption within the classroom. I would be most grateful if you would allow your child to take part in the study.

The questionnaires are completely confidential. No one will be able to identify your child’s responses, and they will become part of a larger data set for this project. Findings written up for the school and for publication will report general trends only. If you choose to allow your child to participate, you are free to withdraw their answers from the project at any time by contacting the Psychology Office on 01227 827030 or writing to the address below.

After taking part in the study children will be given a letter to take home outlining the purpose of the study in more detail. Our researchers are very experienced and have the relevant Police Checks. However, if you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please inform the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Panel (via the School of Psychology Office, address below) in writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.

[Headteacher] and [Vice Principal] have kindly allowed us access to the school on Wednesday 21st March, I also require individual consent from parents to allow their child(ren) to participate. Therefore, if you are NOT happy for your child to take part please return a signed copy of the slip below by Wednesday 21st March.

If you do not return the letter, your child might be asked to participate in the study. If you have any further questions regarding the nature of this research please do not hesitate to contact me (details below).

Thank you for your co-operation.

Sally Palmer

PhD Researcher and Associate Lecturer, School of Psychology, University of Kent

Tel: 01227 827334 ~ Email: sp467@kent.ac.uk
Please complete this form only if you do NOT want your child to participate in this study.

Name of Parent/Carer..........................................................................................................................

I **DO NOT** give permission for my child to participate in the questionnaire for this research project.

Name of Pupil..................................................................................................................Class

Name of School................................................................................................................................

Signature of Parent / guardian........................................................................................................
Hello. My name is Sally Palmer and I work at the University in Canterbury. I am a researcher in the School of Psychology. This means that I go to schools and ask children to do some interesting work for me to help me find out about what you think about different topics. I give questionnaires to hundreds of children then I put all their answers together and see what I can find out. Today, I’m interested in finding out how you think you would respond in different situations that might happen in your school.

What we are going to do together today is really very easy, so it’s nothing to worry about. You don’t have to do it if you don’t want to and at any time you can tell me you want to stop and that’s fine.

I’m going to give you a quick questionnaire. It’s not like other questionnaires you have done in school before, because there are no right or wrong answers; I’m just interested in what you think.

Your name won’t be mentioned anywhere on the questionnaire. Instead you get a coded identity, called a participant number, which I’ll explain to you in a moment. Because of this, all your answers are confidential. This means that nobody finds out what your answers are. We will not share your answers with your friends, parents or teachers. Your answers will be entered onto a computer, into what’s called a data set, and if you or your parents decide at a later date that you don’t want to be included in this study, we can take away your answers from our data set using your coded identity.

As I mentioned, this questionnaire is not like tests you’ve done in school before because there are no right or wrong answers; I’m just interested in what you think. So please work alone and let me know if you’re not sure what a question means, or would like any help reading.

Do you have any questions?

Still want to take part? Remember we can stop at any time.
VERBAL DEBRIEF

Thank you for participating in our research project. Remember, there were no right or wrong answers in the questionnaire you completed, we are just interested in what you think.

The aim of our study is to find out if young people respond in different ways to a name-calling scenario, depending on your age, the reason they perceived to be behind the name-calling, and the people involved in the name-calling. We were also interested in your reasons for your responses.

The findings from your questionnaire will tell us and your school more about how we can support young people to respond during bullying situations amongst peers in school appropriately, for example, by letting a teacher know what’s happening.

Please be assured that all your answers in these questionnaires were confidential, this means that your friends, parents and teachers will not find out what you have written. We take your answers, along with everyone else who completes the questionnaire and put them together on a computer to see if we can find any patterns in your answers.

You are free to withdraw your answers from the study at any time. If you wish to do this, then the letter you take home for your parents will show you how you can do this - you do not have to give a reason for your withdrawal.

Do you have any questions for me about the work we've done here today?

Thank you once again for helping us with this important research.
Dear Parents/Carers,

Thank you for allowing your child to take part in our research, which involved them filling in a short questionnaire to share their opinions about what they think they would do if they saw name-calling happen amongst their peers, and what they think their peers might do.

There weren’t any right or wrong answers in the questionnaire - we were just interested in your child’s opinion. The aim of this research is to find out how children think they might respond if they saw name-calling among peers, and if they respond differently in these situations compared to primary school children. We are also interested in finding out why young people they think they would respond in their chosen way.

The findings will inform us and Herne Bay High school on how to help to support children to respond during bullying situations in school when a teacher might not be present, such as name-calling amongst peers on the playground.

Please be assured that all participants’ answers in these questionnaires are confidential and you are free to withdraw your child’s answers from the study at any time. If you wish to do this, please contact us using the details below. You do not have to give a reason for your withdrawal.

We received ethical approval from the School of Psychology Ethics Committee, as well as permission from Herne Bay High school to work with their students. However, if you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please inform the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Panel (via the School of Psychology Office, address below) in writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.

If you would like to ask any further questions about this research, please contact me by emailing sp467@kent.ac.uk.

Once again, many thanks for allowing your child to take part.

Yours sincerely,

Sally Palmer

PhD Researcher

School of Psychology, University of Kent

School of Psychology Office – School of Psychology, Keynes, University of Kent, CT 2 7NP
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Example Questionnaire Employed in Study One

**What are we doing today?**

We are trying to find out more about what people think they might do in different situations and their reasons why. Today we are interested in finding out what you think you might do in different situations. We will ask you some questions about your school, and another school called Meadow Park Primary School.

**This is not a test**

There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in what you think.

**Who will see my answers?**

Only the researcher from the University of Kent will see your answers and they won’t know who you are, because we’ll give you a secret name. Your teachers, friends or parents won’t see what you write down and will not be shown your answers.

**How to answer the questions**

Some questions can be answered by putting a tick next to a face that represents how you feel about what the question is asking. Other questions can be answered by ticking a box, circling a number, or writing your answer on the dotted lines.

If you get stuck at any time, please put up your hand and someone will come over to help you.

---

Before you begin, please write your participant number on the line below. The researcher will explain to you what a participant number is.

**Participant number:** ............................................................................................
1. How much do you like being a pupil at [name of ingroup] School? Tick a face.

[Face options: ☹ ☹ ☹ ☹ ☹ ☹]

2. How much would you like to be a pupil at Meadow Park Primary school? Tick a face.

[Face options: ☹ ☹ ☹ ☹ ☹ ☹]

How much do you agree with the following statements? Circle a number on the scale to show how strongly you agree with each statement.

“I see myself as a [name of ingroup] School pupil”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“I feel good about pupils from [name of ingroup] School”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“I am glad to be a pupil at [name of ingroup] School”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We are going to tell you about some children.

We will call the children Boy A and Boy B. We’d like you to imagine that Boy A goes to your school, [name of ingroup] School. We’d like you to imagine that Boy B goes to the other school, Meadow Park Primary school.

This is Boy A.
Boy A goes to your school, [name of ingroup] school.

This is Boy B.
Boy B goes to the other school, Meadow Park Primary School.
Imagine that Boy A goes to [name of ingroup] School, and Boy B goes to Meadow Park Primary school.

We are going to show you a picture of a situation that might happen after school.

We would like you to imagine that you are there when this situation happens.

Imagine that it is the end of the school day at [name of ingroup] School. You’ve been told that it is time to go home. All the children at [name of ingroup] School are leaving the school to go home. Boy B is with his friends from Meadow Park School. He is standing near the school gate, and Boy A walks past. Boy A doesn’t say anything to boy B, and Boy A isn’t looking at Boy B or his friends.

You hear Boy B say to Boy A,

“You’re so boring and stupid! Everyone knows how boring and stupid [name of ingroup] School pupils are! No one likes you because you’re from [name of ingroup] School!”
Imagine that you were there, watching this situation happen in front of you, and answer the questions below.

1. If they heard this happen too, how many school children from your school do you think would tell Boy B that he should not call Boy A names? Please circle a response.

   - None of the children
   - A few of the children
   - About half of the children
   - Most of the children
   - Almost all of the children
2. If they heard this happen too, how many school children from your school do you think would not say anything to Boy B about calling Boy A names? Please circle a response.

None of the children | A few of the children | About half of the children | Most of the children | Almost all of the children

3. Do you think that you would tell Boy B that he should not call Boy A names? Please circle an answer.

Yes | No


.........................................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Please answer the following questions by circling a response that best shows what you think about situations like the one we told you about.

5. **Is it alright, or not alright, that Boy B called Boy A names because he is from another school?** Please circle an answer.

   Alright  |  Not alright

   | | | | | |

6. **How bad do you think it is for Boy B to call Boy A names because he is from another school?** Please circle an answer.

   Not bad at all  |  Very, very bad

   | | | | | |

7. **Why do you think this?** Please write what you think on the line below.

   ....................................................................................................................................................
   ....................................................................................................................................................
   ....................................................................................................................................................
   ....................................................................................................................................................

8. **Is it alright, or not alright, that Boy B called Boy A names because he doesn’t have the same interests as him?** Please circle an answer.

   Alright  |  Not alright

   | | | | | |

9. **How bad do you think it is for Boy B to call Boy A names because he doesn’t have the same interests as him?** Please circle an answer.

   Not bad at all  |  Very, very bad

   | | | | | |
10. **Why do you think this?** Please write what you think on the line below.

....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................

11. **Is it alright, or not alright, that Boy B called Boy A names because he does not fit in with the rest of the group?** Please circle an answer.

   Alright   Not alright

12. **How bad do you think it is for Boy B to call Boy A names because he doesn’t fit in with the rest of the group?** Please circle an answer.

   1      2      3      4      5      6

   Not bad at all                                                                 Very, very bad

13. **Why do you think this?** Please write what you think on the line below.

....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
14. How often do you think kids your age call someone a name because of a group they belong to? Please circle an answer.

1 2 3 4 5
Never Always

15. How often do you think kids your age call someone a name because they don’t share the same interests as them? Please circle an answer.

1 2 3 4 5
Never Always

Think back to what happened between Boy A and Boy B. Imagine it as if you were there and saw what was happening.

Below are different ways that people might respond to this situation. Read the questions below, and circle a number that shows how likely or unlikely it is that you would respond in this way to Boy A calling Boy B names.

16. How likely is it that you would tell a friend or someone in your family about this situation after it had happened?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not very likely Very likely

17. How likely is it that you would ignore the situation?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not very likely Very likely
18. How likely is it that you would tell a teacher or a member of staff?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not very likely  Very likely

19. How likely is it that you would say something nasty to Boy B, because he was nasty to Boy A?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not very likely  Very likely

20. How likely is it that you would stand up to Boy B for Boy A, telling him that he shouldn’t be saying the things he is saying?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not very likely  Very likely

21. How likely is it that you would start a fight with Boy B, because he called Boy A names?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not very likely  Very likely
We are all members of groups, clubs and teams. Some of those groups, clubs or teams are very important to us - like what school you go to, clubs you belong to, or which football team you like.

I want you to think of as many groups, clubs or teams that you are a member of, as you can.

They can be any kind of group, big or small.

**What groups, clubs or teams are you part of?** Write them below.

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
How old are you? ___________________________________________________

When is your birthday? _____________________________________________

What school do you go to? _________________________________________

What is your year in school? _______________________________________

Are you a boy or a girl? ___________________________________________

Which country are you from? _______________________________________

Thank you for helping us find out what young people think about different situations, and how you think you would behave in them.

We’d like to remind you that your answers are confidential. If you have any questions about the survey, please ask a researcher.

Please make sure you get a letter about this survey to read and to take home to your parents.
Social-Moral Reasoning Coding Framework (Study 1)

Study 1: Norms and perceived severity (group context = school)

**Method:** The participant is asked to take the perspective of the bystander (when faced with an intergroup name-calling scenario). They provide reasoning for (1) their bystander intention (to intervene or not intervene), and (2) their rating of perceived severity of the name-calling.

There are four groups of categories: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological, and Undifferentiated. Each category has subcategories. There are 3 additional categories for this study: Low Impact, Prudential, and Past History. Definitions and examples are below.

**Moral:** Justification codes 1-4 are referred to as "moral" because the perpetrator's negative actions or "bullying" are referenced, equality and fairness, or psychological harm to the victim form the basis of the response. Includes all positive and negative references to the domain. Also reference if there is interpretation of the victim as a perpetrator in the past.

**Social-conventional:** Justification codes 5-6 are "social-conventional" because school expectations, or peer group expectations and loyalty, or authority figures and rules, are referred to.

**Low impact:** Justification code 7 is for references to the "low impact" and trivializing of the name-calling incident.

**Prudential:** Justification code 8 is for references to self-preservation and self-protection.

**Past history:** Justification code 9 is for references to the victim having done something to cause or deserve the perpetrator's actions.

**Psychological:** Justification codes 10-11 are "personal" because they involve focus on personal choice and preference, reference personality traits of the victim, or familiarity and friendship.

**Undifferentiated:** Category 12 is for "other" reasoning that does not fit into any category or requires further information in order to assign it to a coding category.

**Missing or uncodable:** Please leave cell empty.

**Coding decisions:**

- Typically you should place a reason in one category. If a reasoning response includes two distinct statements then you may use two codes, if the response warrants two codes. If more than two are indicated choose the two most developed codes/reasoning.
- Only code clear responses. If part of a response is ambiguous and another is not, code the part that is not ambiguous.
Assign the undifferentiated code to responses when the full statement cannot be differentiated. If part of it can be coded than provide a code for the part that is codable.

Try not to code responses within the context of the question. Only refer to the context of the question (e.g. decision to intervene or not intervene; perceived severity rating) if a statement is ambiguous.

**Moral domain**

1. References to the perpetrator inflicting harm on another. Also include references to "bullying". (DR: Include references to wrongfulness only when there is a reason given for the wrongfulness. Otherwise code as undifferentiated).
   - I would tell her to stop it, because she is being really horrible
   - Because it’s a form of bullying
   - It’s not nice to be nasty
   - It's mean to call names at somebody
   - It is not a nice way to treat other people
   - So they know they're in the wrong

2. References to equality and fairness. Includes reference to unfair treatment of the victim.
   - Because everyone is equal
   - Because everyone is important, it doesn’t matter what school you go to
   - Just because you are from a different school doesn’t mean you can call them names
   - It’s just not fair
   - Because she’s judging her when she doesn’t even know her, it’s wrong
   - It’s unfair to call names
   - She has no right to do it just because she is from another school
   - It doesn't matter where you are from
   - It is bad that she is calling her names because she is from a different school
   - I think boy B shouldn't be name-called, because he's just the same as any other boy
   - It does not matter what school you go to or how you look or talk
   - Because everyone is different
   - [Victim] didn't do anything to deserve being called names
   - [Victim] hasn't done anything to deserve these comments
   - He might have done nothing

3. References to physical or psychological harm of the victim, empathy for the victim, and perspective taking. Also include references to further harm occurring as a result of bystander intentions.
   - Because it might not matter to that girl but she will probably feel hurt inside
   - Because everyone will know about her and maybe she will be teased by everyone
• Because she could be a little bit frightened to say stop calling me names
• Because if he keeps on calling him names he won't have any friends to talk to and his life will be a misery
• It is not nice and could cause suicide
• I don't like to see people on their own and left out
• Because nobody likes it

4. Interpretation of the victim as a perpetrator due to past history of behavior. Reference to the victim having previously perpetrated harm towards the perpetrator. (DR: If it is generalized past behavior (i.e. not targeted towards the perpetrator, then code as 9).
• Because you don't know what [victim] has done to her before
• He hasn't done anything to [the perpetrator]
• She should not call [the victim] names because [the victim] didn't do anything to her
• Because [victim] doesn't say anything to [perpetrator], there’s no need to be mean.

Social-conventional domain

5. Peer expectations and outcomes of behavior. Reference to peer expectations of behavior, references to loyalty or disloyalty (e.g. doing or not doing what is best for the peer or school group) and expected outcomes of bystander behavior. Include references to preventing a norm of name-calling acceptability, and the prevention of ongoing bullying as a result of the bystander’s decision.
• Other people won't like you very much
• They don't go to the same school, so [the victim] is nothing to do with [the perpetrator]
• Because they are from another school so they can't bully him too much
• If they went to the same school it would not happen
• If I did not tell [the perpetrator], she would keep calling [the victim] names
• Because it's out of order
• Because no one cares what school you’re from
• Because maybe that school has a rivalry with the school
• Because they probably won’t listen
• It could start a fight
• It would just cause more arguments

6. Reference to school expectations or rules for behavior, reference to authority figures (e.g. parents, teachers or members of staff) or other repercussions not related to the self (DR: those related to the self would be coded as 8 – prudential).
• She would get told off for calling her names
• Because he will get in a lot of trouble
• If [the victim] told on [the perpetrator], [the perpetrator] would get told off
• I would just go and tell a teacher and then let them all get sorted together, then it might be alright
Because he won't get told off
You could get detention for 5 days
The teacher will tell them to stop!
She can get her mum in about her

7. Low impact. Place in this category if the participant trivializes the name-calling incident. Also include references to the absence of harm.

- It's not that bad most people wouldn't really care
- It’s not as serious as it could be as there is no swear words, racist comments or physical bullying [also moral]
- It's only names
- He is only saying things, not doing things physically
- Well it's not that bad because it's a stupid thing to say

Prudential reasoning

8. References to self-preservation or protecting the self from immediate or future harm.

- Because if I got involved it would be me that would get bullied as well as [victim]
- Because everyone would be teasing me, like [victim], and I don't want to get some argument with them
- He might call me names
- Because they're my mates and you could end up falling out with them
- Because they might gang up and wait for you to beat you up

Retribution and retaliation

9. References to general retaliation of the perpetrator to a behavior (not inferred as inflicting harm on the perpetrator) that the victim has engaged in, in the past.

Justifying the lack of intervention.

- Because he obviously has an excuse or he wouldn't do it
- People shouldn't be called names if they didn't ask for it
- If he deserves it then he should take it like a man

Psychological domain

10. Reference to personal choice and preferences. References to perceived responsibility within the situation (i.e. “mind your own business” mentality).

- Cause it ain't got nothing to do with me
- Because it's none of my business, I don't want to get involved
- It's none of my business to say stop calling him names
- I probably wouldn't because I don't really like getting involved in things that don't really involve me
- It's a free country, he can do whatever he wants and I'm not involved so it's none of my business
- Nothing to do with me.
11. Personality traits of the victim and/or perpetrator, or references to familiarity or friendship.

- She doesn't know her as a person
- No I wouldn’t get involved unless it was a good mate
- I don’t know who he is
- I don’t know the kid they’re calling names
- Depends on the person. If she is one of my friends I would because I know how she would react, but if it was someone I don't get on with I wouldn't want to get involved
- He might usually be nice

Other

12. Undifferentiated. Reference when a reason doesn’t make sense, or where more information is required in order to assign to any category.

- Because there’s no reason for it
- What’s the point?
- Because it is wrong for him to call the other boy names
- Because I am not to get involved
- I would feel sad if she did that to my friend
- Because you all have to be friends
- Because it’s not nice
Appendix B

Ethics Approval and Measures Employed for Study Two

APPROVAL BY PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE [20132867]

The following research project has been approved by
The Psychology Research Ethics Committee

This project requires a valid CRB check in addition
to this approval. It is your responsibility to provide
it to the School office before you begin collecting data.

Date: 2013/02/19
Code: 20132867

Applicant details:
Name: Sally Palmer
Status: PhD Student
Email address: sp467@kent.ac.uk

Title of the research:
The effect of bystander status during bullying incidents

When carrying out this research you are reminded to
* follow the School Guidelines for Conducting Research with Human Participants
* comply with the Data Protection Act 1998
* refer any amendments to the protocol to the Panel

Please keep this form in a safe place. You may be asked to present it at a later stage of your
study for monitoring purposes. Final year project students and MSc students will need to
submit a copy of this form with their project.

You can log in at [http://www.kent.ac.uk/psychology/technical/ethics/index.php](http://www.kent.ac.uk/psychology/technical/ethics/index.php) to copy or
print pregenerated handouts for this study.
Head teacher consent form

"Examining whether positive role models in schools can help reduce bullying"

Researcher: Sally Palmer

Research Supervisors: Prof. Dominic Abrams & Dr Robbie Sutton

The above study has been fully explained to me and I have had the opportunity to ask questions.

Parents/guardians of each child participating in this study have been fully informed about the nature of the research by letter sent home to parents/guardians on [date]

Parents/guardians have been given a reasonable period of time (1 week) to withdraw their child from participating in the study.

I am willing to act in loco parentis in regard to consenting children whose parents have not contacted me, into the study.

Name of Head teacher.................................................................

Date................................................Signed..........................................

Researcher.................................................................

Date................................................Signed..........................................

Contact details:

Sally Palmer

PhD Student and Associate Lecturer, School of Psychology, University of Kent

sp467@kent.ac.uk ~ 01227 824048

Copies:
1. For Head teacher
2. For Researcher
Hello. My name is Sally Palmer and I work at the University in Canterbury. I am a researcher in the School of Psychology. This means that I go to schools and ask children to do some interesting work for me to help me find out about what you think about different topics. I give questionnaires to hundreds of children then I put all their answers together and see what I can find out. Today, I’m interested in finding out how you think you would respond in different situations that might happen in your school. In a few minutes I have a questionnaire that – if you’re happy to - I’d like you to help me with.

What we are going to do together today is really very easy, so it’s nothing to worry about. You don’t have to do it if you don’t want to and at any time you can tell me you want to stop and that’s fine, you don’t have to give a reason.

I’ve got a quick questionnaire for you to complete. It’s not like other questionnaires you might have done in school before, because there are no right or wrong answers; I’m just interested in what you think. Because of this I like you to fill out the questionnaire on your own, and not talk to the person next to you about your answers. If you don’t understand what a question is asking you then put up your hand and I’ll come over and explain it to you.

Your name won’t be mentioned anywhere on the questionnaire. Instead you get a secret code identity, called a participant number, which I’ll explain to you in a moment. Because of this, all your answers are confidential. This means that nobody finds out what your answers are. We will not share your answers with your friends, parents or teachers. Afterwards, your answers will be entered onto a computer, into what’s called a data set, and if you or your parents decide at a later date that you don’t want to be included in this study, we can take away your answers from our data set using your coded identity.

As I mentioned, this questionnaire is not like tests you’ve done in school before because there are no right or wrong answers; I’m just interested in what you think.

Do you have any questions?

Still want to take part? Remember we can stop at any time.
Dear Parents /Carers,

My name is Sally Palmer and I am a PhD research student at the School of Psychology, University of Kent. I am currently working on a project investigating how group status could help encourage children to be prosocial in school. We hope the findings from this research will have implications for reducing bullying in schools.

[Headteacher] has kindly given me permission to work with students in year [X]. This would involve your child completing a short questionnaire with a fully trained and CRB-checked researcher. The questionnaire will include a fictional story about name-calling at a different school. The story describes a person calling another person names on the playground, and other children seeing it happen. Students will then be asked some questions about what they think about the scenario. We don’t ask children about bullying at their school, but we do give advice at the end of the questionnaire for any child who may be concerned about bullying. The questionnaire takes approximately 15 minutes to complete, and will be conducted in accordance with teacher’s advice and timetables so as to minimise disruption within the classroom. Please feel free to contact me for further information about the questionnaire if required. I would be most grateful if you would allow your child to take part in the study.

The questionnaires are completely confidential. No one will be able to identify your child’s responses, and they will become part of a larger data set for this on-going project. Findings written up for the school and for publication will report general trends only. If you choose to allow your child to participate, you are free to withdraw their answers from the project at any time by contacting the Psychology Office on 01227 827030 or writing to the address below.

After taking part in the study children will be given a letter to take home outlining the purpose of this research in more detail. Our researchers are very experienced and have the relevant Police Checks. However, if you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please inform the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Panel (via the School of Psychology Office, address below) in writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.

[Headteacher] has kindly allowed me access to the school on [DATE]; I also require individual consent from parents to allow their child(ren) to participate. Therefore, if you are NOT happy for your child to take part please return a signed copy of the slip below by [DATE – at least 7 days from the date this letter is sent out].

If you do not return the letter, your child might be asked to participate in the study. If you have any questions regarding this research, or would like to know more, please do not hesitate to contact me using the details below.

Thank you in advance for your help and co-operation.

Sally Palmer
Please complete this form only if you do NOT want your child to participate in this study.

Name of Parent/Carer.............................................................................................................

I **DO NOT** give permission for my child to participate in the questionnaire for this research project.

Name of Pupil...........................................................................................................Class

Signature of Parent / guardian....................................................................................................
Verbal debrief

Thank you for taking part in this research project. Remember, there were no right or wrong answers in the questionnaire you completed, we are just interested in what you think. The aim of this study is to find out what young people think about bystanders during name-calling on the playground. A bystander is someone who is there when name-calling happens, but isn’t the person calling names or the person being called names. They just see it happen. A bystander can do lots of different things if they see name-calling happen, like tell a teacher. We are interested in how people of different ages think about bystanders who do different things when they see name-calling happen, and whether the group they belong to makes a difference. We were also interested in your reasons for your responses.

The findings from your questionnaire will tell us and your school more about how we can help young people to respond helpfully if they see name-calling happen, for example, by letting a teacher know what’s happening.

Please remember that all your answers in these questionnaires were confidential, this means that your friends, parents and teachers will not find out what you have written. We take your answers, along with everyone else who completes the questionnaire and put them together on a computer to see if we can find any patterns in your answers. You are free to withdraw your answers from the study at any time. If you wish to do this, then the letter you take home for your parents will show you how you can do this - you do not have to give a reason for your withdrawal.

Do you have any questions for me about the work we’ve done here today? Thank you once again for helping us with this important research.
Dear Parents/Carers,

Thank you for allowing your child to take part in our research. This involved them completing a questionnaire where they read a fictional story that involved one child calling another child names on the playground, and children from 2 other groups seeing it happen. The story either involved another child helping the person being called names, or leaving the playground. Children were asked to evaluate the behaviour of the person who helped or didn’t help, and asked what they think they would do if they saw something like this happen.

There weren’t any right or wrong answers in the questionnaire - we were just interested in your child’s opinion. The aim of this research is to find out if children’s evaluations of the 2 children who saw the name-calling happen, changes because of their behaviour. We were also interested in whether evaluations change because of the groups that the children in the story belong to. As part of this study children from years 2, 5 and 8 are taking part, so we can also see if there are any differences among primary and secondary school children in how they evaluate people who help their peers, and whether their personal helping intentions change as they get older. The findings will inform us and [name of school] as to how to help to support children to respond during bullying situations in school when a teacher might not be present, such as name-calling amongst peers on the playground.

Please be assured that all children’s answers in the questionnaires are completely confidential and you are free to withdraw your child’s questionnaire from the study at any time. If you would like to do this, please contact the Psychology Office at the address below. You do not have to give a reason for your withdrawal.

We received ethical approval from the School of Psychology Ethics Committee, as well as permission from [headteacher] at [name of school] to work with their students in [year]. However, if you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please inform the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Panel (via the School of Psychology Office, address below) in writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.

If you would like to ask any further questions about this research, please contact me by emailing sp467@kent.ac.uk Once again, many thanks for allowing your child to take part.

Yours sincerely,

Sally Palmer

PhD Researcher and Associate Lecturer, School of Psychology, University of Kent

School of Psychology, Keynes College, University of Kent, CT2 7NP
Example Questionnaire Employed in Study Two

Questionnaire

Completing this questionnaire means you will be helping us find out more about how young people respond to different situations that might happen in school.

All your opinions and answers are completely confidential and anonymous - we do not ask for your name, and your responses will not be shared with parents or teachers. Because of this, we would really appreciate your honest answers to the questions in this booklet.

We put the answers that you give us into a big file with other peoples’ answers so we can see if people say different things about situations in school. We look for patterns and differences to see if we can explain why children and young people might respond in certain ways to different situations in schools.

Today you will be answering questions about a situation that could happen in school.

- This questionnaire is quick and really easy to do, just put your initial reaction to the question.
- You can stop at any time, and don’t have to give a reason. Just put your hand up and someone will come over to you to help.
- All of your answers are confidential – this means that no one will find out that these are your answers – so please just write what you think.
- This is not a test – there are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions, so just write whatever you think.

Do you have any questions? Are you happy to complete this questionnaire? If you would like any more information then please put up your hand and someone will come to help you.

Remember – do not put your name anywhere on this questionnaire. Instead, fill out the information below so we can create a participant code for you.

What is the first letter of your first name?...........................................................................................................

What is the first letter of your last name?...........................................................................................................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circle the day you were born:</th>
<th>Circle the month you were born:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>January February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 9 10 11 12 13 14</td>
<td>March April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 16 17 18 19 20 21</td>
<td>May June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 23 24 25 26 27 28</td>
<td>July August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 30 31</td>
<td>September October</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Circle the year you were born: 1999 2000
**What is your race/ethnicity?**

To answer this question you might think about the colour of your skin, the country you live in, or the country you or your parents were born in.

Tick an ethnicity below that you think best describes you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>White:</th>
<th>Black:</th>
<th>Asian:</th>
<th>Dual Heritage:</th>
<th>Other ethnicity:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>Bangladeshi Indian</td>
<td>White &amp; Black Caribbean</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Czech</td>
<td>Black British</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>White &amp; Black African</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>White &amp; Black British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Polish</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lankan</td>
<td>White &amp; Asian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other.............</td>
<td>Other..........</td>
<td>Other..........</td>
<td>Black &amp; Asian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other..........</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Think about how other people might think of you at school and answer the following questions by circling a number on the scale.

1. How cool do other people think you are?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all cool</td>
<td>Not that cool</td>
<td>A tiny bit cool</td>
<td>Quite cool</td>
<td>Really cool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. How attractive do other people think you are?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all attractive</td>
<td>Not that attractive</td>
<td>A tiny bit attractive</td>
<td>Quite attractive</td>
<td>Really attractive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. How many friends do other people think you have?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No friends at all</td>
<td>Not that many friends</td>
<td>A few friends</td>
<td>Quite a lot of friends</td>
<td>Loads of friends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. How good do other people think your clothes are?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all good</td>
<td>Not that good</td>
<td>A tiny bit good</td>
<td>Quite good</td>
<td>Really good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. How sporty do other people think you are?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all sporty</td>
<td>Not that sporty</td>
<td>A tiny bit sporty</td>
<td>Quite sporty</td>
<td>Really sporty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. How nice and kind do other people think you are?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all nice and kind</td>
<td>Not that nice and kind</td>
<td>A tiny bit nice and kind</td>
<td>Quite nice and kind</td>
<td>Really nice and kind</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. How popular do you think you are?

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
Here are some people from a school called Shadow Park. They are in your year group. Please read the information about them, as you will be asked some questions about them later on.

Dave and John are students at Shadow Park School. They are both in the same year group but they have different friends.

This is Dave and his group of friends.

Dave and his friends are cool. They know how to have a laugh - they like good music and are into sport. Other kids also think they’re cool. Often they’re talked about as the “popular group”.

8. What group do Dave and his friends belong to? Write your answer on the line below.

........................................................................................................................................................................

9. How popular do you think Dave and his group of friends are?
This is John and his group of friends.

John and his friends are not cool. They don’t really have a laugh – they like unusual music and are not into sport. Other kids don’t think they’re cool. Often they’re talked about as the “unpopular group”.

10. What group do John and his friends belong to? Write your answer on the line below.

........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

11. How popular do you think John and his group of friends are? Circle an answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not at all popular</td>
<td>Not that popular</td>
<td>A tiny bit popular</td>
<td>Quite popular</td>
<td>Really popular</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Please read about the following situation that happened at Shadow Park School.
Read this carefully as you will be asked some questions about it later on.

At lunchtime, once the students have eaten in the school hall they go outside on the playground. Dave and his friends, and John and his friends, are out on the playground too.

One lunch time a student called James starts saying nasty things to a different student called Chris. James calls Chris names, threatens him, and makes fun of him in front of everyone on the playground. James and Chris are in Dave and John’s year group, but Dave and John don’t really know them. This has happened before – James calls Chris horrible names, and threatens and teases him in a nasty way. Chris never says anything back - he just stands there looking at the floor. There are no teachers around, and James has never got into trouble for it before.

Dave says to his friends, “I’ve had enough of this.” He goes over to where James and Chris are standing and says calmly to James, “This isn’t on. You’re being totally out of order. Just leave him alone.”
12. Why do you think Dave acted in this way? Write your reason below.

13. How much do you like Dave?

Not at all  Not much  A little bit  Quite a lot  Very much

14. Why do you like Dave that amount?

15. How much do you like John?

Not at all  Not much  A little bit  Quite a lot  Very much

16. Why do you like John that amount?
17. What do you think other students at Shadow Park high would think of how Dave acted?

They think it was very bad
They think it was a little bad
They think it was neither good or bad
They think it was quite good
They think it was very good

18. How likely is it that other students at Shadow Park high would have behaved in the same way as Dave? Circle the answer you agree with.

No other students would behave like that
A few other students would behave like that
Quite a lot of other students would behave like that
Most other students would behave like that
All other students would behave like that

19. What would you do if you saw someone like James being mean to someone like Chris on your school playground? Please write your answer below.

....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

20. Why would you choose to do that? Please write your answer below.

.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
21. If you had seen someone like James being mean to someone like Chris on your school playground, would you behave in any of the following ways?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Definitely would not</th>
<th>Probably would not</th>
<th>In the middle</th>
<th>Probably would</th>
<th>Definitely would</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t get involved and walk away</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t get involved and watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tell James to stop being mean</td>
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<tr>
<td>Help Chris in another way</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk to James afterwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk to Chris afterwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Report to a teacher or member of staff</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

22. Think about Dave. Remember, Dave’s group is the popular group. Here are some sentences about Dave and the popular group. Circle an answer to show how much you agree with the sentences below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Not much</th>
<th>A little bit</th>
<th>Quite a lot</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dave is a very confident member of the popular group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in the popular group look up to Dave</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave does what he thinks is best for the popular group</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave does what he thinks is right for the popular group</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave tells people from the popular group about important things that happen at school</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave is good at what he tries to do</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave helps make the popular group think about old problems in new ways</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dave thinks it is important to think carefully about a problem before he tries to solve it</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>A little bit</td>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>Very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> is an important person in the popular group</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in the popular group want to be like <strong>Dave</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> does what he believes is right for the popular group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in the popular group like <strong>Dave</strong> because he understands how they feel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> encourages the popular group to follow their dreams</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> expects a lot from the other people in the popular group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> thinks that the popular group can do well at whatever they want to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> can change the way the popular group thinks about things</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> takes risks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> listens to the ideas of others in the popular group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> helps people in the popular group to use their imaginations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> listens to what each person in the popular group needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> tries to help people in the popular group who need help</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> is like the other people in the popular group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> has the same interests as other people in the popular group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> is very similar to other people in the popular group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dave</strong> is not the same as other people in the popular group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thank you very much for all your help today.

Remember, there were no right or wrong answers in this booklet, so anything you have written is very helpful, thank you.

Later on you will be given a letter to take home to your parents - this will explain in more detail what it is that you have helped us with today.

Remember that all your answers are confidential. They will go into a big file with everyone else’s answers so we can look at patterns in your responses. If you decide at any point that you would rather your answers didn’t go in the big file then please contact us on the details provided in the letter you take home.

Do you have any questions about the work that you have done today? Please put your hand up and a researcher will answer them for you.

Thanks again!
### Social-Moral Reasoning Coding Framework (Study Two)

**Study 2: Bystander status (popular or unpopular group member) and bystander action (helping or not helping)**

**Method:** The participant is asked to evaluate the action of a bystander who belongs to a popular or unpopular group (helping or walking away when faced with a name-calling scenario). They provide reasoning for (1) the target bystander action (to help or not help), and (2) evaluation (1-5 liking scale) of the target bystander, (3) evaluation of the other bystander, (4) evaluation of own bystander intention.

There are four groups of categories: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological, and Undifferentiated. Each category has subcategories. There are 2 additional categories for this study: Low Impact, and Prudential reasoning. Definitions and examples are below.

**Moral:** Justification codes 1-4 are referred to as "moral" because there is reference to the perpetrator inflicting harm on another, “bullying” is mentioned, references to equality and fairness, psychological harm to the victim or prosocial behavior of the bystander, form the basis of the response. Includes all positive and negative references to the domain.

**Social-conventional:** Justification codes 5-7 are "social-conventional" because group expectations for bystander or bullying behavior are referenced, if authority figures or rules are referred to, or if loyalty, disloyalty, stereotypes or the social status of the bystander’s group (popular vs. unpopular) is mentioned.

**Prudential:** Justification code 8 is for references to self-preservation and self-protection of the bystander.

**Psychological:** Justification codes 9-10 are "personal" because they involve focus on the bystander’s personal choice, autonomy, and preferences, or reference personality traits of the bystander or familiarity of the bystander with the perpetrator or victim, familiarity (or lack) of the participant with the bystander.

**Undifferentiated:** Category 11 is for "other" reasoning that does not fit into any category or requires further information in order to assign it to a coding category.

**Missing or uncodable:** Please leave cell empty.

**Coding decisions:**

- You may use two codes if the response warrants two codes. If more than two are indicated choose the two most developed codes/reasoning.
- Only code clear responses. If part of a response is ambiguous and another is not, code the part that is not ambiguous.
Assign the undifferentiated code to responses when the full statement cannot be differentiated. If part of it can be coded than provide a code for the part that is codable.

Try not to code responses within the context of the question. Only refer to the context of the question (e.g. decision to intervene or not intervene; perceived severity rating) if a statement is ambiguous.

**Moral domain**

13. References to the perpetrator inflicting harm on another. Also include references to "bullying".
   - Because [the victim] was being bullied
   - To stop the bullying
   - Because [perpetrator] was bullying [victim] which is just not right
   - No one should get bullied
   - Because [perpetrator] is bullying
   - No one likes a bully

14. References to equality and fairness.
   - It's not fair [the victim] got talked to like that
   - It’s unfair and he’s had enough
   - Other people matter too

15. References to psychological harm of the victim, empathy for the victim, and perspective taking.
   - Because she felt sorry for [the victim] and wanted [the perpetrator] to stop
   - He might be feeling sorry for [the victim]
   - Because I have been bullied before so I know how it feels and it wasn't nice and I wouldn't want anyone else to have gone through what I did.
   - I would not want to be treated that way
   - If I was in that situation I would want someone to help me
   - I don't like to see people get hurt
   - So [victim] doesn't get picked on
   - I don't want them hurt
   - I wouldn't like it if someone did it to me
   - It's not nice to be bullied

16. Prosociality. References to prosocial, kind or helping behavior. Include all references, including the opposite, i.e. not being kind and helpful. (DR: Kindness is coded as a personality trait if it is mentioned alone, rather than alongside helping.)
   - It’s nice that he stood up for someone and helped them
   - She wants to help
   - He wanted to help [victim] and stand up for him
   - Because she didn’t help the girl at all when she was being bullied
   - She stood up for other people
   - To stick up for his friend
• To help the person being bullied
• Because you are making the world a better place
• She didn't stand up for her friend
• He doesn't really stand up for people
• She didn't stick up for [victim]
• It seems that he actually cares for people
• She didn't help the girl, she just stood there and watched her
• He did not help the boy
• He could of stood up to [perpetrator] and helped [victim]
• He didn't do anything to help [victim] out
• She wouldn't just stand there
• She didn't go over there and say "are you alright" to [victim], she just stood there
• They left the situation, but she could stand up for her friend
• She stuck up for her mate
• Because he did not do anything [to help]
• Because he didn't really do anything [to help]

Social-conventional domain

17. Reference to the expected outcomes of bystander behavior. Also include references to group functioning, via preventing a norm of acceptability for name-calling, and/or the continuation of, name-calling.
   • Because it will carry on if no one stands up
   • So it wouldn't happen again
   • One person can't stop the bully from hurting people
   • If someone doesn't [help] no one will
   • So it can be a happy school
   • She would get bullied even more if I didn't [help]

18. Reference to school expectations and rules, authority figures e.g. parents, teachers or members of staff. References to getting into trouble (DR: Unless references are explicitly about getting into trouble with the bully or other peers - then the response should be coded as 8, prudential).
   • She could of told a teacher
   • So they don’t get into trouble
   • They don’t want to get told off
   • They might get into trouble
   • If she got caught there she will get told off as well as [perpetrator]
   • To not get in trouble
   • So he doesn't get in trouble
   • Teachers can stop bullies
   • A teacher would tell them off
   • Tell a teacher because it'll be the right thing to do
• A teacher could sort it out and help whoever it was that was being horrible to understand how much it hurts feelings

19. References to group status and loyalty. Code loyalty and disloyalty (e.g. doing or not doing what is best for the status group), stereotypes and assumptions about the status group membership (popular vs. unpopular), also include references to status and popularity that infer a particular type of behavior, or for the popularity/unpopularity of the individual being the cause of that actor's behavior. (DR: Code up popularity-related traits as #10). Remember that popularity is conceptualized as being cool, knowing how to have a laugh, liking good music, being into sport. Unpopularity is the opposite conceptualization.

• I think she acted like that because she is popular
• Because she is a good, trustworthy, loyal friend
• Because he is really popular he doesn’t care about the others
• Because he doesn’t want to be seen helping out unpopular people
• Even though she isn’t very popular, she thinks she can gain popularity
• Because he’s not popular he couldn’t make a difference
• He wants to be more popular and get a new friend
• She is not very popular so she didn’t want to get involved
• Because he has loads of friends with him they might feel confident and stand up for the small guy
• To stick up for unpopulars
• She stuck up for someone who wasn’t cool like her
• Because people think he is cool
• He is quite popular and not boring
• Because she stuck up for someone who wasn’t cool like her
• Because he’s not popular
• Because she doesn’t think they’re cool and fun
• She isn’t very cool, she doesn’t like good music
• Because [bystander] was best friends with [victim]
• She and her friends are popular and into sports
• He knows how to have a laugh and he's popular

**Prudential reasoning**

20. Prudential reasoning. References to the self-preservation of the bystander, or to the bystander protecting themself from immediate or future psychological or physical harm.

• She’s scared to become unpopular
• Because she wouldn't have wanted to be teased
• Because if she says something to [perpetrator] she might get bullied
• Because they didn’t want to get called names too
• She doesn’t want [the perpetrator] to bully her
• He is worried that he might get picked on
- He was scared of getting beat up or told off
- It would get into a fight
- If I tell her to stop she might bully me

**Psychological domain**

21. Reference to personal choice, preferences (of the bystander or participant), not being responsible for getting involved (the “none of my business” mentality) and taking the perspective of the bystander.
  - She has done the best thing, leave the situation and carry on with their lives
  - Because he didn't want to get involved
  - She didn’t want to help her
  - She was upset that she was bullying her but didn’t want to get involved
  - They want to stay out of the way because it’s not their argument
  - They didn’t want to have anything to do with it
  - Because she watched her being bullied and I would have helped
  - Because she has the right to walk away from a bad situation
  - Because she was a bit not caring for [victim] but I see why she said what she did
  - Because he didn’t want to sound mean
  - Because she didn’t want to help her
  - I can understand why she didn't help but she could have helped a little bit
  - It isn't my problem
  - I don't like seeing people get bullied
  - I don't want to get involved

22. Personality traits of the bystander or references to familiarity or friendship of the bystander with the perpetrator or victim. Also include references to the participant’s familiarity (or lack of) with the bystander.
  - Because she is self-centered
  - He's an idiot
  - She doesn’t know her
  - Because he doesn’t know him
  - Because she is jealous of the things she has
  - Because she didn’t know them and only cared about her friends
  - She seems boring
  - Because [bystander] was best friends with [victim]
  - She doesn’t know her well enough
  - She helped out someone even though it’s not her mate
  - She ignored her as she didn’t know her
  - I don’t really know him
  - He likes things I don’t
  - She’s a bit like me; she doesn’t like mean people
  - He is brave and he is a little like me
• He’s a show off
• She would be my friend
• It's being a nice friend
• Because that person might be nice
• She doesn't have many friends
• He is just normal
• She is nice but a bit quiet
• He is a show off and chavvy
• He's really funny
• I don't really know her, but she seems quiet
• She likes what I like and seems to be happy
• He sounds quite nasty
• She seems stuck up
• He is quiet and keeps himself to himself
• Because [bystander] hasn't been unkind at all yet and seems good at making friends
• She isn't mean to people
• She is a bit different from me
• I don't really know him

Other

23. Undifferentiated. Reference when a reason doesn't make sense, or where more information is required in order to assign to any category.
• Because he is quite average
• Cause
• She knows how to act in a situation like that
• He don’t know how to do anything
• Because what [the perpetrator] was doing was wrong
• It’s the right thing to do
• [Victim] needs more people to help him
• He didn’t really do anything wrong
• She should have told her mate to back off and get a life
Appendix C

Ethics Approval and Measures Employed for Study Three

APPROVAL BY PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE [20133051]

Your study has been approved. You can now proceed to do your study without resubmitting documents to the ethics committee. However, before proceeding with the research, please ensure you deal with all the issues outlined below. You MUST deal with these issues prior to data collection, otherwise this Ethics approval is not valid.

Date: 2013/09/11
Code: 20133051

Applicant details:
Name: Sally Palmer
Status: PhD Student
Email address: sp467@kent.ac.uk

Title of the research:
Group norms and deviant bystander behaviour: Developmental differences in peer evaluations

When carrying out this research you are reminded to
* follow the School Guidelines for Conducting Research with Human Participants
* comply with the Data Protection Act 1998
* refer any amendments to the protocol to the Panel

Please keep this form in a safe place. You may be asked to present it at a later stage of your study for monitoring purposes. Final year project students and MSc students will need to submit a copy of this form with their project.

You can log in at http://www.kent.ac.uk/psychology/technical/ethics/index.php to copy or print pregenerated handouts for this study.

Comments:
Dominic Abrams

Dominic Abrams
Anna Brown
Sally

I am happy with the level of information you provide for children and parents, both before and after the study. I know that we have had a discussion about the opt-out issue. My personal feeling is that 1 week is too short to expect busy parents to respond; however, I do not have strong opinion/background in these issues. Therefore I will approve this application CONDITIONAL on the Chair of Ethics approval of the opt-out issue.

Just a few minor points.
1) in the questionnaire, you say that the child cannot be identified because they provide their age and gender only, while actually asking for their date of birth. Please rectify this discrepancy.

2) You use rating scales that have only two verbal labels (for top and bottom options). This creates more room for idiosyncratic interpretations of rating options, and response styles in children are stronger than in adults. Labeling all rating options and removing the numbers will improve your rating scale.

Anna
Head teacher consent form

How do peers perceive helpful bystanders?

Researcher: Sally Palmer

Research Supervisor: Prof. Dominic Abrams

☐ The above study has been fully explained to me and I have had the opportunity to ask questions.

☐ Parents/guardians of each child participating in this study have been fully informed about the nature of the research by letter sent home to parents/guardians on DATE.

☐ Parents/guardians have been given a reasonable period of time (2 weeks) to withdraw their child from participating in the study.

☐ I am willing to act in loco parentis in regard to consenting children whose parents have not contacted me, into the study.

Name of Head teacher:

Date: ____________________________ Signed: ____________________________

Researcher: Sally Palmer

Date: ____________________________ Signed: ____________________________

Contact details:

Sally Palmer

PhD Student and Associate Lecturer - School of Psychology, University of Kent

sp467@kent.ac.uk - 01227 824048

Copies:
1. For Head teacher
2. For Researcher
At the beginning of the session:

Hello. My name is Sally Palmer and I work at the University in Canterbury. I am a researcher in the School of Psychology. This means that I go to schools and ask children to do some interesting work for me to help me find out about what you think about different topics. I give questionnaires to hundreds of children then I put all their answers together and see what I can find out. Today, I’m interested in finding out what you think about how others behave in different situations that might happen in school, and how you think others should respond in these different situations. In a few minutes I have a questionnaire that – if you’re happy to - I’d like you to help me with.

What we are going to do together today is really very easy, so it’s nothing to worry about. You don’t have to do it if you don’t want to and at any time you can tell me you want to stop and that’s fine, you don’t have to give a reason.

I’ve got a quick questionnaire for you to complete. It’s not like other questionnaires you might have done in school before, because there are no right or wrong answers; I’m just interested in what you think. Because of this I would like you to fill out the questionnaire on your own, and not talk to the person next to you about your answers. If you don’t understand what a question is asking you then put up your hand and I’ll come over and explain it to you.

Your name won’t be mentioned anywhere on the questionnaire. Instead you get a secret code identity, called a participant number, which I’ll explain to you in a moment. Because of this, all your answers are confidential. This means that nobody finds out what your answers are. We will not share your answers with your friends, parents or teachers. Afterwards, your answers will be entered onto a computer, into what’s called a data set, and if you or your parents decide at a later date that you don’t want to be included in this study, we can take away your answers from our data set using your coded identity.

As I mentioned, this questionnaire is not like tests you’ve done in school before because there are no right or wrong answers; I’m just interested in what you think.

Do you have any questions?

Still want to take part? Remember we can stop at any time.
Dear Parents /Carers,

My name is Sally Palmer and I am a PhD research student at the School of Psychology, University of Kent. I am currently working on a project investigating how young people think others should respond when peers from different social groups are called names.

HEADTEACHER, has kindly given me permission to work with students in year X. This would involve your child completing a short questionnaire with a fully trained and CRB-checked researcher. The questionnaire will include a fictional story about two different groups of friends who see one peer call another peer names. Please be assured that no verbal insults are included in the story. Students would then read about a person in the group of friends who either wants to help the peer, or thinks they shouldn’t get involved. Following this, students will be asked some questions about what they think about the scenario and the group of friends who are present. We don't ask children about their personal experiences of bullying at school, but we do give advice at the end of the questionnaire for any child who may be concerned about bullying. The questionnaire takes approximately 20 minutes to complete, and will be conducted in accordance with teacher’s advice and timetables so as to minimise disruption within the classroom. Please feel free to contact me for further information about the questionnaire if required. I would be most grateful if you would allow your child to take part in the study.

The questionnaire is completely confidential. No one will be able to identify your child’s responses, and they will become part of a larger data set for this on-going project. Findings written up for the school and for publication will report general trends only. If you choose to allow your child to participate, you are free to withdraw their answers from the project at any time by contacting the Psychology Office on 01227 827030 or writing to the address below. After taking part in the study children will be given a letter to take home outlining the purpose of this research in more detail. Our researchers are very experienced and have the relevant Police Checks. However, if you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please inform the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Panel (via the School of Psychology Office, address below) in writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.

HEADTEACHER has kindly allowed me access to the school on DATE (at least 2 weeks from now); I also require individual consent from parents to allow their child(ren) to participate. Therefore, if you are NOT happy for your child to take part please return a signed copy of the slip below by the morning of DATE.
If you do not return the letter, your child might be asked to participate in the study. If you have any questions regarding this research, or would like to know more, please do not hesitate to contact me using the details below.

Thank you in advance for your help and co-operation.

Sally Palmer
PhD Researcher and Associate Lecturer
School of Psychology, University of Kent ~ Tel: 01227 824048 ~ Email: sp467@kent.ac.uk

Please complete this form only if you do NOT want your child to participate in this study.

Name of Parent/Carer............................................................................................................................................................................

I DO NOT give permission for my child to participate in the questionnaire for this research project.

Name of Pupil.................................................................................................................................Class........................................

Signature of Parent / guardian.................................................................................................................................

School of Psychology, Keynes College, University of Kent, CT2 7NP
Verbal debrief

At the end of the questionnaire:

Thank you for taking part in this research project. Remember, there were no right or wrong answers in the questionnaire you completed, we are just interested in what you think. The aim of this study is to find out what young people think about what bystanders may or may not do if they are present when someone tells a joke about a different social group. A bystander is someone who is there when something happens, but isn’t the person telling the joke; they just see and hear it happen. A bystander can do lots of different things if they see or hear jokes being told that they are not comfortable with, like telling a teacher. We are interested in what people of different ages think about how bystanders respond to things like jokes about different social groups. We were also interested in the reasons you give for why you think people may or may not object to a joke that they don’t want to hear.

The findings from your questionnaire will tell us and your school more about how we can help young people to respond helpfully if they see name-calling happen, for example, by letting a teacher know what’s happening.

Please remember that all your answers in the questionnaire are confidential, this means that your friends, parents and teachers will not find out what you have written. We take your answers, along with everyone else who completes the questionnaire and put them together on a computer to see if we can find any patterns in your answers. You are free to withdraw your answers from the study at any time. If you wish to do this, then the letter you take home for your parents will show you how you can do this - you do not have to give a reason for your withdrawal.

Do you have any questions for me about the work we’ve done here today? Thank you once again for helping us with this important research.
Dear Parents/Carers,

Thank you for allowing your child to take part in the pilot study for our research. This involved them completing a questionnaire where they read a fictional story that involved two peer groups observing one peer calling another peer nasty names. Please be assured that no insults were explicitly included. Students read how one peer from each group responded to the name-calling in different ways. We asked students to tell us what they thought about each person, and the response they gave. We also asked students to give us feedback about the questionnaire; whether it was easy to follow, and a relevant scenario for children their age. We will use this feedback to further develop the study before we conduct it fully.

There weren’t any right or wrong answers in the questionnaire - we were just interested in your child’s opinion. The aim of this research is to find out if children’s evaluations of the characters involved change when peer groups have different expectations of their group members. We are also interested in whether evaluations are more or less positive towards the person who wants to help the victim, or thinks that they shouldn’t get involved, but should let other people sort out their own problems. The findings will help us further develop this questionnaire, in order to inform us and Murston Juniors as to how to help to support children to respond during situations in school when a teacher might not be present.

Please be assured that all children’s answers in the questionnaires are completely confidential and you are free to withdraw your child’s questionnaire from the pilot study at any time. If you would like to do this, please contact the researcher by email, or the Psychology Office at the address below. You do not have to give a reason for your withdrawal.

We received ethical approval from the School of Psychology Ethics Committee, as well as permission from Mrs Hatt (Head teacher) at Murston Juniors, to work with their students in year 5 and 6. The school sent home letters with students at least 14 days ago for parents/carers, describing this research. However, if you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please inform the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Panel (via the School of Psychology Office, address below) in writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.

If you would like to ask any further questions about this research, please contact me by emailing sp467@kent.ac.uk. Once again, many thanks for allowing your child to take part.

Yours sincerely,

Sally Palmer (PhD Researcher and Associate Lecturer, School of Psychology, University of Kent)

School of Psychology, Keynes College, University of Kent, CT2 7NP
Example Questionnaire Employed in Study Three

Questionnaire

Completing this questionnaire means you will be helping us find out more about how students your age think about things that other students do.

All your opinions and answers are completely confidential and anonymous - we do not ask for your name, and your responses will not be shared with parents or teachers. Because of this, we would really appreciate your honest answers to the questions in this booklet.

- This questionnaire is quick and really easy to do, just put your initial reaction to the question.
- You can stop at any time, and don’t have to give a reason. Just put your hand up and someone will come over to you to help.
- All of your answers are confidential – this means that no one will find out that these are your answers – so please just write what you think.
- This is not a test – there are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions, so just write whatever you think.

Do you have any questions? Are you happy to complete this questionnaire? If you would like any more information then please put up your hand and someone will come to help you.

Before you start you must complete the information on this page:

Remember – do not put your name anywhere on this questionnaire. Instead, fill out the information below.

Today’s date: ...........................................................................................................................

Your initials (e.g. Mary Smith is MS): ..................................................................................

Your birthday (Please write the day, month and year you were born. E.g. 12th July 1999):
............................................................................................................................................

Your age in years (e.g. 10): ..................................................................................................

Gender (Circle one): MALE FEMALE

School name: [Redacted]
**What is your race/ethnicity?**

To answer this question you might think about the colour of your skin, the country you live in, or the country you or your parents were born in.

Tick an ethnicity below that you think best describes you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>White:</th>
<th>Black:</th>
<th>Asian:</th>
<th>Dual Heritage:</th>
<th>Other ethnicity:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>White &amp; Black Caribbean</td>
<td>White &amp; Black Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Polish</td>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>White &amp; Black British</td>
<td>White &amp; Black British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveller of Irish heritage</td>
<td>Other..................</td>
<td>Sri Lankan</td>
<td>White &amp; Asian</td>
<td>White &amp; Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsy/Roma</td>
<td>Other....................</td>
<td>Other..............</td>
<td>Black &amp; Asian</td>
<td>Other...................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other...................</td>
<td>Other....................</td>
<td>Other..............</td>
<td>Other...................</td>
<td>Other...................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please go to the next page.*
Introduction

You are going to see pictures of some students and read a little bit about them. Then you will answer some questions about these students. We are interested in finding out what children your age think about things students do. There are no right or wrong answers. This is not a test. No one will see your answers, and we do not put anyone's name on any questionnaire booklets. We only record your age, birthday and whether you are a girl or boy.

When you see this type of line on the booklet:

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t like at all</td>
<td>Don’t like much</td>
<td>Don’t like a little</td>
<td>Like a little</td>
<td>Like quite a lot</td>
<td>Like lots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...this means that you will be asked to circle the number that matches your answer to the question.

For example: If someone likes pizza quite a lot then they would circle the 5, just like in the example below.

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t like at all</td>
<td>Don’t like much</td>
<td>Don’t like a little</td>
<td>Like a little</td>
<td>Like quite a lot</td>
<td>Like lots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So just tell us what you think about the stories by filling out the booklet!

Thank you!
Let's get started!

You are in this group with other students at your school:

1. Select a name for your group (e.g. Superstars): ___________________________________

2. At the end of the school year your group has an event. Circle the event you would like your group to have.

   Cinema   Bowling

3. Circle the symbol that you would like for your group:
Introduction

At school, people have different friendship groups. In other schools, students also have friendship groups. You are going to read about students in your group at school, and some students from a friendship group in another school. Here is your group:

Your group

And here is another group from a different school, called Meadow Park school.
How much do you like being a member of your friendship group, from Fulston Manor school? (Please circle one)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t like at all</td>
<td>Don’t like much</td>
<td>Don’t like a little</td>
<td>Like a little</td>
<td>Like quite a lot</td>
<td>Like lots</td>
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How much would you like to be a member of the other friendship group, from Meadow Park School? (Please circle one)

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<td>Don’t like at all</td>
<td>Don’t like much</td>
<td>Don’t like a little</td>
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<td>Like quite a lot</td>
<td>Like lots</td>
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How much do you agree with the following sentences? Circle a number on the scale to show what you think about each sentence.

“I see myself as a pupil”

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>Not really</td>
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“I feel good about pupils from”

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<td>Not really</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
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“I am glad to be a pupil at”

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>Not really</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>Lots</td>
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</table>
In the past your group has said that it is important to help with other people’s problems. In the past, if your group has seen other people having problems they try to get involved with them. Your group thinks it’s important to get involved, and to help other people sort out their problems.
In the past, their group has said that it is important not to interfere with other people’s problems. In the past, if their group has seen other people having problems they try not to get involved with them. Their group thinks it’s important not to get involved, and to let other people sort out their problems.

Make sure you have read the boxes by the pictures.

What does YOUR group say they should do if they see that other people have problems? (Circle the answer you agree with)

- Try not to get involved but let other people sort out their problems
- OR Try to get involved to help other people sort out their problems

What does THEIR group say they should do if they see that other people have problems? (Circle the answer you agree with)

- Try not to get involved but let other people sort out their problems
- OR Try to get involved to help other people sort out their problems
Story

It's the end of the school day and everyone is on the school playground. Your group is there. Students from the other school are walking past, so the other group of friends is there too. Now remember, in the past your group has said...

...that it is important to help with other people’s problems. In the past, if your group have seen other people having problems they try to get involved with them. Your group thinks it’s important to get involved, and to help other people sort out their problems.

Then, in front of your group and the other group, you see something happening with 2 other students, one from your school and one that you recognise from their school.
A student called Alex, who is from your school, starts saying nasty things to a
different student called Sam, who is from the other school. Alex calls Sam
names, threatens Sam, and makes fun of Sam in front of your group of friends
and the other group of friends. Although they are at different schools, Alex and
Sam are in the same year group as you. This has happened after school before
– Alex calls Sam horrible names, and threatens and teases Sam in a nasty way.
Other than your group and the other group there doesn’t seem to be anyone
else around.
1. How do you think your group, from Fulston Manor, feels about what Alex is saying to Sam? (Please circle one)

   1  2  3  4  5  6
   Very bad  Quite bad  A bit bad  A bit good  Quite good  Very good

Jo, who is in your group from Fulston Manor, wants to be different from the other members of your group. Jo says your group should not get involved, but that your group should let Alex and Sam sort out their own problems.

2. How do you think your group, from Fulston Manor, feels about having Jo in the group? (Please circle one)

   1  2  3  4  5  6
   Very bad  Quite bad  A bit bad  A bit good  Quite good  Very good

3. Why? (Please fill the lines with your answer)

....................................................................................................................................................
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4. Do you think Jo, who is from your group of friends but thinks your group should not get involved, was ok or not ok to do what they did? (Please circle one)

   OK   NOT OK

5. How ok or not ok was Jo? (Please circle one)

   1  2  3  4  5  6
   Really not OK  Not OK  Kind of not OK  Kind of OK  OK  Really OK

6. Why? (Please fill the lines with your answer)

....................................................................................................................................................
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7. How much do you think you would like Jo? (Please circle one)

1. Don’t like at all
2. Don’t like much
3. Don’t like a little
4. Like a little
5. Like quite a lot
6. Like lots

8. Why? (Please fill the lines with your answer)

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The next day your group meets up at lunchtime and decides they don’t want to invite Jo to sit with them. It was because Jo didn’t want to help out Sam, when in the past your group has tried to help out with other people’s problems.

9. Would it be OK or not OK for your group to decide that Jo can’t sit with them?

OK NOT OK

10. How ok or not ok is it? (Please circle one)

1. Really not OK
2. Not OK
3. Kind of not OK
4. Kind of OK
5. OK
6. Really OK

11. Why? (Please fill the lines with your answer)

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....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
Remember, as well as your group being on the playground, the other group from the other school, Meadow Park, was there too. Remember, in the past their group has said...

...that it is important not to interfere with other people’s problems. In the past, if their group has seen other people having problems they try not to get involved with them. Their group thinks it’s important not to get involved, and to let other people sort out their problems.

1. How do you think their group feels about what Alex is saying to Sam? (Please circle one)

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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>Quite bad</td>
<td>A bit bad</td>
<td>A bit good</td>
<td>Quite good</td>
<td>Very good</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Charlie, who is in their group, wants to be different from the other members of their group. Charlie goes up to Alex and Sam and tries to help Sam out.

2. How do you think their group, from Meadow Park, feels about having Charlie in the group? (Please circle one)

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<tr>
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<td>Quite bad</td>
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<td>A bit good</td>
<td>Quite good</td>
<td>Very good</td>
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3. Why? (Please fill the lines with your answer)

....................................................................................................................................................
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4. Do you think Charlie, who is from their group of friends but tried to help Sam out, was ok or not ok to do what they did? (Please circle one)

OK   NOT OK

5. How ok or not ok was Charlie? (Please circle one)

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<th>4</th>
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<th>6</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Really not OK</td>
<td>Not OK</td>
<td>Kind of not OK</td>
<td>Kind of OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Really OK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Why? (Please fill the lines with your answer)

....................................................................................................................................................
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7. How much do you think you would like Charlie? (Please circle one)

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</table>
8. Why? (Please fill the lines with your answer)

....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
The next day their group meets up at lunchtime and decides they don't want to invite Charlie to sit with them. It was because Charlie tried to help out Sam, when in the past their group has tried not to get involved with other people's problems.

9. Would it be OK or not OK for their group to decide that Charlie can't sit with them? (Please circle one)
   OK    NOT OK

10. How ok or not ok is it? (Please circle one)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Really not OK</td>
<td>Not OK</td>
<td>Kind of not OK</td>
<td>Kind of OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Really OK</td>
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</table>

11. Why? (Please fill the lines with your answer)

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12. What would you do if you saw Alex being mean to Sam? Please write your answer below.

....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................

13. Why would you choose to do that? Please write your answer below.

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....................................................................................................................................................
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14. There are a number of different ways people might respond if they saw Alex calling Sam names. Please tell us how likely it is that you would respond in the following ways:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Definitely would not</th>
<th>Probably would not</th>
<th>In the middle</th>
<th>Probably would</th>
<th>Definitely would</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t get involved and walk away</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t get involved and watch</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tell Alex to stop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Help Sam in another way</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk to Alex afterwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk to Sam afterwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to a teacher or member of staff</td>
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</table>

15. In the past month, how often do you think other people in your school have seen people being called names?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Once or twice</td>
<td>Once or twice a week</td>
<td>Most days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. In the past month, how often have you seen people being called names in school?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Once or twice</td>
<td>Once or twice a week</td>
<td>Most days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thank you for all your help today.

Please put your hand up and someone will come over to take your booklet.

If you have any questions about the work you have helped us with today, please ask a researcher.

You will be given a letter to take home. Please read it and then pass it on to your parents so they know about the research that you have helped us with.
Social-Moral Reasoning Coding Framework (Study 3)

Study: Examining children and adolescents’ evaluations of ingroup and outgroup bystanders who either challenge a norm to help others, or challenge a norm not to get involved with other people’s problems. Participants respond to incidents involving outgroup school members, or ethnic-outgroup members (Travellers).

Method: A 2 (Age: Primary school/9-11 years vs. Secondary school/12-14 years) x 2 (Group: School vs. Traveller) x 2 (Norm: To help vs. Not get involved) between subjects design.

There are four groups of categories: Moral, Social-conventional, Psychological, and Undifferentiated. Each category has subcategories. Additional categories have been included for this data set (Low impact and prudential). Definitions and examples are below.

Moral: Justification codes 1-3 are referred to as "moral" because the following are references: prosocial behavior; the welfare of the victim and/or the perpetrator's negative actions or “bullying”; equality and fairness, or empathy and perspective-taking form the basis of the response. Includes all positive and negative references to the domain.

Social-conventional: Justification codes 4-6 are "social-conventional" because broader school/social-conventional expectations, or peer group expectations, membership and/or loyalty, or authority figures and rules, are referred to.

Stereotypes: Justification code 7 is used when participants reference stereotypes and/or generalisations about group memberships.

Low impact: Justification code 8 is for when participants reference the meaninglessness of the act, perhaps they play the incident down/ trivialize it.

Past history: Justification code 9 is for references to a previous history between the perpetrator and victim, suggesting that the victim has incited the name-calling due to their past behavior.

Prudential: Justification code 10 is for references to self-preservation and self-protection. Careful not to confuse this with references to outcomes from group expectations – some may need double-coding.

Psychological: Justification codes 11-12 are "personal" because they involve focus on autonomy (i.e., personal choice and personal preference), reference personality traits of the victim, or familiarity and friendship.

Undifferentiated: Category 13 is for "other" reasoning that does not fit into any category or requires further information in order to assign it to a coding category.

Missing or uncodable: When coding, please leave cell empty.

Coding decisions:
Typically you should code each reason into one category only. If a reasoning response includes two distinct statements (i.e., both statements are equally important) then you may use two codes, but only if the response warrants two codes. If more than two codes are indicated choose the two most developed codes/reasoning. Enter .5 and .5 into the data set.

Only code clear responses. If part of a response is ambiguous and another is not, code the part that is not ambiguous.

Assign the undifferentiated code to responses when the full statement cannot be differentiated between codes. If part of it can be coded than provide a code for the part that is codable.

Try not to code responses within the context of the question. Only refer to the context of the question (e.g. decision to intervene or not intervene; perceived severity rating) if a statement is ambiguous.

**Moral domain**

1. **Prosocial behaviour:**
   - Because Sam is not sticking up for himself so other people should
   - It's nice to help people
   - We should all forgive
   - It’s a good thing to do
   - She is helping other people
   - Because he was trying to help
   - If he was in a different position he would want some help
   - Because she feels bad for Casey and wants to help
   - He would try and help people even if he wasn’t part of their group
   - Because you want to help the other group out a bit
   - She was doing something kind she shouldn't be banished

2. **Other’s Welfare, Empathy and Perspective taking:** [Welfare] References to the wrongfulness of inflicting physical and psychological harm on another person (the victim). Also include references to the normative member "bullying". [Empathy] Include references to feeling sorry for the victim. [Perspective taking] Include references to taking their position, perspective, imagining how it feels, or having experienced the same themselves.
   - Because bullying is nasty to people
   - Because it will go on a bit longer and someone will get upset
   - I don't like bullying
   - I don't like seeing people get bullied
   - Because she feels bad for Casey and wants to help
   - Because Alex needed to stop, it wasn't right
   - Because Sam is not sticking up for himself so other people should
   - Because it could have hurt her feelings
Because you need to help them out
Because I would feel sorry for Sam
Because I’ve been in their position before and it’s not nice

3. **Equality, fairness, and rights.**
   - As she is doing the right thing
   - She didn't really do anything wrong
   - Because everybody should be treated the same no matter what race/ethnicity you're from. That is discrimination or racism.

**Social-conventional domain**

4. **School and social-conventional expectations.** Reference to school and wider social-conventional expectations for behavior. About not following the group expectations, but following on wider expectations instead.
   - Because Alex is out of order
   - It is bad not to help
   - Because if I was having problems he would come and help me

5. **Peer group expectations** Reference to norms of the group (i.e., helping or not getting involved) deviant or normative behaviours (behaving in line with, or challenging the group’s norms), and loyalty or disloyalty to the group (e.g. doing or not doing what is best for the peer or school group). Remember the group norm is either: helping with other peoples’ problems; or not getting involved in other peoples’ problems.
   - Because they feel they shouldn't help but he helps them
   - Because it seems like Jo is betraying them
   - Because my group is supposed to help out in problems
   - Because we should help people
   - One person disagreeing is betrayal
   - Going against the group
   - Because she doesn't want to help people being bullied
   - Because he should have left them to it as it's part of their group's plan
   - Because he did what the other group wanted to do
   - Because he is helping but not following our motto
   - We want to be helpful but Jo doesn't
   - He just wants them to deal with their own problem and let them sort it out for themselves
   - She doesn't want to help cos she thinks like their group not her group
   - Because he doesn’t agree with us
   - He doesn't want to get involved
   - He is going against his own group
   - He is still part of the group
• Because he should sit with his group
• Because he had gone against their word and didn't want to help with the problem
• Because their motto is to help people's problems
• Because the other group thinks that they should not get into their problems
• Because they don't want a betrayer in their group
• Because they all said that they won't get involved but Charlie from the other group does the complete opposite. So I think they're probably angry at her.
• Because he doesn't do what the group does
• His friends tried to help but he pushed them back
• Her group don't like involving but Sam did get involved
• Because he did what we did
• Because it's not our business
• Because Hayden wants to help
• She is in my group and friends should help
• He thinks you should help
• Because he's disobeying the rules from the members
• Because everyone in their group are not meant to get involved in others problems
• Because he is not doing what the group says
• She doesn't want to help cos she thinks like their group not her group
• Because he didn't take our rules
• Because Jo doesn't want to be like the rest of her group, she wants to help people

6. **Reference to authority figures e.g. teachers or members of staff or other repercussions not related to the self (DR: those related to the self, i.e., getting into trouble more generally would be coded as 9 – prudential)**
   • Because she will be in trouble and won't bully Sam again

**Past history**

7. **References to the victim having done something to cause or deserve the perpetrator's actions.**
   • As Alex has no reason to be mean to Casey
   • No need for name calling

**Prudential reasoning**

8. **References to self-preservation, avoiding repercussions, or protecting the self from immediate or future harm.**
   • Because you might get called names and you might have a fight
   • He was just trying to stop an argument, he should be forgiven
Jo could have got beaten up, he should have told someone

Psychological domain

9. Autonomy. Reference to personal choice and preferences. References to perceived responsibility within the situation (i.e. “mind your own business” mentality). DR. Remembering that “not getting involved” is a norm, code references to this as 5 when the group is mentioned but as 11 when it is the individual’s opinion that’s referenced.

- Because she is trying to keep everyone independent
- I would still have her as a friend because it is only her opinion, we could still hang out and do our own thing
- Because it's his decision!
- He's got his own plans
- They need to learn to do it themselves
- Because it is what you think individually that matters
- They should help Jo understand she is not right
- Because she thought they needed support at the time and it does not necessarily mean she's going to do it again
- Because he doesn't always have to sit with us
- Cos it's not fair, it's Jo's choice
- Because he wants to get involved but he is a bit convinced not to
- Because sometimes it is good to get involved
- Because Charlie doesn't want her friend being bullied and she thinks neither should her group
- Because he tried to help but it's none of his business
- Jo thinks they shouldn't get in other people's business

10. Personality traits of the normative member, deviant member, or victim, or references to familiarity or friendship.

- Because they don't know who he is
- Because they are friends and they don't want to leave Jo out
- Because Jo is a good friend
- Jo is a friend so he is kind and nice to them
- Because it shows that she cares about other children
- He seems like a good person
- He could be a good friend but he will never be there for you
- Because he isn't very nice
- I would like Jo because of his enthusiasm
- He has some good ideas and wants to be different from other people
- She cares about others and is kind
- We don't have to be best buddies
- It doesn't mean we can't be friends and not listen
- Because they are friends and if she doesn't want to get involved then she doesn't have to
- It's what a good friend will do
- She is mean and nasty to others

**Other**

11. Undifferentiated. Reference when a reason doesn't make sense, or where more information is required in order to assign to any category.