THE EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL POLITICS AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY:
TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS

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2014 SUPERVISORS: 1st DR TOM CASIER 2nd PROF. HARM J.C. SCHEPEL

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Abstract

The aim of this research is to investigate the influence of Turkey’s European Union (EU) candidature on its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, namely Iran and Syria. It argues that EU conditionality and adaptation pressure for the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime to the EU *acquis communautaire* have produced unintended outcomes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, in addition to the intended outcomes in Turkey’s domestic politics. To investigate these phenomena, this study poses the following questions: how, to what extent and in what direction has Turkey’s foreign policy changed towards its non-EU neighbours during the country’s EU candidature, and how has Turkey’s EU candidature to the EU played a role in this? This study utilises Europeanization, and the rational choice and historical versions of the new institutionalist theory as its theoretical framework. Interview and case study methods were employed to answer this research question, and triangulation and the creation of counterfactual scenarios were used to substantiate the validity of the study’s findings and interpretation.

The findings indicate that, first, Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours has undergone a deep transformation from being merely security-oriented disengagement to politically and economically-oriented engagement. Secondly, although 1) due to the nature of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the literature on Europeanisation in the field of foreign policy primarily addresses socialisation and experimental learning related to the impact of the EU on member and/or non-member states’ foreign policies, and 2) due to the nature of EU-Turkey relations, the literature on the impact of the EU on Turkey’s foreign policy mostly focus on Turkey’s foreign policy towards Turkey’s EU neighbours and primarily addresses EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of foreign policy as it is related to the impact of the EU on Turkey’s foreign policy, the findings of this research show that, in fact, EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm, has unintentionally left a very visible influence on Turkish foreign policy towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours by: (a) changing the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations, (b) empowering the government
and civil society against the military–bureaucratic elites in political decision making, (c) accomplishing political and economic stability and growth, (d) increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority rights, and transferring domestic religious and minority issues into the realm of normal politics, and thus (e) changing the institutions, interests, preferences and demands that are involved in foreign policy-making towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours.
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABGS</td>
<td>Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği (Secretariat General for European Union Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>AK Party - Adalet Ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)</td>
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<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)</td>
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<td>BOTAS</td>
<td>Boru Hatları Ile Petrol Tasima Anonim Şirketi (Turkish-Petroleum Pipeline Corporation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agriculture Policy</td>
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<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence-Building Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEECs</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEHAP</td>
<td>Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPA</td>
<td>Greece Public Gas Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (Presidency of Religious Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party)</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTP</td>
<td>Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention On Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument For Democracy And Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUVP</td>
<td>European Union Visitors Programme</td>
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<td>EDISON</td>
<td>Italian Natural Gas Companies</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECO</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<td>EFP</td>
<td>European Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbour Policy</td>
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<td>EOKA</td>
<td>Greek Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FIR</td>
<td>Flight Information Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>Guney Dogu Anadolu Projesi (Southeast Anatolia Project)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPoT</td>
<td>Global Political Trends Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HADEP</td>
<td>Halkin Demokracy Partisi (People’s Democracy Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEP</td>
<td>Halkin Emek Partisi (People’s Labour Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HYD</td>
<td>Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği (Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLCC</td>
<td>High Level Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBDA-C</td>
<td>İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncıları Cephesi (Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court Of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHD</td>
<td>İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>Imam Hatip Lisesi (Religious Vocational School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKV</td>
<td>İktisadi Kalkın Vakfı (Economic Development Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>JITEM</td>
<td>Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight Against Terrorism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCK</td>
<td>Kürdistan Komünler Birliği (Union Of Communities of Kurdistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (National Movement Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUSIAD</td>
<td>Mustakil Sanayici ve Isadamları Derneği (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NLMSA</td>
<td>National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHAL</td>
<td>Olan Ustu Hal (Under Martial Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation Of Islamic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORSAM</td>
<td>Ortadogu Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi (Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Acik Toplum Vakfi (Open Society Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation For Security and Cooperation In Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OZEP</td>
<td>Ozgurluk ve Esitlik Partisi (Freedom and Equality Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OZDEP</td>
<td>Ozgurluk ve Demokrasi Partisi (Freedom and Democracy Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFMC</td>
<td>Law on Public Financial Management and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUK</td>
<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>P2P</td>
<td>People to People Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTUK</td>
<td>Turkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Ust Kurulu (Higher Radio And Television Board)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SETA</td>
<td>Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSCs</td>
<td>State Security Courts</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Saadet Partisi (Virtue Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIEX</td>
<td>Technical Assistance And Information Exchange Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESEV</td>
<td>Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCK</td>
<td>Turk Ceza Kanunu (Turkish Criminal Law)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>Turkish Foreign Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBMM/TGNA</td>
<td>Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>TİKA</td>
<td>Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMK</td>
<td>Terörle Mucadele Kanunu (Anti-Terrorism Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td>Türk Mukavemet Teskilati (Turkish Resistance Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOBB</td>
<td>Turkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi (Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange of Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPS</td>
<td>Turkish Political System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRT</td>
<td>Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu (Turkish Radio And Television Corporation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSE</td>
<td>Turk Standardlari Enstitusu (Turkish Standards Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSEV</td>
<td>Turkiye Ucuncu Sector Vakfi (Third Sector Foundation of Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSIAD</td>
<td>Turk Sanayicileri ve Isadamlari Dernegi (Turkish Industrialists and Business Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜRKAk</td>
<td>Turkiye Akraditasyon Kurumu (Turkish Accreditation Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSKON</td>
<td>Turkiye Is Adamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nation Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT</td>
<td>Virtue Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAS</td>
<td>Yuksek Askeri Sura (Supreme Military Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOK</td>
<td>Council of Higher Education</td>
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Statement of originality

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

Erol Kalkan
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A significant part of this research was based on interviews carried out with participants working on Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey-EU relations. I would like to thank members of the Foreign Ministry working in the Department of Policy Planning Department in Brussels and Ankara, and also representatives from TOBB, TUSIAD, IKV, TUSKON, TESEV, G POT, SETA, IHD and ORSAM for sharing their experiences, thoughts and comments with me on the work undertaken within this research.

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Chapter I

Research Questions and Hypotheses, Europeanisation and Outline of Chapters

1.1 Introduction

The influence of the EU on the transformation of the polity, politics and policies of member and candidate states, including Turkey, during its EU membership and candidature has increasingly become a subject of discussion within the academic literature. However, the influence of the EU on the foreign policy of member and candidate states in general and Turkey in particular is a relatively new subject of academic debate. Despite its newness, the influence of the EU on Turkey’s foreign policy towards its EU neighbours, namely Greece and Cyprus during its EU candidature has already been the subject of several studies, however, the influence of the EU on Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours has not been the subject of discussion within academic literature. Thus, a gap in the literature exists in terms of explaining how, under what conditions and to what extent member and/or candidate state foreign policies have been reoriented by EU membership or candidature, including Turkey’s foreign policy towards Turkey’s EU neighbours and in particular towards its non-EU neighbours. The aim of this study is therefore to contribute to the growing literature on Europeanisation and the influence of the EU on candidate state foreign policy as well as interregional relations by analysing the influence of the EU on the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during the process of the country’s accession to the EU.

Europeanisation scholars primarily argue that due to the nature of CDSP, the influence of the EU on member and candidate state foreign policy, a horizontal pattern of learning and socialization occurs. On the other hand, students engaged in Turkish studies argue that as a result of EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and asymmetric power relations during the accession process, the influence of the EU on the polity, politics and policies of Turkey, even on its foreign policy, is to a large extent a vertical, ‘top down’ process. This study argues, however, that the influence of the EU on Turkey’s foreign policy towards
its non-EU neighbours is neither a horizontal pattern of learning and socialisation nor the result of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of foreign policy. The liberalisation and modernisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime through the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU *acquis communautaire* have had a very visible influence on Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. Although the primary objective of EU conditionality in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, as well as in the economic realm, is not to change Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, it has unintentionally caused changes in the rules, ideas, interests, priorities and demands involved in the formulation of this policy through liberalising Turkey’s political system. Accordingly, the focus of this study is the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime through the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU *acquis communautaire* and the consequent influence on Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours.

### 1.2 Research questions and hypotheses

The following overarching research question is examined in this study: how, to what extent and in what direction has Turkey’s foreign policy changed towards its non-EU neighbours during the country’s EU candidature and how has Turkey’s candidature to the EU played a role in this? This can be divided into three further questions: (1) Has there been any change in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours since it achieved candidate status in 1999? (2) If so, to what extent and in what direction has Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours changed during the country’s EU candidature? (3) How has Turkey’s candidature of the EU played a role in the transformation of its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours?

The study is founded on two hypotheses. It is suggested that since Turkey first achieved candidate status in 1999, its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours has undergone a deep transformation from merely security-orientated disengagement to politically and economically orientated engagement. Secondly, EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy and the rule of law and in the economic realm, aimed at the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime to the EU
*acquis communautaire*, have produced unintended outcomes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours in addition to the intended outcomes in Turkey’s domestic politics. This has come about through: (a) changing the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations; (b) empowering the government and civil society against the military–bureaucratic elites in political decision making; (c) accomplishing political and economic stability and growth; (d) increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority rights and transferring domestic religious and minority issues into the realm of normal politics, and thus (e) changing the institutions, interests, preferences and demands that are involved in foreign policy-making towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours.

### 1.3 Analysis of the domestic impact of European integration

Europeanisation is a concept\(^1\) that is employed to describe different forms and processes of change at both the domestic and European levels generated by European integration throughout the EU. According to the conceptual framework\(^2\) of Europeanisation, in order to engender changes at the domestic level there must be some degree of ‘incompatibility’ between the EU and the domestic levels in terms of polity, politics and policy that requires the associated states to make changes to adapt to the EU *acquis communautaire*. A high level of incompatibility between the EU and domestic levels generates a high level of adaptation pressure at the domestic level. This is expected to result in a high level of change in the associated state (Börzel & Risse, 2003; see also Börzel & Risse, 2007, 2009, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2010) (for further detail on Europeanisation, see Chapter II).

As noted above, this study argues that the ‘incompatibility’, between Turkey and the EU in relation to democracy, the rule of law and economics has driven adaptation and started Turkey down the path of the liberalisation of its political regime, resulting in the above-mentioned hypothesised changes in the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. Drawing on the Europeanisation literature and EU–Turkey

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\(^1\) A concept is an idea or thought about ‘what something is or how it works’.

\(^2\) Europeanisation can be considered a conceptual framework rather than a theory (Featherstone, 2003, p.12). A conceptual framework is ‘the way ideas are organized to achieve a research project’s purpose’ (Shields & Rangarjan, 2013: p. 24).
relations as they relate to democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm, all of which require the obligatory implementation of EU law, it seems that there is a relationship between the existing gap, EU adaptation pressure and ongoing changes at the domestic level in Turkey. Thus, in this study, the Europeanisation concept is employed to describe different forms and processes of change in Turkey, generated by its EU candidature.

As argued by Europeanisation scholars (see Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2010), numerous factors matter in responding to EU pressure to adapt, and thus exert an influence on the domestic impact of the EU, in particular: the ability of domestic actors and institutions, the quality and state of peace relations between EU-associated states, the varying nature of different countries and the policy field, and the cost/benefit calculation of domestic actors. Due to the nature of the CSDP, which does not include an ‘obligatory implementation of EU law’ (Major, 2005: p.180), and the intergovernmental decision-making mechanisms, it is not always possible to address the obligatory implementation of EU directives and rules in the sphere of foreign policy (Wong & Hill, 2011: 231), even if there is an incompatibility (see Section 2.5). The Europeanisation framework does not provide explanatory instruments to analyse how they matter when responding to the EU adaptation pressure arising from the misfit gap between the EU and the domestic level and/or the domestic impact of the EU. The term ‘Europeanisation’ itself thus suffers from a lack of comprehensive explanatory instruments to analyse the domestic impact of the EU in general and specifically the role of the EU in the liberalisation of the Turkish political system and the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during its EU candidature. There is therefore a need for tools from other approaches to address this shortcoming. To overcome this shortcoming of Europeanisation in analysing the domestic impact of the EU Europeanisation scholars (Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Knill & Tosun, 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Schimmelfennig &
Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012; Wong & Hill, 2011) primarily embed it within ‘new institutionalism’ theory.³

New institutionalism theory puts institutions and the structures through which they operate at the centre of its analysis of political behaviours, and stresses that ‘institutions matter’ (Rosamond, 2003: p.114; Schmidt, 2010: p.304, 2011: p.63), ‘institutions affect outcomes’ (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000: p.3) and ‘institutions constrain the actions of the actors who establish them’ (Pollack, 2004: p.139, 2005: p.20). In short, the way institutions are formed, as well as their features, strongly influence ‘how smoothly the car runs, which roads it can take, and how sure we can be that the car will not break down’ (Peterson & Schackleton, 2002: p.5). There are several versions of new institutionalism, but three, historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism, and more recently discursive institutionalism, are usually embedded with Europeanisation in analyses of the domestic impact of European integration throughout the EU. In general, they ‘understand institutions as rules and norms’ (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000: p.6; Schmidt, 2010) and define them as (formal and informal) rules: ‘the formal (and informal) rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy’ (Hall, 1996, as cited by Aspinwall & Schneider, 2001: p.1; Schmidt, 2010: p.304, 2011: p.63).⁴

Rational institutionalism (RI) proposes that individuals adapt new institutions, ideas, values or regulation if the costs of change or adaptation are less than the benefits, and if doing so will serve their interests and welfare (Blyth, 2002: p.306; Schmidt, 2008: p.321, 2010, 2011). The argument is that people are rational utility maximisers who conduct cost/benefit analyses in their choices and act strategically to maximise their own gain. Before acting in a particular way, therefore, they ask themselves ‘what do I get out of this action?’; they do something if they calculate that they will gain more by doing than by not doing it. From this perspective, the harmonisation reforms undertaken to close the existing gap between the domestic and European levels are closely related to the

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³ Theories are constructed generalisable statements to explain, predict and understand how and/or why a phenomenon occurs (see Friedman and Kreps, 1991; Kim, 1995; Lomax, 2010).

cost/benefit calculations of domestic actors regarding rule compliance (see Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Knill & Tosun, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012). The keenness of Turkish actors for harmonisation reforms to adapt to the EU acquis communautaire is seen in light of the cost/benefit calculation of being an EU member, or at least being on the EU track. Thus, the cost/benefit calculation is a fruitful concept to explain the keenness of Turkish actors in responding to EU pressure in relation to democracy, the rule of law and economic matters.

The RI approach pays attention to ‘multiple veto points’ and ‘formal institutions’ and emphasises the importance of the empowerment of new actors and institutions against veto players through harmonisation reforms and the EU’s technical and economic support in the absence of capable domestic actors and institutions in responding to EU adaptation pressure (Börzel & Risse, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). As argued above, this study takes the position that the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU acquis communautaire have empowered the Turkish government and civil society against the military-bureaucratic elites in the Turkish political system through changing the institutions, institutional structure and institutional power relations, and redistributing the resources and power at the domestic level. RI thus provides a theory about which or whose interests and ideas, and the changes to them, bring about harmonisation reforms and how they have driven events, processes and institutional and political changes in Turkey. I therefore employ the explanatory instruments of RI in analysing the causes of changes in the Turkish political system and the country’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours and the role of the EU.

In contrast, the sociological institutionalism (SI) school sees identity and cultural motivations as the main driving forces behind institutional and political change (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999: pp.30–36; Hill, 2003: pp.98–126; Schmidt, 2008, 2010, 2011; Tonra, 2003). The SI school argues that people are ‘satisficers’, rather than self-interested utility maximisers. Thus, before acting in a particular way, they ask themselves ‘what should I do?’ or ‘what is appropriate?’ and further, they act habitually to satisfy their consciences, rather than to acting strategically to maximise their rational self-
interests (March & Olsen, 1989). People thus act in a way that is appropriate in the environment in which they live, or within society. Institutions are seen as socially constituted norms that frame a person’s appropriate behaviour.

From the SI perspective, domestic adaptation to EU norms and standards comes into practice through increasing socialisation and experimental learning. Domestic actors and institutions that are engaged with the EU’s actors and institutions socialise with and learn from them. Their identity, ideas and culture thus change over time and they increasingly find the EU’s values, ideas, norms and standards more appropriate than the alternatives. As such, they increasingly adapt to the EU norms and standards (Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Hall & Taylor, 1996; March & Olsen, 1989; Schimmelfennig, 2010; Tonra, 2003). Accordingly, there is an ontological problem in combining RI and SI in analysing the domestic impact of the EU. On the other hand, due to the significant differences between Turkey and Europe in terms of identity and political culture, changes in Turkey’s identity and political culture through socialisation and experimental learning requires time and intensive relations. Bearing in mind the intensity of EU–Turkey relations and the diversity in their identities, it does not seem likely that the explanatory instruments of socialisation, experimental learning and political change provided in SI theory will be fruitful in analysing the changes in Turkey’s political system and foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during its EU candidature and the role of the EU. SI theory is therefore excluded from the theoretical framework.

Historical institutionalism (HI), on the other hand, combines the perspectives of RI and SI in that it regards people as both ‘satisficers’ and utility maximisers, although not in a straightforward manner. It argues that, depending upon the context, rules and persons, behaviour or a political outcome can be the product of conscience satisficing and/or maximising self-interest. In other words, it is argued that whether a logic of ‘appropriateness’ or of ‘consequences’ is followed depends on the context, rules and persons. The question is thus how to ascertain which logic is dominant in specific choices and political outcomes. Institutions are seen as historically established patterns in HI. In this vein, historical institutionalists search for historical evidence, junctures and records to ascertain which aspect is the most important in determining the chosen behaviours and

The main concepts that the HI literature considers when explaining how institutions, political and social phenomenon, or policies occur, evolve or change are ‘path dependency’, ‘critical juncture’, ‘punctuated equilibrium’ and ‘unintended consequences’ (for details, see Chapter II). Historical institutionalists (Hall & Taylor, 1996: pp.941–942; Pierson, 2005: pp.43–44; see also Merton, 1936: p.895; Thelen, 1999; Vachudova, 2007) argue that a juncture punctuates equilibrium and starts a new path or institutional change. Thus, institutions remain at equilibrium until they are punctuated by an external juncture. The path or institution that is adapted purposefully produces unintended outcomes in addition to intended consequences. From this perspective, critical junctures in EU-associated state relations punctuate the equilibrium at the domestic level and provide a starting point for institutional change and adaptation to a new path, which is expected to produce unintended consequences in addition to intended outcomes.

As detailed above, this study argues that the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999 – a critical juncture in EU–Turkey relations – punctuated the equilibrium and started the country down the path to liberalisation. This liberalisation, adopted by Turkey as a result of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure, has unintentionally produced changes in rules, ideas, interests, priorities and demands in the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours in addition to the intended outcomes in the fields of democracy and the rule of law and in the economic realm. The concepts of ‘critical juncture’, ‘punctuated equilibrium’ and ‘unintended consequences’ are therefore useful in explaining the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime, changing the country’s foreign policy towards its neighbours and the role of Turkey’s EU candidature in this process. These concepts are thus employed in the analysis.

As noted by many historical institutionalists (Katzenelson & Weingast, 2005; Lieberman, 2002; Marcussen, 2000; McNamara, 1998; Steinmo, 2008), however, institutional or political changes are the products of changes in actors’ interests, values and ideas. As noted above, this study considers changes in ideas, interests, priorities and demands in the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy as the main driving force behind the
transformation of foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. HI focuses on structures, processes and junctures but pays little attention to the actors whose actions, ideas and interests – and changes to them – bring this about (Schmidt, 2008). As rightly noted by Steinmo (2008: p.168), junctures themselves do not give people agency (see also Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004). HI therefore does not provide a comprehensive explanation or theory of what brings about junctures, which interests and ideas change and how, or how they drive events, processes and institutional and political changes (Schmidt, 2008; Steinmo, 2008; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004) in general and specifically in relation to Turkey’s political system and foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during the country’s accession process to the EU. To overcome this shortcoming in HI, I use the tools of the RI approach which, as argued above, puts actors and their cost/benefit calculation and changing interests at the centre of analysis in explaining institutional and political change.

In contrast to the older versions of new institutionalism, the most recent version, discursive institutionalism (DI) follows the ‘logic of communication’. It places ideas and discourse in an institutional context, following along the lines of one of the older versions with which it is engaged, and emphasises the role of ideas and discourse in constructing behaviour and/or political action. It argues that ideas and discourse matter in the construction and reconstruction of norms and interests and thus in the construction of behaviour and/or political action. According to the logic of DI, institutions serve ‘both as structures that constrain actors and as constructs created and changed by those actors’ and thus they are internal to the actors (Schmidt, 2008: p.321, p.304). ‘By combining background ideational abilities with foreground discursive abilities, DI puts the agency back into institutional change by explaining the dynamics of change in structures through constructive discourse about ideas’ (Schmidt, 2008: p.309).

DI differs from older versions of new institutionalism in several respects. Institutional change is dynamic in DI (Schmidt, 2008: p.321), whereas it is static in older versions of new institutionalism (for details, see Schmidt, 2008, 2010; see also Chapter II). Interests are also defined as ideas in DI and are thus subjective, whereas they are objective and material in RI (Schmidt, 2008: p. 321; see also Schmidt, 2006a, 2006b, 2010). Ideas and
discourse may have a causal influence on the construction and reconstruction of norms and interests however, drawing on the Europeanisation literature and analysis of EU–Turkey relations, the assumption in DI that ‘everything is related to ideas and discourse, with no neutral incentive structures and no objective and material interests’ (Schmidt, 2008: p.321) is challenged by the reality of EU-associated relations in general, and specifically in EU–Turkey relations. Thus, DI is not deemed appropriate for addressing the causality issue in this study.

In addition to new institutionalism, there are other approaches which offer theories related to the integration of Europe throughout the EU such as neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Neo-functionalism employs the concept of ‘spillover’ in explaining widespread European integration and argues that cooperation in specific economic areas, such as coal and steel, lead to integration in other economic sectors and then other fields in Europe. The argument is that integration in a policy sector creates pressure for cooperation in other areas. National and subnational actors that benefit from integration create pressure for integration in other areas, so as to pursue their interests (Haas, 1958; Moravcsik, 1993; Rosamond, 2000, p.51–52; Wallace et al, 1983; Wiener & Diez, 2009).

On the other hand, intergovernmentalism emphasises the role of the national governments of the member states in the process of European integration. Intergovernmentalists argue that nation states renounce their sovereignty in favour of their interests. When they have shared goals and their interests converge in a policy sector, they pool their sovereignty and speed up the integration process, but when their interests, goals and preferences diverge in a given field, they slow the integration process in this field. Spillover can thus be seen in ‘low politics’ (Rosamond, 2000, p. 132). Liberal intergovernmentalism, developed by Moravcsik (1993) on the basis of the intergovernmental theory of European integration, emphasises the role of the national governments of the member states and inter-state bargains in the process of European integration. It differs from classical intergovernmentalism, however, by highlighting the role of domestic interest groups in the formation of national government interests and preferences in the process of European integration. The argument is that various domestic interest groups compete to
influence the national government to pursue and maximise their interests. The outcomes of this struggle determine the positions taken by the national government in inter-state bargains in the process of European integration (Moravcsik, 1993, 1997; Rosamond, 2000, Wallace et al, 1983; Wiener & Diez, 2009). Liberal intergovernmentalists consider the role of supranational institutions limited in this process, and thus, it differs from the perspective of neo-functionalists in explaining the process of European integration.

As seen above, these approaches all offer theories related to integration of Europe throughout the EU, but not the domestic impact of this integration process, which is the subject of this study. They thus do not provide theory related to the transformation of Turkey’s political system and foreign policy during the EU accession process and the role of the EU, and so are also excluded from the theoretical framework. Consequently, Europeanisation, embedded in the rational and historical versions of new institutionalism, constitutes the analytical toolkit used to examine the hypotheses and research questions in this study (for the operationalisation of the theory, see Section 1.4 and for further detail, see Section 3.3.5).

1.4 Data collection and analysis

Particular methods of enquiry, such as qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods, are employed to collect, process and analyse data for testing and building hypotheses and/or theories according to the purpose of the research. Quantitative research focuses on collecting statistical, mathematical or numerical data through polls, questionnaires or surveys and their measurement. To explain what is observed, the collected data is analysed using statistical and numerical analysis. Qualitative research, on the other hand, focuses on collecting verbal data and considers its meaning (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). Qualitative research uses observation, interviews (individual in-depth interviews, structured and non-structured interviews), case studies, focus groups, reflexive journals, content or documentary analysis and archival research methods. The collected data is organised according to identified themes and then analysed to discover the underlying meanings and patterns of relationships between themes. The aim of qualitative research is to identify ‘the form and nature of what exists’, to investigate ‘the reasons for, or
causes of, what exists’ (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) and to provide a complete, detailed description of what is studied. By its nature, qualitative research is usually more exploratory.

Depending on the topic studied, each model has its strengths and weaknesses. As described above, the quantitative model is employed to answer research questions using numerical evidence. The qualitative approach, on the other hand, is better at explaining how and/or why a particular event took place, or a particular phenomenon is the case, through verbal evidence (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). This study aims to assess Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours and the changes made in foreign policy during Turkey’s accession process to the EU, as well as the reasons for, and/or causes of, the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy, primarily through examining verbal evidence. For this reason, the qualitative approach is chosen for the collection, processing and analysis of data. In specific, case study, interviews, academic journals and documentary analysis technics of qualitative method are used to collect, process and analyse data, but, quantitative data, such as tables, graphs and figures, are also used to illustrate changes in Turkey’s domestic politics, in its economic conditions and in its exports and imports with its selected neighbours during the EU accession process.

With regard to case study methods, the deviant case method seems likely more beneficial in choosing cases that our analytical interests lie within and to probe causal relationships to test the hypothesis of our study in a more specific manner (for details see section 3.3.2 in Chapter III). Thus, a deviant case method is employed. Accordingly, we identified sets of background factors in accordance with the analytical requirements of the study and then selected Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria in accordance with these factors (for details see section 3.3.2 in Chapter III). By examining selected deviant cases we arrived at exceptional and untypical explanations for changes in Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during Turkey’s EU candidature. These include, as noted above, the fact that EU-fostered changes at Turkey’s domestic political and economic dynamics generated by the harmonisation reforms have unintentionally caused the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbour. As noted below and detailed in chapter III, in order to further establish the causal importance of EU-
fostered domestic changes in changes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, we also utilised the creation of a counterfactual scenario approach (see Chapter V).

Primary sources include systematic databases, official reports and legal documents, such as political and economic agreements between Turkey and selected countries, European Council Presidency Conclusions, the Negotiation Framework for Turkey, the Accession Partnership with Turkey, and Commission Progress Reports, harmonisation reforms and interviews in both print and electronic forms. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty people in Turkey (in Istanbul and Ankara) and in Brussels, including officials from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, think tanks, trade unions and human rights organisations. These aimed to shed light on the experiences, knowledge, opinions and attitudes of informants in relation to Turkey’s domestic politics and policy, Turkish foreign policy and Turkey–EU relations. Secondary sources include books and publications from seminars, conferences and other scientific gatherings, and academic journals in four key disciplines (specific studies on EU–Turkey relations, Turkey’s foreign policy, Europeanisation, new institutionalism), as well as journalistic accounts in both print and electronic forms, and information from the internet.

The collected data is organised according to thematic fields identified during the research process, such as: Europeanisation (misfit gap, EU conditionality and adaptation pressure); Theory: RI (empowerment of new actors and institutions, cost/benefit calculation of rule compliance), HI (path dependency, punctuated equilibrium and unexpected consequences); Turkish political system (institutions, norms, ideas, actors and policies in the fields of democracy and the rule of law and economic matters at the Turkish level before the EU accession process in 1999, and changes in them during the EU accession process); EU–Turkey relations (EU conditionality in the fields of democracy and the rule of law and the economic sphere, the EU’s technical and economic support structures and harmonisation reforms); Turkey’s foreign policy towards non-EU countries (Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria before 1999 and changes in foreign policy towards them during the EU accession process). The patterns of relationships between the themes are analysed with the guidance of selected theories to
uncover changes in Turkey's political system and foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process and the causes of the changes (for details of data collection, processing and analysis, see Sections 3.3.3; 3.3.4 and 3.3.5).

Using the primary and secondary data, the misfit gap between Turkey and the EU in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, as well as in the economic sphere, are first explored by examining the sets of rules, norms, ideas, actors and policies at the EU and Turkish levels. EU–Turkey relations are then explored to establish whether the gap between the Turkish and EU levels in these fields has generated (high-level) EU adaptation pressure. Thirdly, harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU *acquis communautaire* are examined in order to probe Turkey’s compliance with EU standards and discover whether, as hypothesised, they have brought about liberalisation in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic sphere. Fourthly, the EU’s technical and economic support structures and the quality and stability of EU–Turkey relations are also assessed and a cost/benefit analysis of compliance with EU standards is undertaken by Turkish actors to ascertain the role of the EU in the liberalisation of the Turkish political system during the EU accession process.

Having examined whether the announcement of Turkey as a candidate punctuated the equilibrium at the Turkish level (thus providing a turning point for the liberalisation of the political regime and bringing about the changes hypothesised in 1.2 above), and if so how, a case study is employed to reveal alterations in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, namely Iran and Syria, during the process of accession to the EU, and the causes of such changes (for details of case selection methods and selected cases see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter III). The analysis therefore examines Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria before and after 1999. Finally, the study explores the influence of the developments identified in Turkey’s domestic political situation, generated by EU conditionality and adaptation pressure for the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime to the EU *acquis communautaire*, in changes in rules, ideas, interests, priorities and demands in the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards selected cases and thus the transformation of this policy. As such, the unintended
consequences for Turkey’s foreign policy of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure are analysed.

To demonstrate the credibility and validity of the data analysis, triangulation and the creation of counterfactual scenarios are undertaken. The information and/or evidence presented in the study are gleaned from data cross-referenced between interviews, documents and secondary sources, as well as within the data types, in a process of triangulation. Counterfactual scenarios are also developed to establish the causal importance of the EU and substantiate the claim that in the absence of EU conditionality relating to democracy, the rule of law and the economy, there would have been no changes in Turkey’s domestic political situation, and thus its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours over the last decade. The absence of EU influence and Turkey’s EU candidature are hypothesised, but other potential explanatory variables remain unchanged (for details see Section 3.4.2). As such, multiple sources of evidence and methods are used to substantiate the validity of the findings and the interpretation of the data.

1.5 Outline of chapters

The following chapter, Chapter II, presents a literature review for Europeanisation, in order to provide a basis for assessing the influence of the EU on the polity, politics and policies of associated states. The existing definition of Europeanisation is critically assessed, conceptualised and delimited for this study. I then discuss the mechanisms, forms and conditions for domestic change in general and specifically foreign policy generated by the EU. In terms of the mechanisms, I consider existing direct and indirect mechanisms relating to the domestic impact of the EU and introduce a new mechanism. Finally, the chapter elaborates on the versions of new institutionalism and how these can be of help in analysing the influence of the EU on the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process.

The third chapter discusses the research design, setting out the models and methods used to collect and process data, as well as delineating the research questions and hypotheses underpinning the study of the domestic impact of the EU. It first critically assesses existing research design models and introduces a new research design model specifically
designed to study the unintended consequence of the domestic impact of the EU. It then describes the data collection, processing and analysing procedures. In particular, it addresses the case study approach and interview analysis used in this thesis to answer the research questions. It introduces these methods and provides an account of precisely how these methods help to answer the research questions and to substantiate or disconfirm the hypotheses. Finally, it introduces counterfactual scenarios and triangulation approaches and an account of how these are helpful in demonstrating the credibility and validity of the data analysis, findings and interpretations.

Chapter IV explores the liberalisation of Turkey’s political, economic and legislative systems in the EU accession process. It empirically examines how the harmonisation reforms undertaken by the Turkish government to adapt the country’s political and economic systems and legislation to the EU *acquis communautaire* have brought about the hypothesised changes in Turkey’s domestic politics. It first, explores the Turkish political system before the EU accession process, followed by the reorientation of Turkey’s political regime in parallel with the EU *acquis communautaire* as a result of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure, as well as considering the technical and economic supports established in the post-Helsinki period. By doing so, it assesses how and to what extent the changes made have been generated by Turkey’s EU accession process.

Chapter V explores the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria over the last decade. It compares Turkey’s foreign policy towards these countries before and during the EU accession process to discover whether, as hypothesised, Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours has undergone a deep transformation from security-orientated disengagement to political and economic-orientated engagement. It then assesses the causes of changes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards these neighbours during the EU accession process. Here, it evaluates how changes in Turkey’s domestic politics generated by the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU *acquis communautaire* have played a role in the increasing transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria by changing the rules, ideas, interests, priorities and demands underpinning the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy.
The thesis concludes with Chapter VI. In the light of the research, it provides a general conclusion on the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours over the last decade, and the role of Turkey’s EU candidature in the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards them. It considers how the theoretical framework, the mechanism introduced to examine unintended consequences, and the research design model as a whole are beneficial in shedding light on these phenomena. The originality of the study and its challenges are addressed.
Chapter II

Europeanisation and New Institutionalism

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the utility of Europeanisation as a conceptual framework to analyse the impact of the EU on the foreign policy of member and candidate states. We first critically assess, conceptualise and delimit the existing definition of Europeanisation. After defining it as a ‘domestic change generated by the EU’ we will discuss the mechanisms, forms and conditions for the domestic change generated by the EU. We seek to clarify the applicability of Europeanisation as a conceptual framework for analysing the changes in member and candidate state foreign policy. Several examples and conceptual frameworks of the Europeanisation of member and candidate state foreign policy are discussed. Finally, we elaborate on the versions of new institutionalism for analysing the domestic impact of the EU.

2.2 Europeanisation and EUisation

For two reasons we use the term ‘EUisation’ instead of Europeanisation. First, since the last period of the Ottoman Empire, the notions ‘Westernisation’, ‘Civilisation’, ‘Modernisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ have been used interchangeably to describe the transformation in Turkish political, economic and social life. As far as European impact on Turkish politics is concerned we therefore need to examine the events of the nineteenth century. They started with the ‘Westernisation’ movement of ‘Tanzimat Fermani’ (1839) and continued with the ‘Islahat Fermani’ (1878). This westernisation movement also continued with the Republican period reforms. In other words, Turkey’s keenness to integrate into the Western bloc is a result of its modernisation project.  

5 ‘Tanzimat’ and ‘Islahat’ are the names of two reform packages in the Ottoman Empire. The aim of the reforms was to modernise the Ottoman administration and the military for integration in the European state system. For more details, see Karaosmanoglu, 2000; Aydınlı and Waxman, 2001.

6 Turkey became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1948, a member of the Council of the Europe in 1949, joined NATO
Becoming a member of the EU is a major step in this process; and it is considered confirmation of Turkey’s ‘European’, ‘Westernised’, and ‘modern’ identity (see Oguzlu, 2006; 2010; Aydin; 2012; Aydınlı & Waxman, 2001). When assessing how and to what extent Turkish foreign politics has re-orientated as a result of Turkey’s EU candidature we therefore use the term ‘EUisation’ instead of ‘Europeanisation’.

Although the debate on ‘Europeanisation’ over the last two decades has entirely focused on European integration throughout the EU and its impact on nation states, it is neither a new phenomenon, a simple synonym for European regional integration, nor a response to it. It is a much broader concept and a long historical process. According to different agents, structures, processes, direction of norm diffusion and conceptualisation of ‘we’ and ‘others’ this process can be divided into different stages.\(^7\) Institution building at a European level, and its impact on domestic institutions and policies, are the last stage of Europeanisation. When we are talking about European integration throughout the EU and a response to the EU regulations, directives and norms, we will therefore call ‘Europeanisation’ EUisation. As H. Wallace put it, ‘Europeanisation is more than and different from EUisation’\(^8\).

As a historical phenomenon, Europeanisation is a way of continental life including social and cultural behaviours (in terms of eating, drinking, and lifestyle), cultural beliefs, religion (Christianity), values, norms and political principles (tolerance, solidarity and liberty), state system, capitalist methods of market and production, and their diffusion to other continents and regions in a historical process through wars, trade, colonisation and globalisation (Kohn, 1937: Weber, 1947, p. 208; Mjoset, 1997; Kohout, 1999;


\(^8\)For more information about how the term ‘EUisation’ is different from ‘Europeanisation’ see also H. Wallace, 2000; H. Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002; Schmit and Wiener, 2005; and Graziano and Vink, 2007, p. 11.
In other words, Europeanisation has a broad scope and long historical process that involves the diffusion of the advanced institutions, norms and policies of Western European civilisation to other regions and continents. In this manner, it is, to some extent, connected with current debate on EUisation. The method and mechanism of EUisation, however, are different from Europeanisation.

2.3 EUisation?

EUisation is a concept that has been employed for decades to describe different forms and processes of change, at both domestic and European levels, caused by European integration throughout the EU, including: ‘regional integration and institution building at the European level’ (Risse, 2003; Cowles et al., 2001, p.3); ‘a shift in institution agendas’ (Wessels & Rometsch, 1996, p.328); ‘a change in domestic institutions, actors, procedure and paradigm and politics generated by European governance’ (Buller & Gamble, 2002; Börzel, 2005; Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005; Kassim, 2005; Ladrech, 2005); ‘institution and consensus building in western Europe’ (Zaborowski, 2002); ‘new norms and identity development’ (Checkel, 2001, p. 80); and ‘domestic impact of European-level institutions’ and ‘exporting European institutions’ (Olsen, 2002, p. 944-921). It is a complex mix and a dynamic process, which is difficult to separate. Some (Kassim, 2000, p. 235) even argue that it does not have any precise meaning, but there are some systemic studies, which map its mechanisms, different uses and definitions (Caporaso, 2007; Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2009, 2012; Graziano & Vink, 2007; Lenschow, 2005; Radaelli, 2003; Haverland, 2005, 2007; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009, 2012; Olsen, 2002). For example: Olsen (2002) categorised six different forms of EUisation: the ‘changing boundary of ‘Europe’, ‘developing institutions at the European level’, ‘domestic impact of European-level institutions’, ‘central penetration of national systems of governance’, ‘exporting European institutions’, and ‘political unification of Europe’. Featherstone (2003, p. 13-4) has also divided it into four broad categories: ‘historical process’, ‘cultural diffusion’, ‘process of institutional adaptation’ and ‘the adaptation of policies and policy process’.

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For decades most studies (Colino, 1997; Heritier, 1999; Moravesik, 1999; Stone, Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998; Risse, 2001; Wallace & Wallace, 2000) on EUisation focused on the institution-building and decision-making process at EU level by showing how domestic conditions affect supranational institution-building and decision-making at EU level. This refers to the first stage of EUisation, which is a ‘bottom-up’ process. It is an “evaluation of European institutions as a set of new norms, rules and practices” (Börzel, 2002, p. 93). Consequently, for decades, the ‘mirror image’ of the concept, the domestic impact of the EU, remained poorly explained. To fill this gap in the literature the impact of the EU on
member, and recently non-member state patterns of governance, policy preferences, interest and identities have increasingly become the subject of study (See, for example, Alter 2012; Alter & Helfer 2010; Barbe et al. 2009; Börzel, 2005; Börzel & Risse, 2007, 2009, 2012; Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005; Dimitrova & Dragneva 2009; Elbasani, 2011; Farrel, 2009; Kassim, 2005; Knill & Tosun 2009; Ladrech, 2005; Lavenex et al. 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Noutcheva & Duzgit, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2007; 2009; 2010; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier, 2006; 2011, 2012; Sepos, 2008; Terzi, 2010; Wong & Hill, 2011; Weber, 2007). The ‘top-down’ correlation of EUisation defined as ‘a process of reorienting the direction and shape of politics to a degree that EC political and economic dynamics becomes part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech, 1994, p. 69). It is employed to analyse how domestic institutions, patterns of governance, policy preferences, interests, identities and norms change as a result of institution-building and policymaking at EU level (Börzel & Risse, 2007, 2009, 2012; Radaelli, 2003, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012).

Although scholars mostly limit the term ‘EUisation’ to the ‘top-down’ approach, there are some scholars who take into consideration the inter-relationships between bottom up and top down stages of EUisation and describe it as an interrelated two-way process (Beyers & Trondal, 2003; Bomberg & Trondal, 2000; Börzel, 2002, 2003; Howell, 2004; Torreblanca, 2001; Radaelli, 2003, 2004, 2012; Vink, 2002; Wong, 2007; Wong & Hill, 2011). For instance, Howell conceptualised it as a downloading, uploading and cross-loading process (Howell, 2004, p. 20-25; see also Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009; 2012; Wong & Hill, 2011) This third conceptualisation, a bottom-up, top-down style and inter-relations between these stages and processes, portrays it as ‘an ongoing, interactive and mutually constitutive process of change, linking national and European levels, where the responses of the member states to the integration process feed back into EU institutions and policy processes and vice versa’ (Major, 2005, p. 177). In other words, while member states are actively shaping European policies and institutions, they and candidate states - in some cases non-candidates - are also (having) to incorporate(ing) them at the domestic level (Börzel, 2001, p. 2; Wong, 2007; Wong & Hill, 2011). In this sense, Radaelli (2004, p. 5) gave one of the comprehensive definitions of EUisation:
“Europeanisation consists of processes of: a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies”\textsuperscript{10}.

As Major put it, however, ‘Being bound up in a circular movement is of little help as it blurs the boundaries between cause and effect, dependent and independent variable’ (Major, 2005, p. 177). There is thus a need to delimit the meaning of EUisation and clarify which definition of EUisation is relevant to this study in order to achieve methodological consistency. We will therefore broadly focus on a ‘top-down’ approach to understanding and explaining the role of the EU in the transformation of a state’s (Turkish) foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during its accession process to the EU. In other words, we are interested in understanding the significance of Turkey’s EU candidature on its foreign policymaking process and foreign policy outcomes towards its non-EU neighbours. As noted previously, this study argues that the changes in the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations, and in the interests, priorities and demands in foreign policy-making that have resulted from the liberalisation of the Turkey’s authoritarian political regime, which was generated by EU conditionality in the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s political system to the EU acquis, have become the main driving force behind the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. Thus, this study considers EU pressure, incentives and the outcomes of European integration throughout the EU to be an independent variable, while changes in the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations, and the interests, priorities and demands in foreign policy-making that have resulted from Turkey’s increasing adaptation to the EU acquis are considered to be an intermediate variable, and changes in Turkish foreign policy outcomes (TFP)\textsuperscript{11} (for this study, TFP towards Turkey’s non-European neighbours) are considered to be a dependent variable. This

\textsuperscript{10} In parallel with this definition Vink (2002) also describes EUisation as a two-way process involving: i) the evaluation of European institutions, rules, norms and implementations, and ii) their impact on the political structure and process of the member and candidate states.

\textsuperscript{11} Accordingly the dependent variable in our study is not measured as ‘EUisation’ but foreign policy change.
reflects a relationship between A (independent variable), B (intermediate variable) and C (dependent variable).

In this regard, for the purpose of this study, we briefly define EUisation in parallel with the ‘top down’ approach, but we narrow it down to the realm of foreign policy: a process of change in institutions, institutional structures, institutional power relations, foreign policymaking mechanisms, foreign policy preferences, interests and policy outcomes that are directly and/or indirectly and intentionally and/or unintentionally impacted by institution-building and policymaking at the European level. As previously noted, our study is interested in analysing the influence of Turkey’s EU candidature on its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. Considering the lack of EU conditionality related to the TF towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours (see EC Yearly Progress Reports on Turkey) our analysis is limited to the process of foreign policy change at the national level that is generated indirectly and unintentionally by the EU. Accordingly, we use EUisation as a conceptual framework to describe the process of change in institutions, institutional structures, institutional power relations, and the interests, priorities and demands in foreign policy-making at the Turkish level caused by Turkey’s EU candidature. The question herein is how to measure and assess the influence of the EU on Turkish political system and foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours

2.4 Mechanisms of EUisation

There is no single content or mechanism to analyse the domestic impact of the EU in any field, state or region (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.10). Different states and regions, as well as policy fields, require the use of a different analytical logic because of the disparate natures of different institutions, identities, traditions, policies, states and regions. Consequently, Europeanisation scholars (Börzel, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Checkel, 2001; Heritier et al., 1996; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Knill & Lenschow, 1998; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Lehmkuhl, 1999; March & Olsen, 1995; Schneider, 2001; Sedelmeier 2011, 2012; Wong, 2007; Wong & Hill, 2011) focus on different variables to explain the domestic impact of the EU, including: the misfit gap between the domestic and EU levels (Börzel & Risse 2003, 2007, 2009; Heritier et al., 1996; March & Olsen,

Although Europeanisation scholars (Börzel, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Checkel, 2001; Heritier et al., 1996; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Knill & Lenschow, 1998; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Lehmkuhl, 1999; March & Olsen, 1995; Schneider, 2001; Sedelmeier 2011, 2012; Wong, 2007; Wong & Hill, 2011) focus on different variables to account for the domestic impact of the EU, their arguments, to some extent, are that, first, the EUisation of domestic institutions and policies exhibits diversity because, as noted by Olsen (2002: p.936), ‘European signals are interpreted and modified through domestic traditions, institutions, identities and resources’. Second, the degree of misfit between the domestic and European levels determines the EU adaptation pressure and the changes that are required at the domestic level. Third, misfit is necessary for domestic EUisation, but it is not sufficient to carry out the required changes. Therefore, fourth, they, to a large extent, embed the Europeanisation approach with a logic of consequences (rational institutionalism) and a logic of appropriateness (sociological institutionalism) in order to account for domestic EUisation through the benefits that are obtained from its variables, methods and mechanisms. In this context, by embedding Europeanisation with the rational and sociological versions of the new institutionalist approach, Schimmelfennig (2010) and Börzel & Risse (2009, 2012) explicitly emphasise the direct and indirect mechanisms that account for domestic EUisation.

Table 1. Mechanisms and Conditions of EUisation

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<tr>
<th>Logic of consequences</th>
<th>Conditionality</th>
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<tr>
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<td>(Cost/benefit calculation in rule compliance)</td>
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<td><strong>Capacity-building</strong></td>
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<td>(Empowerment of pro-EU actors and institutions)</td>
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<th>Logic of appropriateness</th>
<th>Socialisation</th>
<th>Mimicry</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Frequency and density of contacts and identification)</td>
<td>(Normative emulation)</td>
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<td><strong>Persuasion</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Legitimacy/Reason-giving)</td>
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Sources: Adapted from Schimmelfennig (2010) and Börzel & Risse (2012).

According to Schimmelfennig (2010) and Börzel & Risse (2009, 2012), through direct mechanisms, the EU takes an active role and intentionally seeks to spread its polity, politics and policies in its interactions with domestic actors and institutions. By contrast, through indirect mechanisms, the EU either plays an active role or intentionally aims to diffuse its polity, politics and policies. Nevertheless, a domestic actor that views the EU’s polity, politics and policies as ‘best practices’ simply transfers them to the domestic level to solve problems and/or overcome crises that it encounters.

### 2.4.1 Direct mechanisms of EUisation

The first direct mechanism of domestic EUisation is conditionality, which works through instrumental rationality and relies on the manipulation of the utility calculations of domestic actors and the empowerment of pro-EU actors and institutions (‘capacity-building’). The EU creates positive and negative incentives through ‘setting conditions that domestic actors have to meet to obtain rewards and/or to avoid sanctions from the EU’ (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.8; see also Börzel & Risse, 2012: p.8). In addition, if domestic actors and institutions are not capable of meeting the EU’s conditions, the EU
empowers them against veto players.

In this regard, Börzel & Risse (2003, 2007, 2009) propose a three-step EUiisation framework (adaptation pressure, intervening factors and domestic change) that is largely cited and accepted by Europeanisation scholars; it suggests that a high level of incompatibility and inconsistency between EU and domestic levels requires substantially more adaptation pressure, effort, collaboration and altruism to achieve the expected changes at domestic level. In this instance, the level of ‘misfit’ or compatibility determines the adaptation cost and pressure during the domestic EUisation process, with a high level of ‘misfit’ incurring greater adaptation costs and additional adaptation pressure. Therefore, according to this argument, misfit and adaptational pressure constitute the first step of domestic EUisation. As Europeanisation scholars put it, ‘[t]he degree of fit or misfit constitutes adaptational pressures, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for expected change’ (Börzel & Risse, 2000: p. 1, see also 2007, 2009). The second step is the presence of capable actors and institutions that respond to EU regulations and directives by implementing the necessary changes at the domestic level.

If there is a ‘misfit’, there is need for domestic reforms and transformation to reduce the gap between the domestic and EU levels. The EU thus sets conditions that associated actors and institutions must meet to obtain the EU’s rewards, and sometimes, to avoid the EU’s sanctions. The rewards usually consist of accession, trade agreements and financial aid, and sanctions are the suspension and/or termination of aid and/or such agreements (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.9). As such, the EU pressures member and non-member states to carry out the required reforms and changes at a domestic level. The effectiveness of conditionality therefore depends on intervening factors, including: a) the size and certainty of EU rewards (the credibility of the EU’s conditionality)—EU rewards must be higher than domestic adaptation costs and the domestic actor ‘needs to be certain that it will receive the rewards only when the conditions are met’ (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.9); and b) the presence of capable domestic actors and institutions to carry out the necessary reforms and changes at the domestic level.
If domestic actors and institutions are not capable or the domestic structure is not legally and physically suitable to perform the required reforms and transformation to meet the EU’s conditions, the EU empowers domestic actors and institutions. This comes into fruition in two ways: (a) through the EU’s technical and economic support (Börzel, 1999; Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Knill, 1999, 2001)—the EU provides technical and economic support, such as funding, education and various forms of assistance to domestic institutions and actors to improve their ability and capacity to carry out the necessary reforms at the domestic level (Börzel & Risse, 2000, 2003; see also 2007, 2009); and (b) by the redistribution of power and resources through the liberalisation of the domestic political system that results from democratic and market-oriented harmonisation reforms (Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2005; Vachudova, 2005).

As such, the EU plays an active role and intentionally seeks to spread its polity, politics and policies in its interaction with a state and/or an actor by setting conditions, employing pressure, empowering pro-EU actors and institutions and manipulating the cost/benefit calculations of domestic actors. As noted by EUisation students (Börzel & Risse, 2009, 2012; Börzel & Pamuk, 2012; Kelley, 2004; Lenz, 2012; Noutcheva & Duzgit, 2012; Sedelmeier, 2012; Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012; van Hullen, 2012), this mechanism is generally expected to be particularly relevant for the candidate countries that seek EU membership and the European neighbourhood and other countries that seek access to the EU market.

Considering EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and technical and economic support for the alignment of Turkey’s political system to the EU acquis in the field of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm, this mechanism is useful for assessing the influence of the EU on the liberalisation of Turkey’s political regime over the last decade. This study therefore utilises this mechanism to analyse the influence of the EU on the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime over the last decade. Due to the lack of EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and technical and economic support for the alignment of Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU countries to EU/CSDP norms and values, this mechanism itself does not provide a comprehensive analytical tool to assess the influence of the EU on the transformation of TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU
neighbours.

The second direct mechanism is socialisation, which ‘works through normative rationality or the logic of appropriateness’ and is based on the alteration of beliefs, identities and interests through social learning and persuasion (Börzel & Risse, 2012: p.9; see also Checkel, 2005; Johnston, 2007; March & Olsen, 1989, 1998). The argument is that EUisation is a kind of collective learning process that takes place in the context of reducing the incompatibility between policies and institutions at the EU and domestic levels and results in the development of a new identity by the adaption of domestic rules, norms, policies and procedures to the EU structure (Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2010). Without coercion, or directly effecting and/or manipulating the rational calculations of domestic actors through the use of various communities and advocacy networks, the EU tries to convince domestic actors of the appropriateness of its rules, norms and values through social learning and persuasion. As a result, associated domestic actors redefine their beliefs, identities and interests in accordance with those of the EU ‘if they are convinced of their legitimacy and appropriateness and if they accept the authority of the EU’ (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.9; see also Checkel, 2005).

In this sense, the EU plays an active role and intentionally seeks to spread its rules, norms and values by acting as a ‘socialisation agency’ and a ‘teacher of norms’, but it is important to note that the domestic EUisation process, through socialisation and persuasion, not only involves the incorporation by domestic actors of new norms and rules into existing institutions, but also, active contention and resistance (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2011). The effectiveness of this mechanism therefore depends on intervening factors, including the degree of coherence between the domestic and EU traditions, norms, and practices, and the frequency and density of interactions between the EU and domestic actors. Reducing high-level inconsistency between the EU and domestic levels in terms of beliefs, traditions and practices requires long term and dense interactions between the EU and domestic actors and institutions. On the other hand, the frequency and density of interactions between the EU and domestic actors and the ‘high resonance of EU’s norms, traditions and practices with those of the domestic actors’ provides favourable conditions for effective persuasion, and thus, EUisation,

This process of domestic EUisation is observed in candidates, neighbourhood countries and other regions of the world. As argued by many Europeanisation scholars (Checkel, 2005; Kelley, 2004; Knill, 1999, 2001; Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011), and as noted by Börzel & Risse (2012: p.10), ‘accession conditionality is always accompanied by efforts to persuade candidate countries of the normative validity and appropriateness of the EU’s institutional models’.\(^ {12} \) However, due to fewer incentives being offered by the EU in the promotion of its rules and norms in its dealings with other regions of the world, the mechanisms of persuasion are particularly employed to promote the rule of law, democracy and human rights in dealing with third countries (Börzel & Risse, 2009, 2012; Jetschke & Murray, 2012; Lenz, 2012). In this regard, considering, 1) the high level of inconsistency between Turkey’s and EU’s traditions, identities and political cultures, 2) the problematic relations between Turkey and the EU, and 3) the employment of this mechanism to promote the rule of law, democracy and human rights, this mechanism does not seem to provide useful analytical tools to assess the influence of the EU on the ongoing changes at the Turkish level in general, and on TFP towards non-EU countries specifically, during the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU.

2.4.2 Indirect mechanisms of EUisation

Emulation is an indirect mechanism of EUisation: it is based on the emulation by external actors of the EU’s rules, policies and practices without an active role and/or efforts by the EU. In other words, in contrast with conditionality, socialisation and persuasion, emulation does not include an active role and/or efforts by the EU to promote its norms, policies and practices (see Börzel & Risse, 2012: p.10; Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.9).

\(^ {12} \) As will be explained below in the section that addresses the new institutionalism, due to Turkey’s problematic relations with the EU and the fact that its culture is significantly different from that of Europe, this mechanism of EUisation would not be helpful in expanding the ongoing process of EUisation at the Turkish level, especially in its foreign policy.
Domestic actors simply incorporate EU regulations and practices to solve their specific issues and/or to achieve their specific political and economic objectives. Börzel & Risse (2012: p.9-12) divide such emulation into two categories: ‘functional emulation’ and ‘normative emulation’. Functional emulation is based on instrumental rationality and normative/mimicry emulation is based on the logic of appropriateness.

Börzel & Risse (2012) distinguish two mechanisms of functional emulation, namely, ‘competition’ and ‘lesson-drawing’. Competition is encouraged between domestic actors for the ‘best practice’ to achieve their political and economic goals, both in their regions and globally. Applicant, candidate and neighbourhood countries, as well as some other third countries, negotiate bilateral agreements with the EU based on their performance with regard to their adoption of EU rules, norms, practices and policies. With no proactive promotion by the EU, they unilaterally adopt the EU’s policies and practices by calculating the benefits of bilateral agreements and close relations with the EU. That is, as noted by Schimmelfennig (2010: p.9), ‘its (the EU’s) sheer ‘presence’ as a market and a regional system of governance produces (sometimes unintended or unanticipated) externalities. External actors adopt and follow EU rules because ignoring or violating them would generate net costs’ (see also Allen & Smith, 1990: p.19-39).

This study investigates the influence of the EU on TFP towards third countries\textsuperscript{13}. The collected secondary and primary data, including the interviews, reveal that Turkey’s relations with these countries are not a part of the EU-Turkey negotiations (see Yearly Progression Reports on Turkey; DIP4; DIP6; CIV4; CIV7; CIV9; CIV12). Turkey’s performance in solving its problems with and developing close political and economic relations with third countries might have some indirect influence on Turkey’s relations with the EU in the long term. It is not possible to talk about the net cost of Turkey’s relations with them with respect to its relations with the EU, however, or Turkey’s competition for the best practice of EU/CSDP norms and values in its relations with third countries. It is thus not possible to talk about the Turkey’s intentional unilateral adaptation to EU/CFSP norms and rules, or the calculation of its benefits on its relations with the EU. This mechanism of EUisation does not therefore provide a useful analytical

\textsuperscript{13} By the ‘third countries’ we refer to non-European countries.
tool to assess the influence of the EU on TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours.

Lesson-drawing, like competition, is based on instrumental rationality. However, rather than competition for best practices, it works through the search by domestic actors for institutional solutions that are suitable for solving the particular political and economic problems that they face. In other words, domestic actors strategically adapt EU institutions and practices to solve their particular problems with no pro-active role or effort by the EU. It is therefore a selective adaptation to EU norms and policies, rather than a wholesale transformation of institutional solutions at the domestic level (Börzel & Risse, 2012: p. 11; see also Alter, 2012; Jetschke & Murray, 2012; Lenz, 2012).

This process of domestic EUisation is observed in candidates, neighbourhood countries and in other regions of the world. As argued by many Europeanisation scholars (Checkel, 2005; Kelley, 2004; Knill, 1999, 2001; Schimmelfennig, 2005, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011; Vachudova, 2005), and as noted by Börzel & Risse (2012: p.10), ‘accession conditionality is always accompanied by efforts to persuade candidate countries of the normative validity and appropriateness of the EU’s institutional models’.

The second indirect mechanism of EUisation is mimicry (normative emulation), which is based on the social logic of appropriateness. Domestic actors emulate the EU’s rules, norms and values, with no help from the EU, if they find them appropriate according to their prior identity, practices and beliefs. Thus, the driving force behind the transference of EU norms and practices to the domestic level is normative rationality, rather than instrumental rationality. In this sense, it resembles socialisation; however, in contrast to socialisation, it does not include an active role or effort by the EU to persuade domestic actors of the appropriateness of its norms and practices. Domestic actors simply incorporate the EU’s norms and practices into their domestic context only if they find them legitimate and appropriate (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.10; Börzel & Risse, 2012: p.10).

Considering the discourse of Turkish foreign policy-makers (see Sections 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.5.3; 5.5.4 in Chapter V), it is possible to discuss the influence of both lesson-drawing and the mimicry of EU practices on the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU
neighbours. Research findings, however, (see Sections 5.6.1; 5.6.2; 6.3 in Chapter V) also reveal that changes in the institutions, institutional structures, institutional power relations, interests and priorities in foreign policy-making that have resulted from the liberalisation of the Turkish political regime have had a visible influence on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. These mechanisms themselves do not therefore fully explain the influence of the EU on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours during the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU. As Börzel & Risse (2000: p.4) put it, ‘the issue is no longer whether Europe matters, but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point of time’. The problem is, however, as Knill and Lehmkuhl argue, ‘the lack of a comprehensive explanatory framework to account for varying patterns of domestic adaptation across policies and countries’ (1999: p.11). The question is therefore how to measure and assess the domestic impact of the EU in general, and more specifically the influence of the EU on TFP toward Turkey’s non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process, despite the absence of EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and persuasion related to TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. We thus propose an additional indirect EUisation mechanism: the secondary domestic EUisation mechanism.

2.4.3 Secondary domestic EUisation mechanism

Although they focus on different intervening factors, the mechanisms discussed above elucidate the direct and indirect ‘primary’ domestic impact of the EU, and thus they can be called the ‘primary domestic EUisation mechanisms’. I will, however, investigate an alternative domestic EUisation mechanism, in addition to the aforementioned domestic EUisation mechanisms. I call it the secondary domestic EUisation mechanism, and it is based on the alteration of institutions, institutional power relations and interests in field(s) through EUisation in another field(s). The changes in a field(s) arise from, or are triggered by, the alterations in another field(s) that are generated by the aforementioned direct and/or indirect primary domestic EUisation mechanisms. In this mechanism, the EU neither intentionally seeks to diffuse its norms, practices and policies nor to play an active role in the diffusion of those norms, practices and policies at the domestic level, however, the empowerment of new actors and the diffusion of EU norms, practices and
policies in (a) domestic field/s unintentionally causes changes in interests, priorities and demands in another field(s), which thus change the rules, practices and policies in this field. As such, the EU indirectly causes changes in this field without having such an intention or playing an active role. In this sense, to some extent, it resembles the indirect mechanisms of domestic EUisation, however, in contrast, domestic actors do not also intentionally seek to adapt to the EU’s rules, practices and policies or to directly and intentionally emulate them. Thus, although neither the EU nor the domestic actors intentionally seek EUisation in a field, changes in rule(s), practice(s), institution(s) and/or policy(ies) in a field(s) which are generated by the EU, unintentionally cause changes in the rules, norms, implementations and policies in another field(s). For instance, as mentioned above, and as will be further explained in following chapters (Chapters V and VI), the findings of our research show that neither the EU nor Turkey has aimed to change TFP towards its non-EU neighbours through the liberalisation of Turkey’s political and economic system that occurred as a result of harmonisation reforms undertaken to meet EU conditionality in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm. However, the harmonisation reforms have unintentionally played an important role in the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours by changing institutions, interests, preferences and demands in foreign policy-making (for details, see Chapter V, specifically Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2).

Consequently, our study will benefit from the conditionality mechanism, especially examining how liberalisation in Turkey’s domestic politics is brokered by the EU. In considering the transformation of TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours, it is not possible to discuss EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of foreign policy, thus we will benefit from the aforementioned indirect secondary EUisation mechanism in the assessment of the influence of the EU on TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours during the country’s accession process to the EU.

2.5 EUisation in high politics

The majority of empirical studies on the domestic impact of the EU focus on the impact of the EU on member state socio-economic policies and practices. The impact of the EU
on member state foreign policies in general and more specifically on non-member state foreign policies has become less popular with researchers. As will be explained below, with the emergence of a Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), however, an increasing number of studies began to focus on the impact of the EU on the foreign policies of associated states’. Whether, if so, how and to what extent the member and candidate states’ foreign policies have been influenced and re-orientated by EU membership and/or candidature have become subjects of these studies. One of the most, if not the most, comprehensive research in this regard is the National and European Foreign Policies Towards Europeanisation, which is a book written by Wong and Hill (2011). The concept of Europeanisation is employed to analyse the interaction between the EU’s foreign policy and national foreign policies. This concept examines the interaction between the foreign policies of ten member states and EU foreign policy toward third states in terms of uploading, downloading, and cross-loading dimensions of EUisation, and is the first systematic study of a large group of member states. The study covers a range of ten different old and new member states\textsuperscript{14} to build an effective sample of 28. Based on the previously developed Europeanisation frameworks, it assesses the questions of “How does the influence run? In what issue areas? With what significance?”

Regarding the EUisation of national foreign policies, Wong and Hill concluded that first, in varied degrees, the foreign policies of the member states towards the different issue areas had become more coherent through EU membership (Wong and Hill, 2011, p. 230). “There is a trend, albeit broad and slow, towards convergence. Even where the effectiveness, or impact, of European foreign policy is limited, as over the Israel/Palestine dispute….” (Wong & Hill, 2011, p. 232). Second, factors such as socialisation, leadership, external federators, politics of scale, legitimisation of global roles and geo-cultural identity promote the EUisation of national foreign policies (Wong & Hill, 2011, p. 220). Third, factors such as the ideological hostility to further integration, differences in identity, historical ties and foreign security and economic policies, and the uneven patterns of special relationships which the member states enjoy

\textsuperscript{14} Namely, France, Germany, Italy, UK, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finnish, Poland, and Slovenia.
with third countries, obstruct the EUisation of national foreign policies (Wong & Hill, 2011, p. 224-226).

The other three most significant studies (National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation 1983), as a continuation of The Actors in European Foreign Policy (1996) and the last volume The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (2003) were written by Hill. He focused on how the evolving European economic and political cooperation has affected the foreign policy of member states by discussing the effects of socialisation on changing public and elite opinion and of domestic and administrative factors in relation and adaptation to the CSDP. Although it was not a major theme, the top-down model of EUisation was addressed, and Hill concluded that the foreign policies of the member states towards each other and the EU had become more coherent through EU membership (Hill, 1996; see also Wong & Hill, 2011).

In parallel, it is also argued that through the adaptation and transformation process, national identity and foreign policy interests are reshaped and redefined by a growing ‘we feeling’ and a common ‘role identity’ as a consequence of expanding socialisation, engagement and cooperation (Aggestam, 2004, p. 81-98; Wong & Hill, 2011, see p.228-232). The argument is that increasing consensus and consultation in foreign and security policy at EU level limits the potential of nation states to behave and react independently in the international arena (Tonra, 2001; Wong & Hill, 2011). Throughout this process new rhetoric, habits and beliefs come into practice which shape the behaviours of associated states at both the domestic and global scale (Terzi, 2008, p. 7-8; 2010; Wong and Hill, 2011). It is correctly argued, however, that although the EUisation of foreign policy has occurred particularly fast for new members (Whitman & Manners, 2000), foreign policies towards third countries amongst the founding member states must still undergo reform in order to foster a more harmonised foreign policy at EU level (Whitman & Manners, 2000; Wong & Hill, 2011, p. 230-232).

The other influential study in this regard is ‘The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States’, by Manners and Whitman (2000), which discusses how the involvement in CSDP reoriented the actions, choices and opportunities of the foreign policy of nation states. Such factors as adaptation, socialisation, national bureaucracy, and self-interest
and ‘special relations’ shaping the foreign policy of member states were covered in this study. The authors examined the effects of adaptation and socialisation\textsuperscript{15} on changing national foreign policy interests and preferences. Adaptation was explored as an alignment with the CSDP requirements. Socialisation was assessed as one of the main factors behind the changing ‘practices, perceptions and interest of policy makers’ (Manners and Whitman, 2000, p. 7-8). Like Aggestam, they found that the foreign policies of nation states are increasingly restricted and shaped by the EU as a result of acquiring a ‘we feeling’, a common ‘role identity’ and a feeling of ‘common destiny’ as a consequence of increasing coordination, socialisation and flow of information among member states. The common argument is that member states redefine their national interests and identities as a result of intensifying relations in the EU context, bringing about changes in the associated states' foreign policy, which fit with the sociological institutionalist explanation of EUisation.

The term ‘Europeanisation’ was explicitly employed by Tonra to analyse how Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign policy has changed throughout their EU membership. Norms and values were the focus point of this comparative study. The argument was that national norms and values in relation to the EU have changed over time. This internalisation of norms and values has changed beliefs and expectations of national foreign policy actors who bring about transformation in national foreign policy rhetoric and practices (Tonra, 2001). EUisation is explained in foreign policy terms as ‘A transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the way in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalization of norms and expectation arising from a complex system of collective European policy making’ (Tonra, 2000, p. 245).

There are very few studies that have examined the influence of the political, economic and social development generated at a domestic level by EU membership on national foreign policy. ‘Europeanisation of Spanish Foreign Policy’ written by Torreblanca

\textsuperscript{15} The authors examined how member states changed their foreign policies in parallel with the CFSP towards other member states and third countries. In this process socialisation was considered as a factor shaping foreign policy interests and preferences of the member states in line with that of the EU. See Jan Manners and Richard G. Whitman (2000, p. 8-7).
(2001) is one, if not the only one. Torreblanca argues that ‘changes in Spanish foreign policy are part of a wide process of political, economic and social modernization’ (Torreblanca, 2001, p.1). The importance of the democratisation process and market-oriented reforms resulted in multilateralism, specifically stressed in this study as the main factor behind the changes in Spanish foreign policy. New institutionalism (rational and sociological versions of it) with ‘Europeisation’ was employed as a theoretical framework in this study. It is argued that the EUisation of Spanish foreign policy is a consequence of both ‘logic of appropriateness’ and ‘logic of consequentiality’ (Torreblanca, 2001). The argument was that there are different logics and motivations behind the policy convergence and policy transfer. One of the main motivations behind the policy convergence is becoming a full and loyal member of the EU, and for the policy transfer the promotion of national interests. In fact, the typology of policy change as a ‘policy convergence’ and a ‘policy transfer’, and the explanatory instruments such as democratic and market-oriented reforms used in his study to explain the changes in Spanish foreign policy through EU membership, are in many ways helpful in explaining the changes in traditional TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours (see Chapter V). While arguing how actor preferences and interests are shaped or constrained in socialist and conservative governments, Torreblanca (2001) concluded that they were seeking international acceptance and recognition. This argument, to some extent, seems useful to explain why the ruling AK Party-Justice and Development Party- (AKP) followed the multidimensional ‘Europeanised’ foreign policy approach (See Chapter IV and V).

A conceptual framework for measuring how EU membership has been shaping the foreign policy of associated states was advanced by Smith (2000), who conceptualised four indicators for domestic adaptation to CSDP requirements: (1) elite socialisation, (2) bureaucratic restructuring, (3) constitutional changes, and (4) the increase in public support for CFSP. His argument about elite socialisation, which is shared by authors such as Pomorska (2007), Nuttall (1997) Manners and Whitman (2000) and Wong and Hill (2011), is that policymakers are socialised into the institutionalised network system and

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16 In this regard, the examination of the influence of the political, economic and social development at Turkish level, generated by EU membership, on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours, as undertaken by this study, would contribute to the Europeanisation study.
develop a certain trust and a common understanding. ‘The success of EPC came through socialisation. All participants in CFSP attest to the beneficial effect of the club atmosphere in bringing points of view closer together and making consensus easier’ (Nuttall, 1997, p. 3). Examining national bureaucratic adaptation to CSDP, Smith (2000) claimed that although EU members had not yet fully harmonised their foreign policy rhetoric and practices they had visibly organised their foreign ministry in accordance with CSDP requirements, and he stressed three changes: (1) the establishment of new officials such as Political Director, (2) the expansion of most national diplomatic services, and (3) reorientation of national foreign ministries towards ‘Europe’. Constitutional amendments in adaptation to CSDP are not usually required owing to the nature of CSDP, but some associated states, as Pomorska (2007) argued in the Polish case, have reoriented their national legal structures to meet CSDP requirements and norms. Polity and political adaptation to the EU *acquis communautaire* seems to be a first step towards policy changes in the EUisation of the foreign policy of associated states. We acknowledge that policy changes are, to some extent, a consequence of polity and political adaptation to the EU *acquis communautaire*, and therefore Smith’s conceptual framework would, to some extent, serve this study’s assessment of changing TFP towards Turkey’s neighbours.

As noted previously, the other argument about the Europeanisation of national foreign policy is that European foreign and security cooperation through the EU provides a channel for global and regional influence on both the EU and also associated states, by advocating and promoting their national interests and values on a global scale (Couloumbis, 1994; Rua, 2008; Wong & Hill, 2011). Associated states have therefore increasingly promoted cooperation in foreign and security policy realms. The traditional, cultural and historical background of associated states plays an important role in their acting as a regional and international power, but EU membership, and even candidate status, also enhances the acceptability of an associated state as a regional and international power. This provides an instrument and bargaining chip for defending their national foreign and security interests (Wong and Hill, 2011, 228-230). This has

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17 For a similar argument see Couloumbis (1994), who argued that Greece ‘uploaded’ its national interests and preferences to the EU level and thus its national interests and preferences in solving its foreign policy problems with its neighbours gained international status. In parallel with that argument, Savina (2008) also
resulted in the emulation of EU rules and adaptation to CSDP, in some cases voluntarily rather than as a result of EU adaptation pressure or conditionality (Jacoby, 2004; Wong & Hill, 2011).

Most of the studies in this area focus on the influence of the EU on the foreign policy of associated states. The main component of CSDP European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has, however, recently become the subject of study (Gross, 2007, 2009; Ericson, 2006; Howorth & Keeler, 2004; Wong & Hill, 2011). Until now, there have been very few studies (Howorth & Menon, 1997; Wong & Hill, 2011) of the domestic impact of EU/ESDP. The increasing enthusiasm of member states for ESDP was emphasised by Howorth and Menon (1997). Freedman and Menon (1997, p. 155-156) and Wong and Hill (2011), however, concluded that the EU had no direct impact on member state security and defence policies. Although this situation has changed considerably today, the influence of the EU on the security and defence policies of associated states is still the weakest point of the EU. The influence of the EU on British, French and German policymakers in responding to international crises is analysed by Eva Gross (2009) in her new study ‘Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy’\(^\text{18}\). She rightly argues that although the EU has increased its ability for military operations when responding to international crises, member states still consider NATO a more capable and credible institution than the EU in this situation. The influence of the EU on national choices in the security field is therefore still relatively limited. This does not mean, however, that the EU does not have any influence on the defence and security policies of associated states; by virtue of its character the ESDP is largely dependent on member state contributions for military operations and thus member states have considerable impact on ESDP (Gross, 2009). The EU/ESDP also has a major impact, however, on member state security policy, and several structural and administrative reforms generated at domestic level to adapt to ESDP requirements (Fredrick, 2008).

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\(^{18}\) Although it was not the main focus of their study, the influence of the EU on ten EU members (France, Germany, Italy, UK, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finland, Poland and Slovenia) responding to international crises was analysed by Wong and Hill (2011) in their new study ‘National and European Foreign Policies Towards Europeanisation’.
Although they are few, there are some studies that specifically focus on the influence of the EU on ‘new’ member and candidate state foreign policies. The changes in Polish foreign policy as a result of EU membership and the ability of Poland to ‘upload’ its foreign policy interests to the European level were explored by Kaminska (2007). She concluded that the successful adaptation of bureaucratic and administrative structure to EU legal regulations and CSDP generated by EU adaptation pressure changed the ‘way of thinking’ of bureaucratic and political elites and brought about changes in Polish foreign policy. At the same time, successful adaptation to EU/CSDP and increasing dialogue provided the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the ability to ‘upload’ its national interests and foreign policy preferences to EU level.

On the other hand, Pomorska’s (2007, p. 25-51, 2011, 167-187) studies of the EUisation of Polish foreign policy embrace two terms of EUisation processes: before and after EU accession. She addresses changes in domestic organisational structure, institutional culture and everyday practices, and analyses the adaptation process of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to EU membership and participation in CSDP. It is rightly argued that the adaptation process started with the accession negotiation and accelerated especially after Poland became an active observer of the EU and began to attend meetings inside the Council (Pomorska, 2007, 2011, p. 184). Consequently, the experimental learning and socialisation of diplomats has increased, which has brought changes in Polish foreign policy in line with the CSDP (2011, p. 184). She also observes that in comparison with the EU membership phase, changes and transformation in Polish foreign policy and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in negotiation processes, were mainly caused by EU conditionality (Pomorska, 2007). The process of EUisation experienced in Polish foreign policy has generally been shared by other new member states (Pomorska, 2007, 2011). Kajnč (2011) examined the impact of the EU on Slovenian foreign policy before and after EU accession. She concluded that, first, the EU’s conditions for membership provided structure for the Slovenian foreign ministry, foreign policy-making, and foreign policy, especially in the field of trade policy. Second, adaptation to the EU’s conditions for

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19 It is important to note that Kajnč’s (2011) and Pomorska’s studies also examined the influence of Poland and Slovenia on the agenda of the EU foreign policy; in other words, the uploading dimension of EUisation.
membership, taking part in CSDP and the 2008 EU Presidency, broadened the foreign policy of Slovenia in geographic and thematic terms. Thirdly, as do many smaller states, Slovenia played an active role as an honest broker during its EU Presidency. Fourthly, there was increasing socialisation into European politics, especially during Slovenia’s EU Presidency

(Kajnč, 2011:206-207).

It is argued, however, that ‘the EU’s application of conditionality varies across issue areas, target countries, and over time’ (Sedelmeier, 2006). Some scholars have questioned the effectiveness of conditionality (Grabbe, 2006; Pridham, 2005; Smith, 2003). As argued above, some alternative strategies such as socialisation of the elite, experimental learning, persuasion and voluntary adaptation also played an important role in the EUisation of candidate state foreign policy rhetoric and practices. In addition, some studies have also focused on the role of mediating actors in the EUisation process. They conclude that mediating actors gained power in this process as a result of democratic and economically-oriented reforms generated by the EU, and that therefore, they are playing a positive role in candidate state adaptation to EU/CSDP, and also in changes in their foreign policy (see Schimmelfennig, 2005; Vachudova, 2005).

There are also studies that analyse the impact of the EU on TFP (Akcam, 2001; Belge, 2004; Bilgic & Karatzas, 2004; Brewin, 2000; Diez & Rumelili, 2004; Eryilmaz, 2007; Heper, 2005; Rumelili, 2005, 2007; Karaosmanoglu & Tashan, 2004; Kutlay, 2009; Kirisci, 2006; Oguzlu, 2004; Tocci, 2005; Terzi, 2005, 2008; 2010; Tekin, 2005; Tekeli, 2000). They mostly assess the influence of the EU on TFP towards Turkey’s EU neighbours, namely Greece and Cyprus. They primarily use the conditionality mechanism and base their conceptual frameworks on rational institutionalism. However, systemic research into how, to what extent and under what conditions the TFP towards its neighbours have been reoriented by EU candidature is in its early stages. Thus, the examination of the influence of the EU on TFP toward Turkey’s non-EU neighbours

20 However, Kajnč also noted that tracing membership in NATO also shifted Slovenian orientation “from that of a ‘Europeanist’ to a more ‘Atlanticist’ position, which evolved into a foreign policy characterized by the principle of ‘balance’” (Kajnč, 2011:207).
would contribute to the increasing literature on the influence of the EU on national foreign policies in general and on TFP in specific.

As noted by Europeanisation scholars (Hill, 1993; Ginsberg, 1999; Tonra & Cristiansen, 2004, cited in R. Wong, 2007, p. 322; White, 2001, 2005, p. 54-55; Smith, 2002; Wong & Hill, 2011) European Foreign Policy (EFP) is analysed under three subtitles: a) the national foreign policies of member states; (b) EC external trade relations and development policy, and (c) the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP/ESDP). The issue here is that there are also different meanings of EUisation in the context of CSDP, and therefore, we should identify which one is relevant to this study. In terms of the EUisation of Greek foreign policy Agnantopoulos (2005, p. 2) distinguished at least four different uses of the term ‘EUisation’: (1) a process of convergence to a European mainstream, (2) a diplomatic lever and using EU instruments in the pursuit of national goal, (3) a process of adaptation of national foreign policy structure to the EU standards (to adapt national foreign policy structure to the CSDP requirements refers to the constitutional and administrative reforms at domestic level), (4) the influence of the EU on ‘domestic sources’ of foreign policy. From this perspective, changes in foreign policy are considered part or a result of reforms generated by the EU and its conditionality in the fields of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm. We will limit the scope of our analysis to the changes in TFP towards it non-EU neighbours during the EU candidature. The third and fourth meaning of EUisation is thus more relevant to this study. In other words, we will analyse the impact of democratic and economic reforms, generated by the EU conditionality in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and in the economic realm, on ‘domestic sources’ of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours.

It is worth noting, however, that political and polity adaptation to EU/CSDP, and policy change is not the same thing. Changes in foreign policy can be a result of polity and political adaptation to the EU/CFSP, the internalisation of EU norms and values, and democratic and market-oriented reforms caused by the EU. One could choose any or all of these variables. We choose democratic and market-oriented reforms as the main variables that play a role in changing TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours. In
contrast to the general argument of EUisation scholars in the field of foreign policy, we argue that the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours over the last decade is, to a large extent, an unintended consequence of EU conditionality in the field of democracy, the rule of law and in the economic realm which brought about an alteration in domestic sources of TFP and a broadening of the TFP approach to include different dimensions.

All in all, the literature review of the domestic impact of the EU demonstrates that: 1) there are different definitions of EUisation, as well as different models, mechanisms and approaches to analysing the domestic impact of the EU; 2) critical junctures in EU-associated states relations play a determinant role in punctuating equilibrium and starting the process of EUisation at a domestic level; 3) to a large extent domestic institutions matter in the domestic EUisation process; 4) the domestic response to the EU and its adaptational pressure varies owing to the variegated nature of formal and informal domestic institutions mediating for domestic change and adaptation to EU/CSDP; 5) in comparison to other policy fields, “there is a usually great sensitivity among most governments about foreign policy as a special domain in which national concerns dominate international or European interests” (Smith, 2000, p. 614; see also Wong and Hill, 2011, p.230-232); 6) in contrast with the nature of the other fields, the field of foreign policy does not include ‘obligatory implementation of EU law’ (Major, 2005, p. 180) and there is an intergovernmental decision-making mechanism (Wong & Hill, 2011, p. 228); 7) so the capacity of the EU as a supranational authority is relatively limited in the foreign policy realm. To observe a wide range of changes in the foreign policy realm in a limited time is therefore relatively difficult (Wong and Hill, 2011, p. 232); 8) methodologically, it is difficult to distinguish the impact of the EU from other exogenous and endogenous factors in the changing approaches, and/or outcomes, of the foreign policy of associated states (Major, 2005, p. 183; Radaelli, 2004, p. 9; Wong & Hill, 2011, p. 228-230); 9) because of the varying nature of different policy realms and countries, different policy fields, as well as countries, require the use of distinct analytical logic. As a result, Europeanisation scholars have developed a variety of conceptual frameworks and focused on different variables to explain the domestic impact of the EU; 10) Europeanisation is not a theory (Bulmer, 2007, p. 47; Wong & Hill, 2011: 231) and its
framework suffers from methodological weaknesses in identifying the variables that mediate changes. Accordingly, the term itself does not provide a comprehensive analytical framework to measure and analyse how, and to what extent, the EU policies, rules and norms generate changes in the domestic political systems and policies; 11) although theoretical framework is always selective (Goetz and Mayer-Shaling 2008, p. 19) and Europeanisation scholars focus on different variables and mechanisms to account for the domestic impact of the EU, EUisation is generally embedded within the new institutionalism in analysing the domestic impact of the EU. As Graziano and Vink (2013, p.11) observe in their recent survey of the literature, studies of EUisation “have mobilized all strands of the ‘new institutionalist approaches’— historical, rational choice and sociological”.

2.6 New institutionalism

There are several versions of new institutionalism, but three, historical, rational choice, and sociological institutionalism, and more recently, discursive institutionalism, are usually embedded with EUisation in analyses of the domestic impact of European integration throughout the EU. The following section will describe the four versions of new institutionalist theories and the key differences between them. All four might shed light on the domestic impact of the EU, as well as the importance of Turkey’s EU accession process in the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. As argued in the first chapter, and as will be elaborated below, however, the rational choice and historical versions of new institutionalism are likely to be the most useful in analysing and assessing the changes in Turkey, including TFP towards its non-EU neighbours, during the EU accession process, and the role played by the EU.

2.6.1 Historical institutionalism

Similarly to other versions of new institutionalist theories, HI defines institutions ‘as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political economy’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996: p.938). It also conceptualises and stresses the relationship between institutions and individual or political behaviour. However, HI regards the institutions as the ‘results of large-scale and
long-term processes’ and stresses the connection and relationship between historical development and institutions (Schmidt, 2011, p. 63). To understand and explain why a certain choice was made and/or ‘how something came to be what it is’ (Pierson, 2005: p.34), HI focuses on the development of institutions and how they structure actions and outcomes. It considers the phases of change, the path dependencies and unintended consequences that result from historical developments (see Hall & Taylor, 1996: p. 938; Hall & Thelen, 2006; Meunier & McNamara, 2007: p. 4; Schmidt, 2008, 2011; Steinmo et al., 1992; Thelen, 1999).

The argument of historical institutionalists is that current change and development is not only a response to contemporary demands, but also to previous circumstances (Hall & Taylor, 1996). In other words, they regard ‘the time’ and ‘historical developments as crucial in order to understand and explain later events and their causes. For this reason, they believe that an examination of the period of institutional origin provides them with a richer sense of the nature of a contemporary policy or political or social phenomenon (see Pierson, 1996: p.127). ‘The examination of a political phenomenon is best comprehended as a process that unfolds over time… and many of the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions – whether these be formal rules, policy structures, or norms’ (Pierson, 1996: p.126). As such, they engage in historical research by according special importance to the origins and the development of institutions21, and their influence on contemporary polities, politics and policies (Almond, 1956; Annett, 2010: p.4). In researching states, politics, policies and policy-making, and in evaluating them and the changes in them, they ‘combine effects of institutions and processes’ and pay attention to the ‘time’, ‘critical junctures’, ‘sequences’ and ‘tracing transformations’, and how the processes of interaction between institutions and organisations shape and reshape them.

This study investigates the transformation of TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours over the last decade, and the role of Turkey’s EU candidature in its transformation. It also addresses the important puzzle of why and how Turkey has developed close political and economic relations with its non-EU neighbours over the last decade, through abandoning

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21 They are situated in time.
its traditional disengagement foreign policy towards them. In other words, the study analyses how TFP toward Turkey’s non-EU neighbours came to be what it is. It argues that many of the contemporary institutions and implications of TFP are, to large extent, a direct or indirect, and/or intended or unintended result of turning points in EU-Turkey relations over the last decade. In this regard, engaging in historical research by according special importance to the origins and the development of institutions at the Turkish level, and how the processes of interaction between institutions and organisations throughout the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU have shaped and reshaped them, seems crucial to understanding and explaining the increasing changes in TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours and their causation. Examining these factors together, the historical institutional approach would contribute to an understanding and explanation of the increasing changes in TFP toward Turkey’s non-EU neighbours over the last decade, as well as their causes. For this reason, our study will consider both the effects of institutions and processes and will interweave the historical legacy with current conditions. Furthermore, as will be elaborated below, the concepts of HI, including the ‘critical juncture’, ‘path dependency’, ‘punctuated equilibrium’ and ‘unintended consequences’ provide advantages in examining what has precipitated the changes in TFP during the EU accession process. We will benefit, therefore, from the analytical toolkits of HI in identifying the explanatory variables and factors that have mediated changes in TFP toward Turkey’s non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process.22

The main concept that HI literature considers in explaining how institutions, political and social phenomenon, and policies occur, evolve or change is ‘Path Dependency’. Sewell defines path dependency, as ‘a relationship whereby what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ (Sewell, 1996: pp.262–263). In this regard, it means that the adaptation to a particular institution or policy at an earlier point in time will produce an additional adaptation of a similar nature in institutions or move on the same track at a later point in time (Kay, 2005: p.255; Skocpol and Pierson, 2002). As understood in accordance with Skocpol and Pierson’s (2002) definition, which states that ‘outcomes at a “critical

22 The implementation of this theoretical framework in the study will be described below and in subsequent sections.
juncture” trigger feedback mechanisms [negative or positive] that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future’, it is closely linked with the notion of ‘critical junctures’.

‘Critical junctures’ are political, social, or economic upheavals, historical moments or critical turning points in which dramatic changes occur and constitute starting points for the alteration of formal and informal institutions or preferences: they represent the starting points for path dependent processes. As Pierson, (2005: p.135) puts it, “[j]unctures are ‘critical’ because they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories”, 23 and they also determine the choice and power of agency and long-term development patterns. In the context of domestic EUisation, becoming an EU candidate or a member, and important agreements or disagreement and crises between associated states and the EU, are critical junctures that constitute the starting points for EUisation or deEUisation in domestic institutions or polices, and thus, for path dependent processes. Path dependency therefore means that once an EU institution or policy is incorporated at the domestic level, it is followed by additional adaptation to EU institutions or policies (Cowles and Curtis, 2004: p.300). In this context, how the critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations have triggered feedback mechanisms and how those mechanisms have reinforced the recurrence of particular institutions and policies in TFP at a later time will be investigated. As noted by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: p.4), counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing provide a rich analytical toolkit to analyse the role of critical junctures in changing institutions, policies and political outcomes. Critical junctures and counterfactual analysis, therefore, will be employed to enable us to benefit from their rich analytical toolkit in analysing how Turkey’s process of accession to the EU has created enduring effects on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. In this sense, as will be explained in the following chapter, we will conceptualise institutional and political changes that are the result of critical junctures, as well as their unintended impact on other fields (for this study, the field of foreign policy).

23 Although analyses of path dependence — except for the macro historical analyses of the development of entire polities — pay little attention to critical junctures and often focus on ‘reproductive’ phases, such as increasing returns, lock-in and the sequencing that is launched after a path-dependent process is initiated, critical junctures are important in the analysis of path dependence because institutional trajectories change at that time.
Pierson (2000: p.252) asserts that the concept of path dependency is closely connected with the idea of ‘sticky’ and increasing returns. Increasing returns means that ‘the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path’ (Pierson, 2000: p.252). Increased adaptation to a chosen institution or policy, on the one hand, increases the ‘relative benefits’ of maintaining that established institution or policy structure; on the other hand, it increases the cost of exiting the chosen alternative institution or policy (Pierson 2000: p.252). As such, due to the increasing returns of adaptation and the increasing costs of switching to an alternative, once an institution or a policy is established, it becomes *sticky* (Pierson 1996: p.143) and it *locks* itself in *equilibrium* for extended periods’ (Pollack 2005: p.20). As such, the concept of ‘path dependency’ is also connected with the notion of ‘locking in’ and *equilibrium*.

As previously discussed, however, a critical juncture is the starting point for path dependency. Thus, the original and/or chosen path is sticky and locks in equilibrium until an external critical juncture punctuates it and starts a new process on another path. In other words, institutions remain at equilibrium until they are punctuated by an external juncture. From this perspective, the explanation of change is ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (see Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). As argued previously, this study proposes that, for at least the past two decades, critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations have directly and/or indirectly occurred at turning points that have altered the institutions and institutional structure at the Turkish level and have started new eras in Turkey’s domestic, as well as foreign, policies.\(^{24}\) The equilibrium in Turkey’s institutional structure, as well as its domestic and foreign policies, has been punctuated by critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations. The concepts of ‘critical juncture’ and ‘punctuated equilibrium’ are, therefore, useful to explain the new processes of EU-Turkey relations and the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime.

\(^{24}\)As will be described in the following chapters, the announcement of Turkey as a candidate in 1999 initiated a new era in EU-Turkey relations and in the liberalisation of Turkey’s political and economic system by providing Turkey with a roadmap to begin accession negotiations with the EU, as well as guidance for the democratisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime.
Historical institutionalists argue that institution and policy building processes are complex and include a large number of factors, including unpredictable factors, which is why institutions are not merely the intended consequences of an actor’s choices. The actions of institutions or people—especially political actions—always have unanticipated or unintended consequences and effects. The path or institution/s that is/are purposefully adapted produces unintended outcome/s, in addition to intended consequences (Hall & Taylor, 1996: pp.941–942; Pierson, 2005: pp.43-44; see also Merton, 1936: p.895; Thelen, 1999; Vachudova, 2007). As detailed previously (see Chapter I, see also Chapters III and V), the main hypothesis of this study proposes that the institution and policy structures that have been adapted by Turkey as a result of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure have produced unintended outcomes in TFP towards its non-EU neighbours, in addition to the intended outcomes in the fields of democracy, the rule of law, and in the economic realm. The argument is that, although EU conditionality in the fields of democracy, the rule of law, and in the economic realm, did not (primarily) intend to change TFP towards Turkey’s neighbours, it has had an unintended impact. There is, therefore, a clear connection between Turkey’s EU candidature and its path of liberalisation, as well as its engagement in politically and economically-oriented close relationships with its neighbours, after decades of a policy of disengagement towards them. The concept of ‘unintended consequences’ is a useful toolkit to explain the hypothesis in this study, and consequently, we will utilise the ‘critical juncture’, ‘punctuated equilibrium’ and ‘unintended consequences’ concepts of HI to analyse the new processes, developments and changes in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy over the last decade.

As seen above, however, HI focuses on structures and processes and, to some extent, on events through critical junctures; however, it does not give much attention to what brings about the critical junctures that spur change, and which or whose actions, ideas and interests, and which changes to them, spurred those events, structures and processes. From this perspective, the political or institutional changes are seen as products of bursts of fate, a view that has been increasingly criticised and found to be flawed by historical institutionalists, who argue that reliance on junctures ‘gives human beings no agency’ (Steinmo, 2008: p.168; see also Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004).
As argued by many historical institutionalists, institutional changes are the products of changes in actors’ interests, values and ideas (Katzenelson & Weingast, 2005; Lieberman, 2002; Marcussen, 2000; McNamara, 1998; Steinmo, 2008). It is thus important to better understand the ways that actor interests and ideas change and the ways that they affect politics and history. In this vein, Streeck and Thelen (2005) identify five sets of common models of institutional change, however, they do not really offer an explanation or theory regarding the ways that actor interests and ideas change, or the ways that they bring about institutional change (Schmidt, 2008). HI’s framework itself, therefore, lacks an understanding and explanation of what brings about junctures, and which or whose actions, ideas and interests, and/or changes in them, drive events and processes, and thus, institutional and political changes.

In this vein, there is a need for tools from other approaches to overcome this shortcoming (Hall and Taylor, 1996: pp. 940-941; Schmidt, 2006). To this end, historical institutionalists primarily benefit from elements of the rational choice institutionalist approach (RI) and/or the sociological institutionalist approach (SI) (see e.g. Dobbin, 1994; Fligstein, 1990; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Immergut, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004). In our approach, for several reasons (that will be explained below), we benefit from elements of RI, which pays more attention to the actors, ideas and interests behind events and processes. As such, in addition to the aforementioned concepts of HI, the notions of ‘empowerment of actors’, ‘cost/benefit calculation’ and ‘maximisation of interest’ will be enhanced (as we shall see below).

### 2.6.2 Rational and sociological institutionalism

As in other versions of new institutionalism, RI and SI argue that there are interactions between individual behaviours and institutions. Institutions are a consequence of human action and, at the same time, they play a significant role in the determination of

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25 Such as a) ‘displacement’, in which one institution displaces another; b) ‘layering’, in which an institution adopts new functions on top of older functions; c) ‘drift’, in which the environment surrounding an institution changes, but the institution does not adapt in a stepwise fashion (see also Jacob Hacker’s chapter in Thelen and Streeck’s volume); d) ‘conversion’, in which institutions take on new functions, goals or purposes; and e) ‘exhaustion’, which refers to institutional breakdown and failure.
individual behaviours. Individuals construct institutions and, later, the institutions constrain and shape their behaviours in the political arena (Peters, 1999: p.141). Both the RI and SI schools seek to explain the role of institutions in the determination of individual behaviour and the relationships between institutions, individual behaviour and political outcomes. They focus on different institutions, both formal and informal, and the motivations that play a determinant role in individual political behaviours.26

Rational choice institutionalism sees individuals as ‘utility maximisers’ and argues that individuals conduct cost-benefit analyses and act strategically to maximise their material objectives and interests. It gives priority to the rational calculations and interests of actors, instead of the role of institutions, because it maintains that institutions are created by individuals to pursue and maximise their own interests and welfare (Blyth, 2002: p.306; Schmidt, 2008: p.321, 2011). The argument is that individuals calculate the benefits of adaptation to new institutions. If the costs of change or adaptation are less than the benefits, and if it will serve their interests, they make the necessary arrangements and changes to adapt to the new norms, values, rules and regulations (Schmidt, 2008, 2010). From this perspective, institutions may not initially determine actor interests and preferences in the political arena, but they have an impact on their strategic calculations (Harmsen, 2000: p.59).

As argued earlier, adaptational pressure is a required, but not sufficient, condition for domestic change. Mediating factors also play a significant role in this process (Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012). In this regard, the rational institutionalist approach emphasises the importance of two ‘mediating factors’, namely ‘multiple veto points’ and ‘formal institutions’, in the domestic EUisation process (Börzel & Risse, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). The number of institutional vetoes would particularly increase at the early stage of domestic EUisation. This makes it difficult to obtain the necessary consensus regarding the required changes at the domestic level for adaptation to the EU acquis. In such cases,

26For more information about the debate between rational choice institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism, see Hall and Taylor (1996).
the EU empowers pro-EU actors and institutions through providing technical and economic support to make the required changes at the domestic level (Börzel & Risse, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009; Lee, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012). In this process, the redistribution of recourses and power through the harmonisation reforms also empower pro-EU actors and institutions (Börzel & Risse, 2007, 2009).

In this regard, from a rationalist perspective, making the required arrangements at the domestic level to close the existing ‘misfit’ gap between the domestic and European levels is closely related to the cost/benefit calculation of rule compliance made by domestic actors, and the changes in the existing balance of power at the domestic level. The EUisation process, on the one hand, provides new opportunities to some groups and institutions (generally, NGOs and civil society), on the other hand, it may weaken and constrain the ability of some domestic actors and institutions to pursue their interests: ‘Europeanisation leads to domestic change through a different empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution of resources at the domestic level’ (Börzel & Risse, 2003: p.58, 2007, 2009; Knill & Tosun, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012). It is argued that the empowered formal institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially economic elites and organisations, play a significant role in countering resistance to change and adaptation in the domestic EUisation process (Börzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Knill, 1999; Schimmelfennig, 2005, 2009, 2010; Vachudova, 2005).

In this regard, Turkey’s enthusiasm for reforms that comply with the EU accession criteria could be explained by rational institutionalism. According to the rational choice approach, Turkish actors act according to the ‘logic of consequentiality’, they calculate that compliance with EU rules, regulations and norms—regardless of the considerable domestic adaptation costs—will bring greater long-term benefits than the status quo. As noted by Wolfgang (1997) the aspiration amongst governmental and non-governmental actors to adapt national norms to EU guidelines to gain entry to the EU is largely a rational choice. The EU’s technical and economic support, as well as market-oriented reforms and harmonisation laws that are undertaken to close the existing misfit gap.
between the Turkish and EU levels, also changes the existing balance of power in the Turkish political system by providing new opportunities to governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and by constraining the power of autocratic state institutions, such as the military, old bureaucratic elites and the National Security Council (NSC), to pursue their interests. By calculating their economic and political interests, these empowered actors and institutions seek to adapt the EU’s norms and directives. As such, this changing balance of power in the Turkish political system, based on the rational calculation of Turkish actors, plays an important role in Turkey’s increasing adaptation to the EU acquis. In this vein, in the Turkish case, civil and economic elites, and the government, represent strong adapters, whereas the military and the two main opposition parties (the National Movement Party and the Republican People's Party), despite their rhetoric favouring EU integration, remain weak adapters in this process. For the purposes of this study, we can even describe them as veto points.

Sociological institutionalism, in contrast, gives priority to the role of the culture, ideas and informal institutions of individuals in its analysis of their political behaviours. It argues that ‘behaviour is not fully strategic but bounded by an individual’s worldview’ (Börzel & Risse, 2007, 2009, 2012; Hall & Taylor, 1996: p.939; Schmidt, 2008: p.321). According to sociological institutionalist logic, the political behaviours of actors are not strictly rational; cultural and ideological motivations, norms and values, and identity are the main driving forces behind the determination of actor preferences and interests in the political arena (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999: pp.30-36; Hill, 2003: pp. 98-126; Schmidt, 2008, 2010, 2011; Tonra, 2003). Actors act according to what is right, according to the values and norms that prevail in the environment in which they are acting; this is called the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989). As a result of the ‘cognitive influence’ of political institutions, actor values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs are shaped (March & Olsen, 1989: p. 17) by ‘providing the cognitive scripts, categories and

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27 There are strong and weak adapters in the EUisation process. Lee (2005) divided them into two categories, from the micro-level fusion perspective. He argues that, across Europe, as a whole, governmental apparatus and administration, heads of government and foreign and finance ministers particularly arise as strong adapters; opposition parties and national parliaments remain largely weak adapters (Lee, 2005).
models that are indispensable for action’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996: p.15). Consequently, the role of persuasion, socialisation and learning in changing the interests and preferences of actors is emphasised. The argument is that, as a result of intensifying relations, actors who act in the same environment socialise and learn from each other, and thus, the shared understanding of values, ideas, norms and identity among those actors increases over time (Hall & Taylor, 1996: p.15; Schmidt, 2006, 2008, 2010). Actors therefore feel obliged to act in accordance with recognised roles, norms and values. In other words, identities, values and norms motivate actors, and they choose the most appropriate or legitimate rules, norms or behaviours from the alternatives (the logic of appropriateness). They are forced to act in accordance with the dominant norms, values and beliefs (Peter, 1999: p.29; Schmidt, 2006, 2008: p.321, 2010; Simon, 2005: p.377).

Sociological institutionalist logic also emphasises the importance of ‘change agents’ as a mediating factor in domestic EUisation. The actors and institutions that are increasingly engaged with the EU’s actors and institutions in the accession process assume the role of change agents. As such, at the domestic level, political culture and identity change over time, and thus, the EU’s values, ideas, norms and calls are increasingly found to be more appropriate and legitimate than the alternatives, making the necessary consensus regarding the required changes at the domestic level easy to achieve. As such, member and candidate states increasingly adapt to the EU’s norms and directives.

The logic of RI and of SI ‘are not mutually exclusive, any particular action probably involves elements of each. Political actors are constituted of both their interests, by which they evaluate their anticipations of consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions’ (March & Olsen, 1989: p.12). Depending on the actor and the case, the logic of one will play a more important role than the other. As Risse observes, ‘domestic adaptation with national colours’ does occur (Risse et al., 2001: p.1). In this regard, as previously noted, considering the significant differences between Turkey’s and Europe’s identities and political cultures, and Turkey’s problematic relations with the EU, changes in Turkey’s identity and political culture, and thus, in its polity, politics and policies through socialisation and experimental learning require much more time and intensive relations. Thus, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ plays a role that is
considerably less important than the ‘logic of consequences’ in Turkey’s increasing adaptation to EU acquis in the field of democracy, the rule of law and in the economic realm and transformation of TFP toward its non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process. The logic of the rational institutionalist approach is thus more helpful than the logic of SI in identifying the explanatory variables and factors that mediate changes in the context of our study.

2.6.3 Discursive institutionalism

Taking ideas and discourse seriously and placing them in institutional contexts, following the lines of a version of the older new institutionalism, led to the birth of the newest version of new institutionalism: discursive institutionalism (DI). DI follows the ‘logic of communication’ and emphasises the role of ideas and discourse in constructing a behaviour and/or a political action. Ideas that are categorised into two types, such as cognitive and normative, are seen as the substantive content of discourse:

>[D]iscourse serves not just to represent ideas but also to exchange them through interactive processes of (a) coordination among policy actors in policy and program construction and (b) communication between political actors and the public in the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of those ideas, against a background of overarching philosophies. (Schmidt, 2008: p.321)

Ideas and discourse thus matter in the construction and reconstruction of norms, values, interests and preferences, as well as in the dynamics of changes in history and culture, and therefore, in the construction of behaviour and/or political action. As noted by Schmidt (2008: p.321), for DI, ‘[i]nstitutional context also matters—both the formal institutional context (simple polities tend to have a more elaborate communicative discourse, compound polities a more elaborate coordinative discourse) and the more specific meaning context’. It uses background information that stems from one of the versions of the older new institutionalism with which they are engaged, and thus, it is complementary to older versions of new institutionalism in that it has ‘much in common with SI’ (Schmidt, 2008: p.304-305, 2010).
Discursive institutionalism also has aspects that contrast with older versions of new institutionalism in terms of its ‘logic’ and its explanation of institutions and institutional change, as well as norms and interests (Schmidt, 2008: p.304-305). In DI, ‘action in institutions is not seen as the product of agents’ rationally calculated, path-dependent, or norm-appropriate rule-following’. Institutions are defined dynamically as ‘structures and constructs of meaning internal to agents whose “background ideational abilities” enable them to create (and maintain) institutions while their “foreground discursive abilities” enable them to communicate critically about them, to change (or maintain) them’ (Schmidt, 2010: p.1). As such, in contrast to older versions of new institutionalism in which institutional change is static (for details, see the section above), institutional change in DI ‘is dynamic and explainable across time through agents’ ideas and discourse’ (Schmidt, 2008: p.321). In contrast to SI, in which norms are defined as static structures (see above), norms in DI are defined as dynamic, intersubjective constructs. DI defines interests as ideas, and thus, interests are subjective, which contrasts with RI, in which interests are objective and material (Schmidt, 2008: p. 321; see also 2006a, 2006b, 2010).

Ideas and discourse may have a causal influence on the construction and reconstruction of norms and interests, however, as noted by Lynggaard (2012, p. 20) ‘discourse traditions are not always and not exactly concerned with causal explanation’. Thus DI would not be fruitful in dealing with the causality issue in our study. DI’s assumption that ‘everything is related to ideas and discourse, with no neutral incentive structures and no objective and material interests’ (Schmidt, 2008: p.321) considers the presence of primarily material objectives in EU-associated state relations, which is seen as an extremely idealist promise. The literature review on Europeanisation clearly reveals the presence of neutral incentive structures, and objective and material interests, as well as their influence on the construction and reconstruction of discourse. As argued above, DI uses background information that stems from one of the versions of the older new institutionalism with which they are engaged. ‘We cannot have our cake and eat it too’.

28 As previously argued, older versions of new institutionalism define institutions as ‘static external rule-following structures of incentives, path-dependencies, and cultural framing’ (Schmidt, 2010: p.1).
29 The issue of whether the ideas and discourse construct and reconstruct interests and norms, or the interests and norms construct and reconstruct ideas and discourse, presents a ‘chicken-egg’ problem.
It is true that a theoretical framework ‘is always selective’ (Smith & Baylis, 2005: p.3), and no single methodological approach would be able to sufficiently explain the vast, and complicated political reality (Schmidt, 2008). ‘Each gets at a different piece of reality, at different levels of abstraction, with different kinds of generalisations, and different objects and logics of explanation’ (Schmidt, 2008: p.321; see also Bulmer, 2007: p.47; Goetz & Mayer-Shaling, 2008: p.19; Schmidt, 2010: p.304-305, 2011: p.65, 83; Smith & Baylis, 2005: p.3). However, as argued in the first chapter and detailed above, the logic of rational and historical institutionalist approaches seems to be more helpful than the logic of SI and DI to identify the explanatory variables and factors that mediate change for the purposes of our study. EUisation, embedded in the rational and historical versions of new institutionalism, thus constitutes the analytical toolkit used to examine the hypothesis in this study. The application of the selected theoretical framework to the study will be further explained in following chapter, which is the data analysis section.

Table 2: The Four New Institutionalisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rational Choice Institutionalism</th>
<th>Historical Institutionalism</th>
<th>Sociological Institutionalism</th>
<th>Discursive Institutionalism</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Object of Explanation</strong></td>
<td>Rational Behaviour and Interests</td>
<td>Historical Rules and Regularities</td>
<td>Cultural Norms and Frames</td>
<td>Ideas and Discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logic of Explanation</strong></td>
<td>Calculation</td>
<td>Path-dependency</td>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problems of Explanation</strong></td>
<td>Economic determinism</td>
<td>Historical determinism</td>
<td>Cultural determinism or relativism</td>
<td>Ideational determinism or relativism</td>
</tr>
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2.7 Concluding remarks

The purpose of this chapter was to introduce Europeanisation and its applicability to the field of foreign policy as a conceptual framework for analysing the changes in TFP as a result of EU candidature. In this regard, we first delimited the definition of EUisation for our research, and then referred to the mechanism of domestic EUisation. Here, misfit is considered to be a precondition for the EUisation of member and candidate states, but the consensus seems to be that there is also a need for capable mediating actors and institutions in the EUisation process. To identify the applicability of EUisation to the foreign policy realm, we conducted a literature review of the EUisation of member and candidate state foreign policy. We ultimately realised that CSDP does not always include EU conditionality and adaptation pressure, even if there is a misfit gap between domestic and EU levels in this realm. EUisation itself thus suffers from the lack of a certain methodology in identifying the mediating factors and variables for change in the foreign policy realm. We therefore used the explanatory instruments of historical and rational institutionalism in analysing the transformation of TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours and the influence of the EU.

The integration of Europeanisation with rationalist and historical versions of new institutionalism brings in six mediating factors to explain the EUisation of associated state policy, polity and politics as a result of EU membership and/or candidature: misfit and EU adaptation pressure (Europeanisation), critical junctures and path dependency (historical institutionalism) and veto points and formal institutions (rational institutionalism). In the EUisation process, Europeanisation as an explanatory variable emphasises the misfit gap between domestic and EU levels and EU adaptation pressure;
rational choice institutionalists emphasise the empowerment of new actors against the veto player in political decision making and the role of actors’ cost/benefit calculation; and historical institutionalists pay attention to the importance of path dependency, critical junctures and punched equilibrium, thereby changing institutions, institutional structure and policy-making.

In order to reveal the direct influence of the EU on the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime, several issues will be assessed in Chapter IV, including (1) the impact of the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels in terms of polity, politics and policy related to the EU adaptation pressure; (2) the importance of critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations in punctuating the equilibrium at Turkish level and the path of liberalisation of the Turkish political system; (3) the empowerment of the pro-EU actors and institutions against the veto players in political decision-making to carry out the necessary political and economic reforms and policy changes at the Turkish level through the technical and economic supports and harmonisation reforms conducted by the EU; (4) a cost/benefit analysis of Turkish actors in compliance with EU’s directives; (5) the increasing change in Turkey’s political, economic and social dynamics generated by Turkey’s compliance with the EU acquis communautaire; and (6) to reveal the secondary influence of the EU on TFP toward selected countries, the unintended consequences of liberalisation of Turkish political system will be assessed in Chapter V.
Chapter III

Research Design, Methodology, Data Collection and Analysis

3.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the research design and the methods used to collect, process and analyse data as well as to evaluate the hypotheses and evidence-building process. It first critically assesses the existing research design models used in studying the domestic impact of the EU. After determining that the existing research design models for studying the domestic impact of the EU are useful, but not comprehensive in fully explaining the secondary influence of the EU on TFP toward its non-EU neighbours, it introduces a new research design model. The data collection, processing and analysis processes are then introduced. In this context, the qualitative research method and the case study and interview analysis that are used in this thesis to answer the research question are explained. The chapter introduces these methods and an account of how they will specifically help to substantiate our hypothesis and answer the research questions. Finally, it assesses the evidence-building in the study. It introduces counterfactual scenario and triangulation approaches and an account of how they will be helpful in demonstrating the credibility and validity of analysis and interpretations in our study.

3.2 Research design

The nature of Europeanisation, its mechanisms, and the influence of the EU on member and non-member states have increasingly become a subject of discussion within academic literature. The issue of research design in EUisation study has been relatively the subject of few studies, however. Haverland (2005) focuses on the case selection issue and the demonstration of the causal importance of the EU for domestic change. As will be explained below in the counterfactual scenario section, Haverland proposes counterfactual reasoning, which we adapted, and a comparison of EU member states with non-members to overcome the challenges to the demonstration of the causal importance of the EU in domestic developments. Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009) look at causal
analysis in Europeanisation studies and focus on the methods and research design choices made by the most cited Europeanisation articles. Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2012) deal with the problem of causality in EUisation and focus on the logical structure and procedures for understanding causality in the EUisation. They took stock of the research agenda in the EUisation field and tried to tease out the appropriate research design to understand how the EU is having transformative effects on domestic change. As noted by Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009, 2012) and as seen in our literature review on EUisation in the previous chapter, the causal analysis in EUisation studies is organised around the Börzel’s and Risse’s (2003) concept of goodness of fit and new institutionalist propositions. Radaelli’s (2003) top-down and bottom-up research designs are primarily employed for empirical study (see also Caporaso, 2007; Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009, 2012; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007). It is also important to note that, no matter which strategy (top-down or bottom-up) is chosen, exploring changes over the years through case study is the most widely employed approach to EUisation studies (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009, 2012, p. 10; Haverland, 2008, p. 66; 2007). However, as seen in our literature review (see Howel, 2004, Radaelli, 1997) and noted by Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009, 2012), some studies were interested in the relationship between top-down and bottom-up approaches. Accordingly, with respect to their overall design, the existing research in the EUisation field can be categorized into three types (see Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2012, p. 9).

Radaelli summarises types of research designs in EUisation as the $Y = f (X)$ relationship. X indicates the cause (i.e. the EU input, directives), Y indicates the effect (i.e. variation at domestic level), and f indicates the relationship between X and Y (Radaelli, 2012, p. 9). The first type of EUisation research adapts a top-down research design model and focuses on X (the supposed cause: the EU input) as its starting point, and examines the level of fit/misfit between the EU and domestic levels in terms of practices in policies, politics, or polity. It then analyses the absence or presence of change at the domestic level (Heritier et al., 2001; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 2001; Börzel, 1999; Caporaso, 2007). In this research model, empirical analysis starts with the EU input (the supposed cause), and through engaging in a search for effects of causes (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009) traces the impact of the EU input (the supposed cause) all the way down to the domestic
level. On the other hand, instead of starting from the supposed cause (the EU input), the second type of EUisation research focuses on Y (supposed effect-domestic change) as its starting point to avoid “pre-judgment of top-down research design that the EU inputs caused domestic change and adapts a bottom-up research model” (Radaelli, 2003, 2006; Quaglia & Radaelli, 2007; Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005; Radaelli & Franchino, 2004; Bull & Baudner, 2004; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009, 2012). EUisation studies that adapt to this type of research design start their analyses from sets of institutions, rules, ideas, actors, and policies at the domestic level at a given time (t1). These studies then trace these sets over the years until a determined time (t2) and identify alterations and the possible causes of the alterations. They identify the critical junctures at which a major alteration takes place and whether the cause of these changes was national or came at an international level, as do the EU inputs. Such studies thus search for the causes of effects (Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009). The third type of EUisation research focuses on f, which is the relationship between the cause (X) and the effect (Y). Such EUisation studies adapt this research design model, identifying both the EU institutions, rules, ideas, frameworks, policies, and inputs in the policy field that are subject to study (X), and domestic change in this policy field (Y). This first stage of analysis lays the groundwork for the second analytical stage, the examination of the interaction between X and Y (f).

The research models presented above are designed to assess the primary direct and/or indirect influence of the EU on domestic change or the relationship between the EU input and domestic change. Our study also assesses not just the influence of the EU on domestic change, but the secondary influence of the EU on domestic changes (see Sections 1.2; 1.3 in Chapter I and 2.4.3 in Chapter II) - the influence of the changes in a domestic field/s generated by the EU on the changes in another field30. In other word, we

30 As previously argued (see Chapter I and II), our study assesses the influence of the EU on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours, despite the absence of EU conditionality, adaptation pressure, and persuasion in the field of foreign policy. It argues that, although the primary objective of EU conditionality in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, as well as in the economic realm, is not to change TFP towards its non-EU neighbours, it has indirectly and unintentionally caused changes in institutions, interests, priorities, and demands in foreign policy making. Thus, it has changed TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours by (a) changing the institutions, institutional structures, and institutional power relations; (b) empowering new actors and institutions against the traditional actors and institutions in political decision making; (c)
focus on the domestic change which is generated by the EUisation in another field/s. This requires an examination of the alterations in a domestic field/s (F1), and the role of the EU, then the changes in another field (F2) and the role of the changes in F1 generated by the EU in the alteration in F2. In other words, there is a need for two stages of empirical analysis: first, the change in F1 and the influence of the EU on alterations; and then, the change in F2 and the influence of changes in F1 generated by the EU on alterations in F2. Thus, we use the above-argued research design model in EUisation, but we formulate it differently, which can be summarised as \((F2)_w = (F1=X).\) X indicates the cause (EU input), F1 indicates the primary effect (domestic change in a field/s), F2 indicates the secondary effect (the change in another field), and W indicates the relationship between F1 and F2.

We divided our empirical analysis into two stages. As will be detailed below in the data processing analysis section (Section 3.3.5 in Chapter III), we started our analysis from the sets of institutions, rules, ideas, actors, and policies in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm (F1) at the Turkish level before 1999 (t1), the announcement of Turkey as a EU candidate (see Sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3 in Chapter IV). We then traced them over the years until the 2014 (during the Turkey’s EU accession process), time (t2), and we tried to identify the alterations to them and the influence of the EU on the alterations (see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 in IV). This laid the groundwork for the second analytical stage, the examination of the secondary influence of the EU on domestic change (for this study, TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours). In the second stage, we started our analysis from the sets of rules, ideas, actors, and policies in TFP towards selected non-EU neighbours of Turkey (F2) before t1 (see Sections 5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.4.1. 5.4.2 in Chapter V). We then traced them over the years until t2, and we tried to identify the alterations to them (see Sections 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.5.1; 5.5.2 and 5.5.3) and then the influence of the alterations in F1 on the alterations in this field (F2) (see Sections 5.6.1; 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 in Chapter V). Accordingly, the relationship between the changes in F1 (changes in the fields of democracy and the rule of law as well as in the economic realm) generated by X (the EU bring about political and economic stability and growth; and (d) transferring domestic religious and minority affairs into the realm of normal politics.
input) and the changes in F2 (changes in TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours) are analysed.

3.3 Qualitative research, data collection and analysis

It is crucial to understand that all the data initially acquired was used to: (1) demonstrate that a practical transformation of Turkish political system and TFP has indeed been taking place in Turkey’s EU accession process; and (2) apply Europeanisation, rational, and historical institutionalism instruments of analysis)—namely, the ‘misfit’ gap between the Turkish and EU levels, the EU adaptation pressure (Europeanisation), the empowerment of new actors against the veto players, the strategic interest calculation (‘logic of consequentiality’) and ‘path dependency’ ‘critical junctures’ in EU-Turkey relations, ‘punched equilibrium’ and their ‘unintended consequences’ (historical institutionalism).

2.3.1 Qualitative research

As argued in Chapter I, the qualitative method was used to collect, process and analyse data. The qualitative method is an means of enquiry employed in different disciplines in the social sciences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Locke, 2001) to explore issues, understand phenomena and answer questions using a distinct methodological tradition of inquiry (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). It is often used to meet different objectives, such as ‘identifying the form and nature of what exists’ and ‘examining the reasons for, or causes of, what exists’31 (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). It ‘is particularly good at answering the “why”, “what” or “how” questions’ (Lacey & Luff, 2007) that the current study deals with. It allows research to reach real-life contexts, human experiences, practices and opinions (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1993, p. 16; Marsh & Stoker, 2002, p. 207) through interview and observation techniques as well as analysing words, pictures, videos and modern and historical information. As such it can contribute to understanding the complex behaviour, needs, systems, and cultures, their changes and the reasons for, and/or causes, of such changes. It further provides the potential to use several approaches

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31 As well as ‘appraising the effectiveness of what exists’ and ‘identifying new theories, policies, plans, or actions’ (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994).
to examine different aspects of the phenomenon under study (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). This research aims to assess the TFP towards its non-EU neighbours and the changes made to it throughout Turkey’s accession process to the EU as well as the reasons for and/or causes of the changes in TFP. Thus, most of the previously defined objectives—if not all—are required for this study, which is why the qualitative approach was chosen.

Table 3: Qualitative Research Categories and Questions

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Sample questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td>Identifying the form and nature of what exists</td>
<td>What are the dimensions of attitudes or perceptions that are held?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What is the nature of people's experiences?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What needs does the population of the study have?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What elements operate within a system?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic</td>
<td>Examining the reasons for, or causes of, what exists</td>
<td>What factors underlie particular attitudes or perceptions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Why are decisions or actions taken, or not taken?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Why do particular needs arise?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Why are services or programs and not been used?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluative</td>
<td>Appraising the effectiveness</td>
<td>How are objectives achieved?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Strategic | Identifying new theories, policies, plans or actions | What types of services are required to meet needs?  
|          |                                                     | What actions are needed to make programs or services are more effective?  
|          |                                                     | How can systems be improved?  
|          |                                                     | What strategies are required to overcome the newly defined the problems?  

Adapted from "Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research" by Jane Ritchie and Liz Spencer in A. Bryman and R. G. Burgess (eds.) “Analysing qualitative data”, 1994, p.173-194.

As previously discussed in terms of data collection and analysis, qualitative research methods emphasise ‘words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data’ (2001: 506). This has led to the criticism of qualitative methods for not always having hard and reliable data.\(^{32}\) To overcome the potential shortcomings of the qualitative method, quantitative data such as tables, graphs and figures are also used (especially to illustrate the extent to which the Turkish political system and TFP has shifted). Indeed, the central method used to collect, process and analyse data to answer the research questions of the study is qualitative in nature.

Qualitative research includes a variety of techniques, such as observation, interview (individual in-depth interviews, structured and non-structured interviews), case study, focus groups, reflexive journals, content or documentary analysis and archival research

\(^{32}\) Qualitative methods have also been subject to criticism as they are not replicable and are difficult to generalize (Bryman, 2001, p. 285).
methods. The current study uses case study, interview, academic journals and documentary analysis methods to collect, process and analyse data.

### 3.3.2 Methods of case selection

Case study—the most widely employed approach in EUisation research (Haverland, 2007)—is an empirical enquiry investigating decisions, problems, policies, projects, institutions, systems, phenomena, persons, etc., within their real contexts. ‘The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame—an object—within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates’ (Thomas, 2011, p. 521). Case study offers reliable variables and a detailed historical and theoretical account of specific contexts to enhance concept validity (Lijphart, 1971; Haverland, 2007), and ‘a more detailed and in-depth analysis of a specific process of Europeanisation’ (Savino, 2008, p.10), both of which are needed for this research.

In Case study cases can be single and/or multiple, and it and/or they can be chosen randomly and/or intentionally depending on the aim of the study. Random case selection would negatively affect the substantive relevance of the project (King, et al., 1994: 125; Haverland, 2005: 2), if, for instance, an EUisation study like ours ‘does not include any of the most “important” EU member states ... or important EU policy fields like monetary integration random selection may seriously bias conclusions’ (Haverland, 2005, p. 2). Thus, the intentional selection of cases would be more beneficial in testing the hypothesis for this study and in explaining the question of whether the EU has left a very visible influence on TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours.

There are several types of case study approaches. A typical case is one that ‘exemplifies what is considered to be a typical set of values, given some general understanding of a phenomenon’ (Gerring, 2007, p.91; Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.8; 2007). The researcher first identifies an outcome (Y) and a causal hypothesis (X), specific X/Y hypothesis. After the examination of possible examples, the researcher finds a case/s that matches their question of interest and searches for a causal relationship. The evidence found in the case is tested against the propositions of the given theory either to validate
whether the causal proposition of the given theory is true or false, or to reframe it as a finding of the case study (Gerring 2004, 2007; Gerring & Seawright, 2008, King, Keohane, & Verba 1994; Rohlfing 2008; Sekhon 2004). If the study involves a single independent variable, and the casual relationship between X and Y is strong, it would be easy to identify a typical case. As detailed above (see Chapters I and II), we identified specific X/Y hypothesis that need to be validated whether the causal proposition of our study is true or false. A typical case study method would be employed to test our hypothesis, however, our study explores the indirect impact of X (the EU put) on Y (changing TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours), and thus the identification of the causal relationship between X and Y requires an in-depth examination and the elimination of other factors. As will be explained below, Turkey’s non-EU neighbours have different characteristics in terms of their geo-political situations, populations, political regimes, regional and global relations and relations with the EU, and thus it is difficult to identify a typical case with respect to scores for all these dimensions.

A second method of case study is the extreme case approach. In this approach a case is selected ‘because of its extreme value on the independent (X) or dependent (Y) variable of interest’ (Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.12). Through chosen an extreme case among the cases researcher maximises the ‘variance on the dimension of interest’. It is, therefore, not a suitable way of analysing the possible causes of Y or possible effects of X, and thus a specific X/Y hypothesis (Gerring, 2007, p. 102-105, Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.10-12). Accordingly, a study like ours has some notion of what factors affect the outcome and explores the cause/effect hypothesis should not employ this method (Gerring, 2007, p. 102-105, Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.10-12; see also Brady & Collier 2004; Collier & Mahoney 1996).

A third type of case study is the influential case approach. The aim of an influential case study is to check the validity of large cross-case theory through probing the question ‘what about Case A?’ The researcher selects a case/s that seems, at first glance, to invalidate a given theory, or at least cast doubt upon it (Gerring, 2007, p. 108; Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.12), but, at the end the researcher can find confirmation of a given theory. Thus, like the typical case, it tests the validity of a given theory, but without
having a case/s that represents a broader sets of cases.

A fourth type of case study involves most-similar and most-different cases, which bear a resemblance to J. S. Mill's systems of logic (1843), "method of agreement" and "method of difference" (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). The researcher employs the most similar method to select a minimum of two cases that are very similar in many variables, with the exception of one dimension, the variable of theoretical interests (X1) and Y (the outcome), the phenomenon to be examined (Gerring, 2007, p. 108; Gerring and Seawright, 2008, p.12). Through comparing very similar cases that only differs in X1 (the variable of theoretical interests) and Y (outcome) the researcher tries to find out why the outcome is different between the cases (Anckar, 2008, p. 389-401). “It may be presumed from this pattern of covariation across cases that the presence or absence of X1 is what causes variation on Y” (Gerring and Seawright, 2008, p.12). This method would be very helpful in analysing reasons for, and causes of, differences in the policies of different countries policies where the countries are similar, with the exception of X1. In a study like ours, which analyses the influence of the EUisation of a country’s domestic politics on its foreign policy, it is not possible to talk about the absence of one dimension, thus the applicability of this method. The most-different case method is the reverse of the most-similar method. Very different two cases, with the exception of the causal variable of interest (X1) and the outcome (Y), are selected (for details see Gerring, 2007, p.98; Patton, 2002, p. 234)

The fifth method is the deviant case approach. Like the extreme case approach the deviant case approach selects a case/s on the basis of its/their being exceptional and the untypical among cases. Accordingly, the method used for deviant and extreme case selection is opposite to that of typical case selection. ‘The deviant case method selects cases that, by reference to some general cross-case relationship’, demonstrate a surprising value. They are ‘deviant’ in that they are poorly explained by the multivariate model … and ‘cases are judged relative to some general model of causal relations’ (Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.12; Gerring, 2007, p. 105-107). It thus contrasts with the extreme case approach, and can be employed to analyse the X/Y hypothesis. The researcher chose a case/s of non-X and show that ‘they not lead non-Y’. The purpose of a deviant case
analysis is usually to cast light on the exceptional and the untypical explanation. In other words ‘to probe for new – but as yet unspecified – explanations’ (Gerring, 2007, p. 106). After examination of possible cases a deviant case/s in which the analytical interest of the researcher lies is found and the causal relationship is examined to determine whether the given hypothesis of study is true or false.

As noted previously, Europeanization scholars (Aggestam, 2004; Jacoby, 2004; Kajnč, 2011; Kaminska, 2007; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Nuttall, 1997; Pomorska, 2007, 2011; Smith, 2000, 2003; Tonra, 2001; Wong, 2007; Wong and Hill, 2011) who are engaged in the influence of the EU on the members’ and non-member states’ foreign policies primarily argue that, due to the nature of the CSDP, the influence of the EU on member and candidate states’ foreign policy, a horizontal pattern of learning and socialization occurs. On the other hand, students (Akcam, 2001; Belge, 2004; Bilgic and Karatzas, 2004; Brewin, 2000; Diez and Rumelili, 2004; Eryilmaz, 2007; Heper, 2005; Rumelili, 2005, 2007; Karaosmanoglu and Tashan, 2004; Kutlay, 2009; Kirisci, 2006; Oguzlu, 2004; Tocci, 2005; Terzi, 2005, 2008; 2010; Tekin, 2005; Tekeli, 2000) engaged in the study of the influence of Turkey’s EU candidature on its foreign policy primarily argue that as a result of EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and asymmetric power relations during the accession process, the influence of the EU on the polity, politics and policies of Turkey, even on its foreign policy, is to a large extent a vertical, ‘top down’ process. Other scholars (Altinisik, 2004; Altinisik & Tür, 2006; Altinisik and Kirisci, 2011; Aras, 2001; Aras and Polat, 2007, 2008; Aydn & Aras, 2005; Aykan, 1999a; Calabrese, 1998; Çarkoglu & Mine, 2001; Dincer, 2007; Efegil and Stone, 2003; Hinnebusch, 2002; Karacasulu and Karakir, 2011; Kirisci, 2006; Kohen, 1998, 2005; Muslih, 1996; Olson, 2006, 2004, 2002a, 2002b, 2000, 1997; Taspinar, 2008; Türkmen, 2002) engaged in study of Turkish foreign policy primarily argue that changes in TFP towards its neighbours over the last decade have been a result of the changes in regional and global relations with neighbouring countries as well as of Turkey’s changing regional and global politics. However, this study has argued that the influence of the EU on Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours is neither a horizontal pattern of learning and socialisation nor the result of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of foreign policy, nor can it be explained just by the changes in the regional and
global relations of neighbouring countries and/or those of Turkey as a result of changing regional and global politics. The domestic changes generated by the liberalisation and modernisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime by means of the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU *acquis communautaire* have become the main driving force behind the changes in TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. Accordingly, this study hypothesises an exceptional and untypical explanation for the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours and the EU’s role in this.

As noted previously (see Chapter I & II), the influence of the EU on TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours which are not subject to the EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and persuasion in the field of foreign policy (see the EU Yearly Progress Reports on Turkey; CIV1; CIV4; CIV7; CIV11; DIP4; DIP5), has not been the subject of discussion within academic literature. Our study introduces a new mechanism for analysing the indirect domestic impact of the EU that we call the ‘secondary indirect mechanism’ (for details see Section 2.4.3), in the absence of its conditionality, adaptation pressure and persuasion in a field(s). Accordingly, like a deviant case analysis, the purpose of our study is to ‘probe for new – but as yet unspecified – explanations’, secondary indirect mechanisms for analysing the domestic impact of the EU. As will be seen below, identification of the set of background factors in accordance with the analytical requirements of the study and selecting deviant cases in accordance with these identified factors among the cases provides us with the opportunity to choose cases in which our analytical interests lies and search for causal relationship to test the hypothesis of our study in a more specific manner. As noted by students of case study (Gerring, 2007; Gerring and Seawright, 2008; Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Haggard, 1990; Prezeworaki, 1991) the technique of a case study should be chosen on the basis of the objectives of the case study, its appropriateness, and the analytical requirements of the study (Gerring, 2007; Gerring & Seawright, 2008; Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Haggard, 1990; Prezeworaki, 1991). Accordingly, the deviant case selection method seems beneficial on the basis of the analytical requirements of our study.

In the determination of the deviant nature of a case, the question should be “relative to what general set of background factors is Case A deviant?” (Gerring, 2007, p.106). In this
regard, specifically, we looked for Turkey’s non-EU neighbours where a) TFP towards it is not subject to EU conditionality and adaptation pressure and persuasion, b) the EU does not have advance relations with the country, c) the country’s political regimes are not subject to change during the time that it is subject to our study, d) the country’s regional and global relations are not subject to (big) changes, e) Turkey has/used to have problematic relations with them (actually Turkey used to have problematic relations with almost all its neighbours except Azerbaijan and Georgia). These set of factors are identified to test the hypothesis of the study in a more specific manner through eliminating, as much as possible, the role of: 1) the regional and global factors in changes in TFP towards a selected country as well as its policy towards Turkey, 2) the changing domestic dynamics of Turkey’s neighbours that would create opportunity for changes in Turkish foreign policy towards it/them, 3) the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure on changes in Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey’s non-EU neighbours located in the Caucasus - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan - are part of EU’s neighbourhood policy. Thus the EU has increasingly developed its relations with them over the last decade. TFP towards Armenia is, to some extent, also subject to EU conditionality and adaptation pressure (see the 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010 EU progression reports on Turkey). Turkey and Azerbaijan are one nation and two states. Since the establishment of Azerbaijan in 1991 the one nation/two states understanding is the main dimension determining Turkey’s foreign policy towards Azerbaijan, as well as Azerbaijan’s foreign policy towards Turkey. Turkey’s other non-EU neighbours are located to the east and southeast of Turkey: Iran, Iraq and Syria. Iraq underwent a regime change in 2003, and accordingly its domestic as well as foreign policy has undergone a deep transformation. Its regional and global relations are subject to great change. Turkey’s other two eastern neighbours, Syria and Iran, are not subject to regime change. Their foreign policy and both regional and global relations, are also not subject to (great) change during the period of this study. During the 1990s and previously, these two countries had problematic relations with the countries in the region as well as with western countries in the 2000s. The EU does not have advanced relations with these countries, although the Syria is part of the EU’s neighbourhood policy. Accordingly, Iran and Syria are deviant cases among Turkey’s non-EU neighbours. Due
to the above-argued characteristics, they seem to better serve the analytical requirements of our study to specifically analyse the changes in TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours rising from the changes in Turkey’s domestic politics during the EU accession process; thus, to specifically test the identified hypothesis of our study. We choose, therefore, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria as cases in order; a) to demonstrate the changes in TFP towards its non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process, b) to shed light on the reasons for and/or causes of changes in TFP in the absence of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure and persuasion in the field of foreign policy, and c) to maximise confidence in the findings (i.e., evidence-building) by benefiting from a variety of sources (for more details about the evidence building, see the following section).

In this regard, to get an overview of Turkey’s foreign policy toward Iran and Syria, the literature on Turkey-Iran and Turkey-Syria relations was first read and analysed. Primary data includes 1) NGO and the Turkish government’s databases, official reports and political and economic agreements between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Syria, 2) interviews with informants on Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria (for details of interviews see Section 3.3.4 below). Secondary sources include: 1) books and publications from seminars and conferences related to Turkish foreign policy in general and Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria specifically, in both print and electronic form, 2) articles related to Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria from academic journals in both print and electronic form.

After familiarisation with the material, we defined several sub-categories under the theme of Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria, such as: TFP towards Iran and Syria before Turkey’s EU accession process, TFP towards Iran and Syria during Turkey’s EU accession process and changes in TFP towards them\(^3\). We then re-read the collected data and searched the new data for material identifying the reasons for/causes of TFP towards them, both before Turkey’s EU accession process and during the EU accession process. The findings were filed under the theme heading ‘reasons for/causes of TFP towards Iran and Syria’. Finally, we analysed the relationship between themes using the analytical

\(^3\)Accordingly the time frame for our study embraces the 1990s and the period of Turkey’s EU candidature.
toolkits of selected theories to test whether the hypothesis of the study is true or false (for details of identified themes, data processing and analysing see following Section 3.3.5). The role of the changes at Turkish domestic level generated by the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards them were thus analysed. In this context, the relationship between changes in rules, ideas, actors, interests, priorities and demands in the formulation of TFP, and the empowerment of new actors in the Turkish political system and foreign policy-making, increasing political and economic stability, and the growth and transformation of domestic religious and minority affairs into the realm of normal politics, are analysed. In the final stage we employed triangulation and the creation of counterfactual scenario methods to ensure the validity of our data analysis (for details of data collection, processing and analysis and evidence-building in the study see Sections 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 2.3.5, 3.4, 3.4.1, and 3.4.2 below).

3.3.3 Data collection and analysis

The literature was read and analysed to get an overview of Europeanisation, EU–Turkey relations, the Turkish political system and TFP. When Europeanisation, EU–Turkey relations and the transformation of the Turkish political system and foreign policy, and the background, were understood, the research questions and hypotheses were formulated, and the theoretical framework of the study and the research design were determined. The research questions, research design and theoretical framework guided the data-collection procedures as well as the degree and limitations of the data investigation. The sources used in this research can be classified into five types: (1) government (for this study Turkish), EU and NGO sources of primary data (including systematic databases, official reports and legal documents such as political and economic agreement papers between Turkey and selected countries, the European Council Presidency Conclusions, the Negotiation Framework Document, the Accession Partnership, the Commission Progress Reports, harmonisation reforms used to fill the existing misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels, and interviews in both print and electronic form); (2) interviews with NGOs and Turkish Foreign Ministry officials as primary sources (explained in detail below); (3) books and publications from seminars, conferences, and other scientific gatherings, in both print and electronic form as
secondary sources (comprising both theoretical scholarship and more technocratic accounts of the EU); (4) academic journals in four key disciplines (EU–Turkey relations specific studies, TFP, Europeanisation, New Institutionalism) in both print and electronic form; and (5) journalistic accounts and information from the internet. Data continued to be retrieved until 2014. The interviews took place between September 2010 and February 2011.

To easily access the right documents as needed, data was listed, read, reviewed and kept available for the process of study by filing hard or electronic copies organised mostly by topic (Europeanisation, rational and historical institutionalism, the Turkish political system and foreign policy, and EU–Turkey relations, etc.). The data was filed in numerous formats (e.g., PDF, CD-ROM, HTML files and on the internet). The main criteria using in filing the data were the text’s content and where and/or for which subject it could be used. Notes from interviews and document analyses were also listed, reviewed and stored by topic, and kept accessible for later use.

3.3.4 Semi-structured interviews with selected individuals

The interview is a particular method for collecting detailed information about a topic by searching informant experiences, knowledge and attitudes in a specific context (McNamara, 1999; Marsh & Stoker, 2002, p. 197; Yin, 1989). By providing new information and evidence, interviews contribute to a better understanding of the studied phenomenon and contribute to evidence building in a study by providing a cross-reference with other materials (Marsh & Stoker, 2002, p. 197; Yin, 1989). The investigation of the experiences, knowledge and attitudes of informants in the Turkish political system, Turkish foreign policy and Turkey–EU relations is important to obtain new information and evidence about the emerging changes in Turkish domestic and foreign policies over the last decade. In this way, as noted by Yin (1989, p. 90), interviews are also essential sources for case studies and evidence-building efforts. Interviews were therefore conducted with informants in the Turkish political system, and about Turkish foreign policy and Turkey–EU relations in order to benefit from their experiences and knowledge in trying to explain the hypotheses and evidence building in
our study. In this regard, The two major groups, 1) officials of Turkish Foreign Ministry
to Turkish Embassy Brussels and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ankara, and 2) officials of
NGOs (particularly from civil and economic society organisations in Brussels, Istanbul
and Ankara) was selected as interviewees.

These two populations were selected because: 1) the selected NGOs are Turkey’s top
NGOs (see Today’s Zaman, March, 18, 2009; Tusev, 2009), in terms of the number of
their members, representatives in Turkey and abroad, budgets and activities, including
publications, media, etc.; 2) they have been taking an increasingly active role in EU–
Turkey relations and the formulation of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy over the
last decade; and 3) foreign ministry officials in Ankara are at the centre of the
formulation and implementation of TFP, and in Brussels are at the centre or EU–Turkey
relations. Learning more about the meaning of events according to these stakeholders, as
well as their positions, activities, views and perceptions of EU–Turkey relations and TFP
towards selected neighbouring countries would contribute to a better understanding and
explanation of: a) TFP towards selected Turkey’s neighbours and changes over the last
decade; b) their role in, and the reasons for their support of transformations of the Turkish
political system in accordance with EU calls and TFP towards Turkey’s neighbours in
general, and Iran and Syria specifically; and c) the impact of the changes to Turkish
domestic politics throughout Turkey’s accession process to the EU, on its foreign policy
and specifically its foreign policy towards Iran and Syria.

Potential interviewees were first telephoned, and then a letter including information about
the researcher, the purpose of the interview and research, and the intended use of the
results were sent to the interviewees. The interview questions were sent to the
interviewees who agreed to participate. The themes of interview questions were chosen
based on the literature review, research questions and hypotheses, and the information,
gleaned from the secondary and other primary sources before the interviews, about TFP
towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours, changes in TFP towards its non-EU neighbours
over the last decade, and the impact of EU. These themes included: a) the Turkish
political system and its transformation in the EU accession process; b) Turkey’s foreign
policy towards its non-EU neighbours; c) the formulation and implementation of that
foreign policy; d) the main actors and institutions in foreign policy making; e) the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours over the last decade; f) changes in mechanism, actors and interests, and preferences in foreign policy-making over the last decade; g) reasons for and/or causes of changes; and h) the overall impacts of Turkey’s accession process to the EU in the emerging changes in the Turkish political system, foreign policy-making and outcomes. Finally, semi-structured interviews were conducted between September 2010 and February 2011 in Brussels, Istanbul and Ankara, following a purposefully designed structure and defined questions (questions will be discussed below).

**Table 4: Number of Interviewees in Different Institutes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brussels</th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
<th>Ankara</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Ministry Officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 20 interviews were conducted with 20 interviewees (see Table 3). Interviews consisted of three sets of questions, about: (1) TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours (i.e., Iraq and Syria) before Turkey’s accession process to the EU; (2) the changes in TFP towards identified neighbours during the Turkey’s EU accession process; and (3) the reasons for and/or causes of the changes in TFP towards these neighbours over the last decade. One of the main aims of the study was to understand and explain the role of the EU in the transformation of TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours in the EU accession process. In the third set of questions, we therefore focused more on the possible impacts of: (a) critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations; (b) EU conditionality in the rule of law and the economic realm; and (c) unintended consequences of the liberalisation of
the Turkish political system on the transformation of TFP in Turkey’s accession process to the EU.

The interviews generally started by asking about TFP towards the selected neighbours during the 1990s and before. In this stage, we also questioned the reasons for, and/or causes of Turkey’s problematic relationships with its neighbours during the 1990s and before. We then moved to the changes in TFP towards these countries during the Turkey’s EU accession process and the reasons for, and/causes of the changes in TFP towards them. In enquiring about the reasons for, and causes of, the changes in TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours, we first focused on the impact of EU conditionality in the field of democracy and the rule of law, as well as in the economic realm, in terms of: (a) the changes in institutions, institutional structures, institutional power relations and the process and mechanism of political decision-making; (b) the empowerment of new actors against the veto players in political decision making; (c) increasing political and economic stability and growth; (d) increasing respect and protection of religious and minority rights and the transformation of domestic issues into the realm of normal politics; and (e) the changing interest, priorities and demands in foreign policy-making. Next, we moved on to the impacts of these domestic changes on the emerging changes in TFP towards select non-EU neighbours of Turkey over the last decade. Herein the focus was on the relationship between the above-mentioned changes in Turkey’s domestic politics and the changes in interests, priorities and demands in Turkey’s foreign policy-making towards selected countries. As such, we tried to benefit from the interview method when explaining the research questions, verifying the hypotheses and building the evidence in the study (the evidence building will be explained below). During the interviews, however, topics were addressed depending on the interviewees’ individual backgrounds and as the themes emerged in the discussions. Thus, the order of questions varied and additional questions relating to topics were introduced so as to gain more detailed information and easier and more flexible interviews.

In general, the interviews took from 40 to 70 minutes. Most of the interviews, especially those with members of NGOs, were recorded, with the permission of the interviewee, to
increase the reliability and validity of the data collected. The interviews not conducted in English (most were conducted in Turkish) were translated into English by the researcher; all interviews were stored for later use and analysis.

3.3.5 Processing and analysing data
As noted by Ritchie and Spencer (1994) and Lacey and Luff (2007) there are some common processes and stages for analysis of qualitative data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familiarisation with the data through review, reading, listening etc.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transcription of tape recorded material</td>
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<tr>
<td>organisation and indexing of data for easy retrieval and identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymising of sensitive data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coding (may be called indexing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of themes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-coding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of provisional categories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration of relationships between categories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refinement of themes and categories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of theory and incorporation of pre-existing knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testing of theory against the data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report writing, including excerpts from original data if appropriate (e.g. quotes from interviews)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Depending on what we want to get from the collected data, the order of and/or number of stages involved might change in the qualitative data analysis (Lacey & Luff, 2007). The data was all collected by the researcher, thus, the familiarisation process started with the data collection process, and was continued through the later stages of transcription and the organisation of data, and identification of themes through the reading and re-reading of data, listening to tapes and making memos and summaries. As previously mentioned, most of the interviews were conducted in Turkish and recorded, with the interviewee’s permission. The second stage was thus the transcription of the interviews into a word-processing package and their translation into English. In order to incorporate non-verbal communication, the taped data was listened to again while re-reading the transcribed data. After the transcription, we organised the collected data into sections according to their context. We assigned each interviewee a code (pseudonyms). For instance, the interviews conducted with the Foreign Ministry officials were coded as DIP (1, 2, 3…) and the interviews with members of NGOs were coded as CIV (1, 2, 3…).

After familiarisation with the material, we defined several categories, including Europeanisation, New Institutionism, EU criteria, the Turkish political system, the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels, EU–Turkey relations, the liberalisation of Turkish political system, and TFP towards its non-EU neighbours (Iran and Syria). We then searched the data for material identifying the concepts and explanatory instruments in analysing the domestic impact of the EU, changes in the Turkish political system and TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process, and the possible causes of changes.

*Table 5: Thematic fields of data*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic field theory</th>
<th>TFP towards Iran and Syria</th>
<th>EU–Turkey relations</th>
<th>Turkish political system</th>
<th>Reasons for transformation of Turkish political system and TFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europeanisation</td>
<td>Strengthening bilateral</td>
<td>History of EU–Turkey</td>
<td>Turkish political</td>
<td>Misfit gap</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(misfit gap, EU adaptation pressure)</td>
<td>relations</td>
<td>relations</td>
<td>system before EU accession</td>
<td></td>
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<td>---</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational institutionalism (Harmonisation reforms, empowerment of new actors)</td>
<td>Liberalisation of trade and movement of people</td>
<td>EU conditionality in field of democracy, rule of law and economic realm</td>
<td>Liberalisation of Turkey’s political system in the EU accession process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Institutionalism (Path dependency, critical junctures and punched equilibrium)</td>
<td>Relying on soft power instruments for the solution of bilateral problems</td>
<td>EU conditionality in field of foreign policy</td>
<td>Harmonisation reforms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting good governance and peace to create a more stable and secure neighbourhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>Empowerment of new actors in political decision making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cost/benefit calculation of rule compliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data collection, processing and analysis process are divided into four main stages. In the first stage, a literature review of EUisation is employed to identify the concepts and mechanisms for analysing the domestic impact of the EU. The identified concepts and mechanisms such as ‘misfit gap’, ‘EU adaptation pressure’ and, ‘direct, indirect, and secondary EUisation mechanisms’ are filed under the Europeanisation theme heading. By exploring the existing literature on the new institutionalist theory and its versions, analytical tools are identified and filed under the appropriate theme heading such as: empowerment of new actors and institutions, cost/benefit calculation of rule compliance (RI), path dependency, critical junctures, punctuated equilibrium and unexpected consequences (HI).

In the second stage, we searched the data for material identifying the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels in the field of democracy, rule of law and economic realm. In this regard, the EU’s criteria in the fields of democracy, rule of law and economic realm were identified by exploring Article 49 of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on the European Union (TEU)), the 1993 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council (the Copenhagen criteria), and the treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon. The EU criteria identified in these fields were filed under the European political system theme heading. Policies and practices in the field of democracy, rule of law and economic realm at a Turkish level before the EU accession process were identified by exploring the primary and secondary data and filed under the Turkish political system before the EU accession theme. By doing so the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels in these fields, such as the lack of independence of the judiciary, of civilian control over the military, of freedom of press, expression, association and assembly, of respect for, and protection of minority rights and of the functioning free market economy were identified and filed under the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels theme. EU-Turkey relations, more specifically the Presidency Conclusions (the 1997 Luxembourg, 1999 Helsinki), Partnership Document of Turkey and the European Commission yearly progress reports on Turkey,
and other primary and secondary data were explored to discover whether the identified misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels generated (high-level) EU adaptation pressure. The identified EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in these identified fields were filed under the EU-Turkey relations theme. The harmonisation reforms undertaken to meet the EU calls in the field of democracy, rule of law and economic realm were explored to identify the changes in these fields at Turkish level during Turkey’s EU accession process, and the identified changes filed under the liberalisation of Turkish political system theme.

The changes at Turkish level during the EU accession process are measured in terms of changing institutions, institutional structure and institutional power relations, the empowerment of civil actors against the military-bureaucratic elite, increasing political and economic stability and growth, and increasing respect for, and protection of, religious and minority rights, using the taxonomy advanced by Radaelli (2003, p. 37). He proposed a classification for measuring the changes in public policy generated by EU membership or candidature at domestic level: transformation, absorption, inertia and retrenchment. Transformation refers to the fundamental changes in existing policy outcomes; absorption is a domestic adaptation to EU polity and policy without drastic alteration of existing domestic structures or policy; inertia means a lack of alteration and retrenchment is the ‘reverse’ of EUisation, being ‘less Europeanised’ (Radaelli, 2003, p. 38).

In the third stage, we searched the data for material identifying the changes in TFP towards selected Turkey’s non-EU neighbours, namely Iran and Syria, during Turkey’s EU accession process. In this regards, TFP towards the selected countries before the EU accession process, the 1999, and then TFP towards them during Turkey’s EU accession process are identified by exploring primary and secondary data, and more specifically by exploring the systematic databases and official reports of the Turkish government, EU and NGOs, political and economic agreement papers between Turkey and selected countries, and academic journals on Turkish foreign policy. As argued above in case selection section, the identified changes in TFP are filed under the TFP theme heading. The changes in TFP during the EU accession process are measured in terms of
strengthening bilateral relations, the liberalisation of trade and the movement of people, relying on soft power instruments for the solution of bilateral problems and promoting good governance and peace to create a more stable and secure neighbourhood. Finally, the collected data was re-read, and new data was searched to find material to identify the causes of changes in TFP. The identified causes, such as changes in rules, ideas, actors, interests, priorities and demands, were categorised under the causes of changes theme.

In the fourth stage, the analytical process began by examining the relationship between themes using the analytical toolkits of selected theories. Actually the analytical process began after lifting data from the original contexts and reorganising the information according to the thematic cases, even during the course of data collection, by thinking about what was being read and seen. The relationship between EU adaptation pressure arising from the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels and the reforms undertaken by the Turkish government during the EU accession process in the field of democracy, rule of law and economic realm, were analysed. The role of the EU’s technical and economic supports and Turkish actors’ cost/benefit calculation in compliance with EU calls and the quality and peace of EU-Turkey relations in undertaken reforms at Turkish level were thus assessed. The pro-EU stance of the ruling party (the AK Party), civil and economic society’s stance on the incorporation of EU rules and regulations, the implementation of reforms, and the Eurosceptic stance of the military–bureaucratic elites were assessed. Whether, and if so, how, the announcement of Turkey as a candidate has punctuated the equilibrium at the Turkish level, and has been a turning point for the liberalisation of Turkey’s political regime and brought about the hypothesised changes at Turkey level through the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure was analysed. Finally, the unintended consequences of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm on TFP toward selected Turkey’s non-EU neighbours was analysed by assessing the relationship between the changes in Turkish domestic politics during the EU accession process and changes in rules, ideas, actors, interests, priorities and demands in the formulation, and thus the transformation, of TFP.
It is important to note here that we looked backed through the data and explored it further to identify any references that we might have missed. The key issues, concepts and themes were re-identified, regrouped, and replaced based on the output of the gathered and analysed data. This upgrading process—in terms of themes, data collections, research questions and hypotheses—was continued throughout the research process, especially as we gathered new information and evidence about the phenomenon studied and developed our methodology and theory based on the gathered data. Thus, the data collection and analysis processes were dynamic and open to change. To avoid losing data when the analysis stages began, several copies of both the electronic and hard data were maintained. Consequently, the ideas generated from the data were first examined to reveal the changes in Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, then they were incorporated into the theoretical ideas in our analysis in order to answer the research question and to test the hypothesis of the study (for research question and hypothesis see Section 1.2 in Chapter I).

The final stage was the demonstration of the validity of our data analysis through triangulation and the creation of counterfactual scenario methods.

3.4 Ensuring the reliability and validity of the study

Demonstrating the credibility and validity of data analysis is important in all research, especially considering the common criticism of qualitative research that ‘qualitative results are anecdotal…. (and) qualitative analysis is an interpretative process, the preconceptions, assumptions and “worldview” of the researcher are likely to influence the process and any emerging theory, despite use of rigorous approaches’ (Lacey & Luff, 2007:26-27). In demonstrating the reliability of analysis, there is a need for:

‘…describing the approach to and procedures for data analysis; justifying why these are appropriate within the context of your study; clearly documenting the process of generating themes, concepts or theories from the data audit trail; [and] referring to external evidence, including previous qualitative and quantitative studies, to test the conclusions from your analysis as appropriate’ (Lacey and Luff, 2007, p. 26).
We thus clarified the approach to, and procedures for, data analysis, why these were appropriate within the context of our study, and the process of generating themes and concepts. Previous studies in the field of EUisation were examined through the detailed literature review in the previous chapter (Chapter II) to clarify the appropriateness of our analysis.

### 3.4.1 Triangulation

In demonstrating the validity of the interpretation, there is a need to prove that the findings of the study represent a fair and accurate account of the collected data (Lacey & Luff, 2007, p. 27). A viable approach for the current study seems to be triangulation—the confirmation of findings ‘from at least one other source and usually also via another method of data collection’ (Riitta-Maija Hämäläinen, 2008, p. 44). We need precise and systematic references to primary (interviews, reports, spaces, documents) and secondary data indicating that TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours has transformed from merely security-oriented disengagement to a politically and economically oriented engagement over the last decade, and that EU conditionality in the fields of democracy the rule of law, and in the economic realm, has unintentionally become the main driving force behind the transformation. More than one source of evidence, and method, is used to gain a full perspective of the phenomenon under study. The primary and secondary sources previously discussed were used in triangulation.

*Figure 1: Triangulation sources*
The information and/or evidence gleaned from data were cross-referenced from interviews, documents and secondary sources, and within the data types to demonstrate the credibility and validity of the data analysis. None of the data or evidence that emerged from a single source was given priority over the data and evidence arising from any other source. As such, the changes in TFP towards select of Turkey’s non-EU neighbours in the EU accession process, the causes of the changes in TFP and the role of Turkey’s EU candidature (i.e., the influence of the critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations, the misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels, EU conditionality, EU adaptation pressure, the empowerment of new actors, logic of consequences, logic of path dependency, the punched equilibrium and unintended consequences) on TFP towards Iran and Syria were checked with at least one other source to validate the findings and interpretations.

3.4.2 Creating counterfactual scenarios

The other method used to demonstrate the validity of the findings of this study was the creation of counterfactual scenarios. As mentioned before this study takes EU pressures, incentives, ideas, norms, rules, values and the outcomes of European integration throughout the EU as independent variables, and changes in domestic institutions, institutional structures, institutional power relations, foreign policy-making mechanisms, the interests and preferences of actors as intermediate variables, and changes in TFP outcomes as dependent variables. This implies that if the EU variable had been absent, the particular changes in Turkish political system and foreign policy would not have occurred, however methodologically, it is difficult to distinguish the impact of the EU from other exogenous and indigenous factors in the study of domestic EUisation (see Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; Falkner, 2003; Olsen, 2002; Radaelli, 2000; Vink, 2003; Anderson, 2003; Major, 2005), and it is relatively more difficult in the study of indirect and unintended effects of the EU (Haverland, 2005, p. 2) as foreign policy, where European policy in many cases does not require certain regulatory changes at domestic level. As revealed in Schmidt’s (2002) study of the impact of the EU on policy developments in seven economic sectors in Germany, the UK and France34, and in Levi-

34 Only in seven out of twenty-one cases was the EU the dominant source for adaptation pressure.
Faur’s (2004) study of telecommunication and energy reforms in 28 countries\textsuperscript{35}, the changes at domestic level, even in the areas where strong EU effects are expected, are actually driven by other factors.

Ethridge (1990, p.14) argues that to demonstrate likely causation we must show that:

a) the changes in the independent variable precede the predicted changes in the dependent variable;

b) the changes in the dependent variable are related in a non-random way to, or are associated with, the changes in the independent variable; and

c) no other independent variables are responsible for the observed changes in the dependent variable.

To establish the causal importance of the EU in analysing changes at a domestic level, Haverland (2005, p. 3) suggests increasing the variation of the independent variables in two ways:

1. By including real cases with a zero value as the ‘EU variable’: a comparison of EU member states with non-members, policy sectors where EU competencies exist with policy sectors and where EU competencies are lacking, administrative sub-units dealing with EU affairs and sub-units not involved with the EU, etc.

2. By mentally constructing the situation in which the EU variable would be absent; in other words, creating a counterfactual scenario.

We employed the second option, particularly recommended in situations of causal complexity, to establish the causal importance of the EU in our study. The strategy of creating a counterfactual scenario to increase the understanding of the importance of EU in the study of EUisation is particularly advocated (see Haverland, 2005, p. 4; Anderson,

\textsuperscript{35} He concluded that ‘although the Europeanisation of the telecoms and electricity industries led to some liberalization, it is highly plausible that the major features of the liberalization would have been diffused to most member states even if the Commission and other agents of Europeanisation had not existed’ (Levi-Faur, 2004, p. 25).
As such, we developed the counterfactual scenario to substantiate our hypothesis that the EU was the main driving force behind the changes in TFP over the last decade. In other words, we developed the counterfactual scenario to substantiate our claim that in the absence of EU conditionality in the fields of democracy, in the rule of law, and in the economic state, there would have been no change in institutions, institutional structure, institutional power relations, political and economic instability, and respect for and protection of the religious and minority rights at Turkish level. In the absence of these changes at Turkish level there would been no change in the interests, actors, demands and priorities in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours in general, and towards Iran and Syria specifically. Accordingly there would have been no change in TFP towards Iran and Syria over the last decade. For instance, we hypothesise that the absence of the EU would have a direct and/or indirect and intended and/unintended effect on TFP towards its non-EU neighbour, but that other potential explanatory variables such as the political, institutional or economic condition of Turkey and the impact of situations in the Middle East, Caucus or Turkey – US relations, remain unchanged.

It has been argued that the creation of a good counterfactual scenario requires criteria such as clarity, and historical and theoretical consistency (see, for instance, Ned Lebow, 2000; and Tetlock and Belkin, 1996). Clarity requires specifying and delimiting the independent and dependent variables; that is, we need to explicitly show “which variables are changed in our mental thought experiment and which remain unchanged” (Haverland, 2005, p. 5). This is why we specified in the counterfactual scenario that the traditionally security-oriented Turkish foreign policy would not have changed (a change in the dependent variable) without the European Union and its conditionality (a change in the

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36 They have proposed employing counterfactual reasoning to establish the causal importance of the EU in the study of EUisation. For the general logic of counterfactual reasoning, see Fearon (1991), Ned Lebow (2000), and Tetlock and Belkin (1996).

37 An important merit of the counterfactual scenarios is that the researcher can, to a large extent, plausibly control other potentially important variables. A counterfactual scenario is a thought experiment in the methodological meaning of the word and allows for the manipulation of the variable of interest while controlling other variables (Haverland, 2005, p. 4). For instance, if we are interested in the impact of EU conditionality on the rule of law in Turkey, we hypothesise the absence of this conditionality, but other potential explanatory variables such as the political, institutional or economic condition of Turkey remain unchanged.
independent variable). In other words, we explored whether the lack of the European Union, its conditionality, and its adaptation pressure (hypothetical change of the independent variable) would have altered the degree of change in Turkish foreign policy in the selected cases.

Historical consistency requires specifying and delimiting the changes to historical reality. Specifically, in developing counterfactuals, we should make as few changes to the historical facts as possible. We therefore explored what would have happened in the absence of EU pressure or, alternatively, if Turkey was not an EU candidate, rather than going further and exploring what would have happened in the absence of the European Union etc. For instance, we argued that due to the internal and external perception of threat in the military-bureaucratic camp, they were the main actors in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy, they securitised and externalised religious and minority domestic affairs, and followed a security-oriented disengagement neighbourhood policy. Without EU pressure and Turkey’s candidature, civil and economic society, political parties and the government would be less credible and powerful, which would have substantial consequences for the shaping of Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, specifically towards Iran and Syria.

Theoretical consistency requires a reliable theoretical generalisation to be established between the hypothesised independent and dependent variables in the scenario. Developing theoretically informed counterfactual scenarios increases the quality and understanding of the plausibility of a scenario (Ned Lebow, 2000, p. 583). In this study, the counterfactual scenarios were based on rational and historical institutionalism. It is argued that (for example) in the absence of the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999 (a critical juncture in EU-Turkey relations), it would not be possible to talk about EU conditionality and adaptation pressure, and technical and economic support. Pro-EU actors would therefore not have adequate inducement to undertake the harmonisation reforms, and as such the changes in institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations would not be possible. The military-bureaucratic elites did not allow different actors and institutions to participate in the formulation of the foreign policy, and as such, there was no shift in the foreign policy concerns, interests,
preferences, perceptions, or practices of the policymakers. By developing a counterfactual scenario, we tried to control the alternative explanations of the changes in Turkish foreign policy towards selected countries.  

It is also important to note that, in validating our findings, we also benefit from the case study method, which provides an opportunity to look for various sources of information and evidence, as well as multiple measures of the same issue (Yin, 1994; Suoranta, 1998).

3.5 Conclusion

This research focuses on the transformation of TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours during the process of its accession to the EU and the influence of the Turkey’s EU candidature. The principal task of the study is to respond to three questions:

1. Has there been any change in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours since it achieved candidate status in 1999?

2. If so, to what extent and in what direction has Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours changed during the country’s EU candidature?

3. How has Turkey’s candidature to the EU played a role in the transformation of its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours?

The hypotheses suggest that: since Turkey first achieved candidate status in 1999, its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours has undergone a deep transformation from merely security-orientated disengagement to politically and economically orientated engagement. EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and in the economic realm, aimed at the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime to the EU acquis communautaire, have produced unintended outcomes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours in addition to the intended outcomes in Turkey’s domestic politics. This has come about through: (a) changing the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power

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38 Haverland (2005, p. 6) argues that “a counterfactual analysis has the advantage that alternative explanations can be ‘mentally’ controlled for.”
relations; (b) empowering the government and civil society against the military–bureaucratic elites in political decision making; (c) accomplishing political and economic stability and growth; (d) increasing respect for, and the protection of, religious and minority rights, and transferring domestic religious and minority issues into the realm of normal politics; and thus (e) changing the institutions, interests, preferences and demands that are involved in foreign policy-making towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours.

In this regard, the notions of ‘change’, ‘impact’ and ‘adaptation’ are the focus of this study. Accordingly, the research tasks were divided into three groups: 1) ‘change’ in the Turkish political system and the ‘adaptation’ of the Turkish political system to EU acquis; 2) change in TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours, and the direction of that change; and 3) the ‘impact’ of the EU on the Turkish political system and foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. The impact of Turkey’s EU candidature on its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours is assessed by analysing the relationship between the EUisation of the Turkish political system throughout the harmonisation reforms undertaken to meet the EU calls, and the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards selected Turkey’s non-EU neighbours. The research question related to ‘change’ in the Turkish political system and foreign policy thus sought to discover variations in the Turkish political system and foreign policy during the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU and the direction of change. Questions about the influence of the EU on the Turkish political system focused on discovering the influence of EU conditionality in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm, on the Turkish political system (see Chapter IV). The question of the influence of Turkey’s EU candidature on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours focused on the relationship between the outcomes of the liberalisation and modernisation of the Turkish political system by the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure and the changes in TFP towards selected countries during the country’s EU accession process.

The ideas and information generated in the study data were categorised according to key issues, concepts and themes that were identified and analysed using Europeanisation and the rational choice and historical versions of the New Institutionalist Theory. Consequently, this study focuses on various concepts to explain the transformation of
TFP towards Turkey’s neighbours during the EU accession process, and the influence of the EU on this, including: the ‘misfit gap’ between Turkey and EU in examined fields and ‘EU adaptation pressure’ (Europeanisation), ‘path dependency’, ‘critical junctures’ in EU-Turkey relations and their ‘unintended consequences’ (historical institutionalism), the ‘empowerment of new actors and institutions’ against ‘veto players’ and the cost/benefit calculation of rule compliance (rational institutionalism). Triangulation, counterfactual scenarios and case study approaches were employed to ensure the validity of the findings so that the study would represent a fair and accurate account of the collected data. Using a variety of methods and techniques to collect and evaluate the data, the research questions were systematically answered and the hypotheses of the study were tested and found to be satisfactorily substantiated.
Chapter IV

EUisation of the Turkish Political System through Harmonisation Reforms

4.1 Introduction

As explained previously, this study argues that changes in Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours have been mainly caused by EU-fostered domestic changes. Before exploring whether or not, and—if so—how, in what direction and to what extent the alleged EU-fostered domestic changes have played a role in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours during the country’s EU accession process, there is a need to demonstrate and verify that: (a) the alleged changes in Turkey’s domestic politics have occurred since the country achieved candidate status in 1999; and (b) these changes have occurred mainly because of the EU, its conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm.

This chapter therefore investigates the sets of policies, institutions, ideas and actors in Turkey’s political system and the changes to them during the country’s EU accession process. It empirically examines how, and to what extent, the harmonisation reforms undertaken by the Turkish government to adapt the country’s political and economic systems and legislation to the EU acquis communautaire have brought about the hypothesised changes to Turkey’s domestic politics. It first explores the level of fit/misfit between the EU and Turkish levels in the field of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm. After briefly identifying the EU accession criteria in these fields, it engaged in historical research, placing particular importance on the origins of the sets of institutions, rules, ideas, actors, and policies in these fields at the Turkish level before 1999 (t1), to ascertain the misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels in the examined fields. It then explores the absence or presence of change throughout Turkey’s EU candidacy (t2). By doing so, it assesses how and to what extent the changes made have been generated by Turkey’s EU accession process by using the previously identified explanatory instruments of EUisation and rational and historical institutionalism.
4.2 A brief summary of the EU accession criteria

The EU accession criteria requires that any country seeking EU membership must meet the political, economic and legislative criteria defined by Article 49 of the 1992 Treaty on the European Union and the 1993 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, known as the Copenhagen criteria, which were strengthened by the 1995 Madrid European Council. Political criteria require the alignment of any candidate country with EU norms in democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of, minority rights. According to EU political criteria for functioning democratic governance, executive authority may only be exercised in accordance with documented laws. There should be independence of the judiciary; civilian control over the military; all citizens and segments of society should be able to freely maintain their religious and cultural practices, participate in the political decision-making, have access to an independent judiciary and have freedom of press and expression, on an equal basis without any limitation or discrimination. This requires free elections, the establishment and functioning of political parties and NGOs without any hindrance from the state, and again, citizens must have access to a free press, independent judiciary and political decision-making, and there must be respect for human rights. According to the economic criteria, candidate countries must have a functioning free market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the union. Legislative alignment requires the endorsement of the legislation of candidate countries in accordance with the body of European law, such as EU Criminal Law and EU Competition Law.

4.3 The sets of policies, institutions, ideas and actors in Turkey’s political system before the 1999

The Turkish Republic was founded by the military-bureaucratic elites upon the remains of the Ottoman Empire on a strong monocultural, nationalist and Jacobean state ideology

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39 The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) known as the Maastricht Treaty which has been amended by the treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon.
40 The acquis was divided into 35 chapters for the talks with Turkey in preparing Turkey for each admission.
41 Under the leadership of the Turkish national movement of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
(Kemalism). Kemalism\textsuperscript{42} includes six basic principles: republicanism, populism, laicism, revolutionism, nationalism and statism. As the founders of state, the military-bureaucratic elites see themselves as the owners of the state, and the guardians of the principles of the Kemalist regime and the unitary structure of state against the internal and external actors who are considered enemies of the Kemalist regime and the unitary structure of the state (Karaosmanoglu, 2000; Nathalie, 2001; Kirisci, 2004; Aras, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 2010; CIV12, January 6, 2011). Thus, as detailed below, to ensure the survival of the Kemalist values of the regime, and the unitary structure of the state, the military expanded the scope of its task and dominated the state, its institutions and policies (Karaosmanoglu, 2000; Nathalie, 2001; Kirisci, 2004; Aras, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 2010; CIV12, January 6, 2011). The human rights, participation of NGOs in political decision-making, functioning democratic governance, independent judiciary, functioning free market economy and the role of political parties and parliament in the Turkish political system, society and the formulation of state policies were restricted by military-bureaucratic elites through the constitution, some institutions and even by force. Thus, the autonomous role of the military in the Turkish political system, civil–military relations and changes to them that resulted from Turkey’s EU accession process, will be central to the argument in the following sections.

\textit{4.3.1 Lack of civilian control over the military}

Between 1923 and 1950 the Republican People’s Party (RPP) established by the founder of Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk, led the country as a single party. During this period, the retired members of the military held key positions in the state institutions and NGOs\textsuperscript{43} and consistently held 20 per cent of the seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly

\textsuperscript{42}Kemalism is defined as ‘The set of realistic ideas and principles concerning the state, the economy, intellectual life, and the fundamental social institutions. The basic principles were also laid down by Atatürk to ensure the full independence, peace and welfare of the Turkish nation in the present and future, to ensure the sovereignty of the nation as the basis of the state, and to raise Turkish culture to the level of modern civilization guidance of rational and scientific principles... The adaptation of Ataturkism on an individual and nation-wide basis and its protection against current and prospective movements of a deviant and conservative nature serve as the guarantee for the development, strength and enlightened future of the Turkish state’ (Birand, 1991, P.59, cited in Guney and Karatekillioglu, 2005, P. 443). For more information about Kemalist ideology and its role in Turkish political life see, Karakartal, 1985; Sunnar, 1974; Jenkins, 2001; Tocci 2002; Mango 2002.

\textsuperscript{43}The retired members of the military continued, to some extent, to hold key positions in the state institutions and NGOs until last decade.
(TGNA/TBMM) (for details see, Frederick, 1965, p. 181-261). Thus, although the military seemed to be at some distance from politics, it totally controlled the state and its institutions, and shaped its domestic and foreign policies (for details see, Karakartal, 1985; Sunnar, 1974; Jenkins, 2001; CIV4 October 25, 2010; CIV12, January 6, 2011).

After World War II Turkey changed its political system from a one-party system to a multi-party system. At the first multi-party election, held in 1950, the RPP stepped down after 30 years and the Democratic Party (DP) came to power. As a result the army ‘lost both its large general representation and its top-level contingent’ (Frederick, 1965, p. 261). There was a growing feeling in the military that the DP ‘began to tamper with the cherished programs supported and even, to a large extent, inaugurated by the army... and ... began to sabotage some of those programs’ (Jacob, 1974, p. 7). This feeling created politicisation of the army and it directly intervened in politics in 1960 with the 1960 military coup, under the slogan of “a return to Atatürkism” or “Neo-Kemalism” (Jacob, 1974, p. 7). After the coup, the military committee established a commission to write a new constitution in the spirit of Kemalist ideology.

With the 1960 constitution an ‘undemocratic’ political and judicial system was created with the National Security Council (NSC) and the military jurisdiction. The military junta was institutionalised through the NSC and military jurisdiction and legalised the influence of the military in every segment of the Turkish political system. According to the 1961 constitution, the NSC was organised as a mechanism in the area of national security to share its views and opinions with the Council of Ministers in order to inform and assist government in the formulation of a national security policy (Sakallioğlu, 1988, p. 199). In practice however, as seen in amendments made in NSC law in 1973 and 1980, it has worked as an executive decision-making body. The NSC has representatives on the Higher Audio-Visual Board (Radio and TV) (RTÜK) and Higher Education Board (YOK).

On the other hand, through military jurisdiction the army also distanced itself from civil jurisdiction. As Sakallioğlu rightly argued, with the 1961 Constitution the military junta created ‘a double-headed political system: the civilian council of ministers coexisted with the national security council on the executive level, and the military system of justice
continued to operate independently alongside the civilian justice system’ (Sakallioglu, 1988, p. 158). The military expanded its jurisdiction over civilians by codification of laws related to internal security, anti-terrorism, and the maintenance of public and political order by securitising the Kurdish, Islamic and minority affairs (Cizre, 2004, p. 108; CIV4, October 25, 2010; CIV12, January 6, 2011). As such, the army created a political system which included neither executive nor legislative civilian control and/or influence over the military. Even through the NSC, and a broad definition of national security and State Security Courts (SSCs), the military further increased its executive and legislative control and influence over the government and NGOs. In this way, they tried to institutionalise and legalise tighter military control over the civil authority and the state's domestic and foreign affairs. As such, a political system was created with the 1960 constitution which did not include civilian control over the military, an independent judiciary or participation of people in the political decision-making, which are indispensable segments of functioning democratic governance according to the EU acquis.

The double-headed political system and the power of the military in the Turkish political system was further strengthened with the 1971 military intervention. The functions of NSC were extended from informing to making recommendations for the amendments, which were made to the NSC’s charter in 1973. As argued by Preston Hughes, this change ‘strengthened its [NSC’s] role and made it a more effective instrument in national policymaking’ and allowed it to ‘promote more decisive governmental action when situations warranted it’ (cited in Michaud-Emin, 2007, p. 28). As such, military influence on political decisions and its intervention in the political, economic and social life of the country continued increasingly during the 1970s. The military again directly intervened

44 It is worth noting here that owing to the legacy of the Young Turks and the Kemalist ideology the military has been in favour of modernisation and Westernisation. This means it is in favour of democracy. In other words, in theory it accepts the supremacy of civil authority and the democratic control of civil authority over the military. It is not the subject of this study, but it is worth understanding the meaning of democracy for the Turkish military. As rightly argued by Hipper and Guney (2000, p. 636) its understanding of democracy can be explained through Giovanni Sarori’s ‘rational democracy’. As Guney and Karatekillioglu (2005, p. 443) put it, the Turkish military’s definition of democracy ‘is much closer to the maintenance of order than democracy’. In other words, although because of the strong Kemalist legacy the military accepts the rule of law it has not hesitated to intervene in political life when it perceives that civil authority is violating the Kemalist characteristic of the state political regime.
in Turkish political life in 1980, in the name of ending the internal chaos and re-establishing security in the country. After the 1980 coup, a new constitution replaced the constitution of 1961, prepared by a commission appointed again by the military junta. The double-headed political system also continued to increasingly maintain the control and influence of the military over political, social and economic life.

The role of the NSC was further strengthened in the new constitution by an increase in the number of senior commanders in the NSC at the expense of its civilian members, by the fact that the ‘government must give priority to the NSC recommendations’ and by the broad definition of national security: ‘protection and maintenance of the state’s constitutional order, national presence, integrity, its political, social, cultural and economic interests on an international level and contractual law against any kind of internal and foreign threat’ (The Act of the National Security Council and the National Security Secretariat dated 9 December, 1983, No. 2945). The secretary-general of the NSC appointed by the military was empowered with a similar guiding power that was invariably held by the prime minister. He oversaw the foreign and domestic intelligence services and was required to ‘direct the activities of the ministries and the state bureaucracy as a whole’ (Seufert/Kubaseck, 2006).

As the EU Commission Report on Turkey (2000) stated, the NSC and the secretary-general of the NSC were not accountable to Parliament or to the government. The NSC operated mostly as a decision-making body with the power to obstruct any policy. Due to the broad definition of ‘national security’, its task covered all subjects of state policy, including domestic, foreign, security, education, broadcasting etc. The government was obligated to consider the statements and recommendations of the NSC in the formulation of any policy, which strictly limited the government’s power in formulating any policy. As Jenkins (2001) argues, owing to this authoritarian decision-making structure, governments have rarely made a decision in domestic and foreign policy in is conflict with NSC recommendations and opinions.

The separate military jurisdiction and setting of military judges in civil SSCs dealt with alleged ‘crimes against the indivisible integrity of the state, with its territory and nation, the free democratic order, or against the Republic, whose characteristics are defined in
the Constitution, and offences directly involving the internal and external security of the state’ (Article 143 of the 1982 Constitution)\textsuperscript{45}. The army also had its own intelligence services, and autonomous budget, and by law, it was not subject to civilian control. It operated its own businesses that were free from tax and qualified for government subsidies. In other words, the army had a privileged position in influencing and interfering with the work of the civil authority, judiciary and administrative bureaucracy in the Turkish political system (Ozdemir, 2006; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010; Istanbul; CIV12, January 4, 2011, Ankara).

The autonomous role of the army in the Turkish political system, its security concerns rising from internal and external affairs and its interventions in political life brought about the transformation of domestic religious and minority issues from normal politics and imposed limitations on human rights, the establishment and functioning of political parties and NGOs, and their participation in political-decision-making.

4.3.2 Lack of respect for and protection of religious and minority rights

The founder of the Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk, attempted to create a homogeneous nation state in order to secure the unitary structure of the state and people's loyalty to it\textsuperscript{46} (Karaosmanoglu, 2000, p. 200-213; Tocci, 2001). Ataturk attempted to build the state on civic nationalism and citizenship, but, although theoretically the Turkish political regime adopted civic nationalism, in practice distinct ethnic elements of society were fragmented in the Republic. In other words, the Kemalist Turkish political regime ‘attempted to assimilate diverse ethnicities into an ethnically Turkish nation’ (Tocci, 2001, p. 4).

In order to create political homogeneity within the Turkish Republic, secularism became the most important pillar of Kemalist state ideology. The Turkish political regime, on the one hand, attempted to keep religion out of state decisions, and on the other hand, through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (DIB)), attempted to keep religion under state control and reduce its role in public and private life.

\textsuperscript{45} As will be seen the following section, the penalties for these crimes, called crimes against the state, were heavy and not compatible with EU criminal law.

\textsuperscript{46} In Ottoman society, people predominantly identified themselves with their religion and family ties, so the concept of statehood and nationhood, which are the prerequisites for building a strong nation state, were not strong enough.
Turkification and hard secularisation (laicism) thus became the two main policies of the Kemalist state regime.

In this regard, the military, arguably the most Kemalist institution of the Republic, perceived political Islam and different ethnic groups (minorities), including the Kurds, as the main threats to the Kemalist state regime and unitary structure of the state. Anything related to a domestic minority, and Kurdish and Islamic affairs, was transferred out of normal politics and accepted as taboo, and a task for the military, (Ozcan, 1994; Kirisci, 2006; Aras, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV10, December 10, 2010, Ankara). For decades, under the name of the survival of the state regime and the unitary structure of the state, both minorities and religious groups and movements were subjected to repression and persecution (Kirisci, 2006; Aras, 2009; Cengiz, 2004; CIV10, December 10, 2010, Ankara). The establishment and functioning of non-Muslim associations was restricted. For instance, non-Muslims were banned from choosing their own religious leaders, they were not allowed to obtain, sell and or donate real estate, and their real estate properties were confiscated (for more information see Cengiz, 2004). With the Wealth Tax Act (1944) and events of 6-7 September (1955), the goods of non-Muslim businessmen were plundered, and they were, to a large extent, liquidated from Turkey’s economic life (Aktar, 2000; Kuyucu, 2005; Cengiz, 2004). Schoolbooks were filled with discriminatory and nationalist statements. The name of the places that were not Turkish were changed into Turkish. (For more details of Turkification policies against non-Muslim minorities see Kurban and Hatemi, 2009; Aktar, 2000; Kuyucu, 2005; Cengiz, 2004).

47 For example, from 1995 to 2000 745 serving officers were dismissed from the military predominantly for suspected Islamist sympathies (see Jenkins, 2000, p. 28).
48 We specifically mentioned the Kurdish group separately because non-Muslim groups in general are defined as a minority in the founder treaty of the Turkish Republic, Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
49 As will be seen in the following Chapter V, the securitisation and transformation of domestic issues out of normal politics has caused political and diplomatic crises between Turkey and its neighbours. Thus their transformation into the realm of normal politics is important for developing good neighbourhood relations.
50 For more information about the Wealth Tax Act, its application and results, see Aktar (2000), and for details about the 6-7 September events and their results see Kuyucu (2005).
51 As a result of this repression and persecution minorities have left the country. According to Turkey’s first census, held in 1927, the population of Turkey was 13,648,270. According to this census, the Greek population was 108,000; Armenian population was 140,000 and the Jewish population was 42,000. Although the population of Turkey increased to 74,724,269 by 2012, the population of minorities considerably decreased: the population of Greek is about 2,300, of Jews 25,000, and of Armenians 50-60,000.
Muslim minorities also took their share of repression and persecution. Dersim Alawites (Alevies) have a separate identity and were subjected to a military massacre (1938). There were massacres of Alawites in Maras (1978), Corum (1980) and Sivas (1993). Through a mandatory religious course based on Sunni Islamic doctrine, the Alawites were forced to learn Sunni Islam. In the south-east region, which is mainly populated by Kurds, villages were forcibly evacuated and burned, and hundreds of thousands of people were subjected to forced migration and murder. Through the state of emergency and the Anti-Terror Law, such as Articles 7 and 8, freedom of expression, the press, associations and assembly, and even travel was restricted. The use of the Kurdish language in broadcasting, the press, the public sphere and education (both public and private education) was banned.

In addition to the non-Muslim minorities and/or non-Sunny minorities, Sunni Muslim religious groups and individual people were also subjected to repression and persecution. The wearing of head scarves in public areas such as universities and at official ceremonies was banned. Many students wearing the headscarf were banished from schools after the 1997 military intervention. With the 1997 military intervention, people, bureaucrats, politicians, members of NGOs and the press who wore headscarves were banned from attending formal balls and ceremonies, even from attending their children’s university graduation ceremonies. Religious schools such as Quran schools, and Religious Vocational Schools were closed down. Graduates of the Religious Vocational School (Imam Hatip Lisesi (IHL)), were denied entry into university and military schools. The growing Anatolian business community generated by Ozal’s liberal economic policies ‘[was] defined as a green economy (Muslim capital) and [was] treated differently’ (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; Alan, 2012) and following the 28 February 1997 military intervention was to be eliminated from Turkish economic life.

The participation of politicians and NGOs in the discussion about these issues was not welcomed by the military (Aras, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 2010) and thus for decades the political and economic activities and leaders of Islamists, Kurdish and minority groups

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52 For more information about the applications of 28 military interventions to eliminate the Muslim capital see the interview with CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels and Alan, 2012 as well as the analysis of Turkish journalists, Bayramoglu; Candar, 2002; Barlas and many others, during the 2001 economic crisis.
were harassed and prosecuted. Between the 1960 coup and 1980 coup, six political parties, and after the 1980 coup 19 political parties, were closed down. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamist movement’s National Salvation Party (MSP) and its successors, the Welfare Party (RP) and Virtue Party (SP), who supported the expansion of religious and cultural rights, were closed down for threatening the secular principle of the Kemalist state system. In last two decades, four out of the eight political parties, the People’s Labour Party (HEP), Democracy Party (DEP), People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) and in January 2009 the Democratic Society Party (DTP), who supported the expansion of the cultural and political rights of Kurds, were closed down for threatening the territorial integrity of the state. Another three parties, the Freedom and Equality Party (OZEP), Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) and Democratic People Party (DEHAP) abrogated themselves before awaiting the result of the closure cases against them.\textsuperscript{53}

4.3.3 Limitations on establishment and functioning of NGOs

The activities of NGOs and their political engagement were perceived as a threat to the established political system and viewed with the greatest suspicion by the military-bureaucratic elites (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). In order to minimise the effects of NGOs on the state system, policies and society, the establishment and functioning of NGOs was also restricted by the authoritarian state regime (Goksel and Gunes, 2005; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). During the 1980s and 1990s, due to the escalation of Kurdish and Islamic political issues, NGOs and their activities were also further pressured and limited to protect the unitary and secular structure of the state in the name of repressive measures. Public demonstrations and marches were restricted and the activities of NGOs, including voluntary associations, foundations, student organisations and religious groups, were further severely restricted. All types of political activity by all entities other than officially recognised political parties, were banned, and interaction between political parties and institutions such as trade unions, voluntary associations, religious and professional organisations and student groups were prohibited (Megen,\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{53} It is also worth noting that the ten existing electoral thresholds considerably restrict and curtail political participation.
As regularly recorded by domestic and international human rights organisations, many books, periodicals and publishing companies were suspended and politicians, writers, journalists and members of NGOs were repressed and imprisoned due to their expression of non-violent opinions against state institutions, including such issues as the political role of the military in the state system, the army’s reactions to Kurdish, Islamic and minority affairs, and the basic principles of Kemalism. As mentioned above, the growing Anatolian business community was also repressed and persecuted. Their political and economic life, and even schools and universities, were under the repression and persecution of the authoritarian state regime. Any criticism that came from NGOs, including the universities, against the principles of the Kemalist revolution, political regime, institution of the state, territorial integrity and unity of the state, was restricted and regularly prosecuted using Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terrorist Law and Articles 158, 159, 311 and 312 of the Constitution. There was a de facto ban on NGOs and their activities (Ozturk, 2009, p. 16; CIV10, December 10, 2010; Ankara; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul). As a result, before the EU accession process, there was no real civil society and no participation of NGOs in political decision-making. There was no real rule of law in the country (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003; Clarke, 2000; Gencer, 2001; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Obtaining permission to establish an association without having cooperation from the authoritarian state regime and its bureaucracy was almost impossible (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). People were afraid to get involved in political affairs, or to organise under the umbrella of associations to protect their interests (Magen, 2004; Vardar 2005, P. CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). This is why ‘civil society’ simply meant a small group of people in Istanbul or some other big city who were in cooperation

54 The RTÜK has temporarily banned the broadcasting of a number of radio and television stations. Ten radio/TV stations were banned and closed for between 1 and 365 days as a result of their unacceptable comments, as per the law on political events in August 2001. On the basis of Article 26 of the RTÜK, stations were prohibited from broadcasting in Turkey from the BBC and Deutsche Welle on 26 September 2001 (see Progress Report 2001 on Turkey, p. 25). A number of publishing companies have been suspended and their periodicals and books seized. The Interior Minister declared, in his reply to a parliamentary question, that 1309 books and periodicals had been confiscated in 2001; and according to the Association of Turkish Editors’ report, 40 books from 39 writers were banned between January and May 2002.
with the authoritarian state regime, its institutions and autocratic state elites (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels).

All in all, the research engaged in to ascertain the origins of the sets of institutions, rules, ideas, actors, and policies in the field of democracy and the rule of law at the Turkish level, and the misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels in the examined fields before the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in the 1999 reveals a number of things. The military acted as a high-ranking institution in the Turkish political system (Ozturk, 2009, p. 20 see and Heper and Keyman, 1998; Gencer, 2001; Diamond, 2002; Frank, 2002). Under the name of protection from external and internal threats, the Kemalist state system legalised and legitimised the influence and interventions of the military in political, economic and social life through the constitution and institutions like the NSC (Ozdemir, 2006; Gencer, 2001; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The military established power over the political system and political, economic, cultural and religious affairs, the activities of NGOs and political parties and even parliament (Karaosmanoglu, 2000; Nathalie, 2001; Kirisci, 2004; Aras, 2009; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul). They also defined the state’s security, interests and policies and the parliament, politicians and people had to adapt to these, otherwise they would be harassed and prosecuted (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Consequently, there has been a high level misfit gap between the Turkey and the EU in terms of civil-military relations, respect for and protection of, religious and minority rights, the participation of NGOs in political decision-making, functioning democratic governance, an independent judiciary, a functioning free market economy and legislation in criminal law and competition law.

4.4 EUisation of Turkey’s domestic politics during the EU accession process

The following section will explore the institutions, civil-military relations, respect for, and protection of religious and minority rights, functioning democratic governance, independent judiciary and functioning free market economy and political and economic stability and growth in Turkey during the country’s accession to the EU process, and it
will analyse change in them and the causes of these alterations. It seeks to answer, first, how, when and to what extent the change is present, and why. As will be described in following sections, considerable reforms have been undertaken in these fields in accordance with calls from the EU. As a result, to different degrees in different fields, there has been considerable change and adaptation to the EU acquis.

As previously argued, causal analysis in our study is organised around the propositions of Europeanisation and rational and historical versions of new institutionalism. Accordingly, it focuses on whether the above identified misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels has caused EU adaptation pressure and brought about changes in the identified fields at the Turkish level (Europeanisation); the importance of critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations in punctuating the equilibrium at Turkish level and in starting along the path of the liberalisation of the Turkish political system through harmonisation reforms (historical institutionalism); and the empowerment of new actors and institutions against the traditional state actors and institutions in the political decision-making through the EU’s technical and economic supports, harmonisation reforms and the cost/benefit calculation of Turkish actors in rule compliance and policy change (rational institutionalism).

4.4.1 Empowerment of government in political decision-making

As expected and proposed by the theoretical framework of the study, the high level misfit gap between Turkey and EU in the examined fields caused high levels EU adaptation pressure on Turkey. Throughout the 1997 Luxembourg and 1999 Helsinki summit Presidency Conclusions, the 2001 Accession Partnership Document of Turkey and the European Commission yearly progress reports on Turkey, the EU set the condition that Turkey must meet the political, economic and legislative criteria of the European Union, defined by the 1993 Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, to progress towards EU membership. The major role played by the army in political life and the lack of civilian control over the army is one of the main subjects of EU criticism and adaptation pressure (see 1998 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 14; 2000 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 14; 2001 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 97, and Müftüler Baç,
The EU has not only constantly criticised the ‘autonomous’ role of the military in the Turkish political system through the NSC and SSCs, but also persistently asked for reforms in these realms to ensure that the army does not intervene in political life and that civilian authorities exercise full control over the military, its expenditure, and the formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policies in accordance with the practice of EU Member States (see 2001 Accession Partnership Document, p. 19; 2003 Accession Partnership Document, p. 44, and Toktas and Kurt, 2008; Heper, 2005, p. 33-44; Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p. 253-264).

As expected, proposed by the theoretical framework of study and noted by students of Turkish studies, EU adaptation pressure on Turkey over the ‘autonomous’ role of the military in the Turkish political system through the NSC resulted in the changing role and composition and function of the NSC. With the amendment made to Article 118 in 2001 the number of civilian members of the NSC increased from five to nine and the number of military members remained at five. The role of the NSC was limited to recommendations, in that instead of giving priority to the recommendations of the NSC the government would be required to simply evaluate them. The NSC representatives on the Supervisory Board of Cinema, Video and Music were removed. The 2001 European Commission Progression Report claimed, however, that this constitutional change would increase de facto civilian control over the military but needed to be monitored since, while the report was being prepared, the NSC was recommending action on a number of foreign policy issues, such as the Cyprus issue, ESDP and domestic policy issues such as measures to combat anti-secular activism, the extension of the compulsory age limit in primary education, the state of emergency in various provinces, privatisation of state companies, socio-economic developments and even constitutional reform packages (Guney and Karatekillioglu, 2005, p. 443).

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56 NSC representatives on the RTÜK and the YOK, however, stayed. As a result of the EU’s enduring criticism (see the 2001, 2002 and 2003 EU Progression Reports on Turkey), the NSC representatives on the RTÜK and YOK were later removed in 2004.
To limit the influence of the military over the government and the Turkish political system, ‘revolutionary’ changes were made in the ‘seventh reform package’ on 23 July 2003 related to the duties, functions and composition of the NSC to adapt the civil-military relations to the EU norms, involving:

- The extended executive and supervisory power of the Secretary General of the NSC. In particular, the provision empowering him to follow up, on behalf of the President and the Prime Minister, the implementation of any recommendation made by the NSC has been abrogated.
- The ultimate access of the NSC to any civilian agency has also been abrogated.
- The post of Secretary General will no longer be reserved exclusively for a military person.
- The frequency of the NSC meetings has been modified, so that it will meet every two months instead of once a month.
- The government is no longer obligated to consider the statements and recommendations of the NSC in the formulation of any policy.


57 The Financial Times (31 July, 2003) called these changes in the Turkish political system a ‘quiet revolution’ and a triumph for the EU.
In addition, with the amendments to Article 160 of the Constitution and the Law on Public Financial Management and Control (PFMC), the seventh reform package introduced increasing parliamentary control over, and transparency in, defence and military expenditure. With these amendments, defence and military expenditure began to be announced and the Court of Auditors is authorised to audit the accounts and transactions of all types of organisations including state properties owned by the armed forces (2003 EC Progress Report on Turkey). Furthermore, in accordance with calls from the EU (see 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 EC Progression Reports on Turkey) the ratio of military expenditure to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been reduced considerably in the last decade. As noted by the EC progress report on Turkey (2004, p. 23) on the history of the Republic of Turkey, ‘Education spending is for the first time higher than defence spending’ in the 2004 budget (Progress Report on Turkey, 2004, p. 23); and according to the 2011 budget, the Ministry of Education budget (34 billion TL) is more than twice the budget of the Ministry of National Defence (17 billion TL). The ratio of military expenditure to the GDP was 10.5% of the GDP in 1997 and down to 5.6% in 2008 and 2.4% in 2010 (TGNA/TBMM Negotiations on the Budget of National Defence Minister, October 10, 2010, Ankara).

On the other hand, as will be explained in the following section, as a result of EU calls and adaptation pressure, the SSCs were closed in 2004 and members of military engaging in crime can be tried in civil courts following an amendment to legislation (Act 5918) in 2009. As such, the influence of the military over the judiciary is also deinstitutionalised and illegalised. Consequently, civil executive and judiciary control over the military was institutionalised and legalised, and ‘a double-headed political system ended (see 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 EC Progress Reports on Turkey; Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p. 253-264 Satana, 2011, p. 279-292; Heper, 2011, p. 241-252; Bilgiç, 2009, p. 803-824; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The 2010 constitutional reforms opened a path for judicial investigations into previous coups. For the first time in the

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58 As such, many retired and active duty military personnel, including former army commanders, who had allegedly engaged in as-yet unsolved murders during the 1990s, especially in the south-east of Turkey, and attempting to remove or prevent the functioning of the government through force and violence are being tried in civil court.
Republican history the generals and members of army who participated in the coups of 1980 and 1997\textsuperscript{59}, engaged in the coup plan, the ‘Sledgehammer’,\textsuperscript{60} in 2003-2005 and/or the deep-state criminal network, the Ergenekon, were tried in the civil court and sentenced. As noted by the 2012 EC Progression Reports on Turkey (see page 11) and Aydini (2011, p. 227-239) these investigations also contributed greatly to the consolidation of civil-military relations in Turkey by decreasing the people’s confidence in the military around 15 per cent, while the people’s confidence in government has increased about two-fold in the last decade (For details see “Türkiye Değerler Atası 2012” - Turkey's Values Atlas 2012). In addition to losing its legal power in political decision-making mechanisms and the judiciary, the military’s interventions in politics and its influence and control over the government and judiciary also lost its legitimacy in the eyes of Turkish people.

The harmonisation reforms undertaken in 2003 and 2004 have also introduced a number of changes to the prosecution of political parties and the restriction on political participation. The amendment to Article 67 removed the restriction on voting in elections and referenda.\textsuperscript{61} The amendment to the Political Parties Law, and Articles 100 and 102, with the second and fourth reform packages made it difficult to close down political parties in 2003.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} ‘The Judicial investigations into the 1980 coup and the 28 February ‘Postmodern Coup’ of 1997 were initiated. Eight political parties, including the AKP, CHP and the National Movement Party (MHP), as well as the Council of Ministers, many non-governmental organisations and nearly 340 individuals requested to become co-plaintiffs in the 1980 coup case’ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 13). As such, generals such as the former Chief of Staff, Evren, the former commander of the land forces, Cetinkaya who participated in the coup in 1980 and are alive today, are being tried in civil court after thirty years. The leader of the 1997 military coup, Cevik Bir, the former commander of the First Army, and many other generals and members of the army who engaged in the coup in 1997 were tried and sentenced fifteen years later.

\textsuperscript{60} The court made its decision about 'the ‘Sledgehammer’ trial in September 21, 2012, and 323 retired and active duty military personnel, including three former army commanders, were sentenced to 13 to 20 years imprisonment ‘on charges of attempting to remove or prevent the functioning of the government through force and violence’ during the 2003- 2005 period.

\textsuperscript{61} According to the previous 67 Article, all conscripts serving in the armed services, students in military schools, and detainees and convicts in prisons were unable to vote.

\textsuperscript{62} According to the new Article 100, a closure case can only be opened for ‘reasons stipulated in the Constitution in line with Article 68 and with amendment to the Political Party Law of a three-fifths majority’. An amendment to Article 104 provides alternative sanctions instead of closing the party. These amendments restrict the closing of political parties in the Turkish political system. For example, in 2005, the Court of Cassation rejected closure cases against seven political parties and the closure case against the
Consequently, the equilibrium in Turkey’s institutional structure and civil-military relations has been punctuated by a critical juncture in EU-Turkey relations, the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999. The path of the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime began with the harmonisation reforms generated by increasing EU adaptation pressure on Turkey. As detailed above, the reforms concerning the ‘autonomous’ role of the military, the SSCs, the NSC in the Turkish political system, the prosecution of political parties and the restrictions on political participation have considerably liberalised the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations at Turkish level. As expected, this resulted in the waning power of the military in influencing political, economic and social life in Turkey and a shift in the balance of civil-military relations towards civilians. As noted by the EC Progression Reports on Turkey (see 2004, p.23, 2012, p.11, see also 2009, 2010, 2011) many of our interviews (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara) and students engaged in Turkish studies (Aydinli, 2011, p. 227-239; Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p. 253-264 Satana, 2011, p. 279-292; Heper, 2011, p. 241-252; Bilgiç, 2009, p. 803-824) agree that civilian control over the military unexpectedly increased over the last decade, especially after 2007. Today, unlike the past, the civil authority – the Prime Minister and President – have the final say at the Supreme Military Council (YAS) and the NSC. The military influence and control over the judiciary through the SSCs has ended, as has the civil judiciary’s control over the military, established with the amendment to the act of 5918 in 2009 and the 2010 constitutional reforms. As will be explained below, during the changing the functions, duties and composition of the NSC, YOK, RTÜK, SSCs, and cuts in the defence budget the military-bureaucratic elites acted as veto players. However, thanks to the EU, its conditionality, and technical and financial support, reforms were put into practice.

ruling AK Party opened by the public prosecutor of the Court of Appeals in 2008, which was rejected by the Constitutional Court on the basis of the ‘three-fifths majority’ rule.

63 As is correctly believed, as a symbol of the changing balance of power between the civil and military in the Turkish political system, the Chief of General Staff no longer sites beside the Prime Minister at the YAS meetings (See Appendix A.).
Considering the increasing attacks of the PKK against Turkish military forces, the increasing power and influence of religious and Kurdish movements in Turkish society and political life, the increasing instability and clashes in the region in this period, the absence of the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999 and EU conditionality in the rule of law and civilian control over the military, the influence and control of the military-bureaucratic camp over Turkey’s domestic politics would have continued in the last decade, due to their internal and external perceptions of threat, as was the case in the 1990s and in previous decades. Thus, the Government would have been much less credible in making reforms in accordance with the calls from the EU, which would have had substantial consequences for the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime. The reforms at Turkish level previously described would not have been undertaken to adapt EU *acquis communautaire*, and thus, there would not have been a change in the NSC’s composition, function or duties, the political decision-making mechanism or institutional power relations. Parliamentary control over military expenditure and budgetary transparency related to military and defence expenditure would not have emerged. Instead the restriction on political participation and the activities of political parties would have continued. The empowerment of the government against the military–bureaucratic elites in the Turkish political system and the formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policy would not have occurred. The direct and indirect control and pressure of the military–bureaucratic elites on government, its policies and political issues would have continued. The civil authority—namely, the prime minister and president—would not have the final say at the YAS and the NSC, where Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies are formulated. In the absence of the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999 and the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure, the equilibrium at the Turkish level would not have been punctuated and a path toward the liberalisation of institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations would not have been initiated. Military influence and control over the government would have continued, as was the case in previous decades.

Despite improvements, constraints remain with regard to the accountability and transparency of security forces. Although parliamentary oversight of the defence budget was established, ‘the defence budget was disclosed to the public in a highly aggregated
manner with significant off-budget military expenditure not detailed’ (2012 EC Progression Report on Turkey, p. 11). Instead of the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff continues to be responsible to the Prime Minister. Military operations are also not yet subject to sufficient civilian oversight. There is need for an amendment to the Law on Provincial Administrations, used as the legal basis for military operations, in accordance with the EU call to increase civilian oversight of military operations, in particular the gendarmerie operations (for details see 2012 EC Progression Report on Turkey, p. 11). Furthermore, at least in theory if not in practice, the Internal Service Law for the Turkish armed forces – which defines the duties of the military – ‘leaves the military significant potential scope for intervention in politics’ (2012 EC Progression Report on Turkey, p. 11), and has not been changed yet. The 10% national threshold for obtaining seats in parliament remains to be an obstacle for political participation in general, and specifically for the Kurdish political movement.

Overall, as proposed by the theoretical framework of the study, Europeanisation and historical and rational institutionalism, the critical juncture in EU-Turkey relations, and the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999, punctuated the equilibrium at the Turkish level and started Turkey along the path of liberalisation through the harmonisation reforms generated by EU adaptation pressure, which resulted in the democratisation of civil-military relations and the empowerment of government in the Turkish political system and political decision-making. However, despite considerable improvements in the accountability and transparency of the security forces, the Internal Service Law for the Turkish armed forces, and the Chief of the General Staff’s being responsible to the Minister of Defence rather than to the Prime Minister, the misfit gap between Turkey and the EU in terms of civil-military relations, to some extent continues. In this regard, there is still need for further efforts and reforms to fully adapt to EU standards. As noted by many students of Turkish study (Aydin 2011; Altayli 2013; Davuroglu, 2014; Erdogan) however, and our interviewees (CIV4, October 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 2011, Ankara), in practice the army no longer intervenes in political life and civilian authorities fully exercise control over the military, its expenditure, and the formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policies in accordance with EU standards in last years, especially after 2007.
4.4.2 Empowerment of civil society in political decision-making

The Accession Partnership Document and the EU yearly progression reports on Turkey have also constantly criticised the lack of an independent judiciary and respect for human rights such as civil, political, social, cultural, religious and economic rights, and legislative alignment with the body of European law (for details see, 1998 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 13-16; 2000 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 21). The EU has also persistently asked Turkey to fill the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels in these realms (For details see 2001 The Accession Partnership Document, p. 21-22; 2003 The Accession Partnership Document, p. 27). As will be briefly explained below, as a result of the EU adaptation pressure, ‘harmonisation reforms’ in the fields of legislation, judiciary and human rights were undertaken to fill the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels.

In parallel with calls from the EU, Turkey ratified Protocols 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights and it relaxed the restrictions on freedom of the press, association, and expression through the ‘harmonisation law packages’ undertaken in 2002-2005 period. For instance, with amendments to Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution, Articles 159, 169, 301 and 312 of Turkish Criminal Law (TCK), Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-terrorism Law (TMK) and the Press Law (RTÜK) Law) some restrictions on the freedom of expression, press association and assembly have been deleted. The status of international treaties has also been reinforced within the hierarchy of the legal system, and the superiority of international agreements related to fundamental rights and freedoms to national legislation have been established (see the third and fourth

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64 In accordance with calls from the EU nine ‘harmonisation law packages’ have been ratified by TGNA to fulfill the misfit gap between the Turkish and EU level.

65 Article 13 ‘Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only on the basis of specific reasons listed in the relevant articles of the constitutions without prejudice to the values defined therein and by law. These restrictions shall not conflict with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the democratic social order and the secular republic and the principle of proportionality’.

66 Article 14 ‘None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, or for activities undertaken with the aim of destroying the democratic and secular Republic based on human rights. No provision of this constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that grants the state or individuals the right of destroying the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution, and of staging an activity with the aim of restricting rights and freedoms more extensively than is stated in the constitution. Sanctions for persons undertaking activities in conflict with these provisions shall be defined by law’.
‘harmonisation law packages’ and the amendment to Article 90 of the constitution). The SSCs that the military judges\textsuperscript{67} deal with alleged crimes against territorial and national integrity of state and the principles of the republic were removed (see amendment to the Article 9 of the Constitution).\textsuperscript{68} Furthermore, in accordance with EU calls (see 1998, 1999, 2002 Progression Report on Turkey) the state of emergency in six provinces in the south-east (Article 122 of the Constitution) granted extensive powers to the regional governor in restricting fundamental rights and freedoms in the name of ensuring security removed in 2002. As such, the amendments to a number of articles of the criminal code to align Turkish criminal law with that of the EU, and the freedom of expression in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the ECHR itself has increased open and free debate in Turkish society and the media by decreasing legal uncertainties and political and military pressure on the freedom of expression and the press (Goksel and Gunes, 2005), thus easing the activities of associations and foundations (see CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; Özbudun; 2007; Satana, 2011, p. 279-292).

As a result of the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure the existing restrictions on the establishment and functioning of associations have also, to large extent, been removed with the amendment to the Law on Association through the third, fourth and seventh ‘harmonisation law packages’ and amendment to Articles 11, 12, 21 and 33 of the Constitution. The third reform package removed the limitations on civil servants establishing associations and removed the bans on their activities for civil defence purposes. It also removed the requirement to obtain permission from governors to organise meetings or demonstrations. The fourth reform package removed the former obligation of associations to send copies of their announcements and publications to the relevant authorities before distributing them, and the restrictions on NGO announcements and publications. It allowed NGOs the use of any language in their (non-official) correspondence. The seventh reform package has removed, first, the restriction on the establishment of associations on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion, sect, and region.

\textsuperscript{67}Although some amendments have been made during the 2001-2005 period, the Turkish judicial system has been subject to EU criticism and so four judicial reform packages have been ratified by TGNA since 2009 to fulfill the misfit gap between Turkey and the EU.

\textsuperscript{68}The special competence courts were established to deal with crimes against the state, which was also removed in accordance with calls from the EU in the third judicial reform package in 2012.
Second, the requirement to seek prior permission to open branches abroad, join foreign bodies or hold meetings with foreign bodies or hold meeting with foreigners. Third, all restrictions on student associations. And fifth, the requirement to inform local government officials of general assembly meeting (2004 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 40). The amendment to Articles 11 and 12 has regulated relations between domestic and foreign organisations, lifted restrictions on having relationships with international counterparts, increased the freedom to join associations and establish associations, and decreased the minimum age for joining organisations and gatherings from 21 to 18 years. The amendment has also removed the restrictions on the right of NGOs to hold meetings and demonstrations by deleting Article 21 of the constitution. The amendment to Article 33 of the constitution has reduced the restriction on the right to form an association. As noted by many of our interviewees (CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011), students of Turkish studies (Özbudun; 2007, p. 179-193; Göksel and Güneş, 2005, p. 63-68), and outlined in the EC Progress Report on Turkey, the aforementioned reforms have played a significant role in ‘reducing the possibility for state interference in the activities of associations and facilitating the further development of civil society in Turkey’ (2005 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 27).

The EU’s financial and technical support, such as advisory, training, and education, has also contributed greatly to the development and empowerment of NGOs in the Turkish political system, society and political decision-making, by providing them with financial autonomy, professional skill and experience. Since 2002, under the name of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the EU has supported civil society with an average of EUR 2,700,000 per year in promoting, protecting and defending human rights, such as freedom of expression, the protection and respect of cultural diversity and the improvement of access to justice under the name of different projects. For instance, under the Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue the EU funded EUR750,000 and the organisation of 13 EU countries and Turkey worked together on youth, minority rights and business communities in 17 partnership projects. Under the

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69 As a result of these reforms ‘the legal framework for freedom assembly is broadly in line with the European standards’ (2007 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 16).
Europa-Bridges of Knowledge, the EU funded EUR2,000,000 and NGOs and universities worked together in 27 projects to enhance expertise on EU legislation in Turkey. During 2007-2009 under the Promoting Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Turkey programme, 119 joint projects in fields of Towns and Municipalities, Professional Organisations, Universities and Youth Initiatives have been undertaken. 330 organisations were involved in this programme which was funded by the EU with EUR21,500,000. The EU and the Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Trade Unions Confederation have also brought together workers from Turkey and the European Union to increase integration between the EU and Turkish business communities through the Shared Culture of Work Programme (EUR 3,190,000) and the EU-Turkey Chambers Forum (EUR 4,250,000). To further develop integration between Turkey and the EU in different areas, two new civil society dialogue programmes were launched in 2010. These are the Promoting Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Turkey II programme (EUR6,200,000), which promotes initiatives in culture and the arts, and fisheries and agriculture, and the Parliamentary Exchange and Dialogue programme (EUR2,250,000), which promotes dialogue between politicians, NGOs and political parties in the EU and Turkey. Through the European Union Visitors Programme (EUVP) and the People to People Programme (P2P) conducted under the name of the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX), the EU has supported short-term technical assistance and advice, technical training and peer assistance to Turkish civil society. This programme allowed individuals and NGOs to visit EU institutions and meet with EU officials and their counterparts in Europe in such cities as Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg (For further details of the EU’s support of Turkish civil society see Civil Society Facility 2011-2013 Country Fiche: Turkey).

The numbers, financial autonomy, professional skills and experience of civil society has therefore increased tremendously over the last decade as a result of the harmonisation reforms and the EU’s technical and economic supports (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; Özbudun; 2007, p. 179-193; Göksel and Güneş, 2005, p. 63-68). Today there are over 80,000 associations, and 4,000 foundations with a total of about ten million members, which is more than the population of many members of the EU. Their increasing publications have contributed to the changes in the
image of civil society in the eyes of the people and in the public mind\textsuperscript{70}. Thus, as noted in our interviews (CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; DIP4, January 4, 2011, Ankara; DIP5, January 6, 2011, Ankara and DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara) and proposed by rational institutionalists (see section 2.6.2 in Chapter II), Turkish civil society has gained power in the EU accession process as a result of the redistribution of power, research and authority through harmonisation reforms and the EU’s technical and economic support\textsuperscript{71}.

As noted above, the PKK increased its attacks against Turkish military forces during this process, especially after 2003, religious and Kurdish movements gained power and influence over Turkey’s social and political life and the instability and clashes in the region increased in this period. As argued in the first section of this chapter, since the establishment of the Republic of the Turkey, the military-bureaucratic elites have seen these developments as the main threat to the territorial integrity and the Kemalist political regime of the country and thus increased the restrictions on freedom of association, assembly and expression, the judiciary and the civil society. Considering these internal and external developments in the absence of the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate, and EU conditionality regarding the rule of law and the removal of restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms, the ratification of Protocols 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and superiority of international agreements related to fundamental rights and freedoms of the national legislation would not have been established. Articles 9, 11, 12, 21, 33, and 301 of the Constitution (for details about the articles, see the above section) would not have been amended. The state of emergency in six provinces in the south-east (Article 122 of the Constitution) would have continued. The second, third, and seventh reform packages would not have been enacted by TGNA.

\textsuperscript{70} ‘In the 1990s, the image of think tanks and civil society organisations in Turkish society were largely as emissaries of the West. In particular, the military and Kemalist elite who had controlled the state system and formulated state policies viewed the members of think tanks and civil society as spies for the EU or for America; thus, they restricted their activities and did not enter into any relations with them’ (Interview with CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara).

\textsuperscript{71}As elaborated in the following chapter, the empowered Turkish civil society has developed its own agenda and participated in foreign policy making (see Chapter V).
The legal uncertainties and the political and military pressure on the freedom of expression, association, assembly and the press, and restrictions on the establishment and functioning of associations and foundations would have continued as in previous decades. The SSCs and the military judges would have continued to deal with alleged crimes against the territorial and national integrity of the state and the principles of the republic. Article 301 (for details, see above) would have been used to restrict freedom of expression and freedom of the press for journalists, writers and publishing companies. The associations would not have received financial support from other associations and organisations. Turkey, therefore, would have continued to suffer from the lack of a rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms. It would not have become possible to talk about the increasing freedom of expression, association, assembly and the press, or the development of civil society in Turkey in the absence of EU conditionality in the rule of law and the removal of restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms. Furthermore, in the absence of the EU’s financial and technical support (e.g., advisory, training, education), Turkish civil society would not have developed financial autonomy, professional skills or experience, meaning they would not have had the power and opportunity to make their voice heard in political decision making, at least not at the level that it is today.

However, freedom of association, assembly and expression, and independency of judiciary, is not fully at EU standards yet. Restrictions on the freedom of expression and freedom of the media continue to some extent, in practice. ‘The legal framework, especially as regards organised crime and terrorism, and its interpretation by the courts, leads to abuses… Frequent website bans are a cause for serious concern and there is a need to revise the law on the internet’ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 22). Even the number of journalists, media workers and distributors who were imprisoned went up again during the 2010-2013 period.\(^2\) In regard to freedom of assembly the excessive administrative restrictions such as ‘substantial prior notification requirements for demonstrations, and sometimes the confinement of demonstrations to designated sites

\(^2\) According to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) there were 57 journalists in prison in April 2011 which increased to 95 in April 2012. Twenty have since been released, 10 of them as a result of the third judicial reform package in July 5, 2012.
and dates’ continue to restrict the holding of demonstrations and meetings (2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23). NGOs and human rights defenders who exercise their rights to demonstrate, hold protest meetings, assemble and publish freely are still subject to prosecution and fines on charges of terrorist propaganda, disobeying orders under the Law on Misdemeanours and violating Law No 2911 on demonstrations (2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23). Although legislation on freedom of association is, to a large extent, in line with the EU *acquis communautaire*, ‘the constitutional right to freedom of assembly and association appears to be interpreted at times in an overly restrictive manner’ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23). The NGOs and their activities, to some extent, continue to be restricted through administrative obstacles and continue to be subject to harassment, fines and closure proceedings. NGOs also still face difficulties in fundraising, ‘The collection of domestic and international funds was difficult and bureaucratic procedures cumbersome’ (2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23). Furthermore, as regards the independence of the judiciary, although the control of the military over the civil courts disappeared with the removal of SSCs, the duality between the civilian and military court systems continues. The subjective interpretation of the Anti-Terror Law continues to be a problem in the Turkish criminal justice system. There is a need to increasingly deliver training in EU applications and human rights for judges and prosecutors, in order to reduce the subjective interpretation of the Anti-Terror Law (see 2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p.11-15). The training of public officials, judges, public prosecutors and police officers has been continued by the Department of Human Rights, for the promotion and enforcement of human rights, however, as seen during the Gezi Park demonstrations there is still need for the further training of public

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73 The misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels is still on-going with regard to legislation on political parties and trade unions (see 2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23).
74 ‘The Diyarbakir Sarmaşik Association, the Orhan Dogan Support Houses for Education, the Dersim Faith and Culture Academy Association, and the cases of the executive members of the Socialist Democracy Party and the Social Freedom Platform, the Istanbul branch of the Human Rights Association, the Research and Development Association for Kurdish Language (Kurdi Der) İzmir Branch, the Board of Health Professionals and the Turkish Medical Association are alleged examples of the government interfering disproportionately with freedom of association’ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23).
75 ‘Military judges and prosecutors’ independence were limited by the continued authority of military commanders over them. The legal provisions on the composition and powers of the Supreme Military Council need to be reformed, particularly the legal basis for promotions, to ensure appropriate civilian control’ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 12).
officials, judges, public prosecutors, and especially police officers, as well as reforms 76 ‘to strengthen human rights structures and the number of criminal proceedings brought against human rights defenders is a matter of concern’ (2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 20). It is also important to note that as part of the settlement process of Kurdish and PKK issues through ‘the peace process’ started in 2013, the above restrictions on freedom of association, assembly and expression, and the judiciary were increasingly removed through harmonisation law packages (for details see the first, second, third and fourth judiciary harmonisation law packages and the amendments to the Anti-Terror law undertaken in the 2013-2014 period).

Overall, as a result of the ‘harmonisation reforms’ which considerably removed restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association, and the EU’s technical and financial support, civil society has increasingly developed and gained power in political decision-making in the EU accession process, 77 however, there is still a significant misfit gap between the EU and Turkish levels in these realms, especially in terms of freedom of expression and assembly which to some extent continue to restrict civil society from making their voice heard in the political decision-making process. Reforms in these fields have again accelerated since 2013, with increasing effort for the settlement of the Kurdish and PKK issues.

4.4.3 Empowerment of the economic society in political decision-making

In accordance with the Custom Union acquis, since the 1990s Turkey has increasingly liberalised its statist economy to adopt a Custom Union Structure 78. It has increasingly privatised state firms, adopted the EU’s competition policies, rules on protection of intellectual and industrial property rights, commercial policy (such as antidumping) and most of the preferential trade agreements concluded by the EU, and strengthened internal

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76 Although Turkey ratified the Protocols to the ECHR, Protocols 4, 7 and 12 of the ECHR s has not yet been ratified. Thus there is still need for important reforms.

77 Many of our interviewees emphasised the importance of harmonisation reforms and EU technical and financial support in development of civil society and increasing participation of civil society in political decision-making (see, interview with CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara.

78 Turkey became a member of the Custom Union in 1996. Interestingly it is the only country that was a member of the Custom Union before becoming an EU member.
conformity assessment and market surveillance structures (for details of reforms see Ozcan, 1998; Togan and Hoekman, 2005). The economic reforms undertaken to adapt to the Custom Union acquis, to some extent, liberalised the economy and curtailed the dominant role of the state in the economy. Until the early 2000s, however, the dominant role of the state in the economy, economic instability and restrictions on economic rights and trade unions, continued (see 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 EC Progress Report on Turkey; Ozcan, 1998; Togan and Hoekman, 2005; CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV2, October 26, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara). The EU has therefore also constantly criticised the lack of economic stability, the statist economic system and restrictions on economic rights and trade unions (for details see, 1998 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 19; 2000 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 28). Accordingly, the EU has also persistently asked for reforms in these realms through the Accession Partnership Document and the EU yearly progression reports on Turkey (for details see, 2000 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 70).

In parallel with the EU calls, under the name of the National Program, Turkey has undertaken structural and fiscal economic reforms in different sectors. For instance, in the manufacturing sector Turkey adopted new approaches and directives to adopt the CE conformity marking (for details see, EC2004), and institutions such as the Turkish Standards Institute (TSE) and the Turkish Accreditation Agency (TÜRKAK) were strengthened for full implementation of the EU acquis in the manufacturing sector. Challenges arising from physical integration to the harmonisation of infrastructure, logistics networks, vehicles, border crossings and customs facilities have been removed, and significant progress has been made in air, maritime and road transport in accordance with the EU’s common transport policy (EC 2007, p. 48-49). In accordance with the Europe Action Plan signed by Turkey in 2001, Turkey ended the monopoly on fixed lines by privatising some of its fixed telephone services and new legislation and measures regarding the banking sector, such as the privatisation of state banks, independence of the central bank and privatisation of the financing of the central and/or public sector banks to

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79 It is important to note that the diminution of the dominant role of the state in economy was started by the liberal economic policies of Turgut Ozal. Ozal came to power after the 1980 military coup and applied for full EU membership in 1987.
the government deficit, have been undertaken to improve Turkey’s banking and financing sectors to EU standards (for details of reforms in these sectors see Pazarbasıoglu, 2005). Similar to that pursued by the EU in the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), state enterprises in the agricultural sector have been privatised, and high intervention prices and protection from the world market have been replaced by lower direct payments to farmers based on their holdings of land and animals and less protection such as low tariffs. Along with the EU model (see EC Chapter 7) new energy laws were passed in 2001 to take over regulatory functions from the Ministry of Natural Resources, eliminate the need for additional state-guaranteed power purchase agreements, transfer the task of supplying and distributing energy and the associated market risks to the private sector and minimise the costs through competitive pressures on producers and distributors (see Chapters 7 and 8 of 2001 and 2002 EC Progression Report on Turkey). In accordance with these regulations the privatisation of almost all assets in the distribution of energy was completed in 2011 and the regulatory and supervisory regime for the energy sector have been adapted to EU standards (Chapters 7 and 8 of 2011 EC Progression Report on Turkey).

Through these harmonisation reforms, Turkey has adapted, to a large extent, to the body of the EU’s legislation, institutional framework and policies of the economy in different sectors, and to a large extent abandoned the state’s monopolistic position over the economy. As noted by our interviewees (see CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, January 7, 2011, Ankara) and students of Turkish studies (Ghosh, 2007; Bilici, 2010; Togan and Hoekman, 2005; Hadjit and Moxon-Browne, 2005) these harmonisation reforms have liberalised the statist economic system, increased the enjoyment of liberal rules in the economy, benefited Turkey in receiving FDI, and brought about a fiscal and monetary discipline, political and economic stability and sustainable growth in the Turkish economy, as well as boosted bilateral trade.

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80 It is important to note that the financial crises of 2000 and 2001 paved the way for fiscal austerity, privatisation and banking sector reforms under the name of the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue packages, which were also supported by the EU, have also played a key role in the liberalisation and growth of the Turkish economy.
between the EU and Turkey\textsuperscript{81} (CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). Consequently, after several decades, the Turkish economy has experienced single digit levels of interest and inflation rates\textsuperscript{82} and more than doubled its GNP. The GDP in Turkey increased $843 billion in 2013, from $196.3 billion in 2002, and the Turkish economy became the sixth biggest economy in Europe and sixteenth biggest economy among the thirty Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, in which was twenty-sixth in 2002. GDP per capita also increased more than threefold in the last decade, reaching $11,066 in 2013 from 3,492 in 2002. With an 8.5\% growth rate in 2011, Turkey became the third fastest growing country among the G20 countries after China and Argentina. The average growth rate was 6.5 per cent in last the 10 years and according to OECD estimation, with the annual average growth rate of 6.7 per cent in the period of 2011-2017 Turkey is expected to be the fastest growing economy among the OECD countries.

On the other hand, as noted by some of our interviewees (CIV2, October 22, 2010, Brussels; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels), the adaptation to the rule of the free market economy and rule of law, on the basis of EU norms and standards, has increased the business climate for development of the private sector, and freed the growing Anatolian middle class from state pressure and from needing to get permission from the state to establish associations and do business with neighbouring countries\textsuperscript{83}. As such, the growing Anatolian middle class has increasingly come together under the umbrella of different foundations - such as the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and

\textsuperscript{81}Bilateral trade between the EU and Turkey was worth 120 billion Euros in 2011, 'Turkey is the EU’s sixth biggest trading partner while the EU is Turkey’s biggest. A bit less than half of Turkey’s total trade is with the EU and almost 75\% of foreign direct investment flows in Turkey, with a strong high-technology component, comes from the EU’ (2012 AC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 5).

\textsuperscript{82}From the end of 1995 to the end of 1999 the annual inflation (consumer prices) and interest rates rose from 80\% to 100\% and after the 2000 and 2001 economic crises they rose over 100\%.

\textsuperscript{83}According to the previous business association law ‘if the business association organised a business trip to (abroad) Uganda, Bulgaria or the United States, the association had to get permission from the governor of the city in which the association was located, and, after coming back, the association had to write a detailed report of the events of the trip with supporting proof. Failure to comply with these requirements would prevent the association from ever taking another business trip. In addition, until 1977, no one could get a passport to fly out of the country at least not more than once. If you could get a passport for a second trip, which was almost impossible, any further trips required approval of the cabinet of ministers. Turkey was a very closed society’ (interview with CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels).
Industrialists - Türkiye is Adamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (TUSKON), the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey - Türkiye Ucuncu Sector Vakfı (TUSEV), the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation - Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (TESEV), the Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange of Turkey - Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (TOBB), the Economic Development Foundation - İktisadi Kalkın Vakfı - (IKV), the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen - Mustakil Sanayici ve Isadamları Derneği- (MUSIAD), the Turkish Industrialists and Business Association - Türk Sanayicileri ve Isadamları Derneği (TUSIAD), etc., everywhere in Turkey, and also abroad to protect their interests (CIV2, October 22, 2010, Brussels; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Accordingly, as will be detailed in the following chapter, they increasingly began to make their voices heard in the formulation of the TFP for the development of an engagement-oriented foreign policy, solution of problems through peaceful means and the liberalisation of trade and movement of people among Turkey’s non-EU neighbours84 (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV2, October 22, 2010, Brussels; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; DIP4, January 4, 2011, Ankara; DIP5, January 6, 2011, Ankara; DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara).

In this regard, considering the increasing power and influence of Muslim and Kurdish capital in Turkish social, economic and political life under the umbrella of different foundations, such as TUSKON, TBB and MUSIAD, in the last decade, the failure to become an EU candidate in 1999 and EU conditionality in the adaptation to the rule of the free market economy and rule of law, the growing Anatolian business community would have been eliminated from Turkish economic life by the military-bureaucratic camp, as was the case in the 1990s and in previous decades. Turkey would not have undertaken the above-mentioned structural and fiscal economic reforms in different sectors to further liberalise the statist economic system and increased the enjoyment of liberal rules in the economy. As such, it would not have become possible to talk about a fiscal and monetary discipline. The Turkish economy would have continued to

84 For details of how they played a role in formulation of TFP see Chapter V
experience high-level interest and inflation rates as was the case in previous decades. The statist economic system and state’s monopolistic position over the economy would have continued, meaning that it would not have become possible to talk about the need to create a business climate to develop the private sector, or stability and sustainable growth in the Turkish economy. As a result, Turkey would not have received as much FDI, and the economy would not have experienced as much growth or been organised under the umbrella of different foundations to protect their interests and make their voices heard in the formulation of state policies, including the TFP. Accordingly, as proposed by historical and rational institutionalism, argued above, and noted by many of our interviewees (see CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara) and students of Turkish study (Ghosh, 2007; Harrison, 1996; Bilici, 2010), the turning point in EU-Turkey relations in 1999 punctuated the equilibrium and started Turkey down the path of economic liberalisation through the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to EU acquis, which resulted in the accomplishment of economic growth and stability and the empowerment of economic society in political decision-making.

Trade unions, however, and especially their collective actions, are still subject to numerous restrictions. The law on collective labour relations, the right of public servants to strike, and to form and join trade unions are still not fully in line with EU standards (for details see the 2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 25-27). The amendment to the law on strikes in May 2012, which prohibits strikes in the aviation sector, ‘takes Turkey’s labour legislation further from EU and International Labour Organization (ILO) standards’ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 26). Further efforts are thus needed to achieve collective bargaining strikes and lockouts for private sector employees (for details see 2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 8).

Overall, the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999 also punctuated the equilibrium at Turkish level in the economic realm, and started Turkey down the path of liberalisation of the Turkish economy through harmonisation reforms. In parallel with calls from the EU, Turkey curtailed the dominant role of the state in the economy and has increased the enjoyment of liberal rules in the economy. This has brought about
economic stability and growth and growing economic society and its empowerment in Turkish society, the political system and political decision-making. As noted by our interviewees, (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels and CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul), this liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political system, progress in the Turkish economy, the curtailing of state dominance of the economy, and the empowerment of civil society, would have been unthinkable without Turkey’s being an EU candidate in 1999 and the EU’s conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm. However, the law on collective labour relations, the right of the public and private sectors to strike, and the right of public servants to form and join trade unions are still not fully in line with EU standards.

4.4.4 Increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority rights

As argued previously, the Turkish military-bureaucratic elites perceived religious and differing ethnic groups as the main threats to the Kemalist state regime and unitary structure of the state. That is why, in the name of the survival of the state regime and the unitary structure of the state, religious and minority rights were restricted. Anything related to these issues was transferred out of normal politics and was accepted as a task for the military (Ozcan, 1994; Kirisci, 2006; Aras, 2009; CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, November 7, 2010).

However, with the deinstitutionalisation, illegalisation and delegitimation of military control and influence over the government, media, NGOs and political life through the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to EU acquis, the empowered civil actors were able to transfer domestic religious and minority affairs into the realm of normal politics, (CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, November 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011).

85 These domestic affairs were not only transferred the out of normal politics, but they were also externalised, thus causing political and diplomatic crises between Turkey and its neighbours (see Chapters IV and V). The transformation of these issues into normal politics as a result of democratisation of the political regime has also ended the externalisation of these domestic issues, and thus the diplomatic and political crises between Turkey and its neighbouring countries arising from the securitisation and externalisation of these domestic issues (for details see Chapters IV and V). This is why the transformation of these issues into the realm of normal politics is significant for Turkey in developing cooperative political and economic relations with neighbouring countries in 2000s (for details see Chapters IV and V).
Ankara). In this regard, in contrast to the previous decade, the religious and minority affairs and options for their settlement began to be discussed widely and openly in the Turkish media, and the academic and political environment (see 2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 27; Keyman and Onis, 2007; Celik and Rumelili, 2006; Guney and Karatekillioglu, 2005; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Accordingly, as will be detailed below, considerable reforms in recognition of certain cultural, political and religious rights in accordance with the EU calls, were undertaken.

First, as noted above, the restrictions on Kurdish people and their movements have been, to some extent, eased with the removal of the state of emergency in six provinces in the south-east in 2002, and amendments to Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror Law during the 2002-2004 period. The opening of private Kurdish language schools has been possible since 2004. In addition, with the seventh and ninth reform packages, the bans on teaching, publishing and broadcasting in the Kurdish language have gradually further been removed during 2004-2009.86 Private radio and television stations began to broadcast in Kurdish in 2006. On the other hand, although the PKK has increased its attacks against Turkey during the 2004 – 2012, Turkey began the ‘democratic opening process’ in 2009, in contrast to previous decades, to solve the Kurdish issue through the further broadening of political and cultural rights. In previous decades when the PKK increased its attacks against Turkish security forces, under the pressure of military Turkish governments further increased their pressure over the Kurds and Kurdish movement.87 In this regard, the bans on broadcasting in the Kurdish language have been removed and state television - the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), TRT Şeş, began to broadcast twenty-four hours a day in Kurdish in 2009, which was unthinkable a decade before that. With amendments to the Law on the National Education, Kurdish Language and Literature departments were established at universities

86 Education in their mother tongue in public schools has not yet been recognised for Kurds. In this sense, the misfit gap between Turkey and EU levels is still present.
87 For instance, during the 1990s when the PKK increased its attacks against Turkey, extra-judicial killings, and torture, village burning and forced migration in the south-east, as conducted by the JITEM, increased. As will be seen in next chapter, in this process Turkey not only increased its pressure on the Kurdish people and their movement but also accused its neighbour of supporting Kurdish movement and/or intervening in Turkey’s domestic affairs, which caused a diplomatic crises between Turkey and its neighbours, especially Iran and Syria.
The Kurdish language was made an elective course at public schools in 2012 and the restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in defence in courts and the public service were also removed in 2013.

Consequently, as noted by CIV4 (October 25, 2010, Brussels) and CIV6 (November 4, 2010, Istanbul) the path of liberalisation started by the EU accession process provided Turkey with an opportunity to separate the Kurdish and terror issues, and to solve Kurdish issues in a democratic way, instead of using hard power instruments. As a result of these reforms and the ‘democratic opening processes’ the PKK stopped its attacks against Turkey at the beginning of 2013. Thus, the most important challenge for Turkey’s internal and external security and democratisation and prosperity, the thirty years old war between the Turkish military forces and PKK, has come to end.

There is need for further revision in the constitution regarding the definition of citizenship, the use of the mother-tongue (Kurdish) in public education, and administrative decentralisation in accordance with the European Charter of Local Self-Government and Municipalities. In this regard the work on a new constitution, Turkey’s first civil constitution, which aims to bring solutions to, amongst other things, the Kurdish issue, started in early 2012 with the setting up of a Constitution Conciliation Committee composed of three members from each of the four political groups in parliament. So far a democratic and participatory process has been in place in the work on the new constitution (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p.7). Administrative decentralisation in accordance with the European Charter of Local Self-Government and

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88 A Department of Eastern Languages and Literatures, including Zaza and Kurmanjî Kurdish in Tunceli University, The Kurdish Language and Literature Department in Muğ Alparslan University were opened, and post-graduate education in Zaza and Kurmanjî Kurdish in Mardin Artuklu University and undergraduate elective Kurdish language course in in Muğ Alparslan University began since 2011.
89 In June 2012, a new curriculum for primary schools was issued by the Ministry of National Education, including the guideline that if at least 10 pupils apply there is an obligation for a school to add a course on living languages such as Kurdish, Circassian and dialects.
90 ‘The Conciliation Committee held public consultations with a broad range of stakeholders between November 2011 and April 2012 to receive the views of political parties not represented in parliament, of state bodies, professional associations, trade unions and nongovernmental organisations…. Members of the committee also took part in public events around Turkey organised by civil society platforms. A website was set up to gather written opinions, returning over 25,000 contributions. An abundance of local and national civic initiatives also ensured lively debate among citizens and in the media’ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 8).
Municipalities is not fully, but to some extent, established, with amendments to the Law of Municipalities put into practice in 2013 as part of the democratic opening process, begun to settle the Kurdish issue.

Restrictions on Quran courses and religious schools were removed in 2011 with an amendment to Article 1739 on Education. People who want to teach their religion to their children can now freely do so. The secondary school of the Religious Vocational School, which was closed after the 1997 military intervention, reopened in 2011 with the amendment to the education act and restrictions on and discrimination involving students from this school entering university were removed in 2012. Restrictions on wearing headscarves in public areas, such as at universities and official ceremonies etc., which had been eased since 2004, were officially removed in 2010 with the directive of YOK and the governors. Students who wear headscarves could go to universities, and President Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan and, the ministers and bureaucrats, and those wives who wore headscarves, could attend the balls and formal ceremonies with those wives. For instance, for the first time Hayrunnisa Gul, wife of President Abdullah Gul, was able to join the celebration of the foundation of the Republic on 29 November 2010, wearing her headscarf. As noted by our interviewees (CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV4; October 25, 2010, Brussels), these are clear indicators of the normalisation of politics and the transformation of Islamic affairs into the realm of normal politics.

Concerning the restrictions on Islamic political movements, although the AK Party defines itself as a conservative democratic party, its main figures came from the Islamic movement and they have been in power since 2002. As noted by students of Turkish studies (Keyman, 2012; Akan, 2011; Keyman and Onis, 2007) and our interviewees (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara), thanks to the EU and conditionality in the rule of law and democratisation of civil-military relations, in contrast to the previous decade, a party with

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91 The European Charter Of Local Self-Government and Municipalities was signed by Turkey in 1988, but, to a large extent, was not implemented until the 2013 (for details of European Charter of Local Self-Government and Municipalities and the extent to which Turkey has implemented it, see Inanc and Unal, 2007; Cengiz, 2005).
92 Furthermore, new regulations have been prepared by the Ministry of National Education since the academic year of 2012-2013, with school textbooks containing information on the Alevi faith.
an Islamic background is able to stay in power and implement its own policies, which was unthinkable a decade ago. Consequently, “as a result of the democratisation process, Turkey has been gradually normalising, increasingly trying to resolve issues involving political Islam and the Kurds in democratic ways” (CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara).

The seventh and ninth reform packages also brought about revisions in Articles 42, and 134 of the Constitution, and the Law on Association which were bans on the establishment and functioning of minority foundations, which were, to a large extent, removed in 2004. In accordance with the EU calls (see 2000, 2001, 2002 EC Progression Reports on Turkey) a new legislation (Article 4771) which allows the non-Muslim minority foundations to obtain, sell and or donate their real estate was accepted in TGNA in 2004. With this law restrictions on the non-Muslim foundations regarding the renovation of their real estate and the opening of places for worship have been, to a large extent, removed. In 2010 the restriction on worship in places which were considered holy for non-Muslim minorities was, to a large extent, removed. Accordingly, after nine decades, starting from the 2010 Ecumenical, Patriarch Bartholomew has celebrated the Divine Liturgy of the Dormition of Theotokos every year in August at the Sumela Monastery in the province of Trabzon. After 95 years, a religious service has now also been held at the Armenian Holy Cross Church on the Akhdamar Island in Lake Van, since 2010.

The seizure of the real estate of non-Muslim foundations, which was on-going since the late 1930s, stopped in 2001, and with the amendment to the Law on Foundation Association in 2012, minority foundations began to receive compensation for property confiscated earlier. To solve the endowments and Patriarchate issues, in accordance with Greek wishes and EU calls, Turkey gave citizenship to the members of the

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93. According to official information, 108 community foundations applied by the deadline (27 August 2012) for the return of 1,568 properties. By 18 September 2012, the Foundations Council approved the return of 58 properties, the payment of compensation for eight (8) properties, decided that 53 applications were not eligible and continues the processing of the remaining 1,449 applications’ (2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 26).

94. The endowments and Patriarchate issues are that: The leader of the Istanbul Rum Patriarchate has to be a Turkish citizen according to the Treaty of Lausanne. The current leader of the Patriarchate, Bartholomeos, is quite old; and so if he dies there would be a problem in the selection of a new leader.

95. Greece wishes the EU had asked Turkey to give citizenship to the members of the Sensinot Assembly to solve the endowments and Patriarchate issues.
Sensinot Assembly and allowed non-Muslim foundations to choose their own religious leaders in 2011. As such, ‘the endowments and Patriarchate issues, that caused the problems between Turkey and Greece in the past are no longer relevant’ (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Last but not least, thanks to the EU, there are no longer institutions and actors like the NSC and its secretary generals, such as Tuncer Kilic, to warn the bureaucracy to create difficulty to the minority foundations. Consequently, the path to liberalisation of the Turkish political system, which began with the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999, and EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm, also increased the respect for and protection of cultural, religious and minority rights.

In this regard, considering the increasing attacks of the PKK against Turkish military forces, the increasing power and influence of religious and Kurdish movements in Turkish society and political life, the increasing instability and clashes in the region in this period, the absence of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the rule of law and in civilian control over the military—which, as previously argued, resulted in the empowerment of the Government and NGOs in political decision making—and with respect for and protection of religious and minority rights, the transformation of domestic religious and minority affairs into the realm of normal politics would not have occurred. Thus, the root causes of religious and minority affairs and alternative approaches to hard power instruments to solve problems would not have been openly discussed in Turkish society, the media and political and academic environments. Consequently, the recognition of cultural, political and religious rights in accordance with the EU calls would not have occurred. As was the case during the 1990s and in earlier decades, the Kurdish religious and minority affairs and rights would have been maintained to ensure security among the military–bureaucratic elites. Thus, the reform packages, especially the seventh and ninth reform packages, would not have been enacted by TGNA. The bans on teaching, publishing and broadcasting in the Kurdish language, wearing headscarves, attending religious schools, establishing and operating minority foundations, and worshipping in places considered holy for non-Muslim minorities would have continued. Domestic religious and minority affairs would have continued to cause political and
economic crises and a worsening of the political and economic stability and growth, as well as problems in Turkey’s relations with its neighbours, as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s.

Although considerable progress has been made in the respect for, and protection of, minority rights in accordance with EU calls, minorities and their foundations continue to face problems in accessing justice, obtaining work, fundraising, opening places of worship, training their clergy and obtaining residence permits for foreign clergy. As noted by the 2012 Progress Report on Turkey (see page 23-24) some non-Muslims and Alevis have come across job discrimination in the civil service. Despite announcements by authorities, there have been several noted issues for the minority communities, including: the Syriac Orthodox community’s request to open their school to provide training for their community and clergy; the Armenian Patriarchate’s application to open a university department for the Armenian language and clergy; the Greek Patriarchate’s request to reopen the Heybeliada (Halki) Greek Orthodox seminary, closed in 1975, and the decision to reopen a school in Gökçeada (Imvros) that remains pending (Progress Report 2012, p. 24). Turkey still has not signed the UN International Covenant on civil and political rights regarding the rights of minorities, or the UN Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights regarding the right to education. Turkey has also not signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, or the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. Although discriminatory and nationalist statements in schoolbooks have been replaced to a large extent with multiculturalism, tolerance and peace, a number of compulsory schoolbooks still include rhetoric against missionaries or minorities (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 25). Thus, as noted by last the Progress Report on Turkey (see page 25-26), the revision of existing legislation and further efforts are needed to ensure full respect for, and protection of language, culture and the fundamental rights of minorities in accordance with European standards.

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96 ‘The relevant 2010 Council of Europe Venice Commission recommendations have yet to be implemented’ (2012 EC Progress Report, p. 24).

97 Despite the opening made in 2009, restrictions on the Alevi community also continue. Cem houses, place of worship for Alevis, have not been officially recognised, and Alevis experienced difficulties in establishing Cem houses (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 24-25). Although with the amendment to the Law on Foundation (2008) Greek and Armenian foundations began to receive compensation for property confiscated by the Directorate General for Foundations, the legislation does not cover properties confiscated from Alevi foundations.
Overall, the liberal environment, EU adaptational pressure in adopting the Copenhagen political criteria, pressure to meet Copenhagen political criteria, and the empowerment of new actors in political decision-making generated by the EU accession process has offered Turkey the possibility of transferring its religious and minority affairs into the realm of normal politics and to make progress in the respect for, and protection of, religious and minority rights\(^98\) (see also Kirisci, 2006; Aras, 2009).

It is also important to note that the military-bureaucratic elites acted as a veto player during the harmonisation reforms. As noted, scholars engaged in Turkish study and our interviewees believe the liberal environment and the reforms related to religious and minority rights and civil-military relations, promoted by the EU and the accession process, would weaken the ability of Turkey to counter Islamic, Kurdish and minority groups, and would give the elected actors (e.g. AK Party government and BDP) and minority foundations an opportunity to promote separatism and/or Islamism (Heper, 2005; Oguzlu, 2005; Tocci, 2005; Keyman, 2012; Akan, 2011; Keyman and Onis, 2007; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). They thus tried to frustrate the reforms related to the democratisation and civilisation of NSC, YOK, RTÜK, and SSCs, cuts in the defence budget and the reforms which they believed would weaken the monocultural, secular and unitary characteristics of the state’s political regime - such as the removal of the ban on headscarves, religious education, using the mother language (Kurdish language) and the establishment and functioning of minority foundations. They operated an anti-reform campaign through the NSC’s Toplumla Iliskiler Baskanligi (Public Relations Command) to influence public opinion to block the reforms to put pressure on pro-reform actors and institutions. They accused pro-reform actors of being traitors, and of being the enemy of Ataturk and the Kemalist political regime (for more details see Mercan 2006a, Heper, 2005; Tocci, 2005; Keyman and Onis, 2007; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul).

\(^98\) As will be seen in the following chapters, the transformation of domestic issues into the realm of normal politics also played an important role in the transformation of TFP towards its neighbours by offering Turkey the possibility of developing dialogue and cooperative relationships with its neighbours.
Istanbul; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). Even in this process senior generals\textsuperscript{99} accused the Chief of Staff, Hilmi Ozkok, of not being aggressive enough against the government and reforms which cut the power of the military and expanded religious and cultural rights (Haper, 2005).

However, as detailed above pro-EU actors were empowered through the harmonisation reforms and EU technical and economic supports during the EU accession process. The role of the military-bureaucratic elites is deinstitutionalized, illegalized and delegitimized. Thanks to the EU, its conditionality and its technical and financial support, the pro-reform campaign was much stronger. The mainstream media, universities, and NGOs supported the government in its reforms by organising conferences, meetings, TV programmes, place advertisements in newspapers, and handing out brochures regarding the necessity of harmonisation reforms for the solution of Turkey’s problems and for Turkey’s prosperity and peace (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). Accordingly, the veto players failed, religious and minority affairs were transferred into the realm of normal politics, and reforms were undertaken in accordance with the EU calls.

All in all, as proposed by the theoretical framework of the study, Europeanisation and rational and historical new institutionalism, the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999 - a critical juncture in EU-Turkey relationship - punctuated the equilibrium at the Turkish level and started Turkey on the path of liberalisation of its political regime and religious and minority polices. EU adaptation pressure to fill the misfit gap between Turkey and EU in the field of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm have become the main driving forces behind the reforms undertaken at Turkish level over the last decade. The reforms undertaken to adapt to EU acquis resulted in: a) changing institutions and institutional structure, b) the empowerment of government and civil society against the military-bureaucratic elites in the Turkish political system and political decision-making, c) increasing economic stability and growth, and d) the transformation of domestic religious and minority affairs into the

\textsuperscript{99}Such as the Secretary General of the MGK General Tuncer Kilinc; General AytacYalman, the Commander of the Land Forces; General Cumhur Asparagus, the Commander of Air Force; General Sener Eruygur, the Commander of the Gendarmerie; General Cetin Dogan, the Commander of the First Army.
realm of normal politics and increasing respect for, and protection of, religious and minority rights.

The following section focuses on the logic that drives the reforms in line with the EU acquis over the last decade.

4.5 Logic of consequentiality and path dependency in Turkey’s adaptation to EU acquis

As noted previously, while announcing Turkey as a candidate at the 1999 EC Helsinki Summit, the EU clearly noted that Turkey had to adapt to the EU acquis communauteaire in the field of democracy, rules of law, and the economic realm, and be able to start accession negotiations with the EU in order to even get a date for starting the accession negotiation and benefitting from EU economic aids (for details, see 1999 EC Helsinki Summit Presidency Conclusion; 2001 Accession Partnership Documents; and 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 EC Progress Reports on Turkey). The EU offered economic aids for starting the accession negotiations, and being on the EU track for full EU membership. Turkey was (and is) doing more than half of its trade with the EU, and about 80% of its FDI comes from the EU. Furthermore, as noted by Turkish EU Chief Negotiator and EU Affairs Minister, Egemen Bagis (December 18, 2012) and many of our interviewees (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul), Turkey could not complete the democratic and economic reforms that were indispensable for ensuring political and economic stability and becoming more democratic, prosperous and transparent without the EU’s technical and economic supports and adaptation pressure. As noted by Turkish politicians on different platforms, many of our interviewees and Turkish scholars, the political and economic cost of Turkey abandoning the EU track would have been high in the long run.

100 Such as the Turkish EU Chief Negotiator and EU Affairs Minister Egemen Bagis as well as President Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, Economic Affairs Minister Babacan, and Foreign Minister Davutoglu.
101 Such as public meetings at Diyarbekir, Istanbul, and Trabzon, TV programmes (Siyaset Meydani, 32. Gun, Iskele Sancak, Egrisi Dogrusu, Sansursuz, and act.), and conferences at Abant.
term. As such, to be able to start accession negotiations with the EU and benefit from EU economic aids, including undertaking the necessary political and economic reforms for political and economic stability and becoming more democratic, prosperous and transparent, Turkey became fully involved in the pre-accession strategy in the post-Helsinki process and announced its own national programme to adapt to the EU *acquis communautaire* in the field of democracy, rule of law, and the economic realm (see Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Eryilmaz, 2006; Altinisik and Tur, 2005; Aydin and Acikmese, 2007; see also interviews with CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussel; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara).

Turkey adapted to the EU calls and directives “because we are gaining a lot from the EU. My country (Turkey) [is becoming] much more democratic, prosperous, more transparent and has much more self-confidence than it did have before starting the EU-Turkey negotiation process.” The reforms undertaken in the fields of democracy, rule of law, and the protection of religious and minority rights “are important developments that would be very difficult to do on our own” (Turkish EU Chief Negotiator and EU Affairs Ministers Bagis, December 18, 2012, Dublin, the Institute of International and European Affairs).

In this regard, considering the public scepticism about the future of EU–Turkey relations, the threat perceptions of the Turkish population arising from the PKK issue and the efforts of secularists, Kemalists and nationalists to block the reforms, especially related to religious and minority rights and to the limitation of the role of the military in the political system, the absence of rewards offered by the EU (e.g., economic aid), the accession negotiations and EU track for full EU membership and the benefit of economic and democratic reforms, the Government would not have had adequate inducement to become fully involved in the pre-accession strategy in the post-Helsinki process. As a result, it would not have announced its own national programme to adapt to the EU *acquis communautaire* in the field of democracy, rule of law, and economic realm. The calculation of the long term benefits of being on the EU track is one of the main driving forces behind Turkey’s adaptation to the EU *acquis communautaire* in the field of democracy, the rule of law, and the economic realm.
In addition, as noted by the Turkish Chief EU Negotiator and EU Affairs Ministers Bagis (December 18, 2012) and Eryilmaz (2006), Altinisik and Tur (2005), Aydin and Acikmese (2007) and many of our interviewees (see interview with CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara), the reward of getting a date for beginning EU accession negotiations provided pro-EU actors and institutions with an opportunity to defend the harmonisation reforms in a more legitimate and stronger manner. The pro-EU actors and institutions argued accurately that the military’s power over the political system and political decision-making and Turkey’s hard stance against religious and minority affairs damaged Turkey’s internal and external interests including EU-Turkey relations (CIV1 October 18, 2010 Brussels; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul). The limitation of the role of the military in the political system, liberalising the economic system and increasing the respect for and protection of religious and minority rights in accordance with calls from the EU, has been crucial for getting on track with the EU accession process and for the economic, political and democratic stability, and the development of Turkey (Turkish EU chief Negotiator and EU Affairs Ministers Bagis, December 18, 2012; Eryilmaz, 2006; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). In this regard, without the reward of being given a date for starting the EU accession negotiations, pro-EU actors and institutions would not have had an opportunity to defend the harmonisation reforms in a more legitimate and stronger manner.

On the other hand, pro-EU actors and institutions know that without being on track for the EU accession process, EU adaptation pressure for the liberalisation of the political system would lose its impact and its momentum; and if this was the case, further limitation of the power of the army over the government, civil society and state policies would not be possible without democratisation and the benefit of EU technical and financial support (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara). They thus began propaganda both within Turkey and EU capitals in order to gain public support. They also needed the EU’s technical and financial support, in order to make changes in Turkey’s political, economic and
legislative systems, so that they would gain power in political decision-making (CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As such, the radical transformation of Turkey’s political, economic and legislative systems, and the respect for human rights was subsequently introduced through the harmonisation reforms (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As proposed by rational institutionalists (Börzel and Risse, 2003), the high quality and the pace of EU-Turkey relations, the clearer EU accession process during the 1999-2004 period, especially during the 2002-2004 period and the cost/benefit calculation of rule compliance, in addition to the misfit gap, EU adaptation pressure and the empowerment of new actors and institutions, played a very significant role in the reorientation of the Turkish political system and its policies towards religious and minority affairs in accordance with EU calls.

Although Turkey started accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005, as regularly noted by the Progress Reports on Turkey (see 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey), the reform process and Turkey’s effort to meet EU acquis are still not at the expected level. As noted by students of Turkish study (Eryilmaz, 2006, Aras 2009) and some of our interviewees (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV8, January 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara), the ambiguities and uncertainties in EU–Turkey relations and in the negotiation process continue at an increased pace for several reasons: The debates within Europe about the future of Turkey’s full EU membership have continued. Examples include the political discourse of Sarkozy and Merkel in offering Turkey a ‘special status’ instead of ‘full membership’ due to its different religion, history, cultural background and geographical location, and the decisions of some countries (e.g., France, Austria, the Netherlands) to hold a referendum for the final decision about Turkey’s full membership (CIV8, January 3, 2010, Ankara). The quality and pace of accession negotiations shows that Turkey’s accession to the EU is a ‘long-term’ process. The possibility of suspending the negotiations due to the open-ended nature of negotiations
and accession process.\textsuperscript{104} Although Turkey supported the Annan Plan in accordance with calls from the UN and EU, debate over the Cyprus issue and EU pressure on Turkey over Cyprus is ongoing.\textsuperscript{105}

As proposed by the theoretical framework of the study, it is expected that the credibility of the EU and its conditionality in EUising Turkey’s political, economic, and legislative systems would increase in the negotiation process in comparison to the pre-accession negotiation process. As discussed by Bagis (December 18, 2012), Eryilmaz (2007) and some of our interviewees (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara), however, this did not become an issue due to the factors discussed earlier. These factors have negatively impacted the EU’s conditionality and credibility by increasing suspicion about the future of EU-Turkey relations and the benefit of EU membership in Turkish society and the political environment, which undermines Turkey’s efforts of rule compliance (Bagis, December 18, 2012; Eryilmaz, 2006; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara).

Although the reform process and Turkey’s effort to meet EU acquis are not at the expected level after the 2005, the reforms in the field of democracy, rule of law and economic realm are ongoing. As detailed above (see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4) and noted by the 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 EC progress reports on Turkey and many of our interviewees, in the post-2005 period very important reforms were undertaken related to respect for religious and minority rights, the judiciary, rule of law and the economic realm. That is, Turkey’s adaptation to the EU acquis in the fields that are subject to this study is ongoing in the post-2005 period.

Accordingly, as proposed by the historical institutionalist explanation of EUisation, the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999, punctuated the equilibrium at the Turkish level and started it down the path of the liberalisation of institutions, institutional power relations, the civil-military relations, religious and minority rights, and economic

\textsuperscript{104} For details, see the 2004 Progression Report on Turkey and the Framework Document of Negotiations.

\textsuperscript{105} As is currently the case due to the Cyprus dispute. Although Turkey has completed the criteria for opening negotiation chapters, due to Cyprus’s veto, eight chapters have not yet been opened.
institutions, rules and policies. It also determined the choice and power of agency and long-term development patterns in the fields examined. As argued above, increased adaptation to a chosen institution or policy increases the ‘relative benefits’ of maintaining established institutions and policy structure. As such, due to the increasing returns of adaptation and the increasing costs of switching to an alternative, the institutions and policies in the examined field that were established in post-Helsinki period became 'sticky' and they locked themselves in equilibrium for the post-2005 periods, although the ambiguities and uncertainties increased in EU–Turkey relations in the post-2005 period.

It is also important to note that a correlation existed between the degree of changes in Turkey’s polity, politics and policies in accordance with the EU calls and the quality and pace of Turkey’s relations with the EU. Whenever the quality and pace of EU–Turkey relations have worsened, as seen in the post-Luxemburg period and after 2006, when Turkey was excluded from the EU enlargement process and the ambiguities and uncertainties in EU–Turkey relations increased, Turkey has been reluctant and has acted slowly to make further changes in its polity, politics and policy in accordance with EU demands. Whenever the quality and pace of EU-Turkey relations advanced, as happened in 1996 when Turkey was guaranteed membership in the Customs Union, and during the 1999-2004 period when Turkey was guaranteed candidate status and a date for starting accession negotiations, it accelerated the reform process to adapt to EU acquis. This illustrates the need for balance between EU conditionality and its rewards to make further changes in Turkey in accordance with the EU norms, which could be established by removing the ambiguities and uncertainties in EU–Turkey relations and in the negotiation process by providing a time frame for Turkey’s ultimate goal of full membership.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter investigated the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian regime over the last decade and its influence on the country’s political, economic and social dynamics, as well as the role of the EU and its conditionality on the liberalisation of Turkey’s political system and in its changing political, economic and social dynamics. The ideas and information generated from the research data were categorised according to identified
key issues, concepts and themes, and the relationships between them were analysed using Europeanisation and the New Institutionalist theory (i.e., rational choice and its historical version). Consequently, the chapter focused on different concepts, such as the level of the misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels in the field of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm, and EU adaptation pressure (Europeanisation), the empowerment of new actors and institutions against the veto players and the cost/benefit calculation of rule compliance (rational institutionalism), critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations, punctuated equilibrium and path dependency (historical institutionalism). The triangulation and counterfactual scenario approaches were used to substantiate the validity of the findings and interpretation of the study.

This research has revealed that, first, there was (and to some extent still is) a high-level misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels in terms of the independence of the judiciary, civilian control over the military, respect for and protection of human rights and the implementation of the rules of a market economy. Second, the critical juncture in EU-Turkey relations in 1999 punctuated equilibrium at Turkish level and started it on the path of the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime. Third, through its conditionality, the EU placed high-level adaptation pressure on Turkey to fill the misfit gap between Turkey and the EU in the examined fields (see Accession Partnership Agreements between EU and Turkey, EU’s Yearly Progression Reports on Turkey). Fourthly, as expected, the EU’s high-level adaptation pressure on Turkey resulted in a significant change in Turkey’s polity, politics and policy in accordance with EU calls. Thus, EUisation in Turkey’s polity, politics and policy is to a large extent a vertical, ‘top-down’ process. Fifthly, in addition to the EU adaptation pressure, the EU’s technical and economic support, the quality and pace of EU–Turkey relations, and both the logic of consequentiality and the logic of path dependency have played a role in Turkey’s adaptation to the EU *acquis communautaire* through harmonisation reforms, thereby leading to changes in Turkey’s political, economic and legislative system. Sixth, these changes at the Turkish level, generated by harmonisation reforms undertaken to fill the misfit gap between Turkey and EU resulted in changing the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations; the empowerment of the government and civil society against the military–bureaucratic elites in political decision making;
increasing political and economic stability and growth; and the transformation of the religious and minority domestic affairs into the realm of normal politics, and increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority rights. The research also revealed that the empowered actors and institutions have played a very active role in Turkey’s adaptation to calls from the EU, thereby fuelling changes in Turkey’s political, economic and legislative system.
Chapter V

Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran and Syria

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran and Syria during Turkey’s EU accession process and the role of the EU-fostered domestic changes identified above (Chapter IV). It explores Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria before the Turkey’s EU accession process (t1) and then Turkish foreign policy towards them during the Turkey’s EU accession process (t2). Following identification of the changes in Turkish foreign policy towards these countries, it assesses the role of the EU-fostered domestic changes in the rising changes in Turkish foreign policy towards them. It evaluates how the identified EU-fostered domestic changes have contributed to the changing rules, ideas, interests, priorities and demands in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy, and thus the identified changes in Turkish foreign policy towards them. Accordingly it investigates whether and—if so—how EU conditionality and adaptation pressure, aimed at the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime to the EU acquis communautaire, have produced unintended outcomes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria in addition to the intended outcomes in Turkey’s domestic politics.

5.2 Turkish foreign policy towards Iran before the 2000

As argued in detail in Chapter IV, the founder elites of the Turkish republic, military-bureaucratic elites, see two main domestic threats to territorial integrity and/or the political regime of the country, namely Islamic and minority/Kurdish affairs. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Tehran, Turkey began to see Iran and its political regime as a threat to its Kemalist political regime, and the ideological confrontation between the two countries gradually increased. Turkey accused Iran (and Syria, related to Kurdish

106With the 1979 Islamic revolution the anti-western Sharia regime replaced the secular western-oriented Shah Regime in Tehran.
issue) of providing support to Islamic and Kurdish groups in Turkey, and followed a security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Iran (Aras, 2007; Tol, 2010; Olson, 2004; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels).

As had been the case since the establishment of the Turkish Republic when Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party came to power in 1983 and ran the country as a single party until 1991, the influence of military in the formulation and implementation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy continued to be strong (Aras, 2007; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010). As a single party government however, Ozal, to some extent, was able to formulate his own pragmatic foreign policy approaches (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV5, November 4, 2010, Brussels; Efegil and Stone, 2003). Despite strong opposition from the military-bureaucratic camp,107 Ozal visited Iran in 1984, and afterwards, cooperation between Turkey and Iran increased through border security and economic relations108. In this process (1984-1992), Turkey’s trade volume with Iran increased by about $1.5 billion109. After the death of Ozal, with increasing political and economic instability, the influence of the military-bureaucratic camp and their threat perception in the formulation and implementation of TFP further increased during the 1990s. Thus, as will be detailed below, throughout the 1990s Turkey-Iran relations were further characterised by ideological confrontations and diplomatic crises due to the securitisation and externalisation of domestic affairs, which deeply damaged Turkey-Iran political and economic relations during the 1990s.

When the Erbakan’s Welfare Party (WP) came to power in 1996, it sought to reduce ideological confrontation between Turkey and Iran and improve Turkey’s political and

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107 General Kenan Evren, who was a leader of the 1980 coup and later President, comments on Ozal’s visit to Iran in 1984 and clarifies why Turkey had not engaged with its neighbours when the influence of the Turkish military increased in the formulation and implementation of TFP: “I have told Ozal, from time to time, that he should never trust Iran, Libya and Syria, and that the administration of these three countries did not view Turkey in a friendly way. But I could not convince him. He always sees the matter from a point of view of trade, and tries to establish friendship with Iran and Libya to an unnecessary extent” (Cetinsaya, 2003, p.128).

108 To increase commercial relations, the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) was established in 1985 between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, and the newly established Turkish Republic joined in 1992.

109 It is important to note that, as well as the adaptation of the Turkish economy to an export-oriented, liberal economic policy under the leadership of Ozal, and Ozal’s willingness to develop economic relations with Iran, Iran’s increasing dependence on Turkey for import and export routes due to its limited access to the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) also played an important role in Turkey’s increasing volume of trade with Iran in this process.
economic relations with Iran and the Islamic world as a whole. As such, Prime Minister Erbakan paid his first official visit to Iran, and later Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. His attempts to develop political and economic relations with Iran and the Islamic world resulted in increasing economic and security cooperation between Iran and Turkey and the establishment of Developing-8 (D-8)\(^{110}\). Instead of strong opposition from the military-bureaucratic elites to fill Turkey’s increasing energy needs as a consequence of the closing of the Yumurtalik pipeline\(^{111}\), the Erbakan government signed a gas-purchasing agreement with Iran in 1996 (Aykan, 1999b, p. 22-32). The Erbakan government’s attempts resulted in increasing cooperation with Iran in Turkey’s fight against the PKK in 1996\(^{112}\), in addition to a deepening economic and political cooperation. Those positive developments in Turkey-Iran relations reveal that small changes in the dynamics of Turkish domestic politics, even in a short period, brought about a decrease in ideological and political tensions, in addition to rapprochement and a deepening of economic, political and security cooperation between Iran and Turkey.

The hegemony enjoyed by the military-bureaucratic elites over domestic and foreign policy decision-making, however, deeply damaged prospects for the progressive development of political and economic relations between Turkey and Iran (Olsen, 1998; Aras, 2007; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The military-bureaucratic elite were dissatisfied with Erbakan’s attempts to develop Turkey’s political and economic relations not only with Iran but with the whole Islamic world. As such, they increased their pressure on the government by creating an agent\(^{113}\) to force the Erbakan government to resign by securitising and externalising Islamic and Kurdish affairs, and by accusing the Erbakan government of having a secret plan to establish an Islamic regime in Turkey and thus seeking to develop close political and economic

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\(^{110}\) The D-8 was established in 1997 under the leadership of Turkey and Iran with eight developing Muslim countries to establish political and economic relations with the Middle East and Iran, and to increase the credibility and capability of Turkey in the region.

\(^{111}\) The Yumurtalik Pipeline was closed to adapt to the UN embargo against Saddam Hussein’s administration.

\(^{112}\) Turkish security forces conducted more than 20 simultaneous anti-PKK operations in cooperation with Iranian security forces. In this process, Iranian security forces also handed over 35 PKK militants to the Turkish Republic.

\(^{113}\) Well-known Turkish journalists Fatik Altayli and Mehmet Ali Birand confessed that they and other journalists and owners of media groups were briefed by the military elite to create an agent to force the Erbakan government to resign.
relations with Iran. For instance, when it was announced by the government that the Iranian President Rafsanjani would visit Turkey in December 1996, in response to Erbakan’s Iran visit, traditional elites increased their accusations about Iran’s support for Islamic groups in Turkey and of the government’s attempts to develop relations with a country that was seeking to export is regime to Turkey. The ongoing ideological confrontation between the sides reached its peak with the ‘Sincan Affair’. As a result of increasing pressure on the government among traditional actors and institutions the Iranian ambassador to Ankara, Bagheri, was expelled. Iran responded by expelling the Turkish ambassador to Tehran, Osman Koruturk. Finally the Erbakan-led government was compelled to resign by the Turkish Armed Forces who marched a convoy of tanks through the main street of Sincan on February 28, 1997 (For more information about the Sincan Affair and how it was used to further the securitisation of Islamic affairs by traditional elites, see Turkish Daily News, 6 February 1997, Hürriyet, 1,2,3,4 February 1997, Milliyet, 2,3,4,5,6,7, February 1997). After the army-led ousting of Turkish PM Erbakan, the influence of the military-bureaucratic elites increased in Turkish politics. Nevertheless, as a result of Foreign Minister Ismail Cem’s constructive rhetoric and productive contact with the Iranian Foreign Minister Kharazi, both Tehran and Ankara reappointed ambassadors in the last quarter of 1997.

114 During his visit, Rafsanjani did not visit the mausoleum of Ataturk, the founder of Turkish Republic. This was turned into a Kemalist-anti-Kemalist ideological confrontation by traditional Turkish elites who accused the government of being anti-Kemalist, and of having secret agents to change the regime, thus seeking to develop relations with a country that does not respect the founder of the Turkish Republic. In this process Islamic and Kurdish affairs were further transferred out of normal politics and externalised, which negatively affected Turkey-Iran economic and political relations.

115 In the Sincan Affair, a “Jerusalem Night” was organised on January 31, 1997 by Bekir Yildiz, a member of Erbakan’s Welfare Party and the mayor of Sincan, a suburb of Ankara. The Iranian ambassador to Ankara, Mohammad R. Bagheri, gave a speech that night in which he criticised the Kemalist political regime’s approach, and practices against Islamic affairs. The military, which was directly involved in this process, accused Iran of supporting political Islam, terrorism and trying to export its Islamic regime to Turkey. The military blamed the Erbakan government for not being sufficiently aggressive against Iran, causing a change in agenda in the country and resulting in an escalation of tension between Turkey and Iran that turned into a diplomatic crisis.

116 General Cevik Bir, who played an active role in the securitisation and externalisation of the Sincan Affair, stated that it was seen in Sincan that Iran supported political Islam and terrorism in Turkey. Zara, the Iranian consul in Erzurum, criticised General Bir’s declaration; thus he was also expelled by Turkey in February 1997 and Iran responded by expelling the Turkish consul in the Iranian province of Urumiye, Ufuk Ozsancak (Olsen, 1998, p. 56-57; Cevik, 2003).
The political agenda was further occupied by the securitisation and externalisation of domestic Islamic and Kurdish affairs which resulted in the continuance of tension and ideological combat, and the further deterioration of political and economic relations between Turkey and Iran. In this process the ideological confrontation between the two countries continued due to the externalisation and transformation of the headscarf affair - one of the major symbols of the power struggle between Islamists and Kemalists in Turkey - from politics through the ‘Merve Kavakci affair’ and the ban on the wearing of headscarves in universities. As a result of the headscarf affair, the media and traditional elites of both countries again engaged in ideological combat and decried each other’s political regimes. The creation and externalisation of the Hizbullah affairs, and the accusations of the traditional elites that Iran supported illegal organisations committing assassinations in Turkey also caused an ideological confrontation and diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Iran during the 1990s (for details see Olsen, 2000, p. 880-81; Yılmaz, 1997, p. 96-97; Eralp, 1996, p. 106; Ely, 1997).

In addition to Islamic affairs, the securitisation and externalisation of domestic Kurdish affairs by traditional actors and institutions also caused the escalation of tensions between Turkey and Iran in this process. The Turkish military as a main actor in the determination and implementation of domestic and foreign policies sought to solve the Kurdish issue through undemocratic methods. During the 1990s, tens of thousands of assassinations

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117 Merve Kavakci, a headscarf-wearing member of the Virtue Party (VT) and a deputy of the Istanbul district, entered the Turkish parliamentary building for the MP swearing-in ceremony wearing a headscarf (turban) in April 1999. Traditional elites perceived this as a threat to the Kemalist political regime. Under the leadership of Ecevit, some deputies roundly booed and compelled her to leave the parliament chamber. As a result, her parliamentary status and Turkish citizenship was taken away by a decision of Ecevit’s Council of Ministers. (After the closing of the WP by the Turkish Constitutional Court, the Virtue Party was established by some former members of the Welfare Party who were not banned from politics).

118 As a result of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s ban on the wearing of headscarves in universities in 1989, some Iranian groups organised protest meetings in Tehran to back the people who wear headscarves in universities in Turkey. Turkey accused Iran of intervening in its domestic affairs, and Iran responded in the same manner. Those reciprocal accusations resulted in the escalation of tensions between the two countries, which turned into diplomatic crises, and both Iran and Turkey recalled their ambassadors.

119 Hizbullah is “a Kurdish-led professedly Islamist organization that had been created by Turkish security and intelligence organizations to attack PKK leadership and assassinate its leaders, as well as other Kurdish nationalists, especially in the southeast” (Olsen, 2000, p. 381)

120 It is important to note that whether or not, and why, Iran provided shelter, training or funding to the Islamic groups PKK and Hizbullah during the 1990s is not the subject of this study. For those arguments, see Pahlavan, 1996, p. 71-91; Özcan, 1999, p. 49-53; Pirim and Örtülü, 2000; Tekin, 1997, p. 65-69; Eralp and Tür, 1999, p. 69-102; Makovsky, 1999; Olson, 1995, 2000 and 2002.
were committed in the southeast of Turkey, and remained unsolved. The Turkish armed force’s cross-border operations against PKK camps and militants, and Turkey’s accusation of Iran’s support for the PKK, was another main cause of the escalation of political tensions between Turkey and Iran (Olsen, 2000, 2002; Aras 2007; CIV4, October 25, 2010).

5.2.1 Turkey-Iran economic relations during the 1990s

Due to the war between Iran and Iraq, and Ozal’s pragmatic foreign policy approaches, economic relations between Turkey and Iran increased during the 1980s. Turkey’s exports to Iran were valued at $84 million in 1980, and they increased to $1,078 billion in 1985, comprising 19 per cent of Turkey’s total exports. Turkey’s imports from Iran also increased, from $190 million in 1980, to $1.548 billion in 1984. However, in 1987 Turkey’s exports to Iran declined to $440 million due to the cancellation of a barter trade agreement between Iran and Turkey that was signed in 1985 (Bolukbasi, 1989:99-101). During Ozal’s second term, from 1987 to 1992, Turkey’s exports to Iran were valued at $470 million. After the Ozal period, from 1992 to 1995, due to the negative impact of the further escalation of ideological confrontations and political tensions between Iran and Turkey, Turkey’s exports to Iran decreased to $265 million. From 1996 to 1997, Turkish exports to Iran increased to $300 million. The increase in Turkey-Iran economic relations during the 1996 and 1997 was largely a result of the Erbakan government’s engagement-oriented foreign policy approach towards Iran. Erbakan’s visit to Iran reduced tensions between the two countries and resulted in the Turkey-Iranian commercial agreement and establishment of the D-8. As argued above, however, traditional state institutions and actors were not satisfied with these developments, and further securitised and externalised Kurdish and Islamic affairs and compelled the Erbakan government to resign. The securitisation and externalisation of Kavakci, Hizbulah and Kurdish affairs in 1998 and 1999 resulted in a decline in Turkey’s economic relations with Iran. In 1998, Turkey’s exports to Iran again decreased to $195 million from $307 million in 1997. As a result of ongoing political tensions and ideological confrontations between the two countries, it declined again to $158 million in 1999—the lowest level of Turkey’s exports to Iran during the 1980s and 1990s.
Table 6. External trade Turkey-Iran (1980-2000)

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<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Exports</strong></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>249</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Imports</strong></td>
<td>1.265</td>
<td>1.265</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>692</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trade Volume</strong></td>
<td>1.350</td>
<td>2.344</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Exports</strong></td>
<td>268</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Imports</strong></td>
<td>689</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade Volume</strong></td>
<td>957</td>
<td>1.103</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>1.052</td>
<td>1.200</td>
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5.2.2 Remarks on Turkey’s Iran policy before the EU accession process

As seen above, the dominant role of the military-bureaucratic elites in the formulation and implementation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy through the 1990s had a direct impact on the ideology-and security-oriented TFP towards Iran. When the military-bureaucratic elite power further increased in Turkish politics, the agenda in the country was occupied by Kurdish and Islamic affairs, and anti-Iranian and anti-Syrian propaganda spread because relations with Iran and Syria were considered to be part of those internal issues. The ideological confrontations, political tensions and diplomatic crises resulting from the Kavakci, assassinations, Hizbullah, Kurdish affairs, the PKK and bombings were, to a large extent, generated by the externalisation of domestic Islamic and Kurdish
affairs by traditional state actors and institutions. Such actors and institutions saw foreign policy as a function of internal politics; for them, Islam was a main domestic treat to the Kemalist political regime, and thus Iran under an Islamic regime was also a threat to the Kemalist political regime. The traditional Turkish elite threat perception, stemming from domestic Islamic affairs and the Iran Islamic regime, was completely imagined (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels), because the secular tradition of Turkish society and sectoral differences between Turkish and Iranian societies would not allow this outcome in Turkey\textsuperscript{121}.

The escalation of ideological confrontations, political tensions and diplomatic crises stemming from the imagined threat perception of the traditional Turkish elite had further negative effects on Turkey-Iran economic relations. When tension between the two countries further escalated, trade volumes between two countries further declined in the 1990s.

5.3 Turkey-Iran relations throughout the Turkey’s EU accession process

Since Turkey achieved EU candidature in 1999, security-oriented disengagement Turkish foreign policy towards Iran has undergone a deep transformation. Turkey’s new foreign policy towards Iran includes efforts to strengthen the bilateral relations and integrations, the liberalisation of trade and movement of people, promoting good governance and relying on soft-power instruments for the solution of problems with Iran and within the region.

5.3.1 Strengthening bilateral relations and creating a stable neighbourhood

Strengthening bilateral relations, relying on soft power instruments for the solution of bilateral problems and mediation for creating a more stable and secure neighbourhood have assumed a greater role in the new TFP towards Iran. In contrast to the traditional

\textsuperscript{121}“The Iranian Islam revolution is a Shia movement; thus, it could not occur as a model for Sunni Turk interpretation of Islam. When we look at history, Turkish Islamic groups and political Islam have never risen against the Turkish political system, and they have always complied with the political system, because the Sunni interpretation of Islam has always found a way to mainstream their way of life within the Turkish political system. As such, the military elite “threat” regarding political Islam during the 1980s and 1990s was a result of their wish to maintain their power within the Turkish political system and society” (CIV10, January 10, 2011, Ankara).
actors and institutions, the AK Party government gave priority to the high-level official visits between Turkey and Iran to end the decades-long ideological confrontations and to improve trust and bilateral political and economic relations between the two countries.\footnote{For instance, Prime Minister Erdogan visited Tehran in July 28-29, 2004. Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Ertegrul Apakan visited Tehran in June 2008, and Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Ankara in July 2008 and to attend the Friends of Democratic Pakistan Conference in August 2009 organised by Turkey to discuss stabilising Pakistan and to combat extremism in the region. In early July 2008 the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan visited Tehran to discuss the Iranian nuclear programme and the possibility of further deepening bilateral ties. These visits were followed by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s visit to Turkey in August 2008 at the invitation of Turkey’s new President Abdullah Gul. Turkish State Secretary Egemen Bagis, responsible for EU-Turkey relations, met with Iranian Ambassador to Ankara Bahman Hosseinpour in 2010. Iranian Parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, visited Ankara to meet with the Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan in January 2009 and, Gul attended the summit of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) organised in Tehran in March 2009. Erdogan visited Tehran in October 2009, and Turkey and Iran declared 2009 the “Iran-Turkey Culture Year.” Since then the two countries began holding cultural relations conferences: for example, Marmara University and the Iranian Consulate in Istanbul arranged an Iran-Turkey Cultural Relations Conference (IRNA, January 19, 2009).} In this regard, in his visit to Tehran on the 28\textsuperscript{th} and 29\textsuperscript{th} July 2004 Prime Minister Erdogan indicated that Turkey was willing to put aside the deep-rooted and enduring ideological confrontations of the 1990s, and insisted on increasing economic relations with Iran. As will be explained below, the high-level official visits undertaken between the two countries have contributed greatly to the improvement of trust, negotiation and bilateral political and economic relations. For instance, during Ahmadinejad’s official visit to Ankara in August 2008, five memorandums of understanding on cooperation in security, combating organised crime, the economy, and education were signed between the two countries.

Mediation for the solution of issues through dialogue and creating a more stable and secure neighbourhood have also assumed a greater role in TFP towards Iran in the last decade. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, the father of the AK Party’s foreign policy approach, has argued that Turkey’s historical, cultural and geopolitical background requires the country to play an active role in its region. Thus, in the last decade, Turkey pursued a proactive and multidimensional foreign policy to make Turkey a main actor and an “honest-broker” in its region. Under the guidance of Davutoğlu, Turkey has maintained its close relations with the West and in contrast has developed close political and economic relations with the East, especially the Islamic world, in the last decade. As
a candidate of the EU and a strategic partner of the United States, and having close
relations with Iran, Turkey has taken an active role in promoting dialogue and diplomacy
in solving the Iranian nuclear issue by carrying on shuttle diplomacy between Iran and
the 5+1 initiative, namely the permanent members of UN Security Council and Germany.

In this vein, in his visit to Ankara in May 2006, Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme
National Security Council, asked Turkey to play a mediating role between Iran and the
West regarding the Iranian nuclear issue (Kohen 2006; Soylemez, 2006; Candar, 2006).
On his visit to the United States on 6 July 2006, former Turkish Foreign Minister and
current President Abdullah Gul discussed the issue with US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. During his meeting with Rice, based on observations from his
previous journey to Iran, Gul suggested a release US pressure on Tehran to facilitate
the adaptation to demand of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Soylemez,
2006). Turkey discussed the issue with Ali Larijani, head of nuclear diplomacy in Iran,
and warned Tehran about the importance of the affair and the seriousness of the
international community. Turkey warned Iran not to play for time which would cause
unwanted consequences, as had happened in Iraq. Turkey also discussed the issue with
Mohamed El Baradei, head of the IAEA and Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief.
With the success of Gul’s diplomacy, Solana visited Tehran to discuss the Iranian nuclear
issue and its adaptation to the 5+1 report on the Iranian nuclear issue in June 2006
(Candar, 2006). In the days following Ahmadinejad's visit, nine meetings were held at the
ministerial level between Turkey and Iran to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue, bilateral
relations and other issues in December 2008.

As discussed by Davutoglu and Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey wishes to avoid the
existence of nuclear weapons in the region and is thus strongly against Iranian nuclear
power, while arguing that any state should have the right to benefit from nuclear energy
for civilian purposes. In May 2010 under the leadership of Turkey, the Tehran
Declaration, which included the enrichment freeze and exchange of uranium, was signed
between Iran, Turkey and Brazil but was ultimately failure. Ankara supports dialogue

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123 EU foreign ministers first agreed a brief enrichment freeze deal with Iran in 2003. Sides then agreed “the
export of part of Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium” in 2009, but both deals failed.
and diplomacy instead of sanctions and isolation for solving the Iranian nuclear issue, and thus voted against the June 2010 UNSC additional sanctions on Iran (PM Erdogan, January 14, 2010). Turkey is maintaining its policy of using mediation for solving issues through dialogue and diplomacy. The Iranian and American ambassadors to Ankara met with Turkish Deputy PM, Bekir Bozdag, on August 15, 2011, and PM Erdogan visited Tehran on March 28, 2012, for discussion on Iran’s nuclear programme, the Syrian crackdown on anti-regime protests, and the PKK issue. On April 13, 2012, PM Erdogan also met with Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al Saud for discussions on Iran’s nuclear program and the Syrian crackdown on anti-regime protests. After a fifteen month break, a new round of nuclear talks started in Istanbul on April 14, 2012, between Iran and P5+1 regarding Tehran’s nuclear programme. The two sides made progress in the area of exchanging enriched uranium with enriched foreign material, which was described as “constructive and useful” by Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief. The Turkish and Iranian foreign ministers met in Istanbul on October 2013 and agreed to work together to stop increasing sectarian conflict in the region, including in Syria. This is important since Iran, with Russia and China, supports the Shia Assad regime in Syria, while Turkey and the Western block supports the opposition movement –the free Syrian army- in Syria. In this vein, PM Erdogan visited Tehran on January 28-29, 2014 and a special trade agreement (free trade on chosen goods) was signed between two countries (for details of the agreement see Cakiroglu. 2014). As will be seen below, as a result of this agreement the volume of Turkey’s trade with Iran doubled in 2012. 

Iranian President Hassan Rohani also visited Turkey on June 9, 2014 for three days and met with Turkish president Gul and PM Erdogan, and at the end of the June (June 30, 2014) Turkish PM Erdogan also visited Tehran with his Energy Minister and many businessmen. Rohani and Erdogan agreed to further develop the established political relations between the two countries and work together to stop extremism and bloodshed in the Middle East (Yeni Safak, July 1, 2014).

5.3.2 Liberalisation of trade and movement of people

The expansion of economic interdependency between Turkey and Iran, and the liberalisation of trade have become one of the main priorities of new TFP towards Iran.
Turkey has deepened its cooperation with Iran in supplying its own and Europe’s expeditiously mounting energy needs. In August 2007, the two countries concluded the draft of a deal creating a joint company to construct a pipeline designed as 3,500 kilometres long to transport up to 40 billion cubic meters (1.4 trillion cubic feet) of Iranian natural gas annually to Europe. The two countries also decided on the building of three thermal power plants by Turkish companies in Iran. In this vein, in November 2008 the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding related to gas and oil transit and joint energy investments to deliver Iranian gas and oil to Western Europe through Turkey and Italy. The two countries signed ‘$1.5 billion in agreements providing for the joint construction of three 2,000-megawatt thermal power plants - two in Iran and one in Turkey, and several hydroelectric plants in Iran with a total 10,000-megawatt capability. Under terms of the agreement, Ankara will import 3 billion to 6 billion kilowatt hours of electrical energy annually’ (Gregor, 2008).

The growth in the energy trade seems likely to continue. From March 2009 to May 2010, Turkey’s gas imports from Iran increased by 98 per cent (Menafn, May 3, 2010). In February 2010, the two countries announced that they would build a pipeline between Turkey’s northeast port city of Trabzon and the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas (Fars News Agency, February 3, 2010), and a Turkish company signed an agreement with Tehran in July 2010 to construct a gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey that would deliver gas to Western Europe (Parkinson, 2010). As a result of this growing cooperation between the two countries, with 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year, Iran has become the second-largest gas supplier to Turkey after Russia (Blair & Kalantari, 2009) and following the EU, China, Japan and South Korea, Turkey became the 5th largest trading partner of Iran (BBC, June 2, 2009). As a result of Turkey’s increasing access to Iranian energy sources and markets, Turkey has increasingly become a regional economic power and an energy hub for Europe (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels).

Non-energy trade has also increased between Turkey and Iran in the last decade as an outcome of Turkey’s high-level economic growth and increasing need for new markets.

124A member of a civil society organisation noted that the increasing economic interdependence between the two countries in this new period has also made a considerable contribution to reducing mutual threat perceptions and solving problems between the two countries.
To increase bilateral trade between the two countries to $20 billion, they signed an agreement in March 2009. According to Turkish and Iranian media reports, the cross-border trade between the two countries also increased ten-fold in this process, climbing to $2.7 billion in 2009. Turkey has exported chemicals, steel, machinery and textiles to Iran and imported cathodes, polymers, propylene and consumer goods from Iran (Mehr News, January 6, 2010). This increase in cross-border trade makes Turkey the 6th largest trade partner of Iran in non-energy trade (Fars News Agency, May 18, 2010).

In comparison with the 1990s, the border trade with Iran has increased considerably in recent years. Many business leaders from border cities such as Van, Hakkari, Urfa Diyarbakir have increasingly made investments in Iran, especially in Urmia and Tabriz (Yuzbasioglu, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara). According to various reports on a lack of cooperation with Iranian companies, 38 Turkish firms made investments in and around Tabriz, the capital of the Iranian East Azerbaijan province (Yuzbasioglu, 2009). According to a trade delegation from Van, with the aid of newly-approved provincial legislation, economic cooperation between Van and Tabriz reached $200 million (Azarbayjan Provincial TV, July 10, 2009). Bilateral trade, largely through growing energy needs, between Turkey and Iran, jumped from 1 billion in 2000 to $4.33 billion in 2005, $10.43 billion in 2008, and $14.5 billion in 2013, increasing more than four-fold since 2000,\textsuperscript{125} and it is expected to rise to $30 billion per year in the next five years.

Beyond energy and cross-border trade, economic cooperation has also deepened between the two countries in this process; for example the central bank of Iran approved the establishment of a Turkish bank in the Iranian province of Bandar Abbas in February 2010 (Mehr News Agency, February 28, 2010a). By taking into consideration economic society, it can be seen that the Turkish government has increased its political relations and asked Iran to open new border points for trade. In March 2010, Iran decided to open new border points for trade, including Bazergan, Khoy, Saro, and Maku (Parsine, February 9, 2010). The two countries also agreed on the creation of a joint industrial

town on the border of the two countries (Mehr News Agency, February 21, 2010b), and as a result of the end of ideological confrontation and increasing dialogue, diplomacy and economic relations, Turkey is today one of just twelve nations with which Iran has signed preferential and free trade agreements.126

Table 7. External trade Turkey-Iran (2000-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Exports</strong></td>
<td>360</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Import</strong></td>
<td>840</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>1,962</td>
<td>3,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade Volume</strong></td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>2,395</td>
<td>2,775</td>
<td>4,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Exports</strong></td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>3,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Import</strong></td>
<td>5,626</td>
<td>6,615</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>3,406</td>
<td>7,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade Volume</strong></td>
<td>6,693</td>
<td>8,056</td>
<td>10,230</td>
<td>5,431</td>
<td>10,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Export</strong></td>
<td>3,590</td>
<td>9,923</td>
<td>4,193</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Import</strong></td>
<td>12,462</td>
<td>11,965</td>
<td>10,393</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade Volume</strong></td>
<td>16,052</td>
<td>21,888</td>
<td>14,486</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


126 The other twelve countries with which Iran signed free trade agreements are Kyrgyzstan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Uzbekistan, Cuba, Venezuela, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Tunisia, Syria, Turkey, and Indonesia.
All in all, TFP towards Iran has undergone a deep transformation during Turkey’s EU accession process. Until the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey had very problematic relations with Iran. Due to the internal threat perceptions of the military-bureaucratic elites rising from Islamic and Kurdish affairs, Turkey followed a security-oriented disengagement policy towards Iran. The externalisation and transformation of domestic Islamic and Kurdish affairs out of normal politics, which caused the diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Iran, made it difficult for the development of political and economic relations, and for the resolution of problems between two countries through dialogue and diplomacy. In the 2000s, however, TFP towards Iran has undergone a deep transformation. By moving away from the security-oriented disengagement policy, Turkey has developed unprecedented levels of cooperative relations with Iran in the political, economic, and social realms. The bilateral problems between Turkey and Iran were, to a large extent, solved through dialogue and diplomacy. Trade and the movement of people between the two countries have been liberalised, and the volume of trade and movement is at the highest level in its history. Turkey has also played an active role in the solution of the Iranian nuclear issue by mediating between Iran and the E3+3 countries.127

The following section will examine the transformation of TFP towards Syria in the EU accession process by comparing it in the 1990s and 2000s.

5.4 Turkey-Syria relations before the EU accession process

For decades, security concerns focused on the Hatay (Alexandretta)128, water access (the dispute over sharing the water of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers)129, and the PKK issue

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127 The E3+3 countries are the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and the People's Republic of China.
128 Until 2005, the legitimacy of the unification of Hatay with Turkey in 1939 was not accepted by Syria. Turkey annexed Hatay in 1939 with the acquiescence of France, which administered the province at that time, and the decision of the Hatay Assembly. After Syria became independent in 1948, it maintained a territorial claim over the province. It described Hatay as a territory stolen by force and included the province in its official map as a part of its territory (Muslih, 1996; CIV11, January 4, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara). Because of this, Turkey viewed Syria as a threat against its territorial integrity (CIV9, December 7, 2010; CIV11, January 4, 2011; Altunisik, 2004; Aydin & Aras, 2005; Kirisci, 2006 Türkmen, 2002).
129 The water issue between Turkey and Syria, and also Turkey and Iraq, arose with the Southeast Anatolia Project (Guney Dogu Anadolu Projesi; GAP), which was expected by Turkey to end the downturn of the
The water of the Euphrates River is the most important natural water source in Syria. GAP greatly increased Syrian (and Iraqi) concerns over the future quantity and quality of the flow of water downstream from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers into Syria. As such, beginning in the 1980s, Syria tried to increase the Kurdish conflict in Turkey in order to get Turkey to compromise over the supply of water (Sayari, 1997; Carkoglu & Eder, 2001; CIV9 December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara). It provided a safe haven for PKK militants and Abdullah Ocalan in order to exert pressure on Turkey over a water-sharing treaty for the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. In 1983, Turkey openly declared its anger with Syria for supporting the PKK (Carkoglu & Eder, 2001, p. 60). As such, Turkey’s domestic Kurdish issue “gained an external dimension in the form of the PKK” and became one of the top issues in Turkey’s relations with Syria.

As argued before in the Iran case, despite resistance from the military-bureaucratic camp, Turgut Ozal, prime minister (1983–1991) and subsequent president (1991–1993), supported Kurdish cultural rights and tried to cooperate with them. He established relations with Iraqi Kurdish leaders and tried to develop political and economic relations with Syria. As head of a single party government, he was able to make some changes in Turkey’s traditional foreign policy of disengagement towards Syria (Aydin, 2005; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara), as in the case of Iran.

During his visit to Damascus in 1987, a protocol on security was signed between Turkey and Syria. With this protocol, Turkey agreed to negotiate both the water and PKK

Southeast Anatolia region. It included 21 dams for irrigating 1.6 million hectares of Turkish farmland in Southeast Anatolia and 19 hydroelectric stations on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Turkey’s claim of full sovereignty on the Euphrates River, Syria’s most important natural resource, caused problems between Syria and Turkey. Syria argues that the river is an international river.

In this process, the PKK was supported not only by Syria, but also by Greece, Armenia and, to some extent, by Russia and Iran, to exert pressure against Turkey. Turkey tried to end aid to the PKK from its neighbours. As such, the domestic Kurdish issue and the PKK have become one of the top issues in Turkey’s relations with these states (Interview with CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara).

Traditional state institutions and actors refer to the foreign affairs bureaucracy, the military, Kemalist media, and elites.

He visited Damascus in 1987 and started negotiations to solve the problems and improve political and economic relations between the two countries.

According to the protocol, two countries agreed to “obstruct groups engaged in destructive activities directed against one another on their own territory and [to] not turn a blind eye to them in any way” (Pipes, 2002) and that Turkey would release 500 cubic meters of water per second to Syria.
issues together, which the Turkish military-bureaucratic elites were strictly against. Turkey continued to restrict the flow of water into Syria. In these negotiation processes, there were also some trade negotiations and economic relations between the sides, however, Syria continued its claims on the Hatay province and continued to host the PKK leader, Ocalan. The PKK continued attacking Turkey by entering from the Syrian side, and Turkey continued to restrict the flow of water into Syria.

5.4.1 Turkey-Syria political relations during the 1990s

After the death of Ozal in 1993, Turkey suffered political and economic crises. Ten different coalition governments were formed, and the hegemony enjoyed by the military-bureaucratic camp over domestic and foreign policy decisions increased throughout the 1990s (for details, see above, Section 5.3 and Chapter IV), which also deeply damaged prospects for the progressive development of political and economic relations between Turkey and Syria (CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). In this process the negotiations between Turkey and Syria over the water and PKK issues ended. The Turkish army increased its operation against the PKK within Turkey and abroad. The PKK increasingly continued to attack Turkey, entering from Syria and Iraq. As such, under the dominance of military-bureaucratic elites, Turkey increasingly maintained the externalisation of the Kurdish issue in the form of the PKK and followed a security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Syria in the 1990s. In this process, the exception was Erbakan’s WP who tried to change Turkey’s traditional security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Syria and the Islamic world, and took a soft line against the Kurdish issue, the Islamic world, and Syria. Like Ozal, he contacted the Syria administration to engage in trade relations and to build good neighbourhood relations with Syria, and the entire Muslim world. However, as argued in

PKK militants maintained their attacks against Turkey by entering from Syrian side. This was the other main reason for Turkey to continue to restrict the flow of water into Syria. In this process, the water issue was transformed into a Pan-Arab agenda by Syria. In 1992, the two countries made another agreement related to the PKK and the water issue. Turkey promised to allow the flow of enough water from the Euphrates River into Syria, and Syria recognised the PKK as a terrorist organisation and promised to halt PKK attacks on Turkey from its side. In practice, Syria did not stop the PKK militants from attacking Turkey from its territories, and thus Turkey continued the restriction of the water from the Euphrates River into Syria. In 1993, Syria again promised not to allow any terrorist activates in its territories against Turkey and Turkey promised not to cut the flow of the Euphrates into Syria, but like the previous agreements, this one also could not be put into practice (Sever, 2001; Olson, 2006, 1997; Kohen, 1998, 2005; Muslih, 1996).
Chapters IV and above in the Iran case, the military-bureaucratic elites viewed Erbakan’s attempts to develop political and economic relations with Syria and the Muslim world as a threat to Turkey’s Kemalist political regime and territorial integrity. Thus, they further securitised and externalised the domestic Islamic and Kurdish affairs and increased their pressure on the Erbakan government, which resulted in Erbakan’s downfall through a coup in 1997 (for details, see the above Iran case and Chapters IV).

In this process, with the increasing influence of the military in Turkish politics, Turkey adopted a further tough stance against religious and minority affairs, and the countries that were thought to provide support to the Kurdish and Islamic groups in Turkey, such as Iran, the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq, Greece, Armenia, and Syria. The military further increased operations against the PKK, both within Turkey and abroad. The increase in PKK terrorist attacks and media coverage about the Kurdish affair resulted in an increase in Turkish nationalism and anti-Syrian and anti-Arabic propaganda in the country. In January 1996, the Turkish Foreign Ministry sent a memorandum to Syria, declaring that if Syria did not halt its support for the PKK, Turkey would use its “right to respond with any measure it deems appropriate at an appropriate time” (Altinisik, 2004, p. 222). Syria did not expel Ocalan and close the PKK camps in Beqaa Valley in Lebanon. The PKK continued to attack Turkey by entering on the Syrian side. This rising tension between the two countries resulted in Turkey freezing all political and economic relations with Damascus (Olsen, 1997, p.182; Mufti, 1998, p. 35). “The military-bureaucratic camp increasingly began to single out as the main culprit in Turkey’s war against the PKK… and began… gunboat diplomacy” (Altinisik & Tur, 2006, p. 237; see also Aykan, 1999a, p. 177).

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135 As a consequence of increasing Turkish nationalism, for the first time, the marginal National Action Party gained an 18 per cent vote and became a coalition partner.
136 Syria also accused Turkish intelligence of cooperating with Turkmens in an assassination attempt on Father Assad and of bombing offices that were considered to belong to the PKK. There were also border skirmishes between Ankara and Damascus during this process (Altinisik & Tur, 2006).
137 Beqaa Valley was/is a Lebanon territory but at that time it was under the control of Syria.
138 For instance, in early September 1998, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz warned Syria that “it would suffer severe consequences for its support of the PKK terrorists.” In mid-September, General Atilla Ates said, “By supporting the bandit Apo [Abdullah Ocalan], they [the Syrians] have confronted us with the plague of terrorism. We have no patience” (as quoted in Olson 2001, p.110). Top-ranking military-bureaucratic officials had threatened Syria with the using of military force many times if it did not immediately expel Ocalan and halt the PKK from camping in Syria and attacking Turkey by entering from its territories.
On September 30, 1998, the National Security Council consequently decided to use military force against Syria if it did not immediately expel Ocalan and halt support for the PKK. Turkey began to mobilise an additional 10,000 troops along the Turkey-Syrian border. Foreign Minister Ismail Cam tried to oppose the threat of military force to Syria, but he could not overcome the pressure from the military (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). A week later the Turkish government issued a final ultimatum to the Syrian government. Referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter, Turkey declared that it would use military force if Syria continued to host Ocalan and support the PKK (PM Yılmaz, October 14, 1998). Damascus initially refused to admit that Ocalan was in Damascus or that the PKK had camps in Syria or the Baqaa valley in Lebanon, however, Syria soon recognised Turkey’s seriousness about using military force; thus, the committee met at Turkey’s Adana province to negotiate the issue. Syria closed the PKK camps and ended the logistic support for the PKK. Within the framework of the Adana Agreement, the Joint Security Committee comprised of military officials from both Turkey and Syria met regularly to discuss border security between two countries. With this agreement, the political tension between the two countries was reduced. Until 2000, however, it was not possible to talk about a real improvement in political and economic relations between two countries, although there was a decrease in tension and an increase in diplomatic visits at various levels between two countries. Starting with

139 With the announcement of this decision by Turkish Chief of the General Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu on October 2, 1998, the crisis between Syria and Turkey reached its peak: “The crisis is a situation of undeclared war between Turkey and Syria,” Kivrikoglu stated; “They [Syrians] have been giving support to terrorism since 1984. It looks as though our warnings did not succeed” (Cumhuriyet, 1998, translated by Özdamar).

140 See Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz’s speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, October 14, 1998. 141 A day before the Adana agreement between Syria and Turkey ended Syria’s support for the PKK, President Demirel visited the Hatay province on October 19 and said that “Turkey was ready for war if Syria will not expel Ocalan.” Syria expelled Ocalan from Damascus, and the Adana agreement was signed on October 20, 1998. The reason Syria ended its support of the PKK and expelled Ocalan is not a subject of this study, but the general idea was that Syria was weak and helpless in light of a Turkish military intervention. However, in an interview with Bashar Assad conducted by well-known Turkish writers and journalist Mehmet Birand, Assad said that it was “not out of fear, but because we preferred you. We would either be friends with the Turkish people or prefer the Kurds and lose you. Because our preference was with you, we sent Öcalan out” (Birand, 8 November 8, 2009).
Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s attendance at Hafiz al-Assad’s funeral ceremony in June 2000\textsuperscript{142}, the relations between the two countries began to normalise\textsuperscript{143}.

The trade volume between the two countries was only $724 million in 2000 (Turkish Directorate of Foreign Trade), and both parties, especially people living on both sides of border, wanted to increase economic relations, especially border trade, between the two countries. “During this time, in Syria there was not only a willingness to increase trade as can be seen in Daily Tishreen that was writing about the opportunities of further economic relations with Turkey and talking about a potential of $4 billion trade volume (Radikal, 19 June 2002), but there also was an effort to leave the past behind” (Tur, 2010, p.3). The Turkish military-bureaucratic camp, however, stressed cooperation on security matters and viewed Syria’s relinquishing of its claim over the Hatay province and the maintaining of cooperation in border security with Turkey as prerequisites for the solution of the water issues and improvement of political and economic relations (Tur, 2010, p.3; Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 239–242). As such, Turkey prepared a declaration of principles that “included respect for the territorial integrity of each country as a prerequisite for the advancement of relations” (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 239). This meant that Syria had to give up its claim over Hatay. Damascus was reluctant to put the Hatay issue at the top of the agenda in its relations with Turkey, however, thus, it was reluctant to sign such a declaration. This delayed Syrian President Assad’s expected visit to Turkey and the true improvement of relations between two countries (Tur, 2010, p. 3-4; Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 239-242).

\textbf{5.4.2 Remarks on Turkey’s Syria policy before the 2000s}

The dominant role of the military-bureaucratic elites in the formulation and implementation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy through the 1990s and before also had a direct impact on Turkey’s traditional security-oriented disengagement foreign

\textsuperscript{142}There was no consensus among the traditional state actors and institutions about whether Sezer should attend Assad’s funeral or not. Finally he decided to attend the funeral, which contributed greatly to the opening of a new era in relations between the two countries.

\textsuperscript{143}Three months after Sezer’s Damascus visit, Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam visited Turkey, and a security cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries.
policy towards Syria. They saw the Arab world in general, and Syria specifically, as untrustworthy and as a threat to the Kemalist political regime and territorial integrity of the state; thus, they were reluctant to develop any relations with, and to become involved in, the Islamic world. As seen above, the internal and external threat perceptions of the military-bureaucratic elite and the image of Arabs in their mind had a strong impact on the escalation of political tension between two countries, resulting from the Hatay, water, and PKK issues. They aimed to increase Turkish nationalism, limit Islamic influence in public life, and promote reluctance to be involved in relations with the Islamic world. This is why when the power of these traditional actors and institutions further increased in both Turkish domestic and foreign policy, anti-Kurdish, anti-Arabic, and anti-Syrian propaganda spread throughout the country. As seen above and also in the Iran case, this had negative effects on the foreign policies of these countries towards Turkey as well. That is, the disengagement and hard-line policy of the military-bureaucratic elite against neighbouring countries in general, and towards Syria and Iran specifically, had negative feedback effects on the foreign policy of neighbouring countries towards Turkey. For instance, Syria tried to exert pressure on Turkey to gain leverage over the water and Hatay issues by supporting the PKK. As such, Turkey’s disengagement foreign policy towards Syria prevented any constructive attempt to discuss the problems with Syria and any possibility of improving political, economic, and cultural relations with Syria and all regions (Aras & Koni, 2002).

5.5 Turkey’s Syria policy during the EU accession process

Turkey’s security-oriented disengagement policy towards Syria has also undergone a deep transformation throughout the 2000s, until the Syria administration started to use force against the anti-regime protesters in 2011. As in the case of Iran, Turkey’s new foreign policy practices towards Syria have included efforts to strengthen bilateral relations and integrations, increase the liberalisation of trade and movement of people, promote good governance, and rely on soft power instruments for the solution of problems with Syria and within the region.
5.5.1 Strengthening bilateral relations and solution of bilateral problems

Strengthening bilateral relations and relying on soft power instruments for the solution of bilateral problems with Syria also assumed a greater role in the new TFP towards Syria. Instead of the traditional foreign policymakers’ prerequisite of improving and maintaining security cooperation for the development of political and economic relations with Syria, the ruling AK Party government attempted to develop political and economic relations with Syria without any prerequisites. This led to the postponed visit of Syrian President Bashar Assad to Ankara in January 2004 (Altinisik and Tur, 2006; CIV9, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). This visit, the first visit ever from Syria to Ankara at the presidential level, ended six decades of the Hatay problem between Turkey and Syria. With a declaration signed by Assad, Syria recognised Turkey’s current borders. This meant that Syria abandoned its claim over the Hatay province and accepted it as a part of Turkey. Syria changed its official maps, which used to show Hatay as part of Syria. As noted by some interviewees (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels), the AK Party government’s constructive discourse and dialogue, and their diplomacy-oriented engagement foreign policy approach to Syria was very important in Syria’s historical decision. In addition to the solution of the Hatay issue, the cooperation between the two countries at the security, economic, and political levels were also intensely discussed during the visit. At a press conference, Assad announced that Syria had the same concerns as Turkey regarding the territorial integrity of Iraq and the rising autonomous Kurdish structure in Northern Iraq (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 243; and see also Tur, 2010, p. 3–5). Referring to Turkey’s previous declaration, Assad stated that “A Kurdish state (in Northern Iraq) would violate our red line, too” (CNN Turk, January 8, 2004). An institutional framework for economic relations between the two countries was established. As will be discussed further in this chapter, the trade volume between the two countries began to increase considerably. The two countries also decided to further increase cooperation in fighting against the PKK. Assad publicly condemned the PKK attacks against Turkey as “a heinous terrorist act (Middle East News Agency, July 2, 2005) and promised to cooperate with Turkey in every respect in its fighting against the PKK.
In December 2004, that same year, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan paid a visit to Damascus. The cooperation on different levels between the two countries started with Bashar Assad’s visit to Ankara and was further developed with this visit. A free trade agreement was signed, and economic delegations from both sides began to come together monthly to solve the problems in the area of border trade. During Erdogan’s visit, the water issue was on the agenda again, and Turkey promised to allow the flow of enough water into Syria. During the press conference, Erdogan said that Syria could fulfil its increasing water needs from the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (Hürriyet, 23 December 2004). In this regard, the water issue was no longer a political or sovereignty issue. It was accepted as a technical issue, and it was agreed that officials from both sides would come together when it was needed to decide how much water Turkey should allow to flow into Syria in a “win-win approach” (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 242). Erdogan also attended the Syrian-Turkish Business Council meeting in Damascus in April 2007 and met with Bashar Assad, and accompanied Sarkozy (During the French Presidency of the European Union) on his visit to Damascus to talk over the Middle East peace process in 2008. Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan’s chief adviser on foreign policy since 2002 and foreign minister since 2009, also visited Syria 45 times from 2002 to 2010, approximately once every two months. The other high-level visit to Damascus that contributed to the increasing political and economic cooperation between the two countries by increasing trust and solidarity was paid by Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in April 2005, when Syria was isolated internationally due to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Although no agreement was signed during this visit, it contributed to building solidarity and trust between the two countries (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 242). That is, Turkey was, in contrast to the international community, in favour of developing dialogue and diplomacy instead of implementing an

144 After the Adana Agreement, the delegations consisted of water-related organisations from both countries, which met several times to discuss the water issue. These meetings resulted in a joint protocol that was signed in 2001. It “call[ed] for cooperation in training, study missions, technology exchange, and the conducting of joint projects” (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 242). With this protocol in place, the negotiation over the water issue between Turkey and Syria gained an “intergovernmental network.”

145 The traditional actors and institutions see the water issue as a political and sovereignty issue. In contrast to the traditional actors and institutions, the AK Party sees the water issue more as a technical issue rather than political and sovereignty issue.
isolation and sanction policy for the realisation of Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, as happened with Iran’s nuclear issue.

5.5.2 Creation of a stable and secure neighbourhood

The mediation for the solution of issues through dialogue and to create a more stable and secure neighbourhood has also assumed a greater role in TFP towards Syria in the last decade. As mentioned above, the other basic principle of the AK Party’s foreign policy approach is to pursue a proactive and multidimensional foreign policy to make Turkey a main actor and an “honest-broker” in its region. As a consequence of its new dialogue and diplomacy-centric foreign policy towards Syria and Iran, its stance on the Palestine-Israel conflict, and its position on the Iraq war, Turkey has become the only country in the region that has good relations with all sides of the conflicts in the region. This has enhanced Turkey’s trustworthiness and honesty, capability, and credibility in the region (Zaman, September 5, 2008; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As such, as a candidate of the European Union and a strategic partner of the United States, and having close relations with Syria, under the guidance of Davutoglu, Turkey took an active role in promoting dialogue and diplomacy in solving the Syria-West, Syria-Israel, Arab-Israel, Syria-Lebanon, and Syria-Iraq problems by mediating and carrying out diplomacy between sides.

Turkey’s mediation in the peace talks between Israel and Syria, which took place from 2006 to 2009, first entered the agenda during Erdogan’s visit to Damascus in 2004 (Birand, Posta, 8 November 2009). Later on, Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert requested that Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan start mediation with Syria, and the Syrian president Bashar Assad said that Syria would welcome Turkish mediation. In this vein, during Erdogan’s visit to Damascus in 2004, Assad emphasised the importance of Turkey’s EU accession process for Syria and the region, and said that they were watching Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy with admiration and were modelling their own policy on it. Assad stated that Turkey’s good relations with the European Union and all countries in the Middle East, including Israel, were attractive to Syria. This made Turkey a credible and capable actor in solving chronic problems in the region. As a result, Syria
and Israel negotiated indirectly for a year, which was made public in 2008. Turkey’s role as mediator led to new and positive outcomes such as Israel’s unofficial comments to President Erdogan about its readiness to withdraw from the Golan Heights, which had been captured by Israel in the 1967 Israel-Arab war (BBC News, 27 May 2008; CNN News, 27 May 2008; Milliyer Daily, 27 May 2008). Although Turkey’s close relations with Syria were initially criticised by the West, Turkey’s role in the indirect Syria-Israel talks and the 2007 and 2008 Lebanon political crises, which allowed the election of General Michel Suleiman as President of Lebanon and ended an 18 month political deadlock (BBC, 27 May 2008) was praised by both Western and Middle Eastern writers and politicians (see Simpson, May 22, 2008; Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2008; Associated Press, May 22, 2008). Turkey, Syria, France, and Qatar leaders gathered in Damascus (3-4 September, 2008) to assess the situations in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Darfur, and Israel-Syria via indirect talks. Nicolas Sarkozy, who joined the meeting as an EU term president, said that Turkey’s prime minister did good job as a mediator and that all of Europe was indebted to Turkey because of its role in the Middle East peace process. Turkey’s participation will be needed again when direct talks start between Israel and the Arabs. Syria’s President Assad also emphasised Turkey’s leadership role in this process. Negotiations were halted, however, after Israel’s Gaza operation in 2009. Until the beginning of the uprising in Syria and the international community and Turkey’s support of the change of the Asad regime in Syria, the Asad administration was willing to resume negotiations under the mediation of Turkey.

Assad said, “We have full trust in Turkey. Let me give you an example: even if we do not ask them, [Turkey] talks about us to Washington, gives our opinions. This is very important. Besides, the role it played in negotiations with Israel was very important. Because of this, relations came to a point where Turkey can talk for us”. He also states, “However Israel has been reluctant to start negotiations” (Sabah, May 18, 2009).

Turkey played a key role in Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2006 by taking an active mediation role between Syria and the West, and the Syria and Lebanon administrations. Turkey also played a mediator role in the rising political crises between Iraq and Syria after the bomb attacks in the Green Zone in Baghdad in August 2009. Baghdad accused
Syria of being behind the terrorist attacks and recalled its Damascus ambassador. Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu visited both Syria and Iraq and listened to both sides’ opinions about the developments. He offered mediation via Turkey to find a solution to the issue. He suggested the Bagdad administration, “tells us every message you want to be communicated to Syria and give us all the evidence and information and we will pass it onto the Syrian side” (Milliyet, September 1, 2009). In this process, the foreign ministers of Iraq and Syria met in Istanbul under the mediation of Davutoglu. In this meeting, Davutoglu also offered to create a tripartite border security mechanism for Iraq, Syria, and Turkey to fight against the PKK, Al Qaida, and Ba’athist forces in Iraq (Ugur, 2009). As such, the political crises turned into security cooperation between sides as a result of Turkey’s active and constructive diplomacy.  

5.5.3 Promoting good governance and democracy

Promoting good governance and democracy was also one of the characteristics of Turkey’s new foreign policy towards Syria. Since 2000, and especially during 2005 and 2006, while the West was increasingly pushing the isolation and sanction policy against Syria, Turkey followed an engagement policy and developed its political and economic relations with Syria. At the same time, in parallel with the United States and the European Union, Turkey has encouraged the Assad administration to pursue democratic reforms in country since 2004. In Erdogan’s visits to Damascus in 2004, 2007, and 2009 and Davutoglu’s periodical visits, Turkey called on Assad to make democratic reforms for a smooth transition in Syria. For instance, with Syria’s increasing hard-line policy against the anti-regime protesters, Davutoglu visited Damascus in August 16, 2011. The purpose of the visit was to convey the concerns of Turkey’s president and prime minister along with the message that violence against the civilian population was unacceptable. Davutoglu called on the Syria administration to halt violence against civilians and to

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In addition, Turkey made several initiatives that played a crucial role in the prevention of crises in the region. For example, the formation of a Sunni coalition in 2005 by Sunni groups, the Tevafuk group, and their participation in the 2005 Iraq election, and Turkish initiation of Sunni Shia reconciliation in Iraq. Turkey also played an active role in solving the 2007 and 2008 Lebanon political crises; thus, Prime Minister Erdogan was invited to the presidential ceremony of Michel Suleyman. Davutoglu, the current foreign minister and previous chief adviser of Prime Minister Erdogan for foreign policy, was personally involved all these process.
make reforms in parallel with the public’s demands. The positive outcome of the visit was that Syria withdrew its military forces from Hama immediately and Turkey’s Damascus Ambassador went freely to Hama and observed the situation there. However, in the following days, Syria’s military continued to use force against the public and anti-regime protesters. Davutoglu once more clearly warned Assad to immediately halt the military operations against the public and to make reforms in parallel with public demand. Syria did not keep its promises of reform or to halt the military operations against the public. Thus, after August 2011, in parallel with UN and EU decisions, Turkey began to implement sanctions against Syria to force the Assad administration to stop its use of force and to undertake democratic reforms. Until the last moment, Turkey tried help Syria in solving its problems with its own population, with neighbours such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel, and with the West, through dialogue and diplomacy, and increasingly engaging in diplomatic, political, and economic relations with Syria when it was isolated by the international community, by calling for the democratisation and liberalisation of the autocratic regime, and by carrying out negotiations. To find workable solution to the Syrian conflict Turkey has also gathered Syrian opposition groups in Istanbul many times in the past three years and taken an active role in the Geneva I and II peace conferences on Syria, talking about the issue with Iran, Russia and western countries including the USA, Germany, France, and the UK. Unfortunately no solution has been so far, possible and Turkey is one of the countries that is worst affected from on-going civil war in Syria. According to the Turkish government, as of August 2014, one and half million Syrian refugees were living in Turkey (for details see www.mfa.gov.tr.)

Turkey has assumed the role promoting good governance and democracy not only in Iran and Syria but also elsewhere in its region, and globally. For instance, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA)\textsuperscript{147} has conducted many projects to educate women in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia about

\textsuperscript{147}The budget of the TIKA, which promotes good governance, provides development assistance, and develops projects and programmes to improve cooperation between Turkey and neighbouring and developing countries where Turkey has cultural and historical ties, has increased from 85 million Turkish Lira (TL) in 2002 to about 1 billion TL in 2010.
women’s rights, domestic violence, and illiteracy. The expansion of political participation and good governance projects among the members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). These projects were included in the OIC’s Ten-Year Programme of Action in 2005 and its Chapter at the Dakar Summit in March 2008. Interaction between Turkey and neighbouring countries has increased as a natural consequence of a greater volume of trade and the reciprocal free-visas agreement. As such, many people, students, and civil society activists coming to Turkey from neighbouring countries have observed the democratisation of Turkey in the EU accession process. Turkish civil society organisations have joined forces with students and civil society activists coming to Turkey from neighbouring countries on environmental, cultural and educational projects.

There are similarities between Turkey’s authoritarian political regime and one-party regimes in the Arab world in terms of ideology and military control over civil politics. Turkey’s struggle with authoritarianism and military control over civilians and the liberalisation of political and economic systems in the EU accession process has been closely followed by many reformists in the Arab world (Kardas, 2012). As mentioned by Rashid Al-Ghannushi, the leader of the En-Nahda movement in Tunisia, and Tariq Ramadan, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Turkey serves as a moderate and democratic model for the troubled Arab world (Today’s Zaman, January 25, 2012). According to the 2010 study conducted by TESEV, 61 per cent of Arabs see Turkey and its political system as a model (Akgun, 2010, p. 21-22).

The leaders of Turkey, on the other hand, have been involved in the promotion of democracy in surrounding states. They supported revolutionist movements in the Arab world and called on unpopular Arab leaders to respect the will of the public and resign. All of these actions, and Turkey’s active foreign policy in regional affairs, have increased the popularity of Turkey and Turkish leaders, especially Prime Minister Erdogan, in the

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148 For detailed information on TIKA’s operational activities and areas of operation, see http://www.ecocci.com/DC/PDF/19.04.201017_34Presentation%20of%20TIKA.pdf, last accessed on March 9, 2012.
149 This was especially the case after Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu was elected as the ninth Secretary General of Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in January 2005.
150 Interview with members of NGOs in Ankara and Istanbul.
Arab world. According to the 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll, Turkey has played the “most constructive” role in the Arab Spring, and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan is among the most admired world leaders.\textsuperscript{151} Furthermore, TRT has increasingly begun broadcasting in different languages (in 32 languages so far), and is followed closely in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{152} As such, Turkey and the improvements in its social, political, and economic life in the EU accession process have had a democratising effect on the region (Kirisci, 2011, p. 32; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels).

### 5.5.4 Liberalisation of trade and movement of people

Turkey has liberalised trade with Syria in this new period. The ruling AK Party government took into consideration its society’s request for the liberalisation of trade, especially the population located in Turkey’s border provinces, and during Assad’s visit in 2004, they brought to the agenda the opening of a consulate and border centres along the Turkey-Syria border to facilitate border trading between the two countries (CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As a result, a consulate was opened in Gaziantep and border centres were opened in provinces along the Turkey-Syrian border, such as Urfa, Aleppo, Gaziantep, Mardin, and Hatay. During Erdogan’s visit to Damascus in 2004, the FTA was signed, and enacted in 2006. To solve the problems facing bilateral and border trade, Assad and Erdogan decided that monthly economic delegations from both countries would meet\textsuperscript{153} (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 242; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The increasing dialogue and diplomacy brought about the establishment of bilateral economic cooperation mechanisms between Turkey and Syria, such as the Joint Economic Commission, the Partnership Council, the Industry Follow-up Committee, the Business Council, and the Joint Commission for


\textsuperscript{153} The members of economic society in Ankara and Brussels stated that this decision was taken up on their request to Erdogan. This shows that economic society gained power in the EU accession process and played a role in the formulation and implementation of TFP.
Land Transportation. Legal frameworks, such as the Trade Agreement, the Protocol on Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation, the Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment, and the Free Trade Agreement, constitute the legal ground of Turkish-Syrian bilateral economic and commercial relations to facilitate economic cooperation between the two countries. A high-level Strategic Cooperation Council was established between the two countries in 2009, and 47 agreements were signed in the fields of economy and trade on 22 August 2009. As such, the trade volume between the two countries increased more than threefold in less than a decade, reaching US$2.272 billion in 2010, up from US$724 million in 2000. In Erdogan’s visit to Damascus in 2009, the target of trade volume between the two countries was set at US$5 billion for 2013. Erdogan said, “We talked about this with my brother Otri. There is a political will for this. We will succeed in this, God willing.” (PM Erdogan, 23 December 2009). With the Free Trade Agreement, in addition to the jump in trade volume between the two countries, there was also a considerable increase in joint infrastructural projects and investments in Syria by Turkish businesses, especially in Aleppo (Chris, 2009). With US$260 million in investments, Turkish companies were ranked first as foreign investors with respect to the number of projects in Syria.

Table 8. External trade Turkey-Syria (2000-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value (million dollars)</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>1.113</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>1.642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

154 Forty seven agreements were signed in the fields of economy and trade between Turkey and Iraq, on the same day.
155 Turkey exports electrical machines, mineral fuels, animal and vegetable oil, plastics, automotive and subsidiary industry products, iron and steel products, processed petroleum products, chemical products, cement, glass, ceramics, products of brick and tile industry, leather products, forest products, wheat, flour and margarine to Syria, and imports mineral fuels, cotton, oilseed and fruits, automotive and subsidiary industry products, paper and carton paper, vegetables, unprocessed animal hide, fertilizer and wool from Syria.
Turkey has liberalised visa restrictions with Syria. Turkey and Syria share a border that is 877km long, and due to the lack of dialogue, diplomacy, and political problems, this border has been covered with thousands of anti-person and anti-tank mines since 1956. Due to these anti-person and anti-tank mines and political problems, socially and economically similar cities, such as Antep, Mardin, Kamisli, Urfa, Hatay, and Aleppo, were divided for decades. Many people have relatives on just the other side of the border, and they could not visit each other.\textsuperscript{156} As a result of Turkey’s increasing rapprochement with Syria, Turkey decided to remove the mines along the border by 2014.\textsuperscript{157} The increasing rapprochement between Turkey and Syria also brought about the mutual abolition of visa restrictions between the two countries in 2009. With this change, and the removal of the land mines, the border cities that were historically, socially, and economically the same were reunited, which increased trade and the number of tourist traveling between the two countries. Until the starting of civil war in Syria people from Aleppo and other provinces of Syria began to come to Gaziantep, Urfa, for shopping and eating, and many people from Gaziantep and other cities began to go to Syria, which would have been unthinkable just ten years before (CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The latest data on the

\textsuperscript{156}Regarding the lifting of visa restrictions, Foreign Minister Davutoglu said, “I would like to address the Syrian people. Turkey is your second country and Turkish people are waiting for you with open arms without a visa … We are lifting the borders which were artificially placed and becoming the people of one hinterland. We are turning the economic cooperation to an economic unity. We are hoping that this will be a model for all our neighbours.”

\textsuperscript{157}The removing of anti-person and anti-tank mines in Turkey-Syria border came into force in June 17, 2009 (Official Journey, June 17, 2009). For details, also see http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?i=192992. Last access on 20 August, 2011.
Turkish economy also shows how this has contributed to the region’s economy. Gaziantep is becoming one of the most important economic cities in Turkey.¹⁵⁸

According to data from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 406,935 Syrian tourists visited Turkey in 2008, up from 332,847 in 2007. With the abolition of visa restrictions in 2009, the number of Syrian tourists who visited Turkey reached 899,494 in 2010, an increase of 91 per cent from 509,679 in 2009, and Syria ranked eighth among countries sending tourists to Turkey in 2010. According to data from the Ministry of Tourism of Syria, 562,932 Turkish tourists visited Syria in 2008, up from 485,953 in 2007, and with the abolition of visa restrictions, the number reached 1,664,209 in 2010, more than double the 2009 total of 733,132, and Turkey ranked fifth in sending the most tourists to Syria.

Table 9. Rate of Increase of Tourists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Syrian Tourists</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Turkish Tourists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>126,323</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>467,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>406,935</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>562,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>509,679</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>733,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>899,494</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,664,209 (including daily visits)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In summary, the six decades of problematic relations between Turkey and Syria climaxed towards the end of the 1990s, and the two countries almost went to war in October 1998 with the action plan of Turkey’s National Security Council against Syria. However, in last decade, Turkey has transformed its traditional foreign policy towards Syria from security-oriented disengagement to political and economic-oriented engagement. The indicators of this are Turkey’s efforts to develop dialogue, good neighbourhood relations,

the expansion and liberalisation of trade and the movement of people, relying on the soft-power instruments for solution of its problems with Syria and peace-making in the region. All these are clearly indicators of the deep transformation of TFP towards Syria during the country’s accession process to the EU.

5.6 Role of the Turkey’s EU candidature in the transformation of Turkey’s Iran and Syria policy

As discussed, Turkey had very problematic relations with Iran and Syria during the 1980s and 1990s. The internal and external threat perceptions of the military-bureaucratic elite, and the externalisation of domestic Kurdish and religious affairs was the main driving force behind Turkey’s problematic relations, and its security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Iran and Syria during the 1990s and before. However, as discussed above, Turkey has left its traditional security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards these nations over the last decade, and adapted a foreign policy of dialogue-, political- and economic-oriented engagement. Turkey-Iran and Turkey-Syria (until the Assad regime began to use force against its own people) relations have experienced unprecedented levels of cooperation at the political and economic levels.

This study investigates the influence of Turkey’s EU candidature on its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. First of all, it is important to note that the examination of EU-Turkey relations reveal that the EU has not (specifically) asked Turkey to solve its problems with, and develop cooperative political and economic relations with, its non-EU neighbours in general, and Iran and Syria specifically (see 2001, 2003, 2008 Accession Partnership Document, EC Yearly Progression Reports on Turkey; EU summits (1997 Helsinki, 1999 Luxemburg) presidency conclusions on Turkey). It is therefore not possible to talk about the role of the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure related to the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. Accordingly, the following section explores whether – and if so, how – the EU-fostered domestic changes identified in Chapter IV (see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2 and 4.4.3) have played a role in this remarkable change in TFP towards Iran and Syria and the unprecedented level of political and economic cooperation between Turkey and these countries considering their disengagement and hostile relationship during the 1980s and 1990s. As such, we will
investigate how EUisation in one field (F1) has generated changes in another field (F2), the secondary domestic impact of the EU, which we called a ‘secondary domestic EUisation mechanism’ (for details see Chapter II, Section 2.4.3).

5.6.1 Empowerment of new actors and transformation of TFP

The rational institutionalist explanation of EUisation proposes that the reforms generated by EU adaptation pressure to fill the existing misfit gap between domestic and EU levels empower elected and civil actors at the domestic level by providing them with new opportunities, and constraining the power of old and autocratic state actors and institutions in the domestic political system. This changing balance of domestic power and empowerment for new actors and institutions has led to a process of political and social change in the associated states (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999, p. 2-11; Börzel an Risse 2003, p. 58; see also Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005), including in foreign policy (Torreblanca, 2001). As a result of the empowerment of new actors and institutions in the formulation of the foreign policies of associated states, they have tried to achieve their foreign policy objectives by using soft power instruments rather than hard power instruments (for details, see Chapter II, and Torreblanca, 2001). Accordingly, the following section will examine how and to what extent the empowerment of government and civil society against the military-bureaucratic camp in the formulation of TFP as a result of the political, economic, and societal EUisation of Turkey generated by the EU and its conditionality has played a role in the above unprecedented level of change in TFP towards Iran and Syria over the last decade.

5.6.1.1 Empowerment of government and transformation of TFP

As previously discussed, before the 2000s, under the dominance of the military-bureaucratic elites, Turkey formulated its foreign policy by taking its security concerns into consideration. This made it impossible to talk about the solution of problems and the potential political and economic benefits of cooperation and relations with Iran, Syria, and other neighbouring countries (CIV 12, January 6, 2010, Ankara; CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara). As argued in Chapter IV, however, in parallel with the rational institutionalist explanation of EUisation, the harmonisation reforms undertaken to fill the
existing misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels have democratised Turkey’s authoritarian political system, changed the composition, function, and duties of NSC, and have empowered the government and NGOs in the Turkish political system, and in the formulation of TFP against former military-bureaucratic elites (CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV2, October 22, 2010, Brussels). The power and influence of the military-bureaucratic camp as points of veto in the domestic and foreign policy-making process have been weakened, and thus the AK Party government and NGOs are able to take greater initiatives in domestic and foreign policy-making than has previously been the case (for details, see Chapter III). According to CIV11 (January 4, 2011, Ankara) “the control of civil authority over the military has increased as the civil and political elites began to take more and more initiative regarding the formulation and implementation of TFP.” As such, in contrast to the previous governments led by Ozal and Erbakan, the AK Party government was able to overcome the military-bureaucratic camp’s pressure and put into practice its own multidimensional foreign policy approaches towards Iran, Syria, and all of the Muslim world (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV8, January 3, 2010, Ankara).

“The change in domestic power relations has played an important role in having more cooperative relations with other nations, especially those within the Islamic world. The AK Party is luckier than Ozal and Erbakan in being able to practice its own foreign policy approach, since the undertaken reforms have weakened the power of the military in the formulation of TFP” (CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara).

“We know that the EU adaptation reforms have played an important role in [the] justice system and civil-military relations. These reforms have empowered the AK Party government. It is obvious that if these reforms had not been undertaken, the AK party would not have been able to make such revolutionary changes in Turkey’s foreign policy, especially towards the Middle East.” (CIV8, January 3, 2010, Ankara).

The empowerment of the government, and the high level economic growth generated by the harmonisation reforms (for details see Chapter IV, Section 4.4.3) has broadened the TFP approach to include economic and political dimensions rather than merely ideology and security dimensions. As proposed by the rational institutionalist explanation of
EUisation, the empowered ruling AK Party government has tried to achieve its foreign policy objectives in relation to Iran and Syria, and other neighbours, by using soft power instruments rather than hard power instruments. First, they adopted a dialogue- and engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. This change in approach provided an opportunity for high-level official visits between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Syria. These visits brought about an increased trust and dialogue between Turkey and these countries (CIV4, 25 October 2010, Brussels). As detailed above (see Sections 5.4.1 and 5.5.1) during these visits, bilateral agreements on cooperation on economy, security, combating organised crime, and education were signed between the Turkey and these countries. As such, the policy of strengthening bilateral relations and relying on soft power instruments for the solution of bilateral problems with Iran and Syria assumed by the ruling AK Party government resulted in the enhancement of political and economic relations and the solution of long-standing PKK, Islamic, Hatay, and water issues between Turkey and these countries.

High level economic growth resulted in the increasing need for new markets and energy resources (CIV4, October 25, 2010; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara). This guided the AK Party government to liberalise trade and the movement of people with Turkey’s neighbours in general, and with Iran and Syria in particular, by analysing the benefit of developing such relations. Rather, they believe that “the best way to solve foreign policy issues is to develop economic interdependency and create common interest between countries”. Thus “the economy is one of the most important foreign policy instruments of Davutoglu’s (AK Party’s) foreign policy approach” (CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara). In this regard, to increase the volume of trade and economic cooperation between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Syria, the AK Party government has signed many economic agreements, including free trade agreements and free visa agreements, with Tehran and Damascus. As such, since 2000, economic cooperation has also strengthened between Turkey and these countries. The volume of trade between Turkey and Iran has increased ten-fold, and Iran has become the second-largest gas supplier to Turkey (Russia is the

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159 For details see Sections Three and Four.
160 See also many speeches of the members of the AK Party government such as PM Erdogan, Former Foreign Trade Minister Tuzmen, Foreign Affair Minister Davutoglu and European Union Affair Bagis.
largest). The trade volume between Turkey and Syria reached $2.272 billion in 2010, from $724 million in 2000. The number of tourists moving between the two countries reached 1,662,209 in 2010, from 467,648 in 2002. Accordingly, in the absence of the empowerment of the government against the military-bureaucratic camp in political decision-making, increasing political and economic stability and growth, and the increasing needs for new markets and energy resources generated by the EU and its conditionality in the field of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm (for details, see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 in Chapter IV), a cost/benefit analysis by the government for developing cooperative political and economic relations with Iran and Syria would not have occurred. Thus, the above changes in TFP towards Iran and Syria would not have occurred.

The AK Party government ended the externalisation of domestic Kurdish and Islamic affairs in its relations with Iran and Syria. As detailed in Chapter IV (see Section 4.4.4 in Chapter IV) from the establishment of the Turkish Republic to the beginning of the 2000s, under the dominance of the military-bureaucratic camp, Turkey saw the Kurdish and Islamic movements as the main threats to territorial integrity and the Kemalist political regime and sought to solve these issues using hard power instruments. As previously discussed (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.4.1 above), for decades, the externalisation and transformation of domestic Kurdish and Islamic affairs out of normal politics caused an escalation of the tension between Turkey and Iran, and Turkey and Syria, which deeply damaged Turkey’s political and economic relations with these countries. The AK Party government comes from a non-Kemalist tradition that is against the formal state ideology and its religious and Kurdish policy and the externalisation of these domestic issues in its relations with Iran and Syria. They support the expansion of religious and cultural rights in parallel with calls from the EU. Thanks to harmonisation reforms, which have enlarged the scope of religious and cultural rights, the AK Party was able transfer

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161 Turkey exports electrical machines, mineral fuels, animal and vegetable oil, plastics, automotive and subsidiary industry products, iron and steel products, processed petroleum products, chemical products, cement, glass, ceramics, products of brick and tile industry, leather products, forest products, wheat, flour, and margarine to Syria and imports mineral fuels, cotton, oilseed and fruits, automotive and subsidiary industry products, paper and carton paper, vegetables, unprocessed animal hide, fertilizer, and wool from Syria.

162 Like Özal and Erbakan, the main figures of the AK Party, such as Erdogan, Arinc, Gul, Davutoglu, Cicek, etc., come from a non-Kemalist background.
Kurdish and Islamic affairs into the realm of normal politics (CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; Aras, 2007). Instead of the ideological and security-oriented coercive policy approach and discourse of the traditional elites, the ruling AK Party government has adopted a constructive dialogue and engagement approach towards Kurdish and Islamic issues and ended the externalisation of these domestic issues towards Iran and Syria (CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; Aras, 2007). This has provided an opportunity for Turkey, Iran and Syria to focus on market and energy concerns, instead of focusing solely on security concerns, the solution of long-standing problems and the enhancement of political and economic cooperation between Turkey and these countries.

The AK Party government has also played an active role in finding solutions for problems in its region. In contrast with the traditional Turkish foreign policy-makers, the ruling AK Party government believes that Turkey’s historical, cultural, and geopolitical background requires it to engage in close political and economic relations with the Muslim world (Davutoglu, 2001; CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; Aras, 2007). The AK Party’s ideology, which has brought about a dialogue- and engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Syria and Iran and all the countries and actors in the region, has enhanced Turkey’s trustworthiness, honesty, capability, and credibility in the region and has made Turkey an “honest broker” in the eyes of all actors and countries in the region as well as globally (Zaman, September 5, 2008; Davutoglu, 2001; CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Having good relations with all countries and actors in the region and with the European Union and the United States, has given Turkey an opportunity to play an active mediation role in finding a solution to the problems of Iran and Syria, alongside the other countries in the region, such as Israel, Iraq, and Lebanon, and the Western world (Davutoglu, 2001; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). The AK Party has promoted good governance and democracy in the region, especially in its relations with Syria. On a regular basis, Erdogan and Davutoglu have asked Assad to make reforms for a smooth democratic transition in Syria (Davutoglu, March 29, 2012).
It is worth noting here that the changes in the TFP towards Iran and Syria have not been achieved by the AK Party government alone. As argued in Chapter IV and noted by Dincer (2011), the AK Party is a product of the changing social political and economic dynamics of Turkey, generated by the EU and its conditionality. Turkey has developed a political and economically-oriented engagement policy, as will be seen below, not just because of the success of the AK Party government, but also because the NGOs and Turkish society have been driving forces behind Turkey’s new foreign policy approach, as put into practice by the AK party government. The transformation of TFP towards Iran and Syria is linked to Turkey’s on-going political, economic and social modernisation in the EU accession process.

In this regard, as was the case from the establishment of the Republic till 2000, in the absence of the empowerment of the government against the military-bureaucratic camp in the political decision-making generated by the EU and its conditionality, the government would have continued to be under pressure from the military-bureaucratic camp. The power and influence of the military-bureaucratic camp would have continued as points of veto in the domestic and foreign policy-making process. Like the previous governments led by Ozal and Erbakan, the AK Party government would not have been able to overcome the military-bureaucratic camp’s pressure to put into practice its own multidimensional foreign policy approaches.

Iran and Syria have continued to experience problematic relations with the countries in the region as well as with Western countries in the last decade, especially with the US, as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s. The Turkish military-bureaucratic elites see Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East in general and towards Iran and Syria specifically as part of the Turkey–US relations. The instability and clashes have also increasingly been maintained in the Middle East in the last decade. Considering these factors, in the absence of the empowerment of the ruling AK Party in foreign policy making in the EU accession process, under the dominance of the military-bureaucratic elites, Turkey would have continued to formulate its foreign policy by merely taking into account the security concerns of the military-bureaucratic elite arising from the clashes
and instability in the region and in Iran’s and Syria’s relations with the USA, as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s.

On the other hand, as argued in previous chapter (see Section 4.4.4), under the dominance of the military-bureaucratic elites and their domestic threat perception the ruling AK Party government would not have been able to adopt a constructive dialogue and engagement approach towards Kurdish and Islamic issues and end the externalisation of these domestic issues towards Iran and Syria. As such, considering the PKK’s increasing attacks in this period, as was the case in previous decades, the externalisation of these two domestic issues would have also continued to cause diplomatic crises and a worsening of political and economic relations between Turkey and its neighbours. Turkey would have continued to see Iran and Syria as a threat to its territorial integrity or political regime and thus would have maintained its security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards them in last decade, as was the case in previous decades.

Accordingly, in the absence of the empowerment of the Government in political decision making by the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the EU accession process, under the dominance of the military-bureaucratic elites, as the previous governments, the ruling AK Party Government would have been unable to strengthen its bilateral relations, relying on soft power instruments to solve bilateral problems with Iran and Syria. Thus: a) the high-level official visits between Turkey and Iran, and between Turkey and Syria, which brought about increased trust and dialogue between Turkey and these countries, as well as bilateral agreements regarding cooperation on economy, security, combating organised crime, and education; and b) the enhancement of political and economic relations and the solution of long-standing PKK, Islamic, Hatay, and water issues between Turkey and these countries; c) the liberalisation of trade and movement of people and the expansion of economic interdependency between Turkey and these countries, would not have occurred. In the absence of a dialogue- and engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Syria and Iran and all the countries and actors in the region, Turkey would not have become an “honest broker” in the eyes of all actors and countries in the region or globally. Thus, Turkey would have been unable to play a mediating and peace-promoting role in its region.
Overall, in contrast to the military-bureaucratic elites, the AK Party government relied on soft power instruments for the solution to problems with Iran and Syria, strengthened bilateral political and economic relations, liberalised the trade and movement of people between Turkey and Syria, and Turkey and Iran, ended the securitisation and externalisation of domestic Kurdish and Islamic affairs, and began to play a peace-promoting role in relations with Iran and Syria, and all neighbours in their region. As such, the AK Party government has become the main actor in the transformation of Turkey’s traditional security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Iran and Syria and the enhancement of political and economic cooperation between Turkey and these countries in the last decade (CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara). The democratisation of institutional power relations was generated by the EU and its conditionality; therefore, their role is significant with respect to the transformation of the TFP towards Iran and Syria, and all countries in the region, in the last decade. In other words, the reforms undertaken to fill the existing misfit gap between the Turkey and the EU have unintentionally become the main driving force in the transformation of the traditional security-oriented disengagement TFP towards Iran and Syria by empowering the government against traditional foreign policy-makers, the military-bureaucratic camp.

5.6.1.2 Empowerment of civil society and transformation of TFP

As detailed in Chapter IV, through the EU’s technical and economic support, the redistribution of resources and power, and increasing economic stability and growth, NGOs and civil society have developed and gained power in Turkish society and politics (see Section 4.3.3 in Chapter IV). The democratised Turkish political system has also become more open to the influence of NGOs in the formulation of state policies, including foreign policy. As mentioned above, the study argues that two of the main reasons behind the transformation of TFP towards its neighbours are: (a) the empowerment of new actors and institutions, and (b) increasing political and economic stability and growth. In the previous section, we examined the role of the empowerment of the government in the transformation of TFP towards Iran and Syria. This section will

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163 Almost all interviewees directly and (or) indirectly mentioned that.
examine the role of the empowerment of NGOs and increasing economic stability and growth in the unprecedented level of change in TFP towards Iran and Syria.

Considering Turkey’s 90 per cent reliance on imports of energy, as mentioned above and argued in Chapter IV, the need for energy resources and a new market has increased tremendously over the last decade as a result of the high level of growth in the Turkish economy. The growth of Turkish economic society has also considerably increased their trade with – and investment\textsuperscript{164} in – Iran and Syria, and in the region at large. Thus, Turkey and its growing economic society have concrete interests in Iran and Syria that “need some adjustment from their government” (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels see and DIP3, November 2, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV9, December 12, 2010, Ankara; DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara). Iran and Syria are not democratic countries; thus, the relationships and solution of problems between states are vitally important for the interests of Turkish economic society in these countries (CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, December 12, 2010, Ankara). “In these countries (Syria and Syria), … the activities and rights of businessmen are not protected by the international community; thus if you [ran] into problems with these countries’ administrations, you [could] lose everything overnight.” (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; see also CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara; DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara). Considering the benefits of developing economic relations with Iran and Syria, as noted by our above-mentioned interviewees, engaging in better relations with these countries is crucial to the interests of Turkey and its business community. The maintenance and increase of trade and economic interests has required some adjustment, such as the opening of new consulates, border centres, and gates from their administrations; the establishment of new commissions; and the signing of new agreements with these two countries. This could not have been accomplished without dialogue and close political relations (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara; DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara), and finding a solution to bilateral

\textsuperscript{164} “Turkish businessmen’s investments abroad amount to roughly 20 billion dollars.” (CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara).
problems with these countries. The growing economic society forced the government to engage in better relations with these countries.

Thanks to “harmonisation reforms,” the empowered business associations such as TOBB, MUSIAD, TUSIAD, TUSKON, etc., have considerably increased their trade with, and investment in, these countries, have prepared reports, and have pressured the government to develop a dialogue- and engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Iran and Syria for the solution of bilateral problems and liberalisation of trade and the movement of people between Turkey and these countries to maintain their concrete economic interest (CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV4 October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara).

In this process, the AK Party came to power with the support of the growing Anatolian middle class, which is why it wants to respond to the demands of this group, including the development of good relations and the liberalisation of trade and movement of people with neighbouring countries, including Iran and Syria. Thanks to the harmonisation reforms, in contrast to the previous governments, the AK Party was able to respond to the demands of NGOs in the formulation of foreign policy by moving beyond the perceptions of threat held by the traditional elite, and by developing close political relations with Iran and Syria (with Syria until the UN and EU began to implement sanction due to its massacre against its own people) (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). This also provided an opportunity for the Turkish business community to directly describe their problems to the administrations of these countries, and to proffer reports about what should be done to increase economic cooperation with Syria and other Arabic countries (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara; DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara). In parallel with the suggestions of the community commissions, councils, and committees were established and agreements were signed by all sides. During their visits to Iran and Syria, the president, prime minister, and

\[165\] For instance, when the Syrian president Bashar Assad came to Turkey in 2004, he visited TOBB and made this statement: “If you bring your problems to our attention when you are doing business in Syria or with Syrians, we can solve them” (CIV9, December 7, 2010; Ankara; see as well as CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As a result, TOBB prepared a report by forming other economic associations which included problems and solutions. In parallel with this report, the Joint Economic Commission, Partnership Council, Industry Follow-up Committee, Business Council, and Joint Commission for Land Transportation
ministers were accompanied by hundreds of members of NGOs including businessmen (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). During these visits, Turkish civil society engaged with both Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian officials to discuss the solution of problems and the enhancement of business and political relations (DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara; DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). Such interaction between Turkish civil society and foreign policy-makers brought about new agreements.

In addition to these, the members of government and the foreign ministry came together with the members of NGOs on different platforms to discuss Turkey’s problems, and they listened to their offers of, and plans for, solutions to issues, and how to increase political and economic cooperation with neighbouring countries, including Syria and Iran. In these meetings, the Foreign Ministry informed the stakeholders of its work and policies, and Foreign Ministry officials listened to their concerns, noted their demands, and reported matters immediately to Ankara. Ankara thus shaped its foreign policy towards Iran and Syria in accordance with these demands (DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As a consequence of these events, the problems facing border and bilateral trade have been solved by Ankara through dialogue with Tehran and

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were established. In the following years (2005 to 2007), Damascus allowed 35 Turkish investment projects in Syria with a total worth of US$160 million (CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; see also Taspinar, 2008, p. 28).

166“The President, Prime Minister and ministers are acting much like the owners of a big company, and they visit other countries with businessman.” (CIV10, December 10, 2010, Ankara).

167For instance, when Foreign Minister Davutoglu visited Syria in 2009, he invited members of some think-tanks and economic associations to accompany him. They met with Bashar Assad over dinner, during which Esad and Davutoglu listened to their views of how economic and political cooperation could be encouraged between the two countries. As such, TUSKON and TOBB have proffered reports about what should be done to increase economic cooperation with Syria and other Arabic countries (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). In parallel with these reports, a high-level Strategic Cooperation Council was established. The Protocol on Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation, and the Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment were signed. The Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Association Council with Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria were also established in June 2010 to establish a free trade area within 5 years (DIP8, January 7, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara).

168For instance, the Foreign Ministry also organized conferences and visited the cities of Urfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, Maras, Van, Agri, Hakkari, and Igdir, which are located on the Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iran borders, as border trade is very important to the economy of Turkey and these cities (DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara; Davutoglu, 2011; Bagis 2010, 201). During these visits, Foreign Ministry officials met with the local business leaders, media representatives, members of universities, and individuals from civil and economic societies in these cities.
Damascus in accordance with demands and reports of NGOs (DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara)\(^{169}\).

Turkish schools and human rights organisations such as the Deniz Feneri Association, the Kimse Yokmu Association, and the Insani Yardim Association are very active in Syria and Iran and throughout the region in the fight against poverty, illiteracy, and violence. The TIKA,\(^{170}\) has also promoted good governance, provided development assistance, and developed projects and programmes to improve cooperation between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Syria\(^{171}\). They also contributed the ending of anti-Iranian and anti-Syrian propaganda within Turkey by bringing about the pluralisation of free debate in the country (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As such, they are also becoming a channel for the fusion of people and political and economic cooperation between Turkey and these countries by changing the image of Turkey in the eyes of people in the region, and the image of Iran and Syria in the eyes of the Turkish people. As mentioned above, NGOs provide support to many people inside Syria (for details see the web pages of TIKA and Insani Yardim Association). All these and Turkey’s active foreign policy in regional affairs have increased Turkey’s popularity in the region, and Turkey has become a “model” for on-going transition in the region (see the 2010 and 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll; Shibley Telhami, et al. 2011). As such, Turkey and the empowered NGOs have played an active role in promoting peace and democracy, and in the fight against poverty, illiteracy, and violence in these countries, and the region.

Accordingly, the empowerment of NGOs in the EU accession process has also become one of the driving forces behind Turkey’s engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Iran and Syria, the solution of long-standing problems and the liberalisation of trade and movement of people between Turkey and these countries, and Turkey’s peace-promoting role in the regions (CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels;\(^{169}\) For instance, new consulates, border centres and gates were opened in Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iran border provinces to facilitate border trades between Turkey and these countries (for details see above section four and six). As such, the government has helped the civil society by giving it credit for influencing the foreign policy, and civil society pushes the government to develop political and economic relations with Iran and Syria.

\(^{170}\) Its budget has increased from 85 million Turkish Lira (TL) in 2002 to about 1 billion TL in 2010.

\(^{171}\) For detailed information about the operational activities and areas of operation of TIKA, see http://www.ecocci.com/DC/PDF/19.04.201017_34Presentation%20of%20TIKA.pdf, last accessed on March 9, 2012.
The liberalisation and democratisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime, due to the EU accession process, in addition to change at the government level, has also provided new opportunities for NGOs in allowing them to take an active role in the formulation of TFP (for details, see Chapter IV).

In this regard, as detailed in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 in Chapter IV, in the absence of the EU’s technical and economic support and harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to EU *acquite communiteria*, a) Turkey’s authoritarian political regime would not have liberalised; (b) the restrictions on the private sector, and NGOs would have continued, and thus c) the Turkish economy, the private sector, NGOs and civil society would not have grown, developed, and gained power in political decision-making. Instead, Turkish economic society would not have increased their trade with and investment in Iran and Syria, or in the region. In the absence of the benefit of developing economic relations with Iran and Syria, engaging in better relations with these countries would not have been crucial for Turkey and its business community. They would thus not have prepared reports or pressured the government to develop a dialogue- and engagement-oriented foreign policy for the solution of bilateral problems and liberalisation of trade and the movement of people between Turkey and these nations. Even if they had prepared reports and pressured the government to develop a dialogue- and engagement-oriented foreign policy towards them, under the pressure of military-bureaucratic camp, like the previous government led by Ozal and Erbakan, the ruling AK Party government would not have been able to respond to NGO requests, even if they wanted to. Thus, the opening of new consulates, border centres, and gates, the establishment of new commissions and councils, and the signing of new agreements with these two countries would not have occurred. In the absence of these adjustments and the signing of agreements with Iran and Syria, it would not have been possible to discuss increasing trade, or the free movement of goods and people, at least in such a manner.

Accordingly, although the EU’s technical and economic support and its conditionality in the fields of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm do not aim to alter TFP towards these countries, they unintentionally played an important role in the transformation of Turkey’s traditional security-oriented disengagement foreign policy.
towards them by bringing about economic stability and growth, empowering NGOs and civil society, and making the Turkish political system more open to their influence.

### 5.6.2 Increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority rights and transformation of TFP

As previously discussed (see Sections 5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.4.1 in this chapter), the transferral of domestic Kurdish and religious affairs out of the realm normal politics and their externalisation had caused an escalation of ideological confrontations, political tension, and diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran, and between Turkey and Syria during the 1990s and earlier. It caused the worsening of economic relations between Turkey and these nations for decades. As detailed in Section 4.4.4 in Chapter IV, religious and minority rights have been broadened through harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to EU accession process (see Section 4.4.4). Domestic Kurdish and religious affairs have thus been transferred into the realm of normal politics. The ability to settle Islamic and Kurdish affairs at home has ended the cyclical confrontations between Turkey and Iran, and Turkey and Syria (Aras, 2007; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Kurdish and Islamic affairs have not re-emerged as issues and are no longer a threat to relations with Iran and Syria and other neighbours. In contrast to the 1990s, there have not been any threats from the military to Turkey-Iran and Turkey-Syria relations in this new period. Political tension and diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran stemming from the externalisation of those domestic issues are now in the past. This has not only provided a conducive atmosphere for solving issues with Iran and Syria, but also with Kurdish administrations in Northern Iraq, and to developing cooperative political and economic relations (CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 04, 2011, Ankara; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara).

In this regard, in the absence of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of democracy, rule of law and in civilian control over the military—which, as previously argued, resulted in the empowerment of the government, NGOs and civil society in political decision making—and with respect for, and the protection of religious and minority rights, the transformation of domestic religious and minority affairs into the
realm of normal politics would not have occurred. Domestic religious and minority affairs would have continued to cause political and economic crises and a worsening of political and economic stability and growth at home as well as ideological confrontations, political tension, and diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran, and Turkey and Syria, as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s. As such, the EU and its conditionality in the field of democracy, rule of law and in civilian control over the military has also played a key role in the transformation of TFP towards Iran and Syria by increasing respect for, and the protection of, religious and minority rights, and transferring domestic Kurdish and religious affairs into the realm of normal politics, enabling Turkish society and policy-makers to deal with and end the externalisation of these domestic issues.

5.6.3 The military as a veto player

As argued and delineated in Sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2 and 4.4.4 in Chapter IV the Turkish military, founder of the Turkish Republic, considers itself the owner and guardian of the state and its political system (Kemalist political system) and territorial unity (see Sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2). In addition to its dominant role in, and sensitivity to, domestic politics, the military was also sensitive to foreign policy. As argued, until the first half of the 2000s, the Turkish army was the main actor not only in the formulation of Turkish domestic policies, but also Turkish foreign policy. For decades, the military’s high perception of threat that emerged based on the perceived safety of Kemalist political regime and the west, south coast, and eastern boarders of country and territorial unity was one of the main driving forces behind Turkey’s security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards neighbouring countries and the Islamic world.

Concerning its ideology and security concerns arising from the Kurdish and Islamic affairs and security of east borders, the Turkish army cannot be expected to have a positive attitude towards the AK Party's new political and economic-oriented engagement foreign policy towards Muslim world in general, and towards Iran and Syria in specific. The army and the bureaucratic elite are against the development of close political and economic relations with both the Islamic world and Iran and Syria, which have been considered threats to Kemalist political regime and/or territorial integrity of state. Indeed,
the Turkish army’s sceptical attitude towards the Islamic world and Iran and Syria has ideological and historical roots. First, the Army sees Muslim world in general and Iran specifically as a threat to its political regime. Second, due to the growth of Arab nationalism in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the alliance of the Arabs with the Allied forces against the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the military-bureaucratic elites who founded the Republic accused Arabs of ‘stabbing Turks in the back’ in World War I, which fed into Turkey’s anti-Arabic sentiment172 (Aras and Koni, 2005, p. 50). In addition to their security concerns regarding the safety of the Kemalist regime and the image of Arabs in their mind, the military-bureaucratic elites have reservations regarding Turkey’s new engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Iran and Syria due to the perceived threat from the Hatay, and Islamic and Kurdish (PKK) affairs. At least we know that the generals, such as the Secretary General of the NSC General Tuncer Kilinc; General Aytac Yalman, the Commander of the Land Forces; General Cumhur Asparagus, the Commander of Air Force; General Sener Eruygur, the Commander of the Gendarmarie; General Cetin Dogan, the Commander of the First Army who has a strong mistrust of AK Party government, have serious concerns about the government’s foreign policy towards the Islamic world (Heper, 2005; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). They believe that developing close political relations with the Muslim world in general and Iran and Syria in specific is not serving Turkey’s security and international profile, interests, and identity (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). These elites believe that the development of close political relations with Iran and Syria would weaken Turkey’s ability to counter political Islam and the PKK, damage Turkey’s international identity, destroy close relations with western world, and harm the strategic partnership with the USA. Accordingly, in principle, they are against the development of close political relations with the Muslim world in general, and with Iran and Syria in particular.

172 After independence, the images of Arabs in the minds of traditional Turkish state actors and institutions found their place in history and schoolbooks, TV documentaries and programmes, and the discourse of traditional state actors and institutions. The image of Arabs in the military-bureaucratic elites of the Turkish Republic, was one of the driving forces behind Turkey’s anti-Arabic sentiment and its traditional disengagement foreign policy toward Syria and the Arab world (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara).
Specifically, concerning the development of political and economic relations with Syria, the Turkish military had reservations; Syria should relinquish its claim over the Hatay and should cooperate in border security with Turkey (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 239–242; Tur, 2010, p. 3). It is argued that for this reason, Syria cut its support to the PKK and expelled Ocalan in 1998, and until the first years of 2000s, there were no real improvement in political and economic relations between Turkey and Syria. Concerning the development of political and economic relations with Iran, the military also had reservations, claiming Iran should cooperate with Turkey in border security and in the fight with political Islam and the PKK (Cetinsaya, 2003; Olsen, 2002; Tol, 2010). The military has forwarded their reservations regarding the development of political and economic relations with Iran and Syria to the government in NSC.

Thanks to harmonisation reforms, however, the composition, function, and duties of the NSC were changed, thus the government does not need to prioritise the military’s viewpoints in the formulation of domestic and foreign policy. In contrast to previous decades, the government was able to consider the voice of NGOs and civil society, and implement a foreign policy towards Iran and Syria in parallel with its own foreign policy approach and interests, which are considerably different from those of the military. In this regard, as argued in previous sections, in the absence of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of democracy, rule of law and in civilian control over the military, the function, duties and composition of NSC would not have changed and government and civil society would not have gained power in foreign policy making. Thus, as was the case during the 1980s and 1990s, the threat perception of the military-bureaucratic elite would have continued to determine Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. Accordingly, it would not have become possible to talk about political and economic oriented engagement foreign policy towards them, and thus the development of political and economic relations with Turkey.

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173In the second half of the 2000s, especially after 2008, thanks to harmonisation reforms, the military did not declare its opinion regarding the development of political and economic relations with Syria and Iran. Thus, we do not know whether the military still has the reservations mentioned above regarding the development of political and economic relations with Iran and Syria. However, we know that the government does not need to, and does not prioritise, its reservations in the formulation of its foreign policy in general and toward Iran and Syria specifically.
5.7 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran and Syria throughout Turkey’s accession process to the EU and the influence of the EU-fostered domestic changes. In accordance with the research questions and hypothesis, it sought to respond to the question of whether has there been a change in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria since Turkey achieved candidate status in 1999. If so, in what direction has Turkey’s foreign policy towards them changed during the country’s EU candidature? How has the EU-fostered domestic changes played a role in the rising changes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards them? The ideas and information generated in the study data were categorised according to identified key issues, concepts and themes, and analysed with the analytical toolkits of the theoretical framework, rational and historical institutionalism. Thus, the focus was on different concepts, such as the empowerment of new actors and institutions against the veto players and the cost/benefit calculation of policy change (rational institutionalism), and unintended consequences of the EUisation of Turkey’s political system (historical institutionalism). Triangulation and counterfactual scenario approaches were employed to ensure the validity of the findings so that the study represents fair and accurate accounts of the collected data.

The research revealed that, first, before Turkey’s accession process to the EU: (a) Turkey followed a security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Iran and Syria; (b) relations with Iran and Syria were considered part of domestic Kurdish and Islamic affairs as well as Turkey-US relations; (c) the externalisation of the domestic Kurdish and Islamic affairs by the military-bureaucratic camp caused ideological confrontation, political tension, and diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran and between Turkey and Syria, thereby leading to the worsening of political and economic relations between Turkey and these states throughout the 1990s and before. Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria has undergone a deep transformation throughout Turkey’s EU accession process, from security-oriented disengagement to political and economic-oriented engagement. Turkey’s new foreign policy towards Iran and Syria has included efforts to strengthen bilateral relations, the reliance on soft-power instruments for solutions to problems, the liberalisation of trade and movement of people, and the
promotion of peace and good governance. EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm, has unintentionally had a very visible influence on Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria by: (a) changing the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations, (b) empowering the government and civil society against the military–bureaucratic elites in political decision making, (c) accomplishing political and economic stability and growth, (d) increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority rights, and transferring domestic religious and minority issues into the realm of normal politics, and thus (e) changing the institutions, interests, preferences and demands that are involved in foreign policy-making. As such, through bringing about the changes identified above at a Turkish level. EU conditionality and adaptation pressure for the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime to the EU acquis communautaire have produced unintended outcomes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria, in addition to the intended outcomes in Turkey’s domestic politics.

Consequently, the cases of Iran and Syria served to answer the research questions, to test the hypothesis of the study, and to substantiate the validity of the findings and interpretation of the study through allowing us: a) to demonstrate the changes in Turkish foreign policy during the EU accession process, b) to shed light on the reasons for and/or causes of changes in Turkish foreign policy, and c) to maximise confidence in the findings (i.e., evidence-building) by benefiting from a variety of sources.
CHAPTER VI

Thesis Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The aim of this study was to examine the influence of Turkey’s EU candidature on its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. It has argued that the influence of the EU on Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during Turkey’s EU accession process is, to a large extent, a secondary consequence of the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure for the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime to the EU *acquis communautaria*. The primary objective of EU conditions and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm was not to change Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours; however unintentionally they have caused changes in the rules, ideas, interests, priorities and demands that are involved in foreign policy-making towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours through liberalising Turkey’s authoritarian political regime. In other words, EU condition and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm have had an unintended impact on Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours in addition to the intended impact on Turkey’s domestic politics.

The focus of this study was the liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime through the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU *acquis communautaire* and the consequent influence on Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. The study examined, first, the changes in the Turkish political system: to what extent it has adapted to EU *acquis* and the role of EU condition and adaptation pressure in this process. Next it examined the changes in TFP towards selected non-EU neighbours during the country’s EU accession process, including the direction of change. Finally it analysed the influence of the EU-fostered domestic changes generated by the EU on TFP towards selected Turkey’s non-EU neighbours.

This study used the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ to characterise the overall effects of changes to Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy generated by its EU candidature; the rational choice and historical versions of the new institutionalist theory have provided the
theoretical framework for this analysis. Semi-structured interviews, case studies, academic journals and documentary analysis were the main methods used to collect and analyse the data needed to address the research question and test the hypotheses on which this research was based. The findings and the interpretation proposed have been validated by triangulation and the creation of counterfactual scenarios.

6.2 Europeanisation and new institutionalism

The ideas and information generated in the study were analysed using the explanatory instruments of Europeanisation and the rational choice and historical versions of the new institutionalist theory (see Sections 1.3 in Chapter I; 2.4 and 2.6 in Chapter II and 3.3.5 in Chapter III). To this end various concepts have been used to account for the influence of the EU on the transformation of Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy towards selected neighbours during the EU accession process, including the misfit gap; EU adaptation pressure (Europeanisation); path dependency; critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations and their unintended consequences (historical institutionalism); the empowerment of new actors and institutions against the veto players and the cost-benefit calculation of rule compliance (rational institutionalism).

There is a direct relationship between the misfit gap between Turkish and EU regulations and practices regarding democracy, the rule of law and the economy, EU adaptation pressure, the peace and quality of EU-Turkish relations and ongoing changes in Turkey in these fields (for details see Sections 4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 and 4.5 in Chapter IV). To analyse the influence of the EU on changes in Turkey’s domestic politics, therefore, the concepts of the misfit gap, EU adaptation pressure, path dependency, critical junctures, punctuated equilibrium, empowerment of new actors and cost-benefit calculation of Turkish actors in compliance with EU directives were used. The lack of EU conditions and adaptation pressure related to TFP towards selected Turkey’s non-EU neighbours and hence the lack of a direct relationship between the quality and peace of EU-Turkey relations, critical junctures in Turkey and EU relations, a cost-benefit calculation in rule compliance and the ongoing changes in TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours meant, however that these concepts could not be used to analyse the role of
the EU in the transformation of TFP towards the selected cases. As previously argued (see Sections 1.3 in Chapters I and 2.6.2 in Chapter II), the low intensity of EU–Turkey relations and the significant differences between Turkish and European identities and political cultures also meant that the explanatory instruments of socialisation, experimental learning and political change provided in SI theory were not helpful in accounting for the EU’s role in the transformation of Turkey’s political system and its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during its EU candidature. From this its follows that the analytical frameworks developed to account for the EU’s influence in the domestic sphere, through embedding Europeanisation with the rational and sociological versions of new institutionalist theory (for details see Section 2.6.2 in Chapter II) do not provide an analytical framework which can account for the influence of the EU on TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours.

The issue is not however that noted by Börzel and Risse (2000: p.4), ‘whether Europe matters, but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point of time’. Different states and regions, as well as different policy fields, require the use of a different analytical logic because of the disparate natures of different institutions, identities, traditions, policies, states and regions (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.10). Various scholars (Börzel, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Checkel, 2001; Heritier et al., 1996; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2010; Lehmkuhl, 1999; March and Olsen, 1995; Schneider, 2001; Sedelmeier 2011, 2012; Wong, 2007; Wong and Hill, 2011) have analysed the domestic impact of the EU focus on various variables (for details see Section, 2.4 in Chapter II).

The important question in the context of this study was how to assess the influence of the EU on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. Examination of Turkey-EU relations and the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours revealed the existence of close relationship between EU adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm and liberalisation of Turkey’s political system (for details see Sections 4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4; 4.5 in Chapter IV) and between the liberalisation of Turkey’s political system and the transformation of TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours (for details see Sections 5.6; 5.6.1; 5.6.1.1 and 5.6.1.2 in Chapter V). Drawing
on theories of the domestic impact of the EU we saw that HI’s concept of ‘unintended consequences’ could be used to analyse this relationship. The concept of unintended consequences was therefore the primary explanatory concept used in the analysis of the role of the EU in the transformation of TFP towards selected Turkey’s non-EU neighbours. The unintended influence of the EU conditions and adaptation pressure in the above-mentioned fields on the institutions, interests, preferences and demands that are involved in Turkish foreign policy-making towards selected non-EU neighbours was analysed. As such, as argued previously and will be summarized below a new mechanism, the secondary domestic ‘EUisation’ mechanism, was introduced to account for the EU’s influence on TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours. Consequently, this study has used the conditionality mechanism to account for the influence of the EU on the transformation of Turkey’s domestic politics and the secondary EUisation mechanism to account for the influence of the EU on the transformation of TFP towards Turkey’s non-EU countries.

6.3 Research design

The literature review of EUisation in Chapter II (see Sections 2.3; 2.4; 2.4.1; 2.4.2; 2.4.3 and 2.5) and of research designs in EUisation study in Chapter III (see Section 3.2) have revealed that the main research design models used in empirical research on EUisation are top-down and bottom-up research design models. Second, they are designed to assess the primary direct and/or indirect influence of the EU on domestic change or the relationship between the EU input and domestic change. This study also assesses not just the influence of the EU on domestic change, but the influence of the changes in Turkey’s domestic sphere generated by the EU on the changes in TFP towards its non-EU neighbours, which we have termed the secondary domestic influence of the EU (see Sections 1.2 and 1.3 in Chapter I; 2.4.3 in Chapter II and 3.2 in Chapter III).

Analysis of the secondary influence of the EU required a two-stage analysis: first, examination of the alterations in F1 (in this study, the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm) during the country’s EU accession process and the EU’s role in these changes and second, analysis of changes in F2 (in this study, outcomes of TFP
towards selected countries) and the role of changes in F1 generated by the EU conditions and adaptation pressure in changes in F2.

Accordingly, although top-down and bottom-up research designs are useful for analysis of EUisation in F1 produced by the EU conditions and adaptation pressure, they are not comprehensive in fully explaining the unintended influence of EU on TFP. We therefore developed a new research design model for use in this study by utilising top-down and bottom-up research design models. The research design model used in this study summarised as \((F2)w = (F1=X)\). As noted previously (see Section 3.2 in Chapter III) \(X\) indicates the cause (EU input), \(F1\) indicates the primary effect (domestic change in a field/s), \(F2\) indicates the secondary effect (the change in another field), and \(W\) indicates the relationship between \(F1\) and \(F2\).

In this regard, the empirical analysis in our study was divided into two stages. In the first stage started with an analysis of the sets of institutions, rules, ideas, actors and policies in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and in the economic realm (\(F1\)) in Turkey before 1999 (\(t1\)) before the announcement of Turkey’s EU candidature (see Sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3 in Chapter IV). Changes in \(F1\) were tracked over time up to 2014 (i.e. during Turkey’s EU accession process: \(t2\)). We attempted to identify alterations in \(F1\) and the EU’s influence on any alterations (see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 in Chapter IV). This first stage of analysis laid the ground for the second stage, examination of the secondary influence of the EU on domestic changes in Turkey (in this study TFP towards Iran and Syria).

The second stage of analysis began with analysis of the sets of rules, ideas, actors and policies influencing TFP towards selected non-EU neighbours (\(F2\)) before \(t1\) (see Sections 5.2.1; 5.2.2, 5.4.1; 5.4.2 in Chapter V). \(F2\) was tracked over the years to \(t2\), and we tried to identify alterations (see Sections 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.5.1; 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 in Chapter V) and the influence of changes in \(F1\) on alterations in \(F2\) (see Sections 5.6.1; 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 in Chapter V). In this way we analysed the relationship between the changes in \(F1\) (changes in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm) generated by \(X\) (EU input) and the changes in \(F2\) (changes in TFP towards non-EU neighbours).
6.4 Methods of data collection and analysis

The research questions central to this study required evaluation of verbal data and so a qualitative method of inquiry, based on collection and interpretation of verbal data (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) was used rather than a quantitative method of inquiry based on statistical analysis of numerical data. Interviews, case studies, academic journals and documentary analysis were the main sources of data although quantitative data, such as tables, graphs and figures, have also been used to illustrate changes in Turkey’s domestic politics, economic conditions and balance of trade with selected neighbours during the EU accession process.

We selected the deviant case method as the most appropriate case study method for analysis of causal relationships and thus best suited to testing the main hypothesis of this study (for details see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter III). First of all we identified sets of background factors in accordance with the analytical requirements of the study. Second, after examination of possible cases we selected Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria as cases (for details see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter III). Then possible causes of the changes in TFP towards Iran and Syria were examined to determine whether our hypothesis was true or false. In Chapter V it was revealed that during Turkey’s EU candidature TFP towards these countries moved from security-oriented disengagement to political and economic–oriented engagement. Second, the lack of EU conditions, persuasion and adaptation pressure on TFP towards selected countries and the lack of the changes in the political regime and international policy of these countries did not preclude changes in TFP towards them. Third, the EU-fostered domestic changes generated by the harmonisation reforms have become the driving force of changes in TFP towards these countries.

Given that a) nondemocratic foreign policy-making mechanism, b) dominant influence of military-bureaucratic elites perception of threat, and c) securitisation and externalisation of the religious and minority affair in formulation of TFP before Turkey’s EU accession process (for details see Sections 4.3; 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3 in Chapter IV and Sections 5.2; 5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.4; 5.4.1; 5.4.2 in Chapter V) and d) the changes in all these mediating factors in foreign policy-making during the accession process (for details see Sections
4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3 in Chapter IV and 5.6; 5.6.1; 5.6.2 in Chapter V), the findings of this study can be generalised to TFP towards Turkey’s other neighbours and to regional and global policy, except with respect to Cyprus and Greece\textsuperscript{174}. On the other hand, considering non-democratic foreign policy-making mechanism, lack of and/or weakness of NGOs and the dominant role of the non-democratic actors and institutions in formulation of foreign policy in the autocratic political regimes, the finding of study can also be generalised to analyse the influence of the EU on the changes in other autocratic states’ foreign policies that are subject to EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm. The secondary domestic EUisation mechanism introduced in the analysis of EU influence on Turkish foreign policy could also be employed to analyse the impact of the EU in the domestic sphere, specifically to analyse the influence of the changes in a field/s generated by EU input on the changes in another field/s.

As detailed in Section 3.3.3 of Chapter III and Section 1.4 of Chapter I, the sources used in this research can be classified into five larger groupings: (1) primary documentation from government (Turkish), the EU and NGOs; (2) semi-structured interviews with selected experts on the Turkish political system, Turkish foreign policy or Turkey–EU relations; (3) secondary data from books and other publications and seminars, conferences and other scientific gatherings; (4) secondary data from academic journals related to four key disciplines (EU–Turkey relations, TFP, Europeanisation and New Institutionalism) and (5) Internet pages (for details of data-collection see Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 in Chapter III). A total of 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with people in Turkey (in Istanbul and Ankara) and in Belgium (in Brussels), including officials from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, thinktanks, trade unions and human rights organisations (for details of interviews see Section 3.3.4 in Chapter III). These interviews were very helpful in shedding light on the experiences, knowledge, opinions and attitudes of informants in relation to Turkey’s domestic politics and policy, Turkish foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{174} The increasing ambiguities and uncertainties in EU–Turkey relations in post 2005 period has had a de-Europeanisation impact on Turkey’s Cyprus and Greece policy (for details see, Eryılmaz, 2006; Aras 2009; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV8, January 3, 2010, Ankara; DIP1, October 21, 2010, Brussels; DIP2, October 26, 2010, Brussels)
and Turkey–EU relations.

Literature and document reading and analysis were used to give a preliminary overview of EUisation and its mechanisms, including the influence of the EU on member and non-member states’ polity, politics and policy and on EU–Turkey relations, the Turkish political system and Turkish foreign policy in particular. Specific research questions and hypotheses were formulated on the basis of this preliminary analysis of the field; the theoretical framework of the study and the research design were then determined.

Several themes were identified from the preliminary analysis of extant research and documentation: Europeanisation; new institutionalism; EU accession criteria; Turkish political system; misfit gap between Turkey and the EU in several spheres; EU–Turkey relations; liberalisation of the Turkish political system during the EU accession process; TFP towards non-EU neighbours (Iran and Syria) before the accession process; changes in TFP towards Iran and Syria during the accession process and the possible causes of changes in Turkish political system and foreign policy towards selected cases during the accession process. We then searched the previously identified primary and secondary sources for material relevant to a) concepts and explanatory instruments useful for analysis of the impact of the EU on Turkey’s domestic sphere; b) the Turkish political system and Turkish foreign policy before the accession process and changes to them during the accession process and c) possible causes of changes in the Turkish political system and foreign policy towards selected non-EU neighbours. Data were filed under the appropriate theme heading and then relationships between themes were analysed (for details see Section 3.3.5 in Chapter III). Analysis began after data were abstracted from their original context and organised thematically. Ideas generated early in data analysis were later incorporated into the theoretical framework governing the study. The research questions were addressed systematically by combining theoretical ideas and empirical data.

First of all the relationships among the misfit gap between Turkey and the EU in identified fields, EU adaptation pressure, critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations,

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175 In fact, the analytical process was started in the course of data collection by thinking about what was being read, seen and heard.
Turkey’s application of a cost-benefit calculation to rule compliance and ongoing changes at Turkish level in these field were analysed. First the misfit gap between Turkish and EU norms and regulations regarding democracy, and the rule of law and the economic realm were investigated by examining relevant primary and secondary data. Then EU–Turkey relations were explored to determine whether they generated high-level EU adaptation pressure. Third, the EU’s technical and economic support for Turkish actors and institutions and harmonisations reforms was investigated to assess whether and how the EU empowered new actors and institutions to enable them against veto players in the Turkish political system to achieve the necessary changes in the identified fields at Turkish level. We also investigated how actors and institutions empowered by the EU responded to EU adaptation pressure to reduce the misfit gap between the EU and Turkey in the identified fields. After this we looked at the cost/benefit calculation of Turkish actors in compliance with EU rules and calls. Finally we analysed the relationship between ongoing changes in Turkish domestic sphere generated by EU input and changes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards selected Iran and Syria during the accession process (for details see Section 3.3.5 in Chapter III). As part of this analysis we explored the unintended influence on Turkish foreign policy towards selected countries of the EU conditions and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm.

Triangulation and development of counterfactual scenarios were used to validate the analysis and interpretation of the data in the study. Information and evidence gleaned from various sources of data were cross-referenced between and within the data types to demonstrate the credibility and validity of the data analysis. Changes and causes of changes in TFP towards the selected countries inferred from one source were confirmed by checking against at least one other source. A counterfactual scenario was developed to improve understanding of the EU’s role in inducing change in Turkey at the domestic level and EU influence on Turkey’s foreign policy towards selected countries. We considered what might have happened had Turkey not become a candidate for EU membership, with all that entailed in terms of EU conditions and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm, EU technical and economical support and their unintended influence on TFP towards the selected Turkey’s
non-EU neighbours. The counterfactual scenarios we developed were very helpful in eliminating other potential explanatory variables and corroborating that, in the absence of the EU conditions applying to the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic there would have been no change in institutions, institutional structures, institutional power relations, political and economic instability and neglect of religious and minority rights in Turkey. In the absence of such changes there would have been no change in the interests, actors, demands and priorities involved in formulating Turkish foreign policy towards non-EU neighbours generally and Iran and Syria specifically and therefore there would have been no change in TFP towards Iran and Syria over the last decade.

6.5 Major findings of the study

The first major finding of this study was that Turkey’s security-oriented foreign policy of disengagement towards selected non-EU neighbours, i.e. Iran and Syria, has undergone a fundamental transformation during Turkey’s EU accession process. Previously Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria was based on the paranoid mindset of a military-bureaucratic elite which viewed Turkey as a country that was “surrounded by seas from three sides, and by enemies from four sides.”176 The list of threats to national security included almost all of Turkey’s neighbours, including Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia and Greece. Turkey, therefore, had limited and very problematic relations with Iran and Syria until the end of the 1990s. Political and economic relations with Iran and Syria were very problematic and limited. The entire Arab world was also traditionally outside Turkish foreign policy interests. Yet over the last decade, Turkey moved beyond its traditional security-oriented agenda in its approach to foreign policymaking towards Iran and Syria. TFP towards Iran and Syria shifted from being ideology- and security-oriented disengagement to a policy of more economic, political and diplomatic engagement. Turkey has employed soft power - negotiation, cooperation and dialogue - to solve problems with Iran and Syria. It may not have solved all of its problems with them, but in contrast with previous decades, Turkey has developed good relations with Iran and Syria and incredibly increased its political and economic relations with them (with Syria until

176 Domestic policy, including education policy as well as foreign policy was based on the paranoid mindset of military-bureaucratic elites. This perspective was taught in all schools, beginning in primary school.
the Syria’s military began to use force against the public and anti-regime protesters) and other countries in the region (for details see Sections 5.3; 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.5; 5.5.1; 5.5.2; 5.5.3; 5.5.4 in Chapter V).

This study has revealed that the increasing economic interdependence of Turkey and its non-EU-neighbours has become one of the main drivers of the new Turkish approach to foreign policy. Liberalisation of the movement of goods and persons has assumed a greater role in TFP towards Iran and Syria and other countries in the region over the last decade. FTAs have been signed with neighbouring countries and with many other countries within and outside the region.\textsuperscript{177} High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council Agreements were signed and the Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Council involving neighbouring and other regional countries was set up to develop political and economic relationships and promote regional integration.\textsuperscript{178} As a result Turkey’s foreign trade increased more than fivefold, going from $67 billion in 1999 to $375 billion in 2013. Turkey’s exports also increased fivefold, from $26 billion in 1999\textsuperscript{179} to $145 billion in 2013. Liberalisation of trade with its neighbours meant that during the same period Turkey’s trade with its neighbours and with the Arab world increased more than the average increase (Tocci, Altinisik and Kirisci, 2011; DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara). During this period Turkey’s trade with its neighbours increased about ninefold and trade with the entire Middle East increased about sevenfold, whilst trade with the rest of the world increased about threefold.\textsuperscript{180}

Second, the liberalisation of Turkey’s visa policy became one of the main planks of its new approach to foreign policy. Turkey liberalised visa requirements for citizens Iran and Syria and of many countries in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and the Caucasus.\textsuperscript{181} As a result, the number of tourists visiting Turkey has increased by about

\textsuperscript{177} FTAs have been signed with 18 countries, and FTA negotiations with more than 10 further countries are ongoing. The European Union has overlapping FTAs, except in the case of Georgia (for details, see Chapters IV and V).
\textsuperscript{178} With Syria and Iraq in 2009; with Greece, Russia, Lebanon, and Jordan in 2010.
\textsuperscript{179} Turkey’s imports increased fivefold, from $48 billion to $240 billion during the same period.
\textsuperscript{180} All statistical information is based on data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute and is available at turkstat.gov.tr
\textsuperscript{181} From 2002 to 2013, Turkey reached agreements for mutual liberalisation of visa requirements with 60 countries, including Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Fas, Jordon, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Syria, Tunisia, and Qatar. For the list of all
120 per cent, from 13.2 million in 2002 to 34.910 million in 2013.\textsuperscript{182} During the 2002-2011 periods the number of entries from immediate neighbours increased about 400 per cent. Over the last decade resolution of foreign policy problems using dialogue increased and the creation of a more stable and secure neighbourhood assumed a greater priority in TFP (Tocci, Altinisik and Kirisci, 2011; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara). Turkey has attempted to settle its foreign policy problems through dialogue and diplomacy, and it has become a leading mediator and diplomatic force in micro- and micro-crisis affecting the region. Finally, Turkey has undertaken many reforms to consolidate democracy within the country in order to comply with EU norms and conditions relating to democracy and the rule of law (for details see Sections 4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 in Chapter IV). It has also promoted good governance and democracy in its region and globally (for details see Sections 5.5.3 in Chapter V).

\textit{6.6 Role of the EU in the transformation of TFP}

The second major finding of this study, based on an analysis of data which used the concept of Europeanisation and the rational choice and historical versions of new institutionalist theories, was that EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm intended to align Turkey’s authoritarian political regime with the EU \textit{acquis communautaire}, have unintentionally left a very visible influence on TFP towards Iran and Syria by: (a) changing the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations, (b) empowering the government and civil society against the military–bureaucratic elites in political decision making, (c) accomplishing political and economic stability and growth, (d) increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority rights, and transferring domestic religious and minority issues into the realm of normal politics, and thus (e) changing in the institutions, interests, preferences and demands that are involved in foreign policy-making towards them.

There used to be (and to some extent there still is) a high-level misfit gap between Turkish and EU norms and regulations relating to the rule of law, civilian control over the military, respect for religious and minority rights and liberal, free-market economics (for details see sections 4.3; 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3 in Chapter IV). This high-level misfit gap between Turkey and the EU resulted in considerable EU pressure on Turkey to adapt to EU norms and regulations, referred to as EU adaptation pressure (for details see Sections 4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 in Chapter IV). In the accession partnership documents and later in regular progress reports, the EU asked Turkey to address the misfit gap between Turkish and EU norms and regulations within a certain time frame; first as a condition of accession negotiations and later as a condition of EU membership.

As detailed previously (see Section 2.3 and 2.4.1 in Chapter II) the EUisation framework specifies that capable actors and institutions are needed to achieve the necessary changes at domestic level. If domestic actors and institutions are not capable of implementing the necessary changes the EU provides technical and economic support to increase their capability to act (for details of this argument see also Börzel and Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009). In Turkey the forces resistant to reform were stronger than the pro-EU actors and institutions (for details see Sections 4.3, 4.3.1; 4.3.2 in Chapter IV) and so the EU provided funding, education and other forms of assistance to make the pro-EU actors and institutions more capable of implementing the required changes at national level (for details see Chapter IV). At the same time the EU stated clearly that Turkey had to adapt to the EU acquis communautaire in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and economic realm if it wished to benefit from EU economic aid, start accession negotiations and to become a full member of the EU. As it was argued in Chapter IV (see Section 4.5), in the long term the political and economic costs to Turkey of not being on track for EU membership would have been incredibly high. Thus, by calculate the long-term benefits of improved relations with the EU, the TGNA has enacted nine reform packages - known collectively as the ‘harmonisation laws’ since 2002 to adapt Turkey’s polity, politics and policy to the EU acquis communautaire. As will be summarized below, the harmonisation reforms implemented to reduce the misfit gap between Turkish and EU norms and regulations have resulted in liberalisation of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime and the above noted changes in Turkish domestic sphere.
The harmonisation reforms changed, first, institutional power relations, which has increased the authority of the Turkish government and Turkish NGOs in the political decision-making relative to the military–bureaucratic elites (for details, see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3 in Chapter IV). These newly empowered actors and institutions played a key role in the EUisation of Turkey’s polity, politics and policy, and the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. In contrast to the old political decision makers, the EU-empowered actors and institutions have relied on soft power to solve foreign policy problems, strengthen bilateral political and economic relations with Iran and Syria and liberalise trade and movement of people between Turkey and them as well as the other countries in the region (for details see Sections 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.5.1; 5.5.2; 5.5.3; 5.5.4 in Chapter V).

Second, the accession process engendered a liberal environment, EU adaptation pressure to adopt the Copenhagen political criteria and empowerment of new actors in the political decision sphere offered Turkey the opportunity to transfer religious and minority affairs to the realm of normal politics (for details see Section 4.4.4 in Chapter IV). Normalisation of religious and minority affairs has meant that they are increasingly subject to open debate in the media and academic and civil societies, which has in turn contributed to recognition of certain cultural, religious and minority rights in line with the EU requirements for civil democracy (for details see Section 4.4.4 in Chapter IV). This new stance on religious and minority rights is reflected in the TFP approach to ending the securitisation and externalisation of domestic religious and minority affairs and so, in the last decade, religious and minority affairs have not caused political and diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Syria which created the climate for development of political and economic relations (for details see Section 5.6.2 in Chapter V).

Third, the economic reforms undertaken to adapt to EU acquis communautaire curtailed state dominance of the economy and resulted in greater fiscal and monetary discipline and sustainable growth to the Turkish economy\(^\text{183}\) (for details see Section 4.4.3 in

\(^{183}\) After several decades, the Turkish economy experienced single-digit levels of interest and inflation rates while more than doubling its GNP. Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased to $840 billion in 2013, from $196.3 billion in 2002, and the Turkish economy became the sixth biggest economy in Europe.
Chapter III). This resulted in increasing need for new market and energy resources. This is reflected in TFP approach to include economic interest towards Iran and Syria. The empowered economic society has concrete interests in neighbouring countries, also push the government to liberalise trade and movement of people with them; this could not have been accomplished without dialogue, close political relations and efforts to find a solution to bilateral problems with them. As such, Turkey has significantly developed its political and economic relations with Iran and Syria and other countries in the region (for details see Sections 5.6.1.2 in Chapter V).

The findings of this study summarized above reveal that although neither the EU nor the Turkish actors intended the liberalisation of Turkey’s political and economic system to effect changes in TFP towards Iran and Syria, this process had an unintended impact on the institutions, actors and interest which shaped TFP towards them; thus Turkey’s new foreign policy approach was an unintended consequence of the changes in Turkey’s domestic sphere generated by EU conditions and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm. In other words, EU conditionality and adaptation pressure for the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime to the EU *acquis communautaire* have produced unintended outcomes in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran and Syria, in addition to the intended outcomes in Turkey’s domestic politics. This finding of the study introduced a new mechanism by which the EU exerts an influence on national or domestic affairs (for details of mechanisms of EUisation operating at national or domestic level see Chapter II, Sections 2.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2); this has been termed ‘secondary domestic EUisation’. Secondary domestic EUisation involves changes in institutions, actors, interests, priorities and demands in a field or fields (in this study, TFP towards its non-EU neighbours) produced by EUisation in another field or fields (in this study, the fields of democracy and the rule of law and the economic realm).

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and sixteenth biggest economy among 30 OECD countries, despite ranking twenty-sixth in 2002. The GDP per capita also increased more than threefold in the last decade, reaching $11,000 in 2013, up from $3,492 in 2002. With an 8.5% growth rate in 2011, Turkey became the third fastest growing G20 country after China and Argentina. Its average growth rate was 6.5% in last the 10 years. According to OECD estimations, with an annual average growth rate of 6.7% from 2011 to 2017, Turkey is expected to be the fastest growing economy among the OECD countries.
Secondary EUisation is the process by which, although the EU neither intentionally seeks to diffuse its norms, practices and policies nor to play an active role in the diffusion of those norms, practices and policies at domestic level, the intentional empowerment of new actors and the diffusion of EU norms, practices and policies in one or more domestic fields produces unintended changes in interests, priorities and demands in another field or fields with consequence for policies and practices. In this way the EU indirectly causes changes in certain fields although it neither intends such changes nor plays an active role in them. In some ways secondary domestic EUisation resembles the indirect domestic EUisation (for details of indirect EUisation see Section 2.4.2 in Chapter II); however, in secondary EUisation, unlike indirect EUisation, the domestic actors do not intentionally or directly attempt to adapt to or comply with EU rules, practices and policies. In secondary domestic EUisation changes in the rules, norms, implementations and policies in one field - which were not an objective of the EU or the domestic actors - arise as a consequence of intentional EU-influenced changes in another field.

6.7 Contributions of the study

A review of the literature on EUisation revealed that the majority of studies focused on the impact on the member states’ socio-economic policies and practices of the EU’s economic, social and environmental regulations and directives. They looked at how member states adapted their institutions, policies and practices to comply with EU regulations and requirements and how internalisation of EU regulations and directives gradually affected the policies and practice of associated states. The impact of the EU on the foreign policy of associated states in general and Turkey in particular is a relatively new subject of academic debate. Although it is a relatively new subject of academic debate, as noted previously, the majority of scholars focused on the influence of the EU on associated states foreign policy found out that foreign policies of associated states have been significantly changed, if not transformed, as a result of EU membership. The need for research on the impact of the EU on associated states' foreign policies, therefore, has increased. In this regard, this investigation of how Turkish foreign policy has been transformed during Turkey’s EU accession process and the role the EU has played that transformation has contributed new empirical data to the existing – limited - literature on
the influence of the EU on the foreign policy of associated states in terms of the process and outcomes.

Most scholars researching the influence of the EU on the foreign policy of associated states argue that, due to the nature of CSDP, the EU’s influence on the foreign policy of member and candidate states takes the form of a horizontal process of experimental learning and socialisation (for details see Section 2.6.1 in Chapter II). This study has revealed, however, that EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm have unintentionally left a very visible influence on Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. As such, Evidence collected for this study suggests that the concept of ‘unintended consequences’ is also useful in analyzing EU influence on the foreign policy of associated states, whose national actors and institutions have relatively strong voices and are not generally subject to European law or EU regulations and norms.

As outlined above, this study embedded Europeanisation with rational and historical new institutionalism and introduced a new mechanism, secondary domestic EUisation, and a new research design model to analyse the domestic impact of the EU. As such, it also constitutes a contribution to the analytical and methodological framework of Europeanisation in studying the domestic impact of the EU. Additional studies are needed to test this emerging model against the existing models of Europeanisation in the foreign policy realm and in other fields. Accordingly, this study also introduces avenues for further research. Such research would investigate the impact of EUisation in one field or fields on another field or fields using the research design and theoretical entities introduced in this study. In this regard, I am planning to investigate the unintended impact of EUisation in the fields of democracy and the rule of law and in the economic realm on the foreign policies of other associated states by utilizing the research design and theoretical entities introduced in this study.

This study has examined EU–Turkey relations outside the EU–Turkey negotiation framework, with a focus on the unintended impact of this process on the Turkish foreign policy towards Turkey’s non-EU neighbours, and thus serves as one of the few—if not only—academic studies of the transformation of a candidate state’s foreign policy
towards non-EU countries in the EU accession process and of the unintended impact of the EU accession process on an associated state’s foreign policy based on the Turkish case. As such, it contributes to the growing literature on EUisation and the explanation of the mechanism and factors that generate changes in the foreign policies of associated states in the EU accession process.

6.8 The challenges encountered

This study analysed the influence of Turkey’s EU candidature on its foreign policy towards non-EU neighbours; it did not address the influence of other exogenous factors on TFP towards these countries. There are methodological problems in distinguishing between the impact of the EU and the impact of other exogenous and endogenous factors or ongoing changes at domestic level. There were no EU conditions or adaptation pressure which could have directly influenced Turkey’s foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, Syria and Iran, and therefore no direct mechanism by which Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership might have influenced its foreign policy towards them. It is therefore more difficult to demonstrate the causal role of the EU in the transformation of TFP towards these countries. This study used counterfactual scenarios in an attempt to circumvent this problem. Interviewee reliability must also be a consideration; there is a risk that interviewees will give inaccurate or dishonest answers, we tried to address this concern by using the triangulation method.
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