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Two faces of group-based shame: Moral Shame and Image Shame differentially predict positive and negative orientations to ingroup wrongdoing.

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Abstract

This paper proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterised by a focus on specific behaviour; shame can be characterised by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns, 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of shame was controlled for, they were differently related with orientations towards the outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas Moral Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were distinct from the associations of guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design and provided evidence suggestive of a causal direction from emotions to outgroup orientation.

Key words: Shame, Guilt, Apology, Avoidance.
Following prolonged media criticism, the chief executive of a multi-national corporation appears at a press conference to apologise for an incident involving one of their operations that has created major environmental pollution which threatens the health and livelihoods of a nearby community. In his statement he says his company is ashamed that a small minority of its workers have been negligent in causing the accident. He seems worried about how his company’s image may now be damaged by the incident and quickly leaves the press conference after making his statement.

The leader of a country makes a public apology to the aboriginal people of her country for their historical mistreatment at the hands of the non-indigenous majority. In her statement she says that such oppression has brought shame on her country and is incompatible with its core moral values. She promises to implement a new programme of cultural and economic regeneration for them.

These two—not entirely fictitious—examples illustrate something important about the ways in which group members—in this case, group leaders—can respond emotionally to the knowledge that others in their group have wrongly harmed another group. Both protagonists mention the word ‘shame’ in their statements, but the rhetoric and publicly expressed intentions differ. In the first case, the CEO seems mainly concerned about the public image of his company, seems to be reacting defensively and leaves the scene as soon as he can. In the second, the government leader feels that the very foundation of her country’s value system is challenged by the misdeeds of past governments, expresses empathy for the victimised group and then communicates her intention to make reparation to it. We call these two emotional reactions Image Shame and Moral Shame respectively. In this paper we investigate
the psychological reality of these two forms of shame in intergroup settings. We first show how, in intergroup contexts, these emotions can be distinguished from each other and from their closely related cousin, guilt. We propose that, controlling for the other form of shame, image-based shame is likely to be associated with primarily anti-social tendencies, while moral-based shame should be associated with more pro-social orientations. Three empirical studies set in contemporary intergroup contexts provide support for these ideas.

**Group-based emotions**

Group-based emotions result from appraisals of actions or experiences on a group level: others in the ingroup do something, or have something done to them, and the emotion is felt by the individual group members (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Iyer & Leach, 2008; E. R. Smith, 1993). How are such group-based emotions possible? An essential pre-requisite is that the individuals concerned have some level of identification with the ingroup in the particular situation in question. This is likely to happen when contextual factors make certain group identities salient and shift the situation from being ‘interpersonal’ to being ‘intergroup’ (Brown & Turner, 1981; Tajfel, 1978). Once that has occurred, then attributes and experiences of the group have the potential to become attributes and experiences of the individual group members through the process of self-stereotyping (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). E. R. Smith, Seger and Mackie (2007) also include group identification as a defining characteristic of what they term ‘group-level’ emotions, and add three other descriptive criteria to help distinguish group-level from individual-level emotions: empirical distinctness, social convergence within the group and observable relationships with intergroup attitudes and behaviour. Whilst these additional criteria can be analytically useful, it is enough for many research
purposes to ensure that group identities are salient to be able to investigate correlates of group-based emotions. In this research we focus on two group-based emotions in particular, guilt and shame.

**Guilt and Shame**

There are several ways in which guilt and shame have been distinguished in the literature (e.g., Gausel & Leach, 2011; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Teroni & Deonna, 2008). An early contribution was by Lewis (1971). While noting that both emotions were self-focused and arose from a perception of one’s own failings or misdeeds, Lewis proposed that they differed in the degree to which the self is implicated: guilt results from a focus on the misdeed and how that action affected someone else, whereas shame results from a focus on the self, a feeling that one is flawed in some global way. In this scheme, guilt encourages the perpetrator to make reparation, whilst shame is more likely to lead to hiding, avoidance or even self-defensive aggression.

Others followed Lewis’ (1971) lead with research supporting shame’s sense of global worthlessness and guilt’s more action-oriented sense of responsibility (e.g., Branscombe, Slugoski & Kappen, 2004; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). But this is not the only perspective that has been advanced to explain the shame-guilt difference. Some have suggested that guilt is more other-focused than shame. Baumeister and his colleagues, for instance, propose that guilt serves to strengthen and maintain social relationships by motivating perpetrators to make restitution to those they have wronged (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994); shame has been proposed, by contrast, to reflect concerns for social status and inferiority in a hierarchy (Gilbert, 2003).
Another distinction, focusing on the origin rather than outcome of the two emotions, claims that guilt more often arises internally, relative to shame’s greater responsiveness to social input (Fontaine, Luyten, De Boeck, Corveleyn, Fernandez, Herrera & Ittze, 2006; R. H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). On this basis, guilt is often characterized as more intimately related to morality than shame because it arises from a person’s own conscience rather than others’ disapproval. As we shall see, however, this may prove too sharp a contrast, since there may be reasons to distinguish two types of shame, one arising from “the public exposure of defects or transgressions” and the other from “a more private negative evaluation of the self” (R. H. Smith et al., 2002, p. 157). Although, derived from R. H. Smith and colleagues’ work on interpersonal transgressions, this distinction finds echoes in intergroup contexts, as we shall see.

Finally, it has been suggested that guilt arises from norm violations - that is, in situations where people view their own behaviour or that of members of their group as flouting specific rules of conduct (e.g., failing to reciprocate a friend’s help). In contrast, shame stems from more general failures to live up to one’s core values - that is, in situations where people perceive a behaviour or a trait of theirs or of members of their group as severely undermining one or more of the values they hold (e.g., courage or generosity) and which partly define their identity (Teroni & Deonna, 2008). Moreover, and independently of the sort of distinction that is emphasized, shame is commonly characterised as maladaptive and leading to self-defensive and avoidant reactions, while guilt is generally regarded as an emotion with more positive connotations and pro-social outcomes.

Consistent with these hypotheses, in many studies of interpersonal relations, shame has been found to be linked to self-blame and avoidance responses (Roseman,
Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Smith et al., 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996), while guilt has often found to be associated with empathy and pro-social action tendencies (Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 1996). However, the empirical consensus has been less than perfect. For instance, reparation is not always associated more with guilt than with shame (Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996; Giner-Sorolla, Piazza, & Espinosa, 2011). Moreover, De Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg, (2008) showed that shame episodes involving performance failures can motivate pro-social, relationship-enhancing interpersonal behaviour in situations where the shame was relevant to the decision at hand (i.e., in situations that are relevant to the shame-causing event). There is also evidence that guilt is sometimes linked to maladaptive outcomes, for example, depression (Luby et al., 2009; Meehan et al., 1996).

Research on group-based guilt and shame reveals a similarly equivocal picture. Several studies have found that group members’ feelings of guilt about historical or contemporary ingroup misdeeds are, indeed, associated with intentions to make reparations to the wronged outgroup (e.g., Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Swim & Miller, 1999). However, Iyer, Schmader and Lickel (2007) found that feelings of guilt did not predict support for any reparative actions after accounting for feelings of shame and anger, while Leach, Iyer and Pederson (2006) and Harth, Kessler and Leach (2008) also found little connection between group-level guilt and reparative action. Similarly, Allpress, Barlow, Brown and Louis (2010) observed that, in the context of Australia’s apology to Aboriginal Australians, the predictive power of shame rendered guilt an ineffective predictor of collective political action.
Studies investigating the effects of group-based shame also provide mixed evidence. Consistent with the traditional viewpoint, Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier and Ames (2005) and Schmader and Lickel (2006) showed that shame for others’ misdeeds was associated with a desire to distance oneself from both the situation and those responsible for the wrong-doing (Johns, Schmader & Lickel, 2005; Iyer et al., 2007). However, several other studies have found positive correlations between forms of group-based shame and reparation attitudes and other pro-social responses (Allpress et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2008; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles & Brown, 2012; Rees, Allpress & Brown, 2013; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). Such findings, derived as they are from several quite different intergroup contexts, pose something of a puzzle for the view that guilt and shame should have opposite motivational consequences for social relations.

**Distinguishing Among Varieties of Shame**

The theoretical approach to shame we present here has been developed partly in an attempt to understand these apparently conflicting findings.

We begin from a view that contrasts guilt and shame in the following manner (Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni, 2011; Teroni & Deonna, 2008). Guilt arises in contexts in which the person or the group perceives some behaviour as violating a norm. Because people typically adhere to a rule of conduct according to which, say, one ought not steal, they feel guilty over putting the money in their pocket. Shame, by contrast, occurs in contexts of more general failures to live up to one’s or the group’s core values, situations in which people (or members of a group) perceive some behaviour or trait of theirs (or their group) as severely undermining one or more of the values they hold and that make up who they are. For example, stealing might be regarded as a failure to live up to the honest person one aspires to be. Values in this
framework can thus be characterised as qualities of objects or circumstances – e.g., instances of honesty, justice and benevolence but also wealth, power, beauty and reputation - whose existence is favoured, desired or pursued. Values in this sense differ from the more specific norms or rules of conduct that are grounded in these values (cf. Rokeach, 1973). To summarize, shame arising from a threatened value is a more general phenomenon than guilt – which attaches itself to a specific broken norm – but is a less general phenomenon than any feeling that would be based in a global sense of one’s individual or collective worthlessness. Hence, it need not be an all-encompassing, debilitating emotion, as some viewpoints have suggested. We believe, instead, that the nature of shame will be determined more specifically by which value is threatened (Deonna et al., 2011, pp. 104-107).

Becoming aware of a collective wrongdoing by one’s own group can raise two value concerns. One valued aspect of the ingroup is being well regarded in the world, that is, having a positive collective image, which knowledge of wrongdoing can threaten. This value is non-moral because the group would cease to pursue it if it thought it did not serve its own interests. It can be contrasted with another value of the ingroup, its status as, say, a group that is motivated by justice and benevolence. These constitute paradigmatic moral concerns because they entail that they should be pursued by members of the group even in occasions in which they do not advance the interest of the group. Therefore, we propose that feelings of shame that arise from the perception that one’s social image has been undermined – which we term Image Shame – will have different motivational effects from shame that arises from the perception that one’s moral standing has actually been undermined – which we term Moral Shame.
In Image Shame, the concern is solely with the image and reputation of the group, and only secondarily or not at all with the well-being of the victim group. To reach this goal, the most successful way to restore the ingroup’s valued social image, and to reduce the shame that arises from the judgement of others, is likely to involve avoidance and withdrawal from the critical gaze of others, in a hope that the issue will blow over. Someone might also adopt a defensive strategy of actively covering up the group’s misdeeds, if s/he believes such a strategy might reduce external blame of the group. As the concern in Image Shame lies with the restoration of the ingroup’s image, and not primarily or at all with the well-being of the victim group, a person experiencing this form of shame is unlikely to support opening themselves and their group up to further reparative commitments. The default preference, therefore, is likely to reflect an image-maintenance strategy characterised by avoidance and cover-up. Feelings toward the victim group and the situation in general are likely to be hostile, because the emphasis is on how “they have made us look bad”, rather than on how “we need to treat them better”.

It is not so easy, however, to avoid and forget the transgressions that give rise to Moral Shame, because the threat is to a moral value that has, typically, high self-importance. Indeed, morality has even been identified as the most valued trait in one’s own group (Leach, Ellemers & Barreto, 2007). The coping strategy that is adopted in relation to Moral Shame will therefore reflect the relative importance the subject lends to the particular moral value. In this case, avoidance of the issue is unlikely to restore one’s moral standing in one’s own eyes. In order for Moral Shame to be reduced, an individual must be able to see the ingroup in positive moral terms. For this reason, an individual is most likely to adopt attitudes and behaviours that make up for the initial wrongdoing and restore the well-being of the victim group. Such a strategy is likely to
include a genuine support for apology and compensations, and openness to discussing and addressing the original transgression.

Our analysis also provides some insight into the often-weak effects of guilt in intergroup contexts. Because of guilt’s connection with discrete acts of wrongdoing that violate norms, it will not promote the same kind of action that either moral or image shame do. If anything, it should relate to acts of reparation that are limited to compensation of the harm done to the victim (Deonna et al., 2011; Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003; Teroni & Deonna, 2008). This underscores our distinction between Moral Shame and guilt. Even though both are morally oriented, restorative emotions, the effects of guilt in an ongoing group-based context are likely to be weaker than those of Moral Shame. This is because the threat to one’s valued self-conception as moral should prove a more potent motivator of reparative behaviour, than should guilt’s concern over making good on a single act. A further factor likely to weaken the effects of group-based guilt is the reduced sense of personal responsibility for the misdeed. Unlike an interpersonal transgression, where I have done something wrong, I am less likely to feel responsibility for a malfeasance committed by other members of my group. Moral shame, on the other hand, is more linked to my social identity as a member of a particular group. If I identify with that group, its properties and morals become mine, irrespective of any personal responsibility for its actions (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987).

Gausel and Leach (2011) have developed views that likewise support the pro-sociality of group-based shame. They argue that the mistake of the traditional viewpoint was to consider shame as constituting a global sense of failure. They also propose that shame has positive, reparative action outcomes, and is motivated by a threat specifically to the moral self-image – that is, the self’s conception of true
morality. Where our model differs, however, is in proposing Image Shame as a form of shame. Gausel and Leach (2011) see negative, withdrawal-related outcomes of self-conscious emotion as coming from global inferiority feelings and feelings of rejection, rather than shame (Gausel et al., 2012). Of these two, rejection is conceptually closest to Image Shame, because it is concerned with others’ view of the self.

**Existing Research and New Questions**

Initial evidence for these distinctions was provided by Allpress et al. (2010, Study 2), who distinguished between Moral Shame, Image Shame and Guilt. Both Moral Shame and Guilt were significant positive correlates of support for compensation being offered to Kenyans by the British government for British atrocities in Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion. Image Shame was negatively (and non-significantly) correlated with support for compensation, once guilt and Moral Shame were controlled for. Two subsequent studies, covering contemporary Germans’ feelings about the Holocaust and Britons’ feelings about their country’s involvement in the war in Iraq, showed that, when included in the same structural model, Image Shame and Moral Shame were differently associated with prejudice towards a secondary ‘victim’ group – i.e., not the outgroup that was the target of the original ingroup mistreatment (Rees et al., 2013). Image Shame was positively related to social distancing from the outgroup, while Moral Shame was negatively associated with social distancing from the same outgroup.

In two studies examining Norwegians’ feelings about the mistreatment of the Tater minority, Gausel et al. (2012) showed that it was possible to distinguish their new conception of shame from feelings of inferiority and social rejection. The latter emotion was positively correlated with tendencies to avoid or cover up the Tater issue
and negatively related to pro-social orientations such as empathy for the Tater and a
desire to make some kind of restitution. In contrast, shame revealed an exactly
opposite pattern: a negative relationship with avoidance and cover up, positive with
pro-sociality. Guilt proved largely unrelated to either outcome measure in a structural
model that also included shame, rejection and inferiority.

Apart from testing whether negative outcomes are best attributed to rejection
or image shame, our research also builds on previous research that has established
only cross-sectional correlational links between image shame and negative outcomes
(Allpress et al., 2010; Gausel et al., 2012; Rees et al., 2013). To gather evidence more
suggestive of causal patterns over time, therefore, our Study 3 adopts a longitudinal
design.

Before stating our hypotheses, a short statistical comment is in order. Because
the self-conscious emotions we are studying here stem from an initial appraisal that
the group has behaved illegitimately towards others, they are all likely to be positively
correlated with one another. Indeed, it is quite possible to respond to a group
wrongdoing with concerns for the implied norm violation (guilt), and for both the
ingroup’s image (Image Shame) and its moral standing (Moral Shame). The semantic
similarity of the emotion words ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, &
O’Connor, 1987) will further contribute to a co-variation among measures. Thus, in
order to be able to distinguish between these emotions empirically, it is essential that
a multivariate approach is adopted in which the independent associations of each
emotion are assessed, controlling for the other emotions. Indeed, such a practice has
long been adopted in the emotion literature, ever since Tangney et al.’s (1992)
suggestion to study ‘shame-free guilt’ and ‘guilt-free shame’. As we shall see,
although the three different emotions may have similarly signed bivariate
relationships with the dependent measures of interest, once their shared variance is controlled for, differently valenced relationships with the dependent measures emerge. Of course, with such statistical ‘suppression’ effects, it is important to be precise and also cautious about the claims that are being made about the nature of the underlying relationships (Lynam, Hoyle & Neman, 2006). In this case, our hypotheses about the divergent associations between Image and Moral Shame and positive and negative intergroup orientations refer specifically to the associations with those intergroup outcomes once the shared variance with the related emotions has been partialled out.

In the light of the arguments advanced above, we tested the following hypotheses in three studies:

1. When controlling for each other, group-based Moral and Image Shame will be differently related to positive and negative orientations towards a (victim) outgroup: Moral Shame will be positively associated with positive orientations and inversely related to negative orientations; Image Shame will show an opposite pattern of associations.

2. When controlling for both varieties of shame, group-based Guilt is expected to resemble, if anything, Moral Shame’s pattern of associations but with weaker ties to the outcome measures.

**Study 1**

The aim of Study 1 was to develop measures of group-based Moral and Image Shame to establish that they can be separated empirically both from each other and from group-based Guilt. It also addresses an important issue raised above, namely the difference between the conception of shame proposed here and that advanced by Gausel and Leach (2011). We then explored the relationships of these group-based
emotions with both positive and negative intergroup orientations towards a harmed outgroup.

The intergroup context was the recent war in Iraq in which some well documented and systematic abuses of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers had occurred. By first presenting research participants with an incident from that war, and by phrasing all our emotion and social orientation items in terms of one or both of the groups concerned (Britain, Iraq), we ensured that the context was genuinely ‘intergroup’, that some minimal level of group identification would be instigated, and hence that group-based emotions would be in play.

Method

Participants

One hundred and fifty nine British students were recruited as participants. Of those, 147 (73 male, 72 female, 2 unspecified; age range, 18-28 years, mean 20.0) participants who self-identified as “British” were included in the final analysis.

Procedure

Participants were asked (in early 2009) if they would like to fill out a questionnaire on their attitudes toward Britain’s involvement in the war in Iraq. The questionnaire consisted of a newspaper article, ostensibly sourced from the Guardian – a reputable British newspaper – followed by the dependent variables. The article gave an account of prisoner abuse carried out by British soldiers in Iraq (Amnesty International, 2007; Red Cross (ICRC), 2004). Participation was voluntary and anonymous but participants could enter a prize draw for one of two £30 prizes in return for their participation.

Measures
All items were measured on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).

Moral Shame was measured, adapting items from Brown et al. (2008), by asking participants how much they agreed (or disagreed) with the following three statements: (1) “Our treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it means to be British”, (2) “I do not feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Iraqi people” (reversed), and (3) “I feel ashamed for the aggressive tendency of British people”, $\alpha = .82$.

Image Shame was measured, again modifying items from Brown et al. (2008), by asking participants how much they agreed (or disagreed) with the following three statements: (1) “I feel disgraced because the behaviour of British people toward Iraqi people has created a bad image of Britain in the eyes of the world”, (2) “To think how Britain is seen for its treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel ashamed”, and (3) “I feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Iraqi people”, $\alpha = .85$.

Guilt was measured by slightly amending three items from Brown et al. (2008): (1) “I feel guilty for the manner in which Iraqi people have been treated by British”, (2) “Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behaviour of British toward Iraqis”, and (3) “I feel guilty for the bad living conditions of the Iraqi people”, $\alpha = .89$.

Rejection was measured using adaptations of three items used by Gausel et al. (2012): “I feel rejected when I think about what has happened to the Iraqis”, “As a Brit, I feel withdrawn when I think about what has happened to the Iraqis” and “I feel alone when I think about what has happened to the Iraqis”, $\alpha = .78$. 
Two measures of a positive orientation towards the outgroup were devised: Support for apology was measured with “I think that the British government should apologise for the atrocities committed against the Iraqi people”, and support for financial compensation with “I think that the British government should compensate Iraqis financially for injustices that have occurred during the invasion”. As measures of a negative orientation towards the outgroup we included: issue avoidance, “I wish that people would stop going on about the invasion of Iraq”, and anger, “I am angry that the Iraq situation is being talked about so often”.

**Results**

Means and correlations between the variables are presented in Table 1. To test the hypothesised models we performed CFA and SEM analyses using MPlus (version 6). Missing values were estimated using Maximum Likelihood (ML).

Confirmatory factor analyses were performed to assess the factor structure of the items measuring Moral Shame, Image Shame and Guilt. In all models the factors were allowed to correlate but no observed items were allowed to cross-load. The hypothesised model, specifying Image Shame, Moral Shame and Guilt as separate factors provided a good fit to the data, $\chi^2 (24) = 37.72$, $p = .037$, CFI = .982, SRMR = .032, RMSEA = .063. An alternative model that specified the Moral and Image Shame items as loading onto a single “shame” factor, in addition to a Guilt factor, showed a significant decrease in fit, $\Delta\chi^2 (2) = 44.52$, $p < .001$, $\Delta$AIC = 40.52. A third model, in which all emotion items loaded onto one omnibus “negative emotion” factor also proved inferior, $\Delta\chi^2 (3) = 129.91$, $p < .001$, $\Delta$AIC = 123.19. Thus, the data supported Hypothesis 1 in showing that Image Shame, Moral Shame, and Guilt can properly be regarded as separable emotion scales.
In order to determine the relationship between Image Shame and feelings of Rejection, a further analysis was conducted, similar to those reported above. A four-factor measurement model, with Image Shame, Rejection, Moral Shame and Guilt specified as separate factors, fitted the data well, $\chi^2 (38) = 64.60, p = .005$, CFI = .969, RMSEA = .069. Crucially, this model proved to be superior to a three-factor model where Image Shame and Rejection were specified as a single factor, $\Delta \chi^2 (3) = 89.32, p < .001$, $\Delta$AIC = 83.32, indicating that feelings of Image Shame are neither reducible to, nor better explained as, feelings of Rejection.

To test our hypothesis about the relationship between the emotion variables and measures of negative (a latent variable consisting of avoidance and anger items) and positive (consisting of support for apology and support for compensation) orientations, we evaluated the structural model shown in Figure 1. This model, in which all paths were specified between the emotions and the two response types, provided a reasonable fit to the data, $\chi^2 (9) = 16.09, p = .065$, CFI = .984, RMSEA = .074. As hypothesised, Moral Shame was a significant positive predictor of positive responses ($\beta = .44, p < .001$), and a significant negative predictor of negative responses ($\beta = -.70, p < .001$). In contrast, Image Shame positively predicted negative responses ($\beta = .21, p < .05$), but was unrelated to adaptive, positive measures ($\beta = .04, p > .05$). Guilt was not significantly related to either positive ($\beta = .11, p > .05$) or negative responses ($\beta = -.04, p > .05$). It is noteworthy that Rejection was not significantly related to either positive ($\beta = .14, p > .05$) or negative ($\beta = -.05, p > .05$) orientations.

**Discussion**

The results of Study 1 provided support for our hypotheses in a new intergroup context. They confirmed that it is possible to separate Moral Shame, Image
Shame and Guilt as distinct group-based emotions, and these different emotions were differently associated with positive and negative intergroup orientations (support for apology and compensation, versus anger and avoidance) when tested simultaneously in the same structural model. Guilt was unrelated to either positive or negative intergroup orientation, once the two forms of shame were partialled out. Importantly, these results obtained whilst controlling for felt Rejection which was not itself independently associated with either dependent variable. This latter finding suggests that there may be some merit in using Image Shame, over and above rejection, as a way to explain defensive and hostile orientations toward a situation of collective shaming (cf. Gausel et al., 2012). We return to this issue in the General Discussion.

Study 2

In order to refine our measures of group-based Image and Moral Shame, a further study was conducted, again using atrocities committed by British troops in Iraq as the emotion instigating context. Hitherto, the focus in our items was to contrast Image Shame from a more general measure of shame that would tap Moral Shame. However, we recognized that it would be desirable to create measures that more explicitly mentioned these key concepts. We also included an additional measure of negative social orientation, the wish to cover up the crimes committed by the ingroup, a measure suggested by Gausel et al. (2012).

Method

Participants

Two hundred and fifty six psychology students participated for partial course credit. The survey was hosted on the Bristol Online Survey system and participants were invited to complete the study online via the host department’s participant management system. Of those recruited, 252 (45 male, 207 female; age range 16-43 years, mean
participants who self-identified as “British” were included in the final analysis.

**Procedure**

Participants were informed that the survey was investigating attitudes toward Britain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq and that their participation was voluntary. They were presented with excerpts from a real BBC News article on the treatment of Iraqi prisoners (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8266699.stm), followed by the dependent measures. Participants were debriefed following completion of the questionnaire.

**Measures**

All items were measured on seven-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

**Moral Shame** was measured using three items: “I feel ashamed because Britain’s actions with regard to Iraq have been immoral”, “I feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Iraqi people”, and “I feel ashamed for the damage done to Iraqi people by Brits”, $\alpha = .85$.

**Image Shame** was measured using five items: “I feel ashamed because Britain has a damaged reputation”, “I feel ashamed when I realise that other countries might think of Britain negatively because of our involvement in Iraq”, “I feel disgraced because the behaviour of British people toward Iraqi people has created a bad image of Britain in the eyes of the world”, “To think how Britain is seen for its treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel ashamed”, and “I feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Iraqi people”, $\alpha = .93$.

**Guilt** was measured using the same three items as in Study 1, $\alpha = .89$.

**Support for apology, support for financial compensation, issue avoidance and anger** were all measured using the same items as Study 1.
Cover-up was measured with three items adapted from Gausel et al. (2012): “I think that we Brits should make it less clear what has happened to the Iraqi people”, “I think that we Brits need to be careful of sharing national information with other nations”, and “We Brits should make the Iraq issue become less important in the public awareness”, α = .79.

Results

The means of and correlations among the variables are reported in Table 2.

A three-factor model specifying Image Shame, Moral Shame and guilt provided a reasonable fit to the data, \( \chi^2 (41) = 100.01, p < .001, \) CFI = .972, SRMR = .036, RMSEA = .076. This three-factor model proved to be superior to the three alternative models evaluated in the previous two studies: when Image Shame and Moral Shame were combined: \( \Delta \chi^2 (2) = 176.61, p < .001, \Delta AIC = 172.61 \); when Moral Shame and guilt were combined: \( \Delta \chi^2 (2) = 233.48, p < .001, \Delta AIC = 229.48 \); and when all variables were combined into one factor: \( \Delta \chi^2 (3) = 518.24, p < .001, \Delta AIC = 512.24 \).

A structural model similar to that evaluated in Study 1 was then examined, with the exception that cover-up was included in the negative social orientations latent variable (see Figure 2). This model fit the data very well, \( \chi^2 (13) = 15.89, p = .255, \) CFI = .996, SRMR = .032, RMSEA = .030. Moral Shame was again associated with decreased negative orientations (a latent variable consisting of anger, avoidance and a desire to cover up the ingroup’s misdeeds; \( \beta = -.32, p < .001 \)). Additionally, Moral Shame was again associated with positive responses (\( \beta = .60, p < .001 \)). As in study 1, Image Shame was correlated with negative outcomes (\( \beta = .20, p < .01 \)). Also, Guilt was positively associated (\( \beta = .25, p < .01 \)), and Image Shame was negatively associated (\( \beta = -.18, p < .05 \)), with positive outcomes. Guilt was not, however,
significantly related to negative outcome measures ($\beta = -.13, p = .11$).

Multicollinearity statistics were all within normal ranges, all variance inflation factors 
< 1.93 and tolerances > .51

**Discussion**

These findings corroborate the findings of Study 1 with regard to the divergent predictive effects of group-based Moral and Image Shame. Again, the data clearly showed that, once their shared variance was accounted for, Moral Shame was associated with positive outcomes, whereas Image Shame was associated with negative outcomes. This study extends the previous work with a larger sample and demonstrates that the latter outcomes can also include a wish to ‘cover up’ the misdeeds of the ingroup.

Although group-based guilt, unlike in Study 1, was significantly associated with positive outcomes in the structural model, its effect size was much lower than that of Moral Shame ($\beta$s = .25 and .60 respectively). The newly-found statistical significance of guilt (controlling for Moral Shame and Image Shame) can probably best be attributed to increasing the sample size and hence statistical power. As noted earlier, this picture is consistent with the literature on group-based guilt, which shows its associations to be often limited in the presence of other, more influential emotions, such as shame or anger (e.g., Gausel et al., 2012; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006; Rees et al., 2013).

**Study 3**

Studies 1 and 2, like the vast majority in the group-based emotions literature, employed a cross-sectional correlational design with all its attendant interpretative difficulties. Indeed, thus far, all the studies that have found divergent correlations for group-based Moral and Image Shame (or a variant thereof) have suffered from this
limitation (Gausel et al., 2012; Rees et al., 2013). In order to fill this gap in the literature, Study 3 employed a cross-lagged longitudinal design, following the example of Brown et al. (2008). Such a design permits slightly stronger inferences about the directionality of observed associations between presumed antecedents and presumed outcomes (Bijleveld & Kamp, 1998).

The hypotheses were as in the previous studies, although this time we predicted that the relationships between the emotion variables and the intergroup orientation measures would hold over time, and be stronger from emotions to intergroup orientations than vice versa.

Method

Participants

Data were collected at two time points, approximately four weeks apart. At Time 1, a community sample of 427 was recruited via an online survey. Of these respondents, 28 were excluded because they did not self-identify as “British”, leaving a final initial sample of 399 participants (246 males and 153 females; age range 19-81 years, mean 48.0). This survey was run through a rewards-based online shopping network, in which users receive rewards points for completing surveys, entering competitions and purchasing items through the system’s website. Participants were awarded points to the approximate value of £2 for completing the survey. The survey was hosted on the Bristol Online Survey system and participants were invited to complete the survey through an external link.

Four weeks after completing the initial questionnaire, the 399 participants who self-identified as British were invited to complete a follow-up study. They were again paid the equivalent of £2 for their participation. A total of 293 (73%) participants completed the survey again at Time 2 and was used in the final analysis (M = 186, F =
107; age range 19-81, mean 48.0).

**Procedure**

Data were collected in late 2010 and early 2011. Participants were told that the survey was for university research purposes only and would not be used in any political context. Participants were informed that they would be asked to read a BBC article about Britain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq and then answer some questions about their thoughts and feelings about the war. Participants read an article on the maltreatment of Baha Mousa and other Iraqi prisoners by the British army (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8266699.stm). The article was followed by the dependent variables.

British participants who filled out the survey at Time 1 were invited four weeks later to complete a follow-up study. They were told that they had recently completed a survey on their attitudes toward Britain’s involvement in Iraq and that we were interested in how their attitudes may have changed over the last month. They were also informed that some of the questions may be similar to the survey they filled out previously. They were asked to answer each question with how they were feeling in that moment. The subsequent instructions, article and questions were identical to the survey at Time 1.

**Measures**

All items were measured using seven-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Moral Shame ($\alpha = .94$), Image Shame ($\alpha = .96$), Guilt ($\alpha = .90$), support for apology, support for financial compensation, issue avoidance, anger and cover-up ($\alpha = .78$) were measured using the same items as Study 2. As in Study 2, support for apology and compensation were treated as indicators for the latent variable ‘positive
Results

In order to evaluate whether there were any differences between those who completed both time points and those who completed the study only at Time 1, a MANOVA on the T1 data set was conducted, using all dependent measures, gender and age as dependent measures. Using Pillai’s trace, there was a significant omnibus difference between the two samples, $V = .05, F (10, 388) = 1.87, p < .05$. However, inspection of the univariate effects revealed a marginally significant difference between samples on only one variable: anger that the issue of British troops’ behaviour in the Iraq war was being discussed: those who chose not to repeat the study at T2 were slightly more angry at Time 1 ($M = 3.89$) than those who completed the survey twice ($M = 3.55$), $p < .06$.

Means of and inter-correlations among all variables are shown in Tables 3 to 5. As can be seen, there was a slight decrease in mean levels of all variables over time (Table 3). A repeated measures MANOVA revealed that there was a significant omnibus effect of time, $F (5, 288) = 2.85, p < .05$. This omnibus effect was driven by significant temporal decreases in both Moral Shame, $F (1, 292) = 11.02, p < .01$, and positive orientation, $F (1, 292) = 5.17, p < .05$.

As with Studies 1 and 2, confirmatory factor analyses were performed to assess the factor structure of the items measuring Moral Shame, Image Shame and Guilt. CFA analyses were conducted on Time 1 data. In all models the factors were allowed to correlate but no observed items were allowed to cross-load. The hypothesised model, specifying Image Shame, Moral Shame and Guilt as separate factors provided a reasonable fit to the data, $\chi^2 (41) = 126.71, p < .001$, CFI = .978,
SRMR = .022, RMSEA = .085. An alternative model that specified the Moral and Image Shame items as loading onto a single “shame” factor, in addition to a Guilt factor, again showed a significant decrease in fit, $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 160.00, p < .001, \Delta AIC = 164.00$. A third model, in which all emotion items loaded onto one omnibus “negative emotion” factor provided a dramatically worse fit, $\Delta \chi^2 (3) = 453.24, p < .001, \Delta AIC = 459.24$. The three factor model of Image Shame, Moral Shame, and Guilt was therefore again supported, despite the relatively high correlations among them (Table 4).

To test our hypotheses about the effects of emotions at Time 1 on measures of negative and positive orientations at Time 2, the structural model shown in Figure 3 was evaluated. In this model, positive and negative orientations at Time 2 were predicted by the three emotions scales at Time 1, controlling for both positive and negative orientations at Time 1 (Bijleveld & van der Kamp, 1998). This model provided a very good fit to the data, $\chi^2 (42) = 51.62, p = .15, CFI = .997, SRMR = .023, RMSEA = .028$. Moral Shame at Time 1 predicted significantly less negativity at Time 2 ($\beta = -.22, p < .05$), while Image Shame at Time 1 predicted more negativity at Time 2 ($\beta = .18, p < .05$). No other path between the emotions at Time 1 and responses at Time 2 was significant.

Unsurprisingly, the test-retest associations were strong for both positive and negative orientations ($\beta = .80$ and $\beta = .69$, respectively, both $p < .001$). Positive orientation at Time 1 was also (negatively) associated with negative orientation at Time 2 ($\beta = -.22, p < .05$). However, negative orientation at Time 1 was not correlated with positive orientation at Time 2 ($\beta = -.06$, n.s.).

The above results are suggestive of a directional relationship between Moral and Image Shame and negative intergroup orientations. To explore this possibility
further, a second model, in which Time 2 Moral Shame, Image Shame and guilt were predicted from Time 1 positive and negative orientations (controlling for Time 1 emotions), was examined. This model did not fit the data well, \( \chi^2 (28) = 190.34, p < .001, \) CFI = .938, SRMR = .235, RMSEA = .141. Negative orientations at Time 1 did not predict any of the emotions at Time 2, all ps > .65. The absence of reverse longitudinal relationships is consistent with the hypothesis that the direction of these associations runs from emotions to intergroup orientation.

**Discussion**

In this study we have shown for the first time that the divergent effects of group-based Moral and Image Shame on intergroup orientations can be observed longitudinally. Admittedly, these were only reliable on the negative orientation measure, but it is striking that their opposite valences bore out the cross-sectional relationships in Studies 1 and 2, and that have been reported elsewhere (Rees et al., 2013). Moreover, the associations in the reverse direction (from orientation to emotions) were far from significant.

It is notable that group-based guilt had no reliable longitudinal associations with either intergroup orientation measure, broadly confirming an emerging picture from the research presented here and elsewhere that, once Moral and Image Shame are controlled, group-based guilt seems to be a less influential emotion (Allpress et al., 2010; Iyer et al., 2007; Gausel et al., 2012; Leach et al., 2006; Rees et al., 2013). The absence of a longitudinal ‘effect’ of guilt here contrasts with the only other published longitudinal research on group-based emotions where, in two studies of attitudes towards an indigenous group in Chile, guilt and not shame proved to have reliable associations over time with a measure of reparation (Brown et al., 2008). Although the many contextual and methodological differences between those studies
impede any definitive analysis, it should be noted that, in that earlier research, Moral and Image Shame had not yet been fully distinguished, either conceptually or psychometrically. It is thus possible that their effects on intergroup attitudes in the Brown et al. (2008) study cancelled each other out. Note, too, that Brown et al. (2008) did not have a measure of negative intergroup orientation.

One possible limitation of this study are the relatively high correlations amongst the emotion variables (.72 to .86, median .80), a possible indication of multicollinearity. There are four points to note about this issue. Firstly, the findings of this study were strikingly consistent with those from Studies 1 and 2 where the inter-correlations were lower (.51 to .67, median .57). Second, and again consistent with Studies 1 and 2 (and Rees et al., 2013), despite the inter-correlations, a three-factor solution (Guilt, Image Shame, Moral Shame) proved superior to either plausible alternative. Thirdly, the relatively large sample size of the study offers some protection against any potential effects of multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007). Fourthly, regression analyses (not reported here) show that the collinearity statistics were all within normal ranges, all variance inflation factors < 4.20 and tolerances > .24. This suggests that multicollinearity did not unduly influence the results obtained.

**General Discussion**

The three studies presented here provide converging evidence for Image Shame, Moral Shame and Guilt as distinct group-based emotional experiences with different motivational associations in intergroup contexts. When controlling for Image Shame and Guilt, Moral Shame had reliable associations with both positive and negative orientations (but in opposite directions). In contrast, once Moral Shame and Guilt were partialled out, Image Shame was consistently and positively correlated with a negative orientation to the victim group and, somewhat less consistently, inversely
associated with a positive orientation. The associations with negative orientation for both forms of shame survived the more stringent test of longitudinal analysis. Guilt was a much weaker and less consistent correlate of either intergroup measure.

One objection to our findings could be that our Image Shame measures included, in addition to items using the word “shame” (and variants), other items using semantically related concepts such as “humiliated” and “disgraced,” while our Moral Shame measures only used the word “shame.” Perhaps, then, Image Shame was really measuring one of those other emotions. However, empirically, the Image Shame measures always cohered internally and, while correlated with Moral Shame, consistently could be distinguished from it. If Image Shame really had little to do with shame then its “shame” items would have loaded along linguistic lines, with the other “shame” items in Moral Shame. This also suggests that “humiliated” and “disgraced” are semantically appropriate terms to study a form of shame that we believe to be more concerned with social reputation, as shown by their close relationship to items using the word “shame” in an image context. Indeed, humiliation has been shown to be in some ways similar to shame, but with less internalization – that is, involving the belief that the damage to one’s image is unjust (Leidner, Sheikh & Ginges, 2012). From this analysis, “humiliated” appears as an appropriate word to characterize Image Shame but not Moral Shame.

**Theoretical implications**

Our findings have a number of theoretical implications for the understanding of group-based shame and guilt. In the present paper we have outlined a distinction between shame and guilt in which shame is characterised by a perceived threat to one’s values and a focus on the self, whereas guilt is characterised by violated norms and a focus on specific behaviour. An important advantage of our model is that it
allows consideration of different forms of shame that arise from threats to different values. Our research highlights that the values of social image and moral standing are important in motivating distinct intergroup attitudes and behaviours. Given the empirical inconsistencies within the shame literature, we believe that the distinction between Image Shame and Moral Shame is of particular importance for our understanding of shame.

Shame has traditionally been viewed as being associated with hiding, withdrawal and other maladaptive outcomes (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In addition to the three studies presented here, a growing number of studies have now challenged this view by demonstrating the pro-social correlates of group-based shame (Allpress et al., 2010; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Gausel et al., 2012; Rees et al., 2013). These findings confirm the ‘pluralist’ approach of Teroni and Deonna (2008), which allows for the possibility that different forms of shame arise as a function of which type of self-relevant value has been undermined by the subject, and that these different forms of shame may drive behaviour in different ways. We have documented this here in connection with the contrast between positive and negative orientations.

As we have seen, the nature of the value at stake in shame is one important determinant of the direction of its motivational influence. The data are quite clear that, once their shared variance is partialled out, shame arising from a threatened social image is associated with negative outcomes, whereas shame arising from a threatened moral standing is associated with positive outcomes. Still, two pending issues should be addressed. First, how does our conceptualisation of Image Shame relate to Gausel and Leach’s (2011) feeling of rejection? Second, what are the consequences of the fact that Image Shame can sometimes be ‘managed’ by adopting a reparation-like stance?
On the first point, are the experiences of Image Shame and Rejection simply labelled differently but qualitatively identical, or do these experiences differ in some important way? Furthermore, if distinct experiences, might they be different steps in a negative cascade of events that stem from threatened social image (i.e., Image Shame $\rightarrow$ feelings of rejection $\rightarrow$ negative responses)? The present studies were not designed to investigate these questions, but we believe these are fruitful issues for future research.

On the second point, it is possible that in some contexts, group members feeling Image Shame might, indeed, seek to present reparation-like attitudes to restore their damaged reputation (as speculated by Brown et al., 2008). There are circumstances when this may happen, especially when (feigning) to act positively is perceived as the best means to manage one’s image. By contrast, given what Moral Shame is, its relation with positive behaviour will of course be less flexible. While restoring the moral balance can and will take many forms depending on the circumstances, it must necessarily be done through (what the subject perceives as) morally good behaviour. In one study reported in Brown et al. (2008, Study 3), a cross-sectional association between shame and reparation seemed to be partially mediated by ‘reputation management’. The authors concluded then that a desire to manage or improve the ingroup’s public image could be one – albeit short-term – strategy that group members could adopt to deal with feelings of shame. Two observations are worth making here: first, in that earlier research, although the measure of shame used comprised aspects of the two varieties of shame that we now distinguish, in the analyses then employed they were simply combined into a single measure. Thus, at an empirical level, it is impossible to disentangle what was driving the observed mediation effect. Moreover, there was no measure of negative outgroup
orientation in any of the studies reported by Brown et al. (2008) which might have detected (image) shame’s relationship with a less positive intergroup attitude. Second, the authors of that study were not aware of the theoretical account being developed by Teroni and Deonna (only published in 2008), nor self-evidently of the later analysis by Gausel and Leach (2011). In other words, the field has moved on. Our argument now is that, notwithstanding the hypotheses and data published in Brown et al. (2008), it is unlikely that Image Shame can usually be sustainably ‘managed’ by making gestures designed to improve the ingroup’s reputation, although in some circumstances this may still occur. A more probable reaction, we believe, will be to distance themselves from the discomforting misdeeds or to seek other ways to deflect attention from them.

An important implication of our findings concerns the complex effects of ‘shaming’ on perpetrator groups. Our data suggest that the public shaming of perpetrator groups can sometimes increase negativity by provoking such reactions as anger, avoidance, attempts to cover-up the ingroup’s wrong-doing and victim blame. We speculate whether the common tactic of ‘naming and shaming’ may not always promote positive reactions. Combs, Campbell, Jackson and Smith (2010) provide evidence from settings involving interpersonal transgressions that this may, indeed, be the case. Combs and colleagues found that vignettes or personal recollections of wrong-doings involving severe public chastisement evoked increased feelings of humiliation, anger and unfairness, as compared to private chastisement; shame and guilt were much less affected by such public reprimands. Combs et al. (2010) argue, as we do here, that the emotions of guilt and (moral) shame need to be distinguished from humiliation (or image shame). It is the latter emotion especially that is likely to be instigated in ‘naming and shaming’, with potentially adverse social consequences.
The preceding analysis highlights the particular importance of shame experiences and expressions in instances of intergroup wrongdoing. Our data show that the common conception of shame as a universally maladaptive emotion does not capture fully the diversity of motivations to which it is connected. Shame that arises from a tarnished social image is indeed associated with avoidance, anger, cover-up and victim blame, and is likely to have negative effects on intergroup relations. On the other hand, shame that arises in response to violations of the ingroup’s valued moral essence is strongly associated with a positive pattern of responses and is likely to have positive effects on intergroup relations.
Acknowledgements

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Footnotes

1. We are grateful to a reviewer for making this point.

2. In the previous study, the term Essence Shame was used instead of Moral Shame. This reflects an earlier stage of theoretical development in this domain.

3. Participants were also assigned to one of five experimental conditions that asked participants to perform: a personal morality affirmation, a personal non-moral affirmation, a group morality affirmation, a group non-moral affirmation, or a control writing task. These experimental conditions did not affect any of the variables investigated in the present study, all Fs < 2.04, all ps > .05, and are not discussed further.

4. As a rule of thumb, an AIC difference of < 2 indicates no meaningful difference between models; between 4 and 7 indicates considerable evidence that the model with the lower AIC is better; and a difference of > 10 indicates substantial support for the model with the lower AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).
References


Table 1

Study 1: Means of and inter-correlations among variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Moral shame</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.49</td>
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<td>-.44</td>
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<td>2. Image shame</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Guilt</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
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<td>4. Rejection</td>
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<td>.29**</td>
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<td>-.12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.08</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.61**</td>
<td>-.48**</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
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<td>6. Compensation support</td>
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<td>2.42</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.41**</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
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<td>7. Avoidance</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2.06</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.69**</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Anger</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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*p < .05; **p < .01
Table 2

Study 2: Means of and inter-correlations among variables

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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>5</th>
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<td>1. Moral Shame</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>.63**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>-.26*</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
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<td>2. Image Shame</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td></td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>3. Guilt</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
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<td>4. Apology support</td>
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<td>1.28</td>
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<td>.50**</td>
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<td>-.26**</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Compensation</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.34**</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
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</table>

6. Avoidance        | 3.22| 1.39|      |      |      |      |     | .66**| .45**|
7. Anger            | 3.11| 1.53|      |      |      |      |     |      | .51**|
8. Cover-up         | 2.85| 1.21|      |      |      |      |     |      |      |

*p < .05

**p < .01
Table 3: Means of variables at Time 1 and 2

<table>
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<th>SD</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<td>Moral Shame</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>1.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Image shame</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Positive orientation</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative orientation</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>1.29</td>
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Table 4

Study 3: Cross-sectional intercorrelations at T1 and T2

<table>
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<tr>
<td>1. Moral Shame</td>
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<td>.72</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Image Shame</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>-.31</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guilt</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>-.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Positive orient.</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Negative orient.</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-.53</td>
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</table>

All correlations significant, p < .01

Above diagonal, correlations at T1; below diagonal, correlations at T2.
Table 5

Study 3: longitudinal correlations

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>T2 Moral Shame</td>
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<td>.74</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 Image Shame</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>-.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 Guilt</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 Positive orient.</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>-.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 Negative orient.</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All correlations, p < .01
Figure captions

Figure 1. Study 1: Relationships among emotions and positive and negative orientations.
* p < .05, ** p < .001

Figure 2. Study 2: Relationships among emotions and positive and negative orientations.
* p ≤ .05, ** p < .001

Figure 3. Study 3: Longitudinal relationships among emotions and positive and negative orientations.
* p ≤ .05, ** p < .001
Figure 1
Figure 2
Note, error terms for items making up positive and negative response tendencies were allowed to covary over time, but these covariances are not shown in this diagram for the sake of clarity. That is, apology support at T1 was allowed to covary with apology.
support at T2, cover-up at T1 was allowed to covary with cover-up at Time 2, and so on (variables were only allowed to covary with the same variable across time, no cross-loading was allowed). This was done to reflect the stability over time of aspects of these variables that are not captured by the latent variables measuring positive and negative response tendencies.