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The Politics of Majority Nationalism
The Politics of Majority Nationalism

Framing Peace, Stalemates, and Crises

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In 2004, Greece exuded an air of progress and self-confidence. In August, billions of people watched a glittering opening ceremony for the Athens Olympics (CNN 2004). The Greek evening news relayed world media coverage of the newly constructed Rio-Antirio suspension bridge, one of the world’s longest bridges of its kind (ERT 2004; Agence France Presse 2004a). An unprecedented range of new transport options linked the Athens Olympics, including ring roads, a tramway, a suburban light rail system, and extensions to the existing metro system (McDonald 2004). Greece, a small country historically prone not only to foreign policy crises but also to serious infrastructure and corruption problems, had managed to make timely preparations for the Olympics (Smith 2004b: 2). Greeks listened to foreign commentators admiring the wonders of ancient and modern Greece, talking about a new “golden era” (ibid.). A Daily Telegraph reporter asserted: “Greece has broken free of the past (the colonels’ seizure of power in 1967, the anti-Americanism of Andreas Papandreou, the confrontation with Turkey over Cyprus) to become a modern, efficient nation” (2004: 21; emphasis added).

The optimism affected others beyond the borders of Greece. Only weeks before the Olympics, Greek prime minister Kostas Karamanlis had been a special guest of Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the wedding of his daughter in Istanbul; then, sending a message of peace to the entire Greek nation, Erdoğan himself attended the opening of the Athens Olympics (Agence France Presse 2004b). Admittedly, the latter move came as no surprise, given the steady improvement in Greek-Turkish relations over the previous five years. Following the successful initiatives of foreign ministers George Papandreou
and İsmail Cem—not to mention numerous grassroots initiatives—Greek and Turkish leaders had made decisive steps toward reconciliation, first as members of the European People’s Party and later as prime ministers of their respective countries (Matthews and Kohen 2004; Smith 2004b). In brief, after three decades of tension, in the summer of 2004 ties between Greece and Turkey were warm.

However, the burgeoning friendship between the two countries and their leaders was not the whole story. The charismatic Turkish leader seemed at the time determined to introduce serious reforms. In two years he reversed the course of Turkish foreign policy: first in northern Iraq, where Turkey did not intervene as previously threatened and gradually managed to establish a stable relationship with the federalizing Iraqi Kurdistan (Kardas 2010; Romano and Gurses 2014). In Cyprus, the new AKP (Justice and Development Party) government opened up the borders for unrestricted movement in 2003 and later embraced the Annan Plan, leading to a Turkish Cypriot “yes” vote in the April 24, 2004, referendum (Çarkoğlu and Sözen 2014; Öniş and Yılmaz 2009). Then, in an implicit recognition of the Kurdish reality at home, Erdoğan’s administration legalized Kurdish-language broadcasting and freed Leyla Zana, as well as three other former Kurdish parliamentarians (Ayata 2011; Smith 2004a). In his early years in power, the pro-Islamist Erdoğan arguably brought more positives to Turkey’s majority-minority relations than any of his Kemalist predecessors during the earlier decade.

But others were slow to accept the winds of change, proving themselves unwilling to follow Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) “end of history” in Greek-Turkish relations. For example, during the Olympics, when Turkish F-4 fighter planes violated the Greek airspace over the Greek islands, Greece protested and allegedly warned Turkey through NATO of its determination to shoot down “planes threatening the games” (Simerini 2004). In fact, in the years to come, the Greek-Turkish neighborhood would refuse to reject its crisis-prone past. Greece and Turkey entered bilateral negotiations on their Aegean disputes but failed to reach a settlement, or even to ask for mediation from the International Court in The Hague, as implicitly stipulated in the Helsinki conclusions of 1999 (Tsakonas 2010: 43; Karakatsanis 2014). Despite propeace mobilizations for Greek-Turkish friendship, both sides have kept postponing a comprehensive settlement. More importantly, other major ethnopolitical issues in the region—such as the Kurdish question, the Cyprus peace process, and the Greek-Macedonia naming controversy—have not moved in the direction of a conclusive peace settlement but seem locked into prolonged and irresolvable stalemates.
Stalemates in the Eastern Mediterranean seem to persist as well as to proliferate. For instance, following the Mavi Marmara vessel incident in 2010, when Israeli commandos killed nine Turkish activists attempting to confront the Israeli blockade of Gaza, Turkey and Israel became increasingly hostile. Relations with Egypt were similarly damaged with Turkey's support for ousted Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi, leading to the expulsion of Turkey’s ambassador by the new Egyptian regime in November 2013 (Today’s Zaman 2013). More worryingly, since 2011 Turkey has faced the consequences of the Syrian civil war, including an unprecedented refugee crisis with approximately a million refugees crossing its southern border in 2013, a figure expected to grow to 1.6 million people by the end of 2015 (UNHCR 2014). The refugee flows and spectacular rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq have caused many to fear the destabilization of Turkey and the concomitant reversal of its achievements since 2002. Following Turkey’s declining image in the Middle East, the Financial Times wrote: “What once seemed a Turkish beacon of moderate and modernizing Islam to an Arab world in upheaval has been eclipsed, and Turkey risks being sucked into the sectarian violence roaring like a whirlwind throughout the region” (Gardner 2014: 4)

The Politics of Majority Nationalism examines how ethnopolitical frames influence crisis behavior in the Middle East and the Balkans. Interestingly, in 2010 a leading foreign policy thinker of Turkey (and later minister of foreign affairs and prime minister), Ahmet Davutoğlu, attempted to reframe his country’s foreign policy by introducing the doctrine of “zero problems with neighbors” (2010), aiming to shape a new era of relations between Turkey and its immediate region. But, as shown above, Turkish ambitions for regional peace clashed with the tough realities of the Eastern Mediterranean. By the end of 2014, Turkey was identified with the Sunni side of the Sunni-Shia-Kurdish conflict raging across the Levant, despite the fact that a fifth of its own population are Alevi (heterodox Shia) and another fifth ethnic Kurds (Gardner 2014). A political opponent of AKP and former Turkish diplomat from the main opposition party said to the author, in a personal interview, that Davutoğlu’s doctrine had led to a much more difficult situation for Turkey, where it instead faces “zero neighbors without problems.”

On a more positive note, despite these setbacks in foreign policy, Turkey has yet to suffer the fate of other Southern European nations in the global debt crisis. According to some accounts, Turkish GDP tripled in AKP’s decade in power, with the country appearing on the list of the twenty largest economies of the planet (Öniş 2012; Kastoryano 2013).
As for Greece, heady optimism about the Greek economy following the Olympics and the country’s accession to the Eurozone meant that few foresaw the country’s world-record financial disaster. In fact, Greece has faced one of the greatest nonwar recessions in modern economic history, roughly equivalent to the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States. With the wisdom of hindsight, a 2013 op-ed in the Telegraph pointed to a different Greece, one that was “starting to look like Weimar Germany” after five years of financial and political meltdown. Written by Daniel Hannan, a British Euroskeptic conservative MEP, the op-ed describes the hubris of easy credit years, when the markets treated Greek and German debt as interchangeable. It adds: “Now they [Greeks] are suffering the nemesis: GDP down by an almost unbelievable 23 percent from its peak; 28 percent unemployment; middle-class Athenians rummaging in bins for food; farmers bringing supplies to urban cousins” (Hannan 2013).

Inevitably, the financial crisis has had major sociopolitical effects: Greece has seen the collapse of its centrist parties, rising polarization at all levels, and the emergence of one of the most extreme manifestations of majority nationalism, the rise of a prototype fascist party, the Golden Dawn, as the country’s third largest political force (Ellinas 2013; Kovras and Loizides 2014; Zaharias 2014). Faced with a record seven years of continuous recession since 2008, Greece is far from the new “golden era” envisioned during the 2004 Olympics. The country and its neighbors, particularly Turkey, also pose a set of intriguing puzzles of broader interest for comparative politics and international relations.

THE POLITICS OF MAJORITY NATIONALISM

Unsurprisingly, given the tumult, the two countries have received widespread media and policy attention. For scholars in the fields of comparative politics and international relations, the study of the Greek-Turkish neighborhood could provide valuable insights into the limits and failures of majoritarian politics across a wide spectrum of issues, from managing inter-state crises to accommodating national minorities and dealing with severe financial crises. Yet few scholarly debates have integrated Greek-Turkish politics into the broader international relations and comparative politics literature. The study of the two countries and their broader region generally lacks theoretical engagement and innovation particularly with regard to the role of ideational factors in explaining crisis and mediation outcomes. Moreover, until now, no study has provided a comparative perspective of the adversarial or cooperative framing in countries with rich cultural repertoires of contention and moderation.
bridge this gap, this book provides an account of the politics of majority nationalism in the Greek-Turkish neighborhood since the 1980s. It investigates the complex interplay between nationalism and the choice of peace, focusing on how political elites, social movements, and ordinary citizens frame, advocate, and resist peace policies.

Since the creation of their respective national states, political rhetoric in Greece and Turkey has accumulated a diverse cultural repertoire of beliefs, norms, and frames for contention and moderation. At times, hardliners have sustained what Brubaker (1998: 289) calls a nationalist "primed frame," aiming for national emancipation but more frequently leading to violent conflict, partition, and (civil) war. At other times, peacemakers have established strong beliefs in the value of peace and stability. An explanation of this variation and the conditions under which peacemakers succeed or fail is the major goal of this book.

Building on comparative and historical evidence, *The Politics of Majority Nationalism* situates Greece and Turkey within the broader literature of peace and conflict studies. It seeks to explain why and how societies make certain choices to achieve peace while others do not. Specifically, it compares the causes of nationalist and peace mobilizations in Greece and Turkey to those in other conflict-ridden societies facing equally rich, explosive, and diverse pools of ethnopolitical contention and peacemaking. On the one hand, this book examines crises, stalemates, and peace mediations involving Turkey and Greece either bilaterally or with minorities and immediate neighbors in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. On the other, it compares Greece and Turkey with their postcommunist neighbors testing the generalizability of the book's main arguments on Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine.

Conflict-prone dyads such as Greece and Turkey offer theoretically insightful stories about the extent to which framing crisis behavior is driven by "conventional" security concerns or, alternatively, elite manipulation (or alternative factors). The close involvement of international institutions in an area rife with both low- and high-intensity conflicts makes the Greek-Turkish neighborhood a critical testing ground for alternative theoretical frameworks. For one thing, Greece and Turkey are simultaneously NATO allies and strategic rivals with a diverse and explosive repertoire of crises. For another, peace or conflict outcomes are arguably not overdetermined; external incentives for moderation are significant, but so are internal domestic challenges and security dilemmas in a region "tormented by history" (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008).
Few areas in the world combine the rich building material and contrasting features for framing peace and conflict: on the one hand, strategic rivalries and protracted stalemates have led to near-war situations; on the other, arguably open and decisive opportunities for peace have emerged through the conflict-mitigating role of regional and international organizations such as the EU, NATO, and the United Nations. In short, the Greek-Turkish neighborhood offers an ideal locale for juxtaposing competing ideas and theoretical frameworks emphasizing domestic or international determinants of crisis behavior.

*The Politics of Majority Nationalism* contributes to the broader literature by investigating how societies in conflict choose to respond to their peace dilemmas and ethnopolitical challenges, emphasizing the ideational preconditions of peacemaking. It uncovers the conditions that foster a particular intractable nationalist discourse, juxtaposing it to the discourse of peacemakers attempting to reverse the logic of nationalism. The book initiates a debate on the underemphasized linkages between institutions, symbols, and framing processes in enabling or restricting the choice of peace. It provides a measure of precrisis frames and demonstrates how the latter influence the crisis behavior of majority groups, as well as stalemates and, ultimately, the choice of peace. Finally, it builds on an established scholarly tradition by linking case studies with comparative politics and conflict studies (Lijphart 1968; Lustick 1993; McGarry and O’Leary 1993, 2004). Such studies on the Eastern Mediterranean are rare, despite contributions in other areas of comparative politics, such as civil wars (Kalyvas 2006), the extreme right (Bora 2003; Ellinas 2010), secularism and democratization (Turam 2007; Fokas 2014), ethnic conflict and minority politics (Grigoriadis 2008; Aktar et al. 2010), and EU integration (Rumelili 2005; Diez et al. 2008).

While existing literature tends to focus solely on Greek-Turkish relations as the unit of analysis, this book also adds their Balkan, Caucasus, and Middle Eastern neighbors into the broader regional analysis. By so doing, it situates Greece and Turkey within a wider conflict-ridden neighborhood aiming to develop a set of theoretical innovations of relevance to the burgeoning literature of peace and conflict studies. This literature has often ignored ideational factors in conflict management and has hitherto dealt with Greece and Turkey merely in passing. This is an odd omission, as most quantitative studies on crisis behavior rank the two Aegean neighbors among the most crisis prone states of the twentieth century (Geller 1993: 181; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997: 47).

Finally, the book contributes to scholarly and policy debates by examining conflict transformation in protracted stalemates. It asks how peacemakers
challenge and transform the language of ethnic nationalism and war in their
countries and identifies a set of tools to use when communicating peace mes-
sages to local and national constituencies. To date, most studies have focused
on the dark side of nationalism and its destructive manifestations, ignoring
internal variations across cases and the contest between peacemakers ("doves")
and hardliners ("hawks").

**FRAMING PEACE AND CONFLICT**

Erving Goffman introduced the concept of framing to denote “schemata of
interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label”
ocurrences within their life space and the world at large (1974: 21). Following
Goffman, Bert Klandermans defined framing as a process in which social ac-
tors, media, and members of a society jointly interpret, define, and redefine

“Framing” is often used interchangeably with other terms, such as discourse,
ideology, hegemonic beliefs, or narratives; however, what distinguishes framing
from other comparable terms and frameworks including prospect theory (see
Chapter 4), is the degree of strategy involved, particularly in appropriating,
challenging, or negotiating the shared meaning of a given situation (see also
Benford and Snow 2000: 612; Zald 1996: 261; and Payne 2001: 39). Building on
this analytical distinction, I suggest that frames reflect the work of social agents,
whether political leaders, civil society movements, or media. In other words,
frames imply agency, deliberation, or even manipulation in the construction
of new “realities” (Benford and Snow 2000). In the making of majority poli-
tics, framers aim to dominate or monopolize political communication, thereby
shaping patterns of political behavior, whether at state or civil society level.

Frames have two essential components: first, a diagnostic element, or a defini-
tion of the problem, its source, grievances, and more generally, the motives
involved; second, a prognostic element, the identification of appropriate op-
portunities and strategies for redressing the problem, as well as the degree of
efficacy of these strategies (Snow and Benford 1988; Levin et al. 1998). Whether
cooperative or adversarial toward ethnic “others,” ethnopolitical frames are
strategically important in a group’s narrative because they legitimize subse-
quent courses of action by combining past-present-future (Kovras and Loizides
2012). In essence, frames are purposefully driven political accounts that blend
past experience with future action often by excluding uncomfortable facts and
“others,” in an effort to legitimize and motivate in-group goals.
Moreover, frames build on a pre-existing cultural stock drawn from the symbolic politics of a national community (Ross 1997, 2007; Kaufman 2001). They rely heavily on the use of available information, public memories, and analogies from the past. Like picture frames, they reflect public perceptions while restricting certain “realities,” including noteworthy institutional designs and innovations, from public attention. Frames focus attention “by bracketing what in our sensual field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is ‘in frame’ and what is ‘out-of-frame’ in relation to the object of orientation” (Snow 2007). But even when frames correlate to, or reflect, other causes of mobilization and conflict, these variables may remain unnoticed unless elites bring them to public attention and eliminate alternative interpretations. For the most part, winning frames combine diagnostic and prognostic elements and, therefore, are dependent on external security conditions and electoral politics, as well as the personal charisma, authority, and credibility of the leader or opinion-maker during a particular debate.

Ethnopolitical frames and conflict resolution or escalation are closely linked. Ross has demonstrated the importance of using the divergence of historical narratives in contemporary ethnopolitical conflicts (2007) as a starting point in discussions of conflict management. For the most part, frames can influence decision-makers and the broader public in three ways. First, adversarial frames can constrain moderate leaders from capitalizing on their potential for peacemaking. When adversarial framing dominates political debates, a society could become trapped in these frames, even during ostensibly promising times for peacemaking. Alternatively, cooperative frames emphasizing the fairness and viability of peace compromises could be catalysts in conflict transformation, despite prohibitive conditions prevailing in a conflict-ridden society. Contrary to conventional wisdom and as demonstrated in Chapter 5, even hardliners frequently participate in contested peace processes once appropriate political and constitutional arrangements become available. Cooperative frames offer the political arsenal necessary to enable such actors to initiate, justify, and maintain their positive transformation despite ethnic outbidding challenges.

Finally, as the literature of ethnic relations frequently demonstrates, actors are often ambivalent and noncommittal, making it hard to categorize them as hawks or doves. Frequently, ethnopolitical issues are fluid, and ethnic politics can evolve in unexpected directions, both cooperative and conflictual. Such “hybrid” situations are particularly amenable to framing processes and institutional design to nudge them to the right direction. In a nutshell, the book's
treatment of framing goes beyond structural explanations of peace and conflict to assign agency to actors’ decisions and investigating how these are communicated in the public space.

Besides framing processes, the book addresses alternative explanations of the “choice of peace,” including hostile neighbors, socioeconomic conditions, and reluctant allies. It emphasizes a society’s responses to its own ethnopolitical challenges and demonstrates the importance of societal choices in determining the direction and intensity of the causality of alternative explanations. Societies respond differently to similar problems, and the “choice of peace” is critically important, not only for endorsing peace arrangements but also for the ultimate well-being of conflict-ridden nations. This book investigates alternative explanations for such choices, focusing on the institutionalization of symbolic politics and how this enables or restricts leaders from framing the “right” analogies and lessons across space and time (Jervis 1968; George 1980; Bermeo 1992).

RESEARCH DESIGN

To investigate the mechanisms behind episodes of nationalist-driven or peace-driven mobilizations, The Politics of Majority Nationalism employs process-tracing, defined as relevant, verifiable causal stories resting in different chains of cause-effect relations (Tilly 1997: 48; George and Bennett 2005: 205–31). It draws on parliamentary debates, party documents (declarations and memoranda), and biographies and autobiographies of politicians to assess reasons for decisions to support or reject peace arrangements. In order to triangulate the data and fill the existing gaps, it relies on extensive interviews with key political and civil society figures. The Politics of Majority Nationalism supports its arguments by contrasting the experience of Greece and Turkey to “most similar” and “most different” cases and by identifying variations within each case study, particularly at the level of crisis escalation, stalemates, and peace processes (see also King et al. 1994; Van Evera 1997; Levi 1997).

Drawing on Tansey (2007: 766), it also uses elite interviews to corroborate what has been established by others and to determine what a set of people think about key issues. My ongoing engagement with public policy particularly in Cyprus and Georgia has allowed personal access to key actors in peace processes, including individuals with privileged access to information. In addition, I gained access to an electronic copy of parliamentary speeches in Turkey since 1872; to substantiate the book’s arguments, I analyzed selected debates using a
potentially generalizable tool-kit designed for measuring nationalist vs. peace framing. Even though citizens might not follow parliamentary debates systematically, it is possible to identify and select the most “high impact” sessions, cited for consistency purposes in the international press.

Although not the only place to study framing, the national parliament has several advantages over such sources as local newspapers, FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), evening news reports, and interviews. Unlike interviews, which usually take place after a crisis, parliamentary debates do not allow framers to reconstruct their positions. Parliamentary speeches are unrefined and unedited—as compared with, say, an editor’s selection of news, whether for a local newspaper or a translated FBIS source. In fact, the selection of radical news is prevalent in the media. Media might systematically underreport moderate statements by politicians, as more radical statements may capture the attention of the public. Moreover, parliamentary debates tend to reveal aspects of reality not presented in the media; in Greece and Turkey, and most other established or emerging democracies, MPs enjoy legal immunity and, therefore, are not restricted as to what they say publicly. Further, during parliamentary debates, there is often a contest between rival frames, usually between the government and the opposition, something absent in partisan media. In rare moments, parliamentarians with legal immunity even admitted facts that have been otherwise taboo in public discourse. Finally, parliamentary debates constitute, by definition, a characteristic sample of what is said publicly, while an arbitrary selection of television channels or newspaper columns might lead to reasonable criticisms of selection bias.

This book’s distinct methodological contribution lies in integrating comparative analysis with interpretive work. By relying on framing analysis, it addresses a major gap in the literature demonstrating through various comparative designs the role of ethnocentric frames in constraining leaders from negotiating mutually beneficial compromises. While others have recently advocated innovative approaches to the study of framing processes (Desrosiers 2011; Kaufman 2011; McDoom 2012), *The Politics of Majority Nationalism* goes further, utilizing alternative comparative designs to support its main arguments also drawing insights from institutionalist and structuralist approaches.

The analysis in each of the following chapters is puzzle driven and puts forward an alternative comparative approach. Drawing on the observation that nationalist expression is inconsistent across issues, Chapters 3 and 4 examine within case variation and pairs of contrasting cases of mobilization and re-
straint in Greece and Turkey, respectively. In the early 1990s, Greek society focused its attention on the “least threatening” Macedonian issue instead of the “traditional” rivalries with Turkey or Albania. Likewise, Turkey in 1998–99 followed a tough-resolve approach against Syria, Italy, and Greece with regard to their (perceived) support for the Kurdish separatists but reached an important compromise with the latter at the EU summit in Helsinki months later. Both chapters provide detailed chronologies of preceding crisis-making in each case study based on the Greek-Turkish Negotiations and Crises 1983–2003 database, available through a British Academy grant (Loizides 2009b). Drawing from Lieberman (2005, 2010), the dataset pays attention to emerging standards in the design of historically oriented replication datasets, including standards on quality of sources, transparency of citations, reporting uncertainty in the historical record, and the need for valid comparisons. To meet these standards, it relies on primary, secondary, and tertiary sources, including the Economist Intelligence Unit reports, Lexis-Nexis, and Facts on File.

Chapter 5 takes a different direction from the rest of the book by considering positive transformation in deviant or least likely case studies (Lijphart 1968; Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007). Deviant cases of peace transformation are those that initially demonstrated high levels of entrenched ethnocentric framing, majority nationalist mobilization, and human rights violations, yet actors have nonetheless managed to catalyze a process of conflict transformation. Finally, Chapter 6 engages on a broader cross-country comparison of five cases comparing Greece and Turkey with three of their postcommunist neighbors. The Politics of Majority Nationalism introduces an additional methodological innovation by combining historical comparative analysis with process tracing. What is particularly interesting in this comparison is that the five cases of majority nationalism are sequential: Serbia (1987), Greece (1992), Turkey (1998), Georgia (2008), and Ukraine (2014) allowing broader analysis of the effects of cross-learning, elite socialization, and framing of ethnopolitical issues in post–cold war Europe. The research design also follows Petersen (2011) in pointing out that the selection of cases within a particular region and time period often provides the most reliable sample minimizing the effects of selection bias.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The book is divided into six chapters, each addressing a different piece of the puzzle in the study of majority nationalism and the framing of peace, stalemates, and crises.
Chapter 1, "The Politics of Majority Nationalism: Regional and Global Perspectives," situates Greek and Turkish nationalism within the broader picture of conflict-ridden national majorities. This chapter provides key definitions and typologies; it integrates theories of nationalism, social movements, and ethnic conflict, aiming to demonstrate major gaps in these literatures. It argues that majority nationalism and the variations in the response of majorities cannot be adequately explained simply by history or long-standing ethnic and religious rivalries. Moreover, theories of ethnic mobilization, which focus on single-factor explanations, such as group status, relative (or actual or unexpected) deprivation, fear, and repression, offer an inadequate explanation of the politics of majority nationalism.

The social movement literature provides valuable insights on mobilization and conflict, yet as this chapter demonstrates these insights are rarely investigated in studies of nationalism. Following McAdam et al. (1997: 152), the social movement literature has been integrated across a trinity of issues: political opportunities, resource mobilization, and framing processes/norms. Drawing on this study, I argue for a comprehensive perspective in the study of majority nationalism, noting the conditions and constraints that shape protest, the institutions and mobilizing structures that support it, and the framing processes around which action is perceived and acted out (ibid.). One of the underlying themes of this chapter is the need to supplement structural or rational choice explanations with cognitive perspectives. Framing, in particular, needs to be at the center of analytical discussions on crisis behavior and peace settlements, since most variables discussed in the literature do not trigger outcomes unless mobilizing elites can point out their importance.

Chapter 2, "Doves and Hawks: Frames of Peace, Stalemates, and Crises," focuses on precrisis framing (that is, framing before the advent of a crisis or mediation). It asks how framing processes contribute to subsequent crises, stalemates, or peace processes. The chapter provides the book's main argument on why societies succeed or fail in their choice of peace. It identifies the precrisis framing strategies of "doves and hawks" and illustrates how framing becomes embedded in public identities, norms, and institutions to determine a society's subsequent path toward peace or its alternative. It addresses in more detail the following issues: the conceptualization of frames in general and their precrisis features in particular; the key differences between framing and the broader conceptual category of perception; the debate on the limits of plasticity of frames, or to what extent frames should correspond to
pre-existing “perceived realities”; the causal links between framing processes and the choice of peace; the two necessary component frames relating motives and opportunities; and the detailed coding procedures of adversarial and nonadversarial frames.

The chapter also notes the curious absence of successful peacemaking in post-Ottoman societies despite legacies of Ottoman-era tolerance. It addresses these conundrums and offers explanations as to why societies in the Balkans and the Middle East have generally failed in overcoming protracted stalemates. The chapter builds on framing analysis to demonstrate how a selective reading of the past and false analogies drawn from the Ottoman and Western colonialism legacies have made the endorsement of accommodation mechanisms more difficult. Framing analogies with the past shape common (mis)understandings of the fairness and viability of such compromises, leading to a society's ultimate refusal to consider necessary (even unavoidable) mechanisms of accommodating ethnic diversity.

Chapter 3, “Trapped in Nationalism? Symbolic Politics in Greece and the Macedonian Question,” provides the book’s first main case study. It examines how adversarial framing on the Macedonian issue constrained a moderate government in Greece from capitalizing on its peace potential in the early 1990s, when major demonstrations in Thessaloniki and Athens attracted at least a million people each. At the same time, it asks why conflicts related to Turkey or Albania received little attention despite ethnic antagonisms and an alleged “civilizational divide” between Greece and its predominantly Muslim neighbors. Drawing evidence from the Hellenic Parliament, the chapter demonstrates that on Turkish and Albanian issues, a sizable moderate camp championed reconciliation and compromise, maintaining a balance between hardliners and moderates in Greece. Even so, hardliners monopolized the framing of Greece’s Macedonian policies, thus shaping an early nationalist consensus. By adopting this hegemonic frame, mainstream Greek political elites prevented adaptation to new realities in the 1990s, obstructing a feasible peace agreement between the two nations.

Chapter 4, “Europe and (Non-)Accommodation in Turkey: Framing the Kurds, Syria, and Greece,” contains the book’s second main case study, Turkey and the Kurdish question. It highlights the 1998 Öcalan incident, when hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens joined mass nationalist mobilizations to protest against third countries allegedly supporting the Kurdish PKK. It examines how Turkish elites framed foreign governments and the PKK as the parties
solely responsible for the Kurdish uprising, making any potential compromise unimaginable for the next two decades. At the same time the chapter examines the progress made by Turkey in reaching better relations with Greece, leading to the Helsinki compromise in 1999.

The chapter goes on to consider why Turkey has failed to develop accommodation mechanisms for its national minorities unlike other industrial or developing countries facing similar ethnopolitical challenges.

Chapter 5 "Transforming Stalemates into Opportunities for Peace: Four 'Success' Stories," takes a different direction, by considering positive transformation. Deviant cases of peace transformation are those that initially demonstrated high levels of entrenched ethnocentric framing, majority nationalist mobilization, and human rights violations, yet actors have nonetheless managed to catalyze a process of conflict transformation. The chapter focuses on four examples of partial transformation in the Eastern Mediterranean region—namely, the Macedonian name dispute (that is, the 1995 Interim Agreement), the 1999 earthquake diplomacy between Greece and Turkey; the "democratic opening" followed by the first predominantly Kurdish party entering the Turkish parliament in 2015, and finally a set of successful confidence-building measures in Cyprus.

Chapter 6, "Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine: Postcommunist Transitions and Beyond," provides a broader comparative analysis of contentious politics and majority mobilization. The chapter makes a number of comparisons between Greece and Turkey and three postcommunist societies—Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. It demonstrates how precrisis framing had comparable effects in the five countries, despite their differences in economic performance, levels of democratization, military capacity, geopolitical alliances, cultural traditions (for example, religion), and approaches to human rights. Finally, for each case the chapter traces the processes through which precrisis framing has influenced subsequent policy decisions.

The concluding chapter, "Why do Majorities Protest? Global Crises and the Pursuit of Peace," summarizes the book's findings and notes their broader theoretical and public policy implications for Greece and Turkey and for majority nationalism in general. The chapter also discusses the latest developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, emphasizing both promising and worrisome aspects of contemporary politics. Despite apparent progress in Greek-Turkish relations, all major problems remained unresolved, with predictable and probably catastrophic consequences beyond the region. To this point, there is no real evidence
that confrontational behavior belongs to the past, as most analysts recognize a high likelihood of future crises resulting from the spread of genocidal violence in Syria and Iraq, the rise of extreme right-wing nationalism in Greece, and the failure to resolve Greek-Turkish disputes. The unpredictability and fluidity of many variables affecting ethnopolitical crises might alert policy-makers to make better use of opportunities and timeliness for conflict resolution.

A REGION LIKE NEVER BEFORE

The completion of this book in the first half of 2015 coincided with unprecedented developments in the Greek-Turkish neighborhood. Most notably, on 25 January 2015 Syriza, capitalized on the financial crisis to secure a landslide victory, winning 149 out of the 300 seats in the Greek parliament. The phenomenon of the anti-establishment Greek radical Left and its revolutionary forty-year-old leader Alexis Tsipras quickly captured the hearts and minds of intellectuals and policymakers in Europe and globally. But the charismatic Greek PM (as of July 2015) had soon had to compromise his agenda, forging an unholy alliance with a small nationalist party, the Independent Greeks, and signing a third bailout agreement on 13 July 2015 despite a mandate referendum a week earlier to reject older proposals and to renegotiate better terms with international creditors. The meltdown of the Greek economy and society since 2008 has come to threaten not only the country’s position in the EU but also the continuity of Greek democratic institutions.

At the same time, as argued in this book, the post-2008 financial crisis has highlighted the importance of peace and stability in Greece’s immediate neighborhood. Surprisingly, new opportunities have emerged to resolve Greek-Turkish disputes, especially the decades-long Cyprus problem. On 26 April 2015, Mustafa Akıncı, a veteran peacemaker whose earlier contribution to bicomunal cooperation in Nicosia is covered in Chapter 5, won a landslide victory with 60.3 percent in the second round of the Turkish Cypriot elections. For the first time in its long history of stalemates, the Cyprus problem has quietly moved toward resolution, a potentially inspiring example for the entire region at troubled times. For its part, Turkey faced an unprecedented electoral outcome on 7 June 2015 when the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) entered parliament. While predominantly supported by ethnic Kurds, HDP won significant support (and applause) across the Turkish society after a decade of attempted yet unfulfilled reforms by the ruling AKP.

Following public fatigue with the dominance of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP
lost majority seats in parliament for the first time since 2002. The post-June electoral situation has created alternative possibilities for either new elections or a coalition government including the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP) whose rise in the late 1990s is extensively discussed in the following pages. Similarly, PM Tsipras in Greece could face new elections for a renewed mandate after the July 2015 bailout agreement. Trapped in its populist and anti-austerity rhetoric, Syriza also carries the anti-nationalist tradition of Synaspismos of the 1990s (see Chapter 3), an important reason for optimism for the future of the Balkan, Greek-Turkish and Cyprus peace processes.

Greece and its region have been at crossroads despite painful bailouts, elections, and referendums. New challenges and actors are emerging in the region with competing nationalist and peace agendas. Depending on the outcome of current financial and political developments, the Greek-Turkish neighborhood could still face increasing tensions with catastrophic effects for the economy, global migration, and security. Alternatively, a domestic political consensus could prevail, initiating a new process of ambitious conflict transformation. With unresolved puzzles emerging from concurrent crises, stalemates, and peace mediations, the troubled “post-Ottoman region” will continue to be critically important to the study of international relations and comparative politics for the next few decades.
The Politics of Majority Nationalism
The Politics of Majority Nationalism: Regional and Global Perspectives

While studies of contentious ethnic politics generally focus on minority issues, few have attempted to provide a theoretical account of majorities as their primary unit of comparative political analysis. Alexander Motyl’s *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* (2001), for example, includes no entry on majority groups, while only a handful of studies have focused on majorities per se.¹ Yet national majorities deserve scholarly attention, given the impact of destructive actions by numerically dominant groups on their ethnic antagonists. Unlike minorities, which rarely have adequate resources to harm their opponents, majorities can choose to engage in both grassroots and state-level mobilizations. By controlling the state apparatus, including the army and the police, politically and numerically dominant groups can engage in some of the most threatening actions against peace. Many of the worst crimes against humanity have been triggered by majority-group actions, in the late Ottoman Empire, Nazi Germany, and more recently, Rwanda and Sudan.

Majority politics, particularly the evolving nature of modern nationalism, offer opportunities for theoretical innovation. As Kaufmann and Haklai (2008) argue, the world has been in the midst of a long-term transition from dominant minority to dominant majority ethnicity. Whereas minority rule has been common in premodern societies, modernity and the waves of democratization of the past two centuries have engendered a shift to dominant majorities. As demonstrated recently in the Arab Spring revolutions, majorities have become increasingly eager to risk even civil wars in addressing their grievances. The post-2011 civil war in Syria is a sad manifestation of an attempted and badly managed transition from dominant minority to dominant majority ethnicity.
Before continuing, it is necessary to clarify the book’s definitions of majority groups and majority nationalism. Dominant majorities (simply referred to as majorities in the rest of the book) are groups that enjoy effective control of a sovereign state and have a demographic numerical advantage. Unlike mobilizing minorities, whose objectives often include the creation of a new state or autonomous unit, dominant majority nationalism is usually (but not exclusively) manifested in the maintenance of already-achieved state sovereignty, the protection of ethnic kin across the border, the safeguarding of majority-group national culture, and, increasingly, the protection of majority-ethnicity civilian populations from terrorism. Majority nationalism could, therefore, be defined either as an ideological schema that defends the legitimacy of these objectives, or as a feeling of frustration resulting from the failure to advance them.

For instance, Turkish nationalism has been manifested in the denial of Kurdish ethnocultural rights, hostile policies toward countries perceived to sympathize with the Kurdish PKK, preserving territorial disputes with Greece, and more recently confronting Israel in the Middle East. Likewise, Greek nationalism in the past decades has been demonstrated in denying the legitimacy of ethnic Macedonian nationalism, blocking Turkish-EU relations, and joining with Turkey in dangerous escalations of tensions over the Aegean. In both countries, majority nationalism has also targeted international organizations, such as the IMF, NATO, or the EU, seen as treating the countries unfairly or failing to deliver on their commitments and promises. For instance, following the post-2008 sovereign debt crisis, the terms of the EU Commission/European Central Bank/IMF rescue package for Greece became the major cleavage and source of contention within Greek society.

But we should avoid narrowing nationalism as a concept to include only its contemporary manifestations. Several theorists of nationalism studying the formation of nations in modern times offer insightful definitions, including Gellner (1965, 1983), Anderson (1983), and Hobsbawm (1983, 1990). For instance, Gellner relates nationalism to the needs of modern industrial societies. With the division of labor brought about by industrialization, societies become more mobile and more equalitarian. Modern states, just like modern armies, provide a thorough training for their recruits: literacy, numeracy, basic work habits, and familiarity with basic technical skills. The result is a process of homogenization with a twofold effect: a core majority group becomes a united homogeneous population or/and reactionary nationalism is developed by minorities who face various forms of cultural/ethnic humiliation and/or see their opportunities for upward social mobility blocked (Gellner 1983).
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Drawing on Gellner, O'Leary argues that "nationalism, so far the most potent principle of political legitimacy in the modern world, holds that the nation should be collectively and freely institutionally expressed, and ruled by its co-nationals" (1998: 40). To achieve this sense of collective expression, nationalizing elites have historically attempted to eliminate national and ethnic differences. According to McGarry and O'Leary, this has been done through genocide, mass-population transfers, territorial restructuring through partitions/secessions, and cultural engineering through integration or assimilation (1993). In a recent synthesis of these expressions of nation-building, Mylonas (2013) focuses on the making of conationals, refugees, and minorities in the Balkans, probing, in particular, the impact of regional and international environment in the state's choice to assimilate, accommodate, or exclude ethnic groups within its territory.

While drawing on earlier work in the field, The Politics of Majority Nationalism integrates historical and contemporary manifestations of nationalism in an attempt to expand the theoretical, empirical and public policy scope of contemporary nationalism studies. This chapter presents the major typologies of minority and majority nationalism, main definitions of stalemates and peace settlements, and relevant puzzles in Greek-Turkish crisis behavior.

TYPOLOGIES OF MINORITY VERSUS MAJORITY NATIONALISM

The dichotomy between minority and majority nationalism is not always unproblematic or uncontested. For instance, Fearon suggests a complex pattern of "double minorities" or nested minorities among Serbs and Croats, Azeris and Armenians, Catholic and Protestant Irish, Sinhalese and Tamils. Nested minorities are groups whose majority-minority status varies according to the administrative, state, or regional level (1998: 125). Yet distinguishing between minorities and majorities often serves to make an empirical distinction between qualitatively different forms of nationalism and confrontational action.

To begin with, majority mobilization in established majority-ethnicity states is almost always safer than minority activism, especially for such issues as treatment by "in-group" army and police authorities. As mentioned above, the state or parts of the ruling elite might actually encourage participation in popular events, such as, for instance, nationalist rallies, to serve domestic political interests or to force concessions from third actors (see also Haklai 2007). State institutions, media, political parties, religious authorities, and civic groups are usually instrumental in the success of nationalist protests, popular boycotts, and petitions. Moreover, because of this interconnection between states
and dominant majorities, resources are generally available (or constant), and, therefore, resource mobilization theories cannot adequately explain the variation in the responses of majorities during conflictual situations. When members of majorities want to mobilize, it is easy for them to draw upon domestic resources, while minorities are often held hostage to uncertain external support and mobilizing opportunities broadly defined (see Romano 2006).

Finally, majorities confront a number of issues (not always ethnic) that can provide the basis for mobilization. Unlike minorities, who usually have to confront one state on one issue (autonomy/sovereignty), majorities deal with many different ethnic issues and antagonists (as highlighted below in the chapter’s revised version of Brubaker’s typology of non-state-seeking nationalism). The variation of issues and responses among majorities make the latter particularly interesting in terms of theorizing and testing alternative hypotheses, not only in the fields of nationalism and ethnic politics but also in theorizing about comparative politics more generally.

Drawing on Brubaker (1998: 272–307), three broad categories of ethnopolitical crises seem relevant for majority-groups. The first is the “external national homeland” crisis, which erupts when a majority in one state tries to “rescue,” usually across a historically contested border, an ethnically related minority perceived to be threatened or severely repressed. In the period 1983–2003 there were several such episodes between Greece and Albania concerning the status of the Greek minority, and between Turkey and Bulgaria (or Greece) over the status of Thracian Turkish minorities. Despite some dire predictions, none of these crises led to major interstate crises comparable, say, to the events in the former Yugoslavia (Krajina and Bosnia), or the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, or the Transdniester region of Moldova). In fact, Greek and Turkish foreign policy gradually adapted to the constraints of the new world order, limiting the role of external homelands and emphasizing those of international bodies and nongovernmental organizations (Christou 2004; Anagnostou 2001). EU enlargement on its eastern frontier had a catalytic effect. As shown in Chapter 5, even the hitherto intractable Cyprus conflict showed signs of declining “external homeland involvement” in April 2004, after the endorsements of the Annan plan by the governments of Turkey and Greece (Ker-Lindsay 2007, 2011).

The second type of crisis stems from state and social responses to internal minorities. Here, the majority sees itself as the legitimate “owner” of the state, which in turn is expected to become the embodiment and defender of its dis-
tinctive character (Brubaker 1998: 277–78). Preventing secessionism is the cornerstone of majority nationalism, and where potentially secessionist minorities exist, majorities may mobilize to defend the integrity of the state. In practice, however, majorities may also create repressionist or even eliminationist policies affecting small minorities who lack any strategic importance or who pose no threat to the majority group. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, Turkish nationalists targeted the tiny urban minority of ethnic Greeks in Istanbul, leading to the virtual elimination of this historic community (Alexandris 1983). Similarly, Greece has denied official recognition for the remaining ethnic Macedonians in northern Greece after World War II, not to mention repatriation rights for civil war refugees of non-Greek descent, even though no evidence has ever been provided to demonstrate that they pose a direct threat to Greek security, particularly since the 1990s.\footnote{5}

Relatively secure majorities could be defined as those dominant majorities whose numerical status is not threatened; they are dominant economically, politically (represented by a majority in the national parliament), and culturally (with their language taught in state-sponsored educational institutions). More important, secure majorities have primary control of the army and police, and even though they might face occasional terrorist or other attacks, they control a particular territory militarily. Yet as the examples above demonstrate, even “relatively secure” majorities might, on occasion, opt for confrontational policies against minorities, primarily because of the way the concepts of “fear” and “security” are constructed in conflict-ridden societies.

The third type of crisis relates to Interstate conflicts over territory, cultural property, and sovereignty. Disputes over inhabited islets and territorial waters fueled nationalist passions and even risked war between Greece and Turkey twice, in 1987 and again in 1996. Despite the influence of the European Union and NATO, the conflict between Greece and Turkey has not been resolved yet. In the specific case of the Aegean disputes, it is very unlikely that anticipated oil or natural gas revenues would ever recompense the defense budgets of Greece and Turkey, or make up the lost income from bilateral investments, tourism, and trade between the two neighbors (ICG 2012).

Besides territory, interstate crises might occur over cultural issues, the economy, and, more broadly, questions of sovereignty. The Balkans offer multiple examples of interstate conflicts over cultural property, symbols, and history. For instance, in the early 1990s, the name “Macedonia” or “Macedonian,” and the heritage and symbols of the ancient Macedonian Kingdom became issues
of contention between Greece (and its northern province of Macedonia) on the one hand, and the Macedonian Republic (officially FYROM) on the other. More recently, Greece has been embattled with its European allies and the IMF over highly contentious issues on managing its economy and social unrest resulting from the post-2008 financial crisis. As with minorities, majorities might find themselves vulnerable in the face of the pressures of a globalizing and interdependent world.

And as mentioned above, the distinction between majority and minority groups or dominant and nondominant groups could be contested. Admittedly, numerical majorities are not always politically dominant, as suggested by the cases of Apartheid South Africa or Assad’s Syria. Likewise, majorities are not always ethnic; they may be cultural or political. As noted, unless otherwise stated, the book uses the term “majority” for those ethnic groups enjoying the effective control of a sovereign state of their own, with an effective numerical superiority. The literature of nationalism offers synonyms or related terms, such as Laitin’s titular nationalism (1998) or Brubaker’s non-state-seeking nationalism, assuming the group already has a state (1998). For dominant groups, O’Leary uses Staatsvolk to define “the national or ethnic people, who are demographically and electorally dominant” (2001a).

In the definition used throughout this volume, majority groups comprise more than two-thirds of the population of a country; they are politically dominant (that is, more than two-thirds majority in the parliament and domination of the economy) and culturally dominant (that is, the language of the group as the only one taught in state-sponsored educational institutions). Some of the findings may be relevant outside these thresholds, depending on other factors, such as the size of the group, military power, geographic distribution of minorities, and level of economic development. The term “demographic majorities” applies to demographically superior groups that do not have control of the state, such as Sunnis under Assad in Syria and blacks in Apartheid South Africa. Likewise, “dominant minorities” refers to groups that are not numerically superior but do have effective control of a state, such as Shiites in Syria and whites in Apartheid South Africa.

ETHNOPOLITICAL CRISES AND PROTRACTED STEALEMATES

The ethnopolitical crises discussed in this book feature, on the one hand, states and their dominant majorities, and on the other, ethnic antagonists such as minorities or neighboring countries. Drawing upon the Brecher and Wilken-
fied definition of foreign policy crises (1997), ethnopolitical crises involving majority groups are defined here as comprising the following: a perceived threat to the basic values of the majority group; a limited time for response to the threat; and a heightened probability that the majority will respond with military threats, economic reprisals, or alternatively with massive human rights violations against its ethnic antagonists. The dependent variable, crisis behavior, is dualistic in nature: it includes majority-driven state policies as well majority nationalist mobilization at the grassroots level. State policies, such as the closure of ethnic Kurdish parties, official embargoes against neighboring countries, and dangerous escalations in the Aegean, are often supplemented or accompanied by citizen-led boycotts, voting for nationalist politicians or parties, and popular mobilizations in the form of street rallies. For instance, both the Greek mobilization over the Macedonian issue in February 1992 and the Turkish mobilization over the Öcalan extradition trial in November 1998 drew the support of more than a million people in rallies, petitions, and informal boycotts (Alexandri 1992; TRT TV 1998). State policies led to a near-war situation: twice between Greece and Turkey, in 1987 and 1996, and once between Turkey and Syria, in 1998.

Confrontational action could be measured by a combination of factors that include elements of both “quiet” state policy and “noisy” nationalist mobilizations. Ignoring one of the two will create conceptual problems not only methodological but also normative. Essentially, social and state actions are often used deliberately as substitutes for each other. While facing crises with their neighbors and/or third countries, Greek and Turkish elites have encouraged citizens to boycott foreign products of unfriendly countries, but in recent times they have refrained from launching official embargoes at the state level, as a result of European Union (EU) and World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. If coding includes only state actions, these embargoes remain unnoticed. Likewise, under certain conditions, state-sponsored nationalist mobilizations, with the participation of a million people, might be at least as threatening as a state policy against a third country.

Yet “noisy” mobilizations are not a necessary characteristic of confrontational policies. In fact, in many cases, confrontational policies might take the form of maintaining a protracted stalemate or displacement. All major ethnopolitical issues discussed in this book involved significant forced population movements in the past century. Nationalizing majorities might have an interest in engineering new facts on the ground and use a protracted stalemate to legitimize, over time, what was previously seen as expulsion or demographic
engineering. A case in point is colonization of occupied territories, designated as a violation of international law in the Geneva Convention (Chrysostomides 2000: 197–215), a position taken by a 1994 report of the Council of Europe in the case of the Turkish settlers in Cyprus (Cuco 1994). Nevertheless, the massive and indiscriminate expulsion of illegal settlers with their families, especially after the passage of decades, is ethically (Carens 2000: 217) and politically (Hatay 2005) difficult to justify. Countries often use colonization to create “facts on the ground” that are irreversible because of human rights considerations for the settlers and their descendants, as Joseph Carens suggests in similar examples in China (Tibet), USSR (Baltics), Israel/Palestine (West Bank), and in the colony of New Caledonia (2000: 217–18).

Protracted stalemates might not appear as dangerous in their potential to escalate conflict, but they could give the strongest parties an unfair advantage in legitimizing a previously concluded confrontational policy. With regard to displacement crises, UNHCR (2013) defines such protracted situations as involving twenty-five thousand or more refugees for more than five years. UNHCR estimates a total of thirty protracted displacement stalemate situations as of 2013, affecting some 6.4 million refugees (ibid.: 12). Given its importance not only for displacement studies but also for ethnic conflicts more generally, scholarly work on protracted stalemates is surprisingly rare. A notable exception is Zartman (2001: 8), who defines a mutually hurting stalemate as the situation in which “parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree nor for the same reasons).” Yet Zartman’s work has not addressed situations in which stalemates are not mutually hurtful, or there is little “perceived” ripeness among either domestic or neutral observers (see also Azar 1985; Bolukbasi 1995; Lederach 1995). The discussion of the transformation of a number of stalemates in the Eastern Mediterranean region in Chapter 5 of this book makes an important addition to the theory, as conflict transformation in the region has generally taken place under conditions that originally seemed prohibitive.

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT: GREEK-TURKISH PUZZLES

Shifts in majority-group attitudes and foreign policy strategies are part of the main puzzle addressed in this book: what explains variations in majority-group politics in Greece and Turkey? The two countries contain a rich, highly explosive, but also diverse pool of ethnopolitical contention. In past decades,
Greek and Turkish responses to crises have varied. Nationwide mobilizations and confrontational policies over the Macedonian issue in Greece in the first half of the 1990s were not replicated over arguably equally important issues involving either Turkey or Albania. Likewise, Turkish discontent over the Kurdish issue translated into mass mobilizations and confrontational policies toward Syria and Italy in the fall of 1998. Discontent over Cyprus and Greece, however, gave way to significant compromises at the December 1999 European Council summit in Helsinki.

A paradoxical aspect of confrontational behavior is the use of costly, ineffective, and self-damaging strategies by dominant majorities. During the period 1983–2003, Greek and Turkish governments employed confrontational strategies, regardless of financial and political costs to their nations: in fact, according to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, the two countries were among the top six net importers of military equipment worldwide in the years following the Imia-Kardak crisis and its accompanying threat of armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey (Hagelin et al. 2003: 466). Despite its serious fiscal crisis at the time, Turkey imported military equipment worth $4.7 billion (US), while Greece allocated almost $4 billion (US) for the same purpose (the figure does not include Greek Cypriot arms imports). Countries like Egypt, Israel, and South Korea spent less money in conventional weapons imports than Turkey or Greece. The immense spending on military imports has been cited as a major contributing factor in the sovereign debt crisis and the intensity with which it hit post-2008 Greece leading to an unprecedented financial crisis (Slijper 2013).

Besides data on military spending, one could compare the Greek-Turkish crisis experience with third countries by using International Crisis Behavior Project’s global data. Arguably, the Greek and Turkish preoccupation with security is rooted in the troubled history of the two nations. There is no doubt,

**Table 1.1: Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons to the Largest Ten Recipients, 1998–2002 as measured by SIPRI’S Trend Indicator Value (TIV)**

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*Note: Figures are trend-indicator values expressed in US $m. at constant (1990) prices. Figures include the volume of major conventional weapons deliveries to these countries, as measured by SIPRI’s Trend Indicator Value (TIV). Please see SIPRI’s Sources & Methods at http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background. For up-to-date information, please see SIPRI Arms Transfer Database at http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.*
Table 1.2: List of the Most “Crisis-Prone” States of the Twentieth Century

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<td>5. Israel</td>
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Source: ICB Dataset, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997: 47)

in fact, that history plays an important role. The data below from the International Crisis Behavior Project suggest that Turkey and Greece are among the most crisis-prone states of the twentieth century (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997: 47). These data consist primarily of international crises, but they also cover certain “domestic” crises with an international component (for example, the Greek civil war). Interestingly, the data demonstrate that Greece and Turkey are in the same crisis category as their Middle Eastern neighbors: Israel, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. More precisely, Turkey was ranked ninth worldwide, with seventeen interstate crises (just ahead of Libya), while Greece was ranked tenth with fifteen crises, placing it alongside Japan and Syria. For the most part, the data from the International Crisis Behavior Project document the region’s volatility, as well as its significance to European and international security.

Yet these historical data offer an incomplete explanation of our puzzle. To begin with, although Greece and Turkey have had bitter past interactions, they experienced long periods of stability and coexistence following the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and the aftermath of World War II. Historian and Greek diplomat Alexis Alexandris (1983) describes two such periods, one between 1930 and 1938 and the other between 1946 and 1954 (see also Bahcheli 1990). Arguably, Greece and Turkey had the potential to develop a relationship similar to the one between France and Germany, especially having avoided a clash with each other during World War II. In fact, in 1953 the two countries joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but NATO’s tranquilizing effects in Western Europe were not replicated in Greek-Turkish disputes (Krebs 1999). As often noted, even though Germany and France have had an equally crisis prone past, their experience became a source of political ingenuity in creating integrated European institutions to assuage past fears. Clearly, isolating the causes of conflict escalation and management involves a high level of complexity.

But the question remains: where do confrontational actions come from, and
what explains the politics of majority nationalism more broadly? The absence of an explicit body of literature on dominant majorities and their political behavior necessitates borrowing from diverse and often contrasting literatures. Hence, the second part of the chapter critiques the existing literature on nationalism, mobilization, and conflict studies. Providing evidence from various conflict regions, it suggests that variables might be effective in causal combinations, rather than individually, and confrontational policies might result from various combinations. Here, Charles Mackie's interpretation of causality (1965) is useful, as is the concept of INUS (Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition, which by itself, is Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result) causes.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND MILITARY SETTING

Scholars often call attention to the importance of demographic setting, particularly in disputes between minorities and majorities. According to Van Evera, nationalism poses greater dangers in those parts of the world where minorities and majorities are more densely intermingled (1997: 39). He notes that “the Czechs can pursue nationalism with little risk to the peace of their neighborhood, because they have no diaspora abroad, and few minorities at home” (ibid.). However, neither Van Evera nor any other prominent scholar has ever argued that the mere presence of minorities and majorities may cause confrontation. For one thing, evidence demonstrates that only a small fraction of minorities makes a demand for independence, and, more important, even among those minorities who secede de facto, international de jure recognition is hardly ever attainable. According to Ted Gurr's available database on this issue, self-determination conflicts do not move inevitably through all phases and secession. While many observers feared that contemporary self-determination movements would continue the process of state breakdown signaled by the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, only four internationally recognized states were born out of armed conflicts in the period between 1961 and 2001: Bangladesh (1971), Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), and Eritrea (1993) (Gurr et al. 2001).

For another, minority-majority disputes escalate only if other conditions are present, such as intense insecurity felt by at least one of the sides, combined with a narrow window of opportunity for forcible rescue (that is, an interethnic security dilemma). Van Evera draws attention to this combination of these factors and argues that the scope and the structure of intermingling govern the acuteness of what he calls the “inter-ethnic security dilemma” (1997).
Demographic shifts and changes are among the most commonly cited explanations of crisis behavior. Often majorities mobilize when they fear extinction or annihilation, or when they feel that the demographic growth of their ethnic antagonists is threatening their majority status or welfare. For Horowitz, the "fear of extinction" is one of the main sources of nationalism. While he identifies a number of cases in which demographic factors play a crucial role in ethnic relations, he acknowledges that discourses on demographic threats might be constructed in order to legitimize aggressive nationalist actions (Horowitz 1985: 177–79). Manipulation of demographic factors has been extensively deployed by xenophobic movements across Western Europe and the United States (Harris 1994; Huntington 2004; Al-Azmeh and Fokas 2007). Thus the effect of demographic factors on crisis behavior depends largely on how leaders and other opinion makers frame the relationship between majorities and minorities in the domestic political discourse of a country.

Besides demographics, the military setting could determine, to a significant extent, the attainability of majority group objectives. Van Evera claims that "if nationalism is unattainable it may not even appear. It is similar to the realist argument that imperialism is a function of capability: states imperialize simply when and where they can. Likewise nationalism is simply a function of capability: it emerges where it can" (1997: 37). As the main military power in the region, Turkey could maintain tough-resolved approaches in Cyprus, Syria, or Iraq with less cost. State repression against the Kurds is also largely conditioned on the balance of power in the region. Nonetheless, other factors have to be combined to explain these cases (such as EU-Turkish relations, bureaucratic politics, dominant ideology, and domestic politics in Turkey).

Military considerations undoubtedly have a place in explaining majority politics. Nonetheless, there are cases in which small and militarily weak groups mobilize, rebel, and protest, even when the "objective" conditions are unfavorable, chances of success are limited, and risks are extremely high (Kuperman 2008). The cases of the Palestinians or the Kurds, to mention only two, suggest the need to explore other conditions leading to ethnopolitical mobilization and conflict. Kuperman examines, for instance, the case of rebellions among militarily weaker groups. He argues that (often false) expectations for international intervention on the minority side explain the willingness of many such groups to attempt an otherwise risky rebellion. Equally, false expectations of non-intervention are a key factor driving majority politics and their framing of crises. For instance, in some of the most critical cases for humanitarian intervention,
such as Serbia (Kosovo) or Georgia (South Ossetia), majority-ethnicity regimes miscalculated the chances of a third-party intervention.

On this point, Kuperman (ibid.) argues that humanitarian interventions have a "moral hazard" effect: leaders of militarily weaker groups provoke a humanitarian disaster for their own people to entice foreign intervention and eventually fulfill their nationalist inspirations, citing the example of Kosovo Albanians to make his point. Such "windows of opportunity" are rare and temporary, not only for small and oppressed minority groups but also for extremist groups among the majorities; when they appear, they are too tempting to resist, according to Kuperman's reasoning.

"Windows of opportunity" are particularly relevant in the study of the politics of majority groups. Two cases receiving considerable public attention in the 1990s, Russia and Serbia, highlight the critical role of "preventive war calculations." For example, militarily superior Russia did not engage in nationalist projects (with the interesting exception of Moldova), while the less militarily capable Serbia did so at a much greater risk. Posen proposes an alternative explanation for these cases, based on windows of opportunity and vulnerability (that is, the security dilemma). He argues that "the Russians had few incentives for a preventive war. With three times the human and material resources of Ukraine, it is unlikely that the balance of military power will soon shift against them" (1993: 43). Posen also argues that "Ukrainian pledges to become a non-nuclear state make it attractive even for nationalist Russians to postpone aggression until later" (ibid.). Unlike Russia, Serbia had many incentives for preventive war. For one thing, Serbia had a wide, albeit temporary, military advantage because Serbs enjoyed privileged access to the spoils of Yugoslavia, while Croatia was more likely to find allies in the future. For another, as Posen says, "Serbs in Croatia were militarily vulnerable, and Serbs in Serbia had only one way to defend them—a speedy, powerful offensive" (ibid. 42).

Yet as discussed in Chapter 6, Posen's security dilemma does not explain why Milošević fought a war against NATO in 1999 or Saakashvili against Russia in 2008. "Windows of opportunity" were closed, and victory was not attainable by any stretch of the imagination, suggesting the need to supplement demographic or military reasons with alternative explanations emphasizing nonrational approaches to conflict. For instance, a number of recent studies have demonstrated that in emotionally driven confrontations that are rooted in history and everyday reality, elites and masses might understandably fail to respond to rational incentives or sanctions (Kaufman 2006; Petersen 2011; Mock 2011).
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND CRISES

It is frequently hypothesized that economic inequalities between groups are among the most critical causes of mobilization and conflict. Deprivation theories look into economically disadvantaged majorities and how they target relatively well off minorities, such as middle-class Jews of interwar Europe, Chinese in Malaysia, or urban Greeks and Armenians in the late Ottoman Empire (Amor 2003; Chua 2004; Akçam 2012). In such economic settings, lower economic status and negative ingroup/outgroup comparisons might affect feelings about the minority and intensify the need for confrontational action to achieve positive group identity (Horowitz 1985). A recent study by Cederman et al. (2013) argues that political and economic inequalities along group lines generate grievances that, in turn, could trigger civil war. Contemporary research on civil war tends to dismiss grievances as irrelevant, emphasizing the role of opportunities. However, new indicators of political and economic exclusion at the group level proposed by Cederman et al. show that exclusion from central and local government has a strong effect on the risk of civil war.

Other studies show that affluent majorities mobilize against less well off minorities seen as an economic burden—contributing to crime, paying fewer taxes, and extracting resources from the welfare system. Studies aiming to explain the rise of the extreme right in Western Europe point to the relationship between welfare populism and the extreme right (Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1997; Mudde 2007, 2013). To cite only a few examples, the Roma people, Muslim communities in Europe, and African Americans in the United States have been targets of racist discourses, even in advanced democracies, not to mention explicit or implicit policies of state discrimination (Gurr 2000).

At the same time, a direct causality between background economic conditions and confrontational action should not be assumed. For one thing, economic asymmetries and competition are almost a constant in most multiethnic societies, while conflict is a varying feature (Olzak 1992: 224). By extension, economic inequalities might predict more conflict than actually happens. The cases of South Africa and Brazil also demonstrate that majority-minority relations might remain relatively stable despite acute inequalities (Marx 1998; Guelke 1999, 2005). For instance, the South African leadership restrained the black majority from retaliating against the white minority after the former gained power (Berman and Abdollahian 1999; Guelke 2012). Finally, as Ross (2007) demonstrates, cultural contestation is critical in the study of ethnic con-
lict. Frames propagated by peace movements and moderate politicians enable conflict resolution by transforming the symbolic landscape of ethnic relations.

Economic settings are equally dependent on framing processes. Economic asymmetries, like other structural factors, can be interpreted in many ways, and these interpretations shape subsequent action. In Goldstone's view, which interpretation prevails depends on the ability of states and leaders "to manipulate perceptions by relating their actions and current conditions to existing cultural frameworks and to carefully constructed ideologies" (2001: 154). Social psychologists point to the distinction between individual and ingroup economic status, arguing that the former matters very little, while those economic inequalities framed in fraternal/group terms tend to play a major role in mobilizing support for collective action (Kynder 1998).

An alternative interpretation is based on competition for opportunities between groups sharing comparable levels of economic performance but having to struggle for similar resources and jobs. In her classic work *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*, Susan Olzak rejects conventional theories of race relations, which assume that concentrations of poverty, illiteracy, and other indicators of inequality among ethnic groups cause ethnic and racial turmoil. She demonstrates that ethnic unrest is found in the competition processes that stem either from integration or desegregation in a globalizing world (1992: 213; see also 2011). Olzak's arguments echo theories developed by Gellner (1983), while McDoom (2013) has provided insights from the social capital literature to better understand majority group participation in the Rwandan genocide. In explaining why individuals did or did not participate in group violence, he emphasized social interaction effects highlighting that participants are more likely to live in the same neighborhood or household with other participants. Neighbors and household members exert influence for and against participation; as micropatial distance decreases, microsocial interaction increases (ibid. 2013).

Meanwhile, social psychologists have identified processes of reducing prejudice between territorially intermingled majority and minority groups through supportive social norms, education, and common goals (Allport 1954; Brown and Hewstone 2005).

Achieving such common goals might prove extremely difficult in times of economic crisis and fiscal austerity. A large body of literature points to the relationship between economic downturns and ethnic scapegoating, as well as fiscal austerity and the capacity of the state to contain grassroots mobilizations (Davies 1971). Economic crises might lead to scapegoating and demonization of
ethnic antagonists, whether minority groups or new immigrants; a number of classic studies from the 1940s demonstrate the correlation between lynching of black people and economic indices in the American South (Hovland and Sears 1940). As is established in this literature, economic crises increase uncertainty and dependency on state patronage, reduce the fiscal condition of the state, and deepen the divides between conservative and reformist elites (Skocpol 1979; Olzak 1992; Goldstone 2001). Finally, stress of economic modernization and financial crises might affect primarily social and regional groups or the youth.

Yet it is not always clear whether an economic crisis will lead to a nationalist mobilization or a social revolution. Traditionally, economic crises have been associated with social unrest (Goldstone 2001). In the view of Davies, revolutions are more likely to occur when a prolonged period of economic and social development is followed by a sharp reversal. As people fear that the ground gained with great effort will be quite lost, their mood becomes revolutionary (1971). Post-2008 Greek experience demonstrates both trends, as voters increasingly turned their backs on centrist parties, opting instead for antisystemic leftist parties (which nonetheless kept a low profile on foreign policy issues with Turkey and the Balkans) or the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, associated with the most extreme manifestations of majority-ethnicity nationalism (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; Ellinas 2013).

A related line of thought suggests that majority groups experiencing long-term or unexpected economic crises are especially vulnerable to nationalist rhetoric. This assumption is valid in cases in which social grievances are framed in ethnic terms, and where leaders point to scapegoats among their ethnic antagonists. In such cases, leaders try to deflect attention from their own policy errors that led to the economic crisis, by shifting the blame.

However, while economic indicators are often useful in explaining the exact timing of nationalist mobilizations, it is important to stress that not all economic crises lead automatically to confrontational policies. In fact, economic crises occasionally trigger positive change toward cooperative policies. The 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, for instance, led to the electoral triumph of the moderate pro-religious Justice and Development Party (AKP), which gradually minimized the influence of the military in politics and initially brought hopes for a cooperative shift in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy (Fokas 2008; Aktürk 2012; Özbudun and Türkmen 2013). Others note the positive relationship between economic modernization and reactionary nationalism (Turner 1972). It is hypothesized that favorable economic conditions increase the capac-

ity, opportunity, and resources available for mobilization (McAdam et al. 1996). Thus, there are two conflicting hypotheses; economic conditions might relate positively or negatively to the group's propensity to mobilize, depending, of course, on the presence of other factors (see also Brown 1997).

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Some critics focus on domestic politics and emphasize the opportunities offered to ethnic entrepreneurs and nationalist coalitions during periods of democratization (Levy 1989; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). They hypothesize that electoral systems and other domestic political structures provide opportunities for politicians to manipulate ethnic antipathies in order to mobilize mass support (Diamond and Plattner 1994).

Mansfield and Snyder point to historical data suggesting that nationalism goes hand in hand with rising democracy. They argue that both newly ambitious elites and embattled old ruling groups use appeals to nationalism to preserve their unmanageable political coalitions (1995, 2005). Where political parties and representative institutions are still in their infancy, the diversity of interests makes interethnic coalitions so difficult to maintain that often nationalist alternatives get the upper hand. As mentioned in Chapter 6, in Serbia, Slobodan Milošević and his hardline communist allies skillfully created and manipulated images of a threat to the Serbian people in order to overwhelm their opponents (Gagnon 1994). Not only elite interests but also state institutions are extremely important in both the spread and containment of nationalism, according to Snyder (2000). For example, the attempted crackdown on Golden Dawn since September 2013 has demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of the Greek authorities in dealing with violent forms of right-wing majority nationalism. When state institutions are strong, as in Turkey until the late 1990s, elites threatened by democratization will attempt to contain democratic reforms and use state-censored forms of nationalism to prevent social change. In a related study, Snyder and Ballentine (1997) note the role of media in rapidly democratizing societies. Equipped with new technologies and innovative methods of gaining credibility with the public, newly liberalized and privatized media play a crucial role in alarming, enraging, and mobilizing citizens.

Diversionary theory emphasizes internal interactions within the group, suggesting that conflict with another group increases the cohesion of the majority and the political support of its leaders (Mueller 1973; Levy 1998). Several cases from the region provide explanatory evidence for the potency of diversionary
theory, particularly during periods of democratic transition. Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus is often associated with diversionary theory (Adamson 2001); Adamson's interpretation is followed up in Mansfield and Snyder (2005), who attribute the intensity of Turkey's response to the country's newly democratic regime and increasingly free press tied to the main political parties and interests. Moreover, the two near-war situations between Greece and Turkey coincided with the hospitalization of main political protagonists (Turgut Özal in 1987 and Andreas Papandreou in 1996). As leaders and framers of national ideology, Özal and Papandreou dominated the political landscapes of Turkey and Greece, respectively; the deterioration of their health opened up opportunities for challengers in a sudden wave of democratization conducive to diversionary politics. Özal consistently took "a middle ground" on political Islam, relations with the military, and the Kurdish problem. Since his departure, Turkey has remained divided on these issues. Likewise, post-Papandreou Greece has been divided between the modernists and the traditionalists who oppose improving relations with the European Union and Turkey. A number of studies from prominent Greek and Turkish journalists (some with privileged information) have emphasized the primary role of diversionary politics in the escalation of these crises (Birand 2012; see also Lygeros's *The Game of Power* [in Greek] 1996).

However, as Brubaker (1998) argues, the assumption of the existence of opportunistic, cynical, and unprincipled elites has problematic implications. First, nationalism does not always pay off as a political strategy, and therefore, it is not always rational for elites to opt for confrontational policies. Second, while studies show that in the United States a victorious war might lead to a "rally around the flag" effect (Mueller 1973: 300), elsewhere in the world, the consequences of war are more severe, and, as a result, publics might discourage leaders from following risky and costly policies. It is also plausible that some leaders might believe in the importance of their cause: mobilizing the masses entails risks that most rational politicians are unwilling to take unless they themselves believe strongly in the sanctity of a nationalist cause.

There are a number of additional critiques of the early democratization thesis. For one thing, it is possible that the processes posited by Jack Snyder and others are applicable to mature democracies facing crises and elections. For another, wisely designed institutions might prevent ethnic conflict at earlier stages of democratization (Linz and Stepan 1992). Ward and Gleditsch demonstrate that institutional constraints on the executive branch of the government can reduce the risk of war (1998: 59), while McGarry and O'Leary demonstrate the
importance of wider inclusivity and power-sharing in early stages of democratic transitions (2009; see also Lijphart 2004). Horowitz suggests electoral incentives and federal/territorial designs can promote interethnic cooperation (usually by denying minorities their own ethnic federal state and, thus, preventing secession), but his recommendations have yet to receive wide empirical support.  

Institutional designs might differ depending on power dynamics and demographics. O’Leary shows that a necessary condition for the stability of liberal democratic majoritarian federations is the presence of an electorally and demographically dominant group, Staatsvolk, both secure and generous enough to accept a federal arrangement (2001a: 285). O’Leary argues that liberal democratic states have flexible and accommodative methods for managing national and ethnic minorities such as autonomy, federalist, and consociational arrangements: “[T]heir swift, effective, and generous deployment can make it difficult for independence movements to win mandates for break-up because it is always possible to emphasize the benefits of the Union, compared to the risks of independence” (O’Leary 2001b: 61). For instance, the endorsement of the federal idea by Greek Cypriots as early as the late 1970s safeguarded international support for a reunited Cyprus despite the physical separation of the two communities for four decades.

The newly liberalized media of Greece and Turkey demonstrate another interesting paradox for democratization theory. Arguably, media contributed to a war-threatening crisis in the Aegean in 1996 (a journalist placed a Turkish flag on the uninhabited Imia/Kardak islets), but they also instigated a warm rapprochement mobilization between the two nations shortly after the 1999 earthquakes (Ker-Lindsay 2007). Scholars in the region avoid assigning responsibility for the confrontational mobilizations to the media, but they do argue that in the absence of a deep-rooted civil society, the media failed to show adequate social responsibility in times of crisis (Demertzis et al. 1999; Ellinas 2010). Yet it is important to note that media are not independent of state policies, social norms, or commercial networks; for instance, Turkish media echo commercial interests by advocating cooperative policies to bring the country closer to its EU goal, while the Greek media campaigned actively against criminal Golden Dawn in 2013 and in favor of staying within the Eurozone in 2015.

**SOCIAL NORMS AND (MIS) ADAPTATION**

Some International Relations (IR) scholars emphasize the role of norms and their centrality in defining the political behavior of states and their majority
groups. Thomas’s work (2001) on the Helsinki conference and the signing of the treaty in 1973 shows how the spread of minority rights and the subsequent collapse of communist regimes were facilitated by the adoption of common European standards and norms on human rights. A related study by Risse-Kappen (1999) examines how majorities in ten countries have complied with international human rights norms while emphasizing the importance of regime type, civil war, and the presence of local human rights organizations. Similarly, Checkel (1998) argues that not only do states react differently to different international norms, but the mechanisms with which these are internalized (framed) in the domestic political discourse differ as well.

Scholars have extensively analyzed demonstration effects, defined as the impact of a social or nationalist movement in one country providing the impetus for change in another (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Beissinger 2002). Several waves of nationalism can be identified, including the first wave of nationalist revolutions of the United States (1776), Holland (1787), and France (1789), the spring of nationalities or the European revolutions of 1848, the anticolonial nationalist movements of the 1950s through 1970s, the anticommunist revolutions in the former Soviet bloc, and more recently, the Arab Spring. In each of these waves, international or regional influences shaped the direction of the revolutionary and nationalist movements (Katz 1997; Goldstone 2001; Beissinger 2002).

Yet it is important to consider why individuals participate in nationalist mobilizations, when they know their individual participation per se will have only minimal effects. Why do citizens, specifically members of the majority group, support state policies that require major sacrifices, such as long mandatory service in the Greek or Turkish military? The classic work of Mancur Olson (1965) takes an important first step by addressing the problem of collective action. Following Olson’s work, other scholars have identified solutions to the collective action problem based on community obligations, social sanctioning, ingroup respect, and group identification (Lichbach 1995, 1996). To cite one example from Turkey, Navaro-Yashin shows how ingroup respect from families and friends helps maintain support for the state and for compulsory military service: in the 1990s, it became common for citizens’ groups to gather at bus stations with flags and musical instruments to greet young soldiers ready to depart for the war against the Kurdish PKK. They would often carry a young soldier in their arms, shouting, “En Büyük Asker Bizim Asker [Our soldier is the greatest]” (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 117).
Various strategies are used to trigger mobilization. Event organizers draw on the entertainment industry by inviting key celebrities and promoting certain types of popular music. Participants in Greek-Turkish mobilizations do so through professional, local community, or social microworlds. Participation in nationalist groupings can have positive effects on a person’s professional career; for instance, Ethnikophrosyne (national mindedness) is a prerequisite for employment by the Greek state (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002). Thomas Homer-Dixon (2000: 219) notes the link between criteria of recruitment and subsequent policy-making when he says that “over time these people, through their decisions and actions, tend to reproduce the institutions and procedures, including the testing procedures, that empowered them, thus putting more of exactly the same kind of people into positions of influence.” When I interviewed MP Stelios Paphathemelis, a key ethnic mobilizer, on the Macedonian issue, dozens of people were waiting outside to discuss employment and other state favors.11 Admittedly, Mr. Paphathemelis was not the only one to parcel out rewards: his office, like those of most Greek politicians, appeared like a flower shop, with satisfied Greek voters bringing bouquets to their benefactor.

AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE ON CONTENTIOUS ETHNIC POLITICS

Scholars of contentious politics have used cycles of contention to make a number of theoretically informed observations about the origins, nature, and timing of mobilization and contention.12 In theorizing social movements and revolutions, McAdam et al. (1997) divide contentious politics into three main fields:

• the study of conditions or the political institutions and processes that shape collective mobilization;
• the study of means or the mobilizing structures supporting collective action;
• the study of norms or, more broadly, the framing processes around which collective action is perceived and acted out.

They concentrate, however, on the “civil” aspect of contention, such as social movements or “romanticized” movements like revolutions, paying less attention to the darker side of nationalist mobilization and contention. McAdam et al. (ibid.) propose a broader theoretical model that has integrated work on contentious politics, revolutions, and social movements yet refrain from incor-
porating the study of nationalist mobilizations. Nonetheless, Tarrow has urged
cross-fertilization between the scholars of social movements and nationalism.
He criticizes the "ancestral hatred" view of nationalism as uninformed of the
findings of social movements, and he admits that the same criticism applies
to social movement theorists. As yet, however, few studies have attempted to
integrate the two fields.

The theoretical framework for understanding the process of nationalist
mobilization used in this chapter draws extensively from the literatures of
nationalism, political violence, and social psychology. It borrows McAdam et
al.'s (1997) perspective on social movement and revolutions and identifies the
conditions, means, and norms that foster nationalist mobilizations. It pays at-
tention to the conditions or constraints that shape majority nationalist protest,
the means that support it, and the framing processes around which nationalist
action is perceived and acted out (see also McAdam et al. 1996; Lichbach and
Zuckerman 1997).

Although opportunities/risks and means are important, they cannot ade-
quately explain majority nationalist mobilizations by themselves. Shifts in the
conditions and constraints of nationalist mobilization appear when democ-
ratization takes place, old ideological systems fade away, and innovations in
technology provide new means for communication and action (Tarrow 1994;
Beissinger 1996). Expansion of opportunities at the international level can ex-
plain the timing of mobilizations but says little about the process or the origins
of mobilization or why mobilization takes place in certain societies and not
others.

As mentioned elsewhere, resource mobilization theories emphasize organi-
zational and political variables but de-emphasize social psychological variables,
so important in the study of nationalist identification. Mobilizing structures commonly include political parties, diaspora groups, civic associations, and the media (McAdam et al. 1996; Romano 2006; Cochrane at al. 2009). Institutions supporting majority nationalist mobilizations seem to be present across cases but vary from country to country—for example, the official religious institutions (Greece), the communist party (Serbia), conservative pro-Western movements (Georgia), or the military establishment (Turkey). Given that, by definition, majorities are not politically marginalized, one might assume an abundance of means when there is a potential for mobilization.

The framing process can shed more light on how opportunities are perceived and how means can be appropriated. The study of framing considers interpretative schemata with cultural and social psychological foundations. The latter constitute a promising area in the study of nationalism because of the deep emotions associated with national identification and the cognitive and motivational implications of these emotions. In any event, interpretative schemata are crucial in the study of nationalist mobilizations because they project a magnified, or even distorted, picture of opportunities/risks and grievances.

In framing nationalism, ethnic mobilizers use a number of techniques that deserve analytical attention. For instance, they use framing to associate current grievances with old ones, and they present small current “losses” from potential compromises as the springboard for future ones. Through framing, they relate old victories with the prospect of new ones. Subjective shifts in political opportunities and constraints are misinterpreted, and frames are used to appropriate various domestic policy issues. Frames explain how “national property” and grievances are constructed, negative identities are transformed into positive, opportunities are articulated or misperceived, uncertainty is created, and a robust categorization of “we” and “they” takes place. Three framing processes are extensively employed throughout the manuscript: opportunity frames or the construction of opportunities/risks; the framing of grievances in the mobilization of injustices; and frame alignment or the process of aligning nationalism with other issues and mobilizing structures.

Opportunity framing suggests that there is an important element of subjectivity in the reading of opportunity structure. It is not opportunity per se that matters, but how opportunity is framed in the public sphere. Both leaders and the public read and translate opportunities selectively according to their ability to interpret or their current needs. Ethnic entrepreneurs dismiss any positive qualities among their opponents, undermine the likelihood or success of co-
operation, and exaggerate the threats associated with their ethnic antagonists' actions. They also ignore the degree to which their own actions provoke those threats (self-fulfilling prophesies), question the motives of their intraethnic opponents who propose moderation, and play down the costs of seeking national goals through militant means (Snyder and Ballentine 1997: 66). Overall, perception plays a critical role when the public is convinced of the gains associated with action and the losses from inaction.

Grievance frames require a subjective understanding of injustice and victimization.18 As with opportunities, what counts for mobilizations are not grievances objectively counted but perceptions of grievances and their construction in the popular mind. Part of the process of mobilization is the advancement of views about the nation's entitlements and subsequent deprivation. Nationalists make normative claims about land, symbols, or justice that, in most cases, lack objective standards of documentation (ibid.). The process of constructing illegitimacy and self-victimization is usually one-sided and sometimes only marginally linked to reality. It is, however, instrumental, as it "puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul" (Tarrow 1994: 111).

Finally, alignment frames are those schemata that enable the appropriation of means and external issues irrelevant to the theme of nationalism (Snow et al. 1986). A successful alignment of frames provides the formula or recipe for the success of nationalist mobilization by aligning the right themes at the right time. Through framing, the appropriation of institutional means that even contrast philosophically with nationalism becomes possible.19 Issues not related to nationalism, such as corruption, peasant insecurity, or reactions to unpopular economic transitions, are also appropriated. When these issues are aligned to nationalism, the basis of support for nationalism expands and participation in ethnic politics grows. Moreover, through frame alignment, different nationalist issues are brought together to suggest a meaningful continuum; for example, a number of unrelated policies by foreign governments or a series of events may be aligned to form the basis for conspiracy theories. The framing of conspiracies is a common theme in all four cases and is used to interpret major events and the actions of ethnic antagonists and their sympathizers. Conspiracy theories are effective because they attract the attention of hitherto indifferent citizens and activate mass social support for and participation in nationalist politics.

Finally, through the use of art, music, and theater, or other forms of popular expression, a kind of informal consensus is built in the public eye. Majority
nationalism receives a more humane face domestically, and its major tenets become part of conventional wisdom. Nationalists appropriate old cultural symbols dear to influential segments of the population or introduce new ones that fit the needs of dissatisfied groups. In this way, nationalistic views take on a moderate appearance to appeal to a domestic audience. However, while this audience thinks its support is confined to moderate nationalists, it becomes increasingly clear to outsiders that extreme nationalists are controlling the battleground of ideas and popular actions.²⁹

Overall, the preceding discussion of the literature indicates that certain variables should be seen as part of causal combinations rather than examined individually. Many demographic, economic, and political variables fail to explain crisis behavior, unless they are combined with other factors.

The discussion of the literature also suggests that framing should be at the center of analytical discussions of majority groups, since most of the variables discussed in the literature matter, if ethnic mobilizers make a successful case. As Homer-Dixon (2000: 255) argues, many of these variables result from a “messy mixture of objective and subjective factors.” Framing analysis is useful in its ability to integrate and test theories and variables that are hard to define based on “objective” criteria.

In the following chapters, the book explores in greater detail the effects of ideational factors, introduces the concept of precrisis framing, and integrates theoretical work on framing with related concepts in the study of the politics of majority nationalism.
Musicians and artists often come together to define their communities' national identity and politics of reconciliation. Mikis Theodorakis's music for *Zorba the Greek* is well known around the world as the embodiment of modern Greek culture. Although Theodorakis is Greek in origin and understood as such, his music transcends national boundaries; *Zorba* thrilled fans for decades, with hundreds of thousands attending peace concerts across the Aegean and around the world. But he is known for more than his music and for being Greece's best-known living composer. A discussion of nationalism and the framing of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean could start with Theodorakis, as his life embodies many of this book's puzzles with regard to the politics of majority nationalism.

In 1986, when there was little give-and-take between Greece and Turkey, Theodorakis established a committee of artists and writers from both countries to promote reconciliation. However, these were tough times for Greek-Turkish rapprochement, and instead of supporting the initiative, the Greek government of Andreas Papandreou issued a statement condemning the composer for meddling with foreign policy (Hope 1986). But gradually, Theodorakis gained widespread acknowledgment for his peace actions across the Greek-Turkish divide and became a symbol for the international left as well as reconciliation among nations.

Yet Theodorakis's story also exemplifies Greek inconsistencies and ambiguities with respect to nationalism and peace. Like other civil society and political figures in the region, Theodorakis fluctuated in his peacemaking orientation and frequently helped to stir up Greek nationalist passions. In April 2004, for example, when Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan for the reunifica-
tion of their island with a resounding no vote, the Greek composer was one of the most outspoken opponents of the peace plan. Likewise, following the Macedonian crisis in the early 1990s, Theodorakis joined the campaign against the name “Macedonia” and even threatened that Greece would “secede” from the European Union if its allies did not adopt the Greek viewpoint (Smith 1993: 15). But he also pioneered Greek concerts in Skopje, opening a new page in Greek–Macedonian Republic relations (Anastasi 1997: 8). To cite another example of the Janus-faced politics of majority nationalism, Theodorakis, who had decades earlier composed Mauthausen, a masterpiece in memory of the victims of Holocaust, angered Israel in 2003 by making an anti-Semitic statement.2

The story of the celebrated Greek composer highlights a broader set of puzzles in peace studies—namely, how peacemakers and hardliners come to conceive and contest peace policies in conflict-prone societies. To explain this riddle, scholars in many disciplines have recently turned to the concepts of symbolic politics, cultural contestation, and framing (Ross 2007; Desrosiers 2011; Kaufman 2011). While a number of studies show the importance of simple word changes in public statements and decision-making dilemmas, there has been little effort to find causal links between framing and the choice of peace.3

This chapter suggests that the latter is largely dependent on the former’s production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings. In particular, cooperative or confrontational framing by leaders and movements before the onset of a crisis (precrisis framing) in combination with other variables could explain how societies in conflict choose to respond to their peace and conflict dilemmas.

I have previously argued that structural demographic, economic, and security-related approaches inadequately account for these responses. While some crises are explained by combinations of these variables, the making of cooperative or confrontational policies is a complex phenomenon that does not lend itself to monocausal explanations. In this chapter, I hypothesize that precrisis framing defines subsequent decisions, regardless of changes in the external opportunity structures. Once hardliners succeed in monopolizing framing and in fostering an early nationalist consensus, frames become embedded in public identities and definitions of a group’s national interest. This prevents adaptation to new conditions and precludes the ability to reassess contrary information, leading to elite entrapment when compromise is both necessary and attainable. I also hypothesize that an early propeace elite consensus protects
peace processes from unwelcome but often unavoidable changes in the opportunity structure surrounding a negotiated agreement.

In this chapter, I address the following issues: the conceptualization of frames in general, and their precrisis features in particular, and differences between framing and the broader conceptual category of perception. I also investigate the limits of plasticity of frames, or put otherwise, to what extent frames correspond to pre-existing "perceived realities." Furthermore, I investigate the causal links between framing and the choice of peace or nationalist mobilizations, focusing also on the relationship between ethnopолitical frames and political accommodation. Finally, I identify two necessary component frames relating motives and opportunities, highlighting a set of coding procedures with regard to adversarial and nonadversarial frames.

Added to this, the chapter also addresses two major claims: firstly, that frames are simply reflections of "realities," structurally determined by the external environment, pre-existing perceptions, and cultural material available to framers; secondly, that frames have no causal power that can be examined independently of the actions of communities in conflict. I provide examples from the recent history and politics of accommodation in the Middle East and the Balkans to address these claims. Although not a necessary condition in all crises under investigation, this chapter argues that precrisis frames affect nationalism or the choice of peace to the extent that they can override some of the structural, institutional, or cultural determinants. Briefly stated, the framing perspective can shed light on areas that current approaches on mobilization and ethnic politics gloss over or ignore altogether.

DEFINITION OF FRAMING AND PRECRISIS FRAMES

Drawing from the literature of contentious politics and following David Snow et al. (1986; see also McAdam et al. 1996: 6), I define framing as conscious strategic efforts to shape shared understandings about a group, its environment, moral entitlements, and range of possible actions. Frames typically embody two necessary components: a diagnostic element or the definition of the problem and its source (motives or grievances frames); and a prognostic element or the identification of an appropriate strategy for redressing the problem (opportunity frames). On the one hand, an adversarial frame usually emphasizes the negative characteristics of the out-group, the importance and sanctity of the entitlements of the in-group, and the opportunities available to achieve these perceived entitlements through confrontational action. On the
other, a cooperative frame acknowledges in-group responsibilities for the conflict, recognizes shared interests with other groups, and identifies opportunities for peace.

Precrisis frames do not differ substantially, although the adjective “precrisis” suggests that this type of framing is produced in the period preceding a particular crisis to serve as the master frame, which colors and constrains the orientations and activities of subsequent collective action frames (Snow 2013: 472). As mentioned in the Introduction, perceptions shape frames and vice versa. But how different are frames, including the precrisis ones, from perception or other related terms? There are several ways in which perceptions might differ from frames. To begin with, frames are not reflections but simplifications of “perceived realities”: they provide contextual cues, order, and meaning to otherwise complex problems, actions, and events.

For example, the Arab-Israeli conflict might be framed as a matter of US interests in the Middle East, as a struggle between two liberation movements, or as a fight between a tiny embattled nation and surrounding hostile forces (Kynder 1998). The Kurdish uprising in southeast Turkey (or Kurdistan) could be framed as a struggle of national liberation from a repressive regime or, alternatively, as a series of terrorist actions against a sovereign nation and critical US ally (Cornell 2001; Romano 2006). These examples also suggest that frames are rarely even-handed.

Moreover, according to Snow (2013), frames are conscious strategic efforts reflecting the work of social movements or political activists. They imply agency, deliberation, or even manipulation in the construction of new “realities” (Benford and Snow 2000). For social scientists, “frames” are extremely useful in identifying, encoding, and interpreting complex realities. Whether reflected in media representations, parliamentary debates, or governmental reports, frames encapsulate otherwise contested realities, meanings, and actions. As mentioned above, defining “reality” in Greek-Turkish, Israel-Palestinian, or Ukrainian-Russian relations is frequently a controversial exercise; social scientists might challenge the “myths” in the respective frames of each side in these conflicts but can hardly propose fixed notions of reality themselves. And as “realities” are contested, frames become the medium between myths and the “raw” facts of history, allowing social scientists the critical space for understanding each side in a conflict and, more important, for mediating between conflicting narratives.

It is widely accepted that political elites strategically craft frames to make
policies acceptable to their constituencies and to be re-elected (Gamson 1992). Thus, frames could be seen as a subset of the broader category of perceptions, since these neither require nor exclude agency and manipulation. In fact, frames build on a pre-existing cultural stock drawn from the symbolic politics and perceptions of a community (Ross 1997; Kaufman 2001). As Marc Howard Ross (2007) demonstrates, such perceptions or cultural expressions could become focal points in ethnic conflicts and shape group beliefs that facilitate the choice of some actions over others. Perceptions of cultural differentiation might also be passive, evolving parallel to events in the daily life of a population. For instance, the Balkan peasants of the eighteenth century shared certain perceptions of themselves, their neighbors, and the Ottomans. However, following the present definition, these were not frames, since they were not consciously crafted to draw clear distinctions between themselves and their neighbors (particularly those sharing a common faith); they were not designed to put forward claims for the Ottoman lands or to identify timely opportunities for national liberation.4

In fact, the past two centuries demonstrate the ambiguities of identity construction among the successor states of the post-Ottoman empire. Often nationalist ideologies competed or emerged from federal ideas and perceptions of shared history among neighbors. Ideologically winning frames did not always follow pre-existing perceptions. With regard to the development of national states in the Balkans, Mazower (2000: 3) claims that even well after the unmistakable rise of Slav nationalisms, it was hard to discern what pattern of states and peoples would succeed the Ottoman rulers. He argues that some commentators at the time “imagined a variety of self-governing Christian polities under overall Ottoman suzerainty, while others foresaw the partition of the region between a Greek state and a south Slav Federation. Almost none anticipated the process of fragmentation that actually occurred” (ibid.). Similar observations could be made about the Arab Middle East, as few would anticipate the fragmentation across secular versus religious or Sunni versus Shia lines following the post-2010 Arab Spring revolutions.

Perceptions and framing of national symbols could be equally perplexing among closely connected national identities. Zorba, himself an embodiment of Greek popular culture, could be framed as an exclusive symbol of Greekness especially during tough times for the nation. At the same time, Theodorakis’s music has come to symbolize Greek-Turkish friendship, leaving ecstatic thousands across the Aegean during his peace concerts. Ironically, the actual Zor-
bas himself who inspired the initial novel by Nikos Kazantzakis—later on to become a movie with Anthony Quinn—migrated to Yugoslav Macedonia for the later part of his life. His grave is located today in Skopje, and his ancestors are citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. The aforementioned masterpiece of Theodorakis, *Mauthausen*, also inspired the capture of Kabul in Afghanistan, and when the Northern Alliance entered the city in November 2001, the guerrillas paraded to Theodorakis’s rhythms, causing a reaction from the composer, who was at the same time staging an anti-American demonstration in Athens. These examples suggest that the exclusive use of symbols and frames cannot be uncontested in conflict-ridden societies.

THE LIMITS OF PLASTICITY

The conventional approach to framing is to treat frames as corresponding either fully or roughly to existing structural conditions and “realities,” and a commonly accepted belief is that frames must stick close to the “facts” to avoid being debunked. Because of specific historical myths and power relations, we can only assume there are limits to what is possible or impossible to frame (Swindler 1986). Miroslav Hroch argues that the basic condition for the success of any national movement is that its argument (or frame) at least roughly correspond to the reality perceived by those at whom it is directed (Hroch 1998: 99). But many episodes in the Eastern Mediterranean demonstrate that framing is not only the product of “objective conditions” but also the result of agents’ political intentions, even manipulations. Thus, the capacities of framers to construct myths or “new realities” should not be underestimated.

To further probe the issue of plasticity, let’s assume that there is something we can call “the facts of history” around which framing takes place. The “facts of history” can be interpreted in various ways: in other words, the “dots” of history can be connected to create diametrically opposed pictures. This is suggested in both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Kurdish-Turkish examples presented above. There can be an unlimited number of ways for some of these facts to be explored, emphasized, and de-emphasized, thereby suggesting a wide range of potential frames. The major challenge for framers is to construct a story out of these facts that everybody in the group will share. Shaping the dominant frame that includes some “facts” while excluding others is a necessary first step in accomplishing the framers’ ends.

Another way of understanding the relationship between framing and the “facts of history” is to see frames as social scientific theories. In *Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (1962), Thomas Kuhn offers alternative definitions of paradigm. According to one, "[A] paradigm stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community" (1962: 175). The paradigms of a community are revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises, and despite occasional ambiguities, the paradigms of a mature scientific community can be determined with relative ease (ibid.: 41–43). It could be argued that scientific communities are distinct from the imagined communities of nations, therefore frames cannot be simply equated with paradigms.

At the same time, a number of analogies could be made. A frame, like a paradigm, does not need to account for all data that, in the social sciences, are already malleable to different, often mutually exclusive, interpretations. For Kuhn, "a paradigm must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the 'facts' with which it can be confronted" (ibid.: 17–18). Certain paradigms and frames gain status because they are more successful than their competitors in addressing critical dilemmas or simply because those who proffer the frame hold certain positions of strength in comparison with their competitors. Thus framers can ignore some of the facts that may distort paradigms. Nevertheless, they cannot ignore everything, particularly when a rival frame can better explain a crucial topic of public concern.

Communications experts and new information, polling and Internet technologies have altered how frames become malleable. One of the first challenges of framers is to delineate the limits of plasticity; this is often the duty of well-paid communications advisors who provide suggestions on how much leaders should compromise their own ideas to fulfill the public’s expectations. Politicians and movements need to know how far they can stretch an argument without losing either popular appeal or credibility. In these cases, new information technologies offer great advantages to framers and their communications advisers by providing them with a tool for polling their constituencies, identifying their preferences, and selecting strategies used successfully elsewhere to achieve framers’ political ends (McAdam et al. 1996). According to Homer-Dixon (2000: 327): "[N]ew technologies are particularly potent when coupled with new techniques—including scientific polling, direct marketing, and image management—for mobilizing and manipulating public opinion to support specific causes.” Control of the media is important as well, especially in the developing world where such controls can lead to monopoly of discourse and few challengers show up, even with the spread of new social media.
Despite the importance of new technologies and successful framing techniques, they offer only partial explanations of why certain frames resonate among the public. Framing is a science, but it is also an art; thus, temperament, accident, and leadership styles could affect the plasticity and efficacy of frames. Added to this, the credibility of leaders is a major element in successful adversarial or cooperative framing: the more credible a leader is, the more flexibility he/she enjoys in his/her framing of new realities. More important, during peace campaigns, respected and gifted individuals within the broader civil society could tilt the balance in a divided political elite and a public. Unlike Theodorakis, who frequently opted for mixed and ambivalent messages, musicians and artists have played a key role in peace processes elsewhere. Among many others in Northern Ireland, Bono and the U2 were instrumental in condemning IRA attacks and bringing together in peace concerts the two communities during the decisive 1998 referendum campaign.\footnote{2}

Psychological processes, such as the need by the members of a group to maintain positive self-esteem at times of crisis, could increase that group’s vulnerability to adversarial framing (Tajfel 1978; Brown 1986; Turner et al., 1987). Tajfel and his collaborators have shown in many studies that arbitrary division of individuals into two groups, even by flipping a coin, is enough to generate ingroup preferences. Individuals prefer the products of their own group and favor their own members when distributing rewards or costs. The theory assumes that our self-esteem depends to a great extent on the status and success of the groups to which we belong. It challenges the idea that dependence and conflict over resources are necessary conditions for the development of group identity. According to this theory, individuals have a fundamental desire to attain positive self-esteem. This desire, in turn, motivates two kinds of socio-cognitive processes: categorization, in which individuals are led to distinguish between social groups; and self-enhancement, in which people come to emphasize norms, stereotypes, and cognitive frames that favor the in-group (ibid.).

Furthermore, frames emerge and sustain themselves by becoming embedded in social norms, public identities, and more important, in the national and local institutions of a country. As demonstrated in the following chapters, especially Chapter 4 on Turkey and the Kurds, military and judicial institutions can define how nationalism and the choice of peace are framed in public discourse. For instance, in early 2007, a Turkish prosecutor initiated a criminal inquiry against former president Kenan Evren,\footnote{6} for suggesting that Turkey become a federation (Turkish Daily News 2007). Then, in 2009, President Abdullah Gül
faced public outcry after using the word “Kurdistan” in public to describe the administration of northern Iraq. Ironically, Gül initially defended his use of the term, drawing an analogy with Greece and implying that the neighboring country was wrong in preventing the use of the name “Macedonia” (*Hurriyet* 2009). He eventually had to retract his statements after widespread negative reaction, suggesting that Greece and Turkey are not so different in their sensitivities toward symbolic politics.

As in the case of former coup leader Evren, these reframing failure incidents suggest the complex linkage between institutions and framing processes in restricting the choice of peace. They also demonstrate that institutionalized symbolic politics matter in crisis-prone societies, not to mention the difficulties involved in attempting to reframe political discourses. Once a version of reality is constructed and priorities are set, it is politically risky, often suicidal, for leaders (even presidents and formerly powerful heads of the Turkish military) to tinker with them or to construct new ones.

Finally, the example of late Kenan Evren in Turkey suggests that frames often depend on analogies with the past. Framing false analogies by using the past shapes common (*mis*)understandings on the fairness and viability of compromises, leading, for example, to a society’s refusal to consider necessary (even unavoidable) mechanisms of accommodating ethnic diversity. What is particularly odd in Turkey and other post-Ottoman societies is the absence of successful federal and consociational arrangements. The post-Ottoman region features almost no successful cases, while containing notable and well-documented failures, such as Lebanon, Libya (1951–63), the United Arab Republic (1958–61), post-1960 Cyprus, and the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro). The absence is strange, given the legacy of Ottoman cultural accommodation systems such as the *millet* system and, in some cases, the modernizing effects of Western colonial rule (Stavrianos 1958; Inalcik 1973; Shaw 1977; Jelavich 1983; Ingrao 2009). Despite their hierarchical features, Ottoman institutions and religious legacies of tolerance preserved cultural diversity for centuries and, thus, should have provided political antecedents for federal and consociational models in the post-Ottoman lands.\(^9\) Consider, for example, the Kurdish issue. Paradoxically, the way elites frame the *millet* legacy makes the endorsement of federal and consociational arrangements more difficult. Making a series of false analogies, influential decision-makers often associate recent minority accommodation proposals for power-sharing or community recognition with the *millet* system and its role in the subsequent violent collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
In recent decades, presenting power-sharing as a dysfunctional institutional arrangement has been legitimized by the examples and failures of power-sharing in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and post-1960 Cyprus. Once again, the analogies are false. As shown elsewhere (Loizides 2016), contemporary federal and power-sharing models differ greatly from both the millet system and the communist-era and postcolonial arrangements created for Yugoslavia and Cyprus, respectively. Nonetheless, they set up self-fulfilling prophesies and sustain discourses negating federalism and power-sharing arrangements, including recent institutional innovations which can potentially overcome obstacles that led to past failures. In the successor countries of the Ottoman Empire, such as Turkey, these analogies linking past tolerance with imperial collapse preclude any discussion of federalism and consociationalism, either in the official republican ideology or the public discourse.

RESEARCH DESIGN IN FRAMING ANALYSIS

Scholars across disciplines note a number of methodological issues to consider in the study of framing, as for example, determining the exact processes/pathways by which precrisis frames are translated into subsequent confrontational policies. Because both frames and nationalist actions are affected by structural and political variables, some argue they are correlated with or result from the same phenomena, thus having very little effect on each other. This is simply not true. Relevant academic studies often fall into the trap of circular reasoning while using the concept of framing to explain their outcome of interest. If they assign no indicators of effective framing other than to cite the consequences (that is, collective action that the framing is meant to explain), their findings will be merely tautological. It is as if someone were to argue that while a successful mobilization relies on effective framing, we recognize the framing part only because it has led to mobilization.10

But what elements are necessary to test the causal relationship between frames and crisis behavior? To begin with, frames that occur before a particular crisis of interest are of interest. In other words, instead of frames that appear at the time of crisis, we must examine the framing of previous crises and their relevance in shaping preferences and intentions about subsequent crises. Unless we can identify frames well ahead of a nationalist crisis or at its very birth, it is difficult to point to a relationship between framing and nationalist action. For instance, in the next two chapters, I demonstrate that the policies of Greece and Turkey during the Cyprus crisis of 2001–2 were driven by the framing process
of previous crises in the 1990s. In both cases, previous policy failures opened windows of opportunity for the introduction of new cooperative frames in the domestic political discourse. Learning experience, particularly the ability to identify cause-and-effect relationships from earlier incidents, provides the key to assessing the expected consequences of alternative courses of action proffered by conflicting confrontational and cooperative frames.\textsuperscript{11}

In general, then, while a time difference is required between the emergence of the cause and subsequent nationalist action, elapsed time cannot guarantee adaptation if policy-makers refrain from positive learning. Policy failures might not lead to adaptation if actors are negative learners. A strong consensus shared by elites and masses on the rightness and efficacy of nationalist frames and policies might lead to such negative learning.

The second methodological issue is measuring effective framing. To be effective, a frame must be independent of the outcome of interest. It should combine grievances and opportunities and have code-able features. The sample list of features presented below (Table 2.1, Examples of Adversarial and Non-adversarial Framing) is composed of statements used by nationalists or non-nationalists to frame their positions. In my analysis, I apply this coding to public discourse, primarily original source materials from the Greek and Turkish parliaments, some of which have only been recently declassified. I supplement these with articles from the press, newspaper cartoons, editorials, press releases, interviews with opinion makers, and transcripts of media reports.

As mentioned above, according to Snow and Benford (1988), frames typically require two essential components: a diagnostic element or the definition of the problem, including its source, related grievances, and motives; and a prognostic element or the identification of appropriate opportunities and strategies for redressing the problem, as well as their degree of efficacy. In other words, we should begin by investigating how societies become aggrieved about some aspect of their situation and go on to consider how they become confident that by taking nationalist action, they can redress the issue.

What is important here is not to rely exclusively on grievances but to analyze these within the context of power-politics.\textsuperscript{12} For Thomas Homer-Dixon, such action takes place when it is judged both plausible and just (1989: 199). And in explaining war, Van Evera emphasizes the degree of coincidence of power and victimization, arguing that this combination conflates the motive with the capacity to make trouble (1997: 26–60). In other words, it is necessary to understand how communities in conflict come to see previously legitimate and
unimportant relationships as both illegitimate and important, and how nationalist action suddenly becomes a possible and manageable political option. A minimum requirement for nationalist action is, therefore, the presence of two components: the diagnosis of motives/grievances and the prognosis of opportunities/efficacy.

Societies will not mobilize unless they have adequate motives, such as strong grievances. Part of the process of mobilization is the advancement of popular views about deprivation of entitlement. This is instrumental in mobilizing majorities, as it puts "fire in the belly and iron in the soul" (Tarrow 1994: 11). Sources of grievances might vary (for example, status of the ethnic community and the recognition of its perceived rights; injustice to the group; threats to what is perceived "national property"; intolerable political and/or economic relationships, and so forth). There is seldom any documentation to disprove such grievances, because nationalists make normative claims about land, symbols, or justice, which are frequently "independent of objective standards of documentation" (Snyder and Ballentine 1997: 66). Because of the normative complexity of ethnic conflict, it is often almost impossible for the public or outsiders to know to any degree of certainty whether these grievances are legitimate, let alone "real." In any case, although they do not need to be recognized as legitimate by third parties, they should be deemed legitimate by those at whom the framing is directed, and they should generate an "instant consensus" in the discourse of majority groups. At issue, Snow et al. argue, is not merely the presence or absence of grievances but also the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of these interpretations (1986: 466). Mobilizing communities must feel confident that their actions will be successful and will incur only limited costs. The concept of "opportunity frames" is a powerful theoretical tool that brings together structural, rational choice and cognitive dimensions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is not opportunity per se that matters, but rather how actors frame opportunities in the public sphere. Participants must believe that there is an opportunity to bring about social change; they must also see themselves as much-needed "agents of their own history" (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 285).

Confrontational framing undermines the likelihood of successful cooperation by dismissing opponents' willingness or capacity to commit to a future settlement. Furthermore, framers might question the motives of in-group rivals who propose moderation, or they may play down the costs of seeking national goals through militant means (Snyder and Ballentine 1997: 66): More impor-
tant, when “movement activists interpret political space in ways that emphasize opportunity rather than constraint, they may stimulate actions that change opportunity, making their opportunity frame a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 287).

Cooperative framing does the exact opposite. In identifying cooperative framing, I draw from Marc Howard Ross’s seminal work exploring how cooperative framing could transform the symbolic landscape of relations between communities, facilitating successful conflict mitigation through the development of inclusive narratives and identities (2007). As Ross argues, these frames or cultural expressions play a causal role in a conflict by making certain action possibilities more plausible and therefore more probable than others and by directing collective understandings of the motives, interests, and behaviors of the in-group and its opponents (ibid., 3).

However, without a precise coding measure of precrisis frames, it is difficult to demonstrate a causal relationship between framing and the crisis behavior of majorities. In Chapters 3 (on Greece) and 4 (on Turkey), I use debates from the national parliaments of the two countries to demonstrate the presence of precrisis frames. Although not the only place to study framing, the parliament has several advantages over other sources, such as local newspapers, evening news reports, or interviews with experts. Firstly, parliamentary debates provide accessible links between framing and policy-making, thereby constituting a representative sample of elite thinking and acting. Secondly, unlike the information gleaned from interviews, records of parliamentary debates are easily accessible, and findings can be confirmed and retested. Thirdly, unlike interviews that might take place years after a given event, parliamentary debates, particularly those occurring at times of crisis, do not allow participants to reconstruct their positions. Even though most citizens do not follow parliamentary debates, it is possible to identify “high-impact” sessions cited in the press (in this case, Lexis/Nexis, since neither parliament database is easily searchable). Finally, views expressed in the parliament reflect or aim at popular opinion, and what is said in parliament constitutes an appropriate measure of publicly endorsed elite thinking, a variable that could be examined for both its causal effects and its public policy potential to provide early crisis warnings.

To summarize, whether aiming at peace or its alternatives, frames have two main components: a grievance component, including a definition of the problem and its source; and an opportunity component, focusing on the identification of appropriate opportunities and strategies for redressing the problem.
Table 2.1: Examples of Adversarial and Nonadversarial Framing

| ADVERSARIAL | 1. Our ethnic antagonists are exclusively responsible for the past. They possess or unjustifiably claim something that rightfully belongs to us. |
|            | 2. Positive actions of our ethnic opponents do not imply friendly intentions but result from tactical considerations aiming at creating impressions for third parties. |
| Opportunity | 3. There is no chance that we and our ethnic antagonists will reach a compromise because of their unchanging intransigent positions. |
|            | 4. Acting pre-emptively and while we are strong, we could prevent alliances aimed at changing the balance of power among weaker opponents. |

| NONADVERSARIAL | 5. Our group has been also responsible for past crimes and has to take appropriate measures to reinstitute victims of the other side. |
|               | 6. There are leaders on the other side who struggle for peace and whose intentions are positive and honest. |
| Moderating Grievances | 7. Failure to recognize limitations for action and a tendency to overestimate our capacities in a future conflict will be hazardous. |
| Moderating Opportunities | 8. The conflict is equally damaging for both sides and thus there are incentives for peace across the divide. |

Without a context and specificity, framing becomes a descriptive category bereft of analytical properties. To avoid this, it is possible to use a scale to measure framing. Such scales are not unproblematic, however, since much of the complexity and innovation in elite debates might be sacrificed. Most scholars of framing avoid scales to measure framing, even though such scales are common among social psychologists and increasingly common among conflict resolution experts, as demonstrated in Donohue’s and Druckman’s study of message framing in the Oslo peace process in Israel/Palestine (2009).\textsuperscript{14}

Unlike existing scales, the measure of framing suggested below draws from the literature of conflict resolution and its practice, incorporating core arguments put forward by moderates to counter hardliners and vice versa. Theory and practice in conflict resolution are implicitly linked, and most theories of conflict resolution rely on practitioner and participant arguments to explain conflict. Some of these arguments provide raw material for the development of major theories in the field. For instance, in Table 2.1, “Examples of Adversarial and Nonadversarial Framing,” item 1 fits with approaches emphasizing relative deprivation (Gurr 1970), item 2 with the fundamental attribution error (Jones and Harris 1967), item 4 with the security dilemma (Jervis 1978; Posen 1993), item 5 with reconciliation and justice literature (Boraine 2001; Kovras 2014), and item 8 with the mutually hurting stalemate thesis (Zartman 1995).
It is important to note that this scale could be applied in most cases of ethnic conflict, thereby allowing the book’s two hypotheses to be retested: firstly, the presence of a predominantly adversarial framing of both grievances and opportunities determines subsequent confrontation; secondly, adversarial framing has path-dependent properties that sustain confrontation in the long term.

As I argue throughout the book, frames have causal properties by virtue of being embedded in social norms and public identities, and more important, in national and local institutions. This argument is tested in subsequent chapters in the Macedonian conflict, the Kurdish issue in Turkey, Greek-Turkish disputes, and Cyprus. The final empirical chapter also examines the application of the same argument to Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine during their postcommunist transitions.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have defined precrisis frames, distinguishing between the various elements of adversarial and cooperative frames found in the political discourse of societies in conflict and elaborating on the interacting components of framing, such as grievances and opportunity frames. I have argued that frames may have causal properties that need to be uncovered and tested in ways that minimize tautological interpretations of the outcome of interest. The following two chapters will attempt to address these questions with regards to the Macedonian conflict in Greece and the Kurdish dilemma in Turkey.

The chapter also applied framing analysis to highlight some of the problems today facing the broader Middle East and the Balkans. As argued above, the “dots of the Ottoman history” might have been drawn differently in constructing hegemonic post-Ottoman narratives. For instance, one could argue that local conditions, including the diverse but “modernizing impact” of the West, could have given the region an early advantage in peace processes. Faced with comparable challenges, as for instance in India, other postcolonial leaders successfully countered colonial legacies by “crafting a pragmatic, political secularism that offered symmetrical treatment to various religious communities” (Kohli 2001: 5; see also Lijphart 1996). In contrast, in the post-Ottoman lands, coercive power-sharing turned the region’s “early advantage” of tolerance into an unfortunate demonstration of how political accommodation lacks prospects or viability. This example suggests that reframing majority nationalism requires a set of successful indigenous examples of peacemaking in the region highlighted in Chapter 5.
Starting in September 1992, for four months I received training as an officer cadet in the Athens camp of Chaidari. There, one of my closest friends was a local Macedonian from Florina who spoke Slav Macedonian fluently but who was fervently Greek in his ethnic self-identification. One of the issues that came up very quickly in our conversations was how little our fellow Greeks knew about the northern frontier of Greece, its history, and the Macedonian issue in general. Often the military training became so intense that some trainees attributed it to “our preparations for war with Skopje,” while others debated the role of Greek Cypriots in volunteering for the “motherland” in such a case. Two decades later, my memory of this experience has prompted me to look more carefully at the Macedonian issue as a puzzling example of majority nationalism.

The possibility of military confrontation, whether accidental or deliberate, was well within the foreseeable options at the time. Members of the Greek political and social establishment not only demonstrated their determination on the issue at the international level but also insisted for “military pressure” against Skopje (Kathimerini 1992: 8; Pappas 2011). Meanwhile, Milošević offered to divide the Socialist Republic of Macedonia to create the long-desired “Serbo-Greek” border (see Michas 2002; Rossos 2008). Another potential threatening aspect was the proposal to deliver a casus belli against Turkey if it stationed troops in any of Greece’s northern frontiers, including territories of the Macedonian Republic (Ifistos 1995: 60). These attitudes were reflected in the media. For instance, a leading conservative daily, Eleftheros Typos, ran an editorial on April 13, 1992, explicitly advocating a military confrontation: “Maybe we should
make it clear in all directions that if need be, we will send a couple of divisions and a few elite commando units to restore justice” (Quinn 1992).4

Following (FYR) Macedonia’s declaration of independence in September 1991, the Greek public and government protested the “appropriation” of the name and cultural symbols of the ancient Macedonian Kingdom, seen as an exclusive part of the Greek heritage. Not surprisingly, then, Macedonia, particularly the “name issue,” dominated ethnic politics in Greece in the early 1990s. This chapter examines how this primarily symbolic issue could overshadow problems of potentially higher political or security risk for Greece.5 It utilizes debates from the Hellenic Parliament to uncover linkages between elite framing and the choice of foreign policy in Greece and, by extension, in other conflict-prone societies. As noted, Chapter 3 examines how the “name issue” became a major priority in Greek politics, sidelining more threatening and urgent disputes, particularly with Albania and Turkey. A sizable camp of “doves” championed reconciliation and compromise on Turkish and Albanian issues, but “hawks” monopolized framing and fostered an early nationalist consensus on the Macedonian issue. Elites became trapped in their own frame, no matter whether from the left or right sides of the political divide. As the crisis unfolded, elite consensus on the rightness and efficacy of nationalism prevented adaptation to new conditions and reassessment of contrary information. In the end, symbolic politics redefined the meaning of security and the country’s priorities, leading to miscalculations in foreign policy even when compromise was desirable, necessary and feasible.

As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the concepts of symbolic politics and issue framing have gained considerable attention across the social sciences (Benford and Snow 2000; Ross 2007; Kaufman 2011). Even leading neorealist thinkers such as Krasner now acknowledge the role of framing ideas in public policy. As he sees it, the critical issue in policy is not to explain past events with more or less full information—as political scientists might argue—but to consider how ideas are framed (2007). Krasner acknowledges the power of communication in enhancing, modifying, and restraining politics in the modern world. Various studies show public opinion depends on framing, and even small changes in the wording of questions can produce different preferences among respondents (Iyengar 1991; Kynder 1998; Kahneman 2011). In addition, as current literature shows, elite framing becomes embedded in political institutions and processes of decision-making, particularly in crisis-prone societies (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Lustick 1993; Schimmelfennig 2001). Despite
the promising beginning, however, much remains to be done in the area; for example, few studies have decoupled framing processes from security or other contextual factors.

This chapter focuses on elite framing by looking at the above-mentioned highly symbolic dispute that captured the imagination of the Greek public despite other competing priorities in the early 1990s. A critical look at communication and framing strategies in the conflict between Greeks and their “ethnic Macedonian” neighbors to the north can shed light on patterns of moderation and contention. Drawing from Benford and Snow (2000), the chapter examines the concept of elite framing, noting the significance of such processes in explaining Greek majority nationalism.

THE HELLENIC PARLIAMENT

The Hellenic Parliament has been the central site for the formulation and reformulation of Greek national identity for about two centuries. Since the creation of the Greek state in the 1830s, when more than half of Greeks lived under Ottoman rule, political elites have addressed war and peace in political rhetoric, accumulating a rich cultural repertoire of contention and moderation. A prominent historical example is Megali Idea, the principle of territorial and cultural expansion of the nineteenth-century Greek Kingdom. It was articulated and presented as a viable political program in 1844 during a parliamentary discussion on the amendment of the third article of the Greek constitution on the rights of ethnic Greeks born outside the Greek Kingdom (Kitromilides 1979).

Although not the only place to study how elites think and act, a country’s parliament has several advantages over other sources, such as local newspapers, evening news reports, or interviews with experts. As noted earlier in the book, parliamentary debates provide credible and unedited evidence as to the dominant thinking at the highest echelons of government and major opposition parties. Unlike information gleaned from interviews, records of parliamentary debates are easily accessible and, therefore, findings can be confirmed and retested. Moreover, unlike interviews that might take place years after a given event, parliamentary debates, particularly those occurring at times of crisis or even earlier, do not allow participants to rethink and to reconstruct their positions.

THE MACEDONIAN PUZZLE

The historical context of the Macedonian issue is important in situating how the conflict is understood in the Greek Parliament and in southeast Europe in
general. The Greeks arrived in the region in the twelfth century B.C., and the ancient Macedonian Kingdom had organic cultural ties with the Greek cities in the south long before the arrival of the Slavs in the Balkans in the seventh century A.D. (Stavrianos 1958; Rossos 2008). While Macedonia hosted many different cultures for centuries, its inhabitants considered themselves “Macedonians” and used that term for themselves, regardless of language or nationality. At the heart of the contemporary dispute are the name and the cultural symbols of ancient Macedonians and whether one of the ethnic groups in the region can monopolize them, either on the basis of ancient cultural ties (Greek Macedonians) or recent presence and statehood (ethnic/Slav Macedonians) or, alternatively, whether the names and symbols could be constructively shared by the two groups in conflict (Danforth 1995; Ramet 2005a, 2005b; Rossos 2008).

During Ottoman times, almost all the Orthodox populations of the empire were included in the Rum millet (Greek Orthodox confessional group) under the leadership of the patriarchy in Istanbul. Greek national ideology, particularly in the nineteenth century, attempted to embrace those populations that were part of the Rum millet but did not share the Greek language. The same populations, particularly in border regions, were subsequently contested by other national ideologies that projected linguistic affiliation as the main principle of national differentiation.

The primary identity of Slav speakers in western Greek Macedonia has caused severe conflict among rival national ideologies. Since the 1850s there have been three major groups: pro-Bulgarian (old-Exarchists), Greek (Patriarchists), and a third group supporting an independent Macedonia (Rossos 2008). The pro-Bulgarian faction was probably stronger in the Slavic speaking areas, but after the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the alliance between Greece and Serbia, Bulgaria got only a small part of Macedonia. During the interwar period, Bulgaria embraced the idea of “Independent Macedonia” or “Macedonia for the Macedonians.” Unsurprisingly, Greece saw the vision for the reunification of Macedonia as Bulgarian irredentism likely to be followed by the annexation of Greek territory to a Greater Bulgaria (Kofos 1964). Meanwhile, Stalin supported the self-determination rights of Balkan nationalities, while the former Soviet Union tried to take advantage of the national grievances in the region in order to promote the communist ideology.6

After the Balkan Wars (1912–13), Greece initially attempted to comply with its obligations toward minority Slav-speakers, even arguing in the League of Nations that Slavomacedonian (Michailidis 1996) is a separate language and
Slavophones in Western Macedonia should be educated in their native dialect. Yet Ioannis Metaxas, Greek dictator during the 1930s, was obsessed with the Bulgarian threat and followed policies of “rapid assimilation.” A new law prohibited the use of any Slavic idiom; peasants had to take public oaths to always speak Greek. In many cases, punishment included public humiliation, imprisonment, or even exile to the islands. These measures alienated many, even those who fought on the Greek side in the Balkan Wars. Even in the eyes of popular historian Sarantos Kargakos, the ignorance of the problems of Macedonia and chauvinism did not allow the development of a pragmatic policy toward the “Slav speakers.” Nobody, he argued, could develop Greek consciousness or learn the Greek language through police decree; rather, police orders caused Slav-speakers who saw themselves as Greek to lose their affinity with Greece (Kargakos 1992). To this, Danforth (1995) adds that from an anthropological perspective, attempts by the state to impose a homogeneous national culture on a group of people with different linguistic and cultural traditions may itself contribute to the creation of a national minority.

More important, Greek Macedonia experienced unprecedented demographic changes during this period. The Balkan Wars, the Greek disaster in Asia Minor, and the exchange of populations with Turkey and Bulgaria transformed the ethnological structure of the area from a “mosaic of populations” to a predominantly Greek territory. The incoming refugee populations from Asia Minor exhibited diverse linguistic and cultural elements but proved to be assimilatory to the uniform Greek national idea (Mylonas 2013). The only two non-Greek elements in the territory of Greek Macedonia were the Jews of Salonika and a segment of the Slavophone community in the northern parts of the country. In 1928, the League of Nations estimated that 5 percent of the population in Macedonia, or seventy-seven thousand people, were Slav speakers (Jelavich 1983: 256). Greeks saw the idea of a united Macedonian as unjustified on ethnological grounds given the “Slavic character” of their northern neighbors and the increasingly homogeneous population structure of Greek Macedonia. They later portrayed Bulgarian occupation during the Nazi era and Yugoslav support of the communists during the civil war (1944–49) as evidence of uninterrupted territorial aggression against Greece.

Although ethnic Macedonians were over-represented in the ranks of the Democratic Army during the civil war, there is little agreement on their exact role. On the one hand, the Soviets wanted an outlet to the Mediterranean, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians had a “perennial aim” to annex Greek Macedonia, and
Greek communists wanted to gain control of the government. On the other hand, Stalin's cautious policies with Western powers, and the mutual rivalry between Dimitrov and Tito over the spoils of Macedonia, helped the Greek army regain absolute control.

During the civil war, ethnic Macedonians organized a military group called the Slav Popular Liberation Front (SNOF). This organization was the "Slavophone" counterpart of EAM/ELAS (National Liberation Front/Greek People's Liberation Army), even though relations between the nationalist ranks of the two organizations were uneasy (Karakasidou 1993; Rossos 1997). Its purpose was to create an autonomous Macedonia inside a southern Slav federation. For many Greeks, "SNOF was a devilish invention of Tito and therefore EAM was in partnership with the devil himself" (Woodhouse 1948: 93). Ethnic Macedonians showed very little loyalty to EAM, however, and Gotchev (or Gotsi), leader of "Slav Macedonian bands," revolted against EAM at least three times (ibid.: 64).

At the time the Western camp feared that Tito was attempting the unification of the whole of Macedonia within Yugoslavia. In late 1947, he attempted to convince Bulgaria to join the Yugoslav federation in an attempt seen as part of the plan to "push into Aegean—or Greek—Macedonia" (Banac 1988: 37). Tito believed not only in the Macedonian nation but also in the right of Bulgarian and Greek Macedonians to secede and join Yugoslavia as federal states (ibid.; Kofos 1964). He supported Macedonian nationalism to secure the loyalty of the local population and to marginalize pro-Bulgarian elements. The Macedonian issue also presented the chance for Tito to expand his control over Greek and Bulgarian segments of the region. Indeed, much of the legitimacy of the Greek arguments against the use of the name "Macedonia" stems from the attempt to seize a large part of northern Greece in the name of Macedonia only half a century earlier.

After the civil war there was an exodus of ethnic Macedonians from Greece to Yugoslavia and other countries of Eastern Europe. According to official Greek statistics, their numbers had diminished during the German occupation and the civil war from 86,086 to 41,017 (Poulton 1994: 162). The post–civil war trend continued during the 1950s and 1960s with internal migration to the two urban centers of the country and immigration abroad, especially to Australia and Canada.

The attitude of the community during the civil war caused Greek governments to discriminate not only against communists but also against those
"Slavophones" who were politically indifferent. According to Karakasidou (1997: 119), Macedonians suffered political repression and cultural suppression because they were perceived by Greek authorities as different and dangerous (ibid.). By the time of the Yugoslav war, the elements of Slavic language and culture in western Macedonia had almost disappeared. Ethnic Macedonians in the Florina region had learned through decades of experience to be guarded in their responses to Greek journalists and researchers, and they kept silent on issues of identity, consciousness, or even language (ibid.: 117). In short, many ethnic Macedonians renounced their traditions to integrate into the mainstream Greek culture (ibid: 129). It became difficult, particularly for a Greek visitor in the region, to recognize the ethnic features of the group, since members were "hiding" their identity to avoid social and political stigmatization.

Adding fuel to the fire, the Greek government denied the existence of a Macedonian minority in northern Greece, claiming that there was only a small group of "Slavophone Hellenes" or "bilingual Greeks" who spoke both Greek and "a local Slavic dialect" but who had "Greek national consciousness" (Danforth 1995). This claim was not completely unjustified, of course, as many manifested Greek national consciousness and seldom used the local Slavic idiom in public. Yet it failed to recognize that a sizable group also maintained a predilection to the neighboring republic and aspired recognition of a distinct national identity while many others were keeping silent out of necessity.

In the early 1990s, Macedonia, particularly the "name issue," dominated ethnic politics in Greece. In their narrative, Greeks pointed to memories of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, Bulgarian occupation of parts of Greek Macedonia in World War II, the Yugoslav involvement in the 1944–49 Greek civil war, and more recent territorial claims by ultranationalists in the neighboring republic (Kofos 1964; Koliopoulos 1999; Tziampiris 2011). Meanwhile, in their historic narratives, ethnic Macedonians questioned the 1913 partition of geographic Macedonia (Danforth 1995; Rossos 1981, 2008) and pointed to the negation of the Macedonian national identity by all neighbors, especially Greeks, and the involuntary assimilation of ethnic Macedonian speakers into the Greek national community (Rossos 2008).

**ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS**

Although Greeks have legitimate historical concerns about Bulgarian and Yugoslav territorial ambitions in Macedonia, Greek mobilization in the 1990s targeted the new Macedonian republic, which, arguably, could not be held ac-
countable for crimes committed in the name of Bulgarian or Yugoslav "expansionism." Even if the principle of "collective punishment" were to be endorsed in this instance, it could not be extended to include the inhabitants of the new republic, as Bulgarian and Yugoslav war crimes were committed decades before in an arguably different historical context.

Civil war grievances are a similarly weak explanation for the conflict. Slav Macedonians fought on the losing side (Greek communists), while Asia Minor refugees supported the Greek right. However, as Kalyvas argues, the civil war was not an ethnic war (Kalyvas 2006: 312), and despite its pronounced ethnic character, particularly in the Slav-speaking areas of Greece, it has not been understood as such in Greek or Balkan historiographies (ibid.; Kofos 1964; Rossos 2008).

Moreover, following the civil war, Greece enjoyed a close relationship with both Tito’s Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. As demonstrated in Table 3.1, below, strategic priorities and worsening relations with Turkey after the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, as well as rising tensions in the Aegean in the 1980s, dictated closer ties with northern neighbors (see also Heraclides 2001). During the 1987 Greek–Turkish Sismik crisis, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou dispatched his minister of foreign affairs and later president of Greece, Karolos Papoulias, to Bulgaria to secure the country’s support (Cowell 1987: 2). Interestingly, as Ramet notes, even when Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonis Samaras was accusing Bulgaria of “endangering security” by recognizing Macedonia in 1992, agreements for military cooperation were being made by Greece and Bulgaria, including close contact between combat units in the two countries (Ramet 1992).

Further, a close look at the twentieth-century history of Macedonia suggests that Greeks were on the “winning side” in Macedonia, unlike conflicts with Albania and Turkey, where Greeks had grievances, some of which were more visible, and in the case of the latter, documented by international organizations (for example, UN resolutions condemning Turkish actions on Cyprus). Moreover, when compared with conflicts with Albania or Turkey in the same period, the Macedonian issue had little potential to endanger Greek security. The new republic had no current or future military capabilities, while Greece maintained both short-term and long-term strategic, political, and military advantages.

Based on a dedicated online dataset accompanying this book (Loizides 2009b), Table 3.1 summarizes the diverse crises Greece faced in the decade preceding the 1992 Macedonian issue and the variation in the country’s foreign policy responses in each of the events involving Albanian, Macedonian, and Turkish issues.

As Table 3.1 demonstrates, despite the multiple ethnopolitical issues facing
Greece, it was the Macedonian issue that roused the Greek public and led to a tough-resolve political approach to the situation in the early 1990s. As leading Greek journalist Takis Michas argues: "It would not be an overstatement to say that Greece's foreign policy during the first half of the last decade was dominated by a single issue: Macedonia" (Michas 2002: 42). What is more intriguing is the engagement of ordinary citizens in the making of foreign policy, through petitions, demonstrations, and consumer boycotts against EU countries supporting the new republic (Smith 1992: 10). As noted in the table above, two major demonstrations, one in Thessaloniki (February 14, 1992) and the other in Athens (December 10, 1992) attracted at least a million people each. No other issue related to Turkey or Albania has received this type of attention from or-

**Table 3.1: Greece and Ethnopolitical Crises (1982–92)**

**CYPRUS AND "TRNC" CRISIS WITH TURKEY (1983)**

After 1974, Cyprus remained de facto divided between the areas controlled by the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus in the south and the areas controlled by the Turkish military forces in the north. On November 16, 1983, Turkish Cypriot authorities, with the backing of Turkey, declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Radio Bayrak 1983). Following the declaration, Greek PM Andreas Papandreou expressed his determination not to back down on the issue (Cohen 1983: 9; Facts on File, 1983). Greece acted quickly to prevent the recognition of the TRNC, and to secure relevant UN resolutions condemning the act. The international community was worried that Greece under Prime Minister Papandreou would resort to retaliatory measures against Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Possible scenarios included the transfer of military equipment to Greek Cypriots to match Turkish occupation forces, and punitive measures such as cutting water, electricity, or sewage lines between the two sides (Howe 1983: 10). UN Security Council resolution 541 considered the declaration invalid, called for its withdrawal, and asked both communities "to refrain any action that might exacerbate the situation" (UN 1983). As the EEC, UN, and United States made diplomatic efforts to prevent TRNC recognition, it became unnecessary for Greece to introduce confrontational measures against Turkey. One hundred thousand people demonstrated in areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus, but no major mobilizations took place in mainland Greece (UPI 1983), and no additional Greek military forces were sent to Cyprus. The Greek government did not encourage Greek Cypriots to retaliate against Turkish Cypriots or Turkey.

**AEGEAN OIL CRISIS AND TURKEY (1987)**

The March 1987 crisis was caused by a dispute over oil drilling rights in the North Aegean off the island of Thassos, where a Greek-based international consortium planned to start drilling. The Turkish government claimed that these operations contravened the 1976 Berne Agreement (Mauthner 1987: 19). The two countries agreed in 1976, in a secret meeting in Bern, Switzerland, on a formula to deal with disputes over the Aegean, but later, Greek PM Andreas Papandreou renounced the agreement (Anderson 1987). Turkey's National Security Council, headed by President Kenan Evren and dominated by the military, ordered the oil exploration vessel Sismik-1 to sail through the Dardanelles under naval escort. In Greece, Papandreou vowed to stop Sismik-1 by force, to retaliate against the United States by shutting down American bases in Greece and inviting USSR ally Bulgaria to join the conflict. PM Turgut Ozal, still on his way home from heart surgery in Texas, canceled Sismik-1 operations and diffused the crisis by securing an assurance from the Greek government that it would also refrain from drilling in disputed areas (The Economist, 1987: 50). A month later Turkey applied to join the European Economic Community, despite warnings that the timing of such an application was poor.
MINORITY ISSUES WITH ALBANIA (1990)

In early 1990, Albania declared a state of emergency while a crisis erupted over its treatment of the Greek minority (Independent 1990). Greece claimed that up to 400,000 Greeks in the neighboring country were not allowed to move freely, practice their religion, or study Greek at school. Four Greeks were allegedly tortured to death after attempting to seek refuge in Greece (Konstandaras 1990). Relations had been strained since the incorporation of northern Epirus into Albania in 1916. After World War I, Greek claims to the area were denied. During World War II, Italy invaded Greece through Albania, but Greek military forces defeated Italy and captured northern Epirus. Until 1987 the two countries were technically in a state of war (New York Times 1987), but Greece did not actually threaten war or introduce any type of embargo against Albania. The exodus of minority Greeks and Albanians continued through the early 1990s. In 1994 another crisis erupted over the treatment of the Greek minority group Omonia, accused of treason; if found guilty, they would receive the death penalty. Greece retaliated by expelling indiscriminately around thirty thousand illegal Albanian immigrants (Economist 1994: 59).

TURKISH MINORITY IN WESTERN THRACE AND TURKEY (1990)

In February 1990, clashes occurred in northeastern Greece (western Thrace) between Greeks and ethnic minority Turks, leaving one Greek dead and several wounded on both sides (Anastasi 1990: 9). Greece and Turkey expelled each other’s consuls in Thrace and Istanbul (Associated Press 1990). Turkey invoked principles of human rights in its response as minority Turks found it almost impossible to buy or rent land, build, or even restore their own houses (Hearst 1991). Greece invoked the principle of reciprocity as stipulated in the Treaty of Lausanne, citing the fact that Istanbul Greeks had been forced to abandon Turkey decades ago. Greece also feared the creation of a “second Cyprus” (Economist 1991: 59) No major escalation took place on the Greek side at this time, and following the incidents, the new PM Mitsotakis revoked old policies of discrimination. The progress was noticeable to both local and outside observers (Pope 1994: 13).

THE NAME "Macedonia" AND FYROM (1992)

Conflict over the name "Macedonia" as heritage and symbol of the ancient Macedonian kingdom became a major bone of contention between Greece and the Macedonian Republic. From 1992 to 1995, the official Greek position was that the new Yugoslav Republic could not use the name "Macedonia" or any derivative (Valinakis and Dalis 1996). The Mitsotakis government had only a marginal majority in parliament, and references to new elections were made in the press (Barber 1992b: 10). The weak parliamentary majority made it extremely vulnerable to pressure from nationalists, especially the young and charismatic minister of foreign affairs, Antonis Samaras. Because of this issue, ND MPs defected, and the Konstantinos Mitsotakis government lost power on October 13, 1993. PM Andreas Papandreou won re-election by playing the nationalist card and outbidding all opponents in his defense of confrontational policies (Ottaway 1993: A12) Between January 1992 and September 1992, Mitsotakis introduced an oil embargo against its landlocked neighbor (Barber 1992a), while Papandreou followed with a seven-month frontier embargo (excluding food and medicine) on February 16, 1994 (Agence France Presse 1994; see also Hislope 2003: 136). In 1992, two rallies in Thessaloniki and Athens opposing recognition of the new Yugoslav Republic drew 1 million people each (Alexandri 1992; Toronto Star 1992: 10).

dinary citizens, despite collective memories, recent ethnic antagonisms, and an alleged “civilizational divide” (Kaplan 1993). Moreover, no other issue has provoked official government embargoes by two consecutive Greek governments on both the left and right. In southern Greece, the Macedonian issue was virtually unknown; for instance, in a 1986 speech, Greek prime minister Andreas
Papandreou argued that there "are Serbs, there are Croats, there are Bulgarians, but there is no Macedonian issue," while in his 1981 landmark pre-election speech in Thessaloniki, Andreas Papandreou made no single reference to the Macedonian question. Thus, unlike comparable cases of ethnic conflict, the escalation of Greek-Macedonian conflict cannot be attributed to a straightforward elite or mass mobilization of existing memories and symbols.

Other incidents during the same period reinforce the observation that it is not always possible or desirable to "stir up nationalist passions" (Levy 1989; Brubaker 1998: 275, 289). For example, despite the diversionary potential of Greek-Turkish crises at a time of political instability, the Mitsotakis government managed to break the cycle of confrontation with the Turkish minority in the early 1990s (Anagnostou 2001: 103). Further, the country's general policy toward Albania was mostly cooperative, despite incidents involving the Greek minority in southern Albania and difficulties associated with the arrival of almost half a million new Albanian immigrants. At the same time, however, the Greek government failed to use its EU credentials to help stabilize its former Yugoslav border in the north, choosing rather to follow a course of isolation that destabilized Greece domestically. The course of events eventually led to the fall of the moderate Konstantinos Mitsotakis, and the return to power of populist Andreas Papandreou in 1993 (Barber 1993; Ottaway 1993: A12).

To return to the issue at hand, alternative explanations of Greek reactions to the use of the name and symbols of "Macedonia" focus on the role of identity and memory. Scholars have explored a number of explanations, variables, and theoretical avenues, including social identity theory (Triandafyllidou 1998; Kotsovolis 2005), collective memory (Mazower 1995; Tzanelli 2006), the unresolved wounds of the Greek Civil war (Pettifer 1999), ethnic nationalist ideology (Danforth 1995; Michas 2002; Karakasidou 1997; Rossos 2008), political manipulation (Zahariadis 2005), and the influence of the media (Demertzis et al. 1999). But many of these are more immediately apparent in manifestations of Greek nationalism with respect to Albania and Turkey and cannot account for the variations in Greek crisis behavior.

Elite framing captures many of these variables, as framing does not operate in a vacuum but simultaneously reflects, magnifies, and institutionalizes pre-existing interests (Agathangelou and Ling 1997: 23). Even when frames correlate to, or reflect, other causes commonly associated with mobilization and conflict, variables might remain unnoticed unless elites bring them to public attention and eliminate alternative interpretations. Ultimately, how causal variables are understood and framed in political discourse might be more important than
the initial causes. Framing also highlights interactive processes such as the contest between "hawks" and "doves" that often takes on a life of its own, overshadowing proximate or background conditions.

FRAMING IN GREEK PARLIAMENT

As described in previous chapters, framing is generally understood as a conscious and strategic effort to shape shared understandings about a group, its environment, entitlements, and range of possible actions. Whether aiming at peace or war, frames have essentially two components: a diagnostic component, which includes grievances, threats, and definitions of the problem and its source, and a prognostic component, which focuses on identifying appropriate opportunities and strategies for redressing the problem.

As the analysis of parliamentary speeches demonstrates below, the explanation of Greek reactions to the Macedonian issue can be found in the early framing of a nationalist consensus by the country's important political institutions.

On issues with Albania or Turkey, arguably with deeper "historical" or "security-driven" backgrounds, a sizable moderate camp championed ideas of reconciliation and compromise, particularly in the 1980s. Greek parties on both the right and the left had moderate factions that saw the need for compromise and the futility of confrontation. Moderates on the right emphasized the possibility of settling issues with Turkey within the framework offered by the European Community and NATO, while moderates on the left emphasized solidarity with socialist Albania. In each case, these factions prevented a homogenization of the framing of a particular situation or crisis. In contrast, on the Macedonian issue, all parties, even the communist left, avoided (for reasons of political expediency) any association with ethnic/Slav Macedonians.

Working through newspaper retrieval databases such as Lexis/Nexis, Factiva, and FBIS, as well as secondary sources, I identified fifteen references to parliamentary debates on Greek foreign policy in the period between 1979 and 1991, inclusive. By and large, a debate's citation in international media is a good measure of its importance, and this method of selection allowed me to avoid speeches of minor political significance. But because the press generally provides only references to, or summaries of, debates, it was important to locate the complete transcripts. Then, as I read through the relevant parliamentary debates, I could readily identify adversarial and nonadversarial frames in both the grievances and the opportunity categories in accordance with the coding index presented in Chapter 2. In addition, I could distinguish among separate conflict areas involving Turkey, Albania, and Macedonia.
The results of coding debates in the Greek Parliament demonstrate some major differences in elite framing across issue areas between 1979 and 1991. The framing of issues relating to Turkey took the direction one might expect: the framing of grievances was high, but opportunity frames were evenly divided. More specifically, I identified 62 grievance frames, with 7 frames attempting to moderate those grievances (net—55). In the opportunity category, I found 22 opportunity frames, with 26 frames aiming to moderate these arguments (net—4). In other words, although most parliamentarians were aggrieved with Turkey, they were divided on whether Greece should actually confront Turkey.

The framing of issues relating to Albania was a surprise: parliamentarians demonstrated relatively high levels of moderation. Grievances were present in 16 frames, but these were more than balanced by 25 frames aiming to moderate grievances (net—9). More surprising, I found 32 frames aiming to counter adversarial behavior, with only 1 frame aiming at such behavior (net—31). In other words, Greek parliamentarians were less aggrieved with Albania and even less confident that they could redress problems through nationalist action. Also surprisingly, they seemed relatively more confident confronting Turkey than Albania, in contradiction to the actual power dynamics in the region. This strongly suggests that frames may not necessarily reflect structural variables.

"Macedonia" scored very high in both grievances and opportunities. Elite framing was almost “monolithic,” with 39 grievance frames and 9 opportunity ones, compared with 1 frame aiming to moderate grievances and 1 frame aiming to moderate opportunities (net—38 and 8, respectively). The Macedonian

![Graph showing grievances and opportunities for Turkey, Albania, and Macedonia.]

**Fig. 3.1:** Mapping Greek Foreign Policy Discourse.
issue was unquestionably high in both perceived grievances and opportunities to demonstrate resolve. In other words, in this foreign policy area, I found a "united front" in Greek parliamentary thinking and an elite consensus linking the political divide.

AN EXCLUSIVE HOMELAND FOR GREEKS

The degree to which the presence of "ethnic others" is acknowledged, opposed, or misrepresented in the national narrative of a dominant group defines, to a large extent, majority nationalism. In Greek parliamentary debates, for example, Greece is often seen as the exclusive homeland of the Greeks. Thus, any expression of cultural diversity is instantly linked with past threats to the country's territorial integrity (Kostopoulos 2000). During the period from 1978 to 1991, ethnic Macedonians forced to leave the country after the civil war were at the center of this type of discourse. In a debate in parliament, even playing a song from this "enemy" country was represented as a crime; after reading a police report in 1978, Member of Parliament Anastasios Balkos mentioned the following incident:

[A]round nighttime in the village of Koryssos, Kastoria, during the celebrations for Carnivals a Bulgarian song was played that could be translated "Let's go Vasil to Bulgaria." But who was responsible for playing this "pretty" song? ... From the investigation, it was found to be a resettling refugee who had committed this crime before in the past.16

In a 1980 speech, Member of Parliament Stephanopoulos (future president of the Hellenic Republic) said that if civil war refugees were allowed to resettle in Greece, the country would face a major national threat.17 Parliamentarians labeled anyone supporting the "propaganda" of the ethnic Macedonian minority as a traitor to Greece, making it clear that "such traitors existed in the country." As MP Athanasios Kontaxis argued in 1984, "Only Greek traitors that have betrayed Greece—and continue unfortunately even today to exist—could have supported the propaganda of the Skopjian, Slavomacedonian, Macedonian State."18 As Lustick argues in his influential work, the treatment of dissent as evidence of treason, criminality, and insanity rather than contrary opinion is part of the hegemonic politics that help sustain conflicts around the world (1993).

One of the saddest aspects of the Macedonian crisis in the 1990s was the vicious attack on Greek academics and human rights activists (Karakasidou 1993;
Dimitras et al. 1996). MPs narrated horror stories from their visits to Melbourne or Toronto, noting the advance of ethnic Macedonian "propaganda" in those places. MP Ioannis Varvitsiotis even accused the government of appointing as the Australian press officer a person lacking the skills required to confront that country's "unacceptable, incomprehensible and undocumented propaganda" on the Macedonian issue. If such suggestions are taken seriously and national-minded individuals are appointed to key government positions, nationalist worldviews will inevitably become embedded in a country's institutions.

In the debates, even moderate politicians fell into the trap of speaking of minorities as threats, including PM Mitsotakis and the secretary of the Communist Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos), Leonidas Kyrkos. While pointing to the many gaps in Greek policy toward minorities (a rare admission in parliament), Kyrkos warned that minority issues were like barrels of gunpowder. For his part, Mitsotakis challenged Kyrkos to acknowledge that there was no Slavomacedonian minority in Greece, and the leader of the Communist Party obliged.

In fact, the communist left should have challenged the elite consensus on the Macedonian issue. During the civil war, ethnic Macedonians fought alongside with Greek communists; at the time, the party emphasized equality and protection of national rights of ethnic Macedonians in Greece (Rossos 2008: 190). Yet as Rossos argues, even when they needed each other during the civil war, ethnic Macedonians and Greek communists were "incompatible allies" (Rossos 1997) aiming at different objectives. In ethnic Macedonian nationalism, communists saw elements of disloyalty to the Greek state, while in their Greek comrades' nationalism, ethnic Macedonians saw a betrayal of their national rights (Rossos 2008).

After 1974 and following the fall of the junta, Greek communists (and the socialist left) appropriated leftist resistance, adding a nationalist twist by emphasizing resistance against Nazism. They dropped any references to ethnic Macedonians in exchange for participation in normal democratic politics. In the end, Greek communists were allowed to return from exile, while ethnic Macedonian refugees were denied the right of return (Kostopoulos 2000). For the left, any association with ethnic Macedonians could have delegitimized its nationalist credentials and reopened the unresolved wounds of the civil war (Pettifer 1999: 22).

Moderates on the right also unintentionally contributed to the shaping of a nationalist consensus. Mitsotakis played down the importance of the "name
issue” but did so by pointing to what he considered the real problem, the “cre-
ation” of a new minority issue in western Greek Macedonia. He later argued that “with an open Cyprus issue and the stalemate in Greek-Turkish relations if one could add a Slavomacedonian minority issue to the many problems of the Muslim minority in Thrace, then the situation will become unbearable for Greek foreign policy” (Mitsotakis 1995: 3). While these statements might appear to contradict contemporary norms on minorities and cultural diversity, Greek politicians at the time retained painful memories of Cyprus where a minority issue led to the Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island (Heraclides 2001: 43).

Such a view of minorities, shared by most Greek politicians, whether on the left or right, led to an interpretation of human rights reports as acts hostile to the nation’s territorial integrity. For example, a US Department of State report in early 1991 on human rights in Greece (one of the first to mention the presence of ethnic Macedonians) triggered the unprecedented ire of Greek parliamentarians.23

Overall, the Greek case demonstrates what Alexander George calls fake consensus-building whereby policy-makers often make wrong decisions on the basis of what most people want and support rather than attempting to master the cognitive complexity of the problem by means of analysis (George 1980).

GREEK VICTIMIZATION AND THREAT FRAMING

More generally, the theme of a victimized Greece was prominent in Greek elite framing. Kyrkos rhetorically asked the following in parliament: “We had 500,000 dead in World War II. A huge loss of blood. And Turkey, what did it have? Not even one dead. Who was the one who benefited from the war and afterwards?”24 In Figure 3.2 the mythological Greek hero Sisyphus becomes the embodiment of the modern Greek victimization narrative.25 The cartoon expresses Greek indignation with foreign threats and the lack of support from long-standing allies. On his shoulders, Sisyphus (wearing a Greek folkloric uniform) bears the weight of the Cyprus issue, Bulgarian irredentism, “Skopje,” and Turkish provocations. He says: “Think what would have happened to me if I had not fought for the freedom and the liberty of the Western world.”26

The parliamentary debates also provide evidence of conspiratorial elite framing of the intentions of neighbors and third countries, including traditional Greek allies. In fact, on many occasions, the disagreement was not whether the country was facing a threat, but what type it faced. In a debate aimed
at defining the threats facing Greece after the collapse of Yugoslavia, Andreas Papandreou said, “Today a new axis is in the making: Ankara-Skopje-Tirana, and there is also Kosovo”), and Prime Minister Mitsotakis replied: “There is an axis in the making. Not the way Mr. Papandreou had described it. But one that starts from the north Bosnia-Herzegovina and ends at the so-called Macedonia of Skopje.”27 The conspiracy rhetoric was reproduced by the media in sensational titles such as “The Muslim Axis,”28 and by influential ecclesiastical circles who presented the new republic (and its unrecognized church) as aligning with the Vatican in an attempt to secede from the Orthodox world in favor of the much-despised Western-style Christianity. For instance, Bishop Demetriados Christodoulos wrote editorials in the high-quality newspapers Kathimerini and
To *Vima* to propagate his views that “Christian minorities are under threat by Islam and the Vatican.” Six years later he became archbishop of Athens and all Greece as a direct result of his self-promotion as champion of Macedonia and other national issues.

What adds to the durability of these threat perceptions is that they are not falsifiable; as someone pointed out in an interview with me, people will believe them or reject them, depending on the credibility of the framer (Millas 2001). Threat perceptions may persist even when the “objective” conditions have ceased to exist (Kaufman 2011). Benford and Snow (2000) argue the criteria for successful framing include the “credibility of the proffered frame,” based on frame consistency, empirical credibility, and the reliability of the frame-maker (p. 620). When a critical mass of actors endorses a threat, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, instigating actions that transform the overall external environment.

As noted later, this has been both the case historically with Macedonian as well as interlinked disputes with Turkey. The charismatic Andreas Papandreou continuously framed Turkey as Greece’s primary threat during the 1980s, linking Greek-Turkish relations to his anti-American discourse. The Greek prime minister made no distinction among Turkish leaders; in his view, all Turkey’s political leaders, “whether Ecevit, Demirel, or Evren, continued to claim national sovereign Greek territory in the Aegean while Greece was fighting for peace and had no territorial claims against others.” The most dangerous point in recent Greek-Turkish relations came in 1987, when the two countries came close to war over oil explorations in the Aegean. Papandreou celebrated Turkey’s decision to “back down” as one of the major personal successes of his foreign policy. He later claimed that “the Turks did not make a move but that the whole matter was nothing but a bluff.” Papandreou reiterated that Greece was not simply play-acting: “It could go to war to protect its sovereignty and defend its Cypriot brothers from a new invasion.” The Greek PM was also clear on the capacity of Greek armed forces to defend the country against possible Turkish aggression.

If Greek policy-makers were as alarmed about negative Turkish intentions as the many speeches by Papandreou suggest, why did they divert the attention of the Greek public toward the Macedonian issue? To begin with, elite framers did not make an absolute distinction between the two issues. They introduced an overarching theme portraying the two enemies working together to harm Greece. A cartoon titled “Turkey Recognizes Skopje” (Fig. 3.3) presents Turkish
president Turgut Özal and his puppy “Skopje” barking at Greece while Özal says he does not need to bark or be accused of being a bad neighbor, if his puppy does so for him. The cartoon was published after Turkey recognized the Macedonian Republic and a few days before the massive demonstrations in Thessaloniki. It followed a great deal of framing work done by Greek politicians and the media representing the new Macedonian Republic as a satellite state of Turkey.

Interestingly, the religious bond between Orthodox Greeks and ethnic Macedonians was disregarded, even by the clergy, while Skopje and Ankara were portrayed as a “joint threat for Hellenism” in contradiction to Huntington’s explanation of civilization boundaries and expected alliances. This point demonstrates the complexity inherent in identity formation and what International Relations scholars often label diversionary framing (Levy 1989). Gurus
of frame analysis describe a process similar to frame alignment whereby individual issues and frames are linked in innovative ways, complementing each other’s gaps and bringing more credibility and frame resonance (Snow and Benford 1988).

In sum, by transferring grievances and threats from Turkey to Macedonia, Greek hawks mobilized nationalism to act on the Macedonian issue, where opportunities for success were greater and more readily apparent.

CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The key question in the Greek Parliament about Greek-Turkish relations was not whether Greece wanted to confront Turkey, but whether this was the best strategy, given the power differential between the two.

While acknowledging Turkish aggression, Nea Demokratia (ND) attributed some responsibility for conflict escalation to the misguided and controversial policies of PM Andreas Papandreou. The opposition confronted Papandreou on his inconsistencies: “We either have a government that plays dangerous games and a bit of theater in foreign policy to achieve some temporary gains internally—we say partisan gains—or in the best of the cases we have a government that is tragically irresponsible which has to resign before it brings more disasters to the country.” In addition, Mitsotakis identified opportunities for reconciliation with Turkey both in Cyprus and on other issues, without, of course, downplaying grievances and threats. In contrast to Papandreou, he presented the constraints to military competition with Turkey. He pointed to the friendship between Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Ataturk, and commented positively on Turkey’s declaration of commitment to existing treaties. Even PM Papandreou downplayed the possibility of a Greek-Turkish war by admitting that NATO membership for both Greece and Turkey decreased this likelihood, while EU involvement in the region increased the likelihood of a settlement in Cyprus through negotiations. Thus, while Turkey was feared, Greek moderates maintained hope that conflict transformation was possible through international involvement and mediation.

In the Greek Parliament, the framing of issues with Albania was comparable to Turkey, albeit with different roles played by the two major parties. Whereas center-right ND accused leftist Pasok of too much nationalism in dealing with Turkey, Pasok countered by pointing to Albania. In 1987, the Greek government ceased the state of war with Albania that had lasted without violence since World War II when, as noted previously, Italy and its satellite state Albania de-
clared war on Greece. Pasok, who signed this agreement, felt obliged to defend Greek-Albanian relations, thus suggesting path dependency in the party’s moderate policies. At the same time, it criticized ND for not respecting the borders, a criticism that ND refused categorically, thereby shaping a strong consensus among Greek elites on border inviolability.44

Violations of the rights of the local Greek minority in Albania were repeatedly mentioned in parliament, and Greek leaders demanded respect for the rights of their ethnic kin.45 In the winter of 1989, ND minister of foreign affairs Antonis Samaras toured minority Greek regions, where according to the international press, he implicitly pledged the “liberation of ethnic Greeks.”46 This tour was a disaster in relations between the two countries, and in the view of opposition Pasok MPs, it led to tension and the exodus of thousands to Greece (Pettifer 1991: 11).

Surprisingly, this exodus was not framed as Albanian aggression but as the result of Greek propaganda that clumsily lured thousands of Albanian citizens to a “Greek paradise.”47 Pasok MP Theodoros Pangalos criticized the government, even pointing a finger at ecclesiastical leaders like the Bishop of Konitsa Sevastianos: “Whenever someone expressed reservations for these policies, he got attacks of immense fanaticism and hatred from the progovernment press, certain government officials, and of course Sevastianos.”48 Pangalos’s unusual criticism of the church demonstrates the vigor of Pasok leaders in challenging nationalist views on the Albanian issue. Until recently, the Greek Church demanded a role in creating foreign policy by presenting itself as “the guardian of the endangered nation,” a role the church maintained for decades on the Macedonian issue without challenge (Halikiopoulou 2008).49

Looking beyond this particular issue, Pangalos warned the ruling party against claiming Albanian territory, as this could legitimize foreign aggression against Greece by Turkey in the Aegean, or by Cyprus, or even by Skopje (the Macedonian Republic).50 What is significant in Pangalos’s statements is the adoption of international norms on borders and their inviolability, unlike minority rights norms, which Greek elite frames generally opted to downplay during this period. As with center-right PM Mitsotakis, moderates on the left shared a consensus on borders shaped by the painful experience of 1974 in Cyprus.

In summary, despite the history and security dimensions of issues facing Greece with Turkey and Albania, in each case, one of the main political parties championed reconciliation and compromise. What is paradoxical in Greece is that unlike other crisis-prone societies, moderates were not concentrated in
one political party. Both Nea Demokratia on the right and Pasok on the left had moderate factions favoring a compromise with Turkey and Albania, respectively.

Greek parliamentarians, however, were united on their country’s willingness and capacity to take a tough approach to the Macedonian issue. There was no opposition to nationalism or to adversarial framing of grievances and opportunities. Even before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Papandreou and Mitsotakis repeatedly demonstrated their resolve on the issue by pointing out that the “promotion of the Macedonian issue against Greece” could damage Greek-Yugoslav relations, especially in an era when Yugoslavs needed Greek assistance for European initiatives. In the Greek political discourse, the strength and “preferential” position Turkey enjoyed in “Western” eyes was unquestioned. But Yugoslavia and later the young Macedonian Republic were perceived to be relatively less important and, therefore, more manageable targets.

Surprisingly, Greek politicians repeatedly claimed that a small multiethnic society could not survive in the Balkans (Michas 2002: 44–45), an argument contradicting key tenets of Greek foreign policy on Cyprus. Moreover, Greek elites held contradictory beliefs, accusing the West on the one hand for its lack of support while pointing to the advantageous position of their country in the European Union and NATO on the other.

These contradictions added urgency to Greek mobilization. In fact, what happened in Greece after 1992 was anticipated a year earlier in a comment by one of the most hawkish MPs, Stelios Papatheodori, pointing to a narrow window of opportunity in dealing confrontationally with the neighboring republic: “Skopje is a disorganized multiethnic mess, without state entity, economy, or bread. Greece should impose its will by demonstrating strength.... If we do not act now it will be difficult to change an accomplished fact tomorrow.” While Papatheodori’s views represent the most extreme version of the Greek framing at the time, for the most part, Greek leaders shared a minimum of nationalist sentiments on the Macedonian issue.

**LINKING FRAMES AND OUTCOMES: (MIS)ADAPTATION AND REFRAMING FAILURES**

Early consensus on the Macedonian issue made adaptation to new conditions in the mid-1990s more difficult and allowed hawkish framers to sustain what Brubaker describes as a nationally “primed” frame of mind for long periods of time (1998: 289). A predominantly adversarial framing resulted in or
exacerbated an already narrow way of defining national interest. Further, ethnocentric framing led to misadaptations in defining national priorities, even when novel arguments were presented and substantiated with new evidence. Specifically, in the case of Macedonia, a portion of the Greek leadership ignored three key pieces of policy advice pointing in a different direction and that might have led to alternative ways of redefining the Macedonian issue.

For one thing, because of their understanding of minorities as threats, Greek elites failed to acknowledge that recognizing a small minority on Greece’s northern frontier would have no negative effect on security. In fact, such recognition would have had a positive effect on the country’s diverse character, improving Greece’s international image.54 As the country with the smallest number of minorities, Greece could have gained from siding with international actors advocating minority rights. Recognizing minority and refugee rights would have facilitated the settlement of the name issue in favor of Greece. Yet following a rare all-party consensus after the collapse of the 1967–74 junta, Slav Macedonians were excluded from re-entering Greece as part of the “package solution” negotiated by Greek leaders to permit the legalization of the Communist Party (Kovras 2014: 134). As demonstrated in the parliamentary debates, even moderate politicians in the communist left saw minority issues as threatening, describing these as “barrels of gunpowder.” In the end, Greek political elites opted to deviate significantly from international norms on the rights of national minorities and civil war refugees.55

For another thing, early warning signs that the EU was not willing to unconditionally support Greece, such as the decision of the Badinter Committee to recognize the Yugoslav republics, were downplayed. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Papastamkos dismissed the Badinter Report as technocratic, erroneous, full of gaps, nonbinding, and lacking the necessary political backing.56 Greek elites also rejected a reasonable compromise for the joint use of the name “Macedonia” by Greece and its neighbor, while proponents of this view were marginalized in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Heraclides 2001: 340).57 The name “New Macedonia” included in the “Pinheiro package” was considered likely to be accepted at the time and end the conflict.

A reframed interpretation of national security was officially put forward by a high-ranking diplomat, Ioannis Tzounis. In a memo to the ministry, he argued that the new republic was not a threat but a “geopolitical” gift to Greece. He questioned the dominant assumptions and argued that the new neighbor gave Greece a buffer zone against conflict areas in the Balkans, such as Kosovo.
and Bosnia. But not only was the memo rejected by the government, it was also leaked to the daily press in an effort to damage the diplomat's credibility and discredit his ideas (Skylakakis 1995). What the press also failed to report was that the leadership of the Macedonian Republic was willing to reach a compromise and address the geopolitical fears of its neighbors; for instance, in late October 1992, President Gligorov said that his country would "gladly become a demilitarized zone" (Yugoslav News Agency 1992). But as these examples demonstrate, adopting a new definition of a crisis is difficult once definitions of national interest have become popular among elites, media, and the general public, or more specifically, once frames are embedded in the social norms, symbolic politics, and institutions of majority groups.

In Greece, the absence of major dissenting voices in parliament made bipartisan and, therefore, massive mobilizations more likely. More broadly, a consensus on the Macedonian issue was institutionalized years earlier through the creation of specialized research institutes focusing on Macedonian culture and history. These included, for instance, the Institute for Balkan Studies, the Society for Macedonian Studies, and the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, three of Greece's key institutions designed to preserve an ethnocentric interpretation of events that had taken place, particularly in the twentieth century. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece had financially supported and guided the agenda of these institutions (and their related publications) since the 1960s, while younger generations of scholars turned to other issues following Greece's democratization, leaving Macedonian studies to the exclusive monopoly of traditional historiography (los tis Kyriakis 2004). The negation of ethnic Macedonian nationalism dominated the Greek historiography on the issue, while further institutionalization of ethnocentric frames persisted through the careful editing and monitoring of historical archives, educational-literary texts, and even debates on archeological excavations.

Greek nationalists indoctrinated the public with the idea that an independent Macedonian republic was an inherent threat, established and named in a deliberate attempt to harm Greeks and their interests (Smith 1993: 15; Skylakakis 1995; Ellinas 2010). If the Macedonians were not genuine, then there was something suspicious in their use of the name. More significantly, the association of ethnic Macedonians, not only with Bulgaria but also with a potential threat from Turkey, facilitated the efforts of Greek nationalists to frame grievances and draw from past Bulgarian atrocities against Greeks to legitimize contemporary actions toward ethnic Macedonians.
Greek scholars were not an exception in portraying the Macedonian issue in ethnocentric terms. According to Andrew Rossos: "[T]he Macedonian question aroused strong national passions and antagonisms in the region reflected in the writings of both publicists and historians especially in Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia (Yugoslavia)." 62 Likewise, for decades, Macedonian nationalists have provided Greek framers with high-quality visual material on their mobilization of ethnic nationalism, such as expansionist maps, schoolbooks portraying Alexander the Great as a (Slav) Macedonian, a new currency depicting the landmark White Tower monument of Thessaloniki, 63 the use of the star of Vergina, symbol of Philip II's dynasty, and so on.

Moreover, in the years preceding the Macedonian crisis, Bulgarian atrocities were used extensively by the Greek government to consolidate Greek national feeling in previously disputed areas and to destroy any future pro-Bulgarian tendencies in the region. This was institutionalized deliberately through the collection of detailed but selective information at the local level. As Mazower argues:

[S]pecial attention was paid to Bulgarian atrocities of every kind. Such evidence one can guess, was expected not only to expand the pantheon of local heroes and forgotten martyrs but also to associate recent sufferings with past ones and eventually to build a strong anti-Bulgarian collective memory, an element indispensable to cold war Greek Macedonian identity. (Mazower 1995)

Included in such actions are those of the rising Bishop of Demetriados, discussed above, who was certainly not an exception among the political and ecclesiastical leadership. Described as the Ayatollah Khomeini of Macedonia, Bishop of Florina Avgoustinos Kantiotes clearly influenced the history of his border town. Kantiotes's long community service included the destruction of holy (Slav) Macedonian churches, the abolition of the local tongue and customs, as well as the construction of huge crosses over the hilltops across "atheist Yugoslavia" (Ios tis Kyriakis 1990: 29–30). As early as December 1990, small-town protests on the Macedonian issue were organized by the bishop against the production of a new film by Theodore Angelopoulos that called for abolishing Balkan frontiers. 64

A year later, however, a number of influential citizens, including the bishop of Thessaloniki and the town's mayor, academics, journalists, and politicians from all political parties organized the Macedonian Committee and prepared a massive rally in Thessaloniki, held February 14, 1992. 65
and speaker of the event was Mayor Konstantinos Kosmopoulos, who included in his invitation the following statement: "The heart of Greece [is] pounding in Macedonia and its ancient capital Thessaloniki . . . . We Macedonians are here." The rally's banners emphasized not only the Greekness of Macedonia but also the inviolability of borders, a core frame in parliament that could also explain moderation on issues with Albania. In this instance, key framers from all parties and civil society organizations were united on the Macedonian issue. The success of this rally, which created a precedent for similar mobilizations across the country, can partly be attributed to its rare bipartisan character.

Mobilizing public opinion for foreign policy purposes can have multiple effects that differ from the original intentions of the framers. By playing up nationalism, leaders often try to make significant and credible public threats to ethnic antagonists. In mobilizing the public in this fashion, it becomes apparent that if a leader backs down, he/she will suffer what Fearon (1994) describes as "audience costs." Because these costs can affect their re-election prospects, leaders can more easily communicate a credible threat against ethnic antagonists. Moreover, a roused, nationalist-minded public can signal to ethnic antagonists a determination to fight a crisis until the end. For instance, Samaras used photos from the massive Greek rallies to convince his European counterparts of the need to endorse the Greek position on the Macedonian issue (Skylakakis 1995: 91; Tziampiris 2000: 100–103). The public was told that by joining the mobilization, they could become facilitators of an important process or even agents in their own history. But any gains had to be achieved before the republic gained an internationally recognized status, an argument that added urgency to the mobilization processes of Greek society and diplomacy.

CONCLUSION: "A SLAVE OF DECISIONS"?

Overall, in the Greek case, frames wrote the script for subsequent action and determined major policy decisions, particularly in times of uncertainty. The Macedonian issue is highly informative, showing how nations can manage the uncertainty resulting from the collapse of long-time neighbors, such as the former Yugoslavia, the post-Soviet republics, and, more recently, Iraq/Syria. To address the rise of new regional nationalisms and challenges, leaders often argue that previous experience guides their judgment, and they frequently use historical analogies to justify their decisions (George 1980; Jervis 1968). But Bermeo (1992) and Levy (1989) have both demonstrated the problems and effects of past learning. During the Macedonian crisis, for example, Samaras declared
that nobody would blame him for a "second Zurich," a reference to the failure of the Greek government to achieve a viable settlement over Cyprus in 1959. A similar analogy with Zurich was used in 2004 by the Greek Cypriot "No" campaign to reject the Annan plan for the reunification of Cyprus despite the obvious dissimilarities between Zurich and Annan V, as well as between Cyprus in the 1960s and Cyprus within the European Union.

Although most Greeks at the time rejected any compromise with the new Republic, in mid-1992, Mitsotakis reassessed the difficulties of managing the issue on the international scene. He later expressed bitterness over becoming "a slave of decisions that he could not change regardless of his own personal efforts" (Mitsotakis 1995: 4), arguing that Greece had to fight against an international wave of recognitions occurring in the aftermath of Yugoslavia's collapse. In other words, elite consensus is hard to challenge in the presence of tight domestic political constraints and mobilization of spoilers against a proposed agreement (Stedman 1997). In this case, Mitsotakis's government enjoyed a majority of only two votes (and eventually only one) in an assembly of three hundred (Hope 1993: 2). In addition, key moderates were demobilized and party defection became an attractive and credible option after the rallies in Thessaloniki and Athens. Mitsotakis notes:

[As] part from Samaras there was another intra-party faction, headed by Mr. Evert, late Athanasios Kanelopoulos, and Mr. Dimas, who rejected any agreement with a double name. Given the existence and dependency on this faction and without the assistance of the then president for which I asked but never received, I had no parliamentary or intra-party influence to fulfill such an effort [to settle the issue]. (Mitsotakis 1995: 5)

A number of antecedent conditions that could potentially have obstructed confrontational attitudes in Greece, such as the influence of European institutions, proved less significant. Paradoxically, in fact, EU and international negotiations led to further entrenchment of nationalist framing. While negotiating the Macedonian issue, for example, Greek leaders argued that the neighboring republic had no historical basis for calling itself "Macedonia," and it maintained territorial ambitions against Greece, arguments similar to those used by nationalist framers internally. Moderate policy-makers could not weaken their country's negotiating position by criticizing domestically these adversarial frames, especially once they became indispensable elements of the country's foreign policy rhetoric. Critics could easily be dismissed, not only for making
wrong assessments, but also for playing the other side's game and weakening the Greek position. To avoid "harming national interests," influential moderates in the Greek political elite abstained from political debate over the Macedonian issue; former PM George Rallis even opted to resign rather than support an effort to bring the country to a political compromise.\(^7\)

As the framing of the Macedonian issue shows, frames can become a self-fulfilling prophecy by instigating actions that transform the external environment. The way Greeks framed the issue triggered reactions in others which, in turn, confirmed Greek nationalist suspicions of them. When public opinion prevented an acceptable compromise on the name "Macedonia," allies of Greece in the EU concluded that the Greek side was exclusively responsible for the lack of a settlement (Tziampiris 2000: 137–54) and even said that Greek accession was a mistake (Eyal 1993: 19). International reactions led to more isolation and justified earlier nationalist fears of international bias against Greek positions, adding "credibility in proffering the nationalist frame" on the Macedonian issue (Millis 2001; Kaufman 2011). As third countries begun to adopt the name "Macedonia" for international meetings, it became a standard and institutionalized practice of the Greek government to withdraw from such events, making Greece even more isolated and exposed on the issue.\(^7\) As repeated decades later in the mismanagement of the post-2008 sovereign debt crisis, even when Greek politicians finally realized the need for compromise (see Mitsotakis's comments, above), it was simply too late to reverse the forces of nationalism and populism (see Pappas 2015).

In the end, elite framing became entrenched in daily politics and practices by stirring up emotions, increasing uncertainties in times of transition, and shaping new public identities. According to Ross (2007), psychocultural narratives that are often simple but emotionally powerful, particularly at times of societal ambiguity and uncertainty, are key components of framing. When PM Andreas Papandreou declared in a Thessaloniki campaign rally that the "name Macedonia is our soul," this was meant as a reassurance that his leadership would stand by the emotional needs and insecurities of Greek Macedonians and the rest of the country (Barber 1993; Ottaway 1993: A12). Papandreou won the 1993 elections, thereby confirming the significance of the Macedonian issue to the Greek electorate. But as demonstrated in the discussion of the 1995 Interim Agreement in Chapter 5, while the Macedonian issue remained important in Greek elections and in public discourse, the country's political establishment also demonstrated the capacity to learn from it, at least partially.
In November 1998, the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan incident brought many of Turkey's neighbors to the brink of a damaging international crisis. Until then, the Kurdish leader was sheltered by the Assad regime in Syria, but following a Turkish ultimatum against Damascus, Öcalan left Syria for Russia and was subsequently arrested in Italy, which refused to extradite him to Turkey. In February 1999, the PKK leader was apprehended by Turkish agents outside the Greek embassy in Kenya, confirming some of the worst fears among the Turkish public of neighboring countries colluding with the PKK. Inevitably, given its sensational nature, the Öcalan episode became the focus of mobilizing and countermobilizing frames aiming to shape Turkey's future domestic and foreign policy orientation.

Triggered by the Öcalan situation and over a period of six months, Turkey engaged in a near-war situation with Syria, a trade war with Italy, and continuous human rights violations of the Kurdish minority, including a refusal to abolish the death penalty (see chronology in Table 4.1). As this incident suggests, ethnopolitical issues in the broader Middle East are interlinked, not only in how they are experienced but also in how they are perceived. For instance, at the onset of the crisis in October 1998, a Turkish parliamentarian described how "evil" Syria was, labeling the country a "Muslim Greece." At the street level, the usually calm Turkish society mobilized to support majority nationalism; a record 1 million people participated in different forms of mobilization, including a popular boycott of Italian products. Yet a year later, Turkey worked to achieve compromise as part of its bid to join the European Union.

This chapter looks at parliamentary records and political discourse in the
years preceding this crucial 1998–99 period to identify the framing of Turkey's foreign policy and explain these apparently paradoxical sequence events. It compares grievances and opportunities with regard to EU-Greece-Cyprus on the one hand and the Kurdish issue on the other. As will be shown in due course, there was an interesting split in the framing, with the latter largely adversarial (as might be expected) and the former more mixed. Using Turkey as a case study, the chapter underscores how adversarial discourse prevents adaptation to new conditions and assessment of policy errors, while a mixed discourse allows adaptation and compromise, especially when settlements are crafted carefully enough not to contradict pre-existing views.

**TURKEY AND THE KURDISH MINORITY QUESTION**

No conflict can be easily or simply defined, and any single definition is likely to be disputed. However, a plausible definition of the Kurdish conflict is one of large and compact national minorities facing regimes with highly problematic human rights records in Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. According to some accounts, there are approximately 20 to 25 million ethnic Kurds, the fourth largest ethnic group in the region, outnumbered only by Arabs, Persians, and Turks (McDowall 1997: 3). Despite their population size and ethnolinguistic distinctiveness, Kurds are generally seen as latecomers in the development of a national identity compared with fellow Muslims and Christians in the late Ottoman Empire (Romano 2006; McDowall 1997; Olson 1989). Regional geopolitics, partition into rival states or empires, as well as the inaccessibility of Kurdish lands from the West and major seaports delayed the early formation of a modern national identity (Romano 2006).

Almost half of all ethnic Kurds live in Turkey, with others concentrated in northern Iraq, northwestern Iran, and small parts of northern Syria. Ethnic Kurds generally oppose geographic terms such as "southeast Turkey" or "northern Iraq" and deny the legitimacy of their "partition" (O'Leary 2007). Demographic factors are crucial, and these tend to favor the long-term prospects of the Kurdish national movement. At the same time, the Kurdish communities not only in Turkey but also in the entire Middle East have been subject to forced dislocations and, following the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, to lethal genocidal violence. Although there are no official demographic surveys on ethnicity, the Kurds account for around 23 percent of the population of Turkey, while their reproductive rate is arguably double that of ethnic Turks, a determining factor for the future of the conflict (McDowall 1997: 3).
Almost 75 percent of Kurds are Sunni, like the majority of Turks and Arabs, with the remainder Shia, like most Iranians. While closer to their Turkish and Arab Sunni neighbors in religion, Kurds are closer to Persians in language. The Kurdish dialects (or languages) belong to the Indo-European family and are related to Farsi, the official language of Iran. The main division among the Kurdish dialects is between northern Kurmanji and southern Surani to the south of the Turkish-Iraqi border. There are also communities of predominantly Zaza speakers in Turkey who are mostly Shia (usually called Kurdish Alevites) and communities of Gurani speakers in Iran (McDowall 1997). The Yazidis targeted by the Islamic State in 2014 are considered by some to be a Kurdish ethnoreligious community; their ancient syncretic religion linked to Zoroastrianism and ancient Mesopotamian religions has made them targets of persecution for centuries (ibid.).

During the Turkish War of Independence, a significant number of Kurds joined the troops of Mustafa Kemal, who repeatedly called for Kurdo-Turkish unity (Mango 2000). The absence of a strong Kurdish national movement during this period was not merely due to religious differences: rivalries between Kurdish groups (primarily Alevi and Sunni), the fear of Armenian expansion into Kurdish-populated areas, and low expectations of international support for an independent Kurdish state demobilized ethnic activists and diverted local support toward Atatürk’s forces (ibid.).

Only in the 1930s did Kurdish intellectuals engage in a systematic effort to produce knowledge about the Kurdish people to serve the purposes of an independent national movement (McDowall 1997). In the new Turkish Republic, however, Atatürk dropped his earlier references to Kurds, opting for a homogenizing form of Turkish nationalism. In other words, Kurdish nationalism missed the critical moment of national state formation in the late Ottoman Empire and confronted a more repressive and organized state ideology in the republican era.

Unlike its Ottoman predecessor, modern Turkey was apprehensive of expressions of ethnic particularism and aspired to full homogenization (Turkification) of its citizens (Olson 1989). But the effects of assimilation through cultural integration were not always those expected. In fact, throughout the twentieth century, there were several Kurdish rebellions/movements against the Turkish state, including the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925, the Dersim (Tunceli) rebellion of 1937–38, and the Doğu Mitingleri ("Rallies of the East") in 1967 (ibid.; Van Bruinessen 1994: 141–70; Beşikçi 1992). Starting in the mid-1980s
and lasting until the end of the 1990s, the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) waged a violent rebellion against the Turkish state, with hundreds of thousands displaced,4 and about thirty thousand human casualties (mostly Kurds).5 The war became less intense after the capture of Öcalan in February 1999 (Romano 2006), but official negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK were not launched until 2013. On March 23, Öcalan ordered a ceasefire and asked the Kurdish fighters to withdraw from Turkish soil; however, by September 2014 Kurdish leaders warned that the peace process would end because of Turkey’s inaction in the face of Islamic State (IS) attacks on the Kurdish Syrian border town of Kobane (Yildiz 2014).

Kurdish and mainstream Turkish public opinion understand the conflict and prospective peace mediations in very different ways. For the most part, the Kurdish minority has aimed for cultural and political rights, seeking to maintain its identity and also gain an element of local autonomy within Turkey and in nearby countries. By way of contrast, Turkish public opinion has generally framed the conflict as one between the legitimate state and PKK terrorists. It has underemphasized crimes committed by the Turkish military and the role of violent displacement. At the political level, successive governments have attempted to “depoliticize” Kurdish ethnonationalism and address it as an economic development priority. For the most part, majority nationalism in Turkey has increased Kurds’ awareness of their distinct ethnic identity and triggered an acute sense of being second-class citizens (Van Bruinessen 1997; Romano 2006).

As well as being a minority-majority issue, the Kurdish problem speaks to political violence and secessionism, as unlike smaller minorities in the country, Kurds pose a potential threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. As shown in Table 4.1, below, particularly since the American invasion of Iraq, Turkish policymakers fear that federated entities in Iraq, and potentially Syria, will become models for the Kurds of Turkey in seeking their own autonomous status.6 In fact, problems between Syria and Turkey can be traced back to the dispute over the Hatay province (annexed by Turkey in 1939) and the water of the Euphrates River.7

As this book has implied elsewhere, ethnopolitical crises in the Balkan and the Middle Eastern regions are interlinked,8 in terms of security, perceptions, and analogies used to justify actions. Critics often compare Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds to the positions Turkish governments have taken on Bulgarian Turks, Azeris, and Turkish Cypriots. Likewise, Turkish framers have justified
policy decisions by aligning alternative threats facing the country in its foreign and domestic policy. The most relevant foreign policy frame preceding the 1998–99 Öcalan crisis was that of former ambassador, columnist, and politician Sükrü Elekdag. In 1994, he introduced the so-called two and a half war strategy in anticipation of a simultaneous military confrontation with Greece, Syria, and the PKK (Elekdag 1996; Lesser 2004). Central to this argument was the explicit intention of adversaries to use the internal PKK insurgency against Turkey and to coordinate their actions accordingly. Table 4.1 summarizes each ethnopolitical crisis affecting Turkey in 1989–1999; as the rest of the chapter demonstrates, each episode has provided the background for framing subsequent actions in the country’s foreign policy.

PARADOXES AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Table 4.1 points to a curious variation in Turkey’s responses to foreign and domestic crises. In stark contrast to the spirit of compromise displayed in 1999 in Helsinki, Turkey’s response to the Kurdish issue in the period 1998 to 1999 was almost exclusively confrontational. In a very short period, as noted in the introduction, Turkey engaged in a near-war situation with Syria, a trade war with Italy, and continuous human rights violations of the Kurdish minority. In addition, Turkish society mobilized to support majority nationalism.

An examination of parliamentary speeches and other sources of Turkish political discourse highlights a focus on grievances and opportunities with regard to EU-Greece-Cyprus on the one hand and the Kurdish issue on the other. The Kurdish issue was represented by Turkish political elites in a predominantly adversarial discourse on grievances and opportunities. By way of contrast, relations with Greece, Cyprus, and the EU were represented by a mixed discourse that allowed space for maneuvering, negotiations, and eventually the 1999 Helsinki compromise.

Alternative explanations cannot account for this divergence. The EU candidacy status per se came with two conditions for Turkey that most Greeks and Greek Cypriots saw as favoring themselves according to media accounts at the time. For one thing, Turkey committed to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court in The Hague in the Aegean disputes by 2004 at the latest. For another, Turkey failed to prevent the accession of Cyprus to the EU. This was of major importance, since the accession of Cyprus could potentially increase Greek Cypriot leverage in future negotiations with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.
TABLE 4.1: Turkey and Ethnopolitical Crises, 1989–99

BULGARIAN TURKISH REFUGEE CRISIS (1989)
During the second half of the 1980s, the Bulgarian government initiated a program of forced assimilation for Muslim minorities of the country (mostly Turkish and Pomak speakers). In 1984, hard-line communist leader Todor Zhivkov introduced measures prohibiting ethnic Turks from speaking their native language, practicing Islamic rites, or using Muslim names (instead of Slavic ones). In 1986, Amnesty International officially stated that it had received the names of more than 100 ethnic Turks reported killed and more than 250 arrested (Kamni 1987: 9). The Turkish Parliament in Ankara held a secret session in February 1985, taking a number of diplomatic measures to diffuse the crisis, albeit to no effect (Guardian 1985). The conflict escalated when Turgut Özal made an election campaign speech in Bursa on August 18, 1987, in which he pointed out that Ankara would deal with Bulgaria as it had dealt with Cyprus (Kamni 1987: 9). The Bulgarian-Turkish conflict reached its peak in the summer of 1989, when Bulgaria forced ethnic Turks to abandon the country. Turkish president Kenan Evren said Bulgaria was responsible for a “great human tragedy” (Kelsey 1989: 24). Turkish prime minister Turgut Özal accused Bulgaria of “genocide” (BBC 1989) and promised to welcome all refugees to Turkey. However, after the mass exodus of 300,000 people to Turkey, Özal was forced to close the border, as Turkey’s ailing economy could not sustain the massive arrival of refugees (Chiclet 1989: 14). There was overall international support for Turkish positions, mitigating domestic pressure for Turkey to make a confrontational move against Bulgaria. Britain and the United States intervened and persuaded Bulgaria to change its policies (Kelsey 1989: 24).

KURDISH DISPLACED IN IRAQ (1991)
By April 1991, almost 400,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees needed emergency humanitarian aid (Sage 1991: 17). About 27,000 had entered Turkey when conflict between the government and the PKK reached its peak (HRW 1991). The flow of Kurdish refugees was the result of the war in Iraq, but Turkey felt that the refugee camps would provide shelter for PKK fighters. Turkey was criticized for its treatment of Kurdish refugees. At the same time, foreign diplomats acknowledged that the Turkish fear of the consequences of accepting the refugees was legitimate and should be respected (Harden 1991: 29). Turkey threatened to intervene militarily in Iraq to prevent additional flows of Kurdish refugees (Toronto Star 1991: 9).

WAR IN BOSNIA (1992–95)
During the civil war in Bosnia, the local Muslim (Bosniak) population sought Turkey’s intervention. In early 1992, Turkey did not seem to support the independence of Bosnia, fearing a precedent for its own Kurdish regions; nevertheless, a few months later, Ankara followed the rest of Europe in recognizing the Yugoslav republics (Cowell 1992: 4). International observers suggested that Turkey was facing pressure to support the 8 to 10 million Muslims in the Balkans (Miller 1993). Besides transferring arms to Bosnian side, Turkey could not afford a major unilateral expedition in the Balkans. Bosnia was too far from Turkey, and neighbors between the two countries were particularly hostile to Turkey’s intentions. Turkey aligned its efforts with those of Western governments in taking multilateral actions to stop the war.

ARMENIAN WAR IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH (1993)
The six-year Nagorno-Karabakh (1987–93) conflict resulted in around 10,000 deaths and 750,000 Azeri refugees, a tenth of the national population of Azerbaijan (Hiro 1993). At the end of the war Armenians occupied nearly 20 percent of the neighboring country (four times the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, the original source of conflict). President Özal argued that the issue was no longer a question of Nagorno-Karabakh alone: “It must be viewed as part of an attempt to create a Greater Armenia” (Lieven 1993). Azerbaijan is closely related culturally and linguistically to Turkey, and its military setbacks were compared in the Turkish press to the slaughter of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina: “We cannot and will not allow another Bosnia on our doorstep,” was a common cry in Turkish newspapers (Borowiec 1993: A7). The conflict also raised the specter of Armenian claims in Eastern Turkey, claims that helped to provoke the 1915 Turkish genocide of Armenians, an ongoing source of contention between Turks and Armenians (Lieven 1993).
Turkey introduced an economic embargo against landlord Armenia. There were explicit Russian warnings not to engage militarily (Hiro 1993: 6; Kohen 1992: 6), even though Turkey had a treaty right to intervene in some affected areas, such as the Nakhichevan enclave close to its border (ITAR-TASS 1992). The newly elected prime minister, Tansu Çiller, warned that if Armenia launched action against Nakhichevan, she would call on parliament to declare war and send in troops (Hurriyet 1993).

KURDISH MINORITY PARTY CRISIS (1994)

Ethnic Kurdish representatives entered parliament under the umbrella of the leftist SHP (Social Democratic People's Party) after the October 1991 elections. Because of disagreements in the handling of Kurdish issues, the sixteen Kurdish deputies split from the SHP and created the Democracy Party (DEP), later renamed the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) when DEP was banned in 1994. During the same year, Kurdish MPs were accused of "attempted violation of Turkey's territorial integrity" and of "having links with PKK (Mater and Mantiri 1994: 6). In March 1994, parliament decided to lift the immunity of some of those MPs (Agence France Presse 1994b). DEP was banned, and Kurdish MPs were first expelled from parliament and later imprisoned on terrorist charges (Bell 1994: 6). Three of those MPs, including internationally known Leyla Zayna, were kept in prison until 2004 (Smith 2004b: 15).

IRAQI CRISIS AND INVASION (1995)

Turkey carried out several anti-PKK cross-border operations in northern Iraq (outside Baghdad's control since the 1991 Gulf War), arguing that the power vacuum in the area provided a safe haven for Kurdish rebels. In March 1995, Turkey threatened to invade northern Iraq to prevent the infiltration of PKK guerrillas into its territory. Western dependency on Turkish bases created a relative feeling of immunity over the Kurdish issue. Possible pressure on Turkey might make the renewal of permission for Provide Comfort (a US-led operation to protect the Iraqi Kurds) by the Turkish Parliament less likely (Finkel 1995). Despite international efforts, Turkey invaded northern Iraq, increasing regional uncertainty (Rugman 1995: 3). Despite US and EU objections, operations against the PKK in Iraq also took place in 1992, 1997, and 2008 (Keskin 2008).

IMIA-KARDAK ISLET CRISIS WITH GREECE (1996)

In January 1996, Greece and Turkey experienced another crisis in the Aegean Sea, this time over the sovereignty of the uninhabited Aegean islet Imia (Kardak, in Turkish). Prime Minister Çiller pledged to do whatever was necessary to defend Turkish interests (Agence France Presse 1996). This crisis brought the two countries close to war but ended with the withdrawal of both Greek and Turkish troops from the islet. The Greek government claimed that Italy had ceded Imia to Greece under the 1947 settlement (along with the main Dodecanese islands off the Turkish coast). But Turkey argued that the islet and other similar rocks were not included in the 1947 accord, as they had already been granted by Italy to Turkey under an earlier 1932 convention, stating that all Aegean islets within 18 kilometers of the coast belonged to the nearest country (Neuffer 1996).

The status of Imia/Kardak has not been settled since the January 1996 crisis, but the two countries agreed in 1999 to apply to the International Court in The Hague for mediation in the future.

CYPRUS DERYNIA KILLINGS (1996)

Two Greek Cypriots were killed during demonstrations in the Green Line in August 1995. Tassos Isaac was clubbed to death by Turkish counterdemonstrators and policemen when he became entangled in barbed wire in the buffer zone, and Solomos Solomou was shot while climbing a pole to remove a Turkish flag. UN peacekeepers said that Turkish and Turkish Cypriot military personnel fired indiscriminately into the buffer zone, resulting in Solomou's death. Turkish troops, according to the United Nations, fired twenty-five to fifty rounds of ammunition into the crowd, a scene witnessed by the UN force commander. Greece's foreign minister, Theodoros Pangalos, denounced the killings, while his Turkish counterpart, Tansu Çiller, declared: "Where we come from, no one lays a finger on the flag. If anybody has the nerve to do that, we will break their hands" (Theodolou and Vulliamy 1996). State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns argued: "Protection of a flag cannot excuse the horrible events of August 14. Human life and the sanctity of human life are ultimately more important than protecting a piece of cloth" (Gedda 1996).
EU BID IN LUXEMBURG (1997)

Greece spearheaded a movement at the 1997 EU Luxembourg Council to exclude Turkey from the enlarged EU (Mortimer 1997: 20). In response, witnessing the progress of Cyprus toward inclusion in the EU, Ankara hardened its position on Cyprus, moving away from federation to demanding confederation (Radio Bayrak 1998). By blocking Turkey's accession, Greece defended its own strategic interests in Cyprus and the Aegean, but the Turkish president saw the move as detrimental to regional peace (TRT TV 1997) and said that Greece would pay a price for obscuring Turkey's EU membership bid (Agence France Presse 1997b). Accordingly, Turkey froze political dialogue with the EU (Walker 1997: 6). It also threatened to integrate the Turkish-held northern third of Cyprus, if Cyprus was invited to talks with the EU (Agence France Presse 1997a).

S-300 MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN CYPRUS (1998)

Greek Cypriots announced the purchase of sophisticated S-300 missiles, and Turkish forces rehearsed operations to destroy the missiles if deployed. Although such action could trigger a war between Greece and Turkey, according to the Washington Times, Turkey's political leaders were reluctant to back down, particularly with parliamentary elections scheduled for April 1999 (Anderson and Phillips 1998: 18). Turkey escalated threats to destroy the missiles (Agence France Presse 1998), while Greece succeeded in convincing the Cyprus government to give up the deployment of the missiles by the end of 1998 (Hellicar 1998).

SYRIA'S SUPPORT FOR PKK AND ÖCALAN (1998)

In October 1998, Turkey issued an ultimatum over Syria's support of the PKK and the protection of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Even though Israel did not take a position during the crisis (Agence France Presse 1998; Inbar 1998: 8), Turkey's increasing confidence with respect to Syria was partly attributed to its military alliance with Israel two years earlier (Hirst 1998: 12). There was also a high cost of inaction for Turkey, as Kurdish nationalism was gaining legitimacy (de Belloaguet 1998: 3). Finally, the Kurdish factions of northern Iraq signed a peace deal in Washington on August 17, 1998, that limited Turkey's potential for intervening in the Iraqi front.

ITALY'S REFUSAL TO EXTRADITE ÖCALAN (1998)

Following the October 1998 Turkish ultimatum against Syria, Damascus gave in, and Öcalan left Syria for Russia. He was eventually arrested in Italy, and the country refused to extradite him to Turkey. Italy claimed that its constitution would not allow extradition to a government supporting the death penalty (Dogan et al. 1998: 9). Turkey claimed that the arrest of the PKK leader was essential in fighting terrorism. Italy's policy caused the outrage of hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens and the boycott of Italian products in the country. Although the government did not organize the boycott, it helped to initiate it through political statements and its own boycott of Italian military equipment (Agence France Presse 1998).

EU BID IN HELSINKI (1999)

In December 1999, Turkey and EU member countries negotiated granting Turkey applicant member status. President Süleyman Demirel threatened Greece with reprisals if the country vetoed Turkey's accession bid again (Norman 1999: 2). Turkey was asked to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court in The Hague on the Aegean disputes by 2004 at the latest and not to retaliate over the accession of Cyprus to the EU (Jonasson 1999). Months earlier, Turkey had suffered the most devastating earthquake in its recent history, leading to a social outcry that threatened the state and incumbent political elites. The coalition government headed by leftist Ecevit was supported by the ultranationalist MHP. Its leader, Bachel, threatened to leave the government, if concessions were made over Cyprus or the Aegean. Despite these difficulties Turkey reached a compromise with Greece in Helsinki, but conflict continued over Cypriot accession to the EU. In 2001, the Turkish PM used the threat of annexing northern Cyprus if the island was admitted to the EU (Agence France Presse 2001). In the Copenhagen summit of December 2002, the EU mismanaged negotiations on Turkey's candidacy, and in return, Turkey failed to convince the Turkish Cypriot leadership to support the Annan Plan settlement (Dempsey et al. 2002: 2). Turkey revised its policies, but eventually Greek Cypriots voted against the Annan Plan in 2004.
Nor can the pattern of variation in crisis behavior be explained by security considerations alone. In 1998, Turkish parliamentarians rejected media accounts that Turkey threatened Syria after receiving security guarantees from Israel. As Table 4.1 suggests, Turkey’s record of confrontation with Greece (including Cyprus) was more extensive than with any other neighbor. Although Syria was politically and militarily weaker than Greece, Turkey had had five major confrontations with the latter and none with the former in the previous ten years. Even though Greek-Turkish relations worsened in the 1990s, PKK activity was declining, resulting in serious calls for reconciliation. According to a report by Ted Gurr et al. (2001), most countries made significant concessions to their minorities after the mid-1990s in exchange for peace and stability. Turkey was an exception to this trend, but since the early 1990s, the Turkish political system had manifested some signs of moving in that direction. For example, just before his death, President Turgut Özal wrote a confidential letter to Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel advocating an open debate and lamenting both the progressive alienation of the Kurdish community and the growing authority of the PKK (Pope 1993: 12). In the early 1990s, Özal brought about changes that allowed the Kurds to speak their own language freely, while both Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel recognized the cultural identity and presence of the Kurds in Turkey (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997: 113). More important, the 1998–99 majority mobilizations contradicted the ideational background of the official Kemalist ideology that had tried not to play up ethnic particularities, whether minority Kurdish or majority Turkish. Historically, official Kemalism aimed to assimilate—not to antagonize—ethnic Kurds and other minorities.

Finally, political opportunities per se, or rather who was in power at the time, cannot explain variation in Turkey’s foreign policy. Admittedly, Turkey’s democratization in the 1990s opened up new opportunities for street-level nationalist contention previously sanctioned by the military regime. Although the military feared the rise of nationalism both Kurdish and Turkish, it used the latter to intensify the fight against the PKK. As noted in Chapter 1, nationalist contention generally benefits from early democratization attempts and friendly allies within the political system (Tarrow 1994; Snyder 2000). However, these systemic factors do not easily explain variation across issues; throughout the 1990s Turkish elites and the military seemed to be aligned to each other in all main foreign policy issues. Arguably, Mesut Yılmaz, a politician generally seen as a moderate, was prime minister of Turkey during the
Öcalan crisis. But Helsinki was signed by the ailing PM Bülent Ecevit, who owed his personal political legacy to nationalism—more specifically, the Cyprus invasion, the capture of the PKK leader two months before the April 1999 elections, and growing anti-EU sentiment. On the one hand, moderates in the Ecevit coalition had to confront the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which owed its electoral success to the capture of Öcalan and was categorically opposed to any concessions on the national issues collectively. On the other, Greece could only offer Turkey a difficult bargain, as the Simitis government was facing upcoming elections and was pushing hard for more gains. Frustrated with the initial failures to reach a compromise, Turkish politicians sent warnings across the Aegean, threatening that the good climate created after the devastating earthquakes of August 1999 would be ruined by a negative decision in Helsinki (Norman 1999).

FRAMING IN THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT

Precrisis framing, particularly in a representative body such as the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), offers a better explanation of policy behavior. In fact, framing in the TGNA in the years preceding the 1998–99 crises explains why confrontational crisis behavior was demonstrated in the 1998 Kurdish (Öcalan) crisis but not the Helsinki one.

Figure 2.1 summarizes findings from the Turkish parliamentary speeches, based on the two categories of grievances and opportunity frames presented in Chapter 2. The book’s working hypothesis is that issues simultaneously scoring high in both categories are the most likely to manifest confrontational crisis behavior. A high score only in grievances, I argue, will not be enough to shape policy behavior, unless opportunities for mobilization are framed in public discourse.

In my initial analysis, I coded a sample of twenty parliamentary debates from Turkey for the period from 1985 to 1999. Concerning the “Kurdish dilemma,” Turkish parliamentarians saw their country as a nation victimized by PKK terrorism and betrayed by friends and allies in its fight against terrorism. Confrontational policies remained the undisputed policy option, once a connection between a specific country and the PKK was made. There were some exceptions to this rule. For instance, some parliamentarians expressed sympathy for the local population of southeast Turkey. Preceding Helsinki, grievances were also high because of the tensions with Greece in the Aegean and Cyprus, not to mention previous exclusions of Turkey from the EU. Unlike the undis-
puted Kurdish issue, however, demonstrating resolve in Turkey’s European dilemma appears to have been a disputed strategy. There was an equal debate on opportunities for confrontational action, with a few sustained efforts to criticize established adversarial grievances.

In Figure 4.1’s coding of the twenty parliamentary debates from 1985 to 1999, the x axis represents the two areas of Turkish foreign policy: Helsinki versus Kurdish dilemma. The y axis represents precrisis frames calculated as the difference between confrontational minus cooperative frames. In the area of grievances, Helsinki scores 114 confrontational, minus 30 cooperative, with net outcome 84. But in the category of opportunities, it scores only 9, because cooperative frames are 47, while confrontational number 56. The Kurdish dilemma, meanwhile, scores very high in both grievances and opportunities: there are 100 confrontational grievances and only 37 cooperative frames, net result 63; and there are 58 confrontational opportunity frames with only 9 cooperative frames, net result 49.

**PRECRISIS FRAMING ON THE KURDISH DILEMMA**

What does my coding of frames demonstrate for the Turkish framing of the Kurdish issue, in the time preceding the 1998 crises triggered by Öcalan? During this period, Turkey faced the dilemma of either confronting countries supporting the PKK or making the first steps toward a compromise with Kurds.

Based on Chapter 2’s methodology, I restrict myself to the study of fram-
ing before this crisis and include in my discussion a sample of debates in the parliament on the Kurdish question up to the assembly's ultimatum to Syria on October 7, 1998. First, I look at how grievances were constructed against the PKK and the countries supporting it, and second, at how Turkish framers perceived the range of possible options against those threats. Briefly stated, in the years, months, and weeks preceding this crisis, elite discourse in the TGNA was predominantly adversarial, and we may comfortably argue there was no real dilemma in choosing whether or how to act.

Shortly preceding the closure of the Kurdish People's Labor Party (HEP) in 1994, an unusual debate took place in Turkey on Kurdish human rights. Reminiscent of the situation in Greece, as discussed in the previous chapter, was the perception by majority Turks that their country was the exclusive homeland of and for the Turks. Like majority Greeks, they associated multiculturalism with territorial threats to the country's integrity. For instance, Kurdish MP Sedat Yurdaş quoted one of his Turkish colleagues as saying, "In Turkey those who are not Turks have only the right of keeping silence," while on another occasion, Islamist MP Cevat Ayhan argued against the accession of his country to the European Union because this could allow millions of Pontus Greeks to settle on the Black Sea coast of Turkey. When Kurdish MP Mahmut Alinak addressed parliament "not on behalf of Yeltsin, Kohl, or Mitterrand, but on behalf of Kurdish-Turkishness," he received the reply that he was addressing parliament on behalf of Apo [Öcalan]. Another MP protested that the Kurdish people were being ignored, their language was forbidden, and they were not accepted ideologically as part of the country. Those trying to develop an understanding of democracy and freedom, he concluded, "are being accused of being the dividers of the country, and they are seriously penalized."

Instead of being presented as fighting against a group with an equal moral claim to the land, Turkey was portrayed in parliamentary discourse as the victim of an international conspiracy. The leader of the moderate leftist party SHP, Erdal İnönü, saw both the United Nations and Europe as part of this conspiracy, while other MPs called for unity and asked the people to struggle against the external forces trying to divide the country. Mahmut Yilhaş accused the country's neighbors "of being 100 to 300 years behind Turkey and for causing all its suffering." These conspiracies, and more specifically the support of Turkey's neighbors for PKK, were attributed to the "neighbors' negative reactions to seeing Turkey increasing its regional power."
In contrast to the distrust of outside powers, however, some positive emotions were expressed toward the local population of southeast Turkey, especially those whose villages were evacuated for "security reasons" during the war against PKK and who had received no relief or financial support from the government for rehabilitation.24

Preceding the 1995 brief invasion of northern Iraq, all Turkish MPs were categorical on their right to authorize this operation.25 Conservative Motherland Party (ANAP) MP Eyüp Aşık argued: "Turkey has the right and the duty to fight against those who are aiming to divide itself."26 At the same time, leftist Republican People's Party (CHP) MP Ali Dinçer said that Turkey undertook this operation without asking the other states in the region or without asking for the permission of the people living in northern Iraq, because it had a right to self-protection.27 Such frames were also reflected in the popular media; following the success of the Iraqi incursion, Parliamentary Speaker Hüsamettin Cindoruk reasoned that Turkey had a right to launch cross-border operations if they were needed (TRT TV 1995).

In another historic debate, right before the decision to issue an ultimatum to Syria in October 1998, Syria featured as the primary source of PKK support. PM Mesut Yılmaz said that Turkey had tried everything to convince Syria of its good intentions, but Syria had disregarded both bilateral and international agreements signed by the two countries. He also argued that "not only Turkey but also the US saw Syria as a state supporting terrorism."28 A recurring theme in the Turkish discourse was that Turkey had told Syria to stop, but Syria had not listened, and Turkey could no longer permit this.29 It was argued that Turkey's positive stance actually encouraged Syria's aggression.30 Syria was metaphorically portrayed as an ungrateful country; it had been offered water in accordance with all agreements, and in return, it now made Turkey bleed.31 Kamra Inan rhetorically asked parliament: "If Assad did not spare ten thousand of his own people in Hama, will he care about the 30 thousand killed by PKK in Turkey?"32

To describe how evil Syria was, this same MP labeled the country "Muslim Greece."33 This not only shows how Greece was perceived (Syrians were so bad they were labeled Greeks) but also explains the strong opposition of Turkish elites to Assad partly contributing to Turkey's ill-fated involvement in the post-2011 civil war in the country. Moreover, this quote demonstrates how framers made connections between the evil intentions of the country's neighbors to justify their claim that Turkey was surrounded by an aggressive and threaten-
ing regional environment. As noted in Chapter 3, this was the same alignment process identified in Greece in the perceived Macedonian-Turkish connection. In this instance, İnan argued that Turkey had two difficult neighbors, one in the west and one in the south. He clearly stated that “the unchanging axis of Greek and Syrian foreign policies is Turkey and animosity toward the Turks.” He even linked past ambitions of these neighbors with contemporary politics, arguing that “the one neighbor in the West has the Megali Idea while the other [has] Greater Syria.” These included, according to him, Hatay, Cyprus, and the south of the Toros Mountains. Finally, he alleged that Syria had a military agreement with Greece for Greek planes to use Syrian airports, and he asked parliament: “Against whom was this agreement made? A power in the Middle East? No. Directly against me [Turkey].”

Admittedly the difference in the policy options for the Öcalan and Helsinki crises could be attributed to the raw facts of history. In previous chapters, this book has identified potential pitfalls in the use of primordial arguments to explain events occurring many decades later. The basic logic is that the further we look back in history, the easier it is to find events, discourses, and explanations that conveniently and post facto justify an argument. At the same time, the “facts of history” frequently provide the raw material for the development of alternative framing processes; these facts of history can be aligned in various ways to strengthen the nationalist argument as suggested in the previous chapter. Elekdag’s “two and a half war” strategy linking Greece, Syria, and the PKK insurgency is not unique. Another dominant frame is the so-called Sèvres Syndrome, which saw Turkish foreign policy through the lens of Turkey’s ongoing fear of dismemberment, as agreed upon in the Sèvres Treaty of 1920. Former minister of foreign affairs Mümtaz Soysal argued that in Turkey, there is a collective feeling of distrust directed toward the European powers in general and toward its neighbors in particular, and this is a determining factor in Turkish foreign policy (Soysal 2004). These elite frames were also reflected in the popular media—for instance, the mass circulation daily Milliyet published on November 22, 1998, a cartoon starring Abdullah Öcalan as the marionette in a puppet theater labeled Sèvr (Sèvres in Turkish; see Fig. 4.2).

As important as the framing of grievances/fears was the framing of opportunities and the construction of a range of possible options. Confrontational policies were perceived to be successful elsewhere, such as fighting the Kurds in northern Iraq. Despite its bad human rights record, Turkey received interna-
tional military assistance, and US surveillance planes provided the Turkish military with crucial intelligence on guerrilla movements. Moreover, the fact that PKK was recognized as a terrorist organization in the West was perceived as an indication of its lack of connections. Finally, Western dependency on Turkish bases created a feeling of impunity, as demonstrated in the weak international reaction to the Turkish invasion of Iraq in March 1995. A distinguished Western journalist argued at the time that a threatened European arms embargo against Turkey would make the renewal of permission for Provide Comfort by the Turkish Parliament a good deal less likely (Finkel 1995).
Trust in the Turkish military was a recurring theme in all debates, with the exception of some indirect criticism of the problems facing Turkey because of its incomplete democratization. Before the invasion of northern Iraq in 1995, conservative DYP MP Orhan Kilecioglu argued: “When we came in power we had PKK all around us and we were working hard with the Turkish nation and the heroic Turkish military to get rid of it. While we were doing this some Turkish politicians are criticizing us. This I cannot believe.” Three years later, at the time of the Syrian crisis, conservative DYP MP Hayri Kozaçioğlu (a former governor in the Kurdish regions) praised the Turkish Army: “If we decide to go to Syria, the Turkish military would enter from one side and exit from another.” For his part, Kamra Inan rejected the idea that Turkey gained confidence only after making a military agreement with Israel: “We are going to continue the peaceful way. But if not, do we need Israel to run an operation? We have an 800 thousand army and 60 million people. We are facing a 12 million people Syria armed with old Soviet stuff and whose people cannot fill their stomach.”

Showing determination in confronting anyone supporting the PKK became an unquestioned and unquestionable strategy and was increasingly supported by the public. During the Syrian debates in Turkish Parliament, a poll was conducted to assess popular support of the actions of the government. The daily Hurriyet reported that an impressive 74 percent of the Turkish public supported government actions against Damascus. Nevertheless, 61 percent of the interviewees thought applying pressure on Syria would lead to a negotiated settlement, and a minority of only 17 percent thought that an actual war would be fought. Demonstrating resolve was seen as one way of attracting favorable international attention to Turkey’s PKK problem: for instance, Egypt’s president Hosny Mubarak immediately intervened to mediate between Syria and Turkey. This strategy of increasing leverage in negotiations was applied elsewhere, as in December 1997, when Ismail Cem declared that the S-300 missiles did not arrive in Cyprus because of an international campaign against the Republic of Cyprus, motivated by Turkish reactions.

But this was Syria. How did this precrisis framing affect the way the Turkish state and society reacted in the subsequent crisis with Italy? As a matter of fact, even before Apo arrived in Rome, Italy was already featured in the debate, especially after its leftist government allowed the Kurdish Parliament in exile to meet there. Then, Italy’s refusal to extradite Ocalan to Turkey struck at the heart of Turkish nationalism. It raised questions of whether Turkey’s inaction
would allow the PKK to internationalize the Kurdish issue in Europe and, as a result, attract popular support from Europeans and ethnic Kurds in Turkey. The Italian policies were seen as illegitimate; this was grounded on established perceptions that Öcalan, PKK, and their foreign supporters had exclusive responsibility for the twenty-five-year rebellion in the Kurdish regions of Turkey and the killing of thirty thousand people. If Turkey had to fight a war against Syria, a mobilization against Italy was the very least citizens could do for their country.

At the grassroots level, Turkish reactions centered on the perceived support a "terrorist" received from a Western government and NATO ally. Images of the PKK leader being treated like an ordinary asylum seeker in Italy enraged the Turkish public. The Turkish press produced a (fabricated) photo of the pope meeting with and blessing Öcalan and ran editorials of Armenian involvement in the affair. It also produced highly emotional images of victimization with daily photos of funerals, mourning mothers, and the orphans of fallen Turkish soldiers—for instance, a little girl holding a placard saying: "Babamin katili. Canavar Apo’yu istiyorum" (My father was killed. I want the beast Apo [Öcalan]).

At the international level, given Turkey’s advantageous position in NATO, Turkish politicians expected to receive some support from their allies and partners. When this was not forthcoming, MP Abdullah Gül condemned the fact that several European countries considered friendly to Turkey appeared to support a terrorist organization. Unlike other crises, the Kurdish-Italy case both required and benefited from civic activism. The international community and press were divided, with some supporting extradition to Turkey, others supporting the Kurdish struggle, and the rest avoiding any position (Turkish Daily News 1998). Producing images of Turkish citizens mobilizing to counter the arguments of their antagonists was projected as a very effective strategy. One MP called everybody to do his/her own share, labeling the whole incident "a public opinion war."

Winning such a war against PKK required state and society to work together, side by side. It was not enough for Öcalan to be recognized as a terrorist in Turkey: the whole world had to understand and endorse the Turkish point of view. Given that international opinion was split, mobilization was perceived to have a major impact; and since state actions were not adequate, citizens had to supplement its actions through massive mobilizations.

Any gains had to be achieved before Öcalan secured internationally recog-
nized status, an argument that added urgency to the mobilization processes of the Turkish society and diplomacy. According to Abdullah Gül, Turkish mobilization was happening at exactly the right time: the PKK had become completely disorganized and had to be prevented from pulling itself together again.56

As discussed in the introduction of this book, majority and minority nationalisms differ in that majorities possess a wider repertoire of options, using both state and civil society channels to protest. But unlike Greece, which possessed the appropriate “mobilizing structures” to promote nationalism (for example, the church, dedicated research institutes, and independent media), Turkish society lacked such explicitly dedicated social networks; MHP stepped in to fill this vacuum and, since then, has remained the second or third largest political party in Turkey. MHP’s rise has further institutionalized nationalism, making concessions to the Kurds electorally more difficult for decades while at the same time preventing the emergence of a credible coalition with moderate secularists to challenge the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP’s) post-2002 hegemony.

CRISIS FRAMING PRECEDING HELSINKI

In the European Council Summit of December 1998 in Helsinki, Turkey faced the dilemma of either improving relations with Greece and Cyprus or risking its EU candidacy prospects. The Kurdish issue was not part of the Helsinki dilemma, because the EU did not ask Turkey to make any concessions on issues related to the collective rights of the Kurdish minority.57 In fact, at the time, PM Bülent Ecevit argued that in Europe, the concept of minority changed from one country to another, and Turkey respected the rights of its own minorities according to the Lausanne Treaty,58 while France totally rejected the concept.59 Cyprus and more specifically the Aegean issues were part of Turkey’s European dilemma, however. Not only did Ankara fail to prevent the Greek Cypriot side from de facto representing the whole island in the EU, but Turkey agreed to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court in The Hague to settle the Aegean disputes by 2004, at the latest.60 But if Turkish policy-makers were so alarmed about negative Greek intentions, not to mention their skepticism about the inner motives of the EU, why did they endorse Helsinki? Here, the parliamentary records are extremely helpful in exploring the interplay between dominant frames and policy outcomes in Turkey.

Oddly enough, although grievances dominated discussions over Greece or
Cyprus, there was no clear monopoly on discourse. Some parliamentarians attributed the Greek negative attitude toward Turkey to the nature of their "neighborliness," others to domestic politics in Greece, while some even referred to the Megali Idea and the fact that Greece had invaded half of Turkey immediately after World War I. An ultimatum issued against Greece in June 1995 concerning the Aegean was scarcely debated in the Turkish Parliament, and MPs did not mobilize public opinion as they did in the case of Syria. Nevertheless, following the Imia-Kardak crisis, Turkish prime minister Mesut Yılmaz accused Greece of destroying the Lausanne Treaty and militarizing illegally the Aegean islands across Turkey. And after Luxemburg, Turkish framing of Greece worsened. To cite one example, MP Sedat Aoğlu stated: "Greece is a chronic problem for Turkey. Greece has an irrational obsession with Turkey and sees whatever is positive for Turkey as negative for itself."

Following the capture of Apo in Kenya in February 1999, an MP even described Greece as a terrorist country that had lost its position as reliable interlocutor for Turkey. But he eventually undermined his believability by saying that from Greece to the West, there was no country that did not support terrorism against Turkey. As the events leading to the capture of the PKK-leader were not very clear, with the Kurds themselves pointing the finger at Greece for helping Turkey, framers did not mobilize the public against Greece the way they did with Italy. Especially after the capture of Apo, there was a certain amount of relief and even satisfaction to be gained by watching two old foes, the PKK and Greece, accusing and confronting each other. A cartoon published in Turkish Milliyet, February 18, 1999, shows Greece feeding PKK (the crow), which eventually takes out the eye of Greece (see Fig. 4.3).

As for the European Union more generally, grievances dominated, but with frequent exceptions. To begin with, the EU was accused of favoring the Eastern European states over Turkey, even though these states were less well developed than Turkey. Next, a Turkish parliamentarian blasted Europe for "repeatedly stressing human rights issues but in contrast to its own principles, it watches the situation in Bosnia/Herzegovina with joy." In this and other instances, Bosnia was used as an example of Europe's double standard on human rights and Turkey. Finally, a representative of the Islamist Refah Party argued that, since 1953, Turkey had been a NATO member, sacrificing itself for the safety of NATO against the Soviets. He noted, however, that "its Western allies never behaved in a friendly manner .... [In] fact, they were enemies, and in the Cyprus peace operation, they placed embargoes on military equipment." Admittedly,
not all Turkish MPs blamed the EU for Turkey’s failure to join the union. For instance, Abdullah Gül recalled how Turkey started its relations with the EU in the following manner:

And 34 years ago Turkey was told, “Friend: a) Go fix your economy, and b) become a democratic, not a military democracy, in a real sense, a real democracy country.” They gave you 34 years of preparation and everything you did went in the opposite direction. You encountered at least three coups.”
More important than grievances was the framing of opportunities, and this was almost equally divided between adversarial and cooperative elements. In proposing Turkey’s participation in the defense mechanisms of the Western European Union in 1996, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz said that Turkey was an inseparable part of the European security, and it was necessary for the country to be part of the European integration process. Another MP commented that Turkey’s interests in terms of defense depended on its participation in NATO and the Western EU, and he asked parliament: “Can you stand up to Europe to say that you have to take us just because we are crucial to you? ... If you tell to the Western European Union I am not joining the organization, will they reply to you or dear brother you are crucial? I do not think so.”

Concerning EU membership itself, some parliamentarians argued that Turkey should not be asking for membership at any cost, because its own interests and territorial integrity were of primary importance. However, others suggested Turkey had the strengths and qualities to join the EU, while President Süleyman Demirel went so far as to warn those who opposed Turkey’s membership with the judgment of history. Apart from politicians, technocrats in such government ministries as the Ministry of Finance pointed out the many advantages to be gained when Turkey joined the European Union.

Before the devastating earthquakes of August 1998, parliamentarians suggested that a settlement in Cyprus and the Aegean was possible, with some putting forward more conciliatory conditions than usually presented. Others, such as Baki Tuğ, took a more intransigent line, declaring, “Greece had learned a lesson from the Turkish nation in the past and if she liked, she would receive another one in the future.” Following the earthquakes, while the discourse improved, it remained mixed. On the one hand, MHP MP Oktay Vural attributed Greece’s attitude to a tactical move to restore the credibility of the country after the Öcalan incident.

On the other hand, leftist MP Esvet Özdoğan pointed out that “during these catastrophic days, their neighbor Greece had showed a kind and beautiful approach towards Turkey.” Conciliatory frames proved extremely popular with press, which confronted nationalists openly; for instance, in response to the MHP minister of health Osman Durmuş’s statement that Turkey does not need Greek assistance (and blood), the leftwing Radikal wrote on August 17, 1999, in its main headline: “Yeter, Sus ve Git” [Enough, Shut Up and Get Lost].

In an important speech in October 1999, Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem cautiously identified opportunities for cooperating with Greece. He in-
formed parliament that third parties, such as the United States, were paying close attention to issues in Greece and Turkey. The problems between Greece and Turkey, he said, were not easy to resolve; had they been so, they would already have been resolved. He added that both countries had their own versions of the truth, which they were not going to give up; the trick was to identify common interests. For his part, Cem pointed to changes in Greek policy: “Greek foreign policy had been based on an understanding that Greece would gain when it was in opposition to Turkey, while now, Greek foreign policy was based on the idea of avoiding opposition and decreasing tension.”

FROM FRAMES TO POLICIES

A study of framing in the Turkish Parliament demonstrates that mixed discourses preceded the Helsinki compromise, while the Kurdish crisis with Syria and Italy was preceded by a predominantly adversarial framing. This is not to say that Turkish discourse on the Kurdish question in academia, journalism, or elsewhere was monolithic; rather, discourse was fairly uniform in the country’s most relevant and important institution, the parliament. Nevertheless, the conclusion that policy outcomes directly result from preconceived frames needs further elaboration. A causal link should be established between mixed frames and cooperation on the one hand, and predominantly adversarial frames and confrontation on the other.

As in the Greek case, it is not enough to assume that leaders, media, or civic actors manage current crises only on the basis of what they collectively frame, understand, and learn from previous crises. Cause and effect seem to be related in multiple ways. For one thing, conclusions drawn from policy-makers might guide subsequent actions: learning from the invasion of Cyprus guided actions elsewhere; earlier successful incursions into Iraqi territory obviously increased the chances of reacting in a similar fashion against Syria; and once a view was established that foreign interventions were “just” responses in the fight against those supporting the PKK, this sense of justice was applied in other situations. For another, mixed frames can be transformed more easily, particularly when there is a significant mass of people, resources, and ideas to replace a failing foreign policy paradigm. These arguments notwithstanding, we need to investigate additional processes by which frames translate into confrontational policies.

One mechanism helping frames become causal is the way they narrow the definition of national interest and priorities. Once a construction of reality is made and priorities are set, it is very difficult and sometimes dangerous to re-
construct these or supplement them with new ones. Notably, as early as 1969, Turkish dissident İsmail Beşikçi turned the official presumption of established state discourse on its head by arguing that the Kurds, not yet a nation, would inevitably become one, once the feudal relations were dissolved. Because of his openly voiced opinion, Beşikçi lost his job at Erzurum Atatürk University and was sentenced to thirteen years in prison. He received no support or recognition from his colleagues: some even became witnesses for the prosecution, accusing him of communism and of propagating Kurdish propaganda in his lectures. Likewise, a leading Turkish academic, Doğu Ergil, showed in a relevant survey that Kurds did not aim for statehood and argued that repression was an unnecessary and counterproductive policy. His early warnings alienated him from policy circles and made him a major target of criticism in the press.

But even key political figures in Turkey failed to reframe the Kurdish issue; their efforts were often kept secret or quickly abandoned. A rare admission of the severity of the Kurdish question was published after President Özal’s death in 1993. In the letter mentioned earlier, Özal said the following to Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel: “The Turkish Republic is facing its gravest threat yet. A social earthquake could cut one part of Turkey off from the rest, and we could all be buried beneath it” (Pope 1993: 12). To cite another example, in a talk in Rize, a Black Sea city in northeastern Turkey, Erdoğan criticized the military for sending the “dear young children” of Turkey to fight against a professional army in the southeast. These “children” had no military training (thus, did not know how to use weapons) when they faced terrorism. His criticism of the war, however, was only broadcast in the rest of the country a decade later by private ShowTV and was done with the view of questioning his loyalty to the major tenets of Turkish nationalism, just as he was about to become the country’s PM.

Finally, in 1993 Tansu Çiller allegedly proposed the use of the Basque model to solve the conflict in the southeast, something she later denied. On all these occasions, incumbent political elites failed to contradict “established realities,” either because of fears of electoral losses or other extrapoltical reasons (for example, the influence of the Turkish military).

Foreign policy negotiations further strengthened monopolies of adversarial framing. The nature of negotiations often allows policy-makers to emphasize confrontational framing to increase their negotiation leverage abroad (Putnam 1988). As mentioned above, the threat of war forced Mubarak to mediate between Syria and Turkey, leading to concessions on the PKK issue by the former. Because of its central importance and effectiveness (at least in the short term),
this process weakened critics of Turkish foreign policy. For instance, in the October 7, 1998, debate on the Syrian ultimatum, moderate pro-Islamist Abdullah Gül asked for more information on Syria, implying that only then would he support the government. To this suggestion, he received a prompt reaction from an MP, who said that it was Turkey he should be supporting. The future president’s comment was not reported in the Turkish or international media, however, unlike a speech by the hawkish Islamist Recai Kutan, which was published by Ankara Anatolia Agency. In brief, once adversarial framing is introduced, it is hard to be retracted and reconstructed because of its relevance in international negotiations. And because it is hard to be reconstructed, adversarial framing becomes the only interpretive anchor of subsequent crisis behavior.

As noted in the Greek case, frames become institutionalized in various aspects of daily life from education, to the media and to a country’s legal practices. For decades, Öcalan was referred to in Turkish media as “baby killer,” “terrorist chieftain,” “leader of a bloody organization” (Cengiz 2012). Not only was an effort made to use milder language, but in addition “eccentric legal” practices were introduced, such as legal persecutions for those using the term “Sayın Öcalan” [Mr. Öcalan, in Turkish]. According to the Supreme Court of Appeals, there were also approximately three hundred cases against twenty-nine lawyers of Abdullah Öcalan for referring to him as “Mr. Öcalan,” while a total of 949 people were convicted of the same offense in just 2006–7. This unreasonable legal practice was reversed by the same court in 2011, citing the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (ibid.). Two years earlier, nationalists in the judiciary undermined the efforts to reach a peace settlement with the PKK “by arresting thousands of Kurdish political activists, including elected mayors, on terrorism charges” (Pope 2014)

Moreover, as noted in previous chapters, framers may stimulate actions that change opportunity structures, making their opportunity frame a self-fulfilling prophecy (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 287). For instance, assessments of the PKK threat in Turkey and actions taken to balance the threat made it more likely that the threat would be realized. Of PKK, the late Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand wrote in 1992 that “we are harvesting what we have sown.” As early as 2001 in my interviews in the country, I confirmed that the majority of Turkish academics and journalists admitted the counterproductive nature of Turkey’s Kurdish policies; however, this view had limited effect on active policy-makers, who saw outsiders (not Turkey) as the key cause of PKK terror. Finally, a view of the regional environment as threatening affected how
others saw Turkey, leading to a spiral of actions and reactions that resulted in an unfortunate confirmation of the original fears; framers boasted that their predictions had been correct, further undermining the credibility and judgment of their propeace opponents.\(^{100}\)

With this in mind, the mixed discourse preceding HelskinkI could have led to a solution depending on the nature of the proposed institutional arrangements. In the end, the compromise in Helsinki was crafted around the principle of constructive ambiguity, a form of terminological acrobatics that avoided touching sensitive chords on either side. Constructive ambiguity allowed each side to perceive and frame Helsinki as the first step toward achieving its own major goals, rather than as a final or irreversible compromise. Especially with respect to the conditions of the Cypriot membership in the EU, even conflicting interpretations could fit the Helsinki summit conclusions. For instance, Ecevit claimed that Turkey received candidacy status, even though Europeans knew of its determination to protect Cyprus and oppose the island’s accession.\(^{101}\) More important, Ecevit argued that Turkey would be so powerful in the future that it would solve the Aegean problems on its own terms, not through an application to The Hague.\(^{102}\) In this way, partners in the Ecevit leftist-nationalist allies in government not only maintained their previous discourse but also kept their domestic coalition untouched (Turkish Daily News 1999b).

Prospect theory is also relevant in the case of EU-Turkish relations. As noted in this chapter, the exclusion of Turkey from the process of European integration was framed as a “loss”; in other words, EU membership was a step Turkey deserved to take but eventually failed as a result of unfortunate circumstances that parliamentarians explained in great detail. For Jack Levy, prospect theory deviates from expected utility theory by positing that the way people frame a problem around a reference point has a critical influence on their choices, and that people tend to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains, engage in risk-averse behavior with respect to gains and risk-acceptant behavior with respect to losses (Levy 2003: 215).

In this case, precrisis framing of Turkey’s “lost opportunities” in the EU led policy-makers to take the necessary risks (that is, engage in risk-acceptant behavior with respect to losses) to “preserve” Turkey’s European orientation and “correct” its path in the process of European integration. Again, precrisis framing seems to be an important amendment to other frameworks relying exclusively on “objective conditions” (for example, the economic aspects of EU membership) to explain Turkish decision-making.
CONCLUSIONS

AKP’s counterhegemonic positioning in comparison to mainstream Kemalist parties (as well as its interest in gaining the Kurdish votes) made possible certain minimum adaptations discussed in Chapter 5, but not to the extent of initiating a successful process of transforming the Kurdish minority conflict.

Worrisomely, Turkey has unwittingly involved itself in the post-2011 Syrian civil war, not only promoting regime change in Syria but also being too closely identified “with the Sunni side of the Sunni-Shia conflict raging across the Levant” (Gardner 2014). While initially aiming to improve its relationship with Bashar al-Assad’s regime, AKP under the influence of Ahmet Davutoğlu capitalized on the opportunity of the civil war in Syria to assist the majority Sunni rebellion. As this chapter shows, Turkey’s high-risk strategy of transforming the balance of power in the region has its origins in the country’s past. Interestingly, in 2015 Turkey has begun to resemble in some ways the infamous and crisis-ridden 1990s. After fifteen years of attempted yet incomplete transformation in its domestic and foreign policy, Turkey faces renewed political instability, unsettled borders, and deadly violence.

Following declining support for Erdoğan’s administration, AKP lost its majority of seats in parliament in June 2015. As discussed in Chapter 4, Turkey maintains a highly problematic electoral threshold of 10 percent for entry in parliament which eliminates smaller parties and makes coalition formation more difficult. Ironically, in the first entry for a predominantly Kurdish party in parliament HDP will have to compete with the nationalist MHP as the potential kingmakers in future government coalitions. As noted above, MHP has a long history of opposing Kurdish rights and since 2011 the presence of Syrian refugees in the country. At the same time, the party is well situated as both an electoral competitor and a coalition partner for AKP against the dual threat of the ISIS and PKK. The escalating conflict between the Kurds and the Islamic State poses a catch-22 situation for the Turkish government: either to keep fighting against both groups or to reach a durable peace settlement with its Kurdish citizens in order to contain the spread of violence domestically.

The choice of peace has several advantages over any violent alternatives. Since the 1990s, about a million ethnic Kurds have been forcibly displaced from their villages in the Kurdish regions of Southeast Turkey as part of the war against the PKK. They have been displaced primarily in the major urban centers of western Turkey, and often their mobilizations for political and hu-
man rights have led to confrontations with the police, the military, and MHP supporters. Risking a new civil war (this time in Western Turkey) will ruin any achievements for the country in recent times. Moreover, unlike the Öcalan affair in the late 1990s, the Syrian civil war has led to a deadly stalemate between the army and the various opposition groups. A weakening of the PKK and its ally forces in Syria could create a domino effect with immediate security and humanitarian issues for Turkey. Equally, the country’s western allies cannot wait indefinitely for Ankara to reach a peace settlement with the PKK before protecting vulnerable Kurdish communities across Syria and Iraq against the certainty of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

As this chapter has demonstrated, the region’s ethnopolitical issues are interlinked not only in how they are experienced but also in how they are perceived. On July 20, 2015, in a bloody warning by ISIS, 31 young peace activists were murdered during a terrorist attack in the border town of Suruç in Southern Turkey. Most of the victims were university students with the Federation of Socialist Youths assisting the rebuilding of Syrian Kobane for its Kurdish inhabitants after the previous year’s siege of the town by the Islamic State. Kurdish groups accused the Turkish government of collusion with ISIS in the Suruç bombing while PKK responded with the killing of two Turkish police officers days later. On its own part, the Turkish government retaliated with airstrikes against ISIS and PKK in Iraq and Syria, in what was seen by AKP’s opponents as an attempt to regain its one-party dominance. The Suruç massacre demonstrates the vulnerabilities of crisis-prone societies faced with problematic histories, weak institutions, and hostile neighbors. At the same time, this incident and the mobilization of students itself suggests there is hope for the region as younger generations with vision and courage risk their lives for a better future. New norms for cooperation and power-sharing could still emerge in the neighborhood, initiating an ambitious process of societal change.

To address some of these issues, the next chapters discuss alternative conflict-mitigating institutional arrangements for the region, raising the broader question of how frames could be transformed or challenged, particularly in relation to attempts at conflict management and transformation.
Transforming Stalemates into Opportunities for Peace: Four “Success” Stories

In early 2003, the Turkish Cypriots inhabitants of Doğancı (“Elia” in Greek) lit a big propeace bonfire in the middle of their village square, a fire that became an antinationalist symbol of hope for the reunification of the island of Cyprus and its people. Only a few weeks later, the news that a nationalist mobilization in Istanbul had failed to attract more than a thousand people made Turkish Cypriots beam (TRT Radio 2003). It was hard for them to hide their satisfaction: a spontaneous propeace mobilization in a tiny Turkish Cypriot village outnumbered a Turkish nationalist rally in a city of more than 10 million. But their optimism soon gave way to disappointment, as Turkey in March 2003 and then Greek Cypriots in April 2004 both rejected the UN plan for the reunification of the island (Anastasiou 2008; Tocci 2007; Michael 2009).

As shown in the previous chapters, peace mediations are fraught with challenges, structural impediments, and obstacles, either perceptual or institutional. Spoilers will often act during peace mediations to escalate conflict in an attempt to prevent any unfavorable changes to the status quo. During the 2002–4 mediations for the reunification of Cyprus, hardliners on both sides had every reason to seek legitimacy through nationalist protests. On the Turkish side, they tried hard, both in northern Cyprus and in Turkey, to mobilize majority support against the UN initiative. To that end, the language of victimization was trotted out to remind the Turkish public how brutally Greek Cypriots had treated Turks before 1974, how heroically Turkish Cypriots and Turkey resisted, and how the current UN initiative would displace “up to 100,000 Turkish Cypriots.” Yet for the most part, the public rejected calls to mobilize, and the Turkish crisis rhetoric gave way to confidence-building/propeace policies, such
as the opening of the Green line in April 2003, and the endorsement of the Annan Plan in 2004 (Öniş 2003; Faustmann 2004; Joseph 2006). The dog of nationalism in the Greek-Turkish relations barked but did not bite.

The absence of majority nationalism, particularly the failure of hardliners to mobilize the public for confrontational action, is puzzling given the history of the Cyprus conflict. Equally puzzling is the positive transformation in Turkish Cypriot civil society in 2002–4, as well as other counterintuitive attempts to mitigate conflict in southeast Europe during the post–cold war period. As demonstrated below, these transformations occurred in the aftermath of nationalist mobilizations, suggesting the potential to transform conflicts even under conditions that seem prohibitive. Nationalism evolves in terms of definitions of homeland, identity, and religion, as Shelef argues in his study of Israel. However, the argument that nationalism evolves does not negate its power and potency in deeply divided societies (Shelef 2010: viii). And although, admittedly, nationalism in contemporary politics is an obstacle to peace, it is rare for the literature to identify cases in which nationalism has been moderated to allow peacemaking to occur, or at least to progress.

Chapter 6 takes a new direction in the book, considering positive transformation in “least likely” situations; as Lijphart argues (1968: 2), “least likely” or deviant cases have considerable theoretical significance because of the light they shed on the social conditions sustaining stable and effective power-sharing engagements (see also Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007). Deviant cases of peace transformation are those that initially demonstrate high levels of entrenched ethnocentric framing, majority nationalist mobilization, and human rights violations, but still manage to achieve some measure of success. Even though sides fail to reach a comprehensive settlement, partial successes may reduce the potential for violent conflict and human suffering, signifying the beginning of a positive change in contested peace mediations.

Aiming to uncover the puzzles of peace mediation, the chapter examines four examples of partial transformation in the eastern Mediterranean region: the US-led mediation process leading to the Interim Agreement between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia on the naming issue; the period leading up to and following the 1999 earthquakes in Greece and Turkey, when peacemakers transformed the symbolic landscape of Greek-Turkish relations, stabilizing one of the most conflictual dyads in world politics for the first time in recent history; the 2009 “democratic opening” of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government on the Kurdish issue; and, finally, a set of promising confidence-
building measures (CBM) in Cyprus challenging conventional wisdom on the intractability of the island’s division.

In each case, the chapter considers how peacemakers succeeded or failed to transform the language of majority nationalism in their constituencies. As mentioned in previous chapters, popular perceptions and framing processes are linked to peace processes. Adversarial frames portraying “others” as inherently threatening can inadvertently turn into self-fulfilling prophesies, restricting positive transformation even in cases where a peace settlement is feasible. Conversely, pacifist counterframes can emphasize potential solutions, enhancing inclusive narratives of shared entitlement to contested territories or cultural property. Such frames recognize the human rights and shared victimhood of all groups and, more important, the mutual benefits of proposed peace initiatives.

AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION

There is a problem of discrimination in western Macedonia, both in the past and now. There have been periods in our history, as in the Metaxa era, when oppression against a segment of the population was massive (Fotis Kouvelis, MP for Synaspismos, 1993).³

As the result of an American initiative in the region, Greece and the Republic of Macedonia signed an Interim Agreement in September 1995. The agreement called for respect for the territorial integrity and the political independence of each side, the recognition by Greece and the United Nations of the republic with the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and a guarantee that the new state would not use the sun of Vergina on its flag. In addition, the Republic of Macedonia made necessary assurances about its constitution’s adherence to principles of international law. Greece terminated the embargo of February 1994 and made a commitment to an open cooperative economic relationship.⁴ Finally, both sides committed themselves to future negotiations to reach an agreement on the name issue. All of this is surprising, given the background to the issue discussed in previous chapters.

In the four years before signing the Interim Agreement, the Greek position had received very little external support, despite the legitimacy of some of the Greek arguments. In fact, the country’s attitude was seen as incompatible with the country’s position in the European Union and was described at the time as “infuriatingly emotional” and “self-defeating” (Glenny 1995). Because Greek reactions and fears were expressed in highly nationalistic and maximalist terms, the country became alienated from those able to offer much needed support. In
fact, Greece could have very easily achieved a satisfactory solution in the early 1990s, if public opinion had not prevented a reasonable compromise."

Instead, the two main political parties in Greece engaged in a damaging process of ethnic outbidding. In Nea Demokratia, Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonis Samaras opted to oppose any compromise on the Macedonian issue and eventually formed his own party. Andreas Papandreou, who was in opposition after a decade in power in the 1980s, took the same hard line, arguably threatened by the idea that a populist newcomer could have replaced him as the main champion of Greek nationalism. Moderate political leaders acknowledged that the situation was very difficult, but none were willing to risk a compromise (Skylakakis 1995). In any event, Greek elites failed to calculate the risks properly and led the country into a trap prepared by its own nationalist propaganda.

With Andreas Papandreou’s return to power in October 1993, all the signs pointed to a continuation of the vicious circle between majority nationalism and confrontational foreign policy on the issue. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in his campaign rallies, Papandreou vowed that the name “Macedonia” represented Greece’s very soul, thus assuring the public of his future tough-resolve approach (Barber 1992b: 10, 1993: 10; Ottaway 1993: A12). Very soon his government took a risk by introducing a full embargo against FYR Macedonia (Hislope 2003; Agence France Presse 1994a). The Mitsotakis government had instituted an oil embargo against the landlocked republic between January 1992 and September 1992, but the Papandreou government’s tougher approach led to a seven-month frontier embargo that excluded only food and medicine.

Given all these negative indicators, what explains the signing of the Interim Agreement in 1995? Possible explanations include the role of institutional design, leadership, and timing.

Leadership and how leaders were perceived during this crisis were of paramount importance. The Interim Agreement was an example of Richard Holbrooke’s “diplomatic magic,” described in detail in his own memoirs (1998: 122–27). Holbrooke initially secured the green light from President Gligorov, and knowing US determination to influence the small Balkan republic, he offered Papandreou a “unique opportunity to make history” (ibid.: 123). Holbrooke was not discouraged by Papandreou’s intransigence or his reputation among conservative Americans as a turncoat. Although born in Greece, Papandreou became an American citizen and received a Ph.D. from Harvard, serving as chairman of the Economics Department at Berkeley and chair of Adlai Stevenson’s advisory team during his two runs for the presidency. Yet in his years in
power, Papandreou adopted a virulent anti-Americanism, hence the perception of betraying his American connection. Under normal circumstances, this alone would have led foreign mediators to abandon any mediation attempts. Instead, Holbrooke capitalized on Papandreou’s legendary position as the dominant political figure of his era. His following commentary is a textbook example of how reframing the role of “intransigent” actors in peace processes can be a major catalyst for progress:

“Mr. Prime Minister, you and I have something in common,” I began. “We both began our involvement in American politics working for Adlai Stevenson in 1952—only I was an eleven-year-old distributing bumper stickers, and you were a senior member of Stevenson’s economic team. We both grew up despising Nixon. But we must admit that it took Nixon to go to China, and it took Sadat to go to Jerusalem. History will remember their courage and vision.” (Ibid.)

This reframing was not merely unfounded flattery, however. Although Papandreou played the “nationalist card” (Ellinas 2010; Keridis 1998), he was certainly aware of the more fundamental aspects of the Macedonian issue. Not only was he an experienced politician, but he had also spent considerable time in North America, including Toronto, and he knew the Slav Macedonian diaspora firsthand. Anecdotal references from ethnic Macedonians in Toronto suggest that he was at least aware of the arguments of the other side—if not sympathetic. While in power in the 1980s, his government quietly allowed the return of minority Slav Macedonians, provided that they declared themselves Greek and kept their identity private (Mazower 1995). Finally, Papandreou’s second wife hailed from a border area with the Republic of Macedonia and was even denigrated as a “Skopjijan” by the extreme right-wing Greek press. Holbrooke suggests that she might have had an influence on her husband during mediation (see also Clogg 1996). Mrs. Papandreou, who welcomed the American mediators in the couple’s private house in “an almost transparent silk pajama suit that barely concealed her impressive anatomy,” showed “no interest in the details of the issue, but seemed focused on her husband’s welfare and his place in history” (Holbrooke 1998: 123). While leaders are important, it is rare to find such larger-than-life personalities as Papandreou matched with Holbrooke-type mediators capable of seeing beyond the obvious. A certain amount of luck may have been involved as well: Gligorov, a moderate, was in power when American diplomats were most anxious to pacify the Balkans. In addition, the moderates and progovernment
press described the outcome as positive and the amount of pressure exercised on Greece as insignificant.\(^8\)

What is more relevant for conflict resolution in general was that the type of arrangement between the two nations required significant constituencies on both sides to accept it or to learn to live with it. The agreement aimed at delinking the name dispute from the overall relationship between the two countries. The republic was to be referred to as FYROM internationally until the two countries agreed on a different name. According to UN mediator Matthew Nimetz, “Two people or two nations could have a difference but agree that that difference will not interfere with other areas of cooperation” (*Federal News Service* 1995).\(^9\) This revised mediation strategy combined two basic innovations: first, the delinkage of the issue of the name from the wider prospect of a political settlement, and second, the gradual improvement of relations between the two nations.

The logic behind this tactic in postconflict mediations is to decouple the most complicated issues from promising areas of convergence where it is easier to reach a compromise. International experience suggests several such examples of effective delinkage strategies, from Sinai Peninsula in the Camp David negotiations to environmental politics in contested Kashmir (Lohmann 1997; Kovras 2012). On the naming dispute, Nimetz and others also referred to the British-Irish example and noted how the two countries maintained strong relations despite disputes in their use of each other’s name (*Federal News Service* 1995; see also Coakley 2009).

Finally, the timing of the agreement was extremely important. Even a few weeks of delay would have led to yet another protracted deadlock in the Balkans. As luck would have it, however, Papandreou was hospitalized two months later (he died the following summer), and Gligorov faced an assassination attempt weeks after signing the agreement.

The agreement signified one of the first major diplomatic successes during the deadly Balkan wars of the 1990s. At the time, the Bosnian war had caused about 110,000 deaths and 2.2 million displaced out of a prewar population of 4.37 million (Stefanovic and Loizides 2011: 412). Holbrooke himself described the Interim Agreement as a preamble to what followed a few months later in negotiating the end of the Bosnian war in Dayton (1998: 123).

Meanwhile, in Greece, the main opposition party insisted that the Greek government should have made a final determination on the name and accused it of superficial and dangerous policies (*Eleftherotypia* 1995d). Smaller politi-
cal parties were even more belligerent in their criticism. Dimitris Tsouvolas, the leader of a group of socialists that earlier split from the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), accused the government of “selling out” Greece in the name of so-called political realism (Eleftherotypia 1995b). Stelios Paphathemelis, an outspoken socialist MP, warned that the agreement on the symbols was secondary because the name was the instrument of irredentism and instability against Greece (Eleftherotypia 1995a). Antonis Samaras, by that time president of the small right-wing party Political Spring, attacked both the government and Nea Demokratia, saying that the agreement violated Greek national rights by allowing FYROM the right to use its constitutional name, and he concluded: “We call all Hellenism around the World to stand up and prevent the insult against our history and the violation of our national rights” (Eleftherotypia 1995c).

Nonetheless, the Interim Agreement proved that nationalist disputes in the Balkans were not inherently intractable. Besides its impact on the Dayton Accords, the Macedonian dispute taught political elites in Greece a number of key lessons. Before the Interim Agreement, Greece received only short-term support from its allies and partners and, more important, was subject to intense criticism for its lack of flexibility. At times, Greece lost all international support. All this occurred because of its dispute with a virtually unknown and unimportant country (that is, in Western eyes).

Accompanying Greek frustration was a realization that preferential treatment or superiority of the opponent could not account for all disappointing outcomes, and a new paradigm was needed to explain cause-effect relationships in Greek foreign policy (Kovras and Loizides 2012). Greek policy-makers, especially during PM Simitis’s administration following the resignation and death of Andreas Papandreou, attempted to delegitimize confrontational policies by pointing out policy failures in such issues as the Macedonian and other crises, thus introducing antinationalist counterframes into Greek public discourse.10

This example also explains how decision-makers can come to endorse specific frames and not others, or alternatively, what processes can transform frames. The Macedonian crisis initiated a shift among Greek opinion-makers that Doug McAdam et al. (1996) call a process of cognitive liberation.11 With the legitimization of the public debate on the advantages of disengagement from confrontational politics, a new cognitive paradigm of cooperative politics emerged in Greece. There was a realization that unless Greece cooperated and
coordinated its policies with fellow European Union (EU) members’ principles and interests, it would never enjoy the political advantages of being a member state.

TRANSFORMING THE SYMBOLIC LANDSCAPE IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

The contact with reality was shocking. Within two months, 850 NGOs were recorded only in one sector! They undertook actions of solidarity with the earthquake victims in Turkey. It was obvious that Greek society was moving ahead fast, and only few could understand this (Nikitas Lionarakis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece, 2005).12

Following the 1998 Öcalan crisis, the son of the former PM, George Papandreou, an advocate of Greek-Turkish cooperation who enjoyed continuously high levels of popular support in the Greek polls, was appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Tsakonas 2010: 73).13 Not long after his appointment, the devastating earthquakes in the two countries in the summer of 1999 offered an opportunity for transformation in Greek-Turkish relations. The ensuing shift toward cooperative politics soon received the support of the main opposition parties, creating a new warm climate across the political spectrum.14 While the catalyst for change was a natural disaster and its aftermath, the end result was the 1999 Helsinki agreement to grant Turkey candidate status for the EU, something hitherto unthinkable.

The Greek-Turkish 1999 earthquakes, however devastating especially for Turkey, saw tens of thousands of citizens on both sides of the Aegean demonstrating active solidarity with the victims and equally a general change in public attitudes as demonstrated in subsequent public opinion polls (Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi 2004). For their part, George Papandreou and İsmail Cem mastered the art of “disaster diplomacy,” transforming the pain inflicted on their nations into an opportunity for a better future. Turning a moment of weakness into an opportunity for peace proved to be the most successful initiative in Greek-Turkish peace negotiations for decades. The two ministers of foreign affairs essentially transformed the symbolic landscape of Greek-Turkish relations, stabilizing for the first time in recent history one of the most conflictual dyads in international politics. In turn, the postearthquake diplomacy of August 1999 allowed media and civil society networks to play a crucial role in improving the image of Greece in Turkey (and vice versa), creating a warmer climate between the two nations (Rumelilli 2007; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008; Öniş and Yılmaz 2009).
As Greek-Turkish relations improved, Greece lifted its veto of Turkey’s EU candidacy at the European Council Meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 (Ker-Lindsay 2007). The new atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations legitimized the historic decision to support Turkey as an applicant member in Helsinki, the improvement of minority relations in Greece, and the ongoing rapprochement between Greek and Turkish governments. As noted in previous chapters, Greek and Turkish bureaucracy had played a significant role in the past in institutionalizing majority nationalism. The post-Helsinki era marked the reversal of old policies, prompting new institutional mechanisms to support peace initiatives involving the media, think tanks, and civil society. For instance, a Joint Disaster Response Unit was set up under the United Nations as a conflict resolution tool that could be used in other conflicts.15 At the civil society level, the Greek and Turkish ministries of foreign affairs created a Liaison Committee working with NGOs to support joint activities (Lionarakis 2005).

From the perspective of the two governments, compromise in Helsinki was not an easy task, however. For one thing, although the conditions stipulated in Helsinki were both expected and reasonable, they could have easily played into the hands of nationalists, as the public was largely unfamiliar with the complexities of EU politics. The offer made to Turkey in Helsinki contained ambiguities and was seen by Turkey as front-loaded in terms of conditions and obligations—and as leaving rewards, such as accession negotiations, for much later (Ugur 2003). For its part, Greece was about to “abandon” its strongest card. Being militarily weaker than Turkey, Greece could only rely on vetoing progress in Turkish-EU relations to force Turkey into respecting international law.

Complicating the issue, Greek PM Simitis lacked the charisma of the late Andreas Papandreou; he faced upcoming elections and was pushing hard for more gains in the negotiations with Turkey. Likewise, right before Helsinki, Turkish president Süleyman Demirel escalated threats against Greece; these threats were openly articulated in a number of interviews in the English-language Turkish Daily News.16 And as the extreme right, represented by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), was a junior coalition partner, moderates in Turkey began to worry about the collapse of the new government. Unsurprisingly, ailing PM Bülent Ecevit met with little sympathy in Greece, since he was seen as responsible for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.17 Finally, the MHP owed its April 1999 electoral success to the capture of Öcalan and was categorically opposed to any concessions on “nationally sensitive” issues, including Cyprus, the Aegean, or the Kurdish issue (Öniş 2003: 36; Heper and İnce 2006). While
in power, the nationalists were expected to sustain the "primed" frame of mind that brought them into power.

In short, conventional wisdom would expect little progress in Turkey, especially after decades of stalemates and bitter disappointments in Turkish-EU relations. Meanwhile, the historically suspicious Greek side could have easily refrained from taking any steps at all, knowing that conditions on the other side of the Aegean argued against reaching any kind of compromise. Moderates in Greece and Turkey faced not only their own internal constituencies but also hardliners in the two communities in Cyprus. The history of Greek-Turkish relations is inundated with examples of Cypriot leaders using emotional language to blame Ankara or Athens, framing any potential compromise as a "motherland betrayal" (Averoff-Tossizza 1986; Kızilyürek 1999; Papadakis 2005; Bryant 2010).

Nonetheless, both sides took a calculated risk and reached a difficult but valuable compromise. Candidacy status came with two gains for Greece. For one thing, Turkey committed to accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court in The Hague concerning the Aegean disputes by 2004 at the latest. For another, Turkey failed to prevent Cypriot accession to the EU, which implied the possibility of future vetoes of Turkey's accession by the Greek Cypriot leadership.18

At the same time, Turkey enjoyed a number of long-term benefits by coming closer to the EU. The country's GDP tripled in the next fifteen years, with the country joining the twenty largest economies on the planet (Oniş 2012; Herzog and Brennan 2014). Turkish exports and direct investment from EU countries allowed the financing of major infrastructures and social welfare programs, especially with the AKP in government. Economic progress was particularly important in changing the country's image in Europe and worldwide, and debt crisis in southern Europe made Turkey an increasingly attractive place for investment and trade. While in the past Turkish policy-makers had complained about unequal opportunities within the EU, roles were reversed by 2014. Simply stated, Turkey benefited from integration but deferred its own obligations; in other words, it could be argued that Helsinki helped Turkey to get the milk without purchasing the cow, something that was not obvious at the time.

Both Cem and Papandreou framed their policies on the basis of mutual interest. Papandreou attributed the success of earthquake diplomacy to the earlier "positive impact of cooperation in humanitarian issues between Greece and Turkey ... evident in the Kosovo operation," as well as the 1996 Imia crisis, a
turning point when “a lot of people realized that as long as relations remain nonexistent, a random incident could lead to war with disastrous consequences” (Papandreou 2014). In the Turkish Parliament debate just before Helsinki, Cem emphasized common interests. He corrected any illusions about abandoning his country’s legitimate interests while recognizing Greek national concerns:

Both countries are striving for their own interests. That is, the Greek side is striving for the Greek interest and we naturally are striving for our own interest. The skill here if there are any common points of interest, is to find them and to form a rapprochement over these points, and I also expressed this very clearly that in the Greek policies there has not been a major change.¹⁹

Besides win-win gains, Helsinki contained a number of constructive ambiguities. In fact, as in the previous example and the mediations on the name FYROM, the agreement was crafted on the principle of constructive ambiguity and relied on legalistic and terminological acrobatics, thereby avoiding direct conflict with the perceived interests, declarations, and ethnopolitical framing of either side.²⁰ Constructive ambiguity allowed actors to perceive and frame the agreement as the first step toward achieving their own major goals, rather than a final or irreversible compromise. *The Times* (1999) reported: “It was constructive ambiguity that saved the day”: a cunning comma, inserted in the relevant clause, enabled Javier Solana to convince the Turkish side that the phrase “by the end of 2004” referred to the date of the EU’s review of the situation, not the deadline for the settlement of disputes between Athens and Ankara.²¹

Helsinki demonstrates the importance of linking the appropriate negotiation formula with the “right” frame, combining win-win gains, redefinition of national interests, and “constructive ambiguities” to serve the long-term interests of both sides. Ambiguity was a key aspect not only on the Macedonia issue discussed earlier but also in Northern Ireland (Good Friday Agreement) and Cyprus (Annan Plan), albeit with serious problems in the endorsement and implementation of the respective peace plans (Trimikliniotis 2006; McGarry and O’Leary 2009). A hard-to-answer question arising from such incomplete, ambiguous, and interim mediations is whether leaders have failed to fully capitalize on the “peace momentum” by containing rather than effectively transforming conflicts.

In a final analysis, the earthquake tragedy enabled actors to redefine national interests and identify new peace constituencies hitherto silent on the Greek-Turkish issues. For one thing, the media provided touching scenes of Greek
or Turkish rescue teams saving civilian lives across the border. For another, policy-makers were surprised by the unprecedented public support for peace and reconciliation; the civil society network grew rapidly to more than eight hundred organizations, making it impossible for either country's ministry to monitor Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Even previously "uncommitted" elites jumped on the "rapprochement bandwagon" for fear of isolating themselves and leaving all the credit for the successful foreign diplomacy to the ruling parties (Kucuk 2006).  

THE "UNSOLVABLE" KURDISH QUESTION

Diyarbakur is regarded the fifth Haramesh-Sharif of the Islamic world after Mecca, Madina, Jerusalem and Damascus. If Diyarbakur is peaceful, happy and prosperous, so will be Arbil [northern Iraq] and Kamishli [Syria]. And Turkey as well (PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 2013).  

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the 1998 Abdullah Öcalan crisis brought three countries—Syria, Italy, and Greece—into direct confrontation with Turkey. Until September 1998, the Kurdish PKK leader was sheltered in Syria. The Turkish government issued a military ultimatum against Syria, preparing the public for a tough-resolved approach on its fight against the PKK and its international "sympathizers." At this, Öcalan left the country for Russia and was eventually arrested in Italy. Extradition from Italy was technically impossible because the Italian constitution prohibited extradition of prisoners to those countries retaining the death penalty, such as Turkey (Rizzo 1998).

Nonetheless, the Turkish public quickly mobilized against the perceived provocation of a NATO ally. Emotions ran high, and the Turkish telecom company Telsim began an emotional TV campaign, “Keep Your Pasta Clean,” which featured graphic details of children slaughtered by the PKK, with blood dripping onto a bowl of Italian pasta, and ending with the phrase: “Don’t let terror ruin your appetite” (Smith 1998: 10). Protesters gathered outside the Italian embassy in Ankara, waving placards bearing such slogans as “Terrorist Italy” and “We are going to burn Rome.” Businesses opted to join the boycott of their own products. Only black clothing was on display in the 171 shop fronts of the famous Italian brand Benetton. Shop owners festooned their windows with black ribbons, and the only splash of color permitted was the red Turkish flag (Huggler 1998: 16). Other Italian companies, such as Barilla and Pirelli, were targets of a business-inspired initiative to pressure the Italian government and justice system to extradite Abdullah Öcalan.
These incidents illuminate two stark and inter-related dilemmas facing Turkey since the mid-1980s. The first was whether to abandon confrontational politics domestically and in the immediate region in order to maintain the prospect of entry into the European Union. As mentioned above about Greece, Turkish political elites had managed to create a working relationship with their Aegean neighbors, thus increasing the odds for improving Turkish-EU relations.

The second major dilemma was whether to initiate negotiations with representatives of the Kurdish minority to ensure a sustainable peaceful relationship between the Turkish state and the predominantly Kurdish regions of the country. As this book has demonstrated, the Kurdish question poses a geopolitical puzzle, not only for Turkey but also for the surrounding region. Following the capture of the PKK leader, Turkey opted not to confront the Kurds or international public opinion and, therefore, did not sentence Abdullah Öcalan to death (Müftüler-Bac 2000). The PKK made its own concessions, for example, declaring a cease-fire several times since 1999, but delays in the implementation of much-needed reforms on Kurdish minority issues ultimately led to renewed waves of low-intensity violence (Cagaptay 2007).

Turkish public opinion has generally framed the conflict as one between the legitimate state and PKK terrorists. As demonstrated above, popular discourse emphasizes the casualties of this struggle while underplaying the crimes committed by the military and the violent nature of forced displacement in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. In this framing, successive governments have attempted to “depoliticize” Kurdish ethnonationalism and address it as a problem to be solved by regional economic development (Somör 2005; Yeğen 2007). Turkish public opinion remains divided on how to handle the Kurdish issue; on the one hand, it has been shown in the polls that the Turkish public sees PKK terrorism as the most serious problem for the country, while on the other, the majority of the population seems to be increasingly in favor of the peace process announced by the government in December 2012 (Caha 2013).

Roughly speaking, minority Kurds tend to be divided between those voting for ethnic Kurdish parties and those opting for mainstream Turkish parties that accommodate their rights and identity. In the 1990s, moderate Kurds voted for leftist parties. In the past decade, roughly 40 percent of the voters in predominantly Kurdish regions supported the pro-Islamic AKP of PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Güzeldere 2009). Despite the diversity in responses, Kurdish elites, even those supporting AKP, have insisted on the necessity of recognizing and accommodating Kurdish minority rights. In other words, the support of the
Kurdish voters for the ruling party in Turkey is largely conditional on minority rights and the successful conclusion of the current peace process (Hooper 2012; Gunter 2013).

Turkey’s political system excludes from Parliament any party with less than 10 percent of the national vote. In this system, Kurdish votes are extremely important for maintaining AKP dominance in Turkish politics. When Erdoğan rallied liberal and Kurdish circles sympathizing with AKP’s democratic reforms in 2002, he reduced the influence of the military in civilian affairs and minimized the party fragmentation prevalent in the 1990s (Çandar 2013). Other changes ensued as well. While the Kurdish language was banned following the 1980 military coup, TRT began broadcasting documentaries and news in Kurdish in 2004 for about thirty minutes each week, while in 2009, TRT 6 started broadcasting in Kurdish for twenty-four hours a day (Reuters 2013). As demonstrated elsewhere in this chapter, conciliatory moves were made without explicitly contradicting ethnocentric frames. For instance, Nesrin Nas of ANAP (Motherland Party) stated at the time that “it should be known, that there is not any country, which was divided by liberties; however, history is full of countries that were divided because of suppression.”

Interestingly, this cooperative frame had also institutional backing within the country’s bureaucracy. Almost a decade earlier, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) argued for state broadcasting in Kurdish as a strategy of winning over the citizens of Kurdish origin. MIT’s views received an endorsement even within the nationalist establishment. For instance, former ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ, the advocate of the two and a half war strategy (see Chapter 4), described MIT’s views as “correct and wise”:

MIT seeks to prevent the citizens of Kurdish origin from viewing PKK as their representative and to save these citizens from the propaganda campaign waged by MED TV. Finally, MIT seeks to introduce a Kurdish television with the aim of maintaining communication with the Kurdish people. (Elekdağ 2000)

Significant changes in government policies also reflected the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECTHR) on the question of displaced Kurds. Specifically, the AKP introduced domestic remedies within the Turkish judicial and administrative bureaucracy before IDPs could apply directly to the court (Kurban et al. 2006: 33–34; Rumelili et al. 2011). Although the numbers of forcibly displaced are disputed (see Chapter 4), approximately 187,000 Kurds had returned to their homes in southeast Turkey by 2009 (IDMC 2013). In a survey
that Djordje Stefanovic and I have conducted among the returnees in Turkey, state compensations were reported to be a significant determinant of return (Stefanovic et al. 2014). Finally, the AKP government made significant improvements in its relationship with the Kurdish state in northern Iraq, signing ambitious oil and gas deals; in fact Erdoğan’s speech in Diyarbakir cited above was labeled as the “Diyarbakir encounter,” bringing together the Turkish prime minister and Kurdistan’s Regional Government president Massoud Barzani; the latter spoke in Kurdish; attended concerts by Ibrahim Tatlises and Shivan Perwer, a previously banned Kurdish singer; and vowed “Long live Turk-Kurd brotherhood, long live freedom, long live peace” (Çandar 2013).

Nonetheless, AKP as a “broad umbrella” failed to adequately shelter Kurdish voters. On the Kurdish issue, as in the other examples covered in this chapter, while noticeable, progress has been insufficient. As a leading expert on the Kurdish conflict points out, reforms “helped improve the quality of democracy as well as cultural rights of the Kurdish minority,” but “the Kurdish problem remains far from being resolved” (Kirişçi 2011). In the March 2009 elections, Kurds shifted their support to their ethnic party, forcing AKP to initiate its so-called Kurdish opening in July the same year. The main motivation was to recover the lost Kurdish voters and to counterbalance the gradual dismantling of the broader AKP constituent base. To this end, AKP offered amnesty to PKK fighters, encouraging them to return to Turkey from northern Iraq. At the same time, however, AKP failed to seek political consensus and mobilize broader support for further reforms, fearing electoral loses across Turkey (Somer and Liaras 2010). Hence, the “Kurdish opening” was subsequently framed in public discourse as “democratic opening” and then ironically as “national unity plan” (Kirişçi 2011).

The fate of the Kurdish opening demonstrates the weakness of majoritarian politics. Conventional wisdom assumes that a strong mandate will result in rapid and positive change, but once a sufficient plurality offers a leader power, inclusivity becomes less of a priority. Lack of coalitions and public consultation could lead to a style of government favoring majority nationalism, while in the long term, majoritarian political systems could leave important social and political groups excluded or under-represented (Lijphart 2004). Leaders could keep winning elections simply by appealing to their own party constituencies, ignoring the rest of the country, with minority views permanently excluded from decision-making, thus leading to further polarization and conflict.

Majoritarian institutions might encourage “broad umbrella” parties and appeals for votes across the political spectrum including ethnic minorities.
But unlike consensus democracies where minority parties frequently serve as much needed coalition parties, majoritarian democracies provide no credible guarantees for the inclusion of minority views, especially once the government is formed. In other words, even in the best cases “broad umbrella coalitions” within parties have only limited impact in reframing majority nationalism.

By extension, the unprecedented success of the People Democratic Party’s (HDP) to cross the ten percent threshold in the June 2015 elections marks a turning point in Turkish politics. HDP’s breakthrough could be attributed not only to the shifting political opportunity structures of the ‘democratic opening’ but also the capacity of the party itself to align its peace frame with the broader human rights agenda introducing a 10 percent quota for the LGBT community and another 50 percent quota for women candidates. Equally, the party capitalized on the public outcry against Erdoğan’s crackdown of the 2013 Gezi park demonstrations and his attempt to transform Turkey’s parliamentary system into a presidential one. Ironically, HDP will have to compete with the nationalist MHP as the kingmakers in future government coalitions. If it neutralizes the latter’s influence, HDP could become the catalyst for a consensus style democracy in Turkey and the broader Middle Eastern neighborhood.

BEYOND THE CYPRIOT STALEMATE

It is inevitable that anybody who honestly is in favor of a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem with peaceful means acknowledges that rapprochement is a necessary step towards this direction. In order for a solution to function smoothly, there has to promote a climate of mutual understanding between the two communities (Clerides 1991).28

European Union engagement in Cyprus following Helsinki was based on the expectation that Turkey and Turkish Cypriots on the one hand, and Greece and Greek Cypriots on the other, would cooperate in reaching a settlement, without one side being held hostage to the intransigence of the other (Yesilada and Sozen 2002). Although prescribed as extremely important in making the final decision, a settlement was not made a strict precondition for admitting Cyprus into the EU. Greece argued at the time of Europe’s eastern enlargement that it would have been unfair to obstruct Cypriot accession, if Turkish Cypriots were the ones to block the UN secretary-general’s efforts to broker an agreement. Cypriot membership in the EU came as no surprise, then, as mediators attributed the November 2001–March 2003 deadlocks exclusively to the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş, and Turkey (Hannay 2004).

In early 2004, reunification talks resumed between Greek Cypriot and Turk-
ish Cypriot leaders. Although the leaders again failed to agree, they allowed UN secretary-general Kofi Annan to prepare a plan for reunification. Under the proposed plan, Greek and Turkish Cypriots would retain autonomy in most of their affairs under a decentralized federal system. Turkish Cypriots were asked to return land to Greek Cypriot displaced persons in exchange for power-sharing, EU membership, and federal status within a reunited Cyprus (Michael 2009; Pericleous 2009; Sözen and Özersay 2007). Although the Annan Plan initially had the qualified support of the two main Greek Cypriot political parties, namely of the Democratic Rally (DISY) and the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), representing two-thirds of the electorate, it was rejected by a landslide 76 percent of Greek Cypriots, while 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved it during the twin April 2004 referendums.

Unlike their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, moderate Greek Cypriot political parties have failed to convince the public to support the Annan Plan or at least continue the process of renegotiating its gaps and ambiguities. Moderate Greek Cypriot elites focused exclusively on international negotiations and left little space for an open debate domestically. In the meantime, hardliners found an opportunity to campaign undisturbed against the plan, demanding unrealistic changes. The dynamics of Cypriot negotiations prevented acting policymakers from criticizing or deconstructing adversarial framings, fearing that explicitly moderate statements would harm their position abroad. As noted on the Macedonian case, it is hard to challenge or overturn perceptions of interests and goals once those are shaped through precrisis framing. An anecdotal example from a 2004 mobilization among Greek Cypriots substantiates this final point. After dominant frames were shaped in the case of the 2004 referendum, a radio guest in Lazaros Mavros’s famous nationalist early morning program challenged his host: “If the [moderates] Vassiliou, Anastasiades, Papapetrou or other ‘yes’ supporters complained about censorship, they should be given three hours each and every day for all radio and TV channels for months. We will still vote ‘no’ to the Annan plan.”29 The guest was right in pointing out that reframing might have very little causal effect once public perceptions have been shaped. In all cases cited in this book, precrisis framing was one of the determinants of subsequent policy decisions.

The referendum was a once-in-a-lifetime event, with consequences that spanned at least another decade. It constituted a major turning point in conflict resolution and identity politics in Cyprus and the region; on the overt official level, all signs seemed to point away from the possibility of peace and compro-
miso. Yet as this section will show, at the grassroots level, compromise in the form of humanitarian initiatives grew and flourished across the ethnic divide despite the outcome of the referendum.

THE CASE AGAINST COMPROMISE

Unlike other cases across wider Europe (Rumelili 2015), Cyprus’s EU accession inadvertently contributed to the strengthening of Greek Cypriot nationalism and the breakdown of the earlier post-Helsinki peace frames emphasizing cooperation, not only with Turkish Cypriots but also with critical external peace allies for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. With the status of the republic secured within the EU, international cooperation seemed less important; it became possible for Greek Cypriot politicians to imagine Cyprus endorsing a high-risk strategy toward major European countries by relying on its veto power against Turkey’s EU accession. Some even asserted that this could be possible without mainland Greek support, and cooperation with moderates in Greece became less of a priority.30 For the most part, Greek Cypriot leaders rejecting the Annan Plan took a legalistic approach. “Lawfare” was introduced as a new term indicating the creation of new methods of confrontation beyond traditional “warfare,” including excessive use of legal arguments and the ECtHR in expectation of continuous negative rulings against Turkey.31 Greek Cypriot nationalism even assumed an anti-Western orientation with a Cypriot president directly confronting the UN and UNOPS, accusing them of bribing Greek Cypriots to support a particular settlement, an accusation that has yet to be documented (Cyprus Weekly 2004).

In his campaign against the Annan settlement before and after the referendum, President Tassos Papadopoulos (2004) unleashed waves of nationalism, branding “yes” supporters traitors (see Pericleous 2009; American Hellenic Institute 2004). He played up Greek Cypriot attachment to the Republic of Cyprus with the commonly cited statement: “I was given an internationally recognized state. I am not going to give back a Community without a say internationally and in search of a guardian” (Papadopoulos 2004). Finally, he argued that the plan’s provision to disband the National Guard would create conditions of insecurity for Greek Cypriots, an argument that reminded people of 1974 and the inability of mainland Greece to protect Greek Cypriots militarily. Papadopoulos and his political circle won the battle of identity framing but established a form of majority Greek Cypriot nationalism driven by isolationism and lack of trust in the international community. In direct contrast, Turkish

Of course, the situation in the island continued to be conflictual. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots accuse the European Union of endorsing a Greek Cypriot application for the whole island before the final settlement of the issue (Eralp and Beriker 2005). Yet the Turkish side itself accepted the plan too late to have any impact on the Cypriot accession. As implied in the Macedonian naming issue, timing is critical. Had Turkish Cypriots said “yes” to the plan at least a year earlier, a settlement could have been possible while moderate leaders Glafkos Clerides and Costas Simitis still held power in Cyprus and Greece, respectively. Mediators also pointed a finger at Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos, who surprised the international community with his opposition to the plan (Hannay 2004). For their part, moderate Greek Cypriots argued that they did not reject the proposed relationship with the Turkish Cypriots; nevertheless, they argued, the plan disproportionately favored Turkey’s interests with respect to the settlers and the unilateral rights for intervention. A threat effectively played up by President Papadopoulos was that Turkey would renege on its commitments and refuse to return land to the Greek Cypriots after receiving all the benefits of the settlement.

Admittedly, a significant portion of the Greek Cypriot leadership campaigned in favor of the Annan Plan and remained committed to the principles of a bicomunal bizonal settlement. The rejection of the Annan Plan did not lead to a monolithic discourse among the Greek Cypriot elites. In the years following the referendum, opposition leaders in the two largest parties, the center-right DISY and the nominally communist AKEL, argued that each day without a settlement intensified waves of colonization and brought the occupied territories of Cyprus closer to “Taiwanization” and irreversible partition (Moore et al. 2014).

THE CASE FOR COMPROMISE

The referendum led to a dangerous polarization among the Greek Cypriots yet did not prevent a series of successful confidence-building measures with the Turkish Cypriot community. In fact, the Cypriot experience suggests that civil and political actors can challenge the logic of partition with relative success. In fact, Cyprus features a number of positive stories in peace mediation that demonstrate how peacemakers in divided societies can choose to take their fate
in their hands and mitigate even the most difficult aspects of their territorial division.

Innovative framing and creative leadership are critical for peace mediations. In Cyprus, peacemakers have frequently proved, with little outside help, that local communities can choose to reverse even the most difficult aspects of territorial division. The most interesting example relates to the current Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı, whose victory in the Turkish Cypriot elections of April 2015 with 60.3 percent of the vote brought renewed hopes for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. In the early 1980s, the two mayors of the capital Nicosia (Akıncı and Lellos Demetriades) resorted to an ad hoc set of arrangements to address the city’s impending environmental disaster in the absence of a sewer system. The urgency of bicomunal cooperation was artfully framed by Mayor Lellos Demetriades at a dinner at his home with his counterpart and Greek as well as Turkish Cypriot leaders following the de facto division in 1974. Lellos (widely known by his first name) first served his guests their meal and then presented a bleak picture of what would happen to the streets of Nicosia if no agreement was reached on the sewage crisis.\(^4\) Leaving legalistic formalities aside, the two mayors agreed to call themselves “representatives” rather than “mayors” of the city and managed to upgrade the city’s sewer system, making the first step to Nicosia’s “underground” unification (Papadakis 2005). Shortly after, the two sides agreed on a master plan for Nicosia, one which relies on the framework of a town that is going to be united.

Moreover, the 1990s saw the emergence of intensified grassroots movements supporting the reunification of Cyprus across the ethnic divide and across the traditional left-right division. In the Turkish Cypriot community, left-wing parties challenged the hegemonic position of the nationalist right. The Bu Memleket Bizim (This Country Is Ours) movement brought these forces together and mobilized the Turkish Cypriot community in massive peace rallies in 2002–4.

The “yes” vote by Turkish Cypriots in the 2004 Annan Plan referendum and the mere fact that Cyprus came so close to a federal settlement are by themselves a major success. In fact, the mobilization of Turkish Cypriots offers an interesting contrast to the color revolutions (discussed in Chapter 6) by providing critical insights as to channeling nonviolent protest toward peace. Following international isolation after 1974, Turkish Cypriots developed a strong civil society sector as part of circumventing Greek Cypriot legal recognition challenges but also resisting assimilation from Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot vote
in favor of a peace plan could be largely attributed to the early mobilization at
the grassroots level aiming to support the aims of EU accession and reunifica-
tion. Following a symbolic referendum two years earlier in December 2002, the
protesters took a clear position on the Annan Plan:

The plan presented by UN General Secretary Mr. Kofi Annan is for the interests of
the Turkish Cypriots as well as its contents are acceptable by all political parties to
the Cyprus problem. The Annan plan should be accepted immediately. (Cyprus
Action Network 2003)\textsuperscript{35}

In divided societies, it is unusual for breakaway communities to support reun-
ification and even unimaginable among such secessionist communities as the
Serbs in Bosnia or the Abkhaz in Georgia (Ker-Lindsay 2012).

By 2005, Turkish Cypriot moderates gained power by winning all major elec-
tions in the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot left and Mehmet
Ali Talat’s CTP\textsuperscript{36} also exploited every opportunity to win crucial allies within
the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish political systems. There were forces in Turkey
that favored Talat’s pro-settlement policy but feared that a landslide victory of
CTP could potentially alienate Turkish Cypriots from Turkey (Çarkoğlu and
Sözen 2004: 134–35). To appease these fears, Talat incorporated nationalist nar-
ratives, symbols, and crucial domestic allies in his political campaign. Although
its electoral message focused on European Union accession and reunification,
CTP increasingly used Turkish flags through the rallies allegedly at Erdoğan’s
request. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, Turkish Cypriot mobilization did
not directly antagonize but reframed “motherland nationalism,” merging a fa-
vorable political opportunity structure after Erdoğan’s election with political
expediency and its own mobilization capacity.

Another interesting example of a humanitarian issue addressed during this
period is the positive work of the bicommmunal Committee for Missing Persons
(CMP). The process of recovery the missing persons in Cyprus is odd, not only
because of the difficulties associated with addressing an emotionally sensitive
issue but also because an agreement was reached around the time of the failure
of the Annan Plan (Bozkurt and Yakinthou 2012; Kovras 2014). Despite seem-
ingly prohibitive conditions, the remains of 1,092 persons had been exhumed
at different burial sites in the island by the summer of 2014. On this issue, other
divided societies such as South Africa provide an interesting contrast to Cyprus.
Both South Africa and Cyprus report approximately 2,000 cases of missing per-
sons. Yet the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) man-
aged to officially recognize only 447 individuals as missing, out of whom only 66 were exhumed. In other words, the much-celebrated “South African model” combining reconciliation with truth produced only a tiny portion of exhumations, compared with the less known “Cypriot alternative,” where almost half of the missing have been exhumed under conditions of a protracted stalemate (see also Loizides 2016). Moreover, as shown in polls and several related studies, the CMP has become the single most successful bicommmunal project in the island: in a 2007 survey commissioned by the UNFICYP, 92 percent of Greek Cypriots and 74 percent of Turkish Cypriots evaluated the presence of the CMP in Cyprus as positive.37

Breaking stalemates does not happen in a vacuum, of course. The positive turn on the issue of the missing was preceded by significant civil society initiatives. In 2000, thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots put aside years of division and gave blood samples in the hope of finding a compatible donor for a bone marrow transplant for a six-year-old boy.38 Creating the infrastructure and, more important, the public knowledge for DNA extraction proved extremely important when the government later appealed to the Turkish Cypriot relatives of the missing to give blood samples to enable the matching of the Turkish Cypriot missing with their families.

Equally, journalists in both communities challenged the dominant views in their communities by emphasizing the common victimhood of all families of the missing. A prominent example is Sevgül Uludağ whose articles and books have been published on both sides of the divide, despite persecution and continuous threats on her life (2006).39 On the Greek Cypriot side, new media outlets such as Politis, along with a number of investigative journalists such as Andreas Paraschos and Makarios Drousiotis, began to challenge the official narrative. In addition, individual cases of relatives demanding unilateral exhumations in areas controlled by the republic received considerable attention from local media (Drousiotis 2000; Sant Cassia 2005; Kaymak 2007).

Given the ground-swell of interest, by the mid-1990s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—which had for decades assumed the responsibility for the issue—realized that gains from the existing policy were minimal; key ministry officials decided to create a revised policy (Kovras 2014). According to Kasoulides, who led the effort in the MFA, the new policy delinked the issue of the missing from the wider prospect of a political settlement. It also initiated the unilateral endorsement of exhumations by the Greek Cypriot side, combined with strong and credible incentives offered to the Turkish Cypriot relatives to cooperate with
the republic.\textsuperscript{40} A turning point was the publication in the official gazette of the Republic of Cyprus of the list of Greek as well as Turkish Cypriot missing from the 1963–74 period, providing undiscutable evidence as to the mutual suffering of both communities (ibid.: 115). In an interview, Kasoulides suggested the importance of delinking the humanitarian aspects from the political ones as well as acting unilaterally in accordance with European norms, regardless of the actions of the other side.\textsuperscript{41} Tassos Tzionis, a career diplomat leading the effort, argued that the Greek Cypriot side framed the issue in simple terms as a humanitarian one and an obligation the Cyprus government had to relatives irrespective of their ethnic background.\textsuperscript{42} As in the case of Helsinki in 1999, this policy reorientation required a calculated risk that Greek Cypriot leaders were willing to take.

This seemed a sensible unilateral step on the one hand, but on the other it entailed a high-risk strategy, unusual for generally reticent Greek Cypriot diplomacy. Previously, any reference to Turkish Cypriots missing before the Turkish invasion would have seriously delegitimized Greek Cypriot discourses; it would have opened a Pandora’s box, letting out all sorts of inconvenient questions, particularly the extent to which institutions of the republic were responsible for those Turkish Cypriots who went missing in the 1960s (Kovras 2008: 377). The unilateral opening to the Turkish Cypriot community also entailed electoral risks for center-right DISY, as Greek Cypriot perpetrators likely to be associated with the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) movement or EOKA B and their descendants overwhelmingly vote for the party, particularly in its rural strongholds.\textsuperscript{43} Kasoulides was a leading member of the party and became its official nominee for the presidency of the republic in the 2008 elections.

Nonetheless, the CMP’s “restricted mandate” made it easier for those involved in past crimes to tolerate (even support with information) the recovery of the missing. Once recovered, bones of the missing—including small children—constituted the undisputed (forensic) evidence as to the suffering of the other side that no hardliner could challenge. At the same time, the exhumations allowed each community to identify its heroes and pay tribute to their own dead according to its own traditions and religious customs. Understandably, nationalist narratives were often part of funerals on either side, depending on the political orientation of the grieving family. As in the case of the Macedonian naming dispute and the Bu Memleket Bizim movement, the CMP case suggests that peacemaking arrangements are often more sustainable if they avoid directly antagonizing overarching national frames.

Moreover, for Greek Cypriots, the passage of time discredited the previous
policy of internationalization, which aimed at exposing Turkey rather than resolving the problem. In the past, Greek Cypriot and Greek politicians used very strong language to expose Turkey in international forums; for instance, in 1998 in a trip to the Middle East Greek minister of foreign affairs Theodoros Pangalos argued that "two thousand persons were kidnapped by Turkey [in 1974]," causing the immediate reaction of the Turkish government, which responded that "the main reason [for] the 'missing persons' problem in Cyprus is Greece's attempt to annex Cyprus" (Ankara Anatolia 1998).

Although Greek Cypriots won international support—including a number of relevant legal decisions at the ECHR—on the issue, these decisions alone could not secure progress on the missing. Policy-makers who realized the limitations of such policies sought new arrangements that allowed delinkage between the political and humanitarian aspects of the Cypriot question (Kovras 2012). The origins of delinking humanitarian from political issues go back at least to 1975 during the mediations between Denktaş and Clerides. According to the latter's memoirs:

[T]he volume of work on humanitarian issues was so large, so that most of my time in meetings with Denktaş was devoted to humanitarian issues with less time left to discuss substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem. Considering that the delay was purposeful on the Turkish side, I proposed a special committee to discuss humanitarian issues on a daily basis so that Denktaş and I could concentrate on to the settlement of the Cyprus problem. My proposal was warmly supported by the UNSG special advisor while Denktaş found himself in a difficult position and he could not reject it. (Clerides 1991: 196)

The delinkage strategy fits nicely into prevailing conditions in the late 1990s. It was timely, as international organizations, the ECtHR, and local associations (as well as the media) had begun to investigate the issue of the missing in more depth. The Greek Cypriot side could no longer avoid its responsibilities on the issue, and failure to do so could have led to a legal dispute in Cypriot and ECtHR courts; therefore, a proactive unilateral step was both necessary and potentially beneficial. By initiating exhumations, Greek Cypriots relied less on "propaganda" and more on sound legal standards of evidence, thereby incentivizing the Turkish Cypriot side to reciprocate. As mentioned above, Turkish Cypriots were already in the process of challenging their regime and, therefore, it was simply a matter of time for the moderate Talat to opt for a process that would eventually benefit his own community as well.
Two additional developments explain the gradual endorsement of the CMP process by Turkish Cypriots. The first was the consecutive decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (EChHR) condemning Turkey for violating the fundamental human rights of the relatives of the missing. These decisions were backed by several resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Thus each side needed to act unilaterally to avoid finding itself on the wrong side of a future EChHR ruling. Pushing too much on the legal front would have derailed any progress on the ground. The second is that groups of relatives gradually endorsed the CMP process (Sant Cassia 2005). Such initiatives not only made a significant contribution to the public discourse, but they also forced leaders to reconsider their priorities more carefully, weighing the legal and political consequences of noncooperation.

LESSONS FOR (RE)FRAMING MAJORITY NATIONALISM

As mentioned earlier, frames focus attention “by bracketing what in our sensory field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is ‘in frame’ and what is ‘out-of-frame’ in relation to the object of orientation” (Snow 2007). Ethnopolitical frames reflect existing public perceptions while restricting certain “realities,” including noteworthy institutional designs and innovations, from public attention. Thus they constrain peace processes. Recent literature points to the relationship of frames to ethnic violence (Desrosiers 2011; Kaufman 2011) and notes how frames constrain actions by directing people to perceive and interpret an event in a particular way (Gamson and Herzog 1999).

But as this chapter demonstrates, the use of cooperative frames might be a catalyst in conflict transformation despite prohibitive conditions. More specifically, peace frames propagated by the civil society and moderate elites make possible conflict resolution by transforming the symbolic landscape of ethnic relations. The cases discussed here show how intelligently designed and mediated institutional frameworks could neutralize the impact of ethnonationalist frames or coexist with them in a stable symbiotic relationship, allowing ethnic communities to adapt their narratives at their own pace and in their preferred direction as the peace process evolves. Much of the literature on peacemaking has focused on the role of spoiler groups (Stedman 1997), but few studies have investigated how frames could be used to neutralize opposition from such groups. All four cases discussed in this chapter—Helsinki, the CMP, Kurdish broadcasting, and the Macedonian naming issue—point to the symbiotic relationship between adaptation and ethnonationalist frames, suggesting that
peacemaking arrangements might be more sustainable if they avoid directly antagonizing potential spoilers.

Moreover, as this book suggests, nationalist framing can be contained with the use of innovative conflict resolution formulas. For instance, in 1994, Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) signed an agreement aiming to normalize political and commercial relations after four years of tension. Interestingly, the agreement was brokered by Richard Holbrooke, chief architect of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia (Holbrooke 1998). The agreement was a turning point in Balkan politics in the 1990s. It signaled to the West that ethnopolitical conflicts in the Balkans could be resolved and led Holbrooke to a successful mediation at Dayton months later.

Yet Greece and Macedonia remain hostages to the solution; the designation FYROM angers most ethnic Macedonians and makes even those espousing the Greek view on Macedonia uncomfortable with its use. The Simitis administration of 1996–2004 failed to agree on a permanent name, partly because of its emphasis on settling disputes with Turkey and partly because the Republic of Macedonia was unwilling to accept a double name formula (Zahariadis 2005: 167). The Karamanlis administration (2004–2007) avoided the issue altogether, while post-2008 Greece was understandably preoccupied with the debt crisis. The acrimony over “Macedonia” and the ownership of its cultural symbols has become entrenched in Greek electoral and identity politics, particularly among conservative voters in northern Greece. In September 2007 the far-right party LAOS (Popular Orthodox Rally), which played up the Macedonian issue, entered parliament—the first time for a far-right party to do so since the fall of the dictators in 1974 (Carassava 2007). More worrisomely, in the elections of June 2012, the violent neo-Nazi Golden Dawn secured eighteen seats in parliament; since then, it has remained the third largest political party in the polls, including the January 2015 elections, capitalizing on the “blind spots” and inconsistencies of ethnocentric Greek framing not only on the Macedonian issue but also on migration, the economic bailout negotiations, and other foreign policy issues.

At the regional level, the failure of Greek governments to reach a settlement on the Macedonian issue since the mid-1990s presents a challenge to the overall international objective of stabilizing the Western Balkans. By proffering the carrot of NATO and EU enlargement, the international community aims to influence the situation between Albanians and ethnic Macedonians in the republic, described as an “almost-war” situation in 2001 (Hislope 2003; Koneska 2012)
while facing renewed challenges of political stability in early 2015. However, the republic's accession to NATO or the European Union is conditional on Greek endorsement. When in late 2006, the Macedonian government announced that it would give the name “Alexander the Great” to an airport in Skopje, Greece reiterated its “veto” against the latter joining international organizations (Agence France Presse 2006). But in 2011, Greece lost a case at the International Court of Justice, suggesting that the country does not have the right to exercise veto over the entry of its northern neighbor into international organizations.

Of Karamanlis’s threats to use the veto, veteran Greek journalist Rihardos Someritis comments: “And for the issue of our relations with FYR Macedonia again many responsible politicians particularly Mr. Karamanlis got trapped into positions that either him personally or all of us we will regret” (Someritis 2007). Nevertheless, the Interim Agreement has served both countries well. What is especially surprising is how quickly the relationship between the two countries improved after its signing in September 1995. This progress, especially in the area of economics, refutes many of the prophesies of the first half of the 1990s that foretold the emergence of an independent Macedonian Republic and predicted its intent to deliberately harm Greeks and their interests (see, for instance, Chapter 3). This case suggests important policy lessons for Turkey as well, notably in its current quest for a policy on Kurds in northern Iraq (as well as Syria). Turkish policy-makers should not take it for granted that the emergence of a federated or even an independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq will harm their own vital interests. In fact, if Turkey manages to integrate northern Iraq into its economic sphere while accommodating cultural rights for Kurds within its territory, Turkey will maximize its long-term security.

Simply stated, this book analyzes majority nationalism and considers the role of elite framing in ethnic politics. It shows that a predominantly adversarial framing narrows the options of policy-makers and takes on a life of its own when it becomes entrenched in domestic alliances, public identities, and international negotiations. Adversarial framing can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, instigating actions that transform the external environment. Nonetheless, as this chapter makes clear, moderates can prevent nationalist forces from monopolizing and homogenizing foreign policy discourse. For example, peacemakers successfully transformed the symbolic landscape of Greek-Turkish relations following the 1999 earthquakes in the two countries. This positive transformation took place immediately after the 1998 Öcalan/PKK crisis and despite the presence of hardliners in major leadership positions.
Furthermore, the four cases presented in this chapter show how societies can address issues of victimhood, reconciliation, and trust without necessarily relying on ripe moments and comprehensive political settlements. Breakthroughs can be achieved even when actors have minimal expectations following crises and the derailment of the peace processes. As Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) argue in their critique of legalism in international politics, adopting pragmatic approaches to conflict regulation can be critical in such cases. Even least promising times for a settlement could be suitable for introducing gradual steps in confidence-building aiming to serve as the catalyst for later settlement. Such periods also allow for constructive experimentation and the use of innovative frames and ideas in mediations. In short, carefully designed steps could initiate the positive transformation of a peace process and build confidence in subsequent stages of mediation.

A final question is whether the major financial and refugee crises surrounding the region could create opportunities for conflict transformation. Conventional wisdom is somewhat pessimistic, noting for instance that future Greek governments will lack the time and energy for peace initiatives, given the angry protestors, nervous international markets, and dwindling popularity. Yet as the sovereign debt crisis illustrates, postponing solutions to problems can have dire consequences, as these problems will resurface when least expected and under even more difficult conditions. Like economic crises, foreign policy crises can reappear when nations are ill prepared to take positive actions. Even worse, the two can occur simultaneously.

In a more optimistic scenario, the ability to turn crises into opportunities for peace could become a positive feature of the region. As shown in the Greek-Turkish earthquake diplomacy, strong public engagement can legitimize peace and defeat the hawkish voices accusing moderates of selling out. And as the positive orientation of confidence-building measures makes abundantly clear, grassroots movements could make an invaluable addition to the peace process. The conclusion of this book revisits the theme of conflict transformation, also pointing to the role of political institutions in enabling better citizen engagement—for instance, advocating a more proportional electoral system for Turkey and the Kurdish issue, whose progress it compares with Bulgaria's treatment of minority Turks. Other grassroots possibilities include the introduction of civic forums, for instance on the name "Macedonia," with both political and civil society leaders represented from the two countries. By the same token, an East-West forum could initiate discussions on Greek-Turkish affairs. To be
successful, such a forum would require a strong popular mandate and should include representatives of political parties and influential citizens from all sides. Leaders might not be able to secure an agreement on any one issue alone, but active citizens representing a wide spectrum of political and civic organizations would be in a position to work toward a more secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On this later point, active citizenship in Cyprus during the 2015 peace mediations provides a relevant inspiration. When in September 2014, bicomunal negotiations reached an end point after a Turkish frigate started seismic surveys in the Cypriot exclusive economic zone, peace activists did not cease their efforts. Unlike cases covered in the following chapter where civil society and religious institutions sided with nationalism, in Cyprus peace activists saw an opportunity in the crisis to seek alternatives in an attempt to reframe the Cypriot peace process. The period preceding the election of Mustafa Akinci was accompanied by an unprecedented level of social movement activity in terms of bicomunal events and networking as well as the production of new peace ideas and images. These included a new dialogue forum among the island’s religious authorities, the preservation of historical monuments, the reunification of the soccer federations, collaboration on electricity and telecommunications through the chambers of commerce, and finally dedicated international conferences on resolving the Cyprus problem, some of which included George Papandreou himself and other international figures. Importantly, bicomunal groups in the island have become increasingly more professionalized after decades of joint activities across the divide.

Interestingly, Mustafa Akinci and his wife Meral have supported peace initiatives since the 1970s and through bicomunal networks have managed to gain the respect and trust of the Greek Cypriot community. Likewise, Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades has managed to stabilize the Cypriot economy after a near bankruptcy in 2013 and to challenge hardliners in his community while engaging in unilateral gestures of reconciliation after Akinci’s election. At the symbolic level a peace settlement in Cyprus will be as transformative for the Eastern Mediterranean as the reunification of Germany in 1990 for Central and Eastern Europe. Even months after his election, Akinci and Anastasiades have made decisive steps toward a peace agreement; unsurprisingly, 2015 when this book was published, was termed as ‘the year of Cyprus’, a potentially inspiring example for the entire region at troubled times.
Following the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, Garret FitzGerald, an Irish politician who served twice as Taoiseach (head of government) of his country, wrote a letter to the *Irish Times* suggesting that his country’s policy on British security concerns might provide a lesson for Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili. While acknowledging that all sovereign states are equal, FitzGerald argued that it is wise for small states geographically situated beside larger ones to ensure that their foreign policies do not pose a threat to their neighbors. He contrasted Saakashvili with Irish leader Éamon de Valera, who, as early as 1920, explicitly assured Britain about the foreign policy of a future independent Irish state. Ireland’s commitment to British security allowed it to preserve a relationship despite the partition of the island and to later use relations within Europe and bilateral ties (including a civic forum set up by FitzGerald) to promote a peace settlement in Northern Ireland. In his letter, FitzGerald comments: “By allowing emotion rather than reason, nationalism rather than statecraft, to govern his actions, the Georgian leader has now unwittingly set back his country’s cause—probably for many years in the future” (FitzGerald 2008: 14). FitzGerald’s words resonate today, equally relevant to Ukraine in 2014 and more broadly applicable to persistent failures in anticipating ethnopolitical crises in world politics.

Chapter 6 examines the variations, timing, and conditions fostering nationalist mobilizations in post–cold war Europe (or, rather, some parts of it). In the previous chapters, I emphasized the role of contentious ethnic politics and introduced a framework for understanding the origins of nationalist mobilizations. Especially interesting are those cases in which conditions are unfavorable or grievances manageable through dialogue and compromise. Majorities,
defined in demographic and political terms, are usually not subject to the repression or marginalization commonly associated with mobilization of minority nationalist sentiment. Admittedly, security concerns, whether “perceived or real,” are also common to majorities threatened by secessionism, political violence, or military intervention by third countries, as suggested here by the Georgian and Ukrainian cases. Mobilization, contention, and protest are certainly easy options, but unlike oppressed minorities—who frequently opt for conflict or violence—dominant state majorities have a voice, international recognition, and, arguably, political alternatives.

COMPARING GREECE AND TURKEY WITH THEIR POSTCOMMUNIST NEIGHBORS

This chapter summarizes the previous case studies and extends the findings to three new ethnopolitical crises involving Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. To demonstrate the commonalities and cross-linkages across alternative theoretical perspectives, Chapter 6 revisits the literatures of nationalism, political violence, and social movements, focusing on the dilemmas facing majorities when they opt for peace initiatives or for destructive forms of ethnic nationalism. Following the framework developed earlier in this book, it examines the conditions or constraints shaping nationalist protest, the institutions and mobilizing structures supporting it, and the framing processes around which nationalist action is perceived and acted out. In particular, the framing process is shown to be a critical aspect of majority nationalist mobilization. Through framing, various interpretative schemata propagate a magnified or even distorted image of opportunities and grievances. This chapter also demonstrates how the advancement of popular myths about a nation's perceived entitlements and deprivations are a critical part of framing majority nationalism in postcommunist transitions. Finally, as shown earlier in Greece and Turkey, through framing, nationalists downplay the constraints and risks associated with their own hardline policies while exaggerating the risks associated with the “perceived provocations” of ethnic antagonists.

The theoretical framework presented in previous chapters can be applied to the Greek mobilization over the name “Macedonia” in 1992 and the 1998 protests in Turkey over the support Syria and Italy offered to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This chapter summarizes these two cases and notes their implications for the broader literature. It goes on to apply the theoretical findings to three new cases from the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe: the
Serbian protests over the status of Kosovo in 1987, the Georgian mobilization against its breakaway territories leading to the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, and the Ukrainian revolution of February 2014, ending with the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych and Russian's military interventions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Interestingly, when this chapter compares the postcommunist cases of majority nationalism to those explored earlier for Greece and Turkey, there are significant differences in the socioeconomic conditions, military/security settings, political systems, and levels of democratization. Yet all cases experienced moments of extreme ethnic mobilizations in the post–cold war era. Moreover, expressions of majority nationalism included mass demonstrations, hate speech, repressive legislation targeting ethnic antagonists, support for nationalist politicians and parties, and popular commercial embargoes against ethnic antagonists and their "sympathizers."

NATIONS AND NATIONALISM
IN POSTCOMMUNIST TRANSITIONS

The field of nationalism owes much to Eastern European and post-Soviet studies in terms of its development over the past few decades. But to what extent and how does the existing literature deal with nationalism and contemporary nationalist manifestations in Eastern Europe itself? For the most part, the literature has developed in the direction of debating the history and origins of modern nations, failing to account adequately for the evolutionary nature of nationalism. As discussed earlier in this book, constructivist approaches stress the novel character of nations and identify the origins of nationalism in the industrial needs of modern society, print capitalism, or other functional requirements of the modern state, including its capacity to wage war. Alternative approaches employ the primordial paradigm and hold that modern nations are more likely to emerge from premodern ethnic ties (Stack 1986; Smith 1981). Yet neither approach addresses the timing, intensity, or evolution of contemporary nationalist mobilizations, particularly among those groups that completed their nation-building processes at least a century ago.

Although driven by events in the past few decades, particularly the collapse of the former Soviet bloc, the literature makes little contribution to the understanding of contemporary nationalist mobilizations. Especially when applied to post–cold war mobilizations, the primordial paradigm has little analytical merit. While the emphasis on premodern identifications implies the continuity of ethnic and primordial hatreds that can be reactivated under favorable con-
dictions (Stack 1986), the “ancient hatred” thesis has gained little academic acceptance, with case studies revealing its analytical weakness as an ad hoc theory of nationalist mobilizations. Critics point out that modern conflicts stem from recently constructed political ideologies rather than “ancient hatred” (Banac 1992; Ramet 2006). Further, the cases discussed in this chapter demonstrate that deep nationalist or ethnic feelings may not lead to conflict, while weak and overlapping ethnic cleavages can sometimes trigger deadly ethnic violence.

In the aftermath of the cold war, nationalism was seen as a sign of postcommunist politics, with elites quickly working to manipulate a civil society seeking alternatives. Gellner (1994) argues that civil society forces were slow to organize, while ethnic nationalist sentiment was all too readily mobilizable. Manipulative leaders, mainly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, played the “communal card” to sustain their fading authority, and, in the absence of alternative sources of legitimation, nationalism emerged as an ideal candidate to fill the ideological vacuum of postcommunist politics (Hall 1998: 15–16).

Yet Gellner’s reasoning does not explain the vagaries, timing, and variability of nationalist mobilizations, nor does it apply to all postcommunist states. While nationalists might have won elections in some places, a number of elections have led to victories by moderate parties, as demonstrated in recent studies, for instance, on Bulgaria (Koinova 2013), Tatarstan (Faller 2011), or Hungary and Romania (Stroschein 2012). Why have people followed nationalist leaders in some countries and not others? Was nationalism simply the by-product of the transition from communism or the result of shifting opportunities and new uncertainties associated with the end of the cold war? If nationalism was only a phenomenon of the decaying communist regimes, why and how have extreme nationalist politics dominated many neighboring areas of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union?

Although important, Gellner’s argument on civil society and mobilization of nationalist sentiment has limitations. There is no doubt that a vibrant civil society can impede the spread of nationalistic perceptions. However, many studies show social networks to be conducive to the revival of nationalist sentiment rather than reconciliation (Hann 1998; Snyder and Ballentine 1996; McGarry and O’Leary 2009). By way of contrast, the absence of civil society (for instance, in such places as Central Asia) has made the organization of nationalist protest and mobilization more difficult. Thus, instead of perceiving civil society movements as an alternative to nationalism, the complementarity of the two should be considered, particularly their mutually reinforcing nature.
Civil society groups have often made a choice to support nationalist mobilizations and have organized nationalist protests. As highlighted in previous chapters, religious institutions, business associations, and universities play an instrumental role in the mobilization process not only for peacemaking but also for conflictual policies. Newly independent media introduce interesting and novel themes that are often viewed as more trustworthy than previously state run propaganda (Snyder and Ballentine 1996). These independent sources of information make a substantial contribution to the mobilization of nationalist sentiment. For one thing, in the process of competing for a share in an emerging and competitive market, new media have a financial incentive to play the "nationalist card" (ibid.; Ellinas 2007, 2010). For another, societies in transition often lack legal and other provisions for misinformation, thus allowing hate speech to contribute to the propagation of nationalist sentiments.\footnote{11}

As emphasized earlier, a major theoretical innovation of this book is its attempt to marry the literatures of nationalism and contentious politics conventionally seen as indifferent, even antithetical, to each other. In this endeavor, I hypothesize framing as a critical variable in the mobilization of majority nationalism. Shifts in political opportunities and means available to nationalists are significant, but not decisive, without the appropriate frames of opportunities and means. Grievances per se are instrumental, but unless they are strategically presented as intolerable, nationalist sentiment will not be activated. What matters is not only the strength or objectivity of grievances but also perceptions of grievances and their framing in the public sphere. In all cases discussed in this chapter, the processes of conceiving the security, fairness, and efficacy of nationalist mobilization are comparable, while structural factors, particularly the economic or political dimensions conventionally associated with nationalism, play a less dominant role.

**CASE JUSTIFICATION AND RATIONALE**

During the cold war, Southeast Europe was one of the most divided parts of the world, as countries joined either the Soviet or NATO camp or the Non-Aligned Movement. Greece and Turkey became part of NATO, with the former distancing itself from the alliance after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Bulgaria and Romania were members of the Soviet camp, but the latter retained some nominal independence on foreign policy affairs. Georgia was one of the Soviet republics, and Stalin had a Georgian ethnic background (Suny 1994). Ukraine was also a Soviet republic and historically the battleground of
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<th>Religious and Ethnic Cleavages</th>
<th>Incorporation into Western Institutions</th>
<th>Security and Military Advantage</th>
<th>Heterogeneity (Demography)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia (1987)</td>
<td>Communist/ open to the West until 1989</td>
<td>Orthodox/ main target Muslim Albanians</td>
<td>Little but much better than Soviet bloc</td>
<td>Access to Yugoslavia’s weakening military gives Serbs narrow “window of opportunity”</td>
<td>High (embracing the Yugoslav multinational model until 1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (1992)</td>
<td>Social Democratic/ closed to industry (slow growth rates and crisis prone)</td>
<td>Orthodox/ targeted Slav Macedonians (also Orthodox)</td>
<td>Member of NATO and EU</td>
<td>Greece will continue to be militarily superior (FYROM could be furthered weakened because of Albanian rebellion)</td>
<td>Low (prevalence in the twentieth century of nation-state ideology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (1998)</td>
<td>Capitalist/ developing (high growth rates but facing chronic crises)</td>
<td>Muslim/ main target also Sunni Muslim Kurds</td>
<td>Member of NATO and applicant for the EU</td>
<td>Turkey will continue to be militarily superior but could face casualties as a result of PKK violence</td>
<td>High (prevalence in the twentieth century of nation-state ideology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (2008)</td>
<td>Postcommunist and open to the West after 1991</td>
<td>Orthodox/ Main target group (Orthodox) Abkhaz and S. Ossetians</td>
<td>Committed in joining NATO and the EU</td>
<td>Georgia cannot challenge the Russian military but could safeguard further aggression after NATO entry</td>
<td>High (embracing Soviet multinational model until 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine (2014)</td>
<td>Postcommunist/ open to both Western and Russian influences since 1991</td>
<td>Mostly Orthodox/ targeted Russians (also Orthodox and Slavic)</td>
<td>Divided on whether to join NATO and the EU</td>
<td>Ukraine cannot challenge the Russian military but could safeguard further aggression after NATO entry</td>
<td>High (embracing Soviet multinational model until 1991 and with extensive rights to minorities since then)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the czarist, Hapsburg, Polish, and Ottoman empires. Finally, Yugoslavia and
Cyprus were members of the Non-Aligned Movement, while Albania became
a close ally of the People's Republic of China. Not surprisingly, then, the end
of the cold war meant major shifts of power and opportunities in the region.
These shifts were so sudden that people understandably had difficulties un-
derstanding and adjusting to the conditions and constraints of the new era.
Further complicating the issue was the historical record of the region, with
multiple and conflicting interpretations of events over the past few centuries.
As noted in Chapter 2, rival narratives are latent sources of new grievances and
contentious ethnic politics.

To sum up, the region features few successful cases of political accommoda-
tion, and examples of liberal nation-building are similarly limited. In the
absence of a successful regional model to address mutual grievances, the analo-
gies drawn to describe a nation's past or its immediate region have generally
(mis)informed political debates. Events in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the
Caucasus provide an excellent opportunity to study how grievances are rein-
vigorated or invented under conditions of shifting opportunities. As Table 6.1
below suggests, opportunities resulting from external institutions and domestic
sociopolitical factors, as well as cleavages, military factors, and demography,
differ in each of the cases; however, outcomes on majority mobilization are
comparable.

Based on Table 6.1, the chapter's methodology draws specifically on con-
trolled comparison and process tracing theories (King et al. 1994; Van Evera
1997). In controlled comparisons, the investigator explores paired observations
in two or more cases, asking if values on the pairs are congruent or incongru-
ent with the test theory's predictions. Through the method of agreement, cases
with different characteristics of and similar values in the study variable (for
eexample, majority nationalism) are selected. The purpose is to identify other
cases in which the independent variable is particularly salient. As mentioned
above, the independent (that is, explanatory) variable used here is the fram-
ing process through which people come to believe in the importance, fairness,
and efficacy of nationalist action. Therefore, the chapter examines framing pro-
cesses across all cases.

The chapter introduces an additional methodological innovation by com-
bining historical comparative analysis with process tracing. What is particu-
larly interesting in this comparison is that the five cases of majority nationalism
are sequential and potentially interlinked: Serbia (1987), Greece (1992), Turkey (1998), Georgia (2008), and Ukraine (2014).

Conventional wisdom assumes an element of prior elite cross-learning in regional politics in avoiding the devastating mistakes of neighboring countries. Following this line of thought, each subsequent episode of majority nationalism could be described as “less likely” to occur, and as cited earlier, Lijphart (1968: 2) argues that “least likely” cases have considerable theoretical significance (see also Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007). Deviant cases of nationalist transformation in this chapter are those occurring in regional environments where nationalism has clearly demonstrated its more destructive tendencies. Yet cross-country lessons were not learned. In each case, hardliners have monopolized public discourse and adversarial framing has overcome significant constraints to mobilize nationalist sentiment.

CASES COMPARED: SERBIAN NATIONALISM 1987

Slobodan Milošević electrified Serbia and foreshadowed the devastating Balkan wars when in 1987 he responded to a crowd of Serbs protesting their mistreatment by Kosovo Albanians by saying: “No one is allowed to beat you!” (Judah 2002: 56). As we saw earlier in Greece and Turkey, Serbian society became attuned to the type of nationalist rhetoric epitomized in Milošević’s exclamation through a process of precrisis framing dominating the nation’s public discourse. Several accounts on the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia highlight, for instance, the role of the “Memorandum of the Serbian Academy,” which set the stage for Serbian nationalism challenging the ideological basis of the “ethnically benevolent” communist regime (Banac 1992; Meier 1999; Judah 2002).

Not surprisingly, Milošević’s coming to power created new political opportunities for nationalist contention. There were massive demonstrations all over Serbia, with the most impressive occurring in Kosovo during celebrations for the six hundredth anniversary of a famous battle; reports estimated that a million Serbs were in attendance (Judah 2002: 56). Giant rallies were supported by such influential institutions as the Communist Party of Serbia and the Orthodox Church, which aligned to support the “interests of the nation.” Popular opinion, at least in the early phases of the Yugoslav crisis, endorsed Milošević and his tough-resolve policies, as was evident in the media, opinion polls, and the memoirs of foreign diplomats. The public tolerated, even supported, repressive policies against Albanians, such as the suspension of Kosovo’s autonomy.
Yet multiple factors in the history and contemporary politics of the former Yugoslavia should have prevented nationalist contention and violence. Post–World War II Yugoslavia was committed to federal multiculturalism under the guiding principle of “brotherhood and unity” (Petrović and Stefanović 2010). Unlike many other conflict-driven societies, the former Yugoslavia was a federation, with institutional channels for containing nationalist sentiment. Moreover, its citizens enjoyed greater freedom and prosperity than did the citizens of most communist countries in Eastern Europe. Yugoslav society was more open to the West, and its citizens studied, traveled in, and traded with Western European countries (Banac 1992; Woodward 1995). For its part, Western Europe had a vital interest in maintaining peace in the Balkans, as potentially deadly civil wars could strike at the heart of Europe. Opinion makers in Western Europe and the United States drew their own past analogies from World War I, which had started in Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{15}

In fact, the origins of the Yugoslav crisis can be traced to the 1920s and the failure to establish an equitable relationship between Serbs and other nationalities. Using the term “flawed unification,” Banac (1984: 13) argues that Yugoslavia failed to meet the promise of its intellectual founding fathers. This was particularly true in interwar Yugoslavia, originally called the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenses,” an inclusive name that nonetheless ignored the presence of ethnic Albanians. According to Ramet, its component peoples “came to the kingdom with rather different expectations and for different reasons” (2006: 37). Croats and Slovenes sought security, aligning with the new kingdom to protect themselves from further territorial losses to Italy but also hoping for a (con)federal constitution (ibid.; Posen 1993). However, Serbian elites adopted a strict form of centralism within the new state, monopolizing key posts and assuming political, economic, and cultural hegemony.

It would be an exaggeration to say that in the Serbian mindset of the 1990s, Yugoslavia was still framed as an extension of the Great Serbia project initiated after World War I. At the same time, Serbs felt increasingly marginalized and deprived of their national rights.\textsuperscript{16} Peace alternatives were undermined as each federal or state-building project in the country fell short of balancing regional/federal autonomy with national solidarity. Federalism was associated with violations of human rights instead of safeguarding those across ethnic lines. To explain this perception, we need to look at the post–World War II period, when the Tito regime reversed previous injustices, thus marginalizing Serbs, particularly in Kosovo. While in the early decades of Tito’s rule, Kosovo
remained partly under Serbian control, in 1974 it was granted self-government, forcing the exodus of the minority Serb population (Judah 2002). In the classical Serbian view, then, the land of Kosovo was “overwhelmingly Serb until barely a few generations back” (ibid.: 2), a view opposed by Albanians citing their own Illyrian connections (ibid.). For their part, Serbs opposed Kosovo Albanian dominance, citing the horrendous crimes committed against their ethnic kin during the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia, events silenced by the communists (Carmichael 2003).

Arguably, among the strongest symbols to revitalize virulent Serbian nationalism in the former Yugoslavia were the televised exhumations and reburials of World War II victims of genocide (Denich 1994: 382). While these crimes deserved attention and recognition, their sudden exploitation made Serbian society vulnerable to nationalist rhetoric.

Inasmuch as there was no reliable mechanism to address past grievances, Serbian fears and sense of victimization were exaggerated and aligned with present conditions (for example, the extent to which Albanians were using terror to systematically force Serbs to abandon Kosovo). Ethnic activists also appropriated the discontent over the failure of the communist system to deliver the expected social benefits and played on public insecurities during the transition (Stefanovic 2005, 2008a).

The experience of the Balkans and other crisis-prone parts of the world suggests that people preserve strong memories of ethnic rivalry over generations, even when regimes aim to eradicate those memories, as in Tito’s Yugoslavia (Kaufman 1996; Gagnon 1994; Millas 2001). Perceived marginalization and fear were tied to earlier historical experiences. As emphasized in the “Memorandum of the Serbian Academy,” there was strong opposition against turning Serbia into marginalized and victimized republic within the Yugoslav Federation. In its framing, grievances across economic, institutional, and ethnic issues were aligned: “The long-term lagging behind of Serbia’s economic development, unregulated legal relations with Yugoslavia and the provinces, as well as the genocide in Kosovo have all appeared on the political scene with a combined force that is making the situation tense if not explosive” (Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences 1986). Since the Serbian “imagined entitlement” stemming from medieval and contemporary historical narratives was set higher than what Yugoslavia provided, subsequent deprivation was a major bone of contention.

As demonstrated earlier, public memories are often institutionalized to
serve contemporary political agendas; in both Greece and Turkey (not to men-
tion the two communities of Cyprus), the state has played a central role in
maintaining rivalries, especially in public education (Koulouri 2002; Vural and
Özuyanık 2008). This does not mean that ancient hatred drives contemporary
politics; rather, actors make political choices based on emotions and in re-
response to publicly popularized symbols, aiming to arouse feelings of anger and
aggression (Kaufman 2001: 29).

Besides ethnic grievances, economic failures played an important role in
mobilizing national sentiment. Tito’s Yugoslavia not only failed to protect re-
gional minorities but also prevented the integration of the economies of its six
republics and two provinces. Woodward (1995) provides an extensive analysis
of the failures of the Yugoslav economic model, particularly in addressing un-
employment, while Lampe (2000) emphasizes the interplay between the debt
crisis and Yugoslavia’s dysfunctional decision-making process at the federal
level. Moreover, in the former Yugoslavia, each constituent state was guided, for
the most part, into self-sufficiency in terms of outputs and infrastructure; for
instance, investment by the richer Slovenia in the poorer Kosovo was discour-
gaged, since exploiting cheaper labor markets was seen as violating the commu-
nist doctrine (Stefanovic 2008b). Deprived of the benefits of economic interde-
pendence, Yugoslav federalism offered a perverse incentive for each republic to
manage its own financial crisis independently.

In Kosovo, these issues, although seemingly unrelated to ethnic politics,
were appropriated to advocate nationalist action among the Serbs. The pos-
sibility for cooperation was underestimated, and the opportunity for renego-
tiating a “fair” solution with the moderate Albanian leadership of the time was
ignored. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there was no readily available example of
successful or relatively successful accommodation in interwar Yugoslavia,
the Balkans, or the broader post-Ottoman region for Serbia and Kosovo (or
the other republics) to use during those critical times. In addition, a generally
felt sense of impunity prevented the public from recognizing that nationalist
action might have serious domestic and international implications. The “new
genocide in Kosovo” frame monopolized public discourse and fostered support
for the Milošević regime (Petrović and Stefanović 2010). Through miscalcu-
lations of possible constraints and successful framing of grievances and op-
portunities, the Serbian public became convinced of the fairness, efficacy, and
importance of taking nationalist action in Kosovo.
GREEK NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS:
FRAMING THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN 1992

[FYROM’s president] Gligorov will soon regret what he says and what he does. I hope that our allies and partners will eventually understand that there is only one Macedonia and this is Greek. (Greek PM Konstantinos Karamanlis, with tears in his eyes, 1992)¹⁷

Given the preceding discussion of the Serbian case, the unusual intensity of Greek mobilization over the Macedonian issue presented in Chapter 3 is puzzling for a number of reasons. Unlike its postcommunist neighbors, Greece was well integrated into European security and political institutions by the early 1990s; it joined NATO in 1954 and has been a member of the EU since the early 1980s. Despite its Western orientation, Greece has maintained friendly relations with Serbia; many Greek and Serb commentators referred to Serbian-Greek brotherhood to highlight the alliance of the two brother-nations.¹⁸ Because of these ties the coverage of the Balkan wars was extensive, and attention could be drawn to prevent further escalations. Specifically—as demonstrated in the confidential Tzounis memo that reframed FYR Macedonia as a “geopolitical gift”—Greek political elites had valid reasons to avoid jumping into what was seen at the time as the next Balkan quagmire. Moreover, Greek society included strong liberal, leftist, and antinationalist civil groups; democratic elections began in 1974; last but by no means least, throughout the 1990s it enjoyed a relatively high standard of living compared with its Balkan neighbors. Thus, conditions usually associated with the spread of nationalist sentiment in the region—such as lack of incorporation into Western institutions, economic deprivation, and transition to democracy—fail to explain the Greek nationalist mobilization over the name “Macedonia.”

It could be debated whether strong grievances, fear, or opportunities were the determinants of mobilization. Although it is hard to measure grievances, Greeks were not the only ones aggrieved about events occurring in the previous century.¹⁹ In fact, until a few generations prior, Greeks and Slav Macedonians shared some traditions and were under the same ecclesiastical authority. Added to that, the new republic was not a major security threat for Greece, since Greece had a modern NATO-trained army and the highest military expenditure per capita of all alliance members.²⁰ Finally, there had been no recent episode of violence in the region, nor any terrorist acts by ethnic Slav Macedonians against Greece, nor any threatening Slav Macedonian movement in Greek territory.²¹
Unlike most ethopolitical episodes, the object of mobilization was not territory but ownership of symbols—specifically the name “Macedonia” and the cultural heritage of the ancient Kingdom of Philip and Alexander the Great. But important cultural symbols or names are rarely a major foreign policy issue, and when such disputes erupt, they usually last for just a few weeks. A moderate nationalist position insisting on a double name for the new republic (for example, New Macedonia) would have been in line with international norms, while a compromise could have safeguarded all Greek rights to associate with the cultural property of ancient Macedonians. In addition, there were serious international constraints on adopting a hawkish nationalist position against a newly independent and vulnerable country; in fact, external political opportunities dictated a positive and stabilizing role for Greece in the Balkans.

Despite these factors, in post–cold war Greece, nationalist sentiment over the Macedonian question re-emerged in its most virulent form. Nationalist mobilizations took various forms, supported in particular by municipal authorities, the church, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The reaction was not confined to Greek state bureaucracy, but was popularized and received the backing of influential social groups, the average Greek citizen, and the Greek diaspora. Support for nationalist politicians and conflictual nationalist policies grew; the ambitious young minister of foreign affairs, Antonis Samaras, received such high approval for his policies that he felt strong enough to create a new political party and challenge the traditional political system. Besides Samaras, the majority of political figures across the political spectrum adopted the position that there is only “one Macedonia and this is Greek”—including opposition leader Andreas Papandreou and President Karamanlis, most often described as a statesman rather than a nationalist (Woodhouse 1982). As noted in Chapter 3, the Greek public supported two embargoes against the new republic and endorsed a popular commercial embargo against products from “unfriendly” European Union countries. Finally, the Greek public participated in massive demonstrations such as the February 14, 1992, demonstration in Thessaloniki, in which approximately 1 million people demanded that the neighboring state should not be recognized with any name that included “Macedonia.”

What accounts for Greek popular participation in nationalist mobilization and protest? In this case, in mobilizing nationalist sentiment, grievances and fears were exaggerated, opportunities and constraints were misperceived, and unrelated themes were introduced and appropriated by ethnic activists. The Greek public reacted with a feeling of self-victimization that drew from a va-
riety of historical events, such as Bulgarian atrocities in Greek Macedonia and Turkish massacres of ethnic Greeks in Anatolia. Those issues, although not artificially constructed, were artificially related to the protest over Macedonia. Self-victimization was used to mobilize different segments of the population, manipulating public feelings of security and denying the legitimacy and importance of crimes committed by the Greek state against others, especially ethnic Macedonians.

The intentions of the Republic of Macedonia were also misperceived, as most Greek sources automatically related the "appropriation" of the name "Macedonia" to irredentist policies, not to the inevitable need of a new state to define itself. The argument that ethnic Macedonians had nothing to do with the region and were not eligible for the name won the uncritical support of ordinary Greeks whose feelings of justice, national ownership, and honor were violated. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of Greeks had no or very little knowledge of the former Yugoslav Macedonia, thus making Greek society extremely vulnerable to manipulation.

At the same time, conspiracy frameworks provided "meaningful explanations" of the shifting conditions and provoked public reaction. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the so-called foreign arch theory framed an aligned Turkey (and Bulgaria) with "Slav Macedonian irredentism" in a plan to challenge Greek sovereignty and borders in Greek Macedonia and Western Thrace.

Through a combination of frames, then, the Macedonian issue was seen as manageable, important, and worth fighting for. There was a feeling of optimism that Greece could easily deal with the issue. Greece's newly independent neighbor was seen as weak and almost ready to submit to Greek positions or break apart as a result of Bulgarian, Serbian, and Albanian aggression. Finally, there was a feeling of euphoria following a few positive yet ambiguous decisions for Greece in international forums, particularly in late 1991 (Skylakakis 1995). As Karamanlis's comment (cited above) implies, Greek membership in Western institutions led to unfulfilled expectations of European and US support on the issue. The Republic of Macedonia was seen as a vulnerable state, and the Greek public underestimated the extent to which its own actions could provoke an international backlash, wrongly assuming favorable international conditions.
FIGHTING KURDS IN SYRIA AND ITALY:
TURKEY’S 1998 MOBILIZATION

The Turkish army is decisive, hardworking, knowledgeable and well-organized. If we decide to go to Syria, the Turkish military would enter from one side and exit from another. (DYP MP and former "OHAL" governor Hayri Kozakçıoğlu, 1998)²⁸

Turkish mobilizations on the Kurdish issue in 1998–99 were comparable in form and origins to those in Greece over Macedonia. In fact, the Turkish politics of majority nationalism almost led to a war with Syria in September 1998, culminating in massive street protests after November 15, 1998, when Öcalan was arrested in Italy. During Öcalan’s days in Italy a wave of protest surged through Turkey, accompanied by a popular commercial embargo against Italian products and the cancellation of Italian tours to Turkey. Strong nationalist sentiments were voiced against other countries that “sympathized” with the PKK, while Kurdish or other voices defending Öcalan were suppressed. Following the military ultimatum against Syria, the fate of Öcalan became the major political issue and dominated the April 1999 elections that ended in victory for nationalist-minded parties.³⁰

The Turkish mobilization was unexpected for a number of reasons. As mentioned in Chapter 4, it occurred at a time of declining PKK activity and significant prospects for reconciliation. It was directed first against an unpredictable Middle Eastern neighbor and then against a European country, Italy, with which Turkey had had traditionally very good ties, no past hostility, and common EU interests. NATO’s intervention against Serbia in Kosovo had occurred only months earlier. Therefore, Turkey had valid reasons to avoid international publicity on an issue that resembled Kosovo in multiple respects.³¹ Another interesting factor is the common religion shared by Kurds and Turks, who are mostly Sunni Muslims; perhaps not surprisingly, following the other cases, sharing the same faith did not provide an alternative basis for legitimization and reconciliation.³² Moreover, although Turkish soldiers were killed in clashes with the PKK, Kurdish nationalism or particularism and its supporters historically suffered more (McDowall 1997; Romano and Gurses 2014). Finally, mobilization took place in an environment that had previously tried not to recognize ethnic particularities and attempted to assimilate—not antagonize—ethnic minorities.

The origins and processes of mobilizing nationalist sentiment were like those in Greece and Serbia. Through the alignment of various frames, the
Turkish public felt aggrandized, threatened, and capable of taking nationalist action. Italy’s refusal to extradite Öcalan to Turkey struck at the heart of Turkish nationalism. It raised questions of whether Turkey’s inaction would allow the PKK to internationalize the Kurdish issue in Europe and attract popular support from Europeans and ethnic Kurds in Turkey. Italian policies were seen as illegitimate, grounded on perceptions that Öcalan and the PKK carried the exclusive responsibility for the twenty-five-year rebellion in Southeast Turkey (Kurdistan) and the killing of thirty thousand people. In particular, reaction was centered on the perceived support a “terrorist” was receiving from a Western government and a NATO ally.

The negation of Kurdish nationalism was also instrumental in provoking conspiracy theories. If a feeling of particularism or separatism was not popular among the Kurds, then “third others”—Greeks, Russians, Syrians, Cypriots, and Europeans—were forming conspiracies against Turkey. In addition, previous successful mobilizations—for example, against France on its recognition of the Armenian genocide, along with perceptions of Turkish military superiority and the country’s geopolitical importance to the West—allowed perceptions of favorable opportunities to dominate the public discourse. The Kozakçıoğlu quotation opening this section arguably reflects a supercilious feeling of impunity prevalent in the Turkish political and bureaucratic establishment at the time. Yet as demonstrated earlier, in Table 4.1, the long-standing belief in the superiority of the Turkish military was backed by “successes” in earlier crises in Cyprus (1974), Bulgaria (1987), Greece (1987, 1996), and Iraq (1995). In each case, Turkey had either effectively employed military force or threatened its use; each subsequent “success” in foreign policy made the public framing opportunities for confrontation more attractive.

Finally, through the framing process, a number of other issues, including religious themes and corruption, were aligned to nationalism. Before the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) attempted to incorporate Islam within the major tenets of Turkish nationalism, successfully targeting conservative voters in central Anatolia. For instance, following its electoral triumph in April 1999, the leader of the party, Devlet Bahçeli, argued that “every individual in that region [Southeast Turkey] should be considered as given by Allah to the Turkish nation’s safekeeping.” Equally important was how the MHP interpreted the pressing problems of corruption in Turkish politics by associating these with the loss of Turkish national sentiment (Turkish Daily News 1999a: 4). In a report preceding the elections ti-
tled "Fight against Corruption," the MHP emphasized the "political and moral deterioration in Turkey" and criticized those "placing the personal benefits in front of national benefits." By engaging in religious rhetoric or describing the fight against corruption as a "necessity of MHP nationalism," the MHP aligned new themes with its successful 1999 campaign (ibid.). In Turkey, as elsewhere, through the alignment of various seemingly unrelated frames, popular support for nationalism and participation in ethnic politics grew.

FROM THE ROSE REVOLUTION TO THE 2008 RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN WAR

Basically, we are talking about a few hundred Russian soldiers and officers with some old fashioned tanks—metal scrap equipment—that are useless for Russian security. . . . They have symbolic importance to bolster imperial self-confidence of some people in Moscow. Why we are worried by [this], however, is that it is a good framework for any potential future intervention in Georgia. And I hope [Russian] President [Vladimir] Putin is not contemplating any of that. (Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, 2004)\(^6\)

In the summer of 2008, as billions of people watched the stunning opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, Russia and Georgia entered a devastating five-day war. The pro-Western government of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili "responded to the attacks of secessionists" in the tiny enclave of South Ossetia by seeking to retake its breakaway territory through military force (King 2008). Russia, which had supported the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for more than a decade, retaliated with a full-scale invasion of Georgia. The war led to thousands of dead, a military humiliation for Saakashvili, and hundreds of thousands displaced. It ended only after the active involvement of French president Nicolas Sarkozy (Asmus 2010: 196–210). The five-day war, which also brought Russia and the United States to the lowest point in their bilateral relationship since the 1990s, is another good example of the potency of majority nationalism in the post–cold war era.

Formally, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are parts of the Republic of Georgia. However, starting in the early 1990s, the two regions fought to secede from the newly independent nation. Russia was invited to enforce the truce, but Georgians generally resent their neighbor's infringement of their territorial sovereignty. Adding to the confrontation, Russia granted its own passports to the residents of the two regions who opted to refrain from having any contact with Georgian authorities. Meanwhile, the Republic of Georgia faced in-
creasing economic turmoil, leading to massive demonstrations, civil disobedience, and the “Rose Revolution,” which brought Saakashvili to power in 2004 (Wheatley 2005). More specifically, Saakashvili led these mobilizations on an anticorruption and pro-Western platform, advocating membership in NATO and the European Union. His opposition to Russia proved to be a very effective electoral formula; he tapped into an early popular consensus among majority Georgians, winning the election with an impressive 96.24 percent of the vote. 37

At the same time, the rise of ethnic nationalism in Georgia further alienated its breakaway republics. In 2006, South Ossetians voted for independence in an unofficial referendum, and in 2008, Russia took a number of steps to increase its ties with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Admittedly, Georgian resentment of its territorial partition is not uncommon (O’Leary 2007; Ker-Lindsay 2012). Opposing parties are rarely capable of transcending hegemonic frames in which territorial control has become integral to their national identity (Lustick 1993; Haklai 2007). Nonetheless, Georgians had arguably better options than engaging in a self-defeating military confrontation. Although the two breakaway entities demonstrated an intransigent position for decades, a decentralized and potentially asymmetrically federal Georgia could have become a possibility through gradual confidence-building measures (Wheatley 2005; Ker-Lindsay 2012). In interviews that colleagues and I held in Tbilisi in November 2013, opposition figures advocating federalism told me how they were marginalized in the early phases of the conflict; this was so salient that even the moderate camp avoided discussions of federalism, preferring “confidence-building measures” and “policies of engagement without formal state recognition.” 38

At the time the Georgian government was interested in lessons from Cyprus. Yet, as demonstrated in the latter’s case, the federal option could have won allies across the division and reopened the prospect of reintegrating the breakaway regions with Georgia. For one thing, sooner or later Russia was likely to support some kind of political accommodation, as the country faced its own secessionist claims across the border in North Caucasus (King 2008). For another, Russia and Georgia share a history of trade relations, diaspora networks, and common religion that could have provided the basis for a mutually beneficial and constructive relationship (Suny 1994: 331). Admittedly, however, while religious ties are generally seen as important, as the Macedonian naming and the Kurdish issues suggest, they do not usually prevent confrontation.

Simply stated, majority nationalism in Georgia was driven by territorial
grievances and initially aligned with economic problems and corruption, but mobilization and confrontation occurred because Saakashvili proffered a credible opportunity frame. For one thing, the Columbia University–educated leader managed to project an image of Western support that included generous financial aid and imports of military equipment from the United States. In the words of a former US diplomat, “Saakashvili soon became a poster child for the Bush administration’s ‘freedom agenda’ and democracy promotion efforts” (Asmus 2010: 58). Besides having the perceived “unconditional support” of the West, Saakashvili set a precedent when Adjara, another breakaway region in the south, reintegrated with Georgia. Through a series of ultimatums and mass protests, Saakashvili forced the pro-Russian leadership to resign in 2004 and the Russian fleet to abandon its base in Batumi three years later (George 2008; Katz 2008).

When Saakashvili argued in 2004 that Russia’s military presence in his country consisted of “metal scrap equipment,” he likely had no doubts about the efficacy of a tough-resolve approach. Subsequent events in Adjara solidified those perceptions despite international influences at the time. Arguably, the military confrontation could have been avoided, given Georgia’s desire to join the EU and NATO. Conventional wisdom would assume that elite socialization through international organizations would foster positive attitudes toward peace. Moreover, the Republic of Georgia could have capitalized on its connection with Russia through its large diaspora in Moscow, significant commercial incentives for cooperation on both sides, and ongoing cultural/religious ties. Ironically, at the time, the five-day Georgian-Russian confrontation was described by the international media as “the first war between countries with majority Orthodox Christian population since the Second Balkan war” (Kishkovsky 2008). However, as the next crisis between Moscow and Kiev makes abundantly clear, it was not to be the last.

**A NEW COLD WAR? EUROMAIDAN AND THE 2014 UKRAINE-RUSSIAN CRISIS**

The truth about the Holodomor genocide [against Ukrainians] continues to spread around the world, and there is no sinister power that is able to get in the way of it. (Former Ukraine president Viktor Yushchenko, 2011)⁴⁰

Euromaidan (literally “Euro Square”) started as a political movement in Ukraine in November 2013, aiming for the resignation of pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych and seeking closer association with the European Union.
The protests began when the Yanukovych government postponed an association agreement with the EU, in favor of closer cooperation with Russia. Protests intensified in the following weeks, and on February 20, 2014, Ukraine’s capital, Kiev, experienced the worst violence for decades, with at least eighty-eight people killed in forty-eight hours. Although Yanukovych apologized and signed a compromise deal with opposition leaders, he abandoned Kiev on February 22, as protesters took control of presidential administration buildings and an arrest warrant was issued for him.41

Meanwhile, pro-Russian forces seized control of Crimea, announcing a referendum for March 16, 2014, ultimately achieving a 97 percent “yes” vote for union with Russia. Two days later Russian president Putin signed a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation, and tensions escalated in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. For their part, US and EU leaders emphasized the territorial integrity of Ukraine and responded to the crisis with sanctions against Russia. Negotiated ceasefires repeatedly failed, and by September 2014 the conflict had spiraled into the worst crisis for Europe since the end of the Bosnian war.

At the time of this writing, with three thousand dead in less than a year (Guardian 2014), including the loss of a Malaysian passenger airliner, the Ukraine-Russian conflict has come to epitomize the failure of the European security system in the post–cold war era.

Other ethnopolitical episodes covered in this chapter acknowledge that majority groups can have legitimate grievances, entitlements, and security threats. As noted above, Serbian nationalism focused on the treatment of the Kosovo Serb minority, Greek nationalism on the appropriation of Macedonian cultural symbols, Turkish nationalism on PKK violence, and Georgian nationalism on foreign-backed secessionism. Ukrainians could arguably make an even stronger case, pointing to the history of Russian domination, the political involvement of President Putin’s administration in Ukraine’s internal affairs, and, more recently, his initiation of a civil war in their country (Snyder 2014). The annexation of Crimea is an unprecedented violation of a fundamental principle in international law that prohibits the acquisition of territory through the use of force (Burke-White 2014). As noted earlier in this book, neither Turkey on northern Cyprus nor Russia on Abkhazia or South Ossetia has attempted to annex territories they have occupied for decades.

Ukraine’s own nationalism has played a critical albeit underemphasized role in initiating and fueling the crisis. To begin with, Euromaidan was wrongly timed, framed, and strategized, setting the stage for an inevitable majority-mi-
nority clash in Ukraine. Yanukovych’s main political opponents who voted in
the Western part of the country included his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko,
jailed former PM Yuliya Tymoshenko, and, more worrisomely, the “ultra-na-
tionalist and savagely Russophobe Svoboda [Freedom Party]” (Lieven 2014).
The participation of the extreme right has been constant throughout the crisis
from the demonstrations in Euromaidan to the formation of the new govern-
ment. And as noted above, the timing of Euromaidan was problematic. As in
the other episodes of majority mobilizations cited in this chapter, it occurred
at a time of declining popularity for Yanukovych, even within his party. The
pro-West opposition could have simply waited for an uncontested succession
in future elections. Instead, it opted to mobilize on a divisive political theme
with immediate and predictable West/East implications. Unlike the 2005 Cedar
Revolution in Lebanon following the assassination of former PM Rafic Hariri
(see Clark and Zahar 2015), Euromaidan lacked the undisputed legality and
moral superiority necessary for framing an inclusive, rightful, and successful
mobilization.

Added to this, majority nationalism in Ukraine was manifested in various
other forms that hindered the resolution of the conflict in its first months. Just
days after Yanukovych abandoned the country, the parliament passed a bill to
abolish the 2012 August law on regional languages, making Ukrainian the sole
state language at all levels. While the bill was blocked by the acting president,
its support in the Ukrainian Parliament sent the wrong signals to Russian mi-
norities (Sakwa 2015). The new Ukrainian government also laid responsibility
entirely on Yanukovych for failing to carry out a “satisfactory, independent in-
vestigation” of the shootings of eighty-two Maidan militants on February 20,
2014, one that would effectively convince the pro-Russian side (Economist 2014).
Then, the death of about forty pro-Russian demonstrators in early May 2014
during a fire in Odessa further boosted “the Russian narrative that Ukraine is
plagued by rampaging fascists” (ibid.). Finally, the Ukrainian leadership failed
to advocate a credible constitutional alternative for managing the conflict. As
in Georgia, solutions such as federalism and power-sharing were eliminated
from public discourse. Federal solutions were portrayed as likely to dismember
the country and to ensure that Ukraine would never escape Russia’s orbit. The
Ukrainian Parliament went so far as to adopt a resolution barring diplomats
from negotiating any federal constitutional revisions at talks in Geneva (Hig-
gins 2014).

Even so, the intensity of Ukrainian mobilizations is puzzling. It was directed
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gins 2014).

Even so, the intensity of Ukrainian mobilizations is puzzling. It was directed
against both a decisive and predictable Russian leader and a significant segment of Ukraine’s own citizens. In the years preceding the crisis, Putin not only solidified his control over Russia but also improved his standing globally, as demonstrated months earlier through his involvement in the August 2013 Syrian chemical weapons crisis. Like Turkey’s Erdoğan, discussed in the previous chapter, Putin created his own brand of semiauthoritarianism, admired in many countries and celebrated by Western media. Ironically, Time Magazine declared Erdoğan Person of the Year in 2011, and Forbes ranked Putin the most powerful man in the world in 2013. Yet Putin had every reason to fear the spread of “Euro-revolutions” against friendly allies in Russia’s periphery; as Beissinger (2002) argues, revolutions are contentious events with unpredictable (“domino”) consequences. More fundamentally, Ukrainian leaders should have considered what happened six years earlier in Georgia. To avoid confrontation with Russia, they should have identified a less destructive path.

Finally, Euromaidan took place in an environment that had previously tried not to antagonize ethnic minorities but to include Russians and others in national and local administration. Compared with the four other cases in this chapter, Ukraine had arguably the least repressive attitudes toward ethnic minorities and was often referred to by OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) officials as a “success story” (Kulyk 2002: 6). Even the pro-Western camp in Ukraine maintained a high degree of interdependence with Russia on energy and on commercial and security issues (Sakwa 2015). Importantly, its leadership felt comfortable signing the 1995 Budapest memorandum for the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine in exchange for guarantees of the country’s territorial integrity. In a classic study of the security dilemma, Posen (1993) compared Serbs and Croats with Ukrainians and Russians, arguing that there was “no record of large-scale Russian-Ukrainian military rivalry and no clear, salient incident of nationalist bloodletting.” Interestingly, he concludes that Russian and Ukrainian histories of each other are “less terrifying than those found among groups within the former Yugoslavia” (ibid.: 39).

However, Posen qualifies his argument by pointing to a “dangerous historical episode” that he suggested could play a significant role in the development of an “anti-Russian Ukrainian history” (ibid.). The Holodomor (literally, extermination by hunger) killed approximately 3.9 million people in 1932–33. Following the Orange Revolution of 2004–5, President Yushchenko and the pro-Western camp promoted the figure of 10 million, often in comparison to the
Holocaust (Wemheuer 2014: 216). The Ukrainian government and the public erected memorials in Kiev and hundreds of villages around the country and started using the terms "genocide," "holocaust," and "real holocaust" to define the famine (ibid.: 257). 

Posen anticipates recent developments when he cautions: "If Ukrainians begin to blame the famine on Russians, this would be quite dangerous" (1993: 39). In effect, by suggesting that the famine was organized on purpose, Ukrainian nationalists drew a line between Ukrainians and Russians, thus undermining national unity (Wemheuer 2014: 256).

The polarizing effects of politicizing Holodomor were demonstrated in a survey conducted in October 2013. In this survey, the majority of Ukrainians (66 percent) agreed with the statement that the Holodomor of 1932–33 represented the genocide of the Ukrainian people. This was the highest percentage recorded over previous four years. However, while more than 80 percent of respondents in the west, center, and north of the country responded positively, the south and east were divided approximately down the middle. Those voting for President Yanukovych were similarly divided, while voters associated with the (pre-Euromaidan) opposition parties supported the statement by about 90 percent (RISU, 2013).

The answer to the puzzle of Ukrainian nationalism in the 2014 crisis is found in the interplay between a reframed "collective trauma" and beliefs in the efficacy of collective action in the form of mass protests. The 2004–5 Orange Revolution has been considered, along with the Rose, Cedar, and Bulldozer (Serbia) revolutions, to be one of the most successful and fairly peaceful mass protests in recent times. Euromaidan was associated with the Orange Revolution by Ukrainian civic and political leaders, as it featured the same protagonists, themes, and targets, but these leaders underestimated the risk of doing so. It was, in fact, a false analogy, as the aims of the Orange Revolution were supported in the West, conceded by the opposition and even accepted by Moscow. 

In the Ukrainian case, by lacking a clear legal and moral case, Euromaidan triggered a military uprising in the pro-Yanukovych regions of the country and Moscow’s military intervention. Russia annexed Crimea illegally, choosing to ignore international condemnation and sanctions. In the end, almost half of the UN members did not vote against Russia on the relevant UN General Assembly resolution; key members included India, China, Egypt, Brazil, Israel, and South Africa (UN 2014).

Elite framing of a particular situation could nurture exaggerated expectations and lead dominant elites into making false analogies. The Saakashvili ex-
ample above speaks to cases in which militarily weak nations such as Georgia mobilize, rebel, and protest, even when the “objective” conditions are unfavorable, chances of success are limited, and risks are extremely high. As Kuperman (2008) argues, false expectations of international intervention by the minority side explain the willingness of many such groups to attempt an otherwise risky war. Such “windows of opportunity” are attractive not only for small and oppressed minority groups but also for mobilizing majorities facing difficult dilemmas, such as Ukraine. Mearsheimer (2014) lays most of the blame for the crisis on the United States and its European allies, arguing that liberal delusions about expanding NATO into Russia’s backyard provoked Putin and helped move public discourse in Ukraine away from cooperating with Russia into a dominant frame seeking containment and expecting Western support to achieve its goals. An article titled “Containing Russia” by Ukrainian opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko, published years before the 2014 crisis, demonstrates the pro-Western elite’s long-standing belief about “Russia’s expansionism”; in this framing, Ukrainian nationalism was legitimized as an urgent and necessary antidote to Russia (Tymoshenko 2007).

A central analytical conundrum in the study of framing in international politics is the origin of confrontational frames. Conflict-prone societies such as Ukraine offer a theoretically insightful story about the extent to which framing is driven by the country’s own political institutions. To this point, Ukraine’s politics have lacked consensus and dispute resolution mechanisms between president and parliament; more important, the central government has represented either the East or the West, but not both (McGarry and Loizides 2014). As noted in other cases, in majoritarian democracies, oppositional voices could still be marginalized decades after the first free elections. Following Snyder’s work on emerging democracies, this book demonstrates how monolithic framing is more common in societies lacking consensus norms and institutions, particularly as new elites and media compete to capture nationalist audiences (2000). And as Snyder implies, the design of democratic institutions could have additional effects on the vulnerability of societies to extreme nationalism. In particular, majoritarian democracies are more likely to preserve norms and frames serving electorally dominant majority groups.

The temptation in postcommunist transitions (also prevalent in the post–Arab Spring Middle East) is to create strong governments capable of pursuing rapid reforms to address economic transitions. However, the lack of checks and balances as well as consensual decision-making mechanisms could ultimately
lead to devastating decisions and renewed conflict. As I demonstrate earlier in this book, neither the Greek nor the Turkish electoral systems promoted consensus but rather forced parties to rely overwhelmingly on special interests. By extension, innovative proposals for compromise were often suppressed by the demands and mobilizing capacity of conservative, electorally critical, and national-minded constituencies.

In the case of Ukraine, federalism and power-sharing deserve a more careful assessment by those aiming to restore the country’s unity, even if the proposal comes from Russia. Although critics of power-sharing arrangements often assume otherwise, no federation has failed within the European Union or among post–World War II developed democracies. Even among the developing world federal democracies, no minority has engaged in armed struggle in the 1980s with the exception of India, which has made remarkable progress in restoring ethnic relations since then (Bermeo 2004). In other words, Ukrainian leaders should accept that some form of territorial accommodation would be needed to safeguard the country from devastating ethnic conflict and partition.

Admittedly, Ukraine’s fears of federalism are not unprecedented and should be respected in the process of negotiating a constitutional transition. Many countries, such as Spain, India, and South Africa, facing comparable situations federalized in practice without explicitly adopting a federal terminology, thereby contradicting key doctrines of majority nationalism. Federalism might clash with dominant and politically critical frames. Inevitably, frames generate audience costs whereby politicians are rewarded for maintaining confrontational policies and punished for reneging on their commitments (Fearon 1994; Zellman 2012). Yet, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, conflict resolution could progress despite long-standing oppositional frames.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 6 has revisited the findings on Greece and Turkey, particularly in the post–cold war era, probing their generalizability across Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. It synthesizes the findings of the previous chapters and offers a broader comparative understanding of the origins and processes of majority nationalist mobilization. By doing so, it demonstrates the extent to which framing analysis answers the puzzles of majority nationalist “agitation” even when, in the eyes of an outsider, such majority group mobilization does not serve the “objective” interests of the group. Although conflict and conflict escalation may have multiple roots, elite framing and entrapment, as demonstrated in these
five cases, could explain some critical and arguably preventable cases elsewhere, even among mature industrial democracies.

Ian Lustick, for example, emphasizes elite entrapment in the mobilization of majority nationalism in the American “war on terror” (2006). The first Gulf War weakened the politicians who voted against it, cementing a rare bipartisan consensus on Iraq in the 1990s. Majority nationalism raised the cost of dissent, disoriented political elites, and prevented Congress members from questioning available intelligence, thus strengthening a militarized political culture that had taken root in the United States during the cold war (Cramer 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007). Mearsheimer and Walt, citing events in this era as well as subsequent US attempts to address conflicts in Israel and Ukraine, offer a strong challenge to the conventional wisdom of American foreign policy (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Mearsheimer 2014). Similar arguments could be extended to political elites in the United Kingdom and Spain who failed to apply lessons already learned in Northern Ireland and the Basque country to the “global war on terror,” thus instigating actions and reactions that confirmed their worst nightmares (Guelke 2012).

Although he does not use the term “elite framing” per se in his seminal work on unsettled states and disputed lands, Lustick treats a concept related to framing, hegemonic beliefs, as a key variable in understanding disengagement from disputed territories such as Northern Ireland, Algeria, the West Bank, and Gaza (1993). Lustick labels the uncontested acceptance of state borders a hegemonic belief, drawing from Gramsci’s “overall intention to elucidate the impact on political outcomes associated with the transformation of particular beliefs into uncontested, and virtually uncontestable, “commonsense” apprehensions” (ibid.: 54). The strength and durability of hegemonic beliefs at the central state level define subsequent policies of contraction and expansion, explaining why, for instance, France abandoned Algeria while Britain retained a portion of Ireland.

Speaking about Israel, Gamson and Hersog (1999) demonstrate the role of framing and perception, notably the problem of a “taken-for-granted political discourse” (ibid.: 247). Despite the end of the cold war and the otherwise open nature of Israeli political debate, elite consensus has hindered peacemaking in the Middle East. As in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, for Israel relinquishing parts of territory permanently seems to pose a significant challenge to actors’ identities (Lupovici 2012). Zellman’s (2012) study on Israeli territorial discourses also demonstrates patterns of consensus framing across three issues: East
Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. Surprisingly, he finds that elite consensus on the nonwithdrawal on the Golan Heights is stronger than in the other three issues, because of long-standing Israeli security narratives and near-uniform popular perceptions of Syria that solidify, at least in the Israeli eye, the strategic value of the Golan Heights.

Overall, the cases presented in this chapter suggest that nationalist sentiment is not necessarily solely dependent on factors such as economic deprivation, openness of civil society, or ethnic cleavages. Episodes of majority group mobilizations are comparable in Georgia, Serbia, Ukraine, Greece, and Turkey because of the early monopolization of discourse surrounding each ethnopolitical episode, forging an intragroup consensus on the efficacy and legitimacy of confrontational action. In all cases, public protest erupted in demonstrations, popular commercial embargoes, and ethnic voting. By way of contrast, the five countries differed in terms of the timing of their ethnopolitical crises and in their political systems, levels of democratization, size, incorporation into Western institutions, freedom of speech, and ethnic/social homogeneity.

The extent to which “objective” opportunities, fear, and grievances are the sole determinants of nationalist protest is, therefore, open to question. In the five episodes analyzed in this chapter, the processes of conceiving and framing the security, fairness, and efficacy of nationalist mobilization are comparable, while other factors conventionally associated in the literature with the nationalist contention, appear to vary. Admittedly, these variations do not imply the insignificance of alternative explanations; rather, a detailed coding of framing processes could strengthen our understanding of the politics of majority nationalism and ethnic relations more broadly. The broader conclusion of the book is that what matters is not only the combination of grievances, opportunities, and fear “objectively” counted, but how these are perceived and framed in the public sphere. Majority groups could have legitimate grievances, entitlements, and security threats, and as FitzGerald’s comment suggests in the introduction to this chapter, larger neighbors could create difficult dilemmas for smaller ones. Nonetheless, statesmanship, not nationalism, should be prioritized in critical geopolitical puzzles. We would do well to listen to the late Irish leader, particularly as new crises are unfolding with potentially catastrophic consequences for Europe and the rest of the world.
Conclusion: Why Do Majorities Protest?  
Global Crises and the Pursuit of Peace

Turks are our brothers, while Europeans are our partners.  
(Yiannis Boutaris, mayor of Thessaloniki, 2012)  

Being the mayor of Thessaloniki during Greece’s post-2008 recession must have been a herculean task. Following seven long years of consecutive recession, Greek Macedonia has been among the most financially affected areas in Southern Europe, with youth and total unemployment reaching an astonishing 72.5 and 30.3 percent, respectively, in some areas (Chan and Roland 2013; *Ineris* 2014). As noted earlier in this book, the city has also been the bastion of Greek nationalism and conservativism for decades, electing right-wing mayors and mobilizing its residents in rallies that, according to several accounts, have determined the country’s foreign policy on the Macedonian issue (Skylakakis 1995; Ellinas 2010). And although it has been the center of coexistence among multiple cultures and religions, Thessaloniki has experienced firsthand some of the most intractable problems of the twentieth-century Balkans. With widespread poverty, rising polarization at all levels, and the emergence of the extremist Golden Dawn, Greece’s second largest city would have been an unlikely candidate for creative solutions, if not for its perceptive mayor, Giannis Boutaris.

Mayor Boutaris, a renowned winemaker but also a former alcoholic, came to embody the kind of leader societies desperately need at time of crisis. After his election in 2010, he tackled the city’s debt, increased tourism, and resolved many of the chronic administrative problems, prompting European Commission officials to speak of Thessaloniki as a “beacon of hope” (Baker 2012). Unlike his conservative predecessors, the mayor did not conceal but, rather, celebrated the Ottoman and Jewish past of his hometown. Described as “a city unique not just in Europe but the entire history of humanity” (Morris 2004), Thessaloniki
became almost exclusively Greek following the “exchange of populations” with Turkey in the 1920s and the tragic loss of its large Jewish community during the Nazi occupation (Mazower 2004). But Boutaris capitalized on the history of the city by inviting Israeli and Turkish tourists to visit its landmarks, including Atatürk's home and its historic synagogues. By reminding fellow residents that their city was once the “Jerusalem of the Balkans” because of its majority Jewish community, or calling the founder of modern Turkey a “child of Thessaloniki,” Boutaris inevitably clashed with majority Greek nationalism (Angelos 2012).

In 2012 the Greek government organized an extravagant re-enactment of the Greek army's march into the city, aiming to “produce a climate of ethnic pride” as part of celebrations to mark the city’s transfer to Greece. The mayor boycotted the event, accusing the organizers of stoking ethnic nationalism (ibid.); more important, as the quotation above indicates, Boutaris attempted to reframe national sentiments toward Greece’s neighbors.

While providing a rare example of statesmanship, Boutaris is not unique. As The Politics of Majority Nationalism shows, we can find comparable cases of statesmanship or its absence across the region (and indeed around the world), yet most commonly elites tend to vacillate between their choices of crisis-making or the pursuit of peace. Of course, not all are consistent or easy to understand. In Chapter 2, for example, I have introduced the story of one of Greece's most complex personalities, the music composer Theodorakis, frequently described as the “soul” of the Greek nation in its most authentic but also controversial manifestations. The renowned music composer has, paradoxically, been a leader in both peace and nationalist mobilizations, thus embodying the main puzzle of majority-group nationalism I address throughout this book. While Theodorakis displays the inconsistencies of modern Greek nationalism, Boutaris embodies a positive and inspiring alternative as to how national identities can be creatively evolved to allow a society to progress.

Another aspect of majority nationalism considered in the previous pages and suggested by the Boutaris citation opening this chapter is how majority peacemakers and hardliners frame peace and conflict dilemmas. Unlike minorities, majorities are rarely the center of analytical research. Yet as this book demonstrates, majority groups deserve more attention, since majorities, when they decide to do so, are in a better position to threaten or harm their ethnic antagonists. Nationalist agitation by minorities is sometimes a cause of instability, but from Nazi Germany to Rwanda and the Balkans, it has been majority groups that triggered the most horrific crimes against humanity (Mann 2005;
McDoom 2012). In particular, the formation of nation-states in Europe, dominated by national majorities, has led to the assimilation, expulsion, or genocide of ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities. Given the myriad examples of this and the rising majority nationalism in India, China, and the Middle East, the absence of a particular body of literature on majorities is regrettable. As Kaufmann and Haklai (2008) argue, the world is in the midst of a long-term transition from dominant minority to dominant majority ethnicity. Whereas minority domination was common in premodern societies, modernity has engendered a shift to dominant majorities as demonstrated in the Arab Spring revolutions; in the twenty-first century, a week rarely goes by without international media covering a majority group's response to a crisis, either accommodative or conflictual.

To cover the gap in the literature and in the hope of triggering further investigation, this book provides a broader comparison of episodes of majority nationalist protest and moderation. You will recall that nationalist mobilization is defined here as the process of gaining popular support for and enticing participation in the nationalist cause. In majority mobilizations, the public is actively involved in contentious ethnic politics, and national identity becomes the primary focus of collective action. Nationalist sentiment is manifested in mass demonstrations, voting for nationalist parties, or even popular embargoes against ethnic antagonists and their “sympathizers.” During majority-group mobilizations, people support nationalist regimes and endorse conflictual policies espoused by elites. They also create new opportunities that ethnic entrepreneurs use to advance their power. As a part of the mobilization, new meanings are assigned to symbols and traditions, long forgotten nationalist narratives are rediscovered, and hate speech is used against ethnic antagonists. Finally, the most essential part is the production and propagation of one-sided versions of historical events with the preselection of those grievance and opportunity themes most suitable to mobilize nationalist sentiment.

**FRAMING THE POLITICS OF MAJORITIES**

*The Politics of Majority Nationalism* introduces a novel conceptual approach by looking at how precrisis frames influence protracted stalemates, crisis behavior, and ultimately, the choice of peace. Until now, little critical attention has been paid to societies’ choice of peace, or how their relationships with minorities, “unredeemed” territories, and/or “difficult” neighbors affect this choice. More specifically, scant research has addressed precrisis framing, its key fea-
tures, and its possible effects on the subsequent actions of dominant majority groups. Furthermore, to date, scholarship has emphasized the dark aspects of elite framing, examining how nationalists play the "communal card" (Gagnon 1994; Snyder 2000), or how hardliners prevent mutually beneficial compromises (Stedman 1997). This book sheds light on how peacemakers challenge and transform the language of ethnic nationalism and war in their communities; it identifies the strategies and tools engaged by moderates when communicating peace messages to local and national constituencies.

Historically, the communities in the broader Levant (that is, the post-Ottoman space) have entertained accommodative ideas as a means of addressing ethnic diversity or mitigating conflicting national aspirations (Stavrianos 1958; Banac 1984; Dawisha 2003). Moderates have promoted federalism, power-sharing, or related institutional arrangements as an alternative to war, arbitrary partition, violent assimilation, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. Despite their apparent popularity, for the most part, federalist engagements have not been successful; the region surrounding Greece and Turkey has not been able to escape wars and violent conflict, with bitter memories left across divided communities and the creation of new national borders. More worrisomely, as this book suggests, the broader post-Ottoman region has produced few "successful" peace experiments and contains a number of notable failures despite the political and normative merits of peace settlements (Haklai 2011, 2013; Loizides 2016).

Nationalist mobilization against peace settlements becomes a paradox when majorities are the primary focus of analysis. Major factors associated with minority mobilization—such as political marginalization and social and economic grievances—are inadequate when applied to majorities. Dominant majorities, by definition, are represented by a state; therefore, they have multiple domestic and international venues within which they may express their often legitimate grievances and fears. Although majorities have both fair entitlements and insecurities, observers usually suggest that both are often exaggerated to prevent sensible and achievable compromises.

The majorities presented here are, for the most part, more economically advanced than their ethnic antagonists. Admittedly, Greece and Turkey faced their own endemic financial crises while their postcommunist neighbors were coping with extremely difficult conditions during their respective transitions to market economics. But economic crises can open up opportunities for rival visions of a nation's future either to support inward nationalism or, alternatively,
pursuit of peace with neighbors, as the Boutaris example suggests. In 2012, the Greek Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace flew the biggest Greek flag in the nation as part of the aforementioned celebrations in Thessaloniki; the resulting “climate of ethnic pride” (cited above) was intended to serve as an antidote to the country’s economic crisis (Angelos 2012). Yet Boutaris’s own response to the hardships facing his fellow citizens was to focus on building better ties with immediate neighbors. As argued in this book, frames are rarely an epiphenomenon of economic or security factors; instead, they determine not only the intensity but also the direction of causality of structural or other factors commonly associated with nationalist mobilization.

_The Politics of Majority Nationalism_ has demonstrated that a predominantly adversarial framing narrows the options of policy-makers and often takes on a life of its own when it becomes entrenched in domestic alliances, public identities, and international negotiations. The embeddedness of an adversarial frame results from its repetition over time, particularly if unchallenged in the public discourse. As the examples cited here make clear, frames are infused in social and political institutions such as the church, ministries of foreign affairs, and dedicated research institutes, as well as extreme right wing parties. Framing analysis matters the most when leaders attempting to introduce a novel frame retreat in the face of an embedded one, despite new conditions demanding political change. Such “reframing failures” are critical in understanding the enduring nature of confrontational frames. Chapters 3 and 4 highlight the centrality of this additional mechanism, pointing to the failed examples of reframing FYR Macedonia as a geopolitical gift for Greece or the short-lived attempts to debate federalism for Turkey, respectively.

Adversarial framing can become a self-fulfilling prophecy by instigating actions that transform the external environment. Emphasizing the role of ideas in the region, in his influential study on the end of pan-Arabism, leading Middle East scholar Fouad Ajami argues that political ideas make their own realities in defiance of logic not foreseen by those spinning the myths; the result is that these myths play themselves out in the end (1978: 355). That said, political leaders in the region are well aware of the role of ideas in shaping their country’s destiny; for instance, in a conference celebrating the eighty-year anniversary of the Greek Macedonian struggle organized in 1984 by the Institute for the Studies of the Balkan Peninsula and the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle—two of Greece’s key institutions designed to preserve an ethnocentric interpretation of Greek Macedonian history—President Konstantinos Karamanlis argued
that “in the lives of people and those of the nations, nothing is stronger than the power of ideas” (Dakin 1986: xiii).

As noted, Konstantine Karamanlis has often been described as a statesman rather than a nationalist, having secured Greece’s transition to democracy while avoiding a devastating Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus in 1974 (Woodhouse 1982). On the Macedonian issue, however, his emotional statement and tears in 1992, cited in Chapter 6, have been remembered for decades. Frames stick—especially ethnopolitical ones. Since 1992, Greek nationalists have cited Karamanlis as a source of legitimation for tough-resolve approaches on the Macedonia issue. As late as 2014, an opposition party would accuse the government of “selling off [Greek] Macedonia” by accepting that the republic will have a double name (for example, New Macedonia), referring to the sobbing president’s statement that “Macedonia is one and only Greek” (Tribune 2014). Another will even wonder why this quotation did not appear in the anniversary video prepared for the forty-year celebration of Nea Demokratia (KA Business 2014). But as the book demonstrates, Karamanlis’s example as a framer is not unique.

The cases of the two prime ministers of Greece and Turkey (as of early 2015) offer certain interesting similarities. Both Antonis Samaras and Ahmet Davutoğlu are elite thinkers associated with “transforming the hearts and minds” of significant segments of their fellow citizens. Samaras started his career by playing the nationalist card on the Macedonian issue, reframing priorities in Greek foreign policy, and assuming a tough-resolve approach to the “name” controversy. He failed politically; for a decade he was marginalized in Greek politics although he returned victoriously, first capturing the leadership of conservative ND and then becoming Greece’s prime minister in 2012. Davutoğlu, who served earlier both as Erdoğan’s advisor and as minister of foreign affairs, added an Islamic focus to Turkey’s foreign policy that was originally successful, as Turkey formed good relations with Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt, Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya, and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria (Ozkan 2014: 132). But following the Arab Spring revolutions, Turkey felt increasingly confident to challenge these regimes. For Davutoğlu, Turkey’s foreign policy of preserving peace and territorial integrity by adhering to national borders was outdated; in his view, Turkey had to “put itself at the center of a circle of alliances and control its hinterland, or insist on a defensive foreign policy that made it vulnerable to attack by those who had scores to settle with the Ottoman Empire” (ibid.: 123–24). Davutoğlu saw an opportunity to augment
Turkey's influence in the Middle East by openly siding with opposition forces, particularly pro-Sunni parties; he failed, but as in the case of Samaras, he was promoted to become Turkey's new PM when Erdoğan was elected to the presidency.

As my examples of the current Greek and Turkish PMs indicate, frames are critical within the context of intragroup political competition. In elections, whoever offers more credible solutions to problems or, more important, captures the deepest feelings of the electorate, can take the lead. Both confrontational frames and peace frames add flesh and bones to otherwise mundane electoral programs. Frames are not simply made for the sake of reflecting existing identities and cultures; on the contrary, framing contests are an essential part of power politics and make the difference between winners and losers in majority group politics. In winner-take-all elections linked to majoritarian political systems, the framing contest becomes even more intense, as stakes for political actors are higher. As the Samaras and Davutoğlu examples suggest, winning the hearts of the electorate might be more important than winning their minds, particularly given the overwhelming foreign policy failures in both cases.

FRAMES OF PEACE, STALEMATES, AND CRISSES

Nationalist expression is inconsistent and often incomprehensible to an outsider. Why did Greece, for example, in the early 1990s emphasize its differences with the least threatening Macedonian republic, instead of its more threatening and traditional rival, Turkey, or yet again, with the Greek minority in Albania? Or why did Turkey in the late 1990s reach a successful compromise with Greece on EU affairs while failing to mitigate nationalism on the Kurdish issue?

Briefly stated, framing as an articulation mechanism of the past helps guide future actions. In each of these issues, hawks aimed to monopolize political thinking and marginalize pacifist forces or ethnic antagonists, thereby determining patterns of adversarial behavior at both state and civil society levels. Doves framed messages of peace and reconciliation and opposed violence on the basis of political pragmatism and solid "rational" reasoning. Interestingly, hawks and doves relied on similar strategies, including mobilizing core constituencies, aligning their frames with those of potential allies, and marginalizing rival forces.

Framing analysis partly answers the puzzles of majority nationalist "agitation," even when in the eyes of an outsider such agitation does not serve the
WHY DO MAJORITIES PROTEST? 159

interests of the group. The argument is not that Greeks or Turks framed the Macedonian or Kurdish issues, respectively, in a monolithic way. In fact, one of the most rewarding intellectual exercises while conducting fieldwork in either country was discovering the diversity of views on ethnopoli
tical issues within the public, academia, and the media.

In *The Politics of Majority Nationalism*, for methodological and other sub-
stantive reasons explained elsewhere, I have elected to focus on elite framing, as expressed in parliament. In Greece, past experience guided policy-makers confronting any outsider criticizing Greece's role on the Macedonian issue. This was seen as a fairly safe strategy security-wise and as profitable electorally. Although conflict and conflict escalation may have multiple roots, elite fram-
ing and entrapment can explain some critical aspects of Greek foreign policy on the Macedonian issue. Meanwhile, in relations with Turkey, confrontational policies became a highly risky option after the 1987 crisis, when the two coun-
tries came to the brink of war.

Similar processes have occurred across the Aegean in ethnopoli
tical conflicts involving Turkey. Other scholars have also pointed to the securitization of public discourse in Turkey on the Kurds and note that it has prevented the adoption of alternative strategies to mitigate the conflict (Celik 2005; Yeğen 2007). Even in "hard security issues," such as the Kurdish question, an analysis of parliamentary framing is illustrative. Debates on the legality of the Kurdish HEP party, the use of military bases by the United States in southeast Turkey, the Öcalan crisis, and the legalization of Kurdish broadcasting demonstrate the major tenets of elite thinking on the issue. As shown in Chapter 4, in Turkey during the 1990s elite framing on the Kurdish issue was adversarial, with few challenges to dominant nationalist narratives. A successful 1995 Turkish incursion into Iraqi territory enlarged options of reacting in a similar fashion against Syria and Italy as the fight against the PKK became an undisputed policy option for Turkish elites. Meanwhile, in framing of Greek-Turkish disputes, moderates cautiously challenged hardliners on the necessity of cooperating with Greece, leading to the 1999 Helsinki compromise. As a result, relations with Greece, Cyprus, and the EU were represented by a mixed discourse because of the risks of international alienation, which allowed space for negotiations and even a compromise in Helsinki in 1999.

Overall, a predominantly adversarial framing narrows the options of pol-
icy-makers and may take on a life of its own when it becomes entrenched in domestic alliances, public identities, and international negotiations. A leading
Cypriot historian and journalist coined the phrase “Frankenstein of Communication” to describe the effects of nationalist framing (Drousiotis 2004). But at the same time, the analysis of parliamentary debates highlights the pathways through which moderates could prevent nationalist forces from monopolizing and homogenizing foreign policy discourse. In short, diversity in elite thinking leads to a better democratic culture and more effective foreign policy-making, driven by the need to adapt to new conditions, seek out innovative thinking, and make those paradigmatic shifts necessary for the choice of peace.

In my two main case studies, I highlight the processes by which precrisis framing was linked to subsequent policy decisions in Greece and Turkey. Firstly, in both cases, framing usually represented commitments to nationalist constituencies before elections, and these could not be undone later. Secondly, framers succeeded in stimulating actions that changed opportunity structures, thereby making their opportunity frame a self-fulfilling prophecy. For instance, the framing of ethnic antagonists triggered negative reactions and prevented compromises that could otherwise have been possible—not to mention beneficial. Thirdly, frames narrowed the definition of national interest and priorities. Once a certain reality had been constructed and priorities set, it was very difficult and sometimes politically risky to reconstruct them or to supplement them with new ones. Finally, foreign policy negotiations strengthened monopolies of adversarial framing. The nature of negotiations often allowed policy-makers to emphasize confrontational framing to increase their negotiation leverage. Dissidents seeking to prevent this might be accused of damaging the negotiating position of their side. Once politicized, these frames became embedded in the definition of the country’s national interest.

*The Politics of Majority Nationalism* integrates the study of nation-states with that of dominant majorities. A focus on dominant majority nationalism, its miscellaneous manifestations (state or societal), intellectual paradoxes, and causal mechanisms is rare in the literature. The analysis goes beyond the use of conventional theories to suggest alternative paradigms—specifically, the concept of precrisis framing that is coded using a transferable tool-kit applicable to other cases of ethnopolitical contention. Finally, the book identifies cases in which nationalism has been reframed to allow peacemaking to occur under prohibitive conditions.

The findings could prove useful for interpreting causal patterns in other countries, such as majority-group nationalisms in India-Pakistan, China-Japan, and Ethiopia-Eritrea, to mention only few. Most theoretical frameworks
ignore the effect of partial learning and framing as variables, emphasizing the
primacy of "objective" conditions such as domestic crises, shifts in balance of
power, and alliances. But these theories, while useful, often reject the effects of
ideology, culture, and framing.

The conclusions may also serve scholars in two important areas of com-
parative ethnic conflict. For one, democratizing societies, particularly new
parliamentary democracies, have been for the past couple of decades the tar-
get of considerable academic scrutiny. For instance, Mansfield and Snyder ar-
gue against the unqualified promotion of democracy and warn that "pushing
nuclear-armed great powers like Russia or China toward democratization is
like spinning a roulette wheel" (1995: 80), while Thompson and Tucker (1997)
note more than one hundred empirical papers targeted at the peaceful joint
democracy proposition (see also discussion in Ward and Gleditsch 1998: 52).
Understanding how leaders and ordinary citizens frame, advocate, or resist
peace policies might help to resolve some extremely thorny issues. Here, this
book’s methodology and quantification of framing make an important contrib-
ution by highlighting both a causal mechanism and an early warning system
for emerging democracies and their majority-group crisis behavior. Extensions
of this methodology as applied here in the postcommunist transitions in Ser-
bia, Georgia, and Ukraine could contribute to better methods of preventing
violence.

As noted in previous chapters, Snyder (2000) demonstrates the weaknesses
of emergent democracies in confronting nationalism. The book extends this
argument but in a different direction, focusing on the relationship between
frames, social/political movements, and institutional design in emerging de-
mocracies. On the one hand, mature democracies are unlikely candidates in
framing contentious issues in a monolithic or intractable way. Even when they
do so, oppositional frames tend to be moderated and open to challenge sooner
or later. On the other, dictatorships often attempt to engineer a consensus—al-
though ineffectively. Mobilizing consensus in dictatorships tends to be super-
ficial, as significant segments of the population oppose their unelected leaders.
Lack of trust toward these leaders makes genuine mobilizations less likely, while
for the most part unelected elites are worried of any diffusion of power likely to
happen if new social actors emerge.

Contrary to mature or nondemocracies, intractable framing could flour-
ish in periods of early democratization. Following Snyder’s work on emerging
democracies, this book demonstrates how intractable framing is more com-
mon in such cases, particularly as new elites and media compete to capture nationalist audiences. Extending this argument further, I argue that the design of democratic institutions could have additional effects on the vulnerability of societies toward extreme nationalism. In contrast to neighboring Bulgaria, which has developed remarkable capacity to address conflict with its ethnic minorities (Koinova 2013), majoritarian democracies such as Greece and Turkey have consistently preserved norms and frames serving electorally dominant majority groups. Even the breakthrough election of Alexis Tsipras in Greece in January 2015 brought very little change in Greek foreign policy toward Turkey and the Balkans; in fact, Syriza replicated the broad umbrella party structure of ND and Pasok by absorbing nationalist allies from both parties either directly through defections of leading Pasok parliamentarians or as coalition partners after a self-defeating alliance with the extreme right-wing party the Independent Greeks.

As I demonstrate in this book, neither the Greek nor the Turkish electoral system promotes consensus; rather, they force parties to compete for pluralities, often at the expense of minority views. By extension, innovative proposals for compromise are suppressed by the demands and mobilizing capacity of conservative electorally critical and national-minded constituencies. Confrontational frames are more likely to persist in a majoritarian democracy where oppositional voices are marginalized, even decades after the first free elections; in other words, the perseverance of intractable frames is inevitably tied to a country’s political institutions.

Conceptually, this book distinguishes between the framing of grievances and the framing of opportunities. Even in the presence of widespread grievances, nationalist mobilization might fail to take place. According to the main findings, this relates to a “low-opportunity” frame—that is, a shared understanding within the group, particularly at the elite level, that nationalist confrontation might be unwise or counterproductive at a given time. Yet as demonstrated by recent events from the Middle East to Ukraine to Hong Kong, democratization and new technologies continually open novel opportunities for citizens around the globe to protest against repressive regimes. Through major technological innovations, media now have the capacity to transmit live protests around a country or across the world. Internet sites and the social media promote new ideas and organize popular campaigns. The instant global revelation of human rights violations allows ethnic and civic activists to appeal to both domestic and international audiences. At the same time, these opportunities are fre-
quently shared by minorities and majorities in possession of new technologies to police protest; as this book demonstrates, new grievances and opportunities often go hand in hand.

One unexpected outcome of the globalization of international investment and trade is that it allows civil society to protest through commercial embargoes against ethnic antagonists (for instance, in the cases of Greece against Italian and Dutch products and Turkey against French and Italian products, based on assumptions of unfriendly policies). Global attention to nationalism contributes to a shift toward low-violence but high-participation events; such episodes attract international support and bring extra benefits. The combined effect of democratization, reinvigoration of nationalist ideologies, and media coverage could make majority nationalist mobilizations one of the dominant types of contentious politics in this century. If social revolutions belonged to the nineteenth and ethnic conflict to the twentieth century, nationalist mobilizations could mark the twenty-first century. For proof, we need only look at the postcommunist and Arab Spring revolutions.

At the same time, ethnic minorities also benefit from globalization and framing of human rights issues across Western democracies. Social media have transformed the image of the Kurds in 2014 not only in Iraqi Kurdistan but also in the PKK-controlled Syrian Kobane. After repelling the Islamic State from the besieged city, the PKK fighters are the new heroes, not only of Kurdistan but also of Western governments and, more important, their public opinions. In 2014, following the brutal attacks by the Islamic State, the PKK enjoyed increasing popularity comparable to that which the Irish Republican Army (IRA) enjoyed throughout the 1990s (Cochrane 2007; Guelke 2012). And as the Northern Irish case suggests, majority nationalism in Turkey will face an existential dilemma. Turkey could either resist the emerging rapprochement between Kurds and the West or employ a bandwagoning strategy, hoping that the PKK will gradually adapt its strategy—and, like the IRA, use its strong international networking to support a peace process encompassing power-sharing in Turkey and its broader region. Here again, the constraints of majoritarian electoral systems are prevalent; before the June 2015 elections in an unprecedented opening, moderate Turkish public opinion was mobilized for the first time to support successfully the predominantly Kurdish HDP (People’s Democratic Party). However difficult, this attempt could reshape Turkish political frames of reference particularly if HDP aligns its agenda with broader reforms. Past failures to represent ethnic minorities have led to major dis-
crepancies between voter preferences and representation, causing inevitable bitterness in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. For another, in the absence of power-sharing institutions even successful coalitions between moderate Kurds and Turks could lead to the electoral weakening of AKP inadvertently turning nationalist MHP into the kingmaker.

On this issue, The Politics of Majority Nationalism also informs the debate on the relationship between power-sharing and nationalism. As demonstrated, the recent historical record in the Balkan and Middle Eastern regions suggests an implicit incompatibility between the two; neither Greece nor Turkey, nor their immediate neighbors, have developed durable federal or power-sharing institutions. In fact, the post-Ottoman successor states have not been successful in this area, with the partial exception of Iraqi Kurdistan. Equally, state failure in Iraq and Syria poses multiple challenges for their neighbors and the world. However, it is hard to imagine that the region will be exempt from the growing global debate on political accommodation, partly because of the absence of any other alternatives. From a theory standpoint, this book suggests that, where applicable, studies of emerging federalization should be combined with analyses of majority-group framing, while from a public policy perspective, better understanding of successful power-sharing institutions will give peace actors the "ideologically winning formulas" required to frame and catalyze positive change in the broader Middle East and Balkan regions.

CRISSES AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE

The often-intricate interplay of institutions and international organizations on the one hand, and symbolic politics and framing processes on the other, is central in the book’s story. Frames become institutionalized through routinized practices at the governmental level, thus assisting in the advancement of certain political actors and ideologies over others. For instance, recruitment and advancement in the bureaucracy even within universities follow a pattern that eliminates political dissent, while religious authorities, the local government, and the military organize constituents to oppose conciliatory moves. As demonstrated in the Macedonian and Kurdish rallies in Greece and Turkey, respectively, even civil society groups with a vested economic interest in promoting peaceful relations (for example, chambers of commerce) frequently opted to support nationalist mobilizations.

As this book demonstrates time and again, framing shapes political outcomes, for both better and worse. Although admittedly, nationalist ideology
is an obstacle to peacemaking, it is rare in the literature to identify cases and pathways through which nationalism is moderated to allow for peacemaking to occur, or at least to progress. Greek-Turkish relations provide an intriguing such example of how disaster diplomacy can be used to minimize aggression and ethnic rivalries in divided regions. As shown in Chapter 6, the earthquakes of 1999 provided an opportunity for positive communication across the Aegean and demonstrated not only the importance of civil society in providing comfort but also the commitment of hundreds of NGOs to peace and conflict transformation. Transformed images survived new governments and ups and downs in Turkish-EU relations for almost a decade, suggesting a self-enforcing cycle of positive communication and civil society engagement.

Because of this role of civil society, a decisive difference between today’s crises and past crises, highlighted in the Boutaris example, is that constituencies in Greece and Turkey cannot be as easily “manipulated” by hardliners through fear or grievances. The examples of earthquake diplomacy, as well as other positive stories highlighted in Chapter 5, provide the tools for rethinking conflict transformation in the region. Besides consensual decision-making, parties could engage civil and political actors in inclusive negotiations to address ethnopolitical problems, as in South Africa and Northern Ireland. Linkages could be drawn across issues, especially human rights and security concerns. For instance, on the Macedonian name issue, recognizing the small ethnic Macedonian minority in Greece or allowing refugees (or rather, their children) the right of return could be linked to a favorable solution for both sides on the name issue, such as “New Macedonia” or “Ohrid Macedonia,” following the precedent set by the 2001 peace settlement between Slav Macedonians and Albanian Macedonians in the country. These aims are achievable, particularly when we consider other positive examples from the region facing more prohibitive conditions.

Any solution, of course, is neither obvious nor simple. The neighborhood surrounding Greece and Turkey is rife with unresolved foreign policy and minority issues, and myriad opportunities for escalation and de-escalation continue to present themselves. Never before since World War II has the region been more fragile but also in more need of cooperation among actors, a necessity intensified by the global debt crisis, the meteoric rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well as forced migration across the Levant. Nor are problems limited to this region; the book has pointed to numerous manifestations, potential causal mechanisms, and intellectual paradoxes of majority nationalism elsewhere. Alternative explanations, including domestic politics and
security dilemmas, have considerable explanatory power, but these approaches have limits, particularly in times of domestic uncertainty and within a rapidly changing regional and international security system. Likewise, prospect theory emphasizing the relative value of losses vs. gains in decisionmaking seems incomplete in real-world politics without an in-depth understanding of how representative elites frame related episodes of ethnopolitical contention across time.

Here again, the Greece-Turkey situation is illustrative. As this book points out, the last decade of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey is an outlier in the countries’ historical record of crisis behavior. Tables 3.1 and 4.1 highlight the intensity of crises in the 1980s and 1990s, when the two countries faced a near-war situation every few years. A combination of factors such as the Greek economic crisis, the conflict over exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and the rise of extremist groups might turn the clock back in the Greek-Turkish neighborhood. At the same time, past and current mediations in the region and elsewhere demonstrate not only the potential but also the effective strategies for winning hearts and minds for conflict transformation. And as this book demonstrates, the Eastern Mediterranean has already produced successful and inspiring alternatives for its own future.
Reference Matter
PREFACE

1. As highlighted later in the book, the Greek Cypriots voted against the Annan Plan, hoping for an improved settlement after informally securing accession to the EU in 2002–3. Following the April 2004 referendum, Cyprus formally joined the EU, but the membership benefits applied primarily to the Greek Cypriot–controlled portion of the island. For discussions on EU conditionality, see Diez et al. (2008); Richmond (2005); Rumelili (2007); and Tocci (2007). For my most updated work on Cyprus, see Loizides (2016).

2. Interview with Osman Faruk Logoğlu, vice chairperson of CHP (Republican People’s Party) in charge of foreign relations, Ankara, April 2012.


4. For a number of earlier exceptions, see Rumelili (2007); Özkırımlı and Sofos (2008); Diez et al. (2008); Yanik (2011).

5. For comparative examples, see, for instance, Schultz (2005); Mitchell et al. (2009); and Moore et al. (2014).


7. Two already classic studies have adopted comparable approaches in their explanations for why societies collapse or why nations fail; see Diamond (2006); and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). On Greece, see also TED talk by Kalyvas (2011). What is different in this book, however, is the emphasis on the role of political institutions in decision-making and the interplay between frames, contentious politics, and institutional design in fostering peace and political stability.
8. For a discussion of process-tracing, see Van Evera (1997: 65), particularly on comparisons within a historical period (e.g., the cold war, 1947–89).

9. For an earlier application of resource mobilization and other social movement perspectives in the study of the minority nationalisms, see Romano (2006).

CHAPTER 1

1. So far, no extensive work has been dedicated to the politics of majority nationalism, apart from a number of comprehensive but edited volumes by Gagnon and Lecours, Contemporary Majority Nationalism (2011); Kaufmann, Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities (2004); and Gladney, Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States (1998). See also a related concept “core group” in Mylonas’s (2013) insightful analysis of nation-building in the Balkans and the making of co-nationals, refugees, and minorities.

2. Although, officially, members of these minority groups might compromise their nationalist aspirations, few observers could deny that the “ideal objective” of many minority movements is the creation of a new state. However, there are exceptions where federalism or local autonomy could become acceptable to the minority; see Guibernau (1997) on Catalonia and Keating on Scotland (2005).

3. The book does not assume all majority nationalist objectives or confrontation policies to be inherently misguided or illegitimate. Some objectives of the majority might be considered legitimate, such as the fight against terrorists targeting civilian populations or the promotion of human rights of ingroup members. However, even in those cases, the methods used to reach these goals might be unconstructive, unnecessarily risky for peace, and damaging for the country or the region as whole.

4. Admittedly, there are multiple examples of minorities dealing with many different states, such as Kurds (Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey), Hungarians (Slovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia), Basques (Spain and France), diaspora Jews, and European Roma.

5. For a detailed account of state repression of the (Slav) Macedonian minority in Greece, see Kostopoulos (2000). Despite grievances, there have been no acts of violence or terrorism in the region since the end of the Greek Civil War.

6. For an explanation of the distinction between the two forms of nationalism, see Beissinger (2002).

7. In many cases, countries whose products were boycotted asked for the support of the World Trade Organization. For Turkey and the Kurdish issue, see Il Sole 24 Ore (1998: 6). Also, when the Greek government imposed the official embargo against the Republic of Macedonia in February 1994, the European Commission took legal measures against Greece (Agence France Presse 1994a).


10. For a relevant review of the literature, see also Finnemore and Sikkink (2001).
12. For relevant social movement studies, see Tarrow (1994); McAdam et al. (1996 and 1997: 142–73).
13. Tarrow (1994) urges cross-fertilization between the scholars of social movements and nationalism. He criticizes the “ancestral hatred” view of nationalism as uninformed about findings of social movements (ibid.: 211).
15. For a review of resource mobilization theories from a social psychological perspective, see Stryker et al. (2000: 3).
16. For example, both the public and its leaders might read the opportunity structure selectively; among other reasons, a sense of injustice may affect their capacity and/or willingness to deal with complex issues. See, for instance, Tetlock (1998) as well as Petersen (2011).
19. On the kaleidoscopic forms nationalism can take, see Hutchinson and Smith (1994: 3). As argued elsewhere, the incorporation of religious themes into Greek nationalism and the appropriation of religion for its needs is a nineteenth-century phenomenon following the Greek revolution and the first Greek state. For decades religious institutions in Greece have been almost completely aligned to nationalist ideology, even when Greece had to face “enemies” of the same religious doctrine in its northern frontiers (Loizides 2009a).
20. For the “radical flank effect,” see McAdam et al. (1996: 14). Gagnon (1994) argues that the advantage of giving extreme right wing media coverage is that by bringing extremists into the political realm, the nationalist right becomes the “center.” Subsequently a statement that ten years earlier may have been unacceptable may be perceived after this kind of strategy as relatively moderate. For a related argument emphasizing the effects of mainstream parties playing the “nationalist card,” see Ellinas (2007).

CHAPTER 2

1. For a documentary on the Efesos concert, see Giorgos Logothetis; accessed October 7, 2014, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=GPVF-46Tz3Y0.
2. In Mauthausen, Theodorakis documents the suffering of the Jewish people during the Holocaust. The Greek composer based his work on poems written by a survivor of Mauthausen, an Austrian concentration camp (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2003). Ari
Savit, who interviewed Theodorakis for the Israeli Haaretz, made the following comment: “The charismatic composer expresses himself on the Jews without realizing how his words are heard. What their effect is. His stance demonstrates the gap which divides the Christian Europe and the Jews. A sad epic with 1000 years’ history.” The interview was later translated in the Greek press. See Kathimerini (2004).

3. Empirical tests show that public opinion depends largely on issue framing, and even small changes in the wording of questions can produce different preferences among respondents; see Kynder (1998: 778–868); Iyengar (1991); Mendelberg (2001). The link between ideas and policy-making is a central theme in the field of International Relations (see, for instance, Goldstein and Keohane 1993), while scholars of nationalism have pointed to ideational explanations to interpret the development of modern national movements; see, for instance, Kedourie (1960) and O’Leary (2002).

4. For a comprehensive analysis of how groups perceived themselves in the pre-modern era, see Gellner (1983); O’Leary, (1998); and Yack (1996).

5. The Greek daily Apogevmatini wrote on November 14, 2001: “The tyrants are gone—They (Northern alliance forces) entered Kabul to the backdrop of Songs by Mikis” [in Greek]. For other references to Theodorakis at the time, see Xinhua General News Service (2001); and Raptis (2001). In 2014, Kurdish women fighters used Theodorakis songs in a video clip, preparing to mobilize international support for the Syrian Kurds in the siege of Kobane by ISIS; accessed October 17, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7aoWIBQ8kw#t=12.

6. Miroslav Hroch argues that the basic condition for the success of any national movement is that its argument (frame) at least roughly correspond to the reality perceived by those at whom it is directed (Hroch 1998: 99; see also Benford and Snow 2000).

7. Interview with Quintin Oliver, chair of the “Yes” Campaign for the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement.” Belfast, Northern Ireland, 2009.

8. Former chief of staff and president, leader of the September 12, 1980, military coup.


10. Benford and Snow (2000) argue that many studies on framing and framing contests fail to shed much light on the factors that shape the outcomes of such contests. Such studies could be described as tautological, as they suggest that those who won employed the most resonant framing. See also Zuo and Benford (1995) and Coles (1999).

11. For the importance of substantive prior knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships, see George (1991: 451–72).

12. In referring to early stages in the formation of minority nationalism, Brendan O’Leary makes a similar point after analyzing Gellner’s interpretation of nationalism, particularly its grievance component. While Gellner emphasizes the effect of cultural humiliation and blocked social mobility, O’Leary argues that Gellner underestimates the role of power-politics in explaining which cultures become nations. See O’Leary (1998: 65–66).
13. Welch (1993) also argues that justice motives are not being used as a rhetorical ploy but have decisive influence themselves. Welch attributes causal primacy to moral sentiments in the genesis of war.

14. For an earlier period comparative work on radicalization in Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, and Ireland, see Demetriou (2012).

15. “Predominantly” here corresponds to 70 percent of all quoted debates.

CHAPTER 3

1. Army training for cadet officers in Greece has been the standard practice of the Cypriot National Guard even for those completing a compulsory military service.

2. This chapter uses interchangeably the terms “ethnic” or “Slav” Macedonians, and “Macedonian Republic” or “FYROM” to refer to the state officially recognized by the United Nations as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Given that the name conflict is a central theme of this book, it would have been counterproductive to adopt the language used by one or the other side. For the author’s recommendations as to how to resolve the name issue, see conclusion.

3. A decade later, a Financial Times journalist wrote about this crisis: “Following a proposal by Mr. Milosevic in 1991 that Greece and Serbia should split the territory of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia between them, Mr. Mitsotakis asked the defense ministry to make a plan for moving troops across the Greek border into southern Macedonia. The plan was vetoed by Kostantinos Karamanlis, then Greek president, according to a former senior official” (Hope 2004: 3). Although this reference should be treated with caution, it does demonstrate the seriousness of the crisis (see also Holbrooke 1998).

4. In an article critical of Greek nationalism, mainstream daily Eleftherotypia reported preparations for paramilitary activities organized in the island of Crete with the alleged support of Greek military officials, as well as that of the subsequent prime minister of Greece, Antonis Samaras. For relevant documentation, see Ios tis Kyriakis (1994), titled “To the Path of the Death Battalion: Kouzoulades for Macedonia” (July 10) [in Greek], in Eleftherotypia 172.

5. As Thodoros Skylakakis, a close associate of the Mitsotakis government, put it, the issues of the refugees of northern Cyprus, the Karpasia Greek Cypriots, as well as those of northern Epirus of Albania were more important, because in the case of these people what were in danger were their rights, freedoms, and homes (Skylakakis 1995: 146).

6. Stalin supported the Macedonian cause before World War II. During the civil war, he preferred not to risk further relations with the West. Tito’s support for the Greek communists was one of the points where Stalin’s and Tito’s policies clashed (Banac 1988). Mavrogordatos (1983) points out that the Slavomacedonians of eastern Macedonia immigrated to Bulgaria after the agreement on the voluntary exchange of populations, while Slavomacedonians in western Macedonian received orders from IMRO to stay in their territories.

8. See, for instance, ibid., and Rossos (2008).

9. For informal figures, see Alexandri (1992) and Toronto Star (1992).

10. The Mitsotakis government introduced an oil embargo against the landlocked republic between January 1992 and September 1992, while Andreas Papandreou introduced a seven-month frontier embargo (excluding food and medicine) on February 16, 1994 (Agence France Presse 1994a; see also Hislope 2003: 136).

11. Greek Parliament Debates, April 23, 1986: 6382. There is also plenty of evidence showing that both the average Greek citizen and key experts had little knowledge of the Macedonian issue. For example, in various figures cited in Eleftherotypia on November 1, 1992, Greek politicians and bureaucrats appear to make a guess as to how many Greeks lived in their neighboring republic; a brief sampling elicits the following estimates: Christides, 10,000; Zoulas, 250,000; Vakalopoulos, 200,000; Minister Tsitsikostas, 300,000; Tsathas, 250,000; Greek General Staff, 239,000; Ambassador Dountas, zero.


13. One should not downplay problems in these areas; see Poulton (2000); Demetriou (2004); Tzanelli (2006).


17. Ibid., April 14, 1980: 3763.


20. See ibid., 6483.

21. For Kyrikos's arguments, see ibid., February 12, 1991: 5973, 5981.

22. For the PM response on the same debate, see ibid., 5975.


25. In ancient Greek mythology, Sisyphus betrayed the gods' secrets and chained the god of death so the deceased could not reach the underworld. His punishment was
to roll a block of stone up a steep hill; it tumbled back down when he reached the top of the hill. It started all over again, and lasted all eternity. Unsurprisingly, the myth of Sisyphus has been revisited several times to describe Greece’s position post-2008, particularly its unsuccessful attempts to address the sovereign debt crisis (see Pappas 2014).


27. For opposition to Andreas Papandreou’s statement, see Greek Parliament Debates, February 12, 1991: 5969, and for Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis’s reply, see ibid: 5977.


31. Andreas Papandreou, address to the Cyprus House of Representatives, February 28, 1982.


33. Ibid., 6861.

34. Ibid., 6863.


38. See a discussion of Turkish minority incidents in Thrace in ibid., June 6, 1988: 6868. Mitsotakis’s framing of threats over Cyprus is also different from that of Papandreou. The former worries primarily about the lack of settlement. See ibid., June 6, 1988: 6867, while the latter wonders whether the settlement will include Turkish troops and unilateral rights for intervention.


40. See ibid., April 24, 1990.


42. See ibid., January 23, 1987: 2912. Even in the case of Turkey, Mitsotakis legitimized his policy option by pointing out that PM Papandreou also accepted a dialogue with Turkey at Davos immediately after the 1987 Aegean crisis. See ibid., February 24, 1992: 4160.

43. See ibid., June 6, 1988: 6856, 6862.
49. To understand why the official church was so confrontational in its attitudes, one should look at the history of Greek nationalist thinking as this was shaped by national historians in the past two centuries. Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos (1815–91) was arguably the most prominent figure of nineteenth-century Greek historiography. In his contribution, History of the Greek Nation from the Ancient Times to the Present, he redefined and reformulated the Greek nationalist thinking of his time (Paparrigopoulos 1853). Unlike early thinkers, such as Korais, Paparrigopoulos rehabilitated Greece’s Byzantine past and argued that Hellenism (or Greekness) contained both classical and Christian elements, the one complementing the other (ibid.). Paparrigopoulos’s integration of Byzantium and Christianity in Greek national ideology served two practical purposes. On the one hand, it brought together conflicting views on the conception of the Greek nationhood and produced an ideology that was accepted by most Greeks. On the other, his nationalism was more compatible with the clergy and the Orthodox masses of the Ottoman Empire. Greek nationalist thinking gradually penetrated the higher and lower clergy in parts of “unredeemed” Greece. Although Paparrigopoulos’s framing was not unusual at the time, what was surprising was its durability for so long in the Greek public discourse, as well as the failure of both discourse and policy to adapt to contemporary conditions (see also Loizides 2009a).
51. See Mitsotakis’s speech at Pantios (1990); and also Andreas Papandreou, Greek Parliament Debates, January 23, 1987: 2926.
54. Personal communication with Alexis Heraclides, November 2001.
55. This frame shaped a major ideological gap between Greece and most of the developed world that led many Greeks to interpret minority reports as acts hostile to the integrity of their nation. For example, the 1991 US Department of State report on human rights in Greece cited above was the first to mention the presence of ethnic Macedonians in the country. The report caused anger in the Greek parliament. See Greek Parliament Debates, February 12, 1991.
57. Ironically, Kofos, who became a proponent of this solution, was eventually marginalized in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; see endnote below and also a document

58. A former minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece has confirmed to me in an interview that his ministry has financed the promotion of nationalist views on the Macedonian issue particularly through the media. Interview with Michalis Papakonstantinou, Athens 2001.

59. Evangelos Kofos was probably the most influential academic practitioner in Greece with respect to the Macedonian issue. He wrote his MA thesis, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, in Georgetown and subsequently published it with the Institute of Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki in 1964. In an interview he gave to me in 2001, he admitted that there was generally no interest on the Macedonian issue until the 1990s. Kofos (1964) rejected the authenticity of ethnic Macedonian nationalism by pointing out that the name "Macedonians" was assigned to the Slav inhabitants of upper Macedonia by the Yugoslavs in an attempt to invest them with a new national identity. The Kofos case is only one example of views that were also echoed by other influential academics or journalists, such as a close associate of PM Mitsotakis and president of the Society for Macedonian Studies Nikos Mertzos (1992). See also the award-winning Athens Academy book by former minister Nicolaos Martis (1984); and the 1986 edited volume by Douglas Dakin on the Macedonian struggle, also published by the Society for Macedonian Studies (Dakin 1986).

60. For the monitoring and editing of historical archives, see Ios tis Kyriakis (2004), while for national debates on archeology and the authenticity of Philip's grave, see Martis (1999). Finally, for educational text, see the analysis of the heavily edited and misinterpreted text of Stratis Myrivilis used in Greek and Greek Cypriot educational systems; accessed October 7, 2014, available at www.odyssey.com.cy/main/default.aspx?tabID=145&itemID=1332&mid=1088.

61. This is a constant theme in the rhetoric of the speeches of then minister of foreign affairs Antonis Samaras. See, for instance, Tziampilis (2000: 220).

62. With few exceptions, even post–World War II Marxist scholars have not been able to shake off these national influences. See Rossos (1981: xi–xii).

63. Some of the government activities in the republic itself, such as a controversial clause in the constitution, were quickly reverted after Greek reactions. There was also the story of the new republic's currency, depicting the White Tower, a landmark monument in Thessaloniki that ethnic Macedonians denied (Savill 1992: 8). However, this was something confirmed to me by many Greek experts, as well as CIA analyst David Kanin, in an informal discussion in November 2003 during the AAASS (American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies) conference.

64. Kantiotes used the local radio of the church to warn that violence could be used to stop filming Angelopoulos's anti-Greek script and threatened to excommunicate
any local collaborators. Locals demonstrated under the slogan “Macedonia was, is and always be, Greek,” and banners read: “Down with the EEC, the Satanic Superstate funding the treachery of Angelopoulos.” See Thompson (1990a, 1990b); and interviews with locals in Florina (1997) and (2001).

65. Taken from the author’s field notes, 2001.

66. Author fieldwork notes and personal interview with the successor mayor, Vasilis Papageorgopoulos (2001). See also www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfDZp3h-BTg; accessed October 7, 2014.

67. Zurich is the point of reference against negotiating a settlement with Turkey; see, for instance, Greek Parliament Debates, October 23, 1980: 739; for the Samaras reference, see Papahelas (2002: A12).


69. For examples, see Greek Parliament Debates, June 5–8, 1988: 6828, 6856, 6929.

70. Rallis declared that Greece lost its friends and credibility.

71. In 2014, Greece (and Cyprus) canceled their high-level participation at the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict taking place in the United Kingdom because of the use of the name “Republic of Macedonia” in the invitations.

CHAPTER 4


2. Turkish Journalists Union chairman Nazmi Bilgin pointed out that 1 million people contributed to a signature campaign; see TRT TV (1998). Among the best-attended rallies was the one in Kayseri, with nearly 130,000 demonstrators; see Agence France Presse (1998c).

3. Although the government did not make the boycott official, it helped initiate it through its political statements and its own boycott of Italian military equipment. For instance, the Italian Agusta firm lost its chance of winning the bid for the 145 attack helicopters worth $3.5 billion. See Sabah (1998: 22). The boycott was launched by the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and supported both by state and private companies (Agence France Presse 1998c).

4. “Commissioned by the government in 2006, Hacettepe University in Ankara found that between 954,000 and 1.2 million people were forced to flee their homes between 1986 and 2005, the vast majority of them Kurdish. The results of the only survey of its kind have yet to be fully endorsed by the government, which previously put the number of IDPs at 378,000. NGOs have reported between one and three million” (IDMC 2013).

5. Although a figure of thirty thousand deaths prevailed in both Turkish and international media, there is some ambiguity concerning the exact estimates, ethnic origin, and political proclivity (PKK or Turkish state) of the casualties in this war; see HRW (1995); and Turkish Parliament Debates, June 27, 1995.

7. For the history of Syrian Turkish conflicts, see Olson (2000); see also Turkish Parliament Debates October 7, 1998: 11.

8. As the current Turkish PM has argued, its country's foreign policy cannot be seen in isolation across different domains and regions. By was of contrast, “Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of manoeuvring in several regions simultaneously” [emphasis added] (Davutoğlu 2008: 78).

9. See reports in Ms Presswire (1999); Xinhua General News Service (1999); and Turkish Daily News (1999b).

10. The decision on Cyprus was based on a principle referred to as constructive ambiguity, aiming to make no final commitments until the outcome of the negotiations in the island was clear, including which side was responsible for a possible stalemate (Jonasson 1999). The exact wording of the Helsinki conclusions is the following: “The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.” See Helsinki European Council, December 10 and 11, 1999, “Presidency Conclusions,” available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm; accessed October 11, 2014.

11. For instance, Turkish PM Mesut Yılmaz argued that Turkey’s relations with Syria had nothing to do with Israel. See Turkish Parliament Debates, October 7, 1998: 10.

12. Özal’s proposal also suggested the deportation of two hundred thousand Kurds. It was not clear at the time whether this was used as a cover for a major compromise, but he died from a heart attack shortly afterward. There was never a proper investigation into his death, and until recently, his relatives have appeared in news programs alleging a possible assassination.

13. Author’s fieldwork notes from interviews with MHP leaders, November–December 2001.

14. The leader of MHP warned several times that he would not participate in a government eager to make concessions in foreign policy issues, as these would threaten the government’s collapse. See, for example, Turkish Daily News (2002); for a comprehensive study of MHP anti-European ideology, see Canefe and Bora (2003).

15. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a weakness of my Boolean test is its treatment of each crisis as an independent event. Yet one could assume that politicians, opinion-makers, and the public learn from older crises and act accordingly in subsequent ones. What the analysis of precrisis frames permits is the identification of the policy lessons and experiences of actors that allow them to make relevant predictions. I selected twenty debates in order to cover at least one debate for every previous crisis in my dataset. For studies on learning experience in comparative politics, see Bermeo (1992, 2002, 2010).

16. Ethnic Kurdish representatives who claimed to be "Kurds" did not make it to
the parliament before this period. For earlier unsuccessful efforts to discuss the Kurdish issue, see Turkish Parliament Debates, October 31, 1985; Turkish Parliament Debates, January 19, 1988.

17. Turkish Parliament Debates, March 3, 1994: 368. In quoting the results, I excluded comments by nonmajority Turks, such as members of the Kurdish minority in the parliament. I also excluded Western Thrace Turks from the coding of Greek Parliament speeches.

18. He told a story in the parliament recounted to him by locals on the Black Sea coast: Pontus Greeks who became refugees in 1923 were regularly visiting their former villages, telling their neighbors that after Turkey's accession into the EU they would return to the villages of their ancestors. See Islamist RP, MP Cevat Ayhan, Turkish Parliament Debates, June 7, 1995: 70.


20. See speech by Kurdish MP Mehmet Evin Sever, ibid., 383.


24. MPs accused the government of evacuating twenty-two hundred villages without providing the inhabitants alternative housing; see conservative ANAP MP Mustafa Balçlar, ibid., June 27, 1995: 18.

25. There were many debates in the TGNA on the extension of Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, often with indirect references to the Kurdish issue and PKK (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1994).


27. Ibid., 18.


30. Leftist CHP, MP Deniz Baykal, ibid., October 7, 1998: 21; see also an independent's view on p. 27.


32. Ibid., 13.

33. Ibid., 11.

34. Ibid.; see also Kutan's references to the joint activities of Armenia, Syria, and Greece (Ankara Anatolia 1998).


36. Ibid., 12.

37. In August 1920, the Sèvres Treaty was signed between the defeated Ottoman Empire and the victorious allies in World War I. The agreement called for the dismem-
berment of the Ottoman Empire in favor of Christian, Kurdish, and Arab populations, as well as the imperial great powers. Anatolia was divided among the victors: an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan were proposed for the East. Greece received Thrace and the right to occupy Izmir and a hinterland whose final status was to be decided in a plebiscite after five years. The British and the French created their own spheres of influence, Italy took the Dodecanese Islands, and the Bosphorus Straits were internationalized. The allies applied to the Ottoman lands the same principles and methods used in their partition of Africa. See Jelavich (1983: 130–31).

38. In the parliamentary debates, references to Sèvres are made: for instance in the speech of leftist DSP MP Tahir Köse, Turkish Parliament Debates, November 18, 1998: 11; and earlier in the speech of Millet Partisi (Nation Party) MP İbrahim Kumaş, ibid., June 27, 1995: 38.

39. Although Islamist in its general orientation, Davutoğlu’s Stratejik Derinlik (2001), published two years after the 1998–99 Öcalan crisis, also shares similar perceptions on neighbors and the need for Turkey to pursue an active foreign policy that will allow it to establish strategic depth (“a living space”) between the country and its neighborhood. For a rival Kemalist Eurasianism discourse, see Akçali and Perinçek (2009). For elements of continuity and change in Turkey’s foreign policy elite thinking, see also Grigoriadis (2014) and Ozkan (2014).


41. This was the primary reason for Turkey to continue supporting this operation; Murat Karayalçın, ibid., December 18, 1994.

42. Interestingly, this frame contradicts popular conspiracy frames described above that attribute PKK’s actions on outsiders’ support; Orhan Kilercıoğlu, ibid., March 21, 1995: 30.

43. On the Turkish invasion of northern Iraq in 1995, see, for instance, ibid., 22. There was no comment criticizing the actions of the military in general; General Kenan Evren was convinced that the Turkish nation “has always embraced with affection those (in the military) who served it well and gave them their support.” See Heper and Guneş (1996). Moreover, independent data suggest that the military was the most trusted institution in Turkish society. See the survey published as Türk Toplumunun Değerleri (The Values of the Turkish Society), Istanbul: TUSAD, 1991, p. 22, cited in Özbudun (1996).

44. See, for instance, Abdullah Gül, Turkish Parliament Debates, December 20, 1997:

53.


47. Kamra İnan, ibid., 12.


50. İsmail Cem, ibid., December 20, 1997: 46; Cem was probably referring to the
decision of Cyprus president Clerides to delay for sixteen months, then to postpone, and finally to cancel the missile purchase (see chronology in Table 4.1).

51. Speech by conservative DYP MP Hayri Kozakçıoğlu, ibid., October 7, 1998: 15; also leftist CHP Deniz Baykal, ibid., 22.

52. For instance, Milliyet, November 22, 1998, published an article titled “The Armenian Lobby Is Providing Help,” p. 22, while on November 19 it produced a cartoon of a Catholic priest blessing Öcalan. The fabricated photo of the pope blessing Öcalan was published by the same newspaper on November 24, 1998 (p. 1), with small letters indicating that this image was not genuine.


56. Islamist FP MP, Abdullah Gül, ibid., 11.

57. Unlike previous decisions by EU bodies such as the European Parliament, at Helsinki the Kurdish issue was not mentioned. On the absence of references to the Kurdish question in Helsinki, see also Kirisci 2004: 303.

58. The minorities recognized by this treaty are the three tiny communities of Armenians, Jews, and Greeks of Istanbul. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 canceled most of the terms of Sèvres and gave Turkey full control of Anatolia and Thrace (Jelavich 1983:32).


60. For the ambiguity in this clause, however, see Chapter 5.

61. Concerning Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot administrations were hardly the target of criticism, probably a result of the mostly wise and cautious policies of presidents Vassiliou and Clerides. Thus, concerning Turkish Cypriots, references were made usually in abstract form, with some expressing concerns over the economic hardships of the Turkish Cypriots, but without blaming the Greek Cypriots directly. See Süleyman Demirel, Turkish Parliament Debates, October 1, 1995: 6.

62. Süleyman Demirel, ibid., 7. Exactly three years later, President Süleyman Demirel expressed the belief that the two neighbors could resolve their disputes; see ibid., October 1, 1998: 26.

63. This was the interpretation of Ibrahim Tez of the Leftist Party SHP, ibid., December 21, 1994: 393.

64. See the speech by Islamist RP MP Cevat Ayhan in ibid., 410; see also debates on those events and the Pontic genocide in ibid., March 1, 1994.

65. Ibid., June 8, 1995: 70. It was rather presented as a routine action; see, for instance, TRT TV, Ankara 1995, titled “Cabinet Granted Military Power to Protect Aegean Interests,” in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 10.

66. PM Mesut Yılmaz, Turkish Parliament Debates, April 17, 1996: 66. For a similar speech on the Aegean, see Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem, ibid., December 20, 1997: 47–49.
68. Conservative DYP Hayri Kozakçıoğlu, ibid., March 13, 1999: 17; conservative ANAP MP Ulkü Güney argued: “[F]or years Turkey has shown with evidence that Greece was supporting terrorism. We called upon them to give up this inhuman attitude. The scene of Ocalan with Greece was horrible and this has shown that the country is stuck in the mud of terrorism up to her throat.” See ibid., 20.
69. Hayri Kozakçıoğlu, ibid., 17.
70. Similar accusations against Greece and Cyprus appeared before the capture of the PKK leader, for instance, by Islamist RP MP Cevat Ayhan, in ibid., March 21, 1995: 25.
71. See, for instance, a speech by conservative ANAP MP Gurhan Çelebiçan in ibid., December 21, 1994: 398; also see nationalist MHP MP Oktay Vural, in ibid., October 12, 1999: 14–15; there is also a lack of trust among European consumers who were seen as unwilling to buy products labeled “Made in Turkey.” Greece insisted on having country of origin labels in the Common Market in order to harm the Turkish economy; ANAP MP Ekrem Pakdemirli, ibid., June 8, 1995: 42.
72. See conservative DYP MP Baki Tuğ’s speech, ibid., December 21, 1994: 405; Turkish MPs did not concentrate exclusively on the European Union, but accused the UN, NATO, OECD, and the Islamic League of failing to protect Bosnia. See ibid., July 19, 1995.
73. Baki Tuğ, ibid., December 21, 1994: 407; another MP said: “You can stop all the exacts in the world if you wish, the West will still see you as a Muslim. The name of all Muslims in the Western world is ‘Turk’ and being a Muslim means being a Turk. That is why in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are genocides and that is why in Chechnya there is another one and that is why in Azerbaijan, northern Iraq, Western Thrace, Cyprus, Haiti and Somalia there is violence.” See İsmet Gür, ibid., December 18, 1994: 985.
74. Here criticism is also directed at the 1978 US embargo. See Cevat Ayhan, ibid., June 12, 1996: 24. Adopting a similar tone, leftist DSP MP Mümün Soysal argued that Europe could not depend on Turkey for soldiers (i.e., in its various NATO military organizational plans) and at the same time reject its membership; see ibid., 18. Finally, conservative ANAP MP Kamran İnan argued that it was not fair for Turkey to be a half-member (partner) and wondered whether half-members would be shot with half bullets in a war; see ibid., 27. In another debate, the same MP used the word “disloyalty” to describe EU policies toward Turkey; see ibid., December 18, 1994: 971.
75. Ibid., December 20, 1997: 53.
76. Ibid., June 12, 1996: 16–18.
78. See speech by conservative DYP MP Orhan Kılıççioğlu, in ibid., December 8, 1994: 973.
79. Süleyman Demirel describes Turkey as the antidote to the clash of civilizations and the bridge between the West and the East; see ibid., October 1, 1995: 8.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., April 17, 1996.
82. For example, compare SHP with ANAP in ibid., December 21, 1994: 395–99; see Süleyman Demirel, ibid., October 1, 1995: 7–8. (Demirel also points out the need for mutual compromises and for Turkey to show its goodwill and use peaceful methods.)
83. See, for instance, a speech by conservative DYP MP Baki Tuğ, in ibid., December 2, 1994: 405. Pride with no remorse was expressed in discussions of the events in Cyprus in 1974, but this theme was seldom repeated. See ibid., June 22, 1993: 14.
84. Oktay Vural, ibid., October 12, 1999: 14–15. Conservative ANAP MP Kamran Inan attributed this change to energy policies and EU interests in the Middle East; see ibid., 13. However, Leftist DSP MP Ali Tekin said that in international relations, friendship and enmity should not be measured in absolute terms, and that the friendship resulting from the earthquakes gave the two nations an opportunity to improve their relationship; see ibid., 17.
85. Leftist DSP MP Eşvet Özdoğan, ibid., October 26, 1999: 29.
86. Ibid., October 12, 1999: 10–12.
87. One of the most notable exceptions in Turkish politics, which I do not cover in my analysis, was the small (put popular among intellectuals) New Democracy Movement (YDH) of Cem Boyner; although he believed in a unitary state, he admitted that discussing a federal settlement was possible; see Kirişçi and Winrow (1997: 146).
88. Ecevit used the experience he gained from Cyprus to convince the parliament to maintain its military presence in Bosnia; see DSP leader Bülent Ecevit, Turkish Parliament Debates, July 19, 1995: 43. Ecevit ordered the 1974 invasion against Cyprus and since then is occasionally referred to as the “conqueror” of the island (Milliyet 1999: 15).
91. Ibid., 18.
92. Ergil was the president of the Center for the Research of Societal Problems (TOSAV), an Ankara-based nongovernmental organization created to address the tensions between Turks and Kurds. In different studies, such as the TOBB report, he shows that Kurds demand human rights, not secession (Ergil 1995). See interview with Doğu Ergil, December 22, 2001; see also Ergil (1995, 2000).
94. See Pope (1993: 14) and TRT TV (1993). Çiller rival and ANAP successor Mesut Yılmaz stated that regional cultures in Turkey must be allowed to exist but through their own means (TRT 1992). According to McDowall, Yılmaz stated on another occasion that
the Kurdish language should become the second official language in Turkey (1997: 428).


96. Islamist Kutan downplayed the Muslim connection between Syria and Turkey and played up the distinction between (primarily Sunni) Turkey and Alevi-dominated Syria. He said that the Alevi minority in Syria dominated the 90 percent Sunni majority, and cited a perverted Alevi mentality (Ankara Anatolia 1998).

97. For a more general analysis of spirals as positive feedback, see Jervis (1997: 174–75).

98. In the summer of 1988 Birand interviewed Öcalan, causing a major uproar in Turkey as Öcalan was de-demonized for the first time. Birand later wrote this comment in Sabah on April 25, 1992, cited in Poulton (1997: 226).

99. For other critical voices, see a declaration on human rights by some of the leading intellectuals of the country: “Save Turkey from Shame,” in Sabah, October 12, 1999.

100. For instance, when Italy refused to extradite Apo, an opposition deputy criticized the government for being naive about Italy in the first days of the crisis: “You said that you had him caught; it turns out that he was invited. You said that he was in prison; it turns out that he was in a guest house. You said that he was a convict; it turns out he was a guest.” Conservative DYP MP, Bekir Aksoy, Turkish Parliament Debates, November 18, 1998: 9.

101. Ibid., December 14, 1999: 10–11.

102. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

1. The villagers lit the fire on January 13, 2003 (Athanasiades 2003). The Doğanci/Elia protests were part of a greater mobilization against veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas. In January 2003, seventy thousand Turkish Cypriots participated in a propeace rally against the division of Cyprus covered in media throughout the world (Toronto Star 2003; Agence France Presse 2003; Smith 2003: 12).

2. According to the Annan Plan, a large number of the current inhabitants of northern Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots and settlers)—sixty–thirty thousand or fewer—would be relocated to make space for more than half of the current Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their former homes and properties. The majority of Greek Cypriot refugees would return under Greek Cypriot administration, while the rest would receive compensation or return under Turkish Cypriot administration, albeit with some restrictions. In return, the Turkish Cypriot community would be granted recognition for its own constituent state (that is, a federal part of a reunited Cyprus), almost equal participation in the central government disproportionate to its size, control of territory and seacoast, and more important, accession to the EU (see Loizides 2016).

3. Kouvelis as cited in Pittas (1995: 147). The statement was made as part of Kouvelis’s statement as a witness for the trial of the “five of OSE” (Organization for Socialist
Revolution). Using legislation from the Metaxas era, the five were arrested for “treason” and for “endangering national unity” after disseminating a text challenging the major tenets of Greek nationalism on the Macedonian issue. The defense of the “five” brought together witnesses from academia, the civil society, and political parties who provided evidence challenging the dominant narratives of the Greek state (ibid.). This trial provides further evidence as to how nationalist frames become embedded in legal practices (see also Chapter 4 on related legal practices in Turkey).

4. For the agreement, see Valinakis and Dalis (1996: 379) or, for an English translation, see Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Greece and the Balkans: General Principles of Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans,” available at www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/balkan_affairs.htm.

5. Such a solution would have led, for instance, to a shared use of the name “Macedonia,” allowing the republic to use a double name (for example, Slavomacedonia, Nova Macedonia, North Macedonia). See also the discussion of Ohrid Macedonia in the conclusion.


7. Greece assumed the EU presidency in January 1994. The influence of Mrs. Papandreou was such that Philip Jacobson of the Daily Mail ran an editorial on January 3, 1994, titled “Is Mimi the Woman Now Running Europe?” (p. 8).

8. According to Greek daily Eleftherotypia (1995b), Richard Holbrooke exercised more pressure on FYR Macedonia. The paradox is that in FYR Macedonia, the reaction was also insignificant given the history of the problem. The nationalist party, VMRO (Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), cooperated with other parties but only to organize small demonstrations protesting the agreement. Demonstrators turned on “the betrayal of President Gligorov and his acceptance of the Greek ultimatum” (Eleftherotypia 1995e). This implies that there might have been a bigger potential for pressure and compromise in FYR Macedonia. Likewise, in Greece the accord was acceptable to the two biggest parties of Greece; thus the government should have insisted on the “larger package,” which included a mutually advantageous agreement on the name.


10. On the Macedonian issue, some of the best investigative journalism was done by the Ios Press team in Eleftherotypia and other venues, particularly since the mid-1990s. Unfortunately, this landmark reporting was discontinued in 2012 as a result of the debt crisis and funding problems. See Ios Press archive online; accessed October 6, 2013, available at www.iospres.gr/.

11. Shelef (2010: 8) refers to these exogenous shocks as a “cognitive punch” that “shifts the otherwise durable nationalist ideology off its track by offering an incentive to change.”

12. As argued by Lionarakis’s himself in Ependitis (February 28, 2005). Titled “35.855
International Non-Governmental Organizations in Greece," the piece demonstrates the strength of the sector under the encouragement of the MFA; accessed October 6, 2014, available at www.metarithmisi.gr/archivesMeta/eka/readArchives.asp?catID=1&subCatID=0&page=669&textID=1117.

13. According to a number of polls, Papandreou was one of the most popular Greek politicians, a clear sign that the Greek public applauded his policies of rapprochement with Turkey. See, for example, To Vima (2001).

14. For the development of consensus on Greek foreign policy toward Turkey, see Couloumbis (1998).

15. Personal interview by John Mitsis with former Greek PM George Papandreou, August 2014. See also keynote address by George Papandreou at the Turkey and Cyprus: Regional Peace and Stability held at the USAK House in Ankara in February 2015 and organized by Nicos Anastasiou (Cyprus Academic Dialogue), Muzaffer Kutlay (University of Kent), Marc Herzog (British Institute at Ankara), Costas Constanti (Australian High Commission in Nicosia), Mustafa Kutlay (USAK) and the author; accessed May 6, 2015, available at http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/carc/events/index.html.

16. See, for instance, the Turkish Daily News article titled “Warning to EU: Refusing Candidacy Status May Spoil Climate of Turkish-Greek Ties,” on December 7, 1999, and “Exclusive Interview with President Demirel” by two of the leading journalists of Turkey, İlnur Cevik and Yusuf Canlı, published in Turkish Daily News, December 10, 1999.

17. In fact, the daily newspaper Milliyet made an analogy between the 1974 invasion of Cyprus and Abdullah Öcalan’s capture in 1999. See the article titled “The Conqueror of Cyprus Becomes the Captor of Apo” [in Turkish], published on February 17, 1999, 15.


21. See, for instance, Jonasson’s (1999) media article titled “Politics-EU: ‘Constructive Ambiguity’ for Turkey, Greece and Cyprus,” published in IPS-Inter Press Service, December 13. The exact text formulation was: “[T]he European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.” See “Presidency Conclusions at Helsinki European Council, December 10 and 11, 1999”; accessed October


26. Leader of MHP Devlet Bahçeli addressed his party saying that “we will know how to burn Rome,” while Turkey’s most popular newspaper, Hurriyet, added: “Italy will finish on its knees and hide in its boot.” See FBIS Transcribed Text, “ANSA Reports Turkish Rightists Threaten to ‘Burn Rome’,” published on November 23, 1998. See also reporting by Agence France Presse titled “Kurdish Rebels Killed by Turkish Army,” published on November 23, 1998.

27. Turkish Parliament Debates, August 2, 2002: 97. For a detailed analysis of the framing contest between those advocating and opposing broadcasting reforms, see Loizides and Ersin (2006).


30. For instance, two years after the accession To Vima (October 15, 2006: A24), there ran a headline: “A War between Bakoyianni-Lilliaka ahead of the Helsinki Summit” [in Greek], referring to the conflict between the Greek and Cypriot ministers of foreign affairs, respectively.


32. For an overview of the Greek Cypriot arguments, see Palley (2005).

33. “Taiwanization” is a term used by Greek Cypriot politicians to describe the possibility of “TRNC” coming closer to being de facto recognized internationally.

34. Personal communication with Lellos Demetriades, July 22, 2011, Kosovo.

35. For this statement and timeline of events and relevant declarations during the 2002–3 rallies, see www.cyprusaction.org/protests/.

36. The party’s name, Republican Turkish Party (CTP), implied commitment to Turkish Kemalism.

37. For comparative data and survey results, see Kovras and Loizides (2012) and
Aronson (2011) on South Africa, as well as the website of the Committee for Missing Persons in Cyprus.


39. Police were at best ineffective in dealing with these threats. Kutlu Adali, Uludag’s brother-in-law, was assassinated in 1996. There has been no arrest for his murder and, according to a landmark ECtHR decision, no “effective investigation into the killing” by Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot authorities (ECtHR 2005).

40. Personal interview with Ioannis Kasoulides (by telephone), Nicosia-Belfast, July 2010. See also Kasoulides (1999).

41. Personal interview with Ioannis Kasoulides (by telephone), Nicosia Belfast, July 2010.

42. Personal interview with Tasos Tzionis (by telephone), Nicosia Paphos, July 2014.

43. DISY (Democratic Rally) was established by Glaflkós Clerides in 1976. Paradoxically, the party brought together center-right liberals and the Greek Cypriot nationalist traditions of the island linked to the struggle against the British (EOKA, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and the violent opposition against elected president Makarios (EOKA B). Following the 1974 coup, EOKA B members in particular were accommodated within DISY in exchange for ending the violence.

44. For a summary of all related ECtHR decisions, see www.moi.gov.cy/MI/pio/pio.pdf/All/72ACP3CE7B20D0F6C2256D001EAE31?OpenDocument; accessed October 10, 2014.


CHAPTER 6

1. For a related and insightful theoretical discussion on the foreign of small states, see Keohane (1969).

2. For a number of insightful comparisons of the three countries, see Beissinger (2007); Nikolayenko (2007); Bunce and Wolchik (2006); Kotsovilis (2013).

3. For notable exceptions, see Brubaker (1998); Beissinger (2002); Mansfield and Snyder (2005); and Shelef (2010).

4. See Gellner (1965, 1983); Tilly (1978); Anderson (1983); and for a critical review of these theories, see also Smith (1998).

5. For a classic exchange between Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner on the mod-

6. Leading Yugoslav historian Ivo Banac (1992) argued that the conflict among the South Slavs, specifically among the Serbs and the Croats, could not be viewed as ancient, unless the term “ancient” encompasses the end of the nineteenth century (see also Banac 1983). The conflict was also not religious, although religion had played a key part in the development of modern South Slav nationalisms. Banac argues instead that the conflict was primarily ideological and political (1992). For the ideological and political difference among South Slavs, see also Banac (1984).

7. For instance, Gagnon (1994) explains how in Bosnia and Croatia forces allied with Belgrade went to great lengths to destroy the long-standing harmony between Serbs and non-Serbs.

8. See critique in Hall (1998: 15–16). Others stress the effect of communist-era institutional arrangements and the incentives those arrangements provided for ethnic mobilization. The timing of their appearance—before or during the democratization process—is also important. See, for example, Linz and Stepan (1992).

9. The most important work on ethnic mobilizations that deals with societies in transition in the former Soviet Union is that of Mark Beissinger (2002). However, it does not address the simultaneous emergence of nationalist politics beyond these countries nor compare their experience with that of other (non) communist neighboring societies facing similar problems following the end of the cold war.

10. See, for example, Snyder’s (2000: 234) comparison of civil society and nationalist engagement in the Baltics, Caucasus, and Central Asia, where he implies a positive relation between the two (see also Belloni 2001).

11. However, independent media could also focus attention on social issues of common interest across ethnic groups, mobilize support for antiregime demonstrations, and sometimes even promote friendship with “ethnic antagonists,” as illustrated in the previous chapter and the example of the Greek-Turkish earthquake diplomacy in the summer of 1999.

12. For a discussion of process tracing, see Van Evera (1997: 65), particularly on comparisons within a historical period (for example, the cold war, 1947–89).

13. See Judah (2002). Following this incident, Milošević rose to the leadership of Serbia in 1989.

14. See, for instance, memoirs of last US ambassador in the former Yugoslavia (Zimmermann 1996).

15. Two rival frames dominated discourse in the West, a prointerventionist one emphasizing the need for intervention advocated, for instance, by Clinton in his 1992 campaign, and a non-intervention one by President Bush. In explaining US inaction in the Bosnian war, Western argues that the lack of opposing views led most Americans to share President Bush’s framing of Bosnia as a “land steeped in ethnic hatreds dating
back hundreds of years, and as a result, they initially supported his decision to stay away from a Vietnam-style quagmire in the Balkans” (Western 2002: 120; see also Holbrooke 1998: 18–33; and Cohen 2001: 377–407).

16. Milošević, speaking to Serbs in the 1987 Kosovo rally, argued that “after many decades Serbia has her state, national and spiritual integrity back” (Judson 2002: 56).

17. The statement was made on April 28, 1992, and it is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=gsctIvSa938; accessed October 7, 2014.

18. For a detailed analysis of this relationship, see Michas (2002).

19. As mentioned earlier, ethnic (Slav) Macedonians have serious grievances about Greek assimilationist policies in areas of Greek Macedonia (usually northeast Greek Macedonia). These could be summarized as policies that aimed to destroy all signs of Macedonian nationalism, patriotism, or particularism, including an official prohibition on the use of the (Slavic) Macedonian language, particularly during the Metaxas dictatorship; resettlement of ethnic Greek refugees from Turkey to minority inhabited areas; forced denationalization and assimilation through the total control of the educational system; and discrimination against non-Greek, civil war veterans from returning to Greece.


21. A party representing Slav Macedonians was not very successful in attracting popular support and garnered no more than few thousand votes in elections.

22. There was a misperception of the degree to which (Slav) Macedonians were interested in ancient Macedonia. It seems that the preoccupation with ancient history was more endemic in the diaspora communities and the main right-wing party in the republic, as demonstrated by the construction of a massive statue of Alexander the Great in Skopje.

23. In fact, the Greek state followed the reactions and adopted a harsher policy on the issue than PM Konstantinos Mitsotakis wanted at the time. In replying to criticism, the PM said that this was the policy people wanted him to follow (Skylakakis 1995).

24. Despite earlier polls, Samaras Political Spring party was a failure, although as noted earlier Samaras returned to politics victoriously two decades later to become the Greek prime minister as the leader of Nea Demokratia.

25. The Pontics are a Greek ethnic group whose historical homeland is on the Turkish coast of the Black Sea. Although the Pontic question is linked to the Macedonian issue, there are few studies on the Pontics. Some information is included in Karakasidou (1997).

26. Greek historians have documented the existence of ethnic Macedonians at least since the 1960s, but most common people—particularly in southern Greece—had no idea of the existence of a distinct national identity in the area north of Greece.
27. Greek media presented these speculations on Turkey’s role in the Balkans. The attempt to create a common political front uniting ethnic Turks and Macedonians in Greece provided the stimuli for these speculations. According to Greek PM Mitsotakis, “With an open Cyprus problem, an impasse in Greek-Turkish relations, and a deteriorating—due to our mistakes—Muslim minority problem, if a new issue of Slavic Macedonian minority in West Macedonia was added then the burden for Greek foreign policy could be unbearable.” See introduction written by Mitsotakis himself in Skylakakis (1995).

28. The OHAL region (Turkish: Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği; English: Governorship of Region in State of Emergency) was a “super-region” created in the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey in 1987 under the state of emergency legislation. Kozakçıoğlu became the first regional governor, appointed by President Özal.


30. The bigger winners were the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) headed by the current prime minister, Bülent Ecevit (veteran PM of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus). His party represented the nationalist left in Turkey. Moderate leftists remained outside parliament for the first time in decades. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) was the other winner. Its members are connected with the notorious Grey Wolves, a right-wing organization responsible for violent acts against leftists and Kurds in the 1970s.

31. For parallels between Kurdistan and Kosovo, see, for instance, Chomsky (1999).

32. For a discussion of the synthesis of the two in Turkey, see Gellner (1994: 81–91); Sakallıoğlu (1998); and Turam (2007).

33. The Turkish public was earlier involved in an unprecedented wave of protest against France because of the Armenian draft bill resolution. The success of previous mobilizations encouraged participation and convinced people of the efficacy of acting in similar lines.

34. As noted, for more details on each of these crises, see dedicated database at www.qub.ac.uk/researchcentres/CentrefortheStudyofEthnicConflict/TeachingResearch/Datasets/Greek-TurkishNegotiationsandCrises1983–2003/T-NorthernIraq95/#d.en.178164; accessed October 7, 2014.


37. For a report on the 2004 elections, see OSCE (2004).

38. Author’s fieldwork notes from interviews in the Republic of Georgia, November 2012.

39. Asmus (2010: 59) criticizes US support to Georgia and argues that European leaders expressed concern over Saakashvili. He points out that “it was not uncommon to hear senior European officials remark that Saakashvili was an American-backed hot-head who spelled trouble.”


42. See also the question on the authenticity of Tymoshenko’s “taped conversation in which she allegedly called for Russia to be turned into ‘scorched earth’ and for ethnic Russians in Ukraine to be killed” (BBC 2014), as well as statement by Patriarch Filaret, the head of Ukraine’s Orthodox Church, that Putin (without naming him) is “possessed by Satan” (Jones 2014); for the original statement, see http://cerkva.info/en/messages/5417-new-kain.html; accessed October 7, 2014.


44. Tymoshenko was jailed in 2011 “for corruption linked to a gas deal she brokered with Russia as prime minister in 2009” (BBC 2014).

45. As demonstrated elsewhere (Suzuki and Loizides 2011), a “history of hostility” is a necessary condition for the security dilemma, particularly Posen’s (1993) reformulation of the concept. It is also a necessary condition for the diversionary theory of war as formulated by Levy (1989).

46. This is a figure cited by German academic Wemheuer (2014) in his book published by Yale University Press.

47. For examples of the use of social media to promote this frame, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=7acXX3r_1M; accessed October 7, 2014.

48. For a discussion of false analogies in international relations, see George (1980); and Jervis (1968, 1976).

CONCLUSION


2. See rationale of citymayors.com for selecting Boutaris as the mayor of the month in October 2012 (Baker 2012).

3. Following the expulsion of Sephardic Jews from fifteenth-century Spain (Mazor- er 2004). Famous descendants of the Jewish community of Thessaloniki include Turkish MFA Ismail Cem (mentioned in Chapter 5), former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, and Patrick Modiano, Nobel Prize recipient in Literature, 2014.

5. For a more detailed analysis of the links between majoratarinism and populism, including economic populism, see Kovras and Loizides (2014).

6. For instance, Ohrid Macedonia will reflect the name of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed in 2011 between minority Albanians and majority ethnic Slav Macedonians. The name “Ohrid” will also be commercially more attractive in terms of the country's tourism potential, while it relates nicely to the history of religion in the country.
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