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RUNNING HEAD: COLLECTIVE POLITICAL PROTEST

The Psychology of Collective Political Protest

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The Psychology of Collective Political Protest

Summary

Individuals act differently within the political process; behavior can range from passive acceptance of a situation to violent riots. This chapter outlines various theoretical explanations as to why these differences in behavior occur and what psychological processes mediate them. In the social psychological explanations of collective political protest the emphasis has changed in recent years. Traditional theories concerned individual decision making processes whereas more recent research has focused on the intergroup context of the political environment. This chapter concentrates on the three currently predominant approaches; expectancy-value theory (e.g. Klandermans, 1997), relative deprivation theory (e.g. Walker and Mann, 1987) and social identity theory (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It considers recent research that attempts to integrate these approaches with each other (e.g. Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Simon, Loewy, Sturmer, Weber, Freytang, Habig, Kampmeier & Spahlinger, 1998), and we conclude by presenting a study that suggests collective efficacy is an important motivator of collective action, but that social identification moderates this relationship, thereby acting as a crucial psychological platform for collective action.

What is Collective Political Protest?

In order to provide an accurate account of the literature into collective political action it is important to be clear about the types and range of behavior of interest in this chapter. Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam (1990) offer a framework for describing different types of action in response to injustice. To understand the processes underpinning the collective responses, it is also important to appreciate that other forms of action can be chosen by the individual. Wright et al. proposed that sometimes the individual will choose inaction and passively accept the situation. However, when people do decide to act they can do so in four different ways. The protest action can be either individual (to improve one’s own status) or
collective (to improve the group’s status) and it can be either normative (conforming to existing societal norms) or non-normative (conventionally deemed unacceptable and inappropriate). For example, individual normative action may involve working hard to improve one’s situation and attainment, whereas individual non-normative may involve cheating or illegal actions. An example of collective normative action would be voting or lobbying whereas collective non-normative action might involve violent protest resulting in civil disobedience. These are all behaviors easily observed in the current political arena.

**Explaining Collective Political Protest at the Individual Level**

Much early psychological research into collective protest focused on the nature and character of individuals. Early crowd theorists such as Le Bon (1908) believed that group violence resulted from a primitive level of functioning that emerges when people are in crowds. Later explanations of crowd behavior were framed by the hypothesis that frustration would always lead to some form of aggression (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer & Sears, 1939) that is displaced onto relevant out-groups. Crowd behavior, particularly non-normative forms of collective action could be perceived as examples of such aggressive behavior. For example, Hovland and Sears (1940) showed how the increasing number of lynchings of Blacks in the United States between 1882 and 1930 was linked to the decline in cotton prices experienced by White farmers, the lynchings being attributed to scapegoating. In the 1970’s Berkowitz (e.g. Berkowitz, 1972) reiterated the basic idea that under certain conditions frustration and other forms of emotional arousal could result in increased aggression. Meanwhile, deindividuation theorists such as Zimbardo (1970) and Diener (1980) continued to argue that antinormative and violent actions by crowds could be explained in terms of the loss of self-awareness and self-regulation among members, caused by external attentional demands, increased anonymity and lack of accountability.
Personality differences have also been offered as a partial explanation for involvement in collective action. For example, Rotter, Seeman and Liverant (1962) claimed that individuals who tend to attribute cause internally were more likely to get involved in socio-political action than those who attribute externally because internals believe that they can influence outcomes by their own behavior. Similarly, Berkowitz (1972) argued that people do not protest unless they have a strong sense of personal control over their situation. Kelly and Breinlinger (1996) reviewed the individual-based theories of involvement in collective action, and concluded that the evidence is limited. They point out that there is no straightforward link between individual characteristics and participation in collective action. Much of the evidence for individual characteristics is correlational and therefore there are many contradictory findings, perhaps due to uninvestigated third variables (see Kelly & Kelly, 1992). More crucially, individual-level explanations of collective protest are not easily able to explain the target of the protest or the content of the action (Billig, 1976; Hogg & Abrams, 1988) because they do not consider the intergroup context.

**Klandermans’ Expectancy-Value Model**

An alternative direction has been to examine the socio-cognitive basis of individual decision making processes. For example, Klandermans (e.g. 1984, 1986, 1997) has studied trade union participation and has developed a comprehensive model to explain why an individual chooses to protest collectively. Klandermans proposes that there are two key processes; consensus mobilization and action mobilization. In consensus mobilization the union attempts to familiarize the members with their industrial action objectives and gain support for those objectives. This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for action to occur. Union members may be well aware of the objectives and support them, but may not be motivated to participate themselves. Therefore, the second process, action mobilization, is also required. Action mobilization is a process of persuasion whereby the union has to
motivate the members or, as Klandermans (1997) states, convert "sympathizers into participants." (p.65).

The social psychological aspects of Klandermans’ model focus specifically on these motivational processes implicated in action mobilization. Klandermans (e.g. 1997) claims that individuals make a rational choice to participate or not, due to an expectancy-value calculation. That is, individuals weigh the costs and benefits of social protest. Three motives are said to underlie this calculation: goal motives, which are decisions about the achievement of the goal; social motives which concern the reactions of significant others; and reward motives which concern the non-social costs and benefits of participation (e.g. time or lost earnings). Each of these motives consists of an expectation (e.g. a social motive expectation may be “my mother would not like it”) and the value placed on this outcome expectation (e.g. “I do not care what my mother thinks”). The expectations multiplied by their respective values form the basis of the rational calculation. The weighted sum (as the individual components can also vary in importance or strength) determines the individual’s motivational strength.

Klandermans (1984, 1986) has provided much empirical evidence to support his expectancy-value model. He studied Dutch trade union disputes and found that interplant variations in willingness to participate correlated with all three motivational variables. Members who were more likely to participate believed that many members would take part, that fellow workers would be positive about participation and believed that objectives would be successful. There is further support for the idea that people engage in these cost-benefit calculations from case studies in the field of industrial relations. For example, Cole (1969) studied a teachers’ strike in New York and found that teachers with pro-strike friends were more likely to participate in the strike action. This is consistent with Klandermans’ hypothesized social motive (see Kelly & Kelly, 1992 for more examples). Klandermans
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(1984) claims that all three motives are essential for participation and the importance of each will depend on individual, group and context differences but that few researchers seem to test all three motives (e.g. Simon et al., 1998). In Klandermans' own research the goal motive is always the strongest predictor; potential participants must perceive the objectives as achievable outcomes. Social motives follow, and reward motives tend to explain the least amount of variance in most cases (Klandermans, 1997).

Kelly and Kelly (1992) have pointed to a number of potential pitfalls in the expectancy-value approach. There are examples of collective political protest, such as strike action, where consensus mobilization appears to have been sufficient. People may be sensitive to the benefits of action but not consider the costs prior to participating. Finally, Klandemans' research is mainly correlational, and does not rule out the possibility that rational calculations are made after, rather than before, the decision to act (i.e. that they involve post-hoc rationalizations).

Klandermans’ (1997) model of protest provides a good description of how individuals psychologically process socially constructed information and make rational decisions about participation. Social movements can develop methods of mobilizing their members, supporters and sympathizers, by altering the cost-benefit structure in a variety of ways and making participation seem more worthwhile than non-participation. However, there are empirical and theoretical limitations to the model. In particular like the earlier individual-based models, this approach neglects the importance of the larger social and historical context. Collective political protest usually involves conflict between groups; where there is disadvantage for one group this is relative to advantage for some other group. Whilst Klandermans (1997) considers the social environment to be of importance he does not specifically theorize about the intergroup domain. Recently researchers have emphasized the importance of examining collective protest within the social and group context (e.g. Kelly &
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Breinlinger, 1996; Kelly & Kelly, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1998). The next part of this chapter focuses on two social psychological approaches that explain collective protest with an intergroup focus; namely Relative Deprivation Theory (e.g. Crosby, 1976) and Social Identity Theory (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

**Group and Intergroup Accounts of Protest**

**Relative Deprivation Theory:**

Research into the link between deprivation and collective protest suggest that, rather than being a simple reflection of objective (e.g. economic) deprivation, what motivates individuals and groups to protest is a perception of wanting and deserving better conditions relative to some comparison point. Theories of relative deprivation hold that social comparison processes and intergroup context are central when considering collective protest.

Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) proposes that relative deprivation (RD) can arise from two distinct types of comparison, individuals can compare their social position on an interpersonal and an intergroup level (e.g. Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966). If an individual perceives their position to be unjust relative to other individuals they have feelings of individual (or egoistic) relative deprivation, whereas if they perceive their in-group’s position as unjust relative to the out-group, they have feelings of collective (or fraternal) RD. These social comparisons involve a cognitive component whereby the relative difference is perceived and a corresponding affective component whereby the perceived difference results in feelings of frustration and resentment (e.g. Cook, Crosby & Hennigan, 1977; Crosby, 1982, 1984; Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983). Crosby’s (1976) definition of relative deprivation clarifies these differences. She states that for individuals to be in a state of relative deprivation, they must perceive that they lack something someone else has; that this is something they want, they feel entitled to and that they feel no personal responsibility for their not possessing it. She originally proposed that all these aspects must be present for
relative deprivation to be experienced, however she later simplified her model to argue that RD may be determined by perceiving a difference between wanting and deserving (Crosby, 1984).

A growing body of empirical evidence supports the conceptual distinction between personal and collective relative deprivation. A number of studies revealed that personal RD is strongly related to outcomes such as psychological stress (e.g. Walker & Mann, 1987) and individual level behavior (e.g. Hafer & Olson, 1993). In contrast, collective RD seems strongly related to strategies for social change, including collective political protest (e.g. Grant & Brown, 1995; Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983) and support for programs that may enhance the in-group’s welfare (e.g. Beaton & Tougas, 1997).

Several survey studies revealed a positive relationship between measures of collective relative deprivation and attitudes favoring social protest (e.g. Dion, 1986; Dubé & Guimond, 1986). For example, Guimond and Dubé-Simard (1983) investigated whether collective relative deprivation was related to militant socio-political attitudes in Francophone Canadians. Consistent with RDT, collective relative deprivation (compared to Anglophones) was highly correlated with nationalist attitudes, even when controlling for personal relative deprivation. In another study Walker and Mann (1987) used Cantril’s (1965) Self Anchoring Scale to measure unemployed participants’ sense of personal deprivation (in relation to best attainable position in society) and collective deprivation (in relation to peers and other unemployed people). Personal RD correlated with stress symptoms but was not related to collective RD or protest orientation. In contrast, collective RD with both referent groups was related to protest orientation. More recently, de la Rey and Raju (1996) found that Indian South Africans who have strong emotions (i.e. affective component) regarding collective relative deprivation are also likely to have a high social protest orientation. Unfortunately, the correlational nature of this type of research fails to provide any conclusive, causal
evidence, but across studies the consistency with predicted pattern of relationships is highly supportive of RDT.

Grant and Brown (1995) conducted an experimental test to determine the role of collective relative deprivation on collective protest. Female participants all expected to receive equal payment for a group task. Half of the participants were given false evaluation of their group’s performance at the task and were told they would receive less money. This manipulation allowed for a direct comparison between participants who experienced collective relative deprivation and those who did not. Participants who experienced deprivation and injustice were significantly more likely to endorse collective social protest behavior and hold more ethnocentric attitudes; even when accounting for potential covariates (e.g. perception of intergroup threat). Grant and Brown (1995) also point out that the affective component of collective relative deprivation (feeling injustice and discontent) is particularly relevant as it mediates the relationship between perception of deprivation and collective social protest endorsement. This experiment provided clear evidence that collective relative deprivation can cause social protest behavior.

One difficulty in comparing research into relative deprivation is that different studies have operationalized the “comparison other” in differing ways. Tropp and Wright (1999) note that personal comparisons can take place both within and between group boundaries. That is, an individual can compare their personal position with other in-group members or other out-group members; both may result in personal relative deprivation but they may well have different consequences. Strictly speaking, collective relative deprivation is defined as the perception of difference between the position of the in-group as a whole compared to the whole out-group (see Levine & Moreland, 1987). Such comparisons can also occur in a temporal dimension (Brown & Middendorf, 1996). When comparing research findings it is
important to consider how personal and collective relative deprivation have been operationalized in terms of target of comparison (Kawakami & Dion, 1995).

Some research examining the personal-collective distinction revealed that individuals who feel “doubly” deprived (feel personally and collectively deprived) are most likely to participate in collective protest. Foster and Matheson (1995, 1999) suggest that when a woman perceives congruence between self-discrimination and discrimination against women as a group they are more likely to protest collectively. Foster and Matheson (1999) claim that this is because the self becomes an interchangeable exemplar of the group. However, it is important to note that they operationalize personal relative deprivation by self-out-group comparisons.

Foster and Matheson (1998) also questioned the value of the cognitive- affective distinction in relative deprivation, claiming that when emotions run high psychological stress and overload cause individuals to be less likely to attempt to improve their position. They asked female Canadian undergraduates about their perceptions and feelings of discrimination compared to men (self – out-group comparison) and what collective action they had participated in during the previous six months. Women who perceived high personal discrimination had participated in more collective action when they felt low discontent (affective component) than when they were highly discontented. The disparity with previous research (showing that high discontent is most strongly related to protest) was attributed to the fact that the dependent measures involved reports of actual behavior as opposed to attitudes.

RDT explanations of protest leave some important questions unanswered. For example, they do not explain why the individual is motivated to act in response to the group’s relatively deprived conditions or why the amount of relative deprivation does not always seem to affect motivation to protest. This may be due to some of the methodological
difficulties (e.g. difficulty in manipulating feelings of RD) and some of the conceptual confusions in research (e.g. the distinction between comparing self to other in-group members or self to other out-group members for the personal relative deprivation construct). Also, current research trends in the social psychology of collective protest suggest that relative deprivation explains only a part of the motivation for engaging in collective action. It turns out that psychological attachment to the group is also a strong motivator. Petta and Walker (1992) have argued that “cognitive identification with an in-group must precede cognitive recognition of in-group deprivation relative to some out-group” (p.292). Whether or not this is true, the point highlights a major problem for relative deprivation theory. The concept of perceived collective RD assumes that individuals consider a specific in-group and out-group to be relevant for the purposes of comparison. This in turn means that individual must find the in-group important and valuable, and to be in a relationship with a specific out-group. For this reason, theories of intergroup relations seem highly relevant, and in particular the social identity perspective has much to offer.

**Social Identity Theory:**

The importance of group identification has been addressed in much social psychological research surrounding different aspects of collective behavior; particularly by social identity theory (SIT: Tajfel, 1978, Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its theoretical extension self-categorization theory (SCT: Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Social identity theory is essentially a theory about cognitive representations of the self and others in a social context, and it provides a critical link between individual and collective behavior (e.g. Brewer & Silver, 2000; Haslam, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). It is particularly pertinent to the study of collective political protest as it offers some insight into why individuals will act as a group, for the interest of the group and in order to achieve the group goal – even when the personal costs may be very high.
SIT was developed as a psychological account of intergroup behavior; it posits that individuals categorize their social world into groups, some of which they will belong to. SIT and SCT propose that the self-concept includes self-images at different levels of abstraction. At one extreme personal identity involves the unique personality and characteristics of individuals that distinguish them from other individuals. At the other extreme social identity is the individual’s awareness of belonging to various social in-groups that are distinct from relevant out-groups. An individual’s self-concept is partially derived from social comparisons and these will reflect an individual’s self esteem as an individual and as a group member.

Group identification can involve lasting group memberships, for example, gender and ethnicity, or it can involve somewhat transitory but salient categories (see SCT: Turner et al., 1987), for example, sports team membership. Groups in society are often of different size, status and authority, and this can lead to intergroup conflict as group members are motivated to maintain and improve the relative position of their in-group (see Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed three potential strategies for an individual to cope with negative outcomes of intergroup social comparison. These are individual mobility, social creativity and social change/competition. Individual mobility strategies involve the group member quitting the group, either physically or psychologically. Social creativity would occur when a social identity was based on a group low in status; the individual group member would change their group dimension and therefore, their focus of comparison (their out-group). Social change or competition strategies are attempts made to improve the overall in-group’s position (e.g. protesting for change).

Various factors may be implicated when determining which strategy an individual will use. According to SIT a crucial variable is the level of in-group identification, which is substantially affected by factors such as the salience and normative clarity of intergroup
comparisons, but can also vary among individuals within a group. When individuals identify strongly with their group they are more likely to be involved in collective protest to protect the group’s interests, whereas if identification is low individual strategies may be preferred. For example, Dizard (1970) found that attachment to a positive Black identity was a strong predictor of militant and radical political attitudes. Most SIT based research has focused on the intergroup backdrop and social-structural variables. Haslam (2000) highlights the importance of this and argues that high and low identifiers have different perspectives of social reality and will therefore respond differently to their perception of the intergroup backdrop by choosing either an individual or a collective based strategy.

Social identity theory proposes that behavior in response to status differences apparent from intergroup comparisons will depend on three structural aspects of the intergroup context: the permeability of group boundaries; the stability of status; and the legitimacy of status (e.g. Ellemers et al., 1990; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Wright et al., 1990). The permeability of the group boundary refers to how easy (if at all) it is for the individual to pass into the higher status group; it can be open, closed or restricted. The stability of status refers to how likely it is for the group to have the alternative (higher or lower) status position. Legitimacy was cited as an influencing variable in the early stages of SIT formulation. The extent to which the group perceives their status to be legitimate can affect their motivation to change the social situation; illegitimate low status positions will not be tolerated.

The Five-Stage Model:

In an extension and development of SIT, Taylor and McKirnan (1984) proposed a five stage sequence of relations between members of high and low status groups, from the perspective of the low status group. In the first stage groups are clearly stratified in a way that is consensually perceived to be legitimate and stable, and in which low status group
members can conceive of no 'cognitive alternative'. In the second stage, individualistic ideology emerges, whereby stratification is perceived to be based on achievement or talent. This type of stratification allows individuals to believe in personal social mobility as a possibility. In the third stage individual members of the disadvantaged group will attempt to move into the advantaged group (i.e. individual mobility). If the individuals pass, they will conform to the advantaged groups norms. However if they fail, they move to stage four in which they will return to the disadvantaged group and encourage collective action. Finally, if consciousness raising is successful, the disadvantaged group will act competitively and collectively against the advantaged group.

This five-stage model of intergroup relations has allowed researchers to test specific hypotheses regarding collective action. The model postulates that to maintain positive self-esteem individuals will attempt to improve their own status by individual action and only if this is unsuccessful will they attempt to improve the status of the whole group via collective action.

Various social-structural variables have been examined for determining the preference of identity management strategy. The predominant finding appears to be that individual strategies are generally preferred and collective action does not appear to be an easy or usual option for most individuals (e.g. Ellemers, van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1990; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994). For example, Wright et al. (1990) tested the permeability assumptions by experimentally manipulating the perceived openness of the high status out-group. They found that when the advantaged group is perceived as open, individual normative action (i.e. action that complies with societal or general norms) is preferred as a response to disadvantage. They also found that when openness to the advantaged group was highly restricted (a token 2%), individual behavior was still favored, but tended to be non-normative. That is, if access to the high status group is very restricted, but still feasible, individuals from
the low status group may break ranks to join it. Collective non-normative action (i.e. protest) was the preference only when the group boundary of the high status group was perceived as completely closed. The finding for the partially open boundary could be seen as most important, as this situation is probably representative of many real intergroup relationships, and illustrates one reason why intergroup inequalities so often remain unchallenged.

Wright (1997) has pointed out that a perception of tokenism, may not just influence the permeability variable but could have a subsequent effect for the perception of legitimacy and stability. Wright (1997) claims that the success of a very small number of low status group members may undermine collective preferences as the explanation for success becomes focused on personal attributes. However, when an individual is exposed to an in-group source expressing anger at the discriminatory tokenism, interest in collective action increases, although the preference remains for individual non-normative behaviors.

Wright and Taylor (1998) replicated the finding that when group boundaries are open, individual strategies will be preferred and when boundaries are completely closed, collective non-normative strategies are preferred. Moreover, they suggested that permeability should not be examined as a dichotomy of open and closed. In modern society a system of tokenism has developed, whereby the advantaged group allows access to a token number of disadvantaged group members, and this in turn implies partial permeability between groups. In tokenism conditions in Wright and Taylor’s research, participants preferred individual non-normative strategies over other options. Equally striking is the finding that “successful tokens” do recognize collective injustice but are no more willing to support collective action by the disadvantaged group, and even unsuccessful tokens still indicate a preference for individual non-normative action. Therefore tokenism can be an effective tool for preventing collective action (Wright & Taylor, 1999).
In summary experimental studies examining the effects of group boundary permeability have provided a useful insight into how behavioral options are chosen. Often, however, the experimental groups are ‘minimal’, or at best transitory and somewhat trivial. Such groups seem unlikely to evoke very high levels of in-group identification. Many experiments have not even measured the level of group identification. If attachment to the disadvantaged group is low it would be easily understood why collective strategies are not favored. On the other hand, there are some similar results from research that has involved more meaningful groups, such as Boen and Vanbeslaere (1998). They used existing high school classes as their groups and replicated Wright et al.'s (1990) findings.

Experimental research does seem consistent with the assumptions of the five stage model, and particularly seems to confirm the importance of perceived boundary permeability in determining responses to collective injustice. However, controversy remains, as whilst researchers do point to group identification as being a motivational factor, little research actually measures or manipulates it. Previously (Abrams, 1992), we have noted that the 5 stage model embodies some surprising assumptions. For example, it is assumed those group members with highest opportunity, aspirations, and likely self-esteem, (presumably derived from intra-group comparison processes) are those who will be first to seek to leave the group. Yet it seems puzzling that those who are most highly regarded (at least by themselves) within a group might be the first to leave it. Conversely, individuals who would try but fail to pass into the high status group (presumably those who regard the group’s situation most negatively and who also have low self-esteem as a result of being unable to move) are subsequently assumed to lead the intergroup battle for restitution. Even if these assumptions are valid, it seems plausible that there are circumstances when group members shift directly to stage 5, either because the intergroup comparison is new (e.g. for a country that joins the European Union the relevant comparison countries change), or simply because maintaining a
valued group membership can be more important than improving one’s situation. Therefore, fighting for the group may be a more psychologically appropriate course of action than seeking personal advancement even when the latter option is available (Abrams & Emler, 1992).

Ellemers and her colleagues have conducted a series of experiments to examine the impact of social-structural variables on identity and mobility preferences (e.g. Ellemers et al., 1990; Ellemers, Wilke & van Knippenberg, 1993). Consistent with social identity theory, in low status groups with permeable group boundaries, group identification becomes lowered and individual mobility strategies are most likely. However, if status position is perceived as unstable, identification is likely to remain higher and collective strategies are preferred, regardless of permeability. Illegitimate status differentials strengthen group identification but legitimacy seems to have only a limited direct impact on strategy choice; stability and permeability are much more influential (Ellemers, 1993).

Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (1997) examined the role of group identification in more detail. They measured social identity as an individual difference and proposed that identification may be a determining factor for identity enhancement strategy choice. Again consistent with social identity theory they found that, in transitory laboratory groups, high identifiers showed less desire for individual mobility strategies compared to low identifiers. Therefore, this research highlights importance of psychological factors in conjunction with the structural features of the intergroup context.

Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel and Blanz (1999) conducted a field study of East Germans reactions to East-West German reunification. This is an interesting intergroup context because, despite political and financial support, psychologically the East and West Germans still perceive themselves as distinct and of unequal status. Mummendey et al. (1999) examined the relationships between the social-structural variables specified with SIT
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(stability, legitimacy, permeability) and identity management strategies (e.g. individual mobility, such as expressing the will to "live as a West German"). They found that, in line with SIT, perceived group boundary permeability, status stability and legitimacy of differentiation each independently influenced choice of identity management strategy. Unstable, closed and illegitimate conditions were associated with a greater interest in collective strategies, such as expressing a will to demonstrate their credibility to West Germans. Moreover, in-group identification was found to be an important mediator. Those who perceived boundaries as fixed and closed identified more strongly and in turn were more likely to endorse collective strategies. Those who perceived boundaries as open identified less strongly and were more likely to endorse individual mobility strategies. Interestingly, the social-structural variables all had independent effects but there were no interactions. For collective action to occur it was not necessary for all conditions to be present. This study provides an important field test of the role of SIT in collective protest behavior and it lends support for the importance of group identification and not just the intergroup structural context (cf. de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999).

Research investigating the role of social identity in collective political protest has also focused on the psychological processes mediating action. For example, self categorization theory provides an explanation in terms of social influence processes. According to SCT (Turner et al., 1987), an individual must define themselves as a group member before they are involved in group behavior. This implies a shift from personal identity to group identity and the norms of the group will be internalized.

This line of reasoning has been explored by Reicher (1996), who argued that when individuals are in a crowd they will infer the nature of the in-group identity and will behave accordingly. He examined accounts from students who were involved in a violent confrontation with the police during a peaceful demonstration in 1988 (known as "the Battle
of Westminster”). He concluded that intergroup dynamics were crucial to the onset on collective conflict. For example, participation in the conflict depended on the adoption of a student categorization as opposed to a police categorization. Drury and Reicher (1999) point out that social identity is paramount in situations of collective political protest because the intergroup context is the common factor. That is, in situations of collective political protest social identity becomes salient due to the presence of the out-group, therefore the in-group norms are defined largely in contrast to out-group norms. The in-group norms become internalized and behavior is very much based on the interests of the in-group as a whole. In contrast to earlier norm-based models of crowd behavior (e.g. Turner & Killian, 1987) that assume norms emerge from interpersonal observation of action, the SCT account holds that norms are a function of the intergroup comparisons and self-categorization as an in-group member (see also Abrams, 1990, 1992, 1994).

Recent Theoretical Integrations:

Simon et al. (1998) provided a framework which attempts to integrate the SIT approach with Klandermans’ expectancy value approach. Simon et al. (1998) argued that integration was necessary in order to explain both the macrosocial and microsocial processes implicated in collective protest. They conducted two field studies, one involving the ‘Grey Panthers’, an elderly people’s movement in Germany, and the second involving a Gay protest movement in the United States. Measures were taken of group identification (both to the social category and the specific movement), the three expectancy value motives from Klandermans’ model (goal, social and reward) and willingness to participate in collective protest. The results confirmed that collective identification (especially specific to the movement) and the expectancy value approach both accounted for a significant proportion of the variance. Simon et al. (1998) concluded that the two approaches actually represent independent causal pathways for collective protest. However, their current research needs to
be extended to show that these paths are indeed independent, as the data so far are neither experimental nor longitudinal. It may be that the aspects of collective identification and value motives interact to predict willingness to protest. Perhaps the most important point to note is that the different social psychological explanations of collective protest are not (or at least need not always be) in competition, rather they can be complimentary, each examining a specific level of analysis.

Research investigating the role of RDT and SIT demonstrates that recognition of in-group relative deprivation, and identifying strongly with the in-group are both empirically linked to collective action (e.g. Brewer & Silver, 2000; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Walker, 1999). Both the RDT and SIT explanations rely on individuals perceiving themselves to be members of a group and this membership as having emotional and motivational consequences. They also claim that the perceptions and feelings of injustice and inequality that precede collective action are based on social comparison processes; that is comparing one’s own group to another.

Due to these similarities in approach some recent theorists (e.g. Kawakami & Dion, 1993, 1995) have also attempted to clarify the independent roles of RDT and SIT, by investigating whether relative deprivation and social identification have independent effects or whether they are intrinsically linked. Kawakami and Dion (1993, 1995) argue, in line with self-categorization theory, that situational and contextual factors have an important impact on the salience of various self-images and that behavior will depend on which self-categorization (personal or social identity) is salient. They propose that, in response to collective disadvantage, when social identity is salient individuals will focus on the collective basis for their deprivation. Hence they are also more likely to take positive (normative) collective action, such as asking for help for the group as a whole. However, if personal
identity is salient, individuals will consider their deprivation to be personally based, and will therefore take non-normative individual actions, such as quitting the group.

Mummendey and colleagues have used SIT and RDT as predictive of strategy choice in another field study in Germany (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke, 1999). They conclude that SIT best explains individual strategy choices, such as wishing to join the out-group, whereas RDT best accounts for collective action strategies, such as claiming they will ensure that East Germans will receive more resources in the future. They point out that neither theory is superior, and integrating them provides increased predictive power. These integrative approaches to collective political protest are at an early stage of development and more research is required to understand the causal role and relationships among some of the variables. Whilst it is often difficult to manipulate these variables further experimental studies are needed together with longitudinal field studies so that stronger causal inferences can be drawn.

An interesting issue to keep in mind is that responses to deprivation involve both collective and personal reactions, and that these are intertwined in terms of the outcomes (cf. Crosby, Cordova & Jaskar, 1993). For example, Abrams (1990) analyzed the protest orientation of over 1000 first time voters in Scotland. The survey measured identification with Scotland, objective deprivation, perceived personal deprivation relative to in-group and to out group members, perceived intergroup deprivation, social belief structure (social mobility vs. social change), and two outcomes. These were voting intention (for the Scottish Nationalist Party vs. other parties) and stress symptoms. Objective deprivation (measured in terms of income) was predictive only of perceived personal deprivation and its affective component, and this in turn was predictive of stress symptoms. Perceived collective deprivation was associated with its affective reaction, and this together with higher levels of identification predicted social change belief orientation (belief that the situation for Scottish
people would only improve through changes in governance). Social change orientation was in turn predictive of intentions to vote for the Scottish Nationalist Party. Interestingly, higher identification also predicted lower stress symptoms. These data show clearly how personal and group deprivation may co-exist and have distinct types of outcome. Interestingly the data also show that group identification can provide some level of emotional protection against adverse personal circumstances.

**Collective Efficacy:**

One psychological variable that emerges in several forms in theories of collective action is perceived control or efficacy (cf. Berkowitz, 1974). For example, the political efficacy an individual perceives in relation to the participation in and outcomes of action is a variable that distinguishes activists from non-activists in the literature on antecedents of anti-nuclear activism (Fiske, 1987). Similarly, Klandermans' (1997) expectancy-value model draws on the importance of goal motives as decisions about the achievement of the goal. The model posits that individuals who believe their participation will make their objectives successful are more likely to be involved in collective political protest. This mirrors the variable of efficacy as it is highlighting the importance of the individual feeling they can have an impact by protesting as part of a collective.

However, on balance, the findings for perceived efficacy and control over political situations have been mixed. Kelly and Kelly (1994) found that whilst political efficacy did have some predictive value, identification with the in-group was a much stronger predictor of collective action. We note that most studies have examined perceptions of individual or personal efficacy – the impact individuals feel they personally can have on the political process. When it comes to collective political protest this approach may be misdirected. Various theorists (e.g. Yeich & Levine, 1994) have pointed out the importance of examining a more appropriate measure of collective efficacy, that is how much impact individuals
perceive their collective group can have on the political process. If individuals do not believe that their group can have an impact and improve their unjust situation, it seems likely that they will be less motivated to participate in any collective political protest. To conclude this chapter we briefly describe a study that examined the importance of identification and the role of collective political efficacy (see also Abrams, 1992, Abrams & Emler, 1992, Brewer and Silver, 2000).

A Study of the Role of Social Identification and Collective Efficacy in Protest

The first goal of our study was to examine the utility of some of the main variables we have outlined above, including relative deprivation and social identification. Secondly, we attempted to determine what role collective efficacy would play as a psychological constraint to action, and whether this would be moderated by social identification with the group.

The survey was conducted amongst students at the University of Kent at Canterbury (UKC). At the time of the survey, the university had just increased rent and food prices for students living on campus. As a mark of protest students were encouraged by the Union to join a 'rent strike', which involved paying their rents to the Student Union funds as opposed to the university authorities. Our survey asked students how much they identified with UKC students (social identity), how financially deprived they felt UKC students were relative to working contemporaries (collective relative deprivation), and how effective they perceived students to be in dealing with the high rents (collective efficacy).

All participants were resident on campus for the 1990-1991 academic year. The questionnaire was distributed to 200 students from the university, via the Students Union and to students resident in one of the main colleges. An envelope was provided for return of the questionnaires. Fifty five students responded (27.5% response rate). The students ranged in age from 18 to 44 years ($M = 21.6$ years). Nineteen respondents were male and 36 were female.
The predictor variables were objective deprivation; collective relative deprivation; self-in-group and self-out-group relative deprivation; social identification; self efficacy; and collective efficacy. The main dependent variable of interest was the support for the rent strike protest. **Objective deprivation** was measured by the amount of rent paid each week. This was decided to be a more accurate measure than income because at that time students all received very similar incomes. All other constructs were computed using an average across a set of items measured on an 11 point scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 11= very strongly agree). **Social Identification** included six items, such as "I identify with UKC students generally". **Cognitive Collective Relative Deprivation** included two items. The group chosen for comparison was their contemporaries who work for a living. For example, "I believe that as a group, UKC students are financially worse off than people of our own age who are earning a living". **Affective Collective Relative Deprivation** was measured using bipolar dimensions anchored at dissatisfaction, frustration, anger and unhappiness with regards to any perceived inequality arising from comparisons. **Collective Efficacy** was measured using five items to determine how much individuals perceived their group's impact in improving their situation. For example, "Generally, protests by students at UKC can be effective in achieving their aims". **Support for Protest** was measured using various questions, from which a standardized uni-dimensional scale was constructed. Participants indicated their support of the rent strike, for related student union protests and whether they had supported any of three specified protests against the University Administration (safety on campus, anti poll tax campaign, and anti-loan protests). All scales achieved acceptable reliability. Alphas ranged from .66 (cognitive component of collective relative deprivation) to .95 (affective component of collective relative deprivation).

The correlations in Table 1 show that these measures are related to each other in meaningful and reliable ways. In particular, social identification is significantly correlated to
all other variables. To understand the independent effects of collective efficacy and identification we used multiple regression to examine both their direct impact on collective protest and the interaction between them. As shown in Table 2, in step 1 we entered the cognitive and affective collective RD measures, together with identification with students and collective efficacy. These variables together significantly accounted for protest ($R^2 (4,44) = .47, F = 9.60, p < .001$). However, only collective efficacy was a significant predictor ($\beta = .67, t = 4.72, p < .001$). At the next step we entered the identification x efficacy interaction. This accounted for an additional 9% of the variance ($\beta = .30, t = 2.95, p < .05$, total $R^2 = .56$, $F$ final equation $= 10.77, p < .001$). Due to this significant interaction term and the high correlation between collective efficacy and social identification, we next examined the relationship between collective efficacy and protest among those who identified more or less with the group. We divided our sample by a median split of the social identification measure (6.6 on the 11 point scale) and conducted multiple regression on each subset of data.

We found that when identification was low, neither collective efficacy nor the other variables significantly predicted support for protest ($R^2 (4,20) = .12, F = .70, p = .60$). In contrast, among highly identified participants, support for protest was significantly predicted by the variables, accounting for 65% of the variance; $R^2 (4,19) = .65, F = 3.41, p < .001$. Only collective efficacy was significant ($\beta = .61, t = 2.61, p < .001$), although, consistent with RD theory, affective RD was nearly a significant predictor ($\beta = .39, t = 1.79, p = .09$). From this result, we can infer that collective efficacy affects support for protest only when in-group identification is high.

We were somewhat surprised that there were no direct effects of affective collective RD on protest. However we investigated the possibility that affective collective RD and cognitive collective RD might contribute to either efficacy or identification. Consistent with RDT, affective collective RD was strongly associated with cognitive collective RD, as shown
in Table 1. However, neither are associated with efficacy, which suggests that the RDT/SIT variables operate somewhat independently of the efficacy variable. To further determine the role of identification we conducted further multiple regression analyses, to examine if any of the variables predicted affective collective RD and collective efficacy. It was revealed that affective collective RD is significantly predicted by the variables, $R^2 (3, 46) = .46$, $F = 12.86$, $p < .001$ and only identification was a significant predictor (see Table 3, $\beta = .48$, $t = 3.35$, $p = .002$). This is consistent with the research we have reviewed and suggests that collective RD is felt as unjust when the group is identified with. Collective efficacy was also significantly predicted by the variables $R^2 (3, 46) = .41$, $F = 10.47$, $p < .001$ and only identification was a significant predictor (see Table 4, $\beta = .70$, $t = 5.34$, $p < .001$), again indicating that collective measures are important to examine in conjunction with participants' level of identification.

Overall, the results of this study confirm that social identification plays an important role in collective protest, but indicate that there may be other important psychological constraints on action that need to be considered. In particular, our study reveals that perceived collective efficacy needs to be high for protest to occur, but even this is not sufficient unless identification is also high.

The rent strike study suggests that identification plays a role in linking collective efficacy to participation in collective protest. Conversely, it should be the case that personal efficacy should play a role in individual disengagement from a group with threatened status. In another study (Abrams, Hinkle & Tomlins, 1999) we studied employees in a medium sized organization in Hong Kong prior to the transition from British to Chinese authority. We were interested in predictors of the strength with which these individuals would identify with Hong Kong. In this study, we hypothesized that personal efficacy over whether they remained in Hong Kong might be particularly important in affecting individuals’ level of identification.
When group status is lowered or threatened, low personal control represents reduced options for social mobility and an absence of cognitive alternatives. We expected that this combination would be predictive of lower attachment to the group.

We found that perceptions of lower international status of Hong Kong were associated with weakened identification, as would be predicted by social identity theory. Moreover, identification was not affected by perceptions of personal benefits and costs of staying or leaving. However, perceived control moderated the relationship of anticipated deprivation (cognitive RD) with both frustration (affective RD) and identification. Among respondents with low personal control, anticipated deprivation was associated with greater frustration and lowered identification. We interpreted these findings as suggesting that when group status is threatened, freedom to join a higher status group seems restricted and personal efficacy is low, the only option is to withdraw psychologically from the group. This situation represents an outcome not addressed by the 5 stage model. It is a situation in which the status quo is accepted but individuals cope by ceasing to consider their group as important. It is not surprising that this psychological response is associated with perceptions of personal control.

Another outcome that has been discussed by Crosby (e.g. Crosby, Cordova & Jaskar, 1993) is the denial of personal disadvantage, which may have personal self-protective consequences. Sometimes, however, disadvantage is acknowledged, but the reaction is to disregard personal outcomes and focus on group outcomes. For example, Abrams and Emler (1992) found that young adults from Scotland who identified more strongly as Scottish were more likely to perceive their (objectively) disadvantaged economic situation and to support policies for social change (e.g. Scottish devolution). Moreover, greater identification was associated with lowered inclination to move in order to improve their personal opportunities. In other words, identification was associated with a clear social change orientation.

**Conclusion:**
Whatever the social and political context, collective protest is essentially protest behavior in the interest of the group as a whole. Social psychological theories and explanations, particularly SIT have not attempted to explain why certain individuals will be interested in certain political issues, rather they have explained what will link the individual to the group psychologically and it is this link that will mediate perceptions of social injustice and collective political protest.

The study of collective political protest can be conducted at different levels of analysis. For example, the individual level, in terms of the individual differences or perceived costs and benefits of participating; the societal level, in terms of resource availability and the intergroup structure; and the political level, in terms of the possibility and opportunity for change. A social psychological analysis of collective political protest attempts to explain the psychological processes that mediate all these levels and what processes transfer a perception of social inequality or injustice into behavior by individuals in an attempt to rectify this for the benefit of the whole collective. This chapter has described different approaches to tackling this question but has revealed a central set of variables that seem to account for much of the action. These are personal and collective relative deprivation, identification, collective efficacy, intergroup structure, permeability, the presence of tokens, value motives, the normative structure for action and opportunity. Continued research will be necessary to understand how all the various influences co-exist and interact to affect protest behavior.
References


Collective Political Protest


### Tables

Table 1: Correlations between variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Identification</th>
<th>Cognitive CRD</th>
<th>Affective CRD</th>
<th>Collective Efficacy</th>
<th>Support for Protest (standardized)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Social Identification</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
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<td>.14</td>
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<td>.25</td>
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<td>Collective Efficacy</td>
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<td>.66**</td>
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* = p < .05  ** = p < .001
Table 2: Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Support for Protest from Collective Efficacy, Affective Collective Relative Deprivation, Cognitive Collective Relative Deprivation, Identification and the Interaction between Identification x Collective Efficacy

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variable</th>
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<td>Collective Efficacy</td>
<td>.68</td>
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<td>-.95</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
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<td>-.19</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identif.*Efficacy</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
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Table 3: Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Affective Collective Relative Deprivation from Collective Efficacy, Cognitive Collective Relative Deprivation and Identification

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<td>Collective Efficacy</td>
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<td>Cognitive CRD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>&lt;.005</td>
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Table 4: Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Collective Efficacy from Identification, Affective Collective Relative Deprivation and Cognitive Collective Relative Deprivation

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<th>p</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.62</td>
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