The Maintenance of Entitativity: A Subjective Group Dynamics Approach

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Groups have a particular quality that fosters a desire for consensus and compliance (e.g., Asch, 1952; Boyanowsky & Allen, 1973; Burnstein & Vinokur, 1975; Festinger, 1950; Hogg & Hains, 1998; Insko, Drenan, Solomon, Smith & Wade, 1983; Janis, 1982; Levine, 1989; Sherif, 1936). Disunity potentially undermines both the social reality offered by the group and the potential to attain group goals, so it is not surprising that group members conform themselves and make attempts, often successfully, to induce conformity to the group (see Berkowitz & Howard, 1959; Davis & Witte, 1996; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Earle, 1986; Latané & Nida, 1981; Levine & Thompson, 1996; Mullen, 1991; Schachter, 1951; Williams, Cheung & Choi, 2000). As Shaw (1976) observed, “An individual who can be expected to behave in conventional ways is unlikely to disrupt the group, whereas an unconventional person is likely to cause disorder and dissatisfaction.” (p.176). This perspective on group processes suggests that reactions to group members will be driven substantially by the magnitude of their differences from the group norm.

Contrary to the traditional view of small group processes summarized above, an important feature of the social identity approach is that groups and intergroup relationships may have their impact on perception and behavior entirely through the process of categorization. Social Identity Theory (SIT) holds that when social identity is salient a person attributes category-based features to all category members, thereby minimizing individual differences within categories, and maximizing inter-category differences (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) strengthens this idea. SCT considers two aspects of the fit between individuals and social categories, comparative and normative fit (Oakes, 1996; Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991). According to this theory, perceptions of group members are determined by a meta-contrast, which can be approximated mathematically as a ratio of intra-group differences versus intergroup differences (Hogg &
McGarty, 1990; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). This contrast produces abstract prototypes that represent the positions (e.g., on an attitude continuum) that best capture differences between the ingroup and outgroup to the detriment of intra-categorical differences. Deviant category members would thus tend to be overlooked or disregarded under the operation of the meta-contrast principle, particularly when the categories are highly salient. If the deviant is not, or cannot be, disregarded or recategorized, the meta-contrast is reduced. Therefore, one consequence could be that perceivers should use a more relevant categorical dimension. An alternative cognitive response would be to assimilate the group prototype towards the position held by the deviant, a process that would likely depend on the extremity of deviance (e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1997). This would maximize the fit between the social categorization in use and the characteristics of the people being categorized (Oakes et al., 1991, 1994). Both consequences would be psychologically satisfying to the extent they would clarify intergroup boundaries (see Hogg, 1993).

Social cognition research on entitativity has recently revived Campbell’s (1958) idea that the entitativity of a group is based primarily on four defining features: proximity, similarity, common fate and collective movement (see Abelson, Dasgupta, Park & Banaji, 1998; Sherman, Hamilton & Lewis, 1999). Other features, such as prototypicality, essentialism, group size, intra-group interdependence, common goals, common outcomes, and importance of group membership also seem to contribute to entitativity to some extent (Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Lickel, Hamilton, Wieczorkowska, Lewis, Sherman & Uhles, 2000; McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson & Grace, 1995; Mullen, 1991; Sherman et al., 1999; Yzerbyt, Rocher & Schadron, 1997). Consistent with the idea that entitativity is a desired property of groups, Lickel et al. (2000) found that participants attached greater value to membership in more entitative groups, as shown by higher
correlation between ratings of the importance of membership in those groups and perceptions of entitativity. Research on entitativity further suggests that the presence of deviant group members should be especially problematic for more normative members because it highlights potential disunity, and should thereby reduce entitativity. Consistent with this idea, Sherman et al. (1999) proposed that, “members of highly entitative groups will perceive greater differentiation from outgroups and thus show a greater degree of ingroup bias in perceptions and interpretations of events... (In addition)... entitative ingroups should be seen as having more power to do good things and to achieve positive goals... highly entitative groups are more likely to develop clear group norms” (p.102). Thus, the traditional small group approach, the social identity approach, and the social cognition approach are all consistent in arguing that there is a positive relationship between attachment to the group and higher ingroup uniformity, entitativity, or distinctiveness. The presence of deviant members could potentially imperil group entitativity. The present chapter explores a motivated cognition model that examines how group members may respond to threats to, and exert influence over, important aspects of group entitativity.

Subjective Group Dynamics

The Subjective Group Dynamics model (SGD; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) proposes that people generally strive to confirm ingroup reality. For this to happen, at least two conditions have to be met. First the ingroup must be entitative (Campbell, 1958). In intergroup contexts this requires both intergroup distinctiveness and intragroup uniformity. Second, there must be social validation of the ingroup perspective as opposed to the outgroup perspective. For this to be achieved, group members must differentiate other members who strengthen from those who weaken such validation. In short, we argue that group members are motivated to maximize and sustain descriptive intergroup distinctiveness whilst maximizing and sustaining the relative validity
of prescriptive ingroup norms through the parallel and complementary process of intragroup differentiation (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998).

Subjective Group Dynamics and Deviance

The SGD model proposes that judgments of deviant group members depend on the interplay between self-categorization, denotative and prescriptive norms, and social-self regulation. In line with SCT, we believe that the categorization process is largely driven by a search for meaning and reduction of uncertainty (e.g., Hogg, 2000). It follows that people are motivated to ensure the validity of their subjective sense of reality, provided by the reality defined by the ingroup (Abrams, 1990, 1992; Abrams & Hogg, 1988, 2001; Hogg, 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994). This certainty is strengthened to the extent that self and ingroup are seen as sharing a common set of norms and values (e.g., Turner, 1991; see also Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger & Clement, 1996). The flexibility of self-categorization allows mismatches between individuals and groups to be avoided or resolved by the application of different categorizations, reflecting the intergroup context (see Abrams, 1996, 1999a; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers & Haslam, 1997; Turner & Oakes, 1997). However, in some situations, a specific group member who cannot be recategorized may diverge from normative expectations. A deviant member such as this is problematic because he or she undermines the consensus of the group and therefore undermines the subjective validity of the social reality.

The SGD model holds that judgments and evaluations of deviant group members reflect two inter-related goals. As predicted by SIT, group members wish to ensure that ingroups have higher value than relevant outgroups. In addition, in line with SCT, group members wish to maintain the validity of ingroup norms, and thereby validate their subjective reality. We believe that ingroup superiority is often achieved through global category differentiation, whereby the ingroup is favored over the outgroup (see Mullen, Brown & Smith, 1992). However, validation of ingroup norms often depends on making distinctions
within groups to determine which individual members either reinforce or undermine those norms. We assume that judgments of individual group members remain essentially depersonalized, that is, they are framed with reference to group norms and stereotypes. The intergroup and intragroup processes operate in conjunction in such a way that it becomes possible, rather than paradoxical, that someone who strongly favors the ingroup over the outgroup, may also prefer some outgroup members over some in-group members. Indeed, we suggest that groups and individuals are judged in a way that is functionally complementary.

Denotative Norms

To develop this idea we distinguished between denotative and prescriptive norms (Marques, Abrams et al., 1998; Marques et al., 2001; Marques et al., 1998). Denotative norms provide the descriptive criteria for categorization and are thus relevant to the meta-contrast principle and both comparative and normative fit, as defined in SCT. Denotative norms are perceived as essential for, inherent in, or entirely indicative of category membership. Therefore compliance with the norm and category membership are likely to be perceived as inextricable, and category ascriptions can be made immediately from a person’s adherence to these norms. For example hearing a deep voice leads to a strong inference that the speaker is male. In turn, ingroup bias may result from a category membership inference based on denotative differences. It seems likely that denotative norms are often applied non-consciously or at least relatively unreflectively. There are also occasions when people do devote conscious attention to denotative norms, such as when there is a high degree of ambiguity regarding category memberships (e.g., Abrams, 1990, 1996; Abrams & Brown, 1989; Abrams & Masser, 1998), when it is important to ensure that no outgroup members are categorized as ingroup members (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens & Paladino, 2000), when perceivers are prejudiced (Blascovich, Wyer, Swart & Kibler, 1997), or when they need to preserve cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Norms that denote category
membership may be strongly associated with preferential judgments (e.g. sports fans may favor others wearing their own team’s colors), but they are not the sole basis for evaluation of ingroup and outgroup members.

**Prescriptive Norms**

Sometimes it is clear that ingroup and outgroup members should behave differently to uphold their differences (e.g., Jews should support Israel, Arabs should support the PLO). When groups hold competing goals or viewpoints these oppositional norms are usually very clear for members of both groups. In addition, there are norms and standards which are not oppositional, but which are still very important for ingroup members (see Forsyth, 1990). For example, ingroups may embody societal, or generic, norms to a greater extent than outgroups. Both oppositional and generic norms can take on a prescriptive character.

We believe that, as well as distinguishing people’s group memberships based on denotative (or descriptive) differences between categories, group members also distinguish individual group members from one another in terms of how far they support the prescriptive norms of the ingroup. Indeed, these two processes should work in conjunction. Reactions to a particular group member will depend on whether he or she appears to be an ingroup or outgroup member and whether his or her behavior appears to undermine or validate the ingroup prescriptive norm. For example, imagine someone commits a faux pas at a social gathering. To the extent that the ingroup-outgroup distinction is salient, it is likely to be more discomforting to learn that the person is an ingroup member than an outgroup member because embarrassment for the ingroup is equally embarrassing for the self.

We propose that evaluations of specific group members depend on a focus on prescriptive norms and that this often involves backward processing (see Marques et al., 2001), a form of counter-factual thinking that occurs when observed events run counter to expectations (Miller & Prentice, 1996). In these situations, people generate a specific frame
of reference that accounts for the counter-intuitive event, and they construct, on-line, a standard of comparison relevant to that particular context (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Deviants violate normative expectancies, and this makes prescriptive norms highly salient as standards against which to judge ingroup and outgroup behavior. These judgments reflect the evaluative consequences that group members’ characteristics and behavior have for the ingroup and hence for the social self. Ingroup members attend to prescriptive norms so as to ensure consensus on criteria for positive ingroup evaluation. Salient variations from prescriptive norms are therefore very likely to induce active regulation of the subjective image of the group. Specifically, because group members are motivated to preserve the subjective validity of their group’s norms, they will wish to correct or remove challenges to that norm within the group, and to gather evidence from outside the group that bolsters the ingroup norm.

Prescriptive norm differentiation is crucial because it provides a means of garnering evidence that consolidates the validity of ingroup reality. Prescriptive norm differentiation serves a function that cannot be met by categorization alone, because it allows group members to confirm their hypotheses, not about differences between groups, but about the value they associate with their own group membership. For example, the value of ingroup consensus is often made all the more real when a member breaks ranks or deviates from the group norms (e.g., Holtz & Miller, 1985; Miller, Gross & Holtz, 1991). In the McCarthy era, the threat to the USA from Americans that might support Communist ideology was used as a basis for justifying and intensifying the cold war. The issue was not whether people were American or Russian, but whether they were engaging in ‘un-American’ activities. Category membership was not in doubt, what mattered was violation of ingroup prescriptive norms.

Subjective Group Dynamics and Social Self-Regulation
Prescriptive norm differentiation within groups is a process that allows the relationship between different social categories to become dynamic. Believing that the ingroup is somehow better or more valid than the outgroup legitimizes category-based favoritism (based on denotative differences). Once group members are aware of differences of opinion or behavior within the group, they have a motive to validate this subjective reality by enhancing ingroup consensus. Deviant members may shake the subjective reality of the group, and therefore they require special attention. Sensitivity to deviation from prescriptive norms is necessary so that group members can respond to sustain the subjective validity of the ingroup’s position.

Carver and Scheier (1981, 1998) proposed a theory of self-regulation based on a cybernetic framework in which higher order principles (e.g., to maintain a tidy house) set the standards for specific goals (e.g., to throw out the piles of old newspapers). Whenever there is a mismatch between standards and attainments at one level of control the system intervenes to ensure this is corrected at the immediately subordinate level. When routine operation of the system is disrupted (e.g., when behavior does not match the relevant standard), attention is devoted to reducing discrepancies between the intended and actual state (see also Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Higgins, 1987).

The Social Self-Regulation (SSR) model proposed by Abrams (1990, 1994, 1996, 1999a) extends self-regulation theory to apply to the domain of social identity. Within intergroup contexts, the overall goals of behavior are predicted primarily from the relative salience of personal versus social identity (Abrams, 1999a; Abrams & Masser, 1998). However, the specific choice of behavior may vary depending on how the goals can most easily or appropriately be achieved. Therefore, when adherence to a group goal is disrupted, group members may engage in corrective behavior that diverges from routine forms of intergroup differentiation and intragroup conformity. The SSR model holds that novel
intergroup situations, conflicting role demands, or disruptions to group standards are all likely to require group members to stop and think – to select actions consciously and strategically. Different specific goals or standards can arise from a variety of factors. These include the nature of the intergroup context (e.g., competitive vs. cooperative intergroup relations), group members’ motivation to sustain a positive identity, their skills and ability to enact certain behaviors, and anticipated responses from a potential audience.

There is a variety of direct and indirect evidence that self-regulation processes are engaged to influence intergroup and intragroup behavior (e.g., Abrams, 1985; Abrams & Brown, 1989; Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Monteith, Sherman & Devine, 1998; Plant & Devine, 1998; see also Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995; Spears, 2001). We believe that social self-regulation processes also underpin reactions to ingroup and outgroup deviance because, when social identity is salient, maintenance of ingroup standards is a means of validating the standards that are used to regulate the self. Therefore, when social identity is salient or important, one aspect of group members’ self-regulation is the regulation of group adherence to group standards. The presence of a deviant group member indicates that the group is failing to sustain its norms and values. Judgments of, and reactions to, a deviant will therefore depend on whether the target person is an ingroup or an outgroup member and also whether their behavior is more or less consistent with the ingroup’s values or norms. For the perceiver, the important issue is whether the group member’s behavior provides a source of validation for ingroup norms, either directly or by undermining outgroup norms in relative terms.

**The Black Sheep Effect: A Case for Subjective Group Dynamics**

One important source of evidence for the SGD model is the fact that people tend to evaluatively upgrade attractive ingroup members and downgrade unattractive ingroup members, as compared to analogous outgroup members (for a review, see Marques & Paez,
This phenomenon was coined the ‘black sheep effect’ (Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). Evidence shows that the black sheep effect occurs even when individuals show a strong overall preference for the ingroup (Marques, Robalo & Rocha, 1992). As long as the intergroup context is salient, the effect is larger when individuals identify with the ingroup (Branscombe, Wann, Noel & Coleman, 1993), and can occur when perceivers judge members singly (Marques et al., 1988), or directly compare normative and deviant members from the same group, or two members from different groups (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Evidence also suggests that the black sheep effect emerges when differences between group members are relevant to the maintenance of positive ingroup valence (Marques, 1990) or to intergroup distinctiveness (Marques et al., 1988, Experiment 2; for reviews, see Marques et al., 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994).

Marques, Abrams and Serôdio (2001, Experiment 3) showed that derogation of ingroup deviants as compared to similar outgroup members is reinforced when the status of the ingroup as a whole is insecure. Participants were categorized in artificial groups (“Pictorial” versus “Experiential”) on the basis of a bogus imagination test, and stated their positions on an ethical continuum. The experimenter then informed participants that the purpose of the study was to establish the superiority of one type of imagination over the other. In a second session, participants were informed either that the results in the first session were entirely clear and left no doubt about the ethical superiority of the participant’s ingroup (secure identity condition), or that those results were totally ambiguous as to which group was superior (insecure identity condition). Participants were then asked to judge normative ingroup or outgroup members, whose positions on the continuum were socially desirable and matched participants’ positions, or socially undesirable (deviant) members. The purported aim of these judgments was either to confirm (secure identity condition), or to disambiguate (insecure identity condition) the results obtained in the first session. The results
indicated that participants upgraded normative ingroup members and derogated ingroup deviants as compared to equivalent outgroup members, and this effect was stronger in the insecure identity condition than in the secure identity condition. This finding is consistent with the idea that derogatory judgments of ingroup deviants serve to sustain a positive social identity.

In another study (Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001, Experiment 1), Psychology and Law students examined answers purportedly given by other Psychology or Law students to a previous survey about a relevant issue (student initiation). Most of these students either showed agreement (norm validation condition) or disagreement (norm undermining condition) with student initiation. Participants then indicated the most pro-norm and least pro-norm position they would accept about student initiation along a pro-anti initiation continuum. When the norm was challenged, participants reported a higher threshold of rejection as given by the least pro-norm position they found acceptable, than when the norm was validated by strong consensus. However, the most agreed position did not vary across conditions (see Figure 1).

[Figure 1 about here]

This result is crucial to understanding the impact of normative positions on judgments of deviants. In the norm undermining condition, participants considered the least accepted position for ingroup targets to be closer to the norm than the least accepted position of outgroup targets (see Figure 1). They also evaluated the ingroup targets holding the least accepted position more negatively than their outgroup counterparts, whereas normative ingroup targets were upgraded relative to normative outgroup targets (see Figure 2). Finally, when stating how strongly they would attempt to persuade deviant targets to change their opinion in a forthcoming discussion, participants reported higher willingness to persuade deviant targets in the ingroup norm undermining condition than in all other conditions.
In another study (Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001, Experiment 2), following a bogus test, half of the participants received feedback that categorized them in two opposed types of imagination (group condition) whereas others were simply informed of their personal imagination characteristics (interpersonal condition). Participants were then asked to indicate their position on an ethical continuum. In a second session, participants in the group condition received false feedback about the ethical positions of other ingroup or outgroup targets. In the interpersonal condition targets were simply presented as being interpersonally similar to or different from participants in terms of imagination characteristics. All but one of the targets adopted norm-validating positions on the continuum (normative targets). These normative individuals were either highly consensual (high uniformity condition) or somewhat dispersed (low uniformity condition). The remaining target adopted a norm undermining position (deviant). Participants then evaluated one normative target and the deviant, and expressed how willing they were to influence these individuals to change their positions on the continuum. Consistent with the black sheep effect, participants evaluated the normative target more positively and the deviant target more negatively when they were presented as ingroup members than when they were presented as outgroup members or simply as individuals. More importantly, this result emerged most clearly when the ingroup lacked normative uniformity (see Figure 3). As was the case in the previous study, participants were also more willing to influence deviant individuals to change their opinion in the ingroup low uniformity condition than in all other conditions.

Three aspects of the results from the above studies are particularly worthy of attention. First, deviance per se does not necessarily generate norm-reinforcing responses (in the form of derogatory judgments and motivation to reintegrate the deviants). Such responses
emerge more strongly when the social validation of a relevant dimension is endangered by lack of perceived consensus among group members. It seems that, when the group membership of targets is well established, what individuals care about is the extent to which ingroup norms are prescriptively validated or undermined. Second, such responses emerge primarily where deviants are deemed to be ingroup members, rather than in interpersonal or in outgroup settings. Third, derogation of ingroup deviants is not necessarily equated with the exclusion of such deviants from the group. Rather than ostracizing the deviants, there seems to be a strong motivation to influence these deviants in order to persuade them to adhere to the prescriptive norm, especially when the ingroup lacks uniformity.

The Role of Denotative and Prescriptive Norms on Judgments of Groups and their Members

A series of studies conducted by Marques, Abrams et al. (1998) support the idea that category, or denotative, differentiation and prescriptive norm differentiation are distinct processes that operate together. In this series of experiments deviance was manipulated in a way that was not confounded with general likability or social desirability. In each experiment, participants first completed a bogus decision-making test in which they were asked to read a fictional murder story and then rank-order six characters in terms of their responsibility for the murder. In a later session, participants were informed that, based on the pre-test, they had one of two decision-making styles (“Type X” versus “Type Y”). They were then told about the way people with this decision-making style should be expected to rank the six characters in the story (this corresponded to participants’ own rank ordering), and that people with the alternative imagination style should tend to use the opposite rank ordering. These manipulations defined the descriptive or category differences (X vs. Y) and the prescriptive norms for each category (rank ordering of story characters). Participants were presented with the rank-order judgments made by five group members, either from the
ingroup or from the outgroup. Four of these members displayed the rank order linked to their category membership, the fifth member displayed a rank order that was more like the opposed pattern. Note that, in these experiments the ingroup pattern and participant’s own rank order pattern were identical. This ensured that the relative differences between self and target group members were constant across conditions, and it also enabled us to distinguish effects of group membership and deviance from those of interpersonal similarity, because the latter variable was constant. Participants evaluated the ingroup as a whole, the outgroup as a whole, and each of the five target members (from either the ingroup or the outgroup).

The first experiment (Marques, Abrams et al., 1998) illustrated that both denotative and prescriptive differentiation occurred, consistent with the SGD model. Participants judged the ingroup as a whole more favorably than the outgroup (denotative norm differentiation). However, participants also upgraded members whose responses were closer to the ingroup norm and derogated members whose responses were opposed to this norm, irrespective of whether they were ingroup or outgroup members (prescriptive norm differentiation).

Three further experiments investigated the processes that increased or decreased denotative and prescriptive norm differentiation. Marques, Abrams et al. (1998, Experiment 3) manipulated whether participants referred to the prescriptive norm as a comparison standard. In the low prescriptive salience condition, participants were simply provided with the responses of the five ingroup or outgroup targets to the ranking task. In the high prescriptive salience condition, participants were additionally informed that although it was not necessary for belonging to a decision-making style, in general, people who belong to the (ingroup or outgroup) style should make a particular ranking, whereas those who belong to the other style, should rank the characters in the opposed way. The salience of prescriptive norms did not affect expressions of global ingroup bias, which was equally strong and significant in both conditions. Similarly, when the prescriptive norm was not salient
participants judged individual ingroup members more favorably than outgroup members, regardless of whether the members were normative or deviant. However, when the prescriptive norm was made salient, the pattern of findings from Experiment 1 reappeared; participants upgraded ingroup and outgroup members whose responses were closer to the ingroup norm and derogated ingroup and outgroup members whose responses were opposed to this norm. Therefore, salient category differences resulted in denotative differentiation in all conditions, but prescriptive norm differentiation only occurred when participants were attentive to the prescriptive standards for the group.

In Experiment 2 (Marques, Abrams et al., 1998), prescriptive norms were salient in all conditions, but participants believed their responses would be observed either by other ingroup members (ingroup accountability condition) or by outgroup members (outgroup accountability condition). Previous research indicates that accountability increases self-focused attention (e.g., Abrams, 1990; Abrams & Brown, 1989). We therefore expected that accountability to ingroup members should be especially likely to enhance concern with ingroup prescriptive norms. As expected, derogation of the ingroup deviant was significantly stronger in the ingroup accountability condition (see Figure 4).

[Figure 4 about here]

Experiment 4 by Marques, Abrams et al., (1998) explored the hypothesis that intragroup differentiation in terms of prescriptive norms should be related to participants’ level of identification with their group. Identification was measured immediately following categorization and then again after participants had evaluated the normative and deviant ingroup or outgroup targets. Consistent with our assumption that social identity motivates evaluative preference for ingroup and outgroup members who endorse prescriptive ingroup norms, prior identification with the ingroup was associated with evaluative differentiation between normative and deviant group members. In turn, consistent with the idea that
prescriptive norm differentiation bolsters social identity, increased evaluative differentiation was associated with significant increases in identification from time 1 to time 2. Taken together, this series of studies support the SGD model and, specifically, the parallel operation of denotative and prescriptive differentiation and their association with the maintenance of social identity.

**Pro-Norm and Anti-Norm Deviance**

The above experiments are representative of analogous situations in which deviant ingroup group members may be the object of criticism and attempted influence. However, fundamental to the SGD model is the assumption that group members are concerned with the implications or meaning, rather than simply the presence and magnitude, of deviance from prescriptive norms. If deviance potentially undermines ingroup norms then indeed it is likely to attract hostile reactions. Conversely, if deviance potentially validates those norms, it is likely to attract positive evaluations. In other words, we believe that group members may be tolerant, or even approving, of deviants whose differences from other group members mean they can contribute positively to the subjective validity of the group norm. To investigate this possibility we extended our research paradigm to include two types of deviance. Anti-norm deviance differs from the norm of a group in a direction that undermines or rejects the group’s position, and may reduce its distinctiveness relative to opposing outgroups. Pro-norm deviance, by contrast, differs from the norm of a group in a direction that validates and supports its aims or ethos and may enhance the group’s distinctiveness relative to opposing outgroups (Abrams, Marques, Bown & Henson, 2000). Whereas anti-norm deviants may be considered by their group as traitors, pro-norm deviants may be viewed merely as fanatics.

To test these ideas, Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 1) asked participants to evaluate a series of targets from their own gender group who were ostensibly being considered for promotion. The social characteristics of each candidate were depicted using a graphical
display, such that the different candidates were all very similar in levels of competence, intelligence, politeness and other features, but one candidate was more feminine, and another was more masculine than the other (normative) members. The magnitude of deviation from the normative members was objectively equivalent in each direction, and these differences were perceived accurately by participants. Participants regarded themselves as significantly more similar to the normative target than to either of the other targets, but also felt the pro-norm target had more in common with the group and themselves than did the anti-norm target. We predicted that evaluations of these targets would reflect how much each provided support for ingroup gender norms vis-a-vis opposing gender norms. Consistent with this idea, participants rated the normative members as more attractive than the pro-norm deviant, but rated the pro-norm deviant as more attractive than the anti-norm deviant. Moreover, these effects remained significant once ratings of perceived similarity between self and target were partialed out. Thus, although pro-norm deviants were disliked, they were tolerated more than anti-norm deviants, because pro-norm deviants were less undermining of ingroup norms.

A further study (Abrams, Marques, Bown & Dougill, 2002, Experiment 1), examined reactions to deviance in a commercial banking organization. Employees in a major UK offshore bank read descriptions of behavior by other ingroup workers. All participants read about a normative worker. Half the participants also read about an anti-norm deviant. This deviant was critical of the organization, refused to do overtime work, and so forth. The other participants read information about a pro-norm deviant. This deviant was obsessed with supporting the organization, and would go out of their way to work additional hours, recruit new members, and so forth. As in Abrams et al. (2000) Experiment 1, evaluations of the anti-norm deviant were significantly more negative than those of the pro-norm deviant, even though they both were perceived as being equally different from the ingroup norm. Again, as in the first study, these effects remained significant even when perceived self-to-target
similarity was used as a covariate. Moreover, more negative evaluations of deviants were significantly associated with prior identification with the organization. Taken together Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 1) and Abrams et al. (2002, Experiment 1) suggest that, when distinguishing among ingroup members, people are equally able to detect the magnitude of pro-norm and anti-norm deviance, but they reserve their most negative evaluative reactions for anti-norm deviants.

Two further studies extended the above research to explicitly intergroup contexts, and examined the idea that intergroup comparisons should make people more concerned both to ensure the validity of ingroup norms and to maintain ingroup entitativity (see also Yzerbyt et al., 2000). Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 2) focused on attitudes about the number of asylum seekers that should be allowed entry to Britain each year. A pilot study established that psychology students believed the existing entry rate was about right. In the main experiment, psychology students read the results of national surveys that ostensibly had been conducted among psychology students or customs and immigration officers. They were told that psychology students wanted no change in the percentage of asylum seekers allowed to remain in Britain, but that customs officers advocated a reduction in the numbers by 30%. Participants then viewed responses to several of the survey items by six respondents, either from the Psychology Survey or from the Customs Officers Survey. In fact, four target group members were normative in their opinions, one was pro-normative and the other was anti-normative. Across conditions and types of deviant the mathematical difference between normative and deviant targets was kept constant. Moreover, the ingroup and outgroup anti-norm targets actually expressed identical attitudes (i.e., that there should be a 15% reduction in the numbers of asylum seekers allowed to remain in Britain).

As in the previous studies, the ingroup as a whole was evaluated more positively than the outgroup, and this difference was strongly associated with ingroup identification.
Similarly, as in our previous studies, participants were accurate when asked to report the actual opinion position espoused by each target member. However, an interesting change emerged in the ratings of group member typicality. Specifically, pro-norm deviants were judged to be equally typical of their group as were the four normative members. Only the anti-norm members were viewed as being atypical. This suggests that judgments of typicality are made with reference to how much the target helps to validate prescriptive norms, and not with reference to statistical typicality. In the intergroup context of the study it seems reasonable to suppose that typicality judgments reflected prototypicality as defined by the meta-contrast ratio in SCT (e.g., Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner & Onorato, 1995).

Evaluations of the targets did not correspond to the specific attitudinal position they expressed. Ingroup normative members and ingroup pro-norm deviants were evaluated more positively than ingroup anti-norm deviants. The reverse pattern was obtained for outgroup targets (see Figure 5). In fact, the relatively ingroup validating outgroup anti-norm deviant was evaluated more positively than the relatively ingroup undermining ingroup anti-norm deviant, even though both targets expressed identical attitudes. Moreover, the more that participants identified with the ingroup the more strongly they favored deviants that validated, as compared with deviants that undermined, the ingroup norm, regardless of whether the deviants were themselves from the ingroup or the outgroup. These results are highly consistent with the SGD model.

Abrams et al. (2002, Experiment 2) conducted an analogous study in the context of the University of Kent’s policy for admission of students from outside Europe (‘Overseas Students’). British universities charge a higher level of tuition fees to students from outside Europe, but accordingly they try to provide some advantages for these students, including privileged access to accommodation on campus and related schemes. Pilot studies confirmed
that Overseas students were happy with the situation but believed that further privileges would be justified. British students were also broadly acquiescent, but believed that a reduction in privileges for Overseas students would be appropriate. That is, although both groups were not discontented with the situation, they held diverging prescriptive norms regarding policies that would affect future generations of students. Participants were then presented with statements, ostensibly taken from the pilot study, made by three targets from each group. The statements concerned University policy for future cohorts of Overseas students. From each group one target expressed the normative opinion for the group, one expressed an anti-norm position and the other expressed a pro-norm position.

For our manipulations of deviance, an anti-norm ingroup target and a pro-norm outgroup target expressed identical attitudes (more privileges for future members of the outgroup), that were equally divergent from the current norm (maintain the status quo). Conversely, a pro-norm ingroup and the anti-norm outgroup targets also expressed identical attitudes (fewer privileges for future members of the outgroup). Consistent with Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 2), only anti-norm deviants were seen as atypical, and significantly more atypical than normative members and pro-norm members. Typicality ratings of normative and pro-norm members did not differ. Thus, despite potentially strong demand characteristics to distinguish among all 6 targets on a single continuum, perceived typicality followed a principle of relative normativeness or prototypicality, independent of the actual attitude position expressed and independent of objective similarities among targets. This is consistent with the idea that typicality judgments are attributable to prototypicality defined in the intergroup context, and not to absolute differences among targets or to whether the positions adopted by the target are ingroup validating per se.

The pattern of evaluations was also consistent with that found by Abrams et al.’s (2000) Experiment 2. The pro-norm ingroup deviant was evaluated more positively than the
normative member, and both were evaluated more positively than the anti-norm deviant. The reverse pattern was obtained for outgroup targets; evaluations of the pro-norm ingroup and anti-norm outgroup deviant were equally positive. Moreover, we found that evaluations of ingroup validating (ingroup pro-norm and outgroup anti-norm) deviants, relative to ingroup undermining (ingroup anti-norm and outgroup pro-norm) deviants, were strongly associated with the extent to which participants rated the two types of deviants as differing in typicality. In other words, the more that participants focused on discrepancies between the prototypicality of deviant and normative members, the more they showed favoritism to (ingroup and outgroup) members who validated the ingroup norm.

Across the Abrams et al. (2000, 2002) studies the evidence converges to show that, as group membership becomes more salient (i.e., as the context becomes more explicitly intergroup), people may engage in more intragroup differentiation in terms of prescriptive norms. For ingroup targets, anti-norm deviants are evaluated very negatively, but pro-norm deviants are often evaluated as if they are normative (in an intragroup setting) or even more favorably than normative members (in an intergroup setting). Even when perceivers are well aware of the objective magnitude of deviance, their evaluations reflect the implications of deviance for the validity of ingroup norms, and social identity. Additional evidence shows that evaluative differentiation within the ingroup seems to be associated with higher group identification (Branscombe et al., 1993; Castano, Paladino, Coull & Yzerbyt, 1999; Hutchison, 2000; Hutchison & Abrams, in press; Marques et al., 1988). However, it is important to note that evidence suggests this may be accompanied by a motivation to reintegrate deviants by gaining control over them, rather than to reject them from the group (Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001).
As discussed above, previous theory and research (e.g., Lickel et al., 2000; Oakes et al., 1994; Sherman et al., 1999) seem to suggest that the presence of ingroup deviants should reduce the fit of existing categorizations, and also group entitativity, particularly if the deviants are anti-normative. However, our own research suggests that intragroup differentiation often goes hand-in-hand with intergroup differentiation and that both may function together as a means of sustaining the relative validity of ingroup norms (see also Castano et al., 1999; Yzerbyt et al., 2000). For example, Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino and Leemans (2001) found that group members who identify more strongly with their group are likely to devote more cognitive resources to processing information about deviants but nonetheless strongly sustain the group stereotype. Concordant with this, using entitativity measures from Lickel et al. (2000), Hutchison (2000) found that the presence of an ingroup deviant in a sports context actually increased the perceived entitativity of the ingroup relative to an outgroup, and this effect was particularly strong when the deviant was anti-normative, and among highly identified group members. This suggests that the presence of deviants may elevate perceived ingroup entitativity, not because the deviants are excluded from the group, but rather because their salience also heightens the salience of ingroup norms (Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001).

What might be responsible for this effect? We suggest that intragroup differentiation may contribute to, and may indeed provide psychological validity for, intergroup differentiation. Our major point is that the two types of differentiation are based on distinct criteria. Evaluations of the category as a whole seem to be largely based on denotative differences and the higher value attached to ingroups than to outgroups. By contrast, evaluations of individual group members seem to be based largely on prescriptive norm differences and definition of social reality. Ultimately, the higher value of the group depends
on validation of its definition of reality, and therefore these two types of differentiation must work in conjunction rather than opposition to one another.

Conclusions

We believe that the SGD model can augment theory and research across a range of central topics in social psychology. As well as its obvious significance for intra- and intergroup relations, prejudice, and social influence it has relevance to research on stereotyping and stereotype change (Hutchison & Abrams, in press; Hutchison, Abrams & Viki, 2002), self and identity (Baumeister, 1999; Smith, Coats & Murphy, 2001), attraction (Hogg, 1993), ostracism (Williams et al., 2000), self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1998), individual-group discontinuity phenomena (Insko et al., 1983), motivated cognition (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), and small group process (Abrams, 1999b).

In the SGD model, judgments of group properties, such as entitativity, homogeneity and variability can be viewed not merely as perceptual outcomes of various objective differences within and between groups, but as qualities that are psychologically engineered and indeed managed. The SGD model embraces both intergroup and intragroup levels of representation as part of a dynamic process by which people sustain social reality for the self. It starts with the premise that people actively make sense of their social environment and seek a location within it. Therefore self-regulation and regulation of the social environment are necessarily part of the same process. The model extends the Social Self-Regulation model to apply to judgments of ingroups and outgroups and their members, and proposes that individuals may use different means (e.g., positive evaluations of certain outgroup members and negative evaluations of certain ingroup members) to reach the same ends (validation of ingroup norms). The model suggests that phenomena such as the black sheep effect are explainable in terms of an overarching goal to validate ingroup norms and ingroup reality. In the present chapter, we presented evidence that when people identify highly with a group,
they do not show unqualified increased support for the ingroup over the outgroup. Their higher levels of global ingroup bias are accompanied by greater favorability toward ingroup and outgroup members who increase the relative validity of ingroup norms.

To conclude, the subjective group dynamics approach offers several novel hypotheses that, in many respects, contrast with other established theoretical perspectives. Our superordinate aim is to promote the interpenetration and integration of theories that include the social-cognitive, intragroup and intergroup levels (Abrams & Hogg, 1999; Operario & Fiske, 1999). We are confident that the subjective group dynamics model can make a positive contribution in that direction and will stimulate further research.
References


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Figure 1
Most Accepted and Least Accepted Normative Positions as a Function of Target’s Group Membership and Norm Validation vs. Undermining Condition. Marques, Abrams & Serôdio (2000, Experiment 1)
Figure 2.
Evaluations of Targets who Adopted the Most Accepted and Least Accepted Positions in the Ingroup and the Outgroup as a Function of Norm Validation vs. Undermining Condition. Marques, Abrams & Serôdio (2000, Experiment 1)
Figure 3.
Evaluations of Normative and Deviant Targets in Interpersonal and Group Settings as a Function of Group Uniformity. Marques, Abrams & Serôdio (2000, Experiment 2)
Figure 4. Favorability Towards Ingroup and Outgroup Group Members as a Function of Accountability, Marques, Abrams et al. (1998, Experiment 2)

- **Ingroup Accountable**
  - Normative Members: Lower evaluation
  - Deviant Member: Higher evaluation

- **Outgroup Accountable**
  - Normative Members: Lower evaluation
  - Deviant Member: Higher evaluation
Figure 5.
Favorability to Pro-Norm, Normative, and Anti-Norm Group Members as a Function of Group Membership. Abrams, Marques et al. (2000, Experiment 2)