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Winning Peace Frames: Intra-Ethnic Outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

GAVIN MOORE, NEOPHYTOS LOIZIDES, NUKHET A. SANDAL and ALEXANDROS LORDOS

Ethnic outbidding in divided societies can have dire political consequences, ranging from the derailment of peace processes to inter-ethnic warfare. This article investigates the conditions contributing to successful outbidding within the framework of protracted peace negotiations by using the contrasting cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Evidence demonstrates that successful outbidders are able to exploit the fears of their communities with respect to inter-ethnic compromise while identifying appropriate strategies and opportunities for redressing these grievances. The article demonstrates that the degree of outbidding success over the long term derives from combining diagnostic and prognostic frames linked to credible political and constitutional strategies.

Ethnic outbidding occurs in the context of electoral politics when political parties compete for support within an ethnic group, having few incentives to cultivate support from other ethnicities. Each ethnic party seeks to demonstrate that it is more nationalistic than its competitors by raising its ‘bid’, protecting itself from claims by intra-group opponents that it is ‘soft’ on ethnic issues (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Horowitz 1985; Mitchell et al. 2009). Once this auction-like scenario begins, the ethnic outbidding thesis predicts that the resulting extremist discourse will destabilise and ultimately prevent conflict regulation in divided societies.

In this article, we shed light on the mechanisms that underlie the consequences of ethno-political competition, and account for the variation in outbidding outcomes – in other words, why ethnic outbidding succeeds and why it fails. The article will first explore the Northern Irish case where the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) supplanted the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) as the leading party of Unionism after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. We then examine post-2004 Cyprus, in which the Democratic Party (DIKO), the Social Democrat Movement (EDEK), and the European Party (EUROKO),
failed to outbid the moderate Democratic Rally (DISY or ‘the Rally’), despite overwhelming rejection of the ‘Annan Plan’ by the Greek Cypriots in a referendum. The former case is one of success, whereas the latter ended up as a failure for the outbidders. The electoral fortunes of the UUP and the Rally post-referendum illuminate how the contrasting outcomes of outbidding affected both parties, with a clear downward trend for the UUP (see Figure 1) in contrast to the DISY’s relative success in elections.

By examining the cases of ethnic outbidders in the Northern Ireland and Cyprus peace processes, this article establishes a framework that accounts for the variation in outbidding outcomes. The study of ethnic outbidding has important implications for research on intra-group conflict because if the conditions for successful outbidding are understood, then policymakers will have a better chance of minimising its impact on vulnerable peace processes (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 434). Whether outbidding succeeds or fails matters not only for the fate of inter-ethnic compromise, but also for the moderate parties who become vulnerable by their support of an agreement (Horowitz 1985: 354).

Specifically, we argue that the degree of ethnic outbidding success in the long term depends on the ability of ethnic parties to both:

- address the grievances of their own ethnic group with respect to inter-ethnic compromise, and
- identify appropriate frames, strategies and institutional opportunities for redressing the current situation.

![Figure 1](image-url)
In the case of the former, this may involve an ethnic party appearing robust on issues such as cultural identity by not accepting any concessions. The latter involves ethnic parties moderating their stance on issues that may be less salient to their group, such as inter-ethnic cooperation on economic issues. Outbidding may succeed in the short term where ethnic interests are plainly at stake – e.g. in peace referendums – but its long-term success is compromised by parties that are unwilling to adapt and moderate their positions to the new political or institutional opportunities. In this respect, Northern Ireland and Cyprus could tell us an insightful story particularly with regard to power-sharing engagements and party adaptation emerging from this binary comparison.

We begin by outlining ethnic outbidding theory in literature; then we explore how framing and party adaptation could broaden our understanding of outbidding theory. We also support our theoretical observations with primary material such as polling data, party speeches, and author-conducted interviews. We explore these arguments in the contrasting cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus, assessing the overall validity of our claims.

### Ethnic Outbidding and Peace Processes

By their very nature, ethnic parties in divided societies represent the interests of, and receive support solely from, a specific ethnic group rather than competing for a plurality of votes. The seminal authors of the ethnic outbidding thesis, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), argued that political preferences are distributed along a Downsian uni-dimensional issue space with members of each ethnic group clustered at opposite ends of a linear scale (Downs 1957). For instance, an ethnic party representing Serbs in Bosnia will compete intra-ethnically with another Serbian party, rather than with parties representing Muslims or Croats (and vice versa). Ethnic outbidding is the result of this peculiar form of political competition in divided societies. Parties within the same ethnic group seek to portray themselves as the true defenders of the group while simultaneously undercutting the legitimacy of in-group rivals (Gormley-Heenan and MacGinty 2008: 44).

The only way for ethnic parties to gain votes is to outbid their rivals in an auction-like scenario, resulting in parties raising their own bids, so that intra-ethnic rivals move from the conciliatory centre towards the extremes (Horowitz 1985: 345). The outbidding thesis predicts that hard-line parties will benefit from substantial vote switches from moderate parties compromising their positions during peace mediations (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). This movement toward the extremes damages both intra- and inter-ethnic relations, as groups become suspicious of the increasingly hard-line behaviour of their ethnic counterparts.

The centrifugal character of ethnic outbidding can radicalise ethnic groups, undermine multi-ethnic alliances, and lead to violent outcomes as witnessed in several seminal studies of the Sudan (Horowitz 1985), Moldova (Kaufman
1996), and Sri Lanka (DeVotta 2005). Of particular concern is the effect of outbidding on inter-ethnic compromise, peace processes, and the electoral consequences for moderate parties. In addition to the UUP example discussed below, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) was outbid by the United National Party and its calls for a ‘Sinhala-only’ language policy after the SLFP signed the 1957 Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact with ethnic Tamils (DeVotta 2005). Likewise, among both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots outbidding has proven to be an electorally appealing formula in several critical elections in the past decades. The National Unity Party (UBP, Ulusal Birlik Partisi) of Derviş Eroğlu defeated the moderate Turkish Republican Party (CTP, Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi) and its leader Mehmet Ali Talat in the decisive April 2010 elections ending renewed progress in the 2009–10 peace talks. Equally, in the 2003 presidential elections, Greek Cypriot hardliner Tassos Papadopoulos defeated Glafkos Clerides despite the latter’s success in finalising accession negotiations with the European Union. A decade earlier Clerides himself outbid another moderate, President George Vasiliou, by denouncing his earlier support for the Set of Ideas aiming for the reunification of the island.

Despite this seemingly inexorable logic of outbidding, the literature has failed to address the variation that exists in outbidding outcomes during and after peace mediations. Not only did a cluster of anti-Annan Plan parties fail to outbid the Democratic Rally in Cyprus, but there are also examples of outbidding failure across post-conflict societies; in Croatia (Hislope 1997), Angola (Kornprobst 2002), and India (Chandra 2005). Relevant scholarship has shown that outbidding during contested mediations did not earn electoral rewards for its adherents. By not specifying this variation in outcomes, the literature leads to an undue degree of pessimism about its consequences.

Recent studies have called for more specification on the conditions where outbidding is ‘more or less likely’ to pay off (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 434). Giuliano (2000: 296) stated that ‘a convincing theory of ethnic mobilisation should be able to account for variation in outcomes, for cases of frustrated as well as successful mobilisation along ethnic lines’. This article makes use of recent refinements to ethnic outbidding literature, namely Mitchell et al.’s ethnic tribunal thesis (2009) as well as comparative institutional theory on consociational engagements (McGarry and O’Leary 2009). Our aim in this paper is twofold. First, to clarify the variation in outbidding outcomes particularly during decisive moments of brokering peace by comparing the success and failure of outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Second, we link the two cases with regard to relevant policy lessons, particularly following renewed interest among Cypriot mediators on the institutions of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.

(Dis)contents of Outbidding: Politics of Identity and Framing

We argue that successful outbidding appeals are those that contain both identity-based frames addressing grievances of the target ethnic group, as well as opportunity frames in rectifying a contested peace process. The concept of
outbidding implies that ethnic parties will almost always offer an identity-based frame, but the longevity of outbidding success depends on ethnic parties offering opportunity frames tied to credible political and constitutional strategies.

Literature on framing, a process whereby actors jointly interpret, define, and redefine states of affairs, becomes especially relevant in the study of outbidding. Frames build on pre-existing cultural stock drawn from the identity of a community, the basis of outbidding claims. Frames involve the construction of shared meanings of a situation, whether a problem exists and what solutions are possible (Desrosiers 2011; Gray 2004: 167). Parties use ‘diagnostic frames’ which identify the source of a problematic situation, such as inter-ethnic compromise, and attribute blame in an attempt to exploit the group’s fears.

At the same time, the ‘prognostic frame’ establishes those opportunities for change that seem viable and effective. Prognostic frames contain the identification of appropriate opportunities and strategies for redressing the problem as well as an assessment of the efficacy of alternative strategies (Desrosiers 2011; Snow and Benford 1988). We argue that the presence of a prognostic frame in ethnic politics emphasising credible political and constitutional strategies is a necessary condition for successful outbidding. Under what conditions are parties likely to choose appropriate framing strategies? The frames that ethnic parties employ are shaped by political learning in response to incentives, whether domestic institutional or created by external actors. For one thing, party adaptation is a rational response to such incentives including appropriate institutional design with regard to specific demands and needs of the peace process. Furthermore, political parties could better balance nationalist constituencies in peace processes, if they have credible support from the international community including supportive external ‘peace allies’ (Sandal and Loizides 2013).

In the long term, successful outbidding parties are those that adapt by taking moderate positions on practical issues so as not to undermine the gains of inter-ethnic rapprochement their community approves of. In a refinement of earlier outbidding theory, Mitchell et al. (2009) found that although voters endorse ‘ethnic tribute’ parties that are deemed to be the most robust defenders of their group, they may also expect these parties to act in a more conciliatory way. Effective outbidding, especially in democratic systems, is one that does not eliminate the prospect of mutually advantageous inter-ethnic cooperation. Ethnic groups want their ‘strongest voice’ yet they do not want their ethnic champions to damage stable peace arrangements (Mitchell et al. 2009: 403).

Places Apart? Northern Ireland and Cyprus in Comparison

We have chosen the Northern Irish and Cypriot cases because they share characteristics that make them particularly fruitful for comparison.

Both cases are demonstrative of the outbidding process because they exhibit a binary group structure: Nationalist or Unionist in Northern Ireland
and Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot in Cyprus. While parties that do not explicitly define themselves as belonging to one of these groups exist, they are not as electorally salient, nor do voters significantly cross the communal divide in elections.\(^2\) Table 1 contextualises the political parties and their attitudes to compromise for the remainder of this article.

To varying degrees both cases are influenced by the British colonial legacy on each island and subsequent decolonisation, although Northern Ireland continues to have a more substantial British influence. Both cases feature competing ethno-national claims on territorial status, a partitioned island, and fear of gradual demographic reversal (Anastasiou 2008; Kitromilides 1979; Tonge 2005). Greek Cypriots and Irish Nationalists wish to reverse partition,\(^3\) reuniting the two islands under a shared jurisdiction. For the most part, Turkish Cypriots and Unionists (particularly those on the right) wish to maintain the current (de facto) borders, claiming the right of self-determination remains within the units of the Turkish North and Northern Ireland as opposed to the whole of their respective islands. Moreover, Unionists wish to maintain Northern Ireland’s status within the United Kingdom. These groups’ aspirations and identities are influenced by the pull of outside powers, Britain and Ireland for Unionists and Nationalists in Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus (Bekerman et al. 2009).

The role of ‘motherland countries’ in each case can be seen as having both an exacerbating and mediating influence on the respective conflicts (Wright 1987). Much international attention has been paid to Northern Ireland and Cyprus in peacemaking efforts (Byrne 2006). Consociationalism, that is non-territorial power-sharing between antagonistic groups, has been a prominent feature of international thinking, from British and Irish involvement in the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement\(^4\) to the active role of the United States in the 1998 Belfast Agreement.\(^5\) In Cyprus, the United Nations and more recently the European Union have attempted to induce compromise, culminating in various versions of the Annan Plan in the early-to-mid 2000s (Loizides 2014).\(^6\)

Given the striking similarities between the two cases, comparative studies have aroused much interest among academics (Bekerman et al. 2009;
Bose 2007; Byrne 2006; Lijphart 1996; O’Duffy 2003; Sandal and Loizides 2013). Similarly, policymakers have engaged in multiple attempts to transfer knowledge across the two cases during the past five years; for instance, the DUP’s Jeffrey Donaldson and Sinn Féin’s Mitchel McLaughlin were invited to Cyprus in October 2011 to share their experiences of the Northern Irish peace process (ENGI 2012), while at the same time the UN mediation team in Cyprus has included, among other international experts, Professor John McGarry, a leading scholar on consociationalism with a decisive contribution to the Northern Irish peace process (see McGarry and O’Leary 2009).

We recognise that the cases differ in crucial aspects. Chiefly, while the principle of consent in Northern Ireland means its constitutional status is subject to change, the majority on both sides consider the violent aspects of the conflict to be over. Although the conflict in Cyprus has remained largely non-violent after partition, neither side would consider the situation resolved. As our case studies will explore, in only one of the cases was a peace agreement implemented whereby a majority of Unionists and Nationalists endorsed the Belfast Agreement in the 1998 referendum, whereas a majority of Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan in the 2004 referendum. Finally, in Northern Irish elections the two communities vote for a devolved government while in Cyprus the Greek Cypriot side effectively controls the internationally recognised government of the Republic. While these distinctions make the electoral behaviour of the two cases slightly different, ethnic politics appear equally dominant in the periods we examine in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus.

The DUP’s New Clothes: Outbidding and the Fall of the UUP

In the 2003 Assembly election, a major realignment within Unionism occurred as the UUP lost its position as the leader of the unionist community it had maintained for over 80 years to the DUP (Tonge 2005: 60). By signing up to the peace deal, the UUP was expected to be the main beneficiary of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which brought the conflict to an end. Instead, the DUP was to solidify its position in subsequent elections despite opposing the Agreement. We argue that the DUP’s success stems from the party’s ability to exploit Unionist grievances with the Agreement, without taking hard-line positions on practical issues that would undermine stability and the gains of the peace process for Unionism.

Intra-Unionist competition features numerous cleavages in terms of ideology, identity, and attitudes towards compromise. Since its beginnings in 1905 as an offshoot of the Ulster Unionist Council, the UUP has been a centre-right party. In contrast, the DUP has been considered right-wing on social issues, but leftist in its socioeconomic policies (Evans and Duffy 1997: 53).

Disagreement between the parties over how best to secure the union naturally fostered resentment between the parties, with the more dogmatic DUP keen to target any perceived compromises by the UUP to Irish Nationalism (Farrington 2001: 56–57). Outbidding rhetoric from the DUP’s founder, Ian
Paisley, was a constant thorn in the side of the UUP despite the latter’s continuing electoral dominance throughout the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Paisley publicly denounced then-UUP leader Brian Faulkner’s ‘betrayal’ over the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement with the Nationalists. The DUP acquired a reputation as the party to ‘most eloquently articulate the siege mentality of absolute opposition to a united Ireland under all circumstances’ (Mitchell 1991: 71). Although comparatively moderate, the UUP also had its own moments of intransigence, with a large section of the party standing as anti-Sunningdale candidates in the 1973 Assembly election. Concerned about the DUP and dissent within the party, the UUP protected itself in the 1980s and early 1990s by not risking any further inter-ethnic compromise (Cochrane 2001: 323).

The UUP and DUP briefly put aside their hostilities to jointly oppose the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. However, the ‘Ulster Says No’ campaign stunted DUP growth, demonstrated by its disappointing performance in the 1987 Westminster election (Walker 2004: 234–39). The 1990s saw the DUP’s outbidding resume over the UUP’s involvement in the peace process. Paisley claimed that then UUP leader David Trimble was going to ‘sell out the union’ (Cochrane 2001: 371). The deal that emerged from the peace process altered the dynamics of

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UUP (%)</th>
<th>Change since last result</th>
<th>DUP (%)</th>
<th>Change since last result</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>23.0</td>
<td>+12.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>+1.45</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>+7.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>−7.8</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>+4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>13.2</td>
<td>−1.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>−0.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8.5</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>−1.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>+9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>29.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>−13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**  
1. UUP and DUP in United Ulster Unionist Council, a body of Unionists opposing the Sunningdale Agreement;  
2. UUP in electoral alliance with UK Conservative Party; DUP backed two Unionist independent candidates to avoid splitting Unionist vote;  
3. Ex-DUP MEP Jim Allister, leader of TUV won 13.7%.  
Source: [http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/](http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/).
Unionist rivalry, concretising Unionist competition between the anti-Agreement DUP and the pro-Agreement UUP (Evans and Tonge 2005: 324).

Outbidding from the DUP’s formation in 1971 to the early 1990s had only delivered modest growth for the party, demonstrated by the electoral trends in Table 2. Yet in the post-Belfast Agreement atmosphere, the party surged past the UUP and consolidated this position in subsequent elections since 2003. Such has been the electoral dominance of the DUP that there is a growing belief the UUP may even merge with the DUP. Indeed, two high-profile figures from the UUP left the party in response to the DUP–UUP electoral pact for the 2013 Westminster by-election in Mid-Ulster (BBC 2013).

**How did the DUP’s Outbidding Strategy Lead to Success?**

The peace process made the UUP vulnerable to counter-mobilisations from its outbidding competitor. The resulting agreement was a turning point in the DUP’s outbidding strategy, with DUP representative Clive McFarland suggesting that if the UUP had not signed the Agreement, it would have been more difficult for the DUP to achieve electoral success. The DUP adapted its message, addressing Unionists’ grievances without taking a hard line on practical issues such as opposing power-sharing with Nationalist parties. In other words, the DUP did not only present a diagnostic frame that just identified the problem but also emphasised the opportunity to choose an alternative strategy, promising to defend Unionist interests more robustly and effectively.

Polls preceding the referendum had already given an indication of what was to follow with regard to Unionist apprehensions. Specifically, only 4 per cent of Protestants believed Unionists benefited a little or a lot more than Nationalists from the Agreement (Evans and O’Leary 2000: 87). The 1998 referendum results reflected these fears, with a slim 55 per cent Protestant majority backing the Agreement. This number dropped to a minority only three years later as Unionist confidence in the Agreement dissipated for a number of reasons (MacGinty 2004: 90). Chiefly, Unionists protested that the Agreement put Sinn Féin in government with no guarantee of decommissioning; released paramilitary prisoners; radically reformed the Royal Ulster Constabulary police force; and provided for Irish Nationalist vetoes in the Assembly over major issues (Powell 2008: 104). The DUP argued that the Agreement signalled the end of the union and used diagnostic frames to reshape Unionist perceptions of the acceptability of this compromise. Paisley denounced the UUP as ‘office seekers who are prepared to sell their souls for office’ (Farrington 2001: 51). This ethnic outbidding discourse of betrayal resonated with Unionist fears and came at the UUP’s expense, overshadowing many ‘victories’ for Unionism in the peace agreement such as the de facto acceptance of the legitimacy of the Northern Irish state by the Nationalists.

The DUP also exploited Unionist fears by outbidding the UUP on identity-based issues. Once violence stopped, antagonisms manifested themselves in symbolic arenas, with identity politics becoming an increasingly important way
of pursuing the conflict by other means (Hill and White 2008: 44). The controversy over policing reform is one such example. Unionists had always considered the police ‘their’ force, with Nationalists distrustful of its majority Protestant membership and accusing it of bias and brutality (McGarry 2000). Before the Agreement, only 20 per cent of Protestants believed the police should change its symbols to reassure Catholics (Irwin 2006: 2). Unionists were incensed by the 1999 Patten Report that emerged from the Agreement, which recommended changing the emblem and name from the RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (McGarry 2000: 180). In response, the DUP’s Ian Paisley Jr. argued that the removal of the RUC symbols completely ruined anything linking the police service to the British (BBC 2001). His father claimed that ‘Patten’s programme is that Protestants have to be ethnically cleansed’ (Farrington 2001: 52). Four years after the report, 58 per cent of Protestants believed reform had gone too far.

In the 2001 Westminster election, the UUP had lost support due to police reform as DUP leaders were able to blame their rivals with responsibility for the report as part of the wider peace package (Mitchell et al. 2001: 730).

By catering to Unionist fears, the DUP could set itself up as the Unionists’ ethnic tribune, a factor crucial to successful ethnic outbidding. Mitchell et al. (2009: 412) found that 40 per cent of the UUP’s supporters perceived the DUP to be more effective defenders of Unionist interests, with only 7 per cent of DUP supporters believing the UUP to be the more effective. In the 2003 election, the UUP lost 22 per cent of its 1998 support to the DUP, with only 4 per cent going the other way (Mitchell et al. 2009: 406).

After the 1998 referendum loss, the DUP tried to attract Unionists who had given a ‘soft’ Yes to the Agreement. Crucial to the DUP’s successful outbidding was the party’s adaptation around the time of the Agreement. Outbidding had previously produced only modest electoral growth. The party successfully adapted its hard-line positioning to the new environment, cannily pointing to the Agreement’s more sensitive issues yet also offering a viable alternative, demonstrating the party had abandoned its wholly rejectionist position.

As we will discuss in the Cyprus case, long-term ethnic outbidding success is dependent on such adaption and prognostic framing. This strategy stemmed from its desire not to undermine the gains of the peace process. Local politicians now had control of Northern Ireland’s affairs after 26 years, Unionism was gaining international credibility, and inter-communal violence had substantially decreased (McGarry and O’Leary 2009: 51). Furthermore, the devolved institutions were generally popular, with support for the establishment of the Assembly rising from 57 per cent to 70 per cent amongst DUP supporters between 1998 and 2003, and only 13 per cent of Protestants rejecting power-sharing in 2007 (McGarry and O’Leary 2009: 56). Unionists clearly signalled that they wanted a determined ethnic tribune but they also wanted the DUP to act in a more conciliatory way (Mitchell et al. 2009).

The DUP’s adaptation was most evident in power-sharing with Sinn Féin, in which the party’s position changed from one of total resistance to laying out
conditions Sinn Féin would have to meet to form a government. The 2006 St. Andrews Agreement\(^\text{17}\) has restored power-sharing for the longest period in Northern Ireland’s troubled history, with a DUP–Sinn Féin-led executive at the helm. Moreover, the party’s position on policing moderated, accepting the PSNI and the devolution of policing powers in the 2010 Hillsborough Agreement. The party’s adaption since 1998 led to accusations that it had ‘stolen the UUP’s clothes’ (Mitchell \textit{et al.} 2001).

Institutional innovations in the Agreement itself may also have influenced this choice of framing strategy. The Executive was formed on the basis of the d’Hondt procedure which accords cabinet seats on the basis of party strength, effectively guaranteeing the DUP, the UUP, the SDLP, and Sinn Féin a place in the cabinet (O’Leary \textit{et al.} 2005). By rotating its ministerial positions and refusing to talk with Sinn Féin, the DUP could still claim to be ‘outside’ the process, outmanoeuvring the UUP, without destroying the new arrangements.\(^\text{18}\)

In fact a similar process of ethnic outbidding took place on the Nationalist side with Sinn Féin outbidding the moderate SDLP (see Table 1) while at the same time adopting a pragmatic approach within the institutions of the shared d’Hondt administration.

Alternatively, one could argue that the DUP’s post-agreement success was due to the UUP’s organisational weakness. However, this explanation remains unconvincing. Despite its fragmented structure and high-profile departures to the DUP, the UUP had many resources at its disposal, evidenced in support for its position in the referendum campaign from civil society organisations and leading international figures. More importantly, the party had dominated Unionist politics since its formation in 1905, as it was effectively organised around state institutions from 1921, and had closer links with the main Protestant network organisation, the Orange Order (Evans and Tonge 2009; Walker 2004). Thus, while party organisation may influence outbidding, it may not be as significant a factor as party adaptation and framing of available political and constitutional options.

In brief, despite losing the referendum, the DUP was able, in McFarland’s words, to ‘tap into the mood, and press the case against the Agreement’\(^\text{19}\). The DUP addressed Unionist grievances in its outbidding whilst identifying appropriate prognostic frames, thus ensuring the party enjoyed long-term ethnic outbidding success.

‘Rally’ Around the Flag: The Failure to Outbid the DISY

In the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan V, the Democratic Rally was the only major Greek Cypriot party to campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote. The results were particularly disappointing for the party – an overwhelming 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots rejected the Plan.\(^\text{20}\) The failure of parties that were opposed to the Plan – DIKO, EDEK, and EUROKO – to subsequently absorb DISY voters who voted ‘No’ is puzzling, constituting a failure for each of these parties’ outbidding strategies. Clearly Greek Cypriots had grievances regarding Annan, so
TABLE 3
SELECTED ELECTION RESULTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DISY (%</th>
<th>Change since last result</th>
<th>DIKO (%</th>
<th>Change since last result</th>
<th>EDEK (%</th>
<th>Change since last result</th>
<th>EUROKO (%</th>
<th>Change since last result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>31.92</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>33.56</td>
<td>+1.64</td>
<td>27.65</td>
<td>+8.15</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>+2.87</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>+2.24</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>–8.15</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>–0.17</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>–1.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>–3.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>–2.8</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>–1.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>–1.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>–3.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>+3.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>+2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>34.28</td>
<td>+3.98</td>
<td>15.76</td>
<td>–2.14</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>–1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>36.74 / 50.31</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st/2nd round</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>40.1 / 50.8</td>
<td>+3.36</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>38.8 / –</td>
<td>–1.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>+1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>33.51 / 46.63</td>
<td>–5.29</td>
<td>31.79 / –</td>
<td>–19.71</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>45.46 / 57.48</td>
<td>+11.95</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>24.93</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>28.23</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>17.09</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10.79</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.65 / 10.8</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>+7.47</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>–4.79</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>–0.89</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>–8.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ¹Contested as ‘KISOS’ rather than EDEK; ²NEO’s results until the party merged with EUROKO in 2005, contesting its last election under the ‘NEO’ label in 2006; ³First round % change only; ⁴Papadopoulos won 51.5% in the first round with support of AKEL; ⁵EUROKO backed DIKO’s Papadopoulos; ⁶DIKO backed DISY’s Anastasiades; Giorgos Lillikas backed by EDEK while EUROKO split between Anastasiades and Lillikas; ⁷Giannakis (Ioannis) Matis (For Europe) result.

why did these parties not benefit electorally? We contend that the anti-Annan camp did not identify appropriate strategies for redressing the Cyprus problem. In other words, they did not use prognostic frames that focused on ending the deadlock, which Greek Cypriots feared would entrench partition if it persisted.

Party competition in the Republic of Cyprus has been heavily shaped by events after the de facto partition of 1974. Since its establishment in 1976 by Glafkos Clerides, the Rally has identified itself as a centre-right party, drawing support from all segments of society, including nationalists with sympathies for the *enosis* movement as well as liberals supporting compromise with the Turkish Cypriots. The Rally’s absorption of the EOKA-B sympathisers marginalised the party in these formative years, with the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) and the DIKO establishing an alliance to exclude the DISY from government (Christophorou 2006: 517). The DIKO, a centrist party, was also established in 1976 as the party of former President Spyros Kyprianou (Christophorou 2007: 116).

The Rally overcame the AKEL–DIKO alliance to become the largest party in the 1985 parliamentary elections. During the 1990s, the party attempted to balance moderation with ethnic nationalism, with Clerides denouncing the Set of Ideas in his 1993 presidential victory, and taking a tough line on defence issues in his 1998 re-election. The impact of the Annan Plan negotiations in the early 2000s had profound implications for party competition (Vural and Peristianis 2008: 39–40). Before Annan, the Rally had begun to take a more progressive line towards inter-ethnic compromise, supporting a ‘bi-zonal, bi-communal federation’ and power-sharing with Turkish Cypriots (Kasoulides 1999). In echoes of the UUP and the Good Friday Agreement, the party’s decision to endorse Annan caused splits within the party, with influential hardliners defecting to form the EUROKO under ex-DISY parliamentary spokesperson Demetris Syllouris. The DIKO and the EDEK resolutely rejected the Plan, and were to play a key role in the ‘No’ campaign (Christophorou 2007: 120).

The Rally’s endorsement of the Plan appeared electorally risky, given Greek Cypriot anxieties regarding the security provisions, refugee return, and property issues (Anastasiou 2008; Yakinthou 2009). However, the DIKO, the EDEK, or the EUROKO could not take advantage of these apprehensions in subsequent elections (see Table 3).

Why were the anti-Annan parties unable to translate a short-term outbidding success in the referendum to the longer-term position of Greek Cypriots’ ethnic champions?

**Why did the Outbidders Fail to Undermine the Rally’s Support?**

The anti-Annan camp was unsuccessful in its attempts to outbid the DISY due to its inability to offer a prognostic frame, deepening fears that no progress in finding a solution would further entrench partition and lead to a decrease in international sympathy for the Greek Cypriot side. Indeed, the anti-Annan parties did
not alter their strategies after 2004, misreading why Greek Cypriots voted ‘No’ and also believing the prevailing conditions at that time precluded any need for party adaption.

The Rally’s decision to say ‘Yes’ to Annan appears irrational in terms of electoral incentives. Then President Tassos Papadopoulos (former president of the DIKO) campaigned vociferously for a No vote in a major boost to outbidding strategies. In an emotional television address, he invited Greek Cypriots to ‘say no to the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus’ (Christophorou 2005: 89). The ‘ΟΧΙ (No) campaign was also supported by large sections of the media, the church, and civil society organisations (Yakinthou 2009: 152–54). Despite this opposition, the Rally backed a ‘Yes’ vote with a 78 per cent majority at its party congress. Strikingly, 65 per cent of DISY supporters would vote against their party in the referendum (Christophorou 2005: 91 and 96). Lordos (2006: 8) found that the cumulative effect of security provisions, settler issues, and property rights was far more likely to influence how a Greek Cypriot voted than allegiance to the party line on the Cyprus issue. Much like the UUP’s David Trimble, the Rally leader Nikos Anastasiades favoured a solution but had not secured a comfortable majority amongst DISY supporters.25 Nevertheless, the ‘ΟΧΙ campaign failed to translate into substantial electoral gain for the DIKO (only 2 per cent of DISY supporter’s switched votes in 2006) or the EDEK (only 1 per cent). Notably the Democratic Rally did not have to deal with the difficulties associated with the implementation of the peace settlement,26 raising an intriguing ‘what if’ for the UUP case.

We contend that whilst Greek Cypriots were clearly apprehensive of the Annan Plan V, they did not totally endorse the anti-Annan parties’ diagnostic frames, which rejected the settlement in its totality. DISY former representative Katie Clerides argues that the party respected the No vote, whereas the rejectionists may have been undermined by the negativity of their arguments.27 The Rally’s 3.7 per cent loss of their total vote in the 2006 parliamentary elections was seen as a victory, given their internal divisions and the unfavourable referendum outcome (Christophorou 2007: 121–22). Despite the DIKO’s improving electoral performance, the 2006 results fell short of party expectations while the EDEK made only marginal gains. The anti-Annan parties all endorsed Papadopoulos’ re-election campaign in 2008, yet surprisingly the latter failed to make it to the second round of voting. Survey data collected after these elections suggested that supporters of the DIKO/EDEK/EUROKO and the Rally did not significantly differ in terms of reconciliation with the Turkish Cypriots, ethnocentrism, pro-unification attitudes, and anti-partition beliefs.28 The existing differences were insufficient to warrant a ‘No-based’ pre-electoral campaign by the Papadopoulos camp, with anti-solution framing more likely to ‘turn off’ Papadopoulos’ own supporters.

 Ironically, the outbidding strategies and campaigning of the anti-Annan parties were in direct contrast to the advice of their leading communication advisor. Specifically, in documents leaked to the press his recommendation was to avoid ‘brutal patriotic propaganda’, to ‘hide the doctor’ (a reference to the
father figure of Greek Cypriot nationalism Dr Lyssarides), and to ‘soften their language towards moderation’ (Christoﬁlopoulo 2011).

The Rally’s approach was closer to public sentiment on bi-communal federalism, a position that attracted those voters who were ambivalent – but not opposed to – the peace process. By way of contrast, the anti-Annan parties misread the public mood, adopting an inappropriate framing strategy that could not trump the DISY’s prognostic frame. The short-term outbidding success in the referendum did not lead to displacement of the Rally as the Greek Cypriot champion particularly in defending Greek Cypriot interests in the international scene. Although political party discipline had a role to play, it was Greek Cypriots’ personal evaluation of the Plan that most affected their voting behaviour (Lordos 2006: 12). Fears over property, settlers, and security did not automatically translate into votes for the anti-Annan parties, even if the latter reinforced a negative vote. These parties did not adapt their messages after 2004, perhaps believing they did not have to. After all Cyprus’ accession to the EU was guaranteed irrespective of the referendum outcome (Loizides and Keskiner 2004: 159).

A sovereign Cyprus in the EU, facing an unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and with a say over Turkey’s accession to the EU would, from a Greek Cypriot standpoint, have a better bargaining position to draw a more balanced compromise than Annan V. In such a climate, the anti-Annan parties failed to recognise that the Greek Cypriots did not fully buy into their prognostic frames, even if they could relate to their diagnosis. In a sense, the Rally won the ‘battle of ideas’ over the future reunification of Cyprus by taking a more conciliatory approach to a settlement. The party did not convince its constituency to support the Annan Plan, yet it effectively argued that the continuation of the island’s current status would lead to the worst possible outcome, the entrenchment of partition.

In contrast, the rival Democratic Party viewed the status quo as preferable to what they perceived as a ‘non-workable solution’ (Christophorou 2005: 90), though 10 per cent of its supporters disagreed, voting for the Plan (Lordos 2006: 7). The continued influx of Turkish settlers and Greek Cypriot international isolation after the referendum has strengthened the Rally’s push for a solution (Anastasiou 2008; Trimikliniotis 2009). The EDEK and the EUROKO’s vague ‘European solution’ to the Cyprus problem have undermined their outbidding appeals (Christophorou 2007: 117). By way of contrast, in Northern Ireland the DUP’s prognostic frames and operation of the Agreement’s institutions offered voters a viable alternative to the UUP.

The anti-Annan camp’s main outbidding strategy relied primarily on identity issues. For instance, the EUROKO deputy Nicos Koutsou accused the DISY deputy Christos Pourgourides of ‘providing ammunition to the enemies of Hellenism’ by signing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) agreement which looked into alleged abuses of Turkish human rights in the Greek islands (Cyprus Mail 2009). Yet for each ethnic outbidding attempt, the DISY responded by demonstrating its success in gaining key
‘positions of influence’ within European institutions, for instance the appointment of Pourgourides himself to the chairmanship of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the PACE in 2010. Moreover, the Rally was able to outmanoeuvre its competitors on identity issues, maintaining stringent positions as compensation for moderation elsewhere. For example, during elections the DISY leaders would maintain slogans such as ‘Cyprus is Greek’, and during the referendum the party suggested the Greek flag should be the official one of the Greek Cypriot constituent state (Sandal and Loizides 2013).

We argue that framing has been a salient explanation of outbidding failure. The DISY effectively framed its position as the most credible and effective advocate of Greek Cypriot interests following accession to the EU, the referendum, and international isolation after 2004. The party appeared much more capable in adapting its frames in the post-accession period, opting to adapt ‘to what its leaders perceived as new realities’ (Christophorou 2006: 520). This move was vindicated in its electoral performance after 2004, most recently in the May 2011 legislative elections, where the DISY emerged victorious with 34.3 per cent, and 38 per cent in municipal elections six months later. On the other hand, the anti-Annan parties did not sufficiently adapt to these realities and were too negative after their short-term success in the 2004 referendum – quite unlike the situation in Northern Ireland, where the DUP showed its ability to moderate after the referendum and the Good Friday Agreement.

It was only in the summer of 2012 that the DIKO leadership made a pragmatic turn, breaking away from the ‘nationalist’ camp to support the candidacy of Anastasiades for the presidency in the February 2013 elections. The DIKO’s decision could partly be attributed to the effects of the Eurozone crisis but also Anastasiades’ own increasing popularity. In principle, the DIKO did not lack alternatives. In the year preceding the elections the party along with the EDEK and the EUROKO attempted to resurrect the late Papadopoulos 2008 camp. Although the three parties have agreed on their main principles, they failed to agree on a joint candidate. This failure further demonstrates the divisions and weaknesses of ethnic outbidding in the case of Cyprus.

In the 2013 campaign, Anastasiades emerged as an example of an ‘ethnic tribune’ defined by Mitchell et al. (2009), with his poll ratings indicating that he is the most capable and effective leader to negotiate with the outside world on the Cyprus issue (higher than his own voters’ base) (CYBC 2012). Focus groups run by the Rally’s communication advisors have further indicated that even undecided voters felt that Anastasiades has attracted a team around him consisting of the most effective political figures and technocrats in the island. The DISY candidate received 45.46 per cent of the vote in the first round of the elections and then secured 57.48 per cent in the runoff elections, the largest popular mandate for a Cypriot president in decades. His campaign managers have mainly emphasised Anastasiades’ international credibility and ‘team leadership’ as one of his main strengths in the elections. His principled stance on the Annan Plan which divided his party and put him at odds with most Greek
Cypriots did not harm his campaign as priorities changed by 2013 and the electorate prioritised instead Anastasiades’ ‘statesmanship and credibility’.

Yet his victory has also ended the electoral safety of serving in opposition for almost a decade and has opened new challenges for ethnic outbidding. To begin with, the DIKO has failed to outbid the DISY but through their electoral alliance DISY’s leader has endorsed domestic limitations as to the management of the bi-communal negotiations. A critical question for future research is who will transform whom in the DISY–DIKO alliance and whether ethnic outbidders will effectively defeat moderates in neutralising future peace initiatives. Inevitably, the mismanagement of the Eurozone crisis in March 2013 and the treatment of Cyprus in the bailout negotiations has demolished Anastasiades’ domestic image and credibility. But if he eventually addresses the problems of the haemorrhaging economy, he will also be in a better position to balance his domestic alliances with an ambitious attempt to resolve the Cyprus question.

Conclusions

We argue that ethnic outbidding is particularly successful when ethnic parties address the grievances of their ethnic group whilst also identifying appropriate political and constitutional strategies for redressing these concerns. The article makes a twofold contribution to the study of framing in divided societies. First, it identifies the necessary components of ‘winning peace frames’ during critical moments of ethnic outbidding competition. Second, the article challenges the primary emphasis in framing literature on grievances and fears. In the hearts vs. minds debate, our cases suggest that it is not so much sentiments per se that determine the battle of ideas but rather which actors stand more credibly to offer solutions. On this point, the article demonstrates that often the same aggrieved constituencies are also potentially pragmatic in their political preferences. For the Greek Cypriot hardliners their self-imposed deadlock within the EU offered very little prospect for an effective ‘nationalist’ programme in contrast to Northern Ireland’s power-sharing agreement, which offered Unionist leaders the opportunities to revisit the most contentious parts of the agreement.

Yet there are other perspectives to consider before stating conclusively that the framing of these opportunities is the key to outbidding outcomes. For example, Chandra’s (2005) cross-cutting cleavages theory stipulates that outbidding may fail due to the presence of multiple cleavages across ethnicities, forcing majorities to maintain moderate policies. Both cases do feature multiple cleavages but they are not significant enough to cross ethnic boundaries. Cyprus arguably had fewer such alternative cleavages following the aborted Annan Plan, yet ethnic outbidding failed in Cyprus despite the fact that the DISY shares limited civil society links with the Turkish Cypriot community compared to its left-wing and moderate rival the AKEL.

Another aspect of the ethnic tribe theory stresses the importance of power-sharing institutions in producing centripetal moves towards inter-ethnic cooperation by outbidders, provided that they can cover their flanks (Mitchell
The institutionalisation of ethnic identity is often criticised for exacerbating rather than ameliorating ethnic conflict. In both cases, the reification of ethnic cleavages through consociational institutions or other ‘divisive means’ has been criticised for encouraging outbidding (Horowitz 1985). However, the differing outcomes in each case suggest caution with regard to this argument; if anything, ethnic outbidding should have worked in Cyprus since the effects of partition eliminated any opportunities to attract voters across communal lines.

Furthermore, the article’s main arguments could be extended to the Turkish Cypriot community which ironically also demonstrates resemblance with our Northern Irish case study. The moderate leftist CTP won the 2004 referendum but subsequently lost elected offices in the North by 2010. The CTP leadership failed to convince the electorate that Talat and his party could provide a better settlement than the Annan Plan. In essence, the CTP found itself trapped between its own determination for a settlement and Greek Cypriot post-2004 demands for additional concessions. Arguably, win–win institutional arrangements might have made a difference in maintaining support for the moderates; however, the two sides have ultimately failed to consider alternative institutional arrangements of relevance to Cyprus.

In contrast, Cypriot moderates have invested all their fortunes in a centripetalist compromise in 2009 (e.g. cross-voting for co-presidents) which inadvertently contributed to their electoral defeat even before finalising the peace talks. In line with Horowitz’s (1985) argument, Talat agreed that each community in the island would have a minority vote in the election of each other’s co-president. This compromise allowed hardliners to argue that Turkish Cypriots would effectively lose their genuine representation and capacity to defend their community interests. To this point our article demonstrates that relevant comparisons among divided societies could be particularly critical not only with regard to party strategies but also in identifying lessons in designing negotiable and durable conflict-mitigating institutions.

Interestingly, the d’Hondt executive has recently become an attractive alternative for the Cyprus mediations stemming from its effectiveness in Northern Ireland (Loizides 2014). While admittedly failing to prevent ethnic outbidding, the d’Hondt executive encompassed hardliners in government and moderated their positions, thus contributing to an unprecedented political stability. In contrast to Sunningdale, d’Hondt led to stable coalitions since May 2007 and, as demonstrated in this article, even contributed to a working relationship between Ian Paisley and Sinn Féin leader Martin McGuinness, previously sworn enemies.

Overall, our analysis demonstrates the importance of political adaptation and effective framing linked to credible political and constitutional strategies. The DUP enjoyed outbidding success and electoral reward by addressing the grievances of the Unionists with the Belfast Agreement and maintaining the party’s reputation as a robust defender of Unionism, whilst moderating its position in terms of power-sharing and thus attracting previously reluctant UUP voters disenchanted with the state of their party.
In contrast, the outbidders in Cyprus were unable to attract the DISY supporters who were unhappy with their party’s endorsement of the Annan Plan. Although the DIKO, the EDEK, and the EUROKO were able to voice Greek Cypriot grievances with varying degrees of success, none of the parties offered a viable or appropriate prognostic frame. DISY was able to argue that the rejectionists would entrench the status quo on the island, convincing its own voters to stand by the party in subsequent elections.

An important addendum has arisen from our comparative study surrounding the short- and long-term success of ethnic outbidding. Effective framing can achieve short-term successful outbidding where ethnic interests are plainly at stake, such as a referendum. The anti-Annan parties’ success in 2004 contrasts with the DUP, whereby the UUP held off its challenge in part because of the DUP’s overly negative framing before the Agreement. Nevertheless, the ‘Yes’ victory in the 1998 referendum was tenuous. Paradoxically, when outbidders win referendums they also undermine the longevity of their own outbidding strategy. Outbidders will only succeed as long-term ethnic champions when they can displace their rivals through having a plausible prognostic frame as well as a diagnostic frame. The anti-Annan parties most likely felt they did not need to adapt their message after the referendum and were subsequently electorally punished for it. In this respect, analysing the effects of short- versus long-term ethnic outbidding success promises an interesting avenue for further research.

Polling data in both countries demonstrated that voter behaviour was contingent on the framing of grievances and opportunities offered by parties they would not usually vote for. That 40 per cent of the UUP’s own supporters in 2003 should believe the DUP was a more effective voice for unionism illustrates the link between grievances/opportunities and outbidding success. The comparative inability of the anti-Annan parties to offer opportunities to redress the Cyprus problem meant rejectionist framing was unattractive not only to floating DISY voters but also to their own supporters.

This research also found that preventing or curtailing ethnic outbidding is difficult even in relatively successful peace processes. While democracy offers the necessary structural mechanisms to promote accommodation, electoral politics may encourage opportunistic elites to exploit ethnic cleavages (DeVotta 2002: 96–97). Therefore, policymakers need to strike a balance between in-group cohesion that prevents fragmentation and in-group cohesion that reifies antagonistic ethnic identities. Contested peace processes are in essence inundated with questions of priorities and difficult dilemmas. As our comparison of Northern Ireland and Cyprus suggests, rather than maintaining a protracted deadlock, it is arguably better to embrace peace, however risky this might be politically with regard to ethnic outbidding or other negative side effects. Peace processes require reasonable and often unavoidable electoral risks while maintaining a balance between pragmatism and identity politics.
Notes

1. In 1992, the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali attempted to facilitate talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiating parties by outlining a plan of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

2. In Cyprus, the post-partition electoral system prevents Greek Cypriots voting for Turkish Cypriot parties and vice versa. In Northern Ireland, only 7 per cent of Catholics would consider voting for the leading Unionist party, the DUP, and only 3 per cent of Protestants would consider voting for the leading Nationalist party, Sinn Féin in a recent poll. As a majority of Catholics are Nationalist and a majority of Protestants are Unionist, the terms are often used interchangeably. Though debated among academics, religion is seen as a good indicator of group behaviour in Northern Ireland. See LucidTalk 2012 poll: http://www.lucidtalk.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/120530BelfTelResTbles-14Qs.pdf

3. Northern Ireland was established under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 which partitioned Ireland, creating two separate governments in the North and South of the island. Cyprus has been ‘de facto’ partitioned since 1974. The international community recognises only the Republic of Cyprus but not the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which was declared unilaterally in 1983.

4. The Sunningdale Agreement established a power-sharing executive between moderate Nationalist and Unionist parties, which fell in 1974 after the Ulster Worker’s Council, supported by anti-Sunningdale Unionists, declared a strike bringing Northern Ireland to a standstill (Walker 2004).

5. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement established a power-sharing government with an arbitration role for the British and Irish governments and crucially had the support of hard-line Nationalists and some hard-line Unionists (McGarry and O’Leary 2009).

6. More developed than earlier peace proposals, the Annan Plan outlined the structure of governance under a federated Cyprus, as well as proposals for dealing with every single detail of administration in a reunited Cyprus (Yakinthou 2009).

7. The 1998 Agreement allows for Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK or to become part of Ireland should a majority in Northern Ireland and Ireland wish either scenario to be so.

8. Interviews with UUP Member of the European Parliament Jim Nicholson and former UUP adviser Dr Brian Crowe (2009).


11. Decommissioning refers to the handing over of weapons by paramilitary groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (linked with Sinn Féin) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (Unionist militants).

12. Unionists were also facing an existential threat, through the principle of consent. Interview with academics and activists David Officer and Yiouli Taki, Index Cyprus (2010).


14. Interview with Queen’s University Belfast academic Professor Graham Walker (2010).


16. In 1972, the British government imposed direct rule in response to the worsening security situation, meaning governance in Northern Ireland was carried out by the Northern Ireland Office in Westminster.

17. This agreement updated the 1998 Belfast Agreement, abandoning the cross-community voting procedure for First Minister and Deputy First Minister. They would instead be drawn from the largest parties, saving the hard-line parties from voting for each other’s candidate.


20. Annan Plan V was put forward in simultaneous referendums in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities; a 65 per cent majority of Turkish Cypriots accepted the Plan in the April 2004 referendum.
21. The *Enosis* (Union) movement represented an aspiration among Greek Cypriots to unite with the Greek ‘motherland’, and was categorically opposed by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots (Kitromilides 1979).

22. The EOKA B organisation was one of the forces in the internal fighting among Greek Cypriots before 1974. It campaigned against President Makarios and sought the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus, aiming for immediate unification with Greece (Papadakis 1998).

23. Interviews with DISY former members of parliament Katie Clerides, Christos Pourgourides, Christos Stylianides; former and current presidents of the party Glafkos Clerides and Nikos Anastasiades (2009).

24. EUROKO subsequently absorbed another party from the right, the New Horizons (NEO).


26. Interview with Yiouli Taki and David Officer (2010).

27. Interview with Katie Clerides (2009).


30. Interview Glafkos Clerides (2009); Nicos Anastasiades (2009); DISY’s international secretary Alexandros Sinka (2010).


32. Interview with DISY’s Policy Director, Christoforos Fokaides (2012).

References


