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What’s the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) Really Measuring: Compunction or Compensatory Action?

Roger Giner-Sorolla

Jared Piazza

University of Kent

Pablo Espinosa

University of La Coruña

Author final version


Note: This research was partially funded by UK Economic and Social Research Council grant RES-000-22-0004. Correspondence should be addressed to Roger Giner-Sorolla, Department of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, UK CT2 7NP, e-mail R.S.Giner-Sorolla@kent.ac.uk.
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Abstract

Psychologists have long used the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) as an instrument for empirically distinguishing between trait emotions of guilt and shame. Recent assessments of the internal structure of the TOSCA guilt scale suggest that it may not measure the experience of guilt, but rather motivation to make amends for personal wrongdoing. In contrast, TOSCA shame may better assess the tendency to experience negative self-conscious affect. Previous research did not take into account that TOSCA guilt theoretically should only predict emotions in a situation of wrongdoing; we put this idea to the test in two studies. Experimental, but not control, participants received believable feedback that they had shown involuntary prejudice towards a member of a minority group. In both studies TOSCA guilt predicted reparative action after feedback was given, including expressing non-prejudiced views and recommending financial compensation to the minority group. However, TOSCA guilt had no relationship with feelings of guilt or shame after expressing prejudice. In contrast, TOSCA shame was a better predictor of feelings of guilt, shame and other self-critical emotions, but did not predict compensatory action. These findings suggest motivation rather than emotion as a mechanism behind past findings involving TOSCA guilt.
1. Introduction

Self-conscious negative emotions, including shame and guilt, react to unfavorable aspects of the self. One distinction between shame and guilt was proposed by Lewis (1971), and refined empirically by Tangney and colleagues (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). Shame, in this view, is counterproductive. Its appraisals focus on the global, stable unworthiness of the self; its action tendencies foster avoidance and concealment. In contrast, guilt is said to be more productive. Its appraisals focus on the wrongness of a particular, controllable action, enabling action tendencies of apology and reparation. This difference has been empirically demonstrated as distinct personality orientations toward shame vs. guilt, measured with the Test of Self-Conscious Affect or TOSCA (Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989).

1.1. The TOSCA

The TOSCA measures participants' self-reported likelihood of different appraisals, feelings and action tendencies in scenarios of personal blameworthiness. For each situation, there are four concurrently rated responses representing: (a) trait guilt (guilt-proneness), (b) trait shame (shame-proneness), (c) detachment, and (d) externalization of blame. Here, we focus exclusively on trait guilt and shame.

The TOSCA correlates with various outcomes in line with the action- vs. self-focus distinction first outlined by Lewis (1971). Guilt-prone people are thought to focus on the controllable, amendable aspects of their harmful actions, and this enables them to amend the harm. Indeed, TOSCA guilt-proneness predicts self-reported reparative action, apologies, and empathy, as well as numerous positive behavioral outcomes (Tangney, 1991; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002). In contrast, shame-prone people focus on negative, stable or unchangeable aspects of the self, which leads them to feel helpless, externalize blame, and want to escape, and leads them to more counterproductive behaviors (Tangney et al., 1992). Although the action tendencies of guilt-proneness and shame-proneness appear as opposites, the TOSCA scales generally correlate positively with each other. Accordingly, Tangney et al. (1992) prescribes partial correlations for the scales to control for shared variance.

1.2. What does the TOSCA actually measure?

Although numerous published studies have used the TOSCA (for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002), some psychometric tests of its structure and validity have questioned the assumption that the TOSCA scales measure the proclivity to experience the emotions of shame and guilt. Luyten, Fontaine, and Corveleyn (2002) found that the strongest factor loadings in the TOSCA guilt scale involved items measuring the motivation to make reparation, rather than feelings of guilt, whereas for the shame scale the strongest loadings were for negative evaluations of the self. Fontaine, Luyten, De Boeck, and Corveleyn (2001) showed that the items most clearly differentiating TOSCA guilt from TOSCA shame were about reparative behavior, not the affective experience of guilt; and that correlations between TOSCA guilt and chronic “guilt” feelings were very low, whereas TOSCA shame correlated strongly with chronic guilt and shame.

One possible rejoinder is that lay respondents use the terms “shame” and “guilt” interchangeably, so the TOSCA scales shouldn’t be expected to predict their corresponding emotion term uniquely (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). This, however, fails to explain why TOSCA shame predicted both chronic shame and guilt feelings, but TOSCA guilt was related only weakly to any feelings at all. If it were truly random semantic confusion, the cross-correlations should work both ways. Another possibility is that guilt may be a less intense
emotion than shame, and inaccessible to self-report. However, this does not square with evidence from Baumeister, Reis, and Delespaul (1995), who found that individuals are fully capable of identifying guilt-inducing events in their daily lives.

What then does the TOSCA assess, if not the tendency to feel guilt and shame? Consistent with Luyten et al. (2002), we propose that TOSCA guilt measures the motivation to respond to one’s own misdeeds with compensatory action, whereas TOSCA shame measures the tendency to experience intense emotions of guilt and shame from the appraisal of self-blame, and to a lesser extent the desire to withdraw from others.

1.3. The TOSCA and reactions to involuntary prejudice

Existing structural and correlational assessments of the TOSCA scale, however, have not established whether the TOSCA reliably predicts affective reactions in situations of personal transgression. Indeed, existing attempts to correlate the TOSCA with non-situation-specific feelings risk missing a key theoretical point: guilt, because it is act-focused, should be felt only in situations of perceived personal fault. In fact, no studies to date have used an experimental situation of an actual transgression to test the TOSCA’s ability to predict feelings of guilt and shame.

In the present studies, we did just this: measuring participants’ emotional and behavioral responses to manipulated feedback about a personal misdeed, and relating these to the TOSCA. If TOSCA guilt reflects motivation to compensate for wrongdoing, rather than chronic guilty feelings, then it should predict more compensation, but not actual feelings of guilt or shame, in such a situation. In contrast, TOSCA shame should positively predict feelings of guilt and shame, but not compensatory action, following the misdeed.

Our method follows a paradigm from experimental social psychology. Participants are told they have made a racially prejudiced judgment (vs. a control condition), and then are
unobtrusively allowed to compensate by (a) expressing less prejudiced attitudes, and (b) offering symbolic compensation to members of the target group. Research using this paradigm finds that prejudice feedback can trigger compunction feelings such as guilt or shame, as well as reparative motivations (Monteith, 1993). In two studies, we tested our hypotheses about the TOSCA using this paradigm.

2. Study 1

Participants were 91 first-year psychology students from the University of Kent, who participated for course credit. Based on screening, 14 participants were removed from the sample because they identified themselves as one of the target groups (Black, Muslim, or non-heterosexual), leaving 77 participants (12 male, 65 female). The mean age was 20.30 years (SD=3.75). Participants were told they were signing up for two studies, but these were actually two parts of the same study. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In three of these, they rated a Black, Muslim or lesbian candidate for a job position. Control participants did not complete this task, nor did they receive prejudice feedback.

Part I. Participants in the experimental conditions read a job advertisement for a primary school teacher. The CV strongly implied that the female candidate was either Muslim, Black, or lesbian, using background information and/or names indicative of that identity. Participants then rated the candidate’s suitability on 12 traits; these scores were ostensibly analyzed by the experimenter outside the room, and the participant received a bogus bias score, with a key indicating that the score showed “subtle, almost overt prejudice” towards the target group.
Next, the experimenter gave participants a questionnaire containing filler items and 51 items to measure their state emotions. The state emotion items included 15 items from the State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS; Marschall, 1996; as cited in Tangney & Dearing, 2002), and 36 affect items from the questionnaire used by Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, and Elliot (1991) in similar research. Items from both questionnaires were intermixed, and answered in terms of current feelings on the same Likert-type scale. The SSGS provides indices of state shame, guilt, and pride, based on the action- (guilt) vs. self-condemnation (shame) distinction employed by the TOSCA.

Part II. In the second part, a different experimenter in a different room asked participants to distribute funds from a non-governmental organization to various groups, including the three target groups (“Black youth group fund,” “Lesbian support group,” and “Muslim rights defense foundation”) and five filler groups (e.g., "refuge for battered women,” "AIDS sufferers charity"). Participants were asked to allocate £200,000 between the organizations in any way, using the entire endowment. Participants also answered three 10-item versions of the Modern Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay, 1986) using nine-point Likert-type scales. Two of the versions substituted “Muslims” or “lesbians” for “Blacks,” excluding one item on family marriage, which would have been non-equivalent for lesbians.

Next, participants completed an open-ended suspicion probe. No one guessed that the two studies were related or that prejudice feedback was bogus. Afterwards, participants answered the 11-scenario version of the TOSCA-3 (Tangney et al., 2000). The reliability of the TOSCA-3 shame scale was acceptable ($\alpha=.78$), while the TOSCA-3 guilt scale was just below normally accepted standards ($\alpha=.69$). Finally, participants were verbally debriefed about the experiment’s deceptions.
2.1. Results

2.1.1. State Affect Indices

Following Devine et al. (1991), we conducted a principal-axis factor analysis with oblique rotation of the 36 emotion items to extract cohesive affect indices. We conducted parallel analysis using the SPSS syntax developed by O’Connor (2000) as our extraction method. One thousand random datasets were created, each of which had 77 cases and 36 variables. The first five eigenvalues for 95% of the one thousand randomly generated datasets were 2.33, 2.03, 1.83, 1.65, and 1.52. Only the first four eigenvalues of the real dataset exceeded those derived by chance, accounting for 60.8% of the total variance (three items failed to load). In the final solution, the first factor, Compunction (eigenvalue=14.54; 40.4% of the variance), contained 13 self-critical emotion items (e.g., shameful, guilty, angry at myself). The second factor, Positive Affect (eigenvalue=3.76; 10.4% of the variance), contained 6 positive affect items (e.g., happy, content). The third factor, Other Negative (eigenvalue=1.93; 5.4% of the variance) contained 3 other-directed negative affect items (e.g., disgusted with others). The final factor, Negative Affect (eigenvalue=1.66; 4.6% of the variance), contained 11 general negative affect items (e.g., distressed, bothered, sad). Adding SSGS guilt and shame separately, this gave us a total of seven, reliable state-affect indices: Shame (α=.86), Guilt (α=.90), Pride (α=.85), Compunction (α=.94), Negative Affect (α=.91), Other Negative (α=.83), and Positive Affect (α=.81).

2.1.2. Affective reactions to prejudice feedback

In post hoc contrasts among conditions (Black, Muslim, lesbian, control) on the affect indices, participants felt more negative and less positive emotion about exhibiting prejudice towards the Black and Muslim candidates than the lesbian and control. Because participants
did not feel compunction about discriminating against the lesbian schoolteacher, and because
MRS scores for Blacks and Muslims were highly correlated with one another ($r=.78$), but less
so with anti-lesbian prejudice ($r=.52, .51$), we revised our plan to contrast the three feedback
conditions against the control condition, and instead contrasted the Black and Muslim
feedback conditions (1=prejudice; n=40) against the no feedback and lesbian feedback
conditions (0=no prejudice; n=37). ¹ A MANOVA of the affect indices by condition confirmed
the validity of this recoding. Participants in the prejudice feedback group experienced more
state guilt and compunction, and less pride, than participants in the no prejudice group (Table
1). The groups did not differ, however, on shame or the other affect indices.

2.1.3. TOSCA guilt and shame proneness, and affective reactions to prejudice

The two groups did not differ in TOSCA guilt (prejudice: $M=4.23$, SD=0.50; no
prejudice: $M=4.10$, SD=0.42) or shame proneness (prejudice: $M=3.13$, SD=0.73; no
prejudice: $M=3.03$, SD=0.62), $F$s<1.69, $ps>.19$, which were highly correlated across the
sample, $r(77)=.56$, $p<.001$. Partial correlations were conducted with the two scales to control
for shared variance, separately by condition. As seen in Table 2, in the no prejudice control
group, TOSCA shame positively predicted compunction. In contrast, TOSCA guilt did not
correlate with any type of state affect. More importantly, in the prejudice group, TOSCA

¹ Arguably, the lesbian feedback condition represents the ideal control condition, since
participants were exposed to the same procedures as those receiving prejudice feedback, yet
they did not exhibit compunction.
Compunction or Compensatory Action

shame was positively associated with both state shame and compunction, whereas TOSCA guilt did not correlate with any state affect.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

2.1.4. TOSCA and compensation for prejudice

Compensation for prejudice was measured in two ways. Reaffirming non-prejudice in general was measured by aggregating the highly correlated Black and Muslim MRS scores (higher scores represented more prejudice against the target group). The tendency to offer compensation was measured by the proportion of funds allocated to the target groups out of the total funds allocated. A MANOVA of the effects of condition on prejudice and reparations confirmed that participants in the prejudice group expressed less subsequent prejudice towards Blacks/Muslims ($M=3.72$, $SD=1.00$) than participants in the no prejudice groups ($M=4.20$, $SD=1.14$), $F(1,75)=3.87$, $p=.05$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. Likewise, the prejudice group assigned more funds to organizations supporting the target groups ($M=0.21$, $SD=0.05$) than did no prejudice participants ($M=0.18$, $SD=0.08$), $F(1,75)=4.28$, $p=.04$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$.

Next, looking separately at the no prejudice and prejudice groups, we entered TOSCA shame and guilt simultaneously into a regression model, with expression of prejudice and compensation as dependent measures. TOSCA guilt negatively predicted expression of prejudice in the prejudice group (Table 3). However, TOSCA guilt did not relate to prejudice in the no prejudice group. In contrast to TOSCA guilt, TOSCA shame was marginally positively related to the expression of prejudice in both groups. For compensation (Table 4), TOSCA guilt positively predicted allocation of funds to target groups only in the prejudice condition. In contrast, TOSCA shame was not related to allocations in either group.
2.2. Discussion

In Study 1, we found TOSCA shame and guilt to be differentially related to negative affect and compensatory action, following feedback about expressing involuntary prejudice. Whereas TOSCA shame predicted compunction, but not compensatory action for expressed prejudice, TOSCA guilt predicted compensatory action, but not compunction.

3. Study 2

Study 2 replicated Study 1 using a simpler procedure. Participants were 78 White British university students (65 female, 13 male), who participated in exchange for course credit. Their mean age was 20.2 years (SD=5.30). The materials and procedure were the same as Study 1, except only the Black (prejudice; n=39) and control (no prejudice; n=39) conditions were used, and we dropped the SSGS items and 5 affect terms for brevity. Reliabilities for TOSCA-3 shame and guilt scales were similar to Study 2 (α=.77, .63, respectively), though the reliability of the TOSCA guilt scale was even lower than in Study 1.

3.1. State Affect Indices

Affect indices were formed using the same procedure as in Study 1. A principal-axis factor analysis and a parallel analysis were conducted. One thousand random datasets were created, each of which had 78 cases and 31 variables. In 95% of the randomly generated datasets, the first five eigenvalues were 2.06, 1.77, 1.59, 1.42, and 1.29. Again, we obtained a
four-factor solution (explaining 68.7% of the total variance) conceptually and empirically similar to Study 1: Compunction (eigenvalue=14.75; α=.93), Positive Affect (eigenvalue=3.09; α=.86), Negative Affect (eigenvalue=1.82; α=.94), and Other Negative (eigenvalue=1.64; α=.83). The eigenvalues of the four factors all exceeded those derived by chance, and all items loaded.

3.2. Affective reactions to prejudice feedback

A MANOVA of the affect indices by condition revealed that participants who received prejudice feedback reported less positive affect (M=3.86 vs. 4.50), F(76)=6.76, p=.01, η²=.08, but similar levels of negative affect (M=2.31 vs. 2.47), other negative (M=1.51 vs. 1.94) and compunction (M=2.53 vs. 2.24) as control participants, ps>.07, η²s<.05. However, covariance between compunction and general negative affect may have suppressed the effect of condition on compunction. Therefore, we conducted an ANCOVA on compunction with condition as the independent variable and negative affect as a covariate. As predicted, this analysis revealed a significant difference in compunction between conditions, F(1,75)=4.44, p=.04. Thus, the prejudice feedback was successful in inducing compunction, when distinguished from general negative affect.

3.3. TOSCA and affective reactions to prejudice

Again, there were no group differences in TOSCA guilt (prejudice: M=4.23, SD=0.43; no prejudice: M=4.28, SD=0.42) or shame (prejudice: M=3.18, SD=0.69; no prejudice: M=3.24, SD=0.62), Fs<1, ps>.62. TOSCA shame and guilt were correlated, r(78)=.25, p<.05, thus partial correlations were conducted on the TOSCA and state affect measures, separately by condition. In the prejudice condition, TOSCA shame was positively correlated with compunction (but not significantly) and negatively correlated with positive
affect, whereas TOSCA guilt was not related to any state affect (Table 2). Neither TOSCA scale correlated with state affect in the control condition, with the exception of TOSCA shame and other-directed negative affect.

3.4. TOSCA and compensation for prejudice

As in Study 1, prejudice was measured by post-feedback MRS scores, and compensation by the proportion of funds allocated to the target group (Black organization). Separate regressions by condition were conducted on these measures. As in Study 1, TOSCA guilt was negatively related to expressed prejudice in the feedback condition (see Table 3). Likewise, TOSCA guilt tended to predict compensation to the target group in the prejudice condition, although slightly less so than in Study 1 (see Table 4). In contrast to TOSCA guilt, TOSCA shame was unrelated to expressed prejudice (see Table 3), and, as predicted, was negatively related to compensation for the target group (see Table 4).

3.5. Analysis combining data from Studies 1-2

The two studies and their two measures of compensation showed a consistent pattern of simple effects, with only TOSCA guilt, not shame, predicting greater compensation, and only in feedback conditions. However, regression analyses examining the Condition x TOSCA guilt interaction controlling for shame found a significant interaction effect only for Study 2’s measure of compensation, $\beta = .34$, $t(72) = 1.98$, $p = .05$, though the nonsignificant interactions were all in the expected direction ($ps$ ranged from .14-.58). To increase the power of this analysis, we conducted an aggregate analysis combining both studies. We centered TOSCA shame and guilt scores within each study and constructed TOSCA x Condition interaction terms. We entered all three main effects and the two interactions into a regression model predicting expressed prejudice and compensation (both standardized within
study). This found a Guilt x Condition interaction for both expressed prejudice, $\beta = -.29$, $t(149)=-2.34, p=.02$, and compensation, $\beta = .26$, $t(149)=1.94, p=.05$, supporting the observed pattern of simple effects in the individual studies. Because the simple patterns for shame were much less consistent across studies, the results for shame are less informative and will not be reported here. Finally, the same aggregate analysis was conducted on standardized compunction scores, revealing only significant main effects of TOSCA shame, $\beta = .27$, $t(149)=2.21, p=.03$, and condition, $\beta = .17$, $t(149)=2.20, p=.03$, on feelings of compunction (all other $ps > .86$).

4. General Discussion

In two studies, we found that TOSCA guilt predicted compensatory action for unintentionally expressed prejudice, as measured both in terms of the disconfirmation of prejudice views and symbolic financial compensation (though the relationship was somewhat weaker for financial compensation). However, as expected, TOSCA guilt did not predict affective reactions to prejudice; state affect in general also had little to do with compensatory action. TOSCA shame, on the other hand, was found to reliably predict negative affective reactions to prejudice (e.g., compunction), but was either unrelated or negatively related to compensation. Our findings make an important contribution to the field, as we are unaware of any experimental investigations that have tested whether the TOSCA scales reliably predict affective reactions within a guilt-inducing situation.

Our findings more conclusively support the structural critiques of Fontaine et al. (2001) and Luyten et al. (2002), who demonstrated that the most interpretable factor underlying TOSCA guilt represents motivations to amend one’s actions, whereas the TOSCA shame factor involves both the desire to hide and negative evaluations of the self. In an experimental setting where reminders of personal prejudice created feelings of guilt and
shame, we showed that TOSCA guilt did not relate at all to guilty feelings or self-conscious affect, but rather compensatory action. Our findings suggest that the TOSCA shame scale does somewhat of a better job assessing the tendency to experience self-critical emotion than TOSCA guilt, though the correlations of TOSCA shame and compunction were strongest in Study 1. However, we did not find evidence that TOSCA shame measured only the specific emotion of shame as understood by participants, even when an instrument based on the TOSCA’s concept of shame and guilt was used (the SSGS in Study 1). Rather, TOSCA shame correlated with a cluster of compunction emotions in Study 1 and inversely with positive affect in Study 2.

There were limitations to our studies. First, across studies, we obtained stronger reliabilities for the TOSCA shame scale than the guilt scale. The low reliability of the TOSCA guilt scale presents a limitation for the present findings, but more generally reflects a limitation of the TOSCA itself. Past research with the TOSCA has often found reliabilities for the guilt scale below .70 (e.g., see Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, 2005; Luyten et al., 2002; Tangney et al., 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2006), adding weight to our arguments for revision. Second, our samples were fairly small and male participants were underrepresented. Benetti-McQuoid and Bursik (2005) found that women report both greater shame proneness and guilt proneness, as measured by the TOSCA instrument, than men. It is unclear how women’s higher mean scores on both TOSCA scales would affect their multivariate relationships with our dependent measures. Future studies with greater gender balance should be able to address these questions.

Our findings imply that the field needs a better instrument for assessing the tendency to experience strong feelings of guilt vs. shame. The TOSCA instrument did not distinguish between the tendency to feel these two emotions, although it did predict action tendencies to make amends. This is consistent with past research, which has generally found more
“adaptive” or prosocial correlates of TOSCA guilt than TOSCA shame (for a recent review, see Stuewig & Tangney, 2007). For example, Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone (2004) found that TOSCA guilt proneness is associated with both trait self-control and interpersonal adjustment, whereas shame proneness is associated with psychological and social maladjustment. However, research using other guilt instruments (e.g., the Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2; Harder, Cutler, & Rockart, 1992) has often failed to replicate this guilt/shame distinction. Some research (e.g., Heatherton, Striepe, & Wittenberg, 1998) has found that self-critical emotion of any kind can interfere with self-control, as individuals search for hedonic ways to escape negative feelings about the self.

Our perspective may help reconcile these inconsistencies by interpreting TOSCA guilt-proneness as a measure of reparative motivation, rather than emotions aroused in a guilt-producing situation. Consistent with Heatherton et al.’s findings, negative self-conscious emotions over expressing prejudice failed to predict reparative behavior in our studies, whereas TOSCA guilt did predict reparative behavior but not negative affect. Thus, distinguishing between motivational tendencies and feeling states may be critical to understanding the better behavioral outcomes from TOSCA guilt as opposed to shame proneness. Our findings suggest specific ways of improving the existing TOSCA scales. In particular, they reveal the need to inject more feeling items (e.g., responding with distress) and appraisals (e.g., beliefs about the wrongness of one’s actions) into the guilt scale to offset its heavy reliance on action tendencies. It is possible that such an improvement would reveal structural differences between feeling states and action tendencies, because the two often have opposing implications for behavior.
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O’Connor, B. P. (2000). SPSS and SAS programs for determining the number of components using parallel analysis and Velicer’s MAP test. *Behavior Research Methods,*


Table 1. Means, standard deviations, F-values, and effect sizes of affect indices by condition (Study 1).

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Prejudice</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>$\eta^2_p$</th>
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<td>Guilt</td>
<td>2.03 (1.10)</td>
<td>2.68 (1.16)</td>
<td>6.11*</td>
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<td>Shame</td>
<td>1.82 (0.92)</td>
<td>2.19 (1.11)</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>4.32 (1.07)</td>
<td>3.79 (1.10)</td>
<td>4.33*</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compunction</td>
<td>2.29 (1.07)</td>
<td>2.83 (1.10)</td>
<td>4.62*</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<td>Negative Affect</td>
<td>2.72 (1.17)</td>
<td>2.94 (1.04)</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Negative</td>
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<td>2.46 (1.17)</td>
<td>1.61</td>
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<td>Positive Affect</td>
<td>4.28 (1.00)</td>
<td>3.90 (1.05)</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>.03</td>
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</table>

* $p < .05$.

Table 2. Partial correlations of TOSCA and state affect measures by study and condition.

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<th>Study 2</th>
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Table 3. Regression of TOSCA scales predicting expression of prejudice by study and condition.

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<td><strong>t</strong></td>
<td><strong>β</strong></td>
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<td>Guilt</td>
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Note. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. N’s ranged from 32 to 36.
Table 4. Regression of TOSCA scales predicting compensation by study and condition.

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Study 2</th>
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* p < .05, ** p < .01

† p < .10