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Does Power Magnify the Expression of Dispositions?

Ana Guinote¹, Mario Weick², & Alice Cai¹

¹University College London
²University of Kent

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Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that powerholders act more in line with their dispositions. Based on principles of construct accessibility, we propose that this is only the case when no alternatives are activated in the situation. In three experiments, participants’ chronic dispositions were assessed. Subsequently, power was manipulated and participants made judgments or acted in contexts that activated (vs. did not activate), alternative (i.e., inaccessible or counter-dispositional) constructs. When no alternatives were activated, powerholders responded more in line with chronically accessible constructs, displaying disposition-congruent perceptions of other people (Experiment 1), charity donations (Experiment 2), and strategies in an economic game (Experiment 3). However, when alternatives had been activated, powerholders no longer responded more dispositionally than their low-power counterparts. A single mechanism of reliance on construct accessibility is proposed to explain person and environment-driven influences.

Keywords: power, construct accessibility, dispositions, priming, automaticity
Does Power Magnify the Expression of Dispositions?

Conventional wisdom holds that powerholders experience less external resistance, so they act in line with their personality and deep routed sentiments. For example, Lord Acton, former president of the USA, noted that the best way to know a man’s character is to give him power. But does power really magnify the expression of dispositions and true sentiments? Recent socio-cognitive research has shown that those in power express more their true attitudes (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002), relationship orientations (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001), and sexual harassment proclivity (Bargh & Raymond, 1995). However, other findings suggest that this may not always be the case. Observers often fail to consider situational constraints in the actions of powerholders (Overbeck, Tiedens, & Brion, 2006). Furthermore, powerholders show less consistency in attitudes (Weick & Guinote, 2008) and behavior (Guinote, 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2006; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003) than one would expect based on a dispositional account of power. The present article examines the links between power and dispositional behavior, and reconciles conflicting findings.

Following a tradition that considers the environment a press against the person pulling one to act in particular ways (Lewin, 1951), research on power has often treated the person and the environment as opposite influences. Here we favor a single mechanism that accounts for dispositional and environmental sources of influence: reliance on construct accessibility, or the activation and use of constructs that are stimulated and readily come to mind (see Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Eitam & Higgins 2010; Higgins, 1996; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). We propose that this
occurs regardless of whether the constructs are chronically (associated with dispositions), or temporarily stimulated (triggered by environmental influences).

**Chronic and Temporary Construct Accessibility**

It is widely accepted that people differ in their dispositions (see Tyler, 1965). Dispositions derive from the repeated accumulation of experiences with the outside world, and from the formation of knowledge structures that bias the ways individuals interpret and respond to the environment. These frequently used knowledge structures are chronically accessible and hence ready to be used in many situations (Bruner, 1957; Eitam & Higgins, 2010).

Nevertheless, dispositional influences are not inevitable. Behavior is best understood in terms of a person x situation interaction (Kunda & Spencer, 2003; Shoda & Mischel, 1993), where individuals flexibly navigate the world. They respond to unexpected situations, based on a hippocampal fast learning system (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995), and possess multiple response models. For example, insecurely attached individuals act securely in some contexts (see Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr, Enns, & Koh-Rangarajoo, 1996).

Models of construct accessibility converge regarding the notion that activated constructs affect judgment and behavior, usually in the direction of the activated constructs, and regardless of whether they are chronically or temporarily accessible (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1986; Smith & DeCoster, 1998).

**Power and Construct Accessibility**

Past research suggests that power promotes behavior consistent with dispositions. For example, Chen et al. (2001) found that power decreased prejudice scores for
communal oriented individuals and increased prejudice scores for exchange oriented individuals. Following a person x situation perspective, we argue however that a full understanding of the links between power and dispositions requires an examination of behavior across different contexts: in particular, contexts that activate alternative constructs. The present article focuses on this issue.

Power - the ability to control and influence others in meaningful ways (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Vescio et al., 2003) – increases the ability to attain desired outcomes (see Fiske, 1993). We propose that power increases therefore the activation and use of constructs that easily come to mind. Powerholders’ greater predictability and control instigates, according to the Situated Focus Theory of Power (Guinote, 2007, 2010), trust on default processes, and moment-to-moment cognition based on the needs, affordances or goals that emerge, as internal states or the environment change.

Furthermore, powerholders often seek information less extensively (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003), whereas powerless individuals attend to multiple sources of information (Guinote, 2007) and ruminate more (Karremans & Smith, 2010). Cognitive business (see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) and extensive information search (Kruglanski, 1989) decrease construct activation (see Kunda & Spencer, 2003). Powerholders should therefore be in a better position to activate constructs. Indeed, when motivated to accomplish a goal, powerholders, compared to their powerless counterparts, display greater accessibility of goal-related constructs, as shown in lexical decision tasks (Slabu & Guinote, 2010). In addition to differences in construct activation, powerholders may feel more confident and free to use constructs that come to mind (Briñol, Petty, Valle, & Rucker, 2007; that is, power may increase judged usability; see Higgins, 1996).
In sum, we propose that powerholders, more than powerless individuals, rely on accessible constructs, and this should occur regardless of whether the constructs are driven by the person or the environment. These predictions differ from the perspective that power strengthens dispositions per se. Enhanced dispositional strength would imply greater reliance on chronically accessible constructs across situations.

**The Present Research**

The present research sought to examine the links between power and dispositional behavior. We propose that reliance on construct accessibility explains conflicting effects of power. We reason that power promotes the activation and use of constructs that readily come to mind regardless of whether these constructs are chronically or temporarily stimulated. Consequently, power facilitates the activation and use of chronically accessible constructs only when no alternative constructs compete for the control of judgment and action. When alternative constructs are stimulated, chronic and alternative influences may cancel each other out. For example, situationally activated goals and chronic goals may conflict producing equivocal responses (see Kleiman & Hassin, 2011). In such cases, no differences may be observed between powerful and powerless individuals.

These hypotheses were tested in three experiments. Chronically accessible constructs were assessed in a first session. In a second session, power was manipulated, and half of the participants were primed with alternative constructs that were inaccessible (Experiments 1 and 2) or counter-dispositional (Experiment 3). The other half of the participants were subject to a neutral prime. Reliance on accessible constructs was then
examined in the contexts of person perception (Experiment 1), choice behavior (Experiment 2), and an economic game (Experiment 3).

**Experiment 1**

Experiment 1 examined reliance on accessibility in interpersonal relations. Following a power manipulation, participants were primed with an inaccessible (vs. neutral) construct, and made judgments about an ambiguous person. Ambiguous targets are usually interpreted in line with accessible constructs (e.g., Bargh et al., 1986; Srull & Wyer, 1979). The role of positive affect and effort on construct accessibility was also examined (see Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003).

**Method**

**Participants and Design**

Sixty-four students (50 females) were selected based on their chronic trait accessibility. For twenty-five participants rudeness was chronically accessible and honesty inaccessible, for five other participants honesty was chronically accessible and rudeness inaccessible, a further twenty participants were dishonest-chronics for whom extroversion was inaccessible, and finally sixteen participants were extroverted-chronics for whom dishonesty was inaccessible. Thus, the present study employed a 2(power: high vs. low) x 2(prime: neutral vs. inaccessible trait) x 4(chronic-trait: rude, honest, extravert, dishonest) between-subjects design.

**Procedure and Materials**

**First Session.** Following Higgins et al., (1982), participants (N= 300) listed traits of a person they liked, disliked, sought out, avoided, and frequently encountered. The first two traits mentioned were considered chronically accessible. Inaccessible traits were
those not mentioned. To enhance the generalizability of the effects, four different groups of chronics were selected.

**Second Session.** Power was manipulated by asking participants to imagine themselves as a managing director or an employee in a marketing organization (Guinote, 2008). Participants described a typical work-day. They then completed a word-search puzzle. For half the participants the search-matrix contained only neutral words (e.g., *paper, board*). For the second half it contained five words that primed an inaccessible trait, which could be used to make sense of a subsequent impression formation task. Specifically, for rudeness-chronics the words pertained to honesty (e.g., *sincere, trust*); for honest-chronics the words were related to rudeness (e.g., *insult, offence*); for extrovert-chronics the words were related to dishonesty (e.g., *devious, false*); finally, for dishonest-chronics the words were related to extroversion (e.g., *chatty, sociable*).

Participants were invited to form an impression of a person. Participants for whom dishonesty or extroversion was chronically accessible read: *Robert accepts invitations to parties, including those from people he dislikes.* Pre-test indicated that this description elicited equally frequent impressions of extroversion and dishonesty. Participants for whom rudeness or honesty was chronically accessible read: *When Donald met his friend he told him that he was quite smelly.* This description elicited equally frequent impressions of rudeness and honesty. Participants who read the Donald’s description reported how rude (vs. honest) and inconsiderate (vs. veracious) Donald was. Participants who read Robert’s description indicated how two-faced (vs. extroverted) and dishonest (vs. outgoing) Robert was. Answers were given on 9-point scales.

Subsequently, participants reported their mood on scales ranging from -3(*very sad, very
discontent, very tense, very bad) to 3(very happy, very content, very calm, very good), and the level of effort invested to provide correct answers (1=not at all, 9=very much).

On completion, participants were probed for suspicion, thanked and debriefed.

**Results and Discussion**

**Manipulation Check**

Following the power manipulation, participants indicated how much influence they had over others and how much in charge they were in the work context (1=not at all, 9=very much). These ratings were averaged (α=.80) and submitted to an independent *t*-test. Managing directors perceived themselves as having more control than employees (Ms=7.41 vs. 5.08), *t*(60)=6.30, *p* < .001, *d*=1.63, suggesting that the manipulation of power was successful.

**Social Impressions**

Responses were recoded with higher values reflecting impressions in line with chronically accessible traits. In order to achieve adequate cell sizes, we then collapsed across the trait ratings related to the two target impressions (Donald: α=.63, Robert: α=.66), and submitted this score to a 2(power: high vs. low) x 2(prime: neutral vs. inaccessible trait) x 2(target: Robert vs. Donald) analysis of variance. The analysis yielded the predicted interaction between power and prime, *F*(1, 56)=6.35, *p* =.01, *n*₂=*p*.10. When exposed to a neutral prime, high-power participants perceived the target more in line with their chronically accessible traits than low-power participants (Ms=6.22 vs. 4.70), *F*(1, 56)=4.81, *p* =.03, *n*₂=*p*.19 (see Figure 1). However, when primed with an inaccessible trait this was no longer the case (Ms=4.46 vs. 5.66), *F*(1, 56)=1.87, *p* =.18, *n*₂=*p*.05. Furthermore, the impressions of participants in the high-power role varied across
situations, $F(1, 56)=4.59, p=.03, n_p^2=.18$, whereas this was not the case for low-power participants, $F(1, 56)=1.95, p=.17, n_p^2=.05$. No other significant effects emerged, $Fs<1$.

*Self-report Measures*

The averaged ratings of mood ($\alpha=.82$) and effort ($\alpha=.71$) did not differ between high-power and low-power participants $ts(62)<1$.

The results of Experiment 1 supported our predictions. Power enhanced the activation and applicability of chronically accessible constructs. However, this was only the case when the context facilitated the activation of dispositions. When alternatives were activated, no differences emerged between high-power and low-power participants. The temporary activation of alternative constructs led to marked changes in the impressions of high-power, but not low-power individuals.

**Experiment 2**

Experiment 2 examined the joint effects of power and dispositions on behavior. Once constructs are activated, they usually guide behavior in the direction of the activated information (Bargh et al., 1986; Higgins, 1996). However, this is not always the case. For example, prejudiced individuals do not always discriminate against minorities due to social desirability concerns (e.g., Kunda & Spencer, 2003). Given that powerholders have fewer constraints, they should freely apply chronically accessible constructs. However, following our hypothesis, this should only be the case when no alternative constructs are stimulated.

These predictions were tested in the context of choice behavior. Instead of priming alternative constructs, participants were asked to donate money in the presence or absence of alternatives, following Posavac, Sanbonmatsu and Fazio (1997). The tendency
to make choices in line with enduring attitudes decreases when the situation offers alternative possibilities (Posavac et al., 1997).

Methods

Participants and Design

Thirty participants (15 female) took part in two sessions. In the second session participants were randomly assigned to the 2(power: high vs. low) x 2(situation: alternatives not present vs. present) between subjects conditions.

Procedure and Materials

First Session: Participants (N=45) were asked to list as many exemplars as possible of charitable organizations, among other filler categories (e.g., vegetables). Charities listed near the beginning of the list were considered more accessible (see Posavac et al., 1997). Upon completion participants completed a questionnaire that allegedly assessed leadership skills. Finally, participants were thanked, paid, and dismissed.

Second Session: Two weeks later participants expected to simulate an organizational role of a manager (high-power condition) or a subordinate (low-power condition), allegedly based on the results of the leadership questionnaire. Following Guinote, Judd and Brauer (2002), the task of managers was to evaluate the performance of subordinates on various assignments, and the task of subordinates was to work on the assignments. Furthermore, managers received a prize (Amazon voucher) for their participation, and subordinates could potentially receive a prize if their assignments were evaluated positively. While waiting to enact the roles in pairs, participants were informed about their payment. Allegedly the project was financed by a research council, and
payment was originally going to be higher. However, the hosting institution restricted the amount of money that could be paid to participants, leaving extra money. The researchers therefore decided to give the extra money to a charity. Because the money was originally planned for participants, participants were asked to choose their preferred, second and third choice of charities to donate the money to. To manipulate the presence of alternatives, choices were made under one of two conditions: from a list of charities, or on a blank screen. The list consisted of 13 well-known charities obtained on the basis of a pre-test. Upon choosing the charities participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and paid.

**Results and Discussion**

**Donation**

Chronic accessibility was obtained following Posavac et al. (1997). Chosen charities were given a score based on the generation task of Session 1. Chosen charities listed in Session 1 received a score from 1 to 5, with lower values indicating an earlier rank position and therefore greater accessibility. Chosen charities that had not been listed were given a score obtained by averaging the non-used ranks for each participant (for example, if participants had mentioned 4 charities, ranks 5-13 were unused).

A 2(power: high vs. low) x 2(situation: alternatives not present vs. present) analysis of variance was conducted on the mean rank of the three charities chosen by participants. A main effect of situation, $F(1, 29)=7.23, p=.01, \eta_p^2=.22$, indicated that participants chose more chronically accessible charities when alternatives were not present (vs. present; $M_{S}=4.13$ vs. 6.16). More importantly, there was a significant power x situation interaction, $F(1,29)=6.25, p<.05, \eta_p^2=.19$ (see Table 1). When no information
in the choice situation interfered with chronically accessible preferences, high-power participants chose more chronically accessible preferences compared to low-power participants (\(M_s=2.82\) vs. 5.45), \(F(1,29)=7.94, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .38\). However, when alternatives were present no differences emerged between high-power and low-power participants (\(M_s=6.72\) vs. 5.59), \(F<1\). Furthermore, high-power participants varied their choices, relying more or less on chronic preferences depending on the situation, \(F(1,29)=24.49, p<.001, \eta_p^2 = .67\) whereas low-power participants were not affected by the choice situation, \(F<1\).

Consistent with hypotheses, and with Experiment 1, power enhanced behavior in line with chronically accessible preferences when the situation was neutral. This was, however, not the case when alternatives competed for the control of action. Similarly to Experiment 1, powerholders varied more their behavior across situations compared to powerless individuals.

**Experiment 3**

In Experiments 1-2 inaccessible constructs did not directly oppose dispositions. The strongest test of our hypotheses occurs, however, when dispositional tendencies are pitted against the activation of counter-dispositional constructs, such as when a cooperative person is primed with a competition goal. Because counter-dispositional constructs can be used and have value in many situations (see Eitam & Higgins, 2010), we reasoned that participants would respond to counter-dispositional primes in similar ways as to inaccessible primes. This hypothesis was tested using an economic game. Participants had chronic cooperation or competition goals, and were either subject to a neutral prime or a prime that activated counter-dispositional goals. The activation of
counter-dispositional goals can lead to goal conflict (see Kleiman & Hassin, 2011). Therefore, having power, compared to lacking power, should lead to dispositional behavior in neutral contexts, but not when counter-dispositional goals were primed.

Method

Participant and Design

Eighty-six participants (65 females) participated in two sessions. The study employed a 2(power: high vs. low) x 2(prime: counter-dispositional vs. neutral) between subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions.

Procedure and Materials

First Session: Participants (N=128) completed an online questionnaire containing 25 social-value items embedded in unrelated filler items. Social-value items were taken from existing scales to best fulfill the purposes of the study (e.g., “I do not care if I hurt people on my way to success”, Martin & Larsen, 1976). All questions were answered in scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Averaged scores (α=.82) falling below the scale mean were considered pro-social, and those above were considered pro-self.

Second Session: One week later participants were assigned to a condition in which they had vs. did not have power, based on Fiske and Dépret (1996). Participants (N=86; forty-two pro-self and forty-four pro-social) learned about an alleged plan to introduce a University-wide course credit scheme that requires future students across all disciplines to participate in Psychology experiments. Participants who had power were informed that their opinion would receive a weight of 60% towards the final decision.
Participants who did not have power were told that the University was merely interested in their opinions, but these would not affect decisions.

Next, participants took part on what was described as a separate study. They were presented with 30 five-word scrambled sentences used to prime counter-dispositional (vs. neutral) constructs (see Srull & Wyer, 1979). Their task was to construct grammatically correct four-word sentences. Half of the participants were primed with a trait opposing their dispositions (counter-dispositional condition), and the other half were subject to a neutral prime (neutral condition). Participants in the counter-dispositional condition completed 10 sentences containing counter-dispositional words. That is, pro-self participants completed 10 sentences pertaining to cooperation, and pro-social participants completed 10 sentences pertaining to competition. The remaining 20 sentences were neutral. For participants in the neutral condition all 30 sentences were neutral.

Subsequently, participants were given instructions for a mixed-motive-game (Smeesters, Warlop, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003). They were informed that they would be paired with another participant, and each would receive five tokens. The tokens had a value of 10 points for self and 20 points for the other. Participants and their partners had to decide how many tokens they would give to the other. Participants’ monetary payoff was the total points they gained for the self. Maximal cooperation consisted, therefore, in giving five tokens to the partner, and maximal competition consisted in giving zero tokens.

Participants reported their mood on the same scales used in Experiment 1. They also indicated how much control they felt they had over the outcome decision (1=no control at all, 9=a lot of control). Finally, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.
Results and Discussion

Manipulation Check

High-power participants perceived themselves as having more control over the implementation of the University-wide scheme than low-power participants ($M_{high}=5.00$ vs. $M_{low}=3.00$), $t(85)=4.61$, $p<.001$, $d=1.01$. The manipulation of power was therefore successful.

Cooperative Behavior

A 2(power: high vs. low) x 2(disposition: pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2(prime: counter-dispositional vs. neutral) between subjects analysis of variance yielded a main effect of disposition, $F(1, 85)=5.73$, $p=.019$, $\eta^2_p=.07$. Pro-social participants gave more tokens to their partners than pro-self participants ($M_{pro-social}=2.98$ vs. $M_{pro-self}=2.15$). Thus, dispositions affected participants’ social behavior in the expected direction. Importantly, the power x prime x disposition interaction was significant, $F(1, 85)=4.75$, $p=.032$, $\eta^2_p=.06$. Under the neutral prime high-power participants behaved more in line with their dispositions than low-power participants, $F(1, 50)=10.44$, $p=.002$, $\eta^2_p=.18$. That is, pro-self high-power participants gave less tokens than pro-self low-power participants ($M_{pro-self high-power}=1.36$ vs. $M_{pro-self low-power}=2.62$), $F(1, 26)=5.31$, $p=.03$, $\eta^2_p=.18$, whereas pro-social high-power participants gave more tokens than pro-social low-power participants ($M_{pro-social high-power}=3.67$ vs. $M_{pro-social low-power}=2.42$), $F(1, 23)=5.21$, $p=.03$, $\eta^2_p=.19$. No differences emerged when the counter-dispositional trait had been temporarily activated, $F<1$.

Furthermore, the disposition x prime interaction was significant for high-power participants, $F(1, 46)=4.97$, $p=.031$, $\eta^2_p=.10$, but not for low-power participants, $F<1$. As can be seen on Table 2, compared to low-power participants, high-power participants acted more or less cooperatively depending on the prime.
Mood

No significant differences between high-power and low-power participants’ mood ($\alpha = .81$) emerged, $t(85)=.67$, $p=.51$, $d=.015$.

Together these results show that compared to participants who did not have power, powerholders acted more in line with their dispositions, but only when no competing constructs were temporarily accessible. Notably this was the case even though the temporarily accessible constructs were counter-dispositional.

General Discussion

Society at large believes that power magnifies the expression of dispositions, increasing resistance against situational pools. Socio-cognitive research led, however, to conflicting evidence (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Guinote, 2008). Here we propose a single mechanism to explain these effects – reliance on accessible constructs. We propose that power magnifies dispositions only to the extent that no alternatives are activated. Consequently, powerholders vary more their judgments and behavior across different situations compared to individuals who lack power.

Three studies supported these claims. When the context was neutral, powerholders showed greater activation and use of chronically accessible interpersonal constructs (Experiment 1), chose more chronically accessible charities to donate money to (Experiment 2), and acted more or less cooperatively depending on their social-value orientation (Experiment 3). However, when alternatives were stimulated, no differences occurred between high-power and low-power participants. Notably, these effects were obtained using different manipulations of power and different methods of temporary construct activation. They occurred independently of the specific traits involved.
(Experiments 1-3), and even when the alternative constructs opposed dispositions (Experiment 3).

These findings demonstrate that rather than strengthening dispositions per se, power increases reliance on construct accessibility, which can then facilitate dispositional behavior. Although being able to resist external circumstances also helps increase dispositional behavior in powerholders (see Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008), this is not necessary. The cognitive ability to more selectively activate and use chronically accessible constructs is enough to promote disposition consistent behavior.

The effects obtained occurred across multiple contents (Experiments 1-2-3), including opposing ends of various trait dimensions (Experiments 1-3), and regardless of their social desirability. These findings suggest that the effects derive primarily from a single mechanism linked to differences in reliance on construct accessibility. Moreover, we reason that differences in construct activation (i.e., accessibility), rather than differences in the use of the accessible constructs account for the effects obtained. This interpretation is consistent with power differences in construct accessibility previously found using lexical decision tasks (Slabu & Guinote, 2010). Nevertheless the findings do not rule out the possibility that other factors, such as the use of accessible constructs contribute to the results.

When the situation activated alternative constructs, chronic and temporarily accessible constructs competed, and no differences were found between powerful and powerless participants. Past research has shown that when primes do not compete with chronic response tendencies, powerholders show greater priming effects. For example,
they respond more to affordances of situations (Guinote, 2008) or act more in any
direction (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). These findings are consistent with the
present account.

Because chronically accessible constructs are by definition frequently activated,
the present results indicate that most of the time, and in most circumstances,
powerholders potentially act in line with their dispositions. Crucially, their behavior
depends to a great extent on the situation they find themselves in; that is, whether the
situation facilitates or hinders the activation of chronically accessible constructs.
Contrary to Lord Acton’s belief, giving someone power does not always reveal his or her
personality.
References


Table 1
Choice of Charities as a Function of Power, Chronicity, and Choice Situation (Experiment 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Powerful</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Powerful</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not Present</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Lower scores mean choices in line with chronically accessible preferences*
Table 3
*Number of Tokens Given to Others in a Mixed-Motive-Game as a Function of Power, Chronicity, and Prime (Experiment 3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Type</th>
<th>Dispositional traits</th>
<th>Pro-social</th>
<th>Pro-self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>M</em></td>
<td><em>SD</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-dispositional</td>
<td>Powerful</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-dispositional</td>
<td>Powerless</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Trait ratings as a function of power and prime (Experiment 1). Higher scores indicate impressions in line with participants’ chronically accessible traits. Error bars represent standard errors.