

DICTATORSHIPS OF FREEDOM

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“God, make me a good man, but not immediately”

— St. Augustine

The interpretations of the changes on the East European periphery usually confine themselves to the so called “fundamental institutional and economic innovations,” as grasped in terms of a transition from a “closed” social model, linked to a command economy, to an “open,” modern and liberal democratic model with a market economy. The societies themselves perceive the crisis as they experience it – as a liberation from the totalitarian state. However, social change in this region has some peculiarities which put into question some of the “classical” theories of macro-social change as well as the dichotomies between traditional and modern, open and closed societies.

The social change underway in Eastern Europe¹ is proceeding as a rational decomposition of the economic mechanisms and the political discourse of the “ancient regime,” signalling that “the leading role of the party,” “the class struggle” etc., are being replaced by institutions of democracy: “The legal state,” “party – political pluralism,” parliament, market economy structures, etc.

Having adopted as their own the legacy of an alternative state (that of liberal democracies), the East European societies in their transformation do not draw their new normativity from themselves, but borrow their standards of orientation as well as the legal and administrative means for the implementation of the liberal democratic program from “outside” their own societies. Social change here derives its legitimacy either from the principle of restoring previously existing democratic states (the so called historic legitimization) or from the principle of importing a democratic model from neighboring Western societies. In both cases, however, the resource for legitimization as well as the center of public authority is extrinsic to their own societies.

At the root of this strategy for change, bound up with a practice that isolates and considers separately the accompanying legal issues, lies the idea that political forces and institutions can not only gain influence over the mechanisms of democratic self-regulation, but can bring about their very existence (since such mechanisms are absent from Eastern Europe). To this end, the institutions of parliament, the parties, and democratic constitutions are being introduced; these have the role of creating a self-regulating civil society rather than merely reflecting and regulating it. This kind of treatment of the strategy of democratization is analogous to the Stalinist tactics of

"building communism," to the extent that it originates from the same utopian idea of rationally directed social change according to a standard of "normality" derived from a predetermined hypothetical social model.² Thus, the paradigm shift from a communist society to a liberal-democratic one does not present a change in political logic and style, since both paradigms presuppose a centrally directed liberation. The state's planning capacity is merely given a new direction for its operation.

However, to reveal the similarity (rather doubtful in some aspects) between the tactics of democratization and those of "building communism" is not the point. The analogy with Bolshevism and the conclusion that the Bolshevik and the anti-totalitarian transformations are both linked to a relatively unique social condition is drawn only for the sake of detecting a characteristic of the social totality operative here, which could serve as a symptom and methodological tool for investigation of the social processes of crisis and innovation in Eastern Europe.

The aspect common to both the Bolshevik and the post-totalitarian situation is that reflex which idealizes foreign patterns of sociality and gleans normatively substantive principles from alien experiences during the crisis of innovation. This reveals the potential presence of an immanent and constant crisis in the socio-cultural identity [of these countries] which is revealed in a peculiar mechanism of change shared by both the Bolshevik and the post-Bolshevik condition. By simplifying it considerably, we can depict this mechanism as follows: emergence of a social problem (i.e., a crisis), import of a social solution from a foreign cultural model (Marx's collectivist project or that of liberal democracy), and, finally, expansion of the alien forms inside the social body. The appearance of the crisis on the cultural level as a search for "foreign" social alternatives and the transporting of social models from abroad leads to the popular idea of enforcing the social change from "above," which is generally treated as "wrong" political practice. The intentional change of the social condition, however, does not mean an external compulsion toward change. This deliberate search for alternatives is more a rationally self-imposed innovation resulting from an inner crisis of society than an enforcement from above – both as regards the "building of communism" and the current democratization in Eastern Europe. We shall therefore treat this peculiarity of the processes not as a "mistake" but as a syndrome of some immanent standard of social "normality" inherent in these societies. In such a case, the real challenge for the sociological analysis of innovation in this region is the investigation of the social conditions which make such rationality and style of innovation (through centrally-organized import of social models) not only possible, but also normal. What in Eastern Europe produces the political teleology of the social alternative? What social conditions enable the active functioning of this alien dimension in Eastern Europe in the form of innovative mechanisms of implementing Western cultural strategies?

The standards of social innovation in the European East reveal their sociological meaning as well as the possible direction of the [current] transition only in an analysis of the social context of this region from the point

of view of the dependence of the socio-political model (of its conceptional and institutional elements) on the social context.

In terms of its socio-economic prerequisites, the post-communist transition is usually considered with reference to the economic crisis of the resource-constrained socialist economy, which itself is considered a basic characteristic of these societies. The "historic need" which the anti-communist revolutions are to answer to cannot be sought, however, in the emergence of a liberal democratic potential in the societies of Eastern Europe. The liberal model of the state-society duality cannot be applied in explanations of these political changes because the work of emancipating a modern public sphere was not accomplished by private individuals who could exercise influence on political authorities. That is why the paradigm of "polarization and confrontation between civil society and state" seems to be inadequate to the interpretations of social change here. Keeping in mind that the socialist society originated and functioned as a society organized on non-economic, power – ideological principles, the concept of change as being provoked by economic crisis faces an apparent contradiction – the question of the validity of [relying on] economic factors (the shortages) for [explaining] the delegitimation of a non-economic society.

The crises in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as those in Central Eastern Europe, in the late eighties have, without a doubt, an economic background. But the problem of power in these societies must be evaluated: Being a matter of ideology in the fifties and sixties, it was already beginning to be interpreted in economic terms in the seventies and eighties. The formulae of "new economic mechanisms," "high quality and efficiency," and "scientific and technological progress" turned into slogans of political rule. If we accept therefore that the phenomenon of shortages is the basis of the social crisis here, this will mean that the factor that had previously legitimated the system (the economic backwardness, which motivated the political activity of the central party authority) is now the same one that delegitimizes it. This in turn presupposes that the current economic and political crises did not cause the social transition but were already preceded by social change – by a shift from a politically constituted to an economically determined society. This social change took place before the current experience of crisis and made it possible for the crisis of Soviet-type non-economic societies to proceed on an economic basis. The real sociological problem concerning the social conditions of the crisis of innovation in Eastern Europe (which on the level of everyday consciousness appears to be a crisis of identity) therefore is the very possibility of this shift from a politically to an economically grounded society. The transformation in the meaning and functioning of the deficit factor (from a power-legitimizing factor to delegitimizing one) signifies the specific type of mobility inherent in the Soviet type of sociality.

The validation of economic factors in the non-economic socialist society might be sought in the very nature of socialism. Socialism is founded on a strategy of modernization which presupposes the purposeful creation of industrial structures of production and the destruction of patriarchal

traditionalism which in the beginning of the twentieth century was still preserved on the East European periphery. In the period between the late twenties and the mid-thirties (up to Stalin's constitution of 1936 in the USSR and up to the sixties in the other socialist countries), the basic structures of industrial societies were already being introduced as a result of the rapid transition from predominantly agricultural economic forms to those of heavy industry. Introducing abstract social relationships such as the division of labor and exchange of commodities and destroying isomorphous traditionalism, socialist modernization further enforced the transition from a collectivist, closed, "biological" condition of society to an open, abstract one. Introducing heavy industry into a traditional agrarian country brought about the development of modern forms of production under conditions which lacked a home market, lacked commodities exchange and consumption, since heavy industry does not work in accordance with mass consumption. Because of the non-organic character of the innovation, modern integration was not established. The modern structures of production existed parallel to non-economic stratification. The lack of immanent (traditional or modern) social integration brought about a peculiar social state in which the traditional and the modern structures of family relations and of those of production and commerce were disconnected. The functional primacy of the traditional political realm was still preserved, but its total identification with the whole of society was already infringed by the process of modernization.

The type of power emerging at the time, party-political rule, is neither traditional nor modern – it lacks both the legitimacy of traditionally held norms and that of modern social contract. Though the party relations originated as clan-relations, they underwent a complete bureaucratization before the late 1950s. The lack of integration of the separate social structures, the principal economic backwardness and the lack of self-regulating civil society justified the active role of the central power authority. Though the Party's political will had the status of administrative regulator between the isolated, autonomous spheres of society, it could not establish itself as a "natural" integrator of society. The failure to achieve social integrity determined the inefficiency of the basic socialist utopia – the utopia of modernization. The project of modernization excluded the basis of modernity – the emancipation of private individuals.

With the rapid industrialization of the region, quasi-modern forms of relationship began to develop according to the standards of commodification and bureaucratization. They did not, however, establish a genuine plurality of autonomous forms of social participation and thus no public sphere power sources were generated. Creating modern society not organically, as a settlement, but synthetically, as a building, deprives modernity of its genuine integrative character. Modernization here does not bring about new sociality but destroys the very existing sociality. Commodification here is not based on consumption but is dependent on the structures of redistribution. Trade is considered a mechanism of distribution, not of exchange. The lack of market exchange and modern labor processes turns socialist commodities into non-things. In the Soviet type societies, a civility, professionalism and publicity

have been created which are not social, because the constituents as introduced remained disconnected. The process of modernization here is thus one of de-civilization. The destruction of sociality is the reason for the inefficiency of the communist utopia (in contrast to "efficient" utopias like that of protestantism, which established its own constructive norms of social activity).

Because of this lack of total integration, the Soviet type of society cannot be defined [simply] as totalitarian. The lack of dialogue and intercourse between the social structures determines, however, the specific totalitarian aspects of these societies because it deprives them of an immanent alternative, of a natural mechanism of change.

The lack of integration charges the "totalitarian" condition with a specific openness and mobility which makes the shift from a political to an economic determination of social life possible. Being unable to create its own modern principle of civilization, socialism results both in the fulfillment of a modern program (of industrialization) and in the failure of the modern aim (the creation of modern sociality and its standards of life). This failure has drained the energy out of the utopian idea of a communist society, (but not out of the idea of centrally directed modernization). Thus socialism seems to have exhausted its own premises. The resource of its former legitimation – the economic backwardness – turns into a resource for its delegitimation. The popular slogans raised by the communist parties in the 70s: "High quality and efficiency," "To improve the life standard of people," as well as Dubcek's "Socialism with human face" reveal an awareness of the non-integrative character of the modern socialist societies. The economic crisis thus signifies the presence of a tension in the isolated modern structures of political, intellectual and economic life which continued to work under non-modern principles. This tension makes the preservation of conditions which had originally produced the synthetic structure of society (i.e., the central political rule of the party) impossible. However, this impasse of Soviet socialism, which appears to be an economic crisis, does not yet signify the change from a political to an economic type of society. The economic factors gain political value not as a result of the emancipation of the "public sphere of private individuals," but on the principle of negating the constitutive bases of the formerly unsuccessful social development. That is why on the level of cultural discourse the change is being expressed mainly in terms of anti-communism and re-construction (*pere-stroika*). The non-organic character of this process of "economization" of society determines the fictional, "epidermal" character of the change. As a result of the final exhaustion of the system's legitimacy, the social actors envision their relations as being in a state of crisis and perceive social change as an ultimate aim. But the possibility of such an innovation is conditioned by some peculiarities of the East European cultural space.

As we already mentioned, this transformation cannot be sought in the potential for a modern public sphere autonomous from state control. Neither can the social context of the change be described in terms of "opening the closed society." Existing as a mixture of modern forms of interaction and

conventionally held norms (of power, family life, etc.) society had no unique standards of integration. This lack of integrity, combined with the tension between the contradictory types of social relations and systems of stratifications, opens the way for the totalitarian society to create a permanent syndrome of searching for alternatives to the existing state.³ In contrast to the traditional community which perceives history as a cyclical process, the central idea in the time-consciousness here is that of innovation. This kind of perception is by no means typical of traditional cultural attitudes. Thus the opening up of traditional attitudes through the idea of social change is symptomatic of a principal difference between "socialist" and "closed" societies. The combination of a pre-modern mechanism of social organization (that is – by means of the central authority of power) with the tendency towards deliberate self-innovation imply the marginality of the so called socialist type of society in relation to European modernity, Eastern traditionalism, or the closed and open cultural models.

How can this peculiar characteristic of sociality explain the type of innovative mechanism at work?

Modern society is self-organized and protected by the self-regulating mechanisms of civil society which are its resources for integration and innovation. The synthetic character of Soviet type societies determines the lack of immanent alternatives for development (be it of a traditional or a modern pattern). This results in the societies being in a constant crisis situation, which then becomes established as the normal social condition of development in the peripheral cultural space of Europe.

The tension of crisis creates the syndrome, typical of this region, of "overcoming the existing state." Thus the social context which brought about the attempted transition to communism is the historical tension caused by the crisis of rural society (as Russia still was at the end of nineteenth century) and its lack of an inner potential for modernization (as the commodity exchange relations and the structures of civil society were not established). But whereas the social crisis that was the ground for communism was a result of the contradiction between the exhausted pre-modern forms and the underdeveloped modern ones, the current crisis in Eastern Europe is grounded on the inadequacy of the social aspirations directed toward a post-modern condition (as Marx's project prescribed) to the structures of the unsuccessful socialist modernization. The combination of a situation of social crisis based on the need to overcome a certain state of society – the pre-modern or the communist one – and the lack of inner social potential for change appears on the level of everyday consciousness as a crisis of cultural identity. This determines the search for a standard of social "normality" in foreign cultural models – the post-capitalist Marxian project or that of Western democracy. The crisis makes the search for and import of social salvations from abroad possible, while the lack of an inner alternative makes it necessary. This explains to a certain extent the possibility of implementing the projects of social radicalism in the non-modern East. As an aspect of this distinguishing quality of sociality here, Soviet type totalitarianism and anti-communism are two modalities of a common social condition: the lack of

capacity for cultural self-identification, inner social integrity and innovation. This incapacity is the very historical need to which the cycles of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe come as an answer. Without overcoming the inefficient utopia which borrows its standards of social normality from abroad, even in the period of anti-communist revolutions, communism has just begun its new phase (after the "transitional period" and the "building of mature socialism" in the 1970s).

Contrasted to this inclination toward social radicalism is the West European resistance in principle against its own radical intellectual projects, a cultural trait which in its turn is due to the proper social mechanisms of modernity. The projects of social radicalism (i.e., of rational reconstruction of society) that emerge in the form of the collectivist socialist utopia or later in the form of Nazi and Fascist corporatism and the interventionist Welfare state, are intellectual outcomes of the gradual change in the constitutive principle of society (modernity's mechanism of social integration). The idea of a rational and centrally directed modelling of society is an outcome of the cycles of utopian energies that started overwhelming Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century. This provoked the intellectual hysteria, called the "crisis of European civilization." The theoreticians of modern times – from Nietzsche to Spengler, from Bernstein to Lenin, while proclaiming the collapse of individualism, looked for a new social and individual liberation. This intellectual tension is due to a crisis of formal rationality, caused by the changes in classical modernity. What has been experienced as a value crisis is in fact a crisis of the entire social model, a symptom of the change in the principle constituting society.

Whereas in laissez-faire capitalism the connection between the individual (the subject of social activity) and the means of activity (the so-called means of production) is direct, since it is carried out through individual possession of private property, this connection is transformed in the course of the development of mass industrial society. Late capitalism, however, brings about an increase in the forms of property possession and a break in the direct connection person-property. The capital function (the very occupational activity) is separated from capital-property, which enables the bearer of social action (the social subject) to expand beyond the limits of a single individual. The "function," as before, is located in the individual, but the means of social functioning exceeds the limits of individual property. This change in the social condition provokes the evidence of crisis, interpreted as a threat to the liberal individual who seems to have become more dependent on society. From the point of view of the classical (and already dead) modern situation, the individual is no longer a subject, an autonomous functioning body of history. The basic reference point of the modern value-system – individual liberty – is seen to be in a crisis. That is why the radical movements directed their energy to a transformation of the principles of possession of private property, which was considered to be the main presupposition for social participation.

However, with the emancipation of "capital-function" and its establishment as the proper means of socialization, the social problem that was believed to

have caused the crisis ceased to exist (but not so the very notion of crisis). With the breaking of the link between "function" and "property" in mass industrial culture, society has actually become proletarian (that is, predominantly composed of individuals lacking property). However, in the course of this total "proletarianization," society has changed its modus: the possession of property is no longer a criterion of active social participation (and this is reflected in the labor and civil codes of the twentieth century, in the mechanisms of universal suffrage, etc.). The dependence of the exchange relationships on the possession of property was replaced by their dependence on the proper occupational activity, itself autonomous from the possession of the means of production. In the "mass proletarian society," the proletariat does not exist, because the factor determining social status is not property, but the very social capacity to perform, the qualities of social activity. The radical projects directed toward social change are thus deprived of their social context. Thus, by producing the evidence of crisis (from the viewpoint of the problem of individual liberation) and actually changing the prerequisites for social participation (and thus removing the social problem), the increased separation between "capital-function" and "capital-property" in late capitalism becomes the point that both produced and annihilated social radicalism in the West. This change did not create a new social mechanism for modern society, but only confirmed the efficiency and validity of its traditional one: the capacity of private individuals to perform according to the standards of the labor and exchange process. The mechanism of innovation here proves to be built into the very mechanism of social reproduction. It works on the level of every-day social praxis through individual activity. The availability of an alternative to "classical" modernity, inherent within its own limits,⁴ makes social radicalism pointless and determines the non-revolutionary character of innovation in the West. This prevents a crisis from turning into an apocalypse (revolution).

In contrast to the lack of necessity for radical change in the Occident, the East European societies, lacking an immanent potential for innovation but open to change, are bound to import social radicalism.

As a result of the latest strategy for the democratization of East European societies, an "etatistic liberalism" (a state protected economic liberalization) has emerged in which there is an inherent contradiction between the goal – the liberal state of society, and the method – State-directed social engineering. Concerning this contradiction, two questions arise. First – is it possible for new forms of sociality to be brought about through the use of political power? Second – if the current social change takes place by remodelling the every-day world (starting with the decomposition of monuments and extending to the massive import of a foreign commodity standard), does this process, as massive as it may be, really signify a thorough going change? Is the conscious replacement of social symbolism (be it of architectural figures or of governmental structures) a symptom of profound innovation? An answer to these questions could be derived from the character of power as a social phenomenon. As such (following Barthes and Foucault's concept of "multiplicity of power"), it is "dissolved in the thinnest

capillary branches of every-day communication," into the communicative structures of every-day life which are not capable of being imposed from outside. Insofar as social phenomena (including politics) are a result of a symbolic (i.e., in terms of ideological social values) coordination of people's actions through intersubjectively recognized norms, political power is derivative from these norms but is not their creator. From these premises we can see the utopian character of the two strategies of importing modern projects from West to East – first in the form of Marx's post-market model and now as institutional reform directed toward liberal democracy. In this aspect, the specific type of power (the Bolshevik or the new democratic) is a symptom and not a cause of a certain historical condition. That is why, despite the evidence of massive change, which has been deliberately produced, there has been no change in the social body, which (for its part) continues to generate its old cultural meanings dressed up in new democratic forms.

The dependence of political rule on the socio-cultural context as it is being revealed in the current process of democratization "affects" also the interpretation of the concept *democracy*. As the sources of power legitimization are the norms and values of intersubjectivity, which are historically relative, there does not exist an absolute standard of (and therefore a positive prescription for) democracy and social freedom. Democracy, and the state of freedom attributed to it, is not a matter of institutional structures and economic mechanisms. It is rather a question of the adequacy between means of governing (and introducing political norms), on the one hand, and, on the other, the available conditions and everyday norms of intersubjectivity relevant for a certain state of society. Thus, for example, the classical Greek definition of democracy, in contrast to its modern interpretation, does not include the principles of individual autonomy and of modern social plurality. Pluralistic social values and norms could not exist in the non-pluralistic ancient culture (but this does not make this society less democratic).

Given these general premises defining the democratic and the totalitarian, the repressiveness of the social practice of democratization is a natural outcome of the therapy of intentional innovation. The mechanism of introducing social forms cannot bring about a complete legitimization of the established system, because it can not manipulate the "natural" sources of legitimization – the everyday values and norms. The missing legitimacy is to be created additively by the political authority through enforced disciplinary techniques. Thus, by means of this deliberate self-innovation, which is the actual resource and essence of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe, the "totalitarian" state reproduces itself beneath the surface appearance of democratization.

The importing of cultural forms cannot bring about the transportation of the desired social model, but only its transformation, since the introduced structures are deprived of the cultural context that gave them social relevance. The fetishization of the "foreign" which lies at the basis of both therapies, of "building socialism" and of the currently proceeding democrat-

ization, can only pervade the social body by falsifying it. Thus the outcome of these regulated, analyzed and watched-over cycles of change in the life-world is its falsification.⁵ The cultural space here striving to imitate the projects of modern Western society does not contain the social problems (crisis or changes within the civil society) that provoked the invention of these projects. Neither is there available in these societies the main subject of the modern social process – the liberal individual. That is why the import of institutional and legal forms of liberal democracy to the East, forms which have been jarred loose from their genuine social context, causes a certain deviation from the “classical” standard of democracy.⁶ The lack of an autonomous public sphere of privatized economic individuals here affects the public discourse as well as the macro areas of everyday communication and the higher levels of intersubjectivity which still remain bound to purely political motivations, thus distancing these societies from modernity.

With the emergence of an autonomous, power-free, self-regulating civil society in the West, a shift took place in terms of political functions – a shift from properly political tasks to more properly civic ones, since the political task of the bourgeois public sphere was the regulation of civil society.⁷ In contrast to this, in spite of their rapid industrialization, the East European countries did not develop a privatized domain of market economy. The lack, or the rather palliative development, of this “basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor” (Habermas) determines the peculiar character of politics in this region. Its functions are therefore not the modern ones of the representation and balancing of real social interests and problems of civil society, but the realization of a social model fixed as an ultimate end. Social change can not but be initiated and carried on from “above,” by political elites, acting on behalf of the absent autonomous individuals and groups whose economic initiative might have constituted the self-regulating mechanisms of social change. The executors of this change are the authorities of power that normalize and construct society according to a pre-determined model (that of Western democracies).

Whereas modernity replaces the principles of political control by the new principle of publicity, the new democracies treat the question of power not in terms of changing the power principle, but of dividing the power, of parceling out political rights among the new political constituencies. (“Who governs?” and not “How to govern?” was the main problem to be discussed in the democratic election campaign, at least in Bulgaria.)

The creation of political opposition and the decomposition of the power totality (the fusion between communist party and state) does not yet mean that political pluralism has arisen, because these are not an outcome of inter-individual or inter-group solidarities providing the public sphere with power resources. The numerous new political parties do not claim to represent the interests of a certain social group, but to protect those of the social totality. And this claim is not a matter of propaganda, but of the real impossibility of the emergence of a social plurality of a modern type. As a result of this, functional motives and norms of representation do not dominate in the realm of political decision-making. That is why a central topic in the course of the

functioning of the new parliaments is the theme of their legitimacy, a point which is most clearly exemplified in the “file-affairs” in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia in Poland. The lack of intercourse between the power-political center and the structures of public life renders autonomy to the former. This does not, however, generate an authoritarian sovereignty, because the subjects of central rule do not have their own source of authority. The society, permanently suffering an identity crisis, has gradually turned the West into a value resource. On the level of politics, this identification, foreign culture deprives society of its inner resource of power legitimization. Regardless of the nominal ideological differences, both in the communist and the post-communist conditions, the center of authority and social initiative is always situated in an alternative state – in the “communist future” or the democratic West. That is why political leaders here (being neither Stalins nor new democratic presidents) can be defined as authoritarian – they are agents and not subjects of policy making. Thus the consensual relations in the post-communist situation are supposed to issue from outside the society on the one hand and, on the other, they are still to remain purely politically grounded – on the resistance to communism or on the adoption of Western social values and norms.

Thus the new democratic institutions, being a result not of a “natural” transition of society to a modern state, but an outcome of the failure of modernization as performed by the systems of Soviet type communism, and of the aspiration to overcome the contradictions inherent in these systems, are bound to be ineffective.

If the aim of the political revolution is a change in the social model, the use of revolution as a means of social change through intentional actions of modelling society implies a contradiction in itself. Such a change could only be nominal. That is why the different political states in Eastern Europe, though deriving their legitimacy from opposite models of social order (the socialist and the liberal-democratic) constitute one cultural space in which the delegitimation of the “ancient regime” reproduces the logic of its former legitimation, which was obtained from a power resource located outside the community. The social change of the European East can probably commence only when the East gives up the idea of directed change, thus overcoming the new utopia of “the end of utopias.”

NOTES

1. The objects of this analysis are mainly the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia; these countries we shall call the East European periphery. The thesis holds less true in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
2. Thus the idea of introducing the Western liberal model or the idea of reviving the pre-socialist state represents not the [renunciation of] teleological legitimation, but the changing of its modus. Whereas Soviet communism defines its “telos” in terms of the future, the anti-communist “telos” is defined either in terms of the past or in terms of the alien state. The social change therefore is viewed not as an immanent social process, but as an ultimate end.
3. Thus the crisis of identity, which is not an exceptional but a permanent and “normal” social condition here, produces the social mechanism of innovation by importing foreign cultural forms. This constant crisis produces a peculiar social condition in East Europe, which

exists nowadays as a synthesis of still preserved elements of patriarchal traditionalism, of incomplete industrial modernization, and of the forms of Western post-modernity as recently "imported" to the East.

4. From this point of view, the "post-modern condition" is an alternative state of modernity within the ontological boundaries of the same modernity.

5. The legitimacy is attained through the reflex of falsification (constructing social evidence by introducing the symbols of democratic change – parliamentary elections, multiplicity of newspapers, democratic opposition, etc). Since these symbols are lacking their genuine social context and therefore do not have effective validity, they create a social order accomplished by the "coercion" of falsification.

6. Here, of course is a view of the image of democracy as it exists in everyday political consciousness in the societies at issue. This concept of democracy suppresses the identity of democracy with the liberal state of society.

7. Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989), 52.