Two studies examined whether social norms and children’s concern for self-presentation affect their intergroup attitudes. Study 1 examined racial intergroup attitudes and normative beliefs among children aged 6 to 16 years ($n = 155$). Accountability (i.e., public self-focus) was experimentally manipulated, and intergroup attitudes were assessed using explicit and implicit measures. Study 2 ($n = 134$) replicated Study 1, focusing on national intergroup attitudes. Both studies showed that children below 10 years old were externally motivated to inhibit their in-group bias under high public self-focus. Older children were internally motivated to suppress their bias as they showed implicit but not explicit bias. Study 1, in contrast to Study 2, showed that children with low norm internalization suppressed their out-group prejudice under high public self-focus.

An American journalist (Hockstader, 2001) asked three Arab eighth graders to name their heroes and, after some nervous glances and fluttering smiles, they named a suicide bomber who killed himself and 21 others at a Tel Aviv disco. The “nervous glances and fluttering smiles” suggest that these Arab children were unsure about expressing their genuine attitudes to an American reporter. Nevertheless, maybe because they were being interviewed among their peers and within their local school community, these children eventually stated what we presume to be their actual beliefs. This example indicates that although children often harbor negative attitudes to others, they are also sensitive to their audience and social norms.

This article examines how social norms and children’s concern for self-presentation may affect their expression of prejudice. There is a long tradition in social psychology of studying how social norms influence prejudice (Asch, 1956; Pettigrew, 1958; Sherif, 1936). Social norms prescribe appropriate attitudes, values, and behavior in a given situation. Several studies on adults have shown that changing audience norms of prejudice expression can have a strong effect on people’s measured intergroup attitudes (e.g., Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughan, 1994; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996).

A contemporary social norm in Western societies is to avoid expressing discriminatory attitudes or behavior toward individuals based on their ethnic or racial group membership (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991). This social norm, like many others, is conveyed through the mass media (see Graves, 1999), national laws (e.g., equal opportunity legislation), and special multicultural education programs (e.g., Bigler, 1999; McLeod, 1993), which promote tolerance and appreciation of cultural diversity in elementary schools and in wider society. Research provides evidence that children attend to the social norm that blatant or straightforward racial discrimination is inappropriate (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002; Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kin, & Ardila-Rey, 2001; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Rutland, 2004; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001).

Studies with college students have also shown that concern about expressing unacceptable prejudicial beliefs (i.e., self-presentation) is related to reported levels of racial intergroup bias (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998). However, related research with children has been mixed. For example, Doyle, Beaudet, and Aboud (1988) found that first- through fifth-graders’ scores on the Children’s Social Desirability measure (CSD; Crandall, Crandall, & Katkovsky, 1965) did not relate significantly to their racial intergroup attitudes. However, a problem has been noted with the CSD (see Levy & Troise, 2001) insofar as it is a global measure of the tendency to present oneself in an unrealistically positive way (e.g., in terms of manners...
and the expression of negative feeling states) rather than a specific measure of concerns about expressing prejudicial social attitudes.

Levy and Troise (2001) developed and validated a measure to examine children’s social concern about expressing negative intergroup attitudes. In two studies with fifth- and sixth-grade children, higher social concern was related to more positive attitudes toward overweight and elderly people. This finding is compatible with studies that have shown that children provide more positive attitudes when evaluating the group of which the experimenter is a member (Jahoda, Thomson, & Bhatt, 1972; Katz, Sohn, & Zalk, 1975; Lawrence, 1991). Together these studies suggest that children may engage in self-presentation behavior when high in social concern or in the presence of an in-group member.

The studies presented here examined whether 6- to 16-year-olds control their explicit expressions of prejudice toward some racial groups (Study 1) and nationalities (Study 2). Previous research suggests that prejudice suppression is related to social norms concerning discrimination (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1994; Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). Thus, a preliminary study was conducted to examine children’s social norm about out-group prejudice. The children's internalization of this social norm was also examined, and external pressure (i.e., public self-focus) to comply with the norm was manipulated. Nonetheless, explicit bias suppression may occur even without external pressure; thus, implicit intergroup attitudes were also measured. The studies considered any distinctive developmental trends in children’s explicit in-group and out-group attitudes (Aboud, 2003, Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001; Nesdale, 2004).

Previous adult research suggests that the suppression of prejudice is motivated by either internal or external reasons (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Plant & Devine, 1998). Externally motivated suppression represents compliance to normative pressure from others (Kelman, 1958) whereas internal suppression represents egalitarian or humanitarian motivations to be fair minded (Monteith, 1993; Plant & Devine, 1998). The developmental literature suggests two alternative hypotheses regarding the age at which children will show evidence of external and internal motivation to suppress their prejudice (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Piaget, 1965; Quintana, 1994; Ruble, Alvarez, Bachman, & Cameron, 2004; Selman, 1971, 1980). First, research on social perspective taking suggests that children below 8 years old are relatively poor at coordinating and integrating various psychological perspectives such as first-, second-, and third-person perspectives (Quintana, 1994, 1999; Selman, 1971, 1980). Therefore, only older children may be aware of the social norm against explicit prejudice expression and will be externally motivated to suppress their prejudice under high public self-focus.

Alternatively, developmental research suggests that young children are aware of the social norm that racial discrimination is inappropriate (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001). For example, Killen and Stangor (2001) found that 6- to 12-year-olds rated racial exclusion as a negative behavior and unacceptable. Young children should, therefore, be externally motivated to suppress their racial prejudice under high public self-focus (Crandall et al., 2002). In contrast, the development of social identification and awareness of group deviancy in middle childhood should mean that children begin to internalize the social norm and become internally motivated to control their prejudice (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003; Quintana, 1998; Ruble et al., 2004). Thus, older children’s explicit attitudes should be unaffected by a manipulation of public self-focus.

This conception of the transition from externally motivated conformity to prejudice suppression based on internalization is similar to Piaget’s (1965) ideas about the development of moral reasoning. First, Piaget argued that the child’s moral reasoning is heteronomous; namely, moral norms are understood as one-sided and originating from external authority. Second, from approximately 10 years of age children’s reasoning becomes autonomous as they internalize fundamental moral norms and begin to regulate internally their own moral behavior. This internalization process requires the development of empathy, perspective taking, and logical and counterfactual reasoning (Crandall et al., 2002). In line with cognitive-developmental theory (Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Katz et al., 1975), this account suggests that children’s levels of prejudice are related to the acquisition of specific social cognitive skills.

The effect of manipulating public self-focus on children’s out-group attitudes should be dependent on whether children have internalized the social norm that explicit prejudice is unacceptable (Crandall et al., 2002). Children who show low levels of norm internalization should suppress their out-group prejudice under high public self-focus. In contrast, children with high levels of norm internalization (i.e., those high in internal motivation) should be unaffected by external pressure. This finding should be most evident with out-group prejudice because
external pressures to suppress out-group prejudice are typically higher than for in-group bias (Brewer, 1979; Cameron et al., 2001; Nesdale, 2004; Rutland, Brown, Ahmavaara, Arnold, & Samson, 2003) and our measure of norm internalization was a measure of belief about prejudice toward the out-group.

Implicit measures of intergroup attitudes were used in our studies to demonstrate that older children are internally motivated to control their prejudice. Namely, at the controlled (i.e., explicit) level older children should not show bias, whereas they should show bias at the uncontrolled (i.e., implicit) level. Research into childhood intergroup attitudes has typically used explicit measures (e.g., Doyle et al., 1988; Williams, Best, Boswell, Mattson, & Graves, 1975). Arguably, the sole use of such measures increases the likelihood that children will engage in self-presentation and internally control their prejudice (Brown, 1995; Nesdale, 2001; Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle, & White, 1994). Therefore, the present studies used a modified version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to measure children’s uncontrolled implicit attitudes. Research with adults has shown that the IAT is resistant to masking by self-presentation strategies (e.g., Kim, 2003; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). Dissociation between explicit and implicit measures is typically observed, especially for socially sensitive issues and particularly for racial attitudes (Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). Thus, dissociation between explicit and implicit measures, and implicit bias in all age groups, was predicted. It was expected that older children, who should be internally motivated, would show significant implicit bias but no explicit prejudice.

The first study examined whether children engaged in self-presentation by controlling their racial in-group bias and out-group prejudice. This involved measuring their explicit and implicit intergroup attitudes while manipulating public self-focus using a video camera. The first study also examined the children’s internalization of the racial prejudice social norm (i.e., a personal normative belief measure) using social exclusion vignettes. Three age groups were included: 6 to 8 years, 10 to 12 years, and 14 to 16 years. The two youngest age groups were included because intergroup bias typically declines between these ages among White children (see Aboud, 1988; Brown, 1995). A sample was also taken from adolescents, given the commonly found resurgence of bias during this period (Rutland, 1999; Teichman, 2001).

A preliminary study (see the Appendix for full details) was conducted on a cohort of children similar to those used in the present studies to determine whether discriminatory judgments based on a person’s racial category (e.g., Black and Asian) and national category (e.g., American, German, British) were perceived as unacceptable. This study found that prejudice based on both racial and national group membership was perceived as illegitimate. However, the social-norm-prohibiting bias premised on racial group membership was stronger than that for national group membership, especially in relation to Germans. These findings suggest that children are more likely to control their explicit racial bias than national bias.

Study 1

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 155 White British children (57 males, 98 females) from a predominately White middle-class suburban or rural area outside a large metropolitan city in the southeast region of England. Approximately 3% to 4% of the school population was from a visible racial minority, and most of the teachers were White British. Included were forty-five 6- to 8-year-old children ($M = 7$ years 10 months, $SD = 9$ months), sixty-two 10- to 12-year-old children ($M = 10$ years 8 months, $SD = 7$ months), and forty-four 14- to 16-year-old children ($M = 15$ years 5 months, $SD = 5$ months).

Procedure

Children were given a personal normative belief measure, an explicit intergroup bias measure, and an implicit intergroup bias measure, administered in counterbalanced orders. The second author tested children individually in their schools. Assignment to the high or low public self-focus condition was random within each age group. Gender was evenly distributed between conditions. Public self-focus was manipulated using a video camera (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998).

In the high public self-focus condition, children were videotaped completing the explicit and implicit attitude measures. The children were explicitly told they were being videotaped and the recording taken may be watched later by the researcher and her colleagues (i.e., other adults, teachers). Children were shown themselves on screen using the video camera’s LCD monitor. This procedure was repeated between each task to ensure the salience of the video camera. In the low public self-focus condition, the
children were told the battery for the video camera was not functioning. Then, the lens cap was placed on the video camera and it was switched off and pointed down toward the floor. The public-self focus manipulation was successful according to a study (see the Appendix for further details) using a sub-sample of children tested using the public self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975).

Stimulus Materials and Measures

**Personal normative belief measure.** The preliminary study described earlier established that the social norm was the nonexpression of explicit racial bias. Children were presented with social exclusion vignettes to determine whether they had internalized this social norm. There were two versions of the vignettes, with the content of the story and the genders of the characters varied to ensure gender relevance. In the male vignette, because of racial group membership, White boys excluded two Black boys from a soccer game. Similarly, in the female vignette, White girls excluded two Black girls from eating their school lunch (see the Appendix for both vignettes). The selection of the vignettes was based on a small-scale pilot study with 6- to 16-year-old participants. This showed that British children of all ages related to the activities described and that the vignettes maintained their attention. Each vignette included three black-and-white line drawings presented with cartoon captions read by the second author, except among the 14- to 16-year-olds because research suggests that the use of cartoons does not maximize the attention of older children (e.g., Nucci, 1981). Instead, adolescents were presented with typed event descriptions and asked to read these out loud to themselves.

Next, the children were asked two questions. The first question was: “How bad do you think the boys/girls in the story were who wouldn’t let the other children join in?” The 6- to 12-year-olds answered on a 4-point scale of smiley faces. The scale was: OK (smiley face = 1), bad (little frown = 2), very bad (bigger frown = 3), and very, very bad (very big frown = 4). The valence of the faces from left to right was counterbalanced. Smetana and colleagues (Smetana, 1981; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Smetana, Kelly, & Twentyman, 1984) have used this scale previously when studying children’s moral development. The choice of this scale also involved consideration of the developmental literature that suggests children are likely to perceive instances of racial exclusion as unacceptable (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001). Therefore, a scale was selected that was sensitive enough to identify possible variability in children’s beliefs about the acceptability of racial discrimination. The 14- to 16-year-olds answered using a simple 4-point numbered scale with the words (OK, bad, very bad, and very very bad) written below. The children were next asked a second question: “What do you think the teacher should do?” and were required to select one of three responses: not punish (scored 1), punish a little (scored 2), and punish a lot (scored 3). The children’s responses to the two questions were significantly correlated ($r = .50, p < .001$). However, 23 children of our total sample failed to answer the second question. It was decided to maximize statistical power by using the first question only as an indication of personal normative belief. There was a marginal main effect for age group on personal normative beliefs, $F(2, 154) = 2.76, p < .1$. This effect revealed an increase in norm internalization with age ($Ms = 3.27, 3.56$, and 3.61 for 6- to 8-year-olds, 10- to 12-year-olds, and 14- to 16-year-olds, respectively). The marginal significant difference was between the 6- to 8-year-olds and the 14- to 16-year-olds (Tukey’s honestly significant different [HSD] test, $p < .1$).

The children’s responses to the first question were strongly skewed, with 3% responding “OK,” 8% responding “bad,” 26% responding “very bad,” and 63% responding “very very bad.” Moreover, the children’s responses were equally skewed within each age group. Thus, it was inappropriate to use the children’s responses as a continuous variable within a regression model. Instead, a median split was performed on the children’s responses, classifying children who responded “OK,” “bad,” and “very bad” into the low norm internalization group ($n = 57, 37\%$) and the children who responded “very very bad” into the high norm internalization group ($n = 98, 63\%$). There were equivalent distributions of children from each age group in the low and high groups. In the context of this study, children in the high group should show more concern than those in the low group about publicly expressing racial bias because they had internalized to a greater extent the norm that racial discrimination is unacceptable.

**Explicit intergroup bias measure.** The Multiple-Response Racial Attitude (MRA) measure was used to derive separate indexes of in-group bias and out-group prejudice (Aboud, 2003). The children were presented with 20 adjectives, 10 positive and 10 negative. These adjectives were taken from the Preschool Racial Attitude Measure II (Pram II) Series A (Williams et al., 1975). The positive adjectives were: clean, wonderful, healthy, good, nice, happy, friendly, kind, helpful, and smart. The negative
adjectives were: unfriendly, mean, dirty, cruel, stupid, selfish, sick, naughty, sad, and bad. To ensure the children understood the meaning of each word, they were given a corresponding definition. Initially, children were presented with two copies of each word and two cups labeled White and Black. The cups were also identified using simple gender-neutral cartoon faces. The children were explicitly told they could put the adjective in the “Black” cup, the “White” cup, or both cups. For instance, one item read, “Some children are friendly. They often share their toys with other children. Who is friendly? Is it the Black child, the White child or more than one child who is friendly?” To ensure understanding of the task, initially each child was asked to practice assigning adjectives by attributing four nonevaluative items to each of the categories (Black-Gutman & H Hickson, 1996). These items were “likes to run,” “likes to sing,” “likes TV,” and “likes music.”

The number of adjectives assigned to each cup was computed. Four scores were calculated: a positive and a negative trait score for each racial group, each with a possible range of 0 to 10. The higher the scores on positive traits and the higher the scores on negative traits, the more positive and negative, respectively, were the child’s ratings. A separate in-group bias score ranging from –10 (very unfavorable) to +10 (very favorable) was created from the number of in-group positive evaluations minus the number of in-group negative evaluations. In addition, a separate out-group bias score was determined from the number of out-group negative evaluations minus the number of out-group positive evaluations. This score ranged from +10 (very unfavorable) to –10 (very favorable). Therefore, the higher the children’s in-group bias and out-group bias scores, the more was their racial in-group favoritism and racial out-group prejudice, respectively.

Implicit intergroup bias measure. The IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) was used as a computer-based implicit measure. All children were tested on this task in their schools using the same Mac notebook computer supplied by the researchers. The IAT is a task devised to measure uncontrolled or automatic concept–attribute associations. The underlying assumption of the test is that strongly associated (compatible) attribute–concept pairs should be easier to classify together than weakly associated or opposed (incompatible) attribute–concept pairs. Typically, in the IAT participants are presented with a series of words on a computer screen, which are exemplars of a concept (e.g., names associated with the Black racial category; i.e., Latishia, Ebony) and an attribute, (e.g., pleasant and unpleasant words). Furthermore, participants have to categorize these words as quickly as possible by pressing a left or right key on a keyboard.

Pilot work with 6- to 7-year-old children indicated that they had problems understanding a word-based IAT. Therefore, a completely pictorial-based version of the IAT was developed. Instead of using stereotypical Black and White names, unfamiliar Black and White faces with neutral facial expressions were used as concepts. The faces were approximately 3 × 4 cm. The sex of faces was matched with each child’s sex. In addition, as an alternative to pleasant and unpleasant words, simple line drawings of happy or sad cartoon faces were used as attributes. The cartoon faces varied in shape (e.g., squares, triangles, circles) and were 4 × 4 cm. Pilot work indicated that some children had difficulty using keypad responses; therefore, children were required to respond by making movements with the mouse (toward or away). In addition, arrows were attached to the computer screen to indicate the appropriate direction of response for each stimulus category. This pictorial version of the IAT was piloted successfully with 23 children between the ages of 6 and 11 years.

This pictorial version of the IAT, in line with previous research using the IAT (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; Monteith et al., 2001), involved a sequence of five blocks, which together allowed for an assessment of children’s uncontrolled association between concepts and an attribute. Block 1 trials introduced the initial concept discrimination and required children to distinguish between unfamiliar Black and White faces by assigning one concept to a response by using an away mouse movement and the other to a response by using a toward mouse movement. The attribute dimension was introduced in Block 2. The children were presented with simple line drawings of cartoon faces and asked to categorize these faces as either happy or sad by using the same response modes as with Block 1. The first two blocks of the IAT were important because they allowed the children to learn the assignments of particular stimuli to certain response modes (i.e., toward or away) to be used in Blocks 3 and 5. Next, the concepts and attributes were superimposed in Block 3. The stimuli for the concepts and attributes appeared in alternate trials within this block. This was termed the stereotype-consistent block because the White faces (ingroup) were paired with happy cartoon faces and the Black faces (out-group) were paired with sad cartoon faces. Block 4 was similar to Block 1 except that the children were presented with the same stimuli as in Block 1 and they responded using the opposite mouse movements. This was important because it...
allowed the children to learn the response assignments for concepts used in Block 5. Block 5 was called the stereotype-inconsistent block because the target concepts were reversed and combined with the same attribute dimensions as in Block 3. This meant that the target White faces were paired with sad cartoon faces and the target Black faces were paired with happy cartoon faces.

Implicit intergroup bias (i.e., an IAT effect) was shown if the White children recorded quicker response times (RTs) in the stereotype-consistent block compared with the stereotype-inconsistent block. An IAT score was calculated by subtracting the RTs in the stereotype-consistent block from the RTs in the stereotype-inconsistent block. This meant that a higher IAT score indicated more implicit bias. The order in which stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent blocks were presented was counterbalanced, as were response assignments (i.e., toward and away mouse movements). There were 16 trials involving the presentation of stimuli (i.e., racial faces or cartoon faces) within Blocks 1, 2, and 4 (i.e., 8 happy and 8 sad, or 8 Black and 8 White) and 32 trials in the critical stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent blocks (Blocks 3 and 5). A shorter version of the IAT was used with the 6- to 8-year-olds because there was evidence that the length of the task was creating boredom and fatigue within this age group. In this shorter version of the IAT only 12 trials involved presentation of stimuli (i.e., racial faces or cartoon faces) within Blocks 1, 2, and 4 (i.e., 6 happy and 6 sad, or 6 Black and 6 White). However, there were still 32 trials in the critical stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent blocks.

Preparation of IAT Data for Analysis

Inspection of the response latencies in each trial showed the usual impurities for speeded tasks (Greenwald et al., 1998), with a very small number of extremely fast and extremely slow responses. These outlying scores typically indicate either responses undertaken before presentation of the stimulus (i.e., anticipations) or momentary inattention. The responses in the tails of the latency distribution, although lacking theoretical interest, are troublesome as they distort means and inflate variances. To deal with these few problematic responses (cf. Barnett & Lewis, 1984), a standard accommodation procedure was adopted (e.g., Sroufe, Sonies, West, & Wright, 1973), namely, the use of children’s median RTs within each block. The use of the median RT as a robust estimator is common in psychology because this measure is relatively uninfluenced by spuriously fast or slows RTs (cf. Stuart & Ord, 1987).

Nonetheless, analysis was also conducted using the filtering or identification procedures routinely used for full versions of the IAT (see Greenwald et al., 1998). These include (a) recoding latencies under 300 ms to 300 ms and those over 3,000 ms to 3,000 ms; (b) using latencies from all trials (i.e., including latencies on which errors occurred) except for the first two trials of each block, which generally have atypically high latencies; and (c) using logarithm transformations of latencies for statistical significance tests because of their reduced statistical noise. The results using this filtering procedure were not different from those obtained using the children’s median RTs; therefore, only the analyses on the median RTs are reported. Cunningham, Preacher, and Banaji (2001) addressed internal reliability regarding the IAT and found it had satisfactory interitem reliability ($\alpha = .78$) and test–retest reliability ($\alpha = .68$). Internal reliability was less of an issue within the study given the use of the median RT.

**Results**

To ascertain whether the pattern of findings fits the hypotheses, a series of analyses of variance (ANOVs) were conducted with age group (6–8 vs. 10–12 vs. 14–16), public self-focus (high vs. low), and internalization of norm (high vs. low) as between-participants variables. Separate between-participant ANOVAs were conducted on children’s explicit in-group and out-group bias measures. Next, consideration was given to the implicit bias measure; a mixed ANOVA was completed, with IAT block (stereotypical vs. counterstereotypical) as a within-participants variable and age group (6–8 vs. 10–12 vs. 14–16), public self-focus (high vs. low), and norm (high vs. low) as between-participants variables. The correlations among variables are presented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-group bias</td>
<td>−.27**</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-group prejudice</td>
<td>−.12</td>
<td>.76**</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAT score</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal normative belief</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>−.09</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. IAT = Implicit Association Test.*

**p < .01.
in Table 1. Finally, partial correlations were conducted to examine the relationship between implicit and explicit measures.

### Explicit In-Group Bias

The children’s in-group bias scores were submitted to a 3 (age) × 2 (public self-focus) × 2 (internalization of norm) between-participants ANOVA. A significant Age × Public Self-Focus interaction was found, $F(2, 154) = 4.19, p < .05$. A main effect for age, $F(2, 154) = 5.62, p < .01$, was also found that revealed that overall in-group bias became gradually less evident with age (see Table 2). Post hoc analysis indicated that 6- to 8-year-olds showed more in-group bias than did 14- to 16-year-olds (Tukey’s HSD tests, $p < .05$). Simple main effects within each age group revealed that lower in-group bias in the high public self-focus condition compared with the low public self-focus condition was only evident among the 6- to 8-year-olds, $t(42) = 2.02, p < .05$ (Levene’s test for equality of variance, $F = .26, p > .05$; see Table 2). Moreover, only the 6- to 8-year-olds in the low public self-focus condition, $t(22) = 3.70, p < .001$, and the 10- to 12-year-olds in the high public self-focus condition, $t(31) = 3.03, p < .01$, had in-group bias scores significantly higher than 0. The 6- to 8-year-olds in the low public self-focus condition showed in-group bias, but those in the high public self-focus condition did not.

Simple main effects within the public self-focus condition revealed an age effect in the low condition, $F(2, 79) = 10.33, p < .001$, but not in the high condition. Post hoc analysis in the low public self-focus condition showed that 6- to 8-year-olds demonstrated higher in-group bias than did both 10- to 12-year-olds and 14- to 16-year-olds (Tukey’s HSD tests, $p < .05$). Table 2 shows that in-group bias decreased with age in the low public self-focus condition, whereas no such age trend was evident in the high public self-focus condition.

### Explicit Out-Group Prejudice

The children’s out-group prejudice scores were submitted to a 3 (age) × 2 (public self-focus) × 2 (internalization of norm) between-participants ANOVA. A significant Public Self-Focus × Norm interaction was found, $F(1, 154) = 5.09, p < .05$. Simple main effects within each norm group revealed that higher out-group prejudice in the low public self-focus condition compared with the high public self-focus condition was found only among the low norm group, $t(55) = 2.04, p < .05$ (see Table 3). Children who showed less evidence of norm internalizing were most influenced by the public self-focus manipulation, significantly decreasing their out-group prejudice in the high versus low public self-focus condition.

As expected, the ANOVA found a main effect for age, $F(2, 154) = 5.13, p < .01$, and a main effect for public self-focus, $F(1, 154) = 3.94, p < .05$. The main effect for age revealed a decrease in out-group prejudice with age: 6- to 8-year-olds ($M = 1.25, SD = 4.33$), 10- to 12-year-olds ($M = 3.9, SD = 3.01$), and 14- to 16-year-olds ($M = 3.95, SD = 3.83$). Note, however, that the only significant difference was between the 6- to 8-year-olds and 10- to 12-year-olds (Tukey’s HSD tests, $p < .05$). There was evidence of out-group prejudice among the youngest age group as their scores were marginally above 0 (one-sample $t$ test significant at $p = .06$). As expected, the main effect for public self-focus showed that out-group prejudice was higher in the low versus high condition (see Table 3).

### Table 2

**Mean Explicit Racial In-Group Bias (Standard Deviations) for Each Age Group as a Function of Public Self-Focus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Public self-focus</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – 8 years</td>
<td>0.81 (3.68)</td>
<td>3.22 (4.17)</td>
<td>2.07 (4.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 23$</td>
<td>$n = 44$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – 12 years</td>
<td>1.34 (2.51)</td>
<td>0.53 (2.06)</td>
<td>0.92 (2.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 32$</td>
<td>$n = 44$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 – 16 years</td>
<td>– 0.05 (0.50)</td>
<td>– 0.04 (0.83)</td>
<td>– 0.05 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 21$</td>
<td>$n = 44$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.80 (2.61)</td>
<td>1.14 (2.94)</td>
<td>$n = 154$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. In-group bias scores could range from –10 (very unfavorable to in-group) to +10 (very favorable to in-group).

### Table 3

**Mean Explicit Racial Out-Group Prejudice (Standard Deviations) for Each Norm Group as a Function of Public Self-Focus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norm group</th>
<th>Public self-focus</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.23 (1.77)</td>
<td>0.13 (3.69)</td>
<td>1.88 (2.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 52$</td>
<td>$n = 97$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>– 1.05 (4.01)</td>
<td>0.91 (3.19)</td>
<td>0.06 (3.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 32$</td>
<td>$n = 57$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.48 (3.48)</td>
<td>– 1.54 (2.68)</td>
<td>$n = 154$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Out-group prejudice scores could range from +10 (very unfavorable to in-group) to –10 (very favorable to in-group).
**Implicit Intergroup Bias**

The children’s median RTs on the stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent blocks of the IAT were submitted to a 3 (age) × 2 (public self-focus) × 2 (internalization of norm) × 2 (IAT block) mixed design ANOVA, with IAT block as the within-participants variable. A main effect for age was found, F(1, 142) = 83.74, p < .001, as was a main effect for IAT block, F(1, 142) = 23.29, p < .001. There were no other main effects or interactions. The age main effect showed that the children’s responses gradually became quicker with age: 6- to 8-year-olds (M = 2079.52 ms, SD = 442.68), 10- to 12-year-olds (M = 1540.58 ms, SD = 424.48), and 14- to 16-year-olds (M = 943.15 ms, SD = 180.73). Post hoc analysis indicated that all comparisons between age groups were significant (Tukey’s HSD tests, p < .05). The main effect for IAT block revealed that the children’s responses were significantly quicker on the stereotype-consistent block (M = 1433.41 ms, SD = 590.32) than on the stereotype-inconsistent block (M = 1605.43 ms, SD = 607.86). Thus, children in all age groups showed evidence of implicit intergroup bias.

**Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Measures**

The correlations partialing out age between the IAT score and explicit bias measures were all nonsignificant: explicit in-group bias score (r = .07) and explicit out-group bias score (r = .02). Nonsignificant correlations were evident between the IAT score and the explicit in-group bias measure for 6- to 8-year-olds (r = .05), 10- to 12-year-olds (r = .12), and 14- to 16-year-olds (r = -.12). The correlations between the IAT score and the explicit prejudice score were also nonsignificant for 6- to 8-year-olds (r = -.01), 10- to 12-year-olds (r = .08), and 14- to 16-year-olds (r = .02).

**Discussion**

The findings of this study suggest that social norms and children’s concern for self-presentation affect their explicit racial intergroup attitudes. The children below 10 years old suppressed their explicit in-group bias under high public self-focus. The children’s explicit racial in-group bias was highest among the 6- to 8-year-olds and then declined with age. Though significant, this developmental trend was only evident under low public self-focus. As expected, children with low norm internalization significantly decreased their out-group prejudice under high public self-focus unlike those with high norm internalization. Finally, children over 10 years showed significant evidence of implicit intergroup bias but not of explicit in-group bias or out-group prejudice.

These findings provide partial support for the hypothesis that with age there is a transition from externally motivated conformity to internally motivated bias suppression. The youngest age group was aware of the social norm that racial discrimination is negative behavior and inappropriate. Thus, under high public self-focus they were externally motivated to suppress their in-group bias. In contrast, the older age groups showed no evidence of externally motivated in-group bias suppression. Instead, they showed evidence of internally motivated bias suppression as they showed implicit but not explicit in-group bias.

However, a developmental transition from externally motivated to internally motivated suppression was not evident on the out-group prejudice measure. Noticeably, children with low norm internalization irrespective of age were externally motivated to suppress their explicit out-group prejudice under high public self-focus. However, the older children, unlike the youngest age group, showed evidence of internal motivation to suppress their out-group prejudice as they evidenced implicit but not explicit prejudice. These findings suggest that whether children are externally motivated to suppress in-group bias is dependent on their age, whereas the suppression of out-group prejudice is more dependent on the degree to which children have internalized the norm against prejudice.

As predicted, the level of norm internalization moderated the affect of public self-focus on out-group prejudice. This finding is compatible with research on adults that suggests that the expression and suppression of prejudice closely follows normative beliefs held within a particular society (Crandall et al., 2002; Sherif, 1936; Turner, 1991). Children’s suppression of their prejudice may also depend on the prevailing normative context regarding the acceptability of any given form of prejudice. Therefore, children are unlikely to show prejudice suppression when the social norm within their environment is to tolerate a particular form of prejudice (e.g., prejudice based on sexual orientation or nationality). As noted earlier, a preliminary study of norms prevalent in British children’s social environment indicated that the norm against bias based on racial group membership was stronger than that for national group membership, especially regarding Germans. Thus, the findings of our preliminary study and previous research (Bennett, Lyons, Sani, & Barrett, 1998; Rutland, 1999; Verkuyten, 2001) suggest that British children are less likely to engage in self-presentation and control their explicit national prejudice.
Study 2

To test whether British children suppress their explicit national intergroup bias, a second study was conducted replicating the basic design of our first experiment except with an emphasis on children’s national rather than racial attitudes. This second study examined children’s attitudes toward the British in-group and German out-group. Germans were chosen because previous research has shown that British school children perceive them as a salient out-group and are willing to express intergroup bias toward this group (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Barrett, Wilson, & Lyons, 2003; Rutland, 1999).

As in Study 1, children’s personal normative beliefs regarding out-group prejudice were measured. It was expected that children would judge national discrimination as more tolerable, and therefore less punishable, than racial discrimination. Thus, in Study 2 there should be less evidence of explicit national bias suppression. Specifically, the children’s explicit national in-group and out-group attitudes should be unaffected by the public self-focus manipulation.

In accordance with previous research, it was anticipated that children would show less national intergroup bias with age (e.g., Barrett et al., 2003; Lambert & Klineberg, 1967). However, given the salient intergroup rivalries between Germany and Britain (see Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Rutland, 1999, 2004), significant intergroup bias was anticipated into early adolescence (Teichman, 2001). In early adolescence, when self-identity is a central issue (Erikson, 1968) and the collective self is also gaining importance (Quintana, 1999; Ruble et al., 2004), individuals should favor negative characterizations of out-groups as a means of self-enhancement. In middle adolescence this motivation may be less evident given the emergence of a more established and secure sense of self (Phinney, 1990). Finally, as in Study 1, dissociation between implicit and explicit intergroup attitudes and implicit bias at all ages was predicted.

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 134 White British children (33 males, 90 females) from the same demographic background as the children in Study 1. Included were forty-six 6- to 8-year-olds (M = 7 years 8 months, SD = 11 months), forty-five 10- to 12-year-olds (M = 11 years 0 months, SD = 8 months), and forty-three 14- to 16-year-olds (M = 14 years 11 months, SD = 14 months).

Each testing session involved the same procedure and measures as Study 1.

Stimulus Materials and Measures

Personal normative belief measure. This measure was described in Study 1. However, within the vignettes, British (instead of White) boys or girls excluded two German (instead of Black) boys or girls because of their group membership. As in Study 1, the children’s personal normative belief scores were strongly skewed, with 4% responding “OK,” 7% responding “bad,” 34% responding “very bad,” and 55% responding “very very bad.” The children’s responses were also equally skewed in each age group. Therefore, a median split was performed on the children’s responses classifying children who responded “OK,” “bad,” and “very bad” into the low norm internalization group (n = 61, 45%) and the children who responded “very very bad” into the high norm internalization group (n = 73, 55%). There were equivalent distributions of children from each age group in the low and high norm groups.

Explicit intergroup bias measure. This measure was the same as used in Study 1, though with a focus on national attitudes. The children were presented with two cups labeled “British” and “German” and marked with the British and German flags.

Implicit intergroup bias measure. This measure was described in Study 1. To measure implicit national bias, neutral faces different from Study 1 were used. Unfamiliar White faces were used with either the British or German flags superimposed on the face. A pilot study with 6- to 10-year-olds indicated that most children were familiar with both the British and German flags. Nevertheless, before testing, all children were shown large (29 x 20 cm) pictures of the British and German flags and were explicitly told which country each flag represented.

Results

Initially, a series of ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the children’s ratings in the social inclusion vignettes differed between Study 1 and Study 2. Next, separate ANOVAs were conducted on the children’s explicit in-group and out-group bias measures, with age group (6–8 vs. 10–12 vs. 14–16), public self-focus (high vs. low), and internalization of norm (high vs. low) as between-participants variables. Regarding the implicit bias measure, a mixed ANOVA was completed, with IAT block (stereotypical vs. counterstereotypical) as a within-participants variable and age group (6–8 vs. 10–12 vs. 14–16), public
self-focus (high vs. low), and norm (high vs. low) as between-participants variables. The correlations among variables are presented in Table 4. Finally, partial correlations were conducted to examine the relationship between implicit and explicit measures.

**Personal Normative Beliefs**

Two 3 (age) $\times$ 2 (study: racial, national) between-participants ANOVAs were conducted, one using badness and one using punishment as the dependent variable. In the former analysis no main effects or interactions were found. In contrast, the latter analysis, a significant Age $\times$ Study interaction was found, $F(2, 266) = 3.59$, $p < .05$. Simple main effects within each age group showed that only the two oldest age groups rated social exclusion based on nationality as significantly less punishable than that based on racial group membership: 10- to 12-year-olds, $t(99) = 2.18$, $p < .05$ ($M = 2.11$, $SD = .68$; $M = 2.42$, $SD = .68$ for nationality-and racial-based exclusion, respectively), and 14- to 16-year-olds, $t(84) = 2.03$, $p < .05$ ($M = 1.71$, $SD = .64$; $M = 2.02$, $SD = .76$, for nationality-and racial-based exclusion, respectively). In contrast, the 6- to 8-year-olds perceived no significant difference between the level of punishment appropriate for social exclusion based on national and racial group membership ($M = 2.47$, $SD = .66$; $M = 2.27$, $SD = .78$, for nationality-and racial-based exclusion, respectively). A main effect for age, $F(2, 266) = 11.90$, $p < .01$, also revealed that with age children thought the characters should experience less punishment: 6- to 8-year-olds ($M = 2.35$, $SD = .73$), 10- to 12-year-olds ($M = 2.32$, $SD = .69$), and 14- to 16-year-olds ($M = 1.87$, $SD = .72$). Post hoc analysis showed the 14- to 16-year-olds thought the story characters should be punished significantly less than did the 6- to 8-year-olds and 10- to 12-year-olds (Tukey’s HSD tests, $p < .05$).

### Table 4
**Correlations Among Variables in Study 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. In-group bias</td>
<td>−.26**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Out-group prejudice</td>
<td>−.11</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. IAT score</td>
<td>−.20*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personal normative belief</td>
<td>−.04</td>
<td>−.09</td>
<td>−.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. IAT = Implicit Association Test.  
*p < .05. **p < .001.*

**Explicit In-Group Bias**

The children’s in-group bias scores were submitted to a 3 (age) $\times$ 2 (public self-focus) $\times$ 2 (internalization of norm) between-participants ANOVA. This analysis found a significant Age $\times$ Public Self-Focus interaction, $F(2, 132) = 5.21$, $p < .01$, and a main effect for age, $F(2, 132) = 4.92$, $p < .01$. The main effect of age showed that in-group bias became less apparent with age (see Table 5). Post hoc analysis indicated that 14- to 16-year-olds showed less in-group bias than did both 6- to 8-year-olds and 10- to 12-year-olds (Tukey’s HSD tests, $p < .05$). Simple main effects analysis showed lower in-group bias in the high public self-focus condition than in the low public self-focus condition among 6- to 8-year-olds, $t(44) = 2.21$, $p < .05$ (Levene’s test for equality of variance, $F = .08$, $p > .05$). Lower in-group bias under high public self-focus versus low public self-focus was also evident among the 14- to 16-year-olds, $t(41) = 2.35$, $p < .05$ (Levene’s test for equality of variance, $F = 4.67$, $p < .05$). In contrast, among the 10- to 12-year-olds, higher in-group bias was shown in the high public self-focus condition versus the low public self-focus condition, $t(42) = -2.08$, $p < .05$ (Levene’s test for equality of variance, $F = 2.50$, $p > .05$; see Table 5). Only the 6- to 8-year-olds in the low public self-focus condition, $t(24) = 4.70$, $p < .001$, and the 10- to 12-year-olds in the high, $t(21) = 4.22$, $p < .001$, and low, $t(21) = 2.45$, $p < .05$, public self-focus conditions had in-group bias scores significantly higher than zero. This demonstrates that although 6- to 8-year-olds showed in-group bias in the low public self-focus condition, this bias disappeared under high public self-focus. The 10- to 12-year-olds, on the contrary, showed in-group bias under low public self-focus, and heightening public

### Table 5
**Mean Explicit National In-Group Bias (Standard Deviations) for Each Age Group as a Function of Public Self-Focus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6–8 years</td>
<td>0.67 (4.29)</td>
<td>3.16 (3.36)</td>
<td>2.02 (3.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–12 years</td>
<td>3.00 (3.29)</td>
<td>1.18 (2.26)</td>
<td>2.07 (2.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14–16 years</td>
<td>−0.32 (0.84)</td>
<td>0.70 (1.81)</td>
<td>−0.05 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.11 (3.38)</td>
<td>1.75 (2.79)</td>
<td>1.32 (3.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. In-group bias scores could range from −10 (very unfavorable to in-group) to +10 (very favorable to in-group).*
self-focus only increased in-group bias. The 14- to 16-year-olds showed no evidence of in-group bias in either public self-focus condition.

Explicit Out-Group Prejudice

The children’s out-group prejudice scores were submitted to a 3 (age) × 2 (public self-focus) × 2 (internalization of norm) between-participants ANOVA. As expected, there were no significant main effects or interactions. Moreover, the out-group prejudice scores of the 6- to 8-year-olds (M = 1.13), 10- to 12-year-olds (M = .80), and 14- to 16-year-olds (M = .35) were not significantly higher than zero. These findings indicate that at no age were the children showing out-group prejudice. Furthermore, as predicted, the children’s prejudice ratings were unaffected by the public-self manipulation and were unrelated to their personal normative beliefs.

Implicit Intergroup Bias

The children’s median RTs on the stereotype-consistent (British+happy/German+sad) and stereotype-inconsistent (British+sad/German+happy) blocks of the IAT were submitted to a 3 (age) × 2 (public self-focus) × 2 (IAT block) ANOVA, with IAT block as the within-participants variable. This analysis found a main effect for age, F(2, 120) = 51.67, p < .001, and a main effect for IAT block, F(1, 120) = 35.18, p < .001. No other main effects or interactions were found. The age main effect showed that the children’s RTs gradually became quicker with age: 6- to 8-year-olds (M = 1778.25 ms, SD = 524.65), 10- to 12-year-olds (M = 1340.54 ms, SD = 456.48), and 14- to 16-year-olds (M = 861.81 ms, SD = 157.47). Post hoc analysis indicated that all comparisons between age groups were significant (Tukey’s HSD tests, p < .05). The main effect for IAT block indicated that the children’s RTs were significantly quicker on the stereotype-consistent block (M = 1233.24 ms, SD = 543.11) than on the stereotype-inconsistent block (M = 1444.63 ms, SD = 628.95). Thus, children in all age groups showed evidence of implicit intergroup bias.

Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Measures

The relationships between explicit and implicit measures were examined through correlations partialing out age. Overall, the IAT score was not associated with the explicit intergroup bias (r = .05), in-group bias (r = .00), and out-group bias (r = .10) scores. Nonsignificant correlations were evident between the IAT score and the explicit in-group bias measure for 6- to 8-year-olds (r = .05), 10- to 12-year-olds (r = -.17), and 14- to 16-year-olds (r = -.14). The correlations between the IAT score and the explicit out-group prejudice score were also nonsignificant for 6- to 8-year-olds (r = .09), 10- to 12-year-olds (r = -.07), and 14- to 16-year-olds (r = -.10).

Discussion

The two oldest age groups perceived racial prejudice as warranting more punishment than national prejudice. In contrast, the youngest age group saw these two forms of prejudice as equally punishable. This finding seems compatible with research that suggests that children below 8 years old are relatively less attentive than older children to what is normative when engaging in social reasoning about inclusion and exclusion (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron 2003; Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, et al., 2003; Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001).

As predicted, children irrespective of age did not show evidence of self-presentation by controlling their explicit national out-group prejudice under high public self-focus. This finding contrasts with the result from Study 1, where children with low norm internalization showed external motivation to control their prejudice by suppressing their racial out-group bias under high public self-focus. These findings combined suggest that children’s bias suppression is dependent on the prevailing norms within the child’s social environment.

Similar to Study 1 and counter to our prediction, the 6- to 8-year-olds showed significantly less in-group bias under high public self-focus versus low public self-focus. The young children were aware of the social norm that national bias is a relatively inappropriate behavior. Thus, in line with Study 1, they were externally motivated to control their in-group bias. Notably, the youngest children, unlike the oldest children, showed significant in-group bias under low public self-focus and inhibited this bias under high public self-focus. The oldest age group failed to show significant in-group bias in either public self-focus condition. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that only the youngest age group showed significant suppression of explicit in-group bias.

In contrast, among the 10- to 12-year-olds, heightening public self-focus only increased national in-group bias. This finding is particularly interesting because it suggests that increasing public accountability
can actually increase in-group bias. Previous research has shown that when the norm is to tolerate discrimination and the context involves salient intergroup rivalry, early adolescents can show high levels of intergroup bias (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Rutland, 1999; Teichman, 2001). The 10- to 12-year-olds seemed internally motivated to express in-group bias, as they showed significant national in-group bias even in the low public self-focus condition. Heightening public accountability may only have introduced external pressure in line with their internal motivation, resulting in increased national in-group bias. Notably, higher public accountability did not increase national out-group prejudice among 10- to 12-year-olds. This finding is compatible with the literature that suggests the expression of in-group bias is both more common and acceptable than out-group prejudice (Aboud, 2003; Brewer, 1979; Cameron et al., 2001; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Nesdale, 2004).

As expected, the children showed significantly less intergroup bias with age, though they were still showing significant intergroup bias in early adolescence. Finally, as in Study 1, children of all ages showed implicit intergroup bias and they showed no dissociation between the implicit and explicit measures.

**General Discussion**

Taken together, the two studies provide support for the claim that social norms and children’s concern about self-presentation influence their intergroup attitudes. Both studies showed that children below 10 years old were externally motivated to control their in-group bias under high public self-focus. Study 1 also demonstrated that children with low norm internalization (i.e., those externally motivated to control prejudice) suppressed their racial prejudice under high public self-focus. In contrast, as predicted based on our preliminary study, children in Study 2 did not suppress their explicit national prejudice under high public self-focus. In fact, the 10- to 12-year-olds increased their national in-group bias under high public self-focus. These findings indicate that suppression of out-group prejudice is closely related to social norms in the children’s social environment.

The studies found little evidence supporting the developmental prediction that only older children would be externally motivated to suppress their intergroup bias under high public accountability. Instead, the older children showed evidence of internally motivated bias suppression because they showed implicit but not explicit intergroup bias. The developmental prediction of a transition with age from externally to internally motivated bias suppression found some support. In both studies, the youngest children were aware that discrimination was inappropriate and suppressed their in-group bias under heightened public accountability. Furthermore, one might expect that changes in norm internalization would mediate the effect of public self-focus on children’s in-group bias. Unfortunately, the nature of our data set made it impossible to perform full mediation analysis because the children’s responses on the normative belief measure were strongly skewed and age was not a continuous factor (i.e., there were no 9-, 12-, or 13-year-olds in each study). Future studies need to investigate directly this possible mediation process. This research should avoid measuring explicitly children’s normative beliefs because of social desirability concerns that are likely to result in skewed responses. Instead, future studies could adopt a minimal group paradigm (e.g., Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Nesdale & Flessen, 2001) and attempt to manipulate directly children’s norms regarding in-group and out-group bias (e.g., Ojala & Nesdale, 2004).

Evidence for a developmental transition from externally to internally motivated bias suppression was evident only for the in-group attitude measures. The young children were not externally motivated to suppress their out-group prejudice in either study. As expected, there was no evidence of externally motivated out-group prejudice suppression in Study 2, and the suppression of out-group prejudice in Study 1 was dependent on the degree to which the children had internalized the norm against prejudice.

These contrasting findings on the in-group and out-group attitude measures need explanation. One explanation might be that there exist different social norms regarding the acceptability of in-group bias and out-group prejudice. Research suggests that in-group bias is both more common and tolerated than is out-group prejudice (Aboud, 2003; Brewer, 1979, 1999; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Nesdale, 2004). Young children may have internalized less than the older children the norm against in-group bias; therefore, under high accountability they were more likely to be externally motivated to suppress their in-group bias. In contrast, children irrespective of age may have internalized the strong norm against out-group prejudice. Thus, only children in the low norm internalization group were likely to be externally motivated to suppress their out-group prejudice. Further research
is required to validate this explanation and should independently examine children’s social norms regarding in-group bias and out-group prejudice.

Social identity theorists maintain that self-presentation concerns may drive intergroup attitudes when individuals wish to win a positive self-identity within their social group (Abrams, 1994; Barreto & Ellemers, 2000). However, the present studies were unable to examine this proposition without including identification measures. Future studies should examine how in-group identification might moderate the affect of social norms on children’s self-presentation of intergroup attitudes. Another potential extension of this research would be the inclusion of a private self-focus manipulation (Wicklund & Duval, 1971), such as seeing one’s own mirror image. The present studies found evidence that older children are internally motivated to suppress their bias because they showed implicit but not explicit intergroup bias. A private self-focus manipulation should result in children who are internally motivated to suppress their intergroup bias.

The developmental account of a transition from externally to internally motivated bias suppression, partially supported by our studies, acknowledges the importance of sociocognitive skills. These sociocognitive skills include empathy, perspective taking, and logical and counterfactual reasoning, as these are important in the internalization of norms (Crandall et al., 2002). Adult research on the suppression of prejudice also indicates the important role of self-conscious emotions such as guilt and shame (e.g., Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). Future research into children’s social norms and self-presentation of intergroup attitudes should include measures of these sociocognitive and emotional factors.

The dissociation found between implicit and explicit measures suggests that children were engaging in self-presentation. The findings indicate that from an early age children showed implicit intergroup bias, though whether these biases were explicitly expressed depended on social norms and children’s motivation to control their bias. These two studies are, to our knowledge, the first successful attempts at adapting the IAT to measure implicit attitudes among young children. Future research should attempt to include both explicit and implicit measures, thus providing more subtle and socially sensitive measures of intergroup attitudes in children.

There are positive implications for childhood prejudice reduction from the finding that social norms and children’s concern about self-presentation influence their intergroup attitudes. Instead of facing the challenge of changing individually children’s attitudes, these studies suggest that changing the normative climate in children’s social environment can induce significant attitude change (Crandall et al., 2002; Monteith, 1993). Indeed, when children identify with a desirable group in their environment that condemns a prejudice, they are more likely to succeed in the battle for norm internalization.

To conclude, our findings indicate that social norms and children’s concern for self-presentation affect their intergroup attitudes. There was evidence of racial prejudice suppression in Study 1, especially among children with lower levels of norm internalization. As expected, Study 2 provided no evidence of national prejudice suppression. Furthermore, there was some evidence for a developmental transition from externally to internally motivated bias suppression. Overall, the findings of the two studies suggest an original developmental account of intergroup attitudes that acknowledges that children are sensitive to social norms and concerned with self-presentation.

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Appendix

Preliminary Study of Normative Context

This study involved the adaptation of a technique used by Macrae et al. (1998) to measure the appropriateness of judgments based on different social categories. One hundred and eighteen 14- to 16-year-olds were asked to rate the appropriateness within their society of judgments formed solely on the basis of a person’s social group membership. Participants responded on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (appropriate) to 9 (inappropriate). Thirty-five social groups were used. These included two racial groups (Black and Asian), five national groups (French, German, Scottish, American, and Australian), and the in-group categories (White and English). The remaining 26 groups were filler items (e.g., criminals, teachers, athletes, rich people). Participants’ responses to the two racial groups and five national groups were subjected to reliability analyses, yielding Cronbach’s alphas of .80 and .89, respectively. Given these satisfactory reliability coefficients, composite scores for both the racial and the national groups were computed. The composite score for appropriateness of judging someone based on their racial group \( (M = 7.12, SD = 2.10) \) was significantly higher than the composite score for the national groups \( (M = 6.75, SD = 2.10) \), \( t(16) = 2.30, p < .05 \). This finding shows that children thought it extremely inappropriate to judge someone on the basis of their racial group membership. Moreover, they deemed it significantly less inappropriate to judge someone on the basis of their nationality. The children perceived that judging the Germans \( (M = 6.16, SD = 2.90) \) solely on the basis of their nationality was significantly less inappropriate than judging Americans \( (M = 6.60, SD = 2.50) \), French \( (M = 6.54, SD = 2.68) \), Australians \( (M = 7.21, SD = 2.18) \), Scottish \( (M = 7.15, SD = 2.27) \), and English \( (M = 7.31, SD = 2.37) \). Pairwise comparisons showed that all differences were significant at \( p < .05 \).

Public Self-Focus Manipulation Check

To check the success of the public self-focus manipulation, at the end of testing, a subsample of the 10- to 16-year-olds \( (n = 33) \) completed a public self-consciousness 10-item scale. This scale was modeled on one originally used by Fenigstein et al. (1975) to measure public self-consciousness. Minor alterations were made to the wording of the items used by Fenigstein et al., making the items more accessible to children. In addition, the wording of the items was altered so that children responded according to how they were feeling at that time (i.e., immediately after testing had taken place). This scale has been used with children aged 10 years and above (e.g., Abrams & Brown, 1989). The children responded by putting a mark on a 3.5-cm line to show how they felt. The line went from a lot (scored 7) to not at all (scored 0). Each child’s item score was the distance between their response and the not at all end of the line.

The children’s responses were subjected to reliability analysis resulting in a Cronbach’s alpha of .72. Given this satisfactory degree of reliability, the children’s responses were collapsed to form a single scale by calculating a composite mean for public self-consciousness (the higher each child’s mean score, the higher is the child’s public self-consciousness). As expected, children’s public self-consciousness scores were significantly higher in the high self-consciousness condition \( (M = 5.95, SD = .58) \) than in the low self-consciousness condition \( (M = 5.13, SD = 1.11) \), \( t(31) = 2.67, p < .05 \).

Vignettes Used to Measure Personal Normative Belief

Female version:

It was lunchtime and three girls were at a school dining table eating their lunch. There were two extra seats at the table. Next Latisha and Ebony, who were black girls, came up to the girls and asked if they could sit down beside them in the extra seats. The girls said no to Latisha and Ebony, and explained that they do not like mixing with Black people. This upset Latisha and Ebony.

Male version:

One day, in the school ground, three boys wanted to play a 5-a-side soccer game. However, they could not because they needed two extra boys. Next Malik and Lamar, who were Black boys, came up to the boys and asked if they could join in. The boys said no to Malik and Lamar, and explained that they do not like playing with Black people. This upset Malik and Lamar.