Theorising Nudist Equality: 
An Encounter Between Political Fantasy and Public Appearance

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Abstract: This paper approaches in/equality theorising through the lens of social nudism. Its starting point is a left conception of inequality where systemic power and the politics of oppression displace liberal concerns with immutability, offence, and the removal of impediments. But if undoing inequality involves more than clearing away obstacles, what else is at stake? Refracted through nudist subordination, response takes two forms. The first addresses the criteria through which discrimination gets converted into illegitimate inequality. The second considers the manifold character of equality’s ambition. Reading equality as an open-ended fantasy, with material effects, that guides and is shaped by moments of political unsettling, the paper focuses on nudism’s eruption in non-nude publics. Through these non-normative moments of public appearance, the paper addresses the relationship between equality, contact, and “lines of undoing” subordination, and asks whether the nudist/textile divide highlights the limits to group-based understandings of inequality.

Keywords: inequality, discrimination, naturism, contact, touch, public sphere

There is something about nudity that in the right context can stir up the most fundamental questions—of identity, home, naturalness and even humanness itself (Barcan 2004a:25).

Introduction
Two intellectual pathways dominate equality scholarship. The first—more common in liberal writing—focuses on equality of whom and of what. Thus, discussion revolves around the character of equality’s subject, be it individual or group, as it also revolves around what is to be distributed more equally—opportunities, capabilities, satisfactions, utility or something else (eg Dworkin 2000; Sen 1979). The second pathway, more familiar to critical and radical scholarship, sidelines liberalism’s emphasis on the reallocation of discrete goods, to centre structural relations of inequality.1 Gender, race, class in particular constitute the foci of a politics oriented to undoing or transforming asymmetrical relations (Fraser 1997).

This paper is grounded in the second approach, with its embedded, systemic understanding of inequality, and with its recognition of social
life as complex and entangled. Yet, despite the richness of (particularly ethnographic and humanities) work adopting this second approach, the reach of much critical scholarship is limited when it assumes that we know what counts as an “axis” of inequality (particularly once discrimination is identified), when it relies on the group as the paradigm of disadvantage, and when it fails to reflect on what equality can mean. In earlier work, I have addressed some of these under-theorised elements, using as my conceptual anchor the currently recognised claims of sexuality and gender, on the one hand, against the far more contentious equality claims of groups such as smokers, on the other (see, in particular, Cooper 2004, 2008). Here, I want to take this thinking forward in three primary ways: to consider in more detail how we (might) assess what counts as an illegitimate inequality; to address the diverse possibilities inherent in the notion of undoing inequality—from parity for defined, distinct classes to multiple ways of undoing difference itself; and to think more fully about equality as an intangible, unrealisable, yet highly effective, fantasy.

Within liberal thought, equality usually lies on inequality’s other side—emerging as obstacles are removed, resources or opportunities more fairly shared. More radical perspectives, by contrast, to the extent they avoid distributive models, tend to incorporate equality teleologically—as an aspired-to future that makes contemporary politics meaningful. Not all on the left, of course, share this view; some identify equality as a condition of action; others eschew it altogether as a distracting governmental project. Nevertheless, in light of different critical approaches to equality, what purchase is there in thinking about equality in quite other ways, specifically as a non-governmental fantasy that attaches to different political projects? Asking this question gestures to the work of scholars, such as Avery Gordon (1997) and others (e.g. Sprinkler 1999), who have explored the power of non-tangible or virtual phenomena, whether ghosts, spectres or haunting, to have very material effects.

To situate and advance this discussion, my focus is a social practice rarely considered in terms of in/equality discourse: social nudism. According to Rancière, placing a constituency within equality’s frame constitutes political activity. He writes, “Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only noise” (1999:30). The politics of nudism (or naturism), as I explore, are complex for the left, and any nudist brief carrying needs to be attentive to the range of ways in which bodies are socially coded in a given time–space. Nevertheless, considering nudism is, I want to suggest, a productive means of shedding new light on in/equality politics and theorising.
At first glance, nudism may seem an odd subject—a fringe pleasure, lifestyle or leisure activity utterly incommensurable with other relations of inequality. Yet, if immutability is no longer the *sine qua non* of illegitimate disadvantage, if we recognise the ways in which nudism can involve deep attachment, how many nudists seek to live as much of their lives as they can undressed, the idiosyncrasy of talking about nudist inequality starts to lessen and the parallels between nudism and other inequalities start to become clearer. As a constituency, nudists experience considerable discrimination and marginality, while clothed people (or “textiles” as nudists call them) lead—along this axis—relatively easier, less regulated lives. The divide between nudity and clothing, like other inequalities, also extends beyond the specific targeting of groups to play a socially formative role (as the quotation from Ruth Barcan opening this paper suggests). And it is a divide which frames and, some have argued, exacerbates other inequalities, particularly class and gender.

But simply to suggest that nudism parallels other inequalities (even leaving to one side the extent to which they parallel each other) is not enough to explain nudism’s analytical purchase. While the experience of nudist discrimination is a legitimate concern in its own right, it also offers a useful vantage point for thinking about in/equality in three key respects. First, it highlights the importance of activity and place (as much as identity or status) in the production of inequality; second, considering whether nudist inequality is illegitimate provides a pathway through the sticky field of assessing discriminations, one that neither identifies all discriminations as wrong nor treats the determination of right and wrongful discrimination as clear-cut and unequivocal. Third, nudism offers a way of bringing sensation, particularly touch, into thinking about equality, in contrast to equality’s conventional focus on distributional or systemic concerns.

To explore the idea of nudist inequality alongside pathways for its undoing, I draw loosely on a schema developed by Janet Halley. Advocating that feminists take a break from feminism, Halley (2006:17–8) framed contemporary US feminist politics according to what she saw as its three invariable characteristics: a distinction between m and f (m/f), the subordination of f to m (m > f), and opposing this subordination as a matter of justice (carrying a brief for f). Halley’s analysis of gender is problematic in several respects, some of which, alongside others, I have explored (Cooper 2010). However, without embracing the political and theoretical foundations of Halley’s framework, as a boiled down version of prevailing inequality politics, it provides a helpful starting point for thinking about nudist inequality (and “textile” domination), even as this paper seeks to go beyond a group-centred account. Thus, we can think of t (textiles) as the constituency, spaces, and way of life based on the desire and conventions of being dressed, and n as the minoritised, less
conventional desire, place and practice of social nudity. Thus, we have: t/n, t > n, and carrying a brief for n.

We also have a dilemma. In an era where intersectional (or multisectional) thinking and the deconstruction of binaries dominates, how useful is it to locate nudism principally within the context of t/n? What gets lost when t/n is separated out from other social relations—of gender, class, sexuality etc—with which it is enmeshed, as well as from the wider organising principles of dress and bodily appearance through which t/n is constituted and rendered intelligible? Certainly, as Barcan (2004a) explores, much is gained by paying attention to different, complex nudist subjectivities (as well as the skewed demographics of nudist organisations). Likewise, relating nudist struggles to those fought over ethno-religious garments, school uniform, occupational dress codes, and stigmatised youth dress, that is, to other inequalities generated by—or signalled through—the organising principles of dress, would prove interesting and illuminating. However, because my focus is a conceptual one, oriented to the relationship between equality and inequality, I here follow the line of those carrying a brief for nudism. This entails treating nudism as a way of living held in common by the diverse people who participate, and recognising that nudists and nudism (like other minority constituencies and practices) can contribute to framing—and thereby, to some extent, reducing—a complex cluster of organising principles to the narrow and restrictive terms of a binary inequality (see also Cooper 2004).

To explore t/n, then, as a binary inequality, this paper is divided into two halves. The first half explores the question of nudist brief carrying, to ask: on what basis, if any, might t > n constitute an illegitimate inequality? The second moves to the terrain of social action, to focus on the more muddied ground of undoing inequality in a non-governmental context, centring on nudism’s occurrence within mainstream publics.

An ethnographic literature exists exploring nudist spaces; however, far less has been written about nudism’s eruption within hegemonic non-nudist publics. Placing nakedness within such mainstream publics—those familiarly structured modes of open encounter and circulation, oriented to a forging of (limited) commonality—quintessentially foregrounds nudity’s marginal and stigmatised status. Yet, despite prohibitions on public nudity, it continues to emerge in organised mass art events, streaking, bike rides, unanticipated sightings, political protests and other forms of gathering. How might we think about such moments of public nudity? To what extent do they contribute to the undoing of t > n? What equality fantasies get attached? And what norms govern and come to inhabit both the fantasies of equality and their “lines of undoing”?

Asking these questions of contemporary nudism is in many ways speculative. While certain forms of public nudity may be on the rise,
most nudist practitioners and activists bracket or disavow nudism’s redemptive or liberatory qualities, restricting their interest to the availability of designated, clothing optional (or clothing free) spaces for a social minority. Nevertheless, as scholars in feminist, utopian and hope studies have suggested, thinking about futures within contemporary analysis is important (eg Grosz 2005; Miyazaki 2004). This does not have to take a teleological form. Rather, it can mean exploring potential within the now, as well as the ways in which the present sticks to, and constrains, possibilities for things being otherwise. In this paper, my data for the now are drawn from an international selection of media and community texts on public nudity from the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. My aim is to illustrate the potential of contemporary moments of unsettlement to inhabit and create new discursive and material possibilities. However, before turning to the politics of nudist in/equality, I want to introduce the wider field of nudist studies within which my discussion is situated.

Nudist Studies
Existing nudist scholarship is striking in its disciplinary diversity and scope. Alongside work in the humanities on nude and naked bodies and, to a lesser degree, naked communities within art, literature and film (eg Barcan 2004a, 2004b; Clark 1956; Cover 2003; McCarthy 1998), a major tranche of recent work details the social history of early twentieth century nudism. Work has been conducted on European nudist ideologies, discourses and organised forms, particularly between the two main world wars (eg Cleminson 2004; Jefferies 2006; Peeters 2006; Ross 2005). Building on contemporaneous studies by European scholars and visiting Americans (eg Merrill and Merrill 1931; Parmelee 1929), this literature offers detailed accounts of nudism’s political range (from socialist and anarchist to the far right), the links between nudism and associated ideologies, such as eugenics, vegetarianism, heliotherapy, body culture, alternative medicine, and gymnosophy, and the organisational forms and practices nudism embraced, with its “back to nature” clubs, colonies, non-competitive games and gymnastics (Barcan 2001; 2004a; Merrill and Merrill 1931; Parmelee 1929; Peeters 2006; Toepfer 1997). Nudism in Europe has been particularly densely studied; but other work tells stories of other nudist places, including American nudist camps (Hartman, Fithian and Johnson 1970), and the Australian bush (Daley 2005).

Alongside historical studies, contemporary nudist scholarship extends to sociological, psychological, cultural, economic, legal and geographical analyses (eg Barcan 2004a; Bell and Holliday 2000; Cover 2003; Hartman, Fithian and Johnson 1970; Smith 1980; Weinberg 1965). Attuned to industrial and post-industrial liberal societies, such
work (alongside organisational and more popular accounts), highlights three aspects of the contemporary scene: gentrification; geographies of nudist practice; and nudism’s relationship to sexuality and desire. The first narrates the decline, most prominently in the USA, of simple, basic nudist camp living (Hartman, Fithian and Johnson 1970), as luxury resorts and upmarket accommodation emerged. While day and weekend camps still exist, and many organisations, such as British Naturism, orient their activities to affordable leisure spaces, within the nudist travel sector “high end” provision is marketed, from chic lodges, and expensive resorts, to cruises in distant, “exotic”, sun-filled spaces (Woodall 2002). Paralleling the development of gay tourism and the “pink pound”, organised US nudism, in particular, has explicitly commodified itself as the “buff dollar”, publicising and promoting its purchasing power to enhance commercial influence.

The second strand of nudist studies, by geographers and others, aims to place and spatialise nudism (eg Daley 2005; Obrador-Pons 2007). Contemporary nudism inhabits a range of dedicated venues. It also extends its reach as it gains occasional access to public swimming pools, airplane flights, and supermarkets. However, aside from dedicated nudist accommodation, the main spatial focus of contemporary academics’ work is the designated nudist or clothing-optional beach—site of both pleasure and conflict (eg Booth 2001). Beach nudism may today appear as the paradigmatic instance of nudist practice. However, as studies reveal, beach nudism differs from club-based practice in two significant ways. First, participation extends well beyond those who identify as nudists. Thus, in contrast to the community ethos and culture of organised nudism (albeit less politically articulated than in the past), nude or clothing optional beaches speak to the possibility of nudism as a thin optional everyday practice casually adopted or rejected according to time and place. Second, unlike traditional nudist venues where members largely interact in ways that disavow nudity’s exposing qualities, contemporary beach norms are premised on managing potential embarrassment and vulnerability. Here, “good” conduct entails paying minimal visual attention to naked others (Obrador-Pons 2007:133), while remaining vigilant to ensure proximate clothed (or “textile”) persons are protected from alarm.

One theme that repeatedly emerges in writing on beach nudism and other nudist spaces is sex (eg see Cover 2003; Holmes 2006; Obrador-Pons 2007). A major feature of organised nudism is its sexual attentiveness as mainstream bodies repeatedly assert the natural, inevitable and proper boundary between nudism and sexuality. While some boundaries find their force in state law, countries such as the USA and Britain reveal how far mainstream nudist organisations have historically gone to exclude any sexual suggestion. Thus, community rules and norms discourage or forbid inappropriate looking and
“unnecessary” contact, while many clubs have limited single men’s membership, with some only allowing married, heterosexual couples (and their children) to join (Daley 2005:157–158; Hartman, Fithian and Johnson 1970; Smith and King 2008; Weinberg 1965).

Yet, the ability to control behaviour and norms within a broad heterogeneous sector, defined only by a shared interest in being naked, has proven far from complete. Some proponents and writers, such as Smith and King (2008), question the ethical, interpersonal and cultural viability of attempts to banish the erotic from nudist practice, particularly given the complex contemporary relationship between embodiment, sensuality and sex—a theme also explored by Cover (2003) who locates the sexualisation of nakedness in the destabilising of other discursive frames. Other commentators focus on nudist communities’ identification of sexual danger, as they remain constantly on guard, sharing beaches and hotels with others (hippies, swingers or gay men), perceived as dangerously disregarding of nudism and sexuality’s quintessential difference from each other (Holmes 2006).14

Contemporary studies centred on place, gentrification and sex highlight important aspects of modern nudism—particularly its polymorphic character as a series of loosely networked preferences, practices and constituencies engaging very different politics, interests and concerns. Yet, despite the proliferation of scholarship on nudism, two fields remain strikingly absent from any disciplinary list: political theory and social movement studies. Folding in geography, cultural studies and social theory, this paper centres an interdisciplinary political theory attentive to nudism as an equality-seeking social movement project. Yet, given nudism’s commodification, its uneven investments and attachments (from occasional sunbathing to year round nudist living), and its organised policing of the borders of sexual desire, on what basis can nudists or nudism claim not only disadvantage but disadvantage worthy of remedy?

From Discrimination to Illegitimate Inequality

My personal feeling is that the discrimination and fear of the human body is one of the greatest discriminations there is (Richard Cummings, Body Freedom Collective).15

Within post-industrial societies, the question of which discriminations are invalid has taken two primary directions. The first, more liberal, stance distinguishes between immutable and mutable differences (so, between gender and smoking, for instance). It approaches the former by asking what equality-oriented reforms are possible and just (given assumed natural forms of difference), and approaches the latter through the framework of harm (principally who, if anyone, does
the minority practice injure or offend). By contrast, more critical or radical approaches, oriented to the systemic injustices of contemporary liberal society, bracket immutability and minority harm-causing, to direct their attention instead to the question of which discriminations constitute structured inequalities. Thus, radicals can find themselves in the unfavourable position of having to determine which discriminations can legitimately join a growing list that tends to start with class, gender and race, and tail off into an equivocal, uncertain etcetera.

With its presumed status as a mutable difference that can be read as offensive, nudism provides a confident context for liberal work on discrimination (see Kushner 1997). Nehushtan (2007:255), for instance, argues nudism should be tolerated so long as doing so proves less harmful than banning it. Others have addressed harm’s threshold: exploring the question of intentionality (Narvil 1995:99–101) and effects; specifically does nudism negatively affect non-consenting others beyond mere offence or (imagined) disgust (Nussbaum 2004; see also Storey 2002)? Liberal approaches do not aim to justify nudism as a practice legitimate in all times and spaces. Rather, the aim—to the extent it goes beyond mere thought experiments—is to legitimate some current, bounded forms of nudist expression. More radical approaches, by contrast, open up, even if they do not directly propose, a more thorough-going critique of nudist disadvantage. Focused on challenging structural inequalities—namely exploitation, marginality, repression, domination and impoverishment as they become, in Young’s (2001) terms, produced through reiterated and routine social practices—radical perspectives render nudist equality intelligible (if not necessarily acceptable) in ways not automatically constrained by situated time/place micro-frames of legitimacy.

In the discussion that follows, I place nudist brief carrying within this second paradigm. At the same time, I want to shift the balance in several key ways: first, to suggest that nudist equality signals an equality of spaces and practices as well as identities; and second, to supplement the question of significant disadvantage with two other concerns. What are the constitutive effects of disadvantage ($t > n$); and how do both disadvantage and brief carrying relate to progressive politics?\textsuperscript{16}

**Significant Disadvantage**

If $t > n$ is, in any way, analogous to other recognised relations of inequality, it needs a disadvantaged (and advantaged)\textsuperscript{17} subject class. An initial challenge for nudism is that, at first glance, discrimination does not appear to attach to social subjectivity but simply to practice or, more precisely, to the manner and place where things are done. So, nudity is forbidden in a range of locations—streets, courtrooms, universities, mountain paths,\textsuperscript{18} with those who breach place-based prohibitions, by
walking, cycling, or otherwise appearing undressed, facing official and unofficial sanctions including fines and imprisonment (Arneil 2000; Valverde and Cirak 2003). Contemporary opposition to nudity does not only target public spaces, however. Nudist organisations have faced hostility from local residents over the establishment of proposed nudist communities, discrimination from financial service providers, and have had activities closed down or intensively scrutinised on grounds of feared child sexual abuse.

At the same time, nudism differs from other practice-based discriminations, such as cigarette smokers encounter (Cooper 2004; Tuggle and Holmes 1997), in that being naked is something many people do in the “right” time–spaces. Conversely, nudists also—and most nudists mostly—wear clothes. To the extent nudists, as a class, are subject to discrimination and stigmatisation, it is not because they are always naked or even because they sometimes are. Rather, negative status appears tied to an imagined way of living, with imagined investments in particular desires and pleasures conventionally experienced dressed. Negative status is also tied to nudism’s association with sex for the “textile” mainstream, with its accompanying anxieties of exhibitionism and intrusive bodies (and bodily sensations). Thus, paralleling claims by pro-smoking pressure groups (Lecker 2008; see also Cooper 2004), the stigma of nudism extends beyond discrete doings or organisational activities. It can tar social subjects and cause discriminatory treatment, for instance at work, even when nudists are clothed, especially for those in prestigious occupations dependent on public esteem. In ways that parallel earlier fears of being “outed” as gay—a stigmatic outing that, of course, did not require actually identifying as gay—secrecy measures have been common in many nudist organisations (e.g see Hartman, Fithian and Johnson 1970:63), and many nudists remain closeted for fear of professional consequences.

The Formative Power of T > N
Unpacking t > n, then, reveals the complexity coded in this phrase. Nudists may experience direct discrimination and cultural marginality, but they are principally disadvantaged through their relationship to a practice, desire or set of spaces that are explicitly and firmly unequal. This level of differentiation may be enough to explain why we should carry a brief for n. Indeed, for an anti-normative left politics, the institutionalisation of discrimination may be reason enough to justify its overturning. Others on the left, however, have been more concerned with which and how inequalities are manifest (what level of discrimination is acceptable when it comes to “harmful” practices, such as smoking, for instance), while recognising that societies are not (nor should be) neutral. Discriminations are inevitable, even in an imagined left-wing society,
since some ways of living (will) invariably get supported, enabled, and rendered intelligible beyond others. But if the illegitimacy of $t > n$ depends, in part, on assessing the social effects it has, we need to ask: what norms, practices and relations does $t > n$ sustain?

Paralleling the claim that stigmatisation and discrimination towards smokers reinforces other inequalities, most notably of class (Poland 2000; Tuggle and Holmes 1997), does nudist stigmatisation and discrimination exacerbate other social relations? Is Dickberry’s (2006) speculation convincing, when he states (in the fictional aftermath of clothing’s sudden disappearance from Edwardian London), “The vanishing of clothes has done more for human equality than all the philanthropists’ efforts, or the anarchists’ steel blade”. Certainly, scholars have explored how $t/n$ and $t > n$, in very different forms, underpinned by very varying notions of what constitutes nudity, have worked to buttress colonial forms of racism (eg Levine 2008; Watson 1998). However, despite a considerable literature on the relationship between eugenics, nudism and Nazism (eg Jeffries 2006; Ross 2005), for the most part nudist scholars and activists have had little to say about $t > n$’s contemporary relationship to racism (although recent attacks on Muslim communities, justified on the spurious grounds of women’s excessive covering, speak against any simple equation between nudism and anti-racism).

More, by contrast, has been said about how textile dominance ($t > n$) solidifies inequalities of class and gender; how nudist practices, if permitted and affirmed, would undermine these specific status asymmetries (eg Dickberry 2006; Merrill and Merrill 1931:54, 84–85, 130). Yet, in the case of class, the contemporary salience of $t > n$ is uncertain. Clothes may signify wealth and class, but undressed, these inequalities signify in other ways. Woodall (2002), in particular, is sceptical that nudity in any way brackets class distinctions, given the development of nudist luxury resorts and other forms of consumption expenditure. In relation to gender, the position is equally uncertain. Early advocates, such as Parmelee, claimed nudism would end the mystery of sex by allowing both sexes to see “real” bodies (1929:75–76), encourage cross-sex comradeship (78), and work towards convergence, so only “natural” sex differences remained (79–80). Claims of gender equality, through a liberating nudism, may have had more resonance 80 years ago than today, even recognising such equality was then premised on very specific gender roles (eg Ross 2005). Early twenty-first century feminists remain equivocal in their support for nudism, expressing concern about the sexualisation of women’s bodies on nudist beaches and in naturist publications (see Barcan 2004a; Holmes 2006; Woodall 2002). At the same time, Barcan (2001) allows new habits of looking might develop on a nudist beach, diminishing some of sight’s objectifying power. Elsewhere, feminists have asserted women’s right
to go topless or breast-feed in public, challenging the unequal gender regulation of visible naked chests (Arneil 2000).

Equivocation, then, suggests the case for undoing \( t > n \) cannot be straightforwardly made on the grounds that textile dominance sustains inequalities of gender, class or race. But does \( t > n \) maintain other (problematic) aspects of liberal society? While empirically demonstrating this is difficult, my discussion here follows the approach of critical theoretical scholars who have focused on the constitutive role of systemic inequalities in anchoring, producing or sustaining aspects of the social body. Sedgwick (1990:11), for instance, talking about the homosexual/heterosexual divide, argues it proved “a presiding master term of the past century”—marking categories of secrecy/disclosure, private/public, innocence/initiation amongst others.

Paralleling Sedgwick, we can see \( t/n \) contributing to—or at least instantiating—major normative divisions, such as civilisation/nature, normality/deviance, containment/excess. \( T/n \) also variously secures, symbolises and, on occasion, fine-tunes normative spatial divisions organised around the public and private that work to sustain the public’s identification with (and the various articulations between) impersonality, formality, strangers, distance, lack of contact, and visibility. \(^{29}\) So, firm expectations of clothing in business districts, city streets, courts or parliamentary buildings work to accentuate the formal, public identification of such venues. Other spaces, secluded public areas, such as beach dunes, for instance, may appear more private thanks to their nudist association. By contrast, the overseen residential areas of the non-rich—their gardens, pathways, or even living rooms—get (legally) defined as boundary or “grey” areas because nudist activity within is visible to those outside (see also Grabham 2009a; Narvil 1995:98). \( T/n \) distinctions also tell us something about the character of particular spaces; so, changing norms of legitimate nakedness in the domestic realm both reflect and contribute to relations of (un)acceptable intimacy and inter-generational interaction (as recent British outcries over photographing children bathing reveal). \(^{30}\)

But while \( t/n \), and even \( t > n \), may represent—even condense—prevailing social patterns, does its asymmetries contribute much to their formation? In other words, how significant is \( t > n \)’s contemporary force, particularly when compared to relations such as gender, race or class? The thrust of this argument is not surprising. Few, beyond nudism’s most militant advocates, would consider \( t/n \) in any way analogous to \( m/f \) when it comes to structuring force. Yet, while clearly less prominent as a distinction (arguably, in part, because of clothing’s contemporary hegemony), it would be wrong to dismiss altogether the social power \( t > n \) possesses as it contributes to shaping norms, spaces, ways of thinking, and sensory practices, as well as, of course, bodily comportment. But would these social features necessarily change if \( t > n \) was undone? I
consider the flexibility of nudist equality below. But first, I close my discussion of nudist brief carrying by turning to a third justification: politics.

**Wider Political Articulations**

Whether or not undoing t > n contributes to wider social change, one potential argument in favour of its undoing is that it forms an integral part, or is tied to, other progressive politics. This argument highlights the contingency of links between progressive politics and particular social movements or interests, a contingency nowhere more visible than with nudism. As a lifestyle, social movement, leisure activity, and form of resistance, nudism (and naturism) have surfaced as full, rich identities and politics, as well as trivial, spontaneous choices. As such, they have been embraced by the full political spectrum from anarchism to fascism. One effect of this is to extinguish any bright line between pro and anti-nudist constituencies—both sides have drawn, at different times, on values of privacy, religiosity, health, beauty, discipline and fitness. Indeed, at the turn of the twenty-first century, nudism within post-industrial liberal societies, such as Britain, Canada and the USA, continues to be articulated to different political and social projects (if across a narrower spectrum)—from progressive libertarianism to the demand for collective (largely private) group rights and freedoms within its more mainstream organised form.

What does this mean for progressive forces? Should undoing t > n be supported because of the ease with which it can be rolled into a wider left project or left alone because its politics are too uncertain? One approach is to focus on the politics underpinning support for t > n. While this varies, for the most part contemporary advocacy of textile supremacy is tied to conservative, often religious, values—and, in the English-speaking world, to a particular brand of right-wing Christianity (even as conservative Christians spawn their own nudist organisations). Thus, moral panics about nudist child abuse and promiscuity place the struggle to outlaw nudism within a wider context of conservative moral politics (Booth 2001; also Barcan 2004a).

Yet, while those on the left are unlikely to ally themselves with such conservative forces, supporting instead the contours of current nudist practices, how much further should such advocacy go? Undoing subordination can mean many things—from not discriminating against nudists in unrelated work environments, to allowing private nudist venues, or permitting limited public nudity, for instance on beaches. This is the terrain of liberal nudist advocacy and is unlikely to be contentious for those on the left. But what about making all spaces clothing optional or should different spaces function according to different sartorial rules or norms? And what other political principles are at stake? Should
dismantling $t > n$ and $t/n$ challenge, or conform to, prevailing norms of touch, contagion, and proximity, norms to which distinctions and asymmetries between clothed and unclothed living are currently tied?

While these questions have not been addressed directly within nudist studies, parallel discussions have taken place extensively in relation to gender. As feminists have explored, parity between men and women doesn’t exhaust the possibilities for undoing gender, once male and female are seen as far more flexible and mutable characterisations (eg see Bergmann 1998; Cooper 2004; MacKinnon 1991; Richards 1998). Thus, in addressing undoing—whether of gender or nudist inequality—we confront a tricky issue. So far, I have suggested the left might support undoing $t > n$ for three reasons: the breadth of unequal treatment; the social power such inequality has—particularly in supporting a series of alignments around the public/private; and third, because $t > n$ currently functions as an integral, active element of conservative Christian politics. Yet, this doesn’t tell us what undoing $t > n$ should mean; it also, importantly, risks presenting the social as a passive container awaiting political objectives’ installation. Thus, rather than resolving theoretically the question of $t > n$’s undoing, I want to approach it in a different way, to explore the multiple ways undoing subordination might happen. In other words, I want to propose we turn, with the question of “ought” left hanging, from political theory, with its orientation to a deliberating, evaluating, detached “we who think”, to the less controlled and deliberate domain of embedded social practice.

**Nudism in Mainstream Publics**

My focus is public life—a term I prise apart to explore its different faces or strains, so public becomes more than just a sphere of deliberation, mode of address, register of action or way of appearing amongst strangers (see also Clarke 2004). Mainstream public life is not the only (or even primary) site of nudist expression. However, its value is in enabling us to explore those contexts where nudism, as a body practice, directly counters prevailing norms and ways of acting. Public life also provides a domain in which nudism as a widespread, non-ghettoized practice can be most fully accomplished. Thus, through interpretively reading selected instances of public nakedness, the following discussion pulls together three themes that hold out promise of enriching thinking about inequality’s undoing. The first, drawing loosely on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) “lines of flight”, as the forceful movement or mutation away from particular forms of control (also Patton 2007), concerns “lines of undoing” as the embattled, battered pathways through which domination gets dislodged and change can occur. While lines of undoing may sometimes appear as a particular, unfolding logic, they often emerge as the retrospective narrative that pulls together
fragmented moments through which prevailing order appears to be unsettled. Indeed, the instances explored here most clearly conform to a series of punctuated moments. Thinking about them in terms of (intersecting, parallel, reinforcing) “lines”, however, emphasises the connections, continuity and direction central to equality thinking.

The second theme concerns the “compositional” character of inequality within which lines of undoing are located. Compositional emphasises the interconnected changing mix of elements that cohere together—including norms, time, sensory experiences, proximities and fears. Inequality is not (as Halley’s formula might suggest) a discrete relation between groupings severed from other aspects of the social. Here, in considering inequality’s composition, my discussion centres on environmental and embodied expectations. T > n is anchored in a series of norms relating to contact, proximity and touch—norms variously held in place by everyday maintenance-based conduct, affective responses and state action. My third theme relates to equality. I have said I want to think about equality other than as a governmental project—wherein it gets located as inequality’s inversion or the end point of its undoing. Rather, I read equality here as a fantasy that sticks to (or gets materialised through) lines of undoing. As a fantasy, equality guides, animates, and sometimes closes down action, with baggage brought from other (prior) claims. Yet, equality remains protean in its capacity to be constantly reformed and opened up, as lines of undoing move in different directions, creating new forms of intelligibility as well as incoherence. Following the work of Avery Gordon (1997) and others (eg Montag 1999) on haunting, ghosts and spectres, wherein what appears absent is often a seething presence, impressing upon and interfering with presumed realities (Gordon 1997:8), thinking about equality as fantasy is not to trivialise it. It doesn’t mean equality constitutes a worthless, impossible desire, nor that equality is without material effects. Rather, fantasy emphasises equality’s imaginative, virtual character. Extending into the future (and extending the future), equality gets recuperated to govern the present. Yet, equality also eludes domestication by particular times, places, or modes of intelligibility even as it reworks the familiar, substantiated through a calculability or materiality that is almost there, almost graspable, yet which it simultaneously exceeds.

Public undress is not an everyday occurrence, but it is far from rare—evidenced, amongst other things, by the surge in reactive anti-nudist legislation and prosecutions as well as by the quantity of media stories covering naked people in public. Instances of public nudism, beyond the beach, include one-off (mass) art events, carnival rituals, reality television, organised cycling events, mountain and cliff rambling, unintended sightings in one’s home or garden, nude lounging on town streets, “guerrilla pranksterism”, and nude protests by individuals and groups (Barcan 2004a; Grabham 2009a; Sutton 2007). Naked bodies,
in public, are of course never just naked bodies. They are also young, old, ethnically diverse, male, female, disabled, and physically able, amongst others. However, as my aim is to read in/equality through the terms set by nudist brief carrying, and in light of my opening remarks which I return to below, I address t/n as something broader than one intersecting dimension of identity, to focus on the spaces, ethos, gestures, and activity that public nakedness enables, even as the experience and meaning of naked bodies infinitely varies (see also Grabham 2009b).

**Circulatory Publics**

In considering nudist inequality’s undoing, I want to start with circulatory publics (Warner 2002). While the most commonly discussed kind concerns discursive texts, other things can circulate too, including sex (Cooper 2009). Three aspects of a circulatory public are particularly relevant here: they are movement—of things getting passed on; that publics take their shape from what circulates, although, equally importantly for my purposes, what circulates can be shaped by public conduct too; and that the openness and closure characteristic of publics combine: in what circulates; in the people amongst whom it circulates; and in how people get touched or hailed by the circulating text or thing (Warner 2002).

Nakedness circulates publicly in several ways, pornography or classical art being two obvious instances. My interest however is in three others that exemplify the different equality fantasies undoing t > n can bear. In the first, a naked person privately engages with the circulating text. Here, with text unmarked, difference is bounded off. Thus, we see an equality of non-attention—familiar to feminist and sexual politics activists who have struggled both for and against a tolerance contingent on difference being privately contained. In the second, the circulating text bears a discursive imprint of nudist brief carrying—a letter to the editor, for example, from a naturist organisation. Here, the equality of liberal, public sphere politics animates action, as differences constitute legitimate discursive positions or objects for debate, providing (usually) they comply with the proper form. However, it is a third way of inserting nakedness that most concerns me here, a way that combines text and body, as, for instance, when a naked writer’s picture is placed beside their article, or when naked participants take part in a predominantly clothed face-to-face debate. Here, the equality animating action is not only about what is said or written, and by whom, but an equality *texturised* by bare, claims-making bodies.

Bringing bodies right into the circulating text or speech troubles t > n to the extent nudist subordination relies upon non-recognition. This does not mean failing to recognise those who *happen to be* nudists, but a refusal, rather, to take bare bodies into account—a refusal resisted when speech is attached to nakedness. Tying naked bodies to pro-nudist
statements (whether as photographs accompanying text or, even more, as naked claimants at non-naked meetings) causes an embodied form of nakedness to circulate. Here, nudism exceeds particular nudist interests, to become a far more promiscuous signifier, touching readers through the visual body of its claims in ways that cannot be reduced to the pressure exerted by a purely written text. Thus, just as conservatives have claimed homosexual contact causes heterosexuals to “convert” (Herman 1997), this is a line of undoing that harnesses, even if it doesn’t actually work through, fantasies of contagion.

Nudism’s seductive character is a common claim within nudist publications—which suggest a few attempts is all most people need (eg see Merrill and Merrill 1931:11; McLellan 2007:64). Contagion, in this sense, is double-edged—what nudist advocates see as the infectious quality of a good experience, opponents see as a dangerously seductive harm, as nudity in Scott’s (2003:129) words, “infect[s] us like a plague”. Alongside fears of catching nakedness are fears of contamination—whether of spaces now tainted as Emily Grabham (2009a:349) discusses, or of something else caught from naked bodies, out of place.43 Opponents’ contact fears are probably unsurprising (also Nussbaum 2004:92). What is more interesting is the way organised nudism itself incorporates contaminatory concerns and conventions, drawing upon select garments and objects (towels and tampons) to block circulating body fluids (eg see Smith 1980:230).

Contaminatory norms and anxieties are, of course, neither permanent nor fixed (Douglas 1966). Contemporary anxieties about children’s corruption through nudist exposure, and the regulatory and monitoring structures consequently introduced, illustrate how concerns can intensify.44 Conversely, and more positively, some kinds of circulatory publics (at least in their generation)—participation in mass naked art events, perhaps—invoke more benign contact norms. However, what contact norms and fears evidence, more generally, is the tension this line of undoing t > n encounters. On the one hand, circulatory publics are encouraged and expected to radiate, binding people together as they do. At the same time, when texts get texturised by naked bodies rolled in, circulatory publics collide with contact norms, and boundaries may be invoked to make “equality” viable (and safe). Drawing on mainstream nudist practice, these may involve context-dependent garments, spatial divisions or exclusions to control what gets spread—whether in passing nudity on, or what nudity brings in its wake.

Orientalis Publics
The second strain of public action concerns publics as orientational structures.45 While orientational publics take a variety of forms, from witnessed arts performances to welfare use, they share a reciprocating, mirroring relationship—publics may be turned towards a particular
object (a play or council service, for instance), but that object is also turned towards them. Welfare providers, fund-raisers, performers and arts producers attend to the social composition of their public—ideal and materialised. To the extent nudist constituencies come to function as a recognised category of interest (or need) (eg Merrill and Merrill 1931:186)—seeking a mass bike ride permit, permission to use a public swimming pool or allotted beach, and, less favourably, when appearing as objects of court or police scrutiny—this attention may extend to them also. At the same time, in contrast to circulatory forms of public engagement (where participants transact with each other through, and in relation to, the circulating thing), orientational publics interact minimally—if at all—amongst themselves. Thus, they demonstrate the kind of civil inattention that Goffman discusses (1963). Publics rarely get to know one another, and show little reflexivity or interest in themselves, either as an entirety or part.

What happens, then, when naked bodies appear within non-naked orientational publics? While nudists may be recognised as legitimate public subjects, including by theatrical producers (as when naked plays are staged), unexpected audience undressing seems to trouble rather than support undoing. Anecdotal media stories suggest that attendees who distract proceedings by undressing become spectacularised—the temporary objects of interest, amusement, annoyance or anger, as they reorient what counts as the show. Incidents (undeniably rare), of audience members undressing tend to involve random individuals, couplets or small groups. However, as a line of undoing, larger-scale, repeat undressings might have a different effect, as a reoriented public becomes a circulatory one. Alternatively, in a context where nothing gets passed on, continued orientation towards what’s provided—whether play or welfare—might coexist with a heightened sensory regard for what lies between (rather than what passes between) members (see also Schwaiger 2008:51). So, in a close packed auditorium, may come an escalating awareness of the body that’s adjacent or proximate—its angles, pressure, temperature, texture—and the objects and spaces—the arm rest, leg room—across which bodies (moving and at rest) touch.

Yet as a line of undoing that also seeks to undo t/n, naked bodies’ presence in predominantly clothed orientational publics comes up against mediators and boundaries. For circulating publics, constituted through expression, influence and persuasion, spatial and activity-based norms mediate the contaminatory fears attached to naked bodies that appear too appealing, risky or leaky. For orientational publics, defined by a more stable uni-directional attention, other means may be invoked. So distance (physical and functional) secures relations between publics and their (service or entertainment) providers. But what might be brought into play, as it were, in a close packed auditorium when

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naked and dressed people sit together watching a performance? The equality fantasy realised in nudist communities of t/n as an insignificant difference, generating little in the way of awkwardness, may suggest nothing (see also Warren 1933:176). Nevertheless, in thinking about the non-attentive mingling of naked and clothed bodies as a means, or effect, of t > n’s undoing, we come up against the claim of several theorists that (public) contact works through mediating objects or signifiers of distance (generally Arendt 1958; Sennett 1992; Zerilli 1995). What does the removal of clothing do then? Does nakedness erase the boundary keeping people apart and connected? Or, does it provide a new form of boundary; does skin, in a sense, both allow contact and constitute a “skin” against which bodies meet?

Undoing t > n through nakedness performed in non-naked orientational publics confronts a series of tensions to do with contact and connection—distance and alienation. These tensions structure fantasies of equality: from recognition as a constituency of equal value (n = t) to the very denial of t/n as meaningful. In other words, equality both formulates itself here as a relationship of parity and commensurability between differently marked (client or audience) groups and as a unity in which individuals’ different (transient) markings are bracketed as insignificant. The distinction between these two positions, and their respective relationship to contact, goes to the heart of governance equality theorising. For, while group equality emphasises definition, separation and boundaries (with contact taking place between already distinct groups), individual indifference centres, instead, blurring, commonality, and indistinctness.

Read as an equality of sameness or difference, there is little new here. However, what nudism, as a case study, highlights is equality’s textured character. Thus, an equality of indistinctness is not simply equality between people judged to be the same, but an equality attuned to connection and physical contact—to quite different sensory and tactile relations between people. Thinking about equality in such ways holds potential to contribute to what is becoming an exciting area of scholarship, centred on the relationship between affect, the senses and political theory (eg Manning 2007; Panagia 2009; Rancière 2004). But, as I suggested, nudism as the harbinger of a tactile, connective equality should not be overstated. Lines of undoing are (inevitably) compositional pathways, and the equality which animates and is forged may also be one that seeks, or depends upon, other forms of distance or separation. In the case of twentieth century, mainstream American nudism, this has included bans on alcohol and certain forms of touch (Weinberg 1965). But other cultural and regulatory structures might also come into play—not to stop nudism being passed on (as I discussed above) but to enable contact and role performance in a context where clothing no longer provides a significant border.
Appearing in Public
My third line of undoing underpins the two discussed so far. It centres on moments of refusal, or inability, to comply with norms of public appearance. Being constituted as (or in) public is not restricted to human subjects. Yet, whether public appearance concerns spaces, things, or people, it treats the accomplished subject as something or someone provisional and relationally produced, crafted within particular contexts through meanings and forms that are space–time specific, and oriented to relations with unknown others. In Foucault’s terms, as a developed and performed practice of the self—a stylised, normative way of being—appearing in public is regularly over or under-performed. Nevertheless, when people enter into public space unexpectedly naked (whether in an auditorium, meeting or some other space), their accomplishment of being properly public is perceived to have broken down. Unorganised public nudity is deemed a grave bodily mistake—that the body has become so forgotten or neglected it has failed to be hidden (or tucked away), or conversely, that an individual’s over-evaluation has placed it deliberately on show. Moreover, failure to appear properly in public may cause others’ public appearances to break down. The American town of Brattleboro, Vermont, illustrates this point, where, for a few summers, young people gathered naked downtown. According to reports, unhappy locals not only turned to law, but stopped complying with norms of public appearance, as “civil inattention”, “civility towards diversity”, and the pleasures of people watching got disrupted and aborted (also, generally, Lofland 1998:32–33, 90–91).

Out of place nakedness not only breaches social norms, it also foregrounds proprioception (the internal sense of bodily movement and location) in securing t/n and t > n. Brian Massumi (2002:59) writes, “Proprioception translates the exertions and ease of the body’s encounters with objects into a muscular memory of relationality.” The stigma and anxiety attached to unbounded, non-organised forms of public nudity, that is, nakedness outside of reality television or well publicised mass events, such as “the world naked bike ride”, reveals the vitality of individual proprioception (sensing where your bits are) to modes of public appearance. But out of place nakedness does not only invoke the anxiety of misplaced body parts. It also invokes the power of a social proprioception, collectively attuned to the movement and location of parts of the body social. This is more than knowing the right place for particular forms of (un/clothed) activity; more significantly, it is also the social capacity to feel (and to regulate through feeling).

Proprioception, then, can be understood as the process by which norms relating to proximity, distance, contact and place are experienced as feelings and sensations rather than as obligations or right thought. Proprioception resists lines of undoing t > n that haphazardly distribute naked activity. It does not refuse equality’s presence, but inclines towards
an equality of settled allocations, in which naked activity—wherever it occurs—takes place within its own proper (if lesser) space.

A related process might be called “temporoception”, where individuals or the social body sense or feel “right” and conversely “wrong” time. While temporoception’s strength accentuates the deviance associated with out of time nakedness (for instance, following a church service, or in a closed government building at night), it also gives such nakedness power, including the power to denote more than \( n = t \). Sara Ahmed (2006:131), drawing on Merleau-Ponty, suggests white bodies bear their whiteness as a train that extends their bodily motility and reach. To the extent contemporary nakedness gets associated with infancy, sex or transitional daily self-management (getting out of the bath, undressing etc), we can read out of time nakedness as bearing a train of other (often liminal) times. Inserted into the flow and circulation of the proper, these wrong times inject a phantom replay of other fleeting, less settled time–spaces.

Proprioception, then, whether of bodies, space or time, identifies social strains, secures new norms, and gives a troubling weight to improper nakedness. Clearly, where nudism feels right can change, including through sustained acts of impropriety. Nevertheless, proprioception’s orderliness reinforces similar tendencies within equality’s imagining. For the most part, equality bears an assumed legitimate respect (equality of outcome, for instance, for those of equal worth). Equality may be discursively extended to subjugated and despised groupings, but it tends to remain a distant or weak murmur until constituencies, identities or lifestyles cross a certain threshold of socially recognised (or constituted) value. Nudists can, and in many localities have, crossed this threshold. But to the extent this line of undoing \( t > n \) depends upon extending where and when nakedness appears, it comes up against equality’s governmental disdain for the improper (even where a non-government equality is at stake). In this sense, public nakedness precipitates exposure—not only of the body overly undressed and overly present, but of equality also—as public nakedness makes all too readily visible the limits in equality’s contemporary imagining and scope.

**Up Close Interaction**

Nudism is first and foremost an expressive and affectual practice, a way of accessing the world through the body and a sensual disposition (Obrador-Pons 2007:128).

My final line of undoing \( t > n \) foregrounds the contact of everyday social interaction. While contact emerges in orientational publics, it tends to be a by-product of proximity or something to be managed (and often minimised) in the asymmetrical relations of publics to their objects.
However, when we think of public action (or action in public), up close interaction is a common theme—particularly in relation to street use and shopping. I want to consider this further, but as I have already briefly addressed interpersonal contact, I do so by centring the relentless sensory interface of bodies with a physical environment, which, while mutually constituted, is experienced as separate.

Views differ spatially, historically, and politically, about suitable nudist spaces (and for whom), although the bush, beaches and woodland have tended to be so coded (Bell and Holliday 2000; Daley 2005; Parmelee 1929; cf Saldanha 2005). Here, feeling the waves, wind, sea, and sun—becoming blended and interlaced with “nature’s” elements (Obrador-Pons 2007:136), without clothing’s “artificial” separation (Merrill and Merrill 1931:35)—is valued and praised (eg Warren 1933:170), semi-legitimate even within mainstream discourse. But the converse is true for outdoor city spaces, where naked bodies’ presence is, for the most part, intensely regulated and proscribed, even in countries with a more relaxed approach, in general, to social nakedness.58

Building on the discussion of proprioception, up close interactivity provides a line of undoing which directly confronts what’s at stake in t/n as a division within normative outdoor public space. To the extent this has been addressed, scholars and others carrying a brief for nudism have centred the ideological and symbolic associations of nudism with nature (eg Daley 2005). Conceived as a desire for the prelapsarian, or a re-tuning to wilderness, nudism is unsurprisingly associated with, and located within, imaginings of unspoilt or authentic rural idylls. Nudist studies’ orientation to this association, however, has caused less attention to be paid to nudism’s relationship to the city—even to the extent of exploring this relationship as an inappropriate one. But if naked bodies can, at least semi-legitimately, enjoy the sensation of wind, sea, sand, and forest, in various geographies, what happens when we transpose this body/environment interaction to the urban?

In contrast to the anxieties, discussed earlier, in which circulatory publics pass nakedness on, here, I want to suggest, what troubles is the touch that moves between body and built space. In contrast to the benign relationship of resemblance struck between the rural landscape and naked body, in urban contexts it is the mediating, ostensibly non-resembling, contact between body and place that unsettles. Beyond the fear of what touch carries is an anxiety simply about touch itself. Despite naturism’s claim to build hardier bodies (Warren 1933:179), naked bodies are seen as vulnerable. This is not simply fear that, in a densely thronged urban space, incidental physical intimacy may occur without clothing’s protective divider. It is also a reading of the urban, as itself figuratively touching—and debilitating through touching—as the unnatural life of cities imprints upon and diminishes bodies (also Kenway 1998).59 This is an imprinting crafted and conditioned by the
many hands and forms of touch which the urban itself has been subject to. But the reversibility of such touch is also important here, libidinalising the urban in unruly ways. Thus, like the vandal, or anti-social person who, bearing the negative mark of what’s around them, leaves a residue or trace in turn, nudism touches the urban in ways that trouble the logic of instrumental spaces. As carriers of sensation (or at least the fantasy of sensation), naked bodies in non-naked, outdoor, urban spaces disrupt norms that locate intentional and deliberate sensation (or reciprocal touch) in distinct, bounded relationships and distinct bounded places (see also Adams et al 2007; Edensor 2007; Voskuil 2002).

Urban perambulating nudism suggests an unsettling of the controlled sensory spaces and encounters cities variously establish and struggle to sustain. At the same time, despite practical (particularly legal) obstacles, multiple naked bodies within urban localities invoke an equality that not only seeks to manifest $t = n$, but to exceed it. Urban street nakedness marries the undoing of $t > n$ to challenging questions about whose bodies fit and feel at home; who can comfortably extend themselves into contemporary urban spaces and those of an imagined future (see also Ahmed 2006)? We might hypothetically imagine naked bodies legalised on present-day city streets, but given the character of urban design and furniture—of uncomfortable, dirty benches and tarmac roads, of wind tunnels, narrow pavements, and sunless, looming, high rises—this is an undoing of $t/n$ in which certain choices remain more comfortable, preferential or practical than others.

Impressing naked bodies upon contemporary and future city landscapes asks us to think about what urban spaces might be like; what changes are incited by the equality fantasy that cities fit around diverse naked bodies—a theme pursued in Dickberry’s (2006:244) utopian narrative of London suddenly finding itself undressed. This is an equality which neither merges its subjects into a unitary whole nor simply settles for extending choice or formal entitlement. Or, to the extent it is about making choices equal, this is the unattainable equal of equally satisfying, premised on the desire of many bodies for comfort, ease, safety, pleasure and fit. Instead of seeing naked bodies, then, as a minority preference or oppressed rights-needing group, they become in this line of undoing a kind of “loss leader” (or “canary in the mineshaft”). Through the visibility and out of placeness a socially disrupted proprioception engineers, might naked bodies set terms, and secure spaces, in ways that also benefit others: homeless people, backpackers, and children, for instance, whether naked or not? Undoing $t > n$, in this way, returns us to the theme of exposure discussed above. But here exposure does not centre on equality’s limits or on bodies revealing too much. Rather, reflecting on present-day activities such as naked mass cycle rides, we might think of naked bodies exposing city landscapes, and the corporate uses they fit around, in ways that parallel...
and intersect the potentially exposing power of other users, whose urban fit is also currently far less comfortable.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have addressed two primary questions: how might progressive forces approach the question of t > n’s (il)legitimacy; and what pathways does public action enable for undoing nudist/textile inequalities? As I stated at the outset, these questions open nudism up to currently under-researched modes of “sense making” (Rancière 2004:12), in ways that both provoke and cohere with current imaginings of in/equality. Thus, addressing t > n poses a different, yet productive, entry point for thinking about relations of inequality, and equality aspirations, more generally.

I began with the question of brief carrying, suturing it to the process of determining illegitimate inequality. Social nudism has little difficulty in demonstrating disadvantage, more troubling was evidencing t > n’s social significance. As a contemporary relation of post-industrial liberal society, t > n cannot be held responsible for (accentuating) class, gender and racialised forms of inequality—even if it does give them a particular form and force. What it does more clearly contribute to is the representation and intelligibility of mainstream life—the organisation of domestic spaces and intimate relations, what counts as “public”, alongside norms of discipline, containment and self-control. T > n is also sutured to a wider conservative politics. Locating nudist brief carrying in terms of its own political values is not clear-cut, given its promiscuous inhabiting of very different ideological and social formations. However, the contemporary values associated with t > n—of body shame, sexual restraint, modesty, stranger contamination and alienation—suggest a normative outlook strikingly at odds with contemporary progressive thinking (despite the range of attitudes to the body in different left quarters).

Recognising t > n as illegitimate is half the story, although it does not determine what equality or redoing t/n might entail. The second half of the paper therefore turned to the relationship between undoing t > n and equality, focusing on the terrain of public encounters—a terrain chosen to explore undoing as a non-governmental project, where the presence of naked bodies is constitutively deemed out of place. Approaching the public as an ensemble of strands, exemplifying different modes of interaction and activity as people live, in familiar ways, among strangers (rather than treating the public as a single, unitary terrain or structure), I considered four pathways through which t > n might be (deliberately or otherwise) unsettled. As I suggested at the outset, this is a theoretical, in some respects, speculative paper. It does not seek to displant or
supplant, but to complement, the empirical work involved. However, in considering, theoretically, lines of undoing, my aim was twofold.

First, I wanted to highlight the compositional character of inequality, centring on the norms that work to anchor and sustain domination as well as shaping any tendencies for change that might emerge if textile hegemony gets challenged. My second aim was to consider the kinds of equality fantasy that might animate lines of undoing and get tied to (or produced by) them—particularly the tension between creating parity between two or more constituencies (in some respect) and eliminating divisions (and categories) altogether—a unity which might take on the norms and character of dominant social practice or reveal something altogether newer (as I suggested in relation to nudist-friendly urban design). Yet, thinking about equality in relation to nudism also raises other more textured issues that, to date, have been insufficiently considered in equality thinking more generally. These go to the very way in which we imagine relations between bodies—the kinds of touch, proximity and contact possible, as well as the very grain (the pulse, skin, veins, muscles, and senses) equality invokes when reached through embodiment—where the experience of sensing differently may precede any calculative imagining of what equality entails (see also Panagia 2009).

Thinking about equality as fantasy allows us to explore equality as something which exceeds imagining—equality stands in, in a sense, for relations which cannot yet be thought. At the same time, in the second half of the paper, I suggested that equality’s limits can also be exposed—that equality presupposes certain ways of thinking about subjects (as entitled, deserving, respectable), even as it may help to bring such modes of subjectification about. This tension between exposing equality and simultaneously rendering it ungraspable is important. It is also important to understanding inequality, particularly the inequality of subjects.

I have argued that nudists experience discrimination and marginalisation, while also suggesting that what principally is at stake is an inequality of spaces, desire, norms and ways of appearing (as these also generate very different investments in nudist and textile identity). Thus throughout, the paper has deliberately moved between identities, performances, and the socio-spatial manifestation of t/n, in ways that remain attentive to difference, while recognising its flux—as nudism (alongside its relational counterpart) circulates, appears and moves through activities, places, and people. To think about inequality in motion may seem to render it elusive. And this paper certainly does not claim that all inequalities are equally in flux. However, in relation to t > n, rejecting a quasi-propertied conception of inequality (which treats inequality as something belonging to, or held by, individuals or groups) enriches thinking about both inequality and equality.
This is not because the marginalisation, domination or exploitation of people, identified as group members, is unimportant, far from it. Rather, as activists and academics increasingly address the limitations of identity politics, so recognising inequality as something that moves between spaces, activities, norms and institutions, that fashions, and is constituted and expressed, by them—other ways get opened up for engaging with inequality neither predicated on assessing groups nor of tying inequality to them. For, while the former carries with it all the dangers of placing people in (limited) discrete categories hierarchically arranged by desert and worth (are gay men more oppressed than smokers, for instance?), the danger of the latter—of tying inequality to groups—is that in the drive to conceptually demote group identity and judgement, inequality risks getting demoted as a problem too.

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Endnotes
1 For an approach that combines allocation and structural relations, see Young (2001).
2 For a useful analysis of critical perspectives on equality, focused on Rancière’s work, see May (2008); see also Rancière (1999).
3 Nudism and naturism are sometimes used interchangeably; they have also been used to mean, in historically varying ways, different things. Sometimes naturism has included other practices and ideologies, such as vegetarianism (and has not always meant complete nakedness; see Merrill and Merrill 1931: 46–47). Today, many mainstream organisations characterise themselves as naturists to emphasise continuity with earlier associations (even if not with all their ideologies), thereby distinguishing themselves from post-1960s hippy nudism (see Bell and Holliday 2000:128). I use nudism as an umbrella term for the intentional non-wearing of clothes. However, nudism’s focus on baring the torso and genitals may or may not involve removal of shoes, jewellery and make-up.
4 For a useful discussion of some of the wider issues at stake, see Entwistle (2000).
5 For interesting work on veiling which intersects, and in some respects parallels, themes of this paper, see Göl (2002).
6 This does not mean nudism is understood or experienced in identical ways, but that people who self-reflexively engage in nudism hold this practice in common—that is socially and collectively.
7 Thus this discussion relies upon analogical reasoning. While the problems with such reasoning in relation to sexuality, gender and race have been well explored, it provides a dominant paradigm for thinking about in/equality and has thus proved, not surprisingly, the basis for nudist equality claims. For instance, British Naturist representative, Andrew Welch, commented on losing access to a beach, “If we were an ethnic or religious group this sort of thing would never happen” [see “Naturists lose their fight to go naked on the beaches”, The Independent 28 April 2009; http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/naturists-lose-their-fight-to-go-naked-on-the-beaches-1675185.html (last accessed 4 March 2010).

8 See “It’s a wrap for a rustic, remote nudist refuge”, LA Times 4 March 2007; also “Cool nudists quit their camps for cruises”, TimesonLine 25 March 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/travel/article1563942.ece (last accessed 4 March 2010).


10 Echoing experiences of the gay travel industry, nude resorts and excursions also encounter conflict with local communities, hostile or ambivalent to visiting naked tourists. See “Nude, gay tourists concern workers on Bahamian cay”, 4 April 2007, http://www.jonesbahamas.com/?c=45&a=12182 (last accessed 4 March 2010).

11 Bathing nude, however, has a much longer history (eg see Lenček and Bosker 1999: 83–84, 93–94).

12 See McLellan’s (2007) interesting study of post-war East Germany. After government attempts to outlaw nudism failed, nudity emerged as a popular practice, later on casually undertaken in a range of outdoor public spaces, with far less physical segregation and without the formal organisation (and community identification) apparent in other countries at that time.

13 This does vary geographically; eg see Smith (1980) whose empirical research suggests a more relaxed approach to sexuality and sensuality on French nudist beaches.


16 If t > n is determined to be illegitimate, it does not necessarily follow that it should be added to the “list”. This could be argued on the grounds the list has a higher threshold. However, it also suggests that the list, with its analogical reasoning and assumption that members share something significant in common, overstates the degree of similarity between different inequalities. While lists or umbrella categories may help juridical and governmental bodies (including NGOs) intent on creating common, streamlined approaches, it can harm understanding of how inequalities operate by obscuring their differences. This becomes clearer when we depart from the terrain of identity and subjectivity (where inequalities are expressed as differing in content but not largely in form), to focus on how inequalities are constituted and expressed through practices, processes, norms and spaces.

17 My focus here is the experience of disadvantage rather than domination or privilege. How textile living benefits from the divide is a complex question and one more readily understood by nudists than by textiles (who, like an earlier generation of heterosexuals, rarely see themselves in these terms). Domination may also be associated with specific interests. For instance Merrill and Merrill (1931:230) refer to clothing manufacturers benefiting from nudity’s continued marginalisation; see also Barcan (2004a) who comments on the anti-semitism involved in attacks on tailors. Recent remarks in the USA suggest property confiscations form part of the legal regulation of nudism, eg see Fred Foldvary, Editorial, “Attacks on the nude, the naked, the naturist”, The Progress Report, http://www.progress.org/archive/fold34.htm (last accessed 4 March 2010).

18 The presence and severity of exclusions relating to different public spaces varies by jurisdiction, although liberal postindustrial societies commonly have some restrictions on public nudism.

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For reference to “nude-phobic” violence, see British Naturism, spring 2008, p 46.


Thus, people who are persuaded to undress, as a one-off gesture, for “body affirming” reality television get perceived as heroic, or at least far less stigmatised, than those who proactively enjoy nudist leisure activities.

So, employers use stained fingers, a hacking cough or tobacco odour to identify smokers, engaging in direct or indirect discrimination in recruitment, work promotion and provision of rented accommodation (Lecker 2008; Tuggle and Holmes 1997).


See, for instance, the fragile status expressed despite the headline in “GOP activist is proud of his nudism, party”, Arizona Republic 29 September 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/arizonaliving/articles/0929nudistgop0922.html (last accessed 4 March 2010).

For further accounts of early and mid-twentieth century European nudism’s relationship to racism, anti-semitism and eugenics, see Kenway (1998) and McLellan (2007:69); for ambivalence of earlier pro-nudist writers, see also Parmelee (1929:173, 235–238), Merill and Merrill (1931:162), Hartman, Fithian and Johnson (1970) and Warren (1933).

Scholarship on contemporary nudist communities has largely avoided the question of racism and organised nudism’s ethno-religious composition, despite what seems a striking (and unexplained) degree of ethnic homogeneity in, at least, public images of organised nudist associations, within liberal post-industrial societies. For similar findings, see Woodall (2002:271–272).

Nudism also raises complex issues for transgender people—both pre and post-surgery.

Feminist analysis has extensively established the unequal status of intimate and public spaces onto which naked and dressed performances largely map. Naked spaces may be those with great emotional power and intensity but, arguably, little wider power.

T/n also provides a nuanced topography of differently coded home spaces—what it means to be naked in timely ways in different domestic contexts and places (the morning kitchen or study as opposed to the night-time bedroom for instance).

For example, see “Prayer rally, community to focus on naturists”, independentmail.com, 19 October 2006, http://andersonindependent.com/news/2006/oct/19/prayer-rally-community-to-focus-on-naturists/ (last accessed 4 March 2010).


Lines of undoing are also lines of redoing—whether of new n/t relations or as wide reaching adjustments to organising principles of dress, bodily appearance and body relations.
While the notion of composition suggests an insistent pull towards relationship, interconnection and coherence, the coherence of particular relations of inequality is partial, changing, and fraught.

Equality’s attachment is not inevitable. Other fantasies may replace or displace it—including liberty, choice, control, entitlement, and even responsibility.

Gordon (1997:63) suggests ghosts usually represent a loss but they can also represent a future possibility or hope.


While the symbolic deployment of naked bodies is an established mode of political communication, this discussion is less concerned with nudity’s strategic deployment as a mode of transgression, resistance or protest—the discursive power of which depends upon prevailing modes of cultural intelligibility that render the naked body shocking, vulnerable and thus politically effective.

For one illustration of tensions, see “Exposed and stark naked—on purpose”, Seattle Post-Intelligencer Reporter 7 April 2003 (cited above), an account of mainstream nudists’ opposition to those, such as the Body Freedom Cooperative, who campaign for nudism naked, on the grounds it imposes nudity on others.

The significance of showing nudist writers beside their articles is briefly discussed in British Naturism, see letters page, winter 2007, p 7.

A related instance concerned a hustings meeting for an American town council at a nudist community meeting. Again, through the candidates’ political interaction with naked prospective voters, naked bodies got incorporated into the democratic process in a far more experiential, unmediated way than if the candidate had simply deliberated upon pro-nudist texts. See “Town holds clothing-optional political debate”, local6.com, posted 4 March 2007, http://www.clickorlando.com/news/11169655/detail.html (last accessed 4 March 2010).

The removal of clothing has a long history of discursive contaminatory anxieties, for instance the prohibitions relating to the fluids of naked menstruating women referenced in Leviticus. See also Darwin’s comments on the disgust he felt from his food being “touched by a naked savage, though his hands did not appear dirty” (quoted by Ahmed 2006:82; see also on contamination, Dichter 2002:105).

For example, see Andy Crawford’s person website, http://www.andycrawford.net/naturist-swim-saga.htm which includes correspondence between himself and Fenland District Council regarding their ban on young people under 18 taking part in naturist swims (last accessed 4 March 2010).

For an extensive and rich discussion of orientation, see Ahmed (2006).


This contrasts, for instance, with the interactive style of older English theatre audiences, eg see Voskuil (2002).


For example, see “Naked couple go for a stroll” (treating open air diners to a 15 minute naked parade), Metro.co.uk, 28 January 2009, http://www.metro.co.uk/news/world/508052-naked-couple-go-for-a-stroll (last accessed 4 March 2010); also

50 Indeed, the meaning that performing certain activities undressed has led many organised naturist communities to require clothes for activities involving physical contact, such as dancing, in a desire to maintain the necessary boundary between naturism and sex (see Weinberg 1964–1965).

51 Dressing up pets when taken outside also speaks to clothing’s power as a signifier of public appearance, alongside the desire to make animals into public subjects. Thanks to Didi Herman for raising this point.

52 Historically, street nakedness has been proscribed, in explicitly racialised ways, to suggest the “not yet civilized” of improper public performance (see Watson 1998:7).


54 See eg Duncan Heenan, British Naturism autumn 2008, p 23.

55 Especially in formal sites such as courts or government offices. See the Court of Appeal’s (Scotland) rejection of the “naked rambler”’s appeal over a contempt of court finding. Lord Gill commented that appearing in court naked was unquestionably contempt; “Judges turn down appeal by Rambler”, news.scotsman.com, 8 November 2007, http://news.scotsman.com/nakedrambler/Judges-turn-down-appeal-by.3478376.jp (last accessed 4 March 2010).


58 For example, see “Naked tourist shocks city”, Reuters UK, 22 May 2007 (re: man who ostensibly thought walking around naked in Germany was tolerated), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL2245467620070522 (last accessed 4 March 2010). One important exception to the rural/urban divide is the city beach where nudity may be permitted and legitimated (eg see Hartley and Green 2006; Valverde and Cirak 2003); discussion here however focuses on non-beach-based city spaces.

59 This suggests one explanation of why, in Bell and Holliday’s (2000:130) words, “in the city... the naked body becomes lewd and sexual”.

60 While urban nakedness tends to be associated with white adult men, undoing t > n through urban spaces ‘configured around naked bodies’ raises a host of important “intersectional” questions.

References

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