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UNSPECIFIED
This paper investigates the way communities which experience antagonisms in locations they perceive as exilic imagine places in which those antagonisms will be extirpated and their identities fully realized. For the most part my focus is on processes of constructing images of a ‘homeland’ from a position outside its borders, and thus the paper largely deals with dislocation and identity construction. Nonetheless, there is implicit in the project of imagining a homeland from a position of exile the prospect of a movement through which exiles ‘return’ to make themselves ‘at home’ in terrain they heretofore could only imagine. I suggest, using historical and contemporary examples, that returning exiles, rather than finding a place which corresponds with their fantasies, often not only find that ‘home’ is unfamiliar but also that it is occupied by others uncannily similar to the antagonists with whom they struggled while ‘outside’. I note a recurrent recursivity in exilic identity which suggests that ‘return’, rather than being an escape from the antagonisms of exile and other impediments to identity, is in fact an occasion for violently reinscribing those antagonistic relations onto new settings.

The extended examples I cite - the return of the Babylonian exiles to Judah in the sixth century B.C.E. and Theodor Herzl’s construction of an image of Der Judenstaat and its impact on the twentieth century foundation of the State of Israel - are drawn from twenty years of research in and on Israel/Palestine. I feel, however, not only that the model of exilic identity construction I am setting out applies generally to refugee and diasporic communities but also that the role and reinscription of antagonism I examine in exilic identity formulations raises fundamental questions about the constitution of identity in general. Certainly this investigation problematizes the construction of place in space,
querying the standard connection of territory and identity that we see for instance in Emile
Durkheim’s and Marcel Mauss’ *Primitive Classification* (Durkheim & Mauss 1963). If, as I
will suggest, we must reject as naively realist the concept that identity is articulated with
place through presence, it becomes necessary to rethink the aetiology of identity and to
consider whether the process of constructing exilic identities - a process wherein identity is
primally penetrated by the presence of an antagonistic other - is the rule in identity
construction rather than the exception.

I base this proposal on the assumption that attributing an identity to some thing or some
one is constitutive; it does not simply relay an already existing character but *posita*
character for that object or person. One, in other words, *constructs* a being through
representation, and such construction assumes a use to which that entity will be put or a
relationship which might be established with that entity. If this propositional character of
representation is accurate - and the following examples suggest it is - then there is always a
gap, or space, between the entity and its representation. In this paper I reify that gap as
the separation of exile in order to make visible the violence which both provokes
representations and devolves from them. I here foreground exile as a precondition of
identity and suggest that this supplement - this odd ‘outside work’ of experiencing
dislocation, constructing from the position of exile an image of an originary place, and
‘returning’ so as to rework the home territory into something corresponding with that
image - reveals representations of place as at least initially discontinuous with the
territories they claim to mirror.

* * *

It is important to consider life lived in place as distinct from life imagined in an identity
discourse. One moves across a landscape which one recognizes and engages in terms of the
practices one carries out in and on it. Some domains are significant in terms of their
relation to kinship relations, others in terms of other practices of reproduction carried out
upon them - growing and consuming the foodstuffs one lives on, spinning and supporting
the web of sociality which maintains one's self and community. All of the elements of this
dispersed terrain of sociality coexist and constitute an environment through which and in
terms of which one acts, but such an environment rarely if ever coagulates - without a
further stimulus - into an articulation of identity. When Durkheim and Mauss in Primitive
Classification argue that concepts of space are themselves projections of social practices,
kinship networks, demographic concentrations and the like (Durkheim and Mauss 1963:
82-83 and passim), they contend that classification devolves from practice in place, from
that diffused yet structured domain of activity and perception which Bourdieu, drawing on
Mauss, calls habitus (see Bourdieu 1990: 52-97). What I am here arguing, however, is that
systems of classification and of practice which emerge from a habitus are not the same as
identities. When one designates a particular practice or role as a sign of one's identity one
is already fetishising, rendering as representative one element chosen out of the wider field
of sociality, out of that general range of action people engage in, out of that very diffused
sense of everything one does in the course of one's everyday life. One is - in articulating an
identity - pulling out of that dense fabric of interwoven elements certain figures, symbols,
activities or entities that will serve as vehicles for saying 'this is who we are'. These are
metonyms - parts which come to stand for the whole - and to comprehend identity we need
to understand such processes of abstraction and reduction.

Antagonism\(^3\) is fundamental to the process of fetishisation underlying identity, because
one tends precisely to talk about who one is or what one is at a moment in which that
being seems threatened. I begin to call myself such and such a person, or such and such a
representative of an imagined community, at the moment something seems to threaten to
disallow the being the name I speak stands in for\(^4\). Identity terms come into usage at
precisely the moment in which for some reason one comes to feel that they signifying a
being or entity one has to fight to defend. In Laclau and Mouffe’s *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a New Democratic Politics*, the authors point out that a peasant working on the land would not in the normal course of things refer to himself or herself as a peasant but would *become* a peasant - begin to articulate an identity as ‘peasant’ - at precisely the moment at which a landlord comes along and says ‘I am selling this land, get off the land’ (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 125). With that threatened expropriation of the land certain aspects of everyday life explicitly tied to dependency on the land come to the fore of consciousness, and serve to ground the constitution of a new politicised identity as ‘peasant’. Peasantness - with its connotations of a specific relation to a land-based mode of production - here becomes an identity, something political and articulate, something to struggle for. The peasant, threatened with the loss of the land which allows him to be a peasant, raises the link of land and self to the status of an identity.

The move Laclau and Mouffe reveal is quite curious in the fullness of its philosophical implication. When an identity is initially formulated an essential part of that formulation is precisely the imminence of its negation. What one talks about with the positivity of an identity (its ‘essence’, its ‘being’) is primarily the negation of a threatened negation; I ‘am’ who I would be if I could be rid of that which endangers my being. Precisely the solidity of selfhood that one engages in the project to recuperate, strengthen, and support that self is formulated in terms of what suggests the impossibility of that self. In other words, identity has at its very core an antagonism which brings it into being by the threat it poses to the possibility of its expression. Consciously, of course, I imagine my full self as that which will blossom when the antagonist disappears, but in a sense that full self means nothing without the antagonist, because the antagonist is a major part of it - in fact its precondition.

Lisa Malkki, in her study of Hutu refugees in Tanzania (Malkki 1995), worked on two different sites with two distinct groups of Hutus who had fled from genocidal Tutsi
violence in Burundi between 1972 and 1979. One group was located in Kigoma, an urban setting wherein the refugees struggled to assimilate themselves into the host country’s economic and social networks so as to avoid being deported into Burundi. In the city identities were focussed on individual aspirations. There Hutu refugees sought to marry Tanzanian nationals so they could get citizenship, and their driving concern was to hook themselves into the networks of everyday urban Tanzanian life. They had no investment in asserting a Hutu identity since such an assertion would work against that integration. The other group was located at Mishamo, a large and isolated refugee camp where people who had fled from Tutsi violence had been gathered from all over Burundi. In the camp refugees formulated strong essentialist conceptions of collective Hutu identity which allowed no room for individual variation or divergence. A mythical sense of who the Hutu are was there elaborated which manifested itself in a ritualistic and ideological agenda for remaining pure and united in anticipation of returning to and redeeming the homeland.

The camp Hutu concretized their definitions of themselves by setting themselves off with antipathy from the city refugees who they characterised as willing to abandon the nation to save their own skins (which is probably an accurate portrayal since the nation, after all, did not have the same meaning to the city Hutu).

Malkki, in relaying what she calls ‘mythico-histories’ collected in Mishamo, presents a series of Hutu representations which foreground the figure of the antagonist. First of all, the Tutsi are imaged by the Hutu in these narratives as horrific negators; “the Tutsi” as a homogeneous category...had created the violence, perversity and defilement. “They” are therefore seen as the source of the almost unimaginable evil and of the destruction of “the natural” as constituted in collective memory through the refugees’ fifteen years of exile’ (Malkki 1995: 93).

It is not surprising that the Hutu constitute the Tutsi as such horrific antagonists (the
myth in this sense can be seen as simply reflecting popular perceptions of history), and yet Malkki goes on few pages later to point out that Hutu myths of primordiality reveal that the Tutsi are the original and originary figures of mythology and that the Hutu effectively derive from them by negation:

‘in the mythico-history, the Tutsi were cast in many mythico-historical domains (such as the encoding and enacting of the body maps) as the primary subject, while the Hutu were cast as the symmetrical opposite, as that which the Tutsi were not’ (Malkki 1995: 103). The Hutu, in other words, come into being precisely as an antidote - something after the Tutsi, different from the Tutsi, better than the Tutsi - which replaces the Tutsi, both in the mythology and - by projection - in time. Deep within Hutu identity - seemingly before it even was awakened from its pre-conscious revery - is the figure of the Tutsi which simultaneously threatens and enables the emergence of the Hutu.

I here assert that identity is something founded precisely on the anticipation of its disallowal; identity is formulated after and in response to awareness of the threat of extermination. It’s not that I have an identity and something comes along and threatens it; it’s that something comes along and threatens and the threatening makes me constitute myself defensively as an entity (or part of a collectivity) organised to fight against that threat. It is precisely antagonism that draws together the dispersed elements of self or community in order to constitute a political unity the elements of which share a common need to defend themselves against that antagonism (see Bowman 1993). Identity is mobilisation towards struggle given form by the configuration of what it anticipates struggling against, and that mobilisation dissolves the salience of differences which - in everyday life - might have restricted collaboration and interaction.

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In this paper I want to consider two cases in which communities experiencing antagonisms in exile imagine the places where those antagonisms will disappear, allowing the fullness
of identity to emerge. The first is the return from the Babylonian exile of the people who came to be called Jews as a result of that exile. I will argue that the moment of Judaism’s formation was deeply implicated in exile and that the return of a small portion of the exilic population to Judah and what was at that time - because of its own occupation - called Samaria consolidated a conception of a people which was new to the area. Exile, I will argue, was both a constitutive moment in the construction of one particular conception of the people of Israel (a conception monumentalized in the Old Testament) and simultaneously the grounds for the disenfranchisement of another portion of the originary population. The second case I want to examine is that of Theodor Herzl, the chief progenitor of what has proved to be one of most powerful conceptions of Zionism if not actually the dominant mode. There were other Zionisms, but his form became extremely influential in giving form to the state of Israel. I want to present an argument both about the way his identity - and that which he projected onto the Jew he hoped would take form within a Jewish state - was shaped by nineteenth century Vienna and the way that identity, transmogrified into a dominant strain within statist Zionism, gave rise to severe problems, particularly when inflicted upon Sephardic and Mizrachim Jews who came to Israel from the Arab world.

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Recent work around early biblical history has substantially disrupted traditional ways of thinking about the historicity of the Bible. Particularly salient to the argument of this paper is the claim, made by Niels Lemche in *The Canaanites and their Land* (Lemche 1991), that the Bible is for the most part written after the Babylonian exile and that that writing reworks (and in large part invents) previous Israelite history so that it reflects and reiterates the experiences of those returning from the Babylonian exile. Lemche contends that the Canaanites, rather than being the originary inhabitants of the land encountered as
the Israelites fleeing from Egypt came in from the desert, are retrospective projections of the people the Yahwists found living on the land when they returned from the Babylonian exile - that is to say, those Judeans who had not been exiled by the Babylonians when the elites of Judah were expelled in the sixth century. Lemche’s argument disturbs traditional biblical scholars as well as people who want to take the biblical chronicle as writ; it calls for a rethinking of fundamental categories mobilized not only by biblical literalists but also by nationalists who want to shape contemporary Middle Eastern identities in primordialist terms.

It is increasingly accepted that Middle Eastern cultures are, until monotheistic Yahwism emerges in the sixth century before the Christian era (BCE), more or less polytheistic (Lang 1983: 13-56, see also Alt 1966). In the area which will become Israel and Judah people worship *baalim* (singular *Baal*), local territorial gods, as well as various other divinities who are in effect ‘departmental’ gods dealing with rain, fertility, storms, and the like. When distinct social groups are thrown into hostilities devotion focusses on their respective war gods. Yahweh, the figure that develops into the monotheistic god of Judaism and its successor religions, is such a war god, and he comes into prominence precisely when those who acknowledge him draw together to defend themselves against attackers (or mobilize to attack other groups):

‘most of the Judges narratives point to a strong connection between Yahweh and warfare. Similarly they suggest that it was during military undertakings that the tribes joined together in a common cause which transcended local interest. Thus it may have been primarily in connection with Israel's wars that Yahweh gained status as the national god. During times of peace the tribes will have depended heavily on Baal in his various local forms to ensure fertility. But when they came together to wage war against their common enemies, they would have turned to Yahweh, the divine warrior who could provide
victory’ (Miller and Hayes 1986: 112).
In the centuries prior to the Babylonian exile the area that would become Judah and Israel suffered numerous invasions and saw the development of extensive trading networks linking it with surrounding peoples; these events not only gave Yahweh an increasingly significant role in the local pantheon but also brought into the purview of the local inhabitants a number of ‘foreign’ gods. The inhabitants of the region, observing the power or the fortune of other peoples as they fought across or traded through the land, pragmatically adopted those others’ divinities into their local pantheons so as to gain from the patronage of divinities whose powers were manifest.
By the opening of the eighth century BCE the engagement of the population of Israel in quite considerable levels of syncretistic worship, combined with the political and economic affiliation of the Israelite king Ahab with the Phoenicians, led certain priestly groups within Israelite society to aggressively promote Yahwist worship. Official state policy sought to consolidate the king’s hold on power by associating royal patronage with central shrines (such as Bethel) where Israelites and foreigners alike could gather to worship, and sacrifice to, a panoply of divinities; this policy marginalized the Yahwist priesthood - centred at Shechem - and drew pilgrims and patronage away from its shrines. Lang, whose Monotheism and the Prophetic Minority (Lang 1983) is the classic study of the development of Yahwism, argues that the Yahwist priesthood’s self-interest in promoting its shrines was the primary motive leading it to mobilize against syncretistic worship, but he notes as well that a proto-nationalistic impetus may have also impelled the campaign insofar as Phoenician trading power - and the gods bolstering it - was increasingly seen by some to threaten Israel’s economy (Lang 1983: 27-28). Significantly Yahwism was, at this time, henotheistic rather than monotheistic; it rejected the worship of other gods, but not their reality. Yahweh is here being elevated from one god among many - a ‘departmental’ god who comes into action when needed at times of war - to a god who stands against other
peoples’ divinities as the representation of an emerging national identity.

In 722 BCE Israel was conquered by the Assyrians and - as was standard practice at that time - the dominant social groups of the territory were deported (Oded 1979). The political leadership as well as the dominant priesthoods (the syncretist priests) were creamed off and driven into exile, leaving the commoners behind to continue to work the land and render it productive for its new rulers. The Yahwist programme was still at that time a relatively peripheral phenomenon and its priests were not associated with the dominant circles of Israelite society; therefore when those circles were sent into exile the Yahwist priesthood was left behind. A large contingent of them fled south into Judah where they became increasingly more influential, engaging under the patronage of Hezekiah and Josiah in programmes of cultic purification which corresponded to those rulers’ plans for reestablishing the Davidic dynasty and the glories of Greater Israel. This century of nationalist development - which according to II Kings, II Chronicles, and Deuteronomy, saw the expansion of the borders of Israel, the rebuilding of the Solomonic Temple in Jerusalem, and the elevation of Yahwist monotheism to the role of state religion - was brought to an end with the death of Josiah in 609 BCE. Over the next thirty years Judah became a vassal to Babylonia, and a series of revolts led to three successive invasions, between 598 and 582, in the wake of which the elites - this time including the Yahwist priests - were successively deported to Babylon, leaving amidst the ruins of Judah’s cities and the dreams of resurrecting the Davidic/Solomonic empire only what Jeremiah calls ‘the poorest of the land’ (Jeremiah 52: 16).

The Babylonian exile was not a particularly arduous exile (see Newsome 1979 and Oded 1977). Judeans were settled in agricultural areas near to the major cities where they were allowed to reconstitute themselves as coherent communities (one of the main settlements of Judean exiles was called Tel-Abib). In the course of the three generations of the exile many of the deportees married into Babylonian society, took on Babylonian names and
integrated themselves - as merchants and artisans - into the social networks of the surrounding communities (these ‘lost’ Judeans may have given rise to the stories of the ‘Lost Tribes of Israel’). Even more salient was the fact that many of the exiles took to worshipping Babylonian gods in recognition of the fact that those gods had proven more powerful than the god which should have defended them\(^9\). The communities which aggregated under the leadership of the Yahwist priesthood (not unlike the Hutus of the refugee camps in Tanzania) saw assimilation and apostasy not only as social death for themselves as Judeans but also as attempted deicide. They resolved to maintain an absolute and exclusive commitment to Yahweh who they were sure would lead them back to the land from which they had been expelled. They prescribed blood purity as a means of maintaining the borders of the national community, thus proscribing inter-marriage with the communities which surrounded them. They also established a series of exclusivist rituals which set themselves off from their neighbours, and these not only included a surrogate form of temple worship but also a distinct calendar which ritualistically enabled them to exist in a different time frame than the communities with which they shared space. All of these diacritical devices served to mark and maintain difference, but did not prevent them from trading with and thus being able to sustain themselves amongst the Babylonians.

In 539 BCE the Persian Cyrus, who had conquered the Babylonians, allowed those exiles who wished to return to Judah to do so. The returnees made up, in fact, a very small contingent as many of the descendants of those who had been deported declined to return\(^10\). Those who did go back did so with high expectations; \textit{Isaiah} recounts the prophecies that Yahweh would lead them into a beautiful land flowing with milk and honey and that the mountains would level out to provide an easy path for their return. The prophecies also told that when the returnees arrived in Judah they would find an empty
land wherein they would rebuild the cities, erect temples to Yahweh, and live in peace and plenty. It didn’t work out that way. The land which ‘greeted’ the returnees was not, after all, that empty land prophesized by their ideologues but the site of a fully functioning society of Judeans. The Judeans who had been left behind when the elites were expelled had subsequently taken over and developed the lands and properties of the deportees. H. M. Barstad, in his *The Myth of the Empty Land* (Barstad 1996), marshalls archaeological and textual evidence to show that throughout the period of the Babylonian exile Judah hosted a fully functioning indigenous society carrying on and developing the traditions its ancestors had shared with the ancestors of the returnees. That society, unrestrained by the exiled Yahwist priesthood, had not only returned to the syncretic practices that the Yahwists had earlier purged but may as well have taken up worship of some if not all of the gods of their conquerors. The returnees, who had developed a fiercely purist conception of Yahwist monotheism during the exile, were deeply troubled by their encounter with these syncretist others who were, at the same time, even more Judean than they were.

Open hostility soon broke out between the two groups. The descendants of those Judeans who had been left behind were less than enthusiastic about turning over their lands to and accepting the rule of people who were, after three generations, effectively strangers (Soggin 1976: 323), while the returnees responded with horror to the presence on ‘their’ land of syncretists who claimed Judah was theirs. Over the four phases which made up ‘the return’ (and which extended over one hundred and twenty years) cultural and religious antagonisms, as well as struggles over property, arose between the two groups. Two Old Testament books, *Ezra* and *Nehemiah*, chronicle an extended encounter between the two populations in which the antagonism felt by the returnees for the residents was so fierce as to nearly bring about open warfare. For the chroniclers, who were of the party of the Yahwist priesthood, the resident Judeans were not wayward kin but foreigners.
endangering the returnees with the seductions of apostasy and syncretism. In *Ezra*

Yahweh says to one of his prophets:

‘The land which you are entering, to take possession of it, is a land unclean with the pollutions of the peoples of the lands, with their abominations which have filled it from end to end with their uncleanness. Therefore give not your daughters to their sons, neither take their daughters for your sons, and never seek their peace or prosperity, that you may be strong, and eat the good of the land, and leave it for an inheritance to your children forever’ (*Ezra 9: 11-13*).

In 520 BCE the priests of the resident peoples approached the returnees to ask if they could join them in building a temple to the god - Yahweh - that they, like the returned exiles, revered. The biblical account of this exchange tellingly disenfranchises the resident Judeans not only by representing them - as they offer collaboration - as ‘adversaries’ but also by *turning them into* foreigners - people who are presented as the descendants of peoples who had been settled in the land after the Judeans had been exiled:

‘Now when the adversaries of Judah and Benjamin heard that the returned exiles were building a temple to the Lord, the God of Israel, they approached Zerubbabel and the heads of fathers’ houses and said to them, “Let us build with you; for we worship your God as you do, and we have been sacrificing to him ever since the days of Esarhaddon king of Assyria who brought us here”. But Zerubbabel, Jeshua, and the rest of the heads of fathers’ houses in Israel said to them, “You have nothing to do with us in building a house to our God; but we alone will build to the Lord, the God of Israel”’ (*Ezra 4: 1-3*: emphasis mine).

Effectively then the returning exiles reconstructed in the land to which they returned precisely the antagonistic situation they had encountered in Babylonia and in terms of which they had constituted their pure Yahwist identities. The resident Judeans were attributed with the identities of the seductive and syncretistic others who had surrounded the exiles in Babylonia and who had been seen as threatening the exiles with spiritual
extermination. The returning exiles constructed against that antagonistic allure the same
defensive apparatuses with which they had protected their Judean identities in Tel-Abib
and the other cities of the exile (see Nehemiah 10: 30-31 on marriage restrictions and
calendrical divisions). The returnees established criteria of ritual purity (with regards both
to Temple worship and to other domains of public and private ritual) which served to
exclude the residents. Furthermore, one hundred and twenty years after the first wave of
return, they racially purified the collective body which some had sullied by treating kin as
kin; Ezra, under divine instruction, carried out a blood cleansing in the course of which
those of the returnees who had married resident Judeans were forced by threat of
excommunication and loss of all property to ‘put away all these wives and their children’
(Ezra 10:3 and passim). This radical inscription of a racial divide between the two Judean
communities was the origin of the conception of ‘the Canaanite’ later inscribed in the
books of the Torah as the evil impeding the originary construction of an Israelite people.

Lemche writes that
‘the “Canaanites” embraced that part of the Palestinian population which did not convert
to the Jewish religion of the exiles, the reason being that it had no part in the experience of
exile and living in a foreign world which had been the fate of the Judeans who were
carried off to Babylonia in 587 BCE. The Palestinian - or rather old Israelite - population
were not considered to be Jews because they were not ready to acknowledge the religious
innovations of the exilic community, that Yahweh was the only god to be worshipped.
Thus the real difference between the Canaanites and the Israelites would be a religious one
and not the difference between two distinct nations.’ (Lemche 1991: p. 162, n. 12).
The programme of the clearing of the high places of Canaanite abominations which the
Torah chronicles and celebrates is a projection into mythological history of the policies of
cultural cleansing and ethnic disenfranchisement that the descendants of those who
returned from the Babylonian exile carried out against those who had remained in the
land. The violence Yahweh repeatedly commands his followers to impose on the Canaanites throughout the first five books of the Old Testament is more likely the expression of an ideological *desideratum* than an echo of a literal policy carried out after the Babylonian exile against the Judean others, but the rage with which the returning exiles greeted those who had remained in place suggests the extent to which exilic constructions of identity can be antipathetic to the worlds from which their fabricators had been separated.

Where post-exilic Judaism differs from its earlier incarnations as well from other religions of the period and the area is in the fact that the fundamental link between land, nation and divinity has been broken. A people may exist on the territory of the god, but they can be driven out - by the god acting through its self-proclaimed followers - if they don’t make manifest proper allegiance to the god or sufficient obedience to its will. What proves more significant here than residence is a community’s obedience to the authority of its god. It is that adherence to the will of a divinity - known through the mediation of an elite informed by prophecy or textual interpretation - which Judaism - exceptionally among the religions of the region in that period - posits can and should be maintained even beyond the borders of the god’s land. Emerging out of a field of religions which are essentially territorial, Judaism presents itself as a religion which can be adhered to anywhere but which renders redemption conditional on obedience to divine authority. That reinterpretation of the relation of territory and divinity (through which territory becomes a reward for rather than a condition of devotion) along with the foregrounding of extra-territorial obedience to divine dictate renders Judaism perpetually susceptible to transformations of its community and its character effected by self-proclaimed prophets who claim better to know the will of God than their predecessors. The sole criteria for claiming to be the chosen of God is here certainty, and such self-righteous surety tends to be more prevalent in sites of exile - whether physical or spiritual - than on home territory.
This disarticulation of territoriality from access to the divine has, for instance, allowed Christians to assert that the Jews are no longer the proper 'Israelites' because the original chosen people have betrayed their mandate to obey Yahweh’s commands. Yahweh (a.k.a. Jehovah) has, according to Christian theology, rejected the Jews and chosen a new people to whom he gives his support and the rights to his territory. Christianity’s asserted claim to appropriate not only the Jews’s place in the divine plan but also the territory God allegedly gave to the Jews gave rise, in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era, to a Byzantine imperial programme of building up Jerusalem and the Holy Land (purged of Jews) as a Christian version of the land of God-given glory the Babylonian exiles had expected to find in Judah a millenium earlier.

The other case of exile and return which I will discuss differs considerably from that sketched above in that it reflects the formative influence of a substantially different antagonism. Nonetheless at the same time European Zionism, as it developed out Theodor Herzl’s ideas about the place of Judaism in - and beyond - Europe, reveals - in the dynamics of return it posits - traits very similar to those manifest in the history of the Babylonian exilees. Undoubtedly there are methodological problems with treating an individual’s life and work as representative of the culture of a larger collectivity, but it nonetheless seems viable to see Herzl - whose charismatic figure looms over the Zionist Congresses - as someone who spoke to and for many European Jews: ‘Herzl’s experience was emblematic of that of a large number of central European Jews, which is why his resolution of his ambivalence through Zionism resonated so powerfully in others of his generation’ (Kornberg 1993: 3). That so many identified themselves with the scenarios of identity, antagonism and deliverance sketched by Herzl in his speeches, his journalistic work, and his famed Der Judenstaat of 1896 suggests that this particular interpellation (Althusser 1971: 160-165) played a substantial role in shaping Zionism. The structure of
Herzl’s identity discourse may therefore offer insight into Zionism as a general movement. For this reason I want first to consider the conflicts and contradictions shaping the life which gave rise to Herzl’s image of Jewish identity and the Zionist project.

Great strides were taken towards the full assimilation of Jews into mainstream European society in the wake of the French Revolution. Although impediments to full integration were frequently encountered on that path there was a generalized optimism throughout central and western European Jewry in the latter half of the nineteenth century that assimilation was the inevitable fate of the Jewish people. Most Jews in Austria, France, Germany and Great Britain were urbanized and had discarded the cultural distinctions which, further east, signalled the Jewishness of those confined to ghettos in eastern Europe and in and around the Russian ‘Pale of Settlement’. For assimilating Jews religion was a private affair (if not an atavism which had no hold on them at all) which might be discarded in exchange for the benefits of full incorporation into European civilisation. Conversions from Judaism to Christianity had increased significantly in the nineteenth century, either through intermarriage\(^\text{11}\) or through pragmatics. Heinrich Heine, who in 1825 became Christian so as to be able to qualify for a law degree, called baptism an ‘entréeebillet zur europäischen Kultur’ [an ‘entrance ticket to European civilisation’] and queried ‘who would let a mere formality stand between him and European civilisation?’ (Laqueur 1972: 9).

Herzl, up until the early 1890s, considered himself primarily a journalist and a playwright and, while aware of his Jewishness, strove for full incorporation into the hegemonic culture of Vienna (to which his family had moved from Budapest when he was eighteen). As a law student at the university he belonged to - and enthusiastically engaged with, two radical German nationalist organisations - the Akademische Lesehalle (Academic Reading Hall) and the Albia fraternity (a dueling club). Later, as journalist and playwright, Herzl
identified strongly with Vienna’s artistic circles, affecting an aristocratic aestheticism as a means of distancing himself from the commercial taint of common journalism. Jacques Kornberg, in a powerful study of Herzl’s ambivalent relation to his Jewishness, argues that these were attempts to ‘distance himself from his Jewish Hungarian origins’ (Kornberg 1995: 49) by shedding Jewish traits and becoming part of the ‘Germandom’ of the surrounding culture (see Kornberg 1995: 46-51 on German nationalism and 60-66 on aesthetic culture). Viennese culture, up until the rise of racial nationalism in the 1890s, was simultaneously assimilationist and anti-semitic; a Jew could ‘pass’ as a full member of European (Christian) society precisely by showing no evidence of what Christian Europeans saw as stereotypical ‘Jewishness’. Herzl identified strongly with the values of that environment, aspiring to be the ‘new man’ of the Enlightenment while sharing its disdain for the stereotypical ghetto Jew whose atavistic religiosity and provincialism was antithetical to enlightened cosmopolitanism.

Herzl’s struggle through the 1880s to gain recognition as a literary artist coincided with an increase in populist antisemitism sparked by a financial crisis and fueled by accusations that Jewish financiers corrupted the market. This found resonance in the anti-Enlightenment volkisch racial nationalism which was simultaneously emerging (Laqueur 1972: 28-30; Zimmerman 2001: 137-146). Between 1883 (when he withdrew from the Albia association because of its policy shift from promoting the assimilation of Jews into the German nation to advocating excluding them as racially alien) and 1895 (when the election of the antisemitic Christian Socials to power in the Vienna City Council spurred his realization that Jewish emancipation could only take place in a Jewish state) Herzl worked for recognition as a fully assimilated and successful individual against the prejudices which saw him not as a man and an artist but as ‘Jew’.

Part of his strategy for overcoming prejudice was a discursive splitting of the Jew into two distinct personifications. One type of Jew, with whom he identified, was the enlightened
cosmopolitan who carried his Jewishness in the same way an Austrian or a Frenchman bore his national origins - as an evident yet fundamentally irrelevant aspect of an all-round educated person deporting himself with grace and self-possession. The other Jew, who he loathed and in whom he believed anti-Semites found the font of their stereotypes of the Jew, was the Ostjude (‘eastern Jew’) who dwelled in and had been shaped by the ghetto. For Herzl the ghetto Jew - isolated from participation in European national movements as well as from modernization and enlightenment - had developed a self-serving mentality focussed on economic gain and manifest in an obsessive money hunger and a self-debasing humility behind which lurked a crafty arrogance. Herzl, like Freud and other assimilated western Jews, looked with repulsion upon this Jew who they called mauschel (usually rendered into English as ‘yid’, see below):¹²

‘We've known him for a long time, and just merely to look at him, let alone approach or, heaven forbid, touch him was enough to make us feel sick. But our disgust, until now, was moderated by pity; we sought extenuating, historical explanations for his being so crooked, sleazy, and shabby a specimen. Moreover, we told ourselves that he was, after all, our fellow tribesman, though we had no cause to be proud of his fellowship. . . . who is this Yid, anyway? A type, my dear friends, a figure that pops up time and again, the dreadful companion of the Jew, and so inseparable from him that they have always been mistaken for one for the other. The Jew is a human being like any other, no better and no worse. . . . The Yid, on the other hand, is a hideous distortion of the human character, something unspeakably low and repulsive’ (Herzl, “Mauschel” in Die Welt, 15 October 1897, quoted by Pawel 1989: 345).

The mauschel was, however, more than a Jewish other for Herzl; it was an antagonist. The eastern Jew, by providing the bases for the stereotypical images with which anti-Semites legitimated excluding and persecuting all Jews, not only endangered Herzl’s social identity
and status but also, by sharing a ‘tribal’ identity with him, subverted at its foundations his labouriously achieved sense of self. This dual threat devolved from Herzl's anxiety that others, to whom he would present himself as a European, might reject his self-presentation and reduce him to the Jew he and they despised (‘you may think that you are just like everybody else but you're just a Jew’).

Herzl responded to this threat by throwing up barriers - both ontological and social - between himself and the mauwel. Following a strategy not dissimilar to that the Babylonian returnees carried out against indigenous Judeans, Herzl rendered foreign the bloodline he saw as spawning the mauwel, suggesting that ‘at some dark moment in our history some inferior human material got into our unfortunate people and blended with it’ (Theodor Herzl, “Mauschel” in Zionist Writings: Essays and Addresses, Vol. I, pp. 163-165; quoted by Kornberg 1993: 164). In order to protect western Jews from the stigmas arising from being associated with the eastern Jew, Herzl, in 1893, proposed to cut the ties of name and religion that associated them. Herzl argued in articles for a mass enlistment of Jews in the project of Austrian socialism which - nominally antisemitic in its hostility to Jewish distinctiveness - would eradicate that distinctiveness by making Jewish socialists an integral part of the German culture it promoted as a norm for all of Central Europe. He later proposed an even more explicit cessation of the stigma of Jewishness by suggesting an orchestrated mass baptism of Austrian Jews into the Catholic church (see Pawel 1989: 186-188). The self-deputed last generation of Jewish fathers would accompany its sons to a public site where a great collective baptism of the latter would take place. In this manner the last Austrian Jews would gain the respect of the gentiles as they proudly extinguished their community by transforming their sons into full Europeans. The threat posed to the western Jew by the mauwel would be obviated by denying the Jewish religion which bound one to the other.
Herzl was finally forced to abandon such strategies, grounded on confidence that Enlightenment Europe would welcome Jews into its community if Jews discarded the Jewishness rendered them distinct, when - after three decades of Liberal rule - the Christian Socials, an overtly antisemitic party which had begun its climb to power in the previous decade, won a firm majority in the 1895 Vienna city council elections. The Christian Socials instituted policies of Catholic revivalism and Jewish exclusion, and Herzl (already sensitised by the Dreyfus affair to the resurgent appeal of antisemitism in Europe) was suddenly forced to acknowledge that no matter how un-Jewish or un-
Mauzechel he and other Jews would become - no matter how much they would work to transform themselves to effect assimilation - they would never be allowed to co-exist within European society except as ghettoised others barred from entry into the institutions of the dominant culture. In the new racial discourse a Jew was a Jew, even when he was a Christian.

Herzl responded quickly with an elaboration of the fundamentals of the programme he called Zionism. The speed of invention seems less surprising when it is recognized that all Herzl did was to displace the policies of Jewish transformation he’d already elaborated to a site - any site - outside of the bounds of a Europe which would not accept them. Herzl’s Zionist state was not a state informed by the Jewish religion but a state in which Jewish citizens could function as full citizens without suffering exclusory discrimination in any domain of social activity. Herzl in effect argued that as Jews were made ‘Jewish’ by exclusion and Europeans could only see Jewishness when it saw Jews (henceforth insisting on maintaining the exclusory policies that made Jews ‘Jewish’), that Jews would have to leave Europe in order to stop being Jewish and reveal themselves as European. The Zionist state, wherever it was to be established, would be a place where Jews could act just like other Europeans. In the wake of the election which tolled the death knell of
his ambitions of direct assimilation, Herzl - still at heart an assimilationist - announced the programme for establishing a European state outside of Europe: ‘In the election the majority of non-Jewish citizens - no, all of them - declare that they do not recognize us as Austro-Germans. All right, we shall move away; but over there too we shall only be Austrians’ (Patai 1960: I, 246-247).

A careful reading of Der Judenstaat reveals - behind the rhetoric predicting ‘a great upward tendency [which] will pass through our people’ (Herzl 1993: 70) and promising ‘ambitious young men...a bright prospect of freedom, happiness and honours’ (Herzl 1993: 9) - a plan designed to overcome the antagonism the eastern Jew posed to Herzl and, in his eyes, to Jews in general. For Herzl it is the exposure of ‘Christian citizens’ (Herzl 1993: 18) to ‘wandering Jews’ (Ibid), displaced from the ghettos and immigrating into countries in which assimilated Jews already peacefully co-exist, which ‘either introduce[s] Anti-Semitism where it does not exist, or intensif[ies] it where it does’ (Ibid). The Jewish state would eradicate antisemitism by gathering in and settling these ‘faithful’ (Ibid) and ‘foreign’ (Ibid) Jews:

‘The movement towards the organisation of the State I am proposing would, of course, harm Jewish Frenchmen no more than it would harm the “assimilated” of other countries. It would, on the contrary, be distinctly to their advantage. For they would no longer be disturbed in their “chromatic function”14, as Darwin puts it, but would be able to assimilate in peace, because the present Anti-Semitism would have been stopped for ever....They would be rid of the disquieting, incalculable, and unavoidable rivalry of a Jewish proletariat, driven by poverty and political pressure from place to place, from land to land. This floating proletariat would become stationary’ (Ibid).

The Jewish state would isolate the eastern Jew - that provoker and amplifier of antisemitic feeling - and, through a carefully rationalised programme of ‘relief by labour’
(unpaid work), use his labour to both transform him from ‘a good for nothing beggar into an honest bread winner’ (Herzl 1993: 39)\(^\text{15}\) and render the country habitable.

Only after that hard labour of dual transformation had been carried out would other Jews even consider leaving Europe and emigrating to Palestine:

‘We shall not leave our old home before the new one is prepared for us. Those only will depart who are sure thereby to improve their position; those who are now desperate will go first, after them the poor; next the prosperous, and, last of all, the wealthy. Those who go in advance will raise themselves to a higher grade, equal to that whose representatives will shortly follow. Thus the exodus will be at the same time an ascent of the classes’ (Herzl 1993: 20).

The plan for a Jewish state was thus a plan to quarantine eastern Jews from their nominal western ‘brethren’ and, through that isolation and a well-regimented regime of work and social engineering, to raise them gradually to the ‘level’ of assimilated western Jews. This process would sweat from them, and later from the Jewish parvenu who had brought the stench of the market into the drawing rooms of the western Jewish ‘aristocracy’ (see Kornberg 1993: 71-76), all traces of the ghetto. The Jewish state will not effect the fully assimilated Jew at all, except to free him from the curse of antisemitism; some may chose, as a wealthy elite, to emigrate to Palestine once it has been fully developed while others, like the ‘Jewish Frenchmen’ described above, ‘would certainly be credited with being assimilated to the very depths of their souls if they stayed where they were after the new Jewish state, with its superior institutions, had become a reality’ (Herzl 1993: 18).

Zionism would, on the other hand, exterminate the mauschel, purging the Jewish people of the racial taint of its presence:

‘In our own day, even a flight from religion can no longer rid the Jew of the Yid. Race is now the issue - as if the Jew and the Yid belonged to the same race. But go and prove that
to the anti-Semite. To him, the two are always and inextricably linked....And then came Zionism!....We'll breathe more easily, having got rid once and for all of these people whom, with furtive shame, we were obliged to treat as our fellow tribesmen....Watch out, Yid. Zionism might proceed like Wilhelm Tell...and keep a second arrow in reserve. Should the first shot miss, the second will serve the cause of vengeance. Friends, Zionism’s second arrow will pierce the Yid’s chest’ (Herzl, “Mauschel” in *Die Welt*, 15 October 1897, quoted by Pawel 1989: 346).

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Herzl’s heady modernism, which combined the *desideratum* of collective transformation with the simultaneous extinction of what many considered medieval anachronisms - the mauschel and the anti-Semite, resonated strongly in the imaginations of those who prepared the ground for and began building of the state of Israel. Consensus that one of the fundamental purposes of the Jewish state was the destruction of a Jewishness its organisers considered archaic and distasteful survived seven stormy Zionist Congresses and the death of Herzl16. The Nazi Holocaust and Stalinist depradations exterminated a very large portion of eastern European Jewry, and various compromises made between eastern and western Zionist parties served to protect many of the cultural particularities of the surviving objects of the Herzlian project’s zeal. Zionism, if it were to retain the enemy whose extermination underwrote the project of Zionist transformation, would have therefore to rediscover the mauschel in another place. That place was the Middle East.

Israel, in the early years of its existence, endeavoured to ‘gather’ Jews from all over the worldwide diaspora, but particular attention was paid to Jews who had lived - in some cases for millennia - in the countries of the Middle East. Some of these were Sephardim - Jews originally from Spain who, after its fifteenth century *reconquista* and its attendant religious ‘purification’, had been scattered throughout North Africa - while others were
Mizrachim - Jews who had, in many cases since the time of the Babylonian exile, lived in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and other sites as far flung as Ethiopia. Israel worked out various ways of bringing these ‘eastern Jews’ out of their natal countries and into the new world in which they were to be transformed into Israelis; in some cases it negotiated population transfers by economic and political trade and in others, as with Iran, it orchestrated apparent anti-Jewish activities so as to frighten well-established communities into leaving (Giladi 1990: 67-102). When these people arrived in Israel, often in mass population transfers, they were treated as mauschel - archaic, ghettoised Jews with no sense of modernity, of identity, of civilisation - and the state immediately set in train processes of remaking them as human beings, as Europeans. The tragedy is that in most cases they were not what modernizing Zionism needed them to be. They were very often wrenched out of societies in which they had belonged to well-integrated, sophisticated and relatively wealthy urban elites only to be plunged into state-orchestrated collective projects designed to transform them into something approximating the pathetic, unsophisticated and uncivilised anachronisms the modernizing project needed as raw material. Giladi describes the process of stripping them of status and dignity as one of proletarianization: ‘they had to be degraded and their identity and dignity destroyed to make them so desperate for work that they would be grateful to the establishment for giving them menial jobs’ (Giladi 1990: 95).

In planning for the establishment of a Jewish state Herzl had detailed the ways in which immigrants would be brought into the country and initiated into their new lives: ‘Clothing, underlinen, and shoes will first of all be manufactured for our own poor emigrants, who will be provided with new suits of clothing at the various European emigration centres... Even the new clothing of the poor settlers will have a symbolic meaning. “You are now entering on a new life.” The Society of Jews will see to it that long
before the departure and also during the journey a serious yet festive spirit is fostered by means of prayers, popular lectures, instruction on the object of the expedition, directions on hygienic matters for their new places of residence, and guidance in regard to their future work. On their arrival, the emigrants will be welcomed by our chief officials with due solemnity, but without foolish exultation, for the Promised Land will not yet have been conquered. But these poor people should already see that they are at home’ (Herzl 1993: 46).

Gideon Giladi’s interview of an Iraqi Jew who had emigrated to Israel in 1948 presents this process of ‘homecoming’ as it was experienced by one of the beneficiaries of such charity:

‘We were wearing our Sabbath clothing. We thought as the plane landed that Israel would welcome us warmly. But goodness how wrong we were. When the plane had landed at Lod airport, a worker approached us and sprayed us all over with DDT, as if we were lice-infested. What sort of welcome was that? We thought they were spitting in our faces. When we disembarked from the plane, they herded us into a train, which was so crowded that we were stepping on each other and our fine clothes were dirtied. My husband was crying and so was I. Then the children started crying and our sobs went up to heaven and cast a pall over the train. Since it was a freight train it had no electric light, but as it sped along we thought of the death trains which had taken European Jews to the Nazi camps. Finally we reached the “Sha’ar Ha’aliya” camp and we were taken in with other families, then they wrote down our names and “gave” us new Hebrew names. “Said” became “Hayyim”, “Su’ad” became “Tamar”, and I was renamed “Ahuva” and so on. Then we had to wait in long food queues as though we were beggars....Sha’ar Ha’aliya Camp had been a British army detention centre before it became an immigration camp. The Israeli security authorities had reinforced the camp’s security by doubling the height of barbed wire around it and installing a direct telephone link to the Israeli police in Haifa port. There
was a police force of sixty constables, four sergeants and an officer to supervise the immigrants who were housed in tents or tin-roofed barracks. As I wandered amongst these tents an elderly Iraqi way-laid me. “I have just one question”, he said, “are we immigrants or prisoners of war?” My tongue was tied and I could not reply’ (Giladi 1990: 103-104; see also Alcalay 1993: 37-38).

Here, in the opening stages of a process designed to cleanse the new immigrants of the culture they came with, the language they spoke with, and to a large degree even the memories with which they had made sense of their lives, we witness the violent consequences of a situation in which Europeans Jews who were trying to assimilate into Enlightenment models saw themselves as primarily threatened by another form of Judaism which was both part of them and something which radically undermined the identities they wanted to establish for themselves. This conception of identity informed the setting up of a state designed to overcome that ‘bad self’ - even if that bad self had in effect to be invented so that that state could ideologically legitimate itself. Israel, which posed itself as bringing the Jews of the European diaspora back to their true selves as proud Europeans, in fact created two major exilic populations from out of the indigenous populations of the region in which the state was founded. One of these - forced into literal exile outside of Palestine as well as into effective exile from their homeland within the borders (legal and illegal) of the Israeli state - is of course the Palestinians who could not by definition exist as a people on the territory of what the Zionist settlers saw as ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’. The other exilic population created by the return from exile of the European Jews was the Jews already resident in the Middle East who, by being invented as necessary antagonists by the incoming Europeans and thus subjected to the cultural genocide that underlay those ‘returnees’s’ programmes of self realization, were forced into living in a Jewish state which proved to them a more radical exile than anything they had previously experienced.
When one imagines a landscape or a territory, what one imagines is a *mise-en-scene* - a place in which one can envision oneself as being able to enact certain kinds of activities. With home lands imagined from exile we encounter *mise-en-scenes* constituted as sites where exiles will be able to be themselves because the antagonisms which prevent self-realization in exile will have been disappeared. My argument is, however, that images of essential identity - of who people *really* are - are themselves constructed as responses to encounters with antagonisms. These images are already so constitutively involved with the antagonists which they are imagined to counter that when exiles come to play out their ‘real’ selves ‘at home’ they can only recognise those selves when invoking those antagonists. When, therefore, exiles return to what they envisage as their homelands what they most often end up doing is re-establishing once again the terrain of the exilic space in which they came into self-consciousness. A fundamental part of that space is the antagonistic other, and if that other has not followed them home from exile they have to find an other to take its place.

**ENDNOTES**
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See my examination below of Liisa Malkki’s 1995 work on Hutu refugees as well as my “‘A country of words’: conceiving the Palestinian nation from the position of exile” (Bowman 1994). The version of this paper presented at Birzeit concluded by examining relations between indigenous Palestinians and the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation after the latter’s 1994 return to the West Bank and Gaza.

At the core of my thinking on this problematic is the Hegelian concept of antagonism as elaborated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).

I am not here referring to one’s response to the demand of a bureaucratic
apparatus for self-designation (Family Name: ** Given Name: ** Ethnic Group: **) but to the way in which members of a community coming to see itself as an entity term themselves ‘Palestinian’, ‘Kurdish’, ‘Armenian’ or the like to counter another’s naming which in effect disallows the practices of being which characterize that group’s experience.

5

Malkki carried out her fieldwork in 1985, and as her book was coming to press further violence broke out in Burundi with more Tutsi violence against Hutus. That 1993 violence destabilised neighbouring Rwanda setting off there the Hutu violence against the Tutsis which shocked the world in 1994 and 1995.

6

See Ahlstrom 1993, Davies 1992, Garbini 1988, Lemche 1988 and Thompson 1992 for general histories of ancient Israel by those their critics call ‘minimalists’. Their critical attitudes towards the historicity of biblical texts, and their insistence on Old Testament ‘narratives’ being evaluated in terms not only of anthropological and archaeological evidence but also narratological and ideological critiques, may ‘not [have] gained general assent [but]...have begun to make contemporary scholars who attempt to reconstruct ancient Israelite history much more aware of the fundamental problems involved in their task’ (Brettler 1999: 48). Miller and Hayes’ comprehensive edited work (Miller and Hayes 1977) predates these volumes
but manifests awareness of emergent tendencies in the new historiography of ancient Israel, while Amelie Kuhrt’s recent history of the ancient Near East incorporates substantial elements of the new approach (Kuhrt 1995).

The Deuteronomic core, allegedly ‘found’ during Josiah’s reformation of Judah’s cultic practices, is now widely accepted to have been forged to legitimate that programme in the context of the development of nationalistic consciousness during the breakup of Assyrian hegemony in the wider region (see Cohn 1993: 142, Kuhrt 1995: 422, Lang 1983: 39, Lemche 1988: 168 –171 and Oded 1977: 461).

Norman Whybray’s response to the work of Lemche and fellow travellers is indicative: ‘a group of scholars has been telling us that the Old Testament is almost (if not quite) useless as a source of information about the history of ancient Israel. Since the Old Testament is in fact the only ancient source of information that we possess about the history of ancient Israel, this judgment, if true, would appear to wipe out an entire nation from world history; indeed, some scholars appear now to question whether there ever existed a kingdom (or kingdoms) with the name Israel’ (Whybray 1999: 181). Lemche and Davies defend their approach in the same volume (Lemche 1999 and Davies 1999).
'In other Near Eastern societies political misfortunes might be interpreted as signs of divine displeasure – but not such misfortunes as descended on the people of Israel in the period of Assyrian domination. When a people experienced such overwhelming military defeats and such total political subjugation, the obvious conclusion was drawn: its patron deity was recognised as weaker than the patron deity of the conqueror. And once discredited, a god or goddess was soon neglected and forgotten’ (Cohn 1993: 143).

As Norman Cohn indicates ‘the diaspora had come to stay – and that, no doubt, is why it is customary at this point to drop the term “Israelites”, with its territorial associations, in favour of the term “Jews”’ (Cohn 1993: 157).

See Laqueur 1972: 3–39 on intermarriage and integration in western and central Europe generally. Kornberg indicates that, in Germany and Austria at least, intermarriage ‘meant, practically speaking, that the family would be non-Jewish. In Austria in the 1880s intermarriage between Jews and Christians was disallowed by law. Either conversion by one partner or a willingness by one of the partners to accept the social and career impediments of *konfessionslos* (without religious affiliation) status was a prerequisite. Intermarriage involved either religious disaffiliation or integrating Jews into formal membership in a state–established Christianity.’ (Kornberg 1995: 25–26).
Freud, in a letter to Fluss of 18 September 1872 described Eastern Jews he’d recently seen (he refers to their accent as *mauscheln*): ‘he was cut from the cloth which fate makes swindlers when the time is ripe: cunning, mendacious, kept by his adoring relatives in the belief that he is a great talent, but unprincipled and without character....I have enough of this lot. Madame Jewess and family hailed from Meseritsch: the proper compost heap for this sort of weed’ (quoted in Gilman 1993: 13). See also Laqueur 1972: 56–61 and Kornberg 1995: 22–24.

As opposed to earlier Russian movements, which contended that when Jews gathered together as self-sustaining groups a real and undistorted Jewish spirit would emerge, Zionism contended that the state – operating according to principles mapped out for it by an enlightened minority – would shape a new Jew: ‘the notion that Jewish faults stemmed from their exclusion from the political sphere and could be cured by full citizenship was a keystone of this ideology....Herzl believed that a Jewish state would transform Jews because states, out of utilitarian self interest, required subjects who were productive and who possessed civic virtue and soldierly courage. The state’s need to secure and even enhance its power led it to confer status on those who served it, honor physical courage, and bestow glory on its fallen. Jews had been deprived of the benefits of the state as educator: we “have inwardly gone to rack and ruin for there has been no one
to train us to become real men, even if only out of imperial selfishness” [Complete Diaries I, 19]’ (Kornberg 1993: 161 and 166).

14 ‘Chromatic function’, the Darwinian conception of adaptive mimicry, was a topic of contemporary debate and discussion; Nietzsche in 1881 writes of how ‘animals learn to master themselves and alter their form, so that many, for example, adapt their colourings to the colouring of their surroundings (by virtue of the so-called “chromatic function”), pretend to be dead or assume the forms and colours of another animal or of sand, leaves, lichen, fungus (what English researchers designate "mimicry"). Thus the individual hides himself in the general concept “man”, or in society” (Nietzsche 1982: 20).

15 The policy of unpaid labour of the Jewish Company (that agency charged with developing the infrastructure of the coming state) ensures that the worst traits of the mauschel will be extinguished: ‘The company will thus make it impossible from the outset for those of our people, who are perforce hawkers and pedlars here, to re-establish themselves in the same trades over there. And the company will also keep back drunkards and dissolute men’ (Herzl 1993: 37). ‘Redemption through labour’ was a major plank of Zionism evident, for instance, in the central tenet of Poale Zion, the Russian Zionist movement, that only a return to the soil could redeem the Jewish people. For the Jews of the Second Aliya, the first Zionist emigration
to Palestine (1904–1906), ‘manual labour...was not a necessary evil but an absolute moral value, a remedy to cure the Jewish people of its social and national ills’ (Laqueur 1972: 281).
16

See Golden 1996 on the way this programme reveals itself in the aesthetics of Tel Aviv's Museum of the Jewish Diaspora.
17