
Precis: this paper examines the processes through which nationalist movements developed among both the Palestinian people and those national communities which made up the late Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia so as to examine the role played by 'antagonism' in what the paper terms the 'nationalist imaginary'. Fundamental to the text's respective analyses of nation formation and state dissolution is the concept that the imagined violence of a national enemy is at the core of the 'defensive' mobilisations we call nationalisms. This idea that the 'inside' of identity formation is not only shaped by but also grounded on the 'outside' of the perceived antagonism of an other poses a substantial challenge to essentialist conceptions of the various modalities of communal identities.

In this paper I will argue that violence is not simply a device nationalists of certain persuasions take up in pursuit of their ends, but that it plays a constitutive role in the formation of all nationalisms. The violence which engenders nationalism is not, however, the violence the imagined community of the future nation turns against its 'enemies' but the violence members of that not-yet-existent nation perceive as inflicted upon them by others they recognise as making it impossible for them to exist in anything other than the embrace of an independent state. The future nation of the nationalist imaginary functions as an antidote to a violence which threatens the survival of persons who did not, prior to its advent, conceive of themselves as members of a distinct community, much less a nation in waiting. Decisions about what strategies - violent or otherwise - are appropriate to achieving national independence follow from the recognition that such independence is the only guarantor of individual, and collective, survival. Although I will, in the following analyses, demonstrate the ways 'defensive' violences are variously articulated in response to constitutive violences, such strategies are not the focus of this paper. Instead I will concentrate, through investigations of the generation of nationalist movements in the Israeli-Occupied Territories and what is now 'Former Yugoslavia', on the way perceptions of a violence afflicting a diverse range of persons give rise to a concept of a 'national enemy' and, through that concept, to the idea of solidarity with the nation that enemy opposes.

In investigating the way the Palestinian people came into being as a result of the project of nation formation the Zionist movement successfully carried out on the land the 'Palestinians' had occupied long before they thought of themselves as 'Palestinians' and the way Yugoslavians came to see themselves not as conationals within an existent state but as members of opposed national communities unnaturally forced to co-exist under the tyranny of an imposed federation, I will emphasise that national identity is an historical construct which emerges from a reformulation of one's relation to a social field rather than something essential and non-contingent. Furthermore, by stressing the role played by the perceived violence of an other in formulating that identity I will criticise the material determinism of nation theorists such as Benedict Anderson who argue that the emergence of national consciousness simply reflects developments in systems of communication and exchange (Anderson 1991: 37-46 and *passim*). Mandate Palestine and pre-dissolution Yugoslavia were - in terms of the
development of print culture and trans-regional economies - 'modernised' to extents quite capable of supporting nationalist consciousnesses prior to the articulations of Palestinian, Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian nationalisms, but these national movements did not emerge until antagonisms between groups occupying those territories were interpreted in ways which split the field of sociality into domains of the nation and its enemy. I contend, therefore, that while the development of modes of communication enabling dispersed members of a community to conceive of others sharing with them a common language and a common territory was an essential prerequisite of being able to imagine an extended community, this development was not in itself enough to promulgate nationalist consciousness. Communication might suffice to promote an abstract idea of community, but it was the matter communicated which transformed that abstraction into something with which to identify and for which to struggle. For nationalism to arise it was vital that one not only had to see one's identity as integrally linked with that of the wider community but also had to sense that that community, and the identity with which it provided oneself, were at risk. Palestinians, especially after the creation of the state of Israel drove a majority of them into diaspora, rarely (if ever) became Arab nationalists despite their sharing the Arabic language and the Arabic press with other Arabic-reading communities; they became anti-Zionists because they recognised the role of Israel in the dispossession of themselves and other 'Palestinians' who suffered from the anti-Palestinian violence central to the Zionist project. Serbs and Croats were not united in imagined community by their mutual use of Serbo-Croatian and their shared access to a Yugoslav press; despite (and through) that shared medium they came to conceive of each other as blood enemies who had to wage war for the defence of their respective national identities. In each instance, it was stories of violence carried through those media which enabled members of the respective groups to recognise in those scenarios violences like those they suffered and enemies like those who tormented them. Identity, in other words, emerged from identification, and the idea of the nation was generated as a fantasy of the utopic space to be occupied by all those who suffered 'the same' violence at the hands of the enemy after that enemy and its violence are extirpated.

The focus of this paper is, therefore, on the constitution of what I will term the nationalist imaginary. The nationalist imaginary is a discursive structure which emerges out of particular interpretations of violences encountered by those persons who come to see themselves, in its terms, as members of the future nation. It serves to articulate most, if not all, of the antagonisms encountered by those diverse persons as manifestations of the violence of a shared enemy which, in opposing all of them, simultaneously renders all of them 'the same'. As a consequence it presents the contemporary world as divided in a Manichaean manner between the good, but threatened, community of 'us' and the evil community of a 'them' which exists solely to destroy 'us'. Although there tends, in the nationalist articulations discussed below, to be a utopic future state imagined in which all of the other's antagonism will have been elided, the chief emphasis of the nationalist imaginary is on the contemporary struggle to expel or extinguish the sources of constitutive violence. It is, in other words, a logic of mobilisation and as such gives rise to practices which transform the worlds both of
the imagined community and those it wages nationalist struggle against. Thus, although the logic which demands an absolute distinction between the good space of the nation-to-be and the negative space of its other may be fantastical, it nonetheless constructs a reality around that opposition (cf. Taussig 1987: 3-36 and Kapferer 1988: 1-26). In studying the genesis of the nationalist imaginary the analyst must attempt to discern the historical contexts and social processes which give rise to the nationalist imaginary, but must not assume that such an understanding dissolves that discursive structure. People caught up in the logic of nationalism may be engaged in playing out a fantasy but that fantasy is nonetheless real in its ability to conceive a coherent world and give rise to real acts of violence and resistance. Louis Althusser, precariously balanced on the border separating Marxist positivism from discourse analysis, defined ideology as "a 'representation' of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (Althusser 1971: 152). As I will demonstrate in the following analyses, nationalism may provide 'imaginary' solutions to real problems, but such solutions engender real situations of violence and inter-communal warfare.

In the early years of the twentieth century, there were neither 'Palestinians' nor a Palestinian national movement. This was not, as Joan Peters argued in From Time Immemorial, because Arabs only emigrated into Palestine from surrounding countries after 1920 to take advantage of economic opportunities opened by Zionist settlement (Peters 1984) but because the indigenous occupants of the region the British conquered in 1917 and named Palestine had no conception of themselves as a single community. The millet system through which the Ottoman Empire had previously administered the region functioned by juridically dividing the population into autonomous religious enclaves which provided their members with legal identity and social support (see Asali 1989: 206, Abu-Jaber 1967 and Cohen and Lewis 1978). Such a separation of communities "precluded concern for, or even interest in, any people but those of one's own religious community" (Betts 1975: 112). Among the rural peasantry the tradition of a thousand year conflict between Qais and Yemini provided a categorical opposition allowing communities caught up in local conflicts to articulate their mutual antagonism in terms drawn from the time of Muhammad (see Tamari 1982: 181-185, Hourani 1991: 30 and Lapidus 1988: 363). In the cities families and clans perceived friends and enemies in terms not only of sectarian affiliation or alliances in long-running feuds but also of the heated debate between 'Arab nationalists' and 'Ottomanists' (see Muslih 1988: 47-54 and 58-68, Lesch 1979: 23-74, Antonius 1938: 79-148 and Hourani 1991: 258-262). This multiplicity of available categories of identity served to articulate the disparate social and economic interests of relatively autonomous groups and thereby ensured that the community of 'Palestinians' could not recognise 'itself' as a community.

The development of a sense of a specific land, and of a people whose identity devolved from their residence within its borders, needed a powerful impetus to free itself from the domains of familial, sectarian, regional and economic identities and become amenable to integration within a nationalist discourse. That impetus was provided by the movement of substantial numbers of Jewish immigrants into the region in the period following the escalation of anti-semitic persecutions of Jews in
Russia (1881-1882). Jewish immigration changed the face of the land; between 1881 and 1922 the Jewish population more than tripled (rising from 24,000 in 1881 to 84,000 by 1922) and immense tracts of land were bought up by the Jewish colonies, often from absentee Arab landlords (Aaronsohn 1983, Abu-Lughod 1971 and Ruedy 1971). Arab peasants were driven off lands they had long inhabited and cultivated while others were denied their traditional grazing rights. In 1930 the Hope Simpson Report indicated that 29.4% of the rural population of the Mandated area was landless (cited in Ruedy 1971: 131). Many peasants emigrated to urban slums where they rarely found opportunities for employment. Throughout the twenties anti-Jewish rioting frequently broke out in the cities - particularly on occasions when religious festivities generated crowds - and these disturbances would often spread to the countryside where villagers, sparked by rumours of Jewish attacks on Arabs, would take up arms against local Jewish settlements (see Lesch 1979: 206). While there was a general sense among the rural peasantry and urban lumpenproletariat of being threatened by 'the Jews' this perception remained inchoate. The disquiet felt by small merchants and craft producers about the incursion of Jewish competitors into their economic domains (Scholch 1989: 243-245) was similarly only voiced among restricted circles of fellow tradespersons and thus remained unpolicitised.

The Palestinian elites, which traditionally provided the political leadership of the region, were unable to forge a vocabulary capable of designating Zionism as a common threat. Even when individual urban notables recognised the need to resist the steady expansion of Zionist settlement and immigration, they nonetheless attempted to articulate that threat in terms of earlier enunciations of identity and antagonism. Such expressions resparked antagonism between them and their potential allies across borders already inscribed in the Ottoman period by struggles between 'Ottomanists' and 'Arabists' and in the contemporary period by previous attempts to serve the interests of specific sectarian and family groups through attacking those of others. British diplomacy furthermore convinced most Palestinian politicians "that the Arabs' position in Palestine was not as severely threatened as they had initially feared, and therefore...[they should] grasp the available levers of power" (Lesch 1979: 99, see also Porath 1974: 241f).

The failure of the urban notables to provide a political vocabulary capable of enunciating the threat Zionist actions seemed to pose to the peasantry forced it to express its fear and its will to resist 'Jewish' violence in terms drawn from the idiom of its own traditions. In 1929, after the political initiatives of the urban leadership had collapsed in a fracas of factionalisms, major rioting broke out in Jerusalem when Jewish militants celebrating the Jewish fast of Tisha Bav (the destruction of the Temple) asserted claims to the Wailing Wall on the eve of the Muslim feast of Mawlad al-Nabi (the birth of the Prophet Muhammad). In the following two weeks Jewish communities (both Zionist and non-Zionist) were attacked throughout Palestine, leading to the destruction of four colonies as well as the murders of sixty Jewish residents of Hebron and twenty of Safed (see Lesch 1979 208-212 and Porath 1974: 258-273). The 'Wailing Wall Riots' were legitimated in Islamic terms but, as Nels Johnson points out, Islam provided a banner under which to fight not because of a deep investment of peasant subjectivity in religion but because religion was the only
idiom able to join a peasantry divided by regional, factional, kin and clan ties into a united front:

There is no doubt that the idea of *national* interests - even the idea of nation itself - were foreign to the Palestinian peasantry. The very name 'Palestine' was new and uncomfortable, as witnessed by the references to 'Southern Syria' as an appellation for the country in this and earlier periods. Ties of faction, clan and religion remained of greatest importance to the mass of Palestinians. Of these, faction, kin and clan ties had no utility as a symbolic armature on which to mold an ideology for mass resistance. If anything, they were a hindrance....Islam, however, was highly appropriate; faced with a foreign enemy of two different religions who sought domination over the second holiest land of the Faith, Islam provided the cultural categories, in the conceptual field of *jihād* [holy war], to encompass and organize resistance (Johnson 1982: 57, see also Tamari 1982).

Johnson, like Kalkas (1971) and Waines (1971), sees the Arab Revolt as a struggle mobilised by the device of religion towards ends which were inarticulately anti-colonial. The identity of the peasantry that rose up in 1929 - and later during the bloody Arab Revolt - was predicated on the antagonism it experienced as a consequence of British and Zionist colonisation. The first widespread manifestation of what later commentators have come to call 'Palestinian nationalism' was thus neither Palestinian nor nationalist; it was purely oppositional. "Palestinian nationalism was essentially nihilist in the sense that it contained no concept of the shape of future society but was concerned first and foremost with the destruction of European hegemony" (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, cited in Waines 1971: 220).

The Arab Revolt lacked either a coherent programme or a unified leadership and, although it lasted more than three years, tended to fragment into local skirmishes against perceived enemies who were often Palestinians on other sides of the *Qays-Yemini* divide. It also faced a well-organised enemy. Widescale mobilisation of the British military throughout Palestine defeated the revolt by killing and wounding between 4,007 (Government of Palestine 1946: 34-58) and 19,792 Palestinian casualties (Khalidi 1971: 846-849, see also Waines 1971: 234) and destroying rural and urban centres of resistance through aerial bombing, collective demolitions, and 'slum clearance' programmes. Despite this victory the British, weakened by the six year attrition of the Second World War and by the subsequent anti-British liberation struggle of Zionist irregulars, pulled out of Palestine in May 1948. A year of war between Arab and Israeli forces followed resulting, by July of 1949, in the State of Israel occupying 73% of what had been Mandate Palestine (the remaining territory - Gaza and the West Bank - was subsequently commandeered by Egypt and Jordan [see Hilal 1992]). 711,000 (82.6%) of the 861,000 Palestinian Arabs who had lived on the territory which became Israel were forced into exile outside its borders (Morris 1987: 297-298).

The *nakbah* ('catastrophe' in Palestinian Arabic) initiated nearly a decade's surcease in the elaboration of Palestinian political identity. "Military defeat and the destruction of the fabric of their society forced Palestinians to adjust either to varying
degrees and forms of statelessness or to citizenship in the new Israeli state" (Waines 1971: 207). Underlying this was the loss of reference points around which to reconstitute identities. In the refugee camps this experience was perhaps most radical; the loss of lands and properties as well as the dispersal of families and communities left the exiles in a virtual limbo. Rosemary Sayigh, who worked in the Lebanese refugee camps, described the experience of exile from the familiar habitus:

The village - with its special arrangements of houses and orchards, its open meeting places, its burial ground, its collective identity - was built into the personality of each individual villager to a degree that made separation like an obliteration of the self. In describing their first years as refugees, camp Palestinians use metaphors like 'death', 'paralysis', 'burial', 'non-existence', etc.... (Sayigh 1979: 107).

Palestinians of urban origins sought refuge within a network of well-to-do assimilationist expatriate communities scattered throughout the Middle East, Europe and the Americas (see Tamari 1982: 180, Lustick 1980: 48, and Brand 1988: 1-21). Those who remained in Israel proper experienced radical disruptions of their previous ways of living under the severe regime of military control Israel imposed on its internal enemies (Lustick 1980). Military authorities strove to enforce upon resident Palestinians even more radical forms of factionalisation than those which had prevailed before the upsurge of anti-colonialist mobilization (cf. Lustick 1989, Cohen 1965, Asad 1975 and Morris 1987). As a result of these diverse experiences communities in the various milieu of Palestinian life began to reconstitute themselves in relation to their settings rather than with reference to a shared 'Palestinian' identity (Bowman 1994a).

Curiously, it was after the destruction of any shared 'Palestinian' existence that the idea of a Palestinian identity per se came into play. The focus of this identity - the emblem which gave it coherence - was the Palestine Liberation Organisation. This extra-territorial organisation was originally established by the Arab League as a "gathering of traditional and influential notables" (Brand 1988: 28) capable of voicing Palestinian interests in the councils of the League. However, the debacle of the 1967 war - during which the rest of what had been Mandate Palestine was lost to Israel and another 200,000 Palestinians were made refugees - put paid to the illusion that Palestine could be redeemed by other Arab states and led to the 'hijacking' of the P.L.O. by Fatah, a political-commando group which had initially come together to resist Israel's occupation of Gaza during the Suez Crisis (Brand 1988: 26; see also Cobban 1984 and Gresh 1985 on the origins of the P.L.O.). As a guerilla organisation dedicated to military attacks on the State of Israel and its representatives, the P.L.O. was able to stand for Palestinians in exile and under occupation as a representation of their own desires to fight back against the forces which had dispossessed them. For the first time there was an objective correlate to Palestinians' disparate desires for restitution.

The fundamental reason the P.L.O. was able to serve as an icon of Palestinian identity was that it presented itself as representative of all of the diverse 'Palestinian' constituencies which had been disinherted by the creation of the Israeli state. Its programme was solely that of reconstituting a Palestinian national entity on the territory
of Mandate Palestine, and it made no effort to articulate the nature of that future entity save to say that it would be 'Palestinian'. 'Palestinians' were able to recognise themselves as addressed by the oppositional rhetoric of the P.L.O. insofar as that rhetoric did not specify any particular identity to its addressees other than their recognition of themselves as somehow stripped of their rights by the antagonism of the 'Zionist entity'.

The 'Palestine' the P.L.O. promised to redeem was of necessity a place which had never really existed; any accurate evocation of the Palestinian life which had preceeded the loss of the national territory was likely to evoke the inter-Palestinian conflicts which had helped to bring about that loss. Palestine as a 'national homeland' could thus only be conjured up through imagining a space in which the Palestinian people would have lived as a community if the enemy whose violence had created that community had not existed. Since the nation itself had not existed as an imagined community before its enemy came into view, the image of the nation and its population without the enemy had in effect to be called up ex nihilo. Creating a Palestinian history which was not that of the struggle against Zionism demanded a reading back into pre-Israeli Palestinian history of a consensus which did not preexist that struggle. This is evident in Palestinian evocations of Jerusalem's Old City as a place where Christian and Muslim Palestinians mutually respected and engaged in each other's religious traditions 'until the strangers came' (see also Tamari 1992 on the post-1967 elevation of the peasant into an icon of Palestinian identity from its previous status as an easy object for the scorn of the urban intelligentsia). Palestinian community and Palestinian history were constituted through antagonism to an enemy which had, by stealing the ground on which a nation might have been built, destroyed the possibility of 'Palestine' before it had ever been conceived. Thus any evocation of the nation's pre-Zionist community had to appear as something like Holbein's anamorphic 'The Ambassadors' in which the blurred image at the heart of the picture is revealed, when looked at through a special lens, to be a death's head.

By presenting its programme as the inverse of that of the Zionist state builders the P.L.O. provided a space of identification for all those who felt they had lost their identities as a result of Zionism's success. They could see in the P.L.O.'s project the negation of the negation which had opened them to the various violences which afflicted them. In this national imaginary all Palestinians were 'the same' insofar as all of them - as Palestinians - could recognise their true selves as mutilated and denied by the violence of the Zionist enemy (cf. Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 129-130, and Bauman 1989: 26-27). However, Palestinians in the various locales of their dispossession experienced the impossibility of Palestinian identity in a number of diverse ways and the particular forms of violence through which Zionism's generalised antagonism was made manifest led Palestinians in various sites to elaborate strategies of survival and resistance specific to those violences (Bowman 1993a, 1993b, and 1994a). The strategies of the fedayeen (guerillas) of the Middle Eastern refugee camps differed in method and motive as substantially from those of the samidin (those who 'stood fast' on the land) of the Occupied Territories as they did from those of the bureaucrats, businessmen and cosmopolitan intellectuals of the urban diaspora. All worked to 'negate' the activities of the enemy and its allies, but the forms of negation (from
terroristic 'erasure' through passive resistance to intellectual and diplomatic revisionism) were formed in response to the specificities of the violences their formulators encountered. The P.L.O. subsidised and supported this diversity of communities and maintained their respective organisations (see Cobban 1984: 26) and was thus able to claim a wide range of 'defensive' responses to Zionism as its own. Thus the actions of each community and its representative organisations answered to their respective needs to resist specific antagonisms while serving, for other communities in different situations, as signs of a generalised Palestinian resistance to the enemies of Palestine. Dispersion has meant that the actions each group has carried out have not interfered in any immediate way with the interests of other groups in other situations.

Ironically, concrete moves towards a settlement with Israel effected by the success of the intifada have shattered that general consensus by bringing into view the possibility of an actual State of Palestine. During the long period of their exile, Palestinians have diversely imagined what their nation could be if the antagonisms which prevented it were to disappear. Whatever the specificities of these redemption images, every Palestinian saw a place for himself or herself in a 'reborn' state of Palestine. However, as the project of Palestinian postitivity begins to near fruition, the abstract concept of the 'Palestine' which was lost begins to take on discernable form. The concretisation of the 'symbol' of Palestine in the shape of a 'statelet' in the rump of what was Mandate Palestine gives little pleasure to those who fled the area when Israel took control of it. Now, with the P.L.O. negotiating with the Israeli State over which territories will be marked as 'Palestinian' and which permanently surrendered to Israel, many Palestinians from the diaspora and the territories themselves feel betrayed by a leadership they previously revered. Edward Said, one of those Palestinians who has watched the P.L.O. accept that his birthplace will never be Palestinian, recently accused the P.L.O. of betraying "the diaspora Palestinians, who originally brought Arafat and the PLO to power, kept them there, and are now relegated to permanent exile or refugee status" (Said 1993: 5). Others within the Israeli Occupied Territories who have been crippled by Israeli 'rubber bullets' or have seen friends and family members die fighting for Palestinian freedom now fear that they, and the country they suffered to bring into being, are being sold out by their leadership.

At the moment the boundary dividing the antagonist from the objects of its violence breaks down, the consensus on identity discursively structured around that antagonism loses its coherence. The wide field of Palestinian experience was 'fixed' by a perceived antagonism which made the various experiences of those who occupied it coherent in nationalist terms. When perceptions of the nature of that antagonism are transformed by events such as that of the Oslo agreement, various occupants of the formerly 'sutured' field find that former enemies have become allies and, respectively, that former allies appear as antagonists. Here the apparent 'disappearance' of the constitutive antagonism can only lead to new searches for matrices of identification. The responses of those in diaspora and those in the Territories who see Arafat as having 'sold them out' are not radical reconfigurations of Palestinian identity; in these instances the fantasy of the nation is still viable but persons who were previously deemed allies in the struggle to recover it are now seen as traitors who have gone over...
to the enemy. Largely 'external' secular nationalist groups like the Progressive and Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P. and D.F.L.P.) as well as radical factions which have broken away from the P.L.O. 'inside' may now turn their violences against *Fatah* as well as against the Israelis, but they are still working within the nationalist idiom. More salient evidence of the restructuring of identities is the growing influence of *Hamas* (an acronym for the 'Islamic Resistance Movement'), an Islamicist movement which has declared that the secular nationalist strategies of the P.L.O. and its affiliates have always been doomed to failure because they fundamentally misconstrue the struggle against the Jews as a secular, rather than a religious, conflict (on *Hamas* see Abu-Amr 1993, Taraki 1989, Legrain 1990 and 1991, and Bowman 1993a: 442-443 and 451-453). For *Hamas* activists the fight for the redemption of Palestine is a religious conflict fought in the military and political domain "in the defense of Palestine, God's blessed country and that of the prophets, eternal property (*waqf*) of the Islamic community" (Hamas 1988: 11). In the *Hamas* Covenant Palestine's legitimate inhabitants are not 'Palestinians' but 'Muslims' - members of the Islamic *umma* (community). Hamas's redefinition of the struggle is thus as well a redefinition of the imagined community engaged in that struggle. This shift in the field of identity causes Christian Palestinians to query what sort of role they might play in a Palestinian entity in which a movement which tends to consider 'Palestinian' as synonymous with 'Islamic' has substantial influence. As Palestinians who have played a central role in the national liberation struggle both inside the borders of Mandate Palestine and in diaspora, Christians can imagine playing an important part in building up a Palestinian state; as Christians living within a state which can be imagined as adopting Islamic identity and law, they have little if any prospects for the future.

The *Hamas* solution, which strives to recuperate 'older' models of identity and thus to exclude both secularists and Christians from the imagined community, is one new imagining of the 'nation'. Another, that adopted by the secular rejectionists, is to assert that nothing has changed in the nature of Israeli antagonism but that a number of former co-nationals have become traitors and aligned with the enemy. The P.L.O. however asserts that the 'enemy' has tempered its violence and dropped its antagonism. Its suggestion that the boundary separating 'Palestinian' from 'Israeli' is no longer the most salient thing in Palestinian life opens two alternatives for Palestinian identification. One is that national identity ceases to be the central focus in the lives of the people who come to make up the nation, and various more local forms of identification struggle for representation within the parameters of a democratic state and in association with others (including Israelis) outside its boundaries. The other alternative is the advent of 'civil war' within the Palestinian community as the P.L.O. and its Palestinian opponents fight to decide the nature of the real 'Palestine'. On one side would be Arafat and the P.L.O. engaged in organising a repressive state mobilised against 'internal traitors' and on the other groups opposed to peace with Israel who view the P.L.O. as a tool expropriated by the enemy and turned against the Palestinian people.

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In the Palestinian instance we have seen how the violence of an other prompts
both the ‘invention’ of a national identity and the articulation of a national politics capable of promoting that identity; in the instance of Former Yugoslavia we can observe how the politics of an already established state are discursively transformed through the elaboration and promulgation of stories of the violence of ‘others’ previously perceived as neighbours and co-nationals.

The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was an explicitly anti-nationalist state formed in response to the crises nationalisms had forced on Yugoslavia before and during the Second World War. Between December 1918 and the Nazi invasion of April 1941, an earlier ‘Yugoslavia’ - known as "The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" - had consolidated the diverse national movements of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs within the framework of a single state. This formation had, however, been highly unstable; the representatives of the three narods ('nations' or 'peoples') who had joined to create it had different and in large part incompatible reasons for uniting. Slovenes wanted a state to guarantee political autonomy to Slovene-speaking peoples formerly under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; Croats wanted self-determination for Croat-speaking Catholics which entailed independence from that same empire as well as protection from the expansionist nationalism of the Hungarian 'Magyars'; Serbs wanted all Serbs - especially those living outside the borders of the Serbian kingdom established in 1867 after Ottoman dominion was thrown off - to enjoy union under a single state (Pavlowitch 1988: 2-4). The kingdom’s twenty-three years were scored with assassinations, coups and the violences of nationalist movements fighting to seize the state for their own respective peoples, but it survived until the Nazis broke up Yugoslavia and diversely promoted incompatible national aspirations as a means of dividing and ruling the area. The consequences were dire: the Ustaša operated death camps within which massive numbers of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Croat communists and democrats were brutally slaughtered; Ustaša and četnici ('Chetniks') respectively carried out wholesale massacres of Serbian and Muslim civilian populations; and the communist partisans, 'cleaning up' as the war closed, massacred large numbers of 'Chetnik' Serbs and Croat and Slovene 'traitors'. All in all, at least 1,014,000 of a pre-war population of 17,186,000 were killed during the war (Banać 1992: 18) and, according to Paul Garde, eighty percent of the deaths were inflicted on Yugoslavs by Yugoslavs (Garde 1992). "During the Second World War the conquerors not only destroyed the state, but they set its components against each other in an unprecedented way, for never before had there been physical conflict among the Yugoslav peoples as such" (Pavlowitch 1988: 14).

Tito, who had mobilised wartime resistance through "a National Liberation Anti-Fascist Front of all the peoples of Yugoslavia regardless of party or religion" (Clissold 1966: 216), maintained emphasis on pan-Yugoslav confederation in the post-war period by stressing bratstvo i jedinstvo ('brotherhood and unity'). When Tito first used the phrase in 1942 it was not simply 'brotherhood and unity' but 'armed brotherhood and unity' (Godina 1998) and throughout his long rule Tito stressed that the space of Yugoslav federation was a good space endangered by an antagonistic outside. That the border between inside and outside was Titoism's essential ideological plank is made clear by the fact that, as in Orwell's 1984, the external threat continuously shifted its character and its source. From the initial opposition to fascism
which gave Tito and the partisans power, Tito oscillated over the years between emphasising "the Soviet threat" (Auty 1966: 247) and the threat of 'the capitalist West'. While the interests of the nation - and of the various peoples who constituted it - were always presented as threatened by the conspiracies of a labile set of enemies located outside Yugoslavia's territorial, and ideological, borders (Pavlowitch 1988: 22-25), there was no indeterminacy about what threatened Yugoslavia from within. Nationalism for Tito's Yugoslavia was a symptom of what the deconstructivists refer to as a "constitutive outside" (see Derrida 1974: 39-44 and Staten 1985: 16-19); it provided evidence of the attempts of external enemies to subvert the integrity of the space internal to the federation. Throughout all the discursive transformations of the external enemy, nationalism remained firmly fixed as the way external antagonisms were made manifest 'inside' through the perfidy of 'domestic traitors'.

Communist policy did not outlaw national identity but attempted to discursively reformulate it. For Titoism nationalism expressed a politico-economical will to power through which "one society aspires to dominate, exploit or despoil the others" (Ramet 1992: 55). The state therefore worked to dissolve the national aspirations through, on the one hand, devolving economic power to the community level where worker's collectives would cohere around aspirations for mutual economic betterment (see Simmie 1991 on self-management) and, on the other hand, breaking up the political and economic power blocs of the dominant 'republics' (particularly that of Serbia) through the creation of new nationalities (such as those of the 'Macedonians', 'Montenegrins' as well as the 'Muslims'), later enshrined in the 1967 constitution - see Allcock 1992: 278, 282-283) and the devolution of authority to autonomous regions (as with 'the Vojvodina' and 'Kosova' which were progressively carved out of Serbia between the early 1960s and 1972). The federal state protected the rights of narods (nations) and narodnosti (national minorities) and strove, through differential policies of appropriation and distribution of resources, to lift the poorer republics up the the economic level of the wealthier ones. Titoism was founded on the assumption that economic and political homogenisation would lead to the withering away of national differences (and hence of nationalisms) and the enshrinement of a workers' state.

Paul Schoup points out, however, that the system could only work "as long as the communist system in Yugoslavia retained its revolutionary dynamic, or was perceived to be imperilled from without" (Shoup 1992: 52). In the 1980s that dynamic collapsed and the external threat which consolidated the inside came to be interpreted as the threat of the state's policies to the good interior of the nations themselves. The death of Tito and the collapse of the Yugoslav economy challenged the hegemony of Yugoslav ideology. In the popular imagination Tito had been "a symbol of a Yugoslav style that had less to do with socialism, self-management and non-alignment than with freedom of movement, the advent of the consumer society, and fending for oneself" (Pavlowitch 1988: 27). His death coincided with the collapse of the debt-ridden economy which had artificially maintained the style of living he represented. In the early eighties international debts began to be called in and harsh IMF policies were imposed on Yugoslavia. As a result unemployment had surged by 1984 to fifteen percent, inflation was topping sixty two percent and the average standard of living had dropped thirty percent from its 1980 level (see Pavlowitch 1988: 31 and Mencinger
1991: 76-79). Central state policies began to be seen not to defend the people and their standard of living but to be attacking them; in the early eighties a wide range of assertions - expressed in idioms ranging the economic and political to those of art and culture (Mastnak 1991) - began to articulate perceptions of the antagonism of the state to the people.

These expressions did not, however, fall 'naturally' into a nationalist idiom. Tito's anti-nationalist policies and the modernization processes which had accompanied them had to a large extent submerged the idiom of national identity beneath a flood of contending discourses on selfhood. Tito's above-mentioned 'invention' of nationalities had succeeded in dispersing identities across a wider national field than had operated when one was either Slovene, Croat or Serb. The ethnic isolation which had characterised largely rural Yugoslavia prior to the foundation of the communist state had in large part been dispelled by rural migration to the cities and to areas 'outside' Yugoslavia where money could be earned (Pavlowitch 1988: 22). In the cities a trans-Yugoslav cosmopolitanism had developed around work, education and cross-marriage (Cottrell 1990). The violence of the state was not initially perceived as inflicted upon one's national being; it appeared, in a much less ethnocentric manner, to attack people's abilities to earn and save money, play or listen to rock music, call for greater representation in political forums, and so on. All Yugoslavians were afflicted by the declining standard of living and the clumsy moves of the state to enforce cultural and economic homogeneity during this period. Within the republics the state's antagonism to personal fulfillment struck at all residents, regardless of whether or not they were of the ethnic majority.

The discursive shift to nationalist discourse occurred through the intervention of republican politicians who created 'national' platforms from whence they could launch bids to increase their holds on power in a Yugoslav state characterised, after the death of Tito, by a vacuum at the political centre. To gain power they had to consolidate their holds on the dispersed dissatisfactions of the "apocalypse culture" (Ramet 1985) which followed the breakdown of Titoist hegemony, and they did so by inventing ethnically-defined constituencies to represent. Slobodan Milošević, a banker who became head of the Belgrade city council in 1984 before meteorically rising to the post of president of Serbia in 1987, used Tito's own rhetoric of 'internal enemies' to create a domain of 'Serbian interests' for which he could speak. Through a carefully mediated media campaign he alerted Serbs within the Serbian republic to the danger posed to their well-being and rights by the presence of Kosovans (ethnic Albanians who made up ninety percent of the population of the autonomous region of Kosovo) within the borders of Serbia. Kosova was the poorest region of Yugoslavia and the substantial financial and political support Kosovans had been granted by the state to raise their standards of living could be cited, after the disappearance of Yugoslavia's wealth, as a 'drain' on the well-being of other republics. Milošević, however, did not limit his attacks on the Kosovans to the domain of the economic, but accused them of being blood enemies of the Serbian people per se. Milošević repeatedly announced an active assault by Kosovans on the 'body' of Serbia: they were said to rape Serbian girls as well as nuns in the Orthodox monasteries of Kosova (monasteries which stand in the Serbian imaginary as monuments to a Greater Serbia destroyed by the late fourteenth
century Ottoman invasion), to raze and desecrate those Orthodox holy places, and to
drive Serbs living in Kosova out of their homes so that they could be taken over as
residences for the fast-breeding Kosovan population as well as for the illegal Albanian
immigrants they encouraged (Salecl 1993: 79-81).

Milošević turned the Titoist rhetoric of internal enemies to nationalist use by
suggesting that Albanians 'inside' Serbia would make it impossible for Serbian
individuals to live as Serbs on Serbian ground. The threat of Kosova was not explicitly
a threat to the lives of Serbs but a threat to their ability to manifest their national
characteristics. Images of raped women, whether laicy or nuns, struck at the heart of a
strongly patriarchal society in suggesting enemies could 'steal' the 'vessels' through
which, in the case of lay women, men transmitted their identity to future generations
and, in the case of nuns, the wider community of Serbs established kinship links with
God by 'marrying' their sisters to Christ. Stories of Serbs driven out of their homes by
rapacious Kosovans similarly assualted the sensed security of a community in which
family and family life were central markers of identity while the 'attacks' by Muslims
on Orthodox sanctuaries extended this insecurity to the cherished domain of religion.
Through evoking Kosovan violence towards Serbian attempts to inscribe a Serbian
identity on Serbia's land, Milošević reconstituted 'Serbia' as a locus of identity and
'Serbian interests' as a focus of concern.

Kosovans were, however, only the internal agents of an external enemy. Their
assault against Serbia and Serbs was, according to Milošević, backed by a
'Vatican-Comintern conspiracy' (Ramet 1992: 230) which linked the communist state
(which had 'stolen' the Serbian homeland of Kosova from Serbia) with the Catholic
Church (which was said to have sponsored the Ustaša). Milošević and his ideologues
affected a further discursive shift whereby the Kosovans - many of whom had, under
Ottoman occupation, opportunistically converted to Islam (Norris 1993: 271-277) -
became the same as the 'Muslim Turks'. Kosova was not only an autonomous region
within Serbia but was also where the defeat of the Serbian armies of Prince Lazar
Hrebeljanović by Ottoman forces on the 15th of June 1389 initiated the collapse of
the short-lived Serbian Empire Stephen Dušan had established only forty-three years
before (Darby 1966: 96-102). Milošević characterised his struggle to strip Kosovans
of their political rights and regional autonomy as yet another "battle for Kosovo
[which]...we shall win despite the fact that Serbia's enemies outside the country are
plotting against it, along with those in the country" (speech given by Milošević on 19
suppress Kosovan autonomy thus became a continuation of the struggle against an
enemy which, six hundred years before, had stripped Serbia of an empire which had
once stretched from Bosnia to the Gulf of Corinth. Milošević, by reminding Serbs of
the Greater Serbia which had been stolen by the nation's enemies (cf. Žižek 1990 on
'nation theft'), thus legitimated and popularised his simultaneous drive to strip
Montenegro and Macedonia of their republican independence and to outlaw the
autonomy of the Vojvodina (these regions, like Kosova, were parts of the Serbia Tito
had dismembered in his anti-nationalism project - see Aspeslagh 1992, Canak 1993,
loss and the people's enemies Milošević was not only able to constitute a Serbian
positivity - a repertoire of Serbian traditions and an agenda of Serbian aspirations
grounded in a former wholeness - but also a popular following which saw in their
leader's discourse both the 'real' causes of their sufferings and the means of expunging
them.

Whereas the Titoist programme had been 'supra-national' in its attempt to create
a domain of identification which transcended and encompassed the space of national
identification (Godina 1998), Milošević's programme was to subsume 'Yugoslavia'
within a nationalist discourse. Milošević had no intention of withdrawing Serbia from
Yugoslavia; he instead intended that Serbia would dominate Yugoslavia so that all the
Serbs scattered throughout the federal state - forty two percent of Serbs lived outside
of the republic of Serbia (Pavlowitch 1988: 25) - would be united within a single state
serving their interests. Milošević, seventy years after the establishment of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was attempting once again to work out the Serbian
nationalist agenda of making Yugoslavia over into a Serbian state.

Milošević's rise to power coincided with the mobilisation, in Slovenia and Croatia,
of 'democratic oppositions' which were to contend for republican power in the first
Yugoslav elections allowing non-communist participation. Their campaign rhetorics
were not grounded on calls for reforms and changes in the Yugoslav constitution but
on highly nationalistic platforms arguing that the Slovene and Croatian peoples were
being destroyed by the communist state. I was in Ljubljana during the campaigns for
the Slovene election and can remember non-communist campaign stations bedecked
with pictures of caves (foibe) filled with the bones of persons killed during the
massacres which had taken place at the close of the Second World War (Ballinger,
forthcoming). Although the persons the partisans had killed came from various
national groupings and political movements, the captions on the photographs said
simply "This is what They did to Us". The assertion was direct - 'the communists killed
Slovenes en masse as they came to power' - and the implication needed no further
elaboration - 'and subsequent policies from the communist state towards the Slovenes
has been a continuation of national genocide by other means'. This rhetoric called on
people as Slovenes to recognise that communist violence towards Slovenes in the past
was the same as the state's violence towards them in the present. Antipathy towards
communist policies in the economic and social domain thus became articulated as
justifiable defensive responses to an external power motivated by the desire to
exterminate the Slovene nation. In turn, the Slovene nation was constituted as a good
thing because the enemy wished to deny it to the people. Slovenia, which had never
previously moved to constitute itself as an independent nation, committed itself
between 1990 and the outbreak of war in 1991 to a programme of nationalist
realisation.

In Croatia Franjo Tudjman's Christian Democratic Community party (the HDZ)
also paraded pictures of bone piles and asserted these were not the skeletons of 'Nazis'
or ' quislings' but of ' Croatian victims' of communist brutality. Tudjman, however, in
constituting a nationalist position for Croatian identification, drew upon a more
salient articulation of the 'us' which opposed the communist 'other'. Croatia had had a
recent national positivity which had been destroyed by the communist state, and
Tudjman reclaimed the quisling Ustaša 'Independent State of Croatia' as an
"expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people for its own independent state" (Tudjman quoted in Denich 1991: 6). Tudjman and the ideologues of the HDZ campaigned for the republican leadership (and later for Croatian independence) with the - not inaccurate - assertion that the Yugoslav state had existed to prevent Croats from enjoying their nationhood. Tudjman claimed that, since 1945, Titoist policies had served unjustly to 'punish' the Croatian people for attempting to realise themselves as a nation. Equating contemporary Croatian aspirations towards nationhood with those of the Ustaša, Tudjman simultaneously equated the enemies of the Ustaša with the enemies of the contemporary Croats. Yugoslavia was, then, not simply a communist state opposed to nationalism but was a state dominated by Serbs who wanted nothing more than to destroy their national enemies, the Croats. To fight back against Serbian 'aggression' against the Croatian people Tudjman and the HDZ adopted the same anti-Serbian rhetorics and programmes their Ustaša predecessors had utilised (with Nazi encouragement) to defeat the 'Serbian threat'. Tudjman and the HDZ called for an independent Croatia which would expand to Croatia's 'historical borders' (the borders, encompassing most of Bosnia Herçegovina, of the 'Independent State of Croatia'), would fly a national flag on which the red star of the Yugoslavia would be replaced by the 'chessboard' pattern (šahovnica) which had graced the flag of 'Independent State of Croatia', and would purge the Croatian language of the pollution of 'Serbian' words.

The HDZ's nationalist programme, articulated almost exclusively in anti-Serbian terms, panicked the Serbs of the Krajina who saw in the post-communist resurgence of all the gestures and policies of the Ustaša a 'return of the repressed' threatening to inflict on them the same genocide they had suffered in the early nineteen forties. They too had their bone caches. Krajina Serbs invited local and Serbian journalists and photographers into caves where the skeletons of Serbs massacred by Ustaša had been cached. These monuments to the fate of Croatian Serbs under the Ustaša functioned locally to legitimate Croatian Serb resistance to the new Croatian order and attempts to drive out local Croats and constitute a Serbian mini-state within Croatia. They simultaneously served within Serbia itself to substantiate Milošević's claims that the Croats were the same as the Ustaša. Denich points out that the consequent ethnic hatred of Croats by Serbs in Serbia was based on this identification rather than on history:

while the rebellions of Serbian communities in Croatia were motivated by their own memories of the Ustasha [sic] regime, now eerily reincarnated in the declarations and symbols of the new nationalist government...the inhabitants of Serbia itself had not experienced the Ustasha [sic] terror, and their wartime suffering had come at the hands of the Germans and other foreign occupiers, rather than Croats. Accordingly, there was little history of overt anti-Croat feeling throughout Serbia (Denich 1991: 11).

Serbs in Serbia, already inflamed by tales of the violence inflicted on fellow Serbs within the borders of the Serbian republic, were now offered evidence of what fate awaited Serbs outside the republican borders at the hands of other ethnic enemies. Milošević's rhetoric about Albanian threats to a Serbian presence in Kosova made it
possible for Serbs to think in terms of a Serbian homeland (albeit one made palpable only through the evocation of its loss); his conjuring up of the 'future holocaust' facing the Serbs in the Croatian krajina enabled Serbs to imagine a Greater Serbia unifying the 'Serbian people' through the evocation of that people's extermination (Bowman 1994b).

Benedict Anderson, in describing the process of 'imagining community', posits that one imagines one's own situation (as, for instance, a newspaper reader) reproduced in that of thousands - or millions - of others. Through that imaginative extension, Anderson claims, one is able to conceive of a nation of others 'like oneself' (see Anderson 1991: 35-36 and, for a critique, Bowman 1994a). In the republics of what was Yugoslavia the imagining of community came about instead through imagining oneself as like others. Audiences, addressed in terms marked as 'ethnic' by diacritics of language, script, cultural and historical reference or site of address, were 'interpellated' into national subject positions by their recognition that it was they who were being addressed (see Althusser 1971: 152-165). Subsequently the addressee was 'worked on' by a narrative which focussed his or her diffuse and oftimes inchoate anxieties upon powerful and graphic images of violences inflicted by the members of other communities on the bodies and properties of fellow 'Serbs', 'Croats' or 'Slovenes'. Here the violences the addressee encountered in his or her life were the same as those which the national enemy inflicted on the bodies of the tormented objects of the discourse. Recognition that one's own apparently minor sufferings were in fact premonitions of the greater violence the enemy intended to inflict on all who shared one's national identity impelled the addressee to defensively join in inflicting violence on that other under the inspired leadership of those politicians who had 'recognised' the real nature of those violences and the implication of the previous order in their infliction.

The rhetorics of violence which carried Yugoslavian politics into the nineteen nineties could only lead to war between the peoples they constituted. The character of the Serb-Croat conflict which began in the Krajina and spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina (where the Bosnian Muslims became legitimate objects of nationalist violence either because they were the 'historic enemies' of the Serbs or because they impeded the creation of 'Greater Croatia') need not be elaborated here; its genocidal brutality is still displayed daily in the Western media. Suffice it to say that evidence of the violence of the enemy, which proliferate in situations of warfare, fuels the passionate need to extirpate the source of that violence. The ethnic fantasies which sparked the war have given it all the characteristics of a millenarian struggle in which the signs of the other (whether they be markers and agencies of individuality such as the eyes, noses and genitals which are carved from the bodies of the enemies or of a cultural presence like the houses, churches and mosques which must be desecrated before being destroyed and built over - see Bowman 1994b) must be fully effaced so that the 'real' national territory, which can only be imagined through the absolute absence of the other which prevents it, can be 'reinstituted'.

More hopeful is perhaps the fact that in Slovenia, where the drive to national realization was fuelled by an antipathy to the communist state rather than to other ethnic communities, nationalist xenophobia disintegrated when Yugoslavian
hegemony dissolved. During the 1990 elections the victorious anti-communist Demos coalition had proposed no policies other than a radical acceleration of Slovene detachment from the federal state. That goal was achieved with the Slovene defeat of the Yugoslav National Army in the four day war\textsuperscript{xiii}. Subsequently Demos was left with a politics which could not be legitimated if there were not an enemy to blame for everything. Between the withdrawal of the J.N.A. and the spring of 1992, when Slovenia was welcomed into the community of nations, the Demos coalition attempted to maintain the discourse on the enemy which had brought it to power. It cracked down on democratic dissent within the state (a state which, when it was still a Yugoslav republic, had prided itself on its tradition of dissidence) claiming that Demos "directly represented the general, i.e. national interest" (Mastnak 1991: 60). It furthermore attempted to maintain nationalist antagonism towards non-Slovenes by repressing minority rights and curtailing the flow of refugees from the escalating war to the south. Perhaps most signally, it stripped women of their long-established right to abortion on demand on the grounds that 'Slovenia is a tiny country surrounded by enemies, and every Slovene child is a potential fighter for the defense of Slovenia' (see Gaber 1993: 62 and Salecl 1993). A substantial number of women, however, felt less threatened by an impalpable external antagonist than they did by Demos's attempt to abrogate their powers over their bodies. This new articulation of antagonism engendered numerous pro-abortion groups which joined with parties representing other groups (minorities, leftists, homosexuals, \textit{etcetera}) experiencing the ruling coalition's policies as threatening. In the spring of 1992 this popular front succeeded in overturning Demos's parliamentary majority and took power as a liberal coalition concerned in large part with local issues. With the loss of an enemy perceived as common, the nationalist community that enemy's violence made possible simply dissolved (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 144) and people began to enunciate their encounters with frustration and violence in situational terms rather than in terms of a global antagonism:

The failure of the totalitarian elements to prevail in the battle for the right to choose, which coincided with the decreasing popular sense of an external threat and the achievement of international recognition of the statehood of Slovenia, tipped the scales away from totalitarian democracy and led to the collapse of the Demos coalition's rule over Slovenia. In spite of elements working to increase the power of totalitarian and national homogenizing tendencies, Slovenia now has a fairly good chance of building an identity based on civil rights rather than on the totalitarian xenophobia of a 'genuine' Slovene nationalism (Gaber 1993: 62).

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The dissolution of the nationalist imaginary in the post-war Slovene instance, like that which threatens the solidarity of the Palestinian community in the wake of the autonomy agreements effected at Oslo, provides evidence of the necessity of the violence of a national enemy for the maintenance of nationalist solidarity and commitment. Identity is not a fixed thing but is labile and prone to situational reformulation. In the absence of perceptions of a shared threat which renders all the
members of a community 'the same', those persons are likely to reorganise the discourses which constitute their identities in ways which they deem appropriate to the diverse challenges to their respective integrities posed by the wide range of situations they encounter. Rhetorics of nationalist identity can only function for as long as the subjects they seek to interpellate can recognise in the 'national enemy' the source of the violences which afflict them in their everyday lives. When the constitutive violence of the other appears to disappear the discourse which forges a diverse community into a defensive bloc fails to offer convincing interpretations of the field of sociality to the subjects it addresses. Henceforth those subjects are forced to seek new ways of conceiving not only their own identities but also those of their enemies. Such new 'imaginaries' may - if the nationalist project of state formation has been successful - operate within the horizon of the national community, but within that horizon there are spaces for many diverse articulations of identity. The politics of difference which characterises the space of the national community cannot, however, be asserted within the domain of the nationalist imaginary where all identity devolves from, and is forestalled by, the violence of the other.

ENDNOTES

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I will, throughout this text, refer to constitutive violence as 'antagonism'. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe define 'antagonism' as a radical threat to the socially constituted subjectivity of the individual: "in the case of antagonism...the presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself... (it is because a peasant cannot be a peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner who is expelling him from his land). Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 125). This usage emphasises the fact that an antagonism disrupts and disallows a previously constituted identity, and by its incursion makes necessary the formulation of a new identity as a means of countering that antagonism. The new identity is not continuous with the identity which preceded the advent of that violence but is constituted in opposition to that violence; its 'positivity' is that of a negation of a negation.

Both the genesis, and the structure, of nationalist identity is uncannily paralleled in what Sigmund Freud describes as the formation of infantile ego. Freud contends that the infant is forced to make a primary distinction between itself and an outside it initially narcissistically saw as continuous with itself because it senses, in the way the source of its sustenance (breast or bottle) is 'taken' from it against its will, an external violence which hurts and deprives it (Freud 1963a: 66-69 and 1963: 416). "A further incentive to a disengagement of the ego from the general mass of sensations - that is, to the recognition of an 'outside', an external world - is provided by the frequent, manifold and unavoidable sensations of pain and unpleasure....A tendency arises to separate from the ego everything that can become a source of such unpleasure, to throw it outside and to create a pure pleasure-ego which is confronted by a strange and threatening 'outside'" (Freud 1963b: 67). Here too identity is not given but is constructed through a defensive process of separation from an outside which steals pleasure and inflicts pain. Here too the inside and the outside are opposed in a Manichaean manner. I have elsewhere used psychoanalytic categories in approaching questions of xenophobic hatred in Yugoslavia; see my "Xenophobia, fantasy and the nation: the logic of ethnic violence in Former
According to the first British census of Mandate Palestine (which took place in 1922 and excluded the residents of Trans-Jordan) the total population of Palestine (excluding the occupying British forces) was 752,048 of which 589,177 persons were indigenous Muslims (including 103,000 Bedouin), 71,464 indigenous Christians and 83,790 resident Jews, both indigenous and immigrant (Palestine 1946: 141). The remaining 7,617 persons were for the most part foreign nationals residing in various Christian monasteries and institutions.

Peters' thesis, which in effect elaborates Golda Meir's famous assertion that "Palestine is a land without a people for a people without a land", has been soundly refuted by scholars in the U.K., U.S. and Israel (see Finkelstein 1988: 61-63 for a citing of the critical scholarship).

Zionist insistence on *avodah ivrit* (Hebrew labour) meant that Jewish land could not be worked by non-Jews. As a result "settlers refused to let neighboring villagers and bedouin tribes continue customary pasture rights on their lands....Such misunderstandings over customary rights and over boundaries often resulted in violence" (Lesch 1979: 28). As early as 1886 the villagers of al-Yahudiyya, after a dispute over grazing rights, attacked the Jewish colony at Petah Tikva, killing one Jew, wounding four others and inflicting considerable damage (Muslih 1988: 71-72) and other armed clashes occurred between peasants and settlers in Tiberias (1901-1902) and in 'Affula (1911) when local Arabs discovered the land they lived on had been sold out from under their feet (Ibid: 72).

Insofar as it is the loss of the land of Palestine which particularly expresses the impossibility of creating a Palestinian nation, the British - who could, in anti-colonialist rhetoric, have been seen as as much of an enemy as the Zionists - are not demonised today in the same manner as the Israelis. The British, after all, also lost the land to the Zionists.

Christian Palestinians were, before the *ghurba*, a significant and influential element of the Palestinian intelligentsia because they owned substantial properties and had enjoyed quality educations provided them by foreign Christian churches supporting Christians in the 'Holy Land'. Subsequently they played a major role in the P.L.O. and affiliated resistance groups (Betts 1975: 39-43). The importance of Christians to the Palestinian movement, in both exile and the Territories (where they make up only about 4.5% of the population), is evident not only in the central positions occupied by Christians (Naif Hawatmeh - leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine - and George Habash - leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - are both Christians as is Hannan Ashrawi - spokeswoman for the Palestinian team in the peace talks initiated in Madrid) but also in the efforts made by Yasir Arafat to foreground Christian participation in the nationalist movement (exemplified, perhaps, by his recent marriage to Suha Tawil, a Christian Palestinian who is the daughter of a major figure in the 'internal' leadership of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine).

During the Mandate Period Palestinian Christians affiliated to the Greek Orthodox Church organised Arab Orthodox Societies in order to overturn Greek control of Orthodox holy places located in Palestine (Bertram and Young 1926). These societies have recently, in part because of the threat to the continuance of a Christian Palestinian presence in Palestine posed by Hamas, reinstituted themselves after forty-five years of dormancy. Such foregrounding of Christian identities by persons who until very recently felt secure in asserting Palestinian identities reveals a substantial shift in where antagonism is perceived to originate.

The salient issue then, as now, was the *Krajina*, a region of present-day Eastern Croatia which had been the frontier line between the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires and had been populated not only by Serbs fleeing the Turks but also by Serbs who were recruited into the area by the Austro-Hungarians after 1689 to serve as a defensive shield against the Ottomans along that borderline (Hammel 1993a: 37, see also Hammel 1993b).

Also Serbs in Bosnia

Slovenia and the Dalmatian coast were ceded to Italy which promoted fascism as an explicit ideology rather than Slovene nationalism *per se* (Clissold 1968: 209) but in the 'Independent State of Croatia' the German administration fomented the viciously anti-Serb and anti-Jewish Croatian nationalism of Ante Pavelić and his *Ustaša* while in Serbia the...
Nazis promoted a loose confederation of Serbian nationalists led by Milan Nedić and Dimitrije Ljotić which was frequently backed by nominally anti-Nazi yet fiercely nationalist and anti-Muslim četnici led by Draža Mihajlović.

Rape was used by Bosnian Serbs as a means of terrorizing their Bosnian foes after the war had spread to Bosnia in 1991. The logic of expropriation of the bodies of the enemy, already evident in anti-Kosovan propaganda, was there turned against non-Serbs. Women were mass raped until they became pregnant, after which they were kept in captivity until they bore the rapists' children. Not only was the Serb theft of their enemies' women thus monumentalised, but the Serbs were also thus able to reenact an ancient tactic celebrated in the Serbian epics which chronicled their ancient struggle against the Ottomans. In the BBC2 'Bookmark' programme entitled "Serbian Epics" Radovan Karadžić, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, sings to the accompaniment of the guzla (a single-stringed bowed instrument) the lines "beautiful Turkish woman, your child will be baptised by a priest".

The embodiment of this anti-Serb cabal was, of course, Tito himself who was both a communist and a Croat (both Comintern and Vatican) and had occupied the position - dictator of the Yugoslav state - which Milošević intended to usurp (see Ramet 1992: 226).

The wealth of bones in post-war Yugoslavia was fortuitous. As Bloch indicates in his work on Madagascar funerary practices (Bloch 1982 and 1989: 170), bones emblematise undifferentiated community because they are what remains after individuating characteristics have rotted away.

The Slovene defense force met the Yugoslav National Army as an invading foreign army while, according to people I spoke with in Belgrade while the confrontation was still going on, the J.N.A. soldiers saw the 'invasion' as a simple policing action. Fatalities among the J.N.A. forces were several times higher than those among the Slovenes (total casualty figures range between sixty and one hundred), and more than 2,000 J.N.A. soldiers were taken prisoner (Ramet 1992: 256).