

“Let us dare to read, speak, think, and write”:

Patriot Fundamentalism and Nonviolent Civil Resistance in Boston and Philadelphia,

1764-1776

by

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Abstract

This thesis considers the ways in which defensive mobilization in Boston and Philadelphia between the years 1764-1776 stimulated the development of a particular cultural and political identity. This research applies a microhistorical approach and draws upon a hybrid of applied Social Science theories to trace the developmental path of what I characterize as “patriot fundamentalism”, which began as an elite-led, largely urban-centric initiative with the express aim of eliminating taxation without representation and evolved into a social movement that fortified rhetorical and physical defenses to safeguard American interest against what colonial actionists viewed as intensifying Parliamentary encroachment. In doing so, this research isolates distinctive practices of nonviolent civil resistance to challenge preconceptions about America’s violent origins. This study historicizes modern Social Science theories in an eighteenth-century setting and thereby refines our understanding of the Revolutionary movement and its complexion.

The first chapter defines “patriot fundamentalism”, proposing it as an action-oriented ideology which insists upon a strict adherence to faith-based doctrines and ideals which emphasize the pursuit of individual moral accountability and just, lawful government through republican activism. This chapter conceptually and practically assesses patriot fundamentalism and introduces key features and methods of nonviolent civil resistance. It demonstrates the ways in which nonviolence was a tool that patriot fundamentalist leaders used to legitimize colonial claims to self-government, to discourage repression from Great Britain, and to help colonists identify with the movement.

Chapter two contextualizes the previous chapter’s definitions and theories by examining how Boston’s patriot fundamentalist leaders established and nurtured a unique religiopolitical framework by calling upon Puritan ideals and legacies. This chapter argues that Boston’s peaceable challenge to arbitrary Parliamentary rule stimulated feelings of moral righteousness and a sense of civic duty throughout the province of Massachusetts.

The third chapter examines how Boston’s patriot leaders mobilized individuals and groups and routinized noncooperation. Massachusettsans increasingly came to rely upon provincials skilled in law, finance, trade, agriculture, and manufacturing to demonstrably minimize their reliance upon on British government and goods and build their own alternative institutions.

Chapter four sets out how Philadelphia’s patriot leaders had to craft a radical rhetoric that appealed to a remarkably diverse provincial demographic. It examines how this iteration of patriot fundamentalism drew upon Pennsylvania’s unique, multiethnic heritage to convince Pennsylvanians of the admirable nature and the strategic logic of nonviolent civil resistance.

The fifth chapter exhibits how Philadelphia’s resistance leaders combined rhetoric and ideology with action, creating purpose-built political institutions and establishing an inclusive social movement capable of making displays of worthiness, unity, and commitment through the employment of performative, coordinated nonviolent resistance.

Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates how the patriot fundamentalist movement crystallized the ideological grounds of American resistance across different polities by employing practices of nonviolent civil resistance and establishing advanced social and political networks to action colonial grievances.

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Introduction

The decade that preceded independence was deeply transformative for British North Americans. By the mid-eighteenth century, Massachusettsans and Pennsylvanians had long been facing a variety of social, political, economic, and religious struggles, including a post-war financial decline, urban overcrowding, conflicts with Native Americans, conflagration, disease, and changes and evolutions within their faith communities. While this research project is certainly interested in the ways in which class distinctions, socioeconomic conditions, and rapidly changing human geography within the American colonies contributed to practices and rationalities of resistance between the years 1764 and 1776, the central focus of this thesis is to argue that the patriot fundamentalist movement was ultimately a nonviolent civil resistance campaign.¹ To do so, this study will examine how resistance leaders catalyzed macro-level radicalization and mobilization amongst a diverse colonial population during the course of the Imperial Crisis. The history of the Imperial Crisis is often obscured, particularly in modern American popular culture, by nationally eulogized violence, commemorative traditions and celebrations of Revolutionary battle victories, martyred heroes, and romanticized accounts and reenactments of destructive incidents like the Boston Tea Party of 1773. Violence-based narratives and rituals of remembrance, however, undermine the distinctive nonviolent practices and strategies that American colonists employed in order to undermine a British empire that was exponentially superior in terms of material and military resources. By taking into account that through a variety of political, institutional, and ideological tools that were generally employed from the top down, British North Americans mobilized in the forms of organized boycotts, nonimportation associations, and homespun

¹ This research will at time use “civil resistance” and “nonviolent civil resistance” interchangeably to describe deliberate and performative acts of noncooperation, noncompliance, and direct disobedience, including petitioning, boycotting, and conducting colonial business as normal in defiance of imperial mandates.

initiatives as well as elaborate social networks, grassroots political organizations, committees of correspondence, and participatory events including public demonstrations and town hall meetings, we see another side of the American Revolution – one which emphasizes the truly transformative nature of nonviolent civil resistance.

To explain and underpin the intentional and performative methods of nonviolent civil resistance directed by radical de facto political leaders, such as Samuel Adams and John Dickinson, this research puts forward the term “patriot fundamentalism”. Patriot fundamentalism, which this thesis will define more explicitly in the coming pages, describes the social, political, and moral obligations that were ideologically interlocked by determined, purposeful community leaders and activists to equate spiritual and ethical righteousness with political action. Borrowing from modern understandings of revolutions, social movements, and nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, this research conceptualizes patriot fundamentalism as the ideological driver behind pre-Revolutionary mobilization. Thus, by following a rough chronology to trace the developmental path of this pro-continental, uniquely American identity, this study assesses how that carefully crafted identity was inflected and leveraged to support patriot ideals and political objectives throughout the Imperial Crisis. Boston and provincial Massachusetts as well as Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania backcountry constitute valuable historical spaces within which we can examine how an elite-led, largely urban-centric reformist movement altered pre-existing colonial perceptions of and attachments to the British empire and its jurisdiction in North America and transitioned into a legitimized, revolutionary social movement with distinctive nonviolent features.

To be clear, just as this research does not align with historical narratives that recognize American resistance as purely characterized by “popular anger and rage, a desire for revenge, and a feeling of betrayal”, it is also in no way intended to award “posthumous

fame” or direct any sense hero worship toward America’s founding generation.² The fact is that while nonviolent civil resistance is generally thought to be a more “successful” means to sociopolitical ends when compared to violent action, nonviolent campaigns can and often do involve some level of violent activity.³ As such, when this research describes the nonviolent civil resistance of the patriot fundamentalist campaign, the claim is not that patriot fundamentalist leaders infallibly crafted a perfectly peaceable campaign that was totally free of intracolonial differences or divisions. Likewise, this research is not intended to simply regurgitate “Neo-Whig” arguments about the intersectionality of rhetorical debate and sociopolitical grievances or to imitate “Neo-Progressive” studies by focusing specifically on the valuable contributions of ordinary colonists in the Imperial Crisis.⁴ Instead, while this research certainly takes on board the unique contributions that these historical interpretations have made to modern understandings of the pre-Revolutionary era, this study maintains that the radical voices behind the broader patriot fundamentalist movement actively worked to minimize and manage violent behaviors, consistently identifying violent outbursts as contradictory to patriot fundamentalist tenets.

To reveal the underdeveloped, but significant history of nonviolent civil resistance and its dynamics in the Imperial Crisis, this thesis will explore two significant geographical regions in colonial America: Boston and Massachusetts more broadly as well as Philadelphia

² T. H. Breen, *American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People* (Hill and Wang, 2010), pp. 10–11; Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *The Martyr and the Traitor: Nathan Hale, Moses Dunbar, and the American Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 5.

³ See Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Praeger, 1993); Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (Columbia University Press, 2013); Kurt Schock, ‘Nonviolent Action and Its Misconceptions: Insights for Social Scientists’, *Political Science and Politics*, 2003, pp. 705–12; Sharon Erickson Nepstad, ‘Nonviolent Civil Resistance and Social Movements’, *Sociology Compass*, 7.7 (2013), pp. 590–98.

⁴ Michael D. Hattem, ‘The Historiography of the American Revolution’, *Journal of the American Revolution*, Beyond the Classroom, 2013 <<https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/08/historiography-of-american-revolution/>>. Hattem cites Edmund Morgan and Bernard Bailyn as the preeminent Neo-Whig scholars and explains the Neo-Whig interpretation as having given historians permission “to take ideas seriously”. The Neo-Progressive interpretation emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and focuses on the lives of everyday individuals.

and the wider province of Pennsylvania. Each of the selected case studies represents a historical example that while otherwise thoroughly researched in the narrative of early American history, remain largely untouched by the application of modern theories from the Social Sciences. It has been more commonplace for scholars of Political Science to plunder selectively from the American Revolution to help theorize modernist models than it has for historians of the American Revolution to integrate models into their explanatory frameworks. That is not to say that other colonial port cities such as New York or Charleston, other regions such as Canada or Florida do not similarly warrant further investigation from the perspective of patriot fundamentalism (or other theories built from interdisciplinary study) in due course. However, the initial application of a new approach to the study of eighteenth-century British North America was more practically conducted by utilizing the prominent and perhaps more familiar hubs of Boston and Philadelphia as detailed case studies.⁵ The balance of primary and secondary resources consulted in this thesis is slightly unconventional, as this project required a thorough survey of both eighteenth-century historiography and Social Sciences literature; however, this research still relies heavily upon a survey of more than two hundred letters, speeches, resolves, debates, advertisements, and first-hand accounts published during the 1760s and 1770s in the newspapers and pamphlets of Boston and Philadelphia, both of which held some of the largest concentrations of colonial publishers in the years before 1775.

The process of radicalization was never universal, and it unfolded in different ways for different groups of eighteenth-century Americans, meaning that some social groups were quicker to engage in nonviolent civil resistance while others remained apprehensive about the

⁵ A key proponent of historical theory and comparative study, Jack P. Greene often advocated for the development of new research methodologies and models. In particular, Greene argued for a “developmental” approach to assess “historical change in new societies as a movement from the simple to the complex” and to consider unique regional complexions. See *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture* and “Changing Interpretations of Early American Politics” in *The Reinterpretation of Early American History* Ed. Ray Allen Billington.

ways that American “patriots” made deliberate attempts to display worthiness, unity, demographic involvement, and commitment in order to challenge British authority.⁶ As such, the rich religious ties that linked Massachusetts and Pennsylvania to Puritanism and Quakerism respectively as well as the unique demographic configurations within each province allow this research to map the autonomy, the structure, and the agency that nonviolent civil resistance lent to various groups of provincials grappling with where exactly they fit in a rapidly developing British Atlantic world. In addition, Boston and Massachusetts as well as Philadelphia and Pennsylvania efficiently represent diverse ethnic cultures, distinct religions with definitive social norms, and varied systems of political control and government, ranging from the long-term Quaker domination of the Pennsylvania Assembly to the British occupation of Puritan-founded Boston beginning in 1768. This research does not contend that nonviolent civil resistance is dependent upon the types of spiritual foundations that can be observed in colonial Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. As Gene Sharp has noted, these are in fact “separate phenomena”; however, in the context of the patriot fundamentalist movement, religious and ethical beliefs certainly helped to bind rhetorical arguments to nonviolent action.⁷ Thus, this thesis is not interested in returning to relatively outdated, largely superficial questions about whether or not the American Revolution was “radical” or being strictly confined to the “interpretive pressures the present can sometimes place on historians”.⁸ Instead, in each case study, this research will work to link the developing literature on social movements and nonviolent civil resistance with the cultural, social, economic, and political factors that radicalized colonists and the extent of colonial

⁶ Charles Tilly, Ernesto Castañeda, and Lesley J. Wood, *Social Movements, 1768-2018*, 4th edn (Routledge, 2020), pp. 6–7.

⁷ Gene Sharp, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle*, Monograph Series, 3 (The Albert Einstein Institution, 1990), p. 2.

⁸ Patrick Spero, ‘Introduction’, in *The American Revolution Reborn*, Eds. Patrick Spero and Michael Zuckerman (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), pp. 1–28 (p. 2).

mobilization in popular disobedience, boycotts, public processions, celebrations, demonstrations, and other acts of peaceable defiance or disruption.⁹

Literature examining the Imperial Crisis through the lens of the political violence has accelerated in recent years, to the point of saturation.¹⁰ Perhaps surprisingly, however, few of these studies have drawn from other disciplines to help address and understand historical patterns of violent extremism. As such, there exists an opportunity to historicize and evaluate the processes of radicalization and mobilization that occurred across British North America between the years 1764 and 1776 more fully. Indeed, even the likes of Pauline Maier and T.H. Breen, whose work was enormously impactful upon this study, have largely evaded the Social Sciences in their analyses of American resistance. Thus, this research endeavors to develop a more nuanced understanding of American mobilization during the Imperial Crisis by considering a rich variety of primary sources, including the various layers of archival materials digitized by the Massachusetts Historical Society, and collecting data through the methodical study of key secondary sources. This research project utilizes the lens of patriot fundamentalism to explore an angle of penetration which has been neglected in previous historical studies, simultaneously drawing attention to the isolable features and practices of political nonviolence in the American resistance campaign and showcasing the benefits of cross-disciplinary research, specifically between the fields of history and civil resistance studies.

By focusing new light on political nonviolence and its features and utility in the context of resistance practices in eighteenth-century Boston and Philadelphia, this thesis

⁹ Maciej J. Bartkowski, 'Recovering Nonviolent History', in *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles*, Ed. Maciej J. Bartkowski (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), p. 14.

¹⁰ See, for example: Holger Hoock, *Scars of Independence: America's Violent Birth* (Crown Publishing, 2017); Stephen Huggins, *America's Use of Terror: From Colonial Times to the A-Bomb* (University Press of Kansas, 2019); Derek Beck, *Igniting the American Revolution, 1773-1775* (Sourcebooks, 2015); Arthur M. Schlesinger, 'Political Mobs and the American Revolution, 1765-1776', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 99.4 (1955), pp. 244-50; John J. Tierney, Jr., 'Terror at Home: The American Revolution and Irregular Warfare', *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, 12 (1977), pp. 1-19.

works to establish strong theoretical links between patriot fundamentalism and modern understandings of nonviolent civil resistance-based social movements. This study binds empirically tested theories on nonviolent social movements with primary and secondary sources that emphasize and assess practices and features of collective action in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts and Pennsylvania by simultaneously reading the American resistance waged during the Imperial Crisis through a Social Science framework and testing this research project's own composite Social Science approach. "Composite" in this sense refers to the hybrid framework employed here which fuses together certain elements of Social Science theories, thereby creating a new theoretical approach to extend the reach and validity of current understandings of patriot radicalization and mobilization. By assessing pre-Revolutionary contentions through one ideological or mobilizational lens, we miss the opportunity to see how certain theories and approaches interact and buttress one another to create a more holistic view of episodes and trajectories of political struggle.

This project's composite approach to assessing American radicalization borrows elements from Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory, and a variety of academic methodologies in order to assess trajectory of patriot rhetoric and decision-making in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Likewise, by historicizing Social Science theories and case studies on modern "movements, campaigns, or streams of contention" and considering the eighteenth-century patriot fundamentalist movement alongside the work of scholars such as Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Gene Sharp, and Erica Chenoweth, we can better understand the mobilizing structures that created unprecedented space for colonists to engage with political affairs, utilized local knowledge and resources to defend American interests, and developed in response to Parliamentary actions.¹¹ By

¹¹ Kurt Schock, 'The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance', *Journal of Peace Research*, 50.3 (2013), pp. 277–90 (p. 286).

longitudinally evaluating both the radicalization and mobilization that played out during the colonial American resistance movement through a composite lens, this study has determined that the ideological foundations of patriot fundamentalism as well as the movement's strategic capacity to adapt and evolve, coupled with organized, voluntary boycott initiatives, public demonstrations, town hall meetings, and alternative institutions such as committees and conventions more closely align with nonviolent civil resistance than violent political struggle.

While violence certainly occurred in eighteenth-century British North America, there is no evidence to suggest that such incidents were organized by patriot fundamentalist leaders or orchestrated from the top down. In fact, if we are to understand different forms of political violence including dissidence, violent insurgency, and terrorism in the sense that Alex P. Schmidt, Bruce Hoffman, and others have explained it, as a “logical” choice for populations that lack the skills and means for communication, then we can understand popular violence as being largely restrained and curtailed by the nonviolent resistance leaders who voiced and validated colonial concerns during the Imperial Crisis.¹² Moreover, Jo Freeman's twentieth-century theory explaining “radical flank effects”, which this thesis will examine and contextually tie to patriot fundamentalism in the coming pages, offers insight into when, why, and how violent outbursts occurred and were absorbed into the broader movement.¹³ Thus,

¹² Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (SAGE Publications, 1982), pp. 51–53; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 131–32; Martha Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches’, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 10.4 (1987), pp. 13–31 (p. 28); Brigitte L. Nacos, *Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing* (Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 17–18.

¹³ Jo Freeman, *The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social Movement and Its Relation to the Policy Process* (Addison-Wesley Longman Limited, 1975), p. 236; Herbert H. Haines, ‘Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970’, *Social Problems*, 32.1 (1984), pp. 31–43 (pp. 32–33); Herbert H. Haines, ‘Radical Flank Effects’, in *The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, Ed. David A. Snow, Donatella Della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam (John Wiley and Sons, 2013), pp. 211–32 (pp. 1–2). Haines summatively explains radical flank effects (RFEs) as interactive processes involving a spectrum of radical and moderate actors within social movements and third parties outside those movements which can result in detrimental and/or beneficial impacts upon the reputations and effectiveness of a social movement.

this research project challenges academic preconceptions about America's violent origins and works to demonstrate how the patriot fundamentalist movement crystallized the ideological grounds of American resistance by employing practices of nonviolent civil resistance and establishing advanced social and political networks to action colonial grievances.

The benefits of historicizing modern Social Science theories are two-fold in that social movement theories help us to understand features and practices of nonviolent civil resistance in eighteenth-century America in the same way that features and practices of nonviolent civil resistance help us to understand the long and multifaceted history of social movements. Heretofore, there has been a rather significant disconnect between historical scholarship, literature on nonviolent civil resistance, social movement theories, conceptualizations of revolution, and primary accounts of colonial ideals and actions during the Imperial Crisis. In a 2013 TEDx Talk, political scientist Erica Chenoweth begged the question, "What if our history courses emphasized the decade of mass civil disobedience that came before the Declaration of Independence rather than the war that came after?" to pinpoint a prime example the historical efficacy of nonviolent civil resistance and to highlight the "potential of people power".¹⁴ To be clear, it is neither the aim of this study nor within the scope of this research to determine whether or not the patriot fundamentalist movement was "successful" in achieving its ends. One could argue that if achieving Parliamentary representation and maintaining the autonomy to tax colonists on a strictly internal basis while remaining within the British empire were the primary objectives of the movement, then ultimately, the patriot fundamentalist movement cannot be deemed "successful"; however, to quantitatively measure the overall efficacy of the patriot fundamentalist campaign as a

¹⁴ *The Success of Nonviolent Civil Resistance: Erica Chenoweth at TEDxBoulder*, TEDx Talks, 2013 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJSehRIU34w&ab_channel=TEDxTalks>.

nonviolent social movement is beyond the scope of this study.¹⁵ Indeed, to determine whether or not the patriot fundamentalist movement should be seen as “successful” would require an additional, independent study to establish the specific parameters for measuring success, which is to say that future research projects may wish to either identify the primary goals of the social movement as a means of determining whether or not they were effectively accomplished or quantify the number and overall level of engagement of passive and active supporters within the social movement in order to assess the depth of colonial dedication to resistance.¹⁶

Chenoweth’s question does, however, expose an interesting gap between the historical narrative that commences with “the shot heard round the world” in 1775, which generations of Americans have constructed a national identity around, and “one that extends longer in time, includes more than only men, and reaches into the political, economic, and cultural reality of American life”.¹⁷ As Gene Sharp has testified, “an overall conceptual tool has long existed” to study military struggles or political violence, and this has contributed to the lack of connectivity between the historical unfolding of the Imperial Crisis and nonviolent frameworks.¹⁸ Thus, it stands to reason that the events of the Imperial Crisis have more frequently been manipulated to suggest that the decade preceding independence was characterized by militarization and a sense of impending war. Interestingly, however, more

¹⁵ For more on measuring the relative success of nonviolent social movements, see Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*; Mauricio Rivera Celestino and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies’, *Journal of Peace Research*, 50.3 (2013), pp. 385–400; Petter Grahl Johnstad, ‘When the Time Is Right: Regime Legitimacy as a Predictor of Nonviolent Protest Outcome’, *Journal of Peace Research*, 37.4 (2012), pp. 516–43; Nepstad.

¹⁶ Erica Chenoweth, Andrew Hocking, and Zoe Marks, ‘A Dynamic Model of Nonviolent Resistance Strategy’, *PLoS One*, 17.7 (2022), pp. 1–19 (pp. 2–8).

¹⁷ Walter Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, and David Toscano, ‘The American Independence Movement, 1765–1775: A Decade of Nonviolent Struggles’, in *Before Lexington: Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765-1775*, Ed. Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (The Albert Einstein Institution, 2016), pp. 3–33 (p. 299).

¹⁸ Gene Sharp, *Power and Struggle, The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 1 (Porter Sargent Publishing, 1973), p. 72.

than two hundred years before Chenoweth's talk, John Adams contemplated precisely what the term "American Revolution" ought to signify, and he determined that "An History of military Operations from April 19th. 1775 to the 3d of September 1783 is not an History of the American Revolution".¹⁹ Instead, Adams explained, the "real American Revolution" occurred during the twelve years before independence, when patriot leaders facilitated "radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people".²⁰ Similarly, Maciej Bartkowski has validated Adams's characterizations of the revolutionary crescendo that occurred between the years 1764 and 1776, explaining that "civil and nonviolent cultural, social, economic, and political mobilization as well as the use of direct collective actions such as popular disobedience, boycotts, public processions, celebrations, demonstrations, and other acts of defiance...were effective in liberating most of the colonies from British control before the war broke out".²¹ Yet, while Charles Tilly considers American dissent in the age of the Imperial Crisis to be the first demonstrative display of mass civil resistance in the narrative of "vast early America" and Chenoweth underscores the strategic logic of early American political dissent, the existing historiographical scholarship generally fails to evidence a concerted academic effort to identify and analyze the patriot movement specifically as a social movement dedicated to nonviolent civil resistance.²² Indeed, some

¹⁹ 'John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818', Online Library of Liberty.

²⁰ 'John Adams to Jedidiah Morse, 29 November 1815', Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

²¹ Bartkowski, p. 14.

²² The term "vast early America" can be attributed to Karin Wulf, and it is intended to help researchers of all levels to better understand the colonial and early national eras within the broader context of American history. Sources that emphasize the full spectrum of vast Early America include Claudio Saunt, *Unworthy Republic: The Dispossession of Native Americans and the Road to Indian Territory* (W.W. Norton, 2020); Ian K. Steele, "Exploding Colonial American History: Amerindian, Atlantic, and Global Perspectives", *Reviews in American History*, 26.1 (March 1998); Thomas Benjamin, *The Atlantic World: Europeans, Africans, Indians, and Their Shared History* (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Ned Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Harvard University Press, 2008); Sara Georgini, *Household Gods: The Religious Lives of the Adams Family* (Oxford University Press, 2019); Mary Sarah Bilder, *Madison's Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention* (Harvard University Press, 2015); *The Consequences of Loyalism: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Calhoun* edited by Rebecca Brannon and Joseph S. Moore (University of South Carolina Press, 2019); Kacy Dowd Tillman, *Stripped and Script: Loyalist Women Writers of the American Revolution* (University of Massachusetts Press, 2019); Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black: Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812* (University of North Carolina Press, 1968).

academics tend to follow the approach of political process scholarship by highlighting the emergence of radical actors and contextualizing the political factors that facilitated or repressed the patriot cause without identifying or explaining key trajectorial movement strategies that contributed to a recasting of the political context.²³

That is not to say that prominent historians have not thoroughly surveyed and scrutinized the disruptive channels through which eighteenth-century American colonists collectivized their claims against imperial authority in North America; however, much of the historical scholarship on resistance during the Imperial Crisis remains relatively free of the terminologies of nonviolence or social movement theories. For example, in 1926, J. Franklin Jameson notably published *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement*, which, for the first time, clearly and concisely defined what Arthur Schlesinger refers to as “the democratic and humane strivings attending the Revolution” and how they resulted in America’s transition toward participatory politics.²⁴ Jameson’s work was relatively progressive in nature and the scholar thoroughly evidenced his ideas; however, Jameson simultaneously downplayed the ideological factors that later historians like Bernard Bailyn emphasized, concluding that the contentions surrounding the Revolution were largely centered on which elite groups would claim political authority in North America. Even sixty years later, Colin Bonwick revisited Jameson’s interpretations and reiterated that the Revolution was comprised of “a network of social changes that affected many aspects of American life”.²⁵ By that time, social movement theory had already been well developed, but Bonwick neglected to employ the connective terminologies that could have linked his historical analyses with more contemporary research on contentious politics and underscored

²³ Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), Introduction, p. xviii.

²⁴ J. Franklin Jameson, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement* (Beacon Press, 1956), p. 8.

²⁵ Colin Bonwick, ‘The American Revolution as a Social Movement Revisited’, *Journal of American Studies*, 20.3 (1986), pp. 355–73 (p. 355).

the Revolutionary process as being comprised of decentralized networks of individuals mobilized to affect change within American life.

Contrastingly, while Pauline Maier's *From Resistance to Revolution* is not decidedly reliant upon nonviolent social movement theory, the historian is certainly revisionist in her Neo-Whig approach to colonial American historical research. By building upon Bernard Bailyn's groundbreaking work on the ideological foundations of the American Revolution, which was highly influential upon this thesis, Maier expertly binds Enlightenment-era philosophies to colonial realities in her depiction of the evolution of colonial radicalism. In many ways, the historian's work aligns with more recent studies from political scientists, criminologists, psychologists, and sociologists who have confirmed that the existence of political and civil liberties present in a democratic society can be positively associated with the existence of radical groups. Perhaps most notably, social scientist Charles Tilly has relied upon Maier's work to support the claim that colonial opponents of arbitrary rule moved popular public politics toward social movement forms by combining special-purpose associations, public meetings, marches, petitions, pamphleteering, and media reports.²⁶ Moreover, Maier's ideological underpinnings were paramount in establishing the framework of patriot fundamentalism as an ideology predicated upon displaying virtue and worthiness and securing natural and civil rights.

Like Maier, Gordon Wood studied under Bernard Bailyn at Harvard, and as such, both historians fall under the umbrella of the neo-Whig tradition. Yet, whereas Maier's *From Resistance to Revolution* highlights collectivization and coalition building as an outcome of the patriot ideology, Wood's *Radicalism of the American Revolution*, tends to generalize the decade preceding independence as being colored by sweeping change. This thesis does not

²⁶ Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (Paradigm Publishers, 2004), p. 25. Tilly specifically cites Pauline Maier's *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776* to emphasize how the integration of popular forces into an elite-led opposition took an important step toward creating a distinct social movement.

deny that macro-level change occurred ideologically and institutionally across British North America, but Wood's comprehensive approach generalizes the transformative nature of the colonial contest against Britain by presenting readers popular ideas about liberty and political reform. When compared to Maier's illustration of the discreet developmental phases that took ordinary Americans from opposition to resistance to revolution, Wood's scholarship comes across as more "elusive and unsatisfying", as the historian does not paint a clear picture of how resistance actually physically unfolded.²⁷ While this thesis certainly draws upon the debates and intellectual underpinnings of the Revolution that Maier and Wood have expanded upon, the following chapters also aim clarify how mobilizing structures were employed alongside the ideology of nonviolent resistance.

In contrast to some of the more traditional historical researchers, Jack P. Greene has particularly delved into the colonial capacity for nonviolent civil resistance by highlighting the ways in which, with the exception of Georgia, most British North American colonies possessed the sociopolitical "preconditions" necessary for governmental autonomy by 1750. According to Greene, the emergence of "authoritative ruling groups", including local social and political elites, loaned clout to the patriot movement and also garnered extensive political experience, confidence in governmental capacity, and broad public support from colonial Americans. Indeed, due in part to their lineage, figures like the Adams cousins and William Bradford brought to their respective cities of Boston and Philadelphia a sense of competence and trustworthiness that was simply complimented by their steadfastness and proactivity in defending the ideals and pursuing the aims of the patriot fundamentalist movement. Similarly, and in what Greene refers to as a "complementary condition", as quasigovernmental centers and institutions became increasingly capable of dispersing

²⁷ Barbara Clark Smith, 'The Adequate Revolution', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 51.4 (1994), pp. 684–92 (p. 684).

concentrated authority outwards, even individuals on the outermost peripheries of colonial society felt connected to the social movement. Established networks of communication branched out from urban hubs like Boston and Philadelphia to reach rural Massachusettsans and backcountry Pennsylvanians, which ultimately served to create a viable and trusted pool of representatives who were thought to embody the values of the burgeoning patriot fundamentalist movement.²⁸

In addition, Greene explains that the “elastic” political systems in the American colonies demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to absorb new and diverse groups, which allowed the patriot fundamentalist movement to be more inclusive than exclusive, particularly toward free adult males and regardless of their previous levels of participation in the colonial political system. Competence in nonpolitical or semipolitical spheres also indicated a high potential for self-government for the rapidly developing British North American colonies. Indeed, a dramatically expanding system of internal and external trade, new systems of communication, information sharing, and travel “within and among the colonies and between the colonies and Great Britain”, an influx of migration which often brought new labor and capital and settled new spaces, and ever-increasing access to new books, magazines, pamphlets, and newspapers along with the emergence of relatively large numbers of men with proficiency in law, trade, finance, and other technically skilled fields meant that the colonies were well equipped for autonomy, and consequently, economic and military resistance by the mid-1760s. Greene makes the critical distinction that if the American colonies had met merely one or two of the “objective conditions necessary for self-government”, the resistance movement of the Imperial Crisis would have been much less likely to pave the path to independence; however, the vast majority of the thirteen colonies

²⁸ Jack P. Greene, ‘An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution’, in *Essays on the American Revolution*, Ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (University of North Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 32–80 (pp. 35–38).

had largely been governing themselves, maintaining internal civil order, and nurturing spatial and economic expansion “for at least three quarters of a century”.²⁹ When taken together, it becomes clear that the leaders of the patriot fundamentalist movement effectively only needed to foster the burgeoning American identity through public outreach and mobilize recruited forces under the banner of resistance. For Greene, violent outbursts and demonstrations did not necessarily define the patriot movement, but rather they came as the byproduct of a fully functional society’s frustration over forced political dependency. It is certainly difficult to contest Greene’s claims that eighteenth-century British North America satisfied key structural requirements for revolution and provided fertile ground for anti-imperial sentiments; yet, it is simultaneously difficult to ignore that there was still a considerable amount of work to be done in order to mobilize leaders and build alternative colonial institutions through which the colonies could challenge arbitrary Parliamentary rule. Indeed, one need look no further than Nova Scotia to see that even with the sporadic establishment of committees of correspondence, the people of Halifax were unable to establish the physical and ideological infrastructure necessary for a sustained battle against the British empire.³⁰ While Tilly’s scholarship confirms that the existence of certain “preconditions” does not automatically signal the oncoming of a revolutionary social movement, Greene’s analysis offers helpful insight into the ways in which the establishment of viable governmental leaders and institutions, the capacity for nonpolitical and semipolitical autonomy, and the faculty for resource mobilization gave rise to the patriot fundamentalist movement and other resistance campaigns throughout history.³¹

²⁹ Greene, ‘An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution’, pp. 35–38.

³⁰ John Hanc, ‘When Nova Scotia Almost Joined the American Revolution’, *Smithsonian Magazine*, Canada: A Smithsonian Magazine Special Report, 2017 <<https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/when-nova-scotia-almost-joined-american-revolution>>.

³¹ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 202.

More recently, T.H. Breen's *American Insurgents, American Patriots* emerged to examine how ordinary American colonists were drawn into collective action. In contrast to Gary B. Nash's *The Unknown American Revolution*, which was impactful in its own right in shedding new light upon everyday colonists and highlighting the race, class, and gender battles that developed alongside colonial debates over home rule, Breen's *Insurgents* never seizes the chance to characterize historical figures through the use of contemporary terminology and evaluate the implications of youth culture during the coming of independence. Instead, Breen describes the patriot movement as constantly toeing the line between vengeance and restraint, and the historian ultimately concludes that while "rage" and "revenge" were common themes amongst rural and working-class populations, de facto political organizations such as elected committees of safety did make efforts to curtail popular violence. Although Breen's work is thorough and rich in primary sources, the historian misses an opportunity to support his claims with research grounded in the realms of Security Studies, Social Psychology, or Political Sociology, thereby slightly diminishing the illustrative potential that the title suggests.³² Still, there is much to be gained from the model offered by Breen, which bridges an important gap in the existing historiography, and in fact, this research aims to dig deeper into the conceptualizations of eighteenth-century American "insurgency" offered by Breen.

Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this thesis, it is important to understand the value of forging links between eighteenth-century history and the social sciences, for example, as well as the unique challenges associated with an attempt to bind the eighteenth-century past with modern theoretical frameworks. Jean-Francois Lyotard wrote that the problem with "reflection upon the past as past" lies in the assumption that a fully determinable meaning can be assigned to each historical event, suggesting that historical

³² Breen, *American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People*, p. 26.

research is necessarily revisionist in nature.³³ New sources or collections may occasionally surface, but often, as Karin Wulf has testified, scholars must learn to evaluate known materials differently, “using new methods and approaches or simply asking new questions of the same sources”, and that is precisely the aim of this research.³⁴ Certainly, interdisciplinary approaches to historical research should be pursued with care, but as historians are fundamentally charged with the distinct responsibility of striving to utilize new, interdisciplinary research methods as a means of revisiting, reframing, and assigning new meanings to past phenomena, it is critical to navigate the challenges and obstacles associated with interdisciplinary methodologies are not only to contribute to an already saturated field of literature, but also to advance skills-based teaching and learning.³⁵ In fact, while one scholar has suggested that “fringe” foci can put academics at risk of isolating themselves from the core of their field, research suggests that interdisciplinary study is becoming increasingly lucrative, particularly as scholars continue to prove that the academic synthesis established by the crossing of specialty lines is critical lifelong teaching and learning.³⁶ By transposing the interdisciplinary methodologies that social scientists utilize to look at the past and make sense of the present, historians can carefully curate a two-way street between the “then” and the “now”. This allows space for us to widen the breadth of our research, to establish appropriate terminologies which extend beyond the confines of conventional historical research that appropriately describe and analyze critical individuals, events, and themes, and ultimately, to effect change outside of the historical research arena. Thus, by deploying terminologies that

³³ Kent Still, Claire Neuvet, and Zrinka Stahuljak, *Minima Moralia: In the Wake of Jean-Francois Lyotard* (Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 13.

³⁴ Karin Wulf, ‘Vast Early America: Three Simple Words for a Complex Reality’, *Humanities*, 40.1 (2019) <<https://www.neh.gov/article/vast-early-america>>.

³⁵ Casey Jones, ‘Interdisciplinary Approach - Advantages, Disadvantages, and the Future Benefits of Interdisciplinary Studies’, *ESSAI*, 7.26 (2009), pp. 76–80 (p. 76).

³⁶ Casey Jones, p. 78; Rahul Kanakia, ‘Talk Touts Benefits of Interdisciplinary Approach, as Well as Some of Its Pitfalls’, *Stanford Report*, 7 February 2007 <<https://news.stanford.edu/news/2007/february7/barr-020707.html>>.

this research deems to be more applicable to the colonial contest against British authority and utilizing research methodologies that, through a survey of consequential nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, enable the collection cross-disciplinary support, this research will focus on thoroughly historicizing the radical transformation of the eighteenth-century British North American political landscape in order to advance the fascinating and important historiography of eighteenth-century North America.

Occasionally, historians have expressed a certain reticence over the use of contemporary or interdisciplinary terminology to communicate a historical narrative, specifically as doing so can open scholars up to the potential of analyzing their research through either a teleological or retrospective lens. Ray Raphael, for instance, has explicitly condemned methodologies that risk reading history “backwards”.³⁷ Yet, Carlos Spoerhase has defended some forms of present centeredness by explaining that while “[m]aking sense of the past in the vocabulary of the present involves serious risks,” utilizing contemporary intellectual advantages to examine the past irrefutably offers valuable opportunities for historical analysis.³⁸ Furthermore, basic English linguistic principles dictate that there is no determinable limit on open-class nouns, including historical vocabulary, which means that when existing terms fail to communicate a historical characteristic, event, process, or era, scholars can effectively ‘invent’ a suitable descriptor, provided that doing so results in the opportunity for more well-rounded, interdisciplinary analyses.³⁹ As such, a “reflection upon the past as past” can serve to limit the scope of academic understandings and interpretations of the past and ultimately minimize space for scholars to evaluate the historical significance of the developments, events, and individuals that define our past.⁴⁰

³⁷ Ray Raphael, *Journal of the American Revolution Interview: Strategy to Pre-War Violence*, 2013 <<https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/12/strategy-pre-war-violence/>>.

³⁸ Carlos Spoerhase, ‘Presentism and Precursorship in Intellectual History’, *Culture, Theory, and Critique*, 49.1 (2008), pp. 49–72 (p. 49).

³⁹ John Lyons, *Semantics* (Cambridge University Press, 1977), I, pp. 155–57.

⁴⁰ Still, Neuvet, and Stahuljak, p. 13.

In addition, the use of longstanding or antiquated terminologies assumes that the assigned meaning of a given term has remained consistent throughout the term's lexical lifespan, although such is rarely the case. Consider, for instance, America's long and complex usage of "liberal" or "liberalism" and "republican" or "republicanism". While J.G.A. Pocock and Bernard Bailyn both elaborated upon republican tradition in a manner that emphasized the cultural and ideological influences of orthodox European Marxism, Gordon Wood was evidently the first historian to formally recognize the nuances that characterized republicanism as an ideology completely distinct from liberalism.⁴¹ According to Horowitz, "liberalism" became associated with the forfeiture of personal or private interest as a means of benefitting the public collectively, and the "sensation" of "republicanism", as Jonathan Gienapp characterized it, represented "the primacy of politics and the relative autonomy of ideals of the good life".⁴² By today's standards and in a divisive post-Trump America, one may be inclined to stereotype a "republican" as being against active anti-racism, vaccinations, and socialized health care, while the word "liberal" may conjure up images of an overeducated, easily offended environmentalist. However, when comparing and contrasting the characteristics and impacts of "liberalism" and "republicanism" in American political thought, it becomes clear, as Morton J. Horowitz has determined, that these two seemingly polar concepts have blended throughout the course of history and will likely continue to recombine over time.⁴³ For example, in 1720, attitudes toward engagement in commerce or the ownership of property would have been critical to determining an individual's position

⁴¹ See J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton University Press, 1975); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Harvard University Press, 1968); Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

⁴² Morton J. Horowitz, 'Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought', *William & Mary Law Review*, 29.1 (1987), pp. 57-74 (pp. 66-67); Jonathan Gienapp, 'Beyond Republicanism, Back to Constitutionalism: The Creation of the American Republic at Fifty', *The New England Quarterly*, 93.2 (2020), pp. 275-308 (p. 277).

⁴³ Horowitz, p. 64.

within the republican-liberal dichotomy, yet, by 1800, those particular variables were likely to have carried less weight. As such, to employ language as our predecessors did does not necessarily mean that we are able to comprehend certain terminologies in the same manner that they did and accordingly, it is critical to account for the ways in which a cultural, social, or political term, concept, or identity has endured or evolved over the course of time. As such, interdisciplinary research in particular necessitates the contextualization of terminologies with complex meanings or complicated histories.

In fact, for decades, academics from across the Social Sciences have expertly contextualized cross-disciplinary terminologies in order to utilize historical case studies for the purposes of assessing, analyzing, and empirically validating theories and for predicting future phenomena through the establishment of critical precursors for radical action. In 1958, psychologist Erik H. Erikson situated Martin Luther's dissent against the Roman Catholic Church within biographical conditions that bred dissent and rebellion. In the 1973 classic *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pioneering political scientist Gene Sharp used historical evidence from the both the plebian withdrawal from ancient Rome to the 'Sacred Mount' and the nineteenth-century Hungarian resistance of Austrian rule to support his theories on the efficacy of nonviolence.⁴⁴ Additionally, in his groundbreaking 1982 sociological study, Doug McAdam investigated the rise and decline of Black insurgency between 1930 and 1970 as a means of laying the theoretical groundwork for the political process model.⁴⁵ More recently, Charles Tilly traced the establishment of the social movement as a distinct form of politics directly to the aftermath of the Seven Years' War.⁴⁶ Likewise, countless other social scientists have demonstrated the value of engaging in interdisciplinary historical research, utilizing

⁴⁴ Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Porter Sargent Publishing, 1973), pp. 75–80.

⁴⁵ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

⁴⁶ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, pp. 18–27. Tilly describes the Seven Years' War as giving "major impetus" for a social movement to create space within which colonists could carry out claim-making performances and displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC).

historical evidence, and employing historical terminology to further academic understandings of social, psychological, economic, and political theories, concepts, and methods including noncooperative phenomena such as boycotts, strikes, protests, and other acts of civil disobedience intended to mobilize communities to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries sources of power.⁴⁷ As such, this research will expand upon the remarkably nuanced understandings of the Imperial Crisis introduced by scholars including Sharp and Tilly as well as Maciej J. Bartkowski, and Walter H. Conser, Jr. in their efforts to historicize the processes of radicalization and mobilization and examine the patriot movement through the lens of nonviolent civil resistance.

Conser's work presents a particularly stark contrast to the perpetuated the narrative of "America's violent birth".⁴⁸ Conser compartmentalizes the colonial resistance into three distinct campaigns, the Stamp Act of 1765, the Townshend Acts of 1767, and the Coercive Acts of 1774, each of which contributed new innovations to the decade-long patriot movement. According to Conser, while some elements of the resistance campaign were arguably "improvised", the Stamp Act Crisis made it clear to colonists what elements of nonviolent action worked and what elements of nonviolent invited criticism or backlash. Sharing the conclusion of this research project, Conser makes it clear that the American resistance campaign that extended from the Stamp Act through the Declaration of Independence was not centered on "consensus" in the way that historians Daniel Boorstin, Clinton Rossiter, and even Edmund Morgan and Bernhard Knollenberg have worked to demonstrate. Consensus historians underscore the Imperial Crisis as a period of rather conservative, measured responses to Parliamentary legislation in which American unity gradually expanded to the extent that colonists were more deeply bonded by their ideals and

⁴⁷ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 12.

⁴⁸ Hoock.

aspirations than they were distinguished by class lines or internal colonial conflicts; however, Conser's essay, "The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775", highlights the inclusive nature of a colonial movement that intentionally aligned laboring classes, women, and other previously politically inactive communities with roles in the public rank-and-file or homespun movements. In this light, it becomes clear that while distinct social, cultural, political, spiritual, and economic differences existed within the colonies, Americans were able to selectively unite through "spirals" of political opportunity, which created space for contentious political and facilitated the development of a more distinctive American identity, but simultaneously allowed individuals and groups to preserve their sociocultural diversities.⁴⁹ Conser's analysis focuses on specific acts of disruptive protest, including the marches, demonstrations, nonimportation, nonconsumption, and refusals to work that signaled the colonial ability to organize and follow leadership directives. Moreover, Conser identifies "the real work of civil resistance" by highlighting specific practices of noncooperation and defiance of British law, which involved using documents without tax stamps, settling legal disputes without courts, and sending protest petitions to Britain without permission from the royal governor.⁵⁰

Ultimately, Conser concludes, five core dynamics defined the colonies' nonviolent struggle against Great Britain: the collective expression of American political differences with Britain and a coexistent sense of American identity; the growth of organizations and institutions that articulated colonial interests and argued against new British powers and controls; open resistance to specific acts or aspects of the imperial government; coordinated, mass political and economic noncooperation with British authority; and the development of

⁴⁹ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 4–6; James Hutson, 'An Investigation of the Inarticulate: Philadelphia's White Oaks', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 28.1 (1971), pp. 3–25 (pp. 3–4).

⁵⁰ Walter Conser, Jr., 'The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775', in *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles*, Ed. Maciej J. Bartkowski (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), pp. 299–317 (p. 309).

parallel institutions, including local, county, and provincial committees, which assumed governmental powers and carried more weight than “the remnants of colonial royal government” in the end.⁵¹ Painting the picture of a comprehensive and well-rounded resistance campaign that adapted and expanded over the course of a decade, Conser emphasizes the “ignorance” of nationally eulogized violence and reiterates his assessment of the colonial resistance movement as being characterized by self-discipline, adaptability, and a broadly democratic nature.

As a short-form essay, Conser’s work is a helpful starting point for approaching pre-Revolutionary resistance through the lens of nonviolence. The historian’s five dynamics of nonviolent struggle bear scrutiny and certainly align with the peaceable actions identified by this thesis; however, Conser himself notes that any specific local texture was beyond the scope of his research. Moreover, Conser’s work utilizes the Stamp Act, the Townshend Revenue Act, and the Coercive Acts as waypoints of Revolutionary resistance, and by centering his macroanalysis around three specific moments in the Imperial Crisis, Conser’s work lacks the latitude to examine how the patriot movement continued to adapt and expand through the relatively “quiet” period that occurred between 1770 and 1773.⁵² This research, however, fills a significant gap in the existing historiography by offering substantive, microhistorical analyses of the logic and implementation of nonviolent civil resistance in Boston and Philadelphia from 1764 through 1776. Certainly, Conser’s essay is valuable in setting out the general features of peaceable colonial resistance, but this thesis works to extend beyond the “illustrative examples” offered in Conser’s essay by demonstrating how patriot fundamentalism developed as an action-based ideology that included the unique ethnic

⁵¹ Conser, Jr., ‘The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775’, pp. 300–305.

⁵² Kenneth Silverman, *A Cultural History of the American Revolution: Painting, Music, Literature, and the Theatre in the Colonies and the United States From the Treaty of Paris to the Inauguration of George Washington, 1763-1789* (T.Y. Crowell, 1976), p. 162.

and spiritual configurations of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania and emphasized peaceable resistance through purposive, symbolic nonviolent initiatives.⁵³

Thus, the secondary sources upon which this study is based reflect the need to a build new, composite theory through which to assess pre-Revolutionary radicalization and mobilization in British North America. By taking the work of Maier, Breen, and Conser on board and considering the historical scholarship of other prominent, impactful historians alongside the work of renowned social scientists from social movement or nonviolent civil resistance studies, this work aims to bridge the gap between historical perspectives of radicalism and activism. This research will endeavor to demonstrate how the societal conditions in which colonial Americans were forced to contemplate their place in the world influenced individual and group identities before unpacking the logic of a people who came to identify with what this research refers to as “patriot fundamentalism” and practice nonviolent civil resistance during the decade that preceded the Declaration of Independence. Methodologically, this research was conducted by systematically utilizing an array of primary sources, including newspaper articles, journals and diaries, private correspondence, political documents, and drafts of unpublished writings produced by key patriot and loyalist actors in the Imperial Crisis. To qualitatively analyze the patriot fundamentalist movement as a nonviolent civil resistance campaign, this study considered critical secondary analyses and primary sources that offered observations and eyewitness testimonies from key processes and events in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania or provided valuable examples of patriot rhetoric, the colonial capacity for self-organization, and the procedural affairs and outcomes of de facto governmental institution building.

As a popular social movement, the patriot fundamentalist campaign was comprised of groups and individuals who possessed a variety of political philosophies, religious cultures,

⁵³ Conser, Jr., ‘The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775’, p. 306.

leadership styles, intentions, and aims, and as such, it is important to understand and account for the commingling of unique “ideological intricacies” that patriot fundamentalist leaders nurtured and shaped amongst eighteenth-century Massachusettsans and Pennsylvanians as well as the unique mobilizing structures that patriot fundamentalist leaders put into place.⁵⁴ Thus, to identify the causes and reasons as to why ordinary people radicalized and mobilized through specific channels in support of the patriot fundamentalist cause, this research draws upon modern conceptualizations of group grievance dynamics, Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory (NSMT), and Prospect Theory as well as elements of Sidney Tarrow’s Political Opportunity Structure (POS) approach, Charles Tilly’s theory on resource mobilization, Chenoweth and Stephan’s “interactive” approach to contentious politics, and incorporates current understandings of relative deprivation and relationship-related loss of significance.⁵⁵ It is important to highlight the overarching themes of these individual theories and establish the conceptual and practical grounds of a singular, hybrid theory as it applies to patriot fundamentalism.

⁵⁴ Joseph Alkana, ‘Spiritual and Rational Authority in Benjamin Rush’s Travels through Life’, *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, 34.2 (1992), pp. 284–300 (p. 284).

⁵⁵ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40; Tarrow, pp. 18–19; Tarrow, pp. 76–77; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21; Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10 (2007), pp. 103–26 (pp. 104–5); Robert Fisher and Joe Kling, ‘Community Organization and New Social Movement Theory’, *Journal of Progressive Human Services*, 5.2 (1994), pp. 5–23 (p. 12); Alan B. Durning, ‘Action at the Grassroots: Fighting Poverty and Environmental Decline’ (presented at the Worldwatch Paper 88, January 1989), pp. 1–70 (pp. 6–7); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’, *Econometrica*, 47.2 (1979), pp. 263–92 (pp. 263–64); Barbara Farnham, ‘Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory’, *Political Psychology*, 13.2 (1992), pp. 205–35 (pp. 205–6); Jack S. Levy, ‘An Introduction to Prospect Theory’, *Political Psychology*, 13.2 (1992), pp. 171–86 (pp. 171–74); John Scott, ‘Rational Choice Theory’, in *Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present*, Ed. Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli, and Frank Webster (SAGE Publications, 2000), pp. 126–38 (pp. 126–28); Katarzyna Jasko, Gary LaFree, and Arie W. Kruglanski, ‘Quest for Significance and Violent Extremism: The Case of Domestic Radicalization’, *Political Psychology*, 38.5 (2017), pp. 815–31 (p. 820); Heather J. Smith and others, ‘Relative Deprivation: A Theoretical and Meta-Analytic Review’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 16.3 (2012), pp. 203–32 (p. 203). Tarrow makes it clear that the political opportunity tradition is not to be confused with theorists of resource mobilization in *Power in Movement*. According to Tarrow, political opportunity approaches emphasize the mobilization of resources external to the group as well as elements of opportunity that are perceived by activists. Resource mobilization tends to focus on a movement’s dependency on resources, such as time, financial capabilities, and skills, and the ability to use them for the advancement of the movement.

Within the dynamic of group grievance, there exists an easy path to persuasion through pain and fear, emotions which can often prompt individuals to act outside the confines of their behavioral norms. The anxiety, grief, and “relationship-related loss of significance” that occurs when personal responsibilities, relationships, or property are threatened or removed as a result of political trends, can provide an “incentive” for redress, moving even the most passive of people to radical action, specifically when core elements of one’s individual or group identity or livelihood is at stake.⁵⁶ Indeed, individuals are often radicalized to action when new associations or loyalties promote the improvement of both personal and public wellbeing. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko have determined that when an individual’s level of perceived threat is profound enough or when individual responsibilities, such as supporting a family or building a career, are suddenly lost or broken, they can undergo a period of “unfreezing,” in which previous commitments and loyalties will effectively be abandoned for more promising interests and opportunities.⁵⁷ In turn, the individual feelings and beliefs of activists advancing a cause can come to outweigh the risks and apprehensions associated with political struggle. It should be noted that the process by which one becomes radicalized is most often viewed as fluid and dynamic. Participants in social movements often find themselves linked together through shared interests and experiences, including gender, ethnic composition, occupation, and religious affiliation, and accordingly, context in the process of radicalization is critical, as the specific dynamics of group grievance can often indicate how, when, and to what extent individuals become radicalized to political resistance.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski, p. 820; Smith and others, p. 203; Arie W. Kruglanski and others, ‘The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism’, *Political Psychology*, 35.1 (2014), pp. 69–93 (p. 74).

⁵⁷ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us* (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 75.

⁵⁸ Anthony F. Lemieux and Michael J. Boyle, ‘Terrorism’, in *Encyclopedia of Human Behavior*, Ed. Vilayanur Ramachandran, 2nd edn (Elsevier Academic Press, 2012), pp. 595–603 (p. 61).

Throughout history, societies across the globe have experienced periods where a conflict in which they were involved could only be resolved through some level of political struggle. As Gene Sharp has concluded, such conflicts often involve the fundamental social principles of autonomy, of self-respect, or of the public's capacity to have a role in the determination of their own future.⁵⁹ Often, in the context political struggle, individuals and groups become prone to radicalization when the institutional channels through which they should be able to pursue redress, or at very least receive formal recognition, are unavailable, insufficient, or usurped. As such, activists frequently have to create their own pathways to political change, and as Elisabeth S. Clemens has argued, when groups are either marginalized by or have the perception of being marginalized by existing institutions, an incentive to develop alternative models of organization surfaces.⁶⁰ As such, groups and individuals in the midst of conflict can often feel driven to collectivize, molding particular group identities, establishing quasi-governmental institutions and authorities, such as Committees of Correspondence or the Continental Congress, in order to defend their needs through organized, purposeful, and defiant actions.⁶¹ These processes not only incite discussion and create space for new political debates and more accessible pathways for activism, but, as Schneiberg and Lounsbury have suggested, mobilization within social movements has also frequently provided critical opportunities for engagement by women and minority groups, effectively allowing a unique level of inclusivity to those previously barred from involvement in social and political issues.⁶²

⁵⁹ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, p. 3.

⁶⁰ Elisabeth S. Clemens, 'Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women's Groups and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1890-1920', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98.4 (1993), pp. 755-98 (p. 755); Erica Chenoweth, 'Political Mobilization and Institutions', in *In Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions*, Eds. Jennifer Gandhi and Ruben Ruiz-Rufino (Routledge, 2015), pp. 362-76 (p. 362).

⁶¹ Ronald M. McCarthy and Christopher Kruegler, *Toward Research and Theory Building in the Study of Nonviolent Action*, Monograph Series, 7 (The Albert Einstein Institution, 1993), p. 4; Bartkowski, pp. 2-3.

⁶² Marc Schneiberg and Michael Lounsbury, 'Social Movements and Institutional Analysis', in *SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*, Ed. Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin, and Roy Suddaby (SAGE Publications, 2007), pp. 648-70 (pp. 649-50).

Through extensive field work and research on critical aspects of the core membership of resistance movements, Donatella della Porta has determined that individuals in the midst of conflict pursue the links that small groups can provide, largely because vulnerable people often find comfort and security in finding and creating shared formative experiences.⁶³ Generally, the background characteristics and motivational factors that prompt people to seek involvement in broad movements will differ from those who seek involvement in more localized initiatives, meaning that motivation must be considered when explaining the choices to pursue nonviolent action and to continue using it during a conflict.⁶⁴ Notably, Katarzyna Jasko, Gary LaFree, and Arie Kruglanski have concluded that individuals with connections to others who were engaged in a nonviolent social movement were likely to pursue similar to means to ends without engaging in violence, likely because nonviolent social connections “serve as a protective factor” against the consequences of engaging in political violence.⁶⁵ Almost universally, however, individuals radicalize and mobilize alongside school friends, next-door neighbors, colleagues, and relatives, meaning that small group dynamics play an extremely critical role in the processes of radicalization and mobilization.⁶⁶ Indeed, often, and as was the case in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts and Philadelphia, the trust networks that naturally develop along familial, social, cultural, and religious lines are key to disseminating, normalizing, and routinizing the ideas and actions supported by a given cause.⁶⁷

⁶³ Donatella della Porta, ‘Recruitment Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations: Italian Left-Wing Terrorism’, in *International Social Movement Research* (JAI Press Incorporated, 1988), I, 155–69 (pp. 158–60).

⁶⁴ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), pp. 26–27; McCarthy and Kruegler, p. 10.

⁶⁵ della Porta, I, pp. 158–60; Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski, p. 824.

⁶⁶ Sageman, pp. 26–27; McCarthy and Kruegler, p. 10.

⁶⁷ Judith Ridner, *The Scots Irish of Pennsylvania: A Varied People* (Temple University Press, 2018), p. 37; Charles Tilly, ‘Trust Networks in Transnational Migration’, *Sociological Forum*, 22.1 (2007), pp. 3–24 (pp. 5–6).

Whether ideas or actions play a more significant role in recruiting new participants to a cause or social movement has been hotly contested, and social scientists have developed noteworthy cases, which demonstrate that just as radicalization can proceed mobilization, direct action or participation in a social movement can gradually bring about ideological changes. McCauley and Moskalenko tend to explain political radicalization as an “ideas first” phenomenon, which can be functionally described as “preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict”, or in other words, a change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify political action and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup.⁶⁸ According to “ideas first radicalization”, an individual’s desire to participate in activism is preceded by some sort of trauma, hardship, loss, or anxiety. Social Movement scholars and theorists have explained the “ideas first” view of radicalization, which offers three primary interpretations of the correlation between ideas and activism.⁶⁹ For example, Framing Theory, as explained by Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, suggests that individuals and groups can view a single issue from a vast variety of perspectives, and as such, an issue can come to be construed as “having implications for multiple values or considerations”.⁷⁰ Framing allows individuals and groups to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” their views on a given topic either by developing a particular conceptualization or reorienting their previous understandings of an issue.⁷¹ There also exists a caveat within Framing Theory that individuals can place different emphases on various considerations of a

⁶⁸ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20.3 (2008), pp. 415–33 (p. 416).

⁶⁹ Clark McCauley, ‘Does Political Radicalization Depend on Ideology?’, *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 2.3 (2009), pp. 213–15 (pp. 213–14), doi:10.1080/17467581003642344.

⁷⁰ Chong and Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, pp. 104–5.

⁷¹ David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, and Robert D. Benford, ‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, *American Sociological Review*, 51 (1986), pp. 464–81 (p. 464); Takeshi Wada, ‘Modularity and Transferability of Repertoires of Contention’, *Social Problems*, 59.4 (2012), pp. 544–71 (p. 547).

subject, meaning that people can tend to be drawn selectively to the specific facets of an issue that most significantly appeal to their sensibilities or impact their lives and livelihoods.

Similar to Framing Theory, a second interpretation of “ideas first” radicalization, called New Social Movement Theory (NSMT), suggests that the likelihood of individuals becoming radicalized to certain ideals and mobilized behind a cause is dependent upon the movement’s ability to express the beliefs and identities of its participants. As Robert Fisher and Joe Kling have denoted, movements that fall under the umbrella of New Social Movement Theory typically consist of “transclass groupings of constituencies and cultural identities” organized around gender, race, ethnicity, age, sexuality, spirituality, and various other elements of human and civil rights.⁷² Within New Social Movement Theory, groups tend to “tap local knowledge and resources, to respond to problems rapidly and creatively, and to maintain the flexibility needed in changing circumstances”.⁷³ It has been argued that the NSMT approach does not always align with processes of resistance and revolution, as it does not always specifically rely upon ideological themes; however, in the context of the patriot fundamentalist movement, NSMT can be a helpful approach to conceptualizing the ways in which radical leaders drew upon a variety of unique colonial experiences to nurture a distinctly American identity and carry the patriot fundamentalist cause forward, despite shifting circumstances and power structures.

A third “ideas first” explanation of radicalization, Prospect Theory, explains an important element of political psychology which significantly impacts the extent to which individuals are likely to engage in a social movement: risk aversion. Prospect Theory acknowledges that humans innately long for certainty and predictability, and the approach suggests that a movement’s ability to radicalize and mobilize people is reliant upon the

⁷² Fisher and Kling, p. 12.

⁷³ Durning, pp. 6–7.

probability that the movement will bring about sociopolitical change to benefit participants' personal livelihoods.⁷⁴ Like Rational Choice Theory, Prospect Theory denotes that individuals act according to the information that they have about their specific conditions and the calculations they have made on the likely costs and benefits of an action; yet, Prospect Theory additionally emphasizes that people generally think in terms of gains and losses in regard to a certain reference point or status quo.⁷⁵ Moreover, this approach accounts for the fact that people tend to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses, which is to say that when individuals understand the potential loss from a risk to be too significant, they will avoid pursuing it.⁷⁶ While all social movements present some level of risk, individuals can be motivated to activism when they understand the benefits of radical action to outweigh the associated risks. As Barbara Farnham has concluded, risk acceptance to avoid loss can even alter the decision frame and bring about preference reversal. For instance, during the course of the Imperial Crisis, American colonists became more willing to act in ways that had the potential to compromise their connection with Great Britain, a key risk that they had originally hoped to avoid.⁷⁷

One component of Prospect Theory explains that preference reversal does not occur as a result of new information, and in the context of the patriot fundamentalist movement, we cannot take this element on board.⁷⁸ Certainly, Americans were aware of the potential consequences of dependence upon Britain when the Stamp Act was passed; however, these consequences became amplified with the passage of the Townshend duties, the closure of the port of Boston, and the release of information regarding Britain's ideas about "abridged"

⁷⁴ Kahneman and Tversky, pp. 264–65.

⁷⁵ Scott, pp. 127–28.

⁷⁶ Levy, pp. 174–75.

⁷⁷ Farnham, p. 205.

⁷⁸ Farnham, pp. 205–6.

American liberties.⁷⁹ Colonists responded to new information about Britain and their place within its empire by gradually changing their conceptualizations of the Anglo-American relationship and accepting the risks associated with challenging imperial authority. Americans moved from a firm conviction that Parliament would hear their grievances and compromise to achieve a fair and peaceful resolution to accepting the belief that American independence and its determination by arms were both necessary and justified. As such, to reap the full theoretical benefits of Prospect Theory in relation to the patriot fundamentalist ideology, we are best served by considering it in conjunction with Framing Theory and New Social Movement Theory. By joining these three theories into one composite framework, we can better examine how patriot leaders framed the consequential events and outcomes of the Imperial Crisis to themselves and the broader public, how the patriot movement expressed the beliefs and identities of its diverse participants, and how the “certainty” of American exploitation by the British empire yielded ideological evolution in pre-Revolutionary America.

A key commonality of these interpretations of radicalization maintains that action comes secondary to ideas, but conversely, della Porta has critically analyzed the ways in which proximity to a social movement can attract individuals to a cause through “informal mobilization” before they have fully been radicalized on an ideological level.⁸⁰ Likewise, Ziad W. Munson has suggested that ideology is born from action, meaning that the core beliefs of social movements are learned through activism, or as Munson expressed it, that “beliefs about social and moral issues are as much the product of social movement

⁷⁹ ‘Thomas Hutchinson, 20 January 1769’, in *Copy of Letters Sent to Great-Britain by His Excellency Thomas Hutchinson, the Hon. Andrew Oliver, and Several Other Persons* (Edes and Gill, in Queen-Street, 1773).

⁸⁰ Donatella della Porta, ‘Social Movements and the State’, in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, Ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 62–92 (pp. 226–27); David A. Siegel, ‘When Does Repression Work? Collection Action in Social Networks’, *The Journal of Politics*, 73.4 (2011), pp. 993–1010 (p. 993).

participation as they are the impetus for such involvement”.⁸¹ According to Munson, mobilization chiefly occurs through a four-step process in which incidental contact first connects a potential recruit with an activist. For instance, the two parties may connect through social networking opportunities such as school, work, church, or kinship networks, and after such an encounter, potential recruits can be persuaded to join a meeting, protest, or other event at which they can consider and likely develop the views of the social movement. The final step in Munson’s process of mobilization is regular and routine participation within the social movement.⁸²

Although Munson’s application of these observations is quite original, elements of his argument on the development of ideas can be linked to Leon Festinger’s 1957 *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, which effectively articulates that if individuals hold two psychologically inconsistent opinions, beliefs, or pieces of knowledge about the environment, themselves, or their behaviors, they will often seek to reduce that dissonance in the same way that they would work to reduce hunger, thirst, or any other motivator.⁸³ Indeed, cognitive dissonance can be observed as “an everyday condition”, whereby an individual can recognize and understand a piece of information or a belief, yet act in a manner that contradicts or conflicts with that knowledge. For instance, a person who intends to invest a large sum of money must accept that the outcome of an investment comes with a risk and depends upon economic conditions beyond their control, or in the case of pre-Revolutionary America, cognitive dissonance can be observed in the ways in which colonists grappled with the realization that direct action against Parliamentary policies could forever taint their relationship with the “patriot king”, George III. Ultimately, in cases of cognitive dissonance,

⁸¹ Ziad W. Munson, *The Making of Pro-Life Activists: How Social Movement Mobilization Works* (The University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 2.

⁸² Munson, pp. 47–50.

⁸³ Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 2–4.

individuals and groups must either deliberately or instinctively prioritize the elements of an argument that most align with their views and interests.

Moreover, as Festinger has demonstrated, many social, political, or economic issues neglect to have clear-cut solutions, meaning that cognitive dissonance can often be “almost unavoidably created between the cognition of the action taken and those opinions or pieces of knowledge which tend to point to a different action”.⁸⁴ The case for cognitive dissonance as a recruitment pathway for social movements, or perhaps more simply put, the case for radicalization through mobilization makes sense for a variety of reasons, particularly because the process of radicalization through mobilization often occurs quite fluidly, as opposed to involving a conscious decision to alter a way of thinking. For example, human nature dictates that individuals are often influenced or persuaded by the people with which they associate, or as Snow, Zurcher, and Eckland-Olson have contended, the process of mobilization extends beyond the effects of certain social-psychological predispositions to be similarly influenced by “the sociospatial settings in which social movements and potential participants can come into contact” as well as the available modes of communication through which information can be shared.⁸⁵ What this means is that even if an individual is unclear about a movement’s broader aims or skeptical about movement involvement, they can come accept and trust the messaging of the movement as it was relayed by peers and trusted leaders, even if the process happens gradually and unconsciously. A vast body of literature suggests that individuals do not make complex or potentially high-risk decisions independently of trusted peers, and David A. Siegel has concluded that an individual’s decision-making processes generally consider safety, fairness, reputation, available information, and leadership or intra-group

⁸⁴ Festinger, p. 5.

⁸⁵ David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., and Sheldon Eckland-Olson, ‘Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment’, *American Sociological Review*, 45.5 (1980), pp. 787–801 (p. 789).

influence.⁸⁶ Thus, while a person may seek new information on a movement or a cause and in turn, choose to browse the literature created by a social movement or attend a rally aimed at advertising or defending a given issue, people equally choose to get involved in a social movement as a means of making sense out of their environment and their behavior or similarly, in an effort take action in a way that is, at least in their own minds, sensible and meaningful.⁸⁷

A primary theoretical argument on social movements and their ability to mobilize the masses comes from Sidney Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure approach. Drawing from Peter Eisinger's 1973 conclusion that activists take action when and where they can locate access, Tarrow argues that mobilization occurs as a result of conditions whereby individuals on the periphery experience increased access to social groups that reflect their alignments and feature influential partnerships. In short, social movements emerge when the conditions for mobilization expand from people with deep grievances and strong resources to those with fewer grievances and less resources.⁸⁸ Political Opportunity Structure has effectively been applied to other historical movements. Perhaps most notably, Doug McAdams conducted a longitudinal examination of the American Civil Rights Movement which used Political Opportunity frameworks to analyze how demography, repression, migration, and political economy impacted advocacy outcomes in certain regions of the United States. While in many ways McAdams's work serves as a model for evaluating large-scale social movements, social scientists have flagged concerns that the Political Opportunity approach focuses too heavily on top-down mobilizing structures and places too much significance on big moments of

⁸⁶ Siegel, p. 993; Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, 'Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism', *American Journal of Sociology*, 99.3 (1993), pp. 640–67 (p. 643); Snow, Zurcher, Jr., and Eklund-Olson, p. 789.

⁸⁷ Elliot Aronson, 'The Return of the Repressed: Dissonance Theory Makes a Comeback', *Psychological Inquiry*, 3.4 (1992), pp. 303–11 (p. 304).

⁸⁸ Peter Eisinger, 'The Conditions of Protest in American Cities', *The American Political Science Review*, 67.1 (1973), pp. 11–28 (p. 11); Tarrow, pp. 18–19; Tarrow, pp. 76–77.

change, such as sweeping policy changes, instead of considering the smaller, less “volatile” consistencies that present themselves every day in certain social movements.⁸⁹

While the Political Opportunity approach can be seen as minimizing the ways in which groups can shape the outcome of their struggle, it does offer important insight into the ways in which social movements are dependent upon the opening and closing of opportunities created by the political order. In the context of the patriot fundamentalist movement, this approach is particularly helpful for assessing top-down mobilizing structures, whereby elite colonists established the committees and networks of communication through which they were able to communicate patriot ideals, objectives, and plans of action. As such, this research applies the Political Opportunity framework in tandem with two additional Social Science approaches firstly, to more explicitly connect top-down mobilizing structures with people power, and additionally, to address important everyday features and specify pertinent context, including why certain claims were advanced over others, how certain alliances were created and strengthened, and why nonviolent strategies and tactics eclipsed violent means in the colonial pursuit of political change.⁹⁰ In fact, Political Opportunity frameworks are often considered in conjunction with Resource Mobilization Theory, as both approaches are used to assess solidarity and strength in social movement numbers.

Charles Tilly’s theory of Resource Mobilization emphasizes that because social movements vary greatly in their motivations and goals, size and membership, and resources and capabilities, participants often act and react based on the resources available to them,

⁸⁹ William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, ‘Framing Political Opportunity’, in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, Ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 275–90 (p. 275); David S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff, ‘Conceptualizing Political Opportunity’, *Social Forces*, 82.4 (2004), pp. 1457–92 (p. 1459).

⁹⁰ David S. Meyer, ‘Protest and Political Opportunities’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30 (2004), pp. 125–45 (pp. 125–26).

which might range from knowledgeable leaders and advisors to a committed rank and file.⁹¹ As such, a resource mobilization approach suggests that mobilization can occur regardless of political opportunity. This approach is particularly helpful in thinking about individuals' skills and means and how they were used to advance the patriot fundamentalist movement. Where this research will apply elements of Resource Mobilization Theory is in considering, for instance, the role of the media during the Imperial Crisis and ways in which skilled, connected printers such as William Bradford were able to monitor and even control the flow of information that the broader public was absorbing. As the owner and editor of a successful Pennsylvania newspaper, Bradford could guarantee that patriot-leaning propaganda was making its way to his audience. Thus, in this sense, a resource mobilization approach can be a helpful way to consider entrepreneurial impacts on social movements.

However, one feature of Resource Mobilization Theory that this research will not incorporate is its capacity for "forecasting and predictive methods".⁹² This research does not presuppose that colonists in 1765 assumed or even hoped that their resistance efforts would result in American independence. If anything, patriot arguments were retrofitted to remind colonists of the shock they felt upon receiving the news about certain pieces of Parliamentary legislation, and sensibilities of resistance were framed around the fear and suspicion that there might be a more restrictive policy and consequently, another fight waiting just around the corner. Thus, while colonists were certainly focused on surviving the processes of challenging their individual grievances, we cannot rightfully argue that the underlying

⁹¹ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40. Tarrow makes it clear that the political opportunity tradition is not to be confused with theorists of resource mobilization in *Power in Movement*. According to Tarrow, political opportunity approaches emphasize the mobilization of resources external to the group as well as elements of opportunity that are perceived by activists. Resource mobilization tends to focus on a movement's dependency on resources, such as time, financial capabilities, and skills, and the ability to use them for the advancement of the movement.

⁹² Masudul Alam Choudhury, 'Resource Mobilization and Development Goals for Islamic Banks', in *Proceedings of the Second Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance* (presented at the Islamic Finance into the 21st Century, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1999), pp. 31–50 (p. 35).

intention was to advance from “no taxation without representation” to formally declaring independence. Moreover, on its own, a Resource Mobilization approach can overlook the ways in which the resources and actions of the opponent factor into a movement’s ability to mobilize groups and individuals. For instance, Great Britain, a materially and militarily formidable opponent, implemented a variety of legislative measures and physical mechanisms in an attempt to quash colonial mobilization, and these efforts at suppression and repression need to be taken into account, specifically, as Kurt Schock has discussed, as they were most often met with backlash, which often helped to strengthen colonial resolve.⁹³

Correspondingly, a third approach, explained by Chenoweth and Stephan as “an interactive one that draws on a contentious politics approach” focuses on the two-way street between social movements and their opponents. Grounded in recent contributions to Social Movement Studies as well as Security Studies, the approach utilized in the groundbreaking *Why Civil Resistance Works* lends itself to an investigation of firstly, how the structure of the political environment will impact perceptions of resistance and additionally, how the actions of resistance movements will impact the broader the political structure. This approach assesses the distinct effects that the social movement and the structure of the existing system have on one another, and it allows us to examine the reflexive relationship between British and American perceptions and actions.⁹⁴

This research project would be incomplete without acknowledging that a minority of colonists did “improvise” and engage in acts of vandalism, material destruction, and aggressive rituals of humiliation, including tarring and feathering, at various points throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis.⁹⁵ The property damage inflicted upon Thomas

⁹³ Schock, ‘The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance’, p. 284.

⁹⁴ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

⁹⁵ Stacy Schiff, *A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France, and the Birth of America* (Henry Holt and Company, 2005).

Hutchinson, Andrew Oliver, and other less notable colonists as well as the physical abuse suffered by Boston loyalist John Malcolm have been well documented by a variety of historians from different schools of historiographical thought.⁹⁶ However, while some narratives cite the “terror” of social pressures such as oath taking and public apologies, social scientists have long distinguished social pressures from “actual incidents of political violence” such as assassinations or guerilla warfare.⁹⁷ Likewise, historians have emphasized the “indignity” of tarring and feathering, often with the implication that such abuse was a standard solution to everyday disputes despite the fact fewer than a dozen cases of tarring and feather actually occurred between January 1765 and April 1775, and as these incidents typically involved “private grudges” with customs informers, they appear as anomalies and cannot be seen as reflective of or as having been orchestrated by the broader patriot fundamentalist movement.⁹⁸ In addition, following a 1769 coffee house squabble, the Sons of Liberty provided “retinue” for loyalist James Murray, crying, “No violence, or you’ll hurt the cause”.⁹⁹ As late as 1774, even the ever-spirited Samuel Adams urged Massachusetts radicals to maintain the spirit of nonviolence, cautioning, “nothing can ruin us but our violence”.¹⁰⁰ Beyond these few brief references, however, several key caveats stemming from a range of qualitative and quantitative scholarship within the field of Security Studies enable this

⁹⁶ For further reading, see *Between Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of Violence in the American Revolutionary Era*, Ed. Patrick Griffin, Robert G. Ingram, Peter S. Onuf, and Brian Schoen (University of Virginia Press, 2015); Holger Hock, *Scars of Independence: America’s Violent Birth* (Crown Publishing, 2017); *Justifying Revolution: Law, Virtue, and Violence in the American War of Independence*, Ed. Glenn A. Moots and Philip Hamilton (University of Oklahoma Press, 2018).

⁹⁷ Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘The Rise of Political Violence in the United States’, *Journal of Democracy*, 32.4 (2021), pp. 160–76 (p. 167); Perry Mars, ‘The Nature of Political Violence’, *Social and Economic Studies*, 24.2 (1975), pp. 221–38 (p. 231); Virginia Held, ‘The Media and Political Violence’, *The Journal of Ethics*, 1.2 (1997), pp. 187–202 (pp. 187–88).

⁹⁸ Huggins, p. 71; Conser, Jr., ‘The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775’, p. 311.

⁹⁹ *Letters of James Murray, Loyalist*, Ed. Nina Moore Tiffany and Susan I. Lesley (Gregg Press, 1972), pp. 159–60.

¹⁰⁰ ‘Samuel Adams to James Warren, May 21 May 1774’, in *Warren-Adams Letters: Being Chiefly a Correspondence among John Adams, Samuel Adams, and James Warren* (Massachusetts Historical Society, 1917), 1, p. 26; Chaim M. Rosenberg, *The Loyalist Conscience: Principled Opposition to the American Revolution* (McFarland and Company, Inc., 2018), p. 84.

research to qualify the patriot fundamentalist movement as a nonviolent civil resistance campaign.

For instance, nonviolence also involves some combination of three other factors: firstly, doing something without using violence despite the risk of being subjected to force, refusing to use violence despite the risk of being subjected to violence, and in addition, utilizing violence as a means of counteracting the violence of others.¹⁰¹ Indeed, McCarthy and Kruegler have underscored that nonviolence in a political context must be viewed as an action distinct from other forms of conflict resolution, meaning that physical violence, including threats of physical force and material destruction, may be used by the same or different groups as those using nonviolent action, and certainly by adversaries of nonviolent groups.¹⁰² When nonviolent civil resistance movements begin to employ violence with broad consensus, it likely points to an absence of evidence that nonviolent means will achieve the movement's ends, and when smaller factions within a nonviolent civil resistance movement sporadically choose to engage in violent action independently of movement leaders, it indicates the presence of "radical flanks". The presence of radical flanks or fringe members that engage in violent action within otherwise nonviolent movements does not negate the movement's broader nonviolent features or tactics, and likewise, the presence of "radical flanks" does not qualify a movement as predominantly violent, particularly if the social movement is comprised of decentralized networks which cover a broad geographical range and neglect to have one central base or hub through which to convey directives.¹⁰³ Instead,

¹⁰¹ McCarthy and Kruegler, pp. 3–4.

¹⁰² McCarthy and Kruegler, pp. 3–4. Other forms of conflict resolution or conflict management might include third party intervention and efforts at reconciliation, negotiation, and mediation.

¹⁰³ Elizabeth Tompkins, 'A Quantitative Reevaluation of Radical Flank Effects within Nonviolent Campaigns', *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, 38 (2015), pp. 103–35 (p. 103); Jordi Muñoz and Eva Anduiza, "'If a Fight Starts, Watch the Crowd': The Effect of Violence on Popular Support for Social Movements", *Journal of Peace Research*, 56.4 (2019), pp. 485–98 (p. 486); Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 12; Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, p. 33.

radical flank effects might simply suggest a lack of access to the leaders issuing directives for resistance tactics, overlapping identities that prioritize a smaller faction over the broader movement, or frustration from a lack of progress to achieve concessions.¹⁰⁴

Similarly, when examining some of the more significant violent outbursts that occurred during the Imperial Crisis, such as the Boston Massacre or the Boston Tea Party, it becomes clear that violent directives were not issued through quasi-official channels such as local committees or assemblies of patriot fundamentalist leaders, who organized and mobilized with the explicit intention to “showcase a moral dichotomy”.¹⁰⁵ Charles S. Olton has noted that dissenting British North Americans had clear objectives to pursue, but none of which, they recognized, could be obtained through mindless violence or anarchy, and similarly, the scholarship of Joseph Ellis, which takes these largely moralistic perceptions of early American “patriotism” one step further, has emphasized that British North Americans were deeply influenced by a distinctive sense of honor, which originated in the medieval world and determined that a clearly defined, “quasi-chivalric” set of principles should govern a gentleman’s behavior at all times, especially in times of conflict or controversy.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, Dirk Hoerder has suggested that although some patriot collectives did display unruly behavior during early mass assemblies, demonstrating what Jerryson and Kitts have called “the violence of nonviolence”, the majority of urban crowds conducted themselves in a pragmatic, goal-oriented fashion, particularly as dissident events and processes became increasingly orchestrated by county conventions and committees of correspondence.¹⁰⁷ In fact, more commonly, individuals who can be considered as adjacent to the core leaders of

¹⁰⁴ Tarrow, p. 151.

¹⁰⁵ Stellan Vinthagen, *A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How Civil Resistance Works* (Zed Books, 2015), p. 16.

¹⁰⁶ Charles S. Olton, ‘Philadelphia’s Mechanics in the First Decade of Revolution, 1765-1775’, *The Journal of American History*, 52.2 (1972), pp. 311–26 (p. 319); Joseph Ellis, *Revolutionary Summer: The Birth of American Independence* (Knopf, 2013), Preface, p. xii.

¹⁰⁷ Dirk Hoerder, *Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765-1780* (Academic Press, 1977), pp. 243–46; Michael Jerryson and Margo Kitts, ‘Religion and the Violence of Nonviolence’, *Open Theology*, 1, pp. 122–25 (p. 123); Olton, p. 319.

the patriot fundamentalist movement, including William Molineux or Thomas Young, both of whom will be discussed in later chapters, were responsible for managing crowd action during public protests, demonstrating a concentrated effort to curb violent crowd action and instead channel colonial energy into boycotting, petitioning, and carrying out regular acts of performative noncooperation to demonstrate the worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment of the patriot fundamentalist movement.¹⁰⁸

Moreover, in general, nonviolent social movements radicalize and mobilize in the same or similar ways that violent social movements do. Ultimately, to radicalize and mobilize, groups and individuals simply need to understand and identify with the core grievances of the cause and be granted access to procedures and actions designed or intended to bring about some level of sociopolitical change.¹⁰⁹ Certainly, violent political resistance presents more risks, which can often deter certain age groups, faith communities, or social sects; Yet, the causal factors and participatory processes which attract aggrieved groups and individuals to ideologically and physically support a given cause enormously coincide between violent and nonviolent movements.¹¹⁰ What this means is that effectively all nonviolent social movements are theoretically capable of utilizing violence, although the adoption of violent means to ends typically occurs when goals cannot be attained through institutional channels or nonviolent protest.¹¹¹ In the context of the Imperial Crisis, colonial perceptions of being humiliated, rejected, or ignored by Parliament's consistent dismissal of

¹⁰⁸ Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 227; Edward Countryman, *The American Revolution* (Hill and Wang, 2003), p. 123; Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 35.

¹⁰⁹ Muñoz and Anduiza, p. 488.

¹¹⁰ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 10–12; Donatella della Porta, 'Research on Social Movements and Political Violence', *Qual Sociol: Special Issue on Political Violence*, 31, pp. 221–30 (pp. 226–27); Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 13; Tarrow, pp. 76–77; John D. McCarthy, 'Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing', in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, Ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 141–51 (pp. 141–42).

¹¹¹ Schock, 'The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance', p. 282.

their petitions increased the levels of deprivation and frustration that colonists were experiencing, which, in turn, led some groups of colonists to test imperial boundaries and assess the relative costs of violent resistance in ways that were previously unavailable to them via the formal or organized tactics established by the broader patriot fundamentalist movement.¹¹² Thus, while the episodes of violent crowd action that occurred under the pretension of “patriot” activism cannot be defended or excused, they can be examined and understood through a combination of radicalization and mobilization structures, as the following chapters will demonstrate.

Ultimately, between the years 1764 and 1776, British North Americans became increasingly radicalized to the nonviolent ideology of patriot fundamentalism in response to their expanding sense of being actively disadvantaged by Parliamentary legislation that simultaneously failed to offer colonists the benefits and liberties which they believed the English constitution granted to them, ignored and downplayed colonial contributions to the broader empire, and disgraced the legacies of their forbears who facilitated the settlement of the American colonies. The patriot fundamentalist campaign was a popular social movement that radical leaders “framed” and structured in a way that simultaneously reflected the wide variety of political philosophies, religious cultures, and ethnic compositions that comprised eighteenth-century British North American society and articulated the values, intentions, and personal and communal aims of the colonies.¹¹³ By simultaneously reiterating the narrative of colonial strife in the settlement era and creating new space through which eighteenth-century colonists could share formative experiences, patriot fundamentalist leaders lowered the risks associated with noncooperation.¹¹⁴ Likewise, by lowering the barriers once posed by

¹¹² Brandon Ives and Jacob S. Lewis, ‘From Rallies to Riots: Why Some Protests Become Violent’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 64.5 (2020), pp. 958–86 (pp. 959–60).

¹¹³ Chong and Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’.

¹¹⁴ Fisher and Kling; Steven M. Buechler, ‘New Social Movements and New Social Movement Theory’, in *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, Ed. David A. Snow, Donatella Della Porta,

socioeconomic status, gender, ethnic composition, and religious affiliation and organizing new, unprecedented opportunities involvement in political processes, the leaders of the patriot fundamentalist movement drew friends, colleagues, and family members to the banner of resistance and established a social movement that appeared legitimate and deserving of achieving its ends.¹¹⁵ In turn, nonviolent mobilization occurred as a direct result of individuals on the periphery garnering greater access to social and political groups, activists utilizing and manipulating the resources and technical skills that were actually quite abundant in British North America, and the interaction of both British and colonial actions and reactions to the other party's efforts to retain control throughout the Imperial Crisis.¹¹⁶ Gradually, American colonists exposed the fragility of empire by removing their consent to be governed by a body that no longer served them and transferring political authority to new, more representative American institutions.

Thus, in order to comprehensively account for the vast variety of causes and conditions that yielded ideological expansion, increased recruitment, and advanced the breadth of the patriot fundamentalist movement, we must understand the strategic logic and methods employed in the movement's nonviolent civil resistance of British authority by drawing upon a variety of critical theories, approaches, lenses, and conceptualizations of political action. Through patriot fundamentalism, this study applies a new composite approach to evaluating American radicalization and mobilization during the Imperial Crisis, which discourages the theoretical limitations that can come from using one sole framework.

To assess pre-Revolutionary radicalization, his research borrows from Framing Theory the principle that individuals and groups can view a single issue from a vast variety of

Bert Klandermans, and Douglas McAdam (John Wiley and Sons, 2013), pp. 1–7; Scott; della Porta, 'Research on Social Movements and Political Violence'.

¹¹⁵ Tarrow; Meyer and Minkoff; Aronson.

¹¹⁶ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*.

perspectives, placing greater emphases on certain considerations which most closely appeal to their personal sensibilities. Likewise, this project draws upon New Social Movement Theory's tenet that social movements must be able to reflect the needs, beliefs, and identities of their participants, responding to problems quickly and creatively and maintaining flexibility amidst changing circumstances. Lastly, to thoroughly evaluate colonial radicalization, this research considers Prospect Theory to analyze how the patriot movement convinced colonists to mobilize against imperial overreach despite the risks associated with such activism.

To evaluate the mobilizing structures that made the patriot movement successful, this research draws upon Political Opportunity Structure approach to understand how and where colonists were able to locate access to political action and to consider how top-down mobilizing structures like social clubs and committees of correspondence communicated patriot ideas and plans of action. In tandem with the Political Opportunity approach, this research borrows from Resource Mobilization Theory to assess how the patriot movement relied upon built-in resources like legal experts and printing offices to strengthen its reach and recruitment. Lastly, borrowing from Chenoweth and Stephan's interactive approach to contentious politics, this research investigates how the actions and reactions of British authorities contributed to the mobilization of American colonists.

Borrowing elements from these various theoretical frameworks allows us to maintain a full-bodied approach to assessing and analyzing (1) how Americans collectively expressed their grievances against Parliament and established a uniquely continental identity; (2) how patriot fundamentalist leaders established and expanded institutions through which to articulate their case for American autonomy in the face of intensifying British powers and controls; (3) how Americans came to accept certain risks in order to avoid the civil and financial loss; (4) how British North Americans engaged in open resistance of and defiance to

purportedly unjust imperial legislation, (5) how mass political and economic noncooperation bolstered feelings of control and significance amongst American dissenters during the Imperial Crisis, and (6) how Britain's hardline response to American activism encouraged further action.

To nuance our understanding of patriot fundamentalism in both a theoretical and practical sense, chapter one conceptually defines patriot fundamentalism, introduces the ideological and practical applications of patriot fundamentalism in eighteenth-century American resistance, and surveys the literature on nonviolent civil resistance. The first chapter proposes patriot fundamentalism as an action-oriented ideology which insisted upon a strict adherence to faith-based doctrines and ideals which rationalized and necessitated the pursuit of individual moral accountability and just, lawful government through republican activism. Chapter one argues that patriot fundamentalism was founded upon a uniquely American identity that emphasized the righteousness of nonviolent civil resistance against encroaching imperial powers and helped to sustain American resistance throughout the Imperial Crisis. While patriot fundamentalism as a nonviolent had run its course by 1776, this research explains the ways in which nonviolence was a tool that patriot fundamentalist leaders used to legitimize colonial claims to self-government, to discourage repression from Great Britain, and to help colonists identify with the movement, as violence can often minimize general relatability and alienate public support.¹¹⁷

Chapters two and three of this study follow a rough chronology to demonstrate how Massachusettsans interpreted, adapted, and gradually united around the ideology of patriot fundamentalism. Tracing the roots of New England's rich spiritual heritage, the second chapter focuses on how Boston elites not only helped to shape and disseminate what

¹¹⁷ Schock, 'The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance', p. 286; Muñoz and Anduiza, p. 486; della Porta, 'Social Movements and the State', p. 86.

ultimately became the patriot fundamentalist ideology around the intersections of spirituality, ethics, and government, but also worked to establish the ideological foundations and motivations that attracted provincials to nonviolent civil resistance. Chapter three examines the various ways in which all levels of Boston's social hierarchy increasingly supported and advanced the patriot fundamentalist movement. From men of middling wealth, who worked as printers or top-tier artisans and perhaps served on urban committees or facilitated gatherings of the Sons of Liberty to poor laborers, who earned their place in participatory politics by filling church pews during radical sermons and marching in popular demonstrations to women who supported nonimportation and nonconsumption by organizing homespun initiatives and minimizing colonial reliance upon British manufactures, Bostonians and Massachusettsans more broadly mobilized in a variety of impactful ways. Thus, the third chapter of this study assesses how patriot fundamentalist leaders increasingly developed mobilizing structures and made nonviolent civil resistance the status quo.

Similarly, chapters four and five offer a case study on pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania. The fourth chapter of this thesis explains that although the city of Philadelphia remained relatively untouched by the degree of socioeconomic polarization that afflicted the city of Boston until the early 1750s, the province of Pennsylvania more broadly underwent a swift process of diversification, which in turn, created a variety spatial and ethnopolitical concerns. Pennsylvania's unique status as a colony that was granted to the Penn family by the Crown led to conflicts between Quaker loyalists, Proprietary fence-sitters, and burgeoning patriot fundamentalists, who all vied for political control within the province. Pennsylvania was less homogenous than Massachusetts, and consequently, in comparison to Massachusetts, the advancement of the patriot fundamentalist movement in Pennsylvania was slower, more gradual, and more stringently nonviolent, as from the passage of the Stamp Act forward, Pennsylvania experienced comparatively little radical flank effect. However,

Philadelphia's patriot fundamentalist leaders worked to impress upon Pennsylvanians the admirable nature and the strategic logic of nonviolent civil resistance, and as the fifth chapter of this thesis demonstrates, and with leaders including William Bradford, Charles Thomson, and John Dickinson at the helm, Philadelphians and Pennsylvanians more generally increasingly demonstrated the capacity and willingness to engage in noncooperation by participating in boycotts, public demonstrations, and extralegal assemblies and committees.

By historicizing Social Science theories and case studies of contentious politics and considering the eighteenth-century patriot fundamentalist movement alongside the work of modern social scientists, this research concludes that the patriot fundamentalist movement crystallized the ideological grounds of American resistance, which ultimately sustained nonviolence throughout the Imperial Crisis. By examining how dissenting Americans utilized boycott initiatives, organized public demonstrations, built alternative institutions, and employed other practices of civil resistance to action colonial grievances, we can see how nonviolent advocates legitimized and routinized noncooperation, and understand how the patriot fundamentalist movement more closely aligns with nonviolent civil resistance than any form of political violence. Across these chapters, this research employs the terms "motive" and "mobilization" to set patriot ideas and motivations apart from patriot actions and methods of nonviolent civil resistance. "Motive" describes the intersecting social, political, economic, and spiritual factors and reasons which stimulated, explained, and strengthened the ideology of patriot fundamentalism as well as the action it necessitated. "Mobilization" on the other hand, emphasizes the physical protest mechanisms employed by dissenting British North Americans to manage the dynamics of the colonial political struggle against Great Britain. As such, by separating motive from mobilization, as this thesis does in the following case studies of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, we can examine how and why certain types of goals, such as Parliamentary representation or legislative repeal, inspired and

activated marginalized individuals and groups to participate in the nonviolent civil resistance.¹¹⁸ In other words, by defining motive and mobilization in these ways and by compartmentalizing motive and mobilization in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, we are better equipped to understand and explain both the conceptual and behavioral forces that shaped the development of the patriot fundamentalist movement.¹¹⁹

At its core, this study exists to nuance our understanding of nonviolent civil resistance in the pre-Revolutionary colonies of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania by theoretically and practically applying patriot fundamentalism as a lens through which to interpret the transformative events and process that nonviolent civil resistance enabled during the Imperial Crisis, filling an important gap in the existing historiography. As such, this thesis draws upon the “cross-fertilization and synthesis” that links theories and scholarship from the fields of social movement studies, revolutionary studies, and nonviolent civil resistance research not only to explore the ways in which economic, political, and demographic changes influenced socioeconomic conditions and political structures in the colonies of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, but also to examine how eighteenth-century Americans engaged in “claim-making performances” and how those displays varied and evolved throughout the decade that preceded independence.¹²⁰ This research relies on a rich body of nonviolent civil resistance literature from scholars who have greatly contributed to modern understandings of the strategic logic and implementation of nonviolent civil resistance as a mechanism for political change, and in turn, applies a composite, interdisciplinary approach to analyzing the ideological and mobilizing features that ultimately qualify the patriot fundamentalist resistance of Great Britain as a nonviolent social movement.

¹¹⁸ Maarten Johannes van Bezouw and Maja Kutlaca, ‘What Do We Want? Examining the Motivating Role of Goals in Social Movement Mobilization’, *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 7.1 (2019), pp. 33–51 (p. 34).

¹¹⁹ Aaron A. Moore, ‘Motivations for Mobilization: Comparing Urban and Suburban Residents’ Participation in the Politics of Planning and Development’, *Urban Affairs Review*, 58.4 (2022), pp. 1124–51 (p. 1125).

¹²⁰ Schock, ‘The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance’, pp. 280–82.

Chapter 1 –

Patriot Fundamentalism Considered as Nonviolent Civil Resistance

Numerous historical narratives have invoked the violent aspects of America’s transition from colonies to nation, including incidents like the Andrew Oliver ordeal and Boston Tea Party, which this thesis has explained as the products of radical flank effect. Moreover, prominent, acclaimed scholars have frequently referred to eighteenth-century American “patriots” as “rebels”, “radicals”, or “insurgents”, terminologies which often invoke negative connotations or violent imagery. While such terms are not automatically indicative of violence, society has effectively been conditioned to associate those terms with force, hostility, and destruction. We hear about the National Liberation Army (ELN) “rebels” whose targeted, guerilla-style tactics have led Canada, the United States, and the European Union to classify the group as a terrorist organization or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) whose history of violence extends from kidnapping, drug smuggling, and extortion to engaging Colombian police forces with home-made mortars, sniper rifles, and explosives. Likewise, major news networks in the United States and elsewhere “unintentionally or otherwise” discuss “radical Islam” on an annual basis while showcasing grainy footage of two hijacked planes striking the World Trade Center during the 9/11 attacks and recurrently reference the unapologetically aggressive and destructive actions of the “radical Right” during the January 2021 insurrection of the United States Capitol, for instance.¹²¹ In fact, even when news reports draw attention to

¹²¹ Bartkowski, p. 20. See, for example, David Mercer, ‘9/11 Anniversary: I was burning alive – Survivors of September 11 attacks describe how they narrowly avoided being killed’, *Sky News*, 9 September 2021 <<https://news.sky.com/story/9-11-anniversary-i-was-burning-alive-survivors-of-september-11-attacks-describe-how-they-narrowly-avoided-being-killed-12402266>>, Jennifer Peltz, ‘20 images that documented the enormity

“radical” approaches to climate change and “radical” healthcare reforms, concepts which many would be inclined to view as positive, progressive, and ultimately beneficial for society, the tone can often come across as divisive or intimidating. Yet, as Olivier Galland and Anne Muxel have explained, “the notion of radicalism goes far beyond the notion of violence (even if violence is incorporated in it)”, and as such, by accepting a “broadened and diversified spectrum of radicalism”, we can better understand the revolutionary nature of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns like the patriot fundamentalist movement that arise in response to the divisions and inequalities that often precede pushes for sociopolitical change.¹²² This chapter will begin by exploring the individual meanings of the terms “patriot” and “fundamentalism”, differentiating between the eighteenth-century American perception of what it meant to be a “patriot” and how some individuals and groups have come to comprehend American “patriotism” in the post-Trump era. Then, this chapter will proceed to firstly, explain modern understandings and conceptualizations of nonviolent civil resistance and additionally, consider the ideological and mobilizational impacts of nonviolent civil resistance upon social movements. In doing so, this chapter offers the concept of patriot fundamentalism as a means of placing nonviolent civil resistance at the forefront of American dissent in the Imperial Crisis.

of 9/11’, *Associated Press*, 8 September 2021 <<https://apnews.com/article/september-11-photos-80f1c7348e93ea7532a23e1afc23eacf>>, Will Carless, ‘Proud Boys splintering after Capitol riot... Will more radical factions emerge?’, *USA Today*, 12 February 2021 <<https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/02/12/proud-boys-splintering-after-capitol-riot-revelations-leader/6709017002/>>, Jaelyn Diaz, ‘Members of Right-Wing Militias, Extremist Groups are Latest Charged in Capitol Siege’, NPR, 19 January 2021 <<https://www.npr.org/sections/insurrection-at-the-capitol/2021/01/19/958240531/members-of-right-wing-militias-extremist-groups-are-latest-charged-in-capitol-si?t=1631181979768>>, Joe Lowndes, ‘How the Far Right Weaponized America’s Democratic Roots’, *The Soapbox*, 10 August 2021 <<https://newrepublic.com/article/163210/far-right-proud-boys-tea-party-myth>>, Mallory Simon and Sara Sidner, ‘Decoding the extremist symbols and groups at the Capitol Hill insurrection’, 11 January 2021 <<https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-hill-insurrection-extremist-flags-soh/index.html>>, Joanna Walters and Alvin Chang, ‘Far-right terror poses bigger threat to US than Islamist extremism post-9/11’, *The Guardian*, 8 September 2021 <<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/08/post-911-domestic-terror>>.

¹²² Olivier Galland and Anne Muxel, ‘Radicalism in Question’, in *Radical Thought Among the Young: A Survey of French Lycée Students*, Ed. Olivier Galland and Anne Muxel (Brill, 2020), p. 6; Sarah Waters, *Social Movements in France* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 28.

This chapter sets the stage for this thesis to reclaim the language of radicalism and emphasize the truly transformative impacts of the patriot fundamentalist movement's usage of political nonviolence. By applying a hybrid approach that combines the critical empirical features of nonviolence identified by a variety of key sociologists, social psychologists and political scientists to the study of patriot fundamentalist resistance, this chapter validates the aptness of deploying terms such as "radical" and "revolutionary", which tend to stimulate preconceived notions of violence or force, alongside terms like "activists" and "advocates", which tend to be linked to nonviolent civil resistance more than violent resistance.¹²³ By establishing the language of nonviolent civil resistance in eighteenth-century British North America, this research can then effectively communicate the pre-Revolutionary development of patriot fundamentalism as an action-oriented ideology.

This first half of this chapter illuminates the terminological ambiguities of "patriotism" and sets out its application during and after the American Revolution before tying the features of American noncooperation and defiance exercised during the Imperial Crisis to current understandings of nonviolent civil resistance. At present, there exists a gap between historical and modern conceptualizations of radical activism, meaning that in order to nuance our comprehension of patriot fundamentalism, we must first understand the roots, the logic, the tactics, and the advantages of nonviolent civil resistance and examine the truly transformative nature of colonial noncooperation and defiance between the years 1764 and 1776. The conclusion of the Seven Years' War triggered a variety of social, political, and economic concerns and fear-based feelings, including significant class divisions,

¹²³ McCauley and Moskalenko (*Radicalization to Terrorism: What Everyone Needs to Know*, p. 5.) make the distinction that "activists" are people who engage in nonviolent and legal political action, while "radicals" are people who participate in actions that are illegal including violent political action; however, as this research does, Martha Duncan ('Radical Activism and the Defense Against Despair', 255) and Olaf Corry Olaf Corry, 'Protests and Policies: How Radical Social Movement Activists Engage with Climate Policy Dilemmas', 197) have used the term "radical activist" to refer to participants in nonviolent protest movements in independent studies carried out forty years apart.

unemployment, deprivation and anxiety. As such, it is important to unpack how personal and group grievances led British North Americans to identify with what this research refers to as “patriot fundamentalism” and to practice nonviolent civil resistance during the decade that preceded the Declaration of Independence. Thus, to fully develop a conceptualization of “patriot fundamentalism”, this chapter will break down the lexical meanings of “patriot” and “fundamentalism” and consider how each term has been used in popular and academic settings, how conceptualizations of “patriotism” were applied in pre-Revolutionary America, and how the legacy of “patriotism” has been interpreted since American independence.

The second half of this chapter will rely upon a rich body of resources produced by scholars who have greatly contributed to modern understandings of the strategic logic and implementation of nonviolent civil resistance as a mechanism for political change. The resources consulted chronicle, assess, and empiricize popular movements throughout history and offer a breadth of helpful conclusions against which to evaluate the radical and nonviolent nature of “patriot fundamentalism”. Whereas social movement scholarship has established that political action can be classified on a spectrum from nonviolent to violent, the literature on nonviolent civil resistance applies precise criteria to determine whether or not a movement can ultimately be classified as predominately nonviolent. When considered together, however, modern studies of social movements and nonviolent civil resistance allow this research to isolate the key features and practices of peaceable, politically oriented resistance movements that not only colored the “patriot fundamentalist movement”, but also helped radical leaders to sustain the resistance campaign for more than a decade.

Ultimately, the collective expression of colonial political grievances gradually translated into the widespread adoption of the “patriot fundamentalist” belief system and the development of a social movement that simultaneously reinforced the moral righteousness of American “patriots”, cautioned against the moral degradation that modernity catalyzed

throughout the colonies, and necessitated proactiveness in defending colonial Christian liberty.¹²⁴ Moreover, colonial collectivization yielded the organizations and institutions that became parallel institutions of American government by consistently and performatively articulating colonial interests and mobilizing British North Americans in a variety of nonviolent civil resistance initiatives. While the establishment of committees and voluntary associations aimed originally at securing adjustments from the British government, after 1774, these nonviolent initiatives advanced the colonial push for militarization.¹²⁵

As this research has previously expressed, “patriot fundamentalism” describes the social, political, and moral obligations that were interlocked by determined and purposeful activists as a means of persuading eighteenth-century Americans to adopt continental ideals and agendas during the Imperial Crisis. As Alon Confino has concluded, however, there is too often a “facile mode” of historical research, whereby a researcher selects an event or a vehicle of memory, such as a commemoration or a piece of art or literature, analyzes its representation or how people perceived it over time, and draws conclusions about “memory” or “collective memory”.¹²⁶ According to Confino, “only when linked to historical questions and problems...[c]an memory be illuminating,” which is to say that it is not sufficient to interpret historical terminologies and definitional conceptualizations without a nuanced understanding of its contemporaneous connotations or implications.¹²⁷ As such, attempting to minimize the term “patriot fundamentalism” to a simplistic textbook definition can prove to be problematic, as the concept of patriot fundamentalism, while grounded in history, also borrows from studies of social movements, nonviolent civil resistance, and revolutions and

¹²⁴ Steve Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 2nd edn (Polity Press, 2008), pp. 98–100; Nikki R. Keddie, ‘The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do “Fundamentalisms” Appear?’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40.4 (1998), pp. 696–723 (p. 698).

¹²⁵ Conser, Jr., ‘The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775’, p. 305.

¹²⁶ Alon Confino, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method’, *The American Historical Review*, 102.5 (1997), pp. 1386–1403 (pp. 1386–88).

¹²⁷ Alon Confino, ‘History and Memory’, in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, Ed. Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf (Oxford University Press, 2011), 5: HISTORICAL WRITING SINCE 1945, 36–51 (p. 47).

draws upon modern understandings of religio-political fundamentalism, radicalization and mass mobilization. Furthermore, although definition is admittedly “an obstacle that must be overcome in order to devise a coherent research stream”, there is no constructive way to generalize what Wayne E. Lee describes as “the complexity of the situations” in which individuals become so motivated by the fear of a real or perceived threat that they feel forced to either outside of their normative behaviors to achieve specific objectives or risk compromising the way of life to which they have become accustomed.¹²⁸ Thus, in order to contemplate and conceptualize how American activism evolved during the Imperial Crisis and absorbed the unique faith and demographic contours of pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, we must not only think about how the past is represented, but additionally, about the historical mentalities of people in the past, including how amalgamated beliefs, practices, symbols, and anxieties impacted the perceptions of individuals and groups in the past. We must examine the ways in which colonists grappled with their individual, group, and national or colonial identities. We must explore how heritage, religious cultures, socioeconomic conditions, gender, and geography influenced or shaped the attitudes that eighteenth century British North Americans held about government. In addition, we must examine how the nonviolent methods that patriot fundamentalist leaders selected and coordinated enabled the broader social movement to absorb occasional acts of violence committed by radical colonial flanks. In turn, when we speak of “patriot fundamentalism”, a term which communicates the social, political, and moral obligation of eighteenth-century Americans to support continental ideals and agendas, it is important to consult the critical empirical features of nonviolence that sociologists, social psychologists, and political scientists have isolated and analyze both “patriot” and “fundamentalism” with nuance.

¹²⁸ James E. King, Jr., ‘Religion as an Aspect of Human Resource Management and Diversity: The Case For and Obstacles With’ (presented at the Academy of Management Annual Conference, Atlanta, GA, 2006), p. 1, Cited in Thomas W. Moore, ‘The Effects of Religious Fundamentalism on Individual Belonging’ (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Arlington, 2007), 1.; Lee, p. 11.

On an ideological level, patriot fundamentalism as framed by movement leaders emphasizes a stringent loyalty to republican activism and faith-based doctrines and ideals. The principled opposition around which the ideology of patriot fundamentalism was shaped harkens back to the colonies' Judeo-Christian settlement and requires the possession of a strong sense of moral accountability and an ardent dedication to government in accordance with Enlightenment-era principles of natural law and civil consent. On a practical level, patriot fundamentalism dictated individual responsibility in continental initiatives, meaning that those engaged in the social movement were not only expected to comply with boycotts, attend town hall meetings, disseminate patriot fundamentalist arguments, and be willing to make personal sacrifices as a means of supporting the "gallant Struggle", but in addition, it required social movement participants to ensure that their peers also subscribed to continental values and objectives.¹²⁹ However, in order to effectively make sense of "patriot fundamentalism", which without context could present enormous lexical ambiguities, it is important to explore the term's highly consequential components, "patriot" and "fundamentalism" individually by consulting the analyses of historical linguists and Social Science scholars.

Since the late eighteenth century, a cultural folklore "replete with dramatic violence, courageous patriots, and linear outcomes" has not only genericized the term "patriot", but in addition, popular and nationalistic historical narratives have instigated significant hero worship surrounding renowned "patriot" leaders.¹³⁰ Indeed, heroic and nationalistic interpretations revolutionary "patriots" are observable in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century historical accounts of the Revolutionary generation, and in fact, they still exist today in school syllabi and Right-wing narratives throughout the United States. Alfred

¹²⁹ '26 December 1765 from the Diary of John Adams', Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

¹³⁰ Conser, Jr., 'The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775', p. 299.

F. Young has argued that from 1783 onward, political and cultural elites worked hard at “taming” the legacy of the Revolution, an effort with which early national historians and public orators “fell into lockstep” by creating popular portrayals of patriots that emphasized heroic dissenters who battled prejudicial governance to secure autonomy in America.¹³¹

For instance, in the 1780s and 1790s, when historians like David Ramsay and Mercy Otis Warren were simultaneously making sense of the Revolution and navigating the histories taking shape around them, they observed a marked erosion of the harmony and homogeneity that accompanied the contest for American autonomy. Lester H. Cohen has explained, “debilitating partisanship, financial insolvency, and social rivalries” quickly surfaced in the wake of independence, and historians felt a personal responsibility for establishing a sort of national heritage which might restore the public’s memories to a time when Americans were “happy to sacrifice their private Pleasures, Passions, and Interests, nay their private Friendships and dearest Connections, [in order to] Stand in Competition with the Rights of society”, thereby inducing a higher sense of political and ethical consciousness.¹³² In turn, as Cohen has explained, Ramsay and Warren were more inclined to “invent a national past, in contrast to a splintered future, where others might have seen a variety of forces operating”.¹³³ In fact, Rosemarie Zagarri has quoted Mercy Otis Warren’s expression that historians are responsible for delineating “the contrast between a simple, virtuous, and free people and a degenerate, servile race of beings, corrupted by wealth, effeminate by luxury, impoverished by licentiousness, and become the automatons of intoxicated ambition”.¹³⁴ Thus, “patriotism”

¹³¹ Alfred F. Young, *The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution* (Beacon Press, 1999), p. 91; Michael A. McDonnell and Briony Neilson, ‘Reclaiming a Revolutionary Past’, *Journal of the Early Republic*, 39.3 (2019), pp. 467–502 (p. 469).

¹³² ‘John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, 16 April 1776’, Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers; Lester H. Cohen, ‘Creating a Usable Future: The Revolutionary Historians and the National Past’, in *The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits*, Ed. Jack P. Greene (New York University Press, 1987), pp. 309–30 (pp. 316–17).

¹³³ Lester H. Cohen, pp. 313–17.

¹³⁴ Rosemarie Zagarri, *A Woman’s Dilemma: Mercy Otis Warren and the American Revolution* (John Wiley and Sons, 2015), p. 149.

became an expectation and a sort of standard of republicanism for which future generations of Americans should strive. Today, we still see glorified portrayals of Revolutionary “heroes” and “martyrs” via lesson plans designed to familiarize school children with the anti-imperialist legacies of individuals like Patrick Henry and Nathan Hale, with each man being hailed as a keystone of American patriotism while students are instructed to collectively memorialize infamous cries such as, “Give me liberty or give me death!” and “I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country”. In this sense, specific male leaders are aligned with historical events and heroic rhetoric that perpetuate the “republican genealogy” instigated in late-eighteenth-century accounts of the “noble Cause”.¹³⁵

George McKenna illuminates this phenomenon by describing patriotism as an “affection” that evokes memories of words and images which exemplify specific climaxes within American history, often eliciting feelings of pride or nostalgia.¹³⁶ Thus, the narrative of early American strife, virtue, tenacity, and victory, along with its romanticized elements, has long served as a comfort and a source of cultural significance for the public, and although Walter Berns has asserted that there is nothing “particularly American” about the founding documents themselves, considering patriotism as an “affection” makes clear the potential for the term to stimulate some sort of cultural sentiment amongst groups and individuals seeking to make “concrete affirmations about the meaning of America”, both historically and presently.¹³⁷ As a consequence of this ubiquitous patriotic “affection”, the term “patriot” itself has become vastly overutilized in marketing schemes that a brief internet search of the word “patriot” also yields video clips from various fictional films and television programs, highlight reels from a professional American football team, advertisements for a sports utility

¹³⁵ ‘William Tudor to John Adams’, Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

¹³⁶ George McKenna, *The Puritan Origins of American Patriotism* (Yale University Press, 2007), p. 8.

¹³⁷ Walter Berns, *Making Patriots* (University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 5; John Opie, ‘Frederick Jackson Tuner, The Old West, and the Formation of a National Mythology’ (presented at the Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, 1978), pp. 79–91 (p. 81).

vehicle, Donald Trump-inspired merchandise, and a track by self-proclaimed “American badass” Kid Rock, who bastardized the Preamble to the United States Constitution to contrast “patriotic” freedom with state-level face mask mandates in the wake of COVID-19. Perhaps unsurprisingly, to locate a single national symbol representing America’s long and complex founding, be it an artistic rendering of the Boston Tea Party, a photograph of Philadelphia’s Carpenter’s Hall, or even simply a portrait of George Washington, would require more specific search parameters.

Accordingly, from at least as early as the Imperial Crisis to the present, the term “patriot” has been grossly proliferated, manipulated, and marketed to represent strength, endurance, and moral and political fortitude. As a result of these varying definitions and applications, the term “patriot” cannot be considered linear, and therefore, in an academic setting, each usage of “patriot” should be quite nuanced and contextualized. Jonathan Gienapp has emphasized that any discussion of American patriotism and the rhetoric of the founding era must account for the distinct vocabularies that have coexisted, overlapped, and blended throughout the course of history in order to consider how these factors combined in Revolutionary thought, meaning that ultimately, it is important to examine and understand how “patriotism” was perceived and explained in early America, how it has endured and evolved since the eighteenth century, how early Americans viewed their relationship to the past and how those perceptions influenced eighteenth-century colonial identity, culture, and politics.¹³⁸

Throughout the eighteenth century, the term “patriotism” was often expressed in relation to loyalty, both in North America and Europe.¹³⁹ Competing factions portrayed themselves as “good” patriots, who were sincere, loyal, and concerned over the best interests

¹³⁸ Gienapp, p. 286; Michael D. Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution* (Yale University Press, 2020), pp. 2–4.

¹³⁹ J.H. Shennan, ‘The Rise of Patriotism in 18th-Century Europe’, *History of European Ideas*, 13.6 (1991), pp. 689–710.

of their fellow countrymen, while “false” patriots were self-serving, untrustworthy connivers.¹⁴⁰ For instance, while *The Boston Evening-Post* and *The Pennsylvania Gazette* used the term “patriot” to characterize the individuals who congregated beneath the branches of Boston’s “Liberty tree”, held court in William Bradford’s London Coffee House, boycotted British imports, and issued colonial resolves, traditionally Tory publications such as *The Critical Review* disparaged the gatherings as nothing more than an apolitical or criminal “crowd of active and restless rebels”.¹⁴¹ Samuel Johnson’s 1766 *Dictionary of the English Language* defined “patriot” as a person “whose ruling passion is the love of his country”, and interestingly, the current *Merriam Webster Dictionary* entry only slightly differs from Johnson’s centuries-old description of the term, explaining “patriot” simply as “one who loves and supports his or her country”.¹⁴² However, such simplistic definitions of the term minimize the realities, the expectations, and the consequential nature of identifying or qualifying as an American “patriot” during the decade preceding independence. Furthermore, these accounts fail to offer insight into the ways in which colonists exchanged their previously shared English or Scottish nationalism, for instance, for a newly minted and distinctly American patriotism.¹⁴³ The scholarship of Dustin Griffin has expanded upon

¹⁴⁰ Dustin Griffin, *Patriotism and Poetry in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 19.

¹⁴¹ ‘The Critical Review: Or, Annals of Literature’, 47th (1779), p. 48.

¹⁴² Samuel Johnson, ‘Patriot’, *A Dictionary of the English Language: In Which The Words Are Deduced from Their Originals, Explained in Their Different Meanings, and Authorized by the Names of the Writers in Whose Works They Are Found, Vol. II* (A. Millar, 1766), p. 40; ‘Patriot’, *Merriam Webster* <<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/patriot>> [accessed 4 April 2021]. In the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Pat Rogers described Johnson as “arguably the most decorated man of letters in English history”.

¹⁴³ G.K. Chesterton distinguished between these two distinct concepts, suggesting that historically, and even more contemporarily, the British, and specifically the English, have tended to be more “nationalistic” while Americans have tended to be more classically “patriotic”. Chesterton declared that patriotism is the unconscious form of almost theatrical nationalism, meaning that Britons understand their nation as a nation, whereas Americans understand their nation through romantic conceptualizations of the United States’ founding. Similarly, Anthony D. Smith specified that “patriotism” signifies love for a territorial state, whereas nationalism reflects love for the ethnic nation, meaning that people may speak of “British patriotism”, but only of “English Nationalism”, for example. See G.K. Chesterton, *What I Saw in America* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, Limited, 1923), p. 161 and Anthony D. Smith, ‘Dating the Nation’, in *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism*, Ed. Daniele Conversi (Routledge, 2002), pp. 53–71 (p. 55).

Johnson's understanding of the eighteenth-century "patriot", emphasizing the practical elements of the term, which inherently involved not only an attachment to one's country, but also an individual responsibility to provide service or fulfill civic duty to that country. Griffin's contextual definitions of "patriot" and "patriotism" can be seen as an amalgamation and an extension of both Johnson's early usage of the term and the variation featured in Joseph Worcester's 1878 dictionary, which described a "patriot" as one "who loves and faithfully serves his country" and is "[a]ctuated by the love of one's country", particularly as Griffin explicates that patriotic devotion in eighteenth-century America was fueled by anxiety and ambivalence over the state of the nation.¹⁴⁴ Hence, to love one's country was ultimately to fear for its character, its wellbeing, and its longevity.

As Sacvan Bercovitch has explained "in the boldest terms", this "anxiety" over America's integrity and welfare was consistently rooted in the religious origins of the settlement period.¹⁴⁵ Although the pursuit of what Virginia DeJohn Anderson has referred to as "utopian schemes for settlement" certainly yielded enormous demographic, structural, commercial, and institutional change in the American colonies, the potency of early American devoutness remained consistently impactful throughout the Revolutionary era.¹⁴⁶ The feelings and attitudes of colonists who were moved by John Winthrop's analogy of British North America as a "citty upon a hill" with the potential to exemplify true Christian liberty for the rest of the world undoubtedly trickled down to future generations, as evidenced

¹⁴⁴ Joseph E. Worcester, 'Patriot (Noun), Patriotic (Adjective)', *A Dictionary of the English Language* (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1878), pp. 1043–44; Dustin Griffin, p. 12. Additionally, out of the multitude of simplified formats through which Worcester could have demonstrated the correct usage of "bleed", the lexicographer opted to write, "Patriots have toiled, and in their country's cause bled nobly." Similarly, "spring" is grammatically demonstrated via the statement, "He that has such a burning zeal, and springs such mighty discoveries, must be an admirable patriot." The repeated usage of "patriot" in its various forms and in seemingly unrelated contexts suggests that the term was still almost intrinsic in the American vocabulary, even a century after the signing of the Declaration of Independence.

¹⁴⁵ Sacvan Bercovitch, *The Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic Construction of America* (Routledge, 1993), p. 79.

¹⁴⁶ Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *New England's Generation: The Great Migration and the Formation of Society and Culture in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 1–2.

by the fact that more than a century after Winthrop's infamous sermon and at the height of the Imperial Crisis, Pennsylvanian Quaker James Allen echoed the reverend's sentiment, explaining, "The Eyes of Europe are upon us; if we fall, Liberty no longer continues an inhabitant of this Globe".¹⁴⁷ In 1776, Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* more notably highlighted these sentiments with a breadth theretofore unparalleled, both in terms of the scale of his argument and the physical and sociospatial geography his words were able to cover. To audiences on both sides of the Atlantic and across all levels of the social hierarchy, Paine reiterated with striking simplicity the longstanding American viewpoint that not only were the colonies their own entity as a product of settlement-era exertions, but also that as a land yet untainted by the corruption of the Old World, colonists must continue to contest the depravity of British imperialism in order to preserve American virtue.¹⁴⁸

While early American political religiosity is most often associated with the Puritan congregations of New England, it is important to note that deep ties between church and state were similarly found amongst Pennsylvania Quakers and various other provincial faith communities. In fact, throughout the colonies, religious affiliation often had a significant bearing on the ways in which people viewed and engaged with the eighteenth-century political landscape and notions of patriotism. In the case of God-fearing New Englanders, so convolved were their perceptions of church and state that the Christian idea of the church as a "common body" was often replicated through the imagining of a country being united under common laws with one supreme head, and thus, just as religious devoutness required unwavering affection and service, so, too, did American patriotism.¹⁴⁹ In fact, well into the Imperial Crisis, patriot authors and orators continued to refer to the colonial public as "the

¹⁴⁷ John Winthrop, 'A Modell of Christian Charity', 1630, p. 47, Massachusetts Historical Society, Winthrop Family Papers; James Allen, 'Diary of James Allen, Esq., of Philadelphia, Counsellor-at-Law, 1770-1778', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 9.2 (1885), pp. 176-96 (p. 185). Winthrop's words expressed, "The eies of all people are uppon us."

¹⁴⁸ Eric Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America* (Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 79.

¹⁴⁹ Dustin Griffin, p. 22.

Body of the People”, demonstrating the ways in which church and state had long been interlocked. Moreover, as McKenna has reaffirmed, the specific brand of Reformed Protestantism that the Puritans carried with them to the shores of New England had within it a strain of intense political activism which envisaged the Puritan community as a preordained collective, and as such, Americans involuntarily came to view themselves through the lens of a unique religious fundamentalism, whereby national designations took on the combined force of eschatology and patriotism.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, early American political religiosity acted as both an ideological driver of patriot fundamentalism and an actuated, behavioral expectation in the colonies. Although phrases such as predestination, manifest destiny, and American exceptionalism have been variably and even interchangeably utilized to explain this early American religious fundamentalism, such terms seem to downplay the significant long-term social and cultural impacts of political religiosity in British North America. The unique brand of American exceptionalism that was initially illustrated in religious contexts via the rhetoric of individuals like John Winthrop and Samuel Danforth, who praised the tenacity of New Englanders specifically for sacrificing their former lives to “walk in the Faith of the Gospel with all good Conscience,” sustained Americans throughout the Imperial Crisis.¹⁵¹ This political religiosity motivated colonists’ ethical and ideological values, offering them hope in uncertain times, providing a sense of intradenominational unity, and lending a sense of significance to political action, as pushing social and behavioral norms to challenge immoral or prejudicial leadership meant acting on behalf of all of God’s children and preserving Christian liberty so that “endless generations shall enjoy the common rights of mankind”.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ McKenna, pp. 4–13.

¹⁵¹ Winthrop, p. 47; Samuel Danforth, ‘A Brief Recognition of New-Englands Errand into the Wilderness’, 1670, p. 11, Digital Commons, University of Nebraska.

¹⁵² ‘Extract of a Purported Letter from London, 25 July 1774’, *The Pennsylvania Journal; and the Weekly Advertiser*, 12 October 1774, Founders Online National Archives.

In the early settlement era, faith was prominently in the foreground of all aspects of American life, and in continuously worshipping together, religion transcended the boundaries of ideological fervor by providing a critical hook for collective activism as well as community in general. In fact, the rhetoric and social cohesion modeled by early American religious fundamentalism has served as a common thread across various epochs in American history. From a strictly theological standpoint, staunch Puritanism had largely disintegrated by the end of the eighteenth century; however, its accompanying spirits of biblical errand and providential entitlement have survived as rallying cries which have continued to penetrate even the most seemingly secular events and processes in more recent American history.¹⁵³ Even presently, there remains a special fondness and affection for both America's settlement and founding, sentiments which continue to popularly mythologize the era as an especially righteous and unifying chapter in American history. Accordingly, times of national crisis, including periods of economic recession or depression as well as acts of international or domestic terrorism, have consistently led American leaders to harken back to the early American rhetoric of patriotic religiosity. For instance, then President-elect Abraham Lincoln's description of Americans as an "almost-chosen people" in the years preceding the Civil War is not far removed from President Ronald Reagan's "triumphalist" cries against communism which aligned the biblical words of Isaiah with those of Thomas Paine when he explained to his audience, "the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual".¹⁵⁴ Similarly, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's inaugural address, which praised the Constitution as "the most superbly enduring political mechanism the modern world has produced," while President Richard Nixon's *Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam*,

¹⁵³ McKenna, pp. 6–7.

¹⁵⁴ Abraham Lincoln, 'Address to the New Jersey Senate at Trenton, New Jersey in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 4, 1809-1865', 1861, p. 236, University of Michigan Digital Library Text Collections; Ronald Reagan, 'Remarks to the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals' (1983).

pleaded for the same “moral stamina” that sustained hopeful Americans “two hundred years ago”.¹⁵⁵ In addition to the aforementioned excerpts, a multitude of examples can be extracted from the archives of American presidential history to demonstrate how consistently the themes of affection, service, and an adherence to the principles spelled out in the resolves and popular rhetoric of the Imperial Crisis have flooded the American political lexicon.

The religious principles and practices that sustained New England’s Puritans, Pennsylvania’s Quakers, and the vast variety of other colonial faith communities and demographics throughout the pre-Revolutionary era fed into the rhetoric and collective activism of early American religious fundamentalism. In this sense, the progressive development and application of the “patriot” identity aligns with modern conceptualizations of religio-nationalism and the minority groups that resolve to assert their distinctive linguistic, religious and cultural identities and lobby for rights standards. Indeed, when considered alongside the Social Science models and theories, it becomes clear that both patriotic religiosity and religio-nationalism are characterized by “an obligation to promote and protect the group’s existence and identity”.¹⁵⁶

Still, as countless historians, including John Sainsbury, have reaffirmed, the portrait of patriotism was imprecise, and in fact, during the eighteenth century, “patriotism” was a multifaceted and even fluid construct, with a mantle that was frequently claimed by competing factions.¹⁵⁷ As much as patriot rhetoric in the colonies emphasized unity, harmony, and equality, it also underscored contrast, difference, and incongruence. Indeed, colonial patriotism almost inherently instigated social and political othering, particularly in instances

¹⁵⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt, ‘First Inaugural Address’, in *The Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Volume II: The Year of Crisis, 1933*, Ed. Samuel Rosenman (Random House, 1938, 1933), pp. 11–16; ‘Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam’, dir. by Richard Nixon, 1969, The American Presidency Project <<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/240027>> [accessed 24 March 2021].

¹⁵⁶ Geoff Gilbert, ‘Religio–Nationalist Minorities and the Development of Minority Rights Law’, *Review of International Studies*, 25 (1999), pp. 389–410 (pp. 390–91).

¹⁵⁷ John Sainsbury, ‘John Wilkes, Debt, and Patriotism’, *Journal of British Studies*, 34.2 (1995), pp. 165–95 (p. 176).

where “our” sincere and indisputable patriotism was juxtaposed to “their” disingenuous façade of patriotism. In eighteenth-century British North America, this “us versus them” patriotism was visible in two chief contexts. First and foremost, at the onset of the Imperial Crisis, a distinctly American, pro-continental patriotism emerged which directly countered the sentimental historical memory and cultural relationship that the colonies once shared with Britain. In addition, however, a sort of patriotic hierarchy was born within the colonies, whereby self-ascribed “true lovers of Liberty” praised one another for their opposition to Parliament’s revenue-raising measures and questioned the character of their more passive and “lukewarm” peers.¹⁵⁸ At the top of the American “patriot” hierarchy were avid leaders including Samuel Adams, John Dickinson, and various other assemblyman and delegates who would help to establish patriot fundamentalism, while the middle tier consisted of committee members, boycotters, and low-level members of the resistance movement’s rank and file comprised the middle. “Tories”, “loyalists”, and any indifferent colonists then were essentially classed as enemies of the cause, as apprehension or unwillingness to engage with the resistance movement was interpreted as being actively against colonial liberty. Amongst British North Americans themselves and even between Great Britain and the American colonies, patriotic othering effectively pitted the more “virtuous” and dedicated “patriots” against those deemed either less enthusiastic or wholly unpatriotic.¹⁵⁹

As the line was clearly drawn between morally upright American “patriots” and purportedly prejudicial and oppressive British “patriots”, American “patriotism” came to be developed beyond any shared sentiments, symbols, or social explanations that once bound British North Americans to their mother country. Not only was a more integrative, definitively American identity born, but in addition, the pride that accompanied this

¹⁵⁸ *The Boston Evening-Post*, 13 May 1765, 1549th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.; *The Boston Evening-Post*, 15 July 1765, 1558th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

¹⁵⁹ Dale K. Van Kley, ‘Religion and the Age of “Patriot” Reform’, *The Journal of Modern History*, 80 (2008), pp. 252–95 (pp. 253–54).

distinction frequently relied on anti-British attitudes.¹⁶⁰ For instance, when, in the wake of the Stamp Act, Charles Townshend endeavored to reignite a sense of British patriotism amongst Americans and emphasize a familial attachment between Great Britain and the colonies by referring to British North Americans as “Children of our own Planting, nourished by our own Indulgence,” one Bostonian issued a shrewd rebuttal to impress upon their audience the consequences of North American ties to Britain, brutally minimizing the aforementioned “Indulgence” by stating plainly, “She gives her dear Children Pox, Slavery, and Itch”.¹⁶¹ If eighteenth-century Americans felt a connection to Britain, it was likely formed by a romanticized ideal of the generous liberties that the English Constitution and Parliament once represented. For many colonists, however, those images became increasingly tarnished by each piece of revenue-raising legislation that was implemented in North America, and the architects, enforcers, and supporters of that legislation were reduced to unpatriotic Britons and “guileful betrayers of their country”.¹⁶² Thus, the series of actions and reactions that were exchanged between the colonists and Parliament during the Imperial Crisis facilitated the distinguishing of Britain and the colonies as distinct territories with distinct national identities, and consequently, a sense of patriotic othering surged in America, grounding many colonists in the belief that “it is infinitely more honourable to stand well with one’s country than with the proudest of its oppressors”.¹⁶³

Some scholars have logically concluded that “patriotism” and “nationalism” are both linguistically and behaviorally intertwined and even confounded, specifically as both

¹⁶⁰ Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth About History* (W.W. Norton, 1994), p. 94.

¹⁶¹ ‘Extract of a Letter from London’, *The Massachusetts Gazette and Boston News-Letter*, 30 May 1765, 3197th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.; Bostoniensis, ‘Mother Country: An Epigram’, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 2 December 1765, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

¹⁶² A True Patriot, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 14 March 1768, 676th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

¹⁶³ A North American, ‘To the Free and Independent Electors Of Counsellors for Massachusetts Bay’, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 23 May 1768, 686th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

concepts have historically divagated toward highly problematic events and institutions; however, in the context of eighteenth-century America, the links between the two concepts are virtually absent.¹⁶⁴ Across British North America, and particularly in a province such as Pennsylvania, where English Quakers, German Lutherans, Scots-Irish Presbyterians, and various other ethnicities and religious denominations frequently crossed paths and competed over land, resources, and employment opportunities, the “national” in “nationalism” seemed only to accentuate the differences amongst the colonial American in-group. As a term, Dale Van Kley has dated “nationalism” to at least as early as a 1746 sermon delivered by Moravian pietist Nicolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf, but according to Van Kley, “nationalism” was intentionally excluded from the colonial lexicon, whereas “patriotism” was ubiquitously utilized by various “watchful guardians” of colonial liberties to stress transnational ties and parallels, with the overarching aim of uniting Americans under the umbrella of their budding cultural identity and their newly created American past.¹⁶⁵ The term “patriot”, however, evolved throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, and consequently, so did the practical and rhetorical processes of those who identified as such in eighteenth-century America. In fact, it is precisely due to the evolving ways in which self-ascribed “patriots” engaged socially and politically with their peers and adapted their arguments and ideas that “patriot” group dynamics, perceptions, and philosophies are so significant and worthy of consideration.¹⁶⁶

Indeed, throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, the term “patriot” developed as an identity, a philosophy, and a political symbol, and the intense legacy, allegiance, and affection that was linked to “patriotism” shares parallels with modern conceptualizations of

¹⁶⁴ Daniele Conversi, ‘Debate: Can Nationalism Studies and Ethnic/Racial Studies Be Brought Together?’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30.4 (2004), pp. 815–29 (pp. 821–23).

¹⁶⁵ Van Kley, p. 252; ‘From a London Newspaper’, *The Boston Evening-Post*, 3 June 1765, 1552nd edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

¹⁶⁶ Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, pp. 12–13.

“fundamentalism”, although on the surface, the two terms would seemingly be juxtaposed. As Steve Bruce has explained, religiopolitical fundamentalist movements have equally tailored their traditional belief systems to “make them fit what they take to be the spirit of the age”, demonstrating “self-consciously reactionary” behaviors, firstly, by responding to social and political issues through advocating for the far-reaching adherence to what they have identified as an inerrant text or institution, and additionally, by seeking the political authority to impose the “revitalized tradition”.¹⁶⁷ Between the Stamp Act and Lexington and Concord, patriot advocates certainly expanded and reoriented their arguments and philosophies to respond to new threats from Parliament, to legitimize the authority of America’s alternative governmental institutions, and ultimately, to make the movement more inclusive and attractive to a broad spectrum of colonists. Thus, combining the two outwardly dissimilar terms “patriot” and “fundamentalism” offers the significant academic advantage of contemplating and conceptualizing the radicalization and mobilization of eighteenth-century British North Americans through a Social Science lens.

With roots that can be traced back to at least as early as the fifteenth century, the term “patriot” in its various forms certainly has a rich and deeply nuanced history, particularly in the narrative of the American Revolution, while “fundamentalism”, although equally multifaceted and complex, is comparatively modern, with a Protestant-Christian origin that first entered the academic lexicon in the early twentieth century.¹⁶⁸ In its most elementary form, “fundamentalism” can be explained as a set of beliefs which insist on strict adherence to a literal interpretation of the essential beliefs of a political ideology and its aligned faith communities, and Thomas W. Moore has contributed to this encyclopedic definition of “fundamentalism” by explaining the phenomenon as “a highly ethnocentric attitude, value,

¹⁶⁷ Bruce, pp. 96–97.

¹⁶⁸ ‘Patriot’ (Online Etymology Dictionary) <<https://www.etymonline.com/word/patriot>>; Bruce, pp. 96–97; Mohammad Razaghi and others, ‘Religious Fundamentalism, Individuality, and Collective Identity: A Case Study of Two Student Organizations in Iran’, *Critical Research on Religion*, 8.1 (2020), pp. 3–24 (pp. 3–4).

and or belief” characterized by certitude in one’s belief system.¹⁶⁹ However, as Nikki R. Keddie has pointed out, a single comparative term cannot fully define or adequately contextualize the ideas and actions of a “fundamentalist” religiopolitical movement. Consequently, Keddie argues that in order to better understand the complex religious, social, and political factors that correspond with trends in fundamentalism, scholars should look for characterizations and “features of fundamentalism” rather than working to create a vague or generalized portrait of who and what a “fundamentalist” is.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, while fundamentalist movements are extremely varied, researchers have isolated a variety of “general themes” that remain consistent from Protestant and Islamic campaigns to revival movements and nationalist religiopolitical movements.¹⁷¹ For instance, fundamentalists of all different forms and causes are typically driven by feelings, thoughts, experiences, and behaviors that arise from “attempts to identify, articulate, maintain, or transform” their sacred belief system.¹⁷² Moreover, while radical ideologies and actions, or more specifically, the brand of protestant fundamentalism at the center of this research, can involve direct militant action, they are not primarily driven by or shaped around violence. Instead, fundamentalist groups work to institute “patterns of behavior” that they have collectively deemed to be in accordance with their aims and belief systems. In doing so, like eighteenth-century American dissenters, modern fundamentalists feel worthy and prepared to combat the threats that they perceive as having been exacerbated by differing forms of secular, communal, or foreign power, which is to say that more often than not, fundamentalist movements have been populist movements

¹⁶⁹ Lemieux and Boyle, p. 595; Thomas W. Moore, ‘The Effects of Religious Fundamentalism on Individual Belonging’ (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Arlington, 2007), p. 7.

¹⁷⁰ Keddie, pp. 697–98.

¹⁷¹ Bruce, pp. 97–98.

¹⁷² O. Freedman and others, ‘Spirituality, Religion, and Health: A Critical Appraisal of the Larson Reports’, *Annals of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada*, 35.2 (2002), pp. 90–93 (p. 92).

that aimed to garner the political status and prowess necessary to bring about transformative change.¹⁷³

By using “patriot” in conjunction with “fundamentalism” and introducing a composite, interdisciplinary approach to exploring pre-Revolutionary nonviolent civil resistance, this research emphasizes that the ideological drivers of the patriot fundamentalist movement were behaviorally manifested in colonial American communities in a manner that set out moral and behavioral expectations for all “Sober reasonable People” and boosted compliance with patriot fundamentalist ideals and directives.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, this research situates the eighteenth-century nonviolent civil resistance campaign that performatively pursued and actively advanced pleas for fair political representation, strictly internal taxation, and expanded colonial autonomy during the Imperial Crisis within the broader spectrum of popular resistance-based social movements that have struggled against the absence or weakening of certain civil liberties in order to present scholars with new hybrid ways to contemplate and conceptualize American mobilization and activism between the years 1764 and 1776. To be clear, this thesis does not contend that “patriot fundamentalism” is a term that was evidently utilized by eighteenth-century Americans or even by more modern scholars surveying the British Atlantic World, and moreover, the intent of this research is not to “read history backwards”, as it were. Yet, evidence suggests that colonial leaders did understand that they were employing a very specific type of resistance. That is not to presuppose that ordinary colonists were “mindless followers” of colonial elites; however, even as colonists achieved greater agency through alternative institutions, blue-collar and middling Massachusettsans and Pennsylvanians often looked to their wealthier, more educated peers for guidance in social and political matters, and as Walter Conser has

¹⁷³ Bruce, p. 102; Keddie, p. 697.

¹⁷⁴ ‘Benjamin Franklin to William Strahan, 29 November 1769’, Founders Online National Archives, Franklin Papers.

affirmed, although colonists certainly did not use a twenty-first-century vocabulary, a variety of “historical records document conscious support for the programs of social, economic, and political noncooperation”.¹⁷⁵ John Dickinson specially noted that economic boycotts meant “withholding from Great Britain all the advantages she has been used to receiving from us”.¹⁷⁶




Figure 1: The development of nonviolent civil resistance tactics, methods, and leaders between the years 1764 and 1775

¹⁷⁵ Raphael, ‘Journal of the American Revolution Interview: Strategy to Pre-War Violence’; Conser, Jr., ‘The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775’, p. 311; Richard R. Beeman, ‘Deference, Republicanism, and the Emergence of Popular Politics in Eighteenth Century America’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 49.3 (1992), pp. 401–30 (p. 424).

¹⁷⁶ John Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies* (David Hall and William Sellers, 1768), pp. 34–35, Project Gutenberg.

Thus, while patriot fundamentalist leaders likely did not conceptualize nonviolent civil resistance in the way that modern researchers do or grasp the full scope of nonviolent civil resistance, it is clear that they recognized the ways in which nonviolence offered an effective means of resistance. The “nonviolent discipline” that radical leaders fed into the patriot fundamentalist movement impressed upon British North Americans that regardless of British actions and reactions, they would remain dedicated to peaceable, legitimate forms of nonviolent civil resistance until all options had been exhausted.¹⁷⁷ Nonviolent tactics coincided with the patriot fundamentalist movement’s ideological grounds of principled objection to unjust imperial policymaking, and they were also effective in demonstrating the economic value of the American colonies to the broader empire, both as a market for British goods and manufactures and as a source of natural resources, and in garnering the support and sympathy of radicalizable colonists and observers outside of North America. Thus, this research contends that in the face of impending Parliamentary supremacy, American colonists became increasingly willing and able to “make collective claims on authorities; form special-purpose associations or named coalitions; hold public meetings; communicate their programs to available media; stage processions, rallies, or demonstrations and through all of these activities make concerted displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment”.¹⁷⁸ Indeed, these peaceable processes and developments and the intentionality with which they were carried out denote the truly transformative elements of the patriot fundamentalist movement and demonstrate more consistency with nonviolent social movements than with violent campaigns.

Certainly, revolutionary change has always been “an extremely messy business” comprised of reflexive responses to both real and perceived dangers, and to understand such

¹⁷⁷ Sharp, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle*, p. 2.

¹⁷⁸ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 35.

complex processes requires a multifaceted exploration of a “panoply of diverse events”.¹⁷⁹ As such, this research is in no way intended to palliate or whitewash the darker side of the Imperial Crisis either by glazing over the problematic legacies of some patriot leaders or by justifying the physically and psychologically coercive tactics that some groups of colonists occasionally chose to employ. To focus on the more violent aspects of the Imperial Crisis, though, would simply be a recitation of the many critical and comprehensive studies already in existence which demonstrate the ways in which the American Revolution can be seen as having violent undertones.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, to base this analysis of early American activism upon infrequent fringe violence, to focus upon the militia-based force that increased in popularity after 1774, or to ignore the crossover between eighteenth-century American resistance and more modern nonviolent social movements would only serve to detract from the much-needed focus upon colonial practices of nonviolent civil resistance during the Imperial Crisis.

A major point of contention in whether or not the continental cause can or should be qualified as a nonviolent social movement comes as a result of the major shift in resistance dynamics that occurred during 1774 and 1775 and stimulated colonial militarization. Until then, mob action had been limited, property damage had not threatened personal safety, and fewer than twelve cases of tarring and feathering had been documented, despite popular narratives that have since overemphasized the use of such types of street justice.¹⁸¹ Yet, simultaneously, it must be acknowledged that by October of 1774, when the eleventh article of the First Continental Congress’s Continental Association required committees of safety to be established in every town, city, and county, the two-way street between ideological

¹⁷⁹ T. H. Breen, *The Will of the People: The Revolutionary Birth of America* (Harvard University Press, 2019), p. 9; Jack A Goldstone, ‘Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory’, 4 (2001), pp. 139–87 (p. 139).

¹⁸⁰ For further reading, see *Between Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of Violence in the American Revolutionary Era*, Ed. Patrick Griffin, Robert G. Ingram, Peter S. Onuf, and Brian Schoen (University of Virginia Press, 2015); Holger Hock, *Scars of Independence: America’s Violent Birth* (Crown Publishing, 2017); *Justifying Revolution: Law, Virtue, and Violence in the American War of Independence*, Ed. Glenn A. Moots and Philip Hamilton (University of Oklahoma Press, 2018).

¹⁸¹ Conser, Jr., ‘The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775’, p. 311.

motives and mobilization had been consistently developed over the course of a full decade to the extent that patriot fundamentalists had achieved the organizational capacity to feasibly engage militarily with Great Britain.¹⁸² Critically, however, localized committees understood that nonviolent civil resistance was “the instrument by which these goals were to be achieved”.¹⁸³ Patriot fundamentalists had spent ten years actively petitioning, boycotting, establishing networks of intercolonial communication, electing provincial assemblies, and enforcing compliance with nonviolent measures, and not only was there little division over the meaningful nature of purposive resistance by 1774, but moreover, joining or observing nonviolent initiatives had created very formative experiences for colonists throughout British North America. Indeed, throughout the Imperial Crisis, the patriot fundamentalist movement had attained the physical and ideological infrastructure necessary for American autonomy by developing strong ideals about the type of government that Americans needed and deserved and organizing local and provincial bodies to protect constituent interests, implement and enforce policy, and administer justice.

Following the passage of the Coercive Acts, Massachusetts in particular had escalated noncooperation by extending their efforts beyond the parameters of nonconsumption and open defiance British authority by closing courts and refusing taxes. Jerrilyn Greene Marston surveyed 108 local and provincial resolutions issued during 1774. Of that sample, 76 percent acknowledged Boston’s suffering in “the common cause” and 44 percent pledged to raise money in aid of the city’s inhabitants, demonstrating the level of fear that had been stimulated by British attempts to quell New England dissenters.¹⁸⁴ Interestingly, even the colonists who spoke out against the Boston Tea Party and the destruction of material goods

¹⁸² Continental Congress, ‘Continental Association, 20 October 1774’, Founders Online National Archives; Christopher F. Minty, ‘Of One Hart and One Mind’, *Early American Studies*, 15.1 (2017), pp. 99–132 (p. 106).

¹⁸³ Jerrilyn Greene Marston, *King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776* (Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 71–73.

¹⁸⁴ Greene Marston, pp. 71–73.

neglected to express that Massachusettsans should submit to the Coercive Acts. British leaders observed this marked transition themselves, as demonstrated by King George III's 1774 admission to Lord North that "the New England Governments are in a State of Rebellion; blows must decide whether they are to be subject to this Country or independent."¹⁸⁵ By the spring of 1775, at least seven thousand men were serving on local committees, working to enforce the Continental Association's nonimportation, nonexportation, and nonconsumption agreements on a community level.¹⁸⁶ Through political nonviolence, governmental legitimacy and authority had been gradually transferred from British institutions to American institutions. The colonies were dependent on their mother country in definition only, and both parties needed to reconcile the reality that redress was no longer enough to repair the "happy Connection" between Great Britain and America.¹⁸⁷

Furthermore, by 1775, short of violence, patriot fundamentalist leaders ran out of new ways to challenge authorities and embolden supporters in a productive way, a trend that has existed and persisted amongst nonviolent civil resistance campaigns throughout history. As Tarrow has explained, when nonviolent activists become frustrated by a lack of progress or begin to feel a sense of hopelessness about the possibility of achieving meaningful concessions from their opposition, nonviolent action can easily lose its appeal as a strategy. Consequently, the more intense tactics of radical flanks may appear to be the logical next step.¹⁸⁸ In the eighteenth-century political struggle between Great Britain and the American colonies, provincials from North to South griped that their petitions for redress and circular letters had been repeatedly "rejected with Scorn in the Commons", and as measures of Parliamentary repression escalated, even the most peaceable patriot resistance leaders began

¹⁸⁵ 'George III to Lord North, 18 November 1774', Royal Archives, The Georgian Papers, George III Calendar.

¹⁸⁶ Minty, p. 106.

¹⁸⁷ 'Thomas Cushing to Benjamin Franklin, 10 December 1773', Founders Online National Archives.

¹⁸⁸ Tarrow, p. 103.

to express, “nothing is to be expected here from that Mode of Application”.¹⁸⁹ Still, while a combination of Parliamentary actions and reactions, patriot rhetoric, and expanding American infrastructure prompted shifting dynamics and eventually catalyzed provincial militarization, to make generalizations about “mass violence” or “patriot vengeance” in the context of the Imperial Crisis or to reduce the patriot fundamentalist movement to a broadly violent resistance campaign is to ignore the nonviolent nuances of colonists’ decade-long usage of purposive, peaceable resistance techniques.¹⁹⁰ In fact, Kirssa Cline Ryckman has explained that shifting dynamics such as the appearance of radical flanks or the push for militarization are not uncommon in nonviolent social movements, specifically in instances where the social movement possesses the physical and organizational capacity to engage their opponent militarily. According to the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) project, nearly twenty percent of nonviolent civil resistance movements escalate to using violence as their primary tactic at some point during the campaign, further evidencing the point that a while a predominately nonviolent civil resistance campaign may at times possess features of violent resistance, that movement cannot be determinately classified as a being violent in nature.¹⁹¹ Thus, rather than reflecting the patriot fundamentalist movement as a principally violent campaign, the colonies’ gradual escalation to violence and eventually war highlights the extent to which the American public had radicalized, mobilized, and developed distinctly American cultural and political identities by engaging in nonviolence during the decade preceding independence.

Thus, by removing the emphasis that popular historical narratives often place upon violence armed struggle in the Revolutionary era, we are better equipped to understand the

¹⁸⁹ ‘Benjamin Franklin to Charles Thomson, 13 March 1775’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹⁹⁰ Schlesinger, ‘Political Mobs and the American Revolution, 1765-1776’, p. 249; Hooock, p. 347.

¹⁹¹ Kirssa Cline Ryckman, ‘A Turn to Violence: The Escalation of Nonviolent Movements’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 64.2–3 (2020), pp. 231–573 (p. 319); Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, *NAVCO 2.0 Dataset* (2019) <<https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PLXAFY>>.

reciprocal relationship between the textbook characteristics and mechanisms of nonviolent civil resistance and the mobilizing effects of action-based ideals circulated amongst eighteenth-century British North Americans. Indeed, the lens of patriot fundamentalism sheds new light on the logic and methods of colonial resistance, including the ways in which the continental movement was able to absorb the occasional acts of violence committed by radical colonial flanks and begin the process of militarization between the years 1774 and 1775. Understanding the nonviolent features of colonial resistance during the Imperial Crisis broadens our comprehension not just of eighteenth-century American radicalization and mobilization, but also of how and why more recent individuals and groups have engaged in civil resistance against a materially and militarily stronger opponent. Before turning to case studies of patriot fundamentalism and its distinct practices and impacts in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, however, it is important to turn to the literature on nonviolence in order to consider eighteenth-century American resistance alongside the unique features that academics have been able to isolate in their assessments of more contemporary nonviolent civil resistance movements.

Nonviolent civil resistance can be summatively explained as the sustained use of non-routine political acts, including symbolic protests, economic or political noncooperation, and open defiance, by civilians engaged in asymmetric conflict with opponents not averse to using violence to defend their interests.¹⁹² In simpler terms, Gene Sharp has explained nonviolence as “methods of protest, resistance, and intervention without physical violence in which the members of the nonviolent group do or refuse to do certain things”.¹⁹³ Yet, such a relatively simplistic portrayal of nonviolent action seemingly minimizes the impacts that nonviolent movements have historically had in social and political conflicts, and although

¹⁹² Schock, ‘The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance’, p. 277; Erica Chenoweth, ‘The Future of Nonviolent Resistance’, *Journal of Democracy*, 31.3 (2020), pp. 69–84 (p. 69).

¹⁹³ Gene Sharp, *Social Power and Political Freedom* (Porter Sargent Publishing, 1980), p. 218.

nonviolence is genuinely revolutionary as both as a concept and a practice, the term itself can come as almost a lexical relegation. Interestingly, as Mark Kurlansky has noted, while every major language has an appropriate word for “violence”, there is no single word to adequately illustrate “nonviolence” in the context of political action.¹⁹⁴ Instead, nonviolence is often simply expressed in juxtaposition to violence.¹⁹⁵ For instance, the German word for violence is *Gewalt*, and much like the English equivalent, “nonviolence” in German, or *Gewaltlosigkeit*, literally translates to the absence of violence. However, nonviolence is more than simply an action without violence, and attempting to define nonviolence in relation to violence raises the question of what actually constitutes violence and whether or not emotional abuse or material damage, for instance, can or should be factored into the equation alongside human costs. As such, nonviolence should be viewed as both a violation of norms intended to cause disruption in the social and political fabric and a performative, “purposive behavior” that serves as an active technique for persuasion and political activism and aims to normalize acts of disruption, noncooperation, and noncompliance, arguably requiring more inventiveness and resourcefulness than the use of political violence does.¹⁹⁶

Appropriately and with the aim of establishing a broad view of what constitutes nonviolent struggle, Sharp has constructed a sort of web of “advantages” and “characteristics” that can be observed amongst most nonviolent social movements, regardless of their motivations. The factors that Sharp has identified as most frequently appearing within the parameters of nonviolent civil resistance include a movement’s refusal to accept that their struggle’s outcome will be decided by the means of fighting chosen by the opposition, a potential to uniquely aggravate the weaknesses of the state actor and sever its sources of power, an ability to simultaneously be widely dispersed and focused on a specific objective,

¹⁹⁴ Mark Kurlansky, *Nonviolence: The History of a Dangerous Idea* (Random House, 2006), p. 5.

¹⁹⁵ Jerryson and Kitts, p. 122.

¹⁹⁶ McCarthy and Kruegler, p. 2; Vinthagen, p. 20; Kurlansky, p. 6.

an influence over the opposition's judgments and actions, and a capacity to mobilize power in a manner consistent with democracy.¹⁹⁷ Notably, and based on the differentiations defined by Stellan Vinthagen, some social movements utilize these elements of nonviolence as a tactic or a means to overcome a specific battle, while others employ nonviolence with the more long-term objectives of either installing a strategy to win the war or instituting an ideological norm.¹⁹⁸ For instance, a workers' strike might be a relatively short-term tactic used to achieve better working conditions, while the withdrawal of allegiance amongst employees could ultimately be long-term or even permanent. Moreover, depending on factors influencing longevity, such as the movement's ability to recruit new and committed participants, the messaging employed by movement leadership, and the ultimate aims of the movement, a methodological crescendo from tactic to strategy to norm can occur, particularly in nonviolent movements where noncooperation becomes effectively institutionalized as a new norm. Certainly, in the case of the patriot fundamentalist campaign, the movement underwent a gradual transitioning from tactic to strategy to norm, as letters of opposition and group or mass petitions came to involve consumer boycotts and the "haunting" of officials, which ultimately led to the broad American refusal to accept Crown-appointed officials and to dissolve colonial assemblies and institutions in what Pauline Maier has described as the path from opposition to resistance to revolution.¹⁹⁹

While some scholars credit Indian nationalist leader Mahatma Gandhi as the premier "apostle of nonviolence," a praise not entirely without warrant, nonviolent civil resistance as both an ideal and a practice has a rich, centuries-long history that is often neglected in the

¹⁹⁷ Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (Serpent's Tail, 2011), pp. 43–44.

¹⁹⁸ Vinthagen, p. 5.

¹⁹⁹ Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain* (Knopf, 1972), p. 155.

retelling of popular social movements and historical events.²⁰⁰ Gandhi certainly raised the profile of nonviolent civil resistance; however, recent scholarship has revealed that nonviolent movements have been experiencing success for centuries. Schock has suggested that “sporadically” practicing civil resistance campaigns date as least as far back as 449 BCE, when Roman plebs organized a strike, fled the city, and functioned out of a temporary camp until the political elites agreed to their demands for political rights.²⁰¹ The idea of utilizing nonviolent civil resistance as a consequential political strategy did not take hold in earnest until the eighteenth-century, though. According to Tilly, the practice of utilizing political nonviolence as an active resistance technique behind which large portions of the general population could mobilize originates with the Imperial Crisis, and while Conser has suggested that American colonists “did not have a clear idea of what was involved in waging effective nonviolent struggle”, radical leaders were “acutely aware” that certain nonviolent methods were more effective in advancing their cause than others and acted on that.²⁰² Alongside the patriot fundamentalist struggle against British imperial encroachment, a number of past conflicts have been resolved through the purposeful implementation of diverse nonviolent techniques that have been legitimized and normalized to and for group members. Indeed, scholars ranging in fields of expertise from History and Sociology to sociopolitical philosophy and political science have challenged the narrative that rights-based campaigns are predominately decided by arms. Thus, the literature points to a common understanding that although the innovation of new methods of civil resistance has been quite common throughout history, a range of political conflicts have been resolved through the primary use of nonviolent political resistance, which ultimately demonstrates that the weight

²⁰⁰ Claude Markovits, *The Un-Gandhian Gandhi: The Life and Aftermath of the Mahatma* (Anthem Press, 2004), p. 13.

²⁰¹ Schock, ‘The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance’, p. 278.

²⁰² Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, pp. 18–27; Conser, Jr., ‘The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775’, pp. 300–301.

of “population-driven” nonviolent mobilization has consistently shaped and propelled historical resistance movements in ways that violence could not.²⁰³

On a variety of occasions, materially and militarily superior forces have been overpowered by classically ill-equipped opponents almost entirely without the use of violent force.²⁰⁴ Certainly, more than any one figure, the practice of nonviolent collective action has employed a variety of political, administrative, and ideological tools to successfully challenge a more traditionally powerful opponent. Indeed, throughout the course of history, nonviolent movements have established processes and traditions which helped societies to survive, strengthen their social and cultural frameworks, to build economic and political institutions, to shape cultural or national identities, and to pave the way to independence.²⁰⁵ While each nonviolent social movement presents unique features, objectives, and processes, various issue-related social movements have demonstrated the efficacy of doing or refusing to do certain actions that yield political consequences. For instance, Bartkowski has evidenced the historical efficacy of nonviolent civil resistance through the exploration of case studies including not only the eighteenth-century American struggle for independence, but also the Algerian resistance of French colonialism beginning in the nineteenth century, the Ghanaian campaign for independence which spanned nearly sixty years from the 1890s through the 1950s, as well as twentieth-century anti-colonialism efforts in Zambia.²⁰⁶ McAdam has extensively surveyed the remarkable peaceful nature of the American Civil Rights Movement, expressing that the ability to strategically frame and publicize a movement as peaceable and moral presents “a critical dynamic too long neglected by movement

²⁰³ Bartkowski, p. 1.

²⁰⁴ Schock, ‘The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance’, pp. 278–79.

²⁰⁵ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 10; Bartkowski, pp. 2–3.

²⁰⁶ Bartkowski, pp. 8–14.

scholars”.²⁰⁷ Vinthagen has delved into more recent nonviolent social movements including the anti-nuclear weapons movement in 1960s and the Indian Chipko struggle for environmental conservation initiated in the 1970s, both of which utilized highly demonstrative and performative protests to combat the social, economic, and physical threats of their opposition.²⁰⁸ Chenoweth and Stephan have assessed the dynamics and outcomes of a variety of asymmetric conflicts which pitted nonviolent nonstate actors against militarily superior opponents, including the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which ultimately ousted the Shah, the First Palestinian Intifada which combatted the occupational power of Israel in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Philippine People Power Revolution, which forced Ferdinand Marcos from power after violent challengers failed to do so, and the Burmese Revolution, in which student activists posed an unprecedented challenge to their country’s military dictatorship.²⁰⁹ More generally, Jo Vellacott has focused on women’s movements throughout history, concluding that women’s advocacy has been almost exclusively nonviolent. Traditionally, women’s movements have actually framed their advocacy plans around nonviolent action, and in doing so, these social movements have established creative and innovative ways to confront the root causes of violence while simultaneously amplifying demands for equality within the public sphere.²¹⁰

Academic approaches to studying the long and varied history of nonviolent civil resistance movements are understandably varied; however, Gandhian nonviolent civil resistance has received “considerable attention by scholars”, which is largely due to Richard Gregg’s conceptualization of nonviolence as “moral jiu-jitsu”. Underpinning the ethical

²⁰⁷ Doug McAdam, ‘The Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil Rights Movement’, in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, Ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 338–56 (pp. 346–48).

²⁰⁸ Bartkowski, pp. 8–14; Vinthagen, pp. 4–5.

²⁰⁹ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 87–91.

²¹⁰ Jo Vellacott, ‘Nonviolence: A Road Less Travelled’, in *Patterns of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, Eds. Larry J. Fisk and John L. Schellenberg (Broadview, 2000), pp. 103–42 (pp. 106–8).

advantage of peaceable resistance, moral jiu-jitsu highlights the “good will of the victim” as a tool to strip movement opposition of their power. While Gregg’s psychological approach to understanding nonviolence was certainly groundbreaking and remains worthy of consideration, the language employed in *The Power of Nonviolence* verges on hero worship, particularly as Gregg reiterates the nonviolent activist’s “readiness to prove his sincerity by his own suffering rather than by inflicting suffering on the assailant”.²¹¹ Thus, more recent scholars have gravitated away from Gandhian conceptualizations of nonviolent civil resistance in an effort to understand the specific dynamics of movements that have used nonviolent civil resistance as a political tool. Since the early 1970s, Gene Sharp and his colleagues have worked to broaden the scope of nonviolent social movement studies and inject a sense of realism into their approaches.²¹² Sharp’s 1973 work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* revolutionized interpretations of nonviolence civil resistance by focusing on the observable actions associated with nonviolence, rather than its more ideological elements. Moreover, Sharp explained the practice of nonviolent civil resistance as “a distinct and effective mechanism for political change that is not dependent upon either established institutions or violence, for that reason, it is still considered to be a keystone in the arena of civil resistance literature.”²¹³

To forge links between eighteenth-century American resistance and modern understandings of nonviolent civil resistance, this research relies upon a rich body of sources from social scientists including Sharp and Chenoweth, scholars of social movement studies like Tilly and McAdam, and revolution experts such as Jack Goldstone.²¹⁴ While these Social

²¹¹ Richard Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence* (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought) (Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 49–51.

²¹² Schock, ‘The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance’, p. 279.

²¹³ Samuel Bleicher, ‘Nonviolent Action and World Order’, *International Organization*, 29.2 (1975), pp. 513–33 (p. 514).

²¹⁴ The primary works by these authors which this thesis consulted include: Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*; Sharp, *Social Power and Political Freedom*; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The*

Science subjects may superficially appear to be quite similar in the phenomena that they study, each specialty actually offers distinctive methods and models for interpreting historical processes and events. Civil resistance literature tends to emphasize the social structures and strategic logic that facilitate “people power movements” and analyze the efficacy of specific methods of nonviolence. Contrastingly, social movement theories tend to apply a political process approach, intertwining mobilizing structures with political frameworks to explain how “contentious repertoires” influence movement trajectory, whereas theories of revolution tend to focus on structural perspectives to assess how shifting sociopolitical conditions, ideological factors, and state structures can yield revolution.²¹⁵ Certainly, the study of nonviolent civil resistance, social movements, and revolution individually yields certain advantages and limitations, and as such, historically, the conceptual differences that scholars have outlined to assess nonviolent social movements have not always been clear in practice. However, this research has found it particularly fruitful to explore the “complementary” elements of these specialties, as doing so allows for the application of a composite, hybrid approach to analyzing the ideological and mobilizing features that ultimately qualify the patriot fundamentalist resistance of Great Britain as a nonviolent social movement.²¹⁶ By relying upon a vast variety of work from scholars who have greatly contributed to modern understandings of social and political activism, this thesis considers the strategic logic of nonviolent civil resistance, the ideological precursors to political struggle, and the social structures that facilitated radicalization and mobilization in the context of the patriot fundamentalist movement. The following pages draw upon a variety of Social Science

Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict; Chenoweth, ‘Political Mobilization and Institutions’; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Random House, 1978); Charles Tilly, *Regimes and Repertoires* (The University of Chicago Press, 2006); McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*; McAdam, ‘The Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil Rights Movement’.

²¹⁵ Charles Tilly, ‘Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834’, *Social Science History*, 17.2 (1993), pp. 253–80 (p. 283).

²¹⁶ Schock, ‘The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance’, pp. 280–82.

evidence to examine important features and dynamics of nonviolent civil resistance movements that were apparent within the patriot fundamentalist movement.

In struggling politically against issues such as governmental corruption, exclusionary legislation, and foreign occupation, groups and individuals radicalize and mobilize within nonviolent civil resistance campaigns to address a variety of social and political concerns, and those goals as well as the tactics employed to pursue them are ultimately shaped by both the ideological foundations of the cause and the movement's relationship to their opposition.²¹⁷ Yet, nonviolent motivations and foundations are often interlocked and evolutionary, meaning that as the movement matures, activists can become more firm in their ideals and ideological commitment, more bound both to the cause and their fellow dissenters, and less possessed by whatever benefits they may have once reaped from their relationship to the opposition. Alongside nonviolent motives, a cause's chosen methods and tactics tend to shift as the movement experiences surges and setbacks. In his scholarship on mimesis and transgression in violent resistance campaigns, anthropologist Michael Taussig has demonstrated that the undulating progression of resistance-based social movements is anything but linear. As such, Taussig has suggested that researchers trace the parameters of resistance "like a crab scuttling" back and forth in order to account for evolving motivational factors, fluctuations in recruitment and participation, tactical trial and error, and the impacts of oppositional action upon the movement. While experts from the field of Security Studies have thoroughly noted the drastic differences in the dynamics and outcomes of violent and nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, Jerryson and Kitts have demonstrated that the "crab scuttling" principle can be a helpful way to measure the impacts and benefits of nonviolence as well.²¹⁸ For instance, by using a working spectrum of nonviolence, researchers can make

²¹⁷ Lemieux and Boyle, p. 598.

²¹⁸ Michael Taussig, *Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative* (Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 2; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 16; Jerryson and Kitts, p. 123.

important delineations between the different types and tactics of resistance within a given social movement based on whether or not the methods employed were largely peaceably demonstrative, which types of actors were involved, including civilians, armed militants, movement leaders, or radical flanks, and whether or not movement tactics could be seen as escalating.²¹⁹ Tarrow explains this phenomenon as “the ebb and flow of political struggle”, Schock describes “shifts in the balance of power” between challengers, the state, and third parties, and Chenoweth and Stephan “varying” trajectory, but regardless, by employing the “crab scuttling” metaphor, we can understand nonviolent social movements not as undeviating, but as variable, adaptable, and responsive to oppositional actions and reactions.²²⁰

Groups and individuals radicalize and mobilize through a variety of channels as a means of addressing a variety of social and political concerns, and successful mobilization can often be enabled by everyday contributors to collective identity. In their work to demonstrate how fundamentalist movements undermine individuality and construct a collective social identity, Razaghi, Chavoshian, Chanzanagh, and Rabiei have identified a variety of key contextual factors that actively and passively inspire collectivism. Historically, personal and environmental traits and extenuating circumstances have combined to facilitate the construction of new forms of ideology and collective identity. Indeed, personal senses of belonging, solidarity, and control as well as familial religious identities or traditions of worship, authority drawn from religious texts, the personal meaning or significance that religion and culture can lend to human life, feelings of purpose and usefulness, and a sense of infallibility in one’s personal convictions can all combine to counter the difficulties associated with physical displacement from a mother country or even the feeling of lacking

²¹⁹ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 16.

²²⁰ Tarrow, p. 16; Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, p. 143; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 204.

control over one's daily life. More importantly for movement recruitment and mobilization, however, these factors can ultimately yield a single, comprehensive philosophy which offers instructions for conformity and compliance.²²¹

Yet, alongside the more religious and relationship-oriented factors that facilitate mobilization, physical objects and practices can also contribute to collective identity formation. For instance, when a social movement is gaining momentum and bringing new recruits on board, it is likely to have a name which is known to members and nonmembers alike, and its members sometimes appear in public as a group identified by an umbrella term such as “patriots” or a name like “Sons of Liberty”, which reflects the group's objectives and loyalties. In addition, the social movement or group might also utilize “standard” symbols, slogans, or songs to identify their allegiance and advertise their aims.²²² Often these symbols involve a combination of “inherited” symbols that stimulate senses of familiarity or common ground and “creative” symbols that hint at the dynamic, evolutionary nature of the cause.²²³ For instance, during the Imperial Crisis, John Dickinson's “Liberty Song” lent itself to “cultivating the Sensations of Freedom”, and it became a rallying cry for the patriot fundamentalist movement.²²⁴ Indeed, not only did Dickinson's lyrics recall the legacies of the colonies' “worthy forefathers”, but they also invoked forward-thinking sentiments, enabling colonists to remind one another, “By uniting we stand, by dividing we fall”.²²⁵ As a social movement gains momentum, participants will either consciously or naturally allocate

²²¹ Razaghi and others, pp. 8–10; Peter Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism* (Routledge, 2009), p. 126; Herriot, pp. 141–42; Herriot, pp. 150–53; Ralph W. Hood, Jr., Peter C. Hill, and W. Paul Williamson, *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* (Guildford Press, 2005), pp. 8–9; Ted D. Jelen and Santosh C. Saha, ‘Some Priority Variables in the Study of Comparative Religious Politics’, in *Religious Fundamentalism in the Contemporary World: Critical Social and Political Issues*, Ed. Santosh C. Saha (Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 29–46 (p. 38); Michael B. Salzman, ‘Globalization, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Need for Meaning’, *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 32.4 (2008), pp. 318–27 (pp. 320–21).

²²² Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 79.

²²³ Tarrow, p. 147.

²²⁴ ‘14 August 1769 from the Diary of John Adams’, p. 17, Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

²²⁵ Arthur F. Schrader, ‘Songs to Cultivate the Sensations of Freedom’, in *Music in Colonial Massachusetts, 1630-1820*, Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Vol. 53, pp. 104–56 (pp. 113–15).

authority to several spokespeople who are trusted to represent the group and speak for the members as a collective and designate a few “well-defined buildings and spaces” such as Benjamin Edes’ *Boston Gazette* headquarters or William Bradford’s London Coffee House for movement-sponsored activities and events.²²⁶ The role of leaders in social movements not necessarily intended to enforce “deference”, but rather, to help establish, implement, and guide group philosophies and strategies through the maintenance of normative social hierarchies and patterns.²²⁷ As a social movement becomes increasingly recognizable by the individuals, groups, symbols, and spaces associated with it, a sense of legitimacy can often build, as the public can come to view the campaign as an authentic and fully functional quasi-governmental organization. In turn, recognizability and perceived legitimacy can bolster recruitment and mobilization rates, and furthermore, a collective identity can ultimately develop, fulfilling a critical requirement for the successful operational capacity of a social movement.

While all groups and individuals radicalize for different reasons, a fundamental purpose of the nonviolent social movement is to effect change by enabling people through performative action. As such, social movements of all types and from all time periods are deeply dependent upon competent leaders, who can, in the words of John Adams, win the public’s “minds and hearts” by broadcasting the cause’s message to a wide audience and encouraging widespread involvement.²²⁸ Thus, the practical functionality of a trustworthy and influential leadership pool greatly influences a nonviolent movement’s endurance and potential for success, specifically as movement leaders can nurture intragroup bonds and bolster recruitment rates.²²⁹ The scholarship of James F. Childress has exhibited that trust

²²⁶ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, pp. 78–79; Frank W. Young, ‘A Proposal for Cooperative Cross-Cultural Research on Intervillage Systems’, *Human Organization*, 25.1 (46-50), p. Spring 1966 (pp. 47–49).

²²⁷ Beeman, pp. 401–2.

²²⁸ Lemieux and Boyle, p. 596; ‘John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818’.

²²⁹ James F. Childress, ‘Nonviolent Resistance: Trust and Risk-Taking’, *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, 1 (1973), pp. 87–112 (p. 89).

cannot exist within any relationship if one party has “absolute control” over the other, meaning that within the dynamics of a social movement, while the rank and file will certainly possess “some degree of uncertainty” about the actions of the leadership, they expect that leadership will maintain clear limits and boundaries of authority and shape the movement according to the best interests of the whole.²³⁰ Successful nonviolent campaigns are generally guided by a well-connected, intelligent, and motivated leadership pool, which is particularly critical to securing and sustaining the confidence of the masses, specifically as all nonviolent social movements entail a degree of experimentation and adjustment.²³¹

Beyond navigating the trial and error of selecting and employing appropriate and beneficial means of resistance, knowledgeable and confident leaders are also generally charged with the dual responsibilities of radicalizing the public to the ideals of nonviolence and mobilizing dissenters into a structured and active campaign. A large, mobilized rank and file is vital to the functionality of a nonviolent civil resistance campaign, and because the struggle to bring about sociopolitical change does not come without sacrifice or risk, activists must feel empowered and committed to support the movement and its objectives with conviction. While the procedural operations for determining the success of the struggle are rarely explicitly stipulated at a movement’s commencement, it should be noted that the trajectory of a nonviolent civil resistance movement is undeniably driven and shaped by the decisions and actions of its leaders and participants.²³² Nonviolent leaders must push to communicate the foundational values and ideas of the social movement via articles, letters, pamphlets, leaflets, sermons, speeches, social media posts, or other means of communication and simultaneously organize and implement acts of resistance that are both rational and meaningful.

²³⁰ Childress, p. 89.

²³¹ Lemieux and Boyle, p. 596; Vinthagen, p. 20.

²³² Bartkowski, p. 4.

A vast body of literature suggests that individuals do not make complex or potentially high-risk decisions independently of trusted peers, and David A. Siegel has concluded that an individual's decision-making processes generally consider safety, fairness, reputation, available information, and leadership or intra-group influence.²³³ Thus, both the lower ranks of a social movement and the broader public need to be able to comprehend the key ideological doctrines of the cause, the reasoning behind the resistance acts committed, and the symbolism that the act may be communicating. If the chief task of nonviolent struggle is to wage an ideological battle in which a movement strives to win popular legitimacy while endeavoring to push their opponents into a position where maintaining the neutrality or apathy of the population is difficult, then resistance leaders must work to justify nonviolence and embed everyday noncooperation into the fibers of the culture and society as a means of ensuring that the core tenets and goals of the campaign are understood, maintained, and consistently pursued.²³⁴

Advancements in Security Studies have demonstrated that adolescents and young adults are particularly inclined to break social norms through the processes of radicalization and mobilization, specifically as propensities to care about justice for oneself and others, known respectively as “victim sensitivity” and “observer justice sensitivity”, are most likely to develop between the ages of twenty and thirty.²³⁵ In studies of brain and behavior, adolescence and early adulthood are categorized transitional phases in which young people begin to question and challenge behavioral and social norms, make decisions about their lifestyles, and open themselves up to new social environments. In working to gain “a clearer

²³³ Siegel, p. 993; McAdam and Paulsen, p. 643; Snow, Zurcher, Jr., and Ekland-Olson, p. 789.

²³⁴ Vinthagen, pp. 22–23; Bartkowski, pp. 4–5.

²³⁵ Sara Jahnke and others, ‘Observer Sensitivity and Early Radicalization to Violence Among Young People in Germany’, *Social Justice Research*, 33 (2020), pp. 308–30 (p. 309); Anna Baumert and Manfred Schmitt, ‘Justice Sensitivity’, in *Handbook of Social Justice Theory and Research*, Ed. Clara Sabbagh and Manfred Schmitt (Springer, 2016), pp. 161–80 (p. 168). Interestingly, on July 4, 1776, a variety of prominent colonial opinion formers, including Thomas Jefferson, Dr. Benjamin Rush, John Jay, Isaiah Thomas, Alexander Hamilton, Nathan Hale, and the Marquis de Lafayette were all aged thirty or under.

sense of self, belonging, and purpose” and integrate themselves into society, young people can also leave themselves open to radicalization.²³⁶ Still, however, violence tends to intergenerationally go against humans’ “neurological hard-wiring”, which is to say that political violence cannot be seen as a first port of call for resistance movements.²³⁷ Moreover, because nonviolence is remarkably inclusive, the only real “requirement” for nonviolent civil resistance is that in order to break social norms, nonviolent activists must understand the rule or norm that they are breaking, particularly in cases which require the mobilization of large numbers of people, as resistance inherently involves the risk of being subjected to reprisals from the very oppression or violence it is attempting to undermine. Sociopolitical subordinates are neither expected to form alternative institutions, movements, or ways of living, nor predicted to establish competing economic, cultural, or political organizations. Rather, they are generally expected to be dependent upon the existing political structure and remain within their demographic, and in cases where substitutions for the established order are formed, representatives of power tend to either ignore or ridicule alternative institutions.²³⁸

Within the social movement itself, informal rules generally regulate group behaviors. Because nonviolent civil resistance as both a practice and an ideology often maintains a “moral priority”, often aiming to cause disruption rather than disregard for pertinent, recognized social rules, nonviolent activists can appreciate the need to adhere to some sort of code of conduct.²³⁹ Moreover, the absence of procedural governance within a social

²³⁶ Jahnke and others, p. 309; Margarita Bizina and H. David Gray, ‘Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism Policy’, *Global Security Studies*, 5.1 (2014), pp. 72–79 (pp. 53–54); Noémie Bouhana and Per-Olof H. Wikström, *Al Qai’da-Influenced Radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment Guided by Situational Action Theory*, Home Office Research, Development, and Statistics Directorate (2011), pp. 17–18.

²³⁷ Micah Alpaugh, *Nonviolence and the French Revolution: Political Demonstrations in Paris, 1787-1795* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 12.

²³⁸ Vinthagen, pp. 11–16.

²³⁹ James F. Childress and Joseph P. Kennedy, ‘Some Reflections on Violence and Nonviolence’, *Philosophical Papers*, 7.1 (1978), pp. 1–14 (p. 1).

movement comprised of decentralized networks creates space for the cause and its individual activists to be labeled as corrupt, ignorant, irresponsible, illegitimate, terroristic, or otherwise condemned. Vinthagen's research has suggested that even if a social movement has popular support, it periodically risks being disqualified by its opponents who have a stronger foothold in the existing order and thus greater influence over the moderators of the public discourse.²⁴⁰ For example, at the start of the Imperial Crisis, Quakers in Pennsylvania had maintained a long, firm grip over provincial politics, and as such, Pennsylvania's ability to mobilize nonviolent resisters was much more gradual than, for instance, that of Massachusetts. Yet, because respected patriot fundamentalists like Charles Thomson, John Dickinson, and William Bradford were active in the resistance movement and helped to set the precedent for nonviolent civil resistance, Pennsylvanians came to normalize nonviolence, despite opposition from the Quaker-led Assembly and the risk of British backlash.

Certainly, a strong leadership pool to endorse and enforce a movement's nonviolent modus operandi greatly impacts the likelihood of the movement achieving its aims, and across the literature, scholars have pointed to the pertinence of efficient and effective leaders to social movements of all types.²⁴¹ An interesting caveat of patriot fundamentalist leadership stems from what Jack P. Greene has explained as the "political mimesis" of organizational patterns in British North American society and government.²⁴² While Greene strictly applies the lens of mimesis to the legislative behaviors in colonial America, it can also be employed

²⁴⁰ Vinthagen, p. 18.

²⁴¹ See Michael DeCesare, 'Toward an Interpretive Approach to Social Movement Leadership', *International Review of Modern Sociology*, 39.2 (2013), pp. 239–57; Aldon D. Morris, 'Leadership in Social Movements', in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 171–96; Colin Barker, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette, 'Leadership Matters', in *Leadership and Social Movements*, Ed. Colin Barker, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette (Manchester University Press, 2001); Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Clifford Bob, 'When Do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership Dynamics in Social Movements', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 11.1 (2006), pp. 1–22.

²⁴² Jack P. Greene, 'Political Mimesis: A Consideration of the Historical and Cultural Roots of Legislative Behavior in the British Colonies in the Eighteenth Century', *The American Historical Review*, 75.2 (1969), pp. 337–60.

to examine how nonviolent leadership emerged almost by definition from the imperial architecture of systematic violence and warfare. For instance, by the start of the Imperial Crisis, the American colonies had long been culturally and politically influenced by Britain and its government, and during formative eighteenth-century conflicts such as the Seven Years' War and Pontiac's Rebellion, Americans had observed and absorbed the structures of organized political struggle. In this sense, the hierarchies and procedures of British-led political struggle provided Americans with replicable mobilizing structures and ultimately encouraged nonviolent organization, particularly in New England and the Mid-Atlantic colonies, which were removed from the internal violence of plantation culture that characterized Georgia or West Indian colonies such as Barbados.²⁴³

In general, nonviolent leaders can radicalize and mobilize activists with greater ease than those of violent campaigns, and this largely comes down to the fact that nonviolent civil resistance offers an opportunity for individuals and groups with varying levels of commitment and risk tolerance to participate. Chenoweth and Stephan have uncovered four principal reasons as to why nonviolent civil resistance movements are typically more successful than violent campaigns at generating a large supporter base, all of which center on the fact that campaigns that rely primarily on violence must depend on participants who have high levels of commitment, training, and risk tolerance, whereas, comparatively, the demands and consequences of nonviolence are less labor-intensive and less severe. Firstly, carrying out acts of nonviolent civil resistance such as boycotts or marches requires little to no need for training, which means that activists can choose to participate at any given moment. Similarly, nonviolent movements are far less likely to utilize any form of intense screening procedures, as military training or combat experience are not required when small acts of everyday

²⁴³ Philip D. Morgan, 'The Black Experience in the British Empire, 1680-1810', in *Black Experience and the Empire*, Ed. Philip D. Morgan and Sean Hawkins (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 86-110 (pp. 96-97).

compliance with the “rules” of the movement are generally sufficient for proving one’s loyalty. Accordingly, close interpersonal connections within the movement can increase the likelihood of radicalization, as nonviolent activists can easily bring friends and family members on board with peaceable resistance by simply requesting that they not shop at a specific store or inviting them to attend a political rally, for instance.²⁴⁴ Certainly, nonviolent civil resistance is a form of risk taking, and the decision to participate in nonviolent action can ultimately cost movement participants their income, their property, their social and familial relationships, and their lives.²⁴⁵ Yet, more often than not, nonviolent activists retain a greater degree of autonomy than their violent counterparts, as nonviolent civil resistance does not typically force activists to make extreme life choices or engage in high-risk actions.²⁴⁶

Often, campaigns employ a variety of nonviolent techniques simultaneously if their political struggle requires it, meaning that tactics are generally not mutually exclusive. In fact, Sharp has identified 198 different methods of nonviolent action, including the creation or display of slogans, caricatures, symbols, and the issuing of signed public statements as well as the carrying out of mock funerals, judicial noncooperation, and selective patronage. While the list is certainly extensive, it is not necessarily exhaustive, as McCarthy and Kruegler have concluded that the “innovation of new methods is quite common” amongst popular resistance movements.²⁴⁷ The patriot fundamentalist movement alone engaged in more than one aspect of resistance that Sharp classifies under headings such as “Communications with a Wider Audience”, “Symbolic Public Acts” “Pressures on Individuals” and “Rejection of Authority”. Ultimately, as nonviolent social movements create innovations and adaptations in the approach to resistance, new techniques are likely to “stick”

²⁴⁴ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 36.

²⁴⁵ Vinthagen, p. 18.

²⁴⁶ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 36–38.

²⁴⁷ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*; McCarthy and Kruegler, p. 4.

in instances where they produce unexpected successes, because prestigious leaders have adopted them, or because activists have transferred proven mechanisms from one setting to another.²⁴⁸

Resistance campaigns utilize different methods of nonviolent action to bring about social, political, or economic change, and according to Sharp, there are two chief outcomes of the successful application of nonviolent tactics: coercion and disintegration. Nonviolent coercion, meaning coercion effected through nonphysical pressure where no violence is employed against humans, brings about political change when defiance has become too widespread to be controlled by the opponent's repression, when the opponent has lost its willingness or ability to continue practices of repression, or when the nature of the movement's nonviolent civil resistance makes it too difficult for the state to function without significant alterations to its policies or structures.²⁴⁹ Nonviolent coercion can be observed in various features of the Anglo-American political struggle. For example, when Philadelphia merchants were divided over the issue of nonimportation during the Townshend resistance, the city's mechanics invoked the rhetoric of resistance and utilized their skills and social connections to question the character and threaten the reputations of some members of the merchant class, ultimately pressuring merchants to continue nonimportation.²⁵⁰ Nonviolent coercion made it extremely difficult for the imperial regime to maintain their social, economic, and political systems. Due to the patriot fundamentalist enforcement of nonconsumption and nonimportation in the wake of the Townshend duties, exports from

²⁴⁸ Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 31.

²⁴⁹ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, p. 41.

²⁵⁰ Micah Alpaugh, 'Nonviolence, Positive Peace and American Pre-Revolutionary Protest, 1765-1775', in *The Specter of Peace: Rethinking Violence and Power in the Colonial Atlantic*, Ed. Michael Goode and John Smolenski (Brill, 2018), pp. 157–86 (p. 172); Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, 'Mobilization and Resistance: A Framework for Analysis', in *Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict*, Eds. Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence (MIT Press, 2010), pp. 249–76 (p. 251).

Great Britain to New England declined by 213,000 British pounds between 1768 and 1769.²⁵¹ Similarly, Great Britain's ability to apply repression was ultimately undermined and effectively dissolved by the forming of widespread committees and quasi-governmental groups, which increasingly came to lend political authority to the "array of extralegal institutions" created within the patriot movement.²⁵² Thus, while the term "coercion" certainly has a negative connotation, it fits within the parameters of the patriot fundamentalist movement as a powerful method of nonviolent civil resistance.

Disintegration, which Sharp explains as an outcome of nonviolent coercion, results from the more severe application of the same tactics, procedures, and campaigns that facilitate coercion, meaning that when disintegration is when coercive forces operate with such extremeness that the opposing regime or group completely falls apart.²⁵³ Disintegration can occur through a variety of pathways, which often intersect and overlap. For instance, if political power rests in the consent of the governed, then disintegration comes from the widespread withholding or withdrawing of consent. The application of nonviolent struggle can demonstrate the extent to which the opponents have lost authority and simultaneously undermine their authority further. Moreover, in liberation or secession campaigns, nonviolent civil resistance can even lead to the "transfer" of political loyalty in the form of a parallel government. Similarly, nonviolent civil resistance, including noncooperation and disobedience, can serve to diminish the consensus that supplies a group or regime with the power required to govern, and when an opponent becomes unable to enforce their laws and procedures upon a general population, then nonviolence can be seen as having "paralyze[d] the system".²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ Richard Archer, *As If an ENEMY'S Country: The British Occupation of Boston and the Origins of Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 161.

²⁵² Ray Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord* (The New Press, 2003), p. 186.

²⁵³ Gene Sharp, *How Nonviolent Struggle Works* (The Albert Einstein Institution, 2013), p. 126; Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, p. 41; McCarthy and Kruegler, p. 12.

²⁵⁴ Sharp, *How Nonviolent Struggle Works*, p. 127.

When the causal factors of civil resistance couple with far-reaching propaganda and competent leadership to galvanize popular mobilization, a social movement is most likely to be met with severe repression or suppression, including physical force wielded by the military or security apparatus of the regime.²⁵⁵ Indeed, if the number of resources and recruits that a nonviolent movement has acquired presents a real threat to the opposition's power, authority, and economic capacity, however, there are typically two outcomes. Either the opposition will counter with accommodation, which is to say they will yield to the demands of the resistance movement, or they will resort to the application of coercive or repressive measures. In turn, the potential for violent repression can often increase the risks associated with social movement involvement, meaning that the potential benefits of nonviolent civil resistance must outweigh the potential for military action or arrest in the eyes of dissenters.²⁵⁶

As this research has previously discussed, few nonviolent civil resistance campaigns have been entirely removed from all forms of violence, particularly in instances where either a real or perceived threat of violence comes from the opposition. Indeed, because nonviolence generally stands in relation to violence, both as an alternative to and a challenge against it, the practice of nonviolent civil resistance generally risks encountering violent repression from military or police forces, or at the very least, the threat of violent repression.²⁵⁷ Thus, while nonviolent movements do not expect to have their opposition deploy violence against them, as the opposition comes to feel increasingly threatened by “massive, disciplined non-violent resistance”, they may respond with “harsh counteraction”.²⁵⁸ Consequently, social movements that either employ violence or can be

²⁵⁵ Bartkowski, p. 5.

²⁵⁶ Jennifer Earl, ‘Repression and Social Movements’, in *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, Ed. David A. Snow, Donatella Della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Douglas McAdam (John Wiley and Sons, 2013), p. 1.

²⁵⁷ Vinthagen, p. 17.

²⁵⁸ Stephen Zunes, ‘The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37.1 (1999), pp. 137–69 (p. 151); Schock, ‘Nonviolent Action and Its Misconceptions: Insights for Social Scientists’, p. 706.

depicted as having demonstrated violent behaviors open themselves up to repression, as powerful actors will exploit appearances of violence in an attempt to deter the population from participating in a collective action that threatens their power.²⁵⁹ To soften public perceptions of repressive action, governments will often point to some sort of justification for their decision to engage against nonviolent dissenters.

Critically, however, when social movement leaders are unified in their desire for mass participation and when a variety of mobilizing structures have been put into place to increase the accessibility of resistance initiatives, the movement as a whole will become highly resistant to repression, regardless of whether or not that repression targets only certain sects of the social movement, such as laborers on strike, groups organizing prayer vigils, or individuals engaging in sit-ins.²⁶⁰ In the context of eighteenth-century America, the Crown employed measures of overt repression to challenge the colonies' "constructive" alternatives to imperial government, which is to say that the creation of a standing army in Massachusetts was intended to be highly visible and clearly indicative of the type of action with which further defiance was to be met.²⁶¹ In fact, for imperial forces to follow this formula of overt repression is not uncommon, as state opponents work to counter public attempts at civil resistance by creating security barriers, using repressive force, or implementing policies that reduce the ability to conduct certain types of collective action.²⁶²

The question of whether repression works as an antidote to nonviolent civil resistance has yet to be definitively answered, as so many factors and variables contribute to "the

²⁵⁹ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, p. 59; Siegel, p. 993.

²⁶⁰ Siegel, p. 994.

²⁶¹ Sean Chabot and Majid Sharifi, 'The Violence of Nonviolence: Problematizing Nonviolent Resistance in Iran and Egypt', *Societies Without Borders*, 8.2, pp. 205–32 (p. 213); Earl, p. 1.

²⁶² Erica Chenoweth and Laura Dugan, 'Rethinking Counterterrorism: Evidence from Israel', 2010, p. 4 <<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664282>>.

paradox of repression”.²⁶³ A variety of qualitative and quantitative methodologies have been utilized to study the impacts of repression upon dissent in democracies and authoritarian states. While some studies have determined that repression decreases dissent, some have indicated that repression positively impacts dissent, and others have suggested an inverted U-shaped relationship between repression and dissent, indicating that dissent is highest when repressive measure have a more middling severity. Indeed, as Mark Lichbach has explained it, “Deterrence works. And then again, deterrence doesn't work”.²⁶⁴ According to Schock, most likely, the impact of repression on dissent is influenced by the specific political context in which it occurs, meaning that repression could either serve as a catalyst for mobilization or repression could shutdown political opportunities and ultimately quell dissent.²⁶⁵

Accommodation, on the other hand, occurs when nonviolent coercion or violent repression is either entirely inappropriate or no longer suitable or when oppositional forces reach the conclusion that compromise or concession could put an end to a “nuisance” or minimize economic losses which might be expected to increase.²⁶⁶ An inherent danger in the oppositional accommodation of nonviolent social movements is that the achievement of concessions can instigate a sense of “foundational legitimacy” to a resistance movement.²⁶⁷ Indeed, accommodation not only allows activists feel notions of pride, significance, and accomplishment in achieving a significant result, but also, activists can view accommodation as an admission of misconduct or an acknowledgement of weakening control, thereby strengthening the resolve and the purported righteousness of the resistance campaign. For

²⁶³ Lester R. Kurtz and Lee A. Smithey, ‘Introduction’, in *The Paradox of Repression and Nonviolent Movements*, Eds. Lester R. Kurtz and Lee A. Smithey, Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution (Syracuse University Press, 2018), pp. 1–2.

²⁶⁴ Mark Irving Lichbach, ‘Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31.2 (1987), pp. 266–97 (p. 266).

²⁶⁵ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, pp. 32–34.

²⁶⁶ Sharp, *How Nonviolent Struggle Works*, pp. 145–47.

²⁶⁷ Mieczysław P. Boduszyński and Vjieran Pavlaković, ‘Cultures of Victory and the Political Consequences of Foundational Legitimacy in Croatia and Kosovo’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 54.4 (2019), pp. 799–824 (p. 815).

instance, with the hope of limiting the impacts of the Townshend resistance carried out by British North Americans between 1767 and 1768, Parliament issued a partial repeal, removing indirect taxes on imports from Britain while leaving the tea tax in place.²⁶⁸ Parliament was eager to placate American dissenters by attempting to demonstrate not only that their concerns had been received, but additionally, that the British government was willing to compromise to some degree. While Lord North expressed a sense of urgency in administering external taxation and fighting “to keep up the right so repeatedly affirmed by Parliament”, it was simultaneously hoped that parliamentary concession would ease Britain’s fiscal struggles by bringing an end to colonial nonconsumption and nonimportation campaigns.²⁶⁹ Often, however, a resistance movement may feel that the conciliatory measures offered or the partial accommodation agreed to by the opposition fails to meet the broader demands of the of movement, meaning that dissenters may proceed with civil resistance rather than to yielding to accommodation.²⁷⁰

For example, at the start of the Imperial Crisis, British North Americans generally cherished their connection to their mother country and praised King George III’s “Wisdom and Goodness”.²⁷¹ In fact, Benjamin Franklin formally testified that prior to the passage of the Stamp Act, colonists had possessed “not only a respect, but an affection, for Great-Britain, for its laws, its customs and manners, and even a fondness for its fashions, that greatly increased the commerce”.²⁷² Moreover, Franklin insisted, colonists had “considered the parliament as the great bulwark and security of their liberties and privileges, and always

²⁶⁸ Bernhard Knollenberg, *Growth of the American Revolution: 1766-1775* (Liberty Fund, 2003), pp. 77–78.

²⁶⁹ Lord North, ‘Lord North, the Prime Minister: A Personal Memoir II’, *The North American Review*, 177.561 (1903), pp. 260–77 (p. 267).

²⁷⁰ Sabine C. Carey, ‘The Dynamic Relationship Between Protest and Repression’, *Political Research Quarterly*, 59.1 (2006), pp. 1–11 (p. 4).

²⁷¹ ‘Petition of the Pennsylvania Freeholders and Inhabitants to the King, 29 March 1764’, Founders Online National Archives.

²⁷² ‘The Examination of Doctor Benjamin Franklin, before an August Assembly, Relating to the Repeal of the Stamp Act’ (Hall and Sellers, 1766), Founders Online National Archives.

spoke of it with the utmost respect and veneration”; however, as nonviolent leaders continued to craft a spirit of warranted dissidence within and around American resistance, those sentiments were “very much altered”.²⁷³ Franklin elaborated, “arbitrary ministers, they thought, might possibly, at times, attempt to oppress them; but they relied on it, that the parliament, on application, would always give redress.”²⁷⁴ Thus, when Parliament repealed the Stamp Act only to replace it with the Townshend Revenue Act, the imperial regime not only tarnished the trust that colonists had once placed in Britain’s ability to govern, but moreover, by failing to meet colonial expectations, Parliament gave eventual patriot fundamentalists the space to demonstrate their resilience, to repurpose and to establish new mechanisms of nonviolent civil resistance, and to further loosen the binds of obedience to Great Britain.

Ultimately, when taken together, the “intangible factors” of the patriot fundamentalist movement demonstrate the power of nonviolent civil resistance in the eighteenth-century struggle between Great Britain and the American colonies, and moreover, the gradual withdrawal of American consent to be governed by Parliament highlights the disintegrating effects that nonviolent coercion brought to bear upon imperial authority. After all, “obedience as a principle was only too well known; disobedience as a doctrine was not”.²⁷⁵ Certainly, it took time for patriot fundamentalism to develop as an action-based ideology centered on peaceable resistance, but through purposive, inclusive, symbolic nonviolent initiatives, the patriot fundamentalist campaign incrementally progressed into a fully-fledged social movement. Over time, the struggle for American liberty yielded a uniquely American identity, and in turn, the needs and desires of a developing and purportedly deserving

²⁷³ ‘The Examination of Doctor Benjamin Franklin, before an August Assembly, Relating to the Repeal of the Stamp Act’.

²⁷⁴ ‘The Examination of Doctor Benjamin Franklin, before an August Assembly, Relating to the Repeal of the Stamp Act’.

²⁷⁵ Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 281.

American public came to overshadow North American ties to the British Empire. Although the disintegration of whatever types of affection that colonists may have felt for Great Britain or for King George III did not occur instantaneously, the overall tension of the political struggle, including the anxiety of impending war, the efforts to create meaningful acts of resistance, and the process of establishing parallel institutions did yield formative experiences for American colonists.

Indeed, throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, British North Americans transitioned into key new developmental phases, which have also been observed within a number of more recent nonviolent movements and include articulating their grievances, establishing an organized social movement composed of continental hubs, and establishing parallel institution through which Americans could transfer political legitimacy from Parliament to the Continental Congress. Through the interlocking of social, political, and moral obligations with nonviolent tenets and directives, American colonists were enabled to isolate their core grievances and fully articulate their demands and objectives in a way that ultimately allowed them to become more comfortable with noncooperation and more practiced in everyday acts of disruption and defiance. As nonviolent civil resistance became increasingly interwoven into the fabric of everyday life throughout the American colonies, passive individuals mobilized, becoming active participants in eighteenth-century American social life by pursuing popular collective action toward the set of claims, interests, or goals defined by the patriot fundamentalist movement.²⁷⁶

Increasingly, patriot fundamentalist leaders widened the two-way street between ideology and mobilization, which is to say that while radical leaders played upon settlement-era heritage, historical legacies, religious cultures, and socioeconomic conditions to draw recruits into the fold, equally, they utilized public demonstrations and active resistance

²⁷⁶ Chenoweth, 'Political Mobilization and Institutions', p. 362.

initiatives to attract colonists to the “common Cause”.²⁷⁷ Throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, eighteenth-century British North Americans learned to channel their collective anxieties, grievances, and unmet governmental expectations into self-organized petitions, media campaigns, boycotts, committees, and assemblies, and in doing so, nonviolent civil resistance challenged practices of automatic obedience and called established political beliefs and doctrines into question.²⁷⁸ The “rebels” and “insurgents” of the continental movement were, more accurately, activists and advocates. Indeed, colonists quite quickly came to accept that they could march, petition, boycott, and assemble as a means of creating the type of political system that not only best represented the interests of their rapidly expanding and evolving society, but also qualified as a legitimate governmental authority in the eyes of the colonial public.²⁷⁹ In this sense, the nonviolent campaign became more “revolutionary” than “reformist”.²⁸⁰

Critically, alongside the patriot fundamentalist movement’s ability to mobilize with increasing vigor and breadth, was the ability to remain resilient and withstand ongoing challenges from British authorities. Colonists repeatedly adapted to Parliamentary actions and reactions and implemented diverse methods of nonviolent action to counter the imperial repression of what Schock calls methods of concentration, including petitions and demonstrations as well as more far-reaching methods of disruption, such as boycotts.²⁸¹ Moreover, by choosing or not choosing to partake in acts of civil disobedience, such as

²⁷⁷ ‘Benjamin Franklin to Charles Thomson, 27 February 1766’, Founders Online National Archives. This phrasing was used throughout the pre-Revolutionary era to refer to different aspects of the colonial contest against Britain. More recently, Robert Parkinson’s *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution* has provided an important at the propagandizing of race by the patriot movement.

²⁷⁸ Sharp, *How Nonviolent Struggle Works*, p. 127; Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, p. 17.

²⁷⁹ ‘The Examination of Doctor Benjamin Franklin, before an August Assembly, Relating to the Repeal of the Stamp Act’.

²⁸⁰ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 155.

²⁸¹ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, p. 152.

abstaining from drinking tea or refusing to purchase English manufactures, protesters revealed who was “with” and who was “against” the patriot fundamentalist movement, displayed colonists’ willingness and ability to mobilize in defense of their civil liberties, and illustrated the weight of their economic contributions to the British empire. Outside of the context of contentious politics, simply not drinking tea would not have been significant. Yet, under the circumstances of political struggle, such an easy and innocuous action had the effect of demonstrating a unified and persistent opposition to parliamentary authority and of forcing the British government to recognize and respond to the growing continental movement amongst “all classes and castes” in the colonies.²⁸² Indeed, something as straightforward and accessible as a tea boycott opened the door for previously marginalized individuals and groups, including women and ethnic minorities, to participate in political decision-making processes. These types of associationalism encouraged the engagement of diverse social sects in relatively subdued and low-risk forms of nonviolent action and created a potent force through which the patriot fundamentalist movement could combat the asymmetry of power between the imperial regime and the American people.

Through rich, but subtle methods of defiance, most of which could be incorporated into and even disguised within the mundanity of everyday life, seemingly ordinary types of human action demonstrated a powerful counter to imperial authority and interests. The patriot fundamentalist movement made nonviolent civil resistance routine, and in doing so, colonial Americans increasingly became a more alert, self-aware, and self-organized society with the ability to recognize their strength in numbers, and consequently, everyday civil disobedience also created strong links between a colonist’s daily life and work and their chosen practices of resistance. As one scholar has concluded, when one’s personal interests become

²⁸² Schock, ‘Nonviolent Action and Its Misconceptions: Insights for Social Scientists’, p. 706; Bartkowski, p. 17.

interlocked with the interests of the social movement, as can often happen in times of political struggle, the lines blur between defending oneself and defending the cause, forming “an existential unity” between the two objectives.²⁸³ In other words, the British attack upon American autonomy actually bolstered American autonomy.

The political mobilization that radiated from port cities like Boston and Philadelphia occurred outside of formal or Crown-appointed political institutions, and the de facto governmental leadership provided by local committees and organizations essentially served as a substitute for an inadequate and malfunctioning imperial government that was based thousands of miles away from its North American subjects. Ultimately, the alternative institutions established within the colonies meant that even Great Britain’s ability to implement or enforce sanctions against the resistance movement was challenged in the same way that authoritative power has often been curtailed or stripped by nonviolent action, which is to say that those charged with applying imperial penalties and restrictions felt pressured to resign or to carry out their orders with “laxity”, which only served to undermine British authority.²⁸⁴ Although the leaders and participants of the patriot fundamentalist movement did not seek independence at the onset of the Imperial Crisis, they certainly understood the importance of facing the “very difficult Enterprize” of uniting British North Americans “in the Same Principles in Theory and the Same System of Action”.²⁸⁵

By employing nonviolent civil resistance during the decade-long struggle against their mother country, the American colonies established most, if not all, of the prerequisites for self-rule prior to achieving formal independence.²⁸⁶ By implementing nonviolent mechanisms of change, patriot fundamentalist activists relied on pragmatism, deliberate organization, and

²⁸³ Bartkowski, pp. 17–18.

²⁸⁴ Chenoweth, ‘Political Mobilization and Institutions’, p. 362; Sharp, *How Nonviolent Struggle Works*, p. 128.

²⁸⁵ ‘John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818’.

²⁸⁶ Bartkowski, p. 17; Greene, ‘An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution’, pp. 34–35.

purposeful political leaders to navigate a struggle in which contest by military means was initially either unrealistic or wholly undesired.²⁸⁷ Indeed, indirect resistance and the nonviolent performance of regular acts of disruption, including public speeches, picketing, mock funerals, displaying group symbols, and blacklisting the noncompliant, among others serves the three-fold purpose of undermining the movement's adversary, building alternative institutions which reflect the economic, social, and judicial goals of the movement, and justifying American militarization between 1774 and 1775.²⁸⁸ In this "silent but salient" approach to political struggle, the development of self-managed economic cooperatives, social service organizations, and judicial or quasi-governmental institutions undermined the existing political system and created space for the patriot fundamentalist campaign to achieve legitimacy, win popular support, and transform the society before outwardly pressing for independence.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Vinthagen, p. 7.

²⁸⁸ Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, pp. 124–35.

²⁸⁹ Bartkowski, p. 17.

Chapter 2 –

“Every step which prudence and patriotism would suggest”:

Rhetoric, Ideology, and Radicalization in Pre-Revolutionary

Massachusetts

During the decade that preceded American independence, Boston’s leading nonviolent advocates helped to develop and disseminate the ideological drivers that propelled and justified Massachusetts’s nonviolent civil resistance of British authority. By drawing upon a combination of religious conceptualizations, Enlightenment-era philosophies, and historical narratives, nonviolent advocates impressed upon the Massachusettsan public that for Parliament to govern the North American colonies without garnering their consent or offering them physical representation went against the laws of God, nature, and the English constitution. As such, this chapter argues that New England sensibilities and understandings of providential entitlement, moral righteousness, and civic duty became increasingly interlocked as a result of the impetus that patriot fundamentalism gave to nonviolent civil resistance.

To demonstrate the ways in which movement leaders emphasized a stringent loyalty to republican activism and faith-based ideals and to trace the developmental trajectory of patriot fundamentalism as an ideology, this chapter will begin by looking at the social, political, economic, and religious features and demographics that characterized the city of Boston in the mid-eighteenth century and contributed to the wider Massachusettsan contention of new, increasingly invasive Parliamentary legislation between the years 1764 and 1776. By employing evidence from a rich body of primary sources, this chapter will then proceed to explain how patriot leaders drew upon and manipulated settlement-era legacies,

notions of providential entitlement, understandings of Christian liberty, and eighteenth-century interpretations of historical events and processes to establish and nurture a unique religiopolitical ideology that necessitated nonviolent civil resistance in the face of sin, corruption, and tyranny.

This chapter will assess how Boston's patriot authors and printers utilized media sources to amplify, articulate, and socialize the values and sensibilities that ultimately combined to make up the action-oriented ideology of patriot fundamentalism before setting out how the patriot fundamentalist ideology adapted, expanded, and evolved throughout the Imperial Crisis. In doing so, this chapter works to expand understandings of how patriot orators, authors, and printers played upon fear-based feelings as well as real and perceived instances of provincial marginalization, including deprivation, anxiety, significant class divisions, and unemployment to necessitate the pursuit of individual moral accountability and just, lawful government through nonviolent activism. By highlighting this rough chronology of colonial noncooperation with the imperial order, we can understand how radical opinion formers steadily created links between the ideological drivers of patriot fundamentalism, such as biblical narratives and classical metaphors, and the moral righteousness of nonviolent civil resistance, not only in the wake of specific Parliamentary acts, but also during the "quiet" periods when Massachusettsans continued to "read, speak, think, and write" through continental ideals.²⁹⁰ By isolating the key factors that motivated colonists to pursue political action against Great Britain, we can then consider the appeal, the strategic logic, and the impacts of Massachusetts's engagement in nonviolent civil resistance during the Imperial Crisis.

²⁹⁰ John Adams, 'A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, No. 4', Boston Gazette and Country Journal, 21 October 1765, 551st edition, Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

This chapter brings to light the important theoretical benefits of viewing the rhetorical and ideological shifts that occurred in colonial Massachusetts through a Social Science lens. This chapter selects elements of Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory to situate the contentious politics of pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts within the context of nonviolent civil resistance and to trace the development of the nonviolent ideas and structures that governed the patriot fundamentalist movement and colored its trajectory during the Imperial Crisis. By applying this composite approach to patriot fundamentalism and exploring the ideological underpinnings of political nonviolence in the province of Massachusetts, whose inhabitants played a such vital role in America's pre-Revolutionary challenge to British authority, we can extend the reach and validity of current understandings of American dissent between the years 1764 and 1776. Specifically, this chapter will examine how Boston's patriot fundamentalist leaders framed colonial grievances to appeal to a variety of values and considerations, maintained rhetorical flexibility and adaptability in the face of rapidly changing circumstances, engaged colonists in risk acceptance in order to avoid the loss of the remarkable autonomy to which the Crown's North American subjects had become accustomed, and ultimately helped to reverse the colonial conviction that British authorities would fairly and peaceably resolve colonial grievances.

Radical leaders including Samuel Adams, Dr. Joseph Warren, and John Adams as well as James Otis, Jr. and Thomas Cushing, not only encouraged Massachusettsans to actively resist the imperial forces that aided in bringing about the economic downturn that followed the Seven Years' War, but also cautioned provincials against the dangers of Parliamentary interference in North American life.²⁹¹ The continental case for resistance was dependent upon the ability of radical leaders to empathetically underscore the provincial

²⁹¹ 'John Adams to William Tudor, Sr., 5 June 1813', Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers. According to John Adams, "James Otis, Samuel Adams, and John Hancock, were the three most essential characters [of the American Revolution]; and Great Britain knew it."

plight and to stimulate a sense of civic responsibility and a feeling of pride in relation to British North America's nonviolent civil resistance against perceived Parliamentary intrusions. Crafting a multi-faceted argument to validate colonial noncooperation, dissenting Bostonians drew upon the province's deep Puritan roots and referenced a variety of intellectual arguments from the Enlightenment era to emphasize the critical nature of defending the physical, governmental, and financial security of Americans, whose status as a free and Christian people was thought to be in jeopardy.

Throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, Boston's patriot opinion formers strengthened the reach of the continental cause and created and developed the doctrine that would become patriot fundamentalism. Indeed, Massachusettsans of all social standings and sects increasingly came to feel morally obligated to nonviolently safeguard American liberty against the developing threat of Parliamentary supremacy. While it cannot rightfully be claimed that the eventual patriot fundamentalist push for independence originated with the onset of the Imperial Crisis, it is critical to acknowledge the ideological intentionality of Boston's radical leaders in establishing the parameters of resistance, which became apparent following the passage of the Stamp Act and remained a consistent driver of Massachusettsan resistance until April of 1775, when nonviolence had formally justified militarization. Boston's most preeminent patriots deliberately necessitated nonviolent civil resistance, and in turn, the logic and practice of nonviolent civil resistance stimulated the development of a uniquely American identity amongst the provincial public and established grassroots networks to unitedly challenge unjust Parliamentary legislation across Massachusetts. Weaponizing the media to convince British North Americans of the just and ethical nature of political nonviolence, Boston's leading patriot activists cited biblical narratives, advocated for a societal restoration of the Puritan virtue represented by their ancestors, and relied upon historical and philosophical narratives. In doing so, dissenting Bostonians underpinned the

legitimacy of colonial noncooperation and developed what ultimately became the patriot fundamentalist ideology.

Before we examine the ideological contours of Boston and Massachusetts more broadly, however, it is important to understand Boston's physical layout, layout, demographic configurations, and resources. In the period extending from roughly 1750 to 1776, cases of real and perceived marginalization instigated a definitive evolution in the continental attitudes and interests of Massachusettsans. Whether occurring as a result of their links to Puritanism, an influx of immigration to Boston in the eighteenth century, economic insecurity, voting restrictions, conflagration, spatial inequality, or through a combination of such factors, the ways in which budding radicals conceptualized their expectations of government were closely linked to their socioeconomic status.²⁹²

Eighteenth-century observers offer a clear and generally non-conflicting view of the city of Boston in the decades before the Revolutionary War. For instance, near the beginning of the eighteenth-century, Reverend Cotton Mather emphasized Boston's size, describing the city as "a Combustible heap of Contiguous Houses" with a surplus of people and habitations crowdedly coexisting on a "little piece of Ground", a sentiment that was echoed throughout the eighteenth century.²⁹³ Between the settlement of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630 through the Declaration of Independence in 1776, Boston's population multiplied to roughly twenty times its original size, with cartographer William Price noting that both Boston's population and the infrastructure it required were "daily increasing".²⁹⁴

²⁹² Clifford K. Shipton, 'Immigration to New England, 1680-1740', *Journal of Political Economy*, 44.2 (1936), pp. 22–239 (pp. 226–27); Archer, pp. 8–9; Barbara Clark Smith, *The Freedoms We Lost: Consent and Resistance in Revolutionary America* (The New Press, 2010), pp. 56–58.

²⁹³ Reverend Cotton Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana: Or, The Ecclesiastical History of New England, from Its First Planting in the Year 1620. unto the Year of Our Lord, 1698*, 7 vols (The Bible and Three Crowns in Cheapside, 1702), i, p. 68, Internet Archive.

²⁹⁴ William Price, 'A New Plan of Ye Great Town of Boston in New England in America, with the Many Additionall Buildings, & New Streets, to the Year, 1769', Norman B. Leventhal Map and Education Center at the Boston Public Library, Digital Collections <<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:3f462v496>>.

The “metropolis of Massachusetts-Bay” was described by eighteenth-century observers as being “situated upon a peninsula” with a length of “nearly two miles and [a] breadth of half a one”.²⁹⁵ Reverend Andrew Burnaby described Boston as being “defended from the sea by a number of small islands”, and eighteenth-century English historian Daniel Neal illustrated the layout of Boston as “a half Moon round the Harbour” which featured “a noble Pier, 1800 or 2000 Foot long, with a Row of Warehouses on the North Side, for the Use of Merchants”.²⁹⁶ The layout of Boston’s waterfront made it easy even for “Ships of the greatest Burden” to unload their cargo and created a main thoroughfare from the waterfront to the markets of King Street.²⁹⁷ At the head of King Street, or present-day State Street, was the Old State House, which still stands today as a fixture in Boston’s Revolutionary past. From its balcony, Bostonians celebrated the Stamp Act repeal in 1766, witnessed the Boston Massacre in 1770, and proclaimed their independence in 1776. Neal provides a detailed description of Boston in the first half of the eighteenth century, illustrating that,

From the Head of the Pier you go up the chief Street of the Town, at the Upper End of which is the Town House or Exchange, a fine piece of Building, containing, besides the Walk for the Merchants, the Council Chamber, the House of Commons, and another spacious Room for the Sessions of the Courts of Justice. The Exchange is surrounded with Booksellers Shops, which have a Good Trade. There are five Printing-Presses in Boston, which are generally full of Work, by which it appears that Humanity and the Knowledge of Letters flourish more here than in all the other English Plantations put together.²⁹⁸

In a 1775 account of Boston, Reverend Andrew Burnaby similarly confirmed that from the “very fine Wharf”, one could walk the “open and spacious” streets, which were

²⁹⁵ Reverend Andrew Burnaby, *Travels through the Middle Settlements in North-America, In the Years 1759 and 1760, 1775 with Observations upon the State of the Colonies* (T. Payne at the Mews-Gate, 1775), p. 133.

²⁹⁶ Burnaby, p. 133; Daniel Neal, *1678-1743: The History of New-England: Containing an Impartial Account of the Civil and Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Country, to the Year of Our Lord, 1700; To Which Is Added, the Present State of New-England, and an Appendix Containing Their Present Charter, Their Ecclesiastical Discipline, and Their Municipal-Laws*, 2 vols (The Bible and Three Crowns in Cheapside, 1720), ii.

²⁹⁷ Edward Mussey Hartnell, Edward Webster McGlenen, and Skelton, *Boston and Its Story, 1630-1915* (City of Boston Printing Department, 1916), p. 53.

²⁹⁸ Neal, ii.

notably “well-paved” to discover Boston’s “three churches, thirteen or fourteen meeting-houses, the governor’s palace, the court-house or exchange, Faneuils-hall, a linen-manufacturing-house, a work-house, a bridewell, [and] a public granary”.²⁹⁹ Boston harbor provided important links between the urban hub and the Massachusetts countryside, and the trans-Atlantic trade that the warehoused port afforded “integrated the hinterland with Boston”.³⁰⁰ Rural farmers came to Boston to buy manufactured imports that they did not produce, such as sugar, tea, rum, cloth, indigo, iron, and bricks, and to sell the goods they did cultivate, including hay, livestock, butter, cheese, vegetables, apples, wool, and lumber.³⁰¹



Yet, while Boston's market economy ranked amongst the best in British North America, provincial debt soared across the board in mid-eighteenth-century Massachusetts. Indeed, in the wake of the Seven Years' War a multitude of widows with young mouths to feed sought financial assistance from an already tapped out poor relief fund while an excess of merchants, sailors, laborers, and artisans with declining demand were all attempting to salvage their fiscal circumstances.³⁰² As Mark Peterson has concluded, even the most prosperous Boston merchants lived modestly in the pre-Revolutionary era.³⁰³ Thus, while provincial suffering was certainly relative and presented differing levels and features of strife in the Boston metropolis than it did in the surrounding countryside, it was also remarkably widespread. The feelings of "insecurity" that Massachusettsans experienced before the Imperial Crisis were ultimately met with a "possibility" for reform-minded provincials seek stability and lobby for political change following the passage of the Stamp Act.³⁰⁴ Indeed, in the wake of an unprecedented Parliamentary attempt to raise revenue by taxing American colonists directly, provincials found commonalities in their collective longings for equity and stability.³⁰⁵

The strife and discontent that fueled group grievances during the Imperial Crisis helped to bridge the ideological gaps between certain innate and socially constructed hierarchies and patterns in mid-eighteenth-century Massachusetts, but contemporaneous to provincial struggles, Bostonians drew upon scripture, settlement-era legacies, classical history, and Enlightenment philosophies to formulate the rhetoric of nonviolent civil resistance and justify its implementation against an imperial system that they felt was failing

³⁰² Archer, p. 8.

³⁰³ Peterson, p. 94.

³⁰⁴ Griffin, Patrick, 'Introduction', in *Between Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of Violence in the American Revolutionary Era*, Ed. Patrick Griffin, Robert G. Ingram, Peter S. Onuf, and Brian Schoen (University of Virginia Press, 2015), pp. 1–20 (p. 17); Breen, *American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People*, p. 42.

³⁰⁵ Clark Smith, *The Freedoms We Lost: Consent and Resistance in Revolutionary America*, p. 48.

them. Moreover, dissenting Bostonians relied upon urban media outlets to amplify, articulate, disseminate, and socialize the multifaceted logic and rhetoric of nonviolence. Several key ideological components of Massachusettsan identity guided the rhetoric of resistance and validated the performance of political nonviolence during the Imperial Crisis. Patriot authors and orators framed the patriot fundamentalist ideology around settlement era legacies, Puritan values, classical teachings, historical narratives, and Enlightenment-era philosophies. Indeed, during the course of the Imperial Crisis, eighteenth-century Massachusettsans became increasingly moved by the intersections of their shared history, Enlightenment-era ideals of liberty and virtue, the realities of a market-based economy, and the growing probability of war with Britain, as did American colonists more broadly. In turn, burgeoning patriot fundamentalists drew parallels between socioeconomic inequality and gluttony and likewise, between personal sacrifice and moral uprightness, and these themes ultimately came to comprise “the official revolutionary vocabulary”.³⁰⁶ Throughout this chapter, tenets of Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory will be applied to explain the impacts of these themes, including (a) how individuals and groups viewed a single issue from different perspectives, yet still developed similar conceptualizations and reoriented their previous understandings; (b) how patriot leaders used their remarkable knowledge of law, philosophy, and religion as well as their resources and connections to engage transclass and transcultural populations in Massachusetts; and (c) how the momentum of patriot fundamentalist ideas and objectives brought about preference reversal and offered colonists certainty in the rectitude of taking political action against Great Britain.

Because Boston’s patriot fundamentalists were “heirs” to several overlapping political traditions that eventually became more socialized and policy-oriented, the ideology in which

³⁰⁶ Harry S. Stout, ‘Religion, Communications, and the Ideological Origins of the American Revolution’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 34.4 (1977), pp. 519–41 (p. 520).

their unique brand of nonviolent activism was grounded was ultimately a fluid construct.³⁰⁷ Christianity was an integral part of eighteenth-century life, and as such, the doctrines perpetuated by religious texts and practices provided Massachusettsans with a way of accessing shared ideas and practices, which ultimately helped to accelerate the widespread acceptance of the patriot fundamentalist tenets that stressed sacrifice in the names of Christian liberty and moral righteousness and encouraged communal vigilance through collective action. By contrast, as modern societies are becoming increasingly secular, modernist movements, including campaigns for animal rights and women's health initiatives, tend to frame their arguments around ethics and dignity, meaning that these movements must call for individual accountability, rather than rely upon an interpretation and exploitation of God's will to reinforce their respective claims.³⁰⁸ Daniel Boorstin has explained the formation of early American religious identities as occurring due the fact that the ideals of New England's earliest settlers became "transformed by the American reality", and Jack P. Greene has expanded upon Boorstin's view, adding that "a strong sense of group identity" stemmed from shared experiences in the New World and established within eighteenth-century Americans a "boundless optimism" about future endeavors.³⁰⁹ Moreover, as successors of the Great Awakening and intellectual beneficiaries of seventeenth-century Enlightenment and English republicanism, America's revolutionary generation clung to the principles of opposing arbitrary rule and preserving faith in popular sovereignty. While the messages of the Enlightenment discouraged the interweaving of church and state by emphasizing educational secularization and scientific reasoning, the philosophical minds of the era also

³⁰⁷ Mark A. Noll, *America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 56.

³⁰⁸ John A. Hannigan, 'Social Movement Theory and the Sociology of Religion: Toward a New Synthesis', *Sociological Analysis*, 52.4 (1991), pp. 311–31 (p. 312); Marie Mika, 'Framing the Issue: Religion, Secular Ethics and the Case of Animal Rights Mobilization', *Social Forces*, 85.2 (2006), pp. 915–41 (pp. 917–18).

³⁰⁹ Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Americans: The Colonial Experience* (Random House, 1958), p. 1; Jack P. Greene, *Imperatives, Behaviors, and Identities: Essays in Early American Cultural History* (University of Virginia Press, 1992), p. 143.

stressed religious tolerance and civil liberty, which inherently permitted the case for Christian liberty.³¹⁰

Key developments and processes helped to reconfigure philosophical, political, and scientific discourse in North America, and through the new and emerging political arguments of the era, Massachusettsans were able to develop the patriot justification necessary “first for prosecuting their rebellion and second for declaring themselves an independent nation”.³¹¹ As Conser has explained, American independence had its roots in the ten plus years of nonviolent struggle that preceded the Declaration of Independence.³¹² The patriot fundamentalist ideology changed and developed during the Imperial Crisis, and nowhere are these adaptations and evolutions more apparent than in the colonial responses to the Stamp Act, the Townshend Revenue Act, and the Coercive Acts. These three key pieces of legislation offer important waypoints against which to gauge the evolution of nonviolent civil resistance in Massachusetts, but that is not to say that the patriot fundamentalist movement did not continue to evolve and expand during the “quiet” intermediate years.³¹³ Thus, it is important to consider how the patriot fundamentalist ideology ebbed, flowed, evolved, and expanded between the years 1764 and 1776, and to nuance and contextualize our understandings of the ideological trajectory that gradually led Massachusettsans from participating in low-risk forms of nonviolence like petitioning to eventually justifying colonial militarization, this chapter draws upon a variety of Social Science frameworks. To do so, this chapter applies the “composite” Social Science approach outlined in the introduction of this thesis to underscore the nonviolent nature of the patriot fundamentalist movement.

³¹⁰ Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (Vintage Books, 1976), p. 7.

³¹¹ Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, p. 124.

³¹² Conser, Jr., ‘The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775’, p. 300.

³¹³ Silverman, p. 162.

It is critical to note that Massachusettsans, urban and rural alike, shifted gradually and even reluctantly toward the idea of a complete split with their mother country. Indeed, during the earlier stages of the Imperial Crisis, ordinary provincials and prominent Bostonian opinion formers alike strictly sought Parliamentary concession, not American secession. Even as late as June of 1774, provincials remained somewhat disjointed in their approach to redress, as “The Ideas of the People, [were] as various, as their Faces,” which is to say that in conjunction with Prospect Theory, it took time, consistency from patriot leaders, and sustained nonviolent resistance to convince Massachusettsans that American independence was not just an admirable and advantageous pursuit, but an absolutely necessary one.³¹⁴ Ultimately, the real and perceived threats that Massachusettsans gleaned from Parliamentary actions and reactions in conjunction with their shared longing for an American government predicated upon Christian liberty motivated and rationalized the ideological need to dissent. Indeed, after a decade of sustained efforts to craft a new, distinctly American identity around the principles of nonviolent struggle, even some of the most apprehensive provincials came to accept that imperial abuses of power must be resisted at all costs.³¹⁵

Before examining how dissenting leaders and media resources helped not only to structure the parameters of resistance in colonial Massachusetts, but also to ideologically carry nonviolent advocates through the Imperial Crisis, it is important to reflect upon the Great Awakening. While the Great Awakening unfolded decades prior to the passage of the Stamp Act, its messages, motifs, and mobilizing structures impacted the ways in which British North Americans conceptualized the intersections of divinity and constitutionality, an understanding which remains well documented in the historiography.³¹⁶ Indeed, Alan

³¹⁴ ‘20 June 1774 from the Diary of John Adams’, xx; Farnham, pp. 207–8.

³¹⁵ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 42.

³¹⁶ See Timothy D. Hall, *Contested Boundaries: Itinerancy and the Reshaping of the Colonial American Religious World* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994); Frank Lambert, *Inventing the “Great*

Heimert, Thomas Kidd, and other renowned historians have thoroughly connected the Awakening's emphases on sin, redemption, and revolution to the political contentions of the Imperial Crisis, so this chapter will only briefly reiterate that the revivals of the Awakening brought about important theological changes in New England's political and religious cultures, which ultimately provided eventual patriot fundamentalists with both ideological and organizational toolkits for the collective nonviolent action that defined the American Revolution.

The revival era pushed Massachusettsans to “[p]ursue peace with all *people*, and holiness” by condemning the existing religious sources of authority that worshippers had come to view as malfunctioning and ineffective.³¹⁷ Provincials of all social ranks became empowered to challenge elitist assumptions about society and the deference to established figures, as groups of colonists organized peaceable marches, brought together mixed congregations, and endorsed “the visionary, ecstatic experiences of the disenfranchised”, which not only spread evangelical messaging, but also facilitated an physical and ideological interconnectedness within Massachusettsan communities.³¹⁸ The spirit of the movement glorified the devoutness of New England's Puritan settlers and ensured that “the same central Puritan vision endured” in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts.³¹⁹ As such, it is important to bear in mind that the tenor of the Awakening colored the discourse around dissent that came to light in the early 1760s, and these links were made especially

Awakening” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); John Howard Smith, *The First Great Awakening: Redefining Religion in British America, 1725–1775* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2015); and Lisa Smith, *The First Great Awakening in Colonial American Newspapers: A Shifting Story* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012).

³¹⁷ Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, ‘The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 32 (2006), pp. 127–44 (p. 129); *The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments: The New International Version*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2011), Hebrews 12:14.

³¹⁸ Sydney E. Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (Yale University Press, 2004), p. 263; Thomas S. Kidd, *The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evangelical Christianity in Colonial America* (Yale University Press, 2007), p. 250.

³¹⁹ Stephen Foster, *The Long Argument: English Puritanism and the Shaping of New England Culture, 1570–1700* (University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 288; Noll, p. 38.

apparent in James Otis's *Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, which this chapter will discuss in the coming pages.

Near the mid-1740s, the revivals of the Great Awakening had served their purposes, but the religiopolitical rhetoric it inspired remained a constant in the provincial presses, and the enthusiasm of the lower orders only intensified as Massachusettsans were repeatedly reminded that neither a monarch nor a parliament could revoke the rights and privileges with which an individual was born.³²⁰ In the Great Awakening's transference of ideals from the realm of religion to that of politics, Boston's religious community helped to formulate the patriot fundamentalist agenda through the instigation and establishment of belief systems that hinged on the "reflexive connection" between God and civil rights.³²¹ Terms such as "freedom", "justice", and "virtue" became tied to the religious lexicon, and in the following decades, the language of Christian liberty was continually disseminated and diffused through Boston's patriot fundamentalist media campaign. Indeed, the early American religious fundamentalism that peaked during the Great Awakening established new "universal" understandings of salvation, moral righteousness, and liberty, which informed eighteenth-century conceptualizations of American patriotism and helped to sustain Massachusettsans spiritually, socially, and politically throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis.³²²

The Stamp Act was the first major point of contention that allowed Massachusettsans to apply the religiopolitical imperatives of the Great Awakening to Anglo-American politics. Certainly, by 1765, taxation was not a new concept to Americans; however, the acute circumstances of feeling over-taxed or unjustly taxed aided in galvanizing Massachusettsans

³²⁰ J. C. D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660-1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 50.

³²¹ Breen, *American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People*, p. 250.

³²² Kidd, pp. 17-18.

to action and collectivize in new and meaningful ways. Britain had historically regulated colonial trade through a system of restrictions and duties on imports and exports. During the previous year, Parliament issued the Sugar Act, which was imposed as a revenue-raising act and instituted a strict enforcement of duties and restrictions on certain building materials and baking needs.³²³ While the Sugar Act presented a marked shift in the historical trajectory of imperial taxation in the colonies, the Stamp Act made it clear that the British government aimed to tax the American colonies directly, “with no pretense of representation”.³²⁴ The Sugar Act was fairly extensive, and the legislation was undeniably met with backlash. In the end, however, it took the Stamp Act to actively engage Massachusettsans in the constitutional debate, begin uniting Bostonians under the canopy of patriot fundamentalism, and ultimately, bring about critical questions regarding crowd action, violence, and controlled solidarity.

When the Stamp Act was issued on March 22, 1765, Great Britain’s distant Parliament was certainly seen as having reached a new low in their lack of sympathy toward Boston with the passage of the Stamp Act and forced the view of the British government as unrelenting toward an utterly enfeebled people, but more importantly, the legislation garnered questions of constitutional legality. Indeed, the Stamp Act was interpreted as both an unjust law which threatened an individual’s right to property ownership and retainment as well as a cautionary signal which indicated additional and likely more severe threats to colonial rights.³²⁵ The words of James Otis, Jr. were some of the first to help articulate colonial interpretations of the Stamp Act and cultivate nonviolent discipline in challenging the legislation.

³²³ Included in the Sugar Act were products like lumber, iron, sugar, molasses, and certain spices.

³²⁴ Archer, p. 5.

³²⁵ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 99; Archer, p. 5; Woody Holton, *Liberty Is Sweet: The Hidden History of the American Revolution* (Simon and Schuster, 2021), pp. 41–42.

From the start of the Stamp Act Crisis, James Otis, Jr.'s *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, which was published the previous year, began to carry increasing amounts of rhetorical weight, particularly within Puritan-founded Massachusetts, where colonists had seemingly long since reached the consensus that God was “the only monarch in the universe, who has a clear and indisputable right to absolute power”.³²⁶ Although Otis’s contemporaries and biographers alike have described him as a “complex and erratic man”, he was extraordinarily significant to the origins of the patriot fundamentalist ideology in the early 1760s.³²⁷ In fact, Otis’s work was so influential in the framing of the patriot fundamentalist case against the Stamp Act that his sister, Mercy Otis Warren, credited her eldest brother as being one of the key radicals who “may justly claim the honor of laying the foundation of a revolution”.³²⁸ According to James R. Ferguson, Otis was simultaneously well-versed in political theory and “gifted with remarkable perception”, and these abilities enabled him to initiate a dialogue surrounding the difficult intellectual issues involved in the colonial challenging of Parliamentary jurisdiction.³²⁹

Through an extensive interrogation of the links between the doctrine of natural law and the concept of sovereignty, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved* borrowed from John Locke and Thomas Hobbes and employed the word of God to explain the parameters of a healthy relationship between a government and the governed in a “respectable” light.³³⁰ According to Otis, the law should reside in the hands of the people, and

³²⁶ James Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved* (Edes and Gill, in Queen-Street, 1764), p. 10, Evans Early American Imprint Collection.

³²⁷ Archer, p. 15; James R. Ferguson, ‘Reason in Madness: The Political Thought of James Otis’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 36.2 (1979), pp. 194–214 (p. 195). Otis was particularly influential from 1761, when he delivered a five-hour oration against the Writs of Assistance, until as late as 1769, when he suffered considerable head trauma from a physical altercation, which only served to exacerbate pre-existing mental health issues.

³²⁸ Mercy Otis Warren, *History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American Revolution* (1805) (Applewood Books, 2009), p. 317.

³²⁹ Ferguson, p. 195.

³³⁰ Harmonie Toros, ‘From Dissent to Revolution: Politics and Violence’, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Violence*, Ed. Marie Breen-Smyth (Routledge, 2012), pp. 119–36 (p. 119).

governmental doctrines should consider the supreme natural authority of God. Under these conditions, the governed could create general moral standards to deter abuses of authority, and in turn, consent to be governed would be automatically awarded if the people continued to frame and form their government in the light of Christian liberty. As a student of British political thought, Otis believed in the maintenance of social order through authority, or as he expressed it, “earthly power must exist in and preside over every society”. However, his New England upbringing also instilled in him that sovereignty could never override the colonial entitlement “to all the rights of nature”. Thus, Otis rationalized, if just and proper government required the consent of the people and the people were naturally endowed with human rights from God, then “there can be no appeal but directly to Heaven” when the public has not consented to legislative practices.³³¹

With James Otis among the voices underscoring firstly, that Christian law would eternally surpass any legislation implemented by Parliament, secondly, that Parliament had no right to tax the colonies without their consent, and additionally, that British North Americans should see themselves reflected in Parliament through political representatives of their choosing, the continental case against the Stamp Act catalyzed an intercolonial sense of anxiety over the dangerous precedent set by Parliament.³³² Renewing the calls for American republicanism that originated in the Great Awakening, Bostonians extended their grievances over the constitutionality of the Stamp Act and highlighted the societal corruption and despotism that they perceived as taking shape during the Stamp Act Crisis.³³³ There was no immediate sense of preference reversal regarding colonial either affections for Great Britain or the colonial desire to remain within the empire; however, there was a pervasive concern

³³¹ Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, pp. 9–30.

³³² Archer, p. 15; Holton, p. 42.

³³³ Noll, p. 55; Ralph Young, *Dissent: The History of an American Idea* (New York University Press, 2015), p. 79.

about the efficacy of Parliamentary policymaking and its entitlement to preside over North American life. A common feature of New Social Movement Theory, Bostonians relied upon the legal and philosophical expertise of Otis and other respected community leaders, who promptly and creatively expressed colonial concerns to British authorities.

In fact, prior to the Stamp Act Crisis, provincials had never vocalized such a palpable plea against Parliamentary decision-making. Their deep-seated religious inheritance as well as the powerful cultural memory of their ancestors settling the colonies at their own efforts and expenses, however, combined with the fact that unique natural resources of North America accounted for fiscal and physical contributions to the British Empire to underscore the patriot fundamentalist plea for an honest, uncorrupted system of self-government which acknowledged and honored colonists' natural rights. In the minds of many eighteenth-century Boston residents, the provincial submission to unjust Parliamentary legislation meant the sinful forfeiture their natural, God-given rights, and the patriot fundamentalist pens who framed this ideological argument grounded their contentions in the unique providential entitlement to governmental autonomy that they and their fellow Massachusettsans possessed.

Due to their status as the direct descendants of the courageous "Benefactors" of the settlement era who ventured to North America, labored to colonize New England, and funded the entire operation with the contents of their own pockets, Bostonians believed that Britain had no right to institute an external tax as a means of extracting further financial contributions from the colonies.³³⁴ In fact, as Otis explained it, Great Britain should have neither needed nor expected anything more from the colonies than a "reverence to the city whence they derived their origin".³³⁵ Dissenting Bostonians claimed that all colonists should

³³⁴ 'An Address of Thanks from the Town of Plimouth, to the Town of Boston', *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 3 February 1766, 566th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

³³⁵ Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, p. 26.

effectively be exempt from any fiscal obligation to their mother country on the grounds that Great Britain made no financial contributions to the initial settlement of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. As they saw it, upon leaving England, Boston's Puritan predecessors "travelled into remote inhospitable deserts" and experienced "a thousand hardships and dangers" to settle the colonies on behalf of the Crown, and critically, they did so at their own expense, a point which activists like Thomas Jefferson referenced in 1774 to strengthen their case against Parliamentary jurisdiction in the American colonies.³³⁶ In addition, between the trade facilitated by their port and the agricultural capabilities of their rural landscapes, Boston residents recognized the "ineffable benefit" that Massachusetts and the other twelve colonies could and did have on Great Britain's economy.³³⁷ Accordingly, the city's eventual patriot fundamentalists maintained that if colonists were expected to make any sort fiscal contributions to Great Britain in spite of the fact that their ancestors received no financial assistance from the Crown during the settlement period, then their domestic earnings should not be hindered by unjust and incongruous trade regulations handed down by Parliament.³³⁸

Otis's words set an important precedent in the nonviolent rhetoric of the Stamp Act Crisis, framing colonial contentions to appeal to political, religious, and socioeconomic sensibilities for individuals and groups of differing genders, ethnicities, ages, and faith communities. In laying this pertinent ideological groundwork, Otis created space for British North Americans to cherry-pick the considerations that most closely aligned with their values and most significantly threatened to disrupt their lives and routines. As Bailyn's keystone work has demonstrated, the attitudes and ideas that Otis and other Bostonian opinion formers integrated into anti-Stamp Act rhetoric "transformed the meaning of the colonists' struggle"

³³⁶ The Boston Evening-Post, 1 July 1765, 1556th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

³³⁷ B.W., 'To the Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay', The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal, 7 October 1765, 549th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

³³⁸ A Merchant, The Massachusetts Gazette and Boston News-Letter, 30 May 1765, 3197th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

by melding the elements of providential entitlement and moral righteousness.³³⁹ Boston's budding patriot fundamentalists understood themselves to be not simply a handful of aggrieved subjects of the Crown, but "the great Defender[s] of their Liberties".³⁴⁰ In other words, America's legacy was dependent upon the peaceable, purposive resistance of Parliamentary encroachment, and dissent was obligatory. Even amid the Stamp Act Crisis, provincials reaffirmed that they were "strongly and affectionately attach'd...to his Majesty King George the Third and his Royal House", which is to say that Boston's grievances lied with Parliamentary policymaking, not with the King or Americans' status as subjects of the Crown.³⁴¹ Thus, while dissenting Bostonians challenged the constitutionality of the Stamp Act and worked to semanticize nonviolent opposition, they took care to confront Parliament specifically.

Radical authors and printers significantly swayed readers' perceptions of the nature of imperial leadership by disseminating works that assessed the general intent of Crown and Parliament, gauged the imperial regime's response to colonial attempts at redress, and deduced the feelings and attitudes of the king and his ministers toward British North Americans. Moreover, by breaking their criticisms of imperial authority up into identifiable points of challenge, the patriot press provided tools and structures for nonviolent civil resistance and ultimately made opposition an expectation.³⁴² By drawing "the rules of equity and the principles of the constitution" in line with nonviolent civil resistance, radical writers were simultaneously contrasting the legitimacy of the continental cause with the illegitimacy of a government not only distant in geography but also, and to an increasing extent, in ideology, which in turn, provided their readers with conviction in the rectitude of resistance

³³⁹ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 94–95.

³⁴⁰ 'Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Benjamin Franklin, 28 August 1766', *Founders Online National Archives*.

³⁴¹ *The Boston Evening-Post*, 1 July 1765, 1556th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

³⁴² Anselm Strauss, *Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity* (Free Press, 1959), pp. 58–60.

and supplied the “unshakable veridicality” that individuals naturally crave.³⁴³ Certainly, radical authors and printers afforded a greater sense of legitimacy to the patriot fundamentalist campaign, and accordingly, they increasingly came to shape American attitudes toward Great Britain. This conventional characterization of early American dissention has been thoroughly explained by Bailyn, Parkinson, and a host of eighteenth-century historians who have illustrated the process of resistance with originality. However, by interpreting the patriot media through the models afforded by the Social Sciences, we can add nuance to our understandings of the formation and dissemination of patriot fundamentalist ideals. For example, modernist Security Studies scholarship tells us that there are three elements inherent in a successful media campaign: content, conduit, and context, all of which are evident in the relationship between eighteenth-century British North Americans and colonial print media.

By adapting Daniel Kimmage’s work on shifting media landscapes in the age of the internet to eighteenth-century America, clear links are revealed, which demonstrate how the ideology of patriot fundamentalism (content) was funnelled by radical authors and printers (conduit) to the American public as a means of advancing continental ideals and objectives (context).³⁴⁴ Like other movements, violent and nonviolent alike, the patriot organization became “increasingly indistinguishable” from the patriot media phenomenon, which is to say that patriot values, beliefs, and operations as represented by the movement’s most ardent spokespeople became ingrained into the everyday colonial experience.³⁴⁵ Through an onslaught of patriot publications, radical writers were identifying and contextualizing the potential impacts of the Stamp Act for an American audience that was willing and able to

³⁴³ Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, p. 63; Ernest Becker, *The Birth and Death of Meaning: A Perspective in Psychiatry and Anthropology* (Free Press, 1962), p. 115.

³⁴⁴ Daniel Kimmage, ‘Al-Qaeda Central and the Internet’, *Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy*, New American Foundation, 2010, pp. 1–19 (p. 2).

³⁴⁵ Marc Lynch, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies’, *National Interest*, March 2006, pp. 50–56 (p. 50).

react to those concerns. From the Stamp Act Crisis through the Declaration of Independence, a significant portion of the colonial population moved gradually and often tentatively or reluctantly, if at all, toward the possibility of a split with Great Britain, and perhaps more so than any singular public figure, eighteenth-century authors and printers in Boston facilitated that shift.³⁴⁶ Certainly, scholars such as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Robert G. Parkinson, and Joseph M. Adelman have repeatedly demonstrated that although the struggle for American independence was ultimately decided by the “blood on the battlefields”, the real war was one of “communications”, in which American authors and printers challenged British authority, facilitated the crafting of a uniquely continental cause, and disseminated patriot fundamentalist ideals throughout the decade that preceded the Declaration of Independence.³⁴⁷ Although names such as Benjamin Edes and John Gill may not be as recognizable in popular narratives of the American Revolution as those of the Adams cousins, for example, printers and their contributors were the true purveyors of patriot fundamentalism. Industrious urban printers allowed for the nonrelational diffusion of patriot fundamentalist ideals and plans of action, meaning that urban activists did not have to have face-to-face exchanges in order to stay informed about “policy or other organizational innovations”.³⁴⁸ Through authors’ careful word choices and printers’ purposive publishing selections and layouts, eighteenth-century Boston media communicated the language of patriot fundamentalist resistance to an audience that would have been unlikely to understand

³⁴⁶ See Paul H. Smith’s “The American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical Strength” for a detailed description of colonial reticence to support the Revolution and for specific demographical statistics regarding loyalist leanings between the years 1775 and 1783, which suggests that between fifteen and twenty percent of colonists remained loyal to Great Britain through the Revolutionary War.

³⁴⁷ William Beatty Warner, ‘Communicating Liberty: The Newspapers of the British Empire as a Matrix for the American Revolution’, *ELH*, 72.2 (2005), pp. 338–61 (p. 338). See also: *Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776* by Arthur M. Schlesinger; *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution* by Robert G. Parkinson; and *Revolutionary Networks: The Business and Politics of Printing the News, 1763-1789* by Joseph M. Adelman.

³⁴⁸ Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht, ‘The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 528. Citizens, Protest, and Democracy (1993), pp. 56–74 (p. 59).

the subtleties of the legal and constitutional arguments made and debated by colonial lawyers and political figures.³⁴⁹ Indeed, throughout the Imperial Crisis, radical authors and printers acted as the conduit for patriot fundamentalist ideals and agendas by providing critical links between ordinary colonists and patriot fundamentalist leaders, group grievance and fear, and nonviolent discipline and mechanisms of resistance.

Boston's response to the Stamp Act politicized print media and printers in new ways, particularly as the Imperial Crisis ushered in an era in which Boston's dissenters and loyalists both sought to employ the press in a war of words and propaganda.³⁵⁰ The Stamp Act Crisis placed radical printers and authors at the forefront of colonial resistance, as spokespeople from both groups engaged in a "complex symbiosis" of public communication and political agency.³⁵¹ Boston's patriot press was tasked not only with disseminating the nonviolent ideals and objectives of the developing patriot fundamentalist movement, but in addition, with semanticizing the ethos of the social movement to make the continental cause clearer, more explicit, and more attractive to ordinary Massachusettsans.³⁵² In fact, the city's radical printers and writers critically took a targeted approach to both provincial and intercolonial communication, and Boston's patriot press gave meaning to the events of the Imperial Crisis by advertising and instilling within its audience "the integrated group of attitudes and ideas that lies behind the colonists' rebellion".³⁵³ Indeed, by employing their craft to expand provincial channels of communication, radical printers and writers substantiated colonial fears over British encroachment, constructed collective identities, facilitated the self-

³⁴⁹ Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, pp. 57–58.

³⁵⁰ Robert Parkinson, *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution* (University of North Carolina Press, 2016), p. 38.

³⁵¹ William Beatty Warner, p. 340.

³⁵² Razaghi and others, p. 8.

³⁵³ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 94.

organization of budding activists, encouraged outlined the parameters of resistance, and ultimately cosigned the patriot fundamentalist movement.³⁵⁴

Boston's radical printers and authors most predominately utilized pamphlets and newspapers in order to reach readers throughout the colonies, while one-sheet broadsides were circulated on a more localized level to advertise important public meetings, sermons, and community proceedings.³⁵⁵ The patriot press in Boston reached far beyond the city limits and even the provincial boundaries of Massachusetts, influencing the perceptions of readers across British North America who were similarly "THUNDER-STRUCK" by Parliamentary attempts to weaken colonial liberties.³⁵⁶ Indeed, throughout the Imperial Crisis, Boston printers exchanged stories with printers based in other colonial cities as a means of reaching a broader readership and simultaneously regulating the messaging of the patriot fundamentalist campaign on a large scale. By circulating important and influential publications from city to city, Bostonian printers helped to guarantee that Americans throughout the colonies absorbed patriot rhetoric, accepted and promoted its rectitude, and ultimately forged ideological and physical ties to patriot fundamentalism. In fact, from the Stamp Act Crisis forward, Boston's printing presses scarcely had an opportunity to cool. During the Imperial Crisis, British North America was flooded with more than 400 pamphlets, and by the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783, that number quadrupled.³⁵⁷

Pamphlets were critical to the development and dissemination of what ultimately became patriot fundamentalist ideology, the beginnings of which, albeit with fluidity and flexibility, were articulated 1763, when James Otis, Jr. initiated a polemic examination of

³⁵⁴ Eran Shalev, 'Ancient Masks, American Fathers: Classical Pseudonyms During the American Revolution and Early Republic', *Journal of the Early Republic*, 23 (2003), pp. 151–72 (p. 158).

³⁵⁵ Parkinson, *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution*, p. 37.

³⁵⁶ *The Boston Evening-Post*, 17 June 1765, 1554th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

³⁵⁷ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 8.

each colonist's individual rights "beyond a charter from the crown".³⁵⁸ As Bernard Bailyn's scholarship has demonstrated, there was no common printing standard in place for pamphlets, and in turn, they could be manufactured with minimal effort, rapidly distributed, and priced affordably at only a few pence apiece.³⁵⁹ Pamphlets afforded radical authors the space to thoroughly develop their ideas in a way that was difficult to achieve via a simple newspaper article, meaning that purveyors of patriot fundamentalism could offer full counterarguments and rebuttals to loyalist perspectives, circulate sermons and religious reflections which invoked the core of the ideology's basis of political religiosity, and produce satirical literature which qualified the concept of imperialism as preposterously antiquated. Newspapers, however, were also a critical tool for the American resistance movement.

Along with pamphlets and broadsides, newspapers including Benjamin Edes and John Gill's weekly *Boston Gazette* and Thomas Fleet's Monday edition of *The Boston Evening Post*, greatly contributed to the onslaught of mediated in Massachusetts.³⁶⁰ In fact, when the Stamp Act was passed, there were approximately three dozen printers in the colonies, which each produced a weekly newspaper. By 1775, that figure doubled, demonstrating the extent to which Boston's printers were responsible for meeting the demands of an increasingly vast and increasingly literate readership, and in addition, for facilitating connection and communication amongst disparate nonviolent resisters.³⁶¹ Through logic and reasoning, religious philosophy, satire and ridicule, and predictions about Great Britain's ultimate aims

³⁵⁸ James Otis, 'Of the Political and Civil Rights of the British Colonists, 1763', in *Collected Political Writings of James Otis*, Ed. Richard Samuelson (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2015).

³⁵⁹ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 4–9.

³⁶⁰ Snow, Zurcher, Jr., and Ekland-Olson, p. 790; Isaiah Thomas, *The History of Printing in America with a Biography of Printers and an Account of Newspapers*, 2nd edn (Joel Munsell, Printer, 1874), ii, pp. 53–56; Joseph T. Buckingham, *Specimens of Newspaper Literature: With Personal Memoirs, Anecdotes, and Reminiscences* (Little, Brown, 1850), pp. 142–44.

³⁶¹ Philip G. Davidson, *Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783* (W.W. Norton, 1973), p. 32; Charles E. Clark, 'News and Opinion in the Popular Press', in *A History of the Book in America: The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World*, Ed. Hugh Amory and David D. Hall (University of North Carolina Press, 2007), i, 347–65 (p. 361).

to “embarrass”, “imprison”, and corrupt North Americans while reducing them to “absolute Beggars”, Boston’s patriot printing press continuously facilitated the clarification of continental fears, grievances, identities, and nonviolent protocols as they evolved throughout the Imperial Crisis.³⁶²

Notably, direct access literacy rates, meaning a reader’s ability to recognize a word simply by its appearance or letter pattern, aided Boston printers in their efforts to challenge the real and perceived threats that Parliamentary legislation posed to colonial rights. Literary practices amongst eighteenth-century British North Americans were often quite interactive and collaborative, as families read aloud together and neighbors and friends assisted each other in deciphering texts of all varieties.³⁶³ Literacy is typically viewed as an umbrella term for the two distinct skills of reading and writing, and as such, defining the term by colonial standards has proven to be difficult and problematic for historians. Critically, however, Michael Warner has made the distinction that while eighteenth-century New Englanders can accurately be described as an “oral” people in the sense that they tremendously valued speech and often interpreted writing as a form of public speaking, they simultaneously approached the written word “with an intensity equaled by very few other cultures in the world at that time”.³⁶⁴ As such, what remains clear is that the efforts of patriot printers and authors were not wasted on Boston’s less affluent inhabitants. Indeed, as historian Jack Lynch has explained, pre-Revolutionary Bostonians were “obsessed with literacy,” which is reflected in the statistic that between the years 1758 and 1762, 85 percent of all white New England men were considered to be literate, a rate which was likely to be higher within the Boston city

³⁶² ‘Instructions from the Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of the Town of Braintree’, 14 October 1765, 550th edition.

³⁶³ Steven G. Zecker and Mark DuMont, ‘A Shift from Phonological Recoding to Direct Access in Reading as a Result of Previous Exposure’, *Journal of Reading Behavior*, 16.2 (1984), pp. 145–58 (p. 145); Deborah Keller-Cohen, ‘Rethinking Literacy: Comparing Colonial and Contemporary America’, *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 24.4 (1993), pp. 288–307 (p. 291).

³⁶⁴ Michael Warner, *The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America* (Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 21.

limits specifically. In fact, by the end of the eighteenth century, nearly 100 percent of Boston's white male population was classified as literate, and although women in eighteenth-century Boston often lacked the time and space that literacy skills require, they tended to progress with literacy skills at a more rapid pace than males when they were provided with access to literacy-building.³⁶⁵

While the authors organizers of the Boston's resistance relied upon the city's impressive literacy rates, the city's patriot printers made newspapers, pamphlets, and broadsides ubiquitous, ensuring that provincials of all social sects could engage in the colonial debate. Indeed, even though the nature of their work meant that they possessed close ties to city officials, wealthy merchants, and other members of Boston society's upper echelons, the city's most renowned printers were generally considered to rank amongst the blue-collar portion of the population, largely because printing was such a dirty and labor-intensive undertaking. On an ideological level, however, this meant that printers consulted with individuals from all levels of the American social hierarchy and helped to bridge the societal gaps between author and audience.³⁶⁶

The pivotal role of urban printers in the patriot fundamentalist movement was only amplified by the fact that the Stamp Act seemingly threatened printers' livelihood directly. As the legislation levied a tax on legal documents, newspapers, magazines, playing cards, and many other types of paper used throughout the colonies, Boston's printers were more likely to feel the full weight of the financial impact than were the city's more affluent merchants and attorneys, for example.³⁶⁷ Via their efforts in advertising the blossoming patriot fundamentalist cause through a variety of platforms, Boston's radical printers repeatedly

³⁶⁵ Jack Lynch, "Every Man Able to Read": Literacy in America', *Colonial Williamsburg Journal*, Winter, 2011, pp. 14–24 (pp. 17–18).

³⁶⁶ Parkinson, *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution*, p. 66.

³⁶⁷ Ralph Frasca, *Benjamin Franklin's Printing Network: Disseminating Virtue in Early America* (University of Missouri Press, 2006), p. 409.

crossed social barriers. Urban printers exchanged information with city officials, wealthy merchants, and individuals who ultimately assumed de facto roles as political representatives. Accordingly, throughout the Imperial Crisis, Bostonian printers played a significant role not only in instituting a sort of patriotic standard against which colonists could evaluate the lives and loyalties of themselves and their neighbors, but also in building and intensifying continental fervor.

Furthermore, Boston's radical printers demonstrated the ability to adapt and innovate as patriot fundamentalist arguments shifted and evolved in conjunction with the specific social and political issues posed by the Stamp Act Crisis, the Townshend Revenue Acts, and the Coercive Acts. The Bostonian media worked rigorously throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis to communicate and facilitate the widespread recognition of America's supposed destiny. Pre-Revolutionary publications framed petitions, justified boycotts, and advertised other acts of nonviolent civil resistance as serviceable and appropriate for the Anglo-American political struggle. Presently, disruptive acts tend to be discussed in the media either as they unfold or in their aftermath, as we see headlines discussing the Just Stop Oil activists that glued themselves to the frame of a Vincent van Gogh painting at a London art gallery or accounts, images, and videos of Paris in flames during protests against police brutality.³⁶⁸ However, in 1760s and 1770s Boston, newspapers and broadsides advertised meetings and demonstrations, requesting the attendance of "True-born Sons of Liberty" and likewise, printers prominently showcased resolves and instructions to advise provincials on the resistance movement's next steps and clarify the expectations of movement leaders going

³⁶⁸ Ben Quinn, 'Just Stop Oil Protesters Guilty of Criminal Damage to Van Gogh Frame', *The Guardian*, 22 November 2022 <<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/22/protesters-who-glued-themselves-to-van-gogh-frame-found-guilty-of-criminal-damage>>; Angelique Chrisafis and Jon Henley, 'France Police Shooting: Violence Erupts for a Third Consecutive Night', *The Guardian*, 30 June 2023 <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/29/france-police-shooting-second-night-of-unrest-as-protests-over-teenagers-death-spread>>. In *Civil Resistance Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), Kurt Schock presents a succinct discussion of how and why modern media outlets cover civil resistance with certain lenses and biases.

forward.³⁶⁹ Because Boston was “where the British government first opened their designs and first urged their Pretensions”, the city’s radical printing press took charge of following and facilitating this transformative ideological process.³⁷⁰ Indeed, utilizing their platforms of outreach to increase the movement’s breadth, radical printers and authors grew and developed the patriot fundamentalist ideology beyond specific communities, cells and social networks. By rhetorically legitimizing and ultimately socializing the patriot resistance, Bostonian authors and printers win the “minds and hearts” of potential dissenters and provide the “relational underpinnings” required for widespread engagement in nonviolent action.³⁷¹

By applying the composite approach proposed by this research, we can see elements of Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory in the patriot challenging of the Stamp Act. Print discourse became the principal basis of self-representation in Boston and across New England more broadly, and the framing of patriot publications worked to reorient colonial ideas about how British North Americans could and should fit into the broader empire.³⁷² Patriot conceptualizations of American life and American rights attracted support at varying levels and for different reasons, depending on which elements of patriot contentions most significantly aligned with individual interests, a key facet of Framing Theory. Likewise, by applying the lens of New Social Movement Theory, we can better explore the capacity of Boston’s patriots to express the beliefs and identities of Massachusettsans in the wake of the Stamp Act. Although the Stamp Act resistance occurred early in the Imperial Crisis, the patriot media campaign certainly drew in “transclass groupings of constituencies and cultural identities” and empowered Bostonians to

³⁶⁹ ‘St-p! St-p! St-p! No: Tuesday-Morning, December 17, 1765’, Massachusetts Historical Society.

³⁷⁰ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 20; ‘John Adams to Jedidiah Morse, 29 November 1815’.

³⁷¹ ‘John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818’; John D. McCarthy, p. 147.

³⁷² Michael Warner, p. 23.

develop a dialogue around American rights and liberties.³⁷³ A key tenet of New Social Movement Theory, patriot rhetoric tapped into local knowledge and resources and additionally, provided elasticity to help colonists navigate the changing circumstances of the Imperial Crisis. The development of patriot ideals and rhetoric was deeply reliant not only upon leaders who were skilled legal experts capable of breaking down complex legal arguments into digestible, relatable terms for the broader public, but also upon efficient printers who could ensure that hardcopy patriot publications made their way into the hands of a diverse audience. Lastly, we can see the early stages of what Prospect Theory describes as “a change in the decision frame”.³⁷⁴ Unprecedentedly, Bostonians began to acknowledge and confront the flawed system of empire, accepting the risks associated with resistance, such as punishment for defying the Parliamentary order to print only on stamped paper, to advertise and promote the patriot cause. As the following pages demonstrate, the Stamp Act provides the first clear illustration of patriot fundamentalism as an inclusive, structured, and action-based ideology, which helped colonists not only to respond quickly and creatively to real and perceived imperial threats, but also to find agency in their decision-making and accept the risks that offered the greatest sense of security and stability.

Radical writers argued against taxation without representation, employing and adapting a variety of spiritual, philosophical, and ancestral supports to strengthen the appeal of the patriot cause and to justify American resistance. Massachusettsans and colonists more broadly could selectively and varyingly identify with the religious implications of submitting to Parliamentary supremacy, the intellectual contentions that emphasized the imperative nature of actively safeguarding human and civil rights, or the feelings and cultural sensibilities that they attached to the legacies of their forebears. The fear and suspicion that

³⁷³ Fisher and Kling, p. 12.

³⁷⁴ Kahneman and Tversky, p. 453.

permeated the province of Massachusetts ranged from more immediate concerns such as financial distress to potential long-term impacts involving the steady degradation of American civil liberties. External factors such as the distribution of wealth, societal rank, and access to basic necessities were certainly exploited in the media to motivate resistance. However, socioeconomic antagonisms were not the most significant driver of the Stamp Act resistance. Boston's uproarious reaction to the Stamp Act occurred partially because the sums involved threatened the public's general livelihood, but more so because seizing lawfully acquired property without due process represented a clear violation of the rights granted both by God and the English constitution.³⁷⁵ As Ray Raphael has explained, a variety of merchants, attorneys, and other colonists of reasonable financial means expressed their objection to alleged abuses of power by advocating for nonviolent resistance over violent social upheaval.³⁷⁶

As the Stamp Act resistance gained momentum, Boston's patriot leaders firmly established and expanded upon the core values of political nonviolence and strengthened their arguments against imperial overreach in North America. The city's radicals gave shape to an action-oriented ideology by confronting Parliament directly, using petitions, boycotts, and other acts of noncooperation to invoke the themes of constitutionality and Christian liberty. Bostonians identified and acknowledged the inherent dangers of imperial encroachment, and likewise, in the interest of defending their liberties and livelihoods, they accepted the risk that widespread dissent and defiance could alter the Anglo-American relationship. Massachusettsans were clear that as subjects of George III and heirs to important Puritan legacies, they could not tolerate the absence of colonial representation and consent in Parliamentary decision-making processes for fear of new and worsening abuses of

³⁷⁵ Breen, *American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People*, p. 227.

³⁷⁶ Ray Raphael, *A People's History of the American Revolution: How Common People Shaped the Fight for Independence* (The New Press, 2001), p. 14.

monarchical power. As Boston residents became increasingly “roused to a sense of [their] danger” in the wake of the Stamp Act’s passage, their main ideological objective remained simply to “scrutinize into the nature and tendency” of the legislation and its legality via-a-vis the English constitution, not to actively pursue American independence.³⁷⁷

Engagement with the literature and the “vision” of the movement provided a pathway to association with patriot fundamentalism, so whether Bostonians were overhearing and discussing current events during their daily routines or actively attending a townhall meeting and strengthening established beliefs, any level of proximity to the nonviolent campaign added to the life experience of ordinary provincials by allowing them to feel useful and purposeful.³⁷⁸

Dissenting Bostonians emphasized the ways in which the Stamp Act disregarded colonial consent by developing a three-fold argument which insisted that the legislation trampled upon the natural rights and liberties of all Christians, circumvented the province’s original charter, which stipulated that Massachusetts would be governed by local representatives, and simultaneously, defied the English Constitution, which was theretofore viewed as the pinnacle of liberty and virtue. Boston’s nonviolent leaders encouraged their fellow provincials to resist Parliamentary taxation, which they understood to be the removal of lawfully earned property, except in cases where the general public expressed consent via their popularly elected representatives.³⁷⁹ As provincials grappled with the competing emotions of fear for the colonies and affection for Great Britain, they followed what Gary

³⁷⁷ Y.Z., *The Boston Evening-Post*, 25 November 1765, 1576th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

³⁷⁸ Razaghi and others, p. 14.

³⁷⁹ *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 18 November 1765, 555th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

Nash has termed “the course of discontent and resentment”.³⁸⁰ Underpinning the crux of the colonial resistance of the Stamp Act, one Bostonian explained,

The law of nature is the law of God, irreversible itself and superseding all human laws...The laws and constitution of the English government are the best we know in the world, because they approach nearest to the laws God has established in our nature...shall those men who exert themselves in defence of their native rights and the beloved the glorious constitution of England, be treated as factious disturbers of the public peace, and branded with the opprobrious names of rebels and traitors?³⁸¹

When Parliament defaulted on their duty to uphold the English constitution to the level that the Crown’s subjects in North America had come to expect, Boston’s patriot fundamentalists and radicals throughout the colonies more broadly, turned to a more abstract sense of law which transcended the constructs of the colonies. Drawing upon and expanding their understandings of history and Christianity, Massachusettsans felt more ideologically equipped to peaceably confront the most problematic facets of imperialism. Indeed, because provincials had a need to transfigure their grievances into a legitimate ideology which rested upon an effective and credible platform – a common trend amongst social movements –, eighteenth-century authors in Boston appealed to their audiences through scriptural quotes and historical anecdotes which supplied readers with “evidence” of the tyranny that Great Britain intended to wield over its American colonies.³⁸² Throughout Bostonian newspapers and pamphlets, prominent patriot fundamentalist writers adapted a wide variety of spiritual, historical, and intellectual themes to correspond to the colonial experience.

From the Stamp Act resistance forward, Massachusettsans worked to justify nonviolent resistance through the rhetorical exploration of three predominate motifs:

³⁸⁰ Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 184.

³⁸¹ G, ‘To the People of Boston and All Other English Americans’, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 5 October 1767, 653rd edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

³⁸² Charles F. Mullett, ‘Classical Influences on the American Revolution’, *The Classical Journal*, 35.2 (1939), pp. 92–104 (p. 92).

Christian liberty, classical philosophy, and historical legacy. By combining the influence of biblical narratives and a variety of themes associated with the Roman and Greek classics as well as the Glorious Revolution, patriot fundamentalist writers established the admirable nature of their objectives by highlighting historical precedents and simultaneously reiterated the critical necessity of maintaining British North Americans' entitlement to unalienably God-given natural rights.³⁸³ Biblical, philosophical, and historical case studies were used to debate the extent of Parliament's jurisdiction in the colonies, and ultimately, these examples had the effect of demonstrating to provincials that colonial unity and collective action could conquer any barricades that Parliament posed to liberty.³⁸⁴

Alongside Otis's *Rights of the British Colonies* was undeniably formative for colonial opposition thought, the activism-oriented mindset that grew out of the Stamp Act Resistance gained similar traction after an October 1765 meeting of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, when the province's key political players formally registered the public's grievances with the Crown and openly pledged to pursue "a just sense of Liberty".³⁸⁵ In an official ruling that was printed and reprinted from colony to colony, the House of Representatives expounded the rights and liberties granted to all Massachusettsans by God and nature, by their original charter and by the English constitution and highlighted the colonies' capacity to make "advantageous" physical and economic contributions to Great Britain as subjects of the Crown.³⁸⁶ The House represented colonial interests with caution and care, and urban Bostonians and countryside dwellers alike became increasingly invested in

³⁸³ Roman authors that were regularly consulted or cited in the production of colonial publication include: Cicero, Horace, Vergil, Tacitus, Lucan, Seneca, Livy, Sallust, Cato, Pliny, Juvenal, Marcus Aurelius, Petronius, Suetonius, and Caesar, while Greek influencers include Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Euripides, Thucydides, Xenophon, Aristotle, Dio, Polybius, Plutarch, and Epictetus, among others.

³⁸⁴ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 20.

³⁸⁵ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 94–95; 'From the Votes of the House of Representatives of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, 29 October 1765', *The Boston Evening-Post*, 4 November 1765, 1573rd edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

³⁸⁶ 'From the Votes of the House of Representatives of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, 29 October 1765'.

the logic of resistance that the House set forth. Parliament continued to tighten the reigns of taxation, and while provincials attempted to process exactly what the Stamp Act would entail, they turned to Boston's patriot advocates, who encouraged them to combat colonial disenfranchisement for themselves, for the benefit of future generations, in honor of their "glorious ancestors", and in the name of American patriotism.³⁸⁷ In the media and in the streets, emerging patriot leaders condemned the restraints inherent in unfair, asymmetrically beneficial Parliamentary legislation, encouraged Massachusettsans to engage in nonviolent civil resistance against the Crown's attempted marginalization of the colonies, necessitated accountability amongst Massachusettsans in lobbying for colonial rights, and contextualized defiant behaviors like debating, petitioning, and boycotting, as patriot duty. In the state house, provincial representatives formalized the claims and ideological foundations of what ultimately became the patriot fundamentalist movement.

While Boston's burgeoning patriot fundamentalist advocates referenced scripture to bolster their case against the Stamp Act, they also drew support from the literature of the ancient world. By strengthening the supports which buttressed patriot arguments against excessive taxation with practical historical lessons, Boston's resistance leaders creatively provided another angle of penetration through which Americans could access and understand the dangers of imperial encroachment upon colonial affairs. As the following pages demonstrate, patriot activists borrowed from Greek and Roman traditions in order frame American political contention around real-world examples and to provide colonists with a greater degree of certainty that should colonists fail to resist the Stamp Act, they would effectively cosign Parliamentary supremacy and reduce themselves and their loved ones to sin and exploitation. The teachings of classical Greek and Roman philosophers helped to clarify the continental case for nonviolent civil resistance by justifying the moral uprightness

³⁸⁷ Y.Z.

of the American opposition to the Stamp Act, fostering support for the peaceable resistance of unjust Parliamentary legislation, and warning colonists about the potential long-term implications of imperial encroachment upon North American life.³⁸⁸ Indeed, applying the lessons of the ancient world to the Stamp Act Crisis, Boston's patriot pens raised suspicion about Parliamentary intent by highlighting how the loss of Rome's "free constitution" ultimately "plunged her...into the black gulph of infamy and slavery".³⁸⁹

Boston's radical writers latched onto the political history of the Greco-Roman world in general; however, the narrative of Rome was of particular interest to them. While it remains debatable that the typical provincial possessed a genuine comprehension of the broader themes of Roman history, some of Boston's most active patriot advocates, including James Otis, Jr. and the Adams cousins, consistently drew upon one era and one particular group of writers, invoked the philosophies of Sallust, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Livy, amongst others to the Stamp Act Crisis as a means of simultaneously buttressing their arguments and conjuring colonial suspicions over Parliament's intentions.³⁹⁰ John Adams described himself as having a "lifelong identification" with Cicero, and he frequently turned to Cicero as a means of gaining a greater sense of both purpose in his work and clarity in facing the complex issues of the Imperial Crisis.³⁹¹ Like Cicero, John Adams linked militarization with moral degradation.³⁹² Because the Sallust, Cicero, and their fellow classical powerhouses all lived either at a time when the Roman Republic was being fundamentally challenged or when violence and war diminished the Republic's once supreme moral and political virtues, patriot

³⁸⁸ Mullett, pp. 93–94.

³⁸⁹ Joseph Warren, *An Oration Delivered March 5th, 1772 at the Request of the Inhabitants of the Town of Boston; to Commemorate the Bloody Tragedy of the Fifth of March, 1770.* (Edes and Gill, in Queen-Street, 1772), p. 3, *The Library of America*.

³⁹⁰ Mullett, pp. 93–94.

³⁹¹ Carl J. Richard, *The Founders and the Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment* (Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 60–61.

³⁹² T.N. Mitchell, 'Cicero on the Moral Crisis of the Late Republic', *Hermathena*, 136, 1984, pp. 21–41 (pp. 26–27).

opinion formers established strong parallels between the fate of the Romans and that which could await British North Americans who refused nonviolent engagement. Although James Otis was one of the first to highlight the ways in which the “conduct of Rome toward her colonies and the corruptions and oppressions tolerated” catalyzed “the downfall of that proud republic,” other influential patriot fundamentalist pens, including the cousins Samuel and John Adams and Dr. Joseph Warren similarly underscored the Roman example.³⁹³ In turn, and on the grounds that that they could relate to the plight of the Romans, who similarly feared and disapproved of the political trends of their own epoch, eighteenth-century Massachusettsans and British North Americans more generally were both moved by classically-based patriot fundamentalist rhetoric and reassured of the righteousness in resisting Parliament’s intrusion upon American autonomy.³⁹⁴

To cement patriot justifications and evidence the need for nonviolent resistance, radical writers utilized familiar historical narratives to complement the biblical sentiments and Greco-Roman motifs that they explored in pamphlets and newspaper articles, and likewise, historical legacies helped to escalate nonviolent political struggle in the face of Parliamentary encroachment in North America. By drawing upon the cultural beliefs and ancestries which defined colonial identities, Boston’s patriot advocates added another element of appeal for the city’s inhabitants to support nonviolent resistance. Boston’s purveyors of patriot fundamentalism seemed to understand that any attempts to chip away at

³⁹³ Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, p. 27. Otis, the Adams cousins, and other patriot authors regularly employed Greco-Roman-inspired pseudonyms to enhance the connections between ancient Rome and colonial America, which illustrated the potential political trajectory of the latter and downplayed what some perceived as the drastic nature of American resistance. Greco-Roman-inspired pseudonyms allowed to personify their arguments, to showcase their intellectual competence, to project a sense of old-world authority, to gain the high ground in political debates, and to offer a meta-explanation of British North American society in terms of antiquity, meaning that appeals to tradition had a hand in affording Boston’s radical writers and their audience the validation required to advance the patriot fundamentalist movement. See ‘Ancient Masks, American Fathers: Classical Pseudonyms During the American Revolution and Early Republic’ by Eran Shalev, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* by Bernard Bailyn, and *Communicating Liberty: The Newspapers of the British Empire as a Matrix for the American Revolution* by Michael Beatty Warner.

³⁹⁴ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 25.

either the “ancient bonds of consanguinity, culture, traditions, and language” that linked America to Great Britain or the colonists’ “proud sense” of belonging to the British Empire would require more than a simple escalation in radical rhetoric.³⁹⁵ In an era when history increasingly provided “conversational currency”, Boston’s radical writers endeavored to bolster their arguments through historical empiricism, defending the logic of patriot resistance and establishing patterns for how gradual governmental encroachment previously diminished civil liberties.³⁹⁶ As one of Boston’s most radical writers advised, “a free government never degenerated into tyranny all at once, it is the work of years”.³⁹⁷ Accordingly, patriot authors selectively cited the partisan historical analyses of Paul de Rapin de Thoyras as well as the Enlightenment-based accounts of David Hume in an effort to firstly present their peers with a case compelling enough to transform provincial conceptualizations of North American rights on an ideological level and in addition, to mobilize their readers against Parliament’s legislative attempts to “demolish those bugbears to the foes of liberty”.³⁹⁸ In particular, Boston’s radical writers referenced the Glorious Revolution of 1689 as a means of narrowing in on their argument that the resistance of arbitrary rule was not a newfangled or immoral objective taken on by a reactionary few, and in fact, colonists began to deploy much of the resistance-based rhetoric that their ancestors relied upon during the Glorious Revolution.³⁹⁹ By utilizing historical case studies to further support their religious and classical claims to liberty, Boston’s patriot fundamentalist pens highlighted the

³⁹⁵ Greene, *Imperatives, Behaviors, and Identities: Essays in Early American Cultural History*, p. 178.

³⁹⁶ Daniel R. Woolf, ‘From Histories to the Historical: Five Transitions in Thinking about the Past, 1500-1700’, *Huntingdon Library Quarterly*, 68.1–2 (2005), pp. 33–70 (pp. 36–37).

³⁹⁷ James Otis as ‘A Freeborn American’, *Boston Gazette and Country Journal*, 27 April 1767, 630th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

³⁹⁸ Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, p. 34.

³⁹⁹ Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, p. 31.

appropriateness of the colonies' peaceable resistance of the Stamp Act and necessitated the active challenging of Parliamentary attempts to minimize American autonomy.⁴⁰⁰

French Huguenot scholar Paul de Rapin de Thoyras was the first early modern historian to initiate a major discourse on the complex intellectual debates and social dynamics shared between eighteenth-century Europe and the Americas.⁴⁰¹ Rapin spent the better part of two decades writing and publishing his keystone work, *L'Histoire d'Angleterre*, which was translated by the Reverend Nicolas Tindal and reprinted in the colonies between 1725 and 1731.⁴⁰² *L'Histoire d'Angleterre* provided an array of historical arguments, which were grounded in a thorough, intensive exploration of primary literature and demonstrated a sweeping assessment of continuity and change ranging from the Norman Conquest to the reign of William and Mary. Rapin's *Histoire* gave the impression of offering an unprecedentedly balanced historical analysis, which, as one scholar has explained, reflected the author's capacity as both a critical thinker and a "foreigner observer" unconcerned with specific party biases, and Bostonians lauded Rapin's analysis as "just Representation of the English Constitution".⁴⁰³ However, Rapin's analysis was irrefutably shaped by the politics of his lifetime as well as his own personal experiences as an ally of William of Orange in the thick of the Glorious Revolution.⁴⁰⁴

Critics of Rapin argued that a non-English historian could not possibly grasp the nature and complexity of English institutions and cited both his appreciation for Britain's

⁴⁰⁰ Micah Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions* (Cambridge University Press, 2022), pp. 46–47.

⁴⁰¹ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 41.

⁴⁰² Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, p. 36.

⁴⁰³ Miriam Franchina, 'Writing an Impartial History in the Republic of Letters: Paul Rapin Thoyras and His *Histoire d'Angleterre* (1724-1727)' (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, Martin-Luther-Universität, 2016), pp. 8–10; 'On the Useful of History, Particularly Rapin's', in *The American Magazine and Historical Chronicle* (Rogers and Fowle, 1746), pp. 368–69 (p. 368)

<<https://archive.org/details/americanmagazine3174unse/page/368/mode/2up?q=rapin>>.

⁴⁰⁴ Kate Horgan, *The Politics of Songs in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 1723-1795* (Routledge), p. 38.

ancient constitution and his attack of the Stuart monarchy as “distinctly Whiggish”.⁴⁰⁵ As such, Rapin’s work was arguably best suited for North American engagement, as it had the effect of reinforcing of the righteousness of American resistance. To be sure, *L’Histoire d’Angleterre* presented colonists with historical evidence to support their accusations of Parliament’s unconstitutional actions and likewise, offered an intellectually-based sense of validation for patriot fundamentalist claims and objectives that helped to sustain the logic of nonviolent civil resistance throughout the Imperial Crisis. As Bailyn has explained it, Rapin’s work offered an “indisputable proof of the theories of all of the radical and anti-establishment writers by demonstrating their validity through a thousand years of English history”.⁴⁰⁶ Even after the dust of the Revolutionary War had settled, John Adams praised *L’Histoire d’Angleterre* as having illustrated the “honest Truth” about Britain’s illegitimate claims to authority in North America.⁴⁰⁷ In addition, Rapin’s words served to intensify and glorify British North Americans’ “portrait of their ancient ancestors”.⁴⁰⁸

Rapin’s analysis relied heavily on Tacitus’ *Germania*, which helped to bridge the gap between the patriot fundamentalist identification with the Greco-Roman world and the historical understandings of eighteenth-century Bostonians.⁴⁰⁹ Not only did *L’Histoire* emphasize the virtue of England’s Saxon ancestors, which according to Colbourn rivaled only the most stringent Puritans and praise ancient Germany’s democratic achievements in constitutionally balancing monarchical power, but in addition, it plainly explained the Anglo-Saxon connections between Tacitus’ “noble Germans” and eighteenth-century Britons.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁵ Laird Okie, ‘Ideology and Partiality in David Hume’s History of England’, *Hume Studies*, 11.1 (1985), pp. 1–32 (p. 6).

⁴⁰⁶ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 41.

⁴⁰⁷ ‘John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 16 December 1816’, *Founders Online National Archives*, Adams Papers.

⁴⁰⁸ H. Trevor Colbourn, *The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution* (University of North Carolina Press, 1965), p. 33.

⁴⁰⁹ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 42.

⁴¹⁰ Colbourn, *The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 31–32.

Rapin's analysis of Tacitus' commentary on Saxon politics particularly appealed to New England sensibilities about providential entitlement, as the nature of those ancient institutions reflected a sort of governmental utopia based upon a mandated balance between monarch and parliament as well as egalitarian economic arrangements, which Massachusettsans both longed for and felt that they deserved. Boston's radical writers drew upon Rapin's words to deter colonial submission to Parliamentary policymaking which they insisted could revert imperial governmental practices to the "arbitrary and wicked proceedings" that the Stuart monarchs employed to usurp the ancient constitution's checks and balances.⁴¹¹ Moreover, in praising the Glorious Revolution as a deeply transformative event which brought about a necessary restoration of the ancient constitution, Rapin's *Histoire* helped to validate and even necessitate a nonviolent campaign for American liberty. The historical narratives set forth by Rapin ultimately provided Boston's patriot opinion formers with additional means to link historical precedent with action in a process that Carl J. Richard has described as "revolution fueled by tradition".⁴¹²

Rapin's status as the preeminent scholar of English history both in Europe and North America remained intact until the debut of David Hume's *History of England*, which was published in six volumes between 1754 and 1761.⁴¹³ While some have labeled Hume a "tory historian", others note that from the accession of King George III in 1751 forward, Hume became increasingly vocal in his cynicism of the British empire and its intentions with its imperial subjects, and Hume explicitly confessed to Scottish printer and politician William Strahan that Great Britain should relinquish the colonies, "lay aside all Anger; shake hands, and part Friends", rather than attempting to retain them at a significant human or financial

⁴¹¹ Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, p. 31.

⁴¹² Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, pp. 36–37; Richard, p. 233.

⁴¹³ Laird Okie, *Augustan Historical Writing: Histories of England in the English Enlightenment* (University Press of America, 1991), p. 47; David Hume, *The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to The Revolution in 1688*, 6 vols, v, Online Library of Liberty.

cost.⁴¹⁴ Hume's *History* quickly made its way to the colonies, where it was easily accessible and wildly popular amongst British North Americans. During the Imperial Crisis, very few books were printed in the colonies, and although books were incredibly important to eighteenth-century Americans, the sheer number of resources required to print a book meant that it was generally more efficient for booksellers to import more substantial works directly from London.⁴¹⁵ Nonetheless, like Rapin's *Histoire d'Angleterre* which was sold in cheap editions by booksellers and dry goods merchants throughout the colonies, Hume's *History of England* was easily accessible in bookshops and print shops as well as both public and private collections.⁴¹⁶ Moreover, some purveyors of patriot fundamentalism would transcribe selections of critical scholarship from the likes of Rapin and Hume into books and notebooks which could be passed along while others would publicly divulge the details of their readings in newspaper articles and polemical works.⁴¹⁷ Although brought different approaches to the study of history, Michael D. Hattem credits *Histoire d'Angleterre* and *History of England* as the two most impactful British histories read in the colonies before the outbreak of war.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁴ Colbourn, *The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 34; 'David Hume to William Strahan, 26 October 1775', in *Letters of David Hume to William Strahan*, Ed. G. Birkbeck Hill (Clarendon Press, 1888); Andrew Sabl, *Hume's Politics: Coordination and Crisis in the History of England* (Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 65; Ernest C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 403.

⁴¹⁵ Joseph M. Adelman, *Revolutionary Networks: The Business and Politics of Printing the News, 1763-1789* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019), p. 12.

⁴¹⁶ Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, p. 37; Colbourn, *The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 11; John M. Werner, 'David Hume and America', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 33.3 (1972), pp. 439-56 (p. 456).

⁴¹⁷ Colbourn, *The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 16.

⁴¹⁸ Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, p. 38. The most significant way in which Hume differed from Rapin was in his compassionate rendering of the Stuart monarchs. Hume directed particular sympathy in the directions of James I and Charles I, with the former being described as a mix of "timidity" and "justice" and the latter being portrayed as having been "composed of decency, reserve, modesty, [and] sobriety". Moreover, Hume shifted the blame for the Civil Wars away from the Stuarts and instead explained that Parliament was at fault for having "almost annihilated the constitution under the weight of their prerogative". In addition, Hume claimed that the modern Parliament only really came into being during the reign of James I, which effectively countered Rapin's argument that the Parliament dated back to England's Anglo-Saxon origins and challenged the view that Parliament had maintained a long-standing authority within England. Lastly, Hume's *History of England* argued that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 never actually restored the ancient constitution, but rather, that it resulted in a new and improved constitution.

As such, throughout the Imperial Crisis, Boston's advocates for patriot fundamentalism selectively referenced Hume's interpretations, drawing upon the elements of his *History* that best suited their warnings of Parliamentary encroachment upon American liberties. Indeed, although the historiography has traditionally relied upon "aspects of Hume's reception in nineteenth-century America" to make assumptions about how Hume's work would have been received in the eighteenth century, more recent studies, including that of Mark G. Spencer, have undermined "the myth" that British North Americans discounted or rejected Hume's analyses.⁴¹⁹ In fact, citing both Rapin and Hume, John Adams remarked to his son, Charles, that a close examination of "the Events of this Period of Republicanism in England will naturally increase your Esteem of real Liberty and your Affection for it", and this sentiment was seemingly shared by provincials across Massachusetts.⁴²⁰ As Bernard Bailyn has emphasized, to simply say that the brand of historical research disseminated by Rapin and Hume was rapidly transmitted to and throughout the American colonies "and widely appreciated there" would be "to understate the fact", particularly because at the height of the patriot fundamentalist movement, the "real" pursuit of liberty came to be synonymous with boycotting, petitioning, and mobilizing in demonstrations, marches, town hall meetings, and other mechanisms of nonviolent coercion.⁴²¹ Accordingly, Hume should without question be considered as one of the foremost figures involved in shaping the intellectual components of the patriot fundamentalist ideology.⁴²²

The biblical references, classical themes, and historical interpretations that were ubiquitously advertised in polemical publications proved to be critical to the formation and expansion of what ultimately became the patriot fundamentalist ideology both in eighteenth-

⁴¹⁹ Mark G. Spencer, *David Hume and Eighteenth-Century America* (University of Rochester Press, 2005), p. 36.

⁴²⁰ 'John Adams to Charles Adams, 16 December 1793', Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

⁴²¹ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 43–44.

⁴²² Adelman, p. 12.

century Boston and throughout the American colonies. By relying upon spiritual, cultural, and philosophical supports, Boston's patriot authors established the underpinnings of the patriot fundamentalist decision frame, making clear that the purpose of resistance was to shed new light on the transgressions of Parliamentary policy in the American colonies and to demand the repeal of iniquitous Stamp Act through the "measured force" of peaceable resistance.⁴²³ As John Adams attested, on a transclass level, colonists became "more attentive to their Liberties, more inquisitive about them, and more determined to defend them, than they were ever before known or had occasion to be".⁴²⁴ Encouraged by the lessons of their ancestors and the strong moral codes that Massachusettsans associated with their forebears, provincials looked to the past as a means of coping with the changing landscape of New England politics and interpreting how their status as both Massachusettsans and subjects of the Crown positioned them within the British Empire. Moreover, the intellectual evidence that strengthened patriot claims also sustained Massachusettsans ideologically during the Stamp Act Resistance and throughout the Imperial Crisis, as Boston's radical writers insisted that "neither law, gospel, or natural reason enjoin obedience to a power" as illegitimate as an unrepresentative Parliament.⁴²⁵ Although the patriot fundamentalist ideology adapted and evolved between 1764 and 1776 in order to suit the everchanging needs and concerns of the continental movement, its foundations were laid through the religious, classical, and historical ideals laid out in the debates of the Stamp Act Crisis.

Accordingly, even when the Stamp Act was repealed in March of 1766, Massachusettsans were unable to revert to their previous ways of thinking about the British past and their relationship to it as colonial subjects. The passage of the Stamp Act and the

⁴²³ Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, p. 38.

⁴²⁴ '18 December 1765 from the Diary of John Adams', Massachusetts Historical Society, Adams Family Papers.

⁴²⁵ Philaethes, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 11 May 1767, 632nd edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

patriot response to it had taught Massachusettsans to be distrustful of Parliament and its aims in North America, facilitating an almost fixed pathway to patriot fundamentalism. Bostonians demonstrated a combination of jubilee and vindication upon receipt of the “glorious News” that the Stamp Act had been repealed, and Boston residents in particular celebrated the success of their efforts in forcing a concession from Britain; however, the spirit of resistance did not diminish with the legislation’s repeal.⁴²⁶ Moreover, Boston’s core nonviolent leaders distanced themselves from popular jubilee to stay vigilant and maintain the “orderly and constitutional application” of nonviolent struggle.⁴²⁷

By diving into the rhetorical chronology of the Imperial Crisis in Massachusetts, we can see how legislation, repeals, and Parliamentary responses to colonial action caused ebbs and flows in patriot rhetoric and belief systems, and likewise, we can visualize the gradual construction of patriot fundamentalism as an ideology predicated upon faith-based values and moral accountability and demonstrated through republican activism. Certainly, Boston’s nonviolent leaders ensured that the rhetoric of nonviolent opposition remained in the colonial lexicon, and patriot opinion formers reminded their fellow provincials, “we know not what a day or an hour may bring forth even when we think ourselves the most secure”.⁴²⁸ Boston’s patriot organizers cautioned their fellow activists against being “hasty in expressing their gratitude” to imperial authorities, and they underscored the repeal of the Stamp Act as Britain’s acknowledgement of faulty governance.⁴²⁹ Dissenting Bostonians strengthened the pull of the budding patriot fundamentalist ideology by framing the repeal of the Stamp Act to

⁴²⁶ The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal, 19 May 1766, 581st edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.; Pauline Maier, ‘The Townshend Acts and the Consolidation of Colonial Resistance’, in *Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution 1760-1791*, Ed. Richard Brown, 2nd edn (Houghton Mifflin, 2000), pp. 128–36 (p. 128).

⁴²⁷ Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, p. 47.

⁴²⁸ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 42–43; James Otis as ‘A Freeborn American’.

⁴²⁹ A British American, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 11 August 1766, 593rd edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

suggest that Parliament had understood the legislation to be contradictory to the principles of the English Constitution and admitted their own guilt in passing an unconstitutional act. Thus, in achieving imperial accommodation, nonviolence was validated as an effective resistance strategy and deemed ethical by definition.

In the context of the composite framework outlined in the introduction of this thesis, the Stamp Act resistance and the legislation's repeal forged and fortified new connections between Massachusettsans of various backgrounds, socioeconomic classes, and faith communities by organizing colonists around human and civil rights.⁴³⁰ Boston's burgeoning patriot fundamentalists developed various points of access that allowed colonists to understand their rights, identify their objections to Parliamentary policy, and engage with resistance in the name of safeguarding American liberties.⁴³¹ Moreover, Massachusettsans accepted new risks in order to avoid more significant losses in the future. Although the mobilizing structures that patriot advocates established and employed during the Stamp Act resistance will be discussed at length in the next chapter, it is important to note that the continental rhetoric and ideals that were developed in 1765 brought about new certainty effects which unprecedentedly and irreparably altered colonial conceptualizations of the Anglo-American relationship. During the Stamp Act resistance, colonists boldly asserted their rights, not only posing direct challenges to Parliamentary authority, but also conceding to the relational tensions that developed between the colonies and their mother country. Likewise, Bostonians accepted the potential economic risks, logistical nuisances, and legal ramifications associated with the nonviolent tactics of boycotting and defiance. Digesting the patriot arguments against the Stamp Act, colonists weighed the newer, less invasive risks that resistance had the potential to bring about against the more severe threat that a lack of

⁴³⁰ Fisher and Kling, p. 12.

⁴³¹ Snow, Rochford, and Benford, p. 464; Wada, p. 547.

immediate political contention would almost certainly mean a future of endless exploitation and Parliamentary supremacy in British North America.

While Boston's patriot activists considered themselves victorious over Crown and Parliament following the repeal of the Stamp Act, they also recognized the importance of preserving the ideals and obligations that became interlocked by the nonviolent rhetoric of the Stamp Act resistance. Boston's resistance leaders continued to preach hypervigilance in the opposition of arbitrary rule and in the safeguarding of America's sacred civil liberties. When Parliament replaced the Stamp Act with the Townshend Revenue Act in the summer of 1767, Boston's radical leaders revamped and revitalized their intellectual and philosophical arguments and shifted patriot rhetoric "from private debt to public virtue".⁴³²

With dissenting voices excluded, the Townshend Revenue Act passed Parliament without concerted objection and came as the third installment in a string of revenue-raising measures, suggesting to burgeoning patriot fundamentalists up and down the eastern seaboard that Parliament's core interest was to line "British, not American coffers".⁴³³ Comprised of five separate acts, the Townshend duties unprecedentedly threatened the existing political and economic freedoms of the colonies. Not only did the legislation instate further taxation as a means of "defraying" Great Britain's expenses in administering justice and securing the Crown's North American territory, but it also provided customs officers with increased authority over offenders and dictated that royal officials were able to search private property at any time as a means of discouraging the smuggling of goods. Moreover, in affording Royal Naval Courts rather than colonial courts, the jurisdiction over all affairs relating to customs violations, the Townshend Revenue Act established new Royal Admiralty courts in Boston,

⁴³² T. H. Breen, "'Baubles of Britain': The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century", *Past and Present*, 119, 1988, pp. 73–104 (p. 91).

⁴³³ Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, p. 45; Beeman, Richard R., *Our Lives, Our Fortunes, and Our Sacred Honor: The Forging of American Independence, 1774-1776* (Basic Books, 2015), p. 74.

Philadelphia, and Charleston, which were run independently of colonial juries and staffed by Crown-appointed judges who were awarded five percent of any fines levied against prosecuted offenders.⁴³⁴ Lastly, and on top of the aforementioned conditions of the legislation, Parliament utilized the Townshend duties to establish a provision for a standing army in Boston which would support customs officials and enforce all aspects of the legislation.⁴³⁵ The idea that nonviolent dissenters could achieve virtue through abstention, unity through performative acts of solidarity, and political legitimacy through ethical action became evermore pertinent to the American resistance movement.⁴³⁶ Indeed, in response to the Townshend duties, Boston's radical leaders moved to renew and expand the continental boycotts designed to strike at the economic heart of Great Britain. Simultaneously, the city's patriot fundamentalists explicitly discouraged violence against customs officials, repeatedly stating that "no mobs" should resort to any actions which might contradict the peaceable nature of the continental campaign or delegitimize the American cause in the eyes of any foreign observers.⁴³⁷ Radical Bostonians insisted that political change could occur without violence should public opinion be made clear through appropriate, legitimate means, and furthermore, that only Parliament could force a different course, should they again resist reconciliation with the colonies.⁴³⁸

Although patriot fundamentalist arguments shifted during Townshend resistance, broadly speaking, the reactions of Massachusettsans to the duties, which were due to take effect on November 20, 1767, elicited two key reactions.⁴³⁹ While Bostonians underscored the ways in which the Townshend duties impacted their specific communities and trust

⁴³⁴ Peter D. G. Thomas, *The Townshend Duties Crisis: The Second Phase of the American Revolution, 1767–1773* (Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 34.

⁴³⁵ Hoerder, p. 151.

⁴³⁶ Alpaugh, 'Nonviolence, Positive Peace and American Pre-Revolutionary Protest, 1765-1775', p. 170.

⁴³⁷ Hoerder, p. 151.

⁴³⁸ Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, p. 46.

⁴³⁹ Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, p. 105.

networks, the legislation also prompted an emotional reaction which extended beyond mere frustration over Great Britain's unexpected hardline response to the colonial challenging of Parliamentary authority. First and foremost, Massachusettsans communicated feelings of betrayal. Provincials were dismayed at the notion that while British North Americans were thoughtfully crafting diplomatic petitions and perfecting respectful addresses to their mother country, Parliament was preoccupied with drawing up plans for their most oppressive demonstration of imperial authority to date. As Samuel Adams articulated it, "[A]t the very Time when the Stamp Act was repealed, another was made in which the Parliament of Great Britain declared, that they had the right and authority to make any laws whatever binding on his Majesty's subjects in America".⁴⁴⁰ Simultaneously, Massachusettsans expressed profound fear and resentment over Parliament's clear intention to strip the colonies of any popular influence over executive and judiciary affairs in North America. In particular, Massachusettsans expressed anxiety due to their apparent lack of control regarding the Parliamentary decision to station British troops in Boston during a relatively peaceful time.⁴⁴¹ Bostonians and British North Americans more generally were troubled by the implications of imperial militarization as well as the physical and economic realities of having to accommodate several thousand British soldiers at a time when the city was already in an economically "distressed State".⁴⁴² The Townshend Revenue Act marked a significant shift in the rhetoric of the patriot fundamentalist movement. Whereas Boston's opposition to the Sugar and Stamp Acts ultimately maintained a characterization of provincials as loyal subjects of the Crown who simply sought to defend the honor of the English constitution, the

⁴⁴⁰ Candidus, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 19 August 1771, 854th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

⁴⁴¹ Peter D. G. Thomas, p. 127.

⁴⁴² 'A Written Address to the Inhabitants', *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 2 November 1767, 657th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

city's resistance of the Townshend duties underscored polarizing contrasts between the American colonies and their mother country.

Indeed, in the wake of the Townshend Revenue Act and similarly, at a time when provincials were effectively being forced to take stock of their burgeoning identity as Americans distinct from the British Empire, a new development within the movement emerged as Boston's nonviolent leaders began increasingly employing radical "us versus them" rhetoric. Evidently, Massachusettsans had not only become more comfortable with the language of resistance by 1767, and as the Townshend duties were regarded as harsher and more invasive than any earlier orders handed down to the colonies by Parliament, Boston's patriot fundamentalists declared that peaceable resistance was the most appropriate means to protect American interests and project American values.

Unlike the rhetoric of the Stamp Act resistance which ultimately prioritized "the important affair of reuniting a certain American government to the Crown", in the wake of the Townshend duties, dissenting Bostonians began to distinguish "us" as Americans from "them" as Britons.⁴⁴³ For instance, calling for "all Americans to unite", one Boston writer juxtaposed the righteousness of American determination against the aggressive self-interest of British policy by reassuring his peers that "we will not be afraid of their terror".⁴⁴⁴ Although boycotts and nonimportation associations established social and emotional connections between Massachusettsans, in many ways, Americans still had "little in common except the bond of protesting London's policies".⁴⁴⁵ Moreover, urban protests and against the Stamp Act and the Townshend duties cannot necessarily be seen as having created a shared revolutionary mentality, as one-off affairs alone rarely provoke deep ideological shifts.

⁴⁴³ The Boston Post-Boy & Advertiser, 8 April 1765, 399th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁴⁴⁴ Elutherus, 'To the Publishers of the Boston-Gazette', The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal, 28 May 1770, 791st edition.

⁴⁴⁵ Ralph Young, p. 72; Breen, *The Will of the People: The Revolutionary Birth of America*, p. 27.

However, trans-colonial nonimportation agreements did offer “a model for virtuous abstention and moral regeneration”, and highlight “the need for unified action to strengthen colonial leverage”.⁴⁴⁶ Explicitly framing risk evaluations for colonists in the context of civil, moral, economic degradation, Boston’s patriot opinion formers reoriented earlier opinions of Britain and America’s place within its empire, rhetorically connected the dots between the colonies’ wanton reliance upon “foreign superfluities” and Boston’s “drained” economic condition, which they projected would only be amplified in the face of “the late additional Burthens and Impositions” introduced by the Townshend Revenue Act.⁴⁴⁷ As Boston’s resistance leaders continued to prod at group grievances and work to mold a national identity around nonviolent resistance, they harkened back to Otis’s argument that Parliamentary laws which defied the English constitution could not be considered binding in the colonies and brought the issue of Parliamentary supremacy to the forefront of opposition rhetoric and ideology.⁴⁴⁸

The Adams cousins and other prominent nonviolent advocates fortified Bostonian resolve by reaffirming the historical lessons of the Anglophone past and Enlightenment-era teachings on the importance of conquering vanity, luxury, and private interest and introducing a fresh case against Parliamentary jurisdiction in North America. As Michael D. Hattem has explained, the Glorious Revolution brought about Parliamentary sovereignty, which fundamentally changed the relationship between Parliament and the Crown by

⁴⁴⁶ Alpaugh, ‘Nonviolence, Positive Peace and American Pre-Revolutionary Protest, 1765-1775’, p. 172.

⁴⁴⁷ ‘A Written Address to the Inhabitants’; Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 303. Prepared by James Otis, the address was based upon voting at a Boston Town Meeting on October 28, 1767 during which attendees voted in favor of disallowing the importation of “Loaf Sugar, Cordage, Anchors, Coaches, Chaises and Carriages of all Sorts, Horse Furniture, Men and Womens Hatts, Mens and Womens Apparel ready made, Household Furniture, Gloves, Men and Womens Shoes, Sole-Leather, Sheathing and Deck Nails, Gold and Silver and Thread Lace of all Sorts, Gold and Silver Buttons, Wrought Plate of all Sorts, Diamond, Stone and Paste Ware, Snuff, Mustard, Clocks and Watches, Silversmiths and Jewellers Ware, Broad Cloths that cost above 10s per Yard, Muffs, Furrs and Tippetts, and all Sorts of Millenary Ware, Starch, Womens and Childrens Stays, Fire Engines, Chine Ware, Silk and Cotton Velvets, Gauze, Pewterers hollow Ware, Linseed Oyl, Glue, Lawns, Cambricks, Silks of all Kinds for Garments, Malt, Liquors, and Cheese”.

⁴⁴⁸ Richard A. Samuelson, ‘The Constitutional Sanity of James Otis: Resistance Leader and Loyal Subject’, *The Review of Politics*, 61.3 (1999), pp. 493–523 (pp. 494–95).

providing Parliament with the power to introduce new legislation with the monarch's approval. In limiting royal prerogative and unprecedentedly strengthening Parliamentary authority, the Glorious Revolution became "cornerstone of national identity" in the Anglophone world.⁴⁴⁹ On the logic that Parliamentary actions were by default constitutional, Britons of all ranks had theretofore valued the democratic appearance of Parliamentary sovereignty and the fair distribution of imperial governing powers it seemingly afforded. Yet, the implications of the Townshend duties along with the fact that British authorities continued to deny American representation in Parliament meant that "Parliamentary sovereignty" became increasingly interpreted as "Parliamentary supremacy". Accordingly, patriot resistance leaders encouraged and emboldened Massachusettsans by normalizing the that the nonviolent challenge of Parliamentary authority was "more justified by English traditions than were Parliament's innovations".⁴⁵⁰ The American argument against Parliamentary supremacy served as a new ideological component around which colonists could unite. In this sense, the passage of the Townshend Revenue Act helped to solidify Massachusettsan commitment to resistance. Indeed, in attempting to assert the supreme authority of the Crown and Parliament, British leadership inadvertently pushed the colonies one step closer to the "organic unity" that dissenting Bostonians would require to fully transfer political legitimacy from the imperial regime to Massachusetts's alternative institutions.⁴⁵¹

Modernist scholarship from Security Studies tells us that this sort of radicalization often occurs quite fluidly; however, for several reasons, the presence of British soldiers in

⁴⁴⁹ Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, pp. 106–8.

⁴⁵⁰ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 234.

⁴⁵¹ Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, p. 94.

Boston also played a role in compelling provincials to confront their cultural identities.⁴⁵² For instance, British soldiers disparagingly described colonists as “insufficiently British”, which not only forced Massachusettsans to recognize their “Americanness”, but also encouraged them to work to make that descriptor a positive and gratifying identity.⁴⁵³ Boston’s patriot fundamentalists persisted with their Stamp Act-instigated oratory and cautioned one another against being “so blinded” by personal gain that proving the extent to which the colonies were so “greatly wrong’d” became secondary. In fact, the passage of the Townshend Revenue Act validated colonial fears, underscored the accuracy of patriot projections and legitimized the necessity of strategic civil resistance, thereby reinforcing the patriotic obligation of making personal sacrifices to defend the endangered freedoms of the colonies collectively.⁴⁵⁴

The efforts of Boston’s nonviolent leaders in conjunction with Great Britain’s resort to militarization encouraged persistence in nonviolent civil resistance and stimulated the sentiment that dissent was the only logical option for responsible, ethical colonists to make, which is to say that the rhetoric of resistance made it “impossible for Americans to back down”.⁴⁵⁵ During the Townshend resistance, patriot leaders expanded their framing of colonial grievances, placing greater emphasis on risk evaluations and absolutely necessitating civil resistance. Massachusettsans of various backgrounds, socioeconomic classes, and faith communities were still organized around the issues of taxation and Parliamentary political

⁴⁵² See John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (Routledge, 2005); John Horgan, ‘From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 618. *Terrorism: What the Next President Will Face* (2018), pp. 80–94; Michael Jensen and others, *Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR)* (The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), December 2016); Rebecca A. Wilson and Anthony F. Lemieux, ‘An Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Perspective on Terrorist Propaganda’, in *Online Terrorist Propaganda, Recruitment, and Radicalization*, Ed. by John R. Vacca, 1st edn (CRC Press, 2019), pp. 227–37.

⁴⁵³ Ralph Young, p. 58.

⁴⁵⁴ Z, *The Boston Evening-Post*, 8 July 1765, 1557th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

⁴⁵⁵ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 234.

jurisdiction; yet, because the Stamp Act resistance had allowed patriot leaders to skillfully express the beliefs and identities of British North Americans, colonists were ideologically equipped to understand the risks and benefits of resistance by the late 1760s. Colonists already understood their rights, they were capable of identifying their objections to the Townshend duties, and they had become accustomed to engaging with public demonstrations, economic boycotts, and other methods peaceable resistance aimed at displaying the worthiness and unity of the American cause. Vis-à-vis a standing army and unprecedented Parliamentary interference in American affairs, Bostonians increasingly *coded* their circumstances, a common development in Prospect Theory.⁴⁵⁶ That is to say that colonists measured the losses and gains they had experienced since the onset of the Imperial Crisis against their expectations of how the American subjects of King George III ought to be treated. In turn, Bostonians became more orientated toward risk, demonstrating a preference for the risks associated with resistance over the threat of Parliamentary supremacy.

A heavy military presence had already descended upon the city of Boston, with the ratio of soldiers to citizens working out at roughly one to four, but nonviolent civil resistance and the connections that Bostonians formed through colonial advocacy offered civilians a sense of safety and provided a “protective” barrier against mounting tensions in the urban hub.⁴⁵⁷ Verbal and physical altercations between troops and civilians were occurring on an almost daily basis, as the sudden increase in Boston’s rate of inhabitation produced a scarcity of supplies and employment opportunities. Female Bostonians reported multiple incidents of being “knocked down and abused by soldiers for not consenting to their beastly proposal[s]” while working-class men were “seething” over the fact that they were having to compete with admittedly underpaid British soldiers for the relatively few employment opportunities Boston

⁴⁵⁶ Levy, p. 180.

⁴⁵⁷ Alfred F. Young, ‘George Robert Twelves Hewes (1742-1840): A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of the American Revolution’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 38.4 (1981), pp. 561–623 (p. 585); della Porta, i, p. 585.

had to offer amidst nonimportation agreements.⁴⁵⁸ By March of 1770, colonial Boston was “jammed” British troops, and city residents seemed to be competing with the British military to the extent that the conditions of everyday life in Boston were seemingly “subject to the will of THE GENERAL”.⁴⁵⁹ Attempting to live, work, and care for friends and relatives in a militarized city was arduous, and ultimately, unsustainable for Bostonians, and the city’s patriot fundamentalists played upon citizens’ collective fatigue and desperation.

Pseudonymously writing as “Alfred”, Samuel Adams explained that the patriot resistance campaign had been “prudent and legal” without a single step that “cannot be fully justify’d by the Laws of their country” and probed his audience, “How much longer it is expected that the patience of this injured country shall hold out!”⁴⁶⁰

Garrisoning policies had created “an entangled web of social and spatial relationships” between Boston residents and British soldiers.⁴⁶¹ As a result of competition for jobs, resources, and shelter, tensions between townspeople and troops gradually escalated, and patriot fundamentalists began to consciously detach from the martial esteem they once associated with the British military, and instead, shifted their pride toward engagement in Massachusettsans’ ability to engage in protest, resistance, and intervention without violence. Almost inevitably, however, Boston residents had grown increasingly territorial, and hostilities reached an unprecedented high during the unfolding of the Boston Massacre on March 5, 1770, which ironically and unbeknownst to Boston residents at the time, was the

⁴⁵⁸ The Boston Evening-Post, 17 July 1769, 1764th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.; Ralph Young, p. 61.

⁴⁵⁹ Walter Conser, Jr. and Ronald M. McCarthy, ‘Circular Letters, Customs Officers, and the Issue of Violence: The Background to the Townshend Acts Resistance’, in *Before Lexington: Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765-1775*, Ed. Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (The Albert Einstein Institution, 2016), pp. 195–220 (pp. 210–11); A Freeman, The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal, 6 February 1769, 723rd edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁴⁶⁰ Samuel Adams as ‘Alfred’, The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal, 2 October 1769, 756th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁴⁶¹ Serena Zabin, *The Boston Massacre: A Family History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2020), Prologue XVI.

same day that Parliament passed a partial repeal of the Townshend duties, leaving in place only the tax on tea.⁴⁶² A skirmish between Bostonian civilians and British troops led the city's residents to reportedly "throw aside prudence" and make soldiers the targets of verbal harassment, swinging clubs, and hurled objects.⁴⁶³

Yet, the broader continental resistance campaign had not reached a point where an escalation to violence was a rational choice, and certainly, the leaders of what ultimately became the patriot fundamentalist movement were not willing to cosign any sort of popular violence that might risk undoing five solid years of peaceable, purposive noncooperation. While we can apply Prospect Theory to 1770s Boston to understand that the general public was trending toward greater levels of risk acceptance to avoid loss, we cannot argue that the American colonists were physically or ideologically prepared to take on British forces at that point in time. Moreover, patriot leaders deployed their vast understanding of law and government to be pointedly calculative about which risks were appropriate and which risks could ultimately unravel the colonial movement. For a few Bostonian civilians to spontaneously engage armed British troops without the broad consensus of local committees or assemblies suggests that the Boston Massacre was instigated by the fear, frustration, and anger of a relatively small radical flank.⁴⁶⁴ Moreover, this is not an uncommon trend, as nonviolent movements throughout history have endured the violence and vandalism conducted by fringe members who crave the gratification of feeling as though they have properly taken a stand against their opposition. While radical flank effect can delegitimize a social movement, undermine its cause, and alienate support, in other instances, this sort of

⁴⁶² Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, p. 51.

⁴⁶³ James Otis as 'A Freeborn American'.

⁴⁶⁴ Tarrow, p. 151.

within-movement conflict has also driven activists to distance themselves from more extremist members interested in violence and to seek elite support.⁴⁶⁵

For instance, the anti-austerity movement in Spain, or the 15-M movement, spent several years conducting peaceful protests, demonstrations, and occupations to highlight the nation's asymmetric political and economic policies, but in May of 2016, a series of riots broke out in Barcelona, despite the fact that the movement had long been characterized by nonviolence. While the destructive violence instigated by a relatively small minority did not qualify the movement as predominantly violent, it did ultimately reduce support for the movement.⁴⁶⁶ Contrastingly, when groups abandon the efforts of radical flanks in favor of seeking assistance from influential community members, new associations can offer fresh perspectives about the cause and its direction, increase the appeal from outside observers, and add momentum to a social movement. For example, in the case of the Texas Women's Movement which extended from the late 1950s until the early 1970s, McCammon, Bergner, and Arch determined that the in-group conflict effected by a radical flank ultimately propelled the movement forward, as activists sought the close guidance of political elites in order to distance themselves from the behaviors of certain fringe members.⁴⁶⁷

In the context of the patriot fundamentalist movement, we can understand nonviolence as a foundational undercurrent which allowed Bostonians to find greater agency in pushing back against fringe violence and uniting around active, everyday noncooperation. Because the patriot fundamentalist movement had such a far-reaching ideological grasp within the province of Massachusetts, colonists were able to draw a distinction between the few unarmed civilians who had improperly acted upon their fear and resentment over

⁴⁶⁵ Muñoz and Anduiza, pp. 485–86.

⁴⁶⁶ Tompkins, p. 103; Muñoz and Anduiza, p. 486; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 12; Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, p. 33.

⁴⁶⁷ Holly J. McCammon, Erin M. Bergner, and Sandra C. Arch, "'Are You One of Those Women?'" Within-Movement Conflict, Radical Flank Effects, and Social Movement Political Outcomes', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 20.2 (2015), pp. 157–78 (pp. 157–58).

imperial militarization and the troops who had spontaneously shattered the expectation that imperial military force was not and supposedly could not be enacted against British subjects in any part of the empire.⁴⁶⁸ While patriot resistance leaders did not endorse or consent to the physical engagement of British troops, they certainly understood the need to absorb such an unsystematic descent into violence. Accordingly, following “the Bloody Massacre perpetrated in King Street”, the patriot fundamentalist media crafted a popular narrative which underscored the dangers of stationing trained, violence-prone troops amongst civilians.⁴⁶⁹

Upon receiving the news that three Boston residents had been killed and several others had suffered varying degrees of wounds, horror and dismay enveloped the province of Massachusetts, and neighboring colonies braced themselves for updates from New England. Oral illustrations of British incitement and Bostonian bloodshed flooded the colonies as eyewitness testimonies were printed and published as a pamphlet by the city’s patriot fundamentalist press.⁴⁷⁰ Bostonian civilians were classified as “worthy Patriots” and victims of a “most dreadful Tragedy”, while British troops were condemned as “a profligate, licentious and blood-thirsty Soldiery”.⁴⁷¹ In searching the personal accounts recorded from those who participated in the events of the day, historians have been able to gauge the thoughts and experiences of Bostonians before, during, and after the so-called “Massacre”. One such source comes from historian Alfred F. Young’s work on Boston shoemaker George Robert Twelves Hewes who, at the age of twenty-six, found himself “in the thick of the

⁴⁶⁸ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, pp. 29–30.

⁴⁶⁹ Paul Revere, *The Bloody Massacre Perpetrated in King Street, Boston on March 5th 1770 by a Party of the 29th Regiment, 1770*, Massachusetts Historical Society.

⁴⁷⁰ Alfred F. Young, ‘George Robert Twelves Hewes (1742-1840): A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of the American Revolution’, p. 589.

⁴⁷¹ *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 12 March 1770, 779th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*; *A Whig*, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 19 March 1770, 780th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

action” on the day of the violent outbreak.⁴⁷² As one of ninety-nine Bostonians to issue a formal statement about their observations and experiences during the “Massacre”, Hewes’s deposition, as summarized by Young, asserted:

At 1 o’clock in the morning, like many other enraged Bostonians, he went home to arm himself. On his way back to the Town House with a cane, he had a defiant exchange with Sergeant Chambers of the 29th Regiment as well as eight or nine other soldiers, “all with very large clubs or cutlasses”. A soldier, Dobson, “ask’d him how he far’d; he told him very badly to see his townsmen shot in such a manner, and asked him if he did not think it was a dreadful thing”. Dobson swore “it was a fine thing” and you shall see more of it”.⁴⁷³

Similarly, the *Boston Gazette* reported that British soldiers assaulted “unarmed boys and young folks” with every intention of annihilating Boston residents “root and branch”.⁴⁷⁴ Certainly, in the aftermath of the Massacre, Boston’s patriot authors and printers worked to make their readers feel the full effects of vivid depictions of state-sponsored violence against civilians. The patriot fundamentalist press highlighted the contrasts between the Bostonian “heroes” who defended their city’s territory and their provincial values and the British “cowards” who not only “massacred” innocent civilians, but also attempted to “fire upon or push with their bayonets the persons who undertook to remove the slain and wounded”.⁴⁷⁵ As fear and apprehension radiated from the city of Boston, patriot activists from towns and cities all along the eastern seaboard empathized with their New England peers. The patriot media contended that a standing army served no purpose aside from forcing a populace into compliance with tyrannical will was suppressed, and likewise, resistance leaders

⁴⁷² Alfred F. Young, ‘George Robert Twelves Hewes (1742-1840): A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of the American Revolution’, p. 585; Revere.

⁴⁷³ Alfred F. Young, *The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution*, p. 39.

⁴⁷⁴ 12 March 1770.

⁴⁷⁵ 12 March 1770.

implemented a measure of social coercion by publicizing that “no Intercourse or Connection” would be continued with anyone who opted to “basely desert the cause”.⁴⁷⁶

Consequently, romanticized memories of the historical and ancestral bonds shared by Great Britain and America were effectively banished from the public rhetoric in the weeks and months following the Boston Massacre in order to create space for the sharing of patriot fundamentalist ideals and objectives.⁴⁷⁷ That is not to say that loyalism was non-existent by the early 1770s. In fact, an estimated fifteen to twenty percent of all white colonists remained loyal to Great Britain between the years 1775 and 1783; however, due to the genuine dread provoked by the Massacre as well as the efforts of patriot fundamentalist leaders to capitalize on colonial fears, to a great extent, affection for Great Britain became viewed as socially unacceptable and thus, loyalist sentiments were effectively required to be reserved for private, rather than public, discourse.⁴⁷⁸ While it cannot be claimed that Bostonians had been fully radicalized by 1770, the Boston Massacre significantly boosted the city’s faith in the rectitude of the patriot fundamentalist cause.

Yet, while the patriot fundamentalist movement gained ideological legitimacy in the wake of the Boston Massacre, its push for nonimportation and nonconsumption lost momentum. The news of Parliament’s partial repeal of the Townshend duties divided public opinion within Massachusetts and across New England, which ultimately facilitated a trend of patriotic othering throughout the colonies. Some colonists simply wanted to return to life as normal, before the American resistance movement dictated what they could consume or where they could shop, but because the partial repeal of the Townshend duties failed to

⁴⁷⁶ ‘Extract of a Letter from Virginia to New York, Dated 2 July 1770’, *Boston Gazette and Country Journal*, 23 July 1770, 1817th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

⁴⁷⁷ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 116.

⁴⁷⁸ Paul H. Smith, ‘The American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical Strength’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 25.2 (1968), pp. 259–77 (pp. 268–71); Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789* (Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 563–546; Raphael, *A People’s History of the American Revolution: How Common People Shaped the Fight for Independence*, p. 393.

eliminate the precedent of Parliament's direct taxation upon the colonies, Boston's most active and unrelenting patriots pressed for a continuation of the provincial boycott. Patriot authors and orators called upon their countrymen to act "like Christians" and be the worthy and capable descendants of New England's "illustrious ancestors" who sacrificed luxury, vanity, and convenience in the face of imperial encroachment in order "to purchase a quiet habitation for themselves and posterity".⁴⁷⁹ Pressing for further frame alignment and more substantial support, Boston's leading patriot advocates continued to exploit the lenses of legacy and morality through which colonists perceived and interpreted their realities. Patriot spokespeople worked to ensure that Bostonians understood that resistance was the only logical choice for colonists who wished to reclaim the religious and political virtue realized by the forbears.⁴⁸⁰

The city's merchant community, however, including merchants as well as the traders and petty retailers who dealt with them, were seemingly more concerned about the short-term implications of nonimportation and nonconsumption.⁴⁸¹ The ideological split that occurred over the employment of nonviolent mechanisms came as a result of the fact that some Boston merchants who endorsed boycott efforts had either been socially pressured into nonimportation or convinced that a purportedly short-term colonial boycott would relieve them of the dry goods that had been stockpiled during the surges of British importation between 1740 to 1744 and 1750 to 1754.⁴⁸² By 1770, however, the city's merchant community was straining under the economic "pinch" of diminishing inventories, and in turn, they argued that the colonies were too young, too spatially disconnected and too technically

⁴⁷⁹ Consideration, *The Portsmouth Gazette*, 12 March 1770, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

⁴⁸⁰ Jensen and others, pp. 48–49.

⁴⁸¹ Marc Egnal and Joseph Albert Ernst, 'An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 29.1 (1972), pp. 3–32 (p. 23); Benjamin H. Irvin, *Samuel Adams: Son of Liberty, Father of Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 94.

⁴⁸² Egnal and Ernst, p. 14.

unskilled to establish and maintain a self-sufficient economy.⁴⁸³ For them, their immediate financial concerns superseded the political and moral reasoning behind nonimportation, and Boston's merchant community became less willing to exercise the flexibility that New Social Movement Theory explains as necessary for social movements navigating changing circumstances.⁴⁸⁴ Understandably motivated by hopes of economic recovery, the city's merchants were generally satisfied with Parliament's concessions, and as such, they called for the elimination of nonimportation measures. In assessing the prospects and gambles of continued boycotts, Boston merchants linked the risks and consequences of nonimportation to potential monetary outcomes, and as most social groups do, they felt swayed toward the prospect where financial recovery was most probable.⁴⁸⁵ Ultimately, individual mercantile dissent from the patriot fundamentalist agenda threatened the ideological unanimity of the movement, meaning that Parliament's partial repeal of the Townshend duties effectively sabotaged patriot fundamentalists' potential achievement of a united American front. Indeed, the partial repeal of the Townshend duties divided the American resistance, demonstrating that although the movement leaders persisted in their calls for British North American unity, in many ways, the thirteen colonies still constituted an ideological "hodge-podge" in the early 1770s.⁴⁸⁶ The lack of ideological consensus over nonimportation tapered the harmony of the American cause in the aftermath of the Townshend repeal and stimulated an uptick in patriotic othering across Massachusetts.

Boston's nonviolent leaders praised those who remained committed to the continental cause despite the personal costs involved and worked to quieten the homeland affection once expressed toward Great Britain by enflaming feelings and victimization and defensiveness

⁴⁸³ Terrence H. Witkowski, 'Colonial Consumers in Revolt: Buyer Values and Behavior During the Nonimportation Movement, 1764-1776', *Journal of Consumer Research*, 16.2 (1989), pp. 216–26 (p. 221).

⁴⁸⁴ Durning, pp. 6–7.

⁴⁸⁵ Kahneman and Tversky, pp. 263–64.

⁴⁸⁶ Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, p. 95.

and instituting a sort of patriotic hierarchy. Historian Micah Alpaugh has linked this phase of American rhetoric to Siege Mentality, which is to say that Bostonians were fueled by their perceptions of being attacked, oppressed, or isolated by a defined outgroup or enemy.⁴⁸⁷ According to Alpaugh, resistance leaders recognized that if their movement was unsuccessful in its efforts to peaceably achieve remonstrance at that junction, the nonviolent mechanisms upon which they had come to rely upon would likely never successfully muster such a pervasive sense of vigilance again.⁴⁸⁸ Certainly, memories of the provincial plight from the Seven Years' War forward as well as the "silencing" of American petitions and pleas for remonstrance nurtured feelings of collective victimhood and increasingly justified pre-emptive defensiveness.⁴⁸⁹ Alongside Alpaugh's conclusion, this research adds that the extent of Siege Mentality observable in the colonies at this time actually hindered reconciliation by facilitating active patriotic othering.⁴⁹⁰

Indeed, the othering that emerged from the rhetoric of resistance drew a line between Boston's ardent, devoted dissenters and those who lacked "virtue enough to maintain their liberty against a presumptuous invader".⁴⁹¹ As Pauline Maier has explained, the public signing of nonimportation and nonconsumption agreements became almost ritualistic in Boston during the 1770s, as groups of merchants, artisans, and other citizens felt compelled to preserve their reputations in the community and demonstrate their loyalty to the continental cause.⁴⁹² Building upon the "us versus them" rhetoric, patriot opinion formers

⁴⁸⁷ Daniel Bar-Tal and Dikla Antebi, 'Siege Mentality in Israel', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 16 (1992), pp. 251–75 (pp. 251–52).

⁴⁸⁸ Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, pp. 50–51.

⁴⁸⁹ Johanna Ray Vollhardt and Rezarta Biali, 'The Role of Inclusive and Exclusive Victim Consciousness in Predicting Intergroup Attitudes: Findings from Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC', *Political Psychology*, 36.5 (2015), pp. 489–506 (p. 490).

Elisabeth King, 'Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Implications for Peacebuilding', *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal*, 5.3 (2010), pp. 293–309 (p. 293).

⁴⁹¹ Samuel Adams as 'Candidus', *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 14 October 1771, 872nd edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

⁴⁹² Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, pp. 116–17.

emphasized that because Americans could not rely on an external source to come to their aid, they needed to hold themselves “accountable in public and private” and take charge of their political future with a “unanimous voice”.⁴⁹³ Dissenting Bostonians fanned the flames of colonial victimization, and provincials who doubled down on their commitments to nonimportation, nonconsumption, and the general will of the patriot fundamentalist movement were contrasted with “FALSE *Patriots*” who were perceived as absent from collective initiatives, disingenuous, disloyal, and ultimately hazardous to the continental cause.⁴⁹⁴

Although the historiography has often described the time period separating the repeal of the Townshend duties and the Tea Act as “a period of relative quiet”, a rhetorical shift occurred in Boston between 1770 and 1773 whereby the city’s patriot fundamentalist leaders stripped their argument back down to its core: political consent.⁴⁹⁵ Thus, rather than being “a period of restored calm and amity”, the years between 1770 and 1773 provided colonists with the space to think through “the historical implications of the last half decade or more of Parliamentary attempts at imperial reform and their relation to geopolitical developments of the present”.⁴⁹⁶ In February of 1771, Governor Thomas Hutchinson received instructions from Parliament, which were confirmed by the First Earl of Hillsborough, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dictating that the Crown-fulfilled salaries of royal officials were to be exempt from taxation. Hutchinson himself believed that Parliament’s decision would cause unnecessary political uproar; however, he proceeded to abide by Parliament’s ruling and veto the tax bills for that year.⁴⁹⁷ In response, the Massachusetts House of Representatives, which

⁴⁹³ James Otis, ‘To the Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of Boston’, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 13 May 1765, 523rd edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

⁴⁹⁴ Chronus, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 17 February 1772, 880th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

⁴⁹⁵ Silverman, p. 162.

⁴⁹⁶ Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, p. 115.

⁴⁹⁷ Thomas Hutchinson, *The History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay: From 1749 to 1774*, Ed. Reverend John Hutchinson (John Murray, 1828), pp. 345–46.

by that time was replete with leading patriot fundamentalist advocates, strengthened their case for constitutional action in the colonies by denying the right of Parliament to appoint customs commissioners or to collect any revenue in the American colonies and declaring that the original charter of Massachusetts Bay allowed only the House of Representatives to authorize and enforce taxation policies.⁴⁹⁸ Moreover, the House suggested that in violating the colony's charter and disgracing the gubernatorial office, the right to govern the province of Massachusetts automatically bypassed Governor Hutchinson and fell instead to the colonial representatives. Boston's patriot fundamentalist leaders stressed that because the imperial power, then there was no alternative other than to leave colonial lawmaking in the hands of the legislatures. In essence, the House of Representatives had divested Parliament, Governor Hutchinson, and Crown-appointed customs officers of their ability to regulate colonial trade and influence taxation measures in the province of Massachusetts, or at least, disintegrated colonial authority on a rhetorical level.

By December of 1771, patriot rhetoric was an "intellectual switchboard" of spiritual, historical, and philosophical motifs and "us versus them" othering, which continuously highlighted group grievance, predicted the consequences of colonial submission, and instituted resistance as a moral requirement.⁴⁹⁹ Rhetorical innovations had helped patriot fundamentalism to grow as an ideology, uniting overlapping continental identities and philosophies to create a legitimated belief system which nurtured the development of patriot networks and new parallel institutions capable of fully and appropriately articulating colonial grievances within the colonies and directly to London. Central to the burgeoning patriot

⁴⁹⁸ Journal Of the Honorable House of Representatives Of His Majesty's Province of the Massachusetts-Bay in New-England, 29 May - 1 June 1771 (Edes and Gill), pp. 5–8, University of Michigan Digital Library Text Collections.

⁴⁹⁹ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 22–23.

fundamentalist ideology were the social, political, and moral obligations that patriot leaders interlocked with peaceable noncooperation.

Some of Boston's patriot opinion formers, including the "publicists" Samuel and John Adams, had come to understand that "the security and future welfare of the Americans" necessitated that they "set up a government" to "connect the interest of the United Provinces, in such a manner as to lay a foundation for a righteous government, built upon those solid principles of virtue, liberty, and sound policy".⁵⁰⁰ Others similarly recognized that the colonies had "all the advantages for independence".⁵⁰¹ However, the ideological precursors required to sustain dissenters in nationalist-separatist struggles had not been sufficiently developed.⁵⁰² Indeed, while colonists certainly understood that North America offered enormous potential for personal, political, and economic growth, ideologically speaking, colonists had yet to fully transfer political legitimacy from the imperial government to America's developing committees and assemblies.⁵⁰³ While colonists had expressed anger, frustration, and resentment over Parliamentary decision-making and lobbied against taxation without representation, they still admired the English constitution and the liberties it granted. That is to say, Siege Mentality and feelings of collective victimhood had not yet propelled dissenting Bostonians toward the idea of a fundamental overthrow of the British government. Americans were very much still defensive, rather than offensive, and while resistance leaders strengthened tenets and contentions of the developing patriot fundamentalist ideology with

⁵⁰⁰ 'A Note on Certain of Hamilton's Pseudonyms', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Alexander Hamilton: 1755-1804, 12.2 (1955), pp. 282-97 (p. 282); America Solon, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 23 December 1771, 872nd edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*, The use of 'Solon' in this context refers to an ancient Athenian lawmaker and denotes both wisdom and authority, suggesting that the author was likely involved in the Massachusetts House of Representatives or a de facto governmental body such as the Sons of Liberty.

⁵⁰¹ An American, 'To the Good People of England, Scotland, and Ireland', *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 6 January 1772, 874th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

⁵⁰² Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 306.

⁵⁰³ Greene Marston, p. 5.

meticulousness, until late 1773, “independence” was only vaguely referenced and contemplated in popular settings.

Viewed through the composite approach proposed by this research, the patriot fundamentalist movement had successfully offered a variety of pro-continental arguments through which individuals and groups could locate the values and considerations that most closely linked to their own identities, experiences, and values.⁵⁰⁴ Moreover, by effectively employing rhetoric that expressed the beliefs and identities of Massachusettsans from a variety of cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds, patriot leaders helped the public to develop an understanding of their human and civil rights then rallied provincials around them.⁵⁰⁵ However, colonists were not confident about the expected utility of severing ties with Britain. That is to say, colonists were in a position of having to make a deeply consequential decision under risk, and before readily pursuing independence they required a greater level of certainty that nonviolence had accomplished all it could feasibly accomplish and that to remain the subjects of the Crown could only mean “accepting a status akin to slavery”.⁵⁰⁶ Colonists were aware that pushing for independence would have grave and irreversible outcomes, and they needed more information about the potential gains and losses that would result from severing ties with Britain before they could fully commit to either repairing the Anglo-American relationship or separating themselves from their mother country.

Three key events occurring in 1773 revealed potential political opportunities for the American resistance movement to push provincial ideological bounds and advocate for more than simply regional autonomy within the British Empire. In the instances outlined in the coming paragraphs, the actions of Governor Hutchinson and Parliament suggested not only

⁵⁰⁴ Chong and Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, pp. 104–5.

⁵⁰⁵ Fisher and Kling, p. 12.

⁵⁰⁶ ‘Thomas Cushing to Benjamin Franklin, 30 June–7 July 1773’, Founders Online National Archives.

that Boston's nonviolent civil resistance campaign was ultimately failing to earn the colonies' intended concessions from British authorities, but in addition – for the first time since the onset of the Imperial Crisis – that American governmental institutions would likely never gain representative political status within the British empire. In turn, the events of 1773 escalated colonial motivations for resistance and catalyzed rhetorical and ideological justifications for colonial militarization.

In a January 1773 address to the Council and the House of Representatives, Thomas Hutchinson defended the Parliamentary position that denied American colonists the special privileges of direct representation in Parliament and exceptions from Parliamentary legislation. The governor explained that while the original charter of the Massachusetts Bay colony provided eighteenth-century provincials with “a declaration and assurance on the part of the Crown” that America would always be considered part of England, the physical distance between the colonies and their mother country meant that Massachusettsans simply could not reap “full exercise” of their rights as English subjects. Hutchinson made clear his point that residents of Massachusetts “who claim exemption from Acts of Parliament, by virtue of their Rights as Englishmen, should consider that it is impossible [that] the Rights of English Subjects should be the same, in every respect, in all parts of the Dominions”.⁵⁰⁷

In response, Boston's patriot fundamentalist leaders revisited the movement's Townshend-era case against Parliamentary supremacy, and the Massachusetts House of Representatives staunchly countered the gubernatorial attempts to de-escalate the political struggle. The House emphasized the patriot tenet that the settlement generation never understood themselves to be within the jurisdiction of an “absolute uncontroled Supreme

⁵⁰⁷ Thomas Hutchinson, ‘The Speeches of His Excellency Governor Hutchinson, to the General Assembly of the Massachusetts-Bay. At a Session Begun and Held on the Sixth of January, 1773. : With the Answers of His Majesty’s Council and the House of Representatives Respectively.’, 6 January 1773, Evans Early American Imprint Collection.

Power”.⁵⁰⁸ Citing Thomas Hutchinson’s own “History and Publications”, the House asserted that early American interpretations of Parliamentary jurisdiction had become “[v]ery different” from the expectations placed upon eighteenth-century colonists. Indeed, the House explained that Massachusetts’ earliest settlers viewed themselves as British North Americans who owed loyalty strictly to the Crown and highlighted that there was no “Reservation of Power and Authority to Parliament thus to bind us, expressed or implied” in the province’s original charter. As such, if King George III could not provide some semblance of middle ground between the supreme authority of Parliament and the total secession of the colonies, then the consequence would be “either that the Colonies are the Vassals of Parliament, or, that they are totally Independent”.⁵⁰⁹

Subsequently, with the passage of the Tea Act in May of 1773, Parliament initiated a “program to rescue the East India Company”, which legislatively echoed the empire’s previously acted-upon desires to extract revenue from the colonies.⁵¹⁰ By undercutting the price of tea smuggled from Holland and its colonies as well as ports in Germany, France, Portugal, and various other territories, Parliament attempted to nudge British North Americans into honoring the Townshend duties in order to relieve the East India Company of the surplus of tea accumulated as a result of colonial nonimportation and nonconsumption.⁵¹¹ By Parliament’s calculations, Great Britain stood to profit from customs duties as well as the annual dividends accrued by the Company; however, as historians Ray and Marie Raphael have expressed, “Britain’s usurpation of the power of the purse escalated the tension around

⁵⁰⁸ ‘I. Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s First Message, 26 January 1773’, Founders Online National Archives, The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, Vol. 2, September 1755-October 1773; Gordon S. Wood, *Power and Liberty: Constitutionalism in the American Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 24–25; Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, pp. 117–18.

⁵⁰⁹ ‘I. Reply of the House to Hutchinson’s First Message, 26 January 1773’.

⁵¹⁰ Merrill Jensen, *The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution, 1763-1776* (Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 329.

⁵¹¹ Mary Beth Norton, *1774: The Long Year of Revolution* (Vintage Books, 2021), pp. 4–5.

the tea tax”.⁵¹² Since passage of the Revenue Act in 1767, imported tea had been viewed as a symbol of the Parliamentary will to control the colonies, but in the wake of the Tea Act, it also came to be interpreted by the patriot fundamentalist cohort as a corrupt and monopolistic influence upon the lives of Massachusettsans.

Finally, one month later in June of 1773, Thomas Cushing, who was then serving as the speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, helped to fan the flames of resistance by publishing some highly suggestive remarks from Thomas Hutchinson. As Woody Holton has recounted, following the death of Thomas Whatley, an undersecretary of state based in London, Benjamin Franklin inherited correspondence between Whatley, Hutchinson, and Lieutenant Governor Andrew Oliver. Much of the correspondence was unremarkable; however, Franklin was sure to pass along the most critical exchanges to Cushing and his closest colleagues. One line in particular stood out to Cushing – a comment that he and Samuel Adams ensured entered the public sphere. In it, Hutchinson notably claimed that Americans should expect an “abridgement of what are called English liberties”.⁵¹³ Yet, the intensity of Boston’s patriot fundamentalist rhetoric allowed for the application of an “abridgement” to colonial liberties. Indeed, for the better part of a decade, the leaders of the patriot fundamentalist movement continually crafted a case for the inseparable nature of consent, civil liberty, and natural rights, none of which they argued could be limited by an earthly power.

In response to the publication of Whatley’s letters, the Massachusetts House of Representatives intensified America’s ideology of resistance, emphasizing the “Opinion” that Hutchinson’s private comments surely reflected a broader perception within the British empire that North Americans failed to qualify as typical, authentic subjects of the Crown, and

⁵¹² Ray Raphael and Marie Raphael, *The Spirit of ’74: How the American Revolution Began* (The New Press, 2015), pp. 9–10.

⁵¹³ Holton, pp. 122–23; ‘Thomas Hutchinson, 20 January 1769’.

likewise, that the imperial regime had no intention of compromising to preserve the “Harmony and Good-Will” once shared between Great Britain and Massachusetts. The House played upon colonial fears of further imperial militarization by hypothesizing that the worst was certainly to come. Boston’s radical leaders stirred defensiveness, stressing their belief that Parliament would inevitably graduate to enforcing their legislation by introducing “a Fleet and Army into this his Majesty’s loyal Province, to intimidate the Minds of his Subjects here, and prevent every constitutional Measure to obtain the Repeal of those Acts so justly esteemed a Grievance to us, and to suppress the very Spirit of Freedom”.⁵¹⁴ The masterful manipulation of the governor’s words provided critical sway for the patriot fundamentalist resistance movement, and although Hutchinson maintained that his role required him to uphold Parliamentary rulings, Massachusettsans far and wide believed that he could have and should have displayed solidarity with his constituents by refusing to cosign the excessive taxation of British North Americans who remained unrepresented in Parliament. For reluctant resisters and full-fledged patriot fundamentalists alike, a new precedent emerged, and with Governor Hutchinson ranking as “anything but a likely ally”, the bounds of American activism had shifted in the direction of militarization.⁵¹⁵

While the House of Representatives as well as Massachusetts’s committees and de facto governmental bodies continued to promote American rights, the Crown-appointed government of Massachusetts remained loyalist and demonstrated a total lack of interest in American group grievance.⁵¹⁶ In fact, following his removal from office, Thomas Hutchinson himself remarked that Massachusettsans were generally convinced by the patriot contention that the governor and lieutenant governor had devolved into “unsuitable instruments for

⁵¹⁴ The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal, 21 June 1773, 950th edition.

⁵¹⁵ Raphael and Raphael, *The Spirit of '74: How the American Revolution Began*, p. 15.

⁵¹⁶ Bernard Bailyn, *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson* (Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 262–63.

promoting the inseparable interests of the king and his faithful subjects”.⁵¹⁷ Ultimately, the Tea Act of 1773 in conjunction with the publication of Thomas Hutchinson’s apparent acceptance of the Parliamentary limiting of American liberty marked a significant turning point in colonial attitudes toward reconciliation.

The developments that occurred in 1773 not only facilitated the demonstrative outbreak of fringe vandalism that nineteenth-century historians dubbed “the Boston Tea Party”, but also ushered in the “long year of revolution”, which Mary Beth North defines as taking place between December 1773 and April 1775.⁵¹⁸ Indeed, the “missing sixteen months” between the Boston Tea Party and the clashes at Lexington and Concord contain signposts which illuminate the ideological path from nonviolent resistance to genuine revolt.⁵¹⁹ The combination of Parliament’s continued efforts to extract revenue from the colonies, assert political dominance over American affairs, and control the loyalties of the gubernatorial office helped to amplify the sense that Massachusettsans alone were accountable for changing their circumstances, as mere petitions and meetings could “do nothing more to save the country”.⁵²⁰

Therefore, nonimportation, nonconsumption, and everyday acts of disciplined nonviolence had provided Massachusettsan patriot fundamentalists with agency in a turbulent time, a sense of control amidst political struggle, and ultimately the hope that persistent and collectivized civil resistance would force Parliament to reevaluate North America’s place within the British empire. Boston’s most vocal patriots, including figures like Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and Dr. Thomas Young, understood the critical nature of continuing to

⁵¹⁷ Hutchinson, *The History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay: From 1749 to 1774*, Ed. Reverend John Hutchinson, p. 410.

⁵¹⁸ Norton, pp. 3–4.

⁵¹⁹ Raphael and Raphael, *Introduction*, VIII.

⁵²⁰ *Tea Leaves: Being a Collection of Letters and Documents Relating to the Shipment of Tea to the American Colonies in the Year 1773 by the East India Company*, Ed. Francis S. Drake (A.O. Crane, 1884), p. 64; Bernhard Knollenberg, ‘Did Samuel Adams Provoke the Boston Tea Party and the Clash at Lexington?’, *American Antiquarian Society*, 1960, p. 498.

“instruct” ordinary Massachusettsans to pursue nonviolent means to ends, and from the top down, patriot fundamentalist messaging continued to frame collective nonviolent civil resistance as the most logical way to represent and advocate for American interests.⁵²¹ As a purported “Friend to the Cause” expressed it, “*Little things have their Graces* – The action may appear small, trifling, and insignificant to ourselves; but our enemies view it in a different light – it appears to them that we are *determinate* in the cause”.⁵²² Yet, by late 1773, dissenting Bostonians had spent the better part of a decade joining committees, issuing petitions, participating in demonstrations, and holding Town Hall meetings only to have Parliament prioritize the capitalistic interests of the East India Company and lay “the foundation of ruin” in America.⁵²³ As such, preventing the importation of East India Company tea was viewed not as an option, but rather, as a critical component in the preservation of American liberty.

Accordingly, on December 16, 1773, a group of radical Massachusettsans disguised as Native Americans pushed the bounds of nonviolent civil resistance by physically preventing the attempted importation of East India Company tea. Following a Town Hall meeting, dissenters made their way to Griffin’s Wharf emitting “war-whoops” and vowing to turn Boston Harbor into a “tea-pot”, and although historians including Francis S. Drake and Esther Forbes have suggested that the Boston Tea Party was “prearranged” and alleged that Samuel Adams issued a “signal” to incite the destruction of the tea, the evidence suggests otherwise.⁵²⁴ One eyewitness who described themselves as being “uninfluenced by party or

⁵²¹ Jensen, p. 401.

⁵²² A Friend to the Cause, The Boston Evening-Post, 24 January 1774, 2000th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁵²³ ‘A Meeting of the Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of the Town of Lexington’, The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal, 20 December 1773, 976th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁵²⁴ Tea Leaves: Being a Collection of Letters and Documents Relating to the Shipment of Tea to the American Colonies in the Year 1773 by the East India Company, Ed. Francis S. Drake, pp. 63–65; Esther Forbes, Paul Revere and the World He Lived In (Houghton Mifflin, 1999), p. 197; Knollenberg, ‘Did Samuel Adams Provoke the Boston Tea Party and the Clash at Lexington?’, p. 502; Raphael and Raphael, The Spirit of ’74: How the American Revolution Began, p. 187.

any other attachment” expressed that when inflammatory rumblings stirred during the meeting of Massachusetts Committees of Correspondence, “silence was commanded” in the Old South Meeting House, as Adams, Hancock, and Young continued to hear the concerns of their fellow patriot fundamentalists, taking “every step which prudence and patriotism would suggest”, and eventually making the “deliberate” and “judicious” choice to refuse the importation of East India Company tea. Moreover, while the self-proclaimed “impartial observer” acknowledged the radical nature of tossing 342 chests of tea into Boston Harbor, they underscored that the destruction of the tea was committed by a minority who failed to be dissuaded by the city’s radical leadership. The eyewitness also praised those involved in the Tea Party for the fact that no personal assaults or injuries were sustained and that “such attention to private property was observed” that even when “a small padlock belonging to the Capt. of one of the ships [was damaged], another was procured and sent to him”.⁵²⁵ Thus, while the Boston Tea Party certainly presented a marked shift in the approach of some dissenters to the Anglo-American conflict, the historical record suggests that this radical flank was not representative of the broader nonviolent movement. Moreover, in taking care to underscore that personal safety was never endangered during the destruction of the tea, Bostonians evidently felt it was highly important to reaffirm that the patriot fundamentalist dedication to nonviolent civil resistance had not diminished.⁵²⁶

The Adams cousins privately and publicly echoed the published account of the Boston Tea Party, which demonstrates the level of importance that Bostonians placed upon preserving the integrity of the patriot fundamentalist movement and defending its ideological emphasis on performing peaceable acts of resistance. Samuel Adams emphasized that the destruction of the tea was totally removed from the formal protests organized by the patriot

⁵²⁵ An Impartial Observer, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 20 December 1773, 976th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

⁵²⁶ Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 311.

fundamentalist movement, and John Adams made a critical distinction between the types of violence associated with human tolls or bodily harm and the mere disruptive vandalism that the Boston Tea Party constituted.⁵²⁷ Indeed, John Adams minimized the event as “but an Attack upon Property”, and Samuel Adams reinforced that the event took place “without the least injury to the vessels”.⁵²⁸ Samuel insisted that the destruction of the tea was a spontaneous affair, and based on the proceedings of that evening, the actions of the patriot fundamentalist leaders, and the collective conclusion that “the tea should not be landed, but sent back to London”, it cannot “be fairly said that the destruction of the property was in [the movement’s] contemplation”. Instead, Samuel contested that the incident occurred out of sheer frustration with “the consignees, together with the collector of the customs, and the governor of the province”, whose unwillingness to thoughtfully recognize provincial petitions or compromise with colonial committees actually “prevented the safe return of the East India Company’s property”.⁵²⁹

Similarly, to draw the destructive nature of the tea party in line with the harsh consequences of imperial encroachment, John Adams defended the unprecedented action as “absolutely and indispensably” necessary in the sense that permitting the landing of the tea would contradict the robust ethical code that accompanied the nonviolent discipline of the patriot fundamentalist movement and simultaneously risk implying colonial concession. Adams, who always took care to align himself with strictly peaceable action, framed the destructive action of tea party participants as a necessary evil undertaken by locals who had no other means to resolve such a certain and immediate threat. According to Adams, while the province of Massachusetts would surely be reprimanded for destroying East India

⁵²⁷ Benjamin L. Carp, *Defiance of the Patriots: The Boston Tea Party and the Making of America* (Yale University Press, 2011), p. 146.

⁵²⁸ ‘17 December 1773 from the Diary of John Adams’, Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers; ‘Samuel Adams to Arthur Lee, 31 December 1773’, in *The Writings of Samuel Adams*, Vol. III, Ed. Harry Alonzo Cushing (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907), pp. 67–69.

⁵²⁹ ‘Samuel Adams to Arthur Lee, 31 December 1773’.

Company product, the punishments doled out by Parliament would be more easily “Suffered, than the great Principle, of Parliamentary Taxation given up”.⁵³⁰ Due to the compelling nature of these arguments, the political prowess of the Adams cousins, and the provincial need to validate American resistance, the destruction of the tea was largely viewed in patriot circles as unavoidable. Indeed, although some British North Americans disapproved of the practice of destroying private property, colonists throughout British North America were generally supportive of Boston’s steadfast commitment to resistance, and in the wake of the Boston Tea Party, the city was transformed, “in popular opinion at least” into what Merrill Jensen has described as “a citadel of liberty”.⁵³¹

Beyond indicating a sense of restlessness in the resistance movement or a need to feel some sort of accomplishment, Benjamin Carp has explained another unique and symbolic feature of the Boston Tea Party. As Carp has emphasized, the decision to that protesters made to disguise themselves as Native Americans made a clear statement about their national identity. For Carp, the “Mohawk” disguises of Tea Party participants exhibited the colonial assumption of a definitively non-British identity, which simultaneously employed the recurrent patriot fundamentalist themes of New World superiority and the perseverance of a distinctly American people. Carrying out an act of destruction in such disguises suggested that unlike actual indigenous peoples who tended to retreat from the conflicts instigated by imperial conquests, Massachusettsans were increasingly gravitating toward the idea of militarization, which in turn, rendered them as an allegedly “new and improved” people native to North America who deserved full ownership of the land.⁵³²

⁵³⁰ David McCullough, *John Adams* (Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 65; ‘John Adams to James Warren, 17 December 1773’, Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

⁵³¹ Jensen, p. 462.

⁵³² Carp, *Defiance of the Patriots: The Boston Tea Party and the Making of America*, pp. 157–58.

Certainly, urban residents expected consequences, and Bostonians braced themselves for the inevitable imperial penalties. With their eyes on the next obstacle to American liberty, Boston's patriot fundamentalists continued crafting pro-continental rhetoric by likening Britain to an abusive and neglectful parent, reiterating the sinful nature of governmental oppression, highlighting the decade of difficulties that Americans had endured at the hands of an unsympathetic, physically far-removed Parliament, and legitimizing the colonies' nonviolent approach to their political struggle with Britain. If we examine this Revolutionary episode through the composite lens set forth by this thesis, we can see that Boston's patriot leaders helped to justify the Boston Tea Party to large swathes of colonial society by hammering home the perception that while the incident was undeniably destructive, colonial hands had been tied by Parliament, forcing Bostonians to physically safeguard American liberties by rapidly and effectively preventing the landing of the tea. Had the Boston Tea Party occurred just a few years earlier, British North Americans would likely have struggled to view their Bostonian brethren as "the injured not the *injurer*"; however, patriot rhetoric shifted in the wake of the Boston Tea Party.⁵³³ Transitioning from messaging which preached maintaining "cooler Heads" and establishing appropriate "Bounds" of resistance, Boston's most outspoken patriot advocates came to insist that when "their all is at Stake" colonists must feel empowered to act "on the Defensive".⁵³⁴ By drawing upon this research's composite approach, we can see how Boston's patriot leaders played upon the "complicated distress" with which Massachusettsans had grappled for a decade to reiterate the "ancient fraud" of empire, to reorient the boundaries and expectations of American resistance, and to

⁵³³ 'Abigail Adams to Catharine Sawbridge Macaulay, 1774', Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

⁵³⁴ 'Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Cushing, 10 June 1771', Founders Online National Archives, Franklin Papers; 'Samuel Cooper to Benjamin Franklin, 9 September 1774', Founders Online National Archives, Franklin Papers.

ensure colonists that one way or another, the patriot cause would yield the “glorious Restoration of American Liberty”.⁵³⁵

For instance, Framing Theory explains that social movement rhetoric can influence the opinions of a populace as they “grapple with opposing frames”, and in breaking down the more militant style of protest exercised during the Boston Tea Party to its bare bones, – America’s right to political representation versus Parliament’s authority to legislatively govern the colonies – patriot opinion formers helped to diffuse colonial concerns about destroying such a remarkable amount of property in the name of resistance. The tenets of New Social Movement Theory and Prospect Theory are similarly demonstrated by the damage control conducted by patriot leaders in the aftermath of the Boston Tea Party. Patriot leaders hammered home the belief that “desperate Cases” do indeed call for “desperate Remedies”, drawing colonial attention away from the criminality of the destruction of the tea and reminding colonists that their commitment to nonviolent resistance has “had no other Effect than to make them feel more sensibly their own Slavery”.⁵³⁶ In contemplating what the unloading of the tea could have meant not just for the American cause, but also for American rights more broadly, patriot leaders helped Bostonians and colonists across North America to weigh the potential gains and losses of utilizing physical defiance against Britain, ultimately tipping the scales toward militarization.

While the majority of North Americans were seemingly still emotionally and psychologically unprepared to enter into a physical confrontation with Great Britain, the Boston Tea Party and the patriot rhetoric that surrounded it reconceptualized the Anglo-American conflict as one that, due to the unbending nature of Parliament and its policies, may

⁵³⁵ ‘Abigail Adams to John Adams, 16 October 1774’, Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers; ‘Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, 27 February 1774’, Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers; ‘William Tudor to Abigail Adams, 3 September 1774’, Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

⁵³⁶ ‘John Winthrop to Benjamin Franklin, 31 December 1773’, Founders Online National Archives, Franklin Papers.

not be resolved by nonviolent civil resistance. Indeed, reversing the colonial preference to find a peaceable solution and preserve their ties to Britain, patriot leaders in Boston began galvanizing colonists to accept more consequential risks in order to prevent the loss of American liberty. Setting the wheels of colonial militarization in motion, Massachusettsans more readily contemplated utilizing the arms they were “compelled by [their] enemies to assume”, meaning that the Boston Tea Party ultimately served as a rational next step for a patriot fundamentalist movement that was thriving in terms of ideological reach and influence, but lacking in the achievement of its objectives.⁵³⁷

News of the Boston Tea Party reached England in January of 1774 and by March 31, 1774, Parliament had passed the first of the four Coercive Acts, which collectively inhibited access to Boston’s port, revoked Massachusetts’ governmental charter, allowed the royal governor to decide where judiciary hearings would take place, and forced provincials to house British troops.⁵³⁸ Edmund Burke spoke out against the Coercive Acts to his fellow members of Parliament, describing the Boston Port Act in particular as “teazing and irritating without any good effect” and even advocated the patriot fundamentalist proposition that Gordon S. Wood has explained as “a radically new conception of the empire”, whereby each of the thirteen colonies would function independently of Parliament while retaining its allegiance to the Crown.⁵³⁹ However, the king’s ministers continued down the path of repression and maintained their belief that implementing stringent measures would ultimately force Massachusettsans to abandon the patriot fundamentalist cause and serve as a warning to

⁵³⁷ ‘A Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North-America, Now Met in Congress at Philadelphia, Setting Forth the Causes and Necessity of Their Taking Up Arms’, 1775, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project.

⁵³⁸ The four acts include the Boston Port Act, the Massachusetts Government Act, the Administration of Justice Act, and the Quartering Act. The Quebec Act of 1774 is sometimes included as one of the Coercive Acts; however, there is no direct connection between the Quebec Act and the Boston Tea Party.

⁵³⁹ ‘Mr. E Burke’s Speech at the Last Reading of the Boston Port Bill, London’, The Boston Evening-Post, 18 July 1774, 2025th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.; Wood, Power and Liberty: Constitutionalism in the American Revolution, p. 25.

radicals throughout the colonies who may have been contemplating following the Bostonian example that the empire would not tolerate such a destructive act of defiance.

As this research has established, however, when a nonviolent social movement is met with legislative and physical force wielded by a materially and militarily more powerful enemy, repression is most often met with backlash.⁵⁴⁰ Moreover, when social movement leaders have framed group grievance around the actions of the defined enemy, social movement participants and potential recruits have access and means to engage with the cause, and movement leadership is united in utilizing established mobilizing structures to articulate the logic of dissent, the movement as a whole becomes highly resistant to repression, regardless of whether that repression targets certain sects of the social movement or the wider population.⁵⁴¹ Thus, although the Coercive Acts targeted Massachusetts directly, colonists from New Hampshire to Georgia interpreted the measures as a cautionary tale.

As news of the “Intolerable” Acts and their impacts upon the province of Massachusetts spread throughout the colonies, Joseph Warren emphasized that if Massachusetts could fall victim to imperial might, then any colony could have their charter or longstanding governmental policies “torn apart by the harpies of power”.⁵⁴² Moreover, as many colonists saw it, Bostonians had challenged British authority the “right” way by petitioning, boycotting, and relying upon their elected officials to communicate colonial grievances through appropriate channels, yet, still, Parliament pursued repressive measures. In turn, American concerns became two-fold in that colonists feared any colony could be subject to the same treatment and that the actual enactment of imperial repression increased the risks associated with political nonviolence.⁵⁴³ That is to say, had Massachusettsans not

⁵⁴⁰ Schock, ‘The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance’, p. 284; Bartkowski, p. 5.

⁵⁴¹ Siegel, p. 994.

⁵⁴² ‘Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams, 4 September 1774’, in *Life and Times of Joseph Warren* by Richard Frothingham (Applewood Books, 2009), p. 356.

⁵⁴³ Earl, p. 1.

participated in almost a decade of nonviolent civil resistance and gradually accepted that American liberty needed to be safeguarded at all costs, imperial repression may have halted colonial protests. However, because the patriot fundamentalist ideology had been steadily shored up with scriptural support, historical evidence, classical philosophies, nonviolent justification, and a blatant demonstration of Britain's willingness to control the colonies by brute force, the risks associated with colonial submission outweighed those associated with mobilization and militarization.⁵⁴⁴

In this sense, the actions of Parliament contributed to the changing public preference that Framing Theory and New Social Movement Theory often treat as the responsibility of "opinion leaders".⁵⁴⁵ Physical contention became more conscionable and more heavily integrated into patriot discourse because Parliament was not only unbendingly denying Americans rights to which they believed themselves to be entitled, but also actively punishing those who advocated for colonial liberty. The Coercive Acts, being the latest in a series of "repeated Efforts of Administration to subject [Americans] to absolute Power," compounded the colonial conviction that no number of petitions, demonstrations, or boycotts would move Parliament to compromise in favor of American interests and validated the certainty that unless colonists carried out more consequential, more violent acts of resistance, Parliament would inevitably "reduce them under absolute Power".⁵⁴⁶ In turn, the Coercive Acts stimulated a newfound sense of comradery in which each of the colonies rallied around the city of Boston, offering physical and financial aid as well as expressions of solidarity and open "hearts and hands".⁵⁴⁷ Even those who disapproved of the destruction of the tea

⁵⁴⁴ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, p. 41.

⁵⁴⁵ Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, 'A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments', *Journal of Communication*, 57, pp. 99–118 (p. 100).

⁵⁴⁶ 'John Winthrop to Benjamin Franklin, 31 December 1773'; 'A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of America in General Congress Assembled, 28 June 1776', *Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers*.

⁵⁴⁷ Rusticus Americanus, *The Boston Evening-Post*, 18 July 1774, 2025th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.; Raphael and Raphael, The Spirit of '74: How the American Revolution Began*, p. 239.

struggled to rationalize the extreme measures imposed by the Coercive Acts or the implications of Parliament's hardline response. From his post in Philadelphia with the Continental Congress, John Adams reported to Abigail that "Every Gentleman seems to consider the Bombardment of Boston, as the Bombardment, of the Capital of his own Province".⁵⁴⁸ Indeed, the Coercive Acts and the imperial militarization they authorized placed a profound and unprecedented level of strain "upon both the paternal kingship and the benign notion of commercial empire" that had once characterized the Anglo-American relationship.⁵⁴⁹

Ultimately, the Coercive Acts cemented the sweeping ideological transformation that had steadily taken shape during the course of the Imperial Crisis. Heretofore, the radical proponents of the continental cause had generally been intent on conquering governmental issues as they came, and while Bostonian leaders ensured that "watchful" safeguarding mechanisms remained intact, they continued to relay their goals and demands to imperial authorities.⁵⁵⁰ In conjunction with a decade of consistent nonviolent resistance and a steadily radicalizing populace, the Coercive Acts quietened loyalism in Massachusetts and diminished provincial hopes of reconciliation to the extent that independence seemed not only imminent, but remarkably rational and justified. Across Massachusetts, provincials began to reorient their previous understandings of the British empire and the colonies' place within it and outwardly entertain the idea of American independence.

Massachusettsans had become more willing to sacrifice their time, energy, and resources to support the "gallant Struggle" and abandon the bonds of empire that no longer

⁵⁴⁸ 'John Adams to Abigail Adams, 8 September 1774', Massachusetts Historical Society, Adams Papers.

⁵⁴⁹ David Armitage, 'A Patriot for Whom? The Afterlives of Bolingbroke's Patriot King', *Journal of British Studies*, 36.4 (1997), pp. 397–418 (p. 409); Reverend John Allen, 'Stand Alarm'd, O Ye Americans! An Oration upon the Beauties of Liberty; Or, the Essential Rights of the Americans', 1772, p. 30, Evans Early American Imprint Collection; Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 124–26.

⁵⁵⁰ The Boston Evening-Post, 3 June 1765, 1552nd edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

served them.⁵⁵¹ Massachusettsans exercised the “most strenuous civil resistance” against the Coercive Acts not only by refusing to purchase British goods, but additionally by closing courts, refusing taxes, and openly defying Crown-appointed officials.⁵⁵² Yet, Samuel Adams, who had established himself as one of the more vocal patriot fundamentalists, emphasized the need to preserve the cogency and evenhandedness of the nonviolent civil resistance movement, advising, “implore every Friend in Boston by every thing dear and sacred to Men of Sense and Virtue to avoid Blood and Tumult...Let them give the other Provinces opportunity to think and resolve”.⁵⁵³ By November of 1774, King George III himself could no longer envision a route to repairing the relationship between Great Britain and the American colonies, and he expressed to Lord North, “We must either master them or totally leave them to themselves and treat them as aliens”, and ultimately, Massachusettsans and British North Americans more broadly came to feel secure in their judgement that imperial authorities had left the colonies with “no alternative” other than to escalate their political struggle through militarization.⁵⁵⁴ When it was clear that the patriot fundamentalist campaign had constructed a firm ideological foundation, exhausted each possible religious, philosophical, and historical argument, and employed each known mechanism of nonviolent civil resistance, from petitions to boycotts to outright defiance, declaring independence was the only rational option remaining for many Massachusettsans.

By historicizing the process of radicalization and applying the composite approach set forth by this thesis, we can see how patriot leaders framed ideological arguments to appeal to a variety of values, considerations, and sensibilities, attracted new movement supporters by

⁵⁵¹ ‘26 December 1765 from the Diary of John Adams’.

⁵⁵² Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 20.

⁵⁵³ ‘Samuel Adams to James Warren, 14 May 1774’, Massachusetts Historical Society, Warren-Adams Papers, 1767-1822.

⁵⁵⁴ ‘George III to Lord North, 18 November 1774’; James Otis as ‘Hampden’, ‘To the Worthy Inhabitants of the Town of Boston’, Boston Gazette and Country Journal, 8 August 1774, 1008th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

successfully carrying out a decade of measured nonviolent civil resistance which justifiably aimed to serve the morals, interests, and rights of the colonial population, and ultimately, brought about preference reversal by ideologically carrying British North Americans from a firm conviction that Parliament would compromise to resolve American grievances to an understanding that American independence and its determination by arms were not only substantiated, but were also the most viable route to preserving American liberty.⁵⁵⁵ Boston's patriot fundamentalists had managed to make sense of conflicting ideals, identities, and philosophies by utilizing nonviolent civil resistance to aid in the crafting of a uniquely American identity behind which Americans could combat the real and perceived injustices doled out by imperial forces. Resistance leaders in Boston distinguished their peaceable petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations from Parliament, that after a decade repealing unjust laws only to replace them with harsher measures and standing armies, appeared unbending and eager to apply military force. One Massachusettsan summed up the ideological push of the final two years of the Imperial Crisis, proclaiming,

Great Britain adieu! no longer shall we honour you as our mother...your sword is drawn *offensively*, and the sword of New England *defensively*...King George the third adieu! no more shall we cry to you for protection...the oppressive, tyrannical and bloody measures of the British parliament...have DISSOLVED OUR ALLEGIANCE to your crown and government.⁵⁵⁶

Ultimately, the social, cultural, and political crises that Massachusettsans endured in the 1760s and 1770s forced them to reconcile their understandings of a collective past with a volatile present and an unpredictable future. With the guidance of an elite leadership who

⁵⁵⁵ Chong and Druckman, 'Framing Theory', pp. 104–5; Chong and Druckman, 'A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments', pp. 100–101; Snow, Rochford, and Benford, p. 464; Wada, p. 547; Fisher and Kling, pp. 12–13; Durning, pp. 6–8; Kahneman and Tversky, pp. 265–67; Farnham, pp. 205–6.

⁵⁵⁶ Johannes in Eremo, *The Essex Gazette*, 25 April 1775, 352nd edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

helped to create political opportunities and forge shared experiences and sentiments throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, colonists from Boston to the Massachusetts countryside became motivated to act upon their real and perceived proximity to marginalization with increasing commitment. Indeed, through easily accessible print media, public orations, and grassroots outreach, patriot fundamentalist spokespeople helped to legitimize and crystallize an action-oriented set of beliefs that reflected Massachusettsans' core continental values and offered evidence to rationalize their pathways to activism. To the very end of Anglo-American political struggle, Boston's patriot fundamentalists insisted that colonial resistance was instigated by Parliament's assault on the natural, divine, and constitutional rights of Americans, explaining that "the essence of the English Constitution [had been] destroyed" while "all the dear bought liberties purchased and sealed with the BLOOD of [New England's] forefathers" had been compromised "by the polluted hands of an abandoned set of miscreants, supported and defended by a ROYAL TYRANT."⁵⁵⁷ An influx of immigration to Boston in the eighteenth century, economic instability, voting restrictions, conflagration, and spatial inequality certainly contributed to group grievance in Boston; however, for many provincials, the logic of resistance extended beyond socioeconomic concerns and hinged on conceptualizations of American morality.⁵⁵⁸

New England's unique status as a Puritan haven which was settled through personal and collective endurance, frugality, and sacrifice encouraged the collective defense of Christian liberty.⁵⁵⁹ Moreover, not unlike modern fundamentalist movements, the textual support that resistance leaders sourced from biblical, philosophical, and historical texts and narratives evidenced patriot claims about the justness of nonviolent civil resistance,

⁵⁵⁷ 'The Crisis, Number XXII', *The New England Chronicle: Or, the Essex Gazette*, 375, 1775.

⁵⁵⁸ Clark Smith, *The Freedoms We Lost: Consent and Resistance in Revolutionary America*, pp. 48–58; Shipton, pp. 226–27; Archer, pp. 8–9.

⁵⁵⁹ Noll, *America's God*, p. 53.

confirming for provincials that continental efforts were legal and rational, that continental ideals were “infallible” and “absolute”, and that oppositional views and conduct were “illegitimate”.⁵⁶⁰ Not only did mid-eighteenth-century Massachusettsans seek a sense of dependability safety in their everyday lives, but in addition, the “intellectual genealogy” that shaped New England identities and sensibilities combined with “the rhetoric of frightened men” to necessitate the sense of agency that nonviolent civil resistance provided to Massachusettsans searching for their place in a rapidly developing British Atlantic world.⁵⁶¹

As an ideology, patriot fundamentalism steadily developed, adapted, and grew more flexible in nature throughout the Imperial Crisis, becoming more accessible, more inclusive, and more closely linked to the American experience. Massachusettsans radicalized slowly, sporadically, and even reluctantly, with some groups and individuals formulating resistance-based ideas prior to nonviolent involvement and others transforming their beliefs through direct nonviolent action. The ways in which budding dissenters approached the Anglo-American struggle were often linked to their socioeconomic statuses, meaning that while some Bostonians had other, more immediate loyalties or obligations that commanded their attention, such as operating a business or supporting a family, others quickly became invested in the rhetoric and ideology of resistance due to either fearing the implications of increasingly discriminatory legislation and imperial militarization, craving socioeconomic relief, or feeling influenced by friends and relatives. The composite framework proposed by this thesis allows us to understand the scope of these ideological process and transitions, as Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory as well as theories on Siege Mentality and Radical Flank Effect combine to add value to our understandings of the

⁵⁶⁰ Dipankar Sinha, ‘Religious Fundamentalism and Its “Other”’: Snapshot View from the Global Information Order’, in *Religious Fundamentalism in the Contemporary World: Critical Social and Political Issues*, Ed. Santosh C. Saha (Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 9–27 (p. 10).

⁵⁶¹ T. H. Breen, ‘Where Have All the People Gone? Reflections on Popular Political Mobilization on the Eve of American Independence’, in *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815*, Eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 263–84 (p. 282).

gradual but strategic ideological shift that transformed pre-Revolutionary Massachusettsans into “devoted actors” who articulated, advocated, and adhered to patriot fundamentalist expectations.⁵⁶²

⁵⁶² Scott Atran, ‘The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict Across Cultures’, *Current Anthropology*, 57.13 (2016), pp. 192–203 (p. 192).

Chapter 3 –

“Until our rights are fully restored to us”: Nonviolent Mobilization in Boston, 1764–1775

While a variety of long-term personal factors and experiences contributed to the radicalization of eighteenth-century Massachusettsans; however, short-term variables, including provincial practices of state-building, increasing capitalism, and the relatively rapid emergence of a competent colonial leadership group, facilitated the coming of revolution in Boston through physical and resource mobilization between the years 1764 and 1776. At the onset of the Imperial Crisis, colonial Americans from New Hampshire to Georgia were struggling to cope with the implications of coexisting within a rapidly evolving and expanding British Atlantic world, and even prior to the passage of new and more invasive Parliamentary legislation in the 1760s and 1770s, the people of Massachusetts were feeling the effects of an influx of immigration, financial insecurity, voting restrictions, conflagration, spatial inequality, and “burdensome provincial taxes”.⁵⁶³ In turn, provincials from all social sects longed for security and dependability in everyday life. Yet, the ideological effects brought on by popular grievances and real and perceived injustices did not automatically yield sociopolitical change. Indeed, within the patriot fundamentalist movement, as with any social movement, the mobilization of effective leadership, broad-based participation, and a variety of resources were critical for the achievement of popular goals. Thus, while the previous chapter sought to understand *why* patriot fundamentalists were motivated to nonviolently mobilize, this chapter seeks to examine *how* patriot fundamentalists

⁵⁶³ Holton, p. 160; Shipton, pp. 226–27; Archer, pp. 8–9; Clark Smith, *The Freedoms We Lost: Consent and Resistance in Revolutionary America*, pp. 56–58.

nonviolently mobilized, and in order to do so, we must shift our focus from the social psychology of patriot fundamentalism to the mobilizing structures of the social movement. Indeed, to understand how colonists physically came together, we must assess how nonviolent civil resistance created access and opportunities for ordinary colonists to participate in provincial politics, how movement participants acted and reacted based on the resources available to them, including knowledgeable leaders and committed peers, and how the actions of the social movement impacted the broader imperial system and vice versa.⁵⁶⁴

Throughout the Imperial Crisis, patriot fundamentalists in Boston and across Massachusetts employed purposeful, coordinated direct action to challenge Parliamentary agendas that they understood as illegitimate and unconstitutional. A variety of radical minds including Samuel Adams, John Adams, and Dr. Joseph Warren, amongst other elites as well as ordinary, working-class New Englanders developed new channels through which the colonies could articulate their grievances to a distant Parliamentary government. Indeed, by creating space for provincials of all walks of life to actively challenge British authority through small, everyday acts of defiance as well as petitioning, demonstrating, and boycotting, Boston's patriot spokespeople built operational structure and functionality into the patriot fundamentalist movement and consistently brokered the strategic logic of nonviolent civil resistance, they ultimately institutionalized noncooperation.⁵⁶⁵ Dissenting Bostonians established and participated in a "Simmelian web" of third-party associations, where "like individuals" and once "alien and unrelated groups" experienced a sense of "Vereinigung" or unification by collectively partaking in acts of resistance and advocating for colonial interests in the media, in the streets, in courthouses and meeting rooms, and in quasi-

⁵⁶⁴ Eisinger, p. 11; Tarrow, pp. 18–19; Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

⁵⁶⁵ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Penguin Books, 1966), p. 65.

official petitions to the Crown and Parliament.⁵⁶⁶ The implementation of nonviolent repertoires of contention created space for the development a newfound American identity and stimulated feelings of significance across a diverse colonial population, but also enabled dissenting provincials to establish leverage and remove key sources of imperial power through sustained acts of protest and noncooperation.⁵⁶⁷

As such, this chapter will examine a few of the key individuals who provided formal leadership by articulating popular grievances, issuing protest directives, and establishing the de facto governmental institutions that would ultimately be recognized as the colonies' legitimate representative bodies in Boston's systematic pursuit of what Charles Tilly has explained as a "means of deliberate legal action".⁵⁶⁸ This chapter will explore how the patriot fundamentalist movement performatively employed a variety of traditional nonviolent methods to mobilize provincial dissenters, as previously passive groups and individuals became active participants in the sociopolitical arena, leading the nonviolent social movement to procure new resources and benefits at a relatively steady rate.⁵⁶⁹ By examining how the existing mobilizing structures, including churches and social groups, meshed with newly created special-purpose associations such as the Sons of Liberty and committees of correspondence, we can better understand how the patriot fundamentalist movement was able to create advanced social networks and extensive lines of communication that supported the broader American cause in efforts to force governmental concessions from Britain. This chapter sets out how the "nonphysical pressure" applied by formal resolves and petitions as well as everyday acts of noncooperation prompted both hardline reactions and

⁵⁶⁶ Clemens, p. 758; Georg Simmel, *Conflict and The Web of Group-Affiliations* (Free Press, 1955), p. 128.

⁵⁶⁷ Chenoweth and Stephan, 'Mobilization and Resistance: A Framework for Analysis', p. 251.

⁵⁶⁸ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 25; John D. McCarthy, pp. 141–42.

⁵⁶⁹ Chenoweth, 'Political Mobilization and Institutions', p. 362; Amitai Etzioni, 'Mobilization as a Macrosociological Conception', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 19.3 (1968), pp. 243–53 (p. 243).

accommodations from Parliament and gradually disintegrated Parliamentary authority in North America.⁵⁷⁰

This chapter focuses on the ways in which the sociopolitical environment of Boston during the Imperial Crisis offered unprecedented cause and opportunity to pursue activism, how readily available skills and resources strengthened American resistance efforts, and how Parliamentary actions and reactions influenced Bostonian perceptions and resistance measures between the years 1764 and 1776. By drawing upon elements of Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure, Tilly's Resource Mobilization Theory, and Chenoweth and Stephan's "interactive approach" to contentious politics, this chapter tracks and assesses the mobilizing structures that qualify the patriot fundamentalist movement as a nonviolent social movement. Specifically, this chapter will examine how the precise conditions of eighteenth-century Boston afforded colonists the space to collectivize through purpose-built associations, committees, and other mobilizing structures, highlight how the resources available to colonists, including civic infrastructure, public institutions, printing press, influenced the ways in which Bostonians approached resistance, and consider the reflexive relationship between the American resistance movement and their opponent, British authorities.

During the decade preceding American independence, Massachusettsan mobilization hinged simultaneously on the actions and reactions of the imperial government and on the ability of patriot fundamentalist leaders to frame provincial noncooperation, manipulate colonial repertoires of contention, and organize peaceable yet participatory initiatives. Patriot fundamentalists exploited the ebb and flow of political struggle and used "culturally resonant forms of action" to validate patriot claims and garner support for the pursuit of patriot objectives.⁵⁷¹ Likewise, patriot advocates and organizers worked to guide the actions of the

⁵⁷⁰ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, p. 41.

⁵⁷¹ Tarrow, p. 16; Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (Northeastern University Press, 1986), p. 21.

resistance campaign in way that rendered meaning in the context of British Atlantic life.⁵⁷² Boston's patriot fundamentalist leaders crafted and articulated the colonial argument against arbitrary rule and efficiently employed the protest-related tools that either naturally were or ultimately became available to them in the course of the Imperial Crisis.⁵⁷³ Indeed, Boston's nonviolent leaders facilitated the physical mobilization of the provincial public by organizing special-purpose associations, public meetings and demonstrations, petitions, and media campaigns while the patriot fundamentalist rank and file routinized everyday acts of nonviolent civil resistance, from nonconsumption to hand spinning. The movement's resources, recruitment, objectives, mobilizing structures, and "performances" all adapted, expanded, and evolved throughout the Imperial Crisis in accordance with Parliamentary actions and reactions.⁵⁷⁴ Although recruitment to the patriot fundamentalist movement was largely incremental or defensive and often coincided with new legislation or Parliamentary attempts at repression, the processes of radicalization and mobilization occurred quite fluidly on an individual level, as provincials came to participate in the social movement alongside friends, colleagues, and relatives.⁵⁷⁵

Boston's nonviolent leaders maintained and continually strengthened the patriot fundamentalist movement by working to appeal to the desires and demands of their fellow citizens through practical, intellectual, and emotional approaches and by clearly and explicitly establishing the parameters of American resistance. To expand nonviolent association, the patriot fundamentalist resistance campaign established an intricate web of communication from Boston to rural Massachusetts and throughout the colonies. Moreover, Bostonians developed the nonimportation and nonconsumption agreements that became the

⁵⁷² Goffman, p. 21.

⁵⁷³ Snow, Rochford, and Benford, p. 464; Wada, p. 547; Donatella della Porta, 'Repertoires of Contention', in *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, Ed. David A. Snow, Donatella Della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Douglas McAdam (John Wiley and Sons, 2013), pp. 1–3 (p. 2).

⁵⁷⁴ Tilly and Tarrow, p. 16.

⁵⁷⁵ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 206.

“modular weapons” of the movement, organizing committees, congresses, and extralegal associations so omnipresent that “a coalition across region, rank, interest, and belief was achieved”.⁵⁷⁶ In turn, the robust structures established by patriot activists allowed the social movement to absorb occasional incidents of violence perpetrated by radical flanks and sustain American support even throughout periods of “relative quiet”.⁵⁷⁷

At the onset of the Imperial Crisis, Boston’s emerging radical spearheads were provided with a particular advantage in that the city was already heavily networked, serving as the home to thirteen known social clubs as well as a variety of fraternal organizations whose members were able to covertly sharpen their opposition to imperial encroachment. Institutions such as the Merchants Club, Caucus Club, the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company, the Massachusetts Charitable Society and two different Masonic lodges helped to generate patriot fundamentalist thought and action by nurturing Enlightenment-era ideals, unleashing the dynamic forces of Republicanism, developing a burgeoning sense of American nationality, and conveying patriot fundamentalist views to the rural populations of Massachusetts and the other twelve American colonies.⁵⁷⁸ Urban dwellers were able to associate established, identifiable social clubs and faith communities with continental activism and align prominent Boston names and faces with the nonviolent civil resistance campaign, effectively linking the city’s social and spiritual realms with the patriot movement. Moreover, the cross-pollination that occurred between social groups throughout Boston bolstered the accessibility of resistance-based extralegal activity, as memberships in social clubs, fraternities, and religious institutions often intersected with other group and individual roles in the community. Thus, in church, at work, or during social or family time, Bostonians were able to discuss patriot fundamentalist tenets and contemplate the strategic logic of

⁵⁷⁶ Tarrow, pp. 33–38; Clark Smith, ‘The Adequate Revolution’, p. 687.

⁵⁷⁷ Silverman, p. 162.

⁵⁷⁸ Archer, p. 42; Benjamin L. Carp, *Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 9.

nonviolent civil resistance, which meant that a degree of the movement's organizational infrastructure was already in place.⁵⁷⁹

As political scientist Michael Lipsky has argued, to a great extent, a successful nonviolent civil resistance campaign “consists of activating third parties to participate in controversy in ways favorable to protest goals”, and in the mid-eighteenth century, Boston was replete with religious congregations, employment associations, and social clubs that mobilized to earn Massachusetts “a reputation as the vanguard of American resistance to Great Britain’s most oppressive policies”.⁵⁸⁰ In non-democracies in particular, third-party organizations and religious establishments have consistently provided what Kurt Schock has explained as “critical support for the oppressed” to carry out challenges to the state, and while the British empire possessed ostensibly democratic features including, most obviously, elections, allegedly representative institutions were designed to keep civilian power in check and preserve the empire’s strategic and economic concerns, not to facilitate democratic processes.⁵⁸¹ Thus, social and religious as well as political or quasi-political organizations filled a critical gap in colonial society and government, and these third-party institutions worked to combat the “training ground legislatures” upon which British politics in the eighteenth century were built.⁵⁸² Modeling the hierarchy of Boston’s social clubs and religious organizations, respected, educated, politically-minded urbanites were situated in positions of leadership within the patriot fundamentalist movement. In turn, Boston’s recognizable patriot leadership cohort was able to formalize American responses to Parliamentary governance, coordinate networks of intracolony communication, and

⁵⁷⁹ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, pp. 78–79.

⁵⁸⁰ Michael Lipsky, ‘Protest as a Political Resource’, *The American Political Science Review*, 62.4 (1968), pp. 1144–58 (p. 1153); Carp, *Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution*, p. 35.

⁵⁸¹ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, p. 34.

⁵⁸² Nicholas Owen, ‘Democratisation and the British Empire’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 47.5 (2019), pp. 1–25 (p. 3).

publicize and propagate the patriot fundamentalist interpretation of Parliament's actions and attitudes toward the American colonies.

Boston's pre-eminent patriot fundamentalists employed a variety of tactics to strategically escalate nonviolent civil resistance efforts throughout the colonies, and individuals including Samuel Adams, John Adams and Dr. Joseph Warren surfaced at the forefront of the nonviolent coalition, employing their unique personal qualities and technical skills to mobilize increasing numbers of Massachusettsans. As prominent, well-educated, and longstanding contributors to New England society, radical activists including the Adams cousins and Dr. Warren possessed the qualities necessary to herald the patriot fundamentalist cause and to shape its organization, its aims and its tactics. Samuel and John Adams were raised in an environment which fostered an awareness or appreciation of the power of religiopolitical activism, and the Puritan roots of their family alongside their academic endeavors were "pivotal" in shaping their attitudes toward the rapidly changing political landscape of the American colonies in the mid-eighteenth century.⁵⁸³ Although Samuel and John Adams were most definitely the products of their devout New England upbringings, they reflected their life experiences in different ways.⁵⁸⁴ Most notably, while Samuel was known for a certain provocative stoicism, John was known for his unflappable enthusiasm for utilizing written and verbal debates as a means of "avoiding Violence and Confusion".⁵⁸⁵ While the Adams cousins and Warren were all Harvard educated, each brought their own approaches and aptitudes to the patriot fundamentalist movement, individually establishing themselves as architects of the patriot fundamentalist rhetoric and spokespeople for American republicanism.

⁵⁸³ McCullough, p. 36; Sara Georgini, *Household Gods: The Religious Lives of the Adams Family* (Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 2.

⁵⁸⁴ Pauline Maier, *The Old Revolutionaries: Political Lives in the Age of Samuel Adams* (Knopf, 1980), p. 1; McCullough, p. 2.

⁵⁸⁵ '26th December 1765 from the Diary of John Adams.

As the son of a deacon, Samuel had been conditioned from an early age to seek involvement in community proceedings, both politically and socially, via the connections and friendships formed at Boston's Old South Congregational Church. Deacon Samuel Adams, Sr., served as a justice of the peace, a participant in the Boston Caucus, a selectman, and a member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, establishing himself as a political leader in his own right, promoting plans aimed at protecting Boston's lower and middle classes.⁵⁸⁶ In fact, when elite Bostonian loyalists criticized the patriot resistance campaign in the height of the Imperial Crisis for involving "atheists" and "black-hearted fellows whom one would not choose to meet in the dark", the deacon continued working toward widening participation.⁵⁸⁷ Thus, the foundations of Samuel Adams's stern, dissenting attitude were laid in the home during his formative years, and these learned behaviors and distrust of authority undeniably influenced his desire to affect change via the patriot fundamentalist movement.⁵⁸⁸ Samuel Adams's early life was also plagued by the mortality of nine of his siblings, and as a young adult, he endured several failed business ventures, so although he came from a socially prominent family, his life experiences and personal traits aided Adams in his political career, he was also forced to learn the importance of remaining consistent in the face of hardships, mistakes, and missed opportunities. In turn, Adams was able to align himself with the adversities faced by ordinary Bostonians in a way that other, more elite radicals were less equipped or inclined to do.⁵⁸⁹

While John Adams failed to conduct himself with the extent of outward rabble-raising zeal that Samuel Adams did, he took pride in his fairness, frugality, and hardworking nature, all of which contributed to the influential "brace of Adamses".⁵⁹⁰ John Adams was

⁵⁸⁶ John C. Miller, *Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda* (Little, Brown, 1936), p. 8.

⁵⁸⁷ *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts* (John Wilson and Son, 1924), XXV, p. 345.

⁵⁸⁸ Alexander, *Samuel Adams*, p. 23.

⁵⁸⁹ John K. Alexander, *Samuel Adams: America's Revolutionary Politician* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp. 1–2.

⁵⁹⁰ *Letters of James Murray, Loyalist*, Ed. Nina Moore Tiffany and Susan I. Lesley, p. 151.

revolutionary in his own right, seeking to legitimize the continental cause and unite Americans behind it predominantly through the patriot pen. Painfully rational, from an early age, Adams was vocal, meticulous, and literal, displaying a penchant for learning facts and finding evidentiary examples.⁵⁹¹ John, like Samuel, was the son of a Deacon, and as a lifelong reader of vast literary works, he was scholarly, sensible, and pragmatic. He possessed a great appreciation for the epoch of antiquity and in particular, the Roman ideal of honor, a notion upon which his political philosophies were founded.⁵⁹² The interests and ideas provoked by Adams's rich library purportedly found an outlet in his talkative nature. In fact, biographer David McCullough has noted that quite a few people, including Adams himself and his admirers, wished that he simply spoke less. Still, his ambition and extraordinary diligence earned Adams the esteem of many individuals throughout the colonies. Admitted to the bar in 1758, Adams gained nearly seven years of experience in the Massachusetts legal system before the Stamp Act Crisis ushered in an era of change in the political landscape of the colonies. He thoroughly enjoyed the battle of a trial and seemed to thrive on the theatrics of the courtroom. While Adams was irreversibly awkward amongst the social circles of Massachusetts, his brilliance as a lawyer earned him extensive recognition and respect.⁵⁹³ Thus, although John Adams may not have appeared as accessible or relatable as some of Boston's patriot fundamentalist leaders, provincials felt secure in Adams's conviction and dedication to the "gallant Struggle in America".⁵⁹⁴

Conversely, Joseph Warren was generally viewed as quite extraverted and amiable, and more so than John Adams, Warren seemed to share a variety of personal traits with Samuel Adams, as the two are often thought to have complemented one another. The

⁵⁹¹ McCullough, p. 2.

⁵⁹² McCullough, p. 63.

⁵⁹⁴ '26th December 1765 from the Diary of John Adams.

eldest son of a respected New England farm family, Warren was, like the Adams cousins, a child of the Great Awakening. Although Warren came from relatively modest beginnings, he was able to establish a rather large-scale medical office in Boston, where he would treat staunch Loyalists as well as some of the most radical minds in the city and its surrounding areas. In fact, in addition to the many middling sorts he treated, among Warren's patients were Samuel and John Adams.⁵⁹⁵ Long before he formed a close friendship with the Adams cousins, however, Warren maintained a strong sense of civic duty and a desire "to be in the thick of things amongst his peers."⁵⁹⁶ It has been suggested that the Warren family's experience with the 1739 Land Bank Controversy helped to shape the doctor's conceptions of New England society and instigate the belief that aristocrats such as the Hutchinson family were especially prone to neglecting and actively compromising the rights of those belonging to lower social classes.⁵⁹⁷ Intelligent and socially aware, Warren's role in the Imperial Crisis was enhanced by the many opportunities for interpersonal communication brought on by his medical practice, which allowed for the establishment of countless connections that crossed social barriers. Particularly from 1770 onward, Warren "devoted at least as much attention to propagandizing against the British as he did to his medical practice".⁵⁹⁸ His 'Oration' on the Boston Massacre particularly demonstrates both his eloquent, outspoken radicalism and his capacity to lead.

Succinctly contextualizing Enlightenment-era concepts around colonial views on Christianity, republicanism, and settlement-era virtue in a speech which marked the second anniversary of the Massacre, Warren stood at a raised pulpit in the Old South Meeting House, imploring observers to trust in the patriot movement, the legitimacy of the cause, and the

⁵⁹⁵ Christian Di Spigna, *Founding Martyr: The Life and Death of Dr. Joseph Warren, the American Revolution's Lost Hero* (Crown Publishing, 2018), p. 86.

⁵⁹⁶ Samuel A. Forman, *Dr. Joseph Warren: The Boston Tea Party, Bunker Hill, and the Birth of American Liberty* (Pelican Publishing, 2012), p. 19; Forman, p. 32.

⁵⁹⁷ Di Spigna, pp. 26–27.

⁵⁹⁸ Beeman, Richard R., p. 112.

“salvation” that the resistance of British tyranny would surely yield. Underscoring the patriot ideals that had been discussed and debate in pamphlets, articles, and public forums, Warren exclaimed,

The voice of your fathers’ blood cries to you from the ground; MY SONS SCORN TO BE SLAVES! Stain not the glory of your worthy ancestors; but like them resolve, never to part with your birthright; be wise in your deliberations, and determined in your exertions for the preservation of your liberties!”⁵⁹⁹

Three years later, Warren once again set the tone of the patriot fundamentalist movement, demanding that colonists be peaceably “circumspect, vigilant, active, and brave”. Highlighting the dangers of a standing army and sympathizing with all those who had struggled and sacrificed throughout the decade-long Anglo-American conflict, Warren explained, “Our country is in danger, but not to be despaired of.” According to Warren, not only did the violent suppression of American liberties reinforce the justness and the importance of the patriot cause, but moreover, it created an opportunity for Americans to defend “the fortunes of America” and earn the “approbation” of their forefathers. Warren discouraged talk of independence and insisted that colonists “[a]ttend to reason’s voice” by employing the utmost nonviolent discretion; yet, simultaneously, he readied Bostonians for a physical struggle should the patriot movement’s “pacific measures [be] ineffectual” in resolving colonial grievances. Indeed, in an unprecedentedly explicit fashion, Warren called Massachusettsans to action, insisting that colonists persist in their nonviolent struggle until war “appears that the only way to safety”.⁶⁰⁰ As a service provider within the community and a well-respected figure in Boston, Warren’s words carried significant weight for colonists

⁵⁹⁹ Joseph Warren, *An Oration Delivered March 5th, 1772 at the Request of the Inhabitants of the Town of Boston; to Commemorate the Bloody Tragedy of the Fifth of March, 1770.* (Edes and Gill, in Queen-Street, 1772), *The Library of America*.

⁶⁰⁰ Joseph Warren, *An Oration Delivered March 5th, 1772 at the Request of the Inhabitants of the Town of Boston; to Commemorate the Bloody Tragedy of the Fifth of March, 1770.* (Edes and Gill, in Queen-Street, 1772), *The Library of America*.

from a host of social and political backgrounds. His transparency about the likely trajectory of the American resistance movement offered a raw, realistic commentary on the Imperial Crisis and commanded persistence and resilience from colonists who had already endured a remarkably “precious” decade of contention.

Unquestionably, James Otis, Jr., John Hancock, Paul Revere, and other prominent patriot activists played a role in the radicalization and mobilization of Massachusettsan activists; however, between their familial legacies within the community, their ties to the church, their educations, and their social standings within Boston and throughout New England more broadly, Samuel Adams, John Adams, and Dr. Joseph Warren were uniquely qualified to assist in structuring and maintaining the patriot fundamentalist movement in Massachusetts, with each contributing to the sweeping mobilization of colonial forces in their own distinct ways. During the decade that preceded American independence, Boston’s patriot fundamentalist leaders observed the harsh nature of a post-war society that was utterly lacking in food supplies, employment opportunities, adequate housing, and a representative government through which provincials could appeal for relief, and in turn, they acted upon the public’s apprehensions and misfortunes. Whether in Boston coffee shops and committees or in a downtown law office or medical practice, the Adams cousins and Warren were able to hear the concerns of the province’s underprivileged citizens, to reiterate the general public’s sociopolitical concerns, to stimulate a sense of civic responsibility in nonviolently resisting imperial overreach, to bolster the doctrine of patriot fundamentalism, and to extend the reach of the continental cause. Indeed, through their roles in establishing intercolonial communication, their active correspondence, their involvement in the preparation of numerous official documents, and their composing of countless newspaper articles, Samuel and John Adams as well as Joseph Warren and many of their fellow patriots expressed the general sentiment of British North America. Moreover, they informed the opinions of

colonists all along the eastern seaboard and primed discontented provincials for a long-haul resistance campaign against Parliamentary supremacy.

The first genuine attempt that Massachusetts' patriot fundamentalist leaders made at collectivizing provincials against arbitrary and unjust government came in response to the Sugar Act of 1764. Prior to the Sugar Act, sugar and molasses had "flowed freely" from the French and Spanish Caribbean to other regions of the British Empire, and sugar had become the leading American resource.⁶⁰¹ However, the new legislation, which can be seen as an intrusive extension of the 1733 Molasses Act, firstly, required that specific North American goods and resources be solely exported to Britain and in addition, authorized customs officials to try smugglers in vice admiralty courts in which they would receive no sympathy from a colonial jury.⁶⁰² West Indian trade had long been vital to Boston's wellbeing, as New England corn, flour, lumber, and horses were often exchanged for sugar and "cotton wool".⁶⁰³ Thus, and as Gary B. Nash has explained, when the Sugar Act was coupled with outbreaks of Smallpox and Dysentery, an extreme lack of hard currency, soaring provincial debt, and an abundance of unemployed and underemployed sailors, laborers, and artisans, the legislation did more than simply threaten Boston's economy; it actually catalyzed "an epidemic of bankruptcies" in the urban hub.⁶⁰⁴ In addition to simply revising restrictions on colonial trade and initiating the strict enforcement of the duties governing foreign molasses, the Sugar Act also "multiplied the customs personnel" in major port cities like Boston and Philadelphia, meaning that on both a physical and an economic level, the impacts of the legislation were visible in many facets of everyday life.⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰¹ Countryman, pp. 38–40.

⁶⁰² Middlekauff, pp. 64–65.

⁶⁰³ John Pynchon, *The Pynchon Papers*, Ed. Carl Bridenbaugh and Juliette Tomlinson, 6 vols (The University Press of Virginia, 1985), 2: SELECTIONS FROM THE ACCOUNT BOOKS OF JOHN PYNCHON, 1651–1697, p. 147, The Colonial Society of Massachusetts.

⁶⁰⁴ Archer, p. 8; Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 155–56.

⁶⁰⁵ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 103.

A Boston town meeting convened in May of 1764 to formulate a provincial response to the American Revenue Act, or the Sugar Act, as it has become more commonly known. In hopes of addressing “the emerging imperial problem” and halting what politically minded Bostonians viewed as an attempt to strike at the heart of the American economy, meeting attendees elected a committee of five men to draw up instructions to be given to Boston’s representatives in the General Assembly.⁶⁰⁶ The freshly elected committee impressed upon their representatives the need to remain vigilant in preserving colonial autonomy and protecting American trade.⁶⁰⁷ Committee members underscored the fear that the Sugar Act might merely be a steppingstone toward further and more invasive Parliamentary legislation, and they queried, “For if our Trade may be taxed why not our Lands?”⁶⁰⁸ Alongside various resolutions, committee members and other dissenters also penned articles and pamphlets with the hope of drawing attention to the colonial case against imperial interference in American affairs and “providing another ground on which to battle”.⁶⁰⁹ Shortly thereafter, the Massachusetts House of Representatives followed the lead of the Boston town meeting, petitioning British policymakers not only to request that they reconsider their plans to extract revenue from the colonies under the Sugar Act, but also to push for the prevention of further revenue-raising duties which might threaten the provincial economy and reduce the colonial capacity for internal taxation. At the behest of Samuel Adams, the House formed a committee of correspondence comprised of James Otis, Oxenbridge Thacher, Thomas Cushing, Edward Sheafe, and Thomas Gray, and in turn, the committee took “an important step” in calling upon other colonial governments to join Massachusettsans in their opposition to invasive

⁶⁰⁶ Countryman, p. 99. The town committee consisted of Richard Dana, Joseph Green, Nathaniel Bethune, John Ruddock, and Samuel Adams.

⁶⁰⁷ Conser, Jr. and McCarthy, pp. 35–36.

⁶⁰⁸ Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, p. 69.

⁶⁰⁹ Richard D. Brown, *Revolutionary Politics in Massachusetts: The Boston Committee of Correspondence and the Towns, 1772-1774* (Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 68–70.

imperial legislation.⁶¹⁰ Although committee efforts ultimately failed to prevent the implementation of further revenue-raising measures, the Massachusettsan opposition of the Sugar Act critically tested the colonial capacity for nonviolent political action.

America's mobilizational response to the Sugar Act can best be explained by applying the composite approach proposed by this research, which borrows from Sidney Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure, Charles Tilly's theory on resource mobilization, and Chenoweth and Stephan's "interactive" approach to contentious politics. Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure supports the idea that successful nonviolent civil resistance movements often involve top-down mobilizing structures, whereby elite leaders establish seize the chance to develop new connective structures as a means of responding to particular issues, be they material or ideological, long-standing or episodic".⁶¹¹ Additionally, Tilly explains that because social movements vary greatly in their motivations, membership, and resources, participants often act and react based on the resources available to them. In the context of the Sugar Act, we can see that while no formal "patriot fundamentalist" movement had yet developed, colonists did tap the knowledge of respected spokespeople who were able to use their skills and connections to air colonial grievances and piece together some of the building blocks of the nonviolent movement that sustained Americans during the following decade.⁶¹² Lastly, in conjunction with the analysis of Chenoweth and Stephan, the Sugar Act presents the first in a string of episodes which offer insight into the distinct effects that the patriot movement had upon the Anglo-American connection and vice versa.⁶¹³ In Boston itself, there was no enormous uproar over the passage of the Sugar Act; however, the legislation did set

⁶¹⁰ Walter Conser, Jr., 'The Stamp Act Resistance', in *Before Lexington: Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765-1775*, Ed. Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (The Albert Einstein Institution, 2016), pp. 34–143 (p. 36).

⁶¹¹ Tarrow, p. 16.

⁶¹² Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40.

⁶¹³ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

the wheels of mobilization in motion. Urban activists tested some of the mobilizing structures they later advanced in the wake of more oppressive legislation like the Stamp Act and the Townshend duties, as radical leaders took to the presses to openly condemn that act and fifty Boston merchants employed the economic protest tactic of nonimportation.

Following the passage of the Stamp Act, Boston's patriot spokespeople advanced the shared understandings that resonated with colonists on a large scale and the social networks that encouraged participation in the resistance of Parliamentary overreach. Issued in March of 1765, the Stamp Act was slated to take effect that November; however, once news of the legislation reached American shores, Boston's leaders wasted no time in calling upon urban media outlets and social groups to fan "the indignation throughout the colonies over the trade provisions".⁶¹⁴ Indeed, by that time, the city's radical minds had already started developing the ideas and nonviolent mechanisms necessary for a sustained battle against imperial encroachment. Through marches, protests, and town hall meetings, during the Stamp Act Crisis, Bostonians began undertaking "the real work" of the patriot fundamentalist movement, as they organized and protested to the extent that each passing week provided urban dwellers of all societal ranks and demographics with a variety of opportunities through which they were able to gather in a low-risk and seemingly official settings to discuss provincial experiences, grievances, and fears.⁶¹⁵ One of the more high-risk forms of nonviolent civil resistance to the Stamp Act came in the form of printing illegally under the act's conditions, as a group of printers who resided almost entirely in Boston defied Parliamentary orders by openly printing under their own names and without stamps. In fact, Benjamin Edes and John Gill continued to publish the *Boston Gazette* under its usual masthead and with their names listed in a display of open defiance, exemplifying the views of

⁶¹⁴ Knollenberg, *Growth of the American Revolution: 1766-1775*, p. 24.

⁶¹⁵ Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 309.

Tarrow, Tilly, and Chenoweth and Stephan that nonviolent resisters use built-in perceptions and resources to employ culturally resonant forms of protest.⁶¹⁶ As Joseph M. Adelman has determined, for radical printers and particularly for those who actively participated in Boston society, “the fears of suffering British penalties took second place to either the genuine desire to resist more openly or the risks of appearing insufficiently patriotic”.⁶¹⁷

Alongside the peaceable and performative public action and the inflammatory articles and pamphlets produced by Boston’s dissenting printers, colonial delegates convened in a formal Stamp Act Congress in New York during October of 1765 to draft a formal petition condemning the legislation and ultimately to take the next step in legitimizing the American resistance of Parliamentary authority.⁶¹⁸ In total, nine colonies participated in the Stamp Act Congress, and Massachusetts contributed three delegates to the twenty-seven-man congress: Brigadier Timothy Ruggles, who did not heartily oppose the legislation, the “river god” Oliver Partridge, whose family had long been interested and involved in colonial politics, and the agitator James Otis, Jr., who frankly and frequently condemned unjust imperial legislation.⁶¹⁹ For twelve consecutive days, excluding only the Sabbath, the delegates discussed and debated their plan of action, crafted their rhetoric, and finalized *The Declaration of Rights and Grievances* in order to respectfully articulate “the most essential rights and liberties of the colonists”.⁶²⁰

Denouncing Parliament’s unwillingness to even read colonial petitions, the declaration made explicitly clear that all subjects of the Crown were entitled to the full extent of the liberties granted and protected by the English constitution, regardless of where they

⁶¹⁶ Tarrow, pp. 16–18; Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, pp. 40–42; Chenoweth and Stephan, ‘Mobilization and Resistance: A Framework for Analysis’, pp. 20–21.

⁶¹⁷ Adelman, pp. 61–62.

⁶¹⁸ Edmund Morgan and Helen Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution* (Collier Books, 1963), p. 108.

⁶¹⁹ Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord*, p. 26; Hoerder, p. 30; *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 21 October 1765, 551st edition.

⁶²⁰ Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution*, p. 110.

resided within the Empire, and likewise, it clarified that as the British North American colonies had been denied representation in Parliament, it stood to reason that Americans could only rightfully be taxed internally by their elected colonial assemblies. The delegates also called upon their conceptions of natural law, declaring that consent was paramount to the guarantee of basic human rights. Yet, although the declaration was “mild”, the chairman of the Stamp Act Congress, Timothy Ruggles, found its resolutions to be too radical, and consequently, he refused to sign or publish them.⁶²¹ While *The Declaration of Rights and Grievances* may not have achieved any significant impacts immediately, historians Morgan and Morgan credit the Stamp Act Congress with laying critical groundwork for future patriot resistance, as they explained that “by the fall of 1765, the colonists had clearly laid down the line where they believed that Parliament should stop, and they had drawn that line not merely as Englishmen but as men.”⁶²² To the Crown and Parliament, British North Americans demonstrated firstly, that they had the organizational capability of collectivizing and convening within an “official” congress and additionally, that they possessed the technical skills to debate, discuss, and make their own determinations about colonial political affairs. Moreover, extending beyond the initial efforts of most colonies, Massachusettsans filed additional resolutions throughout the Stamp Act Crisis, which allowed patriot leaders to liaise within and between the city’s social groups, expanding upon their continental rhetoric, extending their networks of communication, and establishing resistance models that the other colonies could emulate or adapt. Certainly, Boston’s radical spokespeople became increasingly aware of how their actions impacted the broader North American political structure.⁶²³

⁶²¹ Holton, p. 64.

⁶²² Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution*, p. 118.

⁶²³ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

However, as this research has previously argued, nonviolent social movements are often radicalized to mobilization in the same or similar ways that violent campaigns are, and moreover, according to the “youth bulge” hypothesis, research suggests that large cohorts of young adults experiencing feelings of deprivation or marginalization can increase opportunities and motives for political violence at the macro-level.⁶²⁴ As such, a major difficulty arose as Boston’s burgeoning patriot fundamentalist collective struggled to strike a balance between sufficiently provoking colonists to action and managing potential street violence. In fact, when an extralegal collective known as the “Loyal Nine” challenged this alleged colonial victory, Boston’s nascent patriot fundamentalist leaders began to set clear boundaries between violent, mob-driven resistance and legitimate, thoughtful, nonviolent civil resistance, aligning themselves with the latter. One of the most prominent early community-building extralegal institutions to emerge from the Stamp Act Crisis and correspondingly, a key predecessor to the Sons of Liberty, the Loyal Nine was comprised of local merchants and artisans all in their twenties and thirties and included the likes of printer Benjamin Edes who occasionally offered the office of *The Boston Gazette* as a venue for meetings.⁶²⁵ The members of the Loyal Nine had visibly suffered as a result of Boston’s recessed economy, and due to a combination of their social rankings and experiences, the men served to bridge the gap between the elite members of the radical movement and the lower artisans, laborers, and mariners. That it to say, burgeoning patriot leaders needed to balance the benefits of recruitment potential from the Loyal Nine with the political passion that could provoke public violence and the destruction of property, particularly as even the names of the groups themselves incite resistance.⁶²⁶ While the use of the word “loyal”

⁶²⁴ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 10–12; Henrik Urdal, ‘A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 50.3 (2006), pp. 607–29 (p. 607); Jahnke and others, p. 310.

⁶²⁵ Archer, p. 41. Other members of the Loyal Nine included distillers John Avery and Thomas Chase, braziers John Smith and Stephen Cleverly, and painter Thomas Crafts.

⁶²⁶ Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 186.

implied a deep sense of faith and dedication to the rights of the American colonists, the term “Sons of Liberty” originated with Colonel Isaac Barré in his statement that British officials were misrepresenting the colonists in the 1760s, and had “caused the Blood of those Sons of Liberty to recoil within them.”⁶²⁷

The most notable example of public vehemence and vandalism in the early years of the Imperial Crisis occurred with the harassment and condemnation of Stamp Master Andrew Oliver on August 14, 1765. On that day, the Loyal Nine gathered at Chase and Speakman’s Distillery to write a strongly worded letter to the stamp master. In hopes of demonstrating the colonies’ desire to internally establish and enforce their own laws and procedures, the group stated their demand for Oliver to appear at the Liberty tree at noon the following day to publicly declare his resignation. Their letter was printed in the *Massachusetts Gazette* and the *Boston News-Letter*, and in it, the Loyal Nine threatened that “Noncompliance” with their orders would result in “the displeasure of the true Sons of Liberty”.⁶²⁸ In response, around 2,000 “rain-soaked” townspeople gathered around the Liberty Tree in response to notices posted through the city of Boston calling upon the “True-born Sons of Liberty” to bear witness as Oliver abandoned his position.⁶²⁹ Given Boston’s population of roughly 15,000 men, women, and children, this was both an impressive ratio and a solid indication of the political opportunity that popular resistance provided for Boston’s most marginalized and disenfranchised communities.⁶³⁰

Excitement surely surged as an effigy of the former stamp master was hanged, beheaded, and burned at the gallows, and the crowd raged onward, torching Oliver’s office

⁶²⁷ Benjamin L. Carp, ‘Terms of Estrangement: Who Were the Sons of Liberty?’, *The Journal of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation*, 2012, pp. 14–23 (p. 15); Holton, p. 54.

⁶²⁸ ‘Hanover Square, 16th December 1765, Superscribed to the Honorable Andrew Oliver, Esquire’, The Colonial Society of Massachusetts.

⁶²⁹ Carp, ‘Terms of Estrangement: Who Were the Sons of Liberty?’, p. 14; ‘St-p! St-p! St-p! No: Tuesday-Morning, December 17, 1765’.

⁶³⁰ Hoerder, p. 41; Carp, ‘Terms of Estrangement: Who Were the Sons of Liberty?’, p. 14; Eisinger, p. 11; Tarrow, pp. 17–18.

and raiding and ransacking his home. Although Oliver successfully evaded the mob, he had been more than just threatened, but rather, physically coerced into resigning from the position to which he had been appointed. Upon observing the success of crowd action in Boston, other colonies carried out similar outbursts in cities up and down the eastern seaboard. In collectivizing to achieve their common goal, the Loyal Nine placed blue-collar Bostonians shoulder-to-shoulder with some of the city's wealthiest professionals, forming the social networks and connections that ultimately sustained the patriot movement during the next decade. Indeed, despite the violence that colored the Stamp Act riots, such popular protest demonstrated that a locally organized initiative which encouraged widespread participation had the capacity to bring about macro-level change.⁶³¹

A variety of historians have denoted the events of August 1765 were conducted out of “simple lawlessness”, and undoubtedly, some rioters can be categorized as such.⁶³² For instance, while Philip Davidson has described the “motley gathering” as being fueled by “determined resentment”, Colin Nicolson has detailed how “the violent intimidation of several government officials and opponents of the protest movement threatened the breakdown of civil order,” and neither of these characterizations can be considered inaccurate.⁶³³ Thus, if we can glean any “success” from the Oliver ordeal, it lies strictly in the cross-class and cross-cultural collectivization of Bostonians that was critical to what ultimately became the patriot fundamentalist movement. Indeed, while this thesis cannot excuse the apparent force exercised by Boston crowds during the Oliver ordeal, it does understand dissent as being relative to the grounds and expression of dissent, meaning that

⁶³¹ Archer, pp. 46–47.

⁶³² Conser, Jr., ‘The Stamp Act Resistance’, p. 53.

⁶³³ Philip G. Davidson, ‘Sons of Liberty and Stamp Men’, *The North Carolina Historical Review*, 9.1 (1932), pp. 38–56 (p. 38); Colin Nicolson, ‘Governor Francis Bernard, the Massachusetts Friends of Government, and the Advent of the Revolution’, *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Third Series, 103 (1991), pp. 24–113 (p. 32).

eighteenth-century Bostonians likely felt a need to match their defensive reactions to the unprecedentedness of the Stamp Act.⁶³⁴

Therefore, the colonies had enjoyed a largely cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with their mother country, and as such, British North Americans understood that they had the right to express their disapproval and demonstrate disobedience in instances where they were unable to make their voices otherwise heard.⁶³⁵ After all, Puritan Massachusetts was by definition built upon the dissent of worshippers who championed their own denominational convictions and challenged the religious status quo in England, and that legacy remained vital to provincial political identities. Yet, as Robert W.T. Martin has argued, outcomes are a critical consideration of dissent, particularly as the practice of dissent can be seen as imperfect and unjust, which is to say that while Bostonians may have understood themselves to be entitled to collectivizing in protest to the Stamp Act at that precise moment, the members of the mob did not necessarily understand that the coercion of Andrew Oliver's resignation was not a legitimate, long-term accomplishment.⁶³⁶ In this light, we can view the Oliver ordeal as a turbulent steppingstone to nonviolent action, which forced Bostonians to consider an alternative to the "invitation to chaos" posed by violent political struggle.⁶³⁷

⁶³⁴ Thomas W. Platt, 'The Concept of Responsible Dissent', *Social Theory and Practice*, 1.4 (1971), pp. 41–51 (p. 41).

⁶³⁵ Max M. Kampelman, 'Dissent, Disobedience, and Defense in a Democracy', *World Affairs*, 133.2 (1970), pp. 124–32 (p. 124).

⁶³⁶ Robert W. T. Martin, *Government by Dissent: Protest, Resistance, and Radical Democratic Thought in the Early American Republic* (New York: New York University Press, 2013), pp. 3–4. Social Science literature almost universally demonstrates that the removal of key oppositional figures from positions of power does not necessarily bring about the removal of the procedures of policies being challenged. See, for example, Clifford Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad, 'Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50.10 (2007), 1370–94; Jenna Jordan, *Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019); Bryan C. Price, 'Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism', *International Security*, 36.4 (2012), 9–46; Tricia L. Bacon and Elizabeth Grimm, *Terror in Transition: Leadership and Succession in Terrorist Organizations*, Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2022); Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, 'Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change', *Social Forces*, 44.3 (1966), 327–41; Bert Klandermans, 'Introduction: Leadership in Decision Making', *International Social Movement Research*, 2 (1989), 215–24.

⁶³⁷ Kampelman, p. 126.

By the early months of 1766, the Loyal Nine had officially evolved into the Sons of Liberty, and the radical organization seemingly grew “hour by hour”, developing into a decentralized network with active branches scattered throughout British North America.⁶³⁸ Notably, in transitioning from the rather exclusive Loyal Nine to the more broad-based Sons of Liberty, a seemingly conscious effort was made to improve the optics of popular political contention in Boston. While it appears that the whole of the Loyal Nine shared in the responsibility of coercing Oliver to “make a public Resignation” and “getting the advertisements Printed” to invite Bostonians to congregate beneath the Liberty Tree, the majority of the credit was given to Ebenezer Mackintosh, a South Boston shoemaker.⁶³⁹ In the coming weeks, Bostonians sporadically engaged in the turbulent actions of crowds who were not only fearful and angry, but also saw “egalitarian potential” in popular disorder.⁶⁴⁰ As Alfred F. Young has attested, while members of the Loyal Nine may have participated in the Stamp Act protests, the “gentlemen” of the group took care to distance themselves from Mackintosh. John Adams in particular aligned himself with peaceable resistance efforts, and although he served on committees alongside his cousin, Samuel, Dr. Warren, and other “Sons of Liberty”, he later reflected on early episodes of violent crowd action, explaining that although he was “as heartily for rectifying all those Abuses, and for procuring still further security of Freedom as any [American colonist],” his education and his family’s “exalted Piety to God and good Will to all Mankind” had been so “rivited” within him that he felt implored to refuse invitations to participate in mob activity.⁶⁴¹ When the home of then Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson was ransacked, raided, and dismantled less than two weeks after the intimidation of Oliver, the majority of the Loyal Nine believed the

⁶³⁸ Harlow Giles Unger, *John Hancock: Merchant King and American Patriot* (Castle Books, 2000), p. 135.

⁶³⁹ ‘Henry Bass to Samuel P. Savage, 19 December 1765’, in *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Volume 44* (John Wilson and Son, 1911), pp. 688–89.

⁶⁴⁰ Robert W. T. Martin, *Government by Dissent: Protest, Resistance, and Radical Democratic Thought in the Early American Republic*, p. 24.

⁶⁴¹ ‘26th December 1765 from the Diary of John Adams; McCullough, p. 65.

August riots to be too extreme, and in turn, they replaced Mackintosh with Thomas Young and William Molineaux, each of whom were better equipped to balance public zeal and crowd control.⁶⁴² Thus, as early as 1766, the parameters of resistance had been drawn in an effort to display the deservingness of the colonial cause.

Prominent patriots including Samuel Adams, Joseph Warren, John Hancock, and James Otis, Jr. were all active within the Boston chapter of the Sons of Liberty, and simultaneously, each served within the Massachusetts House of Representatives, meaning not only that some of Boston's most ardent patriot leaders played a role in both the formal and the de facto political operations of the city, but moreover, that these individuals were forced to approach extralegal activity with a degree of prudence.⁶⁴³ On the other end of the socioeconomic spectrum, the rank-and-file of the Sons of Liberty, who ranged in age from seventeen to sixty-nine, generally worked physically taxing, technical jobs in sectors which tended to place less emphasis on after-hours behavioral expectations and optics.⁶⁴⁴ Although historically, young people have demonstrated their capacity to engage in activism and "moral-civic" behavior, from a purely statistical standpoint, youths and young adults are more likely to engage in violent civil resistance than older generations, not because young people should be considered as "unruly, reckless, and unreliable", as Brian K. Barber has explained, but because they have different responsibilities and lived experiences.⁶⁴⁵ In contrast to fully developed adults, young people are more inclined to participate in political violence for three main reasons: because when individuals are relatively free from certain career or familial obligations, they have less at stake in high-risk situations, because young

⁶⁴² Alfred F. Young, *The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution*, pp. 94–96; Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 227.

⁶⁴³ Carp, *Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution*, p. 37; Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 65.

⁶⁴⁴ Archer, p. 143.

⁶⁴⁵ James Youniss and Miranda Yates, 'Youth Service and Moral-Civic Identity: A Case for Everyday Morality', *Educational Psychology Review*, 11.4 (1999), pp. 361–76 (p. 361); Brian K. Barber, *Adolescents and War: How Youth Deal with Political Violence* (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 4.

people are still developing specific cognitive, emotional, and physiological responses to adapt and mentally survive in everyday life, and particularly during challenging times involving economic decline or political struggle, and because young people can be more vulnerable to traumatic events and propaganda than experienced adults may be.⁶⁴⁶ Pre-Revolutionary Boston was, however, slightly atypical, as an individual's social status and the extent of their perceived relative deprivation presented more of a challenge for nonviolent patriot dissenters than age did. For instance, Ebenezer Mackintosh, the "mob captain" of Boston's South End and a key architect of the city's Pope's Day celebrations, married Elizabeth Maverick in the midst of the Imperial Crisis, and although Mackintosh waited until "late in life for a colonist of that period to begin wedded bliss", the couple welcomed a daughter in 1767 and a son in 1769, demonstrating that youth and the lack of responsibility associated with it did not necessarily factor into patriot mobilization.⁶⁴⁷

As a result, the Stamp Act resistance required Boston's radical leaders to set the standard for the American resistance campaign and frame the blossoming ideology of patriot fundamentalist in a manner which ensured that Bostonians were aggrieved and confrontational enough, as Pauline Maier has expressed, to "form the backbone" of popular demonstrations and consumer boycotts, but peaceable and perceptive enough to accept that supplying "the forces necessary" to circulate petitions and distribute patriot publications was ultimately more of a hit to Parliament than violent crowd action. Certainly, the emergent leaders of the patriot campaign understood that the successful resistance of British overreach in the colonies required the widespread participation of colonists from all walks of life, including young people and adults as well as clerics, merchants, artisans, laborers, and women, and equally, radical leaders understood the paramount nature of ensuring that the

⁶⁴⁶ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 35–37; Urdal, pp. 607–8; Barber, p. 64.

⁶⁴⁷ George Pomeroy Anderson, 'Ebenezer Mackintosh: Stamp Act Rioter and Patriot', in *Publications of The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1924-1926* (John Wilson and Son, 1927), xxvi, pp. 44–46.

conduct of dissenting Americans reflected the righteousness of the patriot fundamentalist movement, meaning that they were required to elaborate “the distinctions between just and unjust uprisings in traditional theoretical terms”.⁶⁴⁸ As Barbara Clark Smith has explained, “patriots who acted out of doors and patriots accustomed to roles of leadership did not fully resolve these sources of tension over the following decade”; however, Boston’s elite leaders demanded restraint from the rank and file and effectively “managed violent civil resistance by associating with one another in networks that regulated economic, social, and cultural life”.⁶⁴⁹ To be sure, Samuel Adams and other, more elite patriots functioned “as brokers between the two groups”.⁶⁵⁰

With the benefit of hindsight and in their official roles as provincial representatives, the members of the House somberly reflected upon the violent intimidation of Oliver and Hutchinson, expressing, “We are sensibly affected with the Loss they have sustained, and have the greatest Abhorrence of the Madness and Barbarity of those Persons who were the Instruments of their Sufferings”.⁶⁵¹ A key solution to crowd action came in the form of consumer boycotts and nonconsumption, specifically as radical Bostonians came to realize that economically speaking, Great Britain was almost equally “as dependent on [the American colonies] for taking off the chief Part of their Manufactures” as the colonies were on their mother country.⁶⁵² Together, Boston’s elite radical thinkers, the Sons of Liberty and the city’s merchant community, which conveniently coincided in some cases, launched an initiative to refuse the importation and usage of finished British goods and engaged the city in

⁶⁴⁸ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 64.

⁶⁴⁹ Clark Smith, *The Freedoms We Lost: Consent and Resistance in Revolutionary America*, p. 95.

⁶⁵⁰ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, pp. 24–25.

⁶⁵¹ *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 14 July 1766, 589th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁶⁵² *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 25 November 1765, 556th edition.

a peaceable, but firm position of “direct confrontation”, whereby American consumerism was leveraged as a bargaining chip against the Stamp Act.⁶⁵³

Considering Tarrow’s Political Opportunity Structure, Tilly’s Resource Mobilization Theory, and Chenoweth and Stephan’s interactive approach to mobilization, we can see how nonimportation helped to provide a proverbial seat at the table for communities in and around Boston that had lacked access to colonial political processes prior to the Stamp Act resistance. Indeed, examining nonimportation through these lenses reveals several key features which reflect the people power behind the patriot fundamentalist movement. Boycotting provided a form of dissent that was basic enough to be embedded into everyday colonial life and open enough to connect different associations to a broader range of civic leaders and coalitions.⁶⁵⁴ Excluding the merchant class who undeniably made economic sacrifices by forfeiting sales to support the boycott movement, nonimportation involved no significant financial detriment and effectively only required “free time”, abstinence from British manufactures, and improvisational home-spinning.⁶⁵⁵ Not only did such a peaceable alternative to violent resistance aim to largely prevent the types of property damage and material destruction incurred during Boston’s Stamp Act riots, but in addition, as boycotting is relatively low-risk and discreet, it did not require the physical strength, excessive amounts of time, or explicit partisanship that targeted acts of violence often necessitate, meaning that provincials from all ages, genders, and social sects could easily participate in resistance efforts.⁶⁵⁶ Moreover, nonimportation helped to create “solidarity-based social bonds”, linking Boston artisans, merchants, homemakers, lawyers, and more, bringing useful allies under one umbrella – a common trend amongst nonviolent social movements, as emphasized by Delia

⁶⁵³ Lipsky, p. 1146.

⁶⁵⁴ Delia Baldassarri and Mario Diani, ‘The Integrative Power of Civic Networks’, *American Journal of Sociology*, 113.3 (2007), pp. 735–80 (p. 735).

⁶⁵⁵ Tarrow, p. 134.

⁶⁵⁶ Schock, ‘Nonviolent Action and Its Misconceptions: Insights for Social Scientists’, pp. 706–7; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 35.

Baldassari and Mario Diani as well as Tarrow, Tilly, and other notable social scientists.⁶⁵⁷

Indeed, by mobilizing the resources that colonists had available to them, including their spending power and their abilities to make homespun goods and refuse certain luxuries, Bostonians created new networks of activists, whose friendship, kinship, interpersonal trust, and shared perceptions strengthened their capacity to effect political change in the face of a distant and unrepresentative Parliament.⁶⁵⁸

To mobilize the people of Massachusetts behind boycotting efforts, the Sons of Liberty assembled town hall meetings, organized demonstrations, and employed the media in rhetorical assaults. Indeed, the city's radical leaders made clear that "all reasonable Frugality ought to be observed" and spoke out against the vanity and sinfulness of extravagance and excessive consumerism, repeatedly discouraging "needless Expences".⁶⁵⁹ The Sons of Liberty never attached any official enforcement procedures to the Stamp Act boycotts; however, they did aim to force compliance through humiliating, discrediting, and applying social pressure to merchants and traders who continued to import British manufactures as well as to consumers who attempted to purchase East Indian cloth, leather goods, black tea, and other imported commodities.⁶⁶⁰ Moreover, Boston's radical leaders stressed the need to act in accordance with the "laws of society, which tho' not inscribed on tables of stone, are written on the human heart".⁶⁶¹ Under the watchful eyes of the Sons of Liberty, Bostonians worked to minimize their reliance on British goods, as merchants declined orders from customers and refused deliveries from British traders, town officials and representatives formulated

⁶⁵⁷ Baldassari and Diani, pp. 735–37; Tarrow, p. 132; Tilly, 'Trust Networks in Transnational Migration', pp. 3–4.

⁶⁵⁸ Tarrow, pp. 132–34.

⁶⁵⁹ 'Instructions Adopted by the Braintree Town Meeting, 24 September 1765', Founders Online National Archives; Rebekah Housewife, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 21 January 1765, 521st edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁶⁶⁰ Ellen Hartigan-O'Connor, *The Ties That Buy: Women and Commerce in Revolutionary America* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 161.

⁶⁶¹ Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord*, p. 30; T.S., *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 21 July 1766, 590th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

thoughtful political resolves and responses to imperial actions, and Congregational ministers encouraged the peaceable resistance of imperial encroachment while sympathetic printers ensured that the city's readership was absorbing the burgeoning patriot fundamentalist ideology. Although none of these activities singlehandedly defined Boston's opposition to the Stamp Act, each component combined to create a sense of unity amongst the public and initiate the distinctly Bostonian identity that ultimately sustained the city throughout the Imperial Crisis.⁶⁶²

As word of the Bostonian resistance enveloped the eastern seaboard, Great Britain began to feel the economic strain inflicted by her colonial subjects, reflecting the reflexive relationship between "political opportunity and strategic choice".⁶⁶³ Parliament debated repealing the Stamp Act, and ministers feared that the colonies would interpret the movement as a sign of weakness; however, not only did colonists flood London with petitions, but additionally, the British exporters who had suffered devastating fiscal declines issued "Parliamentary hackles", to the extent that Parliament was forced to concede to public pressure.⁶⁶⁴ In doing so, Parliament relinquished their concern that regardless of any sociopolitical explanations that the British government might assign to the repeal, colonists would claim how their own resistance had been the catalyst of Parliament's decision. Yet, the Stamp Act Repeal did actually come as a result of the "elaborate resistance network" formulated by Boston's merchants, artisans, and ordinary inhabitants.⁶⁶⁵ Gordon Wood has claimed that ultimately, "it was mob violence that destroyed the Stamp Act in America"; however, Wood significantly undervalues the social, political, and economic implications of

⁶⁶² Archer, p. 47.

⁶⁶³ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 23.

⁶⁶⁴ Edmund Morgan and Helen Morgan, 'The Assertion of Parliamentary Control and Its Significance', in *Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution 1760-1791*, Ed. Richard Brown, 2nd edn (Houghton Mifflin, 2000), pp. 119–27 (pp. 122–24).

⁶⁶⁵ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 24.

Massachusetts' boycott efforts and the "interorganizational relations" they generated.⁶⁶⁶ As Dirk Hoerder has explained it, town meetings and crowds as well as legal arguments and constitutional thought "were combined in Massachusetts to render the act ineffectual without stopping all those government and business transactions that required stamps", and in turn, by a vote of 275 to 167, the House of Commons voted to repeal the Stamp Act, and on March 18, 1766, within a year of its passage, King George III officially inked his signature on the repeal bill.⁶⁶⁷ Upon hearing the news of the Stamp Act repeal, colonists took to the streets. Throughout the city of Boston, church bells rang out and canons erupted in celebration as provincials congregated under the Liberty Tree to congratulate one another on achieving real political change through collective resistance. The successful nonviolent coercion that brought about the Stamp Act repeal was a critical first step in facilitating the disintegration of Parliamentary authority in British North America.⁶⁶⁸

By encouraging the widespread withholding of provincial spending power, Boston's patriot resistance campaign caused the Parliamentary attempt to raise revenue in British North America to backfire. Dissenting Massachusettsans had forced the repeal of the Stamp Act, but more importantly, they utilized the resources available to them to account for the boycott of British goods, and in the process, nonviolent civil resistance created political opportunities for ordinary provincials to underscore their capacity for governmental autonomy and showcase their collective worth to the British empire.⁶⁶⁹ Bostonians and the people of Massachusetts more broadly felt a real sense of pride and empowerment in their ability to bring about legislative change in North America, and to a degree, the success of nonviolent civil resistance in coercing the Stamp Act repeal levelled the playing field

⁶⁶⁶ Gordon S. Wood, *The American Revolution: A History* (Modern Library, 2003), p. 29; Baldassarri and Diani, p. 736.

⁶⁶⁷ Hoerder, p. 38; Holton, p. 68.

⁶⁶⁸ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, p. 41.

⁶⁶⁹ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40; Eisinger, p. 11; Tarrow, pp. 18–19; Tarrow, pp. 76–77.

between Great Britain and her American colonies. While some urban dwellers expressed sincere gratitude to the Crown for hearing colonial pleas and toasted William Pitt and the other British representatives who defended the American cause to Parliament, others gave voice to a lingering distrust of Parliament and of the Crown-appointed officials in the colonies and advised their fellow colonists against being “hasty” in their jubilation.⁶⁷⁰

When the Declaratory Act was passed in March of 1766, almost immediately following the repeal of the Stamp Act, *The Boston Gazette* drew attention to the patriot view that the Stamp Act was only repealed to be replaced with more severe legislation, publishing a piece which insisted, “it did not proceed from Ignorance, that these Men advised to a submission. They hoped by this Act to entrap you and finally to subject you to that unconstitutional and oppressive Act”.⁶⁷¹ The Declaratory Act itself was a statement of Parliamentary authority and superiority over the colonies, and as historian Robert J. Chaffin has explained, it was intended to prepare the way for new revenue bills which the Rockingham administration had projected.⁶⁷² The legislation, which Edward Countryman has described as a “gesture” to Parliament’s own self-image, not only affirmed the full extent of Parliamentary governance in British North America, but in addition, it was designed to eliminate extralegal activity and authority in the colonies, proclaiming that colonial “resolutions votes, orders, or proceedings” that questioned Parliament's right to legislate for America were “utterly null and void”.⁶⁷³ Stating that Parliament “had, hath, and of right ought to have full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever”, the wording of the act was quite ambiguous; however, Boston’s patriot leaders were clear about the need to prepare for future, more

⁶⁷⁰ A British American; Morgan and Morgan, ‘The Assertion of Parliamentary Control and Its Significance’, pp. 125–26.

⁶⁷¹ *Boston Gazette and Country Journal*, 14 April 1766, 576th edition.

⁶⁷² Robert J. Chaffin, ‘The Declaratory Act: A Reappraisal’, *The Historian*, 37.1 (1974), pp. 5–25 (pp. 5–6).

⁶⁷³ ‘The Declaratory Act; March 18, 1766’, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project; Countryman, p. 44.

sweeping legislation. The Declaratory Act, which was largely symbolic in nature, did not mobilize the Sons of Liberty's rank and file in the same way that the Stamp Act did, but it did offer an opportunity for Boston's elite radical leaders to further develop their pro-continental rhetoric in preparation for the next battle.⁶⁷⁴

At this point in the Imperial Crisis, the patriot cause had not yet developed into a fully-fledged nonviolent social movement; however, the "Yankee spirit had replaced the Puritan" across New England, and provincials had come to view Parliament's latest efforts as having "more grievously injured its own dignity and authority, by verbally asserting that Right, which it substantially yield[ed] up to their Opposition".⁶⁷⁵ Radical leaders continued to call upon "men of integrity, and wisdom, lovers of liberty and of our civil and ecclesiastical constitutions," as they understood that future resistance measures would require the American public to demonstrate worthiness in their claims to and pursuits of governmental autonomy, to present a largely united front with an unprecedented extent of social barrier crossing, and to remain committed to the patriot cause, regardless of the individual sacrifice required to do so.⁶⁷⁶ Indeed, as Pauline Maier has emphasized, considering the events of late 1765, patriot leaders understood the critical nature of impressing upon provincials that their mission was "to win a redress of grievances, not to occasion new ones", and as such, "more was needed than tradition offered" when it came to resisting future attempts at Parliamentary supremacy.⁶⁷⁷ Consequently, throughout the next year, patriot leaders flooded Boston's print media with pro-continental rhetoric which reiterated religiopolitical ideals about moral accountability, natural law, and civil consent, and likewise, politically minded urbanites

⁶⁷⁴ Holton, p. 105.

⁶⁷⁵ Benjamin Franklin, 'Marginalia in Protests of the Lords against Repeal of the Stamp Act', 1766, Founders Online National Archives; Richard L. Bushman, *From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in Connecticut, 1690-1765* (Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 287.

⁶⁷⁶ *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 2 June 1766, 583rd edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁶⁷⁷ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, pp. 65–66.

continued assembling in town hall meetings and coffee houses to further develop social networks which attached individual expectations to association.

The passage of the Townshend Revenue Act gave way to a new surge in the commitment of Massachusettsans to nonviolent civil resistance, as patriot leaders continuously exploited the real threat that the legislation presented to American liberty.⁶⁷⁸ Such surges are not uncommon amongst social movements. Indeed, according to Verta Taylor, activists may sometimes lie in a sort of dormancy when group aims have been achieved or at least addressed; yet, when new threats emerge from “abeyance” to reinstate important ideological and organizational bridges to new waves of political contention.⁶⁷⁹ Although the basic guidelines for American opposition to Parliament had been established during the Stamp Act Crisis, the nature of the Anglo-American conflict changed radically with the passage of the Townshend duties, meaning that the colonial resistance campaign had to evolve as well. Indeed, the Townshend Revenue Act triggered three distinct factors, which Jack A. Goldstone has shown to facilitate revolutionary mobilization. Firstly, the implementation of the duties demonstrated to colonists that there was a widening imbalance between the revenues the British government could lawfully raise and the obligations and tasks for which the empire was responsible, and in turn, colonists feared that the legislation was only the first step in sourcing revenue from provincial pockets. In addition, the severity of the duties further alienated British North Americans from the empire, as Parliament did not merely create competition for elite political positions, but rather, it stripped colonists of the autonomy to which they had grown accustomed. Lastly, the Townshend duties further

⁶⁷⁸ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 206.

⁶⁷⁹ Verta Taylor, ‘Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance’, *American Sociological Review*, 54.5 (1989), pp. 761–75 (pp. 761–62).

mobilized popular groups by intensifying the grievances of a people who were already “watchful” of Parliament.⁶⁸⁰

Certainly, the Townshend duties were much more multi-faceted and invasive than either the Sugar Act or the Stamp Act, and while the legislation enacted tax on glass, painters’ colors, and various other British imports were of “little economic significance” to colonists by and large, Massachusettsans were deeply concerned about the ways in which Parliament intended to use the act as a means of raising revenue and changing the structure of colonial administration. For instance, by taxing an everyday comfort item like tea at the rate of 3d. per pound, strengthening the Customs service in British North America, broadening the conditions under which the writs of assistance could be granted, which meant that Crown-appointed customs officials could consequently enter any ship or building that they suspected of housing smuggled goods, and forcing provincials to utilize their inns, alehouses, barns, or other properties as lodging for British troops stationed in the colonies, Parliament moved to drastically drive up the cost of living throughout the colonies.⁶⁸¹ Furthermore, in promising to pay Crown-appointed authorities through customs revenues, the Townshend duties threatened both the colonial assemblies’ exclusive right to tax their constituents and their traditional role as paymaster, by which the legislatures had exercised a crucial check on executive power.⁶⁸² Fueled by the achievement of garnering the Stamp Act repeal, outraged by the timing and implications of the Declaratory Act, and unwilling to tolerate the taxes and regulations imposed by the Townshend Revenue Act, patriot fundamentalists throughout Massachusetts vowed, “We shall keep peace within ourselves, frustrate and confound our enemies, rejoice

⁶⁸⁰ Jack A Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (University of California Press, 1991), p. 26; 3 June 1765.

⁶⁸¹ Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, pp. 196–97.

⁶⁸² Maier, *The Old Revolutionaries: Political Lives in the Age of Samuel Adams*, p. 22.

and support our friends, and at last should it not prove effectual, may boldly pursue harsher remedies, and have our conducts justified by all the world.”⁶⁸³

Surpassing the model of 1765-6, the Townshend resistance posed a much graver challenge to British authority, specifically because much of the infrastructure required for provincials to do so had already been established by patriot fundamentalist leaders, occurring in the forms of inter and intracolonial communication, nonimportation associations, local committees that increasingly assumed the functions of civil government.⁶⁸⁴ Initially, the Massachusettsan resistance of the Townshend duties were “sporadic”; however, Boston’s patriot fundamentalist leaders supplied provincials with “internal foci” to which they customarily looked for political leadership and models of social behavior.⁶⁸⁵ Moreover, the rapid top-down physical and resource mobilization carried out during the Townshend resistance officially qualified the continental cause as a social movement led by and consisting of a “plurality of individuals” who chose to engage in political action “on the basis of shared collective identities” and in a manner that enhanced provincial resilience in the context of repression.⁶⁸⁶

In February of 1768, the Massachusetts House of Representatives approved a circular letter drafted by Samuel Adams and addressed to the assemblies of each of the other colonies, which requested unanimous participation in the resistance of the unlawful and immoral Townshend duties.⁶⁸⁷ In response, Lord Hillsborough, the secretary of state within the newly created American Department, order the House to rescind the circular letter; however, following a vote of 92 to 17, the Massachusetts House of Representatives stood by their

⁶⁸³ *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 14 September 1767, 650th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁶⁸⁴ Maier, ‘The Townshend Acts and the Consolidation of Colonial Resistance’, p. 128.

⁶⁸⁵ Conser, Jr., ‘The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775’, p. 302; Greene, ‘An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution’, pp. 36–37.

⁶⁸⁶ Mario Diani, ‘The Concept of Social Movement’, *The Sociological Review*, 40.1, pp. 1–25 (p. 1); Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*.

⁶⁸⁷ Peter D. G. Thomas, p. 81; Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord*, p. 31.

claims that the Townshend duties were unconstitutional in nature and “that what a man hath honestly acquired is absolutely his own, which he may freely give, but cannot be taken from him without his consent.”⁶⁸⁸ As both a punitive measure and an attempt to silence provincial protests, Massachusetts Governor Francis Bernard dissolved the assembly, leading perhaps to observations that 1768 was the year that Samuel Adams decided on independence and certainly prompting radical Bostonians to seethe,

Arise then my fellow-subjects, and with unanimity and firmness assert your freedom – Declare to the other colonies that you look on their chains as your own, and that they shall always be sure of your support. Either disband your Representatives, and send them away as an expensive and useless body, or proclaim to the whole world your resolution to obey such laws and taxes as originate only with them.⁶⁸⁹

By mid-1768, much of the prior faith in Great Britain and its ability to judiciously and constitutionally govern the colonies had given way to a new desperation for American liberty, and that shift was marked firstly, by a willingness to resort to progressively stricter methods to maintain nonimportation agreements and to enforce widespread adherence to the tenets of patriot fundamentalism, by a more concentrated effort to contain coercive or destructive behaviors to rough music or the “besmearing” of shop signs, for example, when gathered intelligence suggested noncompliance with patriot fundamentalist ideals and objectives, and additionally, by acknowledging and encouraging the involvement and efforts of women in sustaining the resistance movement.⁶⁹⁰ Indeed, in the era of the Townshend resistance, the patriot fundamentalist movement based in Massachusetts increasingly absorbed new recruits, and its leaders adapted resistance strategies and rhetoric in the face of imperial actions,

⁶⁸⁸ Wood, *The American Revolution: A History*, p. 33; ‘Massachusetts Circular Letter to the Colonial Legislatures, February 11, 1768’, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project.

⁶⁸⁹ Archer, p. 95; Wood, *The American Revolution: A History*, p. 33; 14 September 1767.

⁶⁹⁰ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 129.

meaning that a “leaders and followers alike had very wide training in politics and self-government and were thoroughly socialized to an ongoing and tested political system”.⁶⁹¹ In turn, new and blossoming patriot fundamentalists understood the strategic logic and the processes of organizing, assembling, channeling grievances through de facto political institutions, and referring to political leaders for instructions. When violence did break out, it was generally not a result of resistance itself; rather, it was a product of frustration which effectively signified the corrosion of Bostonian faith in British rule. Likewise, violent incidents were largely the result of radical flank effects, where smaller factions within the patriot fundamentalist movement sporadically chose to engage in violent action independently of movement leaders’ directives. As the number of patriot fundamentalist recruits increased, committees were enabled to speak for the body of the people, providing an organizational base for the expansion of the patriot fundamentalist movement, and as nonimportation associations came to serve as “social compacts” analogous to formal colonial charters and constitutions, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Joseph Warren, and other “patriot heavy weights” evolved not only into representative figures for the city of Boston, but also into provincial lawmakers with the capacity to largely contain violent political resistance.⁶⁹² With no end in sight for the Townshend duties, women were increasingly drawn into the fold, and while they had no real political clout, women certainly offered cohesion to the movement and provided alternatives to the consumption of finished British imports.

Continuously, Boston’s patriot fundamentalist leaders promoted a minimalist lifestyle, free of the dependency on Britain that “the amazing growth of Luxury” and colonial

⁶⁹¹ Greene, ‘An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution’, pp. 37–38.

⁶⁹² Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 229; Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 136; Ray Raphael, ‘Blacksmith Timothy Bigelow and the Massachusetts Revolution of 1774’, in *Revolutionary Founders: Rebels, Radicals, and Reformers in the Making of the Nation*, Ed. Alfred F. Young, Gary B. Nash, and Ray Raphael (Knopf, 2011), pp. 35–52 (p. 42); Verta Taylor, p. 761; John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, *American Journal of Sociology*, 82.6 (1977), pp. 1212–41 (p. 1214).

consumer culture had only strengthened from the 1740s forward, and as T.H. Breen has demonstrated, “mothers and wives and daughters monitored the ideological commitment of the family”.⁶⁹³ In fact, the homespun movement originated in Boston and increased in popularity as the Townshend boycotts politicized even the most basic of household items. Not only did women forego ribbons and old clothes made of British cloth, but they also mended American-made fabrics and utilized a broad range of skills in weaving, knitting, felting, plaiting, and looping to keep stockings, gloves, bedding, and ornamental items including lace collars within the reach of colonists.⁶⁹⁴ Moreover, women hosted spinning and weaving competitions, where they “*made spinning their only employment*” and drank “*nothing at their meetings but New England Rum*”.⁶⁹⁵ At one such event, ninety-seven Bostonian women rallied around one another, sharing supplies and fellowship and strategizing their continued role in nonimportation as they joined their voices in unison to sing,

To save her sinking Land Foreign productions she rejects; With nobleness of Mind;
For Home commodities to which; She’s prudently inclin’d...
She cloaths herself and family; and all the Sons of need;
Were all thus virtuous, soon we’d find; Our Land from Slav’ry free’d.⁶⁹⁶

The Townshend boycotts, “ineffective though they may have been in forcing Parliament to back down,” facilitated aspects of democratization and equalization, as recruitment numbers increased, intra-movement bonds deepened, political inequality between classes and genders

⁶⁹³ ‘A Meeting of the Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of the Town of Boston, 22 December 1767’, 28 December 1767, 665th edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*; Breen, “‘Baubles of Britain’: The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century”, p. 93.

⁶⁹⁴ Linda K. Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 38–39; *The Massachusetts Gazette Extraordinary*, 24 December 1767, 3351st edition, Massachusetts Historical Society; Kathleen A. Staples and Madelyn C. Shaw, *Clothing Through American History: The British Colonial Era* (Greenwood Press, 2009), pp. 85–97; Staples and Shaw, p. 131.

⁶⁹⁵ 24 December 1767.

⁶⁹⁶ *The Boston Evening-Post*, 11 September 1767, 1172nd edition, *The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.*

decreased, and trust networks developed between dissenters and de facto political leaders and organizers.⁶⁹⁷ Once again, provincials made use of the skills and resources that were available to them, seizing the opportunity to become involved in an unprecedentedly participatory colonial landscape.⁶⁹⁸ Through nonimportation and nonconsumption, patriot fundamentalist leaders successfully recruited sixty New England merchants who agreed to refuse order or requests for all of the taxable items that fell under the umbrella of the legislation, placed an emphasis was placed on home manufacturing, which provided women with a newfound, yet critical role in nonimportation associations, and united like-minded colonists, all of which served to reinforce commitment to the nonviolent civil resistance campaign.⁶⁹⁹ Moreover, in contrast to the more informal methods of resistance employed during the Stamp Act Crisis, the Townshend resistance displayed the ability of patriot fundamentalist leaders to issue directives on when to act and how to limit forceful resistance in just popular uprisings. Rank-and-file patriot activists still had access to the social groups that reflected their alignments and featured influential associations, as Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure explains and likewise, there was still the patriot expectation that Bostonians would use any available skills and means to advance the patriot fundamentalist movement.⁷⁰⁰ However, tackling an important factor of Chenoweth and Stephan's "interactive" approach to social movement analysis, the organizational structure of the movement became more defined, and elite patriots established and worked to enforce guidelines for peaceable resistance, which accounted for the tense Anglo-American political environment and how the actions of the movement might impact the broader political

⁶⁹⁷ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, pp. 136–38.

⁶⁹⁸ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40; Eisinger, p. 11; Tarrow, pp. 18–19; Tarrow, pp. 76–77.

⁶⁹⁹ Breen, "'Baubles of Britain': The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century", p. 92; Archer, p. 96.

⁷⁰⁰ Tarrow, p. 16; Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40.

structure.⁷⁰¹ Indeed, Boston's radical leaders "succinctly summarized" the essential elements of colonial thought and instituted a code of conduct for how those beliefs should be conveyed to imperial lawmakers, directives to which Massachusettsans responded with greater acceptance than they would have been likely to three years prior.⁷⁰² Bostonians had already showcased their ability to handle a substantial portion of their nonpolitical and semi-political affairs with efficiency, and the mechanisms of self-reliance enacted during the Townshend resistance only enhanced the operational capacity, and in turn, the governmental legitimacy of the patriot fundamentalist movement.

In the summer of 1768, four thousand British troops had been stationed in Boston, a town of fewer than sixteen thousand residents, and the increased physical presence of imperial authority on American soil certainly opened provincial eyes to the potential execution of military force against citizens.⁷⁰³ While it cannot rightfully be claimed that the patriot fundamentalist movement was prepared to pursue independence at that point in time, the campaign certainly gained momentum as urban dwellers sensed and even observed the dwindling of their personal and political autonomy, and Boston's nonviolent civil resistance efforts had increasingly garnered "wide popular support throughout the province".⁷⁰⁴ Undeniably, however, the radical campaign as a social movement still lacked the level of consensus and organization required for revolution. For instance, during the week-long proceedings of the Massachusetts Convention of 1768, the overall attendance of ninety-six towns and eight districts signified sympathy, kinship, and support for the American resistance campaign; yet, within the meeting itself, there were differences regarding the purposes of the

⁷⁰¹ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

⁷⁰² Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 65.

⁷⁰³ Alfred F. Young, *The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution*, p. 36.

⁷⁰⁴ Robert E. Brown, *Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1690-1780* (Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 253–54.

convention, including whether or not the meeting was solely in opposition to the landing of troops in Boston, to unconstitutional taxation, or to the dissolution of the General Court, or if the meeting was simply intended to air “all constitutional grievances in general”.⁷⁰⁵ Certainly, the assembly was a helpful way to measure or gauge the breadth of patriot fundamentalism, and indeed, it provided an important opportunity for country delegates to carry freshly kindled grievances directly from Boston to the broader province of Massachusetts attendees were reminded of Bostonians’ repeated attempts for political redress, and they, in turn, carried their freshly kindled frustrations over the deployment of British troops to Boston and the lack of accommodation offered by Britain back to the broader province; however, historian John C. Miller has overestimated the power of the Massachusetts Convention in labelling the assembly “an important milestone in the history of Boston's gradual domination of New England”.⁷⁰⁶

By the beginning of 1770, the discontent caused by the close proximity and intermingling of British soldiers and American civilians had reached new heights. In general, potentially violent incidents had been contained by a “peace team” of sorts, who helped to de-escalate potentially violent incidents and explain the directives handed down by patriot leaders.⁷⁰⁷ Two patriot fundamentalists, William Molineux and Thomas Young, advanced the “equalization” of resources and connections within the social movement and “proved to be particularly effective in directing street crowds”.⁷⁰⁸ Molineux, a local trader characterized as “the first Leader of Dirty Matters”, really connected with Boston’s most blue-collar workers and “waterfront roughnecks”, and he either led or was deeply involved in leading nearly

⁷⁰⁵ Archer, p. 101; Richard D. Brown, ‘The Massachusetts Convention of Towns, 1768’, 26.1 (1969), pp. 94–104 (p. 99).

⁷⁰⁶ John C. Miller, ‘The Massachusetts Convention 1768’, *The New England Quarterly*, 7.3 (1934), pp. 445–74 (p. 473).

⁷⁰⁷ Tom H. Hastings, *Nonviolent Response to Terrorism* (McFarland and Company, Inc., 2004), p. 21.

⁷⁰⁸ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 137; Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 227.

every mass assembly between the years 1768 and 1771.⁷⁰⁹ Young, a politically radical physician who had relocated to Boston from Albany, was also a key mediator between patriot fundamentalist leaders and the movements rank and file. Young not only helped to contain popular violent resistance and enforce nonimportant measures, but he was also active within the Sons of Liberty, the Boston Town Meeting, and the North End Caucus.⁷¹⁰ While Young and Molineux were more radical and “considerably less prominent” than most Boston’s patriot fundamentalist leaders, they demonstrated a capacity to liaise between all sects of Boston society, to follow directives and procedures from elite patriot leaders, and to exert authority over angry urban crowds that qualified them “as sound patriots as were Adams [and] Warren”.⁷¹¹ Due in part to their obligations as “official” leaders within the patriot resistance campaign, Molineux and Young could not be omnipresent; however, as grassroots organizers, they provided an important interpersonal bridge between ordinary Bostonians, patriot decisionmakers, and the political contentions that came to ideologically unite them. Indeed, Molineux and Young, when viewed through the composite mobilizational approach proposed by this research, provided the critical advice and connective structures that allow social movements to develop and employ culturally relevant forms of action, to act and react to Parliamentary policy using the resources that were available to them, and to contemplate how violent action could damage public perceptions of the patriot cause.⁷¹²

Conser and McCarthy have recounted the events of March 3, 1770, in which Samuel Gray, a local ropemaker who met his death in the Boston Massacre, chided a British soldier in search of work by offering him a job cleaning the outhouse. With the intention of

⁷⁰⁹ ‘24 October 1774, from the Diary of John Rowe’, Massachusetts Historical Society; Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 227; Conser, Jr. and McCarthy, p. 205.

⁷¹⁰ Countryman, p. 123; Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 227.

⁷¹¹ *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, XXV, p. 346.

⁷¹² Tarrow, p. 16; Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

retaliating, the soldier assembled a group of friends, and that conflict led to other violent interactions throughout Boston, in which “groups of soldiers and groups of townsmen were ready to settle their differences with their fists”. While these contentious episodes ultimately brought about the Massacre, Conser and McCarthy make clear that the patriot resistance campaign was not causally related to the Boston Massacre. Indeed, the social scientists delineate that “animosities and street fights between the Bostonians and the troops or the Customs agents influenced and were influenced by the context within which the resistance to the Townshend Acts took place,” but the street fights that preceded the Massacre were not supported or condoned by the broader patriot movement, likewise, they neglected to involve any strategies of that the nonviolent civil resistance campaign had put into practice.⁷¹³ Although the Boston Massacre was not supported by the patriot fundamentalist movement, and in fact, Thomas Young stood in the streets of Boston on the night of the Massacre, telling rioters to go home, the incident did lend several significant advantages to the radical campaign, reinforcing Chenoweth and Stephan’s conclusion that political contention is a two-way street.⁷¹⁴

In the immediately aftermath of the Massacre, Governor Thomas Hutchinson addressed a crowd of several thousand from the balcony of the State House, ordering the arrest of Captain Preston and the soldiers under his command and instructing British officers to confine all soldiers to their barracks. In front of the assembled Bostonians, Samuel Adams demanded that Hutchinson order not one, but both British regiments to Castle William. Under pressure, the governor conceded, which suggested to observers that “[t]he Sons of Liberty now ran Boston, and public opinion was overwhelmingly against the governor, the council,

⁷¹³ Conser, Jr. and McCarthy, pp. 211–12.

⁷¹⁴ Pauline Maier, ‘Reason and Revolution: The Radicalism of Dr. Thomas Young’, *American Quarterly*, 28.2 (1976), pp. 229–49 (p. 229).

and the British soldiers”.⁷¹⁵ Moreover, the realization that “random” episodes of street violence could generate such extreme human costs and sociopolitical implications encouraged “fence sitters” to decide where their loyalties should lie and urged active patriot fundamentalists to follow the peaceable directives of elite radical leaders more closely.⁷¹⁶ Indeed, witnessing the brutal force of British troops, particularly as it was exercised against young Bostonians like Christopher Seider and Samuel Maverick, reportedly instigated permeating feelings of fear, anger, and confusion amongst Bostonians, which radical leaders manipulated in print and in public gatherings to advance their recruitment efforts. For instance, after performing Christopher Seider’s autopsy, Dr. Joseph Warren identified the boy’s cause of death as being “willfully and feloniously shott”, and according to historian Thomas P. Slaughter, “not the Stamp Act, not the Townshend Duties, or the occupation of Boston by the British Army” had done as much as post-Massacre propaganda to advance the patriot fundamentalist movement.⁷¹⁷ Although the architects of the patriot fundamentalist movement did not seek reprisals for the lives lost, Samuel Adams and various Sons of Liberty sprang into action, exploiting the traumatic events of the first week of March to mobilize the masses.⁷¹⁸ Indeed, alongside carrying out a total media assault, the Sons of Liberty then organized an extraordinarily public funeral, which drew “crowds approaching the city’s population of 13,000”.⁷¹⁹

Although T.H. Breen has claimed that ordinary Americans between 1771 and 1773 believed the Imperial Crisis had effectively ended, radical leaders were continuing to fill New England’s patriot fundamentalist ranks by legitimizing the coordinated revolutionary efforts

⁷¹⁵ Thomas P. Slaughter, *The Tangled Roots of the American Revolution* (Hill and Wang, 2014), p. 301; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 22.

⁷¹⁶ Slaughter, pp. 298–99.

⁷¹⁷ Slaughter, p. 297.

⁷¹⁸ Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, p. 50.

⁷¹⁹ Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, p. 50.

against Great Britain, even during such an alleged “Period of Quiet”.⁷²⁰ Indeed, although the patriot resistance had perhaps outwardly calmed, patriot fundamentalist leaders ensured that the organizational structures necessary to preserve the American cause remained in place. This continuity was key because as Verta Taylor, Jack S. Blocker, Jr., Steven Buechler, and other notable social scientists have explained, there is often an ebb and flow to political struggle, meaning that activists can re-emerge from periods of “abeyance” when new political threats demand action.⁷²¹ In September 1771, Samuel Adams called for the formal establishment of a committee of correspondence to link all cities and towns in Massachusetts with dissenting people and communities throughout the mainland colonies and in the West Indies and British Isles.⁷²² While various networks of communication were already in existence throughout regions of British North America, former committees neglected to be so remarkably inclusive. The first mission of the Boston Committee of Correspondence was to draft a comprehensive list of grievances against Great Britain, request feedback and support from urban residents, and encourage towns across Massachusetts to similarly take stock of local concerns and attitudes toward resistance.⁷²³ In fact, throughout the colonies, towns and cities followed Massachusetts’ lead, establishing committees of correspondence and developing mechanisms for outreach. The success of Boston’s official committee of correspondence catalyzed the organization of committees of safety and clandestine espionage networks, both of which provided insight into the strategic logic and intentions of the opposition and combatted disloyalty and noncompliance to the patriot fundamentalist movement. Whereas meetings and assemblies orchestrated by the Sons of Liberty facilitated

⁷²⁰ Breen, *The Will of the People: The Revolutionary Birth of America*, p. 28; Eran Shalev, ‘Empire Transformed: Britain in the American Classical Imagination, 1758—1783’, *Early American Studies*, 4.1 (2006), pp. 112–46 (p. 138).

⁷²¹ Verta Taylor, pp. 761–62; Jack S. Blocker, Jr., *American Temperance Movements: Cycles of Reform* (Twayne Publishers, 1989); Steven M. Buechler, *The Transformation of the Woman Suffrage Movement: The Case of Illinois, 1850-1920* (Rutgers University Press, 1986); Tilly and Tarrow.

⁷²² Francis D. Cogliano, *Revolutionary America, 1763-1815: A Political History* (Routledge, 2000), p. 46.

⁷²³ Holton, pp. 121–22.

ideological shifts and the recruitment of new activists to the patriot cause, committees formally mobilized Massachusettsans as “The Body of the People” and involved everyone “regardless of age, sex, rank, or voting status”.⁷²⁴ In fact, by 1774, when the gravity of Parliamentary policies reached new heights and became more widely interpreted as posing a clear and present threat to “disenfranchise every citizen and undermine the autonomy of every community”, even the most rural Massachusettsans already possessed the knowledge necessary to determine their political preferences and the will required to defend their interests.⁷²⁵

Nonimportation and nonconsumption had become the “modular weapons” involving large sections of Massachusettsan society and linking the various phases of the almost decade-long American resistance campaign and propelling the patriot fundamentalist movement forward.⁷²⁶ Undeniably, on the evening of December 16, 1773, dissenting Bostonians pursued extreme and borderline violent measures when a minority of urban citizens boarded the merchant ships Dartmouth, Eleanor, and Beaver and ultimately destroyed 342 chests of tea slated for importation.⁷²⁷ The fact that the Tea Party participants felt the need to disguise themselves as Mohawks suggests that they were aware of how severely their actions pushed the bounds of nonviolent civil resistance. However, Conser, McCarthy, and Toscano, have made the critical distinction that the extralegal methods employed during the Boston Tea Party “were neither nonviolent nor violent,” as they involved the destruction of property or material possessions without threatening injury or

⁷²⁴ Leslie J. Thomas, ‘The Nonconsumption and Nonimportation Movement Against the Townshend Acts, 1767-1770’, in *Before Lexington: Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775*, Ed. Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (The Albert Einstein Institution, 2016), pp. 221–316 (p. 262); Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 231.

⁷²⁵ Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord*, p. 8; Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord*, pp. 85–86.

⁷²⁶ Tarrow, pp. 33–38.

⁷²⁷ Carp, *Defiance of the Patriots: The Boston Tea Party and the Making of America*, p. 163.

causing harm to human life.⁷²⁸ Indeed, while the crowd action of December 16, 1773 can certainly be classified as destructive, offensive, and deeply detrimental to the Anglo-American relationship, it cannot necessarily be deemed entirely unrestrained, specifically because a great deal of accounts from the destruction of the tea stress that the destruction of the tea was done with no physical endangerment whatsoever.⁷²⁹

The criminality of such extensive property damage certainly bears consideration; however, as Nick Robinson has expressed, there has been remarkably little scholarship on the criminality of rioting, despite the “high-profile role” riots have played in American history.⁷³⁰ Paul Gilje defines the word “riot” as any group of twelve or more people attempting to assert their will immediately via force outside the normal bounds of law, whereas Erica Chenoweth explains rioting as simply a disturbance by a crowd.⁷³¹ Certainly, relative to the Imperial Crisis, the Boston Tea Party was the most riotous display of mass physical destruction since the Stamp Act-era assaults on Andrew Oliver and Thomas Hutchinson, and Paul Gilje has explained that regardless of how one choose to define the term, the Boston Tea Party was indeed a riot.⁷³² However, according to Gilje, the criminality associated with the destruction of the tea cannot be equated violence of more modern riots, including the race-related riots that preceded and followed the American Civil War or the type of violent clashes that have occurred in the United States between law enforcement and civilians, such as the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 that involved 63 deaths, 2,383 injuries, and 12,000 firstly, because the tea was the sole target of the protest, secondly, because no one was physically harmed in the

⁷²⁸ Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 6.

⁷²⁹ Ronald M. McCarthy, ‘Resistance Politics and the Growth of Parallel Government in America, 1765–1775’, in *Before Lexington: Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765-1775*, Ed. Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (The Albert Einstein Institution, 2016), pp. 770–860 (p. 786).

⁷³⁰ Nick Robinson, ‘Rethinking the Crime of Rioting’, in *Working Paper*, 2022, p. 4 <<https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Rethinking-the-Crime-of-Rioting-ICNL-Working-Paper-June-2022.pdf>>.

⁷³¹ Paul A. Gilje, *Rioting in America* (Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 4–6; Erica Chenoweth, *Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 53.

⁷³² Gilje, p. 6.

process of the riot, and lastly, because colonists had attempted more peaceable methods to prevent the landing of the tea.⁷³³ Similarly, Elizabeth Hinton condemns the use of the word “riot” in instances where crowd violence does not represent a wave of criminality and occurs in response to a “tangible” threat to civil rights.⁷³⁴ Therefore, while there was certainly criminal element to the destruction of the tea, it did not cause the loss of life or grave bodily harm that we have seen in countless contemporary riots, it did not instigate more severe clashes between Bostonians and British associations, and moreover, it occurred in response to legislation passed by an unresponsive and purportedly tyrannical government. That is to say, the Boston Tea Party was neither indiscriminate nor inarticulate; it occurred as a direct assault on the forced importation of East India Company tea.⁷³⁵ Moreover, leading patriot figures emerged in the aftermath of the Tea Party to contextualize nonviolent civil resistance and isolate the destruction of the tea as not having been cosigned by the chief organizers of the patriot movement. So, while there is no way to excuse such a dramatic display of property damage, we can consider the Boston Tea Party alongside more contemporary cases studies of rioting and criminality to determine where on the spectrum of political violence it should fall.

Historian R.S. Longley who characterized the Boston Tea Party as “the greatest of many such expressions of mob violence” made the important distinction that “no other part of the cargo was touched,” demonstrating that the destruction of the tea was more realistically a product of dedication to the nonimportation of taxable British goods than a desire to cause wanton, indiscriminate injury.⁷³⁶ Moreover, as Ray Raphael has concluded, on the eve of the Revolutionary War, ninety-five percent of Massachusetts residents lived outside the city

⁷³³ Gilje, pp. 20–21; Brentin Mock, ‘What Was Lost in the Fires of the L.A. Riots’, *Bloomberg UK*, 25 April 2017 <<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-25/what-we-forgot-about-the-1992-l-a-riots>>.

⁷³⁴ Elizabeth Hinton, *America on Fire: The Untold History of Police Violence and Black Rebellion Since the 1960s* (W.W. Norton, 2021), pp. 7–10.

⁷³⁵ Hinton, pp. 6–7; Gilje, p. 80.

⁷³⁶ R.S. Longley, ‘Mob Activities in Revolutionary Massachusetts’, *The New England Quarterly*, 6.1 (1933), pp. 98–130 (pp. 121–23).

limits of Boston, meaning that very few of the total provincial population were involved in the Stamp Act protests, the Boston Massacre, or the Boston Tea Party, the “signature” events which often define American independence in the popular narrative of the nation’s revolutionary foundations. This statistic adds a degree of legitimacy to the patriot fundamentalist claim that the broader colonial population should be met with indemnity, rather than being held accountable for the violence of a small minority, but what this statistic fails to indicate, however, is that colonists on the outskirts of urban hubs like Boston had long been focused on specific local and personal sociopolitical concerns, such as taxation, the allocation and use of land and resources, and public health issues.⁷³⁷ Thus, it not only stands to reason that the destruction of the tea cannot overshadow the otherwise nonviolent nature of the patriot fundamentalist movement, but in addition, that an entire resistance movement spanning thirteen colonies cannot be judged as predominately violent based on the behaviors of the few.

News of the Boston Tea Party reached London on January 19, 1774, and by the end of the month, the cabinet began the deliberations which led to the Coercive Acts, a series of four bills intended to bring about commercial and political suffering in Massachusetts and ultimately, to control dissidence by suppressing the patriot fundamentalist movement into dissolution.⁷³⁸ Under the “Intolerable Acts”, Parliament closed Boston’s port, revoked Massachusetts’ governmental charter, granted permission the royal governor to decide where judiciary hearings would take place, and forced provincials to house British troops. In addition, as per the terms of the legislation, to convene a town meeting required the approval

⁷³⁷ Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord*, p. 8; Raphael, *The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord*, pp. 85–86.

⁷³⁸ Ian R. Christie, ‘British Response to American Reactions to the Townshend Acts, 1768–1770’, in *Before Lexington: Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765-1775*, Ed. Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (The Albert Einstein Institution, 2016), pp. 317–51 (p. 364); Tarrow, p. 170.

of the Crown-appointed governor.⁷³⁹ The latter point in particular “awakened” inland New England towns, as town meetings had not only become a cornerstone of the patriot fundamentalist movement, but moreover, they provided ordinary provincials with direct and unprecedented access to the de facto political system, a development to which Massachusettsans had become accustomed.⁷⁴⁰ As Parliament’s most invasive legislation yet, the “Intolerable Acts” were interpreted by provincials as nothing more than revenge, and consequently, they were publicized as such, amplifying the fear-based emotions of Massachusettsans and colonists up and down the eastern seaboard. Consequently, “the story line travels quickly from the raid on the tea ships to the outbreak of war,” not necessarily because of continuity in colonial life, but because the level of repression exerted by Parliament over Americans placed the colonies on a logical trajectory toward independence.⁷⁴¹

Certainly, the physical and resource mobilization required to pose a legitimate threat to British authority necessitated strict top-down directives, but due to the severe nature of the Coercive Acts, Parliament alone triggered a wave of “defensive mobilization” in that the preexisting patriot fundamentalist campaign experienced a surge in the recruitment of new activists and a strengthening of the commitment of more long-term dissenters.⁷⁴² Independence had been referenced during some of the earlier stages of the patriot fundamentalist movement, including the points that the “most eligible course for the Americans, and that which they will probably take, is, to form a government of their own” and that the American colonies “have all the advantages for independence, and every temptation to improve them that ever a people had.”⁷⁴³ However, in the wake of the Coercive

⁷³⁹ Ray Raphael, ‘Yankees With Staves and Musick’, *Phi Kappa Phi Forum*, 86.3 (2006), pp. 23–26 (p. 23).

⁷⁴⁰ Holton, p. 149.

⁷⁴¹ Ray Raphael and Marie Raphael, *The Spirit of '74: How the American Revolution Began* (New York: The New Press, 2015), Introduction, p. viii.

⁷⁴² Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 206.

⁷⁴³ An American.

Acts, American independence became a much more tangible concept, as the ideological foundations of Massachusetts' collective identity had already been laid and the infrastructure for complete political autonomy was well past the initial phase of development. Provincial fear prompted rapid "unfreezing", whereby the overall focus of the patriot fundamentalist movement shifted from nonviolent civil resistance aimed at repairing the colonies' connection to the Crown to active militarization in preparation for the physical defense of American liberty.⁷⁴⁴

Seizing the political opportunity, employing local resources and colonial connections, patriot fundamentalist noncooperation once again involved nonimportation, but such unprecedented encroachment upon civil liberties warranted unprecedented mobilization. Across Massachusetts, patriot fundamentalists dismissed imperial authority by closing courts, refusing taxes, and openly defying government mandates. The Coercive Acts also significantly increased the level of rural engagement within the resistance movement, with villages across Massachusetts mobilizing to limit the imperial government's ability to enforce the legislation. Indeed, from Marblehead to Worcester, committees, conventions, and crowds ordered Crown-appointed officials to renounce their commissions, as committees of correspondence assumed the administrative and judicial functions of the province.⁷⁴⁵ Because defensive mobilization had occurred so rapidly, Bostonian leaders and countryside rank and file alike were forced to debate "where they were heading with all this," and while the horses of rural Loyalists were stolen and windowpanes were selected as symbolic "targets", local patriot fundamentalist continued making attempts to curb "immediate acts of violence, as incredible numbers were in arms".⁷⁴⁶ Critically, Massachusetts' struggle became an American cause, meaning that any damage done to material property in the wake of the Coercive Acts

⁷⁴⁴ McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 75.

⁷⁴⁵ Hoerder, pp. 281–87.

⁷⁴⁶ Raphael and Raphael, *The Spirit of '74: How the American Revolution Began*, p. 122; Hoerder, p. 75; 'Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams, 4 September 1774', p. 357.

could effectively be excused as a reactionary response to imperial oppression. The other colonies rallied around Bostonians and countryside dwellers alike, providing material and financial support and sending displays of solidarity, in which they pleaded, “Oh, Boston, surrender not the liberties of this continent. The eyes of a great part of Europe and of all these Provinces are upon you. The hearts and hands of the latter are open to you.”⁷⁴⁷

As the province of Massachusetts rebounded from the Boston Tea Party and the consequent trickling in of the Coercive Acts, Samuel Adams and Joseph Warren utilized the Boston Committee of Correspondence to push the other colonies to adopt “the Solemn League and Covenant”, which was the first concerted response to the Boston Port Act and the most aggressive nonconsumption and nonimportation agreement theretofore, calling for signers to completely halt the purchase of British goods after August 31, 1774, and to stop associating with those who refused to participate.⁷⁴⁸ In support of the Solemn League and Covenant, the Committee expressed that the closing of Boston Harbor would have been “in violation of natural justice even if they had an acknowledged jurisdiction,” and Adams explained how the inhabitants of Boston had been “Tryed” and “condemned” without ever having been formally “accused of any crime committed”.⁷⁴⁹ Although the petition garnered attention, it was largely ineffective in establishing sweeping boycott measures. Yet, it did succeed in demonstrating the extent to which Massachusettsans had radicalized, and moreover, it revealed that Governor Thomas Gage “could no more control the rising opposition than Hutchinson before him”.⁷⁵⁰ Moreover, the Solemn League and Covenant offered insight into how exactly Samuel Adams intended to present himself at the Continental

⁷⁴⁷ *The Boston Evening-Post*, 18 July 1774, 2025th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.

⁷⁴⁸ Beeman, Richard R., pp. 110–11.

⁷⁴⁹ ‘Circular Letter of the Boston Committee of Correspondence, 13 May 1774’, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project; ‘To the Committee of Correspondence of Portsmouth, New Hampshire’, in *The Writings of Samuel Adams, Vol. III, Ed. Harry Alonzo Cushing* (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907), pp. 106–7.

⁷⁵⁰ Neil York, ‘Imperial Impotence: Treason in 1774 Massachusetts’, *Law and History Review*, 29.3 (2011), pp. 657–701 (p. 682).

Congress. As Mary Beth Norton has explained, within two months, the Massachusetts county conventions began moving subtly from protesting British authority to beginning the process of replacing it all together.⁷⁵¹

Between the ever-encroaching force of British policymakers and the mobilizational structure provided by Boston's patriot fundamentalist leaders, Massachusettsans had been offered a variety of material and ideological incentives, which encouraged previously marginalized communities to fully pursue the path to political participation.⁷⁵² When the Adams cousins, Thomas Cushing, and Robert Treat Paine had travelled to Philadelphia to participate in the First Continental Congress, Massachusetts' county conventions continued to assemble in direct defiance of Parliamentary mandates. In Suffolk County, where Boston was the principal town, Joseph Warren guided the patriot fundamentalists advocating for tax refusal, nonconsumption, and noncooperation with Crown-appointed governor and officials in the province of Massachusetts.⁷⁵³ Although they admittedly employed "over the top language", according to Ray and Marie Raphael, the Suffolk Resolves "were the most cleanly crafted and stood for all the rest", offering a historical account of the New England's settlement and struggles with Parliamentary encroachment before ultimately vowing, "until our rights are fully restored to us, we will, to the utmost of our power, and we recommend the same to the other counties to withhold all commercial intercourse with Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies, and abstain from the consumption of British merchandise and manufactures".⁷⁵⁴ What made the resolves truly radical in nature was their cautious urging

⁷⁵¹ Norton, pp. 186–87.

⁷⁵² Tarrow, p. 16; Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, pp. 40–42; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

⁷⁵³ Beeman, Richard R., p. 112; Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 20. According to newspaper accounts, committee members also included Dr Benjamin Church (Boston) Deacon Joseph Palmer (Germantown), Captain Lemuel Robinson (Dorchester), Captain William Heath (Roxbury), Colonel Ebenezer Thayer (Braintree), William Holden, Esq. (Dorchester), Colonel William Taylor (Milton), Captain John Homans (Dorchester), Isaac Gardiner, Esq. (Brooklyn), Mr. Richard Woodward (Dedham), Captain Benjamin White (Brooklyn), Dr. Samuel Gardiner (Milton), Nathaniel Summer, Esq. (Dedham) and Captain Thomas Aspinwall (Brooklyn).

⁷⁵⁴ Norton, p. 187; Raphael and Raphael, *The Spirit of '74: How the American Revolution Began*, p. 141.

that provincials undertake military training in the event that the defense of American rights should warrant physical combat, covertly signaling the possibility of revolution.⁷⁵⁵ Paul Revere delivered the resolves to directly to his congressional delegation, who in turn, presented them to the Congress. The overall tone of the Suffolk Resolves was quite radical; however, even the most moderate delegates to the Congress could not have opposed the resolves without giving the impression of abandoning the people of Massachusetts. As such, the Congress unanimously endorsed the resolves, recording, “This assembly...most thoroughly approve the wisdom and fortitude, with which opposition to these wicked ministerial measures has hitherto been conducted, and they earnestly recommend to their brethren, a perseverance in the same firm and temperate conduct as expressed in the resolutions”.⁷⁵⁶ Although Boston’s patriot fundamentalists did not initially seek a complete cessation of the parent-child relationship that America once shared with Great Britain, the Suffolk Resolves decidedly placed the colonies on a trajectory toward independence. Indeed, not only had Boston’s patriot fundamentalist leaders mobilized the inhabitants of Massachusetts, but they had also prepared British North Americans more broadly “to be resolute in the hour of danger,” and John Adams rejoiced in that development, writing in his diary, “This was one of the happiest Days of my Life. In Congress We had generous, noble Sentiments, and manly Eloquence. This Day convinced me that America will support Massachusetts or perish with her”.⁷⁵⁷

Between the years 1764 and 1776, the patriot fundamentalist campaign underwent an evolution fueled partly by the expanding sociopolitical awareness of ordinary colonists, but largely by Boston’s patriot fundamentalist leaders who managed to successfully bring about ideological changes, and perhaps more critically, to mobilize provincials behind them. Yet,

⁷⁵⁵ Carp, *Defiance of the Patriots: The Boston Tea Party and the Making of America*, p. 199; Norton, p. 189.

⁷⁵⁶ ‘Saturday, September 17, A.M.’, in *Journals of Congress, Containing the Proceedings from Sept. 5, 1774 to Jan. 1, 1776* (R. Aitkin, 1777), I.

⁷⁵⁷ 1775; ‘17 September 1774 from the Diary of John Adams’, Founders Online National Archives.

only by historicizing this route of radicalization pursued by colonial Bostonians are scholars fully equipped to understand and analyze the city's gradual, and often reluctant, transition toward the prospect of an independent America. Boston's patriot fundamentalist leaders founded the Sons of Liberty, organized the first committees of correspondence, inspection, and safety, and stayed active in a variety of sociopolitical groups and societies through which they could share information and ideas, plan and advertise initiatives and demonstrations, and recruit new members to "the Cause of Religion, of Government, of Liberty, [and of] the Interest of the present Age and of Posterity".⁷⁵⁸ Recruitment occurred across socioeconomic, ethnic, gender, religious, and occupational lines, while top-down guidance allowed provincials from all social sects to acknowledge and address their concerns as a collective and ultimately garner a feeling of control over their environmental stressors and anxieties.⁷⁵⁹ By taking such a comprehensive approach to resource mobilization, Boston's patriot fundamentalist leaders provided provincials with a variety of routes to radicalization and mobilization. For instance, while some provincials mobilized due to friendship and kinship ties and effectively participated in the social movement prior to fully undergoing an ideological shift, others sat in on a townhall meeting or attended a mock funeral and sought more information about the movement's ideals and plans of action.

Certainly, nonphysical social coercion and peer pressure encouraged compliance with patriot fundamentalist doctrines, but additionally, because the patriot fundamentalist came to infiltrate the pulpit, the workplace, and an array of social circles, ordinary provincials often decided for themselves how and when they wanted to become politically involved. Moreover, by having such a variety of channels through which Massachusettsans could participate in nonviolent civil resistance and bring other burgeoning radicals into the fold, the purveyors of

⁷⁵⁸ '9 August 1770 from the Diary of John Adams', Founders Online National Archives, Adams Papers.

⁷⁵⁹ Fisher and Kling, p. 12.

patriot fundamentalism became increasingly able to monitor neighbors, enforce boycotts and new social norms, engage in social networking, share ideas, plan events, elect patriot fundamentalists to government offices, and alter the existing government to benefit colonial interests. The patriot fundamentalist movement proved to be more inclusive than exclusive, which simultaneously empowered Massachusettsans to become politically engaged to an unprecedented extent and mobilized forces behind the nonviolent cause. As such, while socioeconomic conditions and faith communities had the effect of catalyzing the process of radicalization and placing Massachusettsans on their own path to patriot fundamentalism, the radical leaders that engaged in media assaults against unjust Parliamentary legislation, exploited provincial religious sensibilities, pursued legal redress through formal lobbying, and developed the infrastructure necessary to mobilize champions of the cause to carry out acts of nonviolent civil resistance put the patriot fundamentalist ideology into action.

Indeed, throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, what started as a simple resistance initiative developed into a full-fledged nonviolent social movement, capable of making collective claims on authorities, frequently forming special-purpose associations or named coalitions, organizing public meetings, communicating their programs to colonial media outlets, staging processions, rallies, or demonstrations, and through all these activities, making concerted displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment⁷⁶⁰ While it cannot rightfully be claimed that the patriot fundamentalist push for independence originated with the onset of the Imperial Crisis, it is critical to acknowledge that the intentionality of Boston's patriot leaders in radicalizing individuals and groups throughout the province of Massachusetts and establishing the parameters of nonviolent civil resistance sustained the nonviolent civil resistance movement throughout the Imperial Crisis. Boston's most preeminent patriot fundamentalists were deliberate in their efforts to build consensus amongst

⁷⁶⁰ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 35.

the public and establish grassroots networks through which provincials could unitedly challenge unjust Parliamentary legislation. The city's Sons of Liberty, committee members, assemblymen, and other radical leaders played a significant role in establishing dissident rhetoric throughout the colonies not only by organizing committees of correspondence and intricate social networks which connected the Massachusetts countryside to Boston, but also by weaponizing the media through repeatedly citing biblical narratives, advocating for a societal restoration of the Puritan virtue represented by their ancestors, and relying upon historical and philosophical narratives to convince their fellow Massachusettans of the justness of resistance.

As the patriot fundamentalist movement expanded, provincials across Massachusetts were increasingly able to recognize the cause and its aims by the individuals, groups, symbols, and spaces associated with it, and such significant transparency not only bolstered colonial perceptions about the movement's legitimacy, but moreover, it meant that radicalized and radicalizable provincials were increasingly able to seek involvement in nonviolent civil resistance initiatives.⁷⁶¹ In fact, with the maturation of "intangible factors" including the abilities of offering and adhering to directives for peaceable noncooperation, Massachusettans transitioned into a key developmental phase, whereby nonviolent civil resistance had become normalized as a "basic routine".⁷⁶² The inhabitants of Massachusetts mobilized against Parliamentary supremacy due to a combination of factors including the increasing severity of revenue-raising legislation and punitive measures thrust upon British North Americans, the emergence of a competent, elite ruling class, the organization of far-reaching social networks and inclusive resistance initiatives, and a growing sense of alienation from the Crown and Parliament. Certainly, a variety of systems of resources were

⁷⁶¹ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, pp. 78–79; Frank W. Young, pp. 47–49.

⁷⁶² Sharp, *How Nonviolent Struggle Works*, pp. 126–27; Tarrow, p. 34.

in place which enable Massachusetts' ultimate push for independence; however, with the establishment of radical groups including the Sons of Liberty and the Boston Committee of Correspondence, and in addition, with the inclusion of women and working-class Bostonians, the patriot fundamentalist movement demonstrated the ability to establish a structured process of recruitment and subsequently a tight-knit, well-connected, and deeply devoted base.⁷⁶³ Under the leadership of prominent, quasi-governmental patriot fundamentalist leaders who promoted "an ideology of resistance and restraint", the Sons of Liberty assembled, published, and petitioned while women collectivized to abandon tea drinking and take up the spinning wheel, traders, merchants, and artisans negotiated the terms of nonimportation, committees of correspondence linked rural provincial settlements with the urban hub of Boston, and committees of inspection buttressed "a cross-class patriot coalition".⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁶³ James William Jones, *Blood That Cries Out From the Center of the Earth: The Psychology of Religious Terrorism* (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 14.

⁷⁶⁴ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 27; Clark Smith, 'The Adequate Revolution', pp. 686–87.

Chapter 4 –

“Your Zeal is Noble”: Motive and Media in Pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania

During the course of the Imperial Crisis, Philadelphia’s leading patriot advocates helped to popularize the perception of imperial governing institutions as being unable and unwilling to meet the social, political, and moral needs and expectations of American colonists, and as Pennsylvanians steadily reconciled revered religious teachings, Enlightenment-era philosophies, and historical narratives with the realities of a rapidly evolving British Atlantic landscape, a new continental identity gradually took shape in Pennsylvania. The unique contours of provincial politics in Pennsylvania often obstructed consensus and impeded political progress throughout the pre-Revolutionary era, and moreover, spectacular episodes of violence had threatened to shift from the frontier to the provincial capital of Philadelphia. Likewise, rapid rates of immigration, employment inferiority, voting ineligibility, and spatial inequality meant that eventual patriot fundamentalists longed for dependability in everyday life, particularly in the forms of border, economic, financial, food, governmental, and physical security. However, while Pennsylvanians grappled with establishing and protecting themselves, their families, and their livelihoods in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War and in the face of an inadequate provincial government, Philadelphia’s leading radical advocates stressed that the province’s existing political leadership was not equally invested in resolving those same issues and concerns. The province’s traditional political system provided little opportunity for non-Quakers to engage in governmental decision-making processes, meaning that Pennsylvanians who were already struggling with feelings of fiscal marginalization simultaneously found themselves with limited means for challenging a politically dominant

Quaker leadership. Thus, following the passage of the Stamp Act, emerging provincial leaders had to actively create space to hear, articulate, advertise, and inflame these anxieties and grievances of provincial Pennsylvanians.

William Bradford, Charles Thomson, John Dickinson, and other patriot activists utilized provincial feelings of marginalization to impress upon Pennsylvanians the dangers of imperial encroachment and garner support for nonviolent resistance efforts. Pennsylvania's burgeoning patriot fundamentalists pushed to build the continental case for resistance in three primary ways. Firstly, Philadelphia's radical minds empathetically underscored the plights of Pennsylvania's diverse demographic configurations, appealing to underprivileged urban dwellers as well as isolated communities living in the provincial backcountry. In turn, leaders interested in political reforms highlighted the need to establish a more holistically representative government to advocate for the improvement of Pennsylvania's unique sociopolitical circumstances. Lastly, in order to stimulate a sense of civic responsibility and a feeling of pride in relation to British North America's nonviolent civil resistance of unjust Parliamentary legislation, Pennsylvania's radical printers, authors, and orators expounded the unethical nature of a distant imperial regime that refused its subjects direct political representation and governmental self-regulation. While it cannot accurately be contested that the eventual patriot fundamentalist push for independence immediately arose at the start of the Imperial Crisis, it is critical to acknowledge the ideological intentionality of Philadelphia's dissenting leaders in establishing the parameters of resistance, which became apparent following the passage of the Stamp Act and remained a consistent driver of Pennsylvanian resistance during the decade preceding the Revolutionary War. Indeed, Philadelphia's most preeminent patriot fundamentalists simultaneously justified and legitimized nonviolent civil resistance as a means of building a unified continental identity amongst the general public and establishing grassroots networks across Pennsylvania to

collectively challenge Parliamentary authority. Weaponizing the media to convince colonists across British North America of the just and ethical nature of publishing, petitioning, and demonstrating in support of Pennsylvanian interests, Philadelphia's radical writers relied upon a variety of religious, historical, and philosophical narratives to underpin the legitimacy of colonial noncooperation and develop what ultimately became the patriot fundamentalist ideology.

As such, this chapter argues that the distinctive social, political, cultural, and economic features of Pennsylvania's unique pre-Revolutionary landscape, including the backcountry's diverse ethnic and religious configurations and urban Philadelphia's significant division of wealth helped Pennsylvanians to "unfreeze" and become open to certain forms of political resistance even prior to the Stamp Act Crisis.⁷⁶⁵ Indeed, although the grievances, experiences, and sensibilities of rural Ulster-Scots Presbyterians and German Lutherans, for instance, may have differed from those of urban Quakers and Anglicans, huge portions of the provincial population longed for sweeping institutional change in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years' War. The extent of uneasiness felt by white Europeans who had settled upon Native American territories in the Susquehanna Valley and the level of poverty in which many Philadelphians were forced to subsist informed Pennsylvanian attitudes about the government's responsibility to safeguard its citizens from physical, political, and economic vulnerabilities. Accordingly, in order to develop a well-rounded view of patriot fundamentalist motivations in pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania, it is important to understand how provincial historical conceptualizations and situational grievances fostered the group belief that Pennsylvanians and British North America more generally were somehow special or superior, that they had been treated unjustly by Parliament, that neither the Quaker Assembly, the Proprietary faction, nor the imperial

⁷⁶⁵ McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 75.

regime was willing to alleviate their fears and issues, and that the relative autonomy that they had theretofore enjoyed had been compromised by imperial policymaking.⁷⁶⁶

To demonstrate the ways in which nonviolent advocates of patriot fundamentalism commanded adherence to republican and faith-based values and to trace the evolving integrity of patriot fundamentalism as an ideology, this chapter will begin by looking at the social, political, economic, and religious features and demographics that characterized the city of Philadelphia and the broader province of Pennsylvania in the mid-eighteenth century and contributed to the colonial contention of Parliamentary supremacy during the Imperial Crisis. By employing evidence from a vast variety of newspaper articles and pamphlets that were crafted by Philadelphia's patriot pens and produced by the forty-two printers who operated within the urban hub from 1740 to 1776 as well as speeches, sermons, and private correspondence, this chapter will then proceed to explain how Pennsylvania's patriot printers, authors, and orators amplified, articulated, disseminated, and socialized the provincial ideals that ultimately evolved into the action-oriented ideology of patriot fundamentalism. In doing so, this chapter works to advance understandings of how patriot advocates drew upon colonial conceptions of Christian liberty and ancestral legacy and manipulated fear-based feelings and conditions of provincial disenfranchisement, including deprivation, discomfort, divisions of wealth, and unemployment to encourage the pursuit of individual moral accountability and just, lawful government and nurture a unique religiopolitical ideology that necessitated nonviolent civil resistance in the face of sin, corruption, and tyranny.⁷⁶⁷

Considering the explanations and justifications for resistance that were employed by Philadelphia's patriot leaders offers us the important benefit of better conceptualizing how

⁷⁶⁶ Roy J. Eidelson and Judith I. Eidelson, 'Dangerous Ideas: Five Beliefs That Propel Groups Toward Conflict', *American Psychologist*, 58 (2003), pp. 182–92 (p. 183); McCauley and Moskaleiko, 'Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism', p. 416. Eidelson and Eidelson categorize these "belief domains" as superiority, injustice, vulnerability, distrust, and helplessness.

⁷⁶⁷ Carl Bridenbaugh, 'The Press and the Book in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 65.1 (1941), pp. 1–30 (p. 2).

provincial resistance advocates established links between the requisite ideological drivers that motivated Pennsylvanians to petition, boycott, perform acts of disruption and defiance, and ultimately to militarize. By applying a Social Science lens to trace the trajectory of patriot fundamentalist contention and assess how nonviolent leaders firstly cultivated feelings of anxiety, pain, and fear to provide “incentive” for resistance on a transclass, cross-cultural basis and also reframed provincial understandings of the Anglo-American relationship, we can understand how from 1774 onwards, Pennsylvanians came to be more quickly convinced “that any further submission will be destructive to their happiness”.⁷⁶⁸ Indeed, by isolating the key factors that motivated Pennsylvanians to dissent in the face of imperial rule, we can then consider the appeal, the strategic logic, and the impacts of Pennsylvania’s employment of nonviolent civil resistance.

This chapter aims to underscore the significant theoretical benefits of viewing the rhetorical and ideological shifts that occurred in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania through a Social Science lens. This chapter draws upon elements of Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory to situate the political contentions raised by pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvanians under the umbrella of nonviolent civil resistance and to trace the development of the nonviolent ideas and structures that governed the patriot fundamentalist movement and colored its trajectory during the Imperial Crisis. By applying this composite approach to patriot fundamentalism and exploring the ideological underpinnings of political nonviolence in the province of Pennsylvania, whose political leaders organized and capitalized on the power of print to peaceably challenge imperial power, we can extend the reach and validity of current understandings of American dissent between the years 1764 and 1776. This chapter will examine how Philadelphia’s patriot

⁷⁶⁸ Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski, p. 820; Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, p. 16; Smith and others, p. 203; Kruglanski and others, p. 74; Fisher and Kling, p. 12; Snow, Zurcher, Jr., and Ekland-Olson, p. 464.

fundamentalist leaders framed colonial grievances to appeal to the province's diverse demographical values and considerations, maintained rhetorical flexibility and adaptability in the face of rapidly changing circumstances, engaged colonists in risk acceptance in order to avoid the loss of the remarkable autonomy to which the Crown's North American subjects had become accustomed, and ultimately helped to reverse the colonial conviction that British authorities would fairly and peaceably resolve colonial grievances.

To effect lasting change to Parliamentary policy, Pennsylvania's patriot printers, authors, and orators needed to create shared feelings and experiences that crossed the barriers of language, religion, class, culture, and economic standing by establishing and familiarizing provincials with the rhetoric of resistance and by consistently building a strong, evidence-based case against unjust imperial governance. In fact, as Jaroslaw Chodak has explained, a social movement can only truly thrive when it has an established "common framework of identification" to offer participants senses of community and agency.⁷⁶⁹ Thus, to make provincials feel heard and represented in the public sphere and perhaps more critically, to emphasize the respectability and legitimacy of nonviolently resisting governmental oppression, Philadelphia's leading patriot voices expounded the "glorious Cause of Christian Liberty", elaborated Enlightenment-era ideals of liberty and virtue, nurtured the provincial "spirit of enquiry", and employed historical cautionary tales, such as the Carthaginian exploitation of Sardinia's "miserable...oppressed people" dating back to circa 814 BC.⁷⁷⁰ Even while Pennsylvanian Quakers clung to the strictly pacifistic practices that their religion

⁷⁶⁹ Jaroslaw Chodak, 'Symbols, Slogans and Taste in Tactics: Creation of Collective Identity in Social Movements', in *Identities of Central-Eastern European Nations*, Ed. Volodymyr Yevtukh, Artur Wysocki, Ganna Kisla, and Andrzej Jekaterynczuk (Interservice LTD, 2016), pp. 277–97 (p. 277); Lee A. Smithey, 'Social Movement Strategy, Tactics, and Collective Identity', *Sociology Compass*, 3.4 (2009), pp. 658–71 (p. 659); Goldstone, 'Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory', pp. 139–40.

⁷⁷⁰ Benjamin Franklin, 'A Letter to a Friend in the Country', 25 September 1735, Founders Online National Archives, Franklin Papers; Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, p. 13; Richard L. Smith, *Premodern Trade in World History* (Routledge, 2008), p. 65; 'Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, 26 November 1769', Founders Online National Archives.

extolled and frontier communities of Ulster Scots longed for more visible forms of direct action, the province's budding patriot fundamentalists worked to legitimize peaceable resistance, explaining that a refusal to advocate for equality amongst all members of the British Empire was a direct contradiction to Christian life. Indeed, to appeal to Pennsylvania's diverse demographic configurations, the purveyors of the developing patriot fundamentalist movement drew parallels between sacrifice and moral righteousness, between widespread socioeconomic inequality and elitist gluttony, and between blind submission and sinful oppression. Yet, to understand the acceleration of sociopolitical developments of the 1760s, it is necessary to highlight the long roots of these ideological contributors.

Before delving into the social, political, and cultural viewpoints that divided Pennsylvanians during the Imperial Crisis, however we must first look back to Pennsylvania's 1681 founding and understand its status as a proprietary colony and its intended purpose as a refuge for marginalized faith communities. In the decade preceding Pennsylvania's settlement, William Penn was deeply involved in defending the interests of the Quaker church in England by supporting "targeted activism for relief of persecuted dissenters" and "articulating the theoretical foundations of liberty of conscience".⁷⁷¹ Accordingly, when King Charles II granted Penn 45,000 square miles of North American real estate, the young heir was dedicated to establishing a colony that was governed "by the Peoples consent", honored the English constitution, sought to provide "Prosperity, and Security", and unlike Massachusetts, had no privileged church or tax-supported faith community.⁷⁷² Indeed, Penn considered the three fundamental rights of Englishmen to be the possession of both liberty and property, participation in the enactment of the laws governing them, and the ability to influence the execution of provincial law. However, Penn was a

⁷⁷¹ Andrew R. Murphy, 'The Limits and Promise of Political Theorizing: William Penn and the Founding of Pennsylvania', 34.4 (2013), pp. 639–68 (p. 646).

⁷⁷² Richard S. Dunn, 'William Penn and the Selling of Pennsylvania, 1681-1685', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 127.5 (1983), pp. 322–29 (p. 322).

complex character, and as Alan Taylor has explained, Penn was “both highly principled and habitually condescending”, which is to say that while Penn was a religious man, he also strove to protect his family fortune.⁷⁷³ Certainly, Penn was intent on dedicating his colony to the Quaker values of pacifism, civil liberty, and religious freedom, which inherently required that his “Holy Experiment” was established as a safe haven where all individuals who were religiously persecuted in Europe could coexist alongside the region’s Native American tribes.⁷⁷⁴ Yet, with Pennsylvania’s deep forests, fertile fields, sizable rivers, and vast variety of big and small game separating the Puritan port city of Boston from Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay, Penn recognized and advertised the enormous fiscal potential that Pennsylvania was “believed capable of”.⁷⁷⁵

During the initial stages of settler recruitment, Penn predominantly targeted members of the Society of Friends to settle in Pennsylvania, giving away small allotments to George Fox and several other prominent Quaker leaders. Penn’s opportunistic style of business yielded “very substantial” gains, and ultimately, between July 1681 and March 1685, Penn’s associate, Philip Ford documented the sale of 715,000 acres to 589 individuals.⁷⁷⁶ These investors hailed from Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Germany, the Netherlands, and France as well as the English counties of Cheshire, Westmoreland, Wiltshire, and Yorkshire and cities including London and Bristol.⁷⁷⁷ As Harold Donaldson Eberlein has explained, “from the very outset, Pennsylvania was the most polyglot and conglomerate of all the English colonies

⁷⁷³ Alan Taylor, *American Colonies* (Penguin Books, 2001), pp. 264–66.

⁷⁷⁴ William C. Kashatus III, *Historic Philadelphia: The City, Symbols, and Patriots, 1681-1800* (University Press of America, 1992), p. 2.

⁷⁷⁵ William Penn, ‘A Brief Account of the Province of Pennsylvania, Lately Granted by the KING, Under the GREAT Seal of England, TO WILLIAM PENN AND HIS Heirs and Assigns’, p. 6, University of Michigan Digital Library Text Collections.

⁷⁷⁶ Dunn, pp. 324–25; *The Papers of William Penn, Volume 2: 1680-1684*, Ed. Richard S. Dunn, Mary Maples Dunn, Scott M. Wilds, Richard Alan Ryerson, Jean R. Soderlund, Ned C. Landsman (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), p. 630.

⁷⁷⁷ *The Papers of William Penn, Volume 2: 1680-1684*, Ed. Richard S. Dunn, Mary Maples Dunn, Scott M. Wilds, Richard Alan Ryerson, Jean R. Soderlund, Ned C. Landsman, p. 134, 442, 527, 607; Dunn, pp. 324–25; Murphy, p. 649.

or provinces in America”.⁷⁷⁸ In the western half of the colony, past the natural barrier formed by the Appalachian Mountains, extending diagonally across Pennsylvania from present-day Bedford and Fulton counties to the northern bend in the Delaware River, tensions quickly escalated between tight-knit communities of European settlers with “town-making fever” and Iroquoian- and Algonquin-speaking tribes who sought to protect their territories and traditional ways of life.⁷⁷⁹ Yet, still, at the onset of the Imperial Crisis, Pennsylvania offered European settlers a rather communal feel, particularly in the southeastern colonies of Bucks, Chester, Lancaster, and Philadelphia, where settlements developed along cultural lines, and even within the city of Philadelphia itself, which simultaneously offered citizens the economic opportunities of a booming urban port and the interpersonal relationships of a small town.⁷⁸⁰

The city of Philadelphia was founded in 1682, and the urban port quickly became a major hub for settlers, transients, merchants, and mariners. In fact, colonial Philadelphia provides perhaps the most remarkable example of population growth in British North America. By the time that Benjamin Franklin alighted into the urban port in 1723, the young printer found the businesses of bakers, chandlers, soap boilers, and coopers standing amidst tanyards, a brewery, and a slaughterhouse.⁷⁸¹ Likewise, recounting his 1744 visit to a Philadelphia tavern, Dr. Alexander Hamilton observed the “mixed company of different nations and religions”, whereby “Scots, English, Dutch, Germans, and Irish” dined and drank alongside “Roman Catholics, Churchmen, Presbyterians, Quakers, Newlightmen,

⁷⁷⁸ Harold Donaldson Eberlein, *The Architecture of Colonial America* (Little, Brown, 1915), p. 57.

⁷⁷⁹ James P. Myers, Jr., ‘Mapping Pennsylvania’s Western Frontier in 1756’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 123.1/2 (1999), pp. 3–29 (p. 5); James T. Lemon, *The Best Poor Man’s Country: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 143.

⁷⁸⁰ Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 4.

⁷⁸¹ A. Michal McMahon, “Small Matters”: Benjamin Franklin, Philadelphia, and the “Progress of Cities”, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 116.2 (1992), pp. 157–82 (pp. 157–58).

Philadelphia was expanding and diversifying; however, two key themes differentiated Penn's projected provincial haven from the realities of the deeply contoured, rapidly expanding Pennsylvania of the eighteenth century. Each factor contributes to the "syndrome of beliefs" which triggered the feelings of superiority, distrust, injustice, and vulnerability that colored the colonial consciousness during the Imperial Crisis and radicalized Pennsylvanians behind the continental cause.⁷⁸⁵ Firstly, the "nurturing, protective, and collaborative efforts of William Penn" in designing the city of brotherly love were far removed from the ethnopolitical realities of the factional, Quaker-dominated Philadelphia of the early-to-mid eighteenth century.⁷⁸⁶ Indeed, those recruited to migrate to Pennsylvania were led to believe that they had special, innate qualities that would help them to thrive in a province unencumbered by persecution and prejudice. Additionally, westward migration and the competition for land and natural resources that occurred as a consequence induced changing political equations which enormously disrupted the provincial backcountry.

Before delving into the particular ways in which Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect theory can help us to understand the ideological transformations that occurred during the Imperial Crisis in Pennsylvania, it is important to understand the basic innerworkings of eighteenth-century Pennsylvania's religiopolitical makeup. Indeed, in order to be able to understand how (a) Pennsylvania's diverse demographics viewed certain issues from different perspectives without losing the capacity to reorient their previous understandings, (b) patriot leaders like John Dickinson used their profound knowledge of law, philosophy, and religion as well as their resources and connections to engage transclass and transcultural populations in Pennsylvania, and (c) how the strength and momentum of patriot fundamentalist ideas and objectives brought about

⁷⁸⁵ McCauley and Moskalenko, 'Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism', p. 416.

⁷⁸⁶ Alan Tully, *Forming American Politics: Ideals, Interests, and Institutions in Colonial New York and Pennsylvania* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 88.

preference reversal and offered colonists certainty in the rectitude of taking political action against Great Britain, we need to understand Pennsylvania's unique status as a Proprietary colony with an extraordinarily diverse provincial population. Therefore, the following pages outline both Pennsylvania's founding and the religiopolitical structures that were ultimately reformed by the patriot fundamentalist movement.

In part due to the important colonial hub of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was an up-and-coming province, and as the proprietors, the Penn family managed the province's executive affairs and acted as its chief landholders. Thus, in order to maintain and extend the family's influence within British North America, the Penns generally placed Quaker allies and supporters in positions of power.⁷⁸⁷ However, when Thomas Penn became chief proprietor of Pennsylvania in 1746, he quickly introduced a major conflict of interest into Pennsylvania's pre-Revolutionary political landscape.⁷⁸⁸ In favor of utilizing the governor's power to appoint public offices, such as judges and sheriffs, and to regulate investment and speculation in western lands, Penn family supporters established the Proprietary or "Gentlemen's" party, which consisted largely of Philadelphia Presbyterians and Anglicans who denounced Quaker politics and policies. Thomas Penn himself had abandoned the Society of Friends. Not only was he hesitant to preside over new British North American lands with pacifism, but moreover, he and his advisors feared the political ambitions of the Quaker party.⁷⁸⁹ Conservative Pennsylvanians, however, viewed Quaker, or "Old Ticket", politics as being more democratic and more distinctly Pennsylvanian than those of the Proprietary faction, and as such, constituents clung to these provincial foundations, which

⁷⁸⁷ Lorette Tresse, *The Storm Gathering: The Penn Family and the American Revolution* (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 22.

⁷⁸⁸ Foner, p. 57.

⁷⁸⁹ Theodore Thayer, 'The Quaker Party of Pennsylvania, 1755-1765', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 71.1 (1947), pp. 19-43 (pp. 20-21). Some sources also refer to the Proprietary party as the "Presbyterian party" to demonstrate the stark political contrasts between Quaker and non-Quaker voters, particularly in detailing events and processes that took place prior to 1776; however, because its membership was never exclusively Presbyterian, this research will utilize the term "Proprietary party".

ultimately prevented Thomas Penn's party of "gentlemen" from achieving any substantial feats in colonial elections until the 1770s.⁷⁹⁰

For upwards of sixty years, the Society of Friends existed as an almost clannish faith community in Pennsylvania, and they continually secured their dominance within provincial politics with the help of a wealthy merchant class that provided leadership and outreach. Indeed, when William Markham, the lieutenant governor commissioned by William Penn, launched a new frame of government in 1696, competing political factions and ordinary Pennsylvanians were only further excluded from the political arena. Under the new frame, each county elected only two representatives to the Council and four to the Assembly, and the Assembly had the power to introduce new legislation. Moreover, the new frame significantly restricted voting requirements, intentionally excluding a growing number of non-Quakers from participating in the political process. For instance, an eligible voter had to reside in Pennsylvania for two years before being able to vote, and in urban areas, voting requirements were "tightened" to exclude anyone without a fully debt-free estate worth at least fifty British pounds.⁷⁹¹ Thus, due to the Quakers' deepening influence over Pennsylvanian politics, the Assembly possessed a massively inequitable distribution of seats which simultaneously protected the interests of Quaker followers living in the immediate vicinity of Philadelphia and underrepresented Presbyterian and Anglican urbanites as well as a rapidly expanding community of frontier settlers.⁷⁹² Markham's frame of government was consequently adapted and strengthened with the 1701 Charter of Privileges, and by 1730, as Jack P. Greene has calculated, Pennsylvania had the highest ratio of eligible voters to representatives in British

⁷⁹⁰ Benjamin H. Newcomb, 'Effects of the Stamp Act on Colonial Pennsylvania Politics', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 23.2 (1966), pp. 257–72 (p. 258); Chester Raymond Young, 'The Evolution of the Pennsylvania Assembly, 1682-1748', *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 35.2 (1968), pp. 147–68 (p. 151).

⁷⁹¹ Gary B. Nash, *Quakers and Politics: Pennsylvania, 1681-1726* (Northeastern University Press, 1993), pp. 201–3.

⁷⁹² Foner, p. 57.

North America, meaning that whole portions of the provincial population were denied the “free, just and Industrious Colony” that Penn had sold to them.⁷⁹³

Amongst the most politically and geographically excluded demographics were the Ulster Scots and the German-speaking immigrants that flooded into the “new Counties and new Towns” of the Pennsylvania backcountry, “from Philadelphia due west to [the] Susquehanna”.⁷⁹⁴ Ulster Scots were some of the first newly-minted Pennsylvanians to venture into the more mountainous regions of the province, and as such, when later arrivals from Germany constituted additional competition for land and resources, many Ulster immigrants sought to protect and legalize their holdings. White European claims to land, however, meant that the Susquehannock and Lenni Lenape who had long inhabited central Pennsylvania found themselves removed from their lands, often violently and fraudulently, meaning that backcountry feelings of unsettledness and insecurity were universal.⁷⁹⁵ Indeed, as Pennsylvania’s population ballooned from twenty thousand in 1701 to nearly a quarter of a million by the middle of the eighteenth century, we can almost imagine how quickly parcels of land would have disappeared from Pennsylvania’s indigenous communities, changed hands amongst white European settlers, and yielded a competition over land and natural resources so severe as to dominate everyday life on the frontier.⁷⁹⁶ As early as 1732, James

⁷⁹³ Arlin M. Adams and Charles J. Emmerich, ‘William Penn and the American Heritage of Religious Liberty’, *Journal of Law and Religion*, 8.1/2 (1990), pp. 57–70 (p. 68); Jack P. Greene, ‘Legislative Turnover in British America, 1696 to 1775: A Quantitative Analysis’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 38.3 (1981), pp. 442–63 (p. 461); William Penn, ‘A Brief Account of the Province of Pennsylvania in America; Lastly Granted under the Great Seal of England Ro William Penn, &c. Together with the Privileges and Powers Necessary to the Well-Governing Thereof’ (Benjamin Clark, Bookseller in George Yard, Lombard Street, 1681), Evans Early American Imprint Collection.

⁷⁹⁴ ‘Thomas Holme to William Markham, 25 September 1686 in The First Decade in Pennsylvania: Letters of William Markham and Thomas Holme to William Penn: Part I, Ed. Gary B. Nash’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 90.3 (1966), pp. 314–52 (pp. 348–49).

⁷⁹⁵ Patrick Griffin, ‘The People with No Name: Ulster’s Migrants and Identity Formation in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 58.3 (2001), pp. 587–614 (p. 608); Wayne L. Bockleman and Owen S. Ireland, ‘The Internal Revolution in Pennsylvania: An Ethnic-Religious Interpretation’, *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 41.2 (1974), pp. 125–59 (p. 128); Anne M. Ousterhout, *A State Divided: Opposition in Pennsylvania to the American Revolution* (Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 139. For instance, with the 1737 Walking Purchase, the Penn family forced Lenape people to vacate an area of 1,200,000 acres of territory in the Delaware Valley by claiming that a 1686 treaty granted the land to the proprietors.

⁷⁹⁶ Joseph Seymour, *The Pennsylvania Associators 1747-1777* (Westholme Publishing, 2012), p. 24.

Logan warned the Crown in his role as Chief Justice that backcountry anxieties could have the potential to yield remarkable consequences, explaining, “tis very Certain that a present great uneasiness, which in most affairs determines human Choice, will outweigh all the Precepts of Prudence and the most Momentous considerations”.⁷⁹⁷ As such, the fears, anxiety, discrimination, and disappointment that patriot fundamentalist leaders exploited during the Imperial Crisis can be seen as having roots in the first half of the eighteenth century.

Certainly, for many backcountry Pennsylvanians, the rapid rise in immigration stirred fears of impending conflict with Native Americans and further intensified perceptions that individuals on the periphery were swiftly becoming an unacknowledged majority in Pennsylvania politics. In July of 1755, when Major General Braddock’s troops were disastrously defeated by French forces on the banks of the Monongahela, panic was incited amongst the European settlers who had been pouring into the Pennsylvania frontier for a generation.⁷⁹⁸ Tensions soared in the backcountry and colonial clashes with Native Americans grew increasingly violent. While the victories of Chief Pontiac and his warriors failed to yield any long-term security for Native American populations, their attacks upon Fort Pitt and the smaller forts of Venango, LeBoeuf, and Presque Isle highlighted imperial vulnerabilities, effectively forcing each of Pennsylvania’s demographic groups to examine their place and their staying power within the province.⁷⁹⁹

European immigrants who had been attracted to Pennsylvania by William Penn’s promotional tract *Some Account of the Province of Pennsylvania*, which was published in

⁷⁹⁷ James Logan, ‘Of the State of the British Plantations in America’ in “A Quaker Imperialist’s View of the British Colonies in America: 1732” by Joseph E. Johnson, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 60.2 (1936), 97–130 (p. 127).

⁷⁹⁸ David Dixon, *Never Some to Peace Again: Pontiac’s Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), p. 104; Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 267.

⁷⁹⁹ Nathan Kozuskanich, “Falling under the Domination Totally of Presbyterians”: The Paxton Riots and the Coming of the Revolution in Pennsylvania’, in *Pennsylvania’s Revolution*, Ed. by William Pencak (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), pp. 7–35 (p. 11).

England, circulated throughout Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, and quickly translated into Dutch and German to appeal to a wide variety of potential settlers, felt deceived and frightened. They had expected to be valued, respected, and protected as settlers, particularly as Penn suggested incoming provincials would rank among “Some of the wisest men in History”, including “Moses, Joshua and Caleb in Scripture Records”, the “Greeks that Planted many parts of Asia”, and the Romans, who Penn believed “moralized the Manners of the Nations they subjected”, and moreover, they had been promised that new opportunities would allow settlers “to maintain their Families and portion their Children”.⁸⁰⁰ Similar to the Puritan settlers of Massachusetts, the families and individuals who immigrated to Pennsylvania felt almost as though their personal qualities had preordained them for virtue and success in the North America. Instead, however, apprehension and unsettledness were ubiquitous in the Pennsylvania backcountry, and as frontier settlements were extraordinarily remote and removed from the provincial government, they lacked any physical access to the authorities capable of granting assistance or relief. Backcountry counties like Cumberland and York tended to be larger than older counties such as Bucks and Chester, and as Matthew C. Ward has emphasized, local county and township offices seemed almost as unreachable as Philadelphia, to which a return journey could easily have taken two weeks for a settler in Cumberland County.⁸⁰¹ That is to say, in addition to the ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic differences that distinguished urban and rural Pennsylvanians in the eighteenth century, backcountry dwellers were physically sequestered from provincial policymakers in Philadelphia. In comparison to Massachusetts, which was predominantly Puritan and physically removed from the physical engagements of the Seven Years’ War, Pennsylvania’s

⁸⁰⁰ *William Penn and the Founding of Pennsylvania: A Documentary History*, Ed. Jean R. Soderlund (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 58.

⁸⁰¹ Matthew C. Ward, ‘The “Peaceable Kingdom” Destroyed: The Seven Years’ War and the Transformation of the Pennsylvania Backcountry’, *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 74.3 (2007), pp. 247–79 (p. 250).

various cultures and faith communities experienced the financial and religiopolitical fallout of the conflict firsthand, which ultimately pushed Pennsylvanians to contemplate their role in political matters, re-evaluate the efficacy of their contemporary decision-makers, and pursue nonviolent civil resistance during the decade preceding the Declaration of Independence.⁸⁰²

However, the ideological evolutions that took place in Pennsylvania's backcountry between the 1750s and 1776 were remarkably incremental. Pennsylvanians in general, but particularly those living on the frontier, needed the growth afforded by time, leadership, and trial and error in order to be able to articulate their chief grievances, cohesively work to address their concerns, and crystallize their beliefs and values. Indeed, because frontier cultures were so vastly diverse and so unfamiliar with Pennsylvania's political makeup, they needed the unifying effects of a resistance-based social movement, including an identifiable opposition, a strong and capable leadership pool, and precise parameters to guide, limit, and legitimize their resistance efforts, before they could efficiently adopt any long-term sociopolitical changes. Accordingly, before we work to understand how Pennsylvania's frontier transitioned from a splintered and politically inactive society into a more integrated and politically participatory people, it is important to explore some of the factors and characteristics that made these immigrant cultures so different, including their belief systems, the ways in which they migrated, and the ideals, practices, and traditions that they carried with them from their homelands.

Propelled by Ulster's lack of land availability and religious tolerance, a steady and sizeable flow of Scots Irish migrants made their way to Pennsylvania during the early years of the eighteenth century. The first major wave of Scots Irish migration began in 1710, as servants, free people, and refugees flooded through the ports of Philadelphia and nearby New

⁸⁰² Anne M. Ousterhout, *A State Divided: Opposition in Pennsylvania to the American Revolution* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 229.

Castle, Delaware.⁸⁰³ An additional surge in Ulster Scots migration occurred following the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 and the systematic eviction of tenant farmers and tradesmen from the Scottish Highlands during the Highland Clearances, which took place intermittently from 1750 until the mid-nineteenth century.⁸⁰⁴ Of those Protestant migrants, three out of four individuals chose to settle in Pennsylvania, often venturing to the western areas of Chester County and settling along the shores of the Susquehanna River. According to Patrick Griffin, the Ulster Scots community gradually drifted westward into the present-day counties of Dauphin and Lancaster, cutting through “vacant land” and along woodland paths previously forged by Native Americans and traders, which could barely accommodate a horse.⁸⁰⁵ Indeed, Henry Melchior Muhlenberg remarked that “some thousands of acres” were likely to have belonged to one single homestead on the frontier, with the closest neighbor “some further miles on”.⁸⁰⁶




Figure 4: Map of the Pennsylvania backcountry during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) taken from *Breaking the Back Country: Seven Years War in Virginia and Pennsylvania 1754-1765* by Matthew C. Ward, p. xi

⁸⁰³ Marianne S. Wokeck, ‘Searching for Land: The Role of New Castle, Delaware, 1720s-1770s’, in *Ulster to America: The Scots Irish Migration Experience, 1680–1830*, Ed. Warren R. Hofstra (University of Tennessee Press, 2012), p. 25.

⁸⁰⁴ Seymour, p. 23; Jerome Pasto and Pritam S. Dhillon, ‘Farm Production Trends in Pennsylvania to 1960’, *Penn State Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin*, 693, 1962, pp. 4–10 (p. 7).

⁸⁰⁵ Patrick Griffin, ‘The People with No Name: Ulster’s Migrants and Identity Formation in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania’, pp. 593–94.

⁸⁰⁶ ‘Henry Melchior Muhlenberg Quoted in *Image and Counterimage, Tradition and Expectation: The German Immigrants in English Colonial Society in Pennsylvania, 1700-1765* by Hermann Wellenreuther’, in *America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred Year History -- Immigration, Language, Ethnicity*, Ed. Frank Trommler, Joseph McVeigh, I, 85–105 (p. 90).

In an attempt to cope with the physical and emotional challenges posed by life on the frontier, many Ulster Scots endeavored to adapt their Old-World traditions and reinvent the Protestant-based religious practices of Scottish origin that had sustained them in Ireland on the eve of migration.⁸⁰⁷ From the 1730s onwards, however, the debate surrounding the Great Awakening only served to fragment the Presbyterian church, ushering in a bitter contest between the Old and New Light divisions. While Old Light ministers clung to the customs and practices that colored Old World Christianity and sought to establish the church as a source of traditional stability for the Scots Irish community, a younger group of Ulster migrants including Gilbert Tennent questioned the earnestness of the Old Light sect, frequently expressing profound doubt for their commitment to God.⁸⁰⁸ Indeed, New Light Presbyterians embraced the spirited nature of Great Awakening revivalism and distanced themselves from what they began to view as antiquated and disingenuous worship. Not unlike his close friend George Whitefield, Tennent warned his fellow New Light Presbyterians of the dangers of a “dead ministry”, advocated for the sincere and rigorous pursuit of God’s will, and implored his followers to “bear [the Old Light sect’s] unjust censures with Christian meekness and persevere”.⁸⁰⁹ Via both the spoken and the written word, Tennent often likened anti-revivalists to the biblical Pharisees that Jesus Christ condemned as “hypocrites” and painted both groups as enemies to Christianity, which is to say that the rhetoric of redemption had been circulating throughout the Pennsylvania frontier decades prior to the passage of the

⁸⁰⁷ Robert Garland, ‘The Scotch-Irish in Western Pennsylvania’, 1923, pp. 65–105 (pp. 91–92); Patrick Griffin, ‘The People with No Name: Ulster’s Migrants and Identity Formation in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania’, p. 589.

⁸⁰⁸ Patrick Griffin, ‘The People with No Name: Ulster’s Migrants and Identity Formation in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania’, p. 611.

⁸⁰⁹ William Buell Sprague, *Annals of the American Pulpit; Or, Commemorative Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of Various Denominations, From the Early Settlement of the Country to the Close of the Year Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-Five* (Robert Carter and Brothers, 1858), p. 40; Gilbert Tennent, ‘The Danger of an Unconverted Ministry, Considered in a Sermon on Mark VI. 34’ (Philadelphia: Benjamin Franklin, in Market Street, 1740), Library of Congress.

Stamp Act.⁸¹⁰ Indeed, in working to open backcountry eyes to the sinfulness of humanity, the necessity of spiritual redemption, and the critical relationship between religion and human emotion, the New Light Presbyterians of the 1730s and 1740s fueled a spiritual fervor not unlike that observed by Hood, Hill, and Williamson amongst modern-day fundamentalist organizations.⁸¹¹ While the impacts of the Great Awakening are generally seen to be more noteworthy in New England, where evangelicalism seemingly enveloped the region, the seventeen-year split between Old and New Light Presbyterians did impart upon Pennsylvania a religiopolitical language centered on liberty, virtue, and Christian obligation that was reframed to amplify pleas for political change during the Imperial Crisis.

Admittedly, in comparison to both New England Puritans and the German-speaking demographics that later made their way to the “dark and lonely wood” of the Pennsylvania frontier, backcountry Ulster Scots were generally less devout in their religious practices and more poorly educated.⁸¹² In fact, Alan Tully has determined that Ulster Scots immigrants were likely the least literate immigrant demographic in Pennsylvania during the decades preceding American independence.⁸¹³ Thought to be well-suited to the inhabiting of such profoundly remote lands, these individuals were expected to be rather autonomous, and as opposed to travelling in nuclear family units, the chief demographic within these migratory Ulster Scots tended to be single men with no dependents.⁸¹⁴ Moreover, these men were living in utter poverty, and such an extreme lack of means created a tumultuous environment plagued by drunkenness and lawlessness, which threatened the stability of their settlements.

⁸¹⁰ Gilbert Tennent, ‘The Righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, Considered in a Sermon on Matthew V. 20’ (Boston: J. Draper for D. Henchman, in Cornhill, 1741), Evans Early American Imprint Collection; *The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments: The New International Version*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2011), *Matthew 23:13*.

⁸¹¹ Hood, Jr., Hill, and Williamson, pp. 50–51.

⁸¹² *Notes and Queries: Historical, Biographical, and Genealogical, Relating Chiefly to Interior Pennsylvania*, Ed. William Henry Egle (Harrisburg Publishing Company, 1895), II, p. 370, Internet Archive.

⁸¹³ Alan Tully, ‘Literacy Rates and Educational Development in Rural Pennsylvania, 1729-1775’, *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 39.3 (1972), pp. 301–12 (p. 312).

⁸¹⁴ Ridner, *The Scots Irish of Pennsylvania: A Varied People*, p. 6.

For instance, taverns far outnumbered meetinghouses on the frontier, and although settlements such as Donegal did possess a skilled blue-collar cohort, which included tanners, carpenters, smiths, and weavers in addition to general laborers of lesser skills, very few could command cash for their labor and were typically reduced to bartering for compensation from services rendered.⁸¹⁵ Thus, not only were backcountry Ulster Scots physically remote and removed from metropolitan Philadelphia, but they were also statistically less likely to possess the opportunities and comforts that often accompany spiritual, educational, and familial routines and connections. The absence of familial dependents, financial security, and economic opportunity contributed to the fact that backcountry Ulster Scots were prone to political violence. Indeed, as McCauley and Moskalenko have explained, individuals and groups that neglect to have certain responsibilities or obligations to honor are more likely to seek violent means to ends, and in this case, when Pennsylvania's Ulster Scots were living in a general state of insecurity, violent clashes with Native Americans did ensue.⁸¹⁶

Although Pennsylvanians had enjoyed relative peace with the province's native populations prior to 1745, frontier dwellers had long expressed concerns over the "defenseless state of the backcountry".⁸¹⁷ For instance, one Paxtang resident wrote to his brother in the Spring of 1733 to confess his "fear", predicting that neighboring indigenous tribes "intend to give us a good deal of trouble, and may do us a great deal of harm".⁸¹⁸

Speaking to Pennsylvania's territorial tensions, Benjamin Franklin published *Plain Truth: Or Serious Considerations on the Present State of the City of Philadelphia and the Province of*

⁸¹⁵ Patrick Griffin, 'The People with No Name: Ulster's Migrants and Identity Formation in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania', p. 596.

⁸¹⁶ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, *Friction: How Conflict Radicalizes Them and Us* (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 83–85.

⁸¹⁷ R.S. Stephenson, 'Pennsylvania Provincial Soldiers in the Seven Years' War', *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, Pennsylvania at War, 1754-1765, 62.2 (1995), pp. 196–212 (p. 198); Alden T. Vaughan, 'Frontier Banditti and the Indians: The Paxton Boys' Legacy, 1763-1775', *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 51.1 (1984), pp. 1–29 (p. 1).

⁸¹⁸ 'James Magraw to John Magraw, 21 May 1733', in *Notes and Queries: Historical, Biographical, and Genealogical, Relating Chiefly to Interior Pennsylvania*, Ed. William Henry Egle (Harrisburg Publishing Company, 1895), II.

Pennsylvania. Certainly, Franklin had no way of knowing the impacts that his words would have upon political attitudes in Pennsylvania during the following decades. However, *Plain Truth* vocalized the provincial longing for safety and governmental “Succour” or aid, setting out an important element of the colonial expectations toward imperial authorities and their responsibilities to North American that were echoed by the patriot fundamentalist movement throughout the Imperial Crisis.⁸¹⁹

Franklin, who was a staunch Quaker at the time of the pamphlet’s 1747 publication, asserted, “*Protection* is as truly due from the Government to the People, as *Obedience* from the People to the Government,” and equally, he condemned the Assembly for putting “their religious Scruples” ahead of the physical wellbeing of their fellow Pennsylvanians.⁸²⁰ By invoking classical case studies from the time of Caesar and employing Biblical teachings from the Book of Judges, Franklin worked to bolster his claims that rural Pennsylvanians were justified in their desire to prevent the “deserting of Plantations, Ruin, Bloodshed and Confusion” in the backcountry. Moreover, Franklin called for unity amongst Pennsylvania’s diverse demographics, explaining that “without Connection”, the province would remain “without Strength”.⁸²¹ Thus, in order for American mobilization to be successful, the latent political weaknesses and deep fracture lines that hampered Pennsylvanian collectivization in the decades prior to the passage of the Stamp Act would need to be overcome, with provincials echoing Franklin’s claims about the intersections between the authority of God, the law of nature, and the processes of government and accepting that “Every man is bound,

⁸¹⁹ Benjamin Franklin, ‘Plain Truth: Or, Serious Considerations on the Present State of the City of Philadelphia and Province of Pennsylvania. By a Tradesman of Philadelphia’, 1747, Evans Early American Imprint Collection.

⁸²⁰ Franklin, ‘Plain Truth: Or, Serious Considerations on the Present State of the City of Philadelphia and Province of Pennsylvania. By a Tradesman of Philadelphia’; Kozuskanich, “‘Falling under the Domination Totally of Presbyterians’: The Paxton Riots and the Coming of the Revolution in Pennsylvania’, p. 9.

⁸²¹ Franklin, ‘Plain Truth: Or, Serious Considerations on the Present State of the City of Philadelphia and Province of Pennsylvania. By a Tradesman of Philadelphia’.

by the law of nature, not only to preserve his own life, liberty, and property; but also, that of others, so far as he can”.⁸²²

In the wake of the Seven Years’ War, the preexisting ethnic and religious tensions that divided Pennsylvanian society were heightened, and frontier dwellers struggled with the relationship-related loss of significance that came with having their personal responsibilities, relationships, or property are threatened or removed as a result of Parliamentary, Proprietary, and Quaker politics.⁸²³ The “condition of affairs in [the] free, strange country” of the Pennsylvania frontier meant that backcountry dwellers felt stuck “in a pretty poor situation”, and a lack of governmental intervention made rural Pennsylvanians feel unimportant, inferior, and neglected by the British empire.⁸²⁴ The Enlightenment-era emphasis on the rediscovery of British values, culture, and language seemed to push backcountry dwellers further into the provincial margins, and rural migrant communities struggled to “come to grips with their new environment”.⁸²⁵ In turn, backcountry settlers clung to the comfort and familiarity offered by the “chain of migration of friends and kin”, which ultimately strengthened their ethnic trust networks and inhibited their assimilation into the broader provincial culture.⁸²⁶ By insulating themselves into their traditional ethnic groups and trust networks during the first half of the eighteenth century, rural Pennsylvanians not only denied themselves the space to develop more distinctly North American identities, but moreover,

⁸²² John Goodlet, *A Vindication of the Associate Synod upon the Head of Their Principles about the Present Civil Government* (David Patterson, Lawnmarket, 1764), p. 9, National Library of Scotland, Antiquarian Books of Scotland; Nathan Kozuskanich, ‘Pennsylvania, the Militia, and the Second Amendment’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 133.2 (2009), pp. 119–47 (p. 133).

⁸²³ Vaughan, p. 1; Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski, p. 820; Smith and others, p. 203; Kruglanski and others, p. 74.

⁸²⁴ Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, *The Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg*, Ed. Theodore G. Tappert and John W. Doberstein, 3 vols (The Muhlenberg Press, 1942), I, p. 101; Theophile Cazenove, *Cazenove Journal 1794: A Record of the Journey of Theophile Cazenove through New Jersey and Pennsylvania*, Ed. Rayner Wickersham Kelsey (The Pennsylvania History Press, 1922), p. 32.

⁸²⁵ Hermann Wellenreuther, ‘Image and Counterimage, Tradition and Expectation: The German Immigrants in English Colonial Society in Pennsylvania, 1700-1765’, in *America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred Year History -- Immigration, Language, Ethnicity*, Ed. Frank Trommler, Joseph McVeigh, I, 85–105 (p. 93).

⁸²⁶ Ridner, *The Scots Irish of Pennsylvania: A Varied People*, p. 37; Tilly, ‘Trust Networks in Transnational Migration’, pp. 5–6.

they gradually developed an intraprovince “us versus them” mentality, whereby ingroup divides were highlighted through social, cultural, and religious othering.⁸²⁷ For instance, rather than united as marginalized members of one frontier community, German Lutheran Conrad Weiser described the Catholic population as “the worst subjects, and worst of neighbors,” while Anglican priest William Smith described the “barbarian ignorance” of the German community.⁸²⁸ Yet, all backcountry dwellers who failed to meet Quaker voting requirements were vulnerable to real marginalization at the hands of established governmental institutions.

Although it may not have been immediately recognizable to the frontier’s competing sociocultural groups, they all longed for either the imperial regime, the Proprietors, or the Quaker government to provide Pennsylvanians with a strong and uniting governmental leadership that allowed provincials day-to-day autonomy, but also guided frontier communities as they grappled with conceptions of self-defense and security, shifting population structures, and a general absence of economic opportunity.⁸²⁹ At this point, however, fraternal deprivation, meaning the position of some backcountry groups in relation to other backcountry groups or urban populations, did not allow certain frontier groups to see past their own perceptions of injustice enough to facilitate collective action, as has sometimes been the case for different minority groups.⁸³⁰ A likely cause of the fragmentation in group perceptions stems from the fact that frontier communities lacked a definitive enemy prior to

⁸²⁷ Sophia Moskalenko, ‘What Do a Red Triangle, 14 Words, and 88 Ads Have in Common?’, *Friction*, 2020.

⁸²⁸ ‘Traditions of Bally, 1741-1941, Ed. Reverend Leo Gregory Fink’, in *The Woodstock Letters, Vol. 70, No. 3*, 1941, pp. 350–62 (p. 357); Richard H. Shyrock, ‘The Pennsylvania Germans in American History’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 63.3, pp. 261–81 (p. 262).

⁸²⁹ Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 257.

⁸³⁰ Walter Garrison Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth Century Britain* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 9–10; Donald M. Taylor and others, ‘Disadvantaged Group Responses to Perceived Inequality: From Passive Acceptance to Collective Action’, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 127.3 (1987), pp. 259–72 (p. 260); Fathali M. Moghaddam, ‘The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration’, *American Psychologist*, 60.2 (2005), pp. 161–69 (p. 163); Joanne Martin, Philip Brickman, and Alan Murray, ‘Moral Outrage and Pragmatism: Explanations for Collective Action’, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 20.5 (1984), pp. 484–96 (pp. 485–86).

the onset of the Imperial Crisis. As neither the Quaker party, the Proprietary family, nor the imperial regime offered real relief for backcountry struggles, Pennsylvania's divided frontier communities were not necessarily able to associate specific grievances with specific governmental shortcomings under the "common enemy effect" in the way that provincials could following the passage of the Stamp Act.⁸³¹

Although this chapter examines the ideological foundations of Pennsylvania's path to patriot fundamentalism, case studies provided by the province's backcountry showcase the interconnectedness of motive and mobilization. Applying the composite mobilizational approach proposed by this research to the conditions of the pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania backcountry reveals how divided the province was and how ill-prepared colonists were for revolution. Prior to the organizational efforts that emerged during the Stamp Act resistance, Pennsylvanians lacked purpose-built associations to represent and efficiently promote their political interests. Indeed, backcountry dwellers in particular had no access to the elite political leaders or opportunities that ultimately lent ideological and mobilizational structure to the patriot fundamentalist movement and no connective structures that might have allowed for a united response to backcountry instability.⁸³² As Tilly has observed in other political struggles, the instinct of front Pennsylvanians was to react based on the that were seemingly available to them and either wait for political leaders to provide some sort of respite or to take matters into their own hands by displaying physical force.⁸³³ Certainly, backcountry Pennsylvanians in 1763 did not have the means to consider how their actions might impact the broader political structure in the long-term. Instead, they were concerned with the

⁸³¹ Hans Haller and Britta Hoyer, 'The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 162 (2019), pp. 146–63 (pp. 146–47).

⁸³² Tarrow, p. 16.

⁸³³ Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40.

immediate need to secure a better, safer way of life for themselves and their closest connections.⁸³⁴

The Ulster Scots population felt that the realities of the backcountry called for rapid and direct political action, particularly as the frontier's extreme seclusion, meant that backcountry communities found themselves quite literally beyond the reach of both the broader Pennsylvanian society and provincial law itself.⁸³⁵ Due to external threats from Native American populations and competing ethnic groups as well as a lack of internal support provided an accelerant for the political mobilization of Ulster Scots. Indeed, as a result of the events and outcomes of the French and Indian War, Scots Irish Presbyterians were compelled not only to demonstrate their community's full recovery from the division wrought by the Great Awakening, but also to outwardly challenge the social and spatial boundaries of colonial Pennsylvania.⁸³⁶ With the encouragement of Presbyterian minister John Elder, the settlement at Paxtang established two companies of militiamen, and by the summer of 1763, armed frontiersmen began to patrol the Pennsylvania backcountry.⁸³⁷

It was this "frontier banditti" that produced the Paxton Boys, a group of 110 men who determined to resolve backcountry insecurity without the aid or approval of any governing body.⁸³⁸ The violent insurgency exercised by the Paxton Boys, as a population that lacked the knowledge, skills, and means for more effective communication, seemed like a "logical" way to advertise their fears and resentments and act in their own interests.⁸³⁹ Indeed, the Paxtonian

⁸³⁴ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

⁸³⁵ Bockleman and Ireland, p. 142; Patrick Griffin, 'The People with No Name: Ulster's Migrants and Identity Formation in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania', p. 596.

⁸³⁶ Theodore Thayer, *Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776* (Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1953), p. 100.

⁸³⁷ Scott Paul Gordon, 'The Paxton Boys and the Moravians: Terror and Faith in the Pennsylvania Backcountry', *Journal of Moravian History*, 14.2 (2014), pp. 119–51 (p. 120).

⁸³⁸ 'Thomas Gage to John Penn, 10 March 1766', in *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, Ed. Samuel Hazard*, 16 vols (T. Fenn & Co., 1831), IX, p. 307.

⁸³⁹ Schmid and de Graaf, pp. 51–53; Hoffman, pp. 131–32; Crenshaw, p. 28; Nacos, pp. 17–18.

perception of being humiliated, rejected, ignored, and actively endangered by the provincial and imperial government's consistent dismissal of frontier requests to "get some guns" increased the levels of deprivation and frustration that rural Pennsylvanians were experiencing, which, in turn, led some groups of colonists to test governmental boundaries and assess the relative costs of hardline militant violence.⁸⁴⁰ The Paxtonian argument maintained that citizens could justifiably take matters into their own hands when civic boundaries were violated, and approaching territorial disputes with Native Americans with vigor and callousness, the Paxton Boys worked to convince themselves and outside observers that violence and brutality directed toward indigenous populations was "justified as revenge against lying, blood-thirsty 'Indians'".⁸⁴¹ Notoriously, this heightened desire for political engagement and assertion of governmental autonomy translated into the Paxton Boys' horrific December 1763 massacre of the Susquehannock tribe, whereby the Paxton Boys, enraged and self-excused by wartime anxieties and uncertainties, organized to theatrically murder, mutilate, and wipe out all remnants of an entire tribe in not one, but two orchestrations of politically motivated violence.⁸⁴²

Few were willing to outwardly condone the inhumanity displayed during the Conestoga Massacre, and provincials of all backgrounds recognized the inhumanity, illegitimacy, and illegality of the Paxtonian methodology. Indeed, as we have with other acts and representations of group violence, such as the Red Brigades' kidnapping of Italian politician Aldo Moro, some observers sided with the victims, some identified with the struggles of the perpetrators, and yet others looked to official and quasi-official political

⁸⁴⁰ 'James Magraw to John Magraw, 21 May 1733', II; Ives and Lewis, pp. 959–60.

⁸⁴¹ Jeremy Engels, "'Equipped for Murder': The Paxton Boys and 'the Spirit of Killing All Indians' in Pennsylvania, 1763-1764", *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, 8.3 (2005), pp. 355–81 (p. 357).

⁸⁴² Judith Ridner, 'Unmasking the Paxton Boys: The Material Culture of the Pamphlet War', *Early American Studies*, 14.2 (2016), pp. 348–76 (p. 350).

leaders who they knew to prioritize law and offer guidance.⁸⁴³ Benjamin Franklin, the first person to speak out formally and publicly against the Paxton Boys' attack upon the "poor defenseless Creatures...[who] were stabbed and hatcheted to Death!", condemned Paxtonian actions as a direct violation of the legal conventions through which governments maintained sovereignty within their territories. Additionally, Franklin recalled the longstanding friendship between English settlers and the Susquehannocks, and he reprinted two proclamations from Governor John Penn reaffirming the historically peaceable nature of Pennsylvania's indigenous populations and the heinousness of the Paxton Boys' actions.⁸⁴⁴ The Conestoga Massacre and Franklin's *Narrative of the Late Massacres* critically spawned a "vigorous though transient" array of articles, pamphlets, and broadsides through which provincial authors debated the nature and limits of British authority in North America.⁸⁴⁵

The violence exercised by the Paxtonian collective stands in stark juxtaposition to the organized, coordinated, peaceable noncooperation that was exercised by patriot resisters during the Imperial Crisis. Moreover, the level of criminality that surrounds the Conestoga Massacre far outweighs the incidents of harassment and property damage that occurred in the colonies between 1764 and 1776, specifically as race played a central role in this vigilante violence.⁸⁴⁶ This horrific episode of frontier violence lends us definitional clarity by contrasting the types of violence that certain eighteenth-century groups deemed appropriate against the types of nonviolent resistance in which British North Americans more broadly engaged.⁸⁴⁷ Both the Paxton Boys and the participants of the Stamp Act riots exhibited

⁸⁴³ Schmid and de Graaf, pp. 51–53.

⁸⁴⁴ Franklin, XI; John Smolenski, 'Murder on the Margins: The Paxton Massacre and the Remaking of Sovereignty in Colonial Pennsylvania', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 19 (2015), pp. 513–38 (pp. 518–19).

⁸⁴⁵ Vaughan, p. 2; Smolenski, 'Murder on the Margins: The Paxton Massacre and the Remaking of Sovereignty in Colonial Pennsylvania', p. 514.

⁸⁴⁶ Gilje, pp. 94–100; Robinson, pp. 9–11.

⁸⁴⁷ *The Boston Evening-Post*, 21 August 1769, 1769th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.; Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America* (Viking Press, 1992), p. 48.

violent overstep against which the developing resistance movement could push. By condemning these early examples of violent political action as a delegitimizing force, the activists who later provided structure and legal maneuvering for the patriot fundamentalist movement asserted nonviolent civil resistance as “the *only* effectual means” to protect American interests.⁸⁴⁸ Provincials began to articulate a new vision of government which demanded adequate political representation and safety from external threats.⁸⁴⁹ Pennsylvania’s political leaders were not only confronted with the expectation of physical security, but also the basic human longing for border, economic, financial, food, personal, and political security.

John Dickinson appealed to the Paxton Boys in a “Letter to the Inhabitants of the Frontiers” that, while undated, historians estimate to have been drafted in response to the Paxtonians’ *Declaration and Remonstrance*.⁸⁵⁰ As Jane Calvert has explained, with the aim of thwarting further political violence, Dickinson bypassed the trend of condemning Paxtonian actions and instead offered the vigilante group recognition and sympathy with “a degree of disingenuousness”. Introducing himself as a “sincere Friend”, Dickinson bridged the gap between Quaker pacifism and Presbyterian direct action by proclaiming to the Paxton Boys, “Your Zeal is Noble” and simultaneously outlining the consequences of future attacks upon Pennsylvania’s indigenous populations.⁸⁵¹ Most notably, Dickinson emphasized that further bloodshed was not only contradictory to natural, civil, and divine law, but also, that it could give Great Britain an excuse to establish a standing army in Pennsylvania, which would

⁸⁴⁸ Alexander Hamilton, ‘A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress’, 1774, Founders Online National Archives.

⁸⁴⁹ Smolenski, ‘Murder on the Margins: The Paxton Massacre and the Remaking of Sovereignty in Colonial Pennsylvania’, p. 517; Kozuskanich, “Falling under the Domination Totally of Presbyterians”: The Paxton Riots and the Coming of the Revolution in Pennsylvania’, pp. 8–14.

⁸⁵⁰ John Dickinson quoted in, ‘Letters to Farmers in Pennsylvania: John Dickinson Writes to the Paxton Boys’ by Jane E. Calvert, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 136.4 (2012), 475–77 (p. 475).

⁸⁵¹ John Dickinson quoted in ‘Letters to Farmers in Pennsylvania: John Dickinson Writes to the Paxton Boys’ by Jane E. Calvert, pp. 475–76.

certainly compromise colonial liberty and autonomy. Although Dickinson's seventeen-page *Letter* to the Paxton Boys has been "hidden in plain view" until recently, it serves as an important piece of evidence to suggest that Dickinson and his patriot peers not only understood the basic social psychological needs of British North Americans, but employed those understandings as a means of tactically mobilizing popular opinion to pursue nonviolent means to ends.⁸⁵²

The violence conducted by the Paxton Boys failed to garner a direct, participatory government or provincially funded protective forces to keep peace between indigenous and settler communities, and moreover, the "lawless" nature of their behaviors only hindered the perceptions of backcountry Pennsylvanians maintained by both the Crown and the provincial government.⁸⁵³ The illegal, aggressive force employed by the Ulster Scots fringe group did, however, provide a critical lesson for the individuals who went on to lead the patriot fundamentalist movement, as it demonstrated to Pennsylvanians firstly that violence was neither productive nor sustainable, and additionally, that minority-organized incidents of assault, destruction, and vandalism only served to garner negative attention.⁸⁵⁴ A sort of middle ground emerged from Pennsylvanians who seemingly understood the counterproductivity of political violence, yet also empathized with the uncertainties of war and political turmoil that colored the province in the early 1760s.

This precise sentiment ultimately proved critical to future nonviolent leaders, who seemingly recognized the critical nature of security, both as a functional necessity and an innate desire, particularly amongst disadvantaged and downtrodden communities with access

⁸⁵² John Dickinson quoted in 'Letters to Farmers in Pennsylvania: John Dickinson Writes to the Paxton Boys' by Jane E. Calvert, p. 475.

⁸⁵³ T.W. Moody, 'The Ulster Scots in Colonial and Revolutionary America: Part II', *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, 34.134 (1945), pp. 211–21 (p. 217); Schmid and de Graaf, pp. 15–16; Crenshaw, p. 28.

⁸⁵⁴ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 6–7.

to physical resources and numbers.⁸⁵⁵ Indeed, throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, these burgeoning patriot fundamentalists worked to address the backcountry grievances that “lay with the governor, the Assembly, and, most of all, Quakers”, and play upon the themes of defense, underrepresentation, and Quaker favoritism in the political arena.⁸⁵⁶ Thus, while T.W. Moody has asserted that the “Ulster-Scottish contribution to American, independence was in the field of action, not in the field of thought,” in actuality, the action taken by Scots Irish settlers prior to the Imperial Crisis not only exposed the ways in which lines of authority crossed confusingly in Pennsylvania and helped to highlight the unique challenges and difficulties associated with imperial claims to political authority in North America, but additionally underscored the delegitimizing power of political violence.⁸⁵⁷ Moreover, the violence perpetrated by the Paxton Boys speaks to the different dynamics of Pennsylvania’s colonial structures and offers us an example of early American dissidence against which we can push to find clarity and definition in the nonviolent resistance practiced by American colonists during the Imperial Crisis.

By contrast, the migration patterns, attitudes toward redress, and linguistic qualities that characterized the equally marginalized German-speaking communities on the frontier suggest that the Susquehanna Valley’s so-called “Pennsylvania Dutch” adjusted to the realities of provincial life with greater subtlety than their Scots Irish peers. For instance, Pennsylvania’s German-speaking communities were generally more religious, preferred to remain more insular in the face of frontier chaos, and traditionally supported the Quaker regime. That is to say that while German-speaking communities were equally forced to make personal, familial, social, cultural, and political adaptations and compromises, built in trust

⁸⁵⁵ Eli Jelly-Schapiro, ‘Security: The Long History’, *Journal of American Studies*, 47.3 (2013), pp. 801–26 (p. 804).

⁸⁵⁶ Jane T. Merritt, *At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700–1763* (University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 288; Brooke Hindle, ‘The March of the Paxton Boys’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3.4 (1946), pp. 461–86 (p. 483).

⁸⁵⁷ Moody, p. 219.

networks and well-established practices helped them to maintain more normative provincial behaviors.⁸⁵⁸ As a result, however, Pennsylvania's German speakers have traditionally been a rather undervalued component of colonial Pennsylvania's historiography, and where previous scholarship has simplified the experiences of German-speaking migrants as byproducts of the clash between Quaker ideals and the realities of life of the frontier, scholars have missed the opportunity to explain how any colonial resistance campaign, including the patriot fundamentalist movement, had to be inclusive enough to engage activists from a variety of religiopolitical groups.

Numbers alone make Pennsylvania's German-speaking demographics worthy of consideration in the examination of provincial patriot ideologies, as in the decades preceding American Independence, German speakers emigrating to Pennsylvania became the largest group of non-British citizens to enter North America.⁸⁵⁹ The majority of incoming Germans and German-speaking immigrants arrived via the Port of Philadelphia, and from 1730 to 1760, they accounted for nearly thirty percent of the population growth in the Middle Colonies during that time.⁸⁶⁰ Of the thirty thousand Germans who set sail for the eastern seaboard during the 1750s, approximately three-quarters settled in the Pennsylvanian counties of Northampton, Berks, Dauphin, Lancaster, and York, and on the eve of the Revolutionary War, Pennsylvania was between one-third and three-fifths German-speaking.⁸⁶¹ In fact, the influx of *Pfälzer*, *Württembergers*, and *Hessen* led Benjamin Franklin

⁸⁵⁸ Oswald Seidensticker, 'William Penn's Travels in Holland and Germany in 1677', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 2.3, pp. 237–82 (p. 281); Arthur Dundore Graeff, *The Relations Between the Pennsylvania Germans and the British Authorities (1750-1776)* (Norristown Herald Printers, 1939), pp. 104–6.

⁸⁵⁹ Daniel Jay Grimminger and Don Yoder, *Sacred Song and the Pennsylvania Dutch* (University of Rochester Press, 2012), p. 1.

⁸⁶⁰ Farley Grubb, 'German Immigration to Pennsylvania, 1709 to 1820', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 20.3, pp. 417–36 (p. 417).

⁸⁶¹ Jon Butler, *Becoming America: The Revolution Before 1776* (Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 29–30; Nancy Van Dolsen and Sally McMurry, *Architecture and Landscape of the Pennsylvania Germans, 1720-1920* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), p. 3; John B. Frantz, 'Franklin and the Pennsylvania Germans', *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, Benjamin Franklin and His Enemies, 65.1 (1998), pp.

to predict as early as March 1751 that Pennsylvania would “in a few Years become a German Colony”.⁸⁶² Yet, the historical significance of the Pennsylvania “Dutch” role in the American resistance movement extends beyond mere statistics and speaks to the ability of American nonviolent leaders in combining rhetoric, practice, and outreach to mobilize different ethnic groups.

To attract the participation of those who spoke German in the home, read German newspapers, and worshipped using German Bibles and hymnals, or at least to nullify German association with the Quaker faction, the nonviolent messaging of the patriot fundamentalist movement needed to extend beyond simple rhetoric. That is not to say that the rhetorical and ideological foundations of nonviolent civil resistance carried little weight in German-speaking communities, but rather, observing the practices of voting, petitioning, and boycotting helped to lend meaning and context to the *Gewaltlosigkeit* (nonviolence) in the context of the Imperial Crisis. As linguist Sally McConnell-Ginet has concluded, socially structured practices, which give meaning and power to otherwise “impotent” words, have helped to build, explain, and demonstrate identity in a variety of social movement settings, ranging from the American Civil Rights Movement or second-wave feminism to more recent pushes for LGBTQIA+ rights.⁸⁶³

Incoming German speakers, who were often generalized as “Dutch” rather than *Deutsch*, “emigrated chiefly from the Palatinate, from Alsace, Swabia, Saxony and Switzerland” but also included “natives of every principality and dukedom of Germany” and they distinguished themselves from other Old-World immigrants in a variety of forms.⁸⁶⁴ For example, not only did German-speaking communities tend to arrive in family groups rather

21–34 (p. 21); Thomas L. Purvis, ‘Patterns of Ethnic Settlement in Late Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania’, *The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, 70.2 (1987), pp. 107–22 (p. 118).

⁸⁶² ‘Benjamin Franklin to James Parker, 20 March 1751’, Founders Online National Archives.

⁸⁶³ Sally McConnell-Ginet, *Words Matter: Meaning and Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2020), pp. 1–3.

⁸⁶⁴ Benjamin Rush, *An Account of the Manners of the German Inhabitants of Pennsylvania* (Samuel P. Town, Chestnut Street, 1875), p. 6, Penn State University Libraries Digital Collections.

than as autonomous individuals, they also generally possessed greater literacy rates and financial power than their Scots Irish counterparts.⁸⁶⁵ In addition, German-speaking immigrants incorporated a variety of religious factions into William Penn's "holy experiment", including Conrad Beisler's German Baptist cohort, who settled in the Ephrata area of Lancaster County, Mennonites, who followed Protestant reformer Menno Simons, and Nikolaus Zinzendorf's Moravians, who established Bethlehem in the Lehigh Valley. Likewise, Lutherans and members of the German Reformed Church established large congregations in the city of Philadelphia and in the towns of Reading, Lancaster, and York, which allowed German speakers to congregate, share information, and organize.⁸⁶⁶ Once severely fragmented by an array of religions in addition to vernacular ambiguities, Pennsylvania's German-speaking population united over shared language, knowledge, skills, and traditions transferred from their *Heimat* (homeland). Furthermore, feelings and attitudes brought on by rural isolation and English prejudice inspired sentiments of Pennsylvania German pride that permeated German-speaking communities and shaped group identities.⁸⁶⁷ As such, through the maintenance of the nuclear family, traditional gender roles, pride in education, fiscal responsibility, and strong spiritual practices, German-speaking networks upheld the types of Old-World values and social norms that aligned with patriot fundamentalist messaging of Christian liberty.⁸⁶⁸

Many German-speaking settlers struggled under excessive taxation measures and military conflicts prior to emigration, which fueled esteem for the ideals of liberty and the right to possess property. Indeed, the towns and villages along the Rhine River and in the

⁸⁶⁵ Marianne S. Wokeck, 'German and Irish Immigration to Colonial Pennsylvania', in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Symposium on the Demographic History of the Philadelphia Region, 1600-1860, 1989, pp. 128-48 (pp. 132-33); Grubb, 'German Immigration to Pennsylvania, 1709 to 1820', p. 429.

⁸⁶⁶ Butler, p. 30; John B. Frantz, 'Religion, the American Revolution, and the Pennsylvania Germans', in *Pennsylvania's Revolution*, Ed. by William Pencak (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), pp. 76-96 (p. 76).

⁸⁶⁷ Butler, p. 31.

⁸⁶⁸ W.R. Ward, *The Protestant Evangelical Awakening* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 249-51.

Black Forest region of southwest Germany worked to preserve the tradition of local autonomy, and committed themselves to self-administration in matters of public authority, jurisdiction, and local finances more than any other region in the country.⁸⁶⁹ Upon their arrival in Pennsylvania, German-speaking immigrants were armed with the preexisting knowledge of how to peaceably defend the inalienable rights to which they believed they were entitled. Thus, regardless of ecclesiastical ties, most Pennsylvania German-speaking immigrants tended to ally politically with the colony's Quaker party, who strove to minimize the effects of military conflict and its associated costs.⁸⁷⁰

Yet, even with the support of incoming German speakers, as early as the late 1730s, shifting population structures forced Quaker politicians to either to adapt or to simply recede into the background, and as a political entity, they seriously grappled with the concept of how to maintain influence in a society where they were quickly becoming a minority.⁸⁷¹ Still, however, the Proprietary party was unable to split the German vote, even as electoral participation became more widespread. While the total number of eligible voters tripled from six hundred in the election of 1739 to roughly eighteen hundred the following year, German-speaking communities were still demonstrably hesitant to entrust the "Presbyterian party" with their livelihood, safety, and general wellbeing.⁸⁷² Even as the Quaker party became divided between those who remained almost unrealistically pacifistic and those who believed staunch pacifism was "inconsistent with their legislative responsibilities", the Pennsylvania "Dutch" seemingly longed for an ideological middle ground between the conservative

⁸⁶⁹ Wolfgang Splitter, 'The German in Pennsylvania Politics, 1758-1790: A Quantitative Analysis', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 122.1/2 (1998), pp. 39-76 (p. 52).

⁸⁷⁰ Frantz, 'Religion, the American Revolution, and the Pennsylvania Germans', p. 77.

⁸⁷¹ Ousterhout, p. 15.

⁸⁷² Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 230.

Quaker party and the Proprietary faction, who based their political decision-making upon the governor's will.⁸⁷³

The outbreak of the Seven Years' War irreparably altered Pennsylvania's political landscape. Intra-party debates over the ethicality of military action led the Quaker party to become completely civically incapacitated during the Seven Years' War, and the party's push to royalize the province and end what many Friends considered Proprietary privilege further dampened the Quakers' political clout throughout Pennsylvania.⁸⁷⁴ Simultaneously, the Proprietary faction narrowed their focus on the German vote and worked to establish themselves as the dominant party amongst immigrant constituents, a stark contrast to the earlier views of political elites which tended to generalize German-speaking communities as overpopulated groupings of unsophisticated outliers.⁸⁷⁵ Although some members of the German-speaking community were unprepared to desert their Quaker leadership, supporters of the Proprietary government sought to break the prolonged domination of the Quakers in the assembly by drawing in new groups of voters.⁸⁷⁶ When military efforts ceased in 1763, Quaker leaders struggled to regain their political footing in Pennsylvania, even with a once loyal German-speaking base. In fact, although Quaker legislators mildly drifted back into politics following the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, they would never again occupy the majority of Assembly seats as they had before 1756.⁸⁷⁷

Certainly, Pennsylvania's political limbo forced backcountry German-speakers to reevaluate their concerns and loyalties, steering German-speaking communities toward political representation that aligned with their "industrious, sober" inclinations and

⁸⁷³ John J. Zimmerman, 'Benjamin Franklin and the Quaker Party, 1755-1756', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 17.3 (1960), pp. 291–313 (p. 293).

⁸⁷⁴ Matthew C. Ward, *Breaking the Back Country: Seven Years War in Virginia and Pennsylvania 1754-1765* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), pp. 127–29.

⁸⁷⁵ Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 230.

⁸⁷⁶ Dixon, p. 140; Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 230.

⁸⁷⁷ Ousterhout, p. 15.

safeguarded the lives they had worked so tirelessly to build.⁸⁷⁸ By the Fall of 1764, Philadelphia's most renowned *Kirchenleute* (church people), Carl Wrangel and Henry Melchior Mühlenberg, had aligned with Pennsylvania's top German-language printers, Christoph Sauer and Johann Heinrich Müller, later anglicized as John "Henry" Miller, to write, translate, and print anti-Quaker pamphlets for distribution in German neighborhoods, successfully garnering German signatures on petitions opposing royal government.⁸⁷⁹ In fact, Sauer had long advocated for German-speaking Pennsylvanians to actively preserve their virtue, explaining the ways in which authentic, upright Germans should continue "denying their Self" to "resist" the devil. Playing upon the language of Christian liberty that ultimately came to define the patriot fundamentalist rhetoric, Sauer instilled in his readers that "only they are true patriots and friends of the fatherland, who at first have conquered their lust and greed". As such, while Germans remained on the cultural and geographical margins of colonial Pennsylvania, their presence was quite significant in the evolution of the province's pre-Revolutionary political framework.⁸⁸⁰ Indeed, the willingness of German-speaking Pennsylvanians to engage in nonviolent civil resistance and take peaceable action against an inadequate governing body served as an example of the efficacy of political nonviolence and ultimately helped to fuel the patriot fundamentalist agenda that developed during the course of the Imperial Crisis.

Certainly, the impacts of transnational migration and provincial marginalization do not automatically lead to the development of patriot fundamentalism or to revolution.

However, the interpersonal relationships and ideological cohesion that often present in

⁸⁷⁸ 'Benjamin Franklin to Jonathan Willis, 24 May 1764', in *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, Ed. Albert Henry Smyth, X vols (The MacMillan Company, 1907), IV, 1760–1766, p. 247.

⁸⁷⁹ There is no generally accepted mode of spelling Sauer's name, and alternative forms include "Christoph Saur" and "Christopher Sower". However, his birth record reads, "Johann Christoph Sauer", so in an effort to honor his heritage, this research will refer to him as such. Whereas Johann Heinrich Müller was much more oriented toward anglicization, he will be referred to as his professional name, Henry Miller.

⁸⁸⁰ Judith Ridner, 'William Irvine and the Complexities of Manhood and Fatherhood in the Pennsylvania Backcountry', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 125.1/2 (2001), pp. 5–34 (p. 33).

migrant networks provided critical antecedents to the eventual patriot fundamentalist push for independence. The interpersonal networks maintained by Pennsylvania's backcountry dwellers served important social, political, ethnic, and spiritual purposes for frontier communities and offered long-distance migrants a sense of trust and solidarity. Yet, simultaneously, by the early- to mid-eighteenth century, the ethnic insulation of frontier trust networks came to consequentially inhibit assimilation and limit opportunity. Thus, self- and imperially-imposed isolation and segregation were not serving frontier communities, and Ulster Scots migrants as well as their German-speaking counterparts needed the bonds and benefits of social movement engagement to improve their "opportunities for work, housing, sociability, and welfare", all of which were directly linked to colonial processes of government.⁸⁸¹ The Seven Years' War had created a sense of understanding amongst the province's backcountry dwellers, and feelings of shared stakes, mutual sacrifice, and victory over wartime hardships came to yield a greater sense of North American identity than Presbyterian, Scots Irish, Lutheran, or German heritage. Moreover, where a degree of appreciation was once felt specifically for William Penn and for the principles promised by the English constitution, the profound adversity of frontier life combined with military conflict and the endangerment of "their Effects and Families" paved the way for a "common ideological consciousness in a newly discovered historical past".⁸⁸²

Indeed, unlike Massachusettsan society, which was predominately Congregationalist on the eve of the Imperial Crisis, Pennsylvanians had to find and create shared experiences to achieve greater senses of trust, community, and Pennsylvania identity. As previous prejudices waned somewhat amongst provincial Pennsylvanians and their political leaders, rural Ulster Scots and German-speaking communities "stir'd them selves more than was ever known

⁸⁸¹ Tilly, 'Trust Networks in Transnational Migration', p. 6.

⁸⁸² 'Benjamin Franklin to Robert Hunter Morris, 14 January 1756', Founders Online National Archives; Wellenreuther, I, p. 88.

before” and joined forces with urban Philadelphians during the Assembly election of 1764 as a means of challenging the Quakers for control of the Assembly.⁸⁸³ As Sauer encouraged Pennsylvanians rural and urban alike to “actively protect their endangered political rights”, Ulster Scots and German speakers emerged in record number to pledge opposition to leaders like Benjamin Franklin and Joseph Galloway, both of whom had relentlessly pushed for Pennsylvania to fall fully under the dominion of the Crown.⁸⁸⁴ German-speaking demographics in particular sought participation in political affairs by voting Reformed and Lutheran representatives first into county office positions and eventually into the Assembly.⁸⁸⁵ In other words, months before the Stamp Act even took effect, Pennsylvanians observed the inherent dangers of imperial supremacy, rallied in defense of colonial autonomy, successfully ousted Quaker lawmakers from the provincial Assembly, and elected Joseph Richardson, John Dickinson, Amos Strettell, and Henry Keppele to better represent their interests.⁸⁸⁶

Anne Ousterhout has suggested three key reinforcements to explain why some Pennsylvania Quakers became particularly ideologically alienated from the various faith communities and cultural sects that came to support the patriot movement, with each factor centering on the restrictive nature of devout Quaker practice. Ousterhout has explained that because patriot activists and Quaker pacifists showed little interest in working towards any sort of ideological middle ground, much of the Quaker community felt pressured to either choose the “popular side”, physically or financially contributing to patriot efforts or to “keep

⁸⁸³ Thomas Stewardson, ‘Extracts from the Letter-Book of Benjamin Marshall, 1763-1766’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 20.2 (1896), pp. 204–12 (p. 207).

⁸⁸⁴ Bockleman and Ireland, p. 140; ‘Christoph Sauer Quoted in Image and Counterimage, Tradition and Expectation: The German Immigrants in English Colonial Society in Pennsylvania, 1700-1765 by Hermann Wellenreuther’, in *America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred Year History -- Immigration, Language, Ethnicity*, Ed. Frank Trommler, Joseph McVeigh, 1, 85–105 (p. 95).

⁸⁸⁵ Smolenski, ‘Murder on the Margins: The Paxton Massacre and the Remaking of Sovereignty in Colonial Pennsylvania’, p. 517.

⁸⁸⁶ Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution*, p. 244; ‘Election Results in Philadelphia County, 1764 [1–3 October 1764]’.

close to one another”, withdrawing from Pennsylvania’s rapidly shifting political landscape.⁸⁸⁷ Either way, Quakers would likely have had to risk being rejected by their patriot peers or of having to sacrifice their familial bonds and friendships with stauncher members of their faith community for the sake of political action. In addition, according to Ousterhout, economic interests figured into the equation, as Quaker dry goods merchants suffered extensive financial loss at the hands of nonimportation associations from the Stamp Act resistance forward, meaning that the potential fiscal instability wrought by political overhaul was undoubtedly cause for concern for Friends whose savings had steadily depleted during the Imperial Crisis. Yet, the most prominent element of self-imposed Quaker estrangement came as a direct result of the Quaker Peace Testimony, which dictated that because governments were instituted by God, the obedience of the citizenry was mandatory. Quaker philosophy insisted that if a government failed to honor its obligations to the people, ineffective or abusive government was God’s punishment upon a sinful society, and in the event that political resistance became a necessary evil, Quakers encouraged their peers to examine and alter their own behaviors as a means of addressing the root causes of any governmental wrongdoings.⁸⁸⁸ In turn, due to Quaker beliefs, feelings, and attitudes about the intersections of faith and society as well as individual levels of attachment to the Quaker faith, a divide occurred amongst Pennsylvania’s Friends.

While imperial threats “trumped squabbles” amongst some of Pennsylvania’s different demographic groups, the Quaker community split over intragroup perceptions of pacifism and nonviolence.⁸⁸⁹ Some Quakers understood nonviolent civil resistance as a “defensive” struggle that was different than actively working to “advance the national

⁸⁸⁷ ‘John Fothergill to James Pemberton, 17 March 1775’, in *Bulletin of Friends’ Historical Society of Pennsylvania*, 1906, 1.1, 105–6.

⁸⁸⁸ Ousterhout, pp. 12–16.

⁸⁸⁹ Robert Parkinson, *Thirteen Clocks: How Race United the Colonies and Made the Declaration of Independence* (University of North Carolina Press, 2021), p. 82.

cause”.⁸⁹⁰ Yet, others felt that their ties to the Quaker religion and its broader community required them to steadfastly refuse “all participation direct or, so far as they could, indirect in any war or warlike measures”.⁸⁹¹ Together, Framing Theory and New Social Movement Theory help to explain how Quakers differentiated between pacifism and nonviolence. By applying these sociological approaches as lenses through which to interpret Quaker views of the patriot fundamentalist movement, we can better understand that the fear of compromising family, friends, faith, and financial standings ultimately caused most Friends to retreat from the political arena. Although most Pennsylvanian Quakers were concentrated in metropolitan Philadelphia, the broader community of Friends possessed different financial and familial obligations, varying ties to Great Britain, and distinct roles within the mercantile community, all of which inherently impacted individual views of nonviolent civil resistance.⁸⁹² In turn, and in accordance with Ousterhout’s assertions, certain groups and individuals within the Quaker community deemed the potential risks of alienation from those within their own faith, economic repercussions, and ultimately, God’s wrath to be more severe than those associated with the possibility of Parliamentary supremacy, while others were more open or more susceptible to “unfreezing” to the “good Posture of Defence” offered by widespread nonviolent civil resistance.⁸⁹³ Emphasizing the difficulties posed to Quaker consciences, the prominent Quaker attorney James Allen emphasized that although he could not bring himself

⁸⁹⁰ ‘Benjamin Franklin to Nathaniel Seidel, 2 June 1775’, Founders Online National Archives; Isaac Sharpless, *A History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania* (T.S. Leach and Company, 1890), 2: THE QUAKERS IN THE REVOLUTION, p. 175.

⁸⁹¹ Hermann Wellenreuther, ‘The Political Dilemma of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, 1681-1748’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 94.2 (1970), pp. 135–72 (p. 136).

⁸⁹² Arthur J. Mekeel, ‘The Relation of the Quakers to the American Revolution’, *Quaker History*, 65.1 (1976), pp. 3–18 (p. 3); Steven M. Buechler, ‘New Social Movement Theories’, *The Sociological Quarterly*, 36.3 (1995), pp. 441–64 (p. 442); Ronald Inglehart, ‘New Social Movements; Values, Ideology, and Cognitive Mobilization’, in *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 371–92 (p. 371); Raymond Plant, ‘Jurgen Habermas and the Idea of Legitimation Crisis’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 10 (1982), pp. 341–52 (p. 349); Jean L. Cohen, ‘Rethinking Social Movements’, *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 28 (1983), pp. 97–113 (p. 98).

⁸⁹³ McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 75; ‘Benjamin Franklin to Nathaniel Seidel, 2 June 1775’.

to “heartily join” the developing patriot fundamentalist movement, the nonviolence civil resistance employed by “the multitude [was] but one degree better than submission”, a sentiment which was very nearly echoed by the renowned nonviolent leader Mahatma Gandhi during his own nonviolent political struggle.⁸⁹⁴

The Quaker community spent the entirety of the Revolutionary period grappling with the discourse surrounding resistance and the action instigated by patriot signposting, which underscored the shame and sin of being treated as the “Bastards” and “Slaves” of their mother country, directed Pennsylvanians to rise above the “despotic” British empire, and condemned the “Bribery and Corruption” that characterized Crown-appointed offices.⁸⁹⁵ The fact that Quaker leaders were ethically unwilling and unable to bend to meet the evolving needs and demands of the broader provincial population meant that their political influence steadily waned. We often see this sort of state inaction as a precursor to political activism. Governmental refusals to intervene in a conflict and prevent the escalation of certain crises can undermine the state’s capacity to effectively represent the interests of its constituents and incite or legitimize political action.⁸⁹⁶ Thus, Quaker inaction empowered provincials to begin pushing for political change. By voting out prominent Quaker policymakers in the wake of the Stamp Act’s passage, Pennsylvanians indicated that they were forming new popular ideals about North American politics, the intentions of the imperial government, and the capacity of the existing leadership to govern the province. Likewise, Pennsylvania voting results suggested a widespread desire for the Proprietary faction to openly condemn the

⁸⁹⁴ James Allen, p. 186; Virginia Held, ‘Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals’, in *Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues*, Ed. Igor Primoratz (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 65–79 (p. 74). Held quotes Gandhi as having said, “It is better to resist oppression by violent means than to submit”.

⁸⁹⁵ ‘Benjamin Franklin to Timothy Folger, 29 September 1769’, Founders Online National Archives; ‘Josiah Quincy, Sr. to Benjamin Franklin, 25 March 1775’, Founders Online National Archives; Benjamin Franklin, ‘Franklin’s Contributions to the Conference on February 17: Four Drafts’, 1775, Founders Online National Archives; Breen, *The Will of the People: The Revolutionary Birth of America*, p. 56; R.A. Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), p. 143.

⁸⁹⁶ Damien D. Cheong, ‘Strategic Communication and Violent Extremism’, *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 5.2 (2018), pp. 129–48 (p. 131).

Stamp Act as unjust and intrusive. Moreover, although the conclusion of the Seven Years' War relieved some of the instability experienced by Pennsylvanians, provincials remained troubled by the all-too-recent memory of military conflict as well as the government's continued lack of consistency in policymaking. As Governor John Penn and many of his fellow Proprietarymen, fearing the imperial reaction to resistance, maintained an "irresolute" position opting to neither condone nor discourage colonial resistance to the Act, the rivalry deepened between Pennsylvania's three distinct political entities: the steadily weakening Quakers, the seemingly indifferent Proprietarymen, and the burgeoning patriot party who were quietly, and unconsciously, readying their province for political revolution.⁸⁹⁷

The Pennsylvania frontier, though significantly sequestered from urban Philadelphia, managed to affect political change in the pre-Revolutionary era. Prior to the passage of the Stamp Act, backcountry Pennsylvanians trialed different methods and tactics of protest, learned the importance of social cohesion, strengthened their identities as Pennsylvanians rather than continuing to isolate themselves amongst cultural trust networks, demonstrated their strength in numbers by voting against a political regime that was no longer serving their needs, and drew new leaders like John Dickinson, Charles Thomson, and William Bradford to the forefront of Pennsylvania politics, where they served as advisors and voices of the people during tumultuous times. While the consequences of frontier insecurity did knock at Philadelphia's door, the city remained free from the types of violence that backcountry Pennsylvanians endured. Philadelphia did, however, have its own spatial, socioeconomic, and political struggles, as the following pages will discuss.

With a population of upwards of 20,000 inhabitants at the onset of the Imperial Crisis, an influx of German Lutherans, Irish Catholics, English Methodists, and Scots Irish

⁸⁹⁷ Franklin, 'Plain Truth: Or, Serious Considerations on the Present State of the City of Philadelphia and Province of Pennsylvania. By a Tradesman of Philadelphia'; Ousterhout, p. 13.

Presbyterians suffered from the city's post-war economic downturn and contributed to its significant unemployment rate.⁸⁹⁸ Any post-war boom that occurred in Pennsylvania never trickled down to Philadelphia's poorest residents, most of whom generally experienced deteriorating economic circumstances from the conclusion of the Seven Years' War through 1776, and these grave economic conditions allowed them to sympathize with the plights of their rural peers and similarly encouraged them to call for political change.⁸⁹⁹ In fact, a wartime redistribution of wealth within the city of Philadelphia yielded a sharp contrast in the standard of living amongst the upper and lower classes. The city was left with a social pyramid comprised of an overwhelming number of poverty-stricken citizens at the base and a zenith of the wealthy minority, who emphasized their prosperity through the construction of urban mansions, the importation of four-wheeled coaches and carriages from London, the purchasing of fine silks and home furnishings, and the enjoyment of a variety of expensive hobbies.⁹⁰⁰

Unlike Boston, Philadelphia had welfare systems in place that worked to combat poverty, even if only for short-term periods, meaning that Philadelphia was relatively well prepared to handle the evolving needs of its citizens.⁹⁰¹ Along with the almshouse, the workhouse, and the hospital for the sick poor, various churches, charities, and societies such as the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, the Deutsche Gesellschaft, and various charitable

⁸⁹⁸ R.A. Ryerson, 'Political Mobilization and the American Revolution: The Resistance Movement in Philadelphia, 1765 to 1776', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 31.4 (1974), pp. 565–88 (pp. 584–85); John K. Alexander, 'The Philadelphia Numbers Game: An Analysis of Philadelphia's Eighteenth-Century Population', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 98.3 (1974), pp. 314–24 (p. 324); Marianne S. Woceck, 'Irish Immigration to the Delaware Valley before the American Revolution', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature*, 96.5 (1996), pp. 103–35 (p. 120); Marianne S. Woceck, 'The Flow and the Composition of German Immigration to Philadelphia, 1727-1775', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 105.3 (1981), pp. 249–78 (pp. 260–61).

⁸⁹⁹ Peter A. Butzin, 'Politics, Presbyterians and the Paxton Riots, 1763-64', *Journal of Presbyterian History*, 51.1 (1973), pp. 70–84 (p. 76).

⁹⁰⁰ Billy G. Smith, 'The Material Lives of Laboring Philadelphians, 1750-1800', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 38.2 (1981), pp. 163–202 (p. 202); Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 257.

⁹⁰¹ Billy G. Smith, p. 202.

organizations provided temporary relief for some of the city's most impoverished inhabitants.⁹⁰² Still, even if Philadelphia allegedly offered urban, working-class North Americans "the best poor man's country" available, daily life for the city's laboring poor still involved constant vigilance and intense physical exertion.⁹⁰³ The gap between the devastatingly poor and the comfortably wealthy steadily broadened in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War, and Philadelphians experienced unprecedented levels of relative deprivation, as even able-bodied laborers found themselves on the charity rolls alongside the aged, infirm, widowed, and orphaned for the first time since the city's founding.⁹⁰⁴ Indeed, as Billy Smith has explained it, the urban poor, an estimated one fourth to one third of the free population, subsisted like prisoners with a diet consisting primarily of grains, dressed like almshouse inmates without the essential clothing required for the highs and lows of Pennsylvania's seasonal climate, and crowded multiple families into cramped living quarters in an attempt to alleviate the costs of a single-family home.⁹⁰⁵ Unsurprisingly, winters were particularly challenging for poor relief institutions. The freezing of the Delaware River meant the freezing of income for many individuals and families, and these reductions in income accompanied by rumors of imperially-induced increases in expenses continuously signified substantial sacrifices for working-class Philadelphians. As such, Philadelphia's laboring class was extremely materially vulnerable between the years 1764 and 1776, with ordinary occurrences such as seasonal work schedules, illness or injury, pregnancy and childcare needs threatening their livelihoods on a regular basis. By the early 1770s, upwards of four hundred

⁹⁰² Aaron Sullivan, "'That Charity Which Begins at Home': Ethnic Societies and Benevolence in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia", *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 134.4 (2010), pp. 305–37 (p. 309); Andreas Dorpalen, 'The Political Influence of the German Element in Colonial America', *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 6.4 (1939), pp. 221–39 (p. 238).

⁹⁰³ Reference to James T. Lemon, *The Best Poor Man's Country: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972).

⁹⁰⁴ Gary B. Nash, 'Poverty and Poor Relief in Pre-Revolutionary Philadelphia', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 33.1 (1976), pp. 3–30 (p. 3).

⁹⁰⁵ Billy G. Smith, pp. 201–2.

white adult males had spent time in a poverty relief establishment and an additional 469 were designated as insolvent or without sufficient property to pay taxes.⁹⁰⁶

Philadelphia's economic deterioration was evidenced not only in transforming labor relationships and conditions, but also in broader attitudes toward consumerism. Even while a flood of English imports dramatically lowered prices for consumers, merchant firms of all levels were often unable to rid themselves of the goods that many Philadelphians struggled to afford or rationalize as a necessary purchase. The profitable boom of the war years prevented an eager mercantile class from foreseeing the inevitable post-war bust, and dry goods traders were particularly overstocked during the period 1760-1775, which is to say that even if merchants were able to sell off their surplus, they often garnered only a fraction of their anticipated profits during this time.⁹⁰⁷ Yet, the dire economic conditions of ordinary Pennsylvanians did not singlehandedly deter consumerism in the 1760s. With the passage of the Stamp Act in 1764, the ethical implications of materiality, vanity, and excess also discouraged indulging in "Superfluities" such as "Furren [foreign] tea and Coffey", the former of which "sprang from an evil Root" bearing the "fruits of the Corrupt Tree".⁹⁰⁸ Indeed, in the wake of the Stamp Act, Philadelphia's patriot leaders fully engaged the presses, spending "a great deal of time and resources" to develop and disseminate the continental rhetoric that connected the dots between excessive consumption, overreliance upon British wares, slavery, sin, and moral degradation and ultimately helped to lay the foundations for the patriot fundamentalist ideology.⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰⁶ Foner, pp. 45–46.

⁹⁰⁷ Thomas M. Doerflinger, 'Philadelphia Merchants and the Logic of Moderation, 1760-1775', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 40.2 (1983), pp. 197–226 (p. 199).

⁹⁰⁸ Joshua Evans quoted in 'Joshua Evans, 1731-1798: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Quaker Singularity' by Donald Brooks Kelley, *Quaker History*, 75.2 (1986), 67–82 (p. 77).

⁹⁰⁹ Parkinson, *Thirteen Clocks: How Race United the Colonies and Made the Declaration of Independence*, p. 84.

By examining the ways in which Philadelphia's emergent patriot activists challenged the Stamp Act through the composite framework proposed by this research, we can observe elements of Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory. As T.H. Breen has attested, "there was no colonial Bastille for them to storm", so Pennsylvania's patriot spokespeople could only act and react to unjust imperial legislation based on the information and means available to them.⁹¹⁰ Moreover, the violence perpetrated by the Paxton Boys demonstrated to Pennsylvanians that violent resistance was problematic, ineffective, and ultimately delegitimizing to colonial calls for relief. Accordingly, Philadelphia's burgeoning patriots understood that in order to successfully challenge the Stamp Act, they needed to draw upon Pennsylvanian experiences and identities and nonviolently expressing provincial sensibilities whilst working to convince their audience of that peaceably resisting imperial infringement upon colonial life was the correct, most virtuous course of action.⁹¹¹ So, by calling for a widespread provincial boycott of British wares, patriot authors and printers simultaneously began to structure and develop the rhetorical and practical structures that ideologically sustained the nonviolent opposition of imperial overreach during the next decade.

Before delving into the rhetoric and ideals which necessitated the nonviolent resistance of unjust imperial legislation, however, we must understand the physical and intellectual resources that Philadelphians invoked during the Imperial Crisis. As in Boston, Philadelphia's dissenting orators, authors, and printers served as the conduit through which the developing ideology of patriot fundamentalism was funneled to the broader public following the passage of the Stamp Act.⁹¹² Through printed materials and the discourse that

⁹¹⁰ Breen, "'Baubles of Britain': The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century", p. 89.

⁹¹¹ Snow, Rochford, and Benford, p. 464; Wada, p. 547; Fisher and Kling, p. 12; Durning, pp. 6–7; Kahneman and Tversky, pp. 264–65; Levy, pp. 174–75; Farnham, p. 205.

⁹¹² Kimmage, p. 2.

they inspired, Philadelphians were able to contemplate their expectations of the British Empire and how North America factored into the imperial equation. Newspapers were stored and shared in local taverns and coffee houses like William Bradford's London Coffee House, where visitors could read articles or hear them read aloud by friends and acquaintances, meaning that even one newspaper edition could exert "an almost incalculable influence in town and country".⁹¹³

Philadelphia's radical authors and printers used their knowledge, skills, and physical resources to carry out a peaceable, print-based assault on what they explained as the illegal and encroaching nature of revenue-raising taxation measures.⁹¹⁴ Framing the Stamp Act as insulting, authoritarian, and indicative of inevitable harsher measures, patriot publicists insisted that the passive acceptance of legislation which posed such a significant threat to Christian liberty could only be viewed as sinful, shameful, and dangerous. Consequently, radical authors and orators increasingly reoriented colonial ideas about imperial obligations to British North Americans and vice versa, emphasizing how the risks associated with resistance paled in comparison to the consequences of submitting to imperial tyranny. Through the features that occupied the most prominent placements in their publications, the individuals who controlled the printing presses explained and advertised patriot belief systems and controlled the flow of information that gradually pushed Pennsylvanians unite under the banner of resistance.⁹¹⁵

Described by Carl Bridenbaugh as "producers, purveyors, defenders, and aggressive propagators of enlightenment", the forty-two printers who operated within Philadelphia from 1740 to 1776 laid sturdy ideological foundations for the burgeoning patriot fundamentalist movement, and upon those foundations, the rhetoric and practice of nonviolent resistance was

⁹¹³ Bridenbaugh, 'The Press and the Book in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia', p. 7.

⁹¹⁴ Durning, pp. 6-7.

⁹¹⁵ William Beatty Warner, p. 345.

developed and strengthened during the course of the next decade.⁹¹⁶ Moreover, Philadelphia's libraries and above average literacy rates helped to fuel the public demand for printed reports, accounts, rumors, letters, documents, and exchanges and contributed to what Gordon Wood has referred to as the process of "Americanization" in provincial Pennsylvania.⁹¹⁷ Through library subscriptions, the works of Plutarch, Livy, Cicero, and Sallust could be considered alongside historical narratives of ancient Rome, and the pure ease of access allowed the language of liberty to be "more generally diffused in these remote Corners of the World".⁹¹⁸ Indeed, for the developing patriot fundamentalist movement, lending libraries, which boasted the works of Enlightenment authors and allowed for the easy access and sharing of information, "improved the general Conversation of Americans" and served as critical companions to regularly published newspapers that offered shorter, more digestible pieces of inflammatory literature.⁹¹⁹ Although literacy rates within the backcountry ranged from eight to eighteen percent below those of urban dwellers, city officials determined that roughly 81.6 percent of adult white males living in Philadelphia between the years 1773 and 1775 possessed basic literacy skills.⁹²⁰ In fact, Philadelphia boasted twenty-three print shops by the eve of Revolution, a far cry from the eight that operated in the city in 1740 and a true testament to the significant demand placed on urban printers by an increasingly literate general public.⁹²¹

⁹¹⁶ Bridenbaugh, 'The Press and the Book in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia', p. 2.

⁹¹⁷ Gordon S. Wood, *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin* (Penguin Books, 2004), p. 12.

⁹¹⁸ William Temple Franklin and Gordon Saltonstall Mumford, 'List of Books, [before 31 December 1781?]', 1781, Founders Online National Archives; 'Directors of the Library Company of Philadelphia to John Penn and Reply', *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, 24 November 1763, Founders Online National Archives.

⁹¹⁹ James Raven, *London Booksellers and American Customers: Transatlantic Literary Community and the Charleston Library, 1748-1811* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press), p. 26; Benjamin Franklin Quoted in *At the Instance of Benjamin Franklin: A Brief History of the Library Company of Philadelphia, 1731-1976* by Edwin Wolf (Philadelphia, PA: Library Company of Philadelphia, 1976), p. 11.

⁹²⁰ Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-76* (Knopf, 1960), p. 216; Lawrence A. Cremin, *American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783* (Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 517-20; Tully, 'Literacy Rates and Educational Development in Rural Pennsylvania, 1729-1775', pp. 306-7; Farley Grubb, 'Growth of Literacy in Colonial America: Longitudinal Patterns, Economic Models, and the Direction of Future Research', *Social Science History*, 14.4 (1990), pp. 451-82 (p. 454).

⁹²¹ Bridenbaugh, 'The Press and the Book in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia', pp. 3-4.

Philadelphia was flooded with newspapers, pamphlets, and magazines at every junction of the Imperial Crisis. Manufactured with relative ease and little cost, urban printers found pamphlets to be particularly helpful for rapidly circulating lengthier inquiries, essays, and arguments, as they were simultaneously affordable and digestible for readers.⁹²² Because works such as John Dickinson's *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania* and Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* were reprinted as many as twenty-one times in the course of a year with other editions appearing in Boston, New York, Williamsburg, Dublin, London, and Paris, it is difficult to determine a precise tally for the number of pamphlets published in Philadelphia during the Revolutionary era. Approximations often fail to account for the various editions of a single pamphlet; however, historians estimate that Philadelphia's printing presses churned out roughly 1,200 to 1,500 pamphlets between 1763 and 1783, about fifteen percent of which were printed in German.⁹²³ In addition to pamphlets, Philadelphia printers pioneered the publication of magazines, with Benjamin Franklin and William Bradford paving the way; yet, nine major newspapers were the chief conduit through which patriot fundamentalist ideals and objectives were circulated during the Imperial Crisis in Philadelphia alone.⁹²⁴

Whereas Bostonian audiences relied largely upon four major newspapers to inform their opinions, guide their decision-making, and reinforce their values, by the eve of Revolution, Philadelphia printers had coordinated their publications to ensure that at least one newspaper came off the presses six days a week, validating the view of Clark and Wetherell that American newspaper, was "born in Boston and matured in Philadelphia".⁹²⁵ William

⁹²² Parkinson, *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution*, p. 37.

⁹²³ Homer L. Calkin, 'Pamphlets and Public Opinion During the American Revolution', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 64.1 (1940), pp. 22–42 (p. 26); Bonwick, p. 356.

⁹²⁴ Alfred Owen Aldridge, 'Benjamin Franklin and the Pennsylvania Gazette', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 106.1 (1962), pp. 77–81 (p. 78); 'The First Philadelphia Newspaper and Its Republication by the Colonial Society', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 22.2 (1898), pp. 217–20 (p. 218).

⁹²⁵ Charles E. Clark and Charles Wetherell, 'The Measure of Maturity: The Pennsylvania Gazette, 1728-1765', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 46.2 (1989), pp. 279–303 (p. 279).

Goddard's *Pennsylvania Chronicle, and Universal Advertiser* appeared each Monday, Benjamin Towne's *Pennsylvania Evening Post* came on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday evenings, and David Hall and William Sellers's *Pennsylvania Gazette* shared Wednesday distributions with William Bradford's *Pennsylvania journal, and the weekly advertiser. Story & Humphreys's Pennsylvania mercury, and universal advertiser* was circulated on Fridays while Henry Miller's *Staatsbote* reached the German readership every Tuesday and Thursday.⁹²⁶ Constituting approximately one-seventh of all newspapers printed in British North America, between two and three thousand editions were published in Philadelphia, circulated throughout Pennsylvania, and couriered all over the colonies.⁹²⁷

Goddard's *Chronicle* reached the backcountry counties of Bedford and Cumberland and the colonies of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia, and additionally, all continental and West Indian printers and booksellers received copies of his publication. Similarly, with managerial support from Benjamin Franklin, David Hall reported that by 1765, the *Gazette* was circulating "more generally than all the other Papers put together on the Continent," and upon Hall's death in 1772, bookseller William Sellers saw to the publication's continued success. William Bradford reportedly sent copies of his *Pennsylvania journal* as far as France, England, and the West Indies, while simultaneously establishing an extensive domestic audience. In fact, in 1765, Bradford increased his subscriptions by twelve, delivering to York via the Lancaster Post, and a decade later, eight readers from Northampton County shared in covering the travel costs of a post rider to carry copies of the *Journal*

⁹²⁶ The full schedule of publication is as follows: *Dunlap's Pennsylvania Packet, or, The General Advertiser* (Mondays); *The Pennsylvania Chronicle, and Universal Advertiser* (Mondays); *The Pennsylvania evening post* (Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays); *The Pennsylvania Gazette* (Wednesdays); *The Pennsylvania journal, and the weekly advertiser* (Wednesdays); *The Pennsylvania ledger, or, The Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, & New-Jersey weekly advertiser* (Saturdays); *Story & Humphreys's Pennsylvania mercury, and universal advertiser* (Fridays); *Der Wochentliche Pennsylvanische Staatsbote* (Tuesdays and Thursdays); *Der Wochentliche Philadelphische Staatsbote* (Tuesdays and Thursdays).

⁹²⁷ Bridenbaugh, 'The Press and the Book in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia', p. 7.

directly from Philadelphia.⁹²⁸ Certainly, the Philadelphia media was critical for building, supporting, and spreading the patriot fundamentalist ideology, as media outreach strengthened the movement's ability to garner support and sympathy for the continental cause and actively radicalize not just Pennsylvanians, but British subjects and outside observers across the globe.

Philadelphia printers specifically published content that “declared and rejected alternative views, ideas, and perspectives as illegitimate”, and the few publications that neglected to actively advertise patriot ideals struggled to retain an audience.⁹²⁹ As Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory suggest, the developing patriot fundamentalist movement was dependent upon the work of Philadelphia authors and printers, which could appeal to rural and urban audiences alike, bring about new understandings of America's position within the British Empire vis-à-vis Christian liberty and political autonomy, reverse the overwhelming colonial preference to remain under the wing of the Crown. By reinforcing patriot ideals through repeated appeals to a broad range of North American values and identities, Philadelphia printers reframed and reoriented provincial conceptualizations of colonial life and liberty.⁹³⁰ Moreover, in villainizing indifferent or anti-patriot viewpoints, patriot spokespeople buttressed their message that political inaction would guarantee the loss of colonial virtues and freedoms.⁹³¹

In fact, due to his rather fluid political views, Philadelphia printer Benjamin Towne was unable to maintain commercial and political allies throughout the Imperial Crisis.⁹³² Similarly, James Humphreys, Jr., editor of *Story & Humphreys's Pennsylvania mercury, and universal advertiser* and later *The Pennsylvania ledger*, argued that his role required the

⁹²⁸ Bridenbaugh, ‘The Press and the Book in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia’, pp. 7–8.

⁹²⁹ Sinha, p. 10.

⁹³⁰ Chong and Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, pp. 104–6; Snow, Rochford, and Benford, p. 464; Wada, p. 547.

⁹³¹ Kahneman and Tversky, pp. 264–66; Levy, pp. 174–75; Farnham, p. 205.

⁹³² Dwight L. Teeter, ‘Benjamin Towne: The Precarious Career of a Persistent Printer’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 89.3 (1965), pp. 316–30 (pp. 320–22).

guarantee that essays, correspondence, articles, and advertisements were “gratefully received and impartially inserted”.⁹³³ Humphreys produced what was arguably the most objective publication of the era, and his refusal to take a hard patriot stance in favor of fair political representation, strictly internal taxation, and expanded colonial autonomy meant that he was frequently be berated as a Tory. In reality, however, there was almost no semblance of a concerted Tory media campaign in 1760s and 1770s Philadelphia. As Ryerson has noted, just as Loyalists in each colony looked to England for aid rather than making friends at home, Loyalists in Philadelphia relied on British North America’s pre-eminent Tory printer, James Rivington of New York, to publish the Conservative views that they would never dare to submit to a Pennsylvania printer.⁹³⁴ Indeed, during the Stamp Act Crisis, colonists urban and rural alike became unprecedentedly politically minded, and almost all facets of colonial life took on a more symbolic function, as inflammatory newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and broadsides pushed Pennsylvanians to unitedly boycott unnecessary British manufactures. As the paper on which provincial news was printed became politicized, so did the messaging of Philadelphia’s authors and printers, and in the latter half of the eighteenth-century, the city’s press underwent a remarkable transformation, becoming much less politically neutral as a means of protecting patriot interests and advertising the nonviolent cause.⁹³⁵

In accordance with Framing Theory, patriot authors and printers worked to reach colonists with different viewpoints and different means of access, framing the case for nonviolent civil resistance in order to appeal to colonists’ religiopolitical sensibilities and to encourage individuals and groups to identify, expand, and share their views on Parliamentary

⁹³³ Parkinson, *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution*, p. 686; James Humphreys, Jr., *The Pennsylvania Ledger: Or the Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, & New-Jersey Weekly Advertiser*, 1776 1775.

⁹³⁴ Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, pp. 105–6.

⁹³⁵ Parkinson, *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution*, p. 38.

policymaking in North America.⁹³⁶ By expressing colonial beliefs, ideals, and identities, an ability which New Social Movement Theory explains as critical to the success of any social movement, patriot authors and printers steadily mobilized transclass and transcultural groups of Philadelphians behind the patriot fundamentalist cause.⁹³⁷ Crafting thoughtful, well-rounded arguments in favor of American liberties which drew upon different religious, political, and historical themes, Philadelphia's patriot spokespeople provided the movement with built-in elasticity that allowed them to respond to new challenges and changing circumstances swiftly and creatively.⁹³⁸ Consistent with the key tenets of Prospect Theory, the steady employment of urban printing presses not only allowed for the emergence of an identifiable patriot leadership pool in Pennsylvania, but also facilitated preference reversal and risk acceptance to avoid loss. That is to say, steadily, Philadelphia's patriot advocates rationalized resistance and forged a sense of certainty around colonial perceptions of Parliament's inflexibility.

Protest became both a necessity and an expectation, as exchanges in taverns, coffee houses, country stores, and inns, as well as public readings, religious services, and local discussions and debates allowed for the swift recycling of patriot publications and the resistance-based ideals they advocated amongst Pennsylvanians rural and urban. In fact, the printers who ultimately became patriot fundamentalists crossed the social and cultural boundaries inherent in colonial Pennsylvania themselves.⁹³⁹ As skilled craftsmen, printers technically ranked amongst mechanics and artisans in terms of their interest and training; however, the educational preeminence required by their profession, landed them in the

⁹³⁶ Chong and Druckman, 'A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments', pp. 104–5; Snow, Rochford, and Benford, pp. 464–65; Wada, pp. 547–48.

⁹³⁷ Fisher and Kling, p. 12.

⁹³⁸ Durning, pp. 6–7.

⁹³⁹ Carol Sue Humphrey, *The American Revolution and the Press: The Promise of Independence* (Northwestern University Press, 2013), p. 33; Parkinson, *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution*, p. 66.

expanding middle class, with the widening market for their wares procuring printers a significant degree of material prosperity. Moreover, the business of printing forged relationships between these craftsmen and the colonial aristocracy, who not only purchased their publications, but also crafted the editorials and debates that filled them, some of which are discussed in more detail below. As such, Pennsylvania printers embodied the inclusiveness of the patriot fundamentalist movement by protecting their cause and the various levels of contributors who supported it. In gaining the trust of the artisans, speaking for the commercial middle class, and partnering with the white-collar cohort, printers provided a critical utilitarian link between each social layer of Philadelphia's developing patriot fundamentalist network.⁹⁴⁰

Indeed, facilitating “an act of ideological discovery” for Pennsylvanians, Philadelphia's patriot penmen pushed readers to fulfill their civic responsibilities and to pursue a path to moral uprightness by engaging in nonviolent civil resistance.⁹⁴¹ Not unlike their New England counterparts, the authors that ultimately spearheaded Pennsylvania's nonviolent resistance movement took care to be selective in their intellectual attacks, stringent in their arguments, and disciplined in their rebuttals, consistently encouraging Pennsylvanians to safeguard their “Liberty and most essential privileges” against imperial encroachment.⁹⁴² In turn, Philadelphia's patriot authors and printers necessitated the moral obligation of republican activism on both collective and individual levels by amplifying, articulating, disseminating, and socializing the provincial values that ultimately evolved into the action-oriented ideology of patriot fundamentalism. Radical Philadelphian writers united around key arguments which demanded physical representation in Parliament and free press

⁹⁴⁰ Bridenbaugh, ‘The Press and the Book in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia’, p. 2.

⁹⁴¹ Breen, “‘Baubles of Britain’: The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century”, pp. 76–77.

⁹⁴² ‘Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, 24 September 1765’, Founders Online National Archives.

in the colonies while condemning external revenue-raising measures and judicial suppression.⁹⁴³

Philadelphia's patriot penmen called for the imperial allocation of North American representatives to physically convey "the almost unanimous voice of the people" in Parliament and queried the legality of forcing legislation upon a people who "were not there" to give consent.⁹⁴⁴ Surely, as former rivals Benjamin Franklin and William Smith argued, imperially appointed officers based in the colonies and making "a profitable office under the crown" could not impartially determine whether or not "the People [were] willing" to comply with Parliamentary policies.⁹⁴⁵ Moreover, Philadelphia's nonviolent leaders contested the idea that the American colonies should be responsible for helping Great Britain recoup the financial losses accrued during the Seven Years' War when "several of the colonies [singlehandedly] withstood the whole power of the enemy, unassisted not only by the mother country, but by any of the neighbouring provinces".⁹⁴⁶ Seeing neither logic nor justness in any article of Parliamentary legislation that simultaneously overtaxed British North Americans and hindered colonial commerce, radical Philadelphians highlighted the contradiction the Stamp Act.⁹⁴⁷ As the implications of the Imperial Crisis became more severe, prior efforts to maintain neutrality seemingly dissipated amongst the majority of Philadelphia printers, and likewise, the interests of the population that Philadelphia's printers were serving transitioned from local news and the discussion of religious texts and sermons to discussing the

⁹⁴³ Robert W. T. Martin, 'From the "Free and Open" Press to the "Press of Freedom": Liberalism, Republicanism, and Early American Press Liberty', *History of Political Thought*, 15.4 (1994), pp. 505–34 (p. 520).

⁹⁴⁴ William Smith, 'An Answer to Mr. Franklin's Remarks, on a Late Protest' (William Bradford, in Market Street, 1764), Founders Online National Archives; Franklin, 'Marginalia in Protests of the Lords against Repeal of the Stamp Act'.

⁹⁴⁵ William Smith; Franklin, 'Marginalia in Protests of the Lords against Repeal of the Stamp Act'.

⁹⁴⁶ A Lover of Britain, 'Preface to Three Letters to William Shirley', 8 February 1766, Founders Online National Archives.

⁹⁴⁷ Andrew David Edwards, 'Grenville's Silver Hammer: The Problem of Money in the Stamp Act Crisis', *The Journal of American History*, 104.2 (2017), pp. 337–62 (pp. 339–40).

relationship between imperialism and civil liberties.⁹⁴⁸ Patriot publications utilized the “Three Thousand Miles Distance” that separated the colonies from a government that was supposed to protect and represent American interests as a metaphor to demonstrate exactly how “wide apart in Sentiment” the American colonies and Great Britain had become.⁹⁴⁹

Dissenting authors throughout the American colonies worked to elicit feelings of fear, betrayal, and outrage from their audience, and while some printers suspended their operations in order to comply with the Stamp Act, other printers published their newspapers without stamped paper in direct and open defiance of the legislation. For instance, although William Bradford’s infamous “tombstone edition” of the *Pennsylvania Journal* claimed that the financial burdens imposed by the Stamp Act rendered him “unable to elude the Chains forged for us” and illustrated the “last remains” of his printing practice with graphics including skulls, crossbones, and a coffin, the newspaper’s weekly publication schedule remained uninterrupted.⁹⁵⁰ Similar to the burning of identity cards during the South African struggle against apartheid and the freedom rides that toured the segregated American south of the 1960s, Bradford’s open defiance of the Stamp Act presented an important political opportunity for colonial dissenters. The mournful, dejected tone of the “tombstone edition” forced readers to contemplate the ways in which the Stamp Act could alter the provincial landscape, but more critically, by confronting Parliamentary authority at the local level, Bradford challenged imperial policymakers to either accommodate colonial objections to the legislation or bear down and justify harsher resistance measures.⁹⁵¹ In fact, historian John

⁹⁴⁸ Peter J. Parker, ‘The Philadelphia Printer: A Study of an Eighteenth-Century Businessman’, *The Business History Review*, 40.1 (1966), pp. 24–46 (pp. 37–39).

⁹⁴⁹ ‘A Plain Yeoman’, *The Pennsylvania Journal; and the Weekly Advertiser*, 11 July 1765, 1179th edition, p. 1.

⁹⁵⁰ *The Pennsylvania Journal; and the Weekly Advertiser*, 1195 edition, section 31 October 1765, p. 1.

⁹⁵¹ Howard Caygill, *On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), p. 72; Doug McAdam, ‘Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency’, *American Sociological Review*, 48.6 (1983), pp. 735–54 (pp. 745–46).

William Wallace has contended that “to no one man in the colonies was American more indebted for the repeal of the Stamp Act” than Bradford.⁹⁵²

In both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, print production had helped to develop colonial ideals from roughly the mid-seventeenth century, specifically because Quakers and Puritans alike relied upon the printing press to publish religious materials.⁹⁵³ While Pennsylvania boasted more printshops than Massachusetts, Boston printers were generally less equivocal than their peers in Philadelphia, where factionalism intraprovince power struggles sometimes diluted and “softened” the tenors that Boston’s press targeted more consistently.⁹⁵⁴ Moreover, whereas Pennsylvania printers were reportedly more inclined to control their own presses, Boston’s Edes and Gill were known for giving some of their contributors direct control in “cooking up Paragraphs, Articles, [and] Occurrences” to influence public opinion, meaning that Philadelphian spokespeople were more susceptible to alterations and erasure in the copy editing process.⁹⁵⁵ However, printers in both Philadelphia and Boston shared information, swapped newspaper articles, and reprinted the same or similar political tracts. By textually connecting specific themes from the Great Awakening with the beliefs and principles of seventeenth-century Enlightenment, radical patriot authors and orators from both provinces highlighted the logic and reason behind their continued pleas for Parliamentary redress during the Imperial Crisis and underpinned the colonial right to political consent, encouraging their respective audiences to collectively strive for public

⁹⁵² John William Wallace, *An Old Philadelphian, Colonel William Bradford: The Patriot Printer of 1776. Sketches of His Life* (Sherman & Company, Printers, 1884), p. 100.

⁹⁵³ Humphrey, pp. 23–24. Stephen Daye established Massachusetts’ first printshop in 1638, and Pennsylvania’s first printshop opened in 1685.

⁹⁵⁴ Tully, *Forming American Politics: Ideals, Interests, and Institutions in Colonial New York and Pennsylvania*, pp. 88–90.

⁹⁵⁵ ‘3 September 1769 from the Diary of John Adams’; Jeffrey L. Pasley, ‘The Tyranny of Printers’: *Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic* (Charlottesville, VA: The University Press of Virginia, 2001), p. 38; Eric Slauter, ‘Reading and Radicalization: Print, Politics, and the American Revolution’, *Early American Studies*, 8.1 (2010), 5–40 (p. 18).

virtue through political nonviolence.⁹⁵⁶ Moreover, the flexible and responsive nature of the press helped provincials in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts to "understand their rights and to be patient", meaning that provincial motive and mobilization could similarly ebb, flow, and evolve as political trends emerged, shifted, or escalated.⁹⁵⁷ The scope and reach of the media in both provinces helped to establish the need for nonviolent civil resistance beyond the Stamp Act, and ultimately, the ideals perpetuated, the action justified, and the leaders activated by the patriot press helped to carry the patriot fundamentalist movement through to 1776.

The Stamp Act Crisis and the radical writers that propagandized the legislation's unconstitutionality bestowed upon Pennsylvanians a clearer and more holistic understanding of Christian liberty and governmental virtue. By the time that the Stamp Act was repealed in March of 1766, the divisions separating Pennsylvania's diverse social, cultural, political, and economic demographics had become significantly "less rancorous", demonstrating the extent to which Pennsylvanians had begun to develop new understandings of the Anglo-American relationship, believe themselves to be represented the patriot cause, and accept the potential risks that might accompany the protest of imperial authority.⁹⁵⁸ Indeed, by the mid-1760s, imperial threats increasingly "trumped squabbles" amongst some of Pennsylvania's many different demographic groups, as provincials collectively came to find unity in shared colonial experiences.⁹⁵⁹ Pennsylvanians recalled the physical, emotional, and financial costs that they and their ancestors paid in settling Pennsylvania to safeguard their spiritual and

⁹⁵⁶ Andrew Cayton, "'The Constant Snare of the Fear of Man': Authority and Violence in the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic", in *Between Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of Violence in the American Revolutionary Era*, Ed. Patrick Griffin, Robert G. Ingram, Peter S. Onuf, and Brian Schoen (University of Virginia Press, 2015), pp. 21–39 (p. 30).

⁹⁵⁷ Slauter, p. 9.

⁹⁵⁸ James Hutson, 'Benjamin Franklin and William Smith: More Light on an Old Philadelphia Quarrel', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 93.1 (1969), pp. 109–13 (p. 113).

⁹⁵⁹ Parkinson, *Thirteen Clocks: How Race United the Colonies and Made the Declaration of Independence*, p. 82.

economic interests against imperial abuse, and moreover, provincials argued that they were “equally intitled” to representation in Parliament.⁹⁶⁰ As Charles Thomson explained it,

Pennsylvanians struggled to:

see how England with reason or justice could expect, that they should have encountered the horrors of a desert, borne the attacks of barbarous savages, and, at the expence of their blood and treasure, settled this country to the great emolument of England, and after all quietly submit to be deprived of every thing an Englishman has been taught to hold dear.⁹⁶¹

Paradoxically, and in stark contrast to the Bostonian reaction, where readers were commanded to “inquire further” into the nature of imperial policymaking, when the Stamp Act was repealed only to be replaced with the Declaratory Act of 1766 and the Townshend Revenue Act of 1767, the majority of Pennsylvanians paid relatively “little attention” to the new legislation until John Dickinson’s *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania* began to gain traction.⁹⁶² Indeed, although Pennsylvanians had grown closer ideologically during the Stamp Act Crisis, by mid-1768, “the spirit of liberty” was still only “lukewarm” in Philadelphia.⁹⁶³ It stands to reason, however, that Pennsylvanians had yet to “unfreeze” to the idea of engaging in a potentially long-term nonviolent struggle, as the interests and opportunities represented by the developing patriot fundamentalist movement were not promising enough to fully draw provincials’ attention away from other commitments and loyalties.⁹⁶⁴

Virtually all academic models of radicalization, including Fathali Moghaddam's “staircase”, Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko's “pyramid”, and Zeyno Baran's

⁹⁶⁰ Benjamin Franklin, ‘The Colonist’s Advocate: VI’, *The Public Advertiser*, 29 January 1770, Founders Online National Archives.

⁹⁶¹ ‘Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, 24 September 1765’.

⁹⁶² ‘An Address to the True-Born Sons of Liberty’, *The Boston-Gazette and Country Journal*, 31 March 1766, 574th edition, The Annotated Papers of Harbottle Dorr, Jr.; Ryan Ervin, ‘The Declaratory Act as Portrayed in Colonial American Newspapers’, *Historia*, 13 (2004), pp. 52–58 (pp. 52–53).

⁹⁶³ Arthur Lee, *The Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser*, 30 May 1768, Library of Congress.

⁹⁶⁴ R.L. Brunhouse, ‘The Effect of the Townshend Acts in Pennsylvania’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 54.4, pp. 355–73 (p. 357); McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 75.

“conveyor belt”, explain radicalization as a progression that varies in terms of corresponding factors, dynamics, length, and complexity, so although the Declaratory Act and the Townshend duties brought about a more unanimous response in Massachusetts, Pennsylvanians were slower to radicalize due to the “myriad” of other political issues and controversies plaguing the province.⁹⁶⁵ For instance, frontier Pennsylvanians were still navigating the “most critical State of Indian Affairs”, and the possibility of a “distressing War” with the Iroquois Confederacy loomed over the western half of the province where European settlements had “so shamefully encroached” upon Native hunting lands.⁹⁶⁶ Moreover, as a Proprietary colony with Quaker founders and an expanding German-speaking population, Pennsylvanians were struggling to find their provincial identity and make sense of the “vague and ill-defined” relationship between the colonies and their mother country.⁹⁶⁷ Pennsylvanians and British North Americans more broadly were working to determine their “place and [their] rights within the empire”.⁹⁶⁸ As such, many Pennsylvanians simply “chose to avoid fresh dispute” with the Declaratory Act and the Townshend duties, and instead clung to the “high good humour” brought on by the Stamp Act repeal and the hope that radical leaders could once again negotiate a peaceable solution for colonial concerns and grievances.⁹⁶⁹

Yet, because the Townshend duties threatened American autonomy so severely, Philadelphia’s most outspoken radical activists had to intervene in order to draw attention to

⁹⁶⁵ Moghaddam, pp. 161–62; McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism’, p. 416; Zeyno Baran, ‘Fighting the War of Ideas’, *Foreign Affairs*, 84.6 (2005), pp. 68–78 (p. 68); Robert W. T. Martin, ‘From the “Free and Open” Press to the “Press of Freedom”’: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Early American Press Liberty’, p. 520.

⁹⁶⁶ ‘George Croghan to Benjamin Franklin, 12 February 1768’, Founders Online National Archives.

⁹⁶⁷ Brunhouse, pp. 356–57.

⁹⁶⁸ John E. Ferling, *A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic* (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 42.

⁹⁶⁹ Benjamin Franklin, ‘Causes of the American Discontents before 1768’, *The London Chronicle*, 5 January 1768, Founders Online National Archives.

Parliament's attempt to "require a blind obedience and acquiescence in whatever they do."⁹⁷⁰ With no "concerted objection", Parliament had formally and unprecedentedly targeted British North America's free press, trade, and human and civil liberties, while simultaneously denying colonists the "merit" of consent.⁹⁷¹ The duties increased the authority of customs officers, dictated that royal officials could search private property at their own discretion, afforded Royal Naval Courts, as opposed to colonial courts, the jurisdiction over all affairs relating to customs violations, and established new Royal Admiralty courts in Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston, which were run independently of colonial juries and staffed by Crown-appointed judges who were awarded five percent of any fines levied against prosecuted offenders.⁹⁷² Perhaps most dangerously, however, the revenue raised through the Townshend duties was intended to support a standing army in Boston, which would aid customs officials and enforce all aspects of the duties.⁹⁷³

From each side of the Atlantic, Benjamin Franklin and John Dickinson, who had each garnered political experience and provincial attention in their work to advocate against violent uprisings in the wake of the Conestoga Massacre, increasingly positioned themselves as spokespeople for the continental cause. As neither Franklin nor Dickinson was native to Pennsylvania, their multi-regional backgrounds offered built-in ties north and south of Philadelphia.⁹⁷⁴ In London, Franklin argued against Parliament's ability to implement such sweeping and invasive policies in British North America, asserting "we shall not find that a farthing was ever granted for the settling any colonies" and moreover, Parliament "had no participation" in the negotiating the original colonial grants and charters. As Franklin

⁹⁷⁰ 'Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, 24 September 1765'.

⁹⁷¹ Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, p. 45; 'Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, 24 September 1765'.

⁹⁷² Peter D. G. Thomas, p. 34.

⁹⁷³ Hoerder, p. 151.

⁹⁷⁴ Walter Isaacson, *Benjamin Franklin: An American Life* (Simon and Schuster, 2003), p. 16; Charles Janeway Stillé, 'The Life and Times of John Dickinson, 1732-1808', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 15.1 (1891), pp. 1-25 (p. 5).

explained it, British North Americans had been forced to protect themselves “at their own expence, for near 150 years”, and likewise, they were capable of supporting “their own civil and military establishments” and funding their own “publick buildings, churches, colleges, highways, bridges, and other conveniences” through the taxes they “levied among themselves”. Thus, Franklin insisted, the Townshend duties were nothing more than “an internal tax to be raised in the colonies by authority of parliament, forces the money out of my purse without the consent of my representative in assembly”.⁹⁷⁵

Similarly, in Philadelphia, Dickinson set to work in hopes of garnering the level of support that colonists exhibited during the Stamp Act Crisis and using that vigor to fuel the Townshend resistance.⁹⁷⁶ Dickinson’s *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania*, which first appeared in a dozen installments in a Philadelphia newspaper between December 1767 and February 1768, were ultimately printed in twenty-one of the twenty-five colonial newspapers.⁹⁷⁷ Through his “farmer” persona, Dickinson played upon a variety of historical, spiritual, and moral motifs and brought the more localized issues of ordinary Pennsylvanians to the wider colonial stage. While Dickinson acknowledged the legality of Parliamentary authority within British Empire, he also laid out a critical component of what ultimately became the patriot fundamentalist ideology: Parliament had no right to tax the American colonies. Dickinson’s *Farmer’s Letters*, which this thesis will revisit in the following chapter and examine in the context of nonviolent leadership, enormously contributed to a matrix of continental ideals.

The consequences and impacts of the philosophies that Dickinson set forth can be viewed through the composite theory proposed by this research. The conceptual underpinnings of Dickinson’s *Farmer’s Letters* helped to facilitate a change in beliefs,

⁹⁷⁵ Benjamin Franklin as Benevolous, ‘On the Propriety of Taxing America’, *The London Chronicle*, 11 April 1767, Founders Online National Archives.

⁹⁷⁶ Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, pp. 27–28.

⁹⁷⁷ Ferling, *A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic*, p. 70.

feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justified political action and demanded sacrifice in defense of the ingroup, not just in Pennsylvania, but throughout British North America, which is to say that by definition, *Letters from a Farmer* functioned as a mechanism of “ideas first” radicalization.⁹⁷⁸ Indeed, in an argument that transcended the bounds of class groupings and cultural identities, a core tenet of both Framing Theory and New Social Movement Theory, Dickinson explained with precision that to deny British North Americans representation in Parliament and to inhibit the internal affairs of the American colonies solely for the sake of asserting Parliamentary supremacy was patently unconstitutional.⁹⁷⁹ The certainty with which Dickinson wrote and the way in which he described Parliament’s potential to dismantle Christian liberty critically swayed American decision frames, and in accordance with Prospect Theory, encouraged an unprecedented colonial willingness to accept new risks which might safeguard American liberties and virtues.⁹⁸⁰ Significantly, Dickinson’s catalytic essays were originally published in Goddard’s *Pennsylvania Chronicle*, a Galloway-backed newspaper that had traditionally been sympathetic to Quaker interests.⁹⁸¹ Goddard’s willingness to advertise the arguments set out by Dickinson in a prominent place within his far-reaching weekly, however, suggests that the printer understood the provincial longing for a more representative view of American grievances.

In the wake of Dickinson’s *Letters from a Farmer*, Philadelphia’s radical activists directly appealed to the patriotic self-interest of the merchant class by insisting that a renewed boycott would not only force Parliament to repeal the duties, but additionally encourage the public to support the purchase of American-made goods.⁹⁸² Pennsylvania’s burgeoning patriot

⁹⁷⁸ McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism’, p. 416.

⁹⁷⁹ Chong and Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, pp. 104–5; Fisher and Kling, p. 12; Wood, *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin*, p. 123.

⁹⁸⁰ Kahneman and Tversky, pp. 264–65; Levy, pp. 174–75; Farnham, pp. 205–6.

⁹⁸¹ Ousterhout, p. 24.

⁹⁸² Ousterhout, p. 25.

fundamentalists encouraged the rejection of “British Man-Merchants, with their detestable Ware” and instead, reminded provincials to “Manufacture Every article that they Conveniently Can” and “be Content with home Spun”.⁹⁸³ Philadelphia’s merchants “belatedly” joined the nonimportation movement in March of 1769, as an expanding majority of Pennsylvanians were gradually coming to correlate “*Industry and Frugality*” with virtue and to understand the ways in which nonconsumption and nonimportation could “increase the Wealth, Power and Grandeur of the Community”.⁹⁸⁴ Throughout the Townshend resistance, eventual patriot fundamentalists encouraged Pennsylvanians to peaceably challenge Parliament by boycotting, marching, and petitioning rather than engaging in “extremities” and “insurrection” and risking the consequences that “temporary anarchy” could bring.⁹⁸⁵ Indeed, as the patriot fundamentalist ideology developed, Pennsylvanians associated moral uprightness with nonconsumption, unity with performative acts of solidarity, and political legitimacy with ethical government.⁹⁸⁶ In fact, in 1770, “without violence”, Philadelphians had reduced the importation of British goods more significantly than residents in any other North American port-city, and one Pennsylvanian predicted that “Such a Spirit of resentment [has been] Raised in the people of America against Being Brought under Slavery to a British Ministry...that they Won’t Easily forget it”.⁹⁸⁷

Certainly, although the years separating the Townshend duties from the Tea Act have been deemed relatively “quiet”, the leaders of Pennsylvania’s emerging patriot

⁹⁸³ Benjamin Franklin, ‘A Conversation on Slavery’, *The Public Advertiser*, 30 January 1770, Founders Online National Archives; ‘Humphry Marshall to Benjamin Franklin, 28 May 1770’, Founders Online National Archives; ‘Joshua Evans Quoted in Joshua Evans, 1731-1798: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Quaker Singularity by Donald Brooks Kelley’, p. 77.

⁹⁸⁴ Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, p. 47; *Poor Richard Improved: Being an Almanack and Ephemeris for the Year of Our Lord 1765* (B. Franklin and D. Hall, 1765).

⁹⁸⁵ Joseph Priestley, *An Essay on the First Principles of Government* (J. Johnson in St. Paul’s Church-Yard, 1768), p. 31, Online Library of Liberty.

⁹⁸⁶ Alpaugh, ‘Nonviolence, Positive Peace and American Pre-Revolutionary Protest, 1765-1775’, p. 170.

⁹⁸⁷ Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution* (Beard Books, 1939), pp. 193–94; ‘Humphry Marshall to Benjamin Franklin, 28 May 1770’.

fundamentalist movement did not forget or overlook the “Weaklings” of the merchant class who rejected nonimportation and willingly risked the “enslaving” of the American people in the name of financial gain.⁹⁸⁸ The leaders of the developing patriot fundamentalist movement recognized that British North America’s political future relied largely upon widespread nonviolent civil resistance, and likewise, they understood the “Importance of uniting the american Interest in Opposition”.⁹⁸⁹ Charles Thomson expressed that it was necessary to prevent “the conduct of the Merchants” from “affect[ing] the general cause”.⁹⁹⁰ Yet, while continued importation was certainly socially problematic, Philadelphia’s merchant class had “no compelling financial reason” to engage in nonimportation or entertain the idea of a permanent split with England.⁹⁹¹ As such, Philadelphia’s radical writers needed to instigate a shift in the decision frame of the city’s merchant class and demonstrate that the short-term economic concerns associated with nonimportation were worth the prospective long-term benefits of political and economic autonomy in the American colonies. That is to say, Philadelphia’s radical authors and orators needed rhetorically and morally link consumption with politics as a means of refocusing the apprehensive on the long-term implications of submission to Parliamentary will, rather than the immediate costs.⁹⁹²

The voices of the boycott movement focused most specifically on Parliamentary efforts to salvage the East India Company, which legislatively echoed the empire’s earlier attempts to extract revenue from the colonies, and insisted upon the rejection of imported tea and gradually crafted “an entire moral lexicon condemning the rituals of buying and drinking

⁹⁸⁸ Silverman, p. 162; ‘Humphry Marshall to Benjamin Franklin, 28 May 1770’; Franklin, ‘The Colonist’s Advocate: VI’.

⁹⁸⁹ ‘John Holt to Benjamin Franklin, 2 October 1771’, Founders Online National Archives.

⁹⁹⁰ ‘Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, 26 November 1769’.

⁹⁹¹ T. H. Breen, ‘Narrative of Commercial Life: Consumption, Ideology, and Community on the Eve of the American Revolution’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 50.3 (1993), pp. 471–501 (p. 474).

⁹⁹² Farnham, p. 221.

tea”.⁹⁹³ Virtue and moral uprightness were rhetorically equated with a willingness to “sacrifice for the Public Good”.⁹⁹⁴ J.G.A Pocock has traced the struggle between virtue and corruption to the Machiavellian conceptualization of the truly upright individual as one whose “dread” of corruption surpassed their desire for landed wealth, and certainly, Philadelphia’s patriot newspapers were rife with historical and philosophical metaphors to link British North American struggles to those of the ancient world.⁹⁹⁵ For instance, Britain’s inevitable intent to “pour its armies into the colonies, and deluge the country with blood” was explained to be “as right a thing in Old-England, totally to destroy New-England, as it was in Old Rome to destroy Carthage”.⁹⁹⁶ Yet, as Pocock has explained it, for Machiavelli, political nonviolence provided a critical pathway to societal virtue, which is to say that only peaceable, resistance-based challenges to political corruption could be considered as legitimately virtuous. For instance, Pocock emphasizes Machiavelli’s observation that plebians in the late Roman empire closed their shops, refused military service, and marched out of the city in the face of imperial violence and discrimination, making their voices heard with “relative bloodlessness”.⁹⁹⁷

Edmund Morgan, on the other hand, argued that the “Puritan ethic” instilled in British North Americans from New England to Georgia a set of values, ideas, and attitudes that “called” provincials to serve society and himself in “some useful, productive” endeavor. Thus, merchants, were to be regarded with “suspicion”, as their profession inherently created a capitalistic culture and made British North Americans dependent upon the manufactured

⁹⁹³ Jane T. Merritt, ‘Tea Trade, Consumption, and the Republican Paradox in Prerevolutionary Philadelphia’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 128.2 (2004), pp. 117–48 (p. 118); Jensen, p. 329.

⁹⁹⁴ ‘Pacificus: Pax Quaeritur Bello’, *The Public Advertiser*, 26 January 1766, Founders Online National Archives.

⁹⁹⁵ J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 462–67.

⁹⁹⁶ Benjamin Franklin, ‘On the Candidacy of Barlow Trecothick’, *The Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser*, 5 December 1768, Founders Online National Archives.

⁹⁹⁷ Pocock, pp. 195–96.

wares produced by mother country. The nonviolent resistance of superfluities, unnecessary luxuries, and ultimately, consumer-driven enslavement, on the other hand, was represented as a form of “salvation”.⁹⁹⁸ To Pennsylvanians and to British North Americans more broadly, to reject tea, a quintessentially British consumer product, meant recognizing the ways in which the colonial relationship to the British past had changed and rejecting Britain’s governmental and economic supremacy in North America. Yet, whether the patriot emphasis on nonviolent civil resistance was more grounded in historical understandings or spiritual philosophies is relatively insignificant, as both historical approaches suggest that virtue, which inherently involved nonviolent civil resistance in both the Machiavellian and “Puritan” traditions, was the “social glue” that carried American colonists through the boycotts of 1765-1766, 1768-1770, and 1774-1776.⁹⁹⁹ Indeed, as historians Jane Merritt, T.H. Breen, and Thomas Doerflinger have all emphasized, the boycott movement, which started as a mere protest to the Stamp Act, helped to carry Pennsylvanians from the Stamp Act resistance to the Declaration of Independence not just physically, but ideologically.¹⁰⁰⁰

Framing Theory and New Social Movement Theory both tell us that successful nonviolent movements must appeal to a vast variety of perspectives and express the values and identities of “transclass groupings of constituencies” concerned about certain elements of human and civil rights.¹⁰⁰¹ In the context of the Imperial Crisis, Pennsylvania’s diverse population saw themselves, their ancestors, and their posterity reflected in the patriot case for Christian liberty, and increasingly, regardless of heritage, they could accept the peaceable

⁹⁹⁸ Edmund Morgan, ‘The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 24.1 (1967), pp. 3–43 (pp. 3–5).

⁹⁹⁹ Breen, ‘Narrative of Commercial Life: Consumption, Ideology, and Community on the Eve of the American Revolution’, p. 494.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Merritt, ‘Tea Trade, Consumption, and the Republican Paradox in Prerevolutionary Philadelphia’; Breen, ‘“Baubles of Britain”: The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century’; Doerflinger; Breen, ‘Narrative of Commercial Life: Consumption, Ideology, and Community on the Eve of the American Revolution’.

¹⁰⁰¹ Chong and Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, pp. 104–5; Snow, Zurcher, Jr., and Ekland-Olson, p. 464; Fisher and Kling, p. 12.

nature of nonimportation and the crucial defense that nonviolent resistance provided for American liberty. Admittedly, German-speaking merchants lacked emotional and familial ties to Great Britain, however, they understood the threat that imperial overreach presented to their profits and their blossoming political positions. In turn, German-speaking merchants displayed an “openness in challenging imperial policies” that rivaled the Ulster Scots’ eagerness for the democratizing effects of nonimportation.¹⁰⁰² Indeed, for the German-speaking and Scots Irish merchant communities, nonimportation challenged the imperial threat to their profits and political rights, but moreover, the “democratized virtue” that swelled during the colonial boycott movement meant that by risking their personal funds, associators were fundamentally virtuous.¹⁰⁰³ Likewise, Quaker merchants, who William Bradford feared would “prevent” the patriot movement from achieving their aim of political autonomy accepted that “the point in dispute is a very Important one, if the Americans are to be taxed by a Parliament where they are not nor can be Represented, they are no longer Englishmen but Slaves.”¹⁰⁰⁴ In turn, during the “missing” sixteen months between Philadelphia’s own “Tea Party” in December 1773 and the clashes at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, Philadelphians and Pennsylvanians more broadly pursued an ideological path from nonviolent civil resistance to full-fledged revolt in the name of virtue.¹⁰⁰⁵

Conservatives and loyalists did work to negate the methods through which patriot fundamentalist authors and orators linked the social, political, and moral obligation of

¹⁰⁰² Andrew Zonderman, ‘Binding and Unwinding the British Empire: Philadelphia’s German Merchants as Consumer and Political Revolutionaries’, *Early American Studies*, 18.3 (2020), pp. 324–64 (p. 358).

¹⁰⁰³ Patrick Griffin, ‘Searching for Independence: Revolutionary Kentucky, Irish American Experience, and Scotch-Irish Myth, 1770s-1790s’, in *Ulster to America: The Scots-Irish Migration Experience, 1680-1830*, Ed. Warren R. Hofstra (The University of Tennessee Press, 2012), p. 226.

¹⁰⁰⁴ ‘William Bradford to James Madison, 4 January 1775’, Founders Online National Archives; ‘Reynell Family - Origin of the American War’, *The Gentleman’s Magazine, and Historical Chronicle, for the Year, 1824*, 223–24.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ray Raphael and Marie Raphael, *The Spirit of ’74: How the American Revolution Began* (New York: The New Press, 2015), Introduction, VIII; Mary Beth Norton, *1774: The Long Year of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 2021), pp. 3–4; Michael D. Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020), pp. 123–26.

resistance, as conservative pamphlets, newspaper articles, and broadsides were “dispersed to the *disadvantage* of America”, as one Quaker merchant expressed it.¹⁰⁰⁶ Yet, these attempts effectively fell flat. The most significant critique of the budding patriot fundamentalist ideology came when New York printer James Rivington published *A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great-Britain, and the Colonies*. Written by Joseph Galloway as an extension of his 1774 Plan of Union proposal, the *Examination* did not appear until 1775, just after Galloway had failed to convince the First Continental Congress that “there must be one supreme legislative head in every civil society”.¹⁰⁰⁷ Galloway’s essay was grounded in his conceptualization of indivisible sovereignty, and through his *Examination*, he aimed to denounce the constitutional arguments of the patriot fundamentalist movement and expose the alleged ethical blunders and intellectual shortcomings of radical leaders.¹⁰⁰⁸

Buttressed by William Blackstone’s writings on the interactions between law and government, Galloway framed colonial subordination in what was, until the 1760s, an orthodox view in the Anglo-American world.¹⁰⁰⁹ As Galloway viewed it, the question of Parliamentary authority had been settled in the seventeenth century and reiterated clearly through the Declaratory Act, which is to say that “obedience to the authority of parliament”, as opposed to solely the Crown or the English Constitution, was “one of the most essential duties” of all imperial subjects.¹⁰¹⁰ In turn, Galloway expressed bewilderment over the “inconsistency” and “absurdity” of patriot fundamentalists who continued to pledge

¹⁰⁰⁶ ‘David Barclay to Benjamin Franklin, 11 December 1774’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Joseph Galloway, ‘Plan of Union, September 28, 1774’, in *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1879*, Ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford et Al., 7 vols (Government Printing Office, 1904), 1, p. 44.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Robert M. Calhoun, “‘I Have Deduced Your Rights’: Joseph Galloway’s Concept of His Role, 1774-1775”, *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 35.3 (1968), pp. 356–78 (p. 356).

¹⁰⁰⁹ Calhoun, p. 374.

¹⁰¹⁰ Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 201–3; Joseph Galloway, ‘A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great-Britain, and the Colonies: With a Plan of Accommodation, on Constitutional Principles’ (New York: James Rivington, 1775), p. 23, Evans Early American Imprint Collection.

allegiance to the Crown yet refused to abide by Parliamentary rule.¹⁰¹¹ Galloway interpreted the intersection of Parliamentary rule as one “where wisdom and sound policy”, and thus, for him, the idea that “barbarian” patriots could provide better political leadership than Parliament or more efficiently maintain peace and order was nonsensical.¹⁰¹² Although Galloway clearly comprehended the logic in patriot pleas for political consent, internal taxation, and Parliamentary representation, he insisted that “the right of property is in the state, under the license or authority of which they were discovered or conquered”.¹⁰¹³ Noting patriot claims to political autonomy to be fundamentally ignorant and naïve, Galloway described patriot actions and objectives as nothing more than “lawless ambition” that would only lead the colonies to ruin.¹⁰¹⁴ However, by 1775, Pennsylvanians had become convinced that the patriot fundamentalist cause was a worthy one. Philadelphia’s radical spokespeople had crafted a nonviolent movement which built in “implications for multiple values or considerations”, helped provincials to develop new conceptualizations of the Anglo-American relationship and re-evaluate previous understandings of America’s place on the political stage, tapped local knowledge and resources to respond effectively and creatively to new and increasing imperial threats, and convinced colonists that submission to Parliament after such a dedicated and intentional nonviolent campaign would certainly render them as slaves to the empire.¹⁰¹⁵

¹⁰¹¹ Galloway, ‘A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great-Britain, and the Colonies: With a Plan of Accommodation, on Constitutional Principles’, p. 13.

¹⁰¹² Galloway, ‘A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great-Britain, and the Colonies: With a Plan of Accommodation, on Constitutional Principles’, p. 1.

¹⁰¹³ Galloway, ‘A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great-Britain, and the Colonies: With a Plan of Accommodation, on Constitutional Principles’, p. 10; John E. Ferling, ‘Joseph Galloway: A Reassessment of the Motivations of a Pennsylvania Loyalist’, *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 39.2 (1972), pp. 163–86 (p. 168).

¹⁰¹⁴ Galloway, ‘A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great-Britain, and the Colonies: With a Plan of Accommodation, on Constitutional Principles’, p. 1.

¹⁰¹⁵ Chong and Druckman, ‘A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments’, pp. 104–5; Snow, Rochford, and Benford, pp. 464–66; Wada, p. 547; Kahneman and Tversky, pp. 264–65; Levy, pp. 174–75; Farnham, p. 205.

Historians have explained Galloway's quest against the patriot movement as stemming from a desire for immortalization as the man who salvaged the Anglo-American connection or occurring due to the personal security provided by a successful marriage, a thriving law practice, and an abundant inheritance, but that determination is beyond the scope of this research.¹⁰¹⁶ Ultimately, Galloway's *Examination* provides critical insight into one Loyalist's opinions and intentions, and as such, the publication offers an important lens through which to consider firstly, Galloway's inability to appeal to Pennsylvanians facing significant intergroup conflict and additionally the ways in which Philadelphia's patriot fundamentalist leaders prevented the publication from converting Galloway's ideas about reconciliation into political action. Indeed, Galloway's *Examination* displays the author's inability to acknowledge that the colonial relationship to the British past had crumbled in "fundamental ways that were direct responses to the events and rhetoric of the Imperial Crisis".¹⁰¹⁷ Hailing the flexibility of a cooperative British leadership, Galloway described Parliament as having "forfeited" and "surrendered" its own interests to protect British North Americans from their self-imposed sacrifice and detriment.¹⁰¹⁸ Galloway failed to see nonimportation's value as a mechanism of peaceable protest, and furthermore, he failed to acknowledge how the shared experiences that made up the Imperial Crisis facilitated a distinctive American identity with distinctive needs, desires, and values.¹⁰¹⁹ Pennsylvanians had lived through decades of political instability, shifting geographical boundaries, and rapid cultural and demographic changes and evolutions, and virtually all frontier dwellers and

¹⁰¹⁶ Ferling, 'Joseph Galloway: A Reassessment of the Motivations of a Pennsylvania Loyalist', p. 164; Oliver Kuntzleman, *Joseph Galloway: Loyalist* (Temple University Press, 1941), p. 168; Julian P. Boyd, *Anglo-American Union: Joseph Galloway's Plans to Preserve the British Empire, 1774-1788* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941), pp. 15-17; Calhoun, p. 357.

¹⁰¹⁷ Hattem, *Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution*, p. 125.

¹⁰¹⁸ Galloway, 'A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great-Britain, and the Colonies: With a Plan of Accommodation, on Constitutional Principles', pp. 13-14.

¹⁰¹⁹ Calhoun, pp. 356-58.

urban residents experienced some level of trauma, hardship, loss, or anxiety.¹⁰²⁰ In turn, provincials longed for the sense of protection, community, and certainty that a broad-based social movement can offer, a process consistent with “ideas first radicalization”.¹⁰²¹

Philadelphia’s patriot fundamentalist leaders were quick to defend British North Americans’ evolving attitudes and feelings toward the British empire and to justify colonists’ engagement in the nonviolent civil resistance of Parliamentary supremacy.¹⁰²² John Dickinson and Charles Thomson noted of Galloway’s *Examination* that “the very reading” of the publication would be “sufficient to freeze the blood of any man that has a spark of Liberty in him!”, and in order to deny the conservative Quaker cohort the opportunity to retort, Dickinson and Thomson never identified Galloway by name, addressing him instead as “Sir”. In a philosophically condescending rebuttal to Galloway’s *Examination*, Dickinson and Thomson explained that the author either “ignorantly misunderstood or wilfully misapplied” the principles of government to the case of the American colonies. Rating Galloway’s sixty-two-page work as “partial”, “inadequate”, and “totally defective”, the radical duo challenged Galloway’s conviction in Parliamentary supremacy by invoking Lockean theory on the “sacred and unalterable” power of political consent.

Contrary to Galloway’s view, Dickinson and Thomson argued that British North Americans could maintain their allegiance to the king “as supreme executor” of the laws and simultaneously reject “the absurd and dangerous idea” of feeling obligated “to be bound by every law that the British Parliament has or may make”. The radical duo explained that the two positions are not mutually exclusive and insisted that the blind acceptance of Parliamentary policymaking detailed in Galloway’s *Examination* likened the colonists to slaves. Indeed, reiterating the patriot fundamentalist rhetoric that radical leaders had been

¹⁰²⁰ McCauley, pp. 213–14.

¹⁰²¹ della Porta, I, pp. 158–60; Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski, p. 824.

¹⁰²² McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism’, p. 416.

crafting for nearly a decade, Dickinson and Thomson argued that the best way to honor the English constitution was to demand the proper execution of its accords. Likewise, the two defended the right of all British subjects, including Americans, to collectively safeguard their civil liberties through nonviolent civil resistance. Projecting a tone of innocence without compromising the intellectual gravitas of their rebuttal, Dickinson and Thomson maintained that Pennsylvania's patriot fundamentalists had legally and resourcefully utilized their political rights as British subjects in order to best adhere to the basic principles of English government and allow the broader community a voice in political matters.

Although Galloway proceeded to tie together “the tangled threads of his argument” in a *Reply* to Dickinson and Thomson, by 1775, few Pennsylvanian conservatives were willing to voice their support for the increasingly bleak Loyalist campaign to repair Anglo-American relations.¹⁰²³ As the political climate in the American colonies became increasingly polarized, Pennsylvania's Loyalist minority feared being labeled as the sort of fundamentally flawed individual who would “undertake to force the loathsome Pills of Slavery and Oppression down the Throats of a free, independent and determined People”.¹⁰²⁴ Indeed, Ryerson has suggested that the few politically charged essays produced by Philadelphia's Tories following Galloway's *Examination* were timid and resigned, which serves to contrast the weakness of the conservative media between 1774 and 1776 from the strong grip that the patriot fundamentalist had on Pennsylvanians who had collectivized to “Serve the Cause of America” and “the Cause of Liberty”.¹⁰²⁵ While the opponents of the patriot fundamentalist movement “wish'd” for nothing more than colonial “Insurrections” which would “give a good Pretence” for Britain to unleash military force upon North Americans and quell radical

¹⁰²³ Joseph Galloway, ‘A Reply to an Address to the Author of a Pamphlet, Entitled, “A Candid Examination,” & c. By the Author of the Candid Examination’ (New York: James Rivington, 1775), Gale Primary Sources; Calhoun, p. 357.

¹⁰²⁴ Thomas Mifflin, as ‘Scævola’, *Pennsylvania Chronicle*, 11 October 1773, 38th edition, p. 3.

¹⁰²⁵ Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, p. 105; ‘The Philadelphia Merchants to Benjamin Franklin, 18 April 1769’, Founders Online National Archives.

rhetoric and activity, Philadelphia's radical spokespeople practiced restraint, subtlety, empathy, protecting the patriot fundamentalist cause and ensuring widespread commitment to the just resistance of imperial encroachment upon colonial liberty.¹⁰²⁶

Throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, the individuals who ultimately became Pennsylvania's most prominent patriot fundamentalist advocates gradually and strategically crafted a group identity that appealed to the province's diverse population and drew a wide range of sociopolitical demographics to the banner of nonviolent civil resistance. Indeed, during the deeply transformative decade that preceded the Declaration of Independence, Pennsylvania's patriot proponents gradually legitimized and crystallized the ideological grounds of American resistance, and in the process, Pennsylvanians of all walks of life – from underprivileged Ulster Scots and backcountry German speakers to Quaker statesmen and urban Presbyterian merchants – became increasingly motivated to act upon their real and perceived proximity to marginalization. By invoking the province's unique social, cultural, and political history and linking the eighteenth-century Pennsylvanian experience to key religious, philosophical, and historical motifs, radical authors and orators impressed upon Pennsylvanians both the admirable nature and the strategic logic of nonviolent civil resistance, instigating an almost “universal opposition to every thing connected with Great Britain”.¹⁰²⁷

Compared to Massachusettsans, Pennsylvanians were slower to unite around the “Power of Resistance”.¹⁰²⁸ However, through the guidance of trusted and capable leaders and the steadiness of the patriot media campaign, radical spokespeople exploited provincial anxieties, insecurities, and equalities, advancing provincial resentment over the continued political inaction of Quaker and Proprietary leaders and challenging the notion of

¹⁰²⁶ ‘Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Cushing, 9 March 1773’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹⁰²⁷ John Lukens quoted in ‘Editorial Note on the Founding of the Post Office, 26 July 1775’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹⁰²⁸ ‘Josiah Quincy, Sr. to Benjamin Franklin, 25 March 1775’.

Parliamentary jurisdiction in North America. By utilizing a composite sociological approach which includes facets of Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory as a lens through which to interpret the logic and application of nonviolent civil resistance in pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania, we can trace the development of patriot fundamentalism as a collective, action-oriented ideology in the province between the years 1764 and 1776.

Framing Theory, which dictates that individuals apply their own experiences, feelings, values, and considerations to political struggle, can add to our understanding of some Pennsylvanians radicalized in different ways and at different paces than others.¹⁰²⁹ For instance, while the German and Scots Irish settlers that populated the Pennsylvania backcountry likely shared concerns over the interactions of Native American presence and provincial policy, defense, and western settlement, the German immigrants who settled as family units in Pennsylvania had different experiences, educations, conversations, and convictions than the Ulster Scots who generally migrated as single men with no dependents.¹⁰³⁰ Likewise, by applying Framing Theory to the patriot fundamentalist movement, we can better understand how some Quakers came to perceive nonviolent civil resistance as a means of preserving “the tolerant spirit of the colony” while others felt that organized resistance infringed upon the individual’s “Conscientious persuasion or practice”.¹⁰³¹ Thus, Framing Theory, when applied to Pennsylvania’s patriot fundamentalist movement, tells us that because the province’s extraordinarily diverse ethnic groups and social sects possessed an array of familial obligations, employment opportunities, financial

¹⁰²⁹ Chong and Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, pp. 104–5.

¹⁰³⁰ Wokeck, ‘German and Irish Immigration to Colonial Pennsylvania’, pp. 132–33; Grubb, ‘German Immigration to Pennsylvania, 1709 to 1820’, p. 429; Ridner, *The Scots Irish of Pennsylvania: A Varied People*, p. 6.

¹⁰³¹ William Penn, ‘1682: Act for Freedom of Conscience’, in *Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801*, Ed. J.T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders (1896), 1, 107–9; Edwin B. Bronner, ‘The Quakers and Nonviolence in Pennsylvania’, *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 35.1 (1968), pp. 1–22 (p. 3).

responsibilities, belief systems, certain groups and individuals were more open or more susceptible to “unfreezing” to the idea of nonviolent civil resistance than others.¹⁰³² Likewise, it explains how and why patriot fundamentalist leaders had to work so hard to find and create the various points of ideological access that allowed them and their messaging to penetrate the unique and deep-seated values that defined Pennsylvania’s diverse sociocultural communities.

Because eighteenth-century Pennsylvanians had such varied personal and familial histories, unique cultural traditions, belief systems, languages and dialects, and specific governmental expectations, they needed adequate time and space to process the rapidly changing landscape of their province. Particularly in the face of the Seven Years’ War and its economic consequences, alongside perceived threats posed by Pennsylvania’s indigenous populations, and amidst intraprovince conflicts between the Quaker and Proprietary parties, Pennsylvanians were forced to grapple with and consequently prioritize their values, concerns, and objectives. In accordance with the principles of New Social Movement Theory, Pennsylvanians employed their improving literacy rates and took advantage of newfound opportunities for political participation as a means of weighing potential options for solving their “objective problems”.¹⁰³³ Moreover, as dictated by Prospect Theory, Pennsylvanians rural and urban alike needed patriot printers, authors, and orators to provide them with “evidence” that activism would likely yield beneficial sociopolitical change for British North American lives.¹⁰³⁴ Through widely circulated newspapers, pamphlets, broadsides, and books, as well as sermons, speeches, and other public orations, patriot fundamentalist spokespersons injected into everyday conversation a wide variety of spiritual, historical, and intellectual themes which reflected the popular anxieties, grievances, and tribulations of Pennsylvanians.

¹⁰³² McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, p. 75.

¹⁰³³ Buechler, ‘New Social Movement Theories’, p. 442; Inglehart, p. 371; Plant, p. 349; Jean L. Cohen, p. 98.

¹⁰³⁴ Mullett, p. 92; Scott, pp. 126–28.

Slowly, progressively, and at times, hesitantly, Pennsylvanians came to understand nonviolent civil resistance as a necessary, purposeful, and legitimate political struggle, and in turn, provincials became less distinctly defined by their Old-World identities and more collectively North American.

Chapter 5 –

“Harsh methods, cannot be proper, till milder ones have failed”:

Nonviolent Mobilization in Philadelphia, 1764–1775

While an array of long-term conditions, fears, insecurities, and experiences contributed to the individual and collective radicalization of eighteenth-century Pennsylvanians, short-term factors, such as provincial practices of state-building, an expanding British Atlantic economy, and the relatively rapid emergence of a competent colonial leadership group, catalyzed revolution through physical and resource mobilization in Pennsylvania between the years 1764 and 1776. While the previous chapter centered on the radicalization of Pennsylvanians and the ideological arguments that provincials formulated to justify their nonviolent resistance of imperial policymaking, this chapter examines the methods and channels through which dissenting Pennsylvanians mobilized to peaceably challenge Parliamentary authority. Thus, this chapter will examine the ways in which nonviolent leaders helped to activate broad-based participation by creating new political opportunities, establishing new mobilizing structures, and instituting new patterns of behavior which each hinged on political nonviolence.

By intertwining Social Science frameworks including Tarrow’s Political Opportunity Structure and Tilly’s Resource Mobilization Theory, this chapter seeks to shed light upon the unique contours of pre-Revolutionary mobilization in the multiethnic province of Pennsylvania and advance our understanding the nature and evolution of this collectivization. This chapter argues that Philadelphia’s nonviolent advocates combined rhetoric and ideology with action by framing nonviolent struggle to involve Pennsylvania’s unique demographic configurations and tapping local resources, skills and means. Drawing upon the impacts of

group grievance and interpersonal bonds, leaders interested in political change transformed previously passive groups and individuals into active participants in the sociopolitical arena and created space for provincials with diverse social, political, religious, and economic interests to form new trust networks through engagement in voluntary associations, local committees, and special purpose groups.

Accordingly, before exploring the ways in which Pennsylvanians physically assembled, demonstrated, and boycotted to exert nonviolent force as a key component of the broader patriot fundamentalist movement, this chapter will examine several of the key figures who not only helped to routinize act of noncooperation and defiance from Philadelphia to the frontier, but also dynamically created new political opportunities for previously marginalized communities to utilize their resources and assume a more active, less deferential role in colonial politics.¹⁰³⁵ Through the application of a composite theoretical framework, we can assume a new vantage point from which to assess the practicalities of pre-Revolutionary mobilization. In turn, we can look past the popular narratives of angry colonists “clubs, cudgels, and cutlasses” to better understand how Pennsylvanians manipulated the leverage of formal resolves, petitions, and everyday acts of noncooperation to nonviolently disintegrate Parliamentary authority in North America during the Imperial Crisis.¹⁰³⁶

This chapter brings into to focus the unique sociopolitical features of Philadelphia, a prominent Proprietary city with reasonable wealth and resources during the Imperial Crisis and explores how certain conditions within the city offered unprecedented cause and opportunity to pursue activism, how readily available skills and resources strengthened American resistance efforts, and how Parliamentary actions and reactions influenced Philadelphian perceptions and resistance measures. By drawing together elements of

¹⁰³⁵ Beeman, pp. 401–2; Eisinger, p. 11; Tarrow, pp. 18–19; Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, p. 40; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

¹⁰³⁶ Hoock, p. 3.

Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure, Tilly's Resource Mobilization Theory, and Chenoweth and Stephan's "interactive approach" to contentious politics, this chapter tracks and assesses the mobilizing structures that bring the patriot fundamentalist movement in line with more modern nonviolent social movements. This chapter will examine how the precise conditions of pre-Revolutionary Philadelphia afforded colonists the space to collectivize through purpose-built associations, committees, and other mobilizing structures, highlight how the resources available to colonists, including civic infrastructure, public institutions, printing press, influenced the ways in which Philadelphians approached resistance, and consider the reflexive relationship between the American resistance movement and the imperial regime.

Between the years 1764 and 1776, groups and individuals across Pennsylvania established new nonviolent repertoires of contention to challenge unjust and unconstitutional Parliamentary agendas. By collectivizing in the streets, in courthouses and meeting rooms, and in quasi-official committees and associations, developing patriot fundamentalists created new institutions and popularized new political leaders, and coordinated peaceable, purposeful direct action. Under the radical leadership of individuals including William Bradford, "the patriot printer of 1776", John Dickinson, "the Penman of the Revolution", and Charles Thomson, the "Samuel Adams of Philadelphia", ordinary provincials from Philadelphia to the frontier pursued unchartered pathways to participatory politics by establishing new channels and methods through which to communicate colonial grievances to the Crown and Parliament.¹⁰³⁷ As radical Pennsylvanians gradually reordered political power structures through "conservative constitutional protest", the province's patriot leaders institutionalized noncooperation not only by consistently reiterating and demonstrating the strategic logic of

¹⁰³⁷ Wallace; Moses Coit Tyler, *The Literary History of the American Revolution* (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1897), I, p. 115; John Adams, '1774. Aug. 30. Tuesday', in *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, Vol. II: 1771–1781*, Ed. Lyman H. Butterfield, 4 vols (Harvard University Press, 1961), II, pp. 115–17.

nonviolent civil resistance, but also by creating space for Pennsylvanians from all sects of society to action the Continental values and ideals that provincials continuously developed throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis.¹⁰³⁸ As in Boston, Philadelphia's radical leaders provided both operational structure and functionality to the developing patriot fundamentalist movement, as provincials established and contributed to a "Simmelian web" of third-party associations, in which individuals with inherent commonalities as well as those who were once rather "alien" were able to physically and ideologically connect through patriot fundamentalist advocacy.¹⁰³⁹ Indeed, as Pennsylvanians increasingly established committees of correspondence, nonimportation associations, fraternities, and charitable organizations, they stimulated a distinctly American identity, stirred feelings of significance and belonging across an ethnically and socioeconomically diverse population, offered Pennsylvanian protesters unprecedented leverage in their political struggle against Parliament, and removed important sources of imperial power through sustained acts of protest and noncooperation.¹⁰⁴⁰

As such, in order to determine how Pennsylvania's patriot fundamentalist movement slowly, but continuously procured new recruits, resources, and benefits, we must examine the range of performative nonviolent methods that patriot advocates utilized to transform previously passive groups and individuals into active participants in the sociopolitical arena.¹⁰⁴¹ By following a rough chronology, we can explore the contributions and impacts of key patriot leaders, who utilized "modular performances and repertoires" of collective action to create space for a new political faction and new participatory institutions within the Quaker-dominated proprietary province.¹⁰⁴² Indeed, it is important to understand how

¹⁰³⁸ J. William Frost, 'The Mechanics of Internal Revolution', *Reviews in American History*, 6.3 (1978), pp. 326–30 (p. 326); Berger and Luckmann, p. 65.

¹⁰³⁹ Clemens, p. 758; Simmel, p. 128.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Sullivan, p. 310; Chenoweth and Stephan, 'Mobilization and Resistance: A Framework for Analysis', p. 251.

¹⁰⁴¹ Chenoweth, 'Political Mobilization and Institutions', p. 362; Etzioni, p. 243.

¹⁰⁴² Tarrow, pp. 4–6.

Pennsylvania's patriot advocates articulated popular grievances, issued protest directives, and established de facto governmental institutions with intentionality as a means of aligning agrarian backcountry Pennsylvanians, urban laboring classes, women, and other previously politically inactive communities with roles in the public rank-and-file or homespun movements.¹⁰⁴³ Thus, whereas the previous chapter examined the ideological mechanisms of patriot fundamentalism, this chapter will focus on the organization and employment of specific acts of disruptive protest, including boycotts, demonstrations, nonimportation associations, and nonconsumption agreements, and explore practices of colonial defiance of British law, such as using documents without tax stamps to explore "the real work" of nonviolent mobilization in pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania.¹⁰⁴⁴ By examining how the existing mobilizing structures, including religious congregations, social groups, and fraternities interacted with newly created special-purpose associations such as the Sons of Liberty and committees of correspondence, we can better comprehend how the patriot fundamentalist movement was able to create advanced social networks and extensive lines of communication that supported the broader social movement in their efforts to force governmental concessions from Britain.¹⁰⁴⁵

During the Imperial Crisis, Pennsylvania's patriot fundamentalist movement was deeply reliant upon spearheads like William Bradford, John Dickinson, and Charles Thomson, who R.A. Ryerson has argued "seemed to be the whole radical faction" until the early 1770s.¹⁰⁴⁶ Particularly in the face of Parliament's unpredictable actions and reactions to North American resistance, Pennsylvania's fledgling patriot fundamentalist movement

¹⁰⁴³ Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 309.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Conser, Jr., 'The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775', p. 309.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, p. 54; Paul Burstein, Rachel L. Einwohner, and Jocelyn A. Hollander, 'The Success of Political Movements: A Bargaining Perspective', in *The Politics of Social Protest*, Ed. J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 275–95 (pp. 277–79); Gene Sharp, *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 3 (Porter Sargent Publishing, 1973), p. 453.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, p. 249.

needed skilled, capable, confident leaders who could offer social and economic advantages as well as legal and political knowledge to serve the American cause, garner broad public support, guide the course of peaceable action, and reinforce the value of nonviolent resistance.¹⁰⁴⁷ At the onset of the Imperial Crisis, however, ordinary Pennsylvanians scarcely had the resources to navigate the innerworkings of Pennsylvania's political landscape and delineate between the aims and agendas of the Proprietary faction, the Quaker party, and the British empire. According to Ryerson, Pennsylvanians did tend to view their issues as being rooted in the shortcomings of the existing provincial leadership rather than as the products of a malfunctioning imperial government.¹⁰⁴⁸ However, the Quaker-Proprietary leadership system was deeply ingrained into the political fabric of Pennsylvania that it was difficult for some provincials to even envisage that a patriot coalition could transition from boots on the ground to seats in the State House. Thus, whereas Boston's patriot leaders were tasked with mobilizing colonists against a Crown-appointed government, Philadelphia's patriots navigated a more complex course, which required them to wrestle political power away from the Quaker and Proprietary factions while creating political opportunities for potential dissenters to discuss, debate, and participate in the nonviolent civil resistance of imperial policymaking, mustering resources which might advance the patriot fundamentalist movement, and finding ways for provincials to take the sort of political action that enhanced perceptions of resistance and supported the idea that peaceable would positively impact the broader political structure.

As such, by applying the composite mobilizational approach proposed by this research, we can better view the ways in which Pennsylvania's patriot leaders necessitated the "spirit of liberty" amongst provincials by creating political opportunities that reflected

¹⁰⁴⁷ Greene, 'An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution', pp. 35–38.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, p. 248.

colonists' alignments and featured influential partnerships in accordance with Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure, by finding ways for Pennsylvanians to utilize their knowledge, skills, resources, and connections to advance the patriot cause as outlined by Tilly's work on resource mobilization, and by coordinating resistance efforts that positively impacted provincial views of patriot resistance.¹⁰⁴⁹ Mobilization required consistent outreach, coordinated networks of communication through which concentrated authority could be dispersed outwards, and accessible pathways to activism that involved individuals on the outermost peripheries of provincial society and facilitated the application of their developing Continental ideals.¹⁰⁵⁰ Theretofore and unlike Puritan Massachusetts, Pennsylvania's diverse demographic communities had not necessarily been equipped with specific traditions of hardline dissent. Certainly, Quakers had gently resisted Calvinist claims of predestination, Ulster Scots Presbyterians had rejected the authority of ecclesiastical courts during the reign of Queen Anne, and German speakers who migrated from the Rhine River valley had fought to preserve certain aspects of local autonomy; however, there was no holistic Pennsylvanian conceptualization of nonviolent civil resistance or its parameters, which is to say that radical leaders had to frame nonviolent mobilization in ways that appealed to the wide-ranging emotional, intellectual, and economic needs of Pennsylvanians.¹⁰⁵¹ Through their varied backgrounds and expertise, Pennsylvania's radical leaders exuded competence and dependability, and in turn, provincials gradually came to trust Bradford, Dickinson, Thomson, and their patriot peers as experts and orchestrators of nonviolent mobilization. Indeed, throughout the evolution of the patriot fundamentalist movement, radical leaders

¹⁰⁴⁹ Tarrow, p. 16; Tilly, Castañeda, and Wood, pp. 40–42; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Goffman, p. 9; Goffman, p. 21; 'Benjamin Rush to Ebenezer Hazard, 5 November 1765', in *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, Ed. L.H. Butterfield, Vol. I: 1761-1792 (Princeton University Press, 2019), p. 18.

¹⁰⁵¹ Hugh Rock, 'Quakerism Understood in Relation to Calvinism: The Theology of George Fox', *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 70.3 (2017), pp. 333–47 (p. 337); Griffin, Patrick, *The People with No Name: Ireland's Ulster Scots, America's Scots Irish, and the Creation of a British Atlantic World, 1689-1764* (Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 22–23; Splitter, p. 52.

steadily offered “motivational relevancies” that appealed to Pennsylvania’s diverse population and aided in “spiriting the People up against the [unjust Parliamentary] Duties”.¹⁰⁵²

Pennsylvania’s burgeoning patriot fundamentalist leaders certainly faced significant challenges in their efforts to rhetorically, ideologically, and physically unite a remarkably “polyglot and conglomerate” provincial population; however, by the passage of the Stamp Act, Philadelphians had grown accustomed to socializing, organizing, and debating sociopolitical topics through various established social groups, institutions, and fraternities, such as the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, the Deutsche Gesellschaft, the Freemasonry, the Welsh Society of Pennsylvania, the White Oaks, the American Philosophical Society, and the Pennsylvania Grand Lodge.¹⁰⁵³ To the advantage of the developing patriot resistance campaign, artisans and skilled workers became active participants in Philadelphia’s lodges and fraternities, and membership in the city’s voluntary associations required members of all social sects to “learn” collectivization.¹⁰⁵⁴ Indeed, through the ritualized customs of Philadelphia’s fraternal orders and affiliations, provincials were expected to establish by-laws and codes of conduct, adhere to fixed rules, participate in the elections of officers, follow standardized meeting procedures, and additionally, to focus on specific goals and targets, such as social reform or mutual benefit, and ultimately, the participatory features of Philadelphia’s voluntary associations helped to fuel the provincial longing for democratic autonomy which came to characterize American rhetoric in the Imperial Crisis.¹⁰⁵⁵

¹⁰⁵² ‘Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste LeRoy, 21 September 1768’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹⁰⁵³ Eberlein, p. 57; David T. Beito, “‘This Enormous Army’: The Mutual Aid Tradition of American Fraternal Societies before the Twentieth Century”, *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 14.2 (1997), pp. 20–38 (pp. 21–27); Sullivan, p. 312; Dorpalen, p. 238; Wayne A. Huss, *Master Builders: A History of the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of Pennsylvania* (Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted, 1986), I, pp. 286–91.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Tarrow, pp. 4–6.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Don Harrison Doyle, ‘The Social Functions of Voluntary Associations in a Nineteenth-Century American Town’, *Social Science History*, 1.3 (1977), pp. 333–55 (p. 333); Lipsky, p. 1152.

In addition, third-party associations allowed provincials to form kinship-style ties with biologically unrelated individuals through the organization and the pursuit of shared missions.¹⁰⁵⁶ Thus, Philadelphia's most vocal purveyors of resistance were able to utilize preexisting social bonds and networks not only to nurture the development of patriot fundamentalist ideals, but also to fuel the establishment of new lines of communication, which branched out from Philadelphia to the Pennsylvania backcountry, and to mobilize Pennsylvanians in the fight against imperial encroachment. Like the structure and hierarchy of Philadelphia's third-party associations, revered, educated, politically minded urbanites were positioned as leaders within the patriot fundamentalist movement, and relatively temporary groups of collective actors proved to possess "explosive effects", as the city's distinguished leadership cohort utilized voluntary associations to formalize American responses to Parliamentary governance, coordinate networks of intracolonial communication, and publicize and propagate the patriot fundamentalist interpretation of Parliament's actions and attitudes toward the American colonies.¹⁰⁵⁷ Amongst the ranks of Philadelphia's lodges and fraternities were printer William Bradford, attorney John Dickinson, and merchant Charles Thomson, and their involvement in various lodges and fraternities not only helped to link them to the colonists for whom they ultimately came to advocate, but also, it demonstrated the extent to which Pennsylvania's voluntary associations were becoming more inclusive and expanding "beyond a narrow upper crust".¹⁰⁵⁸ Indeed, an emergent new leadership group directly observed and advocated for the grievances, needs, and concerns of Pennsylvanians in ways that a distant Parliament could not. Yet, before discussing *how*

¹⁰⁵⁶ Mary Ann Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood: Class, Gender, and Fraternalism* (Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 33–35.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Tarrow, pp. 4–6.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Beito, p. 27; Charles Willson Peale, 'Charles Thomson', in *Patriot-Improvers: Biographical Sketches of Members of the American Philosophical Society*, Ed. Whitfield Jenks Bell, *Memoirs*, 3 vols (The American Philosophical Society, 1997), I, 183–96 (p. 184); 'Power of the Press: The Bradford & Freemason Rivalry in Provincial America', *The American Lodge of Research*, 2021 <<https://www.alrny.org/articles/power-of-the-press-the-bradford-amp-freemason-rivalry-in-provincial-america>>.

Philadelphia's patriot leaders mobilized provincials behind the continental cause, we need to examine *who* the figures were that exploited the ebb and flow of political struggle and used "culturally resonant forms of action" to validate patriot claims and garner support for the pursuit of patriot objectives.¹⁰⁵⁹

Pennsylvania's radical leadership roots can be traced back as early as 1742, when Philadelphia native William Bradford entered the city's pre-Revolutionary print culture.¹⁰⁶⁰ Bradford, like other eighteenth-century printers, was in almost constant communication with Philadelphia's most educated authors and political theorists while remaining too blue-collar to rank amongst them socially. Yet, as the great-grandson of Plymouth Colony Governor William Bradford, the grandson of William Bradford the younger, who helped to introduce printing into the Middle Colonies in 1685, and the nephew and adoptive son of printer Andrew Bradford, the "patriot printer" William Bradford was able to rely upon his familial legacy to garner widespread recognition and respect.¹⁰⁶¹ Indeed, Bradford was an early and eminent advocate of colonial liberty, and his unique social status helped Philadelphia's developing patriot movement to connect radical authors to their audiences, engaging minds from all levels of the social hierarchy throughout the colonies.¹⁰⁶²

Weighed against the scholarship on his patriot peers, comparatively little has been written about Bradford's life; yet, throughout the course of the Imperial Crisis, Bradford "performed" a variety of services that proved critical to the advancement of the continental cause in Pennsylvania.¹⁰⁶³ Bradford not only edited and printed *The Pennsylvania Journal; and Weekly Advertiser*, making his publication available to readers "at the most reasonable

¹⁰⁵⁹ Tarrow, p. 16; Goffman, p. 21.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Bridenbaugh, 'The Press and the Book in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia', p. 3.

¹⁰⁶¹ Walter L. Ferree, 'Andrew Bradford: A Pioneer Printer of Pennsylvania', *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 21.3 (1954), pp. 214–27 (p. 219); Wallace, p. 5.

¹⁰⁶² Parkinson, *The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution*, p. 66; Frasca, Ralph, 'Benjamin Franklin's Printing Network and the Stamp Act', *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 71.4 (2004), pp. 403–19 (pp. 408–10).

¹⁰⁶³ Parker, p. 26.

rates”, he also operated a bookstore through which he imported and sold a variety of pamphlets, books, and magazines to improve provincial understandings of “the study of History and Morality” and encourage social, political, and theological debate.¹⁰⁶⁴ Bradford’s professional quality, efficiency, and selectivity quickly rendered him and his printing business staples in the community, and in addition, with the 1754 opening of Bradford’s London Coffee House on the southwest corner of Front and High (now Market) Streets, along the banks of the Delaware River, Bradford placed himself at the center of urban exchange, between Philadelphia’s residential gentry and a harbor that regularly welcomed blue-collar seafarers with news from abroad.¹⁰⁶⁵ During the Imperial Crisis, the London Coffee House was more frequented than any other establishment in Philadelphia, and gradually, the establishment earned a reputation throughout the colonies for being an important hub for patriot exchange and organization.¹⁰⁶⁶ Indeed, as the “headquarters of life and action” and the “heart of excitement, enterprise, and patriotism,” Bradford’s London Coffee House landed newspapers from major cities across the globe, served as the home of the Merchants’ Exchange of Philadelphia, hosted concerts, lectures, and public events, accommodated the meetings of the Committee of Safety and various other extralegal groups, witnessed the drafting of nonimportation resolutions, and provided the threshold from which Philadelphians first learned of the 1766 Stamp Act repeal.¹⁰⁶⁷

Yet, Bradford’s reach extended beyond urban Philadelphia. To distribute his publications, Bradford designed logistical routes, employed trusted post riders, and dictated points of distribution, which is to say that by 1765, Bradford and his team had formed

¹⁰⁶⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 8 July 1742, 708th edition, p. 3, Genealogy Bank; ‘William Bradford to James Madison, 27 May 1773’, Founders Online National Archives; Grolier Club, *Catalogue of Books Printed by William Bradford, and Other Printers in the Middle Colonies* (De Vinne Press, 1893).

¹⁰⁶⁵ Wallace, pp. 49–51; Joseph Jackson, *America’s Most Historic Highway: Market Street, Philadelphia* (John Wanamaker, 1926), pp. 13–14.

¹⁰⁶⁶ William H. Ukers, *All About Coffee* (The Tea and Coffee Trade Journal Co, 1922), p. 127.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Alice Morse Earle, *Stage-Coach and Tavern Days* (The MacMillan Company, 1900), p. 50; Wallace, p. 55.

connections with backcountry Pennsylvanians from Lancaster and York to the rural communities in Northampton County and beyond.¹⁰⁶⁸ In fact, in the wake of the Stamp Act controversy, Bradford utilized his carefully planned distribution routes to uphold his open defiance of the stamp duties and to urge compliance with the province's nonimportation agreements by maintaining "a watchful eye" over reluctant dissenters.¹⁰⁶⁹ In this way, Bradford helped to directly flatten conservative opposition to the developing patriot fundamentalist movement by making his political stance known and ensuring that a patriot presence was felt across Pennsylvania. By patrolling the backcountry for Crown-issued stamps that patriot leaders deemed to be unjust and unconstitutional, Bradford and his team applied physical pressure, which ultimately coerced Pennsylvanians into challenging Parliamentary policymaking and consequently "slowed or halted" automatic American obedience to the British empire.¹⁰⁷⁰ Certainly, the Stamp Act resistance did not diminish the conservative consensus in Pennsylvania, and Bradford himself acknowledged that simple repeals were not enough to "reach the root of the disorder"; however, Bradford's consistent efforts in the media and in the streets throughout the Imperial Crisis yielded physical and ideological results.¹⁰⁷¹ By connecting metropolitan Philadelphia to the backcountry through media outreach and by creating a designated space for nonviolent advocates of all social sects to congregate, share ideas, and organize resistance efforts, Bradford helped to physically bring Pennsylvanians together and gradually diminish the consensus that supplied Parliament with the power required to govern.¹⁰⁷²

¹⁰⁶⁸ Wallace, pp. 98–100.

¹⁰⁶⁹ 'William Bradford to the New York Vigilance Committee, 16 February 1766', Genealogy Bank.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 23.

¹⁰⁷¹ 'William Bradford to James Madison, 1 August 1774', Founders Online National Archives; Sharp, *How Nonviolent Struggle Works*, p. 127.

¹⁰⁷² Eric M. Leifer, 'Competing Models of Political Mobilization: The Role of Ethnic Ties', *American Journal of Sociology*, 87.1 (1981), pp. 23–47 (p. 23).

Like Bradford, Philadelphia merchant Charles Thomson rose to prominence during the patriot resistance of the Stamp Act, and although Thomson failed to possess a familial legacy to guide his way into public life, he was eager to voice the concerns and grievances of Pennsylvania's marginalized communities.¹⁰⁷³ In fact, as a relative political outsider, Thomson's ideals and attitudes toward empire resonated with underprivileged Pennsylvanians in a rather significant way, and his story served to establish a sense of familiarity between extralegal patriot leaders and a radicalizable public.¹⁰⁷⁴ Born in Northern Ireland, Thomson lost his mother in his early childhood and his father passed away en route to Delaware. Arriving in the American colonies an orphan, Thomson was placed with a blacksmith in New Castle until he made his way to Wilmington in search of better education prospects.¹⁰⁷⁵ With the help of an acquaintance, Thomson was enrolled at the Philadelphia Academy under the supervision of Dr. Francis Alison, where his notable work ethic and love of philosophy and foreign languages stood out even alongside the likes of John Dickinson. Perhaps more importantly, however, during his time at the Philadelphia Academy Thomson developed a close, lifelong friendship with Benjamin Franklin, and through the connections that relationship afforded, Thomson became widely recognized and respected for his integrity, intelligence, and resilience.¹⁰⁷⁶

Indeed, because of his notable character, Thomson transcended Pennsylvania's distinctive sociocultural circles. Quaker leaders, who failed to look kindly upon Presbyterians at this stage of the eighteenth century, trusted Thomson and sought his assistance in frontier boundary negotiations. Moreover, Pennsylvania's Ulster Scots Presbyterians felt represented

¹⁰⁷³ Nathan Kozuskanich, "'For the Security and Protection of the Community': The Frontier and the Makings of Pennsylvanian Constitutionalism" (unpublished PhD, The Ohio State University, 2005), p. 202.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Thomas Patrick Chorlton, *The First American Republic, 1774-1789: The First Fourteen American Presidents Before Washington* (Author House, 2012), p. 583; John J. Zimmerman, 'Charles Thomson, "The Sam Adams of Philadelphia"', *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 45.3 (1958), pp. 464–80 (p. 467).

¹⁰⁷⁵ Zimmerman, 'Charles Thomson, "The Sam Adams of Philadelphia"', pp. 14–15.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Lewis Reifsneider Harley, *Charles Thomson, Patriot and Scholar* (The Historical Society of Montgomery County, 1897), p. 15.

by Thomson, Delaware Chief Teedyuscung nicknamed him “Wegh-Wu-Law-Mo-End”, meaning “Man Who Talks the Truth”, backcountry communities valued his efforts to improve settler relationships with Pennsylvania’s indigenous population, urban mechanics and artisans perceived him as unpretentious and altruistic, and marginalized communities of all social and cultural sects respected his ability to overcome adversity.¹⁰⁷⁷ Certainly, from the mid-1750s forward, Thomson became intimately familiar with the ins and outs of Pennsylvania politics, and moreover, Thomson’s close relationship with Benjamin Franklin meant that through a steady stream of correspondence which trickled back and forth between Philadelphia and London throughout the Imperial Crisis, he was able to describe directly to British policymakers the extent to which British North Americans felt “deprived” by their mother country and “alarmed” by the implications of invasive Parliamentary legislation.¹⁰⁷⁸

The emergence of continental spokespeople like William Bradford and Charles Thomson demonstrates that by the passage of the Stamp Act, Pennsylvanians were in need of a more popular, more representative political faction that was neither tyrannized by Crown-appointed officials, dominated by a Quaker minority, nor hindered by Proprietary interests. Furthermore, and as Conser has explained, the surfacing of these relatively atypical leaders suggests that Pennsylvanian printers and merchants recognized they that as North Americans needed to participate to a larger extent in the political sphere of colonial society.¹⁰⁷⁹ John Dickinson, on the other hand, was a more characteristic political leader, and although his immediate family routinely voiced “remonstrances” over his engagement in

¹⁰⁷⁷ Clark DeLeon, *Pennsylvania Curiosities*, 4th edn (Morris Book Publishing, 2013), p. 205; Harley, pp. 16–17; Charles Thomson, *An Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese Indians from the British Interest: And into the Measure Taken for Recovering Their Friendship*, 1759, pp. 3–6, McGill University Library.

¹⁰⁷⁸ ‘Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, 24 September 1765’; Chorlton, p. 583.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Conser, Jr., ‘The Stamp Act Resistance’, p. 94.

nonviolent civil resistance, his personal dynamics did not supersede his dedication to managing the “issues, conditions, and personalities” of the Imperial Crisis.¹⁰⁸⁰

Born into a wealthy Delaware family with Quaker roots, John Dickinson inherited important connections in Philadelphia as well as a mind for business and law.¹⁰⁸¹ As H. Trevor Colbourn has explained, Dickinson was raised in a setting that perfectly complemented his political pragmatism.¹⁰⁸² As such, throughout his life, Dickinson strove to honor the expectations of his parents, the ethical uprightness emphasized in the Quaker faith, and his personal ambitions. In a private disclosure to George Read, Dickinson affirmed his desire to lead with integrity and morality, explaining, “I confess that I should like to make an immense bustle in the world if it could be done by virtuous action”, and in performing his intersecting roles as an attorney and a political representative, Dickinson worked to strike a balance between maintaining the important cultural links and traditions with which he was raised and rejecting the societal division and seclusion often enabled by ethnic trust networks.¹⁰⁸³ As provincial values, attitudes, and ideals surrounding government began rapidly evolving during the Imperial Crisis, Dickinson strove to bridge the gap between both the economic and social conservatism of the past and the political and constitutional radicalism on the horizon.¹⁰⁸⁴ Thoughtful and incessantly pragmatic, Dickinson instinctively reacted to social and political change and simultaneously weighed his actions against his morals. Jane Calvert has described Dickinson’s pragmatic approach to the patriot movement

¹⁰⁸⁰ Charles Thomson quoted in *The Relation of the Quakers to the American Revolution* by Arthur J. Mekeel (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1979), p. 136.

¹⁰⁸¹ Ousterhout, p. 12; Peter Bastian, “‘To Secure the Approbation of the Worthy’: The Political Journey of John Dickinson”, *Australasian Journal of American Studies*, 8.1 (1989), pp. 1–11 (p. 1).

¹⁰⁸² H. Trevor Colbourn, ‘John Dickinson, Historical Revolutionary’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 83.3 (1959), pp. 271–92 (pp. 271–72).

¹⁰⁸³ ‘John Dickinson to George Read, October 1762’, in *The Life and Times of John Dickinson, 1732-1808* by Charles Janeway Stillé (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1891), p. 38; Tilly, ‘Trust Networks in Transnational Migration’, pp. 5–6.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ousterhout, p. 92.

as “liberty without tumult”, underscoring Dickinson’s inherent need to check colonial resistance against the strictest codes of conduct.

The Conestoga Massacre demonstrated to Dickinson the radical flank effect that can occur when a government either prioritizes the interests of certain groups over others or refuses to make an impactful change, and as such, Dickinson seemed to understand that Pennsylvania politics needed to consider and involve provincials “of all Denominations and Societies”.¹⁰⁸⁵ Indeed, Dickinson had observed the extent to which the governmental exclusivity stimulated by a distant Parliament and insular Quaker and Proprietary factions resulted in backcountry frustrations over feeling unseen, unheard, and unvalued, and equally, he realized that extreme political action, just like political inaction, would cause divisions amongst Pennsylvania’s diverse population.¹⁰⁸⁶ Thus, when the political “spiral” created by the Stamp Act forced Pennsylvanians to reconcile their scruples against the maintenance of law and order, Dickinson advocated for nonviolent implementation of petitions, nonimportation, and open disobedience of the offending laws.¹⁰⁸⁷ Emerging at the forefront of Pennsylvania’s political stage in 1764, Dickinson “counseled moderation and continuity” by peaceably lobbying for the preservation of Pennsylvania’s 1701 Charter of Privileges despite Quaker plans to royalize the province and outlining plans for the peaceful resistance of the Stamp Act through civil disobedience.¹⁰⁸⁸

The previous chapter discussed the ideological impacts of Dickinson’s *Farmer’s Letters*, but it is equally important to give attention to the ways that Dickinson’s essays demonstrated his capacity for political leadership and mobilized his countrymen to

¹⁰⁸⁵ John Dickinson, ‘Protest against the Appointment of Benjamin Franklin as Agent, 26 October 1765’, Founders Online National Archives; Freeman, p. 236; Haines, ‘Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970’, pp. 32–33.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Jane E. Calvert, ‘Liberty Without Tumult: Understanding the Politics of John Dickinson’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 131.3 (2007), pp. 233–62 (pp. 254–56).

¹⁰⁸⁷ Tarrow, pp. 4–6; Calvert, pp. 245–46; David Sloan, “‘A Time of Sifting and Winnowing’: The Paxton Riots and Quaker Non-Violence in Pennsylvania’, *Quaker History*, 66.1 (1977), pp. 3–22 (p. 19).

¹⁰⁸⁸ Calvert, p. 242.

nonviolent resistance. With the intention of pressuring merchants into joining Pennsylvania's nonimportation association, as Ryan Ervin has summarized, the twelve-part series of essays "criticized Parliament for clamping down on colonists' rights while also calling his countrymen to resistance".¹⁰⁸⁹ Dickinson insisted that imminent change was critical. Not unlike Chief Justice James Logan's comment from more than two decades earlier that "[T]here will be no Danger of any Revolution...while the Colonies are treated with Tenderness and Humanity and not Considered only as Slavishly Subservient to the Interest of the Countrey they came from", Dickinson noted that "where such a power is not lodged in the people, oppression proceeds uncontrouled...till the governed, transported into rage, seeks redress in the midst of blood and confusions".¹⁰⁹⁰

Calling upon all "Freemen" and "Christian men" to defend their civil liberties and advocate for their right to political consent, Dickinson condemned Britain's treatment of the Irish during the sixteenth century and asked readers to consider how far Parliament might push the boundaries of colonial subjugation with "future measures injurious to these colonies".¹⁰⁹¹ Offering both empathy and caution, Dickinson highlighted for his audience the various ways in which the colonies had already been exploited by their mother country and validated the feelings of indignation, distrust, fear, and disappointment that colonists had long experienced in their relationship with Great Britain. Perhaps more critically, however, through the framework proposed by Prospect Theory, we can see that in explaining how the risks associated with noncooperation paled in comparison to the benefits achievable through nonviolence, Dickinson motivated and mobilized his audience.¹⁰⁹² Indeed, ultimately,

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ervin, p. 52.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Thayer, *Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776*, p. 100; Logan, p. 127; Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, pp. 87-88.

¹⁰⁹¹ Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, p. 137; Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, p. 117.

¹⁰⁹² Scott, pp. 127-28.

Dickinson's *Letters from a Farmer* established the precedent that "when the liberties of one's country are threatened, it is still more difficult to be silent".¹⁰⁹³

The third letter in Dickinson's essay series particularly speaks to the trajectory and nonviolent nature of the patriot fundamentalist movement. While Dickinson acknowledged that Britain was certainly powerful in its oppositional capacity, he reiterated the duty and obligation that Natural Law and history placed upon the shoulders of American colonists. Moreover, Dickinson reiterated that pleas for redress could and would be articulated and pursued with the "assistance" of popular violence if peaceable protest was not demanded.¹⁰⁹⁴ With an almost tangible sense of urgency, Dickinson underscored, "The cause of liberty is a cause of too much dignity, to be sullied by turbulence and tumult", highlighting the hypocrisy of using political violence in the first instance to push back against injustice.¹⁰⁹⁵ Acutely aware that American resistance would alter the Anglo-American relationship and British perceptions of their American brethren, Dickinson explained, nonviolent activists "should breathe a sedate, yet fervent spirit" and trust the process of nonviolent civil resistance. Readers were instructed to avoid and discourage violence committed under "pretences of patriotism" so as not to "injure the reputation" of the broader patriot movement.¹⁰⁹⁶

Dickinson clarified the important caveat that resistance of any form must be "justifiable" in relation to the actions and reactions of the imperial regime, explaining, "harsh methods, cannot be proper, till milder ones have failed".¹⁰⁹⁷ That is not to say that Dickinson predicted war or even hoped that American would pursue revolution, but his *Letters From a Farmer* do indicate both awareness of the critical criteria of violent political struggle intentionality in the nonviolent mobilization of his readers. To mobilize Americans behind

¹⁰⁹³ Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, p. 146.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, p. 29.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, pp. 29–30.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, p. 30; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–21.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, p. 31.

their shared legacy and to ensure that readers understood the moral and lawful need to fulfill certain prerequisites of militarization, Dickinson expounded that “the English history affords frequent examples of resistance by force” made “justifiable” through the efforts of a consistently peaceable and pragmatic populace. Dickinson insisted that in order to ethically cosign outright rebellion, the people must be “FULLY CONVINCED” that the threats which imperial overreach posed to American liberties and livelihoods outweighed the risks of escalating resistance tactics.¹⁰⁹⁸ As such, Dickinson’s *Farmer’s Letters* can only be seen as a critical driver of nonviolent mobilization, not just in Pennsylvania, but throughout the American colonies.

Dickinson gracefully toed the line between patriot motivation and manipulation, and with the publication of his final essay on February 15, 1768, a meeting of freeholders in Philadelphia praised the “FARMER as the Friend of Americans, and the common benefactor of mankind”, with similar sentiments being proclaimed up and down the eastern seaboard.¹⁰⁹⁹ Following the far-reaching circulation of Dickinson’s *Letters from a Farmer*, “those persons who were the most moderate [became] set in a flame and have joined the general cry of liberty”.¹¹⁰⁰ Thus, through Dickinson’s eloquent, but stern essays, the burgeoning patriot fundamentalist movement gained significant traction, not just ideologically, but also in terms of physical mobilization. In mapping out the core grievances, values, and approaches of Pennsylvania’s patriot fundamentalists, Dickinson helped to legitimize nonviolent civil resistance and buttress its most ardent advocates.

By drawing upon the social science theories of Tarrow, Tilly, and Chenoweth and Stephan, we can assess how in their own ways, Bradford, Thomson, and Dickinson provided

¹⁰⁹⁸ Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, pp. 31–32.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Kozuskanich, “‘Falling under the Domination Totally of Presbyterians’: The Paxton Riots and the Coming of the Revolution in Pennsylvania”, p. 20.

¹¹⁰⁰ ‘John Penn to Thomas Penn, Quoted in James Hutson, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1746-1770: The Movement for Royal Government and Its Consequences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 225.’

mobilizational structure for resistance, as they each seized and created political opportunities throughout the cycles of contention that colored the patriot fundamentalist movement. Critically bridging the gap between contention and participation in political institutions, Bradford, Thomson, and Dickinson worked to ensure that provincials from all social sects, understood patriot ideals and motivations, saw their own views and alignments reflected in the patriot cause, and had access to patriot networks and plans of action from the Stamp Act and the Townshend duties to the Coercive Acts and the Declaration of Independence.¹¹⁰¹ With grit, intelligence, and advocacy, these patriot leaders advertised and defended the interests, grievances and aspirations of provincial Pennsylvanians in ways that not only provided organizational structure and offered Americans the capacity to peaceably defend their civil liberties, but also collectivized resources including printing presses, sociopolitical influence, and social networks to mobilize provincials behind the patriot cause.¹¹⁰² Likewise, they understood the challenge of strategically testing British authority in ways that pushed boundaries without discrediting the broader movement. Efficiently navigating the relationship between British and American perceptions and actions, Bradford, Thomson, and Dickinson employed defiance, discourse, and debate and created new angles of penetration through which previously marginalized Pennsylvanians could access the political arena.¹¹⁰³

The first major attempt by Bradford, Thomson, Dickinson, and their budding patriot coalition to peaceably mobilize a divided province came when Parliament passed the Stamp Act in 1765. Pennsylvanians were concurrently facing ongoing battles over Native American policy and a Quaker campaign to royalize Pennsylvania, and consequently, alongside the competing Quaker and Proprietary parties, an antagonistic Presbyterian faction, which

¹¹⁰¹ Tarrow, pp. 10–16.

¹¹⁰² Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, pp. 10–12.

¹¹⁰³ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 23.

ultimately functioned independently, began “grafting” itself to the Proprietorship.¹¹⁰⁴ The thickening of the province’s political rivalry, however, meant that Pennsylvanians increasingly divided along religious lines. While a growing minority of Friends, Moravians, and other preachers of pacifism feared the practicalities and implications of resistance, Lutherans and German Reformed approached participatory politics with prudence, and Presbyterian communities shifted their allegiance away from a seemingly apathetic Proprietary party and endeavored “to give every Kind of Opposition to the Execution of [the Stamp Act]”.¹¹⁰⁵ Although the Quakers and their closest allies maintained control over the House until the 1770s, historians have described the “predictable” nature of the “Presbyterian” appeal, and ultimately, the patriot fundamentalist rise to political dominance in Pennsylvania.¹¹⁰⁶ Indeed, as Gary Nash has explained, those who had followed Pennsylvania politics during the last generation hardly missed the irony that the Philadelphia-based Assembly was embarking on a campaign to secure royal government at precisely the moment when royal authority came to be feared, suspected, and resented throughout the colonies.¹¹⁰⁷

Following the passage of the Stamp Act, Pennsylvania’s emerging patriot leaders worked to fill the governmental void that inadequate imperial and provincial governments left in the lives of underrepresented Pennsylvanians. Bradford, Thomson, and Dickinson along with prominent Philadelphian activists including Thomas Mifflin, George Ross, and George Bryan utilized their economic, political, and social influence and knowledge to mobilize Pennsylvanians against the Stamp Act through a variety of approaches. Indeed, the drivers of burgeoning patriot fundamentalist, in accordance with the key traditions of Political

¹¹⁰⁴ Kozuskanich, “‘Falling under the Domination Totally of Presbyterians’: The Paxton Riots and the Coming of the Revolution in Pennsylvania”, p. 7; Ousterhout, p. 13.

¹¹⁰⁵ ‘Joseph Galloway to Benjamin Franklin, 18 July 1765’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹¹⁰⁶ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 52.

¹¹⁰⁷ Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 284–85.

Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization Theory, and Chenoweth and Stephan's interactive approach to political struggle, coordinated and engaged in instrumental action in the political sphere by formulating de facto organizations that gradually assumed more meaningful, more quasi-official roles, thereby demonstrating the British North American ability to self-govern.¹¹⁰⁸ Likewise, Pennsylvania's radical organizers worked to promote a willingness amongst provincials to abstain from indulging in the material goods imported by "an encroaching Administration" with a design for "enslaving the Colonies" and to sacrifice the luxury and conveniences associated with imported manufactures to support the American cause.¹¹⁰⁹

With the help of Philadelphia's nonviolent leaders, the city's reaction to the Stamp Act remained "singularly free" from the vandalism and effigy burning observed in other port cities.¹¹¹⁰ The implications and practicalities of the Stamp Act were no less feared and resented in Philadelphia than they were elsewhere in the colonies, however, crowd action in Philadelphia was more strictly guided by "Men who had Moderation not to proceed to any unnecessary Acts of Violence".¹¹¹¹ For instance, when Philadelphian dissenters gathered by the thousands at the State House in October of 1765, representatives from the Presbyterian faction and the city's newly established Sons of Liberty, whose membership included Charles Thomson, seemingly understood that the sheer size of the protest was enough to demonstrate provincial frustrations over the impending "Slavery" to which "the Stamp must soon reduce" them without the threat of physical violence.¹¹¹² In turn, only a carefully selected delegation was assigned to convince public officials to defy the Stamp Act by using unstamped paper

¹¹⁰⁸ Jean L. Cohen, p. 97; Buechler, 'New Social Movements and New Social Movement Theory', p. 442; Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Translated by Thomas McCarthy*, 2 vols (Beacon Press, 1984), I, pp. 24–25.

¹¹⁰⁹ Inglehart, p. 371; Franklin, 'The Colonist's Advocate: VI'.

¹¹¹⁰ Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 194.

¹¹¹¹ Harold Donaldson Eberlein and Cortlandt Van Dyke Hubbard, *Diary of Independence Hall* (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1948), pp. 111–12.

¹¹¹² 'James Parker to Benjamin Franklin, 25 April 1765', Founders Online National Archives.

and persuade Stamp Commissioner John Hughes to resign from office, thereby lessening the potential for mob violence, and when he refused to resign as Stamp Master, admittedly angry protesters were persuaded to afford Hughes time to reconsider his position.¹¹¹³ In response to the demonstration, Philadelphia newspapers reinforced that while confronting Hughes failed to alleviate the “Resentment of an injured and enraged People”, dissenters should pride themselves on the fact that “cool thinking People” were able to make their voices heard through nonviolent civil resistance.¹¹¹⁴

Two weeks later, Philadelphians returned to the polls to participate in an election that Nash has described as “even more tumultuous than the one in 1764”, where voters ousted Benjamin Franklin and Joseph Galloway from the Assembly.¹¹¹⁵ Nearly two-thousand voters, or roughly eighty percent of eligible men, cast ballots, marking the highest electoral turnout of the Revolutionary era, and although Hughes himself expressed fears over Presbyterian momentum, writing to Benjamin Franklin that “the Spirit or Flame of Rebellion is got to a high Pitch amongst the North Americans”, the Quaker party had managed to recoup the losses they were handed in the previous year’s election.¹¹¹⁶ Yet, while Pennsylvanians had mobilized their voting powers, a key resource, the province’s political equation remained unsolved.¹¹¹⁷ With the knowledge that installing a royal government would remove Thomas Penn and his associates from Pennsylvania politics, Quakers, Friends, Moravians, and other preachers of pacifism worked to mute opposition to the Stamp Act and to bargain for the royalization of the province, ultimately evading hardline political action. Contrastingly, the

¹¹¹³ Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 67.

¹¹¹⁴ Eberlein and Hubbard, pp. 111–12.

¹¹¹⁵ Zimmerman, ‘Charles Thomson, “The Sam Adams of Philadelphia”’, p. 471; Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 195; ‘Election Results in Philadelphia County, 1764 [1–3 October 1764]’.

¹¹¹⁶ Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 197; ‘John Hughes to Benjamin Franklin, 8-17 September 1765’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹¹¹⁷ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 10.

Proprietary party openly condemned the Stamp Act in the hopes that doing so would demonstrate the ability of the Proprietorship to govern, expose the threat posed by royal government, garner the support of the Presbyterian, Lutheran, and German Reformed communities upon whom they had previously looked down, and loosen the Quaker grip on Pennsylvanian voters.¹¹¹⁸ The fact remained, however, that the Proprietary party was not representative of urban mechanics, artisans, laborers, and other marginalized Pennsylvanians who feared and resented Parliamentary encroachment, and ultimately, unlike their Puritan brethren in Boston who were more swift and more assertive in their opposition to the Stamp Act, intraprovince demographic conflicts occasionally overshadowed the political and economic precedents set by the Stamp Act.

In turn, aggrieved Philadelphians worked to employ their own voices in Pennsylvania's political arena. Philadelphia's radical authors, organizers, and Sons of Liberty established a recognized leadership class to defend them and their civil liberties against Parliamentary oppression, gradually developed a more distinctly North American political identity, emphasized peaceable paths to redress, and critically, warned that violence would only beget violence, as imperial troops could enforce the appointment of new stamp masters and the erection of new stamp offices in the city. As provincial dissenters began a transition from theory to action, radical voices underscored shared concerns that British North Americans stood to be stripped of "every thing an Englishman has been taught to hold dear" and generalized beliefs about the causes and possible means of reducing grievances by impressing upon Pennsylvanians, "Your Conduct at this Period must decide the future Fortunes of yourselves and of your Posterity [and whether] Pennsylvanians from henceforward shall be Freemen or Slaves", which is to say that the Stamp Act crisis allowed

¹¹¹⁸ Ousterhout, p. 17; Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 196–97.

fledgling patriot fundamentalists to begin laying the groundwork for “orderly revolution”, as radical voice worked to mobilize the masses in peaceful protest.¹¹¹⁹

Against the better judgement of Stamp Master Hughes, Pennsylvanians pushed to send three up-and-coming patriot delegates to the Stamp Act Congress, which convened in New York during October of 1765.¹¹²⁰ With the aim of establishing a legitimate, united front against the Stamp Act, John Dickinson, Irish American businessman George Bryan, and Chester-county farmer John Morton joined the twenty-eight person Congress and helped to draft its final resolutions.¹¹²¹ While some historians have contended that the Congress limited itself to debates and discussions of taxation, Ryerson has argued that Stamp Act delegates not only solidified and legitimized North American objections to external taxation by grounding them firmly in the English constitution, but moreover, that they forced Pennsylvanians to look beyond pro-Proprietary or pro-Quaker quarrels.¹¹²² Indeed, Dickinson, Bryan, and Morton helped to craft the legal rhetoric that was deployed in continental discourse throughout the duration of the Imperial Crisis, as the Stamp Act Congress resolved that in accordance with the English constitution, only colonial legislatures, which would have been selected “therein by themselves”, could tax constituents, and additionally, that extending the jurisdiction of Admiralty courts to try violators without a jury of their peers illegally subverted American rights and liberties.¹¹²³ Moreover, the delegates insisted, the Stamp Act

¹¹¹⁹ John D. McCarthy, p. 1215; ‘Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, 24 September 1765’; John Dickinson, ‘Friends and Countrymen’, 1765; Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 48.

¹¹²⁰ Clinton Alfred Weslager, *The Stamp Act Congress: With an Exact Copy of the Complete Journal* (University of Delaware Press, 1976), pp. 84–87.

¹¹²¹ Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution*, p. 108; John Hill Martin, *Chester County (and Its Vicinity) and Delaware County in Pennsylvania* (William H. Pile & Sons, 1877), p. 138; Kerby A. Miller, *Irish Immigrants in the Land of Canaan: Letters and Memoirs from Colonial and Revolutionary America, 1675-1815* (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 476.

¹¹²² Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, pp. 21–26.

¹¹²³ ‘From the Providence Gazette Extraordinary. The Following Is Said to Be a Copy of the Resolutions of the Congress Held at New-York’, *The Massachusetts Gazette Extraordinary*, 20 March 1766, Massachusetts Historical Society.

would significantly diminish the familial bond and the successful trade relations that Britain and its American colonies had long shared.¹¹²⁴

For Pennsylvanians and British North Americans more broadly, the Stamp Act Congress was more than simply a means “to avert the storm”.¹¹²⁵ Instead, the proficiency with which nine of the thirteen American colonies collectivized served as a significant leap forward for the development of intercolonial communication and collaboration, and moreover, the proceedings and resolutions demonstrated to Pennsylvanians that political leadership could come from diverse and even unconventional sources. Advancing their endeavors in nonviolent action, Philadelphia’s merchants joined dissenting New Yorkers and entered into a nonimportation agreement on November 7, 1765. The conditions of the boycott mandated that until Parliament opted to repeal the unjust taxation measures, Pennsylvanians could not purchase imported British goods “without a forfeiture of Honour”.¹¹²⁶ To the economic detriment from merchants and the consumerist sacrifice of luxury and convenience, Pennsylvanians rallied behind nonimportation, learning and developing “modular performances and repertoires”.¹¹²⁷ Charles Thomson reported that “while the Stamp Act continues unrepealed the people are determined not to use the manufactures of Great Britain but either to manufacture for themselves or go without”.¹¹²⁸ Indeed, merchants, traders, mariners, artisans, shopkeepers, printers, attorneys, and ordinary Pennsylvanians steadily moved to band together in the regulatory committees that enforced the boycott, Philadelphia became the epicenter of a steadily mobilizing social movement which contested established

¹¹²⁴ Conser, Jr., ‘The Stamp Act Resistance’, p. 55; *Massachusetts Colony General Court House of Representatives Journals* (Nabu Press, 2011), XLII, pp. 108–10.

¹¹²⁵ ‘Gottfried Achenwall: Some Observations on North America from Oral Information by Dr. Franklin, July 1766’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹¹²⁶ Foner, p. 59; Ousterhout, p. 19; ‘At a General Meeting of the Merchants and Traders of This City, Philadelphia, 7 November 1765’, Evans Early American Imprint Collection.

¹¹²⁷ Tarrow, pp. 4–6.

¹¹²⁸ ‘Charles Thomson to Messieurs Welsh, Wilkinson, & Co., 7 November 1765’, in *Revolutionary Papers, Ed. Evert A. Duyckinck, Edward F. De Lancey, and George H. Moore* (New York Historical Society, 1878).

governmental bodies from the bottom up. Indeed, through the Stamp Act resistance, Pennsylvanians were able to test the viability of nonimportation and determine that boycotts were a practical method of nonviolent civil resistance, employing the protest-related tools that either were available to them during the Imperial Crisis.¹¹²⁹

Through Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure, Tilly's Resource Mobilization Theory, and Chenoweth and Stephan's interactive approach to mobilization, we can see the full extent to which created space for communities in and around Philadelphia to unprecedentedly participate in Pennsylvania politics. Indeed, examining nonimportation through these lenses reveals several key features which reflect the people power behind the developing patriot resistance movement. Boycotting provided a form of dissent that was basic enough to become routinized and open enough to connect different associations to a broader range of civic leaders and coalitions.¹¹³⁰ Indeed, for middling colonists, nonimportation effectively only required the time and resources necessary to abstain from British manufactures and participate in home-spinning.¹¹³¹ Nonimportation helped to form a collective challenge "based on common purposes and social solidarities" which was rooted in "the routines and organization of everyday social life".¹¹³² In withholding their spending power and becoming more self-reliant, Philadelphians created new networks of patriot advocates, whose friendship, kinship, interpersonal trust, and shared perceptions strengthened their capacity to effect political change in the face of a distant and unrepresentative Parliament.¹¹³³

In Philadelphia and the other major port cities in North America, the Stamp Act resistance was hugely successful; however, the resistance initiative stirred relatively little

¹¹²⁹ Snow, Rochford, and Benford, p. 464; Wada, p. 547; della Porta, 'Repertoires of Contention', p. 2.

¹¹³⁰ Baldassarri and Diani, p. 735.

¹¹³¹ Tarrow, p. 134.

¹¹³² Tarrow, p. 132; Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French* (Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 4; Tilly, 'Trust Networks in Transnational Migration', pp. 3–4; Baldassarri and Diani, pp. 735–37.

¹¹³³ Tarrow, pp. 132–34.

long-lasting enthusiasm, even within the Philadelphia city limits, largely because various sects of provincial society were apprehensive about the more long-term implications of opposition to Britain and the Quaker party had scarcely started to lose their political footing.¹¹³⁴ Yet, Pennsylvanian noncooperation undeniably set an important precedent. In refusing the purchase of British wares, provincials were able to navigate the trial and error of selecting and employing practical, appropriate, and effective means of resistance. In addition, Pennsylvanians began to identify knowledgeable and confident leaders, who were simultaneously capable of guiding the rhetoric, aims, and tactics of the resistance and empowering ordinary Pennsylvanians to commit themselves to noncooperation.¹¹³⁵ Through the Stamp Act resistance and the consequent advent of Philadelphia's Sons of Liberty, Pennsylvanians were able to observe the political leadership provided by a more diversified representative body that sought to provide constituents with security on economic, financial, geographical, physical, and political levels, and likewise, by mobilizing in the resistance of British manufactures, most Pennsylvanians experienced their first foray into participatory provincial politics.¹¹³⁶

As Merritt has suggested, merchants displayed a greater sense of ambivalence toward the idea of nonimportation than any other Pennsylvanian social sect.¹¹³⁷ Yet, merchant compliance in the boycott movement of 1765–1766 was significant on three key fronts. As Doerflinger has noted, nonimportation offered merchants an eighteen-month-long respite, during which they were able to unload the surplus of British goods that they had accumulated when the economic boom of the Seven Years' War turned to a period of bust.¹¹³⁸ Certainly, nonimportation provided an opportunity for merchants to sell off their inventories, minimize

¹¹³⁴ Breen, *The Will of the People: The Revolutionary Birth of America*, p. 27.

¹¹³⁵ Bartkowski, p. 4.

¹¹³⁶ Breen, "'Baubles of Britain': The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century", pp. 89–90.

¹¹³⁷ Merritt, 'Tea Trade, Consumption, and the Republican Paradox in Prerevolutionary Philadelphia', p. 118.

¹¹³⁸ Doerflinger, p. 219.

their debts to English suppliers, and work toward rebuilding their cash reserves, which, for some merchants, effectively overshadowed the political significance of the boycott. Yet, the bending of the merchant class to the “popular pressure” of urban dwellers demonstrated that a merchant’s need to defend their image and reputation exceeded the economic concerns involved in refusing trade with Britain.¹¹³⁹ Additionally, in jeopardizing their personal finances in the name of nonviolent civil resistance, merchants served as a model of what it meant to “sacrifice [one’s] Interest for the Sake of the Province”.¹¹⁴⁰ Indeed, even the façade of mobilizing behind the resistance’s “patriotic Endeavors for a Change” meant that merchants were able to protect their personal and professional relationships in Philadelphia, evading the possibility of sacrificing their reputations or risking exclusion from involvement in Pennsylvania’s rapidly evolving political landscape.¹¹⁴¹

Although Benjamin Franklin described the American “ambition of becoming independent” in 1765, very few of the nonviolent actionists who engaged in the Philadelphian Stamp Act resistance of 1765–1766 would have interpreted their actions as precursors to independence.¹¹⁴² Nonetheless, by the date of its repeal in March 1766, the Stamp Act was “a dead letter” in the colonies, and the burgeoning patriot fundamentalist movement had implemented five core precursors that ultimately facilitated the British North American shift from colonies to nation, including (1) the expression of American political differences in printed rhetoric, petitions, and public orations, (2) the development of organizations and institutions that articulated colonial interests and publicly defended American autonomy in the wake of extending imperial control, (3) direct collective resistance of Parliamentary legislation, (4) mass political noncooperation through open defiance, demonstration,

¹¹³⁹ Conser, Jr., ‘The Stamp Act Resistance’, p. 89; Doerflinger, p. 214.

¹¹⁴⁰ The Inhabitants of Philadelphia, ‘Remonstrance against the Appointment of Benjamin Franklin as Agent’, 1764, Founders Online National Archives.

¹¹⁴¹ ‘Isaac Hunt to Benjamin Franklin, 21 May 1766’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹¹⁴² Benjamin Franklin as N.N., ‘First Reply to Vindex Patriae’, *The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, 28 December 1765, Founders Online National Archives.

lobbying, and nonconsumption, and (5) the organization and growth of parallel social and governmental institutions.¹¹⁴³

Indeed, as Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure explains, the Stamp Act resistance provided a learning experience for Pennsylvanians and for colonists more broadly, whereby they tested forms of contention, discovered the most what was viable and effective, and diffused them widely, making nonimportation and defiance "modular" or integrated components of colonial life.¹¹⁴⁴ In the context of the composite mobilizational approach proposed by this research, Philadelphians had firmly asserted what Tilly explains as "the five big components" of collective action by clarifying and defending their interests, organizing into a structured political movement, mobilizing and acquiring the pooled and individual resources needed for political action, finding and creating new opportunities for Pennsylvanians to act on their interests, and actively collectivizing in pursuit of common interests.¹¹⁴⁵ Once these mobilizational requisites were established and colonists observed how their actions impacted the broader imperial political structure, a model for resistance was put in place for future cycles of contention.¹¹⁴⁶ In fact, the patriot precedent set by the Stamp Act resistance was revived in 1767 when the Townshend Revenue Act threatened to abolish Pennsylvania's paper currency, institute vice-admiralty courts to prevent local juries from trying violators of the Navigation Acts, and utilize British men-of-war to patrol Delaware Bay in search of illegal goods.¹¹⁴⁷ Indeed, harkening back to the boycotts that forced

¹¹⁴³ Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 15; Jack P. Greene, 'The Social Origins of the American Revolution: An Evaluation and an Interpretation', *Political Science Quarterly*, 88.1 (March 1-22), pp. 1-22 (p. 6); Foner, pp. 53-55; Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, pp. 77-78; Eric Nellis, *The Long Road to Change: America's Revolution, 1750-1820* (University of Toronto Press, 2007), pp. 79-80; Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, pp. 8-9.

¹¹⁴⁴ Tarrow, pp. 37-39.

¹¹⁴⁵ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, pp. 10-12.

¹¹⁴⁶ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 19-21; Tarrow, pp. 23-28.

¹¹⁴⁷ Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 162-63; Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 113.

Parliament to accommodate colonial concerns during the Stamp Act Crisis, Philadelphia's burgeoning preeminent patriot fundamentalist advocates worked to institute a brand-new boycott of British goods, increasingly politicizing policymaking processes, tea, and everyday goods.

During a meeting at Bradford's London Coffee House on March 27, 1768, one of Philadelphia's patriot orators delivered encouraging words from Boston's dissenting traders and merchants, who reinforced the critical nature of nonviolent civil resistance by explaining, the "[e]fficacy of such a Resolution has been most happily experienced by the Abolition of the Stamp Act, and cannot, if now agreed to by us, fail of obtaining a speedy and effectual Relief from this Grievance".¹¹⁴⁸ Subsequently, the "Presbyterian" party, which had gradually come to be known as the patriot faction, began to benefit from what Patrick Griffin has explained as "an attenuation" of imperial authority, whereby political legitimacy in Pennsylvania was slowly but surely transferred from conventional governmental institutions and authorities to the organizers of provincial resistance.¹¹⁴⁹ By the late 1760s, conservative hopes of royalizing the province of Pennsylvania had been dashed, and as Eric Foner has argued, the surge of rhetorical challenges and the constant appeals for public support altered provincial approaches to government.¹¹⁵⁰ Pennsylvania's divergence from Quaker political dominance hardly qualifies as a swift, clean transition, and in fact, between 1775 and 1776, Quaker factions were forced to contemplate if and how their pacifistic principles might interact with the patriot militia movement, causing major ruptures within the Society of Friends.¹¹⁵¹ Pennsylvanians gradually came to interpret the Quaker-Proprietary divide as a

¹¹⁴⁸ The Merchants in Boston, 'To the Merchants and Traders of the City of Philadelphia', *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 31 March 1768, 2049th edition, p. 2, Genealogy Bank.

¹¹⁴⁹ Patrick Griffin, *The Townshend Moment: The Making of Empire and Revolution in the Eighteenth Century* (Yale University Press, 2017), p. 230.

¹¹⁵⁰ Foner, p. 59.

¹¹⁵¹ William C. Kashatus III, *Conflict of Conviction: A Reappraisal of Quaker Involvement in the American Revolution* (University Press of America, 1990), pp. 40–41. In *The Relation of the Quakers to the American*

hindrance to the progress of an increasingly populous and pluralistic society. Thus, in the continuous process of testing and developing physical and rhetorical methods of nonviolent civil resistance, Pennsylvanians collectivized in the struggle against Parliamentary overreach in North America. Recruitment to the budding patriot fundamentalist movement was generally gradual and incremental across the province of Pennsylvania, occurring either as a defensive reaction to Parliamentary policymaking alongside voluntary and special-purpose associations, or due to social coercion from friends, colleagues, and relatives who had embraced nonviolent civil resistance.¹¹⁵²

In turn, on March 10, 1769, during a meeting of over 250 attendees, Philadelphia merchants moved to suspend trade with Britain until the Townshend duties were fully repealed.¹¹⁵³ Some Quaker supporters interpreted the Townshend Revenue Act as a productive way to funnel money into the Pennsylvania government, and as such, Friends like Joseph Galloway were quick to minimize the desire of Pennsylvanians to contribute to the nonviolent resistance movement, explaining that provincials were simply “provoked by the perverse disobedience of some colonies”.¹¹⁵⁴ Other prominent Quakers devalued the significance of provincial political contentions. For instance, Philadelphia merchant Thomas Wharton expressed to Franklin, “We seem at present very Quiet here, and I am satisfied, that, the Watchword Among the [Presbyterians] is *Moderation*”, which is to say that some Friends believed that any proposed challenge to the Townshend duties would never achieve the accommodation prompted by the Stamp Act.¹¹⁵⁵ Yet, Galloway seemingly understood that few Pennsylvanians would share Quaker attitudes toward the Townshend duties, and he

Revolution, Arthur J. Mekeel estimates that upwards of 1,500 Quakers were disowned from the faith as a result of participating in the Revolution either directly or indirectly.

¹¹⁵² Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 206.

¹¹⁵³ Knollenberg, *Growth of the American Revolution: 1766-1775*, pp. 57–58.

¹¹⁵⁴ ‘Cross-Examination of Joseph Galloway’, *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, 25 September 1766, 1970th edition, pp. 2–3.

¹¹⁵⁵ ‘Thomas Wharton to Benjamin Franklin, 17 November 1767’, Founders Online National Archives.

instructed the party's spokespeople to only overtly protest the legislation if Crown-appointed agents in other colonies led the way. As Kozuskanich has affirmed, the Proprietary party was "no less conservative" in their response to the Townshend duties, and rather than openly condemning the legislation, party leaders quietly petitioned the Crown, meaning that open and unapologetic nonviolent resistance fell to the "farmer" John Dickinson and his patriot peers.¹¹⁵⁶

The modular performances and repertoires associated with boycotting had already been established, and colonists were experienced in collectivization through boycotting, demonstrating, and petition as well as resource mobilization through voting, printing, debating, demonstrating, and withholding the full weight of the economic capacity from the British empire.¹¹⁵⁷ With the appointment of a twenty-person committee consisting of eight acknowledged Quakers, six Anglicans, and six Presbyterians, the Townshend boycott was widely endorsed and enforced throughout Pennsylvania.¹¹⁵⁸ Philadelphia's merchants defended their course of action, explaining, "[N]o people, who have any regard for liberty, could in their circumstances shew a more respectful behaviour".¹¹⁵⁹ In fact, once nonimportation measures had officially been implemented, some dissenting Philadelphians even viewed smuggling as a patriotic form of defiance, specifically as smuggling operations were generally conducted without the causing of physical bodily harm.¹¹⁶⁰ While committee members were not entirely unified in their views, Pennsylvania's de facto representative bodies did become increasingly diversified, and ultimately, more radical during the course of

¹¹⁵⁶ Kozuskanich, "Falling under the Domination Totally of Presbyterians": The Paxton Riots and the Coming of the Revolution in Pennsylvania', p. 20.

¹¹⁵⁷ Tarrow, p. 118.

¹¹⁵⁸ Ousterhout, p. 27; Ryerson, 'Political Mobilization and the American Revolution: The Resistance Movement in Philadelphia, 1765 to 1776', p. 586. In 1770, the Merchants' Committee lost three Quaker seats, giving the majority to the Anglicans.

¹¹⁵⁹ Daniel Benezet and others, 'Letter from a Committee of Merchants in Philadelphia to the Committee of Merchants in London, 1769', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 27.1 (1903), pp. 84–87.

¹¹⁶⁰ Ousterhout, p. 27; Merritt, 'Tea Trade, Consumption, and the Republican Paradox in Prerevolutionary Philadelphia', p. 145.

the Townshend boycotts, as Philadelphia's merchants gradually transformed the city's political landscape through a series of challenges and adaptations.¹¹⁶¹ Indeed, the Merchants' Committee served as an important example of the burgeoning resistance campaign's need to establish new and apparently legitimate parallel institutions to firstly, pressure the existing provincial government to challenge Parliament on the legality and ethicality of the Townshend duties and additionally, to act as "alternate executors of political authority" during the political struggle between the American colonies and the mother country.¹¹⁶² Moreover, as individuals like Charles Thomson gained recognition as dedicated leaders and valuable assets to the nonviolent resistance movement, Pennsylvania politics became more representative by default. Recruitment to the budding patriot fundamentalist movement was gradual, but between 1768 and 1771, up-and-coming patriot leaders had garnered "the public trust" and were able to help mold, mobilize, and maintain the popular commitment of the continental cause, as friends, neighbors, colleagues, relatives, and new social connections mobilized alongside each other to nonviolently safeguard American civil liberties, even in the face of physical and financial risks.¹¹⁶³

Consequently, when the cargo ship *Charming Polly* entered the Port of Philadelphia in July of 1769 carrying Yarmouth malt consigned to Philadelphia merchant Amos Strettel, who had apparently neither signed the nonimportation agreement nor ordered the malt, the Merchants' Committee called a public meeting whereby members agreed that anyone who attempted to land the cargo should be labelled "an Enemy" to the American colonies.¹¹⁶⁴ Strettel ultimately refused the cargo, and the incident was resolved with the decision that any

¹¹⁶¹ Foner, p. 59.

¹¹⁶² Ryerson, 'Political Mobilization and the American Revolution: The Resistance Movement in Philadelphia, 1765 to 1776', p. 566.

¹¹⁶³ Beeman, p. 402; Ryerson, 'Political Mobilization and the American Revolution: The Resistance Movement in Philadelphia, 1765 to 1776', p. 566; McCarthy and Kruegler, p. 10; della Porta, I, pp. 158–60; Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski, p. 824; Scott, pp. 126–27.

¹¹⁶⁴ 'Philadelphia', *The New York Gazette and Mercury*, 24 July 1769, Maryland State Archives; Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, p. 192.

goods ordered after February 6, 1769 required both an immediate return to England and a formal denouncement of the consigner in the print media.¹¹⁶⁵ The Strettel affair was a major contest for the growing patriot fundamentalist movement, as it demonstrated the significant threat that the emerging faction posed to the Quaker and Proprietary regimes, whose claims to governmental authority rested largely upon tradition. In fact, for more conservative Pennsylvanians, the prospects that extralegal committees could not only outlaw importation, but also determine punitive measures for the “illegal” unloading of goods paralleled anarchy, and in turn, Quaker leaders encouraged their brethren to withdraw from the Merchants’ Committee.¹¹⁶⁶ Certainly, nonimportation had not eased tensions between Quaker and non-Quaker communities. In fact, the Quaker party’s unwillingness to publicly endorse nonimportation caused a “shift” in the loyalties of Philadelphia’s working class, and artisans who had made substantial economic gains during the time that nonimportation had nullified the sales of their British competitors, steadily broke ties with the Quaker-merchant faction.¹¹⁶⁷

Although the intricacy differences and divisions that existed amongst Philadelphia’s various demographics in 1770 were relatively calm in nature, the extent of certain social, cultural, and economic divisions was no less severe than that of Boston. Historians have long characterized the events of March 5, 1770 as some combination of a steppingstone to war, a violent assertion of patriot power, and a formative moment in the establishment of anti-British rhetoric; however, Peter Messer has more recently explained the Boston Massacre as being a product of the differences among the patriots themselves.¹¹⁶⁸ According to Messer, by viewing the Boston Massacre strictly as an Anglo-American conflict, we miss the opportunity

¹¹⁶⁵ Ousterhout, pp. 27–28; Robert F. Oaks, ‘Philadelphia Merchants and the Origins of American Independence’, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 121.6 (1977), pp. 407–36 (p. 417).

¹¹⁶⁶ Jack D. Marietta, *The Reformation of American Quakerism, 1748-1783* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), pp. 210–11.

¹¹⁶⁷ Kozuskanich, “‘Falling under the Domination Totally of Presbyterians’: The Paxton Riots and the Coming of the Revolution in Pennsylvania”, p. 22; Foner, pp. 59–60.

¹¹⁶⁸ Peter Messer, ‘A Scene of Villainy Acted by a Dirty Banditti, as Must Astonish the Public’, *The New England Quarterly*, 90.4 (2017), pp. 502–39 (pp. 502–4).

to explore how the clash more broadly reflects the differing needs, ideals, objectives, and expectations of urban demographics.¹¹⁶⁹ By Messer's logic, while Philadelphians' relative ability to avoid physical violence may speak to their commitment to nonviolence or evidence urban ties to the Quaker pacifism that helped to "soften" urban approaches to coping with sociocultural differences, the absence of any such "massacre" does not indicate that Philadelphians were any less divided than their brethren in Boston.

While sporadic divisions caused friction between Quaker and non-Quaker merchants and Philadelphia's steadily mobilizing mechanics, most rifts were temporary, particularly as the social roles played by each group frequently intersected and overlapped. For instance, when Parliament issued a partial repeal of the Townshend duties on April 12, 1770, leaving in place the tax on tea, dry goods merchants moved to resume trade with Britain in hopes of reinvigorating their suffering businesses. Philadelphia's mechanics, however, made a case for the moral uprightness and self-sufficiency that accompanied the homespun movement and underscored the dangerous implications of colonial submission to Parliamentary will.¹¹⁷⁰ Not only had nonimportation taught Pennsylvanians to forego imported "Superfluities" and "Fashions", it also afforded them the opportunity to establish the infrastructure for managing their own commerce, producing their own goods, and functioning independently of British trade.¹¹⁷¹ Thus, the mechanics argued, nonimportation helped to revive Philadelphia's economy, as provincial consumers were funneling money directly into local businesses and initiatives. Following a few months of consistent social coercion, however, from a newly formed "Mechanicks Committee" and Charles Thomson, who helped to bridge the gap between his merchant peers and the radical artisans that his grassroots activism had helped to mobilize, the city's dissenting mechanics were able to pressure the merchant class into

¹¹⁶⁹ Messer, p. 504.

¹¹⁷⁰ Ousterhout, pp. 28–29.

¹¹⁷¹ Benjamin Franklin, 'An Expostulation', *The Public Advertiser*, 3 November 1770, Founders Online National Archives.

extending nonimportation. Indeed, both despite and alongside merchants, the Townshend boycott increasingly drew urban mechanics, who prior to 1765, were the least politically active of all northern mechanics, into the patriot fold, and mechanics of all levels formed committees and took remarkably radical steps to transform Pennsylvania's political landscape.¹¹⁷²

Arthur Schlesinger has explained that the “workingmen had emerged from the struggle against the Townshend duties conscious for the first time of their power in the community”, and certainly, as Charles Olton has reaffirmed, mechanics “had learned the value of collective action” and observed their ability to influence political outcomes.¹¹⁷³ Yet, more specifically, nonviolent civil resistance demonstrated firstly, that working-class Pennsylvanians were not required to be submissive or deferential simply to justify a political system that failed to serve them and additionally, that social means could be “democratized” through boycotting, petitioning, and extralegal institution building and proved.¹¹⁷⁴ Indeed, by organizing and enforcing nonimportation, Philadelphia mechanics placed value upon their contributions to British North American society and applied the sociopolitical leverage of their skills, social networks, and spending power in order to acquire agency over their own lives, both as a collective and as individuals.¹¹⁷⁵ In turn, the Townshend resistance advanced the process of redistributing power and political consent in Pennsylvania from traditional governing bodies to “Illustrious Patriot” institutions.¹¹⁷⁶

¹¹⁷² Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 374; Sharon Salinger, ‘Artisans, Journeymen, and the Transformation of Labor in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia’, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 40.1 (1983), pp. 62–84 (p. 77).

¹¹⁷³ Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, pp. 279–80; Olton, p. 322.

¹¹⁷⁴ Sharp, *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 778–79; Harvey Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering: The Process and Prospects of Nonviolent Resistance* (Westminster Press, 1965), p. 174.

¹¹⁷⁵ Alpaugh, ‘Nonviolence, Positive Peace and American Pre-Revolutionary Protest, 1765-1775’, p. 172; Chenoweth and Stephan, ‘Mobilization and Resistance: A Framework for Analysis’, p. 251.

¹¹⁷⁶ ‘A Committee of Philadelphia Tradesmen to Benjamin Franklin, 13 November 1771’, Founders Online National Archives.

Even when Philadelphians appeared outwardly quiet after the 1770 reunification of merchants and mechanics, the momentum of the mobilized continued to build, and the patriot, or “Whig” political collective led by Thomson, Dickinson, Bradford, and Joseph Reed drew strong support from Pennsylvanian mechanics and some groups of merchants. Resistance leaders continued to foster personal and professional connections, newspapers continued to publish anti-imperialist material, and extralegal committees continued to enforce the province-wide boycott. Moreover, while the formerly dominant Quaker and Proprietary factions attempted to thwart the strengthening of the patriot movement by joining forces, the mechanic-backed movement made significant gains when Benjamin Franklin verbalized his support for the nonviolent resistance efforts employed by “the artizans in the towns, and the farmers throughout the country”.¹¹⁷⁷ Both Franklin’s defense of the nonviolent resistance campaign and the strategic leadership demonstrated within Pennsylvania’s developing patriot fundamentalist faction helped to balance the radical desire of the artisan community to suspend all commerce between Britain and North America against the reticence of the merchant class to risk permanently altering “the web of economic ties” that connected Pennsylvania to the wider British Atlantic world.¹¹⁷⁸ Yet, mechanics continued to push, and ultimately secured the extension nonimportation through September of 1770, as they condemned the “TEA-SCHEME” and instructed urban residents, “Let not [the East India Company’s] baneful commodity enter YOUR city”.¹¹⁷⁹ By pushing for peaceful, accessible means of resistance, Philadelphians demonstrated an understanding of the relationships between American protest, mobilizational constraint, British perceptions of the American cause, and societal support for the resistance movement. Mechanics did not insist upon harsh

¹¹⁷⁷ Benjamin Franklin, ‘The Rise and Present State of Our Misunderstanding’, *The London Chronicle*, 6 November 1770; Foner, pp. 60–61.

¹¹⁷⁸ Hartigan-O’Connor, p. 14.

¹¹⁷⁹ A Mechanic, *To the Tradesmen, Mechanics, & c. of the Province of Pennsylvania* (1773), Library of Congress <<https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.1430340d/?sp=1>>.

or violent measures to be employed against Britain. Instead, they pressurized their peers to exhibit calm, peaceable refusals of consumer goods, which Tilly, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Anthony Oberschall, and other prominent social scientists have deemed as critical for both the credibility of any social movement and its capacity to mobilize the masses.¹¹⁸⁰

During the “sullen silence” that separated the end of the Townshend resistance in 1770 and the First Continental Congress in 1774, the groups and individuals that ultimately became patriot fundamentalists remained quiet, but vigilant, which is to say that “resistance forces strengthened themselves whenever possible”.¹¹⁸¹ As in Boston, while Philadelphia’s patriot resistance had outwardly calmed, patriot fundamentalist leaders ensured that the organizational structures necessary to preserve the American cause remained in place, lending a sense of continuity to the ebb and flow of the political struggle, which allowed Pennsylvania patriots to emerge from “abeyance” when a new political threat demanded collective action.¹¹⁸² In late October 1773, reported sightings of British tea ships along the eastern seaboard had reached Bradford’s London Coffee House, and Philadelphia’s burgeoning patriot fundamentalists debated the most appropriate course of action in the event of an attempted delivery. The so-called “Committee for Tarring and Feathering” printed and distributed broadsides condemning specifically Captain Ayres tea ship *Polly* for his impending attempt to ensure that “his *rotten* TEA” was “funnel’d” down the throats of Pennsylvanians.¹¹⁸³ Moreover, the committee vowed that any Delaware River pilot who assisted a Philadelphia-bound tea ship would receive a “halter around [their] neck, ten gallons

¹¹⁸⁰ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, pp. 9–10; McCarthy and Zald, p. 1213; Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Prentice-Hall, 1973).

¹¹⁸¹ David J. Toscano, ‘Sullen Silence or Prelude to Resistance: Background to the Continental Association, 1771 to May 1774’, in *Before Lexington: Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765-1775*, Ed. Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (The Albert Einstein Institution, 2016), pp. 352–89 (p. 352).

¹¹⁸² Verta Taylor, pp. 761–62; Blocker, Jr.; Buechler, *The Transformation of the Woman Suffrage Movement: The Case of Illinois, 1850-1920*; Tilly and Tarrow.

¹¹⁸³ The Committee of Tarring and Feathering, ‘To the Delaware Pilots’, 1773, Library of Congress.

of liquid tar scattered on [their] pate, with the feathers of a dozen wild geese laid over that to enliven [their] appearance”.¹¹⁸⁴ Yet, historians including Alfred Young and Benjamin Irvin have debated whether the Committee for Tarring and Feathering was a real body or a facade through which Philadelphia’s fringe groups could instigate out-of-door behaviors.¹¹⁸⁵ Moreover, the committee’s words were certainly designed independently of the broader patriot fundamentalist movement, and one prominent Philadelphia insisted hours before the shipment was expected that the committee’s words were nothing more than a “Scare Crow”.¹¹⁸⁶

Philadelphia’s patriot fundamentalist leaders, bred by the nonimportation associations of the previous decade, had gathered and resolved not only that the tea should remain on the *Polly* to be returned to England, peaceably fulfilling the “duty of every American” to prevent such “a violent attack upon the liberties of America”.¹¹⁸⁷ When the *Polly* finally reached Chester, which sits roughly twenty miles south of Philadelphia’s “old city”, on December 25, 1773, several thousand Pennsylvanians mobilized to confront the ship captain and the consignees in what was theretofore “the greatest meeting of the People ever known” in Philadelphia.¹¹⁸⁸ As social pressure mounted on the wharf, Quaker merchants Abel James and Henry Drinker reluctantly rejected the shipment, a move to which few Philadelphians reportedly objected.¹¹⁸⁹ Benjamin Franklin later remarked, “the East India Company’s sending their Tea here, subject to a Duty, seems to have given the finishing Stroke to their

¹¹⁸⁴ Frank M. Etting, ‘An Historical Account of the Old State House of Pennsylvania Now Known as The Hall of Independence’ (James R. Osgood and Company, 1876), p. 70.

¹¹⁸⁵ Alfred F. Young, *The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution*, pp. 47–50; Benjamin H. Irvin, ‘Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies of American Liberties, 1768-1776’, *The New England Quarterly*, 76.2 (2003), pp. 197–238 (p. 212).

¹¹⁸⁶ ‘Richard Bache to Benjamin Franklin, 30 November 1773’, Founders Online National Archives.

¹¹⁸⁷ ‘The Philadelphia Resolutions; October 16, 1773’, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project.

¹¹⁸⁸ R.W. Kelsey, ‘Philadelphia Tea-Party Letter by Thomas Wharton, Isaac Wharton, Jonathan Browne and Gilbert Barclay, 28 December 1773’, *Bulletin of Friends’ Historical Society of Philadelphia*, 10.2 (1921), pp. 67–70 (p. 69); Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, p. 37.

¹¹⁸⁹ Merritt, ‘Tea Trade, Consumption, and the Republican Paradox in Prerevolutionary Philadelphia’, pp. 143–44; Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, p. 64.

Patience”, but notably, the dissenting crowd remained rather subdued through the entirety of the incident.¹¹⁹⁰ In fact, prior to sending Captain Ayres on his way with all 696 chests of tea, protesters ensured that “the Vessel was furnished with some necessary Provisions”.¹¹⁹¹

As cooler heads prevailed, however, Philadelphia’s sober resistance strengthened the bonds of patriot fundamentalism and effected a lasting change. Through the “tea party”, nonviolent actionists mobilized the masses in a controlled, strategic, and peaceable operation, again demonstrating Chenoweth and Stephan’s observation that social movements that “work” respect the delicate and interactive relationship between political opportunity and strategic choice.¹¹⁹² Indeed, in peaceably turning away the tea, Philadelphia’s patriot organizers further divorced the resistance movement from mercantile interests and controls, crystallized the roles of the leaders that eventually represented Pennsylvania at the First Continental Congress.¹¹⁹³ Largely independently of vocational, or religious configurations, Philadelphians mobilized under the banner of patriot fundamentalism, demonstrating the extent to which urban dwellers had come to dedicate themselves to nonviolent civil resistance.¹¹⁹⁴ Opposition to the Stamp Act and the subsequent Townshend Revenue Acts had created radical hubs from which patriot activists were able to disperse, legitimize, and coordinate information, logic, and tactics, which is to say that by December 1773, Philadelphia’s “revolutionary spirit” was emotionally and practically strong.¹¹⁹⁵ However, the “tea party” forced Philadelphia’s radical leaders to confront and articulate the scope of their opposition in a way that they had not previously done. Indeed, although Philadelphians surely felt threatened by the East India Company’s attempt to “enforce the ministerial plan” of

¹¹⁹⁰ ‘John Winthrop to Benjamin Franklin, 31 December 1773’.

¹¹⁹¹ Kelsey, p. 69; Toscano, p. 362.

¹¹⁹² Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, pp. 20–22; Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, pp. 19–23.

¹¹⁹³ Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, pp. 37–38.

¹¹⁹⁴ Breen, *The Will of the People: The Revolutionary Birth of America*, p. 39.

¹¹⁹⁵ Charles Henry Lincoln, *The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, 1760-1776* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1901), p. 95.

taxing tea, the city's radical leaders instructed protesters to rationally proceed with firmness and moderation, emphasizing the simultaneous needs of evincing "a firm adherence to the Cause of American liberty" and preventing "matters from coming to extremities".¹¹⁹⁶ Yet, few would have guessed in December 1773 that Boston's own tea party would prompt the passage of the Coercive Acts and thereby alter the "character of the struggle" fundamentally.¹¹⁹⁷

When news of the Coercive Acts, Parliament's punitive retort to the Boston Tea Party, reached Philadelphia in the Spring of 1774, Benjamin Franklin pseudonymously explained the legislation as "the fruits of the seeds that have been sowing ever since 1764", encouraging Pennsylvanians to consider the lengths to which they and British North Americans more broadly had gone during the decade prior in the hopes of rebuilding the once strong Anglo-American relationship. Yet, Pennsylvanians had been sowing their own "seeds" in gradually building their own social and political institutions, and in 1774, nonviolent action was still the predominate strategy employed by Pennsylvanians in their challenge to British authority. Indeed, even when "galvanized as never before" by the imperial move to close Boston Harbor, hold all Massachusetts officials strictly accountable to the Crown, and strengthen occupying forces, Pennsylvanians never completely abandoned the lawful pursuit of redress.¹¹⁹⁸ Indeed, Philadelphians and frontier dwellers alike continued to petition the Crown, appeal to Benjamin Franklin as their agent in London, write to the "few Friends" the colonies had left in Parliament, and urge Governor Penn to implement policy changes.¹¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, provincial tensions were unprecedentedly high, as boundary disputes still

¹¹⁹⁶ Charles Thomson, 'Charles Thomson Papers', in *Revolutionary Papers*, Ed. Evert A. Duyckinck, Edward F. De Lancey, and George H. Moore (New York Historical Society, 1878), pp. 250–51.

¹¹⁹⁷ Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 29.

¹¹⁹⁸ Raphael, *A People's History of the American Revolution: How Common People Shaped the Fight for Independence*, p. 33; Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 6; Sharp, *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 778–79.

¹¹⁹⁹ 'Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Cushing, 16 April 1774', Founders Online National Archives.

plagued the frontier and more than ever, imperial inflexibility threatened American autonomy. Explaining the Pennsylvanian plight, William Bradford predicted, “Our being attacked on the one hand by the Indians, & on the others, our Liberties invaded by a corrupt, ambitious & determined ministry is bring[ing] things to a crisis in America & seems to fortell some great event”.¹²⁰⁰ Full-fledged patriot fundamentalists and enduring conservatives alike were troubled by the implications of the Coercive Acts, and stimulated by empathy for Boston and a concern for the colonies as a whole, Pennsylvanians of all sociopolitical sects seemed to be affected by a growing sense of urgency.

In turn, on May 19, 1774, when Paul Revere delivered a plea from the Boston Town Meeting requesting support in the city’s opposition of the Boston Port Act as well as handwritten letters from John Hancock and Samuel Adams asking Philadelphia’s patriot leaders for allyship, the previously Quaker-dominated Assembly immediately requested that Governor Penn call an emergency session to order.¹²⁰¹ After Penn refused, Charles Thomson and his patriot peers organized a meeting with Revere for the following day, and ultimately, between 200 and 300 Philadelphians crowded into the City Tavern to hear for themselves the communication that Revere had carried from Boston.¹²⁰² As Ousterhout has suggested, the event was “orchestrated” as a means of convincing Pennsylvania’s diverse demographic configurations to swiftly mobilize in support of their New England comrades, and realistically, in defense of their own liberties.¹²⁰³ Philadelphia’s patriot fundamentalist leaders presumed that dry goods merchants would oppose nonimportation and nonexportation, the two measures requested by Boston, while Quakers and other conservative attendees would contest entanglement in Boston’s plight, for fear that involvement could bring about violence.

¹²⁰⁰ ‘William Bradford to James Madison, 1 August 1774’.

¹²⁰¹ Peter Thompson, *Rum Punch and Revolution: Taverngoing and Public Life in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 169.

¹²⁰² Bockleman and Ireland, pp. 141–42.

¹²⁰³ Ousterhout, pp. 54–55.

As such, the running order of the meeting presented a decrescendo of radical proposals, as Mifflin, who had been described by John Adams as a most “animating soul”, provided an inflammatory introduction which was followed by speeches from Thomson and then Dickinson.¹²⁰⁴ In realizing their aim “to carry the measure proposed and yet prevent a disunion,” Thomson recommended unrealistically extreme measures while Dickinson offered a more moderate plan with which conservatives could “compromise”.¹²⁰⁵ Thomson’s time on the floor was reportedly so full of fervency that he fainted and had to be carried outside before Philadelphians could move to declare the Boston Port Bill unconstitutional, endorse the establishment of a continental congress, and elect a city committee of forty-three men to liaise with Pennsylvania’s eleven county committees.¹²⁰⁶ Thus, Philadelphia’s patriot leaders, who had theretofore counseled moderation, took a significant step by making the causes of Boston and Philadelphia one in the same, and ultimately, opening themselves up to the “Troops and Fleets, and Force” with which Boston was afflicted.¹²⁰⁷ In this sense, dissenting Philadelphians expressed a shared sense of victimization with Bostonians, which modern social scientists might equate with “defensive efficiency effect”.¹²⁰⁸ In both colonies, membership of the patriot fundamentalist movement steadily increased, committees were enabled to speak for the body of the people, providing an organizational base for the expansion of the patriot fundamentalist movement, resistance became as integrated into the fabric of daily colonial life as formal colonial charters and constitutions were, and resistance

¹²⁰⁴ Kenneth R. Rossman, ‘Thomas Mifflin - Revolutionary Patriot’, *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 15.1 (1948), pp. 9–23 (p. 13).

¹²⁰⁵ Harley, pp. 20–21; Ousterhout, p. 55.

¹²⁰⁶ Ryerson, *The Revolution Is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776*, p. 23.

¹²⁰⁷ ‘Benjamin Franklin to the Printer of the Public Ledger, After 9 March 1774’, Founders Online National Archives; Harley, p. 21.

¹²⁰⁸ Kris De Jaegher and Britta Hoyer, ‘Collective Action and the Common Enemy Effect’, *Defence and Peace Economics*, 27.5 (2016), pp. 644–64 (pp. 644–45).

leaders became the figures to which ordinary colonists looked for political guidance.¹²⁰⁹ That is to say that despite certain regional differences, Pennsylvanians and Massachusettsans had bonded over the efforts involved in employing common nonviolent strategies by issuing similar petitions to imperial authorities and sacrificing similar luxuries, and now, each province was prepared to “suffer equally” in whatever consequences Parliament would issue.¹²¹⁰

The First Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia from September 5 through October 26, 1774, and its delegates were charged with framing and articulating American civil rights, composing a list of grievances, and establishing and mandating appropriate parameters for pursuing redress.¹²¹¹ Pennsylvania’s patriot fundamentalists won a small, but symbolic victory before the Congress even convenes, as the delegates opted to meet at Carpenter’s Hall rather than the Pennsylvania State House, which had long been associated with the province’s deeply conservative political traditions. In addition, and much to the chagrin of Speaker Joseph Galloway and his conservative cohort, Charles Thomson, who was not even an elected delegate, was selected as secretary of the Congress.¹²¹² Indeed, Thomson’s appointment to the Congress represents the extent to which patriot fundamentalist policymakers from throughout the colonies recognized his influence in advancing the cause of nonviolence in Pennsylvania. After debating on the floor at Carpenter’s Hall and conferring in the corners of the City Tavern, Congress determined that “the most speedy, effectual, and peaceable” means for bringing about the repeal of the Coercive Acts was a

¹²⁰⁹ Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, p. 229; Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain*, p. 136; John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, *American Journal of Sociology*, 82.6 (1977), pp. 1212–41 (p. 1214).

¹²¹⁰ De Jaeger and Hoyer, pp. 644–45.

¹²¹¹ Toscano, pp. 386–87. Delegates from Pennsylvania included Edward Biddle, John Dickinson, Joseph Galloway, Charles Humphreys, Thomas Mifflin, John Morton, Samuel Rhoads, and George Ross.

¹²¹² Zimmerman, ‘Charles Thomson, “The Sam Adams of Philadelphia”’, p. 464.

continent-wide “non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation agreement”.¹²¹³

From December 1, 1774, the colonies would uphold the Continental Association by firmly refusing the importation and consumption of restricted goods from Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies.¹²¹⁴ As Schlesinger has concluded, however, British North Americans were predominantly of the opinion that anything short of a total stoppage of two-way trade would prove “useless”, and as such, nonexportation, which was thought to be the most powerful weapon in the provincial arsenal, would go into effect on September 10, 1775 in the event that nonimportation was unsuccessful in yielding accommodation from Parliament.¹²¹⁵

Thomson, as secretary, forwarded Congress’s resolves to King George III and his ministers, remarking to his friend, Benjamin Franklin, “I hope administration will see and be convinced that it is not a little faction, but the whole body of American freeholders from Nova Scotia to Georgia that now complain and apply for redress; And who, I am sure, will resist rather than submit”.¹²¹⁶

To enforce the Continental Association, congress enlisted local bodies, which ultimately became known as “committees of observation and inspection”. These provincial committees, whose members were elected, were responsible for managing correspondence, and collecting and distributing funds and goods for the relief of Boston. Committees of observation and inspection were designed to be representative of their relative constituencies, assigned to the explicit tasks of investigating and arbitrating alleged violations of the Association, and restricted to only punishing offenders by publicizing their name. Accordingly, Mary Beth

¹²¹³ ‘The Articles of Association’, 1774, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project; Thompson, pp. 166–68.

¹²¹⁴ The Articles of Consideration stated, “[W]e will not import into *British America*, from *Great Britain* or *Ireland*, any Goods, Wares, or Merchandises whatsoever, or from any other place, any such Goods, Wares, or Merchandises as shall have been exported from *Great Britain* or *Ireland*; nor will we, after that day, import any *East India* Tea from any part of the World; nor any Molasses, Syrups, Paneles, Coffee, or Pimento, from the *British Plantations* or from *Dominica*; nor Wines from *Madeira*, or the *Western Islands*; nor Foreign Indigo”.

¹²¹⁵ Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776* (Vintage Books, 1965), p. 206; Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, pp. 18–19.

¹²¹⁶ ‘Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, 1 November 1774’, Founders Online National Archives.

Norton has not only argued that these committees were “legitimized” in nature, but also, that by developing local parallel institutions to enforce their resolves, congressional delegates “clearly” intended to prevent any semblance of violence, such as physical attacks upon noncompliers or their property.¹²¹⁷ As Conser, McCarthy, and Toscano have determined, the overwhelming British North American support for the First Continental Congress alone suggests that by late 1774, the parallel quasi-governmental institutions developed during the course of the Imperial Crisis had fully “adopted the functions of government”, which is to say that self-government in the American colonies was observably gained through nonviolent civil resistance, not through violent struggle, as the bloody narratives of the pre-Revolutionary era contend.¹²¹⁸

By the Pennsylvania Convention of 1776, a majority of Pennsylvanians had come to embrace the idea that British North Americans were both deserving and capable of establishing governments “sufficient to the exigencies of affairs”, which is to say that provincials longed for a government that fit the needs and desires of its rapidly evolving population.¹²¹⁹ Indeed, during the decade prior, a steadily developing patriot fundamentalist movement had created space for provincials with diverse social, political, religious, and economic interests to form new trust networks and take an active role in provincial politics by engaging in voluntary associations, local committees, and special purpose groups. Certainly, Pennsylvania’s road to revolution was fraught with “mixed triumphs and frustrations”, as the province’s diverse demographic configurations failed to allow for a smooth and swift transfer of political power from the imperial regime to the patriot faction.¹²²⁰ English Quaker merchants, Scots Irish Presbyterian mechanics, and German farmers, all approached the

¹²¹⁷ Norton, p. 201.

¹²¹⁸ Conser, Jr., McCarthy, and Toscano, p. 13.

¹²¹⁹ William H. Egle, ‘The Constitutional Convention of 1776’, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 3.1 (1879), pp. 96–101, 194–201, 319–30, 438–46 (p. 96).

¹²²⁰ Ryerson, ‘Political Mobilization and the American Revolution: The Resistance Movement in Philadelphia, 1765 to 1776’, p. 567.

nonviolent civil resistance proposed by developing patriot fundamentalist leaders with their own grievances, concerns, risks, and experiences, meaning that individuals and groups of eighteenth-century Pennsylvanians mobilized at different rates and for different reasons between the years 1765 and 1776. However, a steadily developing patriot fundamentalist leadership core utilized the patterns of action and interaction between Pennsylvanians and their traditional governmental institutions to exploit the shortcomings of Pennsylvania's Quaker and Proprietary factions, contest Parliamentary jurisdiction in North America, and ultimately, replace those inadequate, malfunctioning governing bodies with participatory, representative political institutions.¹²²¹

As is generally the case in modern social movements, there is no universal profile of who or what a Pennsylvanian patriot fundamentalist looked like by the eve of Revolution, particularly as the different stages of the patriot fundamentalist movement mobilized different groups of Pennsylvanians.¹²²² Patriot fundamentalist activists framed nonviolent mobilization in a manner that appealed to the diverse social, political, religious, and economic configurations of Pennsylvanian society. By combining rhetorical and ideological appeals with physical opportunities for provincials to employ group and personal skills and resources and to engage politically at varying risk levels, the continental cause enticed a variety of previously marginalized communities to assume an active role in Pennsylvania politics. Kozuskanich has emphasized that Pennsylvania's patriot advocates "were not all young Presbyterian radicals, nor were they all poor western farmers and eastern mechanics".¹²²³ Within the ranks of radicalized and mobilized Pennsylvanians, ages ranged from seventy-year-old Benjamin Franklin to twenty-four-year-old John Weitzall of Northumberland, while

¹²²¹ Richard English, *Does Terrorism Work?: A History* (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 15–16.

¹²²² Bert Klandermans, 'Transient Identities? Membership Patterns in the Dutch Peace Movement', in *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, Ed. Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, Joseph R. Gusfield (Temple University Press, 1994), pp. 168–84 (p. 169).

¹²²³ Kozuskanich, "'For the Security and Protection of the Community': The Frontier and the Makings of Pennsylvanian Constitutionalism", pp. 321–22.

wealth and status extended from elite landowners and speculators to blue-collar farmers and mechanics. Particularly from late 1774 onward, nonviolent engagement in voluntary associations, local committees, and special purpose groups facilitated new associations and trust networks amongst judges, lawyers, magistrates, surveyors, and sheriffs, debated, deliberated, and demonstrated alongside ministers, traders, gunsmiths, and ironworkers, and native-born North Americans stood shoulder-to-shoulder with immigrants from England, Wales, Ireland, Scotland, France, and Germany amongst other nations, as Anglicans, Baptists, Lutherans, Moravians, Presbyterians, and Quakers collectivized to debate, deliberate, and demonstrate in defense of the American cause.¹²²⁴

At the onset of the Imperial Crisis, Pennsylvania's political landscape was largely dominated by conservative leaders who cherished their connection to Great Britain and often linked their status to the British empire; however, as resistance efforts began to take shape in more reactionary colonies like Massachusetts and Virginia following the passage of the Stamp Act, several fledgling patriot fundamentalists emerged in Philadelphia to strategically challenge what they perceived to be unjust Parliamentary policies.¹²²⁵ As prominent, educated, and proven contributors to Pennsylvanian society, William Bradford, John Dickinson, and Charles Thomson utilized their unique personal backgrounds, qualities, and technical skills in printing, law, and government to inspire, motivate, and organize increasing numbers of Pennsylvanians within the continental cause. While Dickinson as a political moderate was a more traditional leader, Bradford and Thomson demonstrated that political leadership could, in fact, come from outside of the Assembly.¹²²⁶ Fulfilling the general

¹²²⁴ Kozuskanich, "Falling under the Domination Totally of Presbyterians": The Paxton Riots and the Coming of the Revolution in Pennsylvania', pp. 26–27; Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf, 'Introduction', in *Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World*, Ed. Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 115–35 (pp. 4–5); Foner, p. 163; Charles Thomson, 'Early Days of the Revolution in Philadelphia', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 2.4 (1878), pp. 411–23 (pp. 415–16).

¹²²⁵ Stephen Conway, 'From Fellow-Nationals to Foreigners: British Perceptions of the Americans, circa 1739–1783', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 59.1 (2002), pp. 65–100 (p. 74).

¹²²⁶ Wallace, p. 98.

responsibilities of successful social movement leaders outlined by sociologist Michael DeCesare, the individuals who emerged to craft and direct Pennsylvania's patriot resistance campaign simultaneously represented and framed the movement's nonviolent messages and goals, mobilized participants and resources, created and exploited opportunities for political action, and publicly shouldered the responsibility for the movement's successes and setbacks.¹²²⁷ Indeed, Bradford, Dickinson, Thomson, and their partners in patriot leadership appealed to the desires and demands of their fellow citizens through practical, intellectual, and emotional approaches, strategically implementing extralegal procedures and policies to encourage extensive public engagement. In order to legitimize their cause, familiarize provincials with participatory political processes, and minimize the alienation of conservative support, Pennsylvania's leading nonviolent patriot actionists emphasized the critical need "for preventing Tumults and Riotous Assemblies".¹²²⁸ Through the techniques of noncooperation, parallel institution building, and open defiance, ultimately stripped the Quaker and Proprietary parties of their longstanding political domination by gradually shifting the allegiance of the majority to the patriot fundamentalist cause and thereby disintegrating British authority and transferring imperial allegiance to the continental cause. Pennsylvanians increasingly felt as though their government belonged to them, with one Philadelphia's urging, "Let no man represent you...who would be disposed to form any rank above that of Freeman".¹²²⁹ Thus, on paper and in practice, Pennsylvania's patriot fundamentalist leaders had mobilized the dissenting masses to legitimize new continental governmental processes and policies and ultimately, to lay the foundations for national ideals, political processes, and identities cemented following Treaty of Paris in 1783.

¹²²⁷ DeCesare, pp. 239–40.

¹²²⁸ John Dickinson quoted in, 'Letters to Farmers in Pennsylvania: John Dickinson Writes to the Paxton Boys' by Jane E. Calvert, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 136.4 (2012), 475–77 (p. 477).

¹²²⁹ James Cannon quoted in Mary M. Schweitzer, 'The Ratification Paradox in the Great Valley of the Appalachians', in *Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World*, Ed. Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 115–35 (pp. 178–128).

Conclusion

Popular portrayals of the American Revolution continue to perpetuate the notion that America's national identity was born from the Declaration of Independence, tested during George Washington's traverse of the icy Delaware River on Christmas night in 1776, and cemented with the 1781 British surrender at Yorktown. However, as the previous chapters have contended, pre-Revolutionary radicalization and mobilization were more nuanced than such narratives suggest. British North American practices of nonviolent civil resistance steadily, if unknowingly, laid the groundwork for the long climb to colonial self-government a full decade before the eruption of physical conflict with Britain in April of 1775, and as such, we must look beyond traditional historiographical methodologies to reinterpret historical evidence through Social Science frameworks, which allow us to see the patriot movement for what it was: a nonviolent social movement. Indeed, processes and practices of peaceable noncooperation, not riots or acts of physical violence, allowed the leaders of the patriot fundamentalist movement to rally the provincial masses, quieten loyalism, exploit imperial vulnerabilities, and steadily transfer political authority from Great Britain to America's own parallel governmental institutions between the years 1764 and 1776. Thus, the prerequisites for independence, which John Adams later explained as the "real" revolution, were peaceably developed in the public orations and print wars conducted by patriot activists, exercised through the homespun efforts of ordinary American families, strengthened via the committees coordinated by merchants and mechanics, and fixed in the congressional convenings of patriot leaders.¹²³⁰ Through nonviolent civil resistance, the patriot fundamentalist movement established the social and economic infrastructure to replace Crown-appointed officers, neutralize admiralty courts, defy Parliamentary statutes,

¹²³⁰ ['John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818', Online Library of Liberty.](#)

and ultimately diminish imperial authority in North America, as well as helping to justify and galvanize the shift to arms.

Certainly, following the Battles of Lexington and Concord, dissenting Americans altered their approach to the Anglo-American conflict; however, in Boston and Philadelphia as well as the hinterlands of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, provincials continued to cross social, cultural, economic, and political lines to support the establishment of the First and Second Continental Congresses and facilitate the local enforcement of their leaders' resolves and regulations. These significant steps demonstrate the extent to which the patriot fundamentalist movement had not only normalized noncooperation, but also regularized and routinized disruption, dissent, and extralegal organization in the face of excessive and unjust British might. By 1775, colonists from New Hampshire to Georgia had mobilized en masse, boldly advancing American resistance efforts through the development of local committees of enforcement which used quasi-legal means to urge compliance with the nonimportation and nonconsumption measures outlined in the Continental Association. Independently of Crown-operated courts, committees of enforcement settled disputes, made public "Insinuations" about suspected offenders, "expressly" named smugglers in colonial newspapers, pressured noncompliers to publicly apologize, and implemented safeguards against profiteering.¹²³¹ In this sense, by 1775, the colonies were dependent on Great Britain in name only, and the "virtuous Efforts" of nonviolent patriot fundamentalist activists had yielded a self-sufficient America.¹²³² Indeed, the patriot fundamentalist leaders and committees who had assumed de facto legislative and judicial powers in North America had effectively garnered the "right" of self-determination, as Tomis Kapitan has explained it, by deriving consent from the colonial public, developing normative moral ideals to sustain

¹²³¹ 'Benjamin Franklin to Josiah Tucker, 12 February 1774', Founders Online National Archives; Middlekauff, pp. 259–60.

¹²³² 'Address to the Inhabitants of Canada', 14 September 1775, Founders Online National Archives.

popular adherence to new and emerging political and legal institutions, establishing efficient means of intercolonial communication, and fostering an intergenerational community with all of the capabilities required for political independence over the course of the Imperial Crisis.¹²³³

Describing the trajectory of the patriot fundamentalist movement, Boston attorney Josiah Quincy, Jr. wrote,

The cause of the colonies every day grows more popular; that of the ministry, more desperate. The merchants are alarmed, the manufacturers are in motion, the artificers and handicraftsmen are in amaze, and the lower ranks of the community are suffering. Petitions are framing in all parts of the kingdom in favour of their own dear selves.

Noting the ways in which patriot fundamentalist leaders actively worked to minimize radical flanks and manage violent inclinations, Quincy credited the “knowledge, sentiment, and spirit” of “the governing majority” with the radicalization and mobilization of eighteenth-century American colonists and explained that while [no] other country hath ever yet had any choice but that of the sword for their emancipation from bondage,” the leadership of the patriot movement had facilitated widespread engagement in the “peaceful, spiritless, and self-denying warfare” that characterized colonial resistance. While Quincy clarified his “doubt” that “frugal virtue” could be “enough to cement and animate any large popular body, for any length of time”, he hoped and seemingly anticipated that the nonviolent civil resistance movement that had been building from New England to Georgia since the Stamp Act crisis would ultimately yield America’s “bloodless deliverance”.¹²³⁴

¹²³³ Tomis Kapitan, ‘Self-Determination’, in *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Philosophical Essays on Self-Determination, Terrorism and the One-State Solution*, Ed. Raja Halwani and Tomis Kapitan (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 13–71 (pp. 21–22); Omar Dahbour, ‘Self-Determination and Power-Sharing in Israel/Palestine’, *Ethnopolitics*, 15.4 (2016), pp. 393–407 (p. 397); Toros, pp. 130–31.

¹²³⁴ ‘Josiah Quincy as Henry Ireton to Mrs. Quincy, 11 January 1775’, in *Memoir of the Life of Josiah Quincy, Junior of Massachusetts: 1744 - 1775*, 2nd edn (John Wilson and Son, 1874), pp. 250–54.

Yet, Quincy's hopes for a peaceful resolution to the Anglo-American struggle neglected to consider firstly, the ways in which the choices and behaviors of British policymakers would continue to influence American resistance, and secondly, the extent to which extralegal committees and congresses had replaced royal authorities. Certainly, Parliament's hardline defense of imperial jurisdiction in North America suggested to colonists that after a decade of nonviolent political struggle, British authorities were no longer open to issuing policy repeals or conceding to American grievances, even if resistance measures were conducted with the utmost prudence and judiciousness. More critically, however, by 1775, the purposive, peaceful resistance techniques that American colonists had collectively performed for more than a decade provided them with ideological and physical infrastructure required to engage Great Britain militarily. Ultimately, a combination of these factors led North Americans to abandon nonviolent civil resistance in favor of armed struggle, a process which the composite framework proposed by this thesis has worked to demonstrate.

The patriot fundamentalist movement ceased to exist as a both a social movement and a nonviolent entity when physical confrontations between British and Continental forces escalated after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. In fact, a major task of the Declaration of Independence was to rhetorically affirm and validate that via a decade of legitimate nonviolent political struggle, American colonists had fulfilled the prerequisites for revolution, and were therefore justified in seeking to establish themselves as an independent nation.¹²³⁵ Drawing upon the patriot fundamentalist rhetoric that colonial activists had formulated and strengthened for more than a decade, the Declaration presented the ideals

¹²³⁵ Lucas, 'The Rhetorical Ancestry of the Declaration of Independence', *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, 1.2 (1998), pp. 143–84 (p. 144).

about safety, security, identity, law, and governmental aptitude that Americans had come to accept as “Facts” and explained independence as a logical and “necessary” next step.¹²³⁶

Both of the selected case studies represents a historical example that while otherwise thoroughly researched in the narrative of early American history, remain largely untouched by the application of modern theories from the Social Sciences. When viewed through the lens of Social Science theory and considered alongside other nonviolent social movements in history, the distinctive peaceable nuances of patriot radicalization and mobilization in Boston and Philadelphia become not just increasingly perceptible, but also hard to negate. To assess the ways in which the patriot ideology developed, evolved, and was ultimately crystallized during the Imperial Crisis, this research draws upon the core elements of Framing Theory, New Social Movement Theory, and Prospect Theory, which includes the understandings that individuals and groups (1) build their perspectives based on a variety of values, experiences, and considerations, (2) are more likely to reorient their views and understandings of certain situations when they appeal to their sensibilities or impact their lives, (3) are more likely to open themselves up to new ideas and activities when they see those elements of being reflective of their beliefs and identities, which might personal views on gender, race, ethnicity, age, sexuality, spirituality, socioeconomic standing, or other matters of human and civil rights, (4) tend to respond to changing circumstances with as much creativity and flexibility as their knowledge and resources will allow, and (5) are more like to engage in resistance when they feel secure in their belief that the risks of social movement participation will be worth the potential rewards to their personal circumstances.¹²³⁷ In doing so, we can

¹²³⁶ ‘Declaration of Independence’, National Archives, America’s Founding Documents <<https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript>>. The signees from Massachusetts include Samuel Adams, John Adams, Robert Treat Paine, Elbridge Gerry, and John Hancock, and the signees from Pennsylvania were Robert Morris, Benjamin Rush, Benjamin Franklin, John Morton, George Clymer, James Smith, George Taylor, James Wilson, and George Ross.

¹²³⁷ Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10 (2007), pp. 103–26 (pp. 104–5); David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, and Robert D. Benford, ‘Frame Alignment

trace the development of the patriot cause as a nonviolent social movement and ultimately draw the patriot fundamentalist movement in line with more recent nonviolent political struggles. In fact, future research projects may wish to orchestrate comparative studies of the patriot movement and other peaceable political contentions, such as the Anti-colonial struggle of Burma between 1910 and 1940 or Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979.

Yet, radicalization is only one element of the multi-faceted political process that transformed Bostonians, Philadelphians, and American colonists more broadly into nonviolent revolutionaries. By examining pre-Revolutionary mobilization through Political Opportunity structures, insights on Resource Mobilization, and an assessment of the interactive, or reflexive relationship between Great Britain and the American colonies, we equally gain clearer understandings of patriot mobilization, which allow us to clarify how the organizational structure of the patriot movement propelled Americans through each cycle of contention between 1764 and 1776, steadily increased the people power behind the cause. Taken together, the work of Tarrow, Tilly, Chenoweth, Stephan, and other prominent social scientists, whose extensive research has concluded that (1) advocates and activists take action when and where they can locate access, (2) social movement participants often act and react based on the resources available to them, regardless of the movement's overarching aims, membership, and capabilities, and (3) a social movement and its opponent will have distinctive effects upon each other through the process of political contention.¹²³⁸ By blending

Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', *American Sociological Review*, 51 (1986), pp. 464–81 (pp. 464–65); Takeshi Wada, 'Modularity and Transferability of Repertoires of Contention', *Social Problems*, 59.4 (2012), pp. 544–71 (p. 547); Robert Fisher and Joe Kling, 'Community Organization and New Social Movement Theory', *Journal of Progressive Human Services*, 5.2 (1994), pp. 5–23 (p. 12); Alan B. Durning, 'Action at the Grassroots: Fighting Poverty and Environmental Decline' (presented at the Worldwatch Paper 88, January 1989), pp. 1–70 (pp. 6–7); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk', *Econometrica*, 47.2 (1979), pp. 263–92 (pp. 264–65); Jack S. Levy, 'An Introduction to Prospect Theory', *Political Psychology*, 13.2 (1992), pp. 171–86 (pp. 174–75).

¹²³⁸ Peter Eisinger, 'The Conditions of Protest in American Cities', *The American Political Science Review*, 67.1 (1973), pp. 11–28 (p. 11); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 18–19; Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 76–77; Charles Tilly, Ernesto Castañeda, and Lesley J. Wood,

these approaches into a composite theoretical mobilization framework, we can not only trace the development of the patriot movement, but also, we can sociologically explain how and why Americans steadily mobilized in support of the continental aims and objectives. Certainly, the balance of resources utilized in this thesis to assess pre-Revolutionary radicalization and in this thesis is unconventional. As this work relies quite heavily on traditional primary and historiographical sources, the novelty of this research lies in the reinterpretation of otherwise well-researched narratives, not the uncovering of brand-new evidence. However, by employing a composite framework which fuses historical evidence with sociological analyses, we create new interdisciplinary space in which to pave a two-way street between history and the Social Sciences. In doing so, we bolster historical empiricism and extend the reach and validity of current understandings of patriot radicalization and mobilization.

When viewed through the lens of Social Science theory and considered alongside other nonviolent social movements in history, the distinctive peaceable nuances of the patriot fundamentalist movement become increasingly perceptible. Ideologically, patriot fundamentalist leaders had compiled an arsenal of social, political, legal, economic, ethical, and divine logic to legitimize America's resistance of British authority and reinforce America's capacity for governmental autonomy. Emanating from the important colonial hubs of Boston and Philadelphia, patriot rhetoric had increasingly bolstered group grievance and normalized noncooperation through a variety of pathways. As these chapters have shown, a key factor in the successful development of patriot fundamentalist ideals and objectives involved framing the case for colonial resistance in a manner that appealed to a variety of

Social Movements, 1768-2018, 4th edn (Routledge, 2020), p. 40; Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 20–21.

transclass considerations and demographic configurations and expressed the unique beliefs and identities of its advocates.¹²³⁹

Playing upon provincial pain and fear, patriot fundamentalist authors and orators underscored the threats that misdirected Parliamentary supremacy posed to individual and group ways of life and emphasized the British government's inability to relate to the nuanced dynamics of life in North America or respect the governmental systems that American colonists and their settlement-era forebears had established.¹²⁴⁰ By applying religious arguments, philosophical teachings, and historical lessons and metaphors to the continental cause, patriot leaders worked and collaborated to present nonviolent civil resistance as a "rational" solution to imperial overreach, which is to say that for many colonists, the potential benefits associated with reinvigorated political, economic, and moral structures in America came to outweigh the risks and apprehensions associated with nonviolent civil resistance.¹²⁴¹ Through the consistent transmission of continental ideals and objectives in newspaper articles, pamphlets, and public orations, the patriot spokespeople of the Imperial Crisis steadily crystallized the ideological grounds of American resistance. Moreover, as chapters three and five demonstrated, the ideological drivers of the patriot fundamentalist movement encouraged, and ultimately necessitated, resistance to Britain.

While patriot fundamentalist leaders did not employ modern terminologies associated with nonviolent civil resistance, patriot spokespeople including John Dickinson and Samuel Adams certainly expressed "conscious support" for colonial methods of social, economic, and political noncooperation.¹²⁴² Certainly, real violence was observed in pre-Revolutionary incidents like the Stamp Acts riots and the Conestoga Massacre, but these episodes were

¹²³⁹ Chong and Druckman, 'Framing Theory', pp. 104–5.

¹²⁴⁰ Smith and others, p. 203; Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski, p. 820.

¹²⁴¹ Scott, pp. 127–28.

¹²⁴² Conser, Jr., 'The United States: Reconsidering the Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775', p. 311.

ultimately foundational to the political nonviolence practiced in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Not only do the Stamp Act riots and the Conestoga Massacre speak to the different dynamics of colonial structures, but also, in demonstrating to colonists the consequences of violent excess, precipitated concerted nonviolent civil resistance, and moreover, they offer important examples against which we can push to find definition in eighteenth-century American practices of nonviolence. Despite the fact that violence continues to be overemphasized in narratives of the Imperial Crisis, a wealth of evidence demonstrates that violent discourse did not feature in the rhetoric, resolves, and instructions handed down by American congresses, committees, and town hall meetings. Moreover, the rare episodes of relative violence that occurred during the Imperial Crisis failed to play an important role in the provincial resistance of the Stamp Act, the Townshend duties, or the Coercive Acts. During the Townshend resistance, Dickinson encouraged provincials to boycott imported goods and embrace the homespun movement, suggesting, “let us try, if our ingenuity, industry, and frugality, will not give weight to our remonstrances,” and even as late as the Spring of 1774, the allegedly “rabble-rousing” Adams impressed upon Massachusettsans, “Avoid blood and tumult. Give other provinces opportunity to think. Violence will mean ruin”.¹²⁴³ Ultimately, while patriot fundamentalist leaders may not have viewed political nonviolence as a potential pathway to independence, they understood peaceable resistance as an effective means to politicize ordinary Americans, involve colonial demographics that violence would have otherwise deterred (or unhelpfully unleashed), and secure Parliamentary accommodation of colonial demands.

The pull of patriot fundamentalism roused emotions which prompted provincials to act outside the confines of their behavioral norms, and nonviolent civil resistance created

¹²⁴³ Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, p. 35; ‘Samuel Adams to James Warren, May 21 May 1774’, I, p. 26.

opportunities for marginalized communities to assume active roles in provincial politics. While some provincials were radicalized to the idea of nonviolent civil resistance prior to participating in nonviolent initiatives, others came to learn and accept the core values of patriot fundamentalism through direct engagement in resistance tactics such as public demonstrations or boycotts. Throughout Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, mobilization occurred either because provincials were prompted by “ideas first” mechanisms for radicalization including trust networks that reflected specific sociopolitical alignments such as shared ethnicities, religions, professions, and kinship ties and likewise, by a result of mobilizational structures, including increased access to social groups and political arenas that offered influential connections, the resources available at a given time and place, or imperial action, meaning that political opportunity, resource mobilization, and perceptions of the changes within the broader political structure each factored into patriot fundamentalist recruitment. Indeed, mobilizing structures including local committees and established networks of communication not only allowed for the dissemination of patriot ideals, objectives, and plans of action, but additionally, encouraged groups and individuals to utilize their skills and means to advance the patriot fundamentalist movement. In turn, what began as an elite-led, largely urban-centric initiative intended largely to eliminate taxation without Parliamentary representation evolved into a social movement consisting of groups ranging from Pennsylvania Germans and Anglican Philadelphian merchants to blue-collar Bostonian mechanics and New England’s Congregational ministers who worked collectively to fortify the rhetorical and physical protections of American liberty. Critically, the ideological and organizational toolkits that maintained collective nonviolent action throughout the Imperial Crisis included sufficient elasticity to accommodate changing circumstances, meaning that patriot fundamentalism as an ideological entity survived Parliamentary repeals, relatively

quiet periods, and incidents of violence perpetrated by fringe groups who failed to reflect the aims and ideals of the broader social movement.¹²⁴⁴

The parameters of nonviolent civil resistance that patriot fundamentalist activists had put into place between the years 1764 and 1775 ultimately gave way to militarization, a trend which this research has established is not uncommon amongst nonviolent social movements that have acquired the physical and organizational capacity to engage their opponent militarily.¹²⁴⁵ However, neither the congressional choice to prepare for a physical struggle against Great Britain nor the readiness of ordinary Americans to answer calls to arms can minimize the patriot fundamentalist movement to a principally violent resistance campaign. Indeed, it was with great consideration and great reluctance that patriot leaders approved plans to establish the Continental Army, meaning that the eventual push to militarize was viewed as a means to challenge the callousness and immorality of British imperialism on pragmatic grounds, not as a way to perpetrate indiscriminate violence against British forces. Furthermore, because the Second Continental Congress implemented new laws, raised provincial militias, appointed military officers, obtained loans from Europe to support the American cause, and generally functioned as the de facto governmental body in the colonies after the Battles of Lexington and Concord, the procurement of unanimous congressional approval meant that militarization was viewed as legal and legitimate in the eyes of Americans.

Speaking on behalf of the broader Congress, John Dickinson and Thomas Jefferson penned the “Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms” to reaffirm the ideological values established by the patriot fundamentalist movement and express colonists’ profound resentment over the unwillingness of imperial authorities to acknowledge the

¹²⁴⁴ Fisher and Kling, p. 12; Durning, pp. 6–7.

¹²⁴⁵ Ryckman, p. 319; Chenoweth and Lewis.

decade's worth of petitions and appeals that had been thoughtfully prepared by an "illustrious band of the most distinguished peers, and commoners". The patriot penmen defended the American right to direct political representation, condemned the unconstitutionality of Parliamentary supremacy, and explained militarization as an emergency response, insisting that the establishment of the Continental Army was a measure of self-defense intended "for the protection" of the property and ways of life that Americans had acquired as a result of their own "honest industry" and the sacrifices of their "fore-fathers". Dickinson and Jefferson seemingly lamented that while the Congress was ultimately "against violence", the threats posed by the unjust actions of the British empire compelled Americans to "take up arms". In a firm, but final plea for "reconciliation on reasonable terms" and the prevention of physical conflict between the colonies and their mother country, the "Declaration" vowed that Americans would lay down their arms "when hostilities shall cease on the part of the aggressors, and all danger of their being renewed shall be removed, and not before".¹²⁴⁶ Thus, colonial militarization should be seen, not as a mere fulfillment of some sort of desire to demonstrate American force, but rather, as a testament to the strong cultural and political values that nonviolent civil resistance had facilitated in British North America and the lengths to which colonists went to defend them.

The strong theoretical links that this thesis has established between patriot fundamentalism and modern understandings of nonviolent social movements demonstrate that American independence was gained not through violent political struggle, but by discrediting the imperial capacity to govern the colonies ethically and efficiently. By focusing new light on political nonviolence and its features and utility in the context of resistance practices in pre-Revolutionary Boston and Philadelphia, this research has determined that the

¹²⁴⁶ 'A Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North-America, Now Met in Congress at Philadelphia, Setting Forth the Causes and Necessity of Their Taking Up Arms', 1775, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project.

achievement of political autonomy in colonial America was a product of the peaceable civil resistance instigated, directed, and maintained by patriot fundamentalist advocates and initiatives between the years 1764 and 1776. The previous chapters have bound conceptual frameworks of nonviolent civil resistance with the distinct practices and features of collective resistance as it was conducted in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts and Pennsylvania during the Imperial Crisis; yet, alongside this research, future projects might also look to assess the processes of radicalization and mobilization in pre-Revolutionary New York or Georgia, as each colony comes with its own unique considerations.

Whether the ways in which this research has bundled patriot fundamentalism as an action-oriented ideology that sustained Americans and the nonviolent civil resistance movement in which colonists were engaged between the years 1765 and 1776 appeals to some scholars or not, it must be seen that the application of modern Social Science models and frameworks can shed light on historical interpretive claims in important new ways. Firstly, by examining the pre-Revolutionary political struggle through the lens of nonviolence, we can understand nonviolent civil resistance as a “proactive force” for change conducted with pragmatism and purposefulness, as opposed to a form of passivity or inaction.¹²⁴⁷ Equally, the application of nonviolent frameworks to the practices of dissent employed during the Imperial Crisis helps us to identify processes and priorities which stand in stark contrast to the laden claims about “violent agitators” and “outright intimidation”, which are perpetuated by violence-centric historical narratives and popular myths.¹²⁴⁸

By employing practices of nonviolent civil resistance and establishing advanced social and political networks to represent colonial interests and action colonial grievances, the patriot fundamentalist movement undermined the social and political foundations of the

¹²⁴⁷ Randall Amster, ‘Preface’, in *Exploring the Power of Nonviolence Peace, Politics, and Practice*, Ed. Randall Amster and Elavie Ndura (Syracuse University Press, 2013), pp. xiii–xvi.

¹²⁴⁸ William Edward Hartpole Lecky, *The American Revolution: 1763-1783* (D. Appleton and Company, 1912), p. 124; Huggins, p. 70.

imperial system in America. The patriot fundamentalist movement challenged British institutions and authorities on pragmatic grounds by withdrawing cooperation. Through nonimportation, nonconsumption, and nonexportation, dissenting Americans leveraged the economic power of the colonies by denying Great Britain their abundant raw materials and the consumer economy upon which British trade was heavily reliant. Thus, before the Revolutionary War commenced in April of 1775, patriot fundamentalist advocates had utilized nonviolent civil resistance to radicalize the provincial masses and establish parallel governmental institutions to replace Crown-appointed officers, nullify admiralty courts, defy Parliamentary statutes, and ultimately diminish imperial authority in North America.

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