The Structure of Collective Violence Beliefs: Scale Development, Predictors, and Outcomes

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Declaration

I am pleased to submit this thesis, "The Structure of Collective Violence Beliefs: Scale Development, Predictors, and Outcomes", a culmination of research undertaken as a full-time postgraduate student at the School of Psychology, University of Kent. I am indebted to the guidance and support received from my supervisors, Dr. Nikhil Sengupta, and Professor Aleksandra Cichocka, which greatly enriched the theoretical and empirical aspects of this work. It is noteworthy to mention that the research presented herein has not been previously submitted nor contributed towards any other degree or qualifications.

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Abstract

This thesis offers a comprehensive examination of collective violence beliefs, its psychological underpinnings, and related behavioural manifestations. Across four empirical chapters, I delve into the multidimensional nature of these beliefs and their implications. Chapter 1 introduces the topic of collective violence by surveying the extensive existing literature, highlighting notable advancements, and identifying the research gap this thesis seeks to bridge. Chapter 2 presents a novel multidimensional scale, the Two-Dimensional Collective Violence Beliefs Scale (CVBS: 2D), developed across multiple contexts in Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. This scale shifts from earlier emphases on the intensity of violent acts to the targets of such acts, offering a fresh perspective on understanding beliefs about collective violence. Chapter 3 explores the relationships between two intergroup ideologies, RWA and SDO, and support for these beliefs. Chapter 4 delves into the role of collective narcissism, especially national and sectarian variants, as predictors of collective violence beliefs in Lebanon, highlighting the impacts of different forms of narcissism on collective violence attitudes. Chapter 5, using a U.S. sample, probes the links between attitudes about collective violence and corresponding violent behaviours. Chapter 6 provides a comprehensive discussion on the results, outlining both the theoretical and practical contributions of the study. It delves into the research's strengths and limitations, offers recommendations for future studies in the field, and examines the findings' implications within broader contexts. Collectively, this thesis underscores the intricate nature of collective violence and proposes that a nuanced understanding of its beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours can inform and guide interventions in areas experiencing or on the brink of conflict.

Keywords: Collective Violence, Violence Beliefs, RWA, SDO, Collective Narcissism, Intergroup Conflict, Scale Development

Chapter 1: General Introduction

1.1 Chapter Overview

Collective violence, both an age-old phenomenon and a current reality, echoes across large systems, communities, and resonates deeply within individual lives. The gravity of the topic is evident in its societal, political, and psychological ramifications; further magnified by recent events such as over 200,000 deaths in 2022 due to conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war and the Ethiopian crisis (Davies et al., 2023). Most of the research we encounter on collective violence examines the macro effects of violence, such as its impact on political landscapes, or its micro effects, delving into personal stories of trauma and resilience. Yet, the intermediate realm — the domain of personal beliefs, emotions, and mindsets that might either intensify or mitigate the spread of larger violent incidents — remains relatively understudied (see Bar-Tal, 2003; Páez & Liu, 2015; Staub, 1999; Staub & Pearlman, 2001; Winiewski & Bulska, 2020 for some exceptions). This is precisely where the role of social psychology becomes crucial. It equips us with the means to probe these individual psychological facets, shedding light on how a person's mindset can influence, and in turn be influenced by, collective events.

My engagement with this research does not stem from purely academic interests. It is profoundly personal. I am driven by more than mere scholarly curiosity; there is a genuine concern for individuals and a moral imperative at its core. As a social scientist, my mission is not only to understand but also to effect positive change, particularly for those living in conflict-heavy areas.

While significant strides have been made in collective violence research—from structural causes in political science and economics (Balcells & Stanton, 2021; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) to psychological intricacies in support for violence (Bartusevičius et al., 2020; Kalmoe & Mason, 2022)—there remain uncharted territories. Specific nuances, like the

multidimensionality of collective violence beliefs, distinctions in support for violence against outgroup members versus leaders, or the role of threat in priming such beliefs, await deeper exploration. It is these lesser-understood intricacies of collective violence that my research seeks to shed light on, further driven by my personal commitment to the field.

Building upon this motivation, a critical component of understanding collective violence lies in unpacking its beliefs, which encompass attitudes, values, and justifications that individuals link with group violence (Bar-Tal, 2013). If these beliefs indeed carry significant weight, they could profoundly influence actions, shaping how individuals perceive and possibly rationalise their group's violent endeavours. As I was starting this research, there was a movement towards recognising collective violence beliefs as multidimensional, challenging the conventional view that considered collective violence attitudes as a singular entity (Winiewski & Bulska, 2020). This evolving perspective offers a richer understanding of collective violence beliefs, underscoring their intricate nature and the potential for distinct motivators and outcomes across different dimensions.

Therefore, this thesis carefully dissects collective violence beliefs through a systematic progression of empirical studies. In the current chapter, I review inter-disciplinary perspectives on collective violence, setting the stage for the empirical contributions that follow. Chapter 2 delves into the creation and validation of a contextually grounded scale to measure collective violence beliefs, specifically in high-conflict settings in the Middle East. With this foundation laid, Chapters 3 and 4 explore the antecedents of the dimensions revealed during the scale development. While Chapter 3 zeros in on ideology-based psychological mechanisms, Chapter 4 pivots towards identity-based mechanisms. Chapter 5 tests the predictive validity of these dimensions, gauging their influence on actual violent behaviours. Lastly, Chapter 6 reviews the findings, placing them in the context of our broader

understanding of collective violence, while also spotlighting both theoretical and practical implications for conflict across societies.

1.2 Perspectives on Collective Violence

The study of collective violence has been explored extensively across academic fields including sociology, political science, economics, and psychology with scholars examining its intricate facets from multiple angles. It is imperative to approach this vast literature systematically. We begin with a consideration of the structural underpinnings of collective violence. Here, I will assess the roles of socio-political factors in shaping the dynamics of group conflict, followed by a review of economic disparities and how these financial imbalances contribute to collective strife. Then, I will look at ethno-religious conflicts which unravels the complexities of identity-based confrontations. Transitioning from the societal level, the psychological underpinnings of collective violence segment dives into individual and group mental processes that perpetuate or deter violence. Finally, the evolving perspectives on collective violence beliefs captures recent shifts in the study of those beliefs.

1.3 Structural Underpinnings of Collective Violence

1.3.1 Socio-Political Factors

The understanding of collective violence is not monolithic, and is rather influenced by numerous underlying dynamics. Scholars across sociology and political science have extensively studied these dynamics, revealing key socio-political factors that contribute to the emergence and escalation of such violence.

Gurr (1970) postulates a central theory revolving around the concept of relative deprivation. In his seminal work, “Why Men Rebel”, Gurr introduces the idea that perceived discrepancies between value expectations and value capabilities can act as a potent trigger for collective aggression. When groups of people feel that their rightful expectations are stifled by the socio-political structures around them, the seeds of rebellion are sown.

Dovetailing with this perspective, Tilly (2003) offers insights into the evolution of collective action. In his work, Tilly meticulously dissects the origins and manifestations of collective violence. His analysis spans from spontaneous riots to more coordinated revolutions, unearthing the underlying political machinations that facilitate or suppress such outbreaks. A central tenet to his argument is that collective violence is not an isolated aberrant behaviour, but is closely linked to political goals and processes. In his examination, Tilly suggests that acts of collective violence, be they protests, riots, or revolutions, are strategies employed by groups to forward political objectives, particularly when other avenues of redress might be unavailable or ineffective. This is especially the case in situations where there is an imbalance of power, where the state controls most of the resources, or where institutions might suppress certain groups.

While Tilly's framework offers a comprehensive understanding of the intertwined nature of collective violence and political processes, his focus on collective violence primarily as a strategy for political objectives might overlook other equally vital reasons for such behaviours. Social, cultural, or even psychological factors can also play a significant role in shaping collective violence. By concentrating mainly on the political dimension, there is a risk of simplifying a multifaceted phenomenon.

Moreover, Tilly's discourse might present an almost deterministic view of collective violence, where certain political structures will invariably lead to specific forms of collective violence. However, multiple case studies across different nations suggest that similar political structures can result in varied outcomes (Applebaum, 2012; Valenzuela & Dammert, 2006). After World War II, eastern European countries under the Soviet sphere adopted communist political systems. Still, their experiences with collective violence were not uniform. While Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) saw uprisings and subsequent Soviet interventions, other nations like Poland had longer periods of relative peace before the

Solidarity movement in the 1980s (Applebaum, 2012). Even more recently in the Arab Spring we saw similar trends. Bahrain faced severe protests and subsequent repression. In contrast, protests in Oman led to more moderate reforms, and Jordan initiated a dialogue with opposition forces (Lynch, 2012).

On a similar thread but with a unique lens, Skocpol (1979) dives deep into the structural determinants of major revolutions. While her earlier works provided the foundational landscape for understanding societal upheavals, her joint article with Somers in 1980, illuminates the utility of comparative history. More specifically, Skocpol and Somers (1980) advocate for its critical role in deciphering the nature and causes of large-scale societal changes, stressing the significance of state structures and external pressures. While the comparative methodology is valid to many, other scholars have argued against it (Moore, 1966). The criticism against comparing different revolutions might obscure the unique conditions, culture, and history of each situation.

All these scholars highlight the significant influence of socio-political structures on collective violence. While their combined research provides valuable insights into the intricate socio-political interplays that underpin collective aggression, the discourse indicates that there are still unresolved areas of investigation. The existing literature, comprehensive as it is, suggests there are potential gaps that merit further rigorous study in understanding the complete dynamics of collective violence. Specifically, there is a need for deeper exploration into the individual motivators' role leading people and groups to adopt violent attitudes and behaviours. This crucial dimension remains relatively less understood in the study of collective violence.

Kalmoe and Mason's (2022) more recent seminal work steers the conversation towards the intensifying political violence within the United States. Their research, spanning over four years and bolstered by a series of surveys and experiments, zeroes in on radicalism

among average American partisans. In their study, they reveal that such radical partisan hostility, particularly during the era of Donald Trump's presidency, is far more prevalent than previously assumed. Kalmoe and Mason dive deep into attitudes towards political violence in the public sphere, drawing links to predispositions towards aggression, demographics, and political leanings. Crucially, they discuss the concept of "moral disengagement" and its subsequent escalation to violent attitudes. This two-tiered classification of political radicalism deepens our understanding of how individuals can internalise harmful group stereotypes and, over time, endorse threats and physical harm. By highlighting the January 6 insurrection and Trump's continuous inflammatory rhetoric, the authors contextualise their findings within recent historical events, emphasising that America's history of partisan political strife has deep-rooted origins. The research underscores the need for a rigorous examination of socio-political, as well as psychological factors, and their linkages to collective violence in the current American political landscape. While Kalmoe and Mason (2022) provide a pivotal contribution to our understanding of radical partisanship in the U.S., it underscores the broader need for continued research into collective violence, especially in diverse global contexts and against the backdrop of different socio-political dynamics.

1.3.2 Economic Disparities

The economic fabric of societies undeniably holds significant sway over patterns of collective violence. Often, beneath the visible manifestations of such violence, there is an underlying narrative of economic deprivation, inequality, and systemic disparities that push individuals and groups to the brink.

Economic deprivation, as presented by Runciman (1966) is the condition in which individuals or groups perceive themselves as materially disadvantaged in comparison to others in their society. Such perceptions are not necessarily about objective economic disparities, rather centres on the subjective perception of relative disadvantage. This

subjective feeling of being worse than others can lead to frustration, resentment, and a sense of injustice, which in turn can motivate different forms of collective action aimed at rectifying these perceived inequalities.

In their incisive analysis, Esteban et al. (2012) traverse the realm of economic disparities as a potent contributor to collective violence. Their research posits that economic inequalities, more than just being statistical disparities, possess a tangible emotional and societal weight. Such inequalities often evolve into genuine grievances, breeding resentment and discontent. These, when left unaddressed, can indeed form a cauldron of frustration, ripe for episodes of collective violence. Economic imbalances become more than mere numbers; they turn into narratives of injustice and deprivation.

Shifting from the micro to the macro, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) proffer a grand narrative on the role of institutions in the trajectory of nations. Their seminal work delves deep into the dichotomy of 'inclusive' versus 'extractive' institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). Inclusive institutions provide a fair playing field, allowing for innovation, economic prosperity, and equitable growth. In contrast, extractive institutions are designed to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few, often at the expense of the many. Such extractive systems, over time, can lead to state failures, fostering environments where violence becomes an almost inevitable outcome.

Lastly, Nobel laureate Amartya Sen introduces a somewhat unconventional yet profoundly impactful lens to understand structural violence, particularly through the lens of famines. His work challenges traditional notions that famines arise purely due to food shortages (Sen, 1981). Instead, Sen elegantly articulates that the root cause often lies in the economic systems and structures that determine food distribution. Such systemic failures, while not directly violent, precipitate conditions of severe deprivation, which can set the stage for larger-scale conflicts and collective unrest.

While the works of Esteban et al. (2012) and Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) shed light on the importance of economic disparities and institutional arrangements, respectively, some counterarguments emerge. Critics like Cederman and colleagues (2013) argue that focusing predominantly on economic disparities may neglect the potential role of political inequalities in shaping patterns of collective violence. They emphasise the need to explore the political aspect intertwined with the economic fabric.

1.3.3 Ethno-Religious Conflicts

The tapestry of ethno-religious conflicts is complicated, with the fabric of society often teetering on a delicate balance between peace and strife. Fearon and Laitin (2000) provide a nuanced analysis of these ethnic and religious confrontations. They probe the underlying causes that lead some groups to violent clashes while allowing others to coexist in harmony. Their exploration delves into the dynamics of identity, shared histories, and potential flashpoints that might ignite tension between different groups. Recognising these triggers, and the various socio-political conditions that exacerbate or alleviate them, is essential in understanding the broader picture of collective violence rooted in ethno-religious divides.

Building upon Fearon and Laitin's (2000) insights, Cederman et al. (2010) further enrich our understanding in their study. They emphasise the role of political exclusion and ethnic dynamics in the genesis of conflicts. Their findings suggest that where ethnic groups face systemic political exclusion, the likelihood of rebellious violence significantly increases. This perspective underscores the importance of political inclusivity in maintaining ethno-religious peace.

While Fearon and Laitin (2000) and Cederman et al. (2010) offer comprehensive analyses on the dynamics of ethno-religious conflicts, some gaps in understanding remain, particularly concerning the underlying human psychological factors that may propel these

tensions. Varshney (2002) argues that solely focusing on political exclusion might neglect the more personal, deeply entrenched psychological biases that individuals harbour against out-groups. This sentiment is echoed by Brewer (2001), who suggests that our inherent in-group preferences and out-group prejudices, rooted in evolutionary psychology, play a significant role in ethno-religious conflicts. These ingrained psychological tendencies, combined with perceived injustices or inequalities, can heighten the potential for collective violence.

Additionally, Gagnon (1994) emphasises that ethno-religious conflicts are not always the direct outcome of age-old animosities. Instead, he posits that they might be strategically engineered by political elites aiming to consolidate power. This perspective compels us to scrutinise the influence of group leaders, examining how their crafted narratives and potential manipulations amplify conflicts. Notably, these leaders can mould the perceptions of their own constituents, prompting them to endorse or enact violence against outgroup members or leaders. Concurrently, their actions and rhetoric may also shape outgroup members' justification of violence against them, indicating underlying complexities beyond mere identity-based grievances. In light of these criticisms, while the dynamics of political exclusion and identity are undeniably vital in understanding ethno-religious tensions, one must also grapple with deeper, perhaps more covert motivations and the foundational role of human psychology in these confrontations.

1.4 Psychological Underpinnings of Collective Violence

Delving into the psychological exploration of collective violence, certain patterns become discernible. Individuals and groups often act based on profound beliefs influenced by their perceptions of both themselves and others. Tajfel and Turner's (1979) Social Identity Theory illuminates our innate tendency to categorise. Individuals naturally align with groups, exhibiting in-group favouritism and, at times, out-group derogation. When such alignments face external threats, they can be the precursors to conflicts.

Building upon this foundational understanding, Staub (1989) contributes further nuance, exploring the broader societal and cultural triggers that can usher societies toward violent tendencies. He highlights the dangers of passive bystander behaviour, suggesting that indifference or inaction can be seen as tacit endorsements, potentially escalating violence. This sentiment resonates with Opotow's (1990) "moral exclusion", which delves into how certain groups might be deemed unworthy of moral consideration.

Furthermore, Bandura's (1999) conception stands out, positing that individuals can harm others without intrinsic remorse, especially when engaging in dehumanisation. This act of perceiving others as less than human is not isolated. Kteily et al. (2015) expanded on this, presenting empirical evidence of groups often viewed as less evolved, an indicator of how ingrained such biases can become.

Kelman's (2017) work on "sanctioned massacres" delves into the unique features of violent acts that occur in the context of genocidal policies, providing insights into the psychological environment surrounding such massacres. Drawing from this, Valentino (2000) argues that mass killing often originates from a select group of influential leaders, aligning with Kelman's notion that broader society plays a relatively smaller role in such events. Kelman's (2010) extensive research focuses on interactive problem solving and reconciliation in protracted conflicts, particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian context, emphasising the need to go beyond mere conflict settlement to achieve reconciliation between identity groups. Additionally, Kruglanski and Fishman (2007) offer valuable perspectives by differentiating terrorism as a "syndrome" and a "tool". Their analysis views terrorism not as a distinct psychological syndrome but rather as a strategic instrument in conflicts.

While these works collectively reveal the depth of research in the field, they also highlight a persistent limitation: the prevailing tendency to treat collective violence, and any other form of intergroup aggression, including terrorism, from a predominantly

unidimensional perspective. This limited viewpoint is exemplified by studies such as that of Spanovic et al. (2010), which, while illuminating fear and anger as motivators for intergroup aggression, treats intergroup aggression as a binary construct—either it exists, or it does not. Moreover, other significant contributions, like Tausch et al.'s (2011) work, which differentiates between various forms of collective action (normative, non-normative, and violent non-normative), still treats violent non-normative collective action as a one-dimensional behaviour or construct.

These studies and theories, although undeniably important to all the collective action literature, fall short of encapsulating the multidimensionality of collective violence. For instance, is physical violence psychologically equivalent to verbal violence? Is violence provoked by a perceived threat comparable to violence that occurs without such provocation? Is violence directed at outgroup members the same as violence targeting specific individuals within that outgroup? Furthermore, considering the influence of group leaders in shaping justifications for violence, as previously discussed, underscores the layered complexities that extend beyond simple identity-driven intergroup conflicts.

1.5 Evolving Perspectives on Collective Violence Beliefs

Scholars in the field of ethnic conflicts have consistently acknowledged the influence of emotions in the processes of conflict escalation, de-escalation, and resolution (Horowitz, 1985; Lindner, 2006; Petersen, 2002). Moreover, recent research has extended this perspective by examining the impact of emotion and emotion regulation in intergroup conflict situations (Halperin et al., 2011). In 2013, Bar-Tal provided a comprehensive view of collective violence beliefs. His work delved into the cognitive underpinnings of societies. His research scrutinised how beliefs, attitudes, values, and justifications converge to either endorse or condemn group violence, emphasising their deep integration into societal fabric. Furthermore, Bar-Tal's (2013) work underscored the importance of comprehending these

cognitive and emotional underpinnings to address and mitigate the perpetuation of group violence within societies. By shedding light on these dynamics, he offered a framework through which societies frequently rationalise violence, often employing mechanisms like dehumanisation of outgroups and the cultivation of deeply ingrained biases.

However, the landscape of understanding around collective violence beliefs underwent a paradigm shift with the advent of Winiewski and Bulska's research in 2020. Their approach was not simply an extension of Bar-Tal's insights. Instead, it represented a foundational shift, framing collective violence in terms similar to interpersonal violence, particularly in acknowledging the multifaceted nature of collective violence.

Winiewski and Bulska (2020) introduced the idea that our understanding of collective violence beliefs might have been too simplistic. While prior research has not delved deeply into the multidimensionality of intergroup collective violence, Winiewski and Bulska's findings resonate with theories that propose diverse cognitive evaluations of outgroups lead to a range of emotions and consequent behaviours (as discussed in Cuddy et al., 2007; Cottrell & Neuberg 2005). Their results suggest that the endorsement of specific manifestations of intergroup hostility can be viewed within the larger context of the dynamics shaping intergroup interactions.

Central to their argument was the concept that perceptions of threats and the subsequent acceptance of violence differed based on the historical and contemporary status of groups in society. For instance, how a majority group perceives a historically significant minority might differ dramatically from a newly emergent one, and these differential perceptions can influence the type and intensity of violence deemed acceptable.

Furthermore, their development of a scale to measure acceptance of intergroup collective violence underscored their belief in the multidimensionality of the issue. This aligns with more advanced frameworks in interpersonal violence (Anderson & Bushman,

2002) that have long presented the multidimensionality of violence as a fundamental concept (Parrott & Giancola, 2007; Meloy, 2006). While both bodies of research acknowledge the multidimensionality of violence, Meloy (2006) distinguishes between reactive and proactive violence, whereas Parrott & Giancola (2007) conceptualise multidimensionality in terms of various types of behaviours, viewing violence as a behaviour. Winiewski and Bulska's (2020) approach then, was not just about quantifying beliefs but understanding the vast array of factors that influenced them, expanding our comprehension of collective violence beliefs beyond the simplistic view.

Specifically, in their research they recruited participants who engaged in a task involving a short narrative outlining an intergroup conflict scenario, situated in a mid-sized city within Poland, where tensions arose between the established majority group (the Poles) and a recently arrived minority group. Following their exposure to the narrative, participants were instructed to generate a list of up to six potential actions that members of the majority group could undertake in response to the presence of the minority group in this described scenario. The primary objective was to collect a comprehensive range of potential behaviours. The data analysis used a concept mapping technique (Jackson and Trochim 2002) streamlining the original entries into distinct concepts, each representing a unique type of behaviour, which became the basis for analysis.

Their analysis uncovered six dimensions or sub-scales for intergroup violence. Namely: *1) Physical Violence*, which is active and confrontational, and is perhaps the most direct form of violence. Physical violence involves causing bodily harm to the outgroup and is easily discernible. *2) Verbal Violence*, which is another form of active and confrontational aggression, but it deals with words rather than physical actions. Words can wound, sometimes even deeper than physical strikes. Verbal violence, especially in cases of group conflicts, can revolve around derogatory name-calling, insults, and threats. *3) Isolation*, which is a strategy

that is active but non-confrontational in nature. Instead of engaging directly, the aggressor group seeks to ostracise or exclude the outgroup, thereby stifling them. *4) Indirect Violence*, which is a type of active violence but avoids direct confrontation. It involves strategies that harm the outgroup, but through indirect means. For instance, sabotaging an outgroup's resources, spreading rumours, or manipulating systems to disadvantage them. *5) Assimilation (Forced Assimilation)* falls under the non-active and non-confrontational bracket. Instead of physical harm, the majority group pressures the minority to conform to its norms, thereby erasing the minority's distinct cultural or societal values. It is a subtle yet profound form of violence. *6) Disregard* is another non-active, non-confrontational form of violence. This dimension pertains to the majority group's apathetic stance towards the minority group's needs, rights, or issues. It might manifest as ignoring their needs, side lining their concerns, or being indifferent to their hardships.

After identifying the distinct dimensions, Winiewski and Bulska (2020) explored the interplay between intergroup threat perception and the endorsement of collective violence. They framed their investigation within the integrated threat theory, which delineates two foundational components of perceived threat underpinning prejudice (Stephan and Stephan, 2000), and the dual process model, which identifies parallel mechanisms of group dominance (social dominance orientation; SDO) and control over a dangerous world (right-wing authoritarianism; RWA) as sources of prejudice (Duckitt, 2006). Their aim was to address two central research inquiries: 1) How does perceived intergroup threat correlate with the acceptance of various types of collective violence? 2) What is the relationship between RWA and SDO and the acceptance of various types of collective violence?

Their analysis revealed that physical violence was strongly correlated with verbal violence, isolation, and indirect violence. Perceived threats had significant associations with physical and verbal violence, isolation, and indirect violence, but were unrelated to disregard

or forced assimilation. SDO exhibited positive relationships with physical and verbal violence, isolation, and indirect violence but remained unassociated with forced assimilation and disregard. In contrast, RWA showed links with isolation, indirect violence, forced assimilation, and disregard, yet it was not correlated with either physical or verbal violence.

Winiewski and Bulska's (2020) research offers an invaluable exploration into the dimensions of collective violence beliefs, revealing its multifaceted nature. Their findings underscore that the different dimensions of violence they brought forward are influenced by distinct psychological constructs, suggesting a pressing need for a deeper examination of the psychological drivers for each unique violence belief dimension. While their study is groundbreaking, it is essential to note its preliminary nature. Nevertheless, it establishes a foundational base suggesting that further investigation into collective violence dimensions might unlock new insights into the underlying psychology.

1.6 Mapping the Terrain of Collective Violence Beliefs Research

When exploring the landscape of collective violence research, it is important to recognise the dynamic nature of this field. My research journey began during a crucial transitional period when Winiewski and Bulska (2020) were still introducing their groundbreaking scale. Like Winiewski and Bulska (2020), I, too, drew inspiration from the realm of interpersonal violence literature as a foundational framework for this research. At that time, a notable gap existed – the absence of a scale capable of capturing the dimensions of collective violence attitudes.

Taking a cue from the strides made in interpersonal violence research over preceding decades, I integrated intensity-based items into my approach (e.g., including separate items on support for physical and verbal violence). This decision was influenced by Parrott & Giancola's (2007) seminal perspective, which positions violence fundamentally as a behaviour. They postulate that the many facets of violence are extensions of diverse

behaviours, all unified by an intent to inflict harm without the victim's consent. My incorporation of these intensity-based items was not a mere extension of existing methodologies. Instead, it acknowledged the converging direction that both my research and Winiewski and Bulska's (2020) work were taking during this phase in the discipline. As the development of my scale progressed however, distinct variances began surfacing, shedding light on the research gaps that required addressing.

I prioritised capturing genuine beliefs about collective violence, particularly those directed at outgroup leaders, without the use of threat or vignette priming. My research ambitiously endeavours to amplify our understanding of collective violence beliefs by exploring:

1.6.1 Geographic Diversity: A nuanced understanding of collective violence beliefs requires a broad spectrum of socio-cultural contexts. Research has frequently been criticised for over-relying on WEIRD samples (Henrich et al., 2010). By examining both WEIRD and non-WEIRD contexts, my research aims to address this limitation. I delve into various societal structures and norms to better grasp how these shape and influence collective violence attitudes. By adopting such a panoramic approach, I hope to uncover both universal patterns and context-specific variations that are essential for developing well-rounded theories.

1.6.2 Intragroup Differentiation: Within any group, there exists a diverse range of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours, often overlooked in broad group classifications. As highlighted by Fisher (2000), leaders, due to their elevated status and influence, frequently find themselves in the crosshairs, disproportionately blamed for the collective actions of their group. This amplified perception of leaders aligns with the observations of Lord et al., (1999), who noted that leaders, as the most visible and influential group members, become symbolic representations of their respective groups. This makes them primary targets during intergroup

tensions. Similarly, Hogg (2001) has discussed how leaders emerge as prototypes of their groups, intensively embodying the values, beliefs, and norms more than average members.

The distinction between outgroup leaders and members is crucial when examining targeted violence attitudes. Van Knippenberg and Hogg (2003) suggested that these attitudes can be influenced by perceptions of leaders as more powerful or threatening entities, compared to ordinary group members, especially since leaders are more likely to make influential decisions. This disparity in perception underscores the necessity to differentiate between violence targeted at outgroup members versus that directed at outgroup leaders, as they might stem from distinct psychological constructs.

1.6.3 Threat: Traditionally, the measurement of violent attitudes has been anchored in immediate perceived threats. Prior studies, including those by Winiewski and Bulska (2020), employed threat priming, presenting participants with an intergroup conflict scenario before gauging violence attitudes as a response to that particular scenario. This predominant approach carries an implicit assumption: a salient threat is pivotal for violent inclinations to surface. Drawing from the interpersonal violence literature, it is evident that violence can manifest not just as a reactive response to immediate provocations, but also proactively, driven by specific goals or desires, independent of immediate threat (Anderson & Bushman, 2002).

Furthermore, theories on ideological prejudice, such as the dual-process model(DPM; Duckitt, 2001), social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), suggest that individuals hold constellations of beliefs about intergroup relations. These belief systems can serve as guidelines for behaviour in intergroup contexts, potentially including the strategic use of violence as a tool in intergroup competition. Such orientations may not always necessitate the presence of an immediate threat; violence could be integrated into a general orientation towards managing outgroups

and advancing ingroup objectives, irrespective of immediate threat perceptions (Duckitt, 2001; Fiske, 2002).

Therefore, the debate on the essence of collective violence attitudes goes beyond the immediacy of threats. It poses critical questions about the design and implementation of tools assessing these attitudes: Do they invariably require threat priming in their content or preamble? Addressing these intricacies can offer richer insights, reshaping our understanding of the inherent stability and variability of violence attitudes across diverse contexts.

1.6.4 Differential Predictors: Unravelling the intricacies of intergroup dynamics is a formidable task given the breadth and depth of available scholarly work. In the evolving landscape of collective violence beliefs, grounding our understanding in robust, theoretically derived predictors is of paramount significance. Among the pantheon of theories and models dedicated to understanding the predictors of attitudes and behaviours within and between groups, SIT and the DPM are not just chosen for their prominence, but for the distinct and complementary perspectives they offer.

SIT, introduced by Tajfel and Turner (1979), casts a spotlight on the role of group identification and provides a contextual lens, emphasising the salient categorisations in given situations. It contends that individuals draw self-worth from their affiliations, which can, in certain contexts, propel biases and discrimination against outgroups, especially when group status or resources stand threatened. The DPM, on the other hand, offers a more dispositional insight, venturing deeper into the psychological underpinnings of prejudice. Duckitt (2001) elucidated a dual pathway, arguing that prejudice can emanate from both emotional domains (e.g., fear, disgust) and cognitive constructs (e.g., stereotypes).

RWA and SDO, integral parts of the DPM, have been robustly established as predictors of prejudice (Duckitt, 2006). RWA is linked with desires for societal cohesion, order, and tradition, often resulting in prejudices against groups perceived as disruptors or

norm violators. SDO, on the other hand, is associated with the endorsement of hierarchical intergroup relations, fostering prejudices against those considered inferior.

Expanding upon this, Sibley and Duckitt (2008) illuminated the distinct personality antecedents of RWA and SDO, illustrating their capacity to predict a variety of prejudice forms. Building upon this foundational work, Winiewski and Bulska (2020) presented empirical evidence that RWA and SDO predict specific dimensions of collective violence beliefs differently in the Polish context. This nuance in predictive capacity emphasises the need to consider the intricate roles these orientations play across diverse intergroup scenarios, especially in different conflictual contexts.

Our research is anchored in the foundational insights of SIT and the DPM, and is further informed by the recent empirical work of Winiewski and Bulska (2020) that underscores the nuanced interplay of RWA and SDO in shaping collective violence beliefs. Our objective is to elucidate how these orientations distinctly predict various dimensions of such beliefs across diverse contexts. This exploration becomes particularly significant when considering the potential for starkly differential predictions—such as scenarios where SDO might predict support, while RWA simultaneously predicts opposition to a specific dimension.

1.7 Dissertation Overview

This dissertation embarks on a journey into the intricacies of collective violence beliefs. My aim is to construct a robust and holistic comprehension of this domain, illuminating its mechanisms, dynamics, and implications on a multi-dimensional scale.

My *first research question* asks: Can a valid and reliable scale be developed to measure collective violence beliefs? Anchored in this query is the *first objective*: the construction of a novel measurement tool that captures the multidimensionality of collective violence beliefs. I endeavoured to distinguish between violence targeted towards outgroup

members, termed diffuse collective violence, and violence aimed at outgroup leaders, referred to as upward collective violence. These measures are founded on rigorous psychometric principles and procedures. I started by creating initial items based on a thorough literature review and expert consultations, followed by exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses for construct validation. I then used the scale across multiple contexts to test for its sensitivity and confirm its validity in different social structures. I also experiment using multiple threat conditions in different contexts to test the scale's reliability, factor structure, and ability in capturing collective violence beliefs regardless of whether threat is primed or not. Additionally, I confirm the validity of the scale by correlating it to various constructs, and the importance of the different dimensions that emerged by running regressions showing the differential effects of various predictors on those dimensions. The second chapter, "Conceptualising and Measuring Support for Collective Violence", provides a detailed presentation of the scale's development, demonstrating its reliability and robustness in measuring the said dimensions.

Venturing deeper into the complex structure of collective violence beliefs, I then carefully considered the *second research question*: which factors predict diffuse collective violence and upward collective violence? The *second objective* was then to scrutinise various elements influencing these beliefs, casting a spotlight on RWA, SDO, and collective narcissism both sectarian and national. Employing regression analyses and structural equation modelling, I aimed to understand the nuanced roles these predictors play in shaping both dimensions of collective violence beliefs. This exploration has unmasked the multifaceted motivations underpinning each dimension of collective violence. These findings are thoroughly discussed in the third chapter, "Authoritarianism and Social Dominance as Differential Predictors of Individuals' Support for Collective Violence", and the fourth

chapter, “Double Trouble: How Sectarian and National Narcissism Relate Differently to Collective Violence Beliefs in Lebanon”.

The quest did not stop at understanding the beliefs and their predictors; I extended the investigation to answer the *third research question*: could the newly developed scale predict real-world violent behaviours?Therefore, the *third objective* was to empirically validate the scale by bridging the gap between attitudes and behaviours, or more precisely in this case, behavioural intentions. I implemented an experimental design to evaluate our scale’s predictive validity within a controlled setting, and these real-world applications of the scale are narrated in the fifth chapter, “Do People’s Attitudes Towards Collective Violence Matter? Evidence that Collective Violence Attitudes Predict Violent Behaviours”.

Throughout this dissertation, I upheld the robustness and generalisability of the findings by employing diverse samples from various contexts. More specifically, I collected data from one WEIRD context (i.e., USA), and three non-WEIRD contexts (i.e., Lebanon, Syrian Diaspora, and Turkey). Additionally, I used sophisticated statistical analyses such as Exploratory Factor Analysis, Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Measurement Invariance, Item Response Theory, Structural Equation Modelling, and Regression Analysis; using state of the art software for data analysis, including SPSS, MPlus, R, and Stata. Potential limitations and sources of error were carefully considered, ensuring that the interpretations of the findings were as accurate and comprehensive as possible.

In the sixth and concluding chapter, I bring together the threads of all empirical findings, weaving them into a broader narrative. I discuss their implications in both the academic field and the real world and chart the course for future research directions in the area of collective violence beliefs. This dissertation, with its diverse yet interconnected objectives and findings, illuminates the complex domain of collective violence beliefs and seeks to lay the groundwork for more effective interventions to mitigate such violence.

Chapter 2[1]: Conceptualising and Measuring Support for Collective Violence

2.1 Abstract

Although collective violence remains a pervasive issue affecting many societies today, it is relatively understudied in psychology. In four studies, using five samples from Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey (total N = 3,758), we conceptualise and develop a new multidimensional scale for measuring individual differences in collective violence beliefs. Contrary to some prior theorising and extant research on interpersonal violence, we found that people's justifications for collective violence are structured based on the target of the act rather than the intensity of the violent act. Consequently, we developed and validated a Two-Dimensional Collective Violence Beliefs Scale (CVBS: 2D) that distinguishes between violence targeted at outgroup members, referred to as diffuse collective violence, and violence targeted at outgroup leaders, which we term upward collective violence. We validate this novel scale in multiple contexts and discuss the implications of the two dimensions of collective violence revealed in this study.

Keywords: Scale Development, Collective Violence, Item Response Theory, Measurement Invariance

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2.2 Introduction

Collective violence, an ancient phenomenon, and a contemporary reality, continues to afflict many societies (Allen & Anderson, 2017; Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Gómez et al., 2016). While social science research on collective violence has primarily focused on structural causes (see Dixon, 2009), particularly in political science (Balcells & Stanton, 2021; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and economics (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), studies exploring the proximal, psychological factors that produce individual differences in support for collective violence (e.g., beliefs and dispositions) are limited (Bartusevičius et al., 2020; Kalmoe & Mason, 2022). Most of this research treats collective violence as a unidimensional concept (e.g., Setiawan et al., 2020; Spanovic et al., 2010; Tausch et al., 2011), and a standard approach to conceptualising and measuring individuals' support for collective violence within intergroup relations is lacking, despite recent attempts (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022; Winiewski & Bulska, 2020).

In this article, we review recent developments in the conceptualisation and measurement of collective violence beliefs within intergroup contexts and draw upon the more comprehensive literature on interpersonal violence (Parrott & Giancola, 2007) to develop and test a new multidimensional scale for collective violence beliefs. We examine how this scale relates to other theoretically relevant constructs and its performance under varying levels of perceived threat (often considered a prerequisite for violence; Winiewski & Bulska, 2020). Lastly, we validate the scale in diverse intergroup contexts, including Lebanese sectarian politics, Syrian pro-vs-anti-Assad politics, and Turkish-Kurdish relations in Turkey.

2.3 Collective Violence

Buss (1961) provided a seminal and widely cited definition of aggression as "a response that delivers noxious stimuli to another organism." Subsequent definitions

(Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Berkowitz, 1993; Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Meloy, 2006) have retained the core theme while addressing the long-term goal and intentionality of the act. Literature often differentiates between violence and aggression, with the latter including less extreme forms of violence (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). We propose that aggression and violence differ in degree rather than kind, as both involve intentional harm. However, it remains an empirical question whether less severe acts differ qualitatively from more severe ones, which we will investigate in the current studies.

Collective violence, a specific instance of violence, occurs within intergroup contexts. Some scholars define collective violence as a violent act committed on behalf of a group and sanctioned by the group (Littman & Paluck, 2015), while others argue it requires involvement and coordination of two or more individuals (Tilly, 2003; Winiewski & Bulska, 2020). However, both definitions exclude certain common occurrences. Some people may commit a violent act on behalf of a group identity even if group leaders do not sanction it. Some people commit these acts alone, yet explicitly tie their act to defending the wellbeing and rights of a specific group.

To accommodate each of these events, we adopt a definition of collective violence as any violent act conducted by one or more group-identifying members acting on behalf of the group, intending to cause harm, with or without the group's consent, approval, or knowledge. This aligns with intergroup relations literature, which views any interaction between individuals as an intergroup dynamic if they represent their respective groups (Tajfel et al., 1979). With this definition of collective violence in mind, we now explore conceptualising and measuring beliefs about (and/or attitudes towards) collective violence at the individual level, taking into account their role in intergroup relations.

2.4 The Nature and Measurement of Collective Violence Beliefs

Social psychological research on collective violence is still emerging, and a major issue constraining this research is practicality. While studies on interpersonal violence often rely on incarcerated populations known to have varying latent propensities for interpersonal violence, capturing variation in collective violence may necessitate samples from contexts with a higher probability of violent intergroup conflict. This can be dangerous to obtain and ethically challenging (Winiewski & Bulska, 2020).

To address practicality concerns, we can identify and assess individuals who are more likely to support collective violence in settings that may not currently be experiencing armed conflict, but still have high levels of intergroup tensions, various degrees of intergroup conflict, or a history of endorsing aggressive behaviour. Focusing on non-WEIRD, understudied contexts, which often feature intergroup tensions, enables a deeper understanding of the human condition and the complexities of collective violence across diverse populations (see Newson et al., 2019). By examining these individuals in diverse settings, we could better understand the factors that contribute to collective violence beliefs.

In addressing the construct of collective violence, it is essential to consider potential issues such as the reluctance to admit illegal acts, which may hinder honest responses when asking about behaviours or intentions. One alternative approach is to focus on measuring attitudinal associations with collective violence (Kalmoe & Mason, 2020), which may provide insights into individuals' predispositions without explicitly inquiring about their intentions or willingness to engage in acts themselves. It is important to note that attitudinal measures are not intended to be in opposition to existing measures of behavioural intentions. Rather, we view these attitudinal measures as complementary to the literature. By assessing both attitudes and behavioural intentions, we can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that contribute to collective violence beliefs. Our aim is to provide additional

insights that can be used alongside existing measures of intentions to further advance the field and develop a more holistic understanding of collective violence.

Existing research on collective violence in social psychology primarily assesses its attitudinal dimension (Setiawan et al., 2020; Spanovic et al., 2010; Subagya, 2015), often treating collective violence as unidimensional with some exceptions (e.g., Winiewski & Bulska, 2020). In our current research, we assess the dimensionality of collective violence, and develop a scale that adequately captures its dimensionality. We focus on the target of the act, which distinguishes between violence targeted at outgroup members (diffuse collective violence) and violence targeted at outgroup leaders (upward collective violence). By incorporating a broader range of dimensions, we could develop a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that contribute to individual differences in support for collective violence.

Moreover, in designing scales to measure collective violence beliefs, we strive to make them more generalisable by avoiding specific stimuli tied to a particular context. By doing so, we can ensure that our measurements are applicable across different populations and intergroup dynamics (Hewstone et al., 2002). This would enable a more robust examination of the underlying psychological processes that drive collective violence beliefs and facilitate comparisons between different contexts and populations.

2.5 A Refined Approach to Measuring Collective Violence Beliefs

Winiewski & Bulska (2020)'s collective violence scale conceptualises the phenomenon as emerging in response to salient intergroup threats. While such violence is quite likely to emerge in response to threat, we argue that individuals vary in how much they perceive violence as a legitimate means for achieving their ingroup's political objectives regardless of whether they currently feel such threat. Our approach allows us to assess these beliefs in the absence of a salient threat. Our perspective aligns with other intergroup belief

systems, such as SDO, Ambivalent Sexism, and Symbolic Racism, which encompass normative prescriptions about group relations in society independent of a particular situation (Jost, 2006; Brandt, 2022; Brandt et al., 2019; Brandt & Sleegers, 2021). The validity of this approach can also be confirmed empirically, by testing the structure of violence beliefs under varying levels of threat (as we do in the studies described below).

Our approach underscores the significance of understanding collective violence beliefs within the broader context of intergroup relations, elucidating the intricate nature of these beliefs, and providing a more comprehensive insight into their antecedents and consequences. Moreover, our conceptualisation mitigates social desirability concerns by concentrating on the justification of violence committed by others, enabling respondents to express their views more candidly. We believe this offers greater conceptual clarity, as it is purely attitudinal, in contrast to scales that combine attitudes and behaviours.

2.6 The present research

In this research, we develop and test a new scale of collective violence based on the principles and dimensions discussed earlier. We do so using samples from Lebanon, the Syrian diaspora, and Turkey. Sectarian violence in Lebanon is ongoing, and the large number of sects involved makes the intergroup dynamics quite complex. The civil war in Syria has led to millions of Syrians fleeing their country in fear for their lives. While Turkey enjoys a relatively more stable political system, the violent intergroup conflict between the Turks and the Kurds has been ongoing for decades. Additionally, conducting research in these contexts addresses the call to move beyond WEIRD samples (Henrich et al., 2010).

We first develop this scale in Lebanon due to the ongoing intergroup sectarian violence, making it a suitable context for studying this phenomenon. In Study 1, we use two Lebanese samples to select items for the scale, confirm its factor structure, and test its construct and criterion-related validity. In Study 1a, we explore the factor structure of a large

set of items based on the original taxonomy we have developed based on prior intergroup violence literature (see Parrott & Giancola, 2007), covering acts that are direct and indicative of the following subtypes: Physical, Verbal, Postural, Symbolic Violence, and Destruction of Property. In Study 1b, we further develop the scale by confirming the factor structure ascertained from Study 1a and making minor modifications to item content. In Study 2, we examine whether priming intergroup threat affects the structure of the scale. In Study 3, we replicate the threat findings from Study 2 and further confirm the factor structure of the scale outside the Lebanese context (i.e., among the Syrian Diaspora). Study 4 strengthens the ecological validity of the scale by confirming its psychometric properties in Turkey.

2.7 Study 1

2.7.1 Method

Procedure

Phase I: The dimensionality of collective violence beliefs.

Using best practices in scale development (DeVellis & Thorpe, 2021), we took several steps in developing the collective violence scale. Initially, we reviewed relevant literature in collective violence and interpersonal violence. We also reviewed available scales that have been used in interpersonal violence (for a full review see Parrott & Giancola, 2007). Additionally, we reviewed theoretical frameworks that treat violence as multidimensional (e.g., Parrott & Giancola, 2007; Winiewski & Bulska, 2020).

Following this review, we developed 43 items (see Table SI1 for a list of all the original items) based on the taxonomy of Parrott & Giancola (2007). While the items did not tap every dimension in the taxonomy, they included all dimensions we thought were relevant to intergroup violence. In addition to the subtypes mentioned in the taxonomy, we included one additional subtype (symbolic violence) based on our observation of intergroup conflict. The original scale we used included the following subtypes: physical violence (e.g., hitting

someone), verbal violence (e.g., verbally attacking someone), postural violence (e.g., threating someone with their body posture), symbolic violence (e.g., burning an effigy that represents someone), and destruction of property (e.g., destroying a property that belongs to someone with the purpose of causing harm). The developed items were translated into Arabic by two independent sworn translators and then back translated into English by a different translator. The lead researcher, a native Arabic speaker, confirmed that the meaning of the items was preserved before proceeding.

Phase I of the scale development process involved administering these 43 items to a diverse community sample in Lebanon and exploring the factor structure that emerged (Study 1a). The aim was to test which items loaded most strongly onto the underlying dimensions and select the subset of items that would produce the most reliable multi-dimensional scale for future use in collective violence research.

Phase II: Confirming dimensionality and modifying item set

In Phase II, we modified the item set to account for the results of Phase I, specifically with the addition of 24 new items. These additional items were developed in a similar manner to the first attempt, however, while acknowledging the two dimensions that emerged in the EFA of the first phase. We aimed to recreate the factor structure in Phase I, with items that better matched the dimensionality revealed in Phase I. To do so, we administered this new set of items to another large, diverse community sample in Lebanon (Study 1b).

Phase III: Criterion validity

In Phase III, we used data from both Study 1a and 1b to test the criterion validity of the scale – specifically, the degree to which the dimensions of our new scale correlated with existing measures of theoretically relevant constructs. Table 1 shows the validation constructs available across the two samples used in Study 1.

If our new scale validly captures collective violence beliefs, it should correlate positively with other aggression measures, including interpersonal aggression. Thus, we test the correlation between our dimensions and the four dimensions of the most commonly used measure of interpersonal violence: The Buss Perry Questionnaire (BPQ; Buss & Perry, 1991). Our scale should also correlate positively with other measures of collective behaviour typically studied in social psychology, specifically, non-normative and violent non-normative collective action (Tausch et al., 2011). Violence beliefs relating to outgroups should also correlate negatively with tolerance of outgroups. In Study 1a, we operationalized tolerance towards outgroups in terms of a single item feeling thermometer. In Study 1b, we used a more reliable, multi-item measure developed by Roccas & Brewer (2002).

As a second step, we test whether other constructs (i.e., perceived efficacy, system justification, and religious fundamentalism) would be differential predictors of our dimensions. Based on prior research, we expect collective violence to correlate negatively with perceived group efficacy (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011) and system justification (D. Osborne et al., 2019), and positively with religious fundamentalism (Lobo, 2009).

Table 1

Overview of constructs used for Criterion Validity

Variables	Study 1a	Study 1b
BPQ Physical Aggression	✓	
BPQ Verbal Aggression	✓	
BPQ Anger	✓	
BPQ Hostility	✓	
Non-Normative Collective Action	✓	✓
Violent Non-Normative Collective Action	✓	✓
Tolerance toward Outgroup Members	✓	✓
Perceived Group Efficacy		✓
System Justification		✓
Religious Fundamentalism		✓

Participants

Study 1a

An adult convenience sample was collected by circulating an anonymous Qualtrics link via social media, using the lead author's links with community organisations in Lebanon in December 2020. The sample consisted of 596 participants and was broadly representative of the various sectarian groups in this diverse country (Mean Age: 28.71 [SD=9.61], 58.5% female). Specifically, the sample was 17.3% Christian Maronite, 15.1% Shi'a, 32.5% Sunni, 23.4% Druze, 13.7% Christian Orthodox, 0.9% Armenian, 4.1% Other Christian sects, 3% Other Muslim sects. In our sample 21.1% identified themselves as politically affiliated with the October revolution of 2019, while the remaining percentage were either members of traditional parties or other political groups.

Study 1b

A second adult convenience sample was collected in April 2021 by circulating an anonymous Qualtrics link via social media, using the lead author's links with community organisations in Lebanon. The sample consisted of 1035 participants (Mean Age: 31.05 [SD 18.10], 47% female) and captured a similar level of diversity to the Study 1a sample. The sample was 29.5% Christian Maronite, 15.9% Shi'a, 23.9% Sunni, 13.3% Druze, 9% Christian Orthodox, 0.4% Armenian, 5.6% Other Christian sects, 1.9% Other Muslim sects. The majority of the sample did not identify with any political group, including alternative groups that were born after the 2019 revolution.

2.7.2 Results

Phase I

To identify the initial factor structure of our collective violence scale, which was translated into Arabic by independent sworn translators and back-translation, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using maximum likelihood extraction and varimax rotation

in SPSS 27. Maximum likelihood extraction produced a five-factor solution; however, the scree plot indicated a sharp "bend of the elbow" between the second and third factor mark. We proceeded to examine the factor loadings and remove problematic items (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Only items with primary loadings higher than .50 and cross-loadings equal to or less than .20 were retained (J. W. Osborne & Costello, 2009), and after re-examining the fit statistics, we were left with three factors and 33 items.

After this exercise, we examined the factor loadings again, and it was evident that items did not load together based on the nature of the behaviour (physical, verbal, postural, symbolic, destruction of property). Instead, items loaded together because of the target of the act. Items that were targeted against ordinary members of a different sect (outgroup) loaded on the same factor regardless of the act. These acts, which we call diffuse collective violence (acts against ordinary outgroup members), comprise Factor 1. Items that were targeted against outgroup politicians or enemy figures, which we call upward collective violence (acts against outgroup leaders or enemy figures), also loaded on a second factor regardless of the act. None of the items had loadings above .40 on the third factor, so we stopped adding factors and did not interpret the third factor further.

All eight items which included acts of collective violence against politicians or enemy figures loaded on the second factor. The remaining items loaded on the first factor, which resulted in the first factor holding most items. To resolve this imbalance, we decided to retain items loading on factor one higher than .70 and cross-loadings equal to or less than .10. Therefore, we retained 17 items in total, nine loading on factor one and eight loading on factor two, and then re-examined the fit statistics and loadings on a case-by-case basis. During this process, no item loaded on the third factor, and the maximum likelihood extraction produced a two-factor solution. The first factor accounted for 31.2% of variance and the second accounted for 21.8%. The two-factor structure retained this diffuse vs. upward

distinction (see Table 2). Both diffuse collective violence and upward collective violence showed high internal reliability (α_diffuse = .93, α_upward = .87).

Table 2

Factor loadings of the final items used in measuring collective violence

		1	2
7.	It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect	**0.812**	-0.048
1.	It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect	**0.869**	-0.047
3.	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically harm members of a different sect	**0.801**	-0.082
8.	It is justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect	**0.808**	0.052
12.	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally threaten members of a different sect	**0.689**	0.089
13.	It can be justified for members of my sect to verbally assault members of a different sect	**0.749**	0.09
36.	Destroying the property of a different sect is sometimes a justified reaction	**0.712**	-0.004
37.	It is justified sometimes for members of my sect to destroy property of members from a different sect	**0.732**	-0.034
40.	It is justified sometimes for members of my sect to damage cars of members from a different sect	**0.751**	-0.012
10.	Cursing politicians can be justified	-0.053	**0.705**
14.	Verbally insulting politicians can be justified	-0.022	**0.691**
20.	Generally, offending political leaders through drawings, falls under freedom of expression	-0.076	**0.623**
28.	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing enemy figures is a justified act	0.129	**0.624**
29.	It is accepted that people share memes making fun of politicians they do not agree with	0.012	**0.713**
32.	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians is a justified act	0.005	**0.738**
33.	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians and destroying them in groups is a justified act	0.102	**0.734**
35.	Generally, people interact positively with pictures that make fun of politicians they don't like on social media	-0.056	**0.563**

Note: Pattern factor matrix, Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood, Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.

Factor loading characteristic of specific factors are indicated in bold



Figure 1: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right), Diffuse Collective Violence, Study 1a.



Figure 2: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right), Upward Collective Violence, Study 1a.

Graded Response Models

To explore whether people differentiate between different intensities of collective violence without necessarily considering them as distinct dimensions, we employed two-parameter Graded Response Models (GRMs), an Item Response Theory-based method for ordinal data, in Stata 14.

Our analysis showed high discrimination parameters for all items on the Diffuse Collective Violence scale ($\alpha s \geq 2.783$, see Table SI2) and Upward Collective Violence scale ($\alpha s = 1.471\text{-}2.464$, see Table SI3), indicating that the items effectively discriminated between individuals at different points on the scale. The response options captured respondents at varying levels of agreement, with each option becoming more likely as one moves along the latent trait.

These findings suggest that act intensity has minimal influence on support for collective violence, and a higher threshold on the latent trait is required for partial agreement with diffuse collective violence compared to upward collective violence. In summary, our GRMs analysis validates the dimensions identified in our scale and provides further evidence of its robustness in measuring the constructs of interest.

Phase II

In Phase II, we revised our initial item set to better align with the two-dimensional structure identified in Phase I, which differentiated between diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs. We added 24 new items to further capture the concept of upward collective violence, as revealed in Phase I, in order to cover the criterion space more comprehensively (e.g., Being verbally violent against those who got us here is a justified act; Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians is a justified act). We performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using maximum likelihood extraction and varimax rotation in SPSS 27 on this revised item set.

The maximum likelihood extraction yielded a six-factor solution; however, the scree plot indicated a sharp "bend of the elbow" between the fourth and fifth factor mark. Consequently, we examined the factor loadings. Our initial analysis revealed that all nine items targeting violence at outgroup members, retained from Study 1a, loaded together above .60, with no cross-loadings above .20. After removing items with primary loadings below .50 and cross-loadings equal to or higher than .20 (J. W. Osborne & Costello, 2009), we were left with four factors and 24 items.

In the development of our scale for collective violence beliefs, we strategically included items pertaining to both outgroup leaders and members within a unified model. This decision was anchored in the understanding that the dynamics of intergroup hostility often encompass attitudes towards both symbolic figures of authority and the general outgroup populace. Such an inclusive approach aligns with the principles of social identity and intergroup conflict theories, which posit that perceptions of outgroup leaders and members are interrelated and contribute to the broader narrative of intergroup relations. By analysing these elements conjointly, our model offers a comprehensive and realistic representation of collective violence beliefs, reflecting the complexity and interconnectedness inherent in real-

world scenarios of intergroup conflict. This methodological choice enhances the analytical rigor of our study, allowing for a nuanced exploration of how different facets of collective violence beliefs interact within the broader spectrum of intergroup dynamics.

We repeated this process with the remaining items, which resulted in a two-factor structure with 18 items. The first factor accounted for 28.5% of the variance, and the second accounted for 18.4%. Consistent with our findings in Phase I, the factor structure distinguished between diffuse and upward collective violence (see Table 3), and the scale showed high reliability (αdiffuse = .94, αupward = .89). To further substantiate our framing structure, we conducted a CFA using SEM to compare models with one and two factors. The results indicated that the two-factor model demonstrated superior fit (χ^2 (129) = 308.28, p < .001, CFI = 0.97, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .05, CI [.04, .05]), as opposed to the one-factor model (χ^2 (135) = 2845.55, p < .001, CFI = 0.55, SRMR = .23, RMSEA = .17, CI [.17, .18]). We named this final scale the Two-Dimensional Collective Violence Beliefs Scale (CVBS: 2D).

Table 3

Factor loadings of the final items included in the Two-Dimension Collective Violence Beliefs Scale (CVBS: 2D).

		1	2
1.	It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect	-0.01	**0.781**
2.	It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect	-0.054	**0.722**
3.	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically harm members of a different sect	0.031	**0.689**
4.	It is justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect	0.045	**0.702**
5.	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally threaten members of a different sect	0.047	**0.71**
6.	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect on social media	0.002	**0.748**
7.	Destroying the property of a different sect is sometimes a justified reaction	0.094	**0.57**
8.	Burning cars of members from a different sect can be a justified act	0.003	**0.621**
9.	It is justified sometimes for members of my sect to damage cars of members from a different sect	-0.002	**0.65**
10.	Verbally insulting politicians can be justified	**0.766**	0.01
11.	One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders	**0.746**	0.039
12.	Dragging effigies representing corrupted politicians in the streets is a justified act	**0.82**	0.011
20.	Insulting those responsible for our situation is a justified act	**0.706**	0.026

24.	Destroying property of corrupted politicians can be justified	**0.7**	0.032
27.	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians is a justified act	**0.828**	0.02
29.	Being verbally violent against those who got us here is a justified act	**0.721**	0
30.	Burning effigies of corrupted politicians is a justified act	**0.864**	-0.004
31.	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians and destroying them in groups is a justified act	**0.76**	0.056

Note: Pattern factor matrix, Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood, Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.

Factor loading characteristic of specific factors are indicated in bold

Graded Response Models

Similar to Phase I, we estimated GRMs for each subscale in Phase II. All items on the Diffuse Collective Violence scale exceeded the threshold for a "very high" discrimination parameter ($\alpha s \geq 2.142$, see Table SI4), as did the items on the Upward Collective Violence scale ($\alpha s \geq 2.540$, see Table SI5). As in Phase I, the diffuse and upward collective violence items were most effective at placing respondents at the same parts of the scale, which is detailed in the supplementary information (see Figures SI3 and SI4).

Our findings again indicated that intensity played a minimal role in determining participants' positions along each scale, and that participants needed to score higher on the latent trait to endorse diffuse collective violence compared to upward collective violence. This is most likely because it might be easier to endorse violence against outgroup leaders than against outgroup members.

Phase III

As hypothesised, we found positive correlations between all four dimensions of the Buss Perry Questionnaire (BPQ; Buss & Perry, 1991) and our scale (see Table 4). We also discovered a positive correlation between non-normative collective action and the first dimension of our scale in Study 1a ($r = .15$, $p < .01$), as well as a positive correlation between violent non-normative collective action and the second dimension of our scale in both Study 1a ($r = .41$, $p < .01$) and 1b ($r = .46$, $p < .01$; see Table 4). Moreover, we found a negative

correlation between warmth towards outgroup members and diffuse collective violence in Study 1a, and a negative correlation between tolerance towards outgroup members and diffuse collective violence in Study 1b. Surprisingly, the correlation between tolerance towards outgroup members and upward collective violence was positive.

We also examined the relationship between perceived group efficacy, system justification, religious fundamentalism, and each of the two collective violence dimensions in our scale using SEM, while controlling for the shared covariance between our dimensions. We discovered that perceived group efficacy was negatively related to diffuse collective violence ($b = -.13$, $p = .02$) but positively related to upward collective violence ($b = .32$, $p < .001$). Conversely, system justification was positively related to diffuse collective violence ($b = .22$, $p < .001$), but negatively related to upward collective violence ($b = -.37$, $p < .001$). Lastly, religious fundamentalism was positively related to diffuse collective violence ($b = .18$, $p < .001$), but negatively related to upward collective violence ($b = -.21$, $p < .001$).

Understanding and theorising about the nature of these differential predictors of the two dimensions of collective violence is beyond the scope of the current paper. We did not initially expect to find the two specific dimensions revealed in Phase I and, therefore, did not make any predictions about differential effects across dimensions. However, the findings seem to align with social psychological theories. For instance, people who justify the system and religious fundamentalists are more favourable towards societal leaders (Lobo, 2009; D. Osborne et al., 2019) and, as a result, should be more prone to expressing violence against outgroup members rather than leaders. On the other hand, those with higher efficacy have a better understanding of how to achieve their desired group goals, which may lead to directing violent sentiments more towards group leaders than group members. Most importantly, these divergent effects underscore the importance of treating collective violence as a multi-dimensional rather than unidimensional construct.

Table 4
Correlations between the mean scores of DCV, UCV and various constructs (Pearson's *r*)

	Diffuse Collective Violence		Upward Collective Violence	
Construct	Study 1a	Study 1b	Study 1a	Study 1b
Non-Normative Collective Action	.15**	.09	.41**	.46**
Violent Non-Normative Collective Action	.40**	.11*	.27**	.46**
Warmth toward Outgroup	-.14**	-.28**	-.03	.22**
BPQ Physical Aggression	.37**	-	.13**	-
BPQ Verbal Aggression	.04	-	.19**	-
BPQ Anger	.28**	-	.09*	-
BPQ Hostility	.14**	-	.16**	-

* p <.05, ** p <.01

2.7.3 Discussion

Study 1 tested the scale for measuring support for collective violence using two samples from Lebanon. In Phase I, we developed 43 items inspired by complex multi-dimensional taxonomies found in the interpersonal violence literature. Our analysis and repeated EFAs confirmed the multi-dimensional nature of collective violence. However, the factor structure did not align with our initial expectations. Items of the scale loaded on two different factors not related to the intensity of the act, but to the target of said acts. Items targeted at outgroup members loaded together, while items targeted at outgroup leaders loaded together. At the end of the analysis, we retained the 17 best performing items, matching the developed theoretical assumption. Nine items loaded on support for collective violence acts against outgroup members (Diffuse Collective Violence), and eight items loaded on support for collective violence acts against outgroup leaders (Upward Collective Violence). Although our initial expectations were not met, the new factor structure aligns with theoretical reasoning. For example, following the US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11,

numerous protests occurred in various Islamic countries, where protesters burned US flags and effigies of presidents, yet American citizens were still welcome in these countries (Göttke, 2020). This anecdotal evidence is empirically supported by our study. Furthermore, research on stalking has shown that politicians are more likely to be victims of violent attacks than others (Meloy, 2007; Meloy et al., 2001), reinforcing the qualitative differences we found between outgroup members and leaders.

In Phase II, we tested our newly developed model by including 24 additional items to the scale we retained from Phase I. In line with our new approach, we conducted EFAs that confirmed what we found in Phase I. Items loaded on two factors only, and the factors did not differ by the intensity of the act; instead, the difference was the target group of those acts. We retained 18 items, nine on each of the two factors. We then tested for criterion validity and found that our two dimensions positively correlated with the four dimensions of the Buss-Perry Questionnaire (BPQ) and non-normative and violent non-normative collective action. Warmth and tolerance towards the outgroup, as expected, correlated negatively with justification of collective violence beliefs against outgroup members but not outgroup leaders. We also tested the relationship between three known predictors of collective behaviour and our scale's two dimensions: perceived group efficacy, system justification, and religious fundamentalism. We discovered that all three predicted our two dimensions differentially, further confirming the importance of including both dimensions in research on collective violence.

However, this scale has several limitations that we sought to address in the next study. First, it was only tested in a single country and intergroup context – i.e., Lebanon. Therefore, we need to know if the two-dimensional structure can be replicated in other contexts. Secondly, many other violence scales treat threat as a prerequisite for violence and assess support for collective violence in reaction to specific threats (e.g., reactions to newcomers

who threaten the homogeneity and lifestyle of locals, Winiewski & Bulska, 2020). Our conceptualisation and measurement of collective violence beliefs treat the acceptability of collective violence as something members of the population vary on, regardless of any specific threat being primed. We test this assumption empirically by ascertaining if the psychometric properties of our scale depend on the degree to which participants are made to feel threatened by a specific outgroup.

2.8 Study 2

Study 2 had four aims. First, we aimed to confirm the factor structure of the violence scale presented in the previous study. Second, , we sought to explicitly clarify that the leaders in question were outgroup leaders. This clarification was important not only to ensure consistency in the interpretation of the scale items but also to enhance the scale's generalisability across different contexts. Third, we evaluated whether priming threat has a significant impact on the scale's structure. This was to demonstrate that collective violence beliefs are not just a response to salient societal threats, but are an integral aspect of intergroup psychology, in that that people vary in how much they consider violence a legitimate means to serve their ingroup's interests. Fourth, we aimed to test the possibility of creating a shorter version of the scale to enhance its usability. To this end, we retained the six best-performing items from each subscale, resulting in a more concise scale for future applications.

2.8.1 Methods

Participants

An adult convenience sample was collected by circulating an anonymous Qualtrics link via social media, using the lead author's links with community organisations in Lebanon. The sample consisted of 1041 participants (Mean Age: 33.07 [SD=11.43, 65.5% female) and was broadly representative of the various sectarian groups in this diverse country (11.3%

Christian Maronite, 17.5% Shi'a, 38.5% Sunni, 6% Druze, 4.4% Christian Orthodox, 0.5% Armenian, 3% Other Christian sects, 5% Other Muslim sects, 13.8% No sectarian identification). A plurality (41.1%) had no political affiliation, while the remainder varied between all the other political groups.

Procedure

To investigate the impact of threat on the scale's structure, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.

Subtle threat prime condition (N=341): In this condition, we aimed to subtly prime intergroup threat among participants while they considered the items on our scale. As a result, the scale developed in Study 1 was presented with a minor modification. Each item included the qualification that the violent act is justifiable "if you feel your sect is threatened". For instance, Item 1 on the diffuse scale dimension was presented as "It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect if I feel my sect is threatened [emphasis added]".

Strong threat prime condition (N=333): Prior to answering the 12 items on the scale, participants were prompted to think about the sectarian conflict in Lebanon over the past 50 years and its effects on them. They were then asked to write up to three sentences explaining their feelings on the matter. Subsequently, participants completed the same scale as in Study Unlike the subtle threat prime condition, we did not include "if you feel your sect is threatened" in the items.

Control condition (N=367): In this condition, participants were presented with the original version of the scale without any additional threat primes.

2.8.2 Results

To test measurement invariance, we conducted a stepwise analysis. In the first step, we compared the two versions of the scale that were most similar – the control condition and the

strong threat prime condition. These two conditions used identical items, but the latter condition primed threat via an induction task. In the next step, we tested the original scale against the subtle threat prime, in which the items were slightly different (with the latter including an additional clause that said "if I feel my sect is threatened").

A multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was conducted using MPlus with the two similar conditions – the strong threat prime condition and the control condition. The multigroup two-factor scale model fit the data well ($\chi 2$ (126) = 283.64, p <.001, CFI = 0.95, SRMR = .06 RMSEA = .06 CI [.05, .07]). The two factors had a significant correlation in both the control and priming condition respectively (.41, p <.001; .38, p<.001), and the 12 items had strong loadings on the factors (see Table 5 below). To test measurement invariance, we compared the fit of a scalar model, in which the factor loadings were constrained to equality across the two conditions, and a metric model in which both factor loadings and intercepts were constrained to be equal across conditions (Meredith, 1993). The fit of both the scalar and metric models was only negligibly different from that of the configural model (see Table 6; see also Rutkowski & Svetina, 2014), indicating that the two versions of the scale showed metric and scalar invariance. This is further confirmed with a non-significant Mean factor score difference in the Scalar model (p = .91 and p = .52 for Factor 1 and Factor 2, respectively).

Table 5

CFA of the Collective Violence Scale loading on 2 latent variables using Multigroup Maximum Likelihood		Control Cond.	Strong Threat Prime Cond.
Factor 1			
1.	It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect	**0.69**	**0.84**
2.	It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect	**0.75**	**0.76**
3.	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically harm members of a different sect	**0.81**	**0.85**
4.	It is justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect	**0.63**	**0.69**
5.	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally threaten members of a different sect	**0.64**	**0.67**
6.	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect on social media	**0.6**	**0.71**

Factor 2			
7.	Verbally insulting politicians from other sects can be justified	**0.56**	**0.55**
8.	One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders especially those from other sects	**0.57**	**0.53**
9.	Dragging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other sects in the streets is a justified act	**0.71**	**0.68**
10.	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other sects is a justified act	**0.72**	**0.71**
11.	Burning effigies of corrupted politicians from other sects is a justified act	**0.75**	**0.75**
12.	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians from other sects and destroying them in groups is a justified act	**0.76**	**0.75**

Table 6

Measurement Invariance analysis for Control and Strong Threat Prime conditions

	χ2	*df*	*p*	*CFI*	*TLI*	*RMSEA*	*BIC*	*AIC*
Configural	284.1	107	<.001	0.94	0.93	0.07	24139.77	23807.54
Metric	321.38	117	<.001	0.93	0.93	0.07	24111.53	23824.81
Scalar	338.45	127	<.001	0.93	0.93	0.07	24063.09	23821.89

Since the control condition and the Strong Threat prime condition showed no significant differences, we dropped the priming condition from the analysis. In step two, we tested for measurement invariance between the control and Subtle Threat prime conditions. The multigroup two-factor scale model fit the data well ($\chi2$ (126) = 296.25, p <.001, CFI = 0.95, SRMR = .05 RMSEA = .06 CI [.05, .07]). The two factors had a significant correlation in both the control and primed condition respectively (.41, p <.001; .71, p<.001), and the 12 items had very good loadings on the factors (see Table 7 below).

Although we could not establish scalar and metric invariance between the control and subtle threat prime conditions (see Table 8), the factor loadings were strong in both conditions. These analyses helped establish that priming threat does not meaningfully change the measurement properties of the scale. Consequently, a threat prime is not a prerequisite for measuring individuals' support for collective violence. This finding supports our argument

that collective violence beliefs are an integral aspect of intergroup relations and are not solely primed by threat.

Table 7

CFA of the Collective Violence Scale loading on 2 latent variables using Multigroup Maximum Likelihood		Control Cond.	Subtle Threat Prime Cond.
Factor 1			
1.	It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect	**0.62**	**0.72**
2.	It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect	**0.76**	**0.77**
3.	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically harm members of a different sect	**0.78**	**0.78**
4.	It is justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect	**0.67**	**0.76**
5.	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally threaten members of a different sect	**0.68**	**0.73**
6.	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect on social media	**0.61**	**0.72**
Factor 2			
7.	Verbally insulting politicians from other sects can be justified	**0.61**	**0.7**
8.	One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders especially those from other sects	**0.64**	**0.7**
9.	Dragging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other sects in the streets is a justified act	**0.72**	**0.83**
10.	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other sects is a justified act	**0.72**	**0.8**
11.	Burning effigies of corrupted politicians from other sects is a justified act	**0.72**	**0.79**
12.	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians from other sects and destroying them in groups is a justified act	**0.73**	**0.79**

Table 8

Measurement Invariance analysis for Control and Subtle Threat prime conditions

	χ2	*df*	*p*	*CFI*	*TLI*	*RMSEA*	*BIC*	*AIC*
Configural	270.85	107	<.001	0.96	0.95	0.07	24212.44	23879.39
Metric	366.97	117	<.001	0.93	0.92	0.08	24242.94	23955.51
Scalar	402.78	127	<.001	0.92	0.92	0.08	24044.84	23971.32



Figure 5: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right) in the control condition (top), strong threat priming condition (middle), and subtle threat priming condition (bottom), Diffuse Collective Violence, Study 2.





Figure 6: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right) in the control condition (top), strong threat priming condition (middle), and subtle threat priming condition (bottom), Upward Collective Violence, Study 2.

Graded Response Models

We estimated GRMs for each subscale and assessed measurement invariance across conditions using the mirt package in R. Both the Diffuse and Upward Collective Violence items demonstrated full measurement invariance between the Control and Strong Threat prime conditions (see Tables SI6 and SI7, respectively). For the Control and Subtle Threat prime conditions, the Diffuse Collective items exhibited metric and weak scalar invariance but did not display strong scalar or full invariance (see Table SI8), while the Upward Collective Violence items displayed full measurement invariance (See Table SI9). When combining the items into a multidimensional scale, full measurement variance was established between the Control and Strong Threat prime conditions (see Table SI10), but not between the Control and Subtle Threat prime conditions (see Table SI11).

All items on the Diffuse Collective Violence scale exceeded the threshold for a "very high" discrimination parameter across conditions (Control: $\alpha s \geq 2.496$, Primed: $\alpha s \geq 2.451$, Threat: $\alpha s \geq 2.706$; see Table SI12), as shown in Figure 7. In contrast, all items on the Upward Collective Violence scale exceeded the threshold for a "high" discrimination parameter across conditions (Control: $\alpha s > 1.545$, Strong Threat Primed: $\alpha s \geq 1.179$, Subtle Threat Primed: $\alpha s \geq 2.766$; see Table SI13), as indicated in Figure 8.

The analysis suggests that the items are most informative for placing individuals within specific ranges on the latent trait and less informative for respondents elsewhere, with some variations in thresholds depending on the condition.

2.8.3 Discussion

In Study 2, we further tested our scale, including the original developed version and two variations. Measurement invariance analysis confirmed that all three variations of the scale had good fit, with strong invariance observed between the control and strong threat priming conditions, and partial invariance between the control and subtle threat priming conditions. These minor variances were expected, given the sensitivity of the analysis, which is typically used to compare variances among different groups on the same scale, rather than variations of the same scale. We also conducted IRT analysis, which further supported our initial findings in this study.

These findings suggest that, at least in conflict-prone contexts such as Lebanon, either threat cannot be primed due to ceiling effects, or threat is not necessary for people to express their beliefs about collective violence, or both. Moreover, while previous research by Winiewski and Bulska (2020) indicates that primed threat may lead to a more extremity-based multidimensionality, where different acts of collective violence load on different factors, we did not observe such a difference in our study.

2.9 Study 3

Study 3 replicated Study 2's experiment, testing the collective violence scale among Syrians outside Syria, who fled due to the ongoing conflict.

2.9.1 Methods

Participants

A convenience sample of 521 adult participants (Mean Age: 39.65 [SD=13.36], 42.7% female) was collected via a Qualtrics link shared on social media, using the lead author's connections with Syrian opposition community members in the diaspora.

Scale Development

Scales from the previous study were adapted to the Syrian conflict context. The study had three conditions like Study 2 ($N_{control}$=178, $N_{strongthreat}$=189, $N_{subtlethreat}$=154).

2.9.2 Results

Multigroup maximum likelihood factor analysis (containing those in the control and strong prime conditions) using MPlus showed good model fit ($\chi 2$ (126) = 254.19, p <.001, CFI = 0.97, SRMR = .04 RMSEA = .07 CI [.06, .09]). Strong correlations existed between the two factors in both control and strong threat prime conditions (r control = .67, p <.001; r strong threat prime = .73, p*s*<.001). The 12 items had good loadings, and scalar and measurement invariance were established between the conditions, with non-significant mean factor score differences (p = .54 and p = .44 for Factor 1 and Factor 2, respectively).

Table 9

CFA of the Collective Violence Scale loading on 2 latent variables using Multigroup Maximum Likelihood		Control Cond.	Strong Threat Prime Cond.
Factor 1			
1.	It is justified for the opposition to become physically aggressive towards regime supporters	**0.89**	**0.88**
2.	It can be justified for the opposition to hit regime supporters	**0.84**	**0.86**
3.	It can be justified for the opposition to physically harm regime supporters	**0.88**	**0.87**
4.	It is justified for the opposition to verbally insult regime supporters	**0.85**	**0.82**
5.	It is sometimes justified for the opposition to verbally threaten regime supporters	**0.81**	**0.85**
6.	It is sometimes justified for the opposition to verbally insult regime supporters on social media	**0.82**	**0.79**
Factor 2			
7.	Verbally insulting regime politicians can be justified	**0.84**	**0.86**

8.	One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders especially those from the regime	**0.84**	**0.89**
9.	Dragging effigies representing corrupted regime politicians in the streets is a justified act	**0.91**	**0.91**
10.	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted regime politicians is a justified act	**0.90**	**0.90**
11.	Burning effigies of corrupted regime politicians is a justified act	**0.90**	**0.93**
12.	Building representative figures of corrupted regime politicians and destroying them in groups is a justified act	**0.86**	**0.87**

Table 10

Measurement Invariance analysis for Control and Strong Threat Prime conditions

	χ2	*df*	*p*	*CFI*	*TLI*	*RMSEA*	*BIC*	*AIC*
Configural	250.78	107	<.001	0.97	0.96	0.09	11614.42	11329.33
Metric	259.64	117	<.001	0.97	0.96	0.08	11564.23	11318.19
Scalar	274.69	127	<.001	0.97	0.97	0.08	11520.22	11313.24

In Study 3, we dropped the Strong Threat Prime condition and analysed measurement invariance between the control and Subtle Threat Prime conditions. The multigroup two-factor scale model fit well ($\chi2$ (126) = 284.76, p <.001, CFI = 0.96, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .09 CI [.07, .10]). Both factors correlated significantly in the control and Subtle Threat Prime conditions (.67, p <.001; .76, p<.001), and the 12 items had strong loadings.

Unlike Study 2, scalar and metric invariance were established between the control and subtle threat conditions (see Table 12), with non-significant mean factor score differences in the Scalar model (p = .30 and p = .35 for Factor 1 and Factor 2, respectively). Loadings were similar between conditions. These results confirmed that priming a specific intergroup threat did not affect the scale's dimensionality or measurement properties.

Table 11

CFA of the Collective Violence Scale loading on 2 latent variables using Multigroup Maximum Likelihood		Control Cond.	Subtle Threat Prime Cond.
Factor 1			
1.	It is justified for the opposition to become physically aggressive towards regime supporters if they felt threatened	**0.88**	**0.89**
2.	It can be justified for the opposition to hit regime supporters if they felt threatened	**0.85**	**0.88**
3.	It can be justified for the opposition to physically harm regime supporters if they felt threatened	**0.87**	**0.87**

4.	It is justified for the opposition to verbally insult regime supporters if they felt threatened	**0.85**	**0.88**
5.	It is sometimes justified for the opposition to verbally threaten regime supporters if they felt threatened	**0.81**	**0.86**
6.	It is sometimes justified for the opposition to verbally insult regime supporters on social media if they felt threatened	**0.82**	**0.86**
Factor 2			
7.	Verbally insulting regime politicians can be justified if the opposition feels threatened	**0.82**	**0.85**
8.	One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders especially those from the regime if the opposition feels threatened	**0.83**	**0.84**
9.	Dragging effigies representing corrupted regime politicians in the streets is a justified act if the opposition feels threatened	**0.91**	**0.93**
10.	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted regime politicians is a justified act if the opposition feels threatened	**0.91**	**0.93**
11.	Burning effigies of corrupted regime politicians is a justified act if the opposition feels threatened	**0.90**	**0.95**
12.	Building representative figures of corrupted regime politicians and destroying them in groups is a justified act if the opposition feels threatened	**0.87**	**0.91**

Table 12

Measurement Invariance analysis for Control and Subtle Threat Prime conditions

	χ2	*df*	*p*	*CFI*	*TLI*	*RMSEA*	*BIC*	*AIC*
Configural	276.35	107	<.001	0.96	0.95	0.10	10612.94	10335.16
Metric	286.63	117	<.001	0.96	0.95	0.09	10565.17	10325.45
Scalar	302.98	127	<.001	0.96	0.96	0.09	10523.47	10321.80

Graded Response Models

In Study 3, we carried out GRM analyses and evaluated measurement invariance across conditions. Full measurement invariance was observed for both Diffuse and Upward Collective Violence items in various comparisons. The two-factor solution achieved metric invariance, but not scalar or full invariance. All items on both scales surpassed the threshold for a "very high" discrimination parameter, demonstrating their effectiveness in distinguishing individuals at different points on the scale. To answer with anything other than "strongly disagree," participants had to be at or above the mean in the latent Diffuse Collective Violence trait, which is higher than for Upward Collective Violence. Both scales were most effective at placing individuals between 1 SD below and 1 SD above the mean (see Figures SI9 and SI10 and Tables SI20-21).

2.9.3 Discussion

In Study 3, we replicated the methodology of Study 2 in a different context, specifically among the Syrian diaspora. We adapted the scales and their variations to suit the current Syrian context from the opposition's perspective. Measurement invariance analysis confirmed that all three variations of the scale demonstrated a good fit, with negligible differences between the conditions. Furthermore, IRT analysis supported our initial findings. This study validated the CVBS: 2D in a second intergroup context, and reinforced the notion that priming threat is not a prerequisite for assessing variations in collective violence beliefs.

2.10 Study 4

In the final study, we aimed to confirm the factor structure of our scale in another context, specifically Turkey. In this setting, Turks constitute the advantaged ruling majority, while Kurds represent the largest disadvantaged minority (Çoksan & Cingöz-Ulu, 2022; KONDA, 2022). The two groups have a long history of conflict, with Kurds experiencing discrimination in Turkey (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016). For example, majority-Kurdish regions receive disproportionately less governmental investment, such as economic resources and educational opportunities, compared to majority-Turk regions (Kirisci & Winrow, 1997). Additionally, Kurds are not entitled to government services in their native language. The low trust between Turks and Kurds (Çelebi et al., 2014) and the presence of reciprocal negative stereotypes (Bilali et al., 2014) indicate a conflictual context where our scale should be applicable.

2.10.1 Methods

Participants and Procedure

We collected an adult convenience sample by distributing an anonymous Qualtrics link via email, leveraging some of the authors' connections within the Turkish community. The sample consisted of 194 Turkish participants (Mean Age: 24.68 [SD=7.45], 72.8%

female). Participants answered the same items as in previous studies but adapted to the context, using the original 18 items (9 for DCV and 9 for UCV) retained from Study 1 (e.g., "It is justified for Turks to be physically aggressive towards Kurds," "Verbally insulting some Kurdish politicians can be justified"). All items were translated into Turkish.

2.10.2 Results

We conducted a CFA with maximum likelihood estimation using MPlus to confirm the factor structure of the scale, consisting of collective violence towards outgroup members and collective violence towards outgroup leaders. The two-factor scale model demonstrated a good fit for most indicators ($\chi 2$ (128) = 489.65, p <.001, CFI = 0.91, SRMR = .076, RMSEA = .12 CI [.11, .13]). The two factors were strongly correlated (.53, p <.001), and the 18 items had robust loadings on the factors (see Table 13 below). Support for both diffuse (M = 1.45; SD = 0.74) and upward collective violence (M = 1.94; SD = 0.99) was low, with both scales exhibiting high reliability (Diffuse: α = .95, Upward: α = .93).

Table 13

CFA of the Collective Violence Scale loading on 2 latent variables using Maximum Likelihood

Factor 1		
1.	It is justified for Turks to be physically aggressive towards Kurds	**0.77**
2.	It may be justified for Turks to hit Kurds	**0.91**
3.	It may be justified for Turks to physically harm Kurds	**0.89**
4.	It may be justified for Turks to verbally insult Kurds	**0.85**
5.	It may sometimes be justified for Turks to verbally threaten Kurds	**0.8**
6.	It may sometimes be justified for Turks to verbally insult Kurds on social media	**0.8**
7.	Destroying the properties of Kurds is sometimes a justified reaction	**0.82**
8.	Burning the cars of Kurds may be a justifiable action	**0.8**
9.	It is sometimes justified for Turks to damage the cars of Kurds	**0.79**
Factor 2		

10.	Verbally insulting some Kurdish politicians can be justified.	**0.59**
11.	One can justify people's need to be violent towards some Kurdish politicians	**0.66**
12.	Insulting some Kurdish politicians who are responsible for our situation is a justified act	**0.62**
13.	Dragging effigies representing some corrupted Kurdish politicians in the streets is a justified act	**0.9**
14.	Destroying properties of some corrupted Kurdish politicians can be justified	**0.8**
15.	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing some corrupted Kurdish politicians is a justified act	**0.9**
16.	Being verbally violent against some Kurdish politicians who got us here is a justified act	**0.69**
17.	Burning effigies of some corrupted Kurdish politicians is a justified act	**0.88**
18.	Building representative figures of some corrupted Kurdish politicians and destroying them in groups is a justified act	**0.91**

Graded Response Models

We performed GRM analyses for each subscale, finding consistent results with previous studies. Items on both Diffuse (Table SI22) and Upward Collective Violence scales (Table SI23) showed "very high" discrimination parameters. Participants needed to be at or above the mean in the latent Diffuse Collective Violence trait to answer with anything other than "strongly disagree," which was higher than for Upward Collective Violence (see Tables SI20-21). Both scales effectively placed people between the mean and 2 SDs above the mean (see Figures SI13 and SI14).

2.10.3 Discussion

In the final study, we tested our scale in a different context—Turkey. The CFA and IRT analyses confirmed the multidimensionality found in previous studies, further enhancing our scale's generalisability. Although some items behaved differently compared to earlier studies, these differences were unsurprising given the contextual variations between Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. Item factor loadings remained consistent with previous studies.

2.11 Chapter 2 General Discussion

In five samples covering three different intergroup contexts, we conceptualised and developed a two-dimensional measurement scale for collective violence beliefs. Study 1 validated the scale using two samples from Lebanon, demonstrating the multidimensionality based on the target of the act rather than its nature or intensity. Studies 2 (Lebanon) and 3

(Syrian diaspora) confirmed the factor structure, showing it was consistent regardless of whether threat was primed. Study 4 further confirmed the scale's factor structure in the Turkish context.

Our Collective Violence Beliefs Scale (CVBS: 2D) encompasses two dimensions: diffuse collective violence, targeting outgroup members, and upward collective violence, targeting outgroup leaders. Both dimensions include items of varying intensity and nature. The differing mean scores for diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs among the samples demonstrate the scale's sensitivity to diverse conflict dynamics, capturing perceptions in a multidimensional manner. This is crucial, given that different predictors have varying effects on support for distinct types of collective violence.

The three conditions used in Studies 2 and 3 revealed that introducing threat through past or present intergroup conflicts does not fundamentally alter how people support collective violence. While the subtle threat prime increased mean support for each type of violence, the dimensionality of support remained consistent, with differentiation between outgroup members and leaders regardless of act nature.

Our scale is among the first to measure collective violence beliefs, and its development highlights three critical implications for research on collective violence. First, the scale demonstrates the multidimensionality of collective violence support, similar to interpersonal violence (Parrott & Giancola, 2007). Researchers should treat the phenomenon accordingly, as different dimensions have differential predictors and consequences. Future research should focus on determining the unique predictors and outcomes of the dimensions revealed in this study.

Second, the scale confirms that its multidimensionality is based on the target group, rather than the act's intensity or nature. Not finding dimensions based on intensities suggests that people, at least in contexts of conflict, do not differentiate between acts of collective

violence based on their severity. Instead, they view different tools of collective violence towards a given target as globally acceptable or unacceptable. The implications of this finding include refining our understanding of collective violence and its causes and reconsidering how we approach the phenomenon in future research.

Although our study identified two dimensions, there remains an avenue for future research to explore other potential dimensions (for instance, ingroup members vs. ingroup leaders). Another pivotal empirical question to be examined is whether in societies with multiple social groups, the explicit designation of the outgroup influences individuals' justification for violence. Despite our findings not suggesting any changes in the factor structure of our scale as a result of this, it remains an important question to further delve into. Thus, while our scale has laid substantial groundwork, continued exploration of other dimensions could yield even more comprehensive results.

Third, the measurement invariance analysis suggests that support for collective violence is not solely a reactive response to threat. Justification for violence may also be proactive, forming part of an ideological system endorsing violence as a political strategy for advancing ingroup goals. This aligns with research on interpersonal violence, which has shifted from viewing violence as purely reactive to considering instrumental violence for specific ends (Allen & Anderson, 2017; Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Importantly, this means researchers can use our scale without priming threat.

The study and scale also highlight the distinctiveness of beliefs related to outgroup leaders, an area that is often under-explored in intergroup attitudes literature. As targets of political acts, outgroup leaders occupy a unique position (Meloy, 2007). While expressing frustration against outgroup leaders can be perceived by some as an act related to the right of expression, we argue that this does not alter the nature of the acts themselves. Dragging an effigy or engaging in verbal aggression against a politician may fall within the realm of

freedom of speech, particularly in WEIRD countries where such expressions are often tolerated. However, this does not mean that these acts do not hold justifications for violence. In fact, the increase in violent behaviour in countries that emphasise freedom of expression, such as the United States, serves as evidence that supports our argument, especially when considering acts that we classify as collective violence in this context. Recognising people's attitudes towards group leaders, particularly violent attitudes directed against them, is essential for understanding the dynamics of intergroup conflict and how these attitudes may manifest in various forms of collective violence.

Furthermore, the diligent methodology employed in developing our scale and our findings indicating that support for collective violence is determined more by the target than by the nature of the act, underscore the fact that context plays a crucial role. Consequently, we posit that our scale offers not just quantitative measurement, but also qualitative insights. Our discovery that people at least in conflictual settings do not differentiate between the nature of the acts provides a valuable guide for researchers, enabling them to incorporate or disregard acts they deem more or less pertinent to their specific context.

For instance, in less confrontational societies, the inclusion of additional items focusing on verbal violence might hold greater contextual relevance, while still preserving the fundamental principle underpinning the development of this scale: The perception of collective violence is primarily driven by the target group, rather than the intensity of the violence. Thus, our scale offers a nuanced tool that can be tailored to the context under study, enhancing the depth and applicability of the research.

A limitation of this paper is that our scale's properties were not tested in a WEIRD context. However, we see no reason to argue that the scale would function differently in such contexts. We encourage researchers to extend our scale to WEIRD contexts, where both diffuse and upward violence have become increasingly salient. The scale may also provide

valuable insights into understanding individual differences in collective violence beliefs in historically non-conflictual contexts that are becoming more contentious. Another limitation is the lack of exploration of potential contextual differences affecting the scale's performance. While validated across various contexts, the scale's applicability may differ in other settings due to cultural factors or conflict dynamics. Additionally, potential limitations related to methodology or sample size could affect the generalisability of our findings.

By addressing these points and further investigating the implications of not finding dimensions based on intensities, we can refine our understanding of collective violence and improve the scale's applicability in diverse contexts. Future research can focus on understanding how specific cultural, historical, or contextual factors may influence the perception of intensity or nature of collective violence and how this might affect the scale's performance.

2.11.1 Conclusion

Our Collective Violence Beliefs Scale (CVBS: 2D) proficiently encapsulates the multifaceted nature of collective violence beliefs across diverse intergroup contexts. It establishes that the target of violent acts—be it outgroup members (Diffuse Collective Violence) or outgroup leaders (Upward Collective Violence)—serves as the basis for the scale's multidimensionality, rather than the nature of the acts themselves. The scale exhibits both theoretical and empirical significance, establishing its criterion validity through its meaningful correlations with multiple constructs. Further, the distinct influence of various predictors on the two dimensions accentuates the qualitative and psychological differences encapsulated within the proposed multidimensionality. Notably, our findings contest the conventional view that threat is an obligatory precursor for justifying collective violence, particularly within environments marked by intergroup conflict or political turbulence.

While cognisant of its limitations and the potential for contextual variations, our scale provides significant insights into the intricate phenomenon of collective violence beliefs. As such, it can guide the development of interventions aimed at mitigating intergroup conflicts, thus contributing substantially to the discourse on collective violence and conflict resolution.

Chapter 3[2]: Authoritarianism and Social Dominance as differential predictors of individuals' support for collective violence

3.1 Abstract

In political psychology, relatively extreme forms of outgroup animosity, such as collective violence, remain understudied. As such, we know little about the ideological reasons people support different kinds of collective violence. Building on recent research on the dimensionality of collective violence, we test the link between two well-established intergroup ideologies – RWA and SDO – and support for two types of collective violence: diffuse collective violence (against members of outgroups) and upward collective violence (against leaders of outgroups). We hypothesized that RWA would predict higher support for

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diffuse collective violence, but *lower* support for upward collective violence. We also expected that SDO would predict higher support for both forms of violence. Results from two diverse, community samples in Lebanon (n = 596 & 1,035), showed consistent evidence of a negative relationship between RWA and upward collective violence beliefs and a positive relationship between SDO and diffuse collective violence beliefs. These results indicate that people in conflict settings legitimize and de-legitimize different types of violence for distinct ideological reasons.

Keywords: Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Intergroup Violence

3.2 Introduction

Collective violence remains a major problem facing many countries, especially outside the Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Developed (WEIRD; Henrich et al., 2010) world. For example, in Lebanon, on 14 October 2021, while members of Hizbullah and Amal Movement were protesting the lead judge probing the 2020 Beirut's port explosion, a series of violent clashes erupted taking the lives of six people and injuring many others (El Dahan, Perry & Bassam, 2021). The 2021 Beirut massacre was the worst the country has seen ever since the May conflict of 2008. The clashes took places in a famous area known for being a former civil war front line between Christian and Muslim Shiite neighbourhoods. The clashes were followed by an electronic war on social media between supporters of all those involved (Abou-Ismail, 2022), revealing how ideological narratives shape the justification and commission of collective violence against perceived ingroup enemies (see also Gallacher et

al., 2021). In the current paper, we empirically test the relationship between ideology and collective violence beliefs in Lebanon, for the first time.

To do so, we integrate one of the most researched theories in intergroup relations, the dual process model of ideology and prejudice (Duckitt, 2001), with recent developments in conceptualising and measuring individuals' support for collective violence. Specifically, Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al. (2023) showed that collective violence beliefs in high conflict contexts can be characterised by two dimensions – upward collective violence, targeted at outgroup leaders, and diffuse collective violence, targeted at outgroup members – and developed a scale to measure these two dimensions. Further, they found that these dimensions showed differential relationships with several theoretically relevant constructs. This suggested that the vast majority of the literature on collective violence, that treats it as unidimensional (e.g., Spanovic et al., 2010; Tausch et al., 2011), may be missing an important part of the picture. This is especially plausible given that the intergroup relations literature shows that people support different kinds of outgroup-directed animosity for different reasons.

Specifically, the large literature on the dual process model of ideology and prejudice has revealed that there are at least two distinct motivations for expressing animosity towards outgroups:(a) an ideological motive for social conformity and stability called right wing authoritarianism (RWA); and (b) an ideological motive for hierarchy and group dominance called social dominance orientation (SDO; Duckitt, 2001). While these two ideologies are related, they also have distinct elements (Sibley et al., 2007; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Considering the differences between them, we will test the hypothesis that RWA is positively related to diffuse collective violence, but negatively related to upward collective violence. This is because RWA reflects support for authority structures in society and thus, enacting violence against group leaders, even *outgroup* leaders, may be unpalatable to people high on RWA. On the other hand, we expect SDO to be positively related to both

forms of violence, consistent with its function and content relating to maintaining group-based dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). We test these hypotheses in two diverse, community samples from Lebanon (n = 596 & 1,035).

3.3 Predictors of Individuals' Support for Collective Violence

The study of collective violence in the social sciences has mainly been undertaken in the fields of political science (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Balcells & Stanton, 2021) and economics (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), with a focus on the structural causes of violence (such as economic conditions or the nature of the political system; Dixon, 2009). Political science work on collective violence, for instance, tends to focus on nation-level or group-level analyses, as researching individual attitudes in times of conflict is risky and impractical most of the time (Balcells & Stanton, 2021). Relatedly, the fields of evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology focus on distal causes – i.e., selection pressures in ancestral environments that lead to 'coalitional aggression', across many species and across time, either as an adaptive behaviour or as a by-product of other adaptations (Durrant, 2011). Research on gang violence has also considered the roles different factors such as geography, networks and community, culture, families, schools, and gang membership play in promoting violence (Vasquez et al., 2010; Vasquez et al., 2015; Papachristos et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2022).

However, psychological research on the *proximal, individual-level* predictors of collective violence is much scarcer (but see Bartusevičius et al., 2020; Kalmoe and Mason, 2022). The small literature in social psychology, which attempts to differentiate between 'collective action' that is normative versus non-normative (e.g., peaceful versus violent protests), comes closest providing insight on why people differ in their support for collective violence (see Becker & Tausch, 2015 for a review).

In a seminal study, Tausch et al., (2011) distinguished normative from non-normative collective action and showed that these two kinds of collective behaviour have different

psychological antecedents. Since this initial work, a handful of more recent studies have taken up the mantle of examining the antecedents of non-normative collective action (e.g., Stathi et al., 2019; see also Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021). For example, Travaglino's (2019) 'social banditry' framework builds on Tausch et al.'s (2011) model to show that perceived injustice and low political efficacy predict support for dissident groups that engage in non-normative political acts (e.g., the hacking group, Anonymous).

Another recent thread of social-psychological research examines very similar behaviours as the non-normative collective action literature, under the rubric of 'political violence'. For example, Schumpe et al. (2018) found that providing alternate means to achieve social change reduces the motivation to engage in political violence. Moreover, Bartusevičius et al. (2020) found that individuals' levels of autocratic (vs. democratic) political belief predicted higher support for political violence. These findings underscore the importance of studying the proximal, individual-level predictors of support for extreme forms of collective action, especially in places where normative means to social change are hard to achieve.

However, as argued by Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al. (2023), the study of these proximal predictors has been hampered by the lack of a consistent conceptual and measurement framework for studying individual differences in collective violence support (but see Winiewski & Bulska, 2020). Building on the larger interpersonal violence literature, and focussing on attitudes towards collective violence rather than violent behaviours *per se*, these authors found two distinct dimensions of individual-level attitudes. These were, support for collective violence targeted at outgroup members (termed 'diffuse collective violence') and targeted at outgroup leaders (termed 'upward collective violence'). This two-dimensional model was replicated across five studies in three high-conflict intergroup contexts and a scale to measure these dimensions was validated (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023). Crucially,

criterion validity analyses revealed that diffuse and upward collective violence related differentially to established correlates of collective behaviour. For example, system justification and religious fundamentalism were positively related to diffuse collective violence but negatively related to upward collective violence.

This further highlights the need to consider that individuals may support or oppose different types of collective violence for different reasons. In the current analysis, we address the scarcity in the literature on the proximal predictors of violence, by integrating one of the most researched models of intergroup attitudes – the dual process model of ideology and prejudice (Duckitt, 2001) – with the two-dimensional model of collective violence developed by Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al. (2023).

3.4 The Dual Process Model and Collective Violence

The dual process model of ideology and prejudice (Duckitt, 2001) proposes that individual differences in intergroup attitudes can be explained by two orthogonal, but related, ideological motives: RWA (Altemeyer, 1998) and SDO (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In support of this model, hundreds of correlational studies find strong, consistent relationships between RWA and SDO on the one hand, and prejudice, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and support for right-wing policies on the other (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2016 for a review). Moreover, longitudinal studies have shown that RWA and SDO *precede* prejudice, providing evidence for the direction of the proposed causal effects of these ideologies (e.g., Asbrock et al., 2010). In most comprehensive analysis to date – a ten-year study using a large nationally representative sample – Osborne et al. (2021) found that RWA and SDO predicted within-person change in generalized prejudice, group-specific prejudice, and anti-minority beliefs.

Despite this accumulated evidence, very few studies go beyond prejudice, to examine the effects of RWA and SDO on group-based behaviour, such as collective violence (or putative support for such behaviour). The most relevant evidence comes from studies on the

effects of RWA and SDO on behavioural intentions to engage in normative collective action. For example, Choma et al. (2020) found that both RWA and SDO positively correlated with collective action that targets societal moral breakdown, but negatively correlated to collective actions aimed at equalising interracial relations. Saeri et al. (2015) found similar results among American adults, where those higher on RWA and SDO supported collective action that maintained the status quo or the established order. Lemieux & Asal (2010) found that those higher on SDO and RWA are generally less likely to take any action, although those higher on SDO were more likely to both choose terror attack and indicate it as more justified over choosing peaceful measures. In the only other study we know of to examine the relationship between RWA and SDO and collective violence, Winiewski & Bulska (2020) found that SDO predicted active forms of violence (e.g., physical aggression), but not passive forms of violence (e.g., exclusion). These findings provide the first evidence RWA and SDO predict violence beliefs via distinct psychological pathways.

Indeed, distinguishing between the distinct, authoritarian and dominance pathways at play in intergroup relations is one of the primary theoretical contributions of the dual process model (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). According to the model, people low on openness to experience develop a worldview in which outgroups are perceived as threats to the collective security, leading to high RWA. They therefore express prejudice, and support authoritarian policies for maintaining law and order, as a way of tackling the perception of being threatened. On the other hand, people low on agreeableness develop a worldview in which outgroups are perceived as competitors for group dominance, leading to high SDO. They therefore express prejudice, and support hierarchical policies, as a way of promoting their group's interests in the perceived competition with outgroups.

A large number of studies have provided evidence for these differences in RWA and SDO, as well as evidence for their divergent effects on intergroup attitudes and behaviour. For

example, Duckitt (2001) outlined decades of research indicating that RWA was related to attitudes and ideologies that can be considered 'socially conservative', whereas SDO was related to attitudes and ideologies that are 'economically conservative' (see also, Cohrs and Asbrock 2009, Duckitt, 2006; Sibley et al., 2007). Heaven et al. (2006) found that RWA most strongly associated with national security and order values, whereas SDO was most strongly negatively associated with international harmony and equality. Finally, Bilewicz et al.'s (2015) study comes closest to the current paper's focus on collective violence, specifically, by examining the predictors of support for hate speech. They found that SDO was associated with opposition for hate-speech prohibition whereas RWA was associated with support for such prohibition. The authors theorized that people high in RWA are particularly sensitive to norm violations, and thus, are more inclined to oppose counter-normative expressions of prejudice such as hate speech.

These findings highlight that considering the differences between RWA and SDO provides a more nuanced view of the nature of relations between groups in multicultural societies. Given our current aim to integrate the dual process model with the two-dimensional model of support for collective violence developed by Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al. (2023), the distinction between these two ideologies that is most relevant relates to the content of RWA that is not shared with SDO. Specifically, RWA connotes a certain deference to authority, and a desire to maintain social norms, that is not part of the content of SDO (Altemeyer, 1986; Duckitt et al., 2010; Passini, 2017). This feature of RWA suggests that it would lower support for collective violence against outgroup leaders (upward collective violence). With an interest in the maintaining collective security and protecting the existing power structures (Heaven et al., 2006; Sibley et al., 2007; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), those high in RWA might be less willing to endorse violence against group leaders, even leaders of outgroups. This type of 'upward violence' not only goes against their respect for authority, but also represents a

potentially destabilizing change to the status quo. Such a prediction would be in line with Bilewicz et al.'s (2015) finding that people high on RWA oppose counter-normative expressions of outgroup derogation.

However, RWA simultaneously connotes derogation of outgroups more generally, which suggests that violence against outgroup members can be justified – i.e., diffuse collective violence. This would align with the motivation to reduce perceived threats to the ingroup. In contrast, SDO indexes a general preference for group dominance and ingroup superiority (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). As such, should be positively associated with support for violence against both outgroup leaders and outgroup members, as complementary strategies to achieve dominance for their own group (Winiewski & Bulska, 2020).



Figure 1. Conceptual model of the hypothesized associations of RWA and SDO with support for diffuse and upward collective violence.

3.5 The Present Research

Here, we test these differential effects of RWA and SDO on upward and diffuse collective violence in two large, diverse, community samples in Lebanon (N = 596 and 1035). Lebanon is a small country in the Middle East, born in 1920 and officially constitutes 18 sects, which are in principle variations of the three Abrahamic religions (Judaism,

Christianity, and Islam). However, sects in Lebanon (especially ones larger in numbers such as Christian Maronites, Muslim Sunnis, Muslim Shia, Christian Orthodox, and Druze) have developed into different, and at times conflicting political identities. Fighting over resources and values, the Lebanese civil war of 1975 ignited after the different Lebanese sects disagreed on their position from what was going on in the region.

Lebanon is a particularly interesting context for such an investigation because it has 18 sects, dozens of political parties and has witnessed sects dominate one another and take over roles and positions every time the situation permitted. Lebanon has also developed a political system that is very hierarchical, putting the biggest sects on top of every office in the country in what became known as consensual democracy between the sects (Henley, 2016). This unique blend of sects in the Middle East still preserves traditions and witnesses both conversative and liberal norms, making it excellent to observe how RWA and SDO predict prejudice in different forms of aggression. Moreover, tensions between sects have often resulted in collective violence (both upward and diffuse) at various times in Lebanese history, including recently (Abou-Ismail, 2022).

Based on the analysis presented in the preceding section, we will test the hypothesis that RWA will be negatively associated with upward collective violence, but positively associated with diffuse collective violence. On the other hand, we hypothesize that SDO will be positively related to both upward and diffuse collective violence. For a depiction of the full theoretical model being tested in the present research, see Figure 1.

3.6 Study 1

3.6.1 Method

Participants

An adult convenience sample was recruited by circulating an anonymous Qualtrics link via social media, using the lead author's links with community organisations in Lebanon.

The sample consisted of 596 participants and was broadly representative of the various sectarian groups in this diverse country. Specifically, the sample was 17.3% Christian Maronite, 15.1% Shi'a, 32.5% Sunni, 23.4% Druze, 13.7% Christian Orthodox, 0.9% Armenian, 4.1% Other Christian sects, 3% Other Muslim sects. Around 21% of the sample identified themselves as politically affiliated with the October revolution of 2019, while the remaining were either members of traditional parties or other political groups. The sample had a mean age of 28.71 (SD = 9.61) and comprised 58.5% women.

Measures

SDO was measured using seven items from Ho et al. (2015), translated into Arabic: "An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom", "Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups", "No one group should dominate in society (R)", "Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top (R)", "Group equality should not be our primary goal", "It is unjust to try to make groups equal", "We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups (R)" . The scale showed good internal reliability ($\alpha = .67$).

RWA was measured using the 3 item Very Short Authoritarian (VSA) scale developed by Bizumic & Duckitt (2018), translated into Arabic: "It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority (R)", "What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity", "God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late", "There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse (R)", "Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws (R)", "The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down on troublemakers, if we are going to preserve law and order". The first and fifth item showed very weak factor loadings in our CFA, indicating that they did not perform well in the

Lebanese context. These items were therefore removed from the final model to improve the reliability of the latent factor (α = .59).

Collective violence was measured using the scale developed by Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al. (2023). The scale included 17 items in Study 1, measuring two dimensions. Diffuse Collective Violence was measured using items such as "It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect". Upward Collective Violence was measured using items such as "Building representative figures of corrupted politicians and destroying them in groups is a justified act". Both subscales had good internal reliability (diffuse collective violence α = .93; upward collective violence α = .87).

All items were rated using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

3.6.2 Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations between all variables are presented in Table 1. We fit a structural equation model to test the simultaneous effects of RWA and SDO on diffuse collective violence and upward collective violence, while adjusting for the residual covariance between the two outcomes. As shown in Figure 2, latent diffuse collective violence and latent upward collective violence were each regressed on latent RWA, latent SDO and all covariates simultaneously namely: age and gender (coded as 1 female, 2 male; see Table 2 for more details). Overall, results showed that model fit the data very well (χ^2 (392) = 764.73, p <.001, CFI = 0.94, SRMR = .06 RMSEA = .04 CI [.036, .044]). Parameter estimates (see Table 2) revealed no association between RWA and diffuse collective violence (b = .05, se = .04, p = .19) but a positive association between SDO and diffuse collective violence (b = .33, se = .05, p <.001). In contrast, RWA (b = -.18, se = .05, p <.001) and SDO (b = -.16, se = .06, p = .003) were both negatively associated with upward collective violence.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between All Observed Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
1. RWA 1																																
2. RWA 2	0.001																															
3. RWA 3	-.100**	.267**																														
4. RWA 4	-.072*	.101**	.604**																													
5. RWA 5	-0.025	-0.008	0.002	.100**																												
6. RWA 6	-.121**	.150**	.307**	.171**	0.066																											
7. SDO 1	.106**	.120**	-0.02	-.076*	-0.071	0.017																										
8. SDO 2	0.05	.149**	.157**	.141**	-0.012	.116**	.366**																									
9. SDO 3	.154**	0.027	-0.019	-0.012	0.04	-0.042	0.052	0.016																								
10. SDO 4	.186**	0.031	-0.02	ca	0.028	-0.04	.199**	0.069	.233**																							
11. SDO 5	.146**	.083*	-0.001	0.007	-.102**	0.012	.263**	.199**	.161**	.222**																						
12. SDO 6	.159**	0.037	-0.045	-0.044	-.089*	0.024	.241**	.162**	.137**	.257**	.531**																					
13. SDO 7	.229**	-0.006	-0.063	-0.045	-0.059	-.093*	.241**	.118**	.218**	.310**	.397**	.339**																				
14. GCV 1	.179**	0.075	0.025	0.022	-0.046	-0.028	.154**	.160**	.091*	.139**	.154**	.171**	.207**																			
15. GCV 2	.235**	0.075	0.008	0.014	-0.041	-0.026	.102*	.109**	.126**	.187**	.175**	.178**	.241**	.736**																		
16. GCV 3	.143**	0.079	0.017	0.026	-0.033	-0.021	.091*	.113**	.083*	.147**	.177**	.204**	.162**	.678**	.672**																	
17. GCV 4	.178**	0.03	-0.006	-0.012	-0.06	-0.054	0.07	.121**	.144**	.131**	.158**	.157**	.222**	.630**	.693**	.615**																
18. GCV 5	.126**	.080*	0.045	0.037	-0.009	-0.008	.139**	.141**	.141**	.236**	.135**	.172**	.197**	.547**	.557**	.501**	.587**															
19. GCV 6	.161**	0.054	0.031	0.031	-0.05	-.097*	.087*	.138**	.137**	.191**	.156**	.124**	.257**	.571**	.581**	.514**	.705**	.594**														
20. GCV 7	.170**	0.065	0.016	-0.003	-0.06	-0.012	.095*	.093*	.126**	.156**	.162**	.136**	.199**	.530**	.602**	.502**	.572**	.561**	.613**													
21. GCV 8	.148**	-0.005	0.006	-0.026	-0.036	-0.052	0.068	.090*	.135**	.118**	.131**	.116**	.179**	.606**	.670**	.557**	.561**	.444**	.496**	.586**												
22. GCV 9	.234**	-0.014	-0.031	-0.012	-0.066	-0.08	0.069	.123**	.100*	.144**	.130**	.137**	.246**	.624**	.677**	.616**	.582**	.510**	.542**	.563**	.591**											
23. TCV 1	-.157**	-.141**	-.172**	-.115**	-.095*	-0.04	0.052	-0.02	-.122**	-.113**	-.102*	-.094*	-0.059	-0.074	-.087*	-.082*	-0.008	0.05	0.03	-0.077	-0.069	-0.032									
24. TCV 2	-.086*	-.218**	-.175**	-.116**	-0.023	-.094*	0.045	-0.011	-0.028	-0.066	-0.073	-0.04	-0.057	-0.059	-0.052	-0.041	0.023	0.052	0.053	-0.003	-0.032	-0.03	.619**								
25. TCV 3	-.208**	-.184**	-.207**	-.161**	-0.061	-0.079	0.026	-0.068	-.113**	-.154**	-0.026	-0.05	-0.077	-0.077	-0.073	-.109**	-0.055	-0.049	-0.034	-.115**	-0.053	-0.057	.502**	.424**							
26. TCV 4	-0.023	-.110**	-.087*	-0.047	-0.044	-0.016	0.061	0.034	-0.016	-0.025	0.014	0.017	-0.013	0.052	.099*	0.069	.143**	.125**	.128**	.084*	0.08	.131**	.364**	.371**	.293**						
27. TCV 5	-.116**	-.196**	-.258**	-.247**	-0.077	-.102*	0.057	-0.077	-.103*	-0.079	-0.024	-0.024	-0.054	0.006	-0.027	-0.04	0.049	0.034	0.079	-0.017	-0.011	-0.013	.471**	.461**	.526**	.449**						
28. TCV 6	-.167**	-.148**	-0.07	-0.039	-0.068	0.02	0.029	-0.011	-.111**	-0.052	-0.02	-0.002	-0.033	-0.022	-0.031	-0.072	0.023	0.077	0.049	0.011	-0.044	-0.01	.436**	.453**	.405**	.551**	.493**					
29. TCV 7	-0.055	-.120**	-0.043	-0.058	-0.051	-0.008	0.013	-0.009	-0.049	-0.047	-0.069	-0.052	-0.009	0.04	0.05	-0.009	.087*	.146**	.130**	0.076	0.037	0.076	.435**	.494**	.375**	.526**	.462**	.639**				
30. TCV 8	-.163**	-.149**	-.088*	-0.061	-0.049	0.025	-0.034	-0.007	-.092*	-.081*	-.137**	-.133**	-.108**	-.086*	-0.074	-.108**	-0.023	0.016	-0.019	-0.078	-0.066	-.087*	.430**	.364**	.392**	.301**	.389**	.419**	.406**			
31. Age	0.002	-.123**	-.218**	-.186**	0.043	-0.053	0.064	0.009	-0.023	0.027	0.024	0.058	-0.057	-0.071	-0.068	-0.085	-0.057	-.091*	-0.084	-0.081	-.098*	-0.04	0.02	-0.053	0.062	0.028	0.012	-0.03	-.094*	0.011		
32. Gender	.101*	-.156**	-.173**	-.169**	-.091*	-0.069	.106*	0.026	0.05	0.076	0.061	.082*	.195**	.152**	.144**	.107*	.089*	.132**	.118**	0.068	.083*	.098*	0.077	0.068	0.049	0.072	.132**	0.081	0.06	.110**	.088*	
M	1.55	3.06	3.25	3.32	3.46	3.57	1.94	2.31	1.64	1.7	2.04	1.98	1.61	1.31	1.29	1.31	1.37	1.65	1.45	1.36	1.29	1.3	3.46	3.36	3.6	2.66	3.39	3.31	3.23	3.82	28.71	1.42
SD	0.97	1.61	1.6	1.6	1.52	1.33	1.24	1.47	1.2	1.13	1.38	1.29	0.96	0.8	0.75	0.81	0.85	1.12	0.96	0.86	0.8	0.79	1.49	1.51	1.37	1.48	1.45	1.55	1.53	1.32	9.61	0.5

* p < .05 ** p < .01



Figure 2. Structural equation model in which latent RWA and latent SDO are modelled as simultaneous predictors of latent diffuse collective violence beliefs and latent upward collective violence beliefs. *Note.* *p < .01. For visual simplicity, observed indicators and covariates are not shown.

3.6.3 Discussion

In this first study, we tested the relationship between sociopolitical attitudes (RWA & SDO) and collective violence (diffuse and upward). Consistent with our predictions we found that those high on RWA showed lower support for collective violence against group leaders, whereas those high on SDO showed higher support for collective violence against members of outgroups. However, contrary to our predictions, RWA was not associated with diffuse collective violence and SDO was negatively associated with upward collective violence.

Study 1 was the first attempt to draw an empirical distinction between the predictors of diffuse and upward collective violence. Thus, we sought to replicate the findings in a second, diverse community sample in Lebanon. We were also constrained in Study 1 by the fact that our measure of RWA was not the most commonly used in the literature (i.e., Altemeyer, 1998) and many of the items showed very poor loadings onto the latent construct. Therefore, we believe that the measurement of RWA in Study 1 may have been compromised by limited reliability. Thus, in Study 2 we tested the same pattern of relationships with updated measures. Finally, we aimed to recruit a larger sample (double the size of Study 1), to

ensure that any non-significant effects were not simply a reflection of a lack of adequate statistical power to detect subtle ideological effects.

Table 2. Parameter estimates for the models predicting diffuse and upward collective violence in Study 1.

	Diffuse Collective Violence						Upward Collective Violence				
	b	*se*	*z*	99% CI			*b*	*se*	*z*	99% CI	
				low	*high*					*low*	*high*
RWA	.05	.04	1.33	-.05	.16	RWA	-.18*	.05	-3.58	-.30	-.05
SDO	.33*	.05	6.44	.20	.46	SDO	-.16*	.06	-2.95	-.30	-.02
Age	-.14*	.05	-2.61	-.28	<.01	Age	-.09	.06	-1.51	-.25	.07
Gender (1Female. 2 Male)	.34*	.09	3.89	.12	.57	Gender	.22	.11	2.05	-.06	.50

Note. *p < .01

3.7 Study 2

The second study had two main goals: (1) to test SDO and RWA using different scales than the ones used in our first study after the poor performance of some of the items and, (2) to replicate the associations between ideology (i.e., RWA and SDO) and collective violence (i.e., diffuse and upward) found in Study 1 in a larger sample.

3.7.1 Methods

Participants

An adult convenience sample was recruited by circulating an anonymous Qualtrics link via social media, using the lead author's links with community organisations in Lebanon. The sample consisted of 1035 participants and was broadly representative of the various sectarian groups in this diverse country. Specifically, the sample was 29.5% Christian Maronite, 15.9% Shi'a, 23.9% Sunni, 13.3% Druze, 9% Christian Orthodox, 0.4% Armenian, 5.6% Other Christian sects, 1.9% Other Muslim sects. The majority of the sample identified themselves as not affiliated with any political group including alternative groups that were born after the 2019 revolution. The sample had a mean age of 31.05 (SD = 18.10) and comprised 47% women.

Questionnaire Measures

SDO was measured using the only version of SDO that has been validated in Arabic – specifically, the 4-item scale from Pratto et al. (2013): "In setting priorities, we must consider all groups. (R)", "We should not push for group equality", "Group equality should be our ideal (R)", "Superior groups should dominate inferior groups" (α = .58).

RWA was measured using the short 6-item scale from Altemeyer (1998), translated into Arabic: "It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds", "It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored the internet so that people could not get their hands on trashy and disgusting material", "Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fibre and traditional beliefs", "People should pay less attention to the religious books and other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral", "Atheists and others who have rebelled against established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly", "Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the "normal way" things are supposed to be done" (α = .74).

Collective violence was measured using the same scale as Study 1. Both subscales had excellent internal reliability (diffuse collective violence, α =.89); upward collective violence, α =.94). All scales were measured using 5-point Likert scale.

3.7.2 Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations between all variables are presented in Table 3. We fit a structural equation model to test the simultaneous effects of RWA and SDO on diffuse collective violence and upward collective violence, while adjusting for the residual

covariance between the two outcomes. As shown in Figure 3, latent diffuse collective violence and latent upward collective violence were each regressed on latent RWA, latent SDO and all covariates simultaneously namely: age and gender (coded as 1 female, 2 male; see Table 4 for more details). Overall, results showed that model fit the data very well (χ^2 (391) = 849.79, *p* <.001, CFI = 0.94, SRMR = .05 RMSEA = .03 CI [.031, .037]). Parameter estimates (see Table 4) revealed a positive association between RWA and diffuse collective violence (*b* = .18, *se* = .05, p = .001) and between SDO and diffuse collective violence (*b* = .16, *se* = .06, *p* = .005). In contrast, RWA (*b* = -.26, *se* = .05, *p* <.001) but not SDO (*b* = -.08, *se* = .06, *p* = .15) was negatively associated with upward collective violence.



Figure 3. Structural equation model in which latent RWA and latent SDO are modelled as simultaneous predictors of latent diffuse collective violence beliefs and latent upward collective violence beliefs. *Note.* *p < .01. For visual simplicity, observed indicators and covariates are not shown.

3.7.3 Discussion

We attempted to replicate the findings of the first study using different scales for RWA and SDO in a new, larger, community sample in Lebanon. This study confirmed some of our original predictions on the association between RWA, SDO, and collective violence and replicated some of the findings from Study 1. We found that those high on RWA to justify collective violence against members of the outgroup more than others; and justify collective violence against group leaders less than others. On the other hand, we found those high on

SDO justify collective violence against members of the outgroup more than others. The relationship between SDO and upward collective violence was not significant. Thus, Study 2 replicated some of the findings in study 1 namely: the relationship between RWA and upward collective violence, and the relationship between SDO and diffuse collective violence. It is important to note that the significant results between RWA and diffuse collective violence in line with our original hypothesis are most likely the result of using a more reliable measurement of the construct. The same cannot be said about SDO, however (discussed in more detail below).

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between All Observed Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1. RWA 1																														
2. RWA 2	.382**																													
3. RWA 3	.277**	.375**																												
4. RWA 4	.311**	.317**	.193**																											
5. RWA 5	.346**	.415**	.279**	.446**																										
6. RWA 6	.343**	.238**	.228**	.416**	.390**																									
7. SDO 1	0.044	-0.021	-0.019	.093**	0.069	0.036																								
8. SDO 2	.203**	.162**	.115**	.157**	.134**	.177**	.225**																							
9. SDO 3	0.062	0.011	-0.016	.072*	.138**	.141**	.365**	.349**																						
10. SDO 4	.193**	.153**	.106**	.077*	.095**	.116**	.143**	.199**	.218**																					
11. DCV 1	.082*	.096*	.159**	.101*	.224**	.200**	.086*	.124**	0.057	.099*																				
12. DCV 2	.110**	0.073	0.041	.091*	.139**	.192**	0.063	.154**	.099*	.180**	.570**																			
13. DCV 3	0.038	0.076	0.08	.103*	.161**	.156**	0.04	0.065	0.066	.126**	.600**	.570**																		
14. DCV 4	.102*	0.023	0.052	.099*	0.077	.126**	.089*	.129**	.088*	.140**	.504**	.489**	.500**																		
15. DCV 5	.114**	.101*	.141**	.125**	.154**	.158**	0.051	0.063	0.036	.093*	.570**	.517**	.536**	.517**																	
16. DCV 6	0.065	0.029	.083*	.083*	.155**	.160**	.096*	.085*	.121**	.165**	.515**	.535**	.514**	.569**	.633**																
17. DCV 7	0.017	0.025	0.064	0.009	0.045	0.075	.090*	.087*	0.037	0.075	.435**	.420**	.427**	.402**	.462**	.418**															
18. DCV 8	0.076	0.045	-0.012	0.068	0.08	.112**	.081*	.127**	.081*	.157**	.455**	.566**	.427**	.491**	.398**	.409**	.355**														
19. DCV 9	.121**	0.058	0.043	0.062	.112**	.184**	0.064	0.078	0.056	0.071	.539**	.472**	.488**	.455**	.539**	.477**	.399**	.482**													
20. TCV 1	-.243**	-.178**	-.083*	-.159**	-.139**	-.268**	-.117**	-.131**	-0.028	-.104*	-0.002	-0.032	0.047	0.072	0.062	0.041	0.06	-0.002	0.024											
21. TCV 2	-.182**	-0.079	0	-.127**	-.092*	-.231**	-0.068	-.127**	-0.033	-0.081	0.044	0.023	0.071	0.039	.088*	0.065	.093*	0.006	0.033	.647**										
22. TCV 3	-.207**	-0.071	-0.005	-.130**	-.082*	-.216**	-.118**	-.169**	-0.064	-0.061	0.042	-0.005	0.069	0.081	0.047	0.068	.092*	0.029	0.024	.573**	.590**									
23. TCV 4	-.154**	-.133**	-0.011	-.159**	-.102*	-.185**	-.116**	-.083*	-0.03	-0.016	0.045	0.025	0.032	0.078	.091*	0.026	0.038	-0.026	0.039	.661**	.585**	.570**								
24. TCV 5	-.139**	-0.034	-0.001	-.101*	-0.043	-.116**	-0.074	-.122**	-0.027	-0.062	0.052	0.036	0.083	0.033	0.078	0.065	.133**	0.029	0.054	.617**	.665**	.550**	.577**							
25. TCV 6	-.179**	-.166**	0.015	-.089*	-.111**	-.209**	-0.077	-0.069	-0.034	-.108**	0.024	-0.019	0.062	0.075	.094*	0.031	.102*	0.028	0.038	.564**	.577**	.748**	.544**	.544**						
26. TCV 7	-.222**	-.204**	-0.055	-.132**	-.109**	-.224**	-.107**	-0.076	-0.054	-0.046	0.014	-0.008	0.027	.099*	0.06	0.02	0.037	-0.02	-0.034	.728**	.611**	.526**	.679**	.577**	.541**					
27. TCV 8	-.157**	-.099*	-0.003	-.085*	-.116**	-.202**	-.093*	-.113**	-0.054	-0.077	0.019	-0.031	0.055	0.037	.088*	0.04	.091*	0.016	0.041	.602**	.597**	.755**	.553**	.616**	.787**	.564**				
28. TCV 9	-.181**	-.180**	-0.022	-0.069	-0.07	-.206**	-.084*	-.082*	-0.009	-0.016	0.052	0.031	.095*	.108*	.096*	0.068	.142**	0.061	0.059	.562**	.554**	.656**	.509**	.553**	.699**	.538**	.720**			
29. Age	0.082	0.04	0.036	-0.045	-0.018	0.084	0.071	.113*	-0.059	0.08	-0.074	-0.039	-0.015	-0.079	0.039	-0.08	0.058	-0.061	0.061	-.178**	-.169**	-.164**	-0.091	-.168**	-.192**	-.127**	-.150**	-.157**		
30. Gender	0.08	-0.002	.103*	-0.008	0.037	0.029	0.089	0.031	.136**	0.033	0.019	0.018	0.079	0.021	0.046	0.088	-0.016	-0.035	0	0.051	0.022	0.001	-0.02	0.009	0.036	0.009	0.025	0.039	-0.038	
M	1.99	2.21	3.26	2.26	2.21	2.51	1.65	1.88	1.63	1.62	1.28	1.24	1.25	1.44	1.5	1.42	1.38	1.23	1.3	3.92	3.92	3.8	4.01	3.82	3.81	4.01	3.94	3.53	31.05	1.53
SD	1.25	1.45	1.6	1.38	1.37	1.34	1	1.2	1.02	1.1	0.72	0.64	0.66	0.88	0.93	0.81	0.86	0.63	0.75	1.36	1.31	1.41	1.33	1.44	1.42	1.33	1.33	1.47	18.1	0.5

* p < .05 ** p < .01

Table 4. Parameter estimates for the models predicting diffuse and upward collective violence in Study 2.

	Diffuse Collective Violence						Upward Collective Violence				
	b	*se*	*z*	99% CI			*b*	*se*	*z*	99% CI	
				low	*high*					*low*	*high*
RWA	.18*	.05	3.34	.04	.16	RWA	-.26*	.05	-5.14	-.39	-.13
SDO	.16*	.06	2.8	.01	.46	SDO	-.08	.06	-1.45	-.22	.06
Age	.14*	.05	2.62	<.01	<.01	Age	-.07	.05	-1.3	-.19	.06
Gender (1Female. 2 Male)	<.01	.03	.09	-.08	.09	Gender	.01	.03	0.26	-.07	.09

Note. *p < .01.

3.8 Chapter 3 General Discussion

Here, we integrated the dual process model of ideology and prejudice with the two-dimensional model of collective violence (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023) by testing the relationship RWA and SDO and support for two diffuse and upward collective violence. The relationship was analysed using two separate scales and samples from Lebanon. Both studies confirmed our predictions about (a) the association between RWA and upward violence and (b) the association between SDO and diffuse violence. In both studies, RWA had a negative association with support for upward violence, and SDO had a positive association with support for diffuse violence.

Overall, these findings support our argument that that those high on RWA, motivated by respect for authority structures, would show lower support for acts of violence targeting group leaders, even if they are leaders of an outgroup. They also suggest, that those high on SDO, motivated to dominate and out-compete outgroups, show higher support acts of violence against outgroup members more generally. Findings regarding the other associations in our theoretical model were more mixed. Specifically, the relationship between RWA and diffuse collective violence was only positive and significant in Study 2, while the relationship between SDO and upward collective violence was only significant (but negative) in Study 1.

We did not find consistent support for the idea, drawn from prior research on prejudice (Sibley & Duckitt, 2010), that RWA would be positively related to support for diffuse

collective violence. However, we believe the null effect in Study 1 may be a methodological artefact driven by the unreliable measurement of RWA. Some of the items on the RWA scale used in Study 1 loaded so poorly onto the latent construct that we had to exclude them entirely, resulting in a truncated scale and consequently reduced reliability. The fact that the more typical and more reliable measure of RWA used in Study 2 revealed a significant effect in the expected direction lends support to this conjecture.

In contrast, we believe the reasons for the inconsistent observed effects of SDO on upward collective violence are more theoretical than methodological. SDO was initially conceptualised as a preference for the dominance of one's *ingroup* over outgroups in society (Pratto et al., 1994). However, as Jost & Thomson (2000) noted in their seminal article, SDO has also often been conceptualised as a preference for hierarchy *whether or not* it benefits one's ingroup. For groups lower in the intergroup hierarchy, opposition to equality implies maintaining the status quo that disadvantages their group, whereas group dominance implies upending that status quo in favour of their group. For advantaged groups, however, group dominance and opposition to equality both function to maintain the ingroup's advantaged position. Thus, the effects of SDO are contingent on the particular intergroup hierarchy being examined (Jost & Thompson, 2000).

In Lebanon, the sectarian power-sharing arrangements for governing the country, and complexity of ethnoreligious groups involved in it (Salibi, 1990; Harris, 2014), mean that it is not clear which groups can be considered advantaged and disadvantaged in the sense typically used in intergroup research – or indeed which groups see themselves as relatively advantaged or disadvantaged in the current hierarchy. Indeed, the history of conflict between groups could mean that every group considers themselves to be disadvantaged in some way. Prior research has shown that highly conflictual contexts foster feelings of deprivation regardless of the ingroup's objective position in the hierarchy (Leach et al., 2007). Being high in SDO and

perceiving one's ingroup to be relatively disadvantaged should be linked to increased support for violence motivated by ingroup dominance but decreased support for violence motivated by hierarchy maintenance.

The fact that SDO can imply these opposing processes, which could not be disentangled in the current context, might explain the lack of a consistent effect of SDO on upward collective violence observed here. Indeed, Study 2 which had higher statistical power and more reliable violence measures showed a *weaker* (and non-significant) relationship between SDO and upward collective violence. This provides further support for the idea that opposing processes or unmeasured moderators help explain the nature of the relationship between SDO and violence beliefs. Future research that can account for relative ingroup status, the two dimensions of SDO, as well as the two dimensions of collective violence, would help shed light on when the motivation for dominance results in collective violence and when it does not.

Overall, the current findings extend the psychological literature on collective violence by further reinforcing the importance of recent attempts to develop a multidimensional framework for collective violence attitudes at the individual level. In particular, they extend Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al. (2023) recent two-dimensional model in which violence targeted at outgroup members and leaders was found to have different correlates. Integrating this model with the dual process model of ideology and prejudice, we show that those low in RWA, who are motivated to question authority and established norms, seem more willing to support collective violence against outgroup leaders. However, those high in SDO, who are motivated to dominate outgroups, seem more willing to support collective violence against outgroup members. Given the prevalence of both kinds of violence across societies, future research should attempt to distinguish between them when considering the causes of intergroup disharmony in a given context, as well as when proposing potential solutions.

Our findings also extend the literature on the psychology of prejudice and discrimination. The vast literature showing that RWA and SDO predict negative intergroup attitudes and behaviours might lead to the straightforward prediction that these ideologies would also promote support for outgroup-targeted violence. However, our findings show that this is only true for justifying violence enacted against the average member of the outgroup member. RWA and SDO do not predict higher support for violence against outgroup leaders. In the case of RWA, the focus on authority and social conformity seems to result in an aversion to upward collective violence, whereas in the case of SDO the relationship may be null. The findings on RWA dovetails with research suggesting that authoritarians can sometimes support egalitarian intergroup beliefs if the social norms are egalitarian, in line with their motive for conformity (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Bilewicz et al., 2017; Gorska et al., 2021). Future research that considers when the motivation for conformity and support for authority indexed in RWA can lead to atypical intergroup outcomes (i.e., not just more intergroup antipathy), would help shed light on how this ideology functions. Finally, our model also suggests that future research on outgroup animosity that falls short of violence (e.g., prejudice) should move beyond attitudes towards outgroups, and consider attitudes towards outgroup leaders and members separately.

3.8.1 Strengths and limitations

The current study is correlational and therefore precludes causal inferences. We cannot be sure that RWA and SDO cause collective violence beliefs. Our hypotheses, however, were based on prior theorising as well as experimental and longitudinal research suggesting that RWA and SDO predict downstream intergroup attitudes and behaviour. However, longitudinal research also indicates that people's intergroup attitudes can affect their levels of RWA and SDO over time (Osborne et al., 2021). Thus, it is likely that our results reflect a snapshot of a reciprocal process.

Our study is also limited by its focus on a single context, that of Lebanon. There is need for further replication of these patterns across other conflictual contexts. However, as noted earlier, Lebanon provides a unique environment for studying collective violence, which our study has been able to leverage. With its complex sectarian history and politics, it represents a social structure that is prevalent across many similar nations, but that is not well represented in the psychological literature. Most social psychology research, including research on prejudice and discrimination, is conducted in WEIRD contexts (Henrich et al., 2010). This lack of diverse samples is reflected in the scarcity of psychological research on extreme forms of intergroup disharmony such as collective violence – relative to less extreme forms such as job discrimination – that are more prevalent in outside the WEIRD world (although they are also becoming more common in WEIRD countries; e.g., Borowczyk-Martins et al., 2017). Our findings suggest that phenomena such as collective violence are complex, cannot be straightforwardly extrapolated from other intergroup attitudes, and may be highly dependent on the nature of intergroup hierarchy being studied.

3.8.2 Conclusion

We have tested the effect of authoritarianism and social dominance on two types of collective violence (diffuse and upward) using two different samples from a non-WEIRD context, namely Lebanon. We found that those high on authoritarianism tend to oppose collective violence beliefs against leaders, and justify it against members of outgroups. While the first finding was consistent, the second was not. Social dominance on the other hand was found to justify collective violence beliefs against members of outgroups in both of our studies, and oppose it against leaders in one of the studies. While the literature has extensively investigated the effect of these attitudes on different forms of prejudice, research that study the effect of authoritarianism and social dominance on extreme forms of prejudice such as collective violence remains scarce. Future research can investigate this relationship further

and in different contexts, especially with collective violence being an ongoing worldwide phenomenon.

Chapter 4[3]: Double Trouble: Sectarian and National Narcissism as Differential Predictors of Collective Violence Beliefs in Lebanon

4.1 Abstract

Collective narcissism a belief in ingroup greatness which is contingent on external validation. A lack of research on collective narcissism amongst non-Western contexts and minority groups remains a challenge for the field. However, here we test two types of collective narcissism (sectarian and national) as differential predictors of two dimensions of collective violence beliefs (against outgroup members and leaders) in a large, diverse, community sample from Lebanon ($N = 778$). We found that sectarian narcissism (narcissism related to smaller political and religious ingroup identity) predicted support for collective violence against members of different sects, while national narcissism predicted opposition to such collective violence. Neither form of collective narcissism had any significant relationship with collective violence against outgroup leaders. We controlled for both sectarian and national identification and found no significant effects in predicting either one of the two dimensions on collective violence beliefs. In this non-Western context, in which a coherent national identity is undermined by sectarianism, national narcissism seems to be a progressive motivator for unity and social change, while sectarian narcissism is rather associated with extreme attitudes, such as support for collective violence.

Keywords: Collective Narcissism, Collective Violence, Intergroup Conflict

[3] This chapter is based on the following paper: Abou-Ismail, R., Gronfeldt, B., Konur, T., Cichocka, A., Phillips, J., and Sengupta., N., Double Trouble: How Sectarian and National Narcissism Relate Differently to Collective Violence Beliefs in Lebanon. Journal of Aggressive Behavior.

4.2 Introduction

In 2019, the October revolution took place in Beirut, Lebanon. One of the aims of the revolution, in which hundreds of thousands participated, was to end sectarianism which has divided the country between different Muslim and Christian political identities. The revolution was, however, unsuccessful in achieving major change. Nevertheless, the first post-revolution election resulted in 13 new Members of Parliament who eschewed representing their birth sect and instead emphasised a shared Lebanese national identity. Although most Lebanese would without doubt claim to love their country, their idealised vision for Lebanon would usually be dictated by their sectarian ingroup's narrative (Henley, 2015.; Salibi, 1990). Nevertheless, while there are ongoing efforts to establish a shared Lebanese national identity (Sullivan, 2019; Abouaoun, 2022), such sentiments remain a minority position. This recent trend away from sectarian politics in Lebanon, while understudied, has key analogues to a number of initiatives to heighten the salience of superordinate identities that unite (potentially) conflicting subordinate identities. For example, European identity is seen as way to bridge divisions between different European countries (Mayer & Palmowski, 2004). Just as national identities remain salient in Europe, sectarian identities continue to represent most of the Lebanese people (Cammett, 2019).

Interestingly, both movements campaigning for sectarian groups and groups campaigning for a united national identity, believe *their* 'Lebanon' was once great, but has been underappreciated and undermined in more recent history and lacking recognition from other groups in the country or the outside world (Abdeni-Holman, 2022). These beliefs can be captured by collective narcissism, a belief that the ingroup is exceptional but underappreciated (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Marchlewska et al., 2020). People high in collective narcissism think their ingroup is unique and entitled to privileged treatment, but that its greatness is not sufficiently recognised by others (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). They

also see other groups as undermining their interests (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). Collective narcissism is a strong predictor of outgroup hostility, but especially towards outgroups perceived as threatening to the ingroup's image (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). Collective narcissism can generate hostility that manifests in the justification of extreme violence against outgroups (Cichocka, Bocian, et al., 2022) and support for political violence (Jasko et al., 2020). In this paper, we examine collective narcissism at the sectarian and national levels as predictors of two dimensions of collective violence beliefs in Lebanon (one targeted at sectarian outgroup members, and another at sectarian outgroup leaders), a country afflicted by deep sectarian divides, intergroup conflict and the absence of a religious or ethnic majority group (Henley, 2015; Salibi, 1990).

As implied earlier, Lebanon is an interesting context for the study of identity dynamics given the presence of multiple competing ingroup identities known as sects (Henley, 2015; Salibi, 1990). These sects, while religious in origin, play a significant role in the country's political scene, forming the foundation of political identities and values (Henley, 2015; Salibi, 1990). Although there are disagreements among these sects regarding Lebanon's national identity (Salibi, 1990; Salibi, 1971), citizens may still have formed a sense of national identity with the country at large – at least their version of what Lebanon is. This makes the concept of collective narcissism a useful framework for studying national or sectarian identities in a diverse country like Lebanon. It also offers an ideal opportunity to study the effects of multiple types of collective narcissism in parallel. While people can develop collective narcissism with any social group (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), the competing effects of different types of collective narcissisms have never been assessed. Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether collective narcissism of superordinate groups (i.e., nation) behaves the same way as subordinate groups (i.e., sects). In contexts where multiple ingroup identities coexist

and compete, the meaning of ingroup sentiments may differ, particularly if the given national identity is viewed as progressive and seeks to unite more established and traditional subordinate identities into a superordinate one. The presence of a superordinate national identity along with strong sectarian identities make Lebanon a useful test case. Thus, we can contrast collective narcissism at the national level (i.e., national narcissism) and the sectarian level (i.e., sectarian narcissism) and test if they relate differently with support for collective violence, which has unfortunately characterised much of the country's short history.

4.3 Collective Narcissism: The Quest for Ingroup Recognition

Collective narcissism assumes an exaggerated ingroup positivity, and therefore has a moderately positive association with other constructs emphasising ingroup greatness (e.g., social dominance orientation, Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). However, in contrast to social dominance orientation, collective narcissism is not necessarily a quest for dominance over other groups, but rather a quest for recognition from other groups (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Gronfeldt et al., 2021). This becomes especially relevant in contexts where collective narcissism is not expressed through military strength or other forms of material power. For instance, God's love, exceptional loss, suffering and martyrdom are the bases for collective narcissism in Hungary (Forgas & Lantos, 2020) and Poland (Skarżyńska et al., 2012). National narcissism also differs from nationalism (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Federico et al., 2023), which has been described as a belief in national superiority (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) and "chauvinistic arrogance and desire for dominance in international relations" (Li & Brewer, 2004, p. 728). Nationalism captures the perception that its superiority entitles the nation to use force and hostility to achieve and maintain dominance in international affairs (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; de Figueiredo Jr & Elkins, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey et al., 2001; Pehrson et al., 2009). In contrast, people high in collective narcissism would justify hostility, such as collective violence, but primarily as a

way to satisfy a hubristic need for recognition of their uniqueness and achievements (Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019).

Collective narcissism has mostly been studied in the context of WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Developed; Golec de Zavala et al., 2022) samples (though see Jasko et al., 2020; Marinthe et al., 2022; Yustisia et al., 2020 for few notable exceptions). However, populations not accustomed to dominance nationally or internationally also display it. For example, collective narcissism is higher in countries that are less globalised, especially in terms of their political and economic systems (Cichocka, Sengupta, et al., 2022).

It is important to note that not all forms of ingroup identity are defensive. Contrary to collective narcissism, social identification can be secure and confident in that it does not depend on external validation (Cichocka, 2016). Generally, when controlling for collective narcissism, social identification predicts constructive outcomes in intergroup relations, such as tolerance (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Marchlewska et al., 2020) and outgroup solidarity (Górska et al., 2020; Marchlewska et al., 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2022).

4.4 Collective Narcissism and Collective Violence Beliefs

Collective violence refers to acts perpetrated by individuals or a group of individuals on behalf of their collective, irrespective of whether the larger group acknowledges or endorses these actions. It involves targeting one or more individuals from a different group solely based on their group membership (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023; Winiewski & Bulska, 2020). Collective violence beliefs then, are related to how individuals justify or oppose such acts. Hostility, characterised by a strong negative attitude towards others, can be described as encompassing both the cognitive and affective components of aggression. In extreme cases of aggression, hostility can escalate into violence (Buss & Perry, 1992). While justification for violence, which might be related to how one thinks or feels, is different than acts of violence (Parrott & Giancola, 2007), people's attitudes are generally a good predictor of their

intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991; Bosnjak et al., 2020). Admittedly, only a small percentage of those who believe violence is justified would themselves act on those beliefs, however, with a phenomenon that can leave ever lasting effects, deeper understanding of what motivates such beliefs becomes a compelling task (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022).

Research shows that collective narcissism can lead to downstream intergroup hostility as a means to achieve the recognition the ingroup is perceived to deserve (Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). This can take the form of explicit support for extreme collective violence against outgroups (Cichocka, Bocian, et al., 2022; Jasko et al., 2020), as well as justification for the ingroup using anti-democratic means to achieve recognition (Bocian et al., 2021; Golec de Zavala & Keenan, 2022). A characteristic of collective narcissism is an exaggerated perception that the ingroup is constantly under threat (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016), and therefore deserving of being defended by any means necessary (Golec de Zavala, 2011; Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020).

In contexts that are already conflictual (such as Lebanon), actual intergroup behaviours can further exaggerate threat perceptions. The response to any form of deliberate provocation might take a more extreme form of hostility, such as collective violence. Jasko and colleagues (2020) found that collective quest for significance motivated extreme ideological behaviours (such as political violence), especially in conflictual contexts. Collective violence is supported more strongly by those high in collective narcissism in radical contexts (vs. non-radical). Collective significance quest is not necessarily narcissistic, but captures a similar desire for ingroup greatness. Additionally, people more readily engage in violence where it is descriptively normative, and feel belonging to (Littman & Paluck, 2015) and greater identification (Jasko et al., 2020) with groups that use it. It follows that collective narcissists may be especially prone to violence in conflictual contexts.

Somewhat different dynamics seem to be at play for collective narcissism among people whose political identities are minoritized. Establishing respect and recognition for the ingroup is a core element of collective narcissism, so in minoritized identity groups this can be expressed in support for more progressive values, such as racial justice (Marinthe et al., 2022). Recent research found that collective narcissism in minority groups, such as Black people in America, is associated with support for pro-ingroup, but progressive social movements, such as Black Lives Matter, a movement defending Black people's rights (Marinthe et al., 2022).

The expression of collective narcissism in relation to different groups in multi-sectarian societies like Lebanon can likely take on either a reactionary or progressive form, depending on the dynamics between the groups. Specifically, in the context of the study on collective violence, those high in sectarian narcissism may continue to hold reactionary beliefs about intergroup relations, including support for the prevalent sectarian violence in Lebanon. This reinforces its normative descriptive status. However, individuals who identify narcissistically with the nation *and* are in the minority political group in multi-group contexts with newly established national identities (such as in Lebanon), may reject sectarian violence as a national embarrassment standing in the way of the country's recognition on the international stage. Instead, they may adopt a more progressive and forward-looking perspective on Lebanese society's needs to move beyond sectarian violence.

In the Lebanese context, political divisions operate along sectarian lines, with each sect representing a different religious subgroup. At the sectarian level, collective narcissism is likely to fuel ongoing collective violence, both targeted at outgroup members and outgroup leaders. This expectation is based on the vast literature showing the relationship between collective narcissism and outgroup hostility of various kinds, including violence (Cichocka, Bocian, et al., 2022; Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019; Jasko et al., 2020).

However, movements also exist that call for a decreased emphasis on sectarian identity in favour of a superordinate Lebanese identity (Makhlouf & Salami, 2022). In line with the expectations of common ingroup identity model (CIIM; Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), movements in Lebanon seeking to establish a stronger superordinate national identity expect this to reduce sectarian divisions, even if a tension remains between maintaining a subordinate as opposed to a superordinate identity (Wenzel et al., 2008).

Given the novelty of our approach, making directional predictions for national narcissism in Lebanon is not as clear cut as for sectarian narcissism. On the one hand, those high in national narcissism may blame one sect or another as being in the way of establishing an externally respected national identity, which can lead to support for violence against its members or leaders. On the other hand, if sectarian conflict itself is seen as a national embarrassment, those high in national narcissism, who are pre-occupied with maintaining a good national image (Gronfeldt et al., 2022), may want to dispel threats to their national image by refraining from participating in sectarian conflict; whether targeted at outgroup members or leaders. Anecdotal evidence suggests the latter process may be at play. Individuals who exhibit narcissistic identification with the Lebanese nation may seek to present an image of the country that aligns with a nostalgic perception of its distant past. In fact, Lebanon's distant past is often portrayed in the media as a community that is peaceful, respectful of diversity, and open to the world (Bowen, 2022). Lebanon was even colloquially referred to as the central bank, the hospital, the casino, and the university of the Middle East (Bowen, 2022; American University of Beirut, 2016; Rose, 2020). Indeed, previous research has found that national narcissism predicts support for leaders that promise a return to a "glorious past" (Cisłak et al., 2020; Lantos & Forgas, 2021; Marchlewska et al., 2018). By appealing to national nostalgia and blaming sectarianism and intergroup conflict for lack of respect from other countries ("A Kingdom of Absence": In Lebanon, We Are Witnessing the

Slow Disintegration of a Country, 2022), these gestures suggest that those high in national narcissism would rather reject sectarian violence.

4.5 The Present Research

This research examines the relationship between collective narcissism and collective violence in Lebanon. We specifically investigate the differential effects of sectarian and national narcissism on two dimensions of collective violence beliefs – diffuse collective violence that target outgroup members and upward collective violence that target outgroup leaders (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023).

Abou-Ismail, Phillips, and colleagues (2023) developed a new scale to measure collective violence beliefs, which was tested in multiple samples from three non-WEIRD contexts, including Lebanon. They found that the intensity of the collective violence act did not differentiate between the justification of violence but rather the target group. Their analysis identified two dimensions: one targeted at outgroup members and the other at outgroup leaders. We incorporate this new model and scale for collective violence, for the sake of gaining a full picture of people's beliefs and use a validated measurement tool. We hypothesise that sectarian narcissism will positively predict collective violence beliefs directed at both outgroup members and leaders, whereas national narcissism will negatively predict support for sectarian violence against outgroup members and leaders. In our analyses, we will measure and control for national and sectarian identification without making any hypotheses regarding their potential effects. The sample will comprise a large, diverse community sample from Lebanon.

4.6 Study 1

4.6.1 Method

Participants

An adult convenience sample was collected by circulating an anonymous Qualtrics link via social media to community organisations in Lebanon. The sample consisted of 778 participants and was broadly representative of the various sectarian groups in this diverse country. Specifically, the sample was 11.3% Christian Maronite, 17.5% Shi'a, 38.5% Sunni, 6% Druze, 4.4% Christian Orthodox, 0.5% Armenian, 3% Other Christian sects, 5% Other Muslim sects, 13.8% No sectarian identification. Most of the sample (41.1%) had no political affiliation, while the remainder varied between eight other Lebanese political groups. The sample had a mean age of 33.07 (SD = 11.43) and comprised 65.5% women.

Measures

Collective Narcissism

Collective narcissism at both the sectarian and national levels was measured using the ultrashort version of the Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) proposed by (Sibley, 2018) and used in (Eker et al., 2023). The three items we used were "I insist upon my sect/Lebanese getting the respect that is due to it", "If my sect/Lebanese had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place", and "The true worth of my sect/Lebanese is often misunderstood". All items were measured on a scale from 1 to 5. National narcissism had questionable reliability ((α=.61; ω^2 =.63, M = 4.23, SD = 0.90) while sectarian narcissism had acceptable reliability (α=.74; ω^2 =.74, M = 3.67, SD = 1.14).

Collective Violence Beliefs

Justification for collective violence was measured using Abou-Ismail, Phillips and colleagues' (2023) items. The scale measures two dimensions for collective violence beliefs based on the target of the act rather than the intensity of the act (for more see Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023). The scale measures collective violence beliefs against average members of the outgroup, which in this case is members of different sects (e.g., "It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect") in

one dimension, which we call diffuse collective violence (α = .87; ω^2 = .87, *M* = 1.60, *SD* = 0.91); and it measures collective violence against leaders of the outgroup, which is this case is leaders of different sects (e.g., "One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders especially those from a different sect") in the other dimension, which we call upward collective violence (α = .86; ω^2 = .87, *M* = 2.60, SD = 1.19). Each subscale was measured using 6 items on a Likert-scale ranging from 1 completely disagree to 5 completely agree.

Sectarian and National Identification

Sectarian and national identification were used as control variables and measured using three items each from the scale originally developed by Leach et al. (2008) "I feel a bond with my sect/Lebanon" "I feel solidarity with my sect/Lebanon" and "I feel committed to my sect/Lebanon". Sectarian identification had good reliability (α=.80; ω^2 =.81, *M* = 3.45, SD = 1.26) while national identification had a questionable one (α=.62; ω^2 = .63, *M* = 3.96, SD = 1.03).

4.6.2 Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations between all variables are presented in Table 1. We fit a structural equation model to test the simultaneous effects of sectarian and national narcissism on diffuse collective violence and upward collective violence, while adjusting for the residual covariance between the two outcomes. As shown in Figure 1, latent diffuse collective violence and latent upward collective violence were each regressed on latent sectarian narcissism, latent national narcissism, and other covariates simultaneously namely: secure sectarian identification, secure national identification, age, and gender (coded as 1 female, 2 male; see Table 2 for more details). Overall, results showed that model fit the data very well (χ^2 (281) = 590.59, p <.001, CFI = 0.93, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .03 CI [.033, .042]).

Sectarian narcissism had a positive relationship with diffuse collective violence (*b* = .57, *se* = .25, p = .03), though it was not associated with upward collective violence (*b* = -.07, *se* = .24, p = .76). Additionally, secure sectarian identity was not associated with either diffuse (*b* = -.14, p = .50) or upward collective violence (*b* = -.12, p =.55). National narcissism was negatively associated with diffuse collective violence (*b* = -.55, *se* = .18, p = .002) and not associated with upward collective violence(*b* = .12, *se* = .17, p = .49). As with secure sectarian identity, secure national identity was not associated with diffuse (*b* = -.03, p = .82) or upward collective violence (*b* = .04, p =.76). Overall, these results suggest that national and sectarian collective narcissism have opposing effects on diffuse collective violence. Specifically, sectarian narcissism is positively associated with it, while national narcissism is negatively associated. Furthermore, the effects of collective narcissism appear to be restricted to diffuse collective violence and do not extend to upward collective violence. Finally, the results indicate that secure sectarian and national identification are unrelated to either type of violence.



Figure 1. Structural equation model in which latent sectarian narcissism and latent national narcissism are modelled as simultaneous predictors of latent diffuse collective violence beliefs and latent upward collective violence beliefs. *Note.* *p < .05. For visual simplicity, observed indicators and covariates are not shown.

Table 1. Correlation Matrix between all latent constructs tested in the model

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Sectarian Identification								
2. National Identification	.32**							
3. Sectarian Narcissism	.60**	.25**						
4. National Narcissism	.28**	.32**	.45**					
5. Diffuse Collective Violence	.11**	-.06*	.10**	-.14**				
6. Upward Collective Violence	.05	-.004	.11**	.04	.43**			
7. Age	.02	.002	.03	.04	-.19**	-.17**		
8. Gender	-.15**	-.07	-.10**	-.17**	.06	.11**	-.08*	
M	3.45	3.96	3.67	4.23	1.60	2.60	33.07	1.35
SD	1.26	1.03	1.14	0.90	0.91	1.19	11.43	0.48

* p < .05 ** p < .01

Table 2. Parameter estimates for the models predicting diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs

	Diffuse Collective Violence Beliefs							Upward Collective Violence Beliefs					
	b	*se*	*z*	*p*	95% CI			*b*	*se*	*z*	*p*	95% CI	
					low	*high*						*low*	*high*
Sectarian Narcissism	**.43**	**.11**	**3.90**	**.03**	**.07**	**1.23**	Sectarian Narcissism	-.17	.11	-1.58	.80	-.54	.40
National Narcissism	**-.51**	**.12**	**-4.30**	**.002**	**-.90**	**-.20**	National Narcissism	.15	.11	1.26	.49	-.21	.45
Sectarian Identity	-.14	.20	-0.67	.50	-.53	.26	Sectarian Identity	-.12	.19	-.60	.55	-.50	.26
National Identity	-.03	.12	-0.22	.82	-.26	.21	National Identity	.04	.11	.31	.76	-19	.26
Age	**-.02**	**.006**	**-2.54**	**.01**	**-.29**	**-.04**	Age	-.005	.006	-0.86	.39	-.18	.07
Gender	.04	.15	0.28	.78	-.11	.14	**Gender**	**.31**	**.14**	**2.15**	**.03**	**.01**	**.27**

4.7 Chapter 4 General Discussion

Using a large community sample from a multi-sectarian country, we tested the relationship between collective narcissism at two levels (i.e., sectarian, and national) and collective violence beliefs. Consistent with our predictions we found that those high in sectarian narcissism showed higher support for collective violence against members of the sectarian outgroup. While there were reasons to expect that the effect of national narcissism on collective narcissism may go either way, national narcissism was negatively related to collective violence beliefs against outgroup members as we hypothesised. Contrary to our predictions, sectarian collective narcissism had no significant relationship with collective violence beliefs targeted at outgroup leaders. Similarly, national narcissism also had a non-significant relationship with collective violence beliefs targeted at outgroup leaders.

While in line with our predictions, the contradicting relationships national and sectarian narcissism have with diffuse collective violence beliefs remain a striking finding. Participants high in national narcissism showed a strong opposition for collective violence beliefs against outgroup members, whereas those high in sectarian narcissism supported collective violence beliefs against outgroup members. These results suggest that people see attaining respect for the nation as arising from a different process from respect for one's sect within the nation. Those high on sectarian narcissism, which is more traditional in Lebanon, may resort to conventional methods of sectarian violence. This is not surprising given the perceived (and often realistic) threats many Lebanese face from sectarian outgroups (Ghaddar, 2015). People high in sectarian narcissism are constantly reminded that the perceived image they hold of their sects continues to be attacked by members of other sects. This pattern, however, might not be exclusive to Lebanon; several countries with comparable social structures, particularly those that emerged after World War I and the division of the Ottoman Empire, exhibit similar characteristics. These countries, which are often overlooked in

research, share commonalities, and are distinguished by their non-Western and non-Eastern identities, according to recent research (Uskul et al., 2023).

Our findings regarding national narcissism, in the Lebanese case, adds to mounting evidence on collective narcissism among minority groups in Western countries (e.g., Marinthe et al., 2022). In a deeply divided and sectarian society like Lebanon, it is important to note that while identification with the national group may be gaining momentum among individuals, it has not necessarily translated into significant political influence, as evidenced by the outcome of the recent parliamentary elections. The return of traditional sectarian parties as the majority reflects the ongoing challenges in achieving substantial political change (UNDP, 2022). Thus, despite an increasing presence in people's minds, this national identity may still face political oppression and remain less influential at the political level. While those high in collective narcissism are often reactionaries, it is possible that national narcissists adopt alternative strategies that create a progressive facade, especially if they believe that reactionary behaviour could have adverse effects on the country's image.

While the present results might contradict previous work suggesting that collective narcissism has harmful effects for relations within groups (e.g., Biddlestone et al., 2022; Cichocka, Bocian, et al., 2022) it is unclear how genuine support for progressivism is among those high in collective narcissism, even among minority groups. A comparison can be made with research from Poland (Cislak et al., 2021) which found that those high in national narcissism supported a marketing strategy for their country promoting it as "green", but simultaneously opposing genuine environmental reforms, a phenomenon referred to as "greenwashing". Likewise, national narcissism in the United States predicted rushing mass vaccination of the American public, without adequate safety trials, for the country to "look great" by being ahead of other countries (Gronfeldt et al., 2022). It cannot be concluded with the current data whether such paradoxical effects would generalise to other minority groups,

or marginalised political identities, but it is possible that the opposition to diffuse violence expressed by those high in national narcissism in our sample is relatively "thin." It could be that those high in national narcissism in a context like Lebanon would rather distance themselves from the sectarian politics all together to try and portray a better image about themselves. Therefore, making their attitudes in line with the established understanding of collective narcissism as a construct concerned with maintaining a better image; rather than actually being progressive. For instance, it is not clear how the same individuals would justify or oppose collective violence beliefs against members of different nations Lebanon has antagonistic relations with, such as Israel. This means results found here may change according to the political landscape at any given time. For example, collective narcissism in groups with egalitarian goals is associated with support for radical political activism (Panayiotou, 2020). More research should be devoted to collective narcissism in diverse societies, such as Lebanon with its sectarian divides, or contrasting advantaged and disadvantaged groups, such as the United States.

Surprisingly, neither national nor sectarian narcissism predicted upward collective violence beliefs, which refer to violence directed towards outgroup leaders. One might have intuitively expected that outgroup leaders would be perceived as a threat to the image of one's sectarian ingroup. However, recent research conducted by Brown & Marinthe (2022) in the United States and France revealed that national narcissism predicted positive attitudes towards Vladimir Putin and Russian military attacks in Ukraine. Notably, this effect did not extend to positive attitudes towards the Russian people. This suggests that individuals high in national narcissism may support populist outgroup leaders and their actions due to ideological similarity, while displaying indifference towards the well-being of the citizens of the outgroup. Further, it is possible that those high on sectarian narcissism hold high respect for authority, even when it represents exemplars of the outgroup. This is in line with previous

research on the effects of RWA and SDO on collective violence beliefs, where RWA was a negative predictor of collective violence beliefs against outgroup leaders (Abou-Ismail, Cichocka et al., 2023). These two processes together might have accounted for the non-significant relationship. On the other hand, while those high in national narcissism might think justifying violence against outgroup leaders is bad for Lebanon's image, it is possible that they also perceive sectarian leaders as the reason for Lebanon's disunity, which might lead to justification of violence against them. This means it is possible those two opposing processes be operating at the same time affecting the significance of the relationship. All these assumptions show more research should be devoted to understanding how collective narcissism relates to support for violence against outgroup leaders.

Theoretically, our study extends previously established findings in the literature. Collective narcissism predicts intergroup hostility (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013), which we confirmed in this study for sectarian narcissism with its relationship with diffuse collective violence beliefs against outgroup members (see also Cichocka, et al., 2022). Our study contributes to the field by providing nuanced insights, revealing distinct effects within the realm of collective narcissism. Specifically, we found that national narcissism was associated with the rejection of diffuse collective violence beliefs. This pattern shows the benefits of studying collective narcissism in highly conflictual, non-WEIRD context. National identity in contexts where multiple ingroup identities coexist and are at times in a state of conflict might hold a different meaning, especially if this identity is perceived as progressive, aiming at uniting the subordinate identities into a superordinate one. Identifying with an emerging nation in a place where the majority identifies with smaller groups (i.e., sects) can be perceived as a progressive act, even an act of rebellion. This places national groups in multiple ingroup identity contexts in the position of minority, and also of disadvantage. Members of this national group will most likely be derogated by their sect

members for not prioritising the interest of the sect. Importantly, members of such national groups might be treating a superordinate unifying identity that subsumes competing subordinate group identities (Wenzel et al., 2008).

This is in contrast to how national identity is often deployed, as an exclusive category designed to delineate the boundary between native citizens and foreigners/outsiders (Louis et al., 2013). This means that those people might only be identifying with the higher-level identity to end the conflict, and introduce a change to the status quo. While they remain collectively narcissistic in how they perceive this higher order identity as lacking in appreciation, they might not necessarily believe that aggression is a way to reinstate that image.

Importantly, we did not observe the same pattern of results for national or sectarian identification (Cameron, 2004). Both types of identification were unrelated to support for collective violence. Typically, after accounting for collective narcissism, social identification predicts constructive or desirable outcomes in intra- and intergroup relations (Cichocka et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka & Iskra-Golec, 2013). Apart from the purported positive effect of in-group identification on intergroup attitudes, which may have played a role in our non-significant findings. Prolonged periods of conflict and violence in complex social structures with multiple social identities, like Lebanon, could also impact these associations, resulting in decreased inclination to justify violence based solely on in-group identification.

From a practical perspective, this work suggests answers and potential solutions to intractable conflict. In such contexts, where multiple identities are always in some way or another competing, introducing some form of a higher order identification can bring people from different groups together (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). It might be easier said than done, however, finding similarities, and commonalities between conflicting groups might help pave the way to more peaceful resolutions (Wenzel et al., 2008). That is

especially the case between groups within the same country that share common geography, history, and culture. Focusing on these commonalities and constructing some form of secure in-group identity (see Cichocka, 2016), while avoiding promoting collective narcissism, might be a positive approach.

As mentioned in the introduction, these forms of higher order identities do not come without challenges. The lack of a proper understanding of what constitutes such identities, when they relate to collective narcissism, and how they lead to specific outcomes, remains a limitation of this paper; and a future direction that can be explored. For instance, we measured both forms of collective narcissism using a single sample. Future research can strive to measure these two forms independently. Additionally, future research should also explore how sectarian and national narcissism relate to attitudes about international relations. For example, a logical next step would be to examine how sectarian and national narcissism relate to support for collective violence against Israelis or Syrians, prominent outgroups in the eyes of many Lebanese.

Another obvious limitation is that this was only one cross-sectional study in one context. Future research that can explore this or similar contexts, with multiple studies, possibly using experimental approaches where collective narcissism is manipulated would also be interesting and informative; to the degree that ingroup identification, collective narcissism, and collective violence beliefs relate on a causal level. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the internal consistency of our measures for collective narcissism was comparatively weaker than our measures for collective violence beliefs. While this may somewhat decrease confidence in the accuracy of the measures, it does not diminish the significance of our findings and insights. For future research, we recommend utilising the full Collective Narcissism Scale to potentially enhance the robustness of the measurements (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), or if space does not permit then the newly validated three item

Scale (Cichocka, Sengupta, et al., 2022). The lower reliability of certain scales however, such as national identification, is not unexpected in a country where such identities may hold secondary importance. It is crucial to consider the contextual factors when interpreting the role of consistency measures. Furthermore, having used a short three-item measurement might have played a role in the low reliability of those scales. However, it is important to note that the lower internal consistency of our collective narcissism measures does not necessarily preclude testing our hypothesis (Ponterotto & Ruckdeschel, 2007). Nevertheless, this highlights the importance of replicating this study in future research to further validate and strengthen the measurements used. Replication efforts would contribute to enhancing the reliability and generalisability of our findings.

In light of these limitations, we also acknowledge the importance of addressing the variables that were not measured in our study. Specifically, the inclusion of outgroup threat as a variable would provide valuable insights into the relationship between collective narcissism and narcissistic aggression. Additionally, capturing attitudes toward progressivism would offer a more comprehensive understanding of the ideological factors at play. Future research should consider incorporating these variables into their investigations to gain a more nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics surrounding collective narcissism and its potential implications. Replication studies focusing on these variables would not only contribute to further validating our findings but also strengthen the overall body of knowledge in this area. By expanding the scope of measurement and replication efforts, researchers can enhance the reliability and generalizability of the findings and advance our understanding of the relationship between collective narcissism, aggression, outgroup threat, and attitudes toward progressivism.

4.7.1 Conclusion

We tested the relationship between two forms of collective narcissism, namely sectarian and national, and two forms of collective violence beliefs, namely diffuse and upward. We found that those high in sectarian collective narcissism tended to justify diffuse collective violence beliefs (collective violence beliefs targeted against outgroup members), whereas those high on national narcissism tend to oppose diffuse collective violence beliefs. In sectarian societies, those identifying with the higher-order national group may constitute a minority. Narcissistic identification with that national group may entail rejecting sectarian violence, and in that sense, collective narcissism can be expressed as progressive politics, rather than reactionary. More research should be devoted to study collective narcissism in complex societies and groups.

Chapter 5[4]: Do people's attitudes towards collective violence matter? Evidence that collective violence attitudes predict violent behaviours

5.1 Abstract

We examined associations between two dimensions of collective violence attitudes and the corresponding dimensions of violent behaviours. Previous research across several high-conflict settings shows that collective violence attitudes can be distinguished on the basis of whether they target outgroup members (diffuse collective violence) or outgroup leaders (upward collective violence). Using the new CVBs-2D scale that captures these two dimensions and adjusting for measurement error, we assessed the concurrent effects of diffuse and upward collective violence attitudes on distinct manifestations of collective behaviour. In a representative U.S. sample ($N = 450$), we found that diffuse collective violence attitudes were associated with more violent behaviour against outgroup members but only weakly related to violence against outgroup leaders. Conversely, upward collective violence attitudes were positively associated with violence against outgroup leaders, but not related to violence against outgroup members. These results further validate recent findings that collective violence has distinct antecedents and consequences depending on the target of the violence. It highlights the necessity for both research and interventions to consider the dimensionality of collective violence.

Keywords: intergroup conflict, collective violence, social attitudes, collective behaviour, political violence

[4] This chapter has been submitted for publication. Abou-Ismail, R., Wollast, R., Phillips, J., and Sengupta, N., Do people's attitudes towards collective violence matter? Evidence that collective violence attitudes predict violent behaviours. *Under Review*

5.2 Introduction

Collective violence, typified by aggressive acts by groups or by individuals acting on behalf of groups (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023), is a pressing global issue. A myriad of affective and cognitive phenomena initiate and perpetuate conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2013). However, the most direct factor perpetuating continuous conflict is the acceptance of violence in such conflicts by a substantial proportion of the relevant population.

Recent research identified two distinct dimensions of attitudes towards collective violence (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023). These dimensions were based on the targets of violence, rather than multiple dimensions based on the intensity of violence (as has been previously theorised). One dimension of this scale, diffuse collective violence, indexes violence against ordinary outgroup members, while the other dimension, upward collective violence, indexes violence against outgroup leaders. They developed a new scale to measure these dimensions – the CVBS-2D scale – and validated it in multiple high-conflict settings (see also Abou-Ismail, Gronfeldt et al., 2023).

Although the two dimensions of collective violence attitudes are strongly correlated, they represent distinct factors with differential predictors (see Abou-Ismail, Cichocka et al., 2023). The question remains, however, whether these attitudes are associated with violent *behaviours*. This paper seeks to fill this gap by testing relationships between diffuse and upward collective violence attitudes and violent behaviours that target outgroup members and leaders respectively. Moreover, this research represents the first use of the CVBS-2D scale in the US context, where support for political violence as a means to counter perceived threats from the opposing party has surged (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022). By doing so, we aim to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the role these attitudes play in predicting violent behaviour.

5.3 Attitudes and Behaviour

Early research in psychology posited that attitudes and behaviour might not always correspond with each other, a phenomenon which was evidenced by a number of empirical findings. A case in point is the classic study by Richard LaPiere (1934) that highlighted the potential for discrepancies between stated attitudes and actual behaviour. During a time when societal attitudes in the United States were highly negative towards Chinese individuals, LaPiere found that a Chinese couple he travelled with was almost universally accepted in establishments. However, when these establishments were later asked if they would serve Chinese guests, a majority responded negatively, suggesting a disparity between expressed attitudes and actual behaviours (LaPiere, 1934).

Yet, despite the fact that attitudes and behaviours may not *always* correspond, there is a general theoretical consensus in the field that attitudes are cognitive and affective foundations for individuals' behavioural tendencies, and thus play a crucial role in predicting behaviours (Ajzen, 2001). The Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and its extension, the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), support this view, positing that individuals who possess more positive attitudes towards a behaviour demonstrate greater intentions to engage in such behaviour, ultimately leading to an increased occurrence of the behaviour. These theories, however, also acknowledge that this relationship can be influenced by various factors, underlining the importance of empirically establishing the link between attitudes and behaviours (Ajzen, 2001).

Empirical research across various domains has confirmed the associations between attitudes and behaviours. For instance, people's attitudes have been shown to significantly influence their intentions and subsequent behaviours related to activities such as alcohol consumption (Terry & Hogg, 1996), safe sex practices (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003), and pro-environmental behaviours (Liu et al., 2020). While the decision to harm an outgroup member or leader is distinct from choices like alcohol consumption or using protective measures

during sex, it is a behaviour, nevertheless. Therefore, it can be understood as being shaped by one's attitudes toward the behaviour in question (Brewer, 2001; Leidner et al., 2013).

In this study, we will examine how attitudes predict behaviours related to collective violence, addressing a significant gap left by previous work (i.e., Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al. 2023; Winiewski and Bulska, 2020). Previous research has suggested looking into attitudes as a potential solution to practicality problems related to studying collective violence (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023; Winiewski & Bulska, 2020). However, the research has not established empirically, how violent attitudes relate to violent behaviours. By investigating these relationships, our objective is to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that shape individuals' actions and contribute to the dynamics of collective violence. Additionally, we aim to determine the predictive validity of the previously developed scale of collective violence attitudes. If the scale is successfully capturing meaningful variation in attitudes toward collective violence, it should be able to predict related aggressive behaviours.

5.4 Multidimensionality of Collective Violence: Diffuse and Upward Collective Violence

Collective violence represents a range of hostile activities undertaken by a one or more individuals, typically directed towards a perceived outgroup or its members. Recent research has shed light on a two-dimensional structure of collective violence beliefs, which comprises diffuse and upward collective violence (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023).

Diffuse collective violence beliefs encapsulates support for aggressive acts aimed at outgroup members, often characterised by indiscriminate targeting and pervasive hostility (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023). Examples include mob violence, hate crimes, or violence inflicted on individuals or groups based on their affiliation to a specific social, ethnic, or political grouping. Diffuse collective violence underscores a perception that outgroup

members are targets for retaliation, largely driven by negative stereotypes and intergroup biases (Brewer, 2001).

Upward collective violence beliefs, on the flip side, comprises support for aggressive acts specifically directed at outgroup leaders, such as political figures, authority figures, or individuals holding positions of power within the outgroup (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023). This violence can take the form of assassination attempts, acts of terrorism, or targeted attacks on leaders and their symbols of power. Upward collective violence often arises from the conviction that outgroup leaders are accountable for the perceived grievances, injustices, or conflicts endured by the ingroup (Leidner et al., 2013).

It's crucial to distinguish between these two dimensions as they display different correlates. For instance, diffuse collective violence attitudes tends to be positively associated with System Justification and Religious Fundamentalism and negatively associated with Perceived Group Efficacy. In contrast, upward collective violence attitudes typically exhibits a positive association with Perceived Group Efficacy and negative association with System Justification and Religious Fundamentalism (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023). RWA and SDO are both positively related to diffuse collective violence beliefs, but RWA is negatively associated with upward collective violence beliefs (Abou-Ismail, Cichocka et al., 2023). Lastly, sectarian narcissism in Lebanon showed a positive correlation with diffuse collective violence attitudes, while national narcissism displayed a negative correlation (Abou-Ismail, Gronfeldt et al., 2023). Thus, differentiating diffuse and upward collective violence provides critical insights that enrich our understanding of the interplay between collective violence attitudes and behaviours.

5.5 The present research

In this study, our primary objective is to test the relationship between attitudes towards collective violence and violent behaviours within a representative sample from the

United States. We hypothesise that diffuse and upward collective violence attitudes will predict violent behaviours that correspond to the targets of the attitudes. Specifically, we anticipate that diffuse collective violence attitudes will be more strongly associated with violent behaviours towards outgroup members than outgroup leaders, while upward collective violence attitudes will be more strongly associated with violent behaviours towards outgroup leaders than outgroup members. Finally, we will test whether these relationships differ based on an individual's group membership – self-identified Republicans vs. Democrats in the United States. There is some evidence the levels of violence attitudes may be higher among supporters of the Republican Party (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022). However, it is unclear whether the *relationship* between attitudes and behaviours differs by political party. We leave this an open question. Based on that, we will investigate the following hypotheses:

H_1: Diffuse and upward collective violence attitudes will predict violent behaviours that correspond to the targets of the attitudes.

H_2: Diffuse collective violence attitudes will be more strongly associated with violent behaviours towards outgroup members than outgroup leaders.

H_3: Upward collective violence attitudes will be more strongly associated with violent behaviours towards outgroup leaders than outgroup members.

H_4: The relationships between attitudes (diffuse and upward) and behaviours might vary based on an individual's political group membership – self-identified Republicans vs. Democrats in the United States.

5.6 Study 1

5.6.1 Methods

Participants

In this study, we recruited a convenience sample of 450 adults in the United States through Prolific after receiving ethics approval from the psychology ethics committee at the

University of Kent. The sample was broadly representative of both Democrats and Republicans, with 65.14% Democrats and 23.24% Republicans, with the remaining percentage being independent. Participants identified as independent (N = 63) were excluded from this study and did not answer any partisan collective violence questions, leaving 387 eligible participants in the study. The mean age of the sample was 45.58 years (SD = 16.02), and 49.4% of the sample identified as women.

Measures

Partisan collective violence attitudes. The justification for collective violence was measured using CVBS-2D scale from Abou-Ismail, Phillips and colleagues (2023) utilised for the US context. The scale measures collective violence beliefs based on the target of the act rather than the intensity of the act. In one dimension, collective violence beliefs against average members of the outgroup were measured, which in this case refers to members of the other party (e.g., "It is justifiable for Democratic/Republican voters to become physically aggressive towards Republican/Democratic voters"). This dimension is referred to as diffuse collective violence. In the other dimension, collective violence beliefs against leaders of the outgroup was measured, which in this case refers to leaders of the other party (e.g., "Verbally insulting Republican/Democratic politicians can be justified."). This dimension is referred to as upward collective violence. Both dimensions were measured on a Likert scale of 1 (Totally Disagree) to 5 (Totally Agree).

Collective violence behaviours. To assess collective violence behaviours, we employed the Voodoo doll paradigm (DeWall et al., 2013), in which participants were asked to indicate how many pins they would want to put into a doll representing a voter or politician with whom they disagree. The response scale ranged from 0 to 51 for both. The mean number of pins for the voter doll was 10.33 (SD = 15.22) and for the politician doll was 18.29 (SD = 19.63). Both variables were highly correlated (r = .68, p <.001)

5.6.2 Results

Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Measurement

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. For diffuse attitudes items, the means ranged from 1.31 (*SD* = 0.77) for item 2 to 2.46 (*SD* = 1.48) for item 6. Regarding upward attitudes items, the means spanned from 1.61 (*SD* = 1.04) for item 3 to 3.23 (*SD* = 1.97) for item 6.

To test whether the two collective violence attitudes were distinct from each other in this sample, particularly considering Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al. (2023) did not include any sample from a WEIRD context, we performed confirmatory factor analyses and compared several concurrent models. Model fit was assessed using multiple fit indices (Tanaka, 1993). The model was based on maximum likelihood estimation. CFAs indicated that the model distinguishing the two dimensions demonstrates greater model fit statistics. To improve model fit, we allowed six within-factor error covariances. Importantly, all standardised factor loadings were significant and above the conventional threshold (> .40). Ultimately, McDonald's Omega coefficients were good for diffuse collective violence attitudes (ω = .84, *M* = 1.67, *SD* = 0.82) and upward collective violence attitudes (ω= .89, *M* = 1.86, *SD* = 0.97). After running through the exercise, nevertheless, we found item 6 in diffuse and item 1 in upward to be highly correlated reducing model fit, therefore, we decided to remove both items. Reported results in Table 2, and the rest of this study are reflective of that.

Multivariate Analyses

We fit a structural equation model in which latent diffuse and latent upward collective violence attitudes on collective behaviour were used to simultaneously predict observed collective violence against voters and politicians. This approach adjusts for measurement error in violence attitudes as well as the residual covariation between the two dimensions of violent behaviours. Covariates of age and gender were also added simultaneously as

predictors in the model. The overall results demonstrated a good fit to the data ($\chi 2$ (55) = 162.36, p <.001, *CFI* = 0.97, *SRMR* = .04 *RMSEA* = .06; 95% *CI* [.051, .073]). In line with our expectations, we found attitudes toward diffuse collective violence to be positively associated with violence against outgroup voters (b = .39, se = .07, p < .001), albeit demonstrating a significant but weaker link with violence against outgroup politicians (b = .17, se = .08, p = .03). Conversely, attitudes toward upward collective violence did not exhibit a significant association with violence against outgroup voters (b = -.05, se = .07, p = .48), yet they maintained a positively significant relationship with violence against outgroup politicians (b = .22, se = .07, p = .002).

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between All Observed Variable

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. DCV1														
2. DCV2	.770**													
3. DCV3	.739**	.765**												
4. DCV4	.477**	.421**	.429**											
5. DCV5	.659**	.620**	.569**	.547**										
6. DCV6	.428**	.394**	.384**	.816**	.530**									
7. UCV1	.390**	.359**	.380**	.739**	.444**	.781**								
8. UCV2	.484**	.470**	.489**	.577**	.556**	.554**	.570**							
9. UCV3	.552**	.520**	.432**	.485**	.598**	.498**	.454**	.519**						
10. UCV4	.545**	.513**	.461**	.513**	.566**	.546**	.535**	.579**	.837**					
11. UCV5	.557**	.514**	.497**	.506**	.575**	.530**	.517**	.567**	.756**	.781**				
12. UCV6	.494**	.438**	.415**	.474**	.499**	.518**	.479**	.498**	.695**	.714**	.735**			
13. Voodoo Doll Voters	.278**	.237**	.271**	.227**	.237**	.222**	.183**	.234**	.136**	.114*	.189**	.153**		
14. Voodoo Doll Politicians	.205**	.184**	.247**	.276**	.236**	.302**	.323**	.316**	.209**	.221**	.255**	.256**	.681**	
M	1.4	1.31	1.33	2.14	1.57	2.25	2.46	2	1.61	1.66	1.71	3.23	10.33	18.29
SD	0.85	0.77	0.8	1.33	1	1.41	1.48	1.31	1.04	1.1	1.08	1.97	15.22	19.63

* p <.05 ** p <.001



Figure 1. Structural equation model in which latent diffuse collective violence beliefs, and latent upward collective violence beliefs are modelled as simultaneous predictors of two violent behaviours targeted at both outgroup voters and politicians. *Note.* *p < .05; **p< .01. For visual simplicity, observed indicators and covariates are not shown.

Table 2.
Parameter estimates for the model predicting collective violence against outgroup voters and politicians

	Voodoo doll pins into voters						Voodoo doll pins into politicians				
	b	*se*	*z*	95% CI			*b*	*se*	*z*	95% CI	
				low	*high*					*low*	*high*
Diffuse Collective Violence Attitudes	**.39****	**.07**	**5.29**	**.25**	**.54**	**Diffuse Collective Violence Attitudes**	**.17***	**.08**	**2.24**	**.02**	**.31**
Upward Collective Violence Attitudes	-.05	.07	-0.70	-.19	.09	**Upward Collective Violence Attitudes**	**.22****	**.07**	**3.17**	**.08**	**.35**
Age	.09	.05	1.87	-.004	.19	**Age**	**.10***	**.05**	**2.03**	**.003**	**.19**
Gender	.06	.05	1.35	-.03	.15	**Gender**	**.11***	**.05**	**2.37**	**.02**	**.20**

*p <.05 **p <.01

5.7 Chapter 5 General Discussion

Through this study, we sought to investigate the intricate relationship between collective violence attitudes and violent behaviours within an American sample. As projected in our first hypothesis (H1), our findings confirmed a pronounced degree of domain-specificity with both diffuse and upward collective violence attitudes distinctly associating with different forms of violent behaviour.

More specifically, attitudes toward diffuse collective violence, reflecting attitudes against outgroup members, indeed exhibited a potent positive association with violence against such members, and additionally, a modest positive correlation with violence directed at outgroup politicians, thereby confirming our second hypothesis (H2). Contrarily, attitudes toward upward collective violence, encapsulating attitudes against outgroup leaders, displayed a significant positive association exclusively with violence against these leaders, supporting our third hypothesis (H3). However, they did not significantly correlate with violence against outgroup voters, despite observable positive correlations among the items under study (Refer Table 1).

Our findings thus resonate with the view that specific collective violence attitudes - diffuse and upward - subtly influence individuals' violent behaviours. Furthermore, they accentuate the distinct impacts these attitudes wield on specific violence targets, thus

broadening our understanding within the extant collective violence literature. Consequently, our study reaffirms the importance of adopting a multidimensional approach while examining attitudes toward collective violence, given their manifestation in varied behavioural outcomes. Our investigation, however, did not identify any significant variation in attitudes based on individual's political group membership, as per our fourth hypothesis (H4).

From a practical standpoint, these findings bear significant implications for the formation of strategies aimed at reducing collective violence. By understanding the subtleties of the relationship between attitudes and behaviours, policymakers and practitioners can devise specific approaches addressing the unique factors influencing collective violence. Such strategies may include interventions promoting alternative attitudes towards outgroup members and leaders, mitigating violent behaviours risk. Moreover, our results can guide the construction of educational campaigns and community initiatives emphasising social cohesion importance and dissuading attitudes that foster collective violence.

Nonetheless, it is vital to acknowledge the limitations inherent in our study. The cross-sectional design restricts our capability to infer causality in the relationships between attitudes and behaviours. Our theoretical framework suggests attitudes' causal linkage to behaviours based on previous theory and research, yet behaviours' potential to influence attitudes (Chorlton & Conner, 2012) cannot be discounted. Consequently, our findings likely offer a glimpse into a reciprocal process. Experimental or longitudinal designs could more effectively establish causality and unravel these relationships' temporal dynamics.

Additionally, potential social desirability or recall bias may have been introduced due to the study's reliance on self-report measures, possibly affecting data accuracy. Future research could employ alternate data collection methods, like behavioural observations (Lindstrom et al., 2023), to authenticate these findings. The study's focus on a representative American sample could also curtail the findings' generalisability to other cultural or national

contexts. Therefore, the relationship between attitudes and collective violence behaviours warrants further exploration across different populations and settings. Also, we acknowledge that the voodoo task is not direct aggression but a proxy, and therefore other operationalisation of direct aggression in future research should be encouraged. Finally, while certain demographic factors were controlled, the potential influence of unaccounted confounding variables, like personality traits, political ideologies, or past experiences, on the observed relationships between attitudes and behaviours should be considered in future research.

5.7.1 Conclusion

This research offers substantial insights into the nuanced relationship between collective violence attitudes and violent behaviours, focusing on the American socio-political landscape. The results underline the significant role of attitudinal factors in predicting and understanding behaviours tied to collective violence. Importantly, this study foregrounds the multidimensionality of collective violence attitudes, demonstrating the need for a finely grained approach in their examination. While acknowledging certain limitations, this study opens the door for more comprehensive and targeted research. The aim is to unravel the intricacies of attitudes and collective violence behaviours more thoroughly. With this understanding, it becomes feasible to devise evidence-based interventions and preventive strategies. These strategies, in turn, can serve to alleviate the devastating impacts of collective violence on communities and promote harmony and unity within society.

Chapter 6: General Discussion

6.1 Overview of Results

This thesis developed and validated the Two-Dimensional Collective Violence Beliefs Scale (CVBS: 2D), presenting a significant contribution to the understanding of collective violence beliefs. In developing the CVBS: 2D, it became clear that different dimensions of collective violence beliefs do not hinge on the intensity of the acts, but instead the target of such acts, distinguishing between diffuse collective violence (targeting outgroup members) and upward collective violence (targeting outgroup leaders).

Investigation of the relationship between ideologies and collective violence beliefs revealed the nuanced role of RWA and SDO. RWA was found to predict higher support for diffuse collective violence but lower support for upward collective violence. Conversely, SDO was found to predict higher support for both forms of violence. These findings underscore that different ideologies underlie different types of collective violence beliefs.

Different dimensions of identity can also impact collective violence beliefs differently. In this thesis, a study using a Lebanese sample found that sectarian collective narcissism predicts greater support for collective violence against members of different sects. By contrast, national collective narcissism predicted opposition to sectarian violence.

The thesis also examined the associations between collective violence attitudes and corresponding violent behaviours using an American sample. Diffuse collective violence attitudes were positively associated with support for violent behaviour against outgroup members but only weakly and positively related to violence against outgroup leaders. Conversely, upward collective violence attitudes were positively associated with violence against outgroup leaders, but unrelated to violence against outgroup members. This further validates the dimensionality of collective violence beliefs, reinforcing the necessity for research and interventions to consider the target of violence.

6.2 Theoretical Contributions

This thesis notably augments existing literature in political psychology and violence studies by presenting a fresh multidimensional perspective on understanding collective violence beliefs. The newly crafted CVBS: 2D (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023) embodies this shift, taking a crucial leap away from the literature's general assumption that people mainly differ in the intensity of the acts they support. By doing so, we offer a more nuanced understanding of the dimensionality of collective violence beliefs. This dimensional treatment can be profitably exported to a wide range of cultural and geopolitical settings.

Although people unquestionably differ in how intensely they support specific acts, the centrality of an act's intensity in shaping the multidimensionality of these beliefs may be overstated. Across multiple countries, more intense acts are not seen as qualitatively different acts. Instead, holding the target of the act constant, more intense acts are simply more difficult for participants to endorse. The core distinction this work introduces is that the dimensionality of attitudes primarily hinges on whether the violence is aimed at the entire group or its prominent members. This distinction holds significance when viewed in the light of existing research on leaders and their pivotal roles within groups. Leaders, being representative figures, often serve as the embodiment of group values, norms, and identity (Haslam & Platow 2001). Attacking or undermining these figures might be seen not merely as an act against an individual but as an assault on the group's collective identity and its cherished values. Consequently, violence aimed at such prominent figures can have a ripple effect, evoking intense emotions and reactions from group members compared to acts of violence targeted at the broader group.

Moreover, research on outgroup prototypicality offers profound insights into the dynamics of intergroup relations. Outgroup members who are seen as prototypical or emblematic of their group exert significant influence on intergroup perceptions and

interactions (Wilder, 1984). Recent findings build upon this, demonstrating that the perceived prototypicality of outgroup members can not only mould both implicit and explicit attitudes towards the entire outgroup (Thomas et al., 2009), but also influence how actions towards them are interpreted. For instance, when the target of violence is a prototypical figure, the repercussions and interpretations of the act may significantly differ from situations where the target is seen as non-prototypical. Instances where these prototypical members defy group stereotypes can further lead to broad shifts in attitudes towards the entire outgroup (Kervyn, et al., 2012). Furthermore, the contemporary research underscores the fluid nature of prototypicality, indicating that the prominence of specific group attributes can evolve based on the prevailing socio-political environment, thereby altering perceptions of who is deemed prototypical within an outgroup (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2015). Thus, the nuanced interplay between prototypicality and collective violence necessitates a meticulous consideration by researchers, acknowledging that different outgroup targets may carry distinct implications in the broader schema of collective violence dynamics.

Given these insights, it becomes imperative for violence researchers to tap into the rich literature on leadership roles and outgroup prototypicality. Doing so can provide a deeper understanding of the motivations behind acts of violence and the varied reactions these acts evoke depending on the chosen target. Our findings underscore the need for a more holistic approach in violence studies, where the psychological intricacies of targeting specific group members are intertwined with broader group dynamics and perceptions.

In addition to scale development, this thesis also examined how intergroup threats condition both the level and structure of collective violence support. A striking revelation from our study was that, while the salience of such threats increased the degree of support for collective violence, it did not change the fundamental structure of collective violence beliefs. This observation is crucial, especially when seen against the backdrop of previous violence

research that often positioned threat as a determinant of violent attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Winiewski & Bulska, 2020).

If the structure of collective violence beliefs remains largely consistent irrespective of the degree of perceived threat, it suggests an inherent stability in how individuals conceptualise collective violence. This implies that the way we measure these beliefs is not necessarily contingent on the priming of threat. A significant takeaway from this is that while the intensity or mean levels of collective violence beliefs might oscillate based on the immediacy and magnitude of perceived threats in a given sociocultural context, the foundational dimensions, or the structural of these beliefs, remains unchanged.

Such a consistent structure, regardless of the surrounding threat context, has far-reaching implications for the application of the CVBS: 2D. It indicates that the scale does not have niche utility only in conflict-ridden settings or environments punctuated by threats. Instead, it can be reliably employed across a spectrum of contexts – from those marked by overt hostilities to those that are relatively peaceful. Thus, even in environments where collective violence beliefs may not be as pronounced due to reduced threats, the CVBS: 2D scale can still be instrumental in decoding the underlying dynamics of these beliefs.

What this translates to is a tool with potent generalisability. By maintaining its structural integrity across contexts, the CVBS: 2D scale becomes an important tool for understanding the antecedents and repercussions of violence beliefs on a more universal scale. By transcending the confines of immediate threat environments, it lays the groundwork for a more holistic, cross-contextual understanding of collective violence beliefs.

Additionally, this thesis contributes to the ongoing theoretical discourse regarding the influence of intergroup ideologies, specifically RWA and SDO, on extreme forms of prejudice such as collective violence beliefs. By uncovering nuanced relationships between these ideologies and distinct dimensions of collective violence attitudes, our findings offer a fresh

perspective that aligns with the insights provided by Sibley and Duckitt (2013) on the unique nature of these two ideological constructs. This research adds depth to existing theories on ideological influences within extreme intergroup prejudice (Altemeyer, 1988; Pratto et al., 1994), providing further evidence for differentiating between seemingly similar ideological constructs (Sibley & Duckitt, 2013).

Specifically, our discovery that RWA predicts higher levels of support for diffuse collective violence and lower support for upward collective violence aligns with the conceptualisation of RWA as a construct associated with conformity, obedience to authority, and a desire for social order. In contrast, the somewhat inconsistent relationship between SDO and both forms of collective violence underscores the potential multidimensionality within this ideology. Previous research highlights that SDO is primarily concerned with endorsing and justifying group-based inequalities on one hand and ingroup dominance on the other (Ho et al., 2015; Sibley and Duckitt, 2013), shedding light on the complexities of its influence; as evident from the results presented in this thesis.

While this research underscores the distinct operations of SDO and RWA in shaping beliefs and attitudes concerning collective violence and its dimensions, it is imperative to recognise the nuanced nature of these findings. At first glance, one might interpret the results as simply reiterating the well-established ideological distinctions proposed by the dual process model of prejudice (DPM; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2017). However, applying these distinctions to the realm of collective violence beliefs ventures into uncharted territory. This assertion is underscored by the limited research on the topic, with the study by Winiewski & Bulska (2020) being one notable exception.

The existing body of literature primarily focuses on the psychological consequences of the DPM in the realms of prejudice, policy preferences, and broader ideological constructs (e.g., Birdir et al., 2022; Choma et al., 2020; Craig & Richeson, 2014; see Winiewski &

Bulska, 2020 for an exception; also see General Aggression Model (GAM) Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Venturing into the realm of extreme attitudes and outcomes, such as collective violence beliefs, however, brings forth unique challenges. The psychological processes underpinning generalised prejudice might differ considerably from those that drive individuals to endorse or even partake in acts of collective violence. Hence, extrapolating the distinctions between SDO and RWA from the former to the latter is not as straightforward as it may seem.

By demonstrating the nuanced relationships between SDO, RWA, and collective violence beliefs, this thesis breaks new ground. It pushes the boundaries of the DPM by extending its implications from mere attitudes and policy endorsements to more tangible and extreme outcomes. While one might argue that this was a predictable outcome, the actual trajectory of collective violence beliefs, as conditioned by these ideological stances, holds a level of complexity that warrants attention. For instance, how do high levels of both SDO and RWA influence beliefs as opposed to high levels of one and low levels of the other? Moreover, the contextual variables play a pivotal role. In situations where intergroup hierarchy is threatened, does SDO emerge as a stronger predictor? Conversely, in situations where societal norms and cohesion are perceived to be in jeopardy, does RWA take precedence? These intricacies hint at the potential for a more detailed, conditional model of how these ideological orientations influence extreme beliefs.

Furthermore, the findings from this research underscore an urgent call to arms for violence researchers: the necessity to intricately weave ideological considerations into their investigations. Collective violence is not just an outcome of situational triggers or latent prejudices; it is intrinsically tied to deeper ideological frameworks that shape how individuals perceive, interpret, and react to their social environments (Bar-Tal, 2013; Staub, 2005). These ideological frameworks, as illuminated by Jost et al., (2004) and Haidt (2012), not only

influence how one perceives a potential threat or conflict (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Duckitt, 2003) but also guide how one rationalises and legitimises acts of violence against certain groups or individuals (Bandura, 1999; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006).

Further, our exploration into the impact of collective narcissism on collective violence attitudes underscores the importance of embracing a more sophisticated identity model (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). While many theories in the domain of group dynamics adopt a binary view, pivoting primarily around ingroup love and outgroup hate (Brewer, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) our research showcases that the nature of group attachment is not black and white; both secure and defensive identifications play crucial roles in shaping intergroup perceptions and behaviours (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Marinthe et al., 2022).

Insights into national and sectarian variants of collective narcissism, both forms of defensive identification in this thesis, underline that even within defensive stances, there exist nuanced distinctions with divergent implications for collective violence. National narcissism, intriguingly, seems to mitigate collective violence tendencies, while sectarian narcissism exacerbates them. This might point to a critical realisation that not all defensive identifications are homogenous in their outcomes.

Additionally, while empirical findings in this thesis did not present direct evidence linking secure identification to collective violence beliefs, the inclusion of both secure and defensive identifications in our theoretical framework not only refines existing identity-based models but also aligns with more recent nuanced understandings of group dynamics (Roccas et al., 2006). This enriched framework is pivotal for predicting and interpreting collective violence attitudes; underscoring the imperative for a comprehensive approach in subsequent research.

Finally, this thesis presents some empirical evidence highlighting distinct associations between collective violence attitudes and the corresponding violent behaviours. Far from

being a trivial observation, this evidence underscores the concept of domain specificity in the attitude-behaviour relationship within the context of collective violence. Specifically, it suggests that while attitudes toward violence against a particular type of target are likely to result in violent behaviours against that same target, they might not necessarily generalise or spill over into behaviours directed at a different target. This distinction is important. It points to the possibility that individuals may hold specific attitudes tailored to distinct forms of collective violence, rather than adhering to a generalised or universal pro-violence stance.

Furthermore, this revelation holds implications for the broader attitude-behaviour literature. While previous works have hypothesised and observed the alignment between attitudes and behaviours in various contexts (Ajzen, 2001; Terry & Hogg, 1996; Rivis & Sheeran, 2003; Liu et al., 2020), this research uniquely emphasises the nuanced variations within a single domain—that of collective violence. By doing so, it refines our understanding of how attitudes towards one form of violence might not be indicative of attitudes or behaviours towards other forms.

Moreover, and while previous theoretical frameworks, as proposed by Gurr (1970), Tilly (2003), and Skocpol (1979), have highlighted structural, economic, and ethno-religious factors, our findings emphasise the psychological processes operating within these broader structural contexts. For instance, the effects of perceived economic deprivation (Runciman, 1966) can be viewed through a new lens where the intensity of collective violence beliefs might be amplified by individual psychological processes. Similarly, ethno-religious tensions, analysed by Fearon and Laitin (2000) and Cederman et al. (2010), are not just external contexts but potentially integral to shaping internal cognitive and emotional dynamics. This integration of psychological perspectives with existing theories provides a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of collective violence, where individual cognitions and emotions interact with broader societal structures. Such an intertwined

perspective enriches the theoretical landscape of collective violence studies and challenges researchers to adopt more holistic models in future investigations.

All of this extends our understanding of the consequences of collective violence beliefs, highlighting the need for differentiated intervention strategies that account for the nature and target of the violence. This reaffirms the theoretical relevance and applicability of the developed CVBS: 2D scale for violence studies. In sum, this thesis significantly augments existing theoretical frameworks and stimulates fresh avenues for research in the study of collective violence beliefs, laying the groundwork for more nuanced, targeted, and effective interventions.

6.3 Practical Contributions

The outcomes of this thesis hold significant practical implications, most notably for conflict resolution strategies and policymaking. Historically, several interventions have aimed to mitigate intergroup prejudices and tensions. For instance, intergroup contact has been posited as a robust tool for prejudice reduction, with meta-analyses demonstrating its efficacy under specific conditions (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Furthermore, media-driven interventions like the radio soap opera in post-genocide Rwanda have showcased the power of narrative in reshaping behaviours and tempering intergroup animosities (Paluck, 2009). Another potent method is narrative-based coexistence education, as evidenced in Israeli interventions where Jewish and Arab students were acquainted with each other's historical narratives, facilitating mutual understanding and tempering animosities (Salomon, 2004).

Additionally, the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) proposes the unifying effects of shared identities, a concept with practical implementations that have achieved success in diverse settings (Gaertner et al., 1993). Dialogues, such as those between Palestinians and Jews in Israel, have also provided platforms for mutual understanding and stereotype reduction (Maoz et al., 2002). Yet, despite these commendable efforts, the nuanced

beliefs underpinning collective violence across varied societies and groups often remain unaddressed. This thesis, through the formulation and validation of the CVBS: 2D scale, presents a refined mechanism to capture these nuances (Abou-Ismail, Phillips et al., 2023). Such an approach, particularly in conflict-prone regions like Lebanon and Syria, can pave the way for interventions that address collective violence beliefs at their core, aligning with the progressive needs of conflict resolution and potentially curtailing the frequency and magnitude of violent confrontations.

The insights derived from the influence of RWA and SDO on collective violence beliefs underscore the profound complexities embedded within these ideologies. True, such ideologies are deeply entrenched and exhibit significant stability over time (Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Various studies on educational interventions have demonstrated that altering these ideologies is a daunting task, with many efforts falling short of desired outcomes. For instance, beliefs, particularly those tied to intergroup dynamics, can form during childhood, and solidify during adolescence, becoming increasingly resistant to change (Nesdale, 2004).

However, acknowledging the challenge does not diminish the imperative to address it. For governments and policymakers, understanding these distinct ideological stances is vital when crafting policies. This is especially important when considering that these ideologies are more than just biases – they are foundational worldviews that shape individual and collective behaviours (Perry et al., 2013). The task then is not merely to correct these biases, but to engage with them, understanding their origins and implications. Jost et al. (2009) have similarly highlighted the significance of delving into the psychological roots of political ideologies for more effective policy formulation.

Recognising that RWA and SDO, although related, are influenced by distinct worldviews and drive prejudice - including extreme forms such as collective violence beliefs

- differently is crucial. Given that a substantial segment of the population may align with either threat-based (RWA) or dominance-oriented (SDO) perspectives, it is imperative that policies are tailored to consider these unique standpoints both jointly and separately. This nuanced approach can inform public communications, guide development strategies, and shape policy decisions. Building on the principles of intergroup relations highlighted by Tajfel and Turner (1979), directly engaging with these individual ideological perspectives can, over time, attenuate deep-seated prejudices. Ultimately, this could lead to diminished support for extreme measures, such as collective violence.

Therefore, the objective should not be to transform these ideologies head-on. Instead, the focus should be on creating environments that foster critical interactions with the core principles of RWA and SDO. Echoing Haidt's (2012) sentiments, interventions should holistically address both the overt beliefs and their underlying moral underpinnings. Such a comprehensive approach enables individuals to introspectively assess and potentially recalibrate their biases. By doing so, governments and institutions can craft interventions that genuinely resonate with the diverse ideologies of their citizenry, thereby nurturing a more cohesive society. Such a society not only understands its psychological needs but also seeks ways to manage its biases rather than attempting to eradicate them entirely. Importantly, managing these biases – as a targeted outcome of interventions – should in principle reduce justifications for collective violence and potentially diminish more generalised forms of prejudice (Crisp & Turner, 2010; Paluck & Green, 2009).

Moreover, in the intricate landscape of intergroup relations, a comprehensive understanding of identity's nature is essential. These identities are multifaceted, encompassing both secure and insecure dimensions. While the CIIM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014) underscores the advantages of highlighting a shared superordinate identity, our findings encourage a deeper exploration. They suggest that superordinate identities, even when

intertwined with narcissistic elements, can act as mediators in mitigating tensions among subgroups.

The promotion of national identification as a superordinate identity within multi-group societies, even in the presence of its defensive component, may still have the potential to foster unity and reduce extreme attitudes, echoing the intriguing patterns revealed in our research on national narcissism (Abou-Ismail, Gronfeldt et al., 2023). Simultaneously, navigating the intricate landscape of ingroup narcissism, an identity facet that, if unchecked, could exacerbate conflicts, remains essential.

Interventions should recognise and cater to the diverse needs and sensitivities of collective narcissists, particularly their desire for external validation. Whether by providing this validation or mitigating perceived threats, there lies the potential to diminish their inclination toward collective violence. Hence, a comprehensive and nuanced perspective is indispensable when conceptualising and addressing the dynamics of intergroup relations.

Lastly, this research provides invaluable insights into the specific targets of collective violence, distinguishing between outgroup members and leaders. These distinctions have far-reaching implications for both policymakers and security forces. Firstly, this research enhances the understanding of the dynamics at play within collective violence. By discerning that outgroup members and leaders can be distinct targets, it offers a valuable tool for assessing potential threats. Security forces can use this insight to better comprehend the nuances of violence dynamics. This understanding allows them to maintain order without unduly suppressing legitimate protests or dissent. For instance, they can recognise that violence against leaders might be a manifestation of deep-seated grievances, which require a more reconciliatory approach. Conversely, when violence is indiscriminate and targets everyone, it might be linked to different justifications and motivations, such as extremist ideologies. This understanding can help in allocating resources more efficiently, not just for

the immediate security concerns but also for addressing the underlying factors that fuel different forms of collective violence, including terrorism.

Secondly, policymakers can leverage these findings to delve deeper into the root causes of violence. Understanding whether violence primarily targets leaders or outgroup members is essential. Past interventions have demonstrated that addressing root causes—like social inequalities, historical grievances, and lack of trust—can significantly mitigate intergroup hostility (Rothman, 1997; Kelman, 2004). In instances where violence predominantly targets leadership, there is evidence that leadership interventions emphasising transparency, accountability, and ethical leadership can reduce hostility (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). Such interventions underscore the importance of leadership in maintaining peaceful intergroup relations, especially in contexts rife with historical tensions (Kelman, 2004). On the other hand, when violence targets outgroup members, drawing from reconciliation practices like those employed in post-conflict societies, such as South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Gibson, 2004), might be effective. Policymakers can promote dialogue, mutual understanding, and alternative means for groups to express grievances without resorting to violence. By implementing these evidence-based strategies, policymakers can potentially mitigate violent attitudes and actions.

By recognising the distinctive targets and the motivations behind such violence, both security forces and policy makers can formulate more effective strategies. Consider two central findings from this thesis: Firstly, individuals with higher SDO tendencies are more likely to justify violence against outgroup members. Secondly, heightened sectarian collective narcissism is also linked to an increased propensity for endorsing violence against outgroup members. Recognising these particular motivations can enable a tailored approach to addressing the underlying roots of such violent inclinations.

Security forces can maintain order while respecting the right to peaceful protest especially in regions or during events where pronounced SDO or sectarian collective narcissism sentiments are likely to manifest and addressing specific threats effectively. Concurrently, policymakers can initiate campaigns that promote intergroup dialogue and understanding, specifically aiming at those who score high on SDO and sectarian collective narcissism. By highlighting shared values and objectives across diverse groups, these efforts can potentially diminish the divisive "us vs. them" dynamic that underpins justifications for violence. This concerted strategy not only promotes reconciliation but also offers alternative avenues for expressing group grievances without resorting to violence.

6.4 Limitations & Strengths

Although this thesis presents comprehensive findings within a number of non-WEIRD context (i.e., Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey) and one WEIRD context (i.e., the United States), one limitation lies in the geographical scope of the samples used. The conclusions drawn may not apply uniformly across different cultural, social, or political environments. While we have endeavoured to test our theories in different settings, caution should be exercised when generalising these findings to other contexts.

A further limitation relates to potential biases arising from the self-report nature of the measures used. Participants' responses about their attitudes towards and participation in collective violence might have been influenced by social desirability bias, potentially leading to under-reporting of these behaviours and attitudes. Scholars are invited to consider more novel ways to test the application of collective violence away from self-reported surveys, while respecting at the same time any ethical consideration.

While the use of cross-sectional designs allowed for broad overviews of the relationships between variables, these designs limit the ability to make definitive statements about causality. Consequently, care should be taken when interpreting the findings of this

thesis as indicative of causal relationships. Despite the many theoretical arguments brought forward, without many years of longitudinal analysis, causality cannot be inferred.

While this research had potential limitations, it also showcased significant strengths that deserve acknowledgment. One of the primary strengths was the representativeness of the samples. The participants in this study closely mirrored the diverse sectarian groups present in the Middle East and beyond. Such representativeness ensures that the findings can be generalised more confidently to these populations, providing a comprehensive insight into their attitudes and beliefs.

Additionally, the high statistical power of the studies added weight to the conclusions. The narrow confidence intervals observed throughout the research underscored the precision of the estimates, enhancing the reliability and validity of the findings. The study's rigorous approach to measurement was another crucial strength. The utilisation of structural equation modelling allowed for better control of measurement error, ensuring that the relationships between variables were accurately captured and interpreted. Such measurement practices, especially in complex psychological constructs, elevate the robustness of the research.

Additionally, highlighting underrepresented populations, the research placed a strong focus on non-WEIRD populations. By including participants from countries that are often overlooked in mainstream psychological research, the study contributes unique perspectives and fills critical gaps in the literature.

Lastly, the ecological validity of the research was commendable. Instead of relying solely on controlled lab settings with hypothetical scenarios, the study captured real-world attitudes and beliefs by relying on community samples during times where the Middle East was witnessing dramatic changes such as the Lebanese uprising in 2019 and the ongoing Turkish Kurdish conflict in Southern Syria. This approach ensured that the findings are not

only theoretically significant but also practically relevant, reflecting genuine sentiments and tendencies of individuals in their natural environments.

However, a pertinent aspect to address is our study's methodological choices, particularly concerning the General Aggression Model (GAM) by Anderson and Bushman (2002). Although GAM is a comprehensive framework for understanding aggression, it was not directly employed in our research. This decision was informed by our focus on the multidimensionality of collective violence beliefs, which necessitated a more specialised approach. Additionally, while GAM provides an extensive overview of aggression, our study aimed to delve deeper into the nuances of collective violence beliefs, particularly in intergroup contexts. Our approach, therefore, prioritised models and theories that align more closely with these specific aspects. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that incorporating elements of GAM could offer additional insights and this represents an area for future research to explore.

6.5 Recommendations for Future Research

Throughout this thesis I delved deeply into the intersections of ideologies, identity processes, and collective violence beliefs, using the CVBS: 2D scale I introduced in Chapter 2. While much emphasis has been placed on the salience of studying collective violence beliefs in non-WEIRD societies, characterised by pronounced intergroup conflicts, it is essential to remember that collective violence transcends cultural and geographical confines. As we look towards future research, it becomes paramount to probe deeper into the differential predictors that distinguish collective violence against outgroup members from those against outgroup leaders. Furthermore, broadening the lens to include WEIRD societies alongside those mired in conflict will not only help validate the CVBS: 2D scale more comprehensively but will also yield a richer, multifaceted understanding of collective violence beliefs in diverse cultural contexts.

Additionally, an intriguing direction for future research would be to explicitly incorporate elements of GAM (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), particularly examining the role of outgroup leaders in priming aggressive responses in contexts with a history of intergroup conflict. This exploration could reveal how the presence or actions of these leaders might activate aggressive thoughts and emotions, a concept that is fundamental in GAM. Such an investigation would not only enrich our understanding of collective violence in intergroup settings but also bridge the gap between general aggression theories and specific intergroup dynamics.

6.5.1 Broadening Ideological and Contextual Considerations

This thesis has shed light on the differential influences of RWA and SDO on collective violence beliefs. Both ideologies, rooted in conservative thought, showcase distinct motivations, and subsequently exert different impacts on diffuse and upward collective violence. While RWA, underpinned by perceived threats, intensifies support for diffuse collective violence but shows lesser support for upward collective violence, SDO's drive for dominance augments support for both dimensions albeit inconsistently. This distinction reiterates that conservatism, as characterised by RWA and SDO, is not a monolithic construct.

As we expand the scope, several socio-structural factors might modulate the relationship between RWA, SDO, and collective violence beliefs. Economic disparities, societal stability, education levels, or even historical contexts could profoundly influence these relationships. An intriguing hypothesis is the role of economic inequities and their interplay with RWA and SDO. In societies grappling with vast economic differences, the RWA-induced deference to authority might lead to heightened diffuse collective violence beliefs, especially when authority figures sustain the status quo.

But the ripple effects of the RWA and SDO dynamics are not restricted to collective violence alone. In environments where these ideologies amplify collective violence beliefs,

there might be repercussions such as diminished social cohesion, increased societal polarisation, or even adverse impacts on communal mental health. In contrast, where they diverge, societies could witness grassroots movements championing peace, fostering dialogues, or initiatives to bridge divides.

Additionally, every society, shaped by its unique historical, socio-political, and cultural narrative, may harbour specific ideologies reflecting its idiosyncratic experiences. Societies marked by postcolonial legacies, for instance, might harbour distinct postcolonial ideologies, as evident in New Zealand (Sibley & Osborne, 2016). Likewise, in the United States, the "melting pot" concept underscores the significance of assimilation, sometimes at individual cultural identities' expense (Maddern, 2013). Building on this thesis's findings, future research should consider these broader ideologies alongside context-specific ideologies, offering a more comprehensive perspective on how the different dimensions of collective violence beliefs evolve across various cultural and historical backgrounds.

Furthermore, our study's findings that sectarian status was not a significant predictor challenge conventional ethno-religious perspectives. It paves the way for deeper inquiries into how specific religious doctrines might differentially impact diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs. This underscores the need for a more granular investigation into the role of religious tenets and their interpretations in driving or curtailing support for different dimensions of violence.

6.5.2 Intersections of Multiple Ideologies and Collective Violence Beliefs

A promising avenue for advancing our understanding of collective violence beliefs lies in examining the confluence of multiple ideological stances, beyond just RWA and SDO. As societal beliefs and norms are rarely shaped by single ideologies, it is crucial to investigate how a cocktail of ideological beliefs might differentially influence diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs. Consider, for instance, the interplay of nationalism with

RWA and SDO. While nationalism might amplify feelings of ingroup pride and identity, its convergence with RWA might increase support for diffuse collective violence beliefs, as defending the nation from perceived threats becomes paramount. Conversely, an alignment of nationalism with SDO might heighten support for upward collective violence beliefs, as the emphasis shifts to establishing ingroup dominance by targeting outgroup leaders.

Additionally, ideologies centred on religious fundamentalism or ethnocentrism might also play important roles. How might an individual who strongly adheres to religious fundamentalist beliefs, and simultaneously leans towards SDO, perceive upward collective violence beliefs? Would they be more inclined to target outgroup leaders who are seen as threats to their religious dominance? Another intriguing direction is the study of progressive ideologies, such as those centred on social justice or egalitarianism. How do these interact with RWA and SDO? For instance, might a strong egalitarian belief system counterbalance the effects of SDO on upward collective violence beliefs, advocating instead for dialogue and reconciliation with outgroup leaders? By exploring multidimensional ideological intersections, future research can yield a richer and more holistic understanding of the predictors of both diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs. Such an approach will not only refine our conceptual frameworks but also offer actionable insights for interventions aiming to mitigate collective violence.

6.5.3 Identity Processes and Differential Influences on Collective Violence Beliefs

The observed differential effects of national and sectarian narcissism on collective violence in the Lebanese context underscore the intricate relationship between identity processes and collective violence beliefs; suggesting their potential varying influences on diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs. For instance, in regions such as Nagorno-Karabakh, marked by historical ethnic tensions; individuals with elevated ethnic narcissism might be particularly inclined towards diffuse collective violence beliefs when perceiving

threats from outgroups. This is likely because, in such settings, direct violence against ordinary members of outgroups might be seen as a means to defend the perceived superiority of one's own ethnic group. However, when national identity becomes more salient, perhaps due to external threats or notable national events, there might be a stronger inclination towards upward collective violence beliefs, targeting outgroup leaders seen as symbolic threats to the national identity.

Conversely, in situations where the national identity gains prominence, the impetus for diffuse collective violence beliefs might wane, even amidst inter-ethnic disputes. A unified front against external adversaries might push people to prioritise targeting outgroup leaders over general members. Similarly, in multi-ethnic regions, ethnic groups that perceive themselves as marginalised might exhibit a strong inclination towards upward collective violence beliefs, aiming to challenge the dominance of majority group leaders. This inclination toward upward collective violence beliefs can be a manifestation of their attempt to assert their identity and secure their place within the broader national fabric.

Exploring how different identity processes, whether ethnic, religious, national, or political, distinctly influence different dimensions of collective violence beliefs will enable a more comprehensive understanding of those beliefs. Building on the Lebanese context, future research should consider these variances, transitioning from a broad-brush approach on identity and violence to a differentiated and more intricate exploration.

6.5.4 Mediators and Moderators

Furthermore, future research should aim to identify the mediating and moderating mechanisms through which identity processes shape collective violence beliefs. For instance, group cohesion could serve as a pivotal mediator, especially for diffuse collective violence beliefs. When individuals feel a profound sense of connection within their group, this cohesion could intensify the relationship between identity salience and beliefs supporting

violence against outgroup members. Groups with strong cohesion, forged through shared beliefs or adversities, might be more inclined to support violence against ordinary outgroup members, viewing it as an embodiment of their collective stance.

On the other hand, intergroup perceptions might emerge as significant moderators, especially for upward collective violence beliefs. The inclination to target outgroup leaders could be contingent on how a group perceives its counterparts. A group with a dominant identity that perceives a direct threat from another group's leadership might amplify its support for upward beliefs, while harmonious intergroup relations might reduce these inclinations.

Defensive identifications also offer an intriguing layer to this exploration. When groups perceive their identity as under threat, their heightened emphasis on their distinctiveness could amplify beliefs in upward collective violence beliefs, targeting symbols of perceived threats. Additionally, the harmonisation or tension between multiple identities, such as religious and ethnic, can further complicate the dynamics. When these identities align, they might jointly heighten support for diffuse collective violence. In contrast, potential conflicts between these identities might redirect the inclination towards upward collective violence, challenging the leadership symbols of the conflicting identity. To truly grasp the interplay between these mediators, moderators, identity processes, and their differential influences on diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs, comprehensive explorations across varied cultural contexts become indispensable.

6.5.5 Cross-Cultural Considerations

Embracing a cross-cultural approach unveils more than mere regional variations; it unlocks the potential to compare macro-structural variables from non-psychological theories on collective violence with the individual processes unearthed in our research, especially when discerning between diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs.

Comparative studies across diverse regions can unravel how societal norms, sculpted by historical and political heritages, merge with personal identity experiences. For example, in societies marked by stark economic inequalities, personal identity processes could be closely tied with socioeconomic positions, potentially leading to amplified support for diffuse collective violence against outgroup members representing these inequalities. Conversely, nations steeped in historical animosities might witness upward collective violence tendencies surging, as individuals target specific outgroup leaders or symbols, echoing past transgressions.

Governance structures, especially those that lean towards repression or exclusion, can heighten feelings of marginalisation, further fuelling an individual's proclivity towards collective violence. The interplay between such systems and personal identity could lead to differential effects supporting diffuse and upward collective violence. A hypothesis worth exploring is whether exclusionary governance amplifies tendencies toward upward collective violence beliefs rather than encouraging the broader forms of violence found in diffuse collective violence beliefs.

In contrast, societies characterised by inclusive governance and the harmonious amalgamation of various groups might serve as exemplars of how positive identity experiences, even amid diversity, can temper collective violence inclinations. When national unity is prioritised in response to external threats or significant national milestones, upward collective violence beliefs might take a backseat, even if underlying intergroup tensions simmer.

By delving deep into these cross-cultural intersections, researchers can elucidate the links between societal conditions and individual motivations, thereby offering both a macro and micro-level comprehension of collective violence beliefs. Expanding the research panorama to envelop a wider spectrum of identity processes and their worldwide

manifestations will enable the creation of a more holistic theoretical framework. Grounded in empirical veracity, such a framework can act as a cornerstone for devising targeted interventions and policies, aiming to counteract the adverse impacts of identity-driven factors on collective violence beliefs.

6.5.6 Methodological Recommendations

Building upon our exploration into the nuanced relationships and dynamics surrounding diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs, a more systematic methodological approach is necessary to rigorously unpack these connections.

While our research has shed light on the interplay between collective violence beliefs and potential violent behaviours, adopting longitudinal designs in future investigations will be crucial. Such designs not only offer the ability to validate existing relationships but also present the opportunity to trace the evolution and cyclical nature of these beliefs. It is plausible that while ideologies and identity processes shape collective violence beliefs, the converse may also hold true. Specifically, entrenched collective violence beliefs at least in some societies may in turn catalyse the radicalisation of distinct ideologies and foster deeper commitments to defensive ingroup identities.

Furthermore, in light of our discussion on differential predictors for diffuse and upward collective violence beliefs, longitudinal designs could illuminate how these predictors vary over time and under different circumstances. For instance, under what conditions might a previously held belief system become a stronger predictor for one form of collective violence over another? Or how might shifts in societal norms or geopolitical changes recalibrate these relationships?

To capture the intricate dance between predictors, beliefs, and behaviours, multi-wave studies would be particularly beneficial. These would allow researchers to pinpoint specific temporal sequences, such as whether heightened investment in defensive ingroup identities

precedes an increase in upward collective violence beliefs or follows it. Moreover, integrating mixed-methods approaches—combining both quantitative and qualitative techniques—can further enhance our understanding. Qualitative insights can offer depth, capturing the lived experiences, narratives, and rationales behind individuals' endorsement or rejection of certain forms of collective violence.

Therefore, a multifaceted methodological approach, grounded in longitudinal designs and potentially complemented by mixed methods, stands as a promising avenue for future research. Such endeavours will not only enrich our theoretical comprehension but will also provide actionable insights to inform policy and intervention strategies aimed at curbing the negative ramifications of collective violence beliefs and behaviours.

6.6 Lebanon and the Middle East

Lebanon, with its mosaic of diverse cultures, embodies the challenges and nuances of intergroup dynamics in the Middle East. The country's multisectarian fabric, while being a source of resilience, has also rendered it vulnerable to intergroup tensions. In a nation where various religious sects coexist, each carrying its unique cultural narratives and historical grievances, Lebanon epitomises the imperative of understanding the psychological underpinnings of intergroup relations. While sectarian divides often remain dormant in day-to-day interactions, they can become susceptible to external provocations, leading to escalations in conflict. The complexities presented by Lebanon highlight the need for social research that delves deeper into the cognitive frameworks of its citizens, uncovering the biases, misconceptions, and fears that may hinder intergroup harmony. Recognising these intricacies not only serves Lebanon but also offers a blueprint for other multi-ethnic and multi-religious nations grappling with intergroup dynamics. By identifying the underlying factors that strain intergroup relations and addressing them head-on, nations can develop holistic strategies that ensure sustainable peace and progress. The lessons derived from

Lebanon's experience, when viewed through the lens of our research, hold the potential to shape global discourse on intergroup harmony and societal integration.

Contrastingly, Syria strikingly highlights the challenges of imbalances in power dynamics between majority and minority groups. Even with a Sunni majority, the Alawite minority has historically held significant sway in Syria's political landscape. The resulting tensions, exacerbated by regional and international interventions, culminated in the Syrian civil war—a chilling manifestation of unchecked intergroup conflict. Such a scenario underscores the importance of studying the psychological processes that contribute to the polarisation of groups, especially in contexts where power disparities exist. For Syria, understanding these processes offers the opportunity to address its intergroup frictions at a foundational level. By harnessing the insights from research on identity processes, collective violence beliefs, and intergroup dynamics; initiatives can be designed to promote dialogue, understanding, and reconciliation among Syria's diverse populace. Only by acknowledging and integrating the myriad voices can Syria hope to craft an inclusive governance framework, ensuring lasting peace and prosperity.

In Turkey, the deep-rooted discord between the Kurds and the national government underscores the challenges ethnic minorities face in their quest for acknowledgment and autonomy. Representing one of the most significant stateless ethnic populations, the Kurdish story resonates not only within Turkey but also across neighbouring nations like Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Within Turkey, their journey has been punctuated by extended conflicts, political silences, and a trust deficit. From a researcher's perspective, such dynamics emphasise the urgent need for understanding the roots of ethnic divides, mutual perceptions, and the interplay of historical narratives with present realities. By understanding the depths of these interactions, one can hope to unearth pathways for dialogue, mutual understanding, and

perhaps, a shared vision for the future that acknowledges the richness of diverse cultural histories without being ensnared by them.

While I have not directly studied the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to limited accessibility, its significance in the Middle East's broader context cannot be understated. The conflict underscores the profound impact of historical injustices on collective violence beliefs. The Palestinian identity, emerging and solidifying in the face of adversity, has been deeply shaped by the shared experience of displacement and the ongoing quest for nationhood. This collective identity, born from being disadvantaged and denied the right to self-determination, stands in contrast to an Israeli identity that has, over time, rooted itself in both ethnicity and nationhood. The coexistence of these identities presents multifaceted challenges. On one hand, they each bear historical grievances and deep-seated mistrust. On the other, understanding the intricacies of their respective identity formations provides a unique opportunity. By carefully considering the intricacies and depths of these identities, we can aspire to develop a conflict resolution framework that genuinely engages with the fundamental concerns and hopes of both groups. While a resolution remains challenging, such an approach could provide a more informed pathway towards addressing one of the most longstanding and deeply rooted conflicts of our time.

Reflecting on these interconnected scenarios, from Lebanon's dynamics to the deeply entrenched Israeli-Palestinian divide, one cannot help but grasp the delicate interplay of power, historical narratives, and external agendas that mould the region. My personal journey, set against the backdrop of these evolving narratives, not only underscores the importance of deciphering these dynamics but also illuminates the dire need for pathways toward reconciliation and harmony. As researchers and dedicated observers of the region, our task — and truly, our moral imperative — is to leverage our insights in fostering genuine dialogue,

mending fractures, and envisioning a Middle East where diversity and mutual respect are its greatest strengths.

6.7 Conclusion

This thesis has made considerable strides in the exploration of support for collective violence. By introducing and validating the Two-Dimensional Collective Violence Beliefs Scale (CVBS: 2D), I have provided a tool to delve deeper into understanding the nuances of collective violence attitudes. Findings highlight that the target of violent acts, rather than their intensity, serves as a key differentiator in people's justifications for collective violence.

The research in this thesis has illuminated the relationship between ideologies, such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO), and distinct types of collective violence. Furthermore, the research has enriched our understanding of collective narcissism's role in shaping attitudes towards collective violence. These insights represent significant contributions to the field of political psychology, introducing new pathways for research and theory development.

Beyond its theoretical implications, this research holds profound practical significance. The nuanced understanding of collective violence beliefs offered by this work could inform more targeted and effective interventions in conflict settings. By identifying the drivers of different forms of collective violence, policymakers and practitioners can better design strategies for conflict resolution, awareness campaigns, and educational programs.

Finally, this research carries broad societal implications. By exploring the underpinnings and consequences of collective violence, we are better positioned to address this pressing global issue. It underscores the critical need to understand and address the roots of collective violence in our quest for more peaceful societies.

This thesis demonstrates the complexity and multifaceted nature of collective violence beliefs, thereby opening new avenues for research, interventions, and societal improvements.

The understanding gained from this study underscores the urgency and necessity of continuing to delve into the intricate dynamics of collective violence.

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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 2 SUPPLEMENTS

Table SI1: Original 43 items including all Collective Violence sub-scale

Item	
1	It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect
2	It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect
3	Physical aggression against certain groups can be legitimate
4	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically harm members of a different sect
5	Sometimes it is justified for members of my sect to physically attack members of a different sect
6	Physical aggression is justified if carried out on behalf of the state
7	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically assault members of a different sect
8	Sometimes it is justified for members of my sect to use physical violence against members of a different sect
9	It is justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect
10	Sometimes it is justified for members of my sect to curse members of a different sect
11	Cursing politicians can be justified
12	Speaking wrongfully of members of a different sect on social media can be justified sometimes
13	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally threaten members of a different sect
14	It is justified for members of my sect to spread rumours about members of a different sect
15	Verbally insulting politicians can be justified
16	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect on social media
17	It can be justified for members of my sect to verbally assault members of a different sect
18	It is acceptable for people to share posts that contain verbal aggression against other groups on social media
19	Members of my sect and during an argument with a different sect may pose in an offensive way as if wishing to start a fight
20	During an argument, members of my sect can sometimes be justified to stand in an offensive pose toward members of a different sect
21	When encountering a member of an enemy state, it is justified to want to invade their space with your body as a form of threat
22	I think that it can be justified for members of my sect to threaten a different sect member with one’s facial expressions
23	It is justified for someone to threaten an offender from a different sect with their physical posture

24	Squeezing one's teeth in front of a members from a different sect as if threatening them is sometimes a justified reaction
25	It is sometimes justified to make threatening fists against members of a different sect
26	Generally, burning flags of enemy states is a justified reaction
27	Building figures representing members of an enemy state and destroying them is a justified act
28	Generally, offending political leaders through drawings, falls under freedom of expression
29	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing enemy figures is a justified act
30	It is accepted that people share memes making fun of politicians they do not agree with
31	Symbolic burying of enemy figures is a justified act
32	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians is a justified act
33	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians and destroying them in groups is a justified act
34	Replacing the head of an effigy representing the enemy with an animal head effigy is a normal expression of dissatisfaction
35	Generally, people interact positively with pictures that make fun of politicians they don't like on social media
36	Destroying the property of a different sect is sometimes a justified reaction
37	It is justified sometimes for members of my sect to destroy property of members from a different sect
38	Burning cars of members from a different sect can be a justified act
39	Destroying private property belonging to members from a different sect can sometimes be justified
40	It is justified sometimes for members of my sect to damage cars of members from a different sect
41	Attacking the embassy of another state to get back at that state can sometimes be justified
42	Destroying enemy properties is a symbolic victory over the enemy
43	Destroying public property to get back at the government can sometimes be justified

Table SI2: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Diffuse Collective Violence Scale, Study 1a.

Item		α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
DCV1	It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect	4.663	1.079	1.389	1.830	2.262
DCV2	It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect	6.875	1.095	1.382	1.872	2.036
DCV3	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically harm members of a different sect	4.248	1.120	1.477	1.894	2.221
DCV4	It is justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect	4.036	1.000	1.372	1.968	2.083
DCV5	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally threaten members of a different sect	2.783	0.645	1.028	1.629	2.025
DCV6	It can be justified for members of my sect to verbally assault members of a different sect	3.502	0.895	1.216	1.855	2.123
DCV7	Destroying the property of a different sect is sometimes a justified reaction	3.381	1.054	1.411	1.978	2.230
DCV8	It is justified sometimes for members of my sect to destroy property of members from a different sect	3.723	1.197	1.510	2.017	2.168
DCV9	It is justified sometimes for members of my sect to damage cars of members from a different sect	3.631	1.171	1.491	1.981	2.382

Table SI3: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Upward Collective Violence Scale, Study 1a.

Item		α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
UCV1	Cursing politicians can be justified	2.220	-1.233	-0.808	-0.114	0.383
UCV2	Verbally insulting politicians can be justified	2.198	-1.108	-0.685	-0.098	0.477
UCV3	Generally, offending political leaders through drawings, falls under freedom of expression	1.869	-1.550	-1.134	-0.367	0.453
UCV4	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing enemy figures is a justified act	1.661	-0.620	-0.195	-0.640	1.242
UCV5	It is accepted that people share memes making fun of politicians they do not agree with	2.321	-1.209	-0.773	-0.066	0.516
UCV6	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians is a justified act	2.464	-0.938	-0.647	-0.058	0.468
UCV7	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians and destroying them in groups is a justified act	2.366	-0.931	-0.575	0.035	0.586

UCV8	Generally, people interact positively with pictures that make fun of politicians they don't like on social media	1.471	-1.829	-1.580	-0.630	0.231



Figure SI1: Item characteristic curves for all Diffuse Collective Violence items, Study 1a, Sample 1. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order.



Figure SI2: Item characteristic curves for all Upward Collective Violence items, Study 1a, Sample 1. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order.

Table S4: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Diffuse Collective Violence Scale, Study 1b.

Item		α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
DCV1	It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect	4.219	1.105	1.677	2.093	2.399
DCV2	It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect	4.211	1.091	1.784	2.379	2.560
DCV3	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically harm members of a different sect	3.834	1.139	1.793	2.354	2.491
DCV4	It is justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect	3.105	0.791	1.516	2.041	2.348
DCV5	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally threaten members of a different sect	2.950	0.736	1.425	2.042	2.460
DCV6	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect on social media	3.084	0.772	1.462	2.297	2.821
DCV7	Destroying the property of a different sect is sometimes a justified reaction	2.142	1.078	1.708	2.423	2.686
DCV8	Burning cars of members of a different sect can be a justified act	3.049	1.228	1.806	2.539	2.785
DCV9	It is justified for members of my sect to damage cars of members from a different sect	3.030	1.160	1.757	2.218	2.423

Table SI5: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Upward Collective Violence Scale, Study 1b.

Item		α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
UCV1	Verbally insulting politicians can be justified	3.161	-1.479	-1.061	-0.645	-0.073
UCV2	One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders	2.875	-1.557	-1.041	-0.640	0.041
UCV3	Dragging effigies representing corrupted politicians in the streets is a justified act	3.532	-1.318	-0.885	-0.475	0.018
UCV4	Insulting those responsible for our situation is a justified act	2.540	-1.575	-1.212	-0.764	-0.129
UCV5	Destroying property of corrupted politicians can be justified	2.549	-1.341	-0.957	-0.518	-0.034
UCV6	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians is a justified act	3.665	-1.305	-0.959	-0.430	-0.001
UCV7	Being verbally violent against those who got us here is a justified act	2.744	-1.589	-1.180	-0.739	-0.178
UCV8	Burning effigies of corrupted politicians is a justified act	4.752	-1.425	-0.960	-0.538	-0.065
UCV9	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians and destroying them in groups is a justified act	3.064	-1.216	-0.736	-0.193	0.270



Figure SI3: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right), Diffuse Collective Violence, Study 1b.



Figure SI4: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right), Upward Collective Violence, Study 1b.



Figure SI5: Item characteristic curves for all Diffuse Collective Violence items, Study 1b. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order.



Figure SI6: Item characteristic curves for all Upward Collective Violence items, Study 1b. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order.

Table SI6: Invariance between Control and Strong Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Diffuse Collective Violence Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 2.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	5475.518	5577.899	5581.021	5748.411	-2677.759	-	-
Metric	5471.976	5546.119	5566.929	5717.580	-2681.988	8.458	.206
Scalar (weak)	5464.780	5508.717	5521.048	5610.323	-2700.390	45.262	**.021**
Scalar (strong)	5464.560	5507.124	5519.070	5605.555	-2701.280	47.042	**.018**
Full	5463.889	5505.080	5516.640	5600.335	-2701.944	48.371	**.018**

Table SI7: Invariance between Control and Strong Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Upward Collective Violence Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 2.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	10773.07	10855.62	10878.62	11046.13	-5326.533	-	-
Metric	10766.59	10840.89	10861.59	11012.35	-5329.297	5.528	.478
Scalar (weak)	10739.47	10783.50	10795.76	10885.10	-5337.734	22.402	.762
Scalar (strong)	10738.34	10780.99	10792.87	10879.42	-5338.168	23.271	.764
Full	10736.91	10778.18	10789.68	10873.44	-5338.453	23.841	.779

Table SI8: Invariance between Control and Subtle Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Diffuse Collective Violence Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 2.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	6458.570	6541.633	6564.282	6732.147	-3169.285	-	-
Metric	6452.923	6527.680	6548.063	6699.142	-3172.461	6.353	.385
Scalar (weak)	6442.968	6487.268	6499.347	6588.875	-3189.484	40.398	.061
Scalar (strong)	6452.906	6495.822	6507.524	6594.254	-3195.453	52.336	**.005**
Full	6454.746	6496.278	6507.602	6591.535	-3197.373	56.176	**.003**

Table SI9: Invariance between Control and Subtle Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Upward Collective Violence Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 2.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	10087.68	10170.92	10193.45	10361.43	-4983.842	-	-
Metric	10101.37	10176.28	10196.56	10347.74	-4996.686	25.688	**<.001**
Scalar (weak)	10099.38	10143.77	10155.78	10245.38	-5017.688	67.693	**<.001**
Scalar (strong)	10135.61	10178.61	10190.25	10277.04	-5036.804	105.924	**<.001**
Full	10139.38	10181.00	10192.26	10276.26	-5039.692	111.699	**<.001**

Table SI10: Invariance between Control and Strong Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Combined Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 2.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	16140.68	16336.06	16390.49	16786.93	-7928.34	-	-
Metric	16115.44	16279.17	16324.80	16557.02	-7938.722	20.764	.596
Scalar (weak)	16077.43	10180.63	16209.38	16418.77	-7963.717	70.755	.354
Scalar (strong)	16076.01	16176.45	16204.43	16408.24	-7965.004	73.328	.338
Full	16075.33	16173.02	16200.24	16398.46	-7966.667	76.654	.302

Table SI11: Invariance between Control and Subtle Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Combined Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 2.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	P
Default	16319.67	16516.65	16569.97	16967.53	-8017.833	-	-
Metric	16327.72	16492.80	16537.48	16870.65	-8044.859	54.052	**<.001**
Scalar (weak)	16294.53	16398.57	16426.74	16636.72	-8072.266	108.865	**.001**
Scalar (strong)	16401.28	16502.54	16529.96	16734.33	-8127.638	219.61	**<.001**
Full	16405.06	16503.56	16530.22	16729.00	-8131.532	227.398	**<.001**

Table SI12: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Diffuse Collective Violence Scale, Study 2.

Item		Condition	α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
DCV1	It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect	Control	3.050	0.931	1.273	1.683	1.852
		Strong	5.034	0.905	1.312	1.578	1.793
		Subtle	3.000	0.667	1.118	1.580	1.946
DCV2	It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect	Control	4.073	0.978	1.324	1.760	1.953
		Strong	4.767	0.954	1.360	1.569	1.750
		Subtle	3.752	0.580	0.943	1.445	1.655
DCV3	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically harm members of a different sect	Control	4.709	0.935	1.245	1.696	1.831
		Strong	5.151	0.892	1.251	1.552	1.742
		Subtle	3.289	0.556	0.863	1.445	1.811
DCV4	It is justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect	Control	2.733	0.739	1.221	1.863	2.014
		Strong	2.953	0.947	1.375	1.703	1.921
		Subtle	3.497	0.478	0.871	1.366	1.748
DCV5	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally threaten members of a different sect	Control	2.496	0.757	1.213	1.811	2.070
		Strong	2.549	0.801	1.308	1.607	1.967
		Subtle	2.706	0.382	0.731	1.341	1.757
DCV6	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect on social media	Control	2.655	0.727	1.089	1.662	1.865
		Strong	2.451	0.903	1.495	1.926	2.183
		Subtle	2.861	0.555	1.066	1.563	1.899

Table SI13: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Upward Collective Violence Scale, Study 2.

Item		Condition	α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
UCV1	Verbally insulting politicians from other sects can be justified	Control	1.545	-0.468	0.056	0.874	1.404
		Strong	1.439	-0.225	0.306	1.146	1.615
		Subtle	2.766	0.092	0.540	1.079	1.383
UCV2	One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders especially those from other sects	Control	1.711	-0.583	-0.090	0.883	1.355
		Strong	1.179	-0.687	0.017	1.212	1.834
		Subtle	2.508	0.050	0.418	1.082	1.486
UCV3	Dragging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other sects in the streets is a justified act	Control	2.904	-0.407	-0.085	0.413	0.771
		Strong	2.153	-0.426	-0.028	0.627	0.965
		Subtle	4.014	0.021	0.359	0.925	1.280
UCV4	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other sects is a justified act	Control	2.561	-0.683	-0.292	0.206	0.580
		Strong	2.453	-0.744	-0.288	0.350	0.675
		Subtle	3.543	-0.042	0.394	0.848	1.141
UCV5	Burning effigies of corrupted politicians from other sects is a justified act	Control	2.799	-0.462	-0.157	0.331	0.727
		Strong	3.031	-0.527	-0.205	0.467	0.716
		Subtle	3.765	-0.078	0.304	0.878	1.157
UCV6	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians from other sects and destroying them in groups is a justified act	Control	2.876	-0.589	-0.211	0.347	0.680
		Strong	2.839	-0.440	-0.082	0.464	0.874
		Subtle	3.686	-0.018	0.489	0.982	1.178


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

Figure SI7: Item characteristic curves for all Diffuse Collective Violence items, Study 2. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order. Control condition items on left, strong threat prime condition items in middle, and subtle threat prime condition items on right.


Probability
Theta
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

Figure SI8: Item characteristic curves for all Upward Collective Violence items, Study 2. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order. Control condition items on left, strong threat prime condition items in middle, and subtle threat prime condition items on right.

Table SI14: Invariance between Control and Strong Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Diffuse Collective Violence Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 3.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	4018.464	4058.220	4110.125	4248.553	-1949.232	-	-
Metric	4012.533	4048.313	4095.828	4219.613	-1952.267	6.069	.416
Scalar (weak)	4002.365	4023.568	4051.251	4125.079	-1969.183	39.901	.067
Scalar (strong)	4000.755	4021.295	4048.113	4119.634	-1969.378	40.291	.079
Full	3999.007	4018.885	4044.838	4114.051	-1969.504	40.543	.095

Table SI15: Invariance between Control and Strong Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Upward Collective Violence Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 3.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	4278.333	4318.088	4369.994	4508.421	-2079.166	-	-
Metric	4270.892	4306.672	4353.387	4477.972	-2081.446	4.56	.601
Scalar (weak)	4244.816	4266.019	4293.702	4367.530	-2090.408	22.483	.758
Scalar (strong)	4242.869	4263.409	4290.227	4361.748	-2090.435	22.536	.797
Full	4240.908	4260.786	4286.739	4355.952	-2090.454	22.575	.832

Table SI16: Invariance between Control and Subtle Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Diffuse Collective Violence Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 3.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	3562.661	3595.588	3651.943	3785.879	-1721.330	-	-
Metric	3556.286	3585.921	3636.641	3757.183	-1724.143	5.625	.466
Scalar (weak)	3549.037	3566.598	3596.654	3668.087	-1742.518	42.376	**.040**
Scalar (strong)	3547.104	3564.117	3593.234	3662.434	-1742.552	42.444	.051
Full	3545.509	3561.972	3090.150	3657.118	-1742.754	42.848	.060

Table SI17: Invariance between Control and Subtle Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Upward Collective Violence Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 3.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	3830.270	3863.197	3919.553	4053.489	-1855.135	-	-
Metric	3825.947	3855.582	3906.301	4026.844	-1858.973	7.677	.263
Scalar (weak)	3799.403	3816.964	3847.020	3918.453	-1867.701	25.133	.621
Scalar (strong)	3797.435	3814.448	3843.565	3912.765	-1867.718	25.165	.670
Full	3796.307	3812.770	3840.948	3907.916	-1868.153	26.037	.673

Table SI18: Invariance between Control and Strong Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Combined Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 3.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	p
Default	7970.411	8064.498	8187.342	8514.954	-3843.205	-	-
Metric	7955.710	8034.558	8137.504	8412.052	-3858.855	31.299	.116
Scalar (weak)	7930.996	7980.690	8045.572	8218.607	-3890.498	94.585	**.015**
Scalar (strong)	7927.799	7976.168	8039.320	8207.740	-3890.899	95.388	**.019**
Full	7930.498	7977.542	8038.964	8202.770	-3894.249	102.087	**.009**

Table SI19: Invariance between Control and Subtle Threat Prime Conditions using IRT, Combined Items. Significance denotes difference from configural model, Study 3.

	AIC	SABIC	HQ	BIC	LL	χ^2	P
Default	7136.675	7214.603	7347.977	7664.959	-3426.337	-	-
Metric	7108.228	7173.535	7285.306	7550.945	-3435.114	17.554	.781
Scalar (weak)	7096.361	7137.520	7207.964	7375.384	-3473.180	93.686	**.017**
Scalar (strong)	7092.452	7132.514	7201.079	7364.035	-3473.226	93.777	**.025**
Full	7073.072	7112.037	7128.724	7337.214	-3465.536	78.398	.256

Table SI20: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Diffuse Collective Violence Scale, Study 3.

Item		Condition	α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
DCV1	It is justified for members of my sect to become physically aggressive towards members of a different sect	Control	6.353	0.215	0.537	0.809	1.202
		Strong	4.501	0.109	0.548	0.934	1.187
		Subtle	5.893	0.094	0.546	0.899	1.199
DCV2	It can be justified for members of my sect to hit members of a different sect	Control	3.827	0.197	0.660	1.025	1.354
		Strong	5.378	0.031	0.604	0.855	1.075
		Subtle	4.399	0.146	0.572	1.113	1.350
DCV3	It can be justified for members of my sect to physically harm members of a different sect	Control	5.330	0.092	0.501	0.970	1.079
		Strong	5.164	0.177	0.577	0.897	1.058
		Subtle	4.641	0.033	0.573	0.967	1.309
DCV4	It is justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect	Control	4.023	-0.184	0.324	0.867	1.227
		Strong	4.868	-0.056	0.341	0.690	1.016
		Subtle	4.331	-0.326	0.219	0.590	1.032
DCV5	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally threaten members of a different sect	Control	3.106	0.170	0.469	0.782	1.291
		Strong	3.608	-0.168	0.429	0.753	1.035
		Subtle	4.114	0.066	0.476	1.074	1.259
DCV6	It is sometimes justified for members of my sect to verbally insult members of a different sect on social media	Control	4.264	-0.196	0.291	0.697	1.188
		Strong	4.721	-0.065	0.387	0.674	1.101
		Subtle	3.198	-0.364	0.185	0.629	1.082

Table SI21: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Upward Collective Violence Scale, Study 3.

Item		Condition	α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
UCV1	Verbally insulting politicians from other sects can be justified	Control	3.731	-0.769	-0.433	0.108	0.604
		Strong	4.287	-0.593	-0.131	0.246	0.730
		Subtle	4.649	-0.719	-0.391	0.235	0.587
UCV2	One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders especially those from other sects	Control	3.942	-0.774	-0.355	0.177	0.660
		Strong	4.135	-0.602	-0.338	0.288	0.749
		Subtle	5.445	-0.755	-0.370	0.233	0.693
UCV3	Dragging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other sects in the streets is a justified act	Control	6.389	-0.790	-0.451	0.111	0.609
		Strong	8.800	-0.585	-0.266	0.113	0.518
		Subtle	6.388	-0.713	-0.425	0.186	0.623
UCV4	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other sects is a justified act	Control	6.071	-0.819	-0.399	0.061	0.540
		Strong	8.003	-0.569	-0.284	0.102	0.500
		Subtle	5.618	-0.718	-0.445	0.107	0.564
UCV5	Burning effigies of corrupted politicians from other sects is a justified act	Control	6.309	-0.870	-0.438	0.138	0.552
		Strong	10.341	-0.603	-0.246	0.101	0.506
		Subtle	8.184	-0.745	-0.398	0.183	0.557
UCV6	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians from other sects and destroying them in groups is a justified act	Control	5.914	-0.917	-0.422	0.173	0.520
		Strong	10.245	-0.725	-0.305	0.161	0.469
		Subtle	6.403	-0.734	-0.439	0.250	0.667



Figure SI9: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right) in the control condition (top), strong threat prime condition (middle), and subtle threat prime condition (bottom), Diffuse Collective Violence, Study 3.



Figure SI10: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right) in the control condition (top), strong threat prime condition (middle), and subtle threat prime condition (bottom), Upward Collective Violence, Study 3.


Probability
Theta
Pr(diff1=1)
Pr(diff1=2)
Pr(diff1=3)
Pr(diff1=4)
Pr(diff1=5)
Probability
Theta
Pr(diff1=1)
Pr(diff1=2)
Pr(diff1=3)
Pr(diff1=4)
Pr(diff1=5)
Probability
Theta
Pr(diff1=1)
Pr(diff1=2)
Pr(diff1=3)
Pr(diff1=4)
Pr(diff1=5)
Probability
Theta
Pr(diff2=1)
Pr(diff2=2)
Pr(diff2=3)
Pr(diff2=4)
Pr(diff2=5)
Probability
Theta
Pr(diff2=1)
Pr(diff2=2)
Pr(diff2=3)
Pr(diff2=4)
Pr(diff2=5)
Probability
Theta
Pr(diff2=1)
Pr(diff2=2)
Pr(diff2=3)
Pr(diff2=4)
Pr(diff2=5)
Probability
Theta
Pr(diff3=1)
Pr(diff3=2)
Pr(diff3=3)
Pr(diff3=4)
Pr(diff3=5)
Probability
Theta
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Pr(diff3=2)
Pr(diff3=3)
Pr(diff3=4)
Pr(diff3=5)
Probability
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Pr(diff3=2)
Pr(diff3=3)
Pr(diff3=4)
Pr(diff3=5)
Probability
Theta
Pr(diff4=1)
Pr(diff4=2)
Pr(diff4=3)
Pr(diff4=4)
Pr(diff4=5)
Probability
Theta
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Pr(diff4=2)
Pr(diff4=3)
Pr(diff4=4)
Pr(diff4=5)
Probability
Theta
Pr(diff4=1)
Pr(diff4=2)
Pr(diff4=3)
Pr(diff4=4)
Pr(diff4=5)



Figure SI11: Item characteristic curves for all Diffuse Collective Violence items, Study 3. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order. Control condition items on left, strong threat prime condition items in middle, and subtle threat prime condition items on right.


Probability
Theta
Pr(upw1=1)
Pr(upw1=2)
Pr(upw1=3)
Pr(upw1=4)
Pr(upw1=5)
Pr(upw2=1)
Pr(upw2=2)
Pr(upw2=3)
Pr(upw2=4)
Pr(upw2=5)
Pr(upw3=1)
Pr(upw3=2)
Pr(upw3=3)
Pr(upw3=4)
Pr(upw3=5)
Pr(upw4=1)
Pr(upw4=2)
Pr(upw4=3)
Pr(upw4=4)
Pr(upw4=5)



Figure SI12: Item characteristic curves for all Upward Collective Violence items, Study 3. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order. Control condition items on left, strong threat prime condition items in middle, and subtle threat prime condition items on right.

Table SI22: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Diffuse Collective Violence Scale, Study 4. No one answered "5" on items 4 and 6.

Item		α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
DCV1	It is justified for Turks to be physically aggressive towards Kurds	3.326	0.888	1.250	1.834	2.462
DCV2	It may be justified for Turks to hit Kurds	12.157	0.852	1.233	1.638	2.275
DCV3	It may be justified for Turks to physically harm Kurds	8.112	0.869	1.204	1.705	2.323
DCV4	It may be justified for Turks to verbally insult Kurds	4.741	0.604	1.057	1.631	N/A
DCV5	It may sometimes be justified for Turks to verbally threaten Kurds	3.870	0.460	1.040	1.550	2.589
DCV6	It may sometimes be justified for Turks to verbally insult Kurds on social media	3.829	0.433	1.008	1.568	N/A
DCV7	Destroying the properties of Kurds is sometimes a justified reaction	4.744	0.973	1.409	1.784	2.482
DCV8	Burning the cars of Kurds may be a justifiable reaction	5.925	1.210	1.417	1.878	2.383
DCV9	It is sometimes justifiable for Turks to damage the cars of Kurds	5.095	1.153	1.353	1.799	2.451

Table SI23: Discrimination parameters (α) and threshold locations (δ) for the Upward Collective Violence Scale, Study 4.

Item		α	δ_2	δ_3	δ_4	δ_5
UCV1	Verbally insulting some Kurdish politicians can be justified	1.848	-0.053	0.639	1.232	2.505
UCV2	One can justify people's need to be violent towards some Kurdish politicians	2.296	0.443	0.981	1.476	2.246
UCV3	Insulting some Kurdish politicians who are responsible for our situation is a justified act	1.897	-0.268	0.156	0.770	2.511
UCV4	Dragging effigies representing some corrupted Kurdish politicians in the streets is a justified act	4.772	0.383	0.714	1.027	1.849
UCV5	Destroying properties of some corrupted Kurdish politicians can be justified	3.121	0.472	0.815	1.245	2.180
UCV6	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing some corrupted Kurdish politicians is a justified act	5.588	0.497	0.849	1.185	1.738
UCV7	Being verbally violent against some Kurdish politicians who got us here is a justified act	2.445	-0.244	0.250	0.729	1.879
UCV8	Burning effigies of some corrupted Kurdish politicians is a justified act	8.836	0.484	0.828	1.215	1.627
UCV9	Building representative figures of some corrupted Kurdish politicians and destroying them in group is a justified act	12.363	0.445	0.818	1.213	1.650



Figure SI13: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right), Diffuse Collective Violence, Study 4.



Figure SI14: Test characteristic curve (left), item information functions (centre), and test information function (right), Upward Collective Violence, Study 4.



Figure SI15: Item characteristic curves for all Diffuse Collective Violence items, Study 4. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order.



Figure SI16: Item characteristic curves for all Upward Collective Violence items, Study 4. Each shows the probability of selecting a given response category (y axis) at each level of the latent trait (x axis). Items in horizontal order.

Table SI24: Final Items for Diffuse Collective Violence sub-scale

Item	
DCV1	It is justified for members of my ingroup to become physically aggressive towards members of an outgroup
DCV2	It can be justified for members of my ingroup to hit members of an outgroup
DCV3	It can be justified for members of my ingroup to physically harm members of an outgroup
DCV4	It is justified for members of my ingroup to verbally insult members of an outgroup
DCV5	It is sometimes justified for members of my ingroup to verbally threaten members of an outgroup
DCV6	It is sometimes justified for members of my ingroup to verbally insult members of an outgroup on social media

Table SI25: Final Items for Upward Collective Violence sub-scale

Item	
UCV1	Verbally insulting politicians from other groups can be justified
UCV2	One can justify people's need to be violent towards our country's leaders especially those from other groups
UCV3	Dragging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other sects in the streets is a justified act
UCV4	Holding symbolic trials and hanging effigies representing corrupted politicians from other groups is a justified act
UCV5	Burning effigies of corrupted politicians from other groups is a justified act
UCV6	Building representative figures of corrupted politicians from other groups and destroying them in groups is a justified act

Table SI26: Final Items for Diffuse Collective Violence sub-scale (Arabic - Lebanon)

Item	
DCV1	إن ممارسة العنف الجسدي من قبل أفراد طائفتي تجاه أفراد من الطوائف الأخرى فعلٌ مُبَرّر
DCV2	يمكن تبرير إستعمال الضرب من قبل أبناء طائفتي ضد أفراد من طائفة أخرى
DCV3	يمكن تبرير إستعمال العنف الجسدي من قبل أبناء طائفتي ضد أفراد من طائفة أخرى
DCV4	يمكن تبرير قيام أبناء طائفتي بتوجيه كلمات نابية ضد أفراد من طائفة أخرى
DCV5	من المبرر أحيانًا أن يقوم أبناء طائفتي بتهديد لفظي لأفراد من الطوائف الأخرى
DCV6	من المُبَرَّر أحيانًا قيام أفراد من طائفتي بإهانة لفظيّة لأفراد من طائفة أخرى على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي

Table SI27: Final Items for Upward Collective Violence sub-scale (Arabic - Lebanon)

Item	
UCV1	يمكن تبرير الإهانة اللفظيّة الموجّهة ضد السياسيّين المنتمين إلى الطوائف الأخرى
UCV2	يمكن تبرير حاجة الناس إلى توجيه العنف ضدّ زعماء بلادنا خاصة أولئك الذين ينتمون إلى الطوائف الأخرى
UCV3	إن جر الدمى التي تمثل سياسيّين فاسدين من طوائف أخرى في الشوارع فعلٌ مُبرَّر
UCV4	إقامة محاكمات رمزية وتعليق مشانق للدمى التي تمثّل السياسيين الفاسدين من طوائف أخرى فعلٌ مُبرَّر
UCV5	حرق الدمى التي تمثّل السياسيين الفاسدين من الطوائف الأخرى فعلٌ مُبرَّر
UCV6	بناء مجسمات للسياسيين الفاسدين من الطوائف الأخرى وتدميرها بشكل جماعي فعلٌ مُبرَّر

Table SI28: Final Items for Diffuse Collective Violence sub-scale (Arabic - Syria)

Item	
DCV1	إن ممارسة العنف الجسدي من قبل أفراد المعارضة السورية تجاه مؤيدي النظام فعلٌ مُبَرّر
DCV2	يمكن تبرير إستعمال الضرب من قبل أفراد المعارضة السورية ضد أفراد مؤيدين للنظام
DCV3	يمكن تبرير إستعمال العنف الجسدي من قبل أفراد المعارضة السورية ضد أفراد مؤيدين للنظام
DCV4	يمكن تبرير قيام أفراد المعارضة السورية بتوجيه كلمات نابية ضد أفراد مؤيدين للنظام
DCV5	من المبرر أحيانًا أن يقوم أفراد المعارضة السورية بتهديد لفظي لأفراد مؤيدين للنظام
DCV6	من المُبَرَّر أحيانًا قيام أفراد من المعارضة السورية بإهانة لفظيّة لأفراد مؤيدين للنظام على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي

Table SI29: Final Items for Upward Collective Violence sub-scale (Arabic - Syria)

Item	
UCV1	يمكن تبرير الإهانة اللفظيّة الموجّهة ضد السياسيّين المنتمين إلى النظام
UCV2	يمكن تبرير حاجة الناس إلى توجيه العنف ضدّ زعماء بلادنا خاصة أولئك الذين ينتمون إلى النظام
UCV3	إن جر الدمى التي تمثل سياسيّي النظام الفاسدين في الشوارع فعلٌ مُبرَّر
UCV4	إقامة محاكمات رمزية وتعليق مشانق للدمى التي تمثّل سياسيّي النظام الفاسدين فعلٌ مُبرَّر
UCV5	حرق الدمى التي تمثّل سياسيّي النظام الفاسدين فعلٌ مُبرَّر
UCV6	بناء مجسمات سياسيّي النظام الفاسدين وتدميرها بشكل جماعي فعلٌ مُبرَّر

Table SI30: Final Items for Diffuse Collective Violence sub-scale (Turkish)

Item	
DCV1	Türklerin Kürtlere karşı fiziksel olarak saldırgan olması haklıdır
DCV2	Türklerin Kürtlere vurması haklı olabilir
DCV3	Türklerin Kürtlere fiziksel olarak zarar vermesi haklı olabilir
DCV4	Türklerin Kürtlere sözel olarak hakaret etmesi haklı olabilir
DCV5	Türklerin Kürtleri sözel olarak tehdit etmesi bazen haklı olabilir
DCV6	Türklerin Kürtlere sosyal medyada sözel olarak hakaret etmesi bazen haklı olabilir

Table SI31: Final Items for Upward Collective Violence sub-scale (Turkish)

Item	
UCV1	Bazı Kürt siyasetçileri sözel olarak aşağılamak haklı görülebilir
UCV2	İnsanların ülkemizdeki bazı Kürt siyasetçilere karşı şiddet kullanma gereksinimi haklı görülebilir
UCV3	Bazı yozlaşmış Kürt siyasetçilerin temsili kuklalarını sokaklarda sürüklemek haklı bir eylemdir
UCV4	Sembolik duruşmalar düzenleyip bazı yozlaşmış Kürt siyasetçilerin temsili kuklalarını asmak haklı bir eylemdir
UCV5	Bazı yozlaşmış Kürt siyasetçilerin temsili kuklalarını yakmak haklı bir eylemdir
UCV6	Bazı yozlaşmış Kürt siyasetçilerin temsili figürlerini oluşturmak ve onları gruplar halinde yok etmek haklı bir eylemdir