The Radical Right in England and Wales: Permission to Hate?

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Dedication

This thesis is the culmination of unwavering hard work and dedication despite numerous challenges. I must thank my supervisors, Andy Wroe and Matthew Goodwin for their invaluable support for which I am grateful.

The timeframe in which this thesis has been completed has unfortunately coincided with incredibly difficult personal circumstances and unimaginable loss. I am eternally thankful for the incredible support from those closest to me. Without this, I am unsure whether this would have been possible.

Contents Page

List of Figures

List of Tables

Abstract

Despite the prominence of the radical right in the UK, scant research has been undertaken to explore the influence that these organisations have on the perpetration of hate crime. Whilst current literature on hate crime predominantly looks at the impacts these crimes have on victims, it does not sufficiently investigate the conditions under which these crimes occur. The few studies on this issue have been conducted in the USA and Canada, the most recent of which was conducted by Perry and Scrivens (2019) who presented a new theoretical framework to account for this relationship. This framework - permission to hate - establishes a general environment of hate. This thesis contributes to the field by developing permission to hate to a more racialised social structure, and identifies the ways in which the radical right influences hate crime in England and Wales. Thus, this thesis is theory testing, adopting a similar sequential mixed-methods approach used by Perry and Scrivens. Due to the anti-minority ideology of the radical right, this thesis uses official crime statistics measuring racially and religiously aggravated crimes and demographic data to determine whether there is a correlation between these crimes and both the electoral performance of radical right parties and the protest activities of radial right organisations at the local level. In order to identify the causal mechanisms, a case study of the West Midlands is undertaken using semi-structured interviews with individuals who worked at Third Party Reporting Centres, media reports of radical right protests and more localised crime data. By combining these methods this thesis expands upon the work by Perry and Scrivens, contributing towards the theory permission to hate, whilst also highlighting the ways in which the radical right influence racially and religiously aggravated crimes. This study finds that the radical right achieve this through the consumption of alcohol during their protests, inserting themselves into local issues and how they emphasise the risks minority communities pose to British society, especially in the aftermath of high profile events.

Chapter 1:

Introduction

Hate crime presents a significant problem that has long-standing consequences for many local communities and individuals. Academics have sought to measure the extent of the problem of hate crime in society, the reasons why people commit hate crimes, and the toll these crimes have upon the victims and their communities. Much of the research investigating the drivers of racially and religiously motivated hate crime has focused on the relative importance of economic and cultural factors. A recent addition to this has been the consideration that high profile events such as terror attacks are also a motivating factor for these crimes. The causal logic is that an increase in the level of tension between communities, when combined with media coverage of the event and the presence of local communities with similar ethnic or religious backgrounds to the perpetrators of the terror attacks, results in a higher level of hate crime.

Despite this body of literature, much of the variation in racially and religiously aggravated hate crime remains unexplained. One key factor in particular which has been underexplored, especially in the case of the UK, has been the influence and role of the radical right in the promotion of racially and religiously aggravated hate crime. The consideration of their influence on hate crime is important as these groups are known to promote a divisive ideology that champions a hierarchical society in which White British communities hold privileged positions of power. It is plausible to suggest that these crimes may be perpetrated by individuals who are directly involved with these groups, or by those who have no formal ties but are influenced and motivated by the ideology and rhetoric that the groups espouse. Therefore, this thesis will address the research question: in what ways do the radical right influence the perpetration of racially and religiously aggravated crimes in England and Wales?

A Brief Overview of the gap in the Literature

This thesis tests and expands upon the permission to hate theory developed by Perry and Scrivens (2019) to account for hate group formation and hate crime in Canada. The framework describes a society that is hierarchically structured producing a general climate of hate. Further, hate crime is used by those in the 'majority' to control minority groups and protect the existing societal hierarchy. Permission to hate contends that hate does not exist in a vacuum and focuses on what Perry and Scrivens (2019) describe as enabling environmental factors. These include the action or lack of action by state and political actors that produce the context in which hate crimes occur. Other enabling factors include local anti-immigrant rhetoric, a "history of hate" towards minorities, and limited responses by the police which signals to the radical right that xenophobia is accepted in the area, giving these groups a sense of impunity. This thesis will test whether the permission to hate theory explains hate crime in England and Wales. To do so, it utilises a mixed-methods approach.

The influence of the radical right on the perpetration of hate crime is theoretically complex. Permission to hate promotes the idea that hate crimes are an expression of power dynamics where White communities that want to maintain positions of power and privilege use hate crimes as a means of further marginalising minority groups. This thesis develops permission to hate as a racialisation of social structures in which all forms of hate occur. By championing the ideals of returning to a homogenous ethnic and cultural society, the radical right encourage the marginalisation of minority communities which may lead to the worsening of community cohesion. This thesis posits that this will be acutely felt in areas where radical right groups experience electoral success or focus their protest activities, as their ideology will be more salient where they are present. Accordingly, hate crimes are expected to be lower in areas in which the radical right do not succeed electorally and where they do not hold protest activity because this promotion of the marginalisation of minorities is not present. The members of extremist groups and political parties may be influenced by the radical right to perpetrate racially and religiously aggravated crimes. Alternatively, the radical right could exploit tensions after high profile terrorist events to increase either direct

participation in their activities or to extend their ideology to individuals who are not formally associated with their organisation.

As permission to hate has not been extensively tested, this thesis contributes to the field by testing the validity of the theory in a new context (England and Wales), as well as developing permission to hate to a more racialised social structure, and identifying the ways in which the radical right influences hate crime in England and Wales. By doing so, the thesis also provides a template for future research relating to permission to hate and its validity in other country contexts and how well it can explain different types of hierarchical social structures.

Prior research has explored the association between support for radical right parties and hate crime. Some research has shown an association between anti-immigration, anti-minority and authoritarian sentiments and support for radical right parties. Others have found positive associations between the strength of these parties and racist crimes (Dancygier, 2010; Jackle and König, 2016, 2017). However, other studies have found that the electoral success of radical right parties provided a sufficient outlet for the anti-immigrant sentiment of the electorate. Accordingly these studies found that the electoral success of those parties was associated with lower levels of racist crime at the local level (Koopmans, 1996; Koopmans et al., 2005; Ravndal, 2016).

Previous studies that have investigated the relationship between the radical right and hate crime have generated inconsistent results, largely because of the different levels of data employed. One study used state level data and found little evidence of hate groups being associated with hate crime, or for the role of economic or demographic factors (Ryan and Leeson, 2011). This contrasts to research conducted with county level data which did find that the presence of hate groups was associated with an increase in the rate of hate crimes (Mulholland, 2013).

This literature, which will be discussed in more depth in following chapters, has focused largely on developments in Western European and North American contexts. However, there has not yet been an investigation into the relationship between the electoral success and

protest activities of the radical right and the level of hate crime. Further, the extant literature lacks an in-depth investigation into the radical right and hate crime in the UK. This thesis addresses both these omissions.

The Research Design

The goal of this thesis is to answer the following research question: in what ways do the radical right influence racially and religiously aggravated hate crime in England and Wales? Currently there is no established methodology within hate crime literature, and this has been under researched in the UK. Therefore, this thesis seeks to answer the research question by employing a sequential mixed-methods design. In order to effectively test the ways in which the radical right influence hate crime, alternative explanations for hate crime also need to be taken into account. This is addressed in the quantitative large-N design which identifies whether there is a statistical correlation between the radical right and hate crime, as well as alternative explanations including relative economic deprivation. Therefore, quantitative analysis is needed to identify which factors account for higher levels of hate crime perpetration. This will also guide the focus of the following qualitative chapter by highlighting whether both the electoral success and protest activities of the radical right or only one of these has a statistically significant relationship with hate crime. As this has not been tested in the UK, these findings will be a significant contribution to the field. The quantitative analyses will only be able to establish whether a relationship exists between the variables, and therefore cannot account for the ways in which the radical right influences hate crime. This will be achieved through the qualitative chapters which take the form of a case study of the West Midlands. These chapters will drill down into the causal mechanisms as to how and in what ways the radical right influence hate crime in the case study of the West Midlands.

The quantitative chapter utilises a unique data set built specifically to test the thesis's central research question. It is structured around the 375 local authorities across England and Wales and the 43 police forces in which they sit. The dependent variable is the number of racially and religiously aggravated crimes recorded by the police between 2010 and 2018. The demographic independent variables are taken from the National Census and the Annual

Population Survey. It operationalises permission to hate using variables taken from the House of Commons Library for the vote share that radical right parties received in the 2010, 2015 and 2017 general elections. Additionally, data is taken from news sources via Lexis Nexis to record the location and dates of protests held by radical right organisations. The resulting data is organised according to local authority, police force area and year creating longitudinal/panel data. Due to this organisation of the data, fixed effects models are used alongside bivariate correlations to identify whether there is a correlation between the variables, and whether the relationships hold when the data is grouped by local authority and by police force area.

Once the statistical correlations have been identified, the causal mechanisms are then explored through the qualitative case study chapters focusing on the West Midlands. These causal mechanisms include the justification for the protest, the role of the police, the location of protests, and the antagonisation of the local minority communities. These chapters utilise contemporary news coverage of protests held by the radical right, interviews with individuals who have worked in Third Party Reporting Centres, website content of the radical right organisations, and information derived from Freedom of Information (FOI) requests. The case study Chapter 7 is organised chronologically focusing on the protests held between 2009 and 2018 by the English Defence League their offshoots, Britain First, Pegida, the Football Lads Alliance and Democratic Football Lads Alliance in the West Midlands.

Summary of the Findings and Contribution to the Field

The quantitative models found a negative correlation between *electoral support* for radical right parties (UKIP and BNP) and racially and religiously aggravated crimes. This finding expands and further develops the theory of permission to hate as it is absent from Perry and Scrivens' (2019) study. Therefore, this thesis contributes to our understanding of permission to hate as it was able to test the impact of radical right electoral support on hate crime. In contrast, the *protests* organised by radical right groups had significant and positive correlations with racially and religiously aggravated crimes. The latter finding supports the

assertions of Perry and Scrivens (2019) and the permission to hate thesis, suggesting something about the protest events encouraged or facilitated the perpetration of hate crime. Furthermore, there was little empirical support for a relationship between economic circumstances and radical right support at the local level.

Permission to hate posits that hate crimes are perpetrated as a means of upholding the racialised societal hierarchy in which White male populations occupy more privileged positions compared to ethnic minorities. This was supported in the quantitative chapter which found positive correlations between hate crime and the percentage of White, Black and Asian residents in an area. The latter finding was further supported in the qualitative chapters which found that radical right protests in the West Midlands were focused in areas with high Asian and Muslim populations. These findings expand upon permission to hate by demonstrating that in England and Wales, the radical right focus their protest activity in areas with larger ethnic minority communities. This thesis contributes towards permission to hate as it found that the radical right maintains this social structure through the use of deliberately provocatively tactics towards Muslims and ethnic minority communities and counter-protesters. Such tactics included wearing pig masks, tearing pages from the Qur'an and burning the flag of Pakistan. These methods provoked violent responses from local Muslim communities and resulted in increases in the number of hate crimes recorded.

The case study chapter also highlight the influence that the English Defence League had on racially and religiously aggravated crimes during their formative stages in the West Midlands (between 2009 and 2014). Specifically, these findings contribute to permission to hate as Birmingham was established as a venue for violent conflict, appealing to early supporters with backgrounds in football firms (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Additionally, the case study chapter expands upon our understanding of how permission to hate can be spread through a region. In this case it is not only across other towns in the West Midlands, but also through the introduction of other radical right groups including the first protest of Britain First in Dudley in 2015.

The findings of this study support Perry and Scrivens' (2019) argument that the capacity of the radical right to promote permission to hate is dependent on their organisational capacity. Whilst their research concluded that this was largely achieved via the internet, this thesis finds that it was achieved via collaboration between radical right groups. This can be traced to the formative stages of the English Defence League during which they collaborated with the Welsh Defence League and Combat 18. Further, this was also seen with protest events that were co-organised between groups, such as between the English Defence League and Britain First. However, these chapters also demonstrate that these groups suffered from periods of decline and destabilisation caused by the departures and legal battles of their leaders.

The work by Perry and Scrivens did not investigate permission to hate in relation to terrorist attacks. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the theory by finding that the radical right capitalise upon local and national events. During the timeframe of interest, these events included the murder of Lee Rigby, the actions of Pavlo Lapshyn, as well as the incidents that took place in Manchester and across London.

My findings from the qualitative chapter also contributes to permission to hate by highlighting how the radical right benefitted from policing tactics that enabled them to hold protests that in turn contributed towards hate crime. Between 2009 and 2018, the police repeatedly organised venues for the supporters to meet. This resulted in not only the congregation of supporters ahead of the events, but promoted the consumption of alcohol despite it being a recognised contributing factor to disorder. Thus, my thesis contributes to permission to hate by identifying some novel ways in which the radical right influences the perpetration of racially and religiously aggravated crime in England and Wales.

This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of hate crime as a concept in academia. Additionally, it will detail how hate crime legislation has evolved in the UK, and the initiatives that have been designed to address hate crime perpetration. This is followed in Chapter 3 by a summarisation of the ideology of the radical right, what is currently known about hate crime perpetration, and the evolution of the radical right in the UK. Chapter 4

describes Perry and Scrivens' theoretical framework of permission to hate that underpins this thesis. This is then followed by Chapter 5 which details the mixed-methods approach that is used in this thesis. The quantitative analysis can be found in Chapter 6, and is followed by the qualitative case study of the West Midlands in Chapter 7. Finally, the thesis concludes with Chapter 8 which provides a summary of the findings and the contribution to the literature.

Chapter 2:

Hate Crime: The Concepts and Legislative Framework

This thesis explores the ways in which the radical right influences the perpetration of racially and religiously motivated hate crime within England and Wales. This chapter introduces the key concepts that will be used throughout this thesis. Firstly, it provides an overview of how hate crime has developed as a concept in academia, and how permission to hate can extend our understanding of their perpetration. The chapter will then go on to outline the evolution of hate crime legislation across England and Wales and will explain how these crimes are recorded by the police, and the impact that has on research. Due to the lack of consensus regarding the definition of hate crime within academia, two aspects will be discussed. Initially, in order to understand how the radical right may influence hate crime, there needs to be an overview as to what types of actions are understood as constituting hate crime. Secondly, we also need to recognise which societal groups are considered to be at risk of being victims. This is necessary as the issues around how to define hate crime impact upon how these crimes are recorded.

Hate Crime as a Concept in Academia

Before any discussion of the context and evolution of hate crime in the UK through its legislation and policies, the concept of hate crime needs to be outlined, as there is little agreement over its definition. In 2001 hate crime research was described as being in "its infancy" and remains a relatively new field in the UK (Green, McFalls and Smith, 2001; Chakraborti and Garland, 2015). In 2014 the College of Policing reflected that there remained "no criminological consensus on the definition or even the validity of the concept of hate crime, but it is important that this policy has a framework" (2014: 2). However, there are some aspects of agreement within the academic literature. The phrase 'hate crime' has been used as a collective term to cover a range of crimes committed based on prejudice, including crimes such as vandalism, physical assault, and murder (Borell, 2015: 3). Thus, the use of the

term 'hate crime' can be ambiguous and used to describe a wide spectrum of acts and behaviours depending upon the context (Bufacchi, 2005; Perry, 2003). This results in multiple strands of hate crime literature, varying on the type of crime becoming the primary focus of the study.

The various definitions and applications in academic literature refer to a range of factors that motivate hate crimes, and therefore consider that these crimes are not exclusively motivated by hate (Chakraborti et al., 2014; Hall, 2013; Chakraborti and Garland, 2012; Perry, 2001). To highlight this, alternative labels or motivators such as 'hostility', 'prejudice' and 'bias' have been used relatively interchangeably when exploring the perpetration of hate crime, especially in studies relating to the USA (Hall, 2005; Lawrence, 2003; Walters, 2011; Chakraborti, 2018). Each of these terms could be considered as defining factors of hate crime and suggests that hate itself is apparent in only a small proportion of hate crimes, and will be discussed further in the following chapter (McDevitt et al., 2010; Roulstone et al., 2011). This is consequential when taking into account the victims who are supposed to be covered by the hate crime framework, and the range of offences that are classed as hate crimes (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015). Connected to this is the assertion that hate crimes are more harmful than their non-hate equivalents, due to targeting victims based on specific characteristics, resulting in reduced self-worth, impacting upon confidence and can cause psychological trauma (Herek et al., 2003).

Within academia, hate crime is therefore understood as a culturally and historically situated social construct (Awan and Zempi, 2018: 3). Accordingly, many of the academic definitions of hate crime are rooted in the relationships between structural hierarchies, prejudices, and the perpetration of hate crime. In particular, the complexities of structural hierarchies and power dynamics, with a focus on crimes committed by the empowered against marginalised groups in society (Chakraborti, 2018; Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Perry (2003), contends that it is possible to create a conceptual definition which reflects historical social contexts, and community relationships, and that a definition of hate crime should recognise and include different forms of violence carried out on an individual.

For authors such as Gerstenfeld (2010), a victim of hate crime is targeted due to their actual or perceived membership of an inferior social grouping, rather than a bias or hatred towards the individual. This approach assumes hate crimes are "stranger offences" where the victim and perpetrator do not know each other prior to the event and the victim is selected based upon group identifying characteristics (Perry, 2001; Borell, 2015: 3). Therefore, in the minds of the perpetrators, the victims represent a group of people toward whom they hold a prejudice (Craig, 2002; Perry, 2001). Additionally, these crimes are also considered "message crimes" as they send an intimidating message to those of a similar background to the victim, producing a "ripple effect" across the community and beyond (Lawrence, 2003; Perry, 2009).

Perry goes further in establishing a theoretical framework which contends that power dynamics between those who hold power within society and those who do not are a fundamental causal aspect of hate crimes (Perry, 2009; Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Those in powerful positions are able to intimidate those who are inferior in order to maintain their privilege within the social hierarchy through the use of hate crime (Perry, 2009). Perry therefore suggests that hate crimes are perpetrated as a means of reinforcing dominant attitudes within society and are intended to further entrench the dominant position of majority "ingroup" populations (Perry, 2009; Perry and Scrivens, 2019). These ideals can present the "outgroups" as the "legitimate" objects of hate crime in order to maintain this hierarchy. This underpins the theoretical framework of permission to hate used in this thesis and will be explored in greater detail in the theoretical chapter.

The approach of permission to hate affords insight into how hate crime is perpetrated by using the opportunity structures to explain how the purveyors of hate crime are socially dominant groups, and the victims are those who do not conform and are identified as inferior. However, this lens is contested and has sparked discussion as to whether all communities are potential victim groups, or whether hate crime victimisation is solely the remit of minority groups that have been historically disadvantaged. Hate crimes with a racial or religious motive are widely understood as majority versus minority crimes, and therefore are expected to be perpetrated by the White majority against ethnic minority communities. However, hate crimes can also occur between different minority groups, and by ethnic minorities against

ethnic majorities. This then leads to the debate as to which of these disadvantaged groups is "deserving" of legal protection (Garland, 2011; Mason-Bish, 2010). This thesis will explore hate crimes as a consequence of opportunity structures and power dynamics that are exploited by the radical right.

Hate Crime Legislation

As noted in the previous section, the academic definition of hate crime differs to the legal framework, however the legal considerations have changed over time. According to the 1986 Runnymede Research Report 'Racial Violence and Harassment', a total of 62 murders in Britain between 1970 and 1986 were either known or were believed to be racially motivated (Iganski, 2008). However, it was only after the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and the following Macpherson Inquiry in 1999 that the UK began to develop a unified hate crime policy (Mason-Bish, 2014: 25; Clayton, Donovan and Macdonald, 2016: 65).

The Macpherson Inquiry made 70 recommendations. The most pertinent for this research was for there to be a police and agencies to improve the recording and responding to racist crime. This would ensure that the police recorded data more accurately reflects the real-world experience of these crimes. Over the past two decades, legislation and evidence-based policy guidance has been developed by lawmakers, non-governmental organisations, activists and professionals to improve responses to hate crime (Chakraborti and Hardy, 2017). These include Hate Crime Action Plans, localised hate crime initiatives, an annual hate crime awareness week, and the development of Third Party Reporting Centres (TPRCs).

The first legal provisions for hate crime in the UK were detailed in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. The legislation introduced racially aggravated violence, criminal damage and racial harassment as offences, and the 2000 Home Office Code of Practice set out procedures for the reporting and recording of racist incidents. In 2001, these laws were expanded to include religiously aggravated crimes, in part as a response to the revenge attacks carried out against Muslims, and those perceived to be Muslim following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA

(Mason-Bish, 2014). In 2003, the Criminal Justice Act included prejudice crimes based upon disability and sexual orientation, and in 2012 the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act added transphobic hate crime (Mason-Bish, 2014: 24). These motives need to be considered by the police or victim as being central to the crime for the offence to be categorised as hate crime. This ad hoc approach to including the bias that drives hate crime limits the timeframes for analysis of disability and sexual orientation studies to 2003 onwards, and transphobic offences to 2012 onwards.

Due to the way in which hate crime legislation has evolved, the legislation itself does not propose a singular definition of hate crime. Instead, the definition presented by the College of Policing and used by the Crown Prosecution Service serves as the legal definition in the UK. Hate crimes and hate incidents are defined as "any crime or incident where the perpetrator's hostility or prejudice against an identifiable group of people is a factor in determining who is victimised" (College of Policing, 2014: 3). Such wording establishes a clear distinction between hate incidents and hate crimes. The first consists of "any non-crime incident which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice" (College of Policing, 2014: 3). By contrast, hate crimes are defined as "any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice" (College of Policing, 2014: 4). Included in this legal framework are five strands of hate crime based upon disability, race, religion, sexual orientation and transgender status (College of Policing, 2014). This is a legal consideration that remains unique to the UK, as other nations have different protected characteristics. For instance, Canada includes age, Poland includes political affiliation, and Belgium includes health into their classifications (Garland, 2016: 628) The differing considerations make cross country comparative studies difficult as countries have different recording criteria, or they may record different types of hate crime.

Whilst the majority of hate crime interventions within the UK are based around these five strands, the College of Policing guidance encourages police forces to record other forms of targeted hostility as hate crime if they deem it necessary and appropriate. This has enabled a number of individual forces to monitor other offences as additional hate crime strands, including violence against alternative subcultures (for example, goths), sex workers, and

recently misogynistic harassment (Campbell, 2014; Garland and Hodkinson, 2014; Mason-Bish, 2016). The inclusion of these strands more accurately record experiences of prejudice and hostility, however, as these strands are not universally recorded across the UK those experiences are not included in the official hate crime statistics. This means it is not possible to look at trends in these types of prejudicial crimes across the UK.

The way in which hate crime legislation in England and Wales has evolved over time to include different victims has created the desire for recognition by victim groups that the legislation currently neglects, resulting in competition for inclusion between neglected victim groups (Mason-Bish, 2014: 26). Therefore, current considerations of hate crime do not record the true real world experience. A recent example of this is the petition to have abuse on the basis of gender and old age included as monitored hate crime strands within the UK, as they can both be argued as occurring within social contexts where women, men or the elderly are not valued (Garland, 2011). Instead, these groups are stigmatised, and marginalized, in a similar manner to those of the acknowledged hate crime victim groups (Perry, 2009). The same point can be made about crimes committed against the homeless community. They have a history of being a socially excluded population, suffering from acts of harassment and violence. However, the homeless remain a neglected group within the hate crime debate (Wachholz, 2009; Wright, 2005).

Prior to 2017, hate crime could only be recorded as having one motivating factor. This presented the issue of how the police record and categorise hate crimes, as one hate crime strand had to be selected when documenting a crime. As there was no way to catalogue more than one motive for the crime, the way the crimes were recorded did not always accurately capture and reflect the victim's experience (Lawson, 1995). For example, the transgender experience of racial violence was often ignored, or was simplified to be categorised and recorded as motivated either by transphobia or racial prejudice. There had previously been no accommodation for a hate crime to be classified as being motivated by both (Mason-Bish, 2014: 27; Moran and Sharpe, 2004). However, it must be noted that since 2017 the police in England and Wales have changed their recording of hate crimes and now contend that: "It is possible for a hate crime offence to have more than one motivating factor" (Home Office,

2017). This consideration has a twofold impact upon hate crime analysis. First, it allows hate crimes to be more accurately recorded to reflect the victim's experience. Secondly, it creates an inherent upward trend in the number of hate crimes recorded across each strand. This could create an increase in hate crime that cannot be explained by factors in statistical analysis. However, the consideration of multiple motivating factors has not caused a significant increase in racially and religiously aggravated hate crimes from 2016/7 to 2017/8 outside of the trigger events that will be discussed in this thesis. As this way of recording hate crime is a relatively recent development, it is necessary to look at both racially and religiously motivated crimes within this thesis, rather than to focus on one at the expense of the other. This will take into account the racialisation of religion, and the consideration that these are often believed to co-occur, and are attributes that some perpetrators consider to be interchangeable.

The under reporting of hate crime has been recognised by the police as a significant issue. The MacPherson Report also included the recommendation to provide alternatives to the police as a mechanism for victims of racial hate crime in the UK to report to. As such, TPRCs were established in order to by-pass the mistrust felt towards the police whilst still reporting the incident and accessing support. The Home Office justified their creation and stated that being able to report hate crime through a TPRC rather than to the police directly has improved "the accessibility of the criminal justice system" (Home Office, 2016). As a means to address the underreporting of hate crime, TPRC status has been given to pre-existing organisations, ranging from Citizens Advice Bureaus, community and faith groups, student unions, public libraries, and housing authority neighbourhood offices to day care centres (Wong et al., 2019). The intention was that these centres would be a convenient and familiar place for a victim to report a hate crime, and to receive the necessary support. However, this ideal has not necessarily been realised. Chakraborti et al.'s (2014) extensive survey of hate crime victims in Leicester found that over three-quarters of respondents had not reported their experience of hate crime to the police. The most commonly cited reason for this being that they did not feel the police would take it seriously (Chakraborti et al., 2014: 70).

Additionally, Third Party Reporting encourages the reporting of hate crime as the centres provide support for the victim, police only being contacted to investigate the crime with the victim's consent (Metropolitan Police Authority 2010). According to Giannasi (2015), outreach work such as collaborative projects, and ability to record crimes anonymously were significant factors in improving the relationship between the police and communities that have been affected by hate crime. The intention of TPRCs was to increase the reporting of hate crime, and in this they have been regarded as quite successful (Chakraborti et al., 2014; Stonewall, 2013; Wong et al., 2013; Pezzella et al, 2019; Wong et al, 2019). By addressing the issue of underreporting, it is hoped that authorities can generate a more accurate picture of the extent and pattern of hate crime victimisation, allowing for the development and implementation of more effective solutions (Green et al., 2001; McDevitt et al., 2002).

Despite the centrality of TPRCs to strategies addressing hate crime, there has been no consistent way to evaluate their impact on hate crime reporting (Wong et al., 2019). Some TPRCs have been affected by budgetary constraints which negatively impacted upon their ability to collect hate crime data, especially in rural areas (Wong et al., 2013; Clayton et al., 2016: 72–73; Garland and Chakraborti, 2007). As TPRC status is granted to existing organisations they are not universally distributed across geographic regions and communities creating "a patchwork of provision across the UK" (Wong et al., 2019). As a result, rural areas and their residents are far less supported through TPRCs compared to more urban areas. Therefore, it must be considered that more thought needs to be put into which organisations are given TPRC status, how they are funded and supported, and how this is advertised to the community. Since 2012, the government developed an Action Plan to tackle hate crime (Challenge It, Report It, Stop It), which improved understanding within the police of the impact that hate crime can have on communities. Consequently, there has been an improvement in how police record hate crime, how they capture data on recorded hate crimes under all five of the monitored strands, and the publishing of that data as Official Statistics.

In the specific case of hate crime motivated by religious prejudice, many Christian and Muslim communities are well catered to, with churches, mosques and local charities serving as TPRCs,

alongside successful outreach work undertaken by the Muslim organisation TellMAMA, which raises awareness of Islamophobia and aims to provide support for victims. This network of support cannot be said to exist within other religious communities. This contributes to the uneven distribution of TPRCs across communities, and therefore access to reporting hate crime. Additionally, awareness of reporting techniques relies on the victim having a level of familiarity with the organisation prior to their victimisation. This is a particular issue when it is considered that most TPRCs are pre-existing organisations, such as places of worship and welfare charities. Therefore, it is difficult for someone unfamiliar with the services they provide to identify the support that they offer for hate crime.

Conclusion

Hate crime suffers an ambiguity problem in academia in relation to what motivates hate crime, which groups are more likely to perpetrate such actions, and which are more likely to become victims. This is a particular issue as hate crimes are motivated by the assumption that the victim belongs to a particular group, regardless of the individual's actual membership. When looking at racial and religious hate crime, it can be difficult to separate the two due to the extent to which they are considered to co-occur. That is to say that a person's skin colour may motivate assumptions to be made as to their religion, and thus motivate hate crime.

The thesis ahead will focus on how the radical right influences racial and religiously motivated hate crimes within racialised power dynamics and opportunity structures. The following chapter will explore this literature in more detail, as well as hate crime perpetration through power dynamics and opportunity structures.

Chapter 3:

The Radical Right in the UK

This thesis will address the question: *in what ways do the radical right influence the perpetration of racially and religiously motivated hate crime within England and Wales?* As such, this chapter sets out what is currently known about the perpetration of hate crime and the radical right. Firstly, it will explore the issues surrounding the term 'radical right' and the ideology that the term describes, before moving on to studies looking at the relationship between radical political parties and groups on hate crimes. This chapter will then go on to give an overview of the grievances and tactics of the key radical right organisations that have operated in Britain since 2001, namely the British National Party, UK Independence Party, the English Defence League and Britain First. This period will cover the attempts made by the British National Party to become a more credible electoral option and the rise in popularity, and crisis, of the English Defence League, and the creation of Britain First.

What is missing from the literature is a full understanding of how the radical right can encourage the perpetration of hate crimes by their own membership and by others, especially in the context of the UK. It also fails to include how the radical right use high profile events such as acts of terrorism to promote their ideology, which can further encourage hate crimes in a period of high tensions following such events. This thesis aims to bring together these separate approaches to understanding the societal conditions that facilitate and encourage hate crimes, using a mixed-methods research design. But first it must review the existing knowledge on the topic.

The Ideology of the Radical Right

There have been attempts to define the radical right-wing and similar ideologies. This has resulted in "conceptual confusion" in the "messy field" of studies on the European radical

right, resulting in confusion about terminology (Arzheimer, 2019; Wahl, 2020). In English literature, terms such as ultra-conservatism, the far right, the populist right, the populist radical right, the radical right, the extreme right, the violent or terrorist right, are all used in academic literature. This creates conceptual confusion as the same political parties are described by some authors as (ultra-)conservative or populist, and by others as radical or extreme.

According to Rydgren (2018: 3), many of the "radical right-wing" social movements are situated on the border between the "radical right" and the "'extreme right", and several representatives and activists of some "radical right-wing" parties and movements maintain contacts with the "extreme right". For Minkenberg (2008: 12), right-wing radicalism can be defined as "the radical effort to undo or fight (...) social change by radicalizing inclusionary and exclusionary criteria". From this perspective, the radical right responds to the differentiation of society and confronts individual autonomy, status mobility, and role flexibility with a return to traditional roles and status. The ideology of the radical right centres around a myth of a homogeneous nation and is directed against the liberal, pluralistic democracy with principles of individualism and universalism (Minkenberg, 2008; Wahl, Ottinger-Gaßebner, Kleinert, and Renninger, 2005: 19).

The way in which radical right organisations combine nationalism and xenophobia results in an ethnicity-based understanding of the national culture. This can be used as a political resource to unite and define a particular section of the population apart from others (Smith, 1995: 17). The radical right emphasises cultural differences that exist within a multicultural society which are then portrayed as cultural rivalries that need to be challenged and removed. These interpretations can lead to a belief in ethnic nationalism, the view that there should be an exclusion of those who are considered outsiders based upon their ethnic origin or birthplace (Smith, 1995: 18). This separation and perceived rivalry between societal groups can cause community division and be exploited for the perpetration of racially and religiously motivated crimes against those they consider inferior based upon ethnicity. The xenophobic attitudes espoused and promoted towards non-European and non-Western immigrants by the radical right have been widely researched (Gibson, 2002; Fennema, 1997; Mudde, 2007;

Allen, 2011: 291; Sniderman et al., 2004; Ivarsflaten 2005). However, the influence of these factors on hate crime perpetration has not been investigated in the same detail.

Other authors contend that the radical right seek to offer solutions for socio-political crises: first, a crisis of distribution concerning the welfare of the lower and lower middle class and second, a crisis of political representation from the corrupt political elite; and third, a crisis of identity in the face of globalisation and immigration. From this perspective, the radical right reacts to these crises by making use of social issues, by painting politics as corrupt and by propagating ascriptions of national identity (Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011). Wahl (2020: 14) proposed the following working definition: "ideologies of the radical right emphasise social and economic threats in the modern and postmodern world (globalisation, immigration). This includes the rejection of democratic values, procedures and institutions, the rejection of equality, and the championing of nationalism and xenophobia (Carter, 2005: 17; Zúquete, 2008: 329; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Van Der Brug et al., 2005).

While the radical right favours traditional social and cultural structures (family and gender roles, religion, etc.) it does not ascribe to a specific economic position; with some parties favouring liberal, free-market policy, and others a welfare state policy. Finally, the radical right can be scaled by using different degrees of militancy and aggressiveness from right-wing populism to racism, terrorism, and totalitarianism (Wahl, 2020). Thus, there is no consensus on how to categorise political parties, due to the mixture of positions and political programmes that they offer, as well as contradictory opinions of party leaders. Therefore, the same parties can be described as populist by some authors but as extremist by others. Therefore, by viewing the term radical right as a scale or a spectrum, it will be used in this thesis to describe political parties and protest groups that each adhere to the ideological traits described, but vary in relation to their populism and racism. The gradations are based on the degrees of ideological radicalism and militancy (against outsiders, democratic principles, nativism instead of cosmopolitism, etc.) as well as the degree of approval or use of violence. On this scale, political parties such as UKIP are placed on the more moderate end, and the EDL and Britain first further along the scale with a more explicit approval of militancy and

violence. Throughout the thesis the term 'radical right' is used as a shorthand term to cover this variation.

Hate Crime Perpetration

As the ideology of the radical right promotes the idea of hierarchical social structure, it reinforces the worldview promoted by permission to hate. Radical right organisations and parties perceive that their national culture is being threatened by non-European immigration, it can motivate violence based upon the belief that these minority communities pose a threat to their way of life and to the national culture (Gibson, 2002; Fennema, 1997; Mudde, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004; Ivarsflaten, 2005). Despite a tradition of radical right political parties, and research into the actions of radical right organisations, there has been little investigation into the relationship between these attitudes and the perpetration of racially and religiously motivated crimes in the UK.

The perpetration of hate crimes poses a significant threat to community relations both locally and across the UK more widely. Following the killing of British Army soldier Drummer Lee Rigby in 2013, and the terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia in 2015, there was a significant increase in anti-Muslim attacks in the UK (Awan and Zempi, 2016). These incidents included the vandalising of mosques, the forceful removal of Muslim women's hijab (headscarf) or niqab (face veil), racist graffiti on Muslim properties, and an increase in anti-Muslim hostility online (Awan and Zempi, 2016). These acts reinforced the central importance of this topic; however, existing research does not yet offer an adequate account of how hate crimes are perpetrated, a situation which this thesis aims to address. Instead, the majority of the literature provides qualitative accounts of how the victims understand their victimisation (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014; Mason-Bish and Zempi, 2018; Hopkins et al., 2017; Ray, Smith, and Wastell, 2004; Gadd, Dixon, and Jefferson, 2005). This body of research has been instrumental in developing an understanding of the emotional and physical impact of hate

crime. However, it has not enriched our current understanding of why these crimes are committed.

Permission to hate in this thesis upholds a hierarchical society based on ethnic and racial lines with white males taking privileged positions and minorities are subjugated. Collective attitudes held towards minority ethnic communities, often lead to the groups being scapegoated, and being the target of hate crime. Therefore, hate crimes are considered more damaging to the social fabric of society than parallel crimes because they attack collective values, disrupt social harmony, and fuel intolerance of diversity (Wickes et al., 2017). The level of social cohesion has been found to play an important additional role in hate crime, as regions where there is less social integration experience a higher number of hate crimes (Piatkowaska and Hövermann, 2018). These areas have been targeted by the radical right to rally support, as when the social climate of a region is hostile to immigrants, the probability of hate crimes increases (Piatkowaska and Hövermann, 2018; Busher et al., 2018). Therefore, hate crimes that go unchallenged send a message of implicit support and encouragement to future perpetrators, and thus help legitimise these actions (Levin and Rabrenovic, 2001: 575). Bowling and Phillips (2003) suggest that the racist views articulated by individuals were also reinforced by the communities to which they belonged. These can include extremist groups, and, accordingly, this thesis will look at the ways in which the radical right influence hate crime.

There are a handful of studies that have explored the motivations behind hate-based crimes – with motivations ranging from ideology and politics and the desire to commit violence, to the 'thrill' of offending (Bjørgo and Carlsson, 2005; Goodwin, 2012:50; McDevitt et al., 2002). One study found that over half of the perpetrators of extremist violence acted in association with a wider movement, and only 6% were motivated by purely personal reasons (Gill, Horgan, and Deckert, 2014). Others found that group-based offending suggests that committing hate crimes serves as a form of peer bonding (Franklin, 2000; Steinberg et al., 2003). Therefore, violence acts as a means by which individuals can prove their commitment to the group and elevate their status (Sitzer and Heitmeyer, 2008). Thrill-based hate crimes

are perpetrated by youths seeking to gain importance and superiority by victimising and degrading groups, rather than acting on ideology (Levin and McDevitt, 1993). Instead, their aim is to victimise others as a means of experiencing excitement, using low-medium level prejudices to select their target (McDevitt et al., 2002).

A sense of 'mission' can also be a motivator for hate crime (McDevitt et al.,2002).According to McDevitt et al. (2022) mission perpetrators are driven to identify and target certain groups, and are likely to be members of hate groups who co-ordinate protests and attacks against. It is likely that such individuals are driven by an ideology of hate and are therefore likely to carry out the most extreme forms of violence (Dunbar et al., 2005). An example that is often cited of a mission offender is that of Anders Behring Breivik, a far-right extremist who murdered 77 people in Norway in 2011 (Walters, Brown, and Wiedlitzka, 2016).. Despite no formal group membership, he held extremist ideology, including opposition to Islam and feminism, which were detailed in his manifesto (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015: 137–8). His radicalisation highlights the role of the internet in disseminating and galvanising support for hate-based ideologies, and how this should not be underestimated (Perry and Scrivens, 2016). However, this type of perpetrator is believed to only constitute fewer than 1% of cases. This suggests that hate crime incidents are likely to be carried out by 'everyday' people during the course of their 'everyday' lives (Iganski, 2008). However, this assessment may be outdated as there have been few recent studies on this type of perpetrator, or perpetrator types. Despite these considerations, 'mission' perpetrators remain an integral part of understanding hate crime.

Despite the centrality of ethnic nationalism for the radical right, not all perpetrators of hate crimes are associated with, or members of radical right groups (Heitmeyer, 2005; Ray, Smith and Wastell, 2004). Prior to the 1980s, acts of xenophobic violence or hate crimes were typically carried out by older males with strong ties and ideological commitment to neo-Nazi groups (Watts, 2001). However, during the 1980s there was a decline in elite sponsored groups, creating a space for the prominence of right-wing subcultural networks based within the skinhead culture (Bjørgo, 1997; Bjørgo and Witte, 1993; Merkl and Weinberg, 1997; Ravndal, 2015). Thus, by the early 1990s hate crimes were predominantly committed by skinhead groups and there was an increase in acts of xenophobic violence carried out by

individuals or groups that were not associated with traditional extremist organisations (Urdal, 2006; Watts, 2001:66).

Since the 1990s the majority of perpetrators of radical right violence have been under the age of twenty (Sitzer and Heitmeyer, 2008; Urdal, 2006). The actions of these youthful perpetrators are less likely to be driven by extremist ideology than are the actions of their older counterparts, in part because they are less likely to be members of radical right groups (Watts, 2001; Goodwin, 2012). These young perpetrators are often marginalised by issues at school and at home, and they gain a sense of belonging and power through the perpetration of hate crimes (Levin and Rabrenovic, 2001: 578). Therefore, this type of violence is now considered to be largely the remit of the younger members of society. However, the motivations for this are not always based upon ideology. Blazak (2001) found that whilst some young males will eventually grow out of committing hate crimes, others will join groups where they will be encouraged to continue or escalate their acts of violence. Many members will have had criminal histories before and during their membership of hate groups, and so some are attracted by the inherent violence of the radical right. Additionally, it has been found that when radical right groups include military personnel it increases the capacity of the group for lethal violence (Adamczyk et al., 2014). However, not all radical right group members have strong commitments to a group's ideology, which explains why many join a number of different extremist organisations over time (Perry and Scrivens, 2019; Mullhollands, 2011; Ryan and Leeson, 2011).

It has been found that organised radical right extremists are responsible for only a small proportion of hate crime in Britain (Athwal et al., 2010; Gadd et al., 2005; Husbands, 2009). However, the studies exploring the link between extremist group activity and hate crime are out of date and do not take into account the increased mobilisation of these groups. The level of violence used by the radical right is more severe and causes more damage than those carried out by individuals who are not part of the movement (Gadd et al., 2005; Dunbar, Quinones and Crevecoeur, 2005).

The ideas and ideology of the radical right can influence those who are not affiliated with the party or organisation and can motivate them to carry out acts of violence motivated by those ideals, despite activists only accounting for a small proportion of hate crimes (Gadd et al., 2005). These movements present ideologies of validation and act as a facilitator for the channelling of personal frustrations onto a specific group and the placing upon them of the responsibility and blame for personal grievances (Spaaij, 2012). If it must be considered that hate crimes can be motivated by factors other than hate group membership, we need also to ask if the perpetration of these crimes are motivated by the ideology of the radical right, or by other factors entirely.

Therefore, perpetrators of hate crime may have prior involvement in larger extremist movements, which serve as an initial means and opportunity to commit violence, before adopting a more extreme outlook (Spaaij, 2012; Moskalenko and McCauley, 2011; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014). This type of offender goes on to develop their own ideologies based on a combination of personal and political grievances (Stern, 2003: 172). The personal ideologies may reflect and be based upon the ideology or beliefs of the extremist group that they were once associated with (Spaaij, 2012). This indicates that the ideology promoted by the radical right can motivate hate crimes and will be explored further in this thesis.

What is missing from these investigations is the role of the internet in widening support for hate-based ideologies, such as that held by some radical right organisations (Perry and Scrivens, 2016). Recently there has been increase in support for anti-immigrant political parties and politicians across Europe and the USA (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015). The majority of which do not explicitly advocate physical violence against immigrants and refugees, however their rhetoric has become increasingly hostile towards these groups, including the value they have in society which has been identified as contributing towards a climate of hate in Britain (Schweppe and Walters, 2016; Walters, Brown, and Wiedlitzka, 2016). Accordingly, this may provide justification to those inclined to carry out 'low-level' or everyday acts of hate and hostility (Levin and Rabrenovic, 2009; Walters, Brown, and Wiedlitzka, 2016).

Walters, Brown, and Wiedlitzka (2016) suggest that compartmentalising perpetrators into single 'types' may be overly simplistic, as many perpetrators have multiple motives, and the 'types' may influence each other. Whilst 'mission' perpetrators and the activities of hate groups make up a minority of offences, they may, alongside other factors, contribute to wider climates of hate, creating an environment in which 'thrill seekers' and 'defensive' perpetrators feel legitimised in committing hate crime (Walters, Brown, and Wiedlitzka, 2016). Further, 'defensive' offences may give provoke 'retaliatory' ones, creating a vicious circle between (perceived) victimisation and perpetration (Walters, Brown, and Wiedlitzka, 2016).

This thesis will expand upon our understanding of permission to hate by testing whether the presence of radical right organisations and parties influence racially and religiously motivated crimes through the introduction of their ideology in an area (Bunar, 2007; Mulholland, 2013; Adamczyk et al., 2014). The ideology of the radical right fits within permission to hate's view of society by promoting the ethnic superiority of the White native population over ethnic minorities, encouraging negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. Therefore, this ideology has the potential to influence individuals to perpetrate racially and religiously motivated crimes (Gadd, Dixon and Jefferson, 2005). Hate crimes can be directly encouraged by fellow group members or by the leadership to reinforce and publicise their cause and ideology. Additionally, the crimes can either be committed in connection with and alongside official organised events and activities, or they can be carried out in addition to these arranged activities.

The Radical Right and Hate Crime

The way permission to hate is utilised by parties and protest organisations is slightly different. The radical right parties believe that their aims can be achieved via the mainstream political process, and therefore frame their goals within legislative aims, whereas the protest groups believe their aims can only be achieved via more direct routes. Therefore, radical right organisations are believed to be able to exploit the gap where the preferences and demands of the majority population are not catered to within mainstream politics. Research has shown

that in Western countries there is an association between anti-immigration, anti-minority and authoritarian sentiments, and support for radical right parties (Andersen and Evans, 2003; Bohman, 2011; Dunn and Singh, 2011; Immerzeel, 2015; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Semyonov et al., 2006; Sprague-Jones, 2011; Wilkes et al., 2007; Kitschelt, 1997: 1-2; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000). Specifically, comparative studies have found a positive association between anti-foreigner sentiment, racist crime, and the strength of radical right parties (Semyonov et al., 2006).

Accordingly, the success of these parties has been found to be linked with levels of immigration, economic conditions, and the political environment (Lubbers et al., 2002). Further, Dancygier (2010) found a positive association between the strength of right-wing parties and the occurrence of racist crimes at the local level. Similarly, Jackle and König (2016, 2017), found that the strength of radical right parties in Germany was positively related to the level of xenophobic violence. Within the framework of permission to hate, this gives an air of acceptability. However, in some cases in Western Europe, the electoral success of radical right parties was a substitute for street activity and violence, resulting in lower levels of racist crime where radical right parties were strong (Koopmans, 1996; Koopmans et al., 2005; Ravndal, 2016). This contradiction highlights the need for more detailed analysis of radical political parties and the level of hate crime and will be tested in this thesis.

As with radical right political parties, the relationship between hate groups and hate crimes has also produced contradictory results. Some studies have explored the relationship between the presence of hate groups and hate crime in the USA (Mulholland, 2013; Ryan and Leeson, 2011; Adamzyk et al., 2014; Mills, Freilich, and Chermak, 2015). On one hand, hate groups promote permission to hate and encourage violence as a demonstration of belief and support of the group and the ideology. On the other, hate group activity in the form of protests and meetings provide a sufficient outlet for members to direct their grievances, reducing the tendency to commit hate crimes (Mulholland, 2013: 91; Koopmans et al., 2005). There is a complex and often contradictory understanding of how members of radical right organisations are directly or indirectly involved in violence, and the extent to which the presence of certain groups increases the number of hate crimes reported in an area.

The two main studies that highlight this issue have had conflicting results despite using similar panel data at different levels of analysis in the USA. One found there to be little evidence at the state level that hate groups are associated with hate crime, with limited support for economic or demographic factors related to hate crime (Ryan and Leeson, 2011). However, this was followed by research by Mulholland (2013) who found that the presence of hate groups was associated with an increase in the rate of hate crimes at the county level. When taken together, these studies highlight that whilst there did not appear to be a relationship at the state level, the relationship became more evident when using lower aggregate level county data.

There has also been exploration as to whether the presence of hate groups increases the likelihood of ideologically motivated violence committed by far-right extremists at the county level in the USA (Adamczyk et al., 2014). This found that the existence of a hate group in a county is significantly related to the occurrence of far-right ideologically motivated violence (Adamczyk et al., 2014; Mills, Freilich, and Chermak, 2015). Further research suggests that hate groups are mainly motivated by a perception of threat, whereas hate incidents are a result of opportunities which allow them to be committed (Cunningham, 2017). However, no study has looked at the influence of both radical right protest organisations and political parties on the level of hate crime. This gap is something that this thesis aims to address.

The issue of why extremists or extremist groups refrain from perpetrating more violence has not been extensively researched (Bjørgo and Gjelsvik, 2017; Cragin, 2014; Simi et al., 2018). The research that has focused on issue has found that violence can be limited by a lack of opportunities and capabilities, and by the group's own decision-making processes and motivations, including opposition, state actors, public opinion and other external constraints (della Porta, 1995; Lehrke and Schomaker, 2016; Matesan, 2018; Oliver and Myers, 2002; (Crenshaw, 1991; Shapiro, 2013). When looking at the English Defence League (EDL) as an example, the main limiting factor on the level of violence they were able to achieve were the tactics used by the police at their demonstrations (Treadwell, 2014). As a result of police strategies, the EDL protests were characterised by public disorder and a high number of

arrests. The police modified their tactics to separate the EDL from the counter-protests which succeeded in reducing arrests and the level of disorder and street-fighting at demonstrations. (Treadwell, 2014: 128). Further to this, the authorities routed protests away from potential areas of conflict such as minority communities, thereby reducing the potential for violent conflict (Treadwell, 2014: 134–135).

The Radical Right in the UK

So far, the question of how radical right groups and their ideology can engender violence and hate crime has been under-researched in the UK (Treadwell and Garland, 2011). Accordingly, the UK lacks a similar panel data analysis looking at the presence of hate groups and the level of racial or religiously motivated hate crime experienced. This thesis will combine these two strands of radical right literature, exploring how the presence of radical right parties and protest organisations influences the level of hate crime in an area.

Until recently, the UK was considered immune to the electoral success of the radical right (Eatwell, 2000, 2003, 2017; Griffin, 2008, 2017; Goodwin, 2011; Ignazi, 2003; Taggart, 2017). Compared to their European counterparts, the radical right in the UK had struggled to establish political recognition from the mainstream parties; many of whom had success in the election of local and national representatives, with some being part of coalition governments (Copsey, 2004; Rhodes, 2010: 85; Ignazi, 2003; Eatwell, 2000). Therefore, political support has not been a credible outlet for anti-minority sentiments in the UK compared to other European countries. The most prominent radical right political party has been the British National Party (BNP), which was formed in 1982. The party tried to become a credible alternative to the mainstream political parties by moving away from the extremist image it inherited from the National Front (Rhodes, 2010: 84; Copsey, 2004; Wood and Finlay, 2008: 707). This included a shift from biological racism and anti-Semitism towards cultural racism and voluntary rather than compulsory repatriation of immigrants (Rydgren, 2005; Goodwin, 2010: 39). This created and ideological shift from the more extreme end of the radical right ideological spectrum, towards the more moderate end.

These measures produced a level of electoral success, gaining them over fifty council seats, two places in the European Parliament and one Greater London Assembly seat between 2001 and 2010. In 2006 33 BNP candidates won in local elections and 70 came in second place (Goodwin et al., 2012: 888; Goodwin, 2010: 39). The party performed well in areas where the community was White working-class and low-educated, especially where there was a large Muslim community (John et al., 2006; Bowyer, 2008; Goodwin et al., 2012: 899). Their success in local elections was attributed to a tactical focus on local, rather than national issues. However, this success was short lived. By 2010 the party had begun to fragment, creating a vacuum within the radical right of British politics, which facilitated the rise of other radical right groups (Alessio and Meredith, 2014; Allen, 2014).

Since the BNP's implosion in 2010, the radical right in the UK experienced a process of fragmentation and shifted backward towards a more direct-action form of politics (Allchorn, 2019). As one report noted, these movements have become a more "isolated and in retreat" fringe than at any point over the past 20 years, and "becoming more extreme and violent" in the process (Hope not Hate, 2016). This shift has had a twofold effect. It has not only caused the movement of the radical right onto the UK's streets, but there has also been a transitioning of these movements towards the more pernicious (and criminal) space of online and offline anti-Islamic protests and attacks (accounting for two-fifths of the incidents in the year 2013/14) (Feldman and Littler, July 2014: 3).

At various points the radical right attempted to recruit members from different communities to rally behind the anti-Islam message, including those from other Asian communities (Copsey, 2010: 21). For example. there were attempts by the BNP to recruit Hindus into an anti-Islam alliance, in line with the group's move towards denigrating 'Muslims' rather than 'Asians' to minimal success (Eatwell, 2004: 71). This created a deterrent for individuals from Asian communities to join these movements as they did not want to become victims of the anti-Muslim abuse (Copsey, 2010: 23). If the radical right had been successful, it would have distanced them from accusations of being racist, since they would have been able to

demonstrate that other sections of the British multicultural society were also against Islam. Ultimately these attempts failed.

As the BNP began to decline, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) asserted itself as the new anti-immigration party. It emerged in 1993 as a single-issue pressure group in opposition to the Maastricht Treaty and the UK's membership of the European Union. From 2010 onwards, UKIP transformed from an organisation solely interested in EU membership towards a more ideologically developed radical right party that combined Eurosceptic, socially conservative, anti-immigrant and anti-elitist ideals (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). They also promoted a referendum on EU membership as the only way to control immigration (Geddes, 2014). These measures were successful as UKIP won 23% of the vote in the wards it contested in the 2013 local election. They went on to win 27% of the vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections, more than either the Conservative or Labour parties (Clarke et al., 2016; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). UKIP also managed to gain defections from the Conservative Party, resulting in its first representation in Parliament, and won over 4 million votes and 13% of the vote share in the 2015 General Election (Webb, Bale, and Poletti, 2017). These electoral gains put pressure on the Conservative Party and contributed to the decision to hold a referendum on Britain's membership of the EU (Bale, 2018). However, since the referendum in 2016, UKIP has experienced turmoil, instability and decline, including the exit of their leader from the party. By 2017 its vote share fell to just under 600,000 votes, or 1.8% of the total. It lost nearly all of its council seats at the 2018 UK local elections, and has experienced several tumultuous leadership transitions (Davidson and Berezin, 2018). UKIP therefore positions itself on the more moderate side of the radical right spectrum, and entrenches its claims within the legislative agenda of the country.

By this point, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes had become a prominent dynamic of the British radical right. Whilst the BNP was the first to embrace anti-Islamic activism, it was then adopted by the English Defence League (EDL) (Copsey, 2007). The EDL emerged from London football firms including Combat 18 in June 2009, in response to the demonstration against the Afghanistan war by the radical Islamist group Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (Copsey, 2010). This sparked tensions between the Muslim and White communities in Luton and

established the town as a venue for protests against extreme aspects of Islam (Allen, 2011: 283). From there, the EDL became a street-based group with a loose divisional structure with Tommy Robinson as their leader. Robinson had been active in football groups and the radical right and had previously been the leader of a local football firm, which called itself Men-in-Gear. He had previous been a member of the BNP, and went on to become the leader of Pegida and a prominent figure within the radical right (Copsey, 2010). The EDL "offered a more attractive and confrontational alternative to [BNP and UKIP's] perennial failure at the ballot box" (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 8). The salience of the EDL's Islamophobic rhetoric and the emotional appeal of activism to young, White, working-class men lacking educational or employment opportunities has been widely studied (Goodwin et al., 2016; Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015; Winlow et al., 2017; Busher, 2015; Pilkington, 2016).

The EDL followed in the footsteps of other radical right organisations by holding protests to defend the national and cultural identity that they argued was being threatened by Islam, thus converging around the theme of anti-Islam (Copsey, 2010: 11; Allen, 2011: 291). Meadowcroft and Morrow (2017) suggest that participation in EDL activities provide activists with an opportunity to protect their families and country from the 'threat' of radical Islam. The majority of the EDL violence appears to be targeted at Muslims, underscoring the earlier point about the anti-immigrant sentiment and racist tendencies of the group and the ideology (Alessio and Meredith, 2014). The racist behaviour of EDL supporters during the protest events has even been captured on video; for example, a video showing a protest in Stoke on Trent shows a protestor shouting "You fucking Paki-loving bastard!" at the police (YouTube, 2010). For many EDL supporters, the immediate benefits of activism through mass mobilisation became more important than any long-term goals (Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2018). These benefits included violent conflict, which was essential for the initial success of the EDL in recruiting activists from hooligan networks (Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2018). For instance, Pilkington (2016: 79) found evidence that for some hooligans, their participation in the demonstrations of the EDL replaced football violence.

The murder of British soldier Lee Rigby by Islamic extremists in Woolwich, South London, on 22 May 2013 was a pivotal moment for the EDL (Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2018). They

attracted significant media attention by attacking mosques in the immediate aftermath and consequently contributed to increased tensions within communities. Before then, the EDL had largely occupied the margins of British society, with their organised protests poorly attended – albeit always met with counter-protests. However, over 1500 people attended their demonstration in Newcastle, held three days after the murder (Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2018). Two demonstrations held in May in London and July in Birmingham attracted 1000 and 2000 protesters respectively. After the incident at Woolwich, the EDL saw a massive increase in online support, though this was not necessarily matched with increased attendance of their street-based activities. The main aim of these events was to provoke responses from the Muslim community, local residents, as well as anti-fascist protesters. The EDL would organise these demonstrations through Facebook, social media and their official website. However, the increased popularity of their events was relatively short-lived, with the attendance of their events returning to 'normal' levels after a few months.

By the end of 2013, the dominance of the EDL as the main anti-Islam organisation was dwindling. This was in part due to the departure of Tommy Robinson as the leader of the group, after his own alleged process of de-radicalisation. Following this change in leadership the EDL splintered and their street demonstrations were poorly attended. Despite Robinson's reputation as a charismatic and popular figure, he did not personally command loyalty or devotion from the members of the EDL. This can be seen in the comparative failure of his post-EDL venture, Pegida, at matching the success of the EDL (Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2018).

Since the decline of the EDL, other radical right organisations have emerged, including Britain First, which was initially created as a mailing group based in Belfast but – after Lee Rigby's death – became more vocal and made the transition into a more prominent radical right organisation, positioned on the more militant side on the radical right scale. Britain First managed to bridge the gap between the BNP and the EDL. They combined the political aspirations and rhetoric of the BNP with the vehement opposition to Islam that defined the EDL. Britain First attracted attention and support due to publicised confrontations and publicity stunts which were recorded on video and uploaded to their social media. They used

a variety of tactics to provoke reactions from politicians, the Muslim community, and – most importantly – radical Islamists. Their most infamous tactic involved what they called "Christian Patrols", the patrolling of high streets in predominantly Muslim areas, in armoured vehicles, and the distribution of leaflets which were purposively derogatory towards Islam. This tactic was used as a way to promote and sustain the racialised hierarchy and entrench themselves within the White Christian identity. They also engaged in street campaigns in Bradford and East London, under the banner "Operation Fightback", which involved the targeting of mosques and prominent Muslim politicians as well as anyone who criticised their movement. These tactics sparked not only a reaction from the Muslim community, but also the national and international media.

This positioned them as both a grassroots activist group and a political party contesting European Parliament elections (Hope not Hate, 2014). Britain First appealed to EDL supporters who were alienated by the departure of Robinson, as well as UKIP supporters. There had been fluidity between supporters of the radical right previously. For instance an overlap had been noted between those who were active in organisations such as the EDL, and those with a history of activism in overtly racist organisations, such as the National Front and BNP. (Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2018; Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016). Both the EDL and Britain First have been accused of being the equivalent to the militia wing of the BNP. However, the exact link between them has neither been proven, nor admitted, (Allen, 2011: 285). Despite discouragement by the BNP, their members attended EDL protests as they supplied the opportunity to conduct street-based protests (Copsey, 2010: 14). This can be seen in the overlap of membership between BNP and Combat 18, the EDL and BNP and Britain First and the EDL (Mudde, 2004: 205). The two different types of organisation fulfils different needs for the supporters. Political party support provides an outlet for electoral dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, and the desire to enact societal change via legislation. By contract protest groups encourage direct engagement and promote social change via description and conflict. It has been found that radical right groups are both directly and indirectly responsible for racist violence (Mudde, 2004: 205).

However, no attempt had been made by any of these groups to create an umbrella association and provide a united front for the British radical right. Instead, the groups have been extremely critical of their rivals, holding rival events, and trying to discredit the other in order to compete for supporters. Ultimately this rivalry stemmed from the belief that each group alone can champion the grievances felt by the unrepresented British population. They are also presented as being paranoid over the loss of national and cultural identity, which drives their resentment towards Islam (Copsey, 2010: 30).

The radical right – especially the EDL and Britain First -- rely on media and social media as a means as to raise awareness of both themselves and their objectives to recruit new participants (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993; Koopmans, 2004; Rohlinger, 2002; Seguin, 2016; Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Specifically, the use of social media provides opportunities for groups to connect to supporters and potential sympathisers unmediated, allowing them to directly communicate with potentially large audiences (González-Bailón, Borge-Holthoefer, and Moreno, 2013; Davidson and Berezin, 2018). The appeal of social media lies mainly in its provision of an efficient and low-cost way for sympathisers and activists to communicate with each other and organise protest events (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Castells, 2012; Hanna, 2013; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012).

The use of these tools also allowed these protest groups to frame their grievances and demands, as well as facilitating the construction of a collective identity creating a unity between them (Earl 2010; Earl and Kimport, 2011; Bennett and Segerberg, 2011; Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Social platforms can also allow for the wider diffusion of protest opportunities, and for groups to sustain themselves when they are considered to be in decline (Della Porta and Mattoni, 2014; Caren, Jowers, and Gaby, 2012; Earl and Kimport, 2011). Both groups could be considered as hybrid movements, as they have small cores of activists who engage in protest events, and a larger group of supporters who engage with the groups online (Davidson and Berezin, 2018). However, Britain First and the EDL have had their social media presence effectively censored, as they have been deplatformed by Twitter, Facebook and Youtube, and now rely on their own websites, the video hosting site BitChute as well as dark web platforms including Gab.

The EDL and Britain First utilised their significant online presence to mobilise and motivate their online supporters to attend their offline protests and demonstrations. They achieved this by promoting their ideology to sympathetic supporters, who share their world view that there is a perceived Islamic threat (Awan and Zempi, 2016). However, by early 2018, the online activity had sharply declined, especially for Britain First, whose leaders faced legal issues. Along with the EDL, the group has also been banned from all major social media platforms (Davidson and Berezin, 2018).

Conclusion

This chapter has given an overview of the literature that explores the inconsistent relationship between the radical right on the level of hate crime. It has explored the spectrum of the ideology of the radical right and how it promotes establishing power dynamics based upon race and religion and a nationalistic and xenophobic ideology. This creates an idealised society and promotes power dynamics which will be explored in the following chapter. Previous research has found that the strength of the electoral performance of these parties is either positively, or negatively associated with racially motivated crime. This highlights the need for more detailed analysis to see which of these relationships holds true with the level of hate crime in the UK. Studies looking at the presence of hate groups and hate crime in the US have also found inconsistent associations. However, this may be due to the level of analysis used as the relationship is observed at the lower aggregate level, but is not seen in the analysis at a higher aggregate level. This literature also lacks in-depth investigation into the UK context. This thesis aims to address the imbalance in the literature into how the political parties and organisations are each associated with hate crime at the local level.

This chapter also provided an overview of some of the different groups that occupy different positions on the radical right spectrum. The BNP became the most successful radical right political party in the UK, though they are widely considered as a less credible voting choice compared to the mainstream political parties. The frustration felt by radical right

sympathisers at this lack of representation of their interests led to the creation of the EDL. The EDL favoured street-based demonstrations through organised protests over the pursuit of electoral goals. Protests organised and held across the UK over the life span of the organisation had fluctuating attendance and were extensively policed to limit conflict. However, by 2013 the EDL was struggling to motivate its members to attending these protests, up until the events of Woolwich that took place in May of that year. Immediately after the event, the EDL managed to rally members to protest mosques and saw a huge resurgence in membership. Unfortunately for them, this rise in popularity was short-lived.

The marginalisation of the BNP and effective collapse of the EDL created a vacuum within the radical right's ideological space. This allowed Britain First to move from operating as a purely mailshot group and exploit it. They have managed to capitalise on the electoral aspirations that supporters of the BNP feel are no longer met by the party, and the protest activity that the EDL was no longer offering.

What these radical right organisations have managed to achieve is verging on an anti-Islam consensus. Since 9/11 there has been a climate of fear and suspicion that characterised the West's attitude towards Islam and the Muslim community, which has been exploited by the radical right as a means of driving support. The BNP used extensive propaganda after the 7/7 attacks to provoke the British public into supporting them, which had mixed results. The EDL was widely considered a single-issue organisation whose sole purpose was to oppose Islam through its demonstrations. Britain First has managed to improve upon this opposition by adopting the demonstration tactics of the EDL in opposition to Islam – through the invasion of mosques, protesting against radical Islamists, and performing "Christian Patrols", all of which will be looked at in the following chapters.

Chapter 4:

Permission to Hate: A Theoretical Framework

This chapter will outline the theoretical approach of permission to hate which will be tested in this thesis to see if it can explain the influence of the radical right on racially and religiously aggravated crimes in England and Wales. Perry and Scrivens' permission to hate theory currently focuses on a general environment or climate of hate within the social, political and economic landscape of a nation, region. This thesis further develops permission to hate into a more racialised social structure that encourages hate. The approach of permission to hate explains how the radical right exploit opportunity structures to promote their ideology, and by extension influence the perpetration of hate crime. This approach incorporates wider societal conditions and power dynamics that are missing in other theoretical explanations for hate crime. This refined version of permission to hate contends that radical right groups promote a world view of hierarchy and incompatibility of ethnic minorities within Western society. Additionally, permission to hate includes state policies, police responses, the media portrayal of ethnic minorities, and the increased tensions that exist after high profile events and terrorist attacks.

Alternative Theoretical Approaches

Before the approach of permission to hate can be discussed, it is important to take into consideration other theoretical approaches that have been applied in studies of hate crime. However, these theories do not include the role of power dynamics or the radical right in the perpetration of hate crime and thus will not be included in this thesis.

Ethnic competition has often been applied to explain hate crime perpetration. It contends that hate crimes are a result of an economic rivalry between different ethnic groups. In particular it argues that hate crimes are a result of the desire to limit the level of competition immigrants and minorities pose for scarce resources including jobs, housing, and welfare. This contributes to a scepticism about immigration and ethnic minorities which can motivate

individuals to conduct violence against those they believe to be responsible for their hardship (Rydgren and Ruth, 2011; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013: 106; Sibbit, 1997). Therefore, a person's unemployment, threat of unemployment or loss of status can result in hate crime (Hofstadter, 1963; Lipset, 1963; Falter and Klein, 1994). However, previous empirical research on the link between racial or religious hate crime and unemployment has produced conflicting findings.

Some research has found that unemployment and poverty are strongly associated with a greater levels of hate crime (Ryan and Leeson, 2011). It has also been found that minorities in high-unemployment neighbourhoods experience racial harassment with significantly greater frequency (Dustmann et al., 2004). However, this study relied on the self-reporting of victim accounts and their perceptions of their crime. Within the UK it has been found that areas with historic economic decline had the highest concentration of hate crime (Clayton, Donovan and Macdonald, 2016: 70). These results differ from the results of Green et al. (1998), and Stacey et al. (2011), who found no interaction between high unemployment and a high influx of minorities, and recorded hate crimes in New York. In an analysis of recorded hate crime from counties in the USA, Sexton (2011) also only found partial support for the hypothesis that hate crime prevalence is driven by economic strain.

Therefore, an economic-based theory is limited in how well it can consistently explain the perpetration of hate crime. We must consider theoretical approaches which take into account societal conditions to be more appropriate in explaining hate crime. Shaw and McKay (1942) found that neighbourhoods exhibit a resistance towards outsiders, which also includes hate crime perpetration. This is frequently referred to as the 'defended neighbourhood thesis'. Other studies have found White neighbourhoods to be well organised in using intimidation, violence and hate crimes against newcomers (Bell, 2002; DeSena, 1990; Reider, 1985). This is supported by the work of Lyons (2007), who found that hate crimes against blacks by Whites are more prevalent in well-integrated communities than in disorganized White ones experiencing economic strain.

Another alternative is 'social disorganisation theory', which explains hate crimes as a result of the failure of a community to realise common values and maintain effective social control (Osgood and Chambers, 2003). Here, criminal activity is a product of ethnic diversity, economic status, family disruption, residential instability, population size and density, and proximity to urban areas (Osgood and Chambers, 2003). These elements also influence a community's capacity to develop and maintain systems of social relationships. Sampson and Wilson (1995) argue that the separation of communities also leads to what Kornhauser (1978) defined as cultural disorganisation, or the decrease in cultural values within a community. Therefore, institutional instability, distrust, poverty, and heterogeneity in urban communities hinder communication, and hamper common values, resulting in criminal behaviour (Sampson and Wilson, 1995). As noted by Grattet (2009), such a theoretical approach is difficult to evaluate empirically, especially through survey data. Whilst this approach has been tested for general criminal behaviour, it is not necessarily clear how this approach applies to hate crime specifically. Additionally, these approaches fail to include the role of power dynamics or explore how the radical right may exploit these community divisions to encourage the use of hate crime. Instead, this thesis will test the theoretical approach of permission to hate, which incorporates elements of these theories whilst also including power dynamics and influence of ideology when exploring racial and religious hate crime.

Permission to Hate: Combining Opportunity Structures and Power Dynamics

The theoretical approach of permission to hate was developed by Barbara Perry to explore the conceptual definition of hate crime and its causal factors. This was later expanded in her works with Scott Poynting and Ryan Scrivens to explain the opportunity structures and power dynamics in which hate crimes occur. In her work with Scrivens (2019), they argue that current approaches to hate crime do not help us to understand how or why patterns appear as they do. Additionally, they assert that other hate crime studies are too a-theoretical and positivist in their approach and are based on regressions of official statistics, without a theoretical framework to guide variable selection (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). In contrast, the

approach of permission to hate looks at the enabling environmental factors, such as action or lack of action by state and political actors, that let hate movements thrive. Examples include: prominence of anti-immigrant rhetoric signals that xenophobia is acceptable; lack of police responses to groups gives them a sense of impunity; and regions with histories of being unwelcoming to minorities will continue to be so.

For Perry (2009), society, hierarchy and dominance are central to understanding the nature of hate crime. These crimes are symptomatic of broader and deeper societal processes that create powerful groups that seek to maintain their dominant position by subordinating disadvantaged groups through targeted violence (Perry, 2009). Accordingly, offenders see their crimes as rational as they are connected to their identity and position of power and privilege within society (Perry, 2005: 125). Here, the intent behind hate crime perpetration is to marginalise a person and community in order to maintain specific social/societal hierarchies (Perry, 2001). This violence is therefore a reflection of social attitudes and values that support and reproduce such inequalities (Perry, 2009).

Perry (2001) also argues that hate crimes are an extreme form of discrimination based within a history and context of discrimination and marginalisation of minority groups. These crimes are rooted in social hierarchies that are formed through dominant identity traits such as gender, race, sexual orientation and class (Perry, 2001: 46; Walters et al., 2016; Perry and Scrivens, 2019). This predominantly takes the form of a hegemonic White identity (Hughey, 2010; Simi et al., 2016) that is based on masculinity (Ferber, 2016; Treadwell and Garland, 2011), or a combination of the two (Perry and Scrivens, 2016). Therefore, the theory places societal power with White, Christian and heterosexual males, resulting in hate and hostility based on power, identity and belonging as a means to deprive minorities of security, freedom of movement and engagement (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). This is especially true for ethnic and religious minorities, which fits within the ideology of the radical right. This thesis explores this by further developing permission to hate into a racialised society that encourages hate.

One way to maintain the hierarchy is to “police spaces” for minorities who threaten societal norms and values (Walters et al., 2016; Perry and Blazak, 2010). Under this approach, the

perpetrators of hate crime are likely to be influenced by expectations of ideal identity traits to send a clear message that minorities are not welcome (Lawrence, 2003; Perry, 2009; Walters et al., 2016). Therefore, hate groups and hate are "embedded in broader patterns of subjugation and oppression" through structural and cultural practices (Perry, 2014). These can be through a network of norms, assumptions, behaviours, policies which create hierarchies, which in turn define society.

Perry describes the notion of "histories of hate" as the foundation of the radical right and the perpetration of hate crime. In the work by Perry and Scrivens (2019), they found that in Canada hate groups were based in areas where their presence is indicative of the normality of racism and exclusion (Quebec, Western Ontario, Alberta, and lower mainland of British Columbia), as there was something about these areas that provides a fertile ground for these groups. The radical right depended upon the normalisation of hate in order to make their message salient, and resonate with members and potential recruits by speaking to their concerns and establishing their legitimacy. Specifically, they focused on areas where there had been a "history of hate" towards aboriginal people, as a history of oppression established the privilege of White straight Christian males. Consequently permission to hate predicts that hate grows in enabling environments, and hate groups exploit poor economic circumstances and rapidly changing demographics to provide a permission to hate minority communities (Burnett, 2017; Perry, 2001, Poynting, 2006; Komaromi and Singh, 2016; Bowling, 1993; Young, 1990). However, both histories of hate and enabling environments are difficult and measure and test empirically. In the UK this could be theorised as areas that have previously experienced levels of radical right support as this has been concentrated in some areas and not others.

Within the further developed permission to hate used in this thesis, racialised society can be perpetuated by racist attitudes which become part of a community's culture and create an atmosphere of hostility for ethnic minorities (Sibbit, 1997). This is especially the case in areas experiencing dramatic demographic change, in which people frame newcomers as threats to their historic hegemony and present them as scapegoats for the young and unemployed. McDevvit, Levin and Bennett (2002) found that hate crimes frequently took place when

communities or neighbourhoods were in the transition from being ethnically homogenous to becoming multi-ethnic. Therefore, racially and religiously aggravated violence was used to inform the newcomers that they were not welcome within that community. Under these conditions, violence against those whom they consider to be 'others' is seen by hate groups as a legitimate means for achieving their goals, (Coester, 2010: 58). They then use ideological claims of superiority and societal power as part of an ongoing struggle or battle to define and exclude outgroups based on cultural and political norms. Their aim is to maintain their privileged societal dominance to limit the ability of minorities to express their needs. As minorities are not only stigmatised, but are also considered to have less societal worth, this can legitimise violence towards minorities (Sitzer and Heitmeyer, 2008). The perception that ethnic outgroups pose a threat limits the possibility that native population will actively seek to develop social interactions or meaningful relationships with ethnic minorities (Huijts, Kraaykamp, and Scheepers, 2014: 43). This is central to the radical right in the UK as political parties wish to limit immigration via legislation, whilst the protest organisations aim to alienate and force minorities out through direct actions.

According to permission to hate, radical right groups exploit these opportunity structures to attract membership and attendance at their events. Their ideology and rhetoric contribute towards the marginalisation of minorities. Within this thesis' expansion of permission to hate, this embeds a sense of ethnic superiority and can be used as a motivator and justifier by those who commit crimes against those whom they consider to be inferior. Strict adherence to these attitudes could be a motivator for violence as individuals seek to address and correct what they consider to be the favourable treatment of ethnic minorities over the native population, regarding resources that they may consider to be rightfully theirs. The radical right also adopted the attitude that immigrants and minorities should be denied certain privileges. This extended in some cases to the view that only native citizens should be able to receive welfare related benefits (Betz, 1994; Dewinter, 1992; Mudde, 2007). These attitudes therefore could be used as justification for the perpetration of racial and religiously motivated crimes in order to establish societal dominance. This results in the perspective that power relations and contestations between groups create relationships of domination and subordination (Deschamps, 2010: 88-91). These produce perceptions of superiority and

inferiority that encourage battles for acceptance (Brown and Ross, 2010). In turn, this encourages what Brown and Ross (2010: 170) have termed "social creativity as a response to threat", whereby group members respond to feelings of threat or superiority by altering the 'attachment' they place on certain values and qualities.

Specifically, immigrant or minority communities from non-Western countries are identified as the greatest threat to the national identity, with the highest risk coming from Muslim nations (Rydgren and Ruth, 2011: 210). This is due in part to Islam being considered by these groups to be in direct conflict with Western culture and values and thus a significant threat to the native population. In the words of Alexander, "Muslims thus become the ultimate 'Other,' transfixed through the racialization of religious identity to stand at the margins: undesired, irredeemable, alien" (2002: 564). Many counter-terror strategies (such as the UK Government's anti-terrorism strategy, Prevent) intended to address extremism have had the side effect of disproportionately targeting certain minority groups in society, resulting in further stigmitisation (Awan, 2012). Awan's research in this area concluded that:

> "while counter-terrorism policies such as Prevent have an overall goal of community engagement to combat extremism, it may alienate sections of the Muslim community through counterterrorism policing tactics. Such policies, in effect, constructed a "suspect" community within the dictum of community engagement for counterterrorism purposes" (2012: 1168).

This has been exacerbated by the media conflation of the issue of terrorism with Muslims and Islam, which has been well documented in academic research (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Poynting and Perry, 2007). Additionally, the racialisation of religion focuses on debates about community cohesion, inter-ethnic interactions, stereotyping "suspect" Muslim communities, and deliberations over the prevention of Islamic extremism (Fortier, 2008; Mythen, Walklate, and Khan, 2009; Spalek, 2013).

Permission to hate posits that social structures and processes enable radical right groups, as they are able to construct collective identities on these cultural lines to appeal to supporters

(Perry, 2001; Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Futrell and Simi, 2004; Oaten, 2014; Perry and Scrivens, 2016). To further develop this, racialisation occurs when race becomes the socially constructed outcome of processes and practices of exclusion (Lumsden et al., 2018). The state also plays a role in establishing these collective identities and the construction of difference in racialised terms through immigration policies and hostile environments to immigrants based on the colonial inheritance of immigration legislation (Poynting and Perry, 2007; El-Enany, 2020). Radical right political parties are part of this process as the political agenda and rhetoric of parties like BNP and UKIP increase the saliency of immigration, forcing mainstream parties to not only respond to their claims but to attempt to appeal to the electorate that are attracted to more restrictive policies.

This can be illustrated by the ways in which Muslims in post 9/11 Western societies have been subject to state action designed to control the terrorist threat through stigmatising all Muslims (Poynting and Perry, 2007). Expressions of hate can be seen in judicial outcomes, parliamentary debates, electoral political campaigns with racialised images and language (Poynting and Perry, 2007). In the aftermath of 9/11, many Western governments, including the UK, passed anti-terror legislation that could be interpreted as demonising Muslim communities, including the Prevent Strategy. This was continued by high profile politicians as they demonised Muslims through rhetoric used in speeches and debates. More recently legitimisation of radical right sentiment can be seen in the accusations of institutional Islamophobia within the Conservative Party.

The prominence of policies and public rhetoric that focus on the Muslim community has resulted in the development of the “us” vs. “them” categorisation both by politicians when discussing the security threat posed by Muslims, and by citizens who are encouraged to be distrustful of such communities. The marginalisation of Muslims is reflected in the widespread questioning by politicians and in the media of whether Muslims can be integrated into European society (Abbas, 2005; Fortier, 2008; Ingram and Dodds, 2009; McGhee, 2008; Modood, 2005; Werbner, 2009). The media have also been found to include Islamophobic representations of Muslim and Asian communities which is adopted by their readers (Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004). Muslims are often presented as a threat to Britishness on the

grounds of a perceived homogenized religious identity, and therefore acts of anti-Muslim hate are driven by a psychological division between the categories of "us" and "them" based upon this distinction, regardless of the accuracy of such perceptions (Nickels et al., 2010; Heitmeyer, 2005). The resulting homogenization also ignores efforts Muslims have made to resist these media representations of Islam and Muslims (Hussein and Bagguley, 2012).

The rhetoric of cultural invasion and inevitable violence has made its way into general mainstream political discourse (Carr, 2006: 5). This can be exploited by the radical right to legitimise their belief structure and perpetuates the creation of a Muslim enemy and the belief that a clash of civilisations between Muslims and non-Muslims is inevitable (Allen, 2010: 47). These extreme visions stem from the belief that Western society and Islam are diametrically opposed cultures and as such are mutually exclusive – that therefore Islam is incompatible to the British way of life and poses a significant threat to national identity (Carr, 2006: 10; Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010: 31; Betz, 2013: 75; Allen, 2011: 291). The Muslim community in this interpretation is considered to be unable or unwilling to assimilate into Western society (Betz, 2013: 81). However, the radical right narrative itself is not clear cut on the issue, as often they try to distinguish between 'good' South Asians (non-Muslims) and 'bad' South Asians (Muslims) within their propaganda material (even if this distinction is rarely maintained) and all Asians end up being merged within the 'bad Asian/Muslim' framework (Modood, 2005). Related to this is the belief that multiculturalism has failed and has set in motion the erosion of European culture, based upon the belief that Europe and Western culture are threatened by the encroachment of Islam (Carr, 2006). Radical right political parties are able to use this to motivate electoral support, whereas the protest groups filter this into attendance of their events. Radical right parties in the UK have sought to provoke a backlash from the Asian or Muslim community to force the Government to take some type of action against them, with the hope that they will overreact to the situation (Copsey, 2010: 26).

Racially motivated hate crime therefore can be understood through the institutionalisation of difference through inequalities in employment via race discrimination, and culturally where the media play a role by depicting minority ethnic groups as the 'criminal other'

(Wolhuter et al., 2008; El-Enany, 2020). In a review of opinion polls, Field (2007) found an increase in hostile attitudes towards Muslims between 1988 and 2006 in parallel with the developing anti-Muslim discourse amongst politicians and the media at the time. This has also been investigated within the English context where studies have found that since the 2001 riots in the North of England, South Asian and Muslim young men have been presented as violent, drug addicted, involved in criminal activity and at risk of radicalisation (Alexander, 2004; Bagguley and Hussain, 2008). Asian Muslim men are widely represented in these discourses as being unable to achieve economic and social success, and consequently they are thought to rely on a mythology of masculine strength as expressed through violence and involvement in criminal activities (Hussein and Bagguley, 2012). Therefore, it is now well established that political discourse, the media and government policies have constructed Islam and Muslims as a threat (Abbas, 2005; Bhattacharyya, 2008; Brighton, 2007; Fortier, 2008; Ingram and Dodds, 2009; Kundnani, 2009; McGhee, 2005, 2008; Moore et al., 2008; Nickels et al., 2010; Poynting and Mason, 2007; Werbner, 2009).

With this interpretation, hate crimes are rooted within ideological structures of societal oppression based upon embedded notions of ethnic and religious difference (Perry, 2001: 16). This approach leans on the ideology of the radical right to explain societal divisions based on ethnic and religious identity. However, one of the limitations of this approach is that it can only explain those hate crimes which are perpetrated by ethnic majority perpetrators against ethnic minority victims. Additionally, state practices, polices and frameworks both at the individual and institutional level marginalise and oppress minority groups. This in turn can legitimise acts of discrimination or hate crime against them (Perry, 2001, 2005). The state can legitimise the radical right or give permission to hate through rhetoric and legislation – including through the gendered and racialised rhetoric of politicians, judges and newspapers towards immigrants (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). This thesis will also investigate how the police, as part of the state, legitimise permission to hate through their enforcement or lack of enforcement of laws that maintain this social order. Politicians demonise minorities through policies and practices, such as legislation since 9/11 in which Muslims have been presented as problematic. This allows people to feel comfortable with their prejudice towards Muslims and empowers these groups to exclude and target them. Here the radical right benefits from

a culture of possibilities, and their ability to contest elections (whilst not being electorally successful in the UK) gives some legitimacy to their intolerance and their ideals.

Perry and Scrivens' study highlighted the need to take both a local and national approach to extremism as the police officers they interviewed had a limited idea of radical right activity within their community or region. The authors identified three types of radical right in Canada – white supremist/neo-nazi/racist skinhead; anti-authority communities; and found approximately 100 groups. However, this figure does not include ideologues, gurus and lone actors – or those who are below radar (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). They found that violence was sporadic, unplanned and opportunistic, and largely committed by small groups or individuals. The activities were categorised as either non-violent crime (such as drug dealing); non-ideologically motivated criminal violence (such as fighting); and extremist violence by which minority or anti-racist groups or law enforcement is targeted (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Notably, the Perry and Scrivens do not include political parties in their analysis.

Permission to hate also identifies what Perry and Scrivens describe as endogenous factors that shape the development of the radical right. Specifically, these factors enable radical right organisations to be more or less likely to plan, engage and incite violence (Perry and Scrivens, 2019: 60). Perry and Scrivens described this as including groups being domestically and globally connected through online spaces and interactions (2019: 60). However, radical right groups suffer from weak organisation and experience rapid phases of morphing and collapse (Morrow and Meadowcroft, 2018). These are a result of internal and external rivalries, which are exacerbated by weak leadership, which destabilises the group, and results in their splintering. By contrast, Perry and Scrivens (2019: 84) describe exogenous or contextual enabling factors that shape the capacities of radical right groups which constitute permission to hate. These factors provide means for these groups to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the public or the mainstreaming of their ideas by other political parties (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). In the UK this is also from radical right political parties emphasising these issues as part of the mainstreaming process. Perry and Scrivens describe this as being achieved through toning down their rhetoric, avoiding uniforms such as white robes or black/brown shirts, and forging links with the state (by contesting elections).

Additionally, permission to hate contends that members encourage friends and associates to join their radical right group. This creates a level of trust between members and might explain some of the regional clustering of hate groups (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). The interactions between members establishes a sense of belonging, and connection with each other over their shared grievances that can be exploited by the group (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). This helps them to craft a larger identity, and to feel connected to part of something bigger. For many, it is the prospect of solidarity that appeals to members. It is the internal community – grounded in hate – that links the group rather than the hatred itself.

Perry and Scrivens (2019) also identified exogenous factors that inhibit the opportunity structures for the radical right. These include strong and visible police responses in investigating the radical right, community engagement, and the neutralising of groups. The authors had two seemingly contradictory findings: first, that responding to the radical right can enable them, whereas over-response to their activities can result in their further radicalisation. This thesis will also investigate the role of police responses on the influence radical right protests may have on hate crime. Perry and Scrivens also identified the function of active and present set of anti-racist movements to fill the void left by the police and legislation. Most importantly, they found that preventative work against the radical right requires the community resilience and resistance. For example, they found Lethbridge, Alberta was able to resist the radical right through collective efforts and effective local policies. The city established a successful Action Plan in 2011 that addressed some of the challenges the community was facing due to its demographic changes. Consequently, the attempts by the radical right to rally support in Lethbridge were met with strong community resistance. This was supplied by law enforcement, educational systems, equity-seeking groups and citizens, which prevented the radical right from gaining a foothold in the community. Therefore, Perry and Scrivens recommend a multidimensional approach to resisting and countering the radical right that involves collaboration with law enforcement and anti-racist movements, and a sense of collective responsibility by all elements of the local community. This thesis will look at how responses to protests by police and counter

protesters contributed towards the enabling environment.

The Role of Events

The role the media plays in permission to hate and hate crim perpetration also requires attention. Burnett (2017) found that the media disassociates itself from the creation and promotion of a climate that can lead to racial violence. Some of the newspapers and media outlets which highlighted and condemned examples of racist violence after the referendum had been involved in long-term campaigns against 'undeserving' asylum seekers, migrants and BAME communities, and the demonising of 'terrorist' Muslims. They regurgitated and contributed to the presentation of migrants as threats/invaders and the notion of a multicultural enemy within (Burnet, 2017).

The media coverage of specific events and political discourse can legitimise negative evaluations of difference based on ethnicity or religious lines, which can in turn result in hate crime. These in turn can be exploited by the radical right. Radical right organisations have relied on vilifying a particular outgroup for the purposes of self-definition. As discussed previously, this has historically been through anti-Semitism (Taguieff, 2004; Wistrich, 2003; Simmons, 2003; Marcus, 2000; Heinisch, 2003; Wodak, 2002; Mudde, 2000), but has since been replaced by Islamophobia as the main feature (Betz, 2003). After 9/11, the threat of an Islamic Europe became a fundamental theme of the radical right, where they considered Muslims as a unified entity against which they were able to present themselves as advocates for the defence of Christian values (Zúquete, 2008: 322-323).

The issue of media bias thus needs to be considered seriously, as the extent of coverage of 'extremist groups' and 'Islamic terrorisms' has increased significantly (Moore et al., 2008; Nickels et al., 2010; Poole, 2006). Arabic words (such as 'jihad') are appropriated into a universal journalistic vocabulary, and they have been invested with new meanings, with connotations of extremism and violence. Furthermore, words such as 'fundamentalist', 'extremist' and 'radical' have been regular features in headlines across the British press

(Moore et al., 2008; Nickels et al., 2010). The study by Piatkowska and Hövermann (2018) underlines the need for caution in media representations, laws and policies, or in everyday interactions in regards to presentation of certain groups. This is due to the hostile social climate that media representations which can encourage the perpetration of xenophobic and racially motivated crimes.

There have been a range of studies exploring the link between high profile terrorist events and hate crime. By 2002 the electorate was beginning to show concern over the level of asylum seekers coming to the UK. The Daily Mail published multiple articles about Britain being soft on asylum seekers and the BNP published an issue of *The Voice of Freedom* stating that asylum seekers would benefit from more hand-outs than pensioners and unemployed Britons (Eatwell 2004:70). In February that year they alleged in the same publication that young Muslim men were being recruited for war against the West (Eatwell 2004: 71). This is just one example of the BNP using online and print literature to vilify Islam – a tactic that both the EDL and Britain First also exploit. Therefore "sensationalist coverage" of events, it is argued, can produce a "hate crime contagion" through "perpetuating or legitimating stereotypes" of minorities, and specifically Asian and Muslim communities (Green, McFalls and Smith, 2001). The ability of the media to drive support for anti-immigrant or radical right parties has already been established (Walgrave and Swert, 2004; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009; Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden, 2010). It has been shown that the contagion effect and the dynamics of elite rhetoric are particularly potent following 'triggering events', which can create a permission to hate and legitimacy for radical right organisations (Hall, 2014).

The stereotypes that are promoted of Muslims as potential terrorists, paedophiles or somehow culturally 'alien' (including Sharia courts and halal diets) were previously largely confined to the fringes of British politics. The situation began to change in the wake of the 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks, which killed 52 innocent people in London and was carried out by four 'home-grown' suicide bombers. In the aftermath of the Woolwich murder, the EDL's online content included calls to kill Muslims and petrol bomb mosques (Jackson, 2013b: 5). In this aftermath, TellMAMA, a Muslim organisation focused on raising awareness of

Islamophobia and supports victims suggested that “it is the English Defence League (and not the BNP) which is most visibly making its online presence felt in terms of anti-Muslim attacks” (Copsey, 2013: 22). Anti-Muslim prejudice in Britain was further ‘mainstreamed’ in several high-profile child abuse scandals in the UK involving criminal acts by predominately South Asian men over the last decade that were heavily featured by the media. This has since become a rallying point for the radical right.

Terror attacks can foster the perception of the out-group as threatening, which directs attention to sources of intergroup conflict (Quillian, 1995; Legewie, 2013; Hopkins, 2010). These also have long-term effects on attitudes. For instance, surprisingly high levels of anti-Muslim attitudes were found in Spain, largely as a result of the Madrid bombings (Savelkoul et al., 2011). Since this requires a perception of threat (Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010), terror attacks are linked to the increase in hate crimes due to the increased perception of threat and in particular towards the “prevailing way of life or the foundation of national identity” (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). The response by the dominant group to such attacks is a ‘backlash’ or retaliation derived from this feeling of threat. It is not clear to what extent this is valid for other types of events (Devine, 2017).

Within this context, hate crimes present a route for enforcing ideological beliefs and purporting to reduce the risk for those who might wish to retaliate against terrorist events (Mills et al., 2017). These beliefs establish a grievance towards a specific group considered responsible for the event, especially when there is media publicity. As such, studies have found that hate crimes briefly increase after such events, before de-escalating and returning to their previous ‘normal’ levels (King and Sutton, 2013). Terrorist attacks have the potential to be exploited by the radical right to drive their support, but this has not been sufficiently researched in the UK.

Disha et al. (2011) explored this correlation in the USA and found that hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims increased dramatically in the months following 9/11. Additionally, they found that counties with larger concentrations of Arabs and Muslims had higher incidents of such hate crimes, likely a result of the availability of targets for this type of offending.

However, the likelihood of victimization is lowest in counties where the percentage of Arab or percentage of Muslims is highest, in line with a power-differential perspective on discrimination and intergroup violence (Disha et al., 2011). The work of Hanes and Machin (2014) had similar findings using data from four police force areas in England to explore the effects of the 7/7 and 9/11 terror attacks on hate crime experienced by Asian/Arab populations. They found significant increases in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs almost immediately after both terror events, which – whilst the levels did decrease over time – still remained higher than they were prior to the attacks a year later. Hanes and Machin also posit that "attitudinal changes resulting from media framing and coverage may act as a conduit linking terror attacks and hate crimes" (Hanes and Machin, 2014). What is missing from this literature is how these events are exploited by the radical right.

This vilification of Muslims escalated in the UK after the 7/7 bombing, when they were predominantly depicted in the media in relation to terrorism and major international conflicts (Nickels et al., 2010; Poole, 2006). This was also true of the rhetoric of the radical right. For example, BNP propaganda began to present Islamic extremists as representing all Muslims (James, 2009: 12). After the 7/7 attacks, the BNP refocused their rhetoric away from Asians as the targeted enemy and towards Muslims specifically. This move took advantage of the fact that Muslims are not considered to be an ethnic group in British law, meaning they could not claim racial discrimination (James, 2009). This also explains why the BNP swapped the use of the word Asian for Muslim in much of their rhetoric (James, 2009: 6). In the days following the 7/7 bombings, the Director of the BNP Legal Department, Lee Barnes, claimed that Britain and Islamic terrorism are at war with each other (Wood and Finlay, 2008: 712). Barnes inferred that any British Muslim is a potential terrorist targeting White, indigenous British population with the aim of making Britain an Islamic state. The UK and US Governments and Al Qaeda all consider these types of incidents to be attacks on freedom and democracy and responses to a war on Islam; the BNP, on the other hand, considers them to be based on race and genocide, and their rhetoric builds up the idea that terrorism and immigration are linked (Wood and Finlay, 2008: 713).

Post 7/7, the BNP continued to spread fear of Islam and resentment towards immigration, arguing that Islamists have benefitted from an increase in anti-Islamic attacks and White supremacist support (James 2009: 14). White supremacist violence has increased since the European elections which has seen a rise in the BNP's profile (James 2009: 15). These aspects support the assertion that the actions of groups or individuals advocating one type of extremist ideology, in this case radical Islamists, can motivate individuals or groups who subscribe to an opposing extremist ideology, such as the radical right. Copsey attributes this opposing motivation for the creation of the EDL as their formation was the result of community tensions in Luton (2010: 11). The BNP accused Muslim communities of grooming young White girls and for being responsible for the drug trade in Britain; in 2006 the BNP were accused of worsening ethnic tensions with depictions of the Prophet Muhammed in a leaflet campaign (James, 2009: 27). This culminated in 2009 when a member of the BNP was charged with incitement to commit racial hatred for distributing leaflets relating to heroin (James, 2009: 35). The EDL and Britain First aimed to provoke a backlash from Asian or Muslim communities to force the Government to take some of action against them, with the hope that they would in fact overreact to the situation. However, the EDL never managed to provoke such actions through the demonstrations they organised (Copsey, 2010: 26).

It has now become routine for leaders of Muslim organisations to speak out against terrorist attacks committed by Islamic extremists (Poynting and Perry, 2007). Despite these attempts, terrorist attacks are often succeeded by a spate of anti-Muslim violence and the vandalism of mosques, as some individuals feel it necessary to make Muslim communities pay for the atrocities for which the perpetrators believe the communities are responsible. For instance, Awan and Zempi (2019) found that Islamophobic hate crime increased after 'trigger' events, including the Brexit vote, Donald Trump's presidency, and ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks in European countries such as France, Germany, Sweden and the UK. This is supported by the work of Devine (2018), who found that the referendum acted as a bigger 'trigger event' for hate crimes, in both daily and monthly data, than either the Manchester and London terror attacks.

Additionally, Brexit may have encouraged some to be openly hostile towards immigrants, physically and online (Cuerden and Rogers, 2017: 158). For instance, Virdee and McGeever (2018) argue that the history of immigration to Britain has been so racialised over time that a reservoir of latent racism was activated in the referendum campaigning through the production of appropriately coded language. Immigration overtook economic issues towards the end of the referendum campaign (Deacon et al., 2016). The impact of Brexit was significant, with three-quarters of police forces in England and Wales reporting record levels of hate crime between July and September 2016 (BBC News, 2017).

Conclusion

The influence of the radical right on hate crime perpetration is theoretically complex. Permission to hate promotes the idea that hate crimes are an expression of power dynamics where White communities want to maintain positions of power and privilege and use hate crimes as a means of further marginalising minority groups. This influence could be experienced directly by those who are members of extremist groups and political parties. Alternatively, the radical right could exploit tensions after high profile terrorist events to increase either direct participation in their activities, or to extend their ideology to individuals who are not formally associated with their organisation.

This chapter provided an overview of the framework of permission to hate, detailing how opportunity structures for hate crimes operate. Perry (2001) states that hate groups aim to constrain and punish ethnic minorities who try to move from their submissive position in the societal hierarchy. This is in line with the permission to hate thesis, which focuses on environmental factors such as action or lack of action by state and political actors, including the police. Examples of this include: the prominence of anti-immigrant rhetoric signalling that xenophobia is acceptable; the lack of police responses to groups gives them a sense of impunity; and the existence of regions with histories of being unwelcoming to minorities which continue to be so. These blur the line between the extreme and the mainstream.

In the UK, the radical right political parties and organisations exploit the ways in which minority communities are portrayed in the media and how they are often framed within mainstream political discourse. This is often manifested as legitimising discriminatory actions towards these communities and the belief that hostilities towards them are accepted. As the radical right echoes these sentiments and frames them within a rhetorical framework where minorities and Muslims specifically are seen as threatening British culture, they can capitalise on perceptions that not enough is being done to protect the country from this threat. Whilst not all those who perpetrate hate crimes are official members of these political parties and organisations, they could still be influenced by their divisive ideology.

More recently, perpetration of hate crimes has also been motivated by high profile events, and the way in which the aggressors have been portrayed in the news. The radical right capitalise on such increased tensions by characterising these events as examples of how Islam threatens the Western and British way of life. Therefore this thesis theorises how the rhetoric and actions of political elites, including the police, can embolden those without power to follow suit through their thoughts and their actions, resulting in radical right support and hate crime.

Chapter 5:

Research Design

This thesis aims to address the research question: what are the ways in which the radical right influence racially and religiously aggravated crimes? This will be achieved by firstly testing quantitatively whether there is a relationship between the presence of radical right organisations and the level of hate crime recorded in an area. It will then go on to explore qualitatively the ways by which these organisations may influence hate crime when they are active in an area. Thus, I employ a mixed-methods approach which incorporates both qualitative and quantitative methods to generate an account of the role the radical right plays in hate crime perpetration across England and Wales.

There is no conventional or established methodology used in hate crime research, although qualitative methods have been the most frequently used. The majority of the research literature provides qualitative accounts of how victims understand their victimisation (Zempi and Chakraborti, 2014; Mason-Bish and Zempi, 2018; Hopkins et al., 2017; Ray, Smith, and Wastell, 2004; Gadd, Dixon, and Jefferson, 2005). Some examples of the methods used in these qualitative studies include in-depth interviews and focus groups with hate crime victims (Gadd et al., 2005; Mason-Bish and Zempi, 2018; Hopkins et al., 2017), transcriptions and the analysis of previously conducted interviews (Ray et al., 2004), content reviews of the criminal histories of perpetrators of hate crime (Dunbar et al., 2005), and the analysis of police case files (McDevvit et al., 2002). This body of qualitative research has been instrumental in developing an understanding of the emotional and physical impact of hate crime. However, this research does have a shortcoming as it has not enriched our current understanding as to why these crimes are committed.

Research Design

The research question addressed in this thesis is: *what are they ways in which the radical right influence the perpetration of racially and religiously motivated crime in England and Wales?*

When used in combination, quantitative and qualitative methods complement each other and allow for a more robust analysis, taking advantage of the strengths of each approach (Green, Caracelli, and Graham, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Green and Caracelli, 1997; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Additionally mixed-methods and sequential approaches have been used in other hate crime studies, including Perry and Scrivens (2019) and Vergani and Navarro (2020). My thesis collects, analyses and integrates quantitative and qualitative data to create a comprehensive understanding as to how the radical right influence hate crime (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Creswell, 2005; Bryman, 2006). The aim of this mixed-methods approach is to use the qualitative methods to elaborate and clarify the findings of the quantitative analysis (Greene et al., 1989: 259).

The research question has to be addressed using a sequential mixed-methods research design. Before the influence of the radical right can be investigated, this thesis must first identify whether there is a statistical correlation between the presence of radical right groups and the level of hate crime in areas of England and Wales (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007). Accordingly, quantitative analysis uncovers the different effects that both of these measures of radical right presence have on hate crime. This contributes to the theoretical framework permission to hate as it tests both the electoral success and protest activities of the radical right. Additionally, the quantitative analysis identifies the variables that account for higher levels of hate crime, including crime rates and demographic factors. This is followed by a qualitative exploration into the causal mechanisms as to how and in what ways the radical right influence hate crime.

The quantitative methods allow for a large scale exploration into whether there is a correlation between the presence of the radical right in an area and the level of racial and religiously motivated crimes perpetrated. This helps to identify any trends that are evident in the data. However, the quantitative data can only identify the variables that are correlated with the level of these crimes and cannot identify the causal mechanisms or explain why there may be differences between areas. But these correlations do provide context for the more in-depth qualitative approach which will explore the mechanisms by which the radical right may influence racial or religiously motivated crimes when they are active in an area. Therefore,

both quantitative and qualitative methods are necessary in order to answer the research question.

Whilst the quantitative data covers a wide geographic area, there are issues with the level of detail it is able to provide. The data used in this thesis was at the lowest aggregate level currently available, which is the local authority. Whilst this allows for a detailed analysis and an exploration into some variation in hate crime, it is still limited. It is not able to provide detail into how hate crime varies geographically within these local authorities, or the precise role the radical right plays in their perpetration. Consequently, this data cannot aid our understanding in terms of where these crimes are concentrated within local authorities and how they are dispersed across smaller, more localised areas. A connected issue is that this data cannot tell us which communities experience comparatively more hate crimes and are more impacted by the activities of the radical right. These issues are remedied in the qualitative chapter by the inclusion of interviews, media coverage of protest events, and analysis of the websites of EDL and Britain First. These provide more detailed analysis into how areas may experience the presence of the radical right and hate crime differently. Therefore, these methods provide an account of how radical right activity can encourage hate crime perpetration.

The quantitative data is relatively rich and detailed, and the way in which it is recorded by the police is highly standardised. Additionally, this study explores both racially and religiously aggravated crimes as they are typically analysed together in England and Wales due to the way they are recorded. However, this data suffers from an underreporting problem which produces some bias (Lantz, Gladfelter and Ruback, 2017; Zaykowski, 2008). Additionally, it is difficult to know whether this bias is across all regions equally, or whether it is more acute in some regions compared to others. This is addressed in part by the qualitative methodology in the subsequent chapters. The interviews and media analysis capture more accurately the differing experiences of hate crime across different communities and the targeted presence of the radical right. These methods also allow for further investigation into the ways in which the radical right might exploit localised tensions to encourage engagement with their events and promote the perpetration of hate crimes.

Case Selection

There is extensive literature examining hate crime perpetration in North America. This ranges from explorations into the characteristics of the perpetrators (McDevvit et al., 2002; Dunbar, 2003; Dunbar and Crevecoeur, 2005; Lantz et al., 2017) to the contexts in which hate crimes occur (Gladfelter et al., 2017; Lantz et al., 2017; Pezzella and Fetzer, 2017; Cunningham, 2017; Ciobanu, 2019; Drakulich et al., 2019). There have been a number of studies which have explored the possible link between the presence of hate groups and hate crime in the both the USA and Canada (Ryan and Leeson, 2011; Mullholland, 2011; Adamczyk et al., 2014; Mills et al., 2017; Perry and Scrivens, 2017, 2019). Up to now, however, no similar study has been carried out in the UK.

The handful of studies investigating this link in the USA have produced conflicting findings. Research by Ryan and Leeson (2011) found there to be no relationship between hate groups and hate crime, whilst the works by Mulholland (2013) and Adamczyk, Chermak and Freilich (2014) found there to be some relationship between the presence of right-wing hate groups and the perpetration of hate crimes. This inconsistency is likely a result of the differing levels of the data used in the analysis. The association was more evident at a lower aggregate level and was less clear at a higher aggregate level (Clayton et al., 2016). Accordingly, this thesis will focus on the local authority as this is the lowest aggregate level that the data is available, in order to investigate whether there is a link between the presence of the radical right and the level of hate crime in England and Wales.

In the UK, hate crime research is predominantly qualitative, using focus groups or interviews in order to gain a deeper understanding of the harms hate crimes cause to the victims and their communities (Chakraborti et al., 2014; Lumsden et al., 2018; Allen, 2015; Hopkins et al., 2017). There have been a range of quantitative studies in the UK, including investigations into the experience of disability hate crimes (Macdonald, 2015), whether the level of hate crimes increased after terrorist attacks (Hanes and Machin, 2014), the determinants of racial and religious harassment and reporting (Dustmann et al., 2004; Clayton et al., 2016), the

experience of hate crimes in the aftermath of Brexit (Burnet, 2017; Cuerden and Rogers, 2017; Devine, 2018), and the characteristics of the perpetrators (Iganski et al., 2011; Jollifee and Farrington, 2019). As noted in these studies, the England and Wales have rich hate crime data due to the consistent and standardised way in which the police forces record them. However, due to devolved powers, not all of the nations record the crimes in the same format. For instance, Northern Ireland and Scotland use different recording criteria compared to England and Wales. As such, this thesis will focus on England and Wales due to the comparability of their police recorded data. Despite the richness of this data, however, relatively few hate crime studies have utilised them. Of these studies, many have obtained the data via FOI requests for specific areas (for example, Hanes and Machin, 2014), or have benefitted from special access to the reported data by either the police or a specific TPRC (for example, Macdonald, 2015). This study is the first to use the hate crime data as it is officially published by the Home Office to look at hate crime across England and Wales between 2009 and 2018. Additionally, the potential link between hate groups or the radical right in an area and the level of hate crime experienced has been underexplored within the UK, as has the official hate crime data as recorded by the police across a wide geographic area.

The Quantitative Approach

The scope used in the quantitative analysis is limited to local authorities within England and Wales. The crime data recorded in these two countries are directly comparable due to the shared reporting criteria of their police forces. There are 353 local authorities in England and 22 in Wales, which are located within 43 police force areas. The quantitative part of the thesis uses the crimes that are recorded by the police as having a racial or religious motivation as the dependent variable and will be taken from the Home Office. The resulting dataset is described as long as structured by local authority and year as the "data set has multiple entities [units], each of which has repeated measurements at different time periods" (Park, 2011: 1). This is in contrast to pooled cross-sectional data which samples different units at various time intervals. In this thesis the entities/units are local authorities, which are nested in Police Force areas, each with observations for each year in the dataset. As outlined above, this data unfortunately does suffer from an under-reporting problem. This makes it difficult

to know how accurately the hate crime data reflects the real-world experience of these crimes, or whether the issue of underreporting affects some regions more significantly than others, or whether it is universal across them. The data is however well standardised between the regions and allows for them to be compared.

To mirror the operationalisation of hate crime used in other studies (see Mulholland, 2011 and Ryan and Leeson, 2011), this thesis uses hate crime as a proportion of the total number of crimes reported as the dependent variable. The independent variables are taken from a range of sources. The population data is taken from the National Census, and the demographic data is taken from the Annual Population Survey. This was preferred to the National Census as the Census data would not vary each year as it is only taken every decade. By contrast, the population survey is taken on an annual basis and more accurately depicts the population changes within each local authority. The diversity variables are also be taken from the Annual Population Survey. They capture the proportion of the population born in the UK, as well as ethnicity variables including White, Black, Indian, and Pakistani. Economic variables include the employment rates and education levels as measured by NVQ levels 1-4 as well as other qualifications and no qualifications.

The approach of permission to hate is operationalised in different ways in order to capture the influence of the radical right in an area. The first measures the electoral support of radical right political parties, and is recorded as the percentage vote share of the following parties in the 2010, 2015 and 2017 general elections: the BNP, National Front, English Democrats, Britain First and UKIP. This data is taken from the House of Commons Library, and news outlet coverage of the electoral performance of the smaller political parties in the general elections. Therefore, there are years included in the dataset that do not have a corresponding election. In order to address the missing data this produces, a lagged vote share variable was also recorded. The third measure of the presence of the radical right records the street-based activity of the following organisations: English Defence League, Britain First, Pegida, Football Lads Alliance, Democratic Football Lads Alliance. This data is collected using LexisNexis to find news articles which reference the protests these groups organised and attended. The date and location are recorded in reference to the local authority in which the events took place.

The data is recorded as a continuous variable as a local authority could experience between zero and four protest events in a year.

Data Analysis

One of the problems with the official crime data is the lack of pre-existing datasets. Thus, a new dataset was created. The data is recorded at the local authority level, and records the police force that each local authority belongs to. This allows investigation into whether the relationship between radical right groups and hate crime is observable at both aggregate levels. The data analysis used for the quantitative section of the thesis includes a range of models to test the relationships between the variables. The first of these are bivariate correlations which provide an initial insight into the perpetration of these crimes within England and Wales which is then further explored through other quantitative models and the qualitative approaches. The analysis also includes fixed effects models which take into account the clustering of local authorities within police force areas, the police force areas themselves, to examine fixed effects. This is an appropriate method for panel data as it examines group unit effects (in this case the police force area), time effects (by year), or both in order to deal with heterogeneity or unit level effects that may or may not be observed (Park, 2011).

The assumption made by the fixed effect model is that the unit-specific effects are correlated with the independent variables. The model assumes that there is something within the unit that may impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables which needs to be controlled for. By making comparisons within the units and averaging those differences across all the units in the sample, each unit (local authority or police force area) acts as its own control (Allison, 2009). Therefore, the fixed effects approach controls for police force level heterogeneity and allows concentrating on the effect of the local authority level predictors. The model examines whether intercepts vary across group or time period, as the model imposes no restrictions on the relationship, whereas the random effects model assumes that all variables are uncorrelated. The random effects model could also be used with panel data, however, it was not chosen in this case due to the results of the Hausmann test. Additionally, multilevel

models were not used in this thesis, as they explain country level variation whereas fixed effects models provide controls for this variation. Consequently, fixed effects models are appropriate for analyses with a small number of units to examine the effect of individual level variables and to test if that effect is universal, whilst controlling for 'random noise' related to the police force level.

The fixed effects model controls for each of the stable characteristics or variables related to the units and eliminate potentially large sources of bias. Therefore, fixed effects methods completely ignore the between-unit variation and focus only on the within-unit variation. These methods remove the effect of those time-invariant characteristics so that the net effect of the predictors on the outcome variable can be assessed (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Another assumption of the model is that time-invariant characteristics are unique to the unit and should not be correlated with other unit characteristics. Each unit is different therefore the entity's error term and the constant (which captures unit characteristics) should not be correlated with the others (Torres-Reyna, 2007).

It must be noted that fixed effects models can have higher standard errors compared to other models. This is because the estimates use only within-unit differences, discarding any information about differences between the units. If predictor variables vary greatly across units but have little variation over time for each unit, then fixed effects estimates will be imprecise and have large standard errors. However, the between-unit variation is very likely to be contaminated by unmeasured unit characteristics. By focusing on within-unit variation, we can avoid contamination and are much more likely to arrive at unbiased estimates. Therefore, according to Allison (2009), there is a trade-off between bias and efficiency. Other methods such as random effects suffer from omitted variable bias, whilst fixed effects methods control for omitted variable bias by having units serve as their own controls.

Qualitative Methods

The findings of the models and correlations of quantitative models are developed further using qualitative methods. The prior quantitative analysis identifies whether there is a

correlation between the presence of the radical right and the level of hate crime. This provides the foundations for the qualitative investigations into the role the radical right plays in the perpetration of hate crime. The qualitative chapter uses a range of data sources. These include the media coverage of protest events, the website content of the English Defence League and Britain First, as well as interviews with Third Party Reporting Centre (TPRC) workers across the West Midlands.

The West Midlands was selected due to the ease of identifying TPRCs compared to other regions, combined with my previous engagement with TRPCs in earlier research. This approach is understood as 'convenience sampling', a nonprobability sampling technique whereby subjects are selected because of their accessibility to the researcher (Maxfield and Babbie, 2009). The sampling strategy also includes snowball sampling. This sampling technique is another non-probability method refers to participants that are recruited through referral from individuals who were contacts, who felt that a colleague or former colleague would have more accurate recollection of the protests in question. Any gap in the recollection of those being interviewed, or any bias in their responses will be balanced by the use of news coverage of the protests and the content of the websites of radical right groups. By using multiple data sources, it produces a rich qualitative account of the causal mechanisms linking the radical right and hate crime and to gain an understanding of role the radical right plays in the perpetration of hate crime at the local level.

The West Midlands is made up of six areas: Birmingham, Sandwell, Solihull, Dudley, Walsall and Wolverhampton. When looking at the diversity of the region from the National Census, on average 76% of the population of the West Midlands is White. Birmingham has the lowest proportion, with a White population of 60%, followed by Sandwell with 70%. Dudley has the largest White population with 90% followed by Solihull with 89%. Approximately 8% of the population of the West Midlands are Indian. Sandwell and Wolverhampton have the largest Indian populations making up between 12.4 and 14.6% of the population, followed by Coventry and Walsall. Dudley has the smallest Indian population with 1.7%, followed Solihull with 4.25%. Approximately 6% of the population in the West Midlands are Pakistani. Birmingham has the largest Pakistani population at 17.9%, followed by Sandwell, and Walsall.

Wolverhampton and Solihull have the smallest Pakistani populations at 1.6 and 2.4%. On average 4.6% of the region's population is Black, with Birmingham and Wolverhampton having the largest Black communities at 8.4 and 7.4%. Solihull and Dudley have the smallest Black populations of 1.7%.

In terms of the religious communities, 53.8% of the region is Christian, with Dudley and Solihull having the largest communities at 65%, and Birmingham the lowest at 46%. There is a small Buddhist community making up 2.2% of the region, and the Jewish community is 0.1%. The Hindu population is on average 2.2%, with Coventry and Wolverhampton having the largest communities at 3.6% and Dudley the lowest at 0.6%. Sikhs make up on average 4.3% of the population with Wolverhampton and Sandwell having the largest communities at 8.7and 9.1% of the population, and Dudley and Solihull having the smallest at 1.2 and 1.7%. Across the region, Muslims make up 12.2% of the population. Birmingham has the largest Muslim community at 21.8%, followed by Sandwell and Walsall with 8.2%; Solihull has the smallest community at 2.5%.

When looking at socioeconomic factors, Sandwell has the largest population with no educational qualifications at 20.5%, followed by Wolverhampton with 19.4%, with Solihull having the lowest with 7.75%. Sandwell also has the highest number of residents with other forms of qualification (this includes vocational or work-related qualifications, as well as non-UK/foreign qualifications) at 10.6%, followed by Birmingham, with Solihull having the lowest at 5.6% of the population. There is little variance in the number of residents with only NVQ level 1 qualifications, although Dudley and Wolverhampton have the highest with 14% of the population. Dudley also has the largest population with NVQ level 2 at 20% of the population followed by Walsall and Sandwell with 19%. There is also little variance for NVQ level 3. Sandwell has the smallest population with 16%, and Coventry has the highest with 20% of the population. Solihull has the highest population with NVQ level 4 at 38% of the population, and Sandwell has the smallest with 20%.

Data Collection

This thesis is theory testing as it expands the scope of the findings of the work of Perry and Scrivens (2019) to England and Wales. The qualitative section of the thesis achieves this by uncovering the ways in which the radical right influences the perpetration of racial and religious crimes in the West Midlands. Firstly, to address any potential bias and omissions from the interviews, the qualitative chapters also include the news coverage of protest events held between 2009 and 2018 by the radical right groups. This is achieved by including multiple local and national news outlets in order to address any political bias in the reporting. By using multiple sources, it allows for an in-depth study of the activities of radical right groups as covered in the media contributing to an accurate assessment of how they may encourage hate crime. This data is collected and analysed in a chronological manner. Additionally, data is taken from the websites of EDL and Britain First. These groups publish online articles intended to inform their current supporters of their activities and attract newcomers to join their cause (Gerstenfeld, Grant and Chiang, 2003: 30). By looking at how the groups frame the events to their supporters, the themes regarding motivational factors for the events themselves, and the locations they are targeting are uncovered. This produces a better understanding of how they promote and influence the level of hate crime based on where they are holding the event and the reasons for the event itself. This provides an understanding as to how these groups may encourage hate crime, and how their methods have changed over time.

There are limitations that need to be considered when looking at the website data of these groups. Mudde (2002) states that there is a difference between the internally distributed literature of a party and that which they display externally, as they are aimed at different demographics/audiences. This is especially true when it concerns radical right organisations, as the information available to the general public tends to have a more diluted message and rhetoric than that distributed amongst party members and core supporters (Mudde, 1995: 208). As the internet allows these kinds of extremist groups to have more control over their own public image, their websites may detail the motivations behind the protests which may be absent in the media coverage of the events (Gerstenfeld, Grant and Chiang, 2003: 40). The data taken from the websites of the radical right is treated as process data, and is analysed

alongside the data taken from the news coverage of the protests (Bergmann and Meier, 2004: 244).

In order to understand how the protests of the radical right were conducted, newspaper and online media data was also collected. This was done using LexisNexis to find articles in national and local newspapers that mentioned the radical right groups or their protests (Davidson and Berezin, 2018). This includes several national newspapers in the United Kingdom that span the ideological spectrum: The Daily Mail, The Sun, The Guardian, The Daily Mirror, The Independent, The Times, and The Telegraph, along with their Sunday editions. The local newspapers analysed included Dudley News, Birmingham Mail, Express and Star, and the Stourbridge News. To find articles mentioning the EDL, LexisNexis was queried using the terms "EDL" and "English Defence League". For articles mentioning Britain First, the query term "Britain First" was used but since LexisNexis makes case insensitive queries, the results often consisted of unrelated articles, for example those mentioning the first time a certain event happened in Britain. I filtered the results to retain those that contained the exact string "Britain First."

The qualitative approach also includes interviews with those who work in TPRCs in order to gather information about the local impact of the activities of the radical right. These individuals are able to speak about the local experience of hate crime, and the role the radical right plays in this. They have local knowledge for why there may have been a rise in hate crime in their area due to their positioning in TPRCs. The interviews uncover the areas in which these groups concentrated their activities, their motivations for selecting those locations, and how well attended and supported these events were. The respondents are selected based upon the TPRC status of their organisation and their location. Each police force in England and Wales has a list of the TPRCs that are active in the region available online. Some cater to specific ethnic/religious communities, some are more generic and service the community in which they are located. These individuals are able to report on the changing levels of hate crime and activity of the radical right within that area based upon what has been reported to them. Therefore, they are aware of the ways in which the radical right may be influencing

hate crimes, which was not possible to identify through the quantitative data. This creates a localised account of hate crime and how the radical right influence hate crime.

Participants are selected based upon the location of their institution. For example, a mosque was selected if it was located within one of the case study areas and had been given TPRC status. They are contacted by email with an invitation to interview, followed by additional email and telephone correspondence to arrange the interview. As the questions in the interview focus on observations they have about the local community, and not any practice that is internal to the organisation, there are no issues related to expectation of harm to the individual due to the selection of the participant. As the focus of this interview is the community and not the individual participating in the interview, a monetary incentive was not deemed necessary.

In total 26 interviews were conducted, and participants included religious organisations and community and cultural organisations that were registered as TPRCs. In total 137 organisations were registered by West Midlands Police as having TPRC status. However, after being contacted for this research, 45 of these organisations were no longer in operation, 24 claimed that despite being registered as a TPRC they had not recorded any hate crimes, and 16 were unable to participate in this study as they did not have any employees who could recall any protests held by the radical right. Of the remaining 54 organisations, 24 declined to participate, and 4 individuals withdrew their consent either before or after the interviews were conducted and therefore their interviews were not used in this research. Therefore, interviews were conducted with representatives of the 26 organisations: six in Birmingham, four in Coventry, five in Dudley, one in Sandwell and in Solihull, five in Walsall and four in Wolverhampton. The details of these participants and the organisations that they worked in can be found in the appendix.

The interviews conducted in this case study section of the thesis are semi-structured. They uncover the community experience of radical right protests and racially and religiously aggravated hate crimes at the local level. Semi-structured interviews were preferred as they allow for topic exploration and self-expression, and are therefore likely to facilitate the

development of an understanding of the respondent's perspective and experience, since they can be tailored to the individual and their responses (Esterberg, 2002: 87). The interviews are semi-structured as the same topics are discussed on each interview to make the data comparable. The topics covered: their personal recall of radical right protests, observable changes in the community in relation to the protests, the media coverage of the events, and local responses to the protests. However, the exact questions that were asked depended upon the responses given as respondents may cover topics related to the second question whilst answering the first. In this scenario, the second question was not asked to avoid the participants feeling they were repeating themselves.

The interviews were recorded via a phone application on a mobile device which is only used for the purpose of the interviews to prevent any data loss, and they were saved onto a password protected memory drive. Each of the recordings were saved under the date of the interview and not the participant's name. The interviews were then manually transcribed to avoid any mistakes that could arise in an automated method when participants have a range of regional and national accents. These transcripts were then be coded within NVivo according to the interview topics specified above, as well as identifying additional themes in the data, and changes over time.

The interviews were conducted either face to face, or via audio or video call, depending upon the availability and preference of the participant, as well as adhering to Covid-19 guidelines. Those that were conducted via the telephone lacked the ability of the interviewer to control the environment in which the interview takes place. As a result, compared to face to face or video call interviews, audio call interviews could be held in unsuitable environments with the interviewee being "visible" to those they work with, or those they are around at the time of the call (Opdenakker, 2006). The lack of in-person contact with virtual interviews is said to restrict the development of rapport and a 'natural' encounter (Gillham, 2005; Shuy, 2003). This can limit the quality and openness of the answers given due to the absence of visual cues which are considered to affect the depth of meaning that can be conveyed (Fielding and Thomas, 2008; Gillham, 2005). This also limits the ability to standardise the situation across each of the interviews carried out and the direct reactions that usually take place in face-to-

face interviews (Mann and Stewart, 2000). The distractions experienced by the respondents during the interviews held with all three methods included receiving other phone calls, interjections of spouses and colleagues to their responses, driving, and background noises. However, the effects can be diminished by using an interview protocol and by the awareness of the interviewer of this effect, and therefore are not considered to be problematic for this research (Opdenakker, 2006). The interviews conducted via audio call were between 31 and 55 minutes in length with an average of 42 minutes, video calls were between 45 and 82 minutes and an average of 75 minutes, and in person interviews were between 40 and 70 minutes and were on average 60 minutes long.

The project addresses non-maleficence by focusing on the community, not the individual participant in the interview questions, and assurances of anonymity in the data analysis. Autonomy is achieved by allowing potential participants the opportunity to refuse the invitation to interview, and to refuse to answer any of the questions. The possibility of cultural issues that may arise during the interview is negated through the use of audio or video calls as alternatives to the traditional face to face interview. This method minimises person-to-person interaction and therefore limits the occurrence of cultural or gender issues that may arise when attempting to conduct interviews within a place of worship which may not be an appropriate area for the interview to be conducted between individuals of different gender. As the religious leaders are based within the UK, it is expected that someone within the church, mosque, gurdwara or Hindu temple are able to conduct the interview in English. If this is not possible, an interpreter would be arranged.

To ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act, the names of the participants, or the name of the organisation they work for are not be included in the thesis to ensure that the data used is not personal data, and that it is anonymised. The quotations used in the thesis only contain anonymised identifiers (e.g. Interview 1 conducted with an Asian male working in Dudley), and not the name of the individual or the organisation to which they belonged. Confidentiality is offered and assured to each participant. Assurances have been made that the names of the individual or the organisation are not be included in the thesis as the results from the interview are not used to give an individual experience, but focus on the impact of

the protests on the local area. The interviews therefore are used to give an account of how hate crimes are experienced within that particular region.

Prior to the interview each potential participant was informed about the focus of this research, what the purpose of the interview with them is, how the interview will be recorded, how the data would be analysed and how it would be used within the thesis. They were also offered a copy upon completion. These considerations aided the participants to make an informed decision about whether to accept the invitation, to issue informed consent to participate, or to withdraw their consent at any point during in the project. In order to provide consistency between the different interviewing methods, verbal consent was sought from those participating in the interviews. This provided them the opportunity to ask any additional questions, and to ensure that they fully understood the remit of the interview and the research and therefore allow them to give their informed consent. They were then asked if they have any questions, and then to formally declare their consent. If they did not issue their formal consent, the interview was not conducted.

Data Analysis

The data from the media coverage of protest events, the published content by the radical right organisation, and the interviews with TPRC workers was analysed using process tracing and thematic analysis.

Process tracing is a research design in which processes are traced over time in a manner related to the theory. It has been used in theory development since the 1990s (Bukve, 2019: 130; Pettigrew, 1990, 1997). Process tracing builds a theoretically informed historical narrative by identifying and tracing causal processes over time (Hay, 2002: 47-8). This study looks at the radical right and hate crime over time, and therefore uses an approach which emphasises the process of change over time (Hay, 2002: 148). Process tracing provides inferential leverage, identifies and tests causal mechanisms, contributing to descriptive richness (Collier, 2011). The method reconstructs events to identify processes and mechanisms that would result in an observed outcome. An essential part of the process is

developing a timeline or narrative, and describing the different activities that have been carried out, outputs, changes, and external events that may have affected the change (White and Phillips, 2012). It is also important to set out what evidence would be expected if a hypothesis was true, and what would be expected if it was false (Oxfam, 2011).

Therefore, process tracing helps to develop hypotheses, generalisations and explanations about the chain of events that led up to the observable one (Bukve, 2019). Process tracing can be used in a mixed-method design to clarify whether the direction of causal influence is from the independent variable to the dependent variable, and to help assess whether any observed correlations might be spurious (Lieberman, 2005, 2009). In these ways, process tracing on the mechanisms hypothesised in statistical models can increase the confidence in the causal significance of the correlations identified in them. Process tracing can therefore be an important supplement to quantitative methodologies, which tend to show whether or how far a change has happened, but not always how or why.

There are four types of evidence for process tracing analysis: pattern, sequence, trace, and account. Pattern evidence is the predictions of statistical patterns, in this thesis, the pattern of hate crime. Sequence evidence is the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, the prediction that hate crimes increase after a radical right protests. The presence of trace provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists, such as coverage that a protest took place. Finally, account evidence is the content of empirical material, such detailed news coverage about how the protest was conducted.

A limitation to process-tracing is the problem of infinite regress in which an infinite series of entities governed by a recursive principle that determines how each entity in the series depends on or is produced by its predecessor (Bennett, 2010). King, Keohane, and Verba suggest that the fine-grained level of detail involved in process tracing can potentially lead to an infinite regress of studying ‘‘causal steps between any two links in the chain of causal mechanisms’’ (1994: 86).

While some influential works by methods scholars have argued that the ability of process-tracing to make causal claims is limited by low degrees of freedom (King, Keohane and Verba, 1997) methodologists widely reject that the "degrees of freedom" problem applies to research that uses process-tracing, given that qualitative research entails different logics than quantitative research (where scholars do need to be wary of degrees of freedom) (Bennett, 2010). However, not all data are created equal. With process tracing, not all information is of equal probative value in discriminating between alternative explanations, each line of evidence does not need to be examined in equal detail. It is possible for one piece of evidence to strongly affirm one explanation and/or disconfirm others, while at the same time numerous other pieces of evidence might not discriminate among explanations at all. What matters is not the amount of evidence, but the contribution to adjudicating among alternative hypotheses. (Bennet, 2010)

This thesis uses of the case study of the West Midlands to explore causal mechanisms that make up the core of permission to hate (Goertz, 2017). Statistical analysis alone cannot explain the patterns, as they provide little understanding of the actual mechanisms that help to identify the connection between causal factor (protests) and result (hate crime) (Bukve, 2019: 152). Goertz argues that case studies are needed to explore the mechanisms between cause and effect (Goertz, 2017). As this thesis looks at the protests and their impact on hate crime over time, it uses process tracing to trace and identify the interaction of causal processes and mechanisms that results in hate crime perpetration (Bukve, 2019: 149). This approach allows for the building of an empirical picture of change and advance theoretical assumptions on the process of change (Hay, 2002: 149).

The data was analysed chronologically to discover patterns in the different ways in which the radical right may influence hate crime through their protest events (Mayring, 2000). The analysis uses multiple cycles of categorising data as different themes and causal mechanisms are identified across the different data sources (Silverman, 2011). The data is then categorised according to the way in which the radical right influenced hate crime due to their presence in an area (Saldaña, 2009). Through the process of analysis these categories included the location of the protest, proximity to counter-protesters, tshe consumption of alcohol, and

deliberately provocative tactics. The categorisation of the data is a multistage process since the categories are refined as the data is analysed. This also helps to ensure there are no errors in the categorising of the data (Saldaña, 2009).

An advantage of thematic analysis is that it facilitates research into societal trends over time (Silverman, 2011). It is important to see not only how the protests may have changed, but also the different impacts the presence of these groups have had at the local level and how this may influence hate crime. A limitation of this method is that the events need to be covered by a media outlet, and the promotional website content needs to still be available to the public to view (Silverman, 2011). However, the inclusion of the interviews brings up any local activities by these groups that may not have received news/website coverage.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the mixed-method sequential research design that will be used within this thesis. It has outlined how the approaches fit together in order to provide a more detailed understanding as to the role radical right groups play in the perpetration of racially and religiously motivated crime in England and Wales. The chapters that follow use the official crime statistics available for England and Wales to investigate whether the presence of radical right political parties and organisations is associated with racial or religious motivated crimes. The findings from the quantitative models are then further developed through the qualitative approaches in order to uncover the ways in which these groups influence hate crime when they are present in an area. By combining these approaches, it is possible to gain a better understanding as to the role of radical right groups in the perpetration of racially and religiously motivated crime across England and Wales.

Chapter 6:

The Quantitative Data

This chapter uses a newly created dataset to explore whether there is a correlation between the presence of the radical right and the level of racially and religiously motivated crimes perpetrated. The theoretical framework of permission to hate predicts that hate crimes are perpetrated due to opportunity structures that are exploited by the radical right. This will be a basis for the more in-depth qualitative approaches in Chapter 7, which explore the ways in which the radical right may influence racially and religiously motivated crimes when they are active in an area. This chapter starts with a descriptive overview of the dependent, independent and control variables in the dataset. This is followed by fixed effects regression models which will examine the strength of the relationship between the variables. This will show whether there is a correlation between the activities of the radical right and the level of hate crime.

Drawing upon the permission to hate theoretical framework as outlined in Chapter 4, this chapter uses three separate ways of capturing the influence of the radical right in an area. The first is the street-based activity of radical right organisations. The second measure is the electoral support of radical right political parties, recorded as the percentage vote share of these parties in the 2010, 2015 and 2017 general elections for each local authority. The third measure is a lagged version of this vote share variable, where the vote share is recorded for the year of the election and the year succeeding it. It is expected that these measures will be positively and strongly correlated with the level of hate crime in an area, providing tentative evidence for the permission to hate theory. As this analysis cannot account for the causal mechanisms by which these groups influence hate crime, this will be explored further in the succeeding qualitative chapter.

The Dependent Variable

As discussed in the previous chapter, there are relatively few quantitative studies of hate crime, and there is no established way in which to operationalise it. This study takes two different approaches. It is not possible to look at the proportion of hate crimes that are categorised as racial or religious hate crimes due to the availability of data at the local authority level. Instead, the first dependent variable records the proportion of all crimes in a local authority that have a racial or religious motive. This way of measuring hate crime takes into account the crime rate of the local authority, as some will experience higher crime rates than others. Not all local authorities with high crime rates will also have high levels of hate crime, but some may. Therefore, it is useful to see the proportion of crimes perpetrated in an area that had a racial or religious motive. This can be depicted as: hate crime/all crime x 100. Multiplying the value by 100 is logical as it produces a percentage variable, however, it does mean that the resulting figures are small. When recorded in this manner, the mean is 0.07, and the range is from 0 to 0.244, as displayed in Figure 1 below. Further, Figures 2 and 3 below also show the distribution of hate crime, and hate crime as a proportion of all crime over time. These figures demonstrate that the rate of hate crime decreased between 2012 and 2013, before increasing and reaching a peak in 2017, before reducing in 2018.

Figure 1: Distribution of Hate Crime



Figure 2: Dependent Variable over Time; Figure 3: Hate Crime over Time





The Independent Variables

The Radical Right

The presence of the radical right is measured in three different ways. Two of these are vote share variables, and the third uses protest data. For the vote share variables, the following radical right parties are included: the National Front, English Democrats, Britain First and UKIP. The level of support for these parties was captured by their percentage vote share in each local authority in the 2010, 2015 and 2017 general elections, and was taken from the House of Commons Library. The level of electoral support for radical right-wing parties within the local authorities ranged from 0 to 34% of the vote share in a general election, and has a mean of 6.87%. Bivariate correlations were used to identify the strength of the association between the independent and control variables with either measure of hate crime. These are measured between -1 and 1. This has a negative bivariate correlation of and -0.23 with the dependent variable. Therefore, where there are higher levels of support for these parties, there are lower levels of hate crime, however this is not a particularly strong relationship. This is a surprising result as it is counter to the assumptions of permission to hate that when radical right groups are present or supported in an area, there are higher levels of hate crime.

As the presence of these parties, and the effect of their campaigning, does not disappear as soon as the elections are over, a lagged vote share variable is also included in the dataset. Here, the vote share is recorded for the year of the election, and for the years until the next election. For example, the vote share of radical right parties in the 2015 election is captured for the year 2015, and also for the year 2016. This is necessary in order to take into account the lasting effect of electoral campaigns after the election has taken place, and to address the missing data that is created when only using the election data for the year the election was held. This lagged variable also has a negative and weak correlation of -0.16 with the dependent variable. As with the above vote share variable, this does not support the assumptions of permission to hate as where there are higher levels of support for radical right

parties, there are lower levels of hate crime in the years of general elections and the year following.

The protest events organised and attended by radical right organisations (English Defence League, Britain First, Pegida, Football Lads Alliance, Democratic Football Lads Alliance, and National Action) were also recorded as another measure of radical right activity and influence in an area. This was done by using Lexis Nexis to search for the events being organised by these organisations. These events included demonstrations, protests and organised leafleting. Each organisation name was used as a search term, and only news articles which covered the protest events were included. As noted in the Research Design chapter, selection bias was mitigated by using a range of newspaper sources from smaller local news outlets to larger national broadsheets. In total, there were 111 protest events held by radical right organisations between 2009 and 2018 in the areas under study and reported in the media. This variable was coded as a ratio variable with 0 being recorded for areas without any protest event that year, and 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 for the number of protest events that were held in an area within one year. Therefore, this variable has a range of 0 to 5 and the mean is 0.06. This variable has a positive correlation of 0.17 with the dependent variable, and does support the assumptions of permission to hate. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the range in the protest events and vote share variables.

Figure 4: Distribution of Radical Right Vote Share; Figure 5: Distribution of Protest Events held by the Radical Right



Tables reports the bivariate correlations of the radical right variables and the dependent variable.

Table 1: Bivariate Correlations. Dependent Variable and Radical Right Variables

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Hate Crime as Proportion of Crime	1.000			
(2) Protest Events	0.168***	1.000		
(3) Radical Right Vote Share	-0.229***	-0.025	1.000	
(4) Lagged Radical Right Vote Share	-0.158***	0.086***	0.018	1.000

**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Ethnicity Variables

The ethnicity variables are taken from the Annual Population Survey, and capture the proportion of residents who are Indian, Pakistani, Black and White. Each of these is recorded as a separate variable, measured as values between 0 and 100%. There is between 24.3% and 100% of the population of an area identifying as White, with a mean of 90.5%. This has the strongest bivariate correlation of -0.5 with the dependent variables compared to the other ethnicity variables, meaning that areas with larger White populations experience lower levels of hate crime. Between 0 and 87.8% of the population identifies as being Indian with a mean of 2.1%, and this had a positive correlation with the dependent variable. Therefore, areas

with more Indian residents experience more hate crime. For Pakistani, the range is 0 to 35.5% of the population and the mean is 1.76%, and has a positive correlation of 0.32 with the dependent variable. This means that areas with larger Pakistani populations also experience more hate crime. Between 0 and 25.5% of the population of an area identifies as being Black, with a mean of 2.05%, and it has a positive correlation of 0.38 with the dependent variable. Therefore, areas with more Black residents experience more hate crime. This correlation is stronger than both the Indian and Pakistani bivariate correlations, which indicates that, whilst permission to hate largely focuses on Islamophobia and hate crime perpetrated against Asian victims, we also need to consider how it applies to Black communities. The bivariate correlations provide some initial support for permission to hate as areas with larger White populations experience lower levels of hate crime. However, where there are larger Indian, Pakistani, or Black populations, there are higher levels of hate crime. The distribution of these variables is displayed in Figures 6 to 9 below.

Figure 6: Distribution of White Ethnicity; Figure 7: Distribution of Indian Ethnicity



Figure 8: Distribution of Pakistani Ethnicity; Figure 9: Distribution of Black Ethnicity



Table 2 displays the bivariate correlations of the ethnicity variables and the dependent variable.

Table 2: Bivariate Correlations. Dependent Variable and Ethnicity Variables

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Hate Crime as Proportion of Crime	1.000				
(2) White	-0.464***	1.000			
(3) Indian	0.311***	-0.751***	1.000		
(4) Pakistani	0.315***	-0.677***	0.374***	1.000	
(5) Black	0.382***	-0.799***	0.394***	0.368***	1.000

**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

The Control Variables

Socioeconomic Variables

Socioeconomic conditions are used as control variables in the regression models and are taken from the Annual Population Survey. They record the unemployment level, size of the male population, and education variables for each local authority for each year. The variable which captures the level of unemployment in an area ranges from 0.87 to 18.5 and has a mean of 5.87%. Unemployment has a positive and weak correlation of 0.06 with hate crime

as weighted by the population, so where there are higher levels of unemployment, there are higher levels of hate crime. Here, where there are higher unemployment levels, there are lower levels of hate crime. The variable that captures the size of the male population has a range of 43.7% to 54.9%, and has a mean of 48.8%. This has a positive and weak correlation of 0.17 with the dependent variable, and so where there are higher male populations, there are higher levels of hate crime. The distributions of these variables are illustrated in Figures 10 and 11 below:

Figure 10: Distribution of the Unemployment Level; Figure 11: Distribution of the Male Population



The bivariate correlation of these variables and the dependent variables are below in table.

Table 3: Bivariate Correlation. Dependent Variable, Unemployment and Male

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) Hate Crime as Proportion of Crime	1.000		
(2) Unemployment	-0.06***	1.000	
(3) Male	0.167***	0.012	1.000

**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Education is measured through six variables. Each of these variables are measured as the proportion of the population that only have that specified qualification level. This allows for the education levels of an area or a population to be tested as a predictor of the level of racial and religiously motivated crimes perpetrated within an area. These education levels are categorized by NVQ levels 1-4, no qualifications attained, or other form of qualifications. NVQ

level 1 is the lowest level of education gained and is the equivalent of GCSE grades D–G. NVQ level 2 is the next highest and is the equivalent of GCSE grades A*-C. The equivalent for NVQ level 3 is having reached AS and A levels, and for NVQ level 4, which is the highest category, the equivalent is Higher Education certificate. Each of the variables for NVQ levels 1, 2, 3, 4 and other qualifications range from 0 to 100% of the population.

The variable which captures the proportion of the population without any qualifications varies from 0 to 74.7%, with a mean of 8.33 and positive correlation of 0.48 with the dependent variable. These correlations are very weak. However, they show that when there are more residents without any qualifications, there are higher levels of hate crime. The percentage of those with other forms of qualification varies between 0 and 28.4% of the population with a mean of 6.25%, and positive correlation of 0.24 with the dependent variable. Therefore, where there are more residents with other forms of qualification, there are higher levels of hate crime. The percentage of those with NVQ level 1 has a range of 1.2% to 29% of the population and a mean of 12.16 and has a negative correlation of -0.25 with the dependent variables. For those with NVQ level 2, the data ranges from 5.3% to 32.5% and has a mean of 17.9%. It has a negative correlation of -0.23 with the dependent variable. For NVQ level 3, the range is between 7.9 and 34.3, there is a mean of 20.2%, and a negative correlation of -0.36 with the dependent variable. The bivariate correlations show that areas with higher levels of residents with NVQ level 1-3 qualifications experience lower levels of hate crime. Finally, NVQ level 4 has a range of 10.2 to 71.5 and a mean of 35%. This has a positive correlation of 0.24 with the dependent variables, and so, where there are more residents with NVQ level 4 qualifications, there are higher levels of hate crime. These are depicted in Figures 12 to 17 below:

Figure 12: Distribution of those with No Qualifications; Figure 13: Distribution of those with Other forms of Qualification



Figure 14: Distribution of those with only NVQ Level 1; Figure 15: Distribution of those with only NVQ Level 2



Figure 16: Distribution of those with only NVQ Level 3; Figure 17: Distribution of those with NVQ Level 4



The bivariate correlations of these variables and the dependent variables are below in Tables 4:

Table 4: Bivariate Correlations. Dependent Variable and Education Variables

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Hate Crime as Proportion of Crime	1.000						
(2) Other Qualifications	0.242***	1.000					
(3) No Qualifications	0.048***	0.327***	1.000				
(4) NVQ Level 1	-0.251***	0.026	0.250***	1.000			
(5) NVQ Level 2	-0.225***	-0.098***	0.128***	0.456***	1.000		
(6) NVQ Level 3	-0.361***	-0.243***	-0.014	0.295***	0.304***	1.000	
(7) NVQ Level 4	0.237***	-0.244***	-0.563***	-0.735***	-0.693***	-0.544***	1.000

**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

The Fixed Effects Model

The linear regression models are helpful for identifying which variables may be determinants of hate crime. However, it is not the most appropriate method for this data as it fails to take into account the fact that the data is hierarchical and panel. According to Park (2011), a panel data set is one that contains entities that are measured at regular time intervals. In this thesis, the entity is local authority, and the observations are measured at regular year intervals. This data also has two levels with the local authority as level one, which are contained within larger geographic areas of police force areas, level two. Therefore, as this data uses the same units that have multiple observations over time, it can be classified as panel data, and is most appropriately analysed by using the fixed effects regression model. With fixed-effects models, variation is contained within units (e.g., local authority or police force area) to minimize the potential for unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias (Allison, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, it looks at how a group may vary at any particular point from its own mean. Additionally, the fixed effects approach controls for level two heterogeneity, other factors and 'random noise' related to the higher aggregate level (police force area), and allows concentrating on the effect of the lower level (local authority) predictors. The fixed effects

model will be used to model within-unit variations over time. The fixed effect model was chosen over a random effects model due to the results of a Hausman Test[1].

The theoretical framework of permission to hate predicts that when radical right organisations are present in an area, there are higher levels of hate crime. As this theory has not been widely tested, there is no established convention as to how it should be operationalised in quantitative studies. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter will use three different variables to capture the presence of the radical right. In the first column the only radical right variable included is the one which records the number of protest events that took place in that local authority in that year. The second column includes this protest event variable, as well as the percentage vote share received by radical right parties in each local authority in a general election. The third column also includes the protest event variable, as well as the vote share received by radical right parties which is recorded both in the year of a general election, and the years after. By using these three different means of operationalising the presence of the radical right, the regression models will identify whether there is a link with hate crime.

Each regression table contains three models which vary in the number of observations they include. The first model in each table has the highest number of observations at 2309, as this model includes data from each year of the dataset, and therefore does not have any missing years. This model uses only the radical right protest events as a measure of the activity of the radical right in an area. The second model includes the protest events and the electoral results recorded for that year. There are three general elections in this dataset, and so this model only includes the data for those three years. Accordingly, these models have 765 observations as they only include the data recorded for those three years. The third model in the regression tables includes both the protest events, and a lagged vote share variable for the radical right. As this includes the data not only for the year a general election took place, but also for the years after, until the next election, this model include 2309 observations.

[1] The Hausman tests had p-value of 0.02 for model 1, a p-value of 0.03 model 2, and p-value of 0.01 for model 3. In each instance, the null is rejected, and therefore the fixed effects model is most appropriate for the data

permission to hate being focused around anti-Muslim and anti-Asian prejudice, it also needs to include prejudice against Black communities.

Counter to the bivariate correlation, unemployment now has negative correlation with hate crime when it is weighted by population, and is significant at the .001 level. Only the variables capturing the population with no qualifications and NVQ level 2 are consistent in the direction of their association with hate crime, and the only one to be significant is NVQ level 2, when the lagged vote share variable is included in the model.

Fixed Effects Models Clustered by Police Authority

In order to address the issues raised in Ryan and Leeson (2011) and Mulholland (2013), where the level of analysis was key in understanding the relationship between hate groups and hate crime, the fixed effects model was run by clustering the data according to the level 2 variable, police force. Three models were run, the First, with only the radical right protest variable, the second with the protest and vote share variables, and the third with protest and a lagged vote share variable. The resulting models have consistent R^2 values of 63%, thus they explain approximately 63% of the variation in hate crime.

Table 5: Fixed Effects Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Radical Right Protests	0.00890***	0.00891***	0.00881***
	(4.77)	(4.78)	(4.69)
Radical Right Vote Share		-0.0000134**	
		(-2.81)	
Lagged Radical Right Vote Share			-0.000435*
			(-2.54)
Male	0.00121*	0.00119*	0.00128*
	(2.49)	(2.43)	(2.52)
Unemployment	0.000217	0.000174	0.000276
	(0.72)	(0.58)	(0.89)

Indian	0.00150***	0.00151***	0.00146***
	(9.32)	(9.40)	(8.66)
Pakistani	0.000573***	0.000579***	0.000547**
	(3.34)	(3.39)	(3.15)
Black	0.00143***	0.00144***	0.00140***
	(6.26)	(6.31)	(5.98)
Other Qualifications	0.000303	0.000275	0.000308
	(1.17)	(1.06)	(1.14)
No Qualifications	0.00111***	0.00111***	0.00118***
	(5.05)	(5.07)	(5.20)
NVQ Level 1	-0.000173	-0.000147	-0.0000687
	(-0.86)	(-0.73)	(-0.33)
NVQ Level 2	-0.00124***	-0.00125***	-0.00124***
	(-7.11)	(-7.17)	(-6.86)
NVQ Level 3	-0.000152	-0.000157	-0.000144
	(-0.86)	(-0.90)	(-0.79)
Population	-5.52e-09	-6.31e-09	-5.73e-09
	(-0.89)	(-1.02)	(-0.90)
Constant	0.0213	0.0237	0.0182
	(0.85)	(0.94)	(0.69)
N	2309	765	2309
Within R^2	0.628	0.630	0.630

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Across the three models, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between radical right protests and the level of hate crime, each with similar sized coefficients. When there is an additional protest event in a police force area, hate crimes increase by between 0.0082-0.0083%.

As levels of protest events increase, the levels of hate crimes increase by 0.0088-0.0089%. In contrast, there is a negative and significant correlation between the vote share of the radical right parties and hate crime. The election variable capturing vote share on election years demonstrates that when there is increased support for these parties, there is a reduction in the rate of hate crime by 0.00001%. When this variable is lagged for the years in-between

protests, the coefficient is stronger, and so increased support for these parties reduces in the rate of hate crime by 0.0004% .

The contradictory relationship between party support and protests in relationship to hate crime can be explained with the consideration that the variables are measuring different people. As the voting variables include UKIP voters, many of whom are on the moderate and conservative side of the radical right spectrum compared to the BNP. As UKIP experienced more electoral success compared to the other radical right parties in this period, the voting variables are skewed towards the more moderate supporters. In comparison, the protest variable captures groups such as the EDL and Britain First who engage in more direct protests which directly result in extreme actions like violence. As such, these different variables capture different types of people, with protest supporters more likely to engage in violence compared to the more moderate party supporters.

The proportion of the male population is positively associated with hate crime and is significant. Thus when there is an increase in the number of males within a police force area, the rate of hate crimes increases by 0.001. This supports assumptions of permission to hate that hate crimes are used a means for white males to continue to maintain privileged societal positions compared to minorities.

All of the ethnicity variables, are significant when compared to the size of the White population. When the Indian population increases, hate crime increases by 0.0015. When the Pakistani population increases by a percent compared to the White population, hate crime increases by 0.0005-0.00058. Finally, when the comparative size of the Black population increases, hate crime increases by 0.0014. According to these models, hate crime increases when there is an increase in the proportion of ethnic minority residents compared to those who are White. These findings fit with the assumptions of permission to hate that hate crimes are committed where there are higher levels of ethnic diversity.

Only two of the education variable have a significant correlation with hate crime, when compared to those with NVQ level 4 qualifications. The proportion of residents with no

qualifications has a positive association with hate crime when compared to those with NVQ level 4. As the number of those without qualification increases compared to those with NVQ level 4, the number of hate crimes increase by 0.001. In contrast, the proportion of residents with NVQ level 2 qualifications when compared to those with NVQ level 4 has a negative correlation with hate crime. Therefore, when there is an increase in those with NVQ level 2 in an area, hate crime reduces by 0.0012 across the models. According to the assumptions of theories such as relative economic deprivation, it would have been expected that there would be a clear association between those with no qualifications and NVQ level 1 and hate crime. However, the findings of the regression model indicate that whilst there is a positive association between no qualifications and hate crime, there is a negative association between those with NVQ level 2 qualifications and hate crime. This finding would indicate that more research could be undertaken to explore further the causal mechanisms that underpin this association.

Discussion

The regression table presents some interesting results. The positive associations between the size of the male and ethnic minority populations support the assumptions of permission to hate that hate crimes are performed by White males within a racialised societal structure to maintain their favourable positions.

The radical right protests had a positive association with hate crime and were statistically significant. This gives support to the permission to hate thesis as there is a positive correlation between where these protest events were held and the level of racial and religious hate crime in an area. While we need to be very careful about imputing causality from the preceding data analysis, it nonetheless seems that there is something about the protest events that may encourage or facilitate the perpetration of hate crime. We do not yet know whether the events encourage hate crimes by those attending the protests against local residents, or whether the events heighten local tensions and result in an increase in hate crime. This needs to be further explored in the qualitative analysis in the following chapters.

However, the data analysis also demonstrated that there is a negative link between electoral support for radical right parties and the level of racial and religious hate crime in an area, regardless of the way in which it was operationalised. Therefore, according to these findings, protest events have a different and opposite impact on the level of hate crime than electoral support of radical right parties. Whilst the latter does seem counter to the permission to hate thesis, it was not the only measure of radical right presence. The discrepancy between the two measures of radical right presence in an area indicates, although does not conclusively demonstrate, that there is a difference between those who participate in protest events and those who support radical right parties. However, it could be that those who attend the protest events are more inclined to participate in hate crime compared to those who participate in electoral politics. Those who attend the protests may not be as engaged in electoral politics and, as such, they are not exposed to the electoral messages of radical right political parties. As this is consistent across all the regression models, the following qualitative chapter will take a different approach and drill down into the local communities to uncover whether the protest events of the radical right engender racially and religiously motivated crime.

As the explanatory power of the regression models ranges from 63% hate crimes may be influenced by factors not included in the data. Therefore, the quantitative data used in this chapter cannot identify short term or longstanding local tensions between communities. This data also does not include how terrorist events, trials and high-profile news stories, or local issues, may influence the level of hate crime in an area (King and Sutton, 2013). Additionally, the data cannot capture how the radical right may exploit local tensions between communities, or indeed certain news stories, to promote a permission to hate and justify hate crime (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Therefore, the way in which local and national events are covered by the radical right, how they are framed by them, and the reasons for their holding of protests in certain areas, will be explored in the next chapter.

Chapter 7:

What explains hate crime? A Qualitative analysis of Radical Right Protests in the West Midlands

This chapter will build upon the quantitative results in Chapter 6, which found a statistically positive correlation between the presence of radical right protests in an area and the level of hate crime, but which was unable to identify the causal mechanisms underpinning the relationship. This chapter looks at how the protests by the English Defence League (EDL) and their offshoots, and Britain First have impacted upon the level of racial and religiously motivated hate crimes between 2009 and 2018. These were the dominant radical right organisations operating in the West Midland during this time.

This will be achieved using qualitative methods to investigate the causal mechanisms behind how the radical right influence the perpetration of hate crime. It will go on to uncover when the protests took place, how they were managed, and the level of disturbance, through the use of process tracing, news articles sourced from LexisNexis, and more detailed arrest data from Freedom of Information (FOI) requests. Interviews were also conducted with twenty-six individuals, due to their roles within Third Party Reporting Centres across the West Midlands. These ranged from places of worship to community centres and local charities. As the individuals were not in their roles during the whole timeframe, or have accurate recollection of the early events, thus the majority of their interview data is included in later protests.

This chapter is structured chronologically in order to trace the progression and potential evolution of the EDL's protests over time. Using this method, it will look at the ways in which the protests of the EDL contributed to permission to hate and the level of racially and religiously aggravated offences, and also at whether the effects of the EDL were consistent or varied over time. The data will be used to test whether there were increases in hate crime locally following radical right protests, as well as uncovering the role that the role of the police, alcohol consumption, protest locations, and antagonization of local communities played in the impact of these protests.

The protests were largely reactionary responses to the following: Islamic extremist-inspired acts of terror; court cases involving Muslim grooming gangs; plans for new mosques; and Brexit. Each protest was in turn designed to provoke violent responses from Muslim communities. It also covers the tactics used to provoke reactions, the emergence of new groups, the continued attempts to develop a veneer of legitimacy, and the responses within and by the communities affected that lead both to permissions to hate and hate crime.

Overview of the West Midlands

The West Midlands has been a prominent venue for anti-minority and radical right sentiments. In April 1968, Enoch Powell made his now infamous "Rivers of Blood' speech in Birmingham, setting the tone for subsequent anti-minority protests in 1977, the National Front held a violent rally in Birmingham, and in the same year the party won 8.2% of the vote in a by election in Stechford (BBC News, 13th August 2005). More recently, the British National Party contested a number of local Council and Parliamentary seats in West Midlands during the 2000's.

In the 2000 local elections the BNP obtained 23% of the while the National Front polled 10% in Sandwell. In 2001, the BNP contested 4 seats across the West Midlands, polling 4.7% Dudley North, 4.5% West Bromwich West, 3.4% Birmingham Hodge Hill, and 2% Coventry North East. In the same election, the National Front polled 2.2% in Erdington and 2% in Wolverhampton South East. In 2004, the BNP contested 24 seats in Birmingham, one in Coventry, 4 in Dudley gaining 32.2% of the vote, 2 seats in Solihull gaining 25.9% of the vote, and 7 seats in Walsall (HC Library Research Paper 04/49).

Dudley had experienced racially motivated violence towards the Black and South Asian communities in 1962 during a period of industrial strokes. The violence began after a black man allegedly drank from a white man’s pint in mistake, which triggered further disturbances, including groups of white men roaming the town centre looking for ethnic minorities to attack.

There were four riots in Birmingham prior to 2009 that helped to establish the city as having a history of hate, providing an attractive venue for the EDL's early protests. Three of these took place in the same place, Handsworth, a racially diverse part of the city with one of its highest unemployment rates, with the first taking place in 1981. The 1981 riot took place over three days in July, taking place shortly after riots in London, and at the same time as riots in Liverpool and Manchester (Scarman Report, 1981).The riots began after a Police Superintendent was attacked after trying to dispel rumours of an impending National Front march. This culminated in widespread property damage, 121 arrests and 40 injured police.

Further riots ensued in 1985 following the arrest of a man and a police raid in Lozells following the arrest of a man and a police raid on a pub in the area during a period of racial tension, tension with the police and high unemployment. This resulted in attacks on police, property, alongside looting and firebombs culminating in two deaths, two missing persons, 35 injuries, and 45 shops looted and burnt. In 1991 the third riot took place in the city after a power cut which sparked a looting spree affecting hundreds of shops, houses and cars. Finally, in 2005 riots took place in Lozells and Handsworth as a result of ethnic tensions between the Caribbean and British Asian communities. The riots were sparked by an alleged gang rape of a teenage black girl by a group of South Asian men. Whilst the allegations were never substantiated, they resulted in the deaths of two men. Coventry experienced riots in 1992 after police began to confiscate off-road motorbikes from local youths. The riots began in Wood End area of the city before spilling out into Bell Green and Willenhall. The ensuing violence saw the torching of a school, shops being looted, with one being petrol bombed, resulting in 16 arrests.

2009

In their first year of operation, the EDL held three events in Birmingham across consecutive months. The impact each event had on the region escalated concurrently with each event. Their first protest in July received little local or national media attention and consequently

has largely been forgotten in official accounts and research into the EDL's activities. The limited information that was available revealed some racist graffiti was found following the event. However, there were no additional details around local disturbances in connection to the protest (Elkes, 9 Sept 2009; Coysh, 10 August 2009). Therefore, according to the process tracing methods there is only trace evidence of the protest, making it difficult to build a precise picture of how many attended, the exact location, or the influence this protest had on hate crime in the region. Birmingham City Councillor for Aston, Ayoub Khan, claimed that the EDL's first protest in July had been "brushed away" as there were no rival protesters to provoke trouble (Elkes, 9 September 2009).

This initial protest established what Perry and Scrivens describe as an enabling environment for hate in Birmingham, and thus offer support for the permission to hate thesis (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). That environment was first established during the EDL's initial event in July, as the absence of a formal counter-protest and the prominence of locals in the crowd, asserted Birmingham as being sympathetic to the EDL. These factors indicated that the city offered an appropriate enabling environment for both hate groups and hate crimes to flourish, as predicted by the permission to hate thesis, and gave the EDL confidence to return twice more in 2009 (Perry and Scrivens, 2019).

The EDL returned to Birmingham in August and September, characterised by disturbances, violence, and media attention. These two protests had similar features which resulted in increases in hate crime. This included the EDL's collaboration with known football hooligan firms, increasing their capacity for violence, the protests took place in Birmingham city centre where the EDL confronted counter-protesters. The EDL protesters provoked local Muslims resulting in clashes between the two groups, however the Muslims were blamed for the disorder rather than the EDL.

The Role of Hooligans

One of the contributing factors for the violence not only in the August and September protests, but during the formative stage of the EDL's development was their deliberately

recruitment of football hooligans known for violence (Copsey, 2010; Booth and Jones, 12 August 2009). This was particularly pertinent as the August protest had been prompted by the conversion of an eleven-year-old white boy in Birmingham by the radical Islamist group Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (Allen, 2011; Richards, 2013). The EDL affiliated themselves with Casuals United, an organisation of former football hooligans who were described in news reports as wanting to "fight Jihadists in the community" (Hamilton, 8 September 2009). Additionally, the EDL collaborated with their more established counterpart, the Welsh Defence League, alongside loyalist Irish paramilitaries, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) (Goldby, 25 October 2009). Weyman Bennett, the joint secretary of United Against Fascism (UAF), said that the recruitment of these “foot soldiers” from the football scene would encourage potentially explosive protests against Islamic extremism across Britain (Booth and Jones, 12 August 2009). The MP for Perry Barr, Khalid Mahmood raised concerns about what this meant for the violence during the protests:

> "The EDL are becoming more dangerous […] they've proved they want to incite violence and hatred. They're teaming up with a paramilitary group to entrench themselves in a campaign of violence and they should be banned from marching on our streets” (Goldby, 25 October 2009).

In accordance with permission to hate, the collaboration with organisations known for the hooliganism and criminal tendencies of their supporters increased the capacity of the event to include disorder and violent behaviour as well as hate crime (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). As these groups do not have a strict members-only structure in terms of their organisation or activities. There is a fluidity of supporters between different groups over time, and in their propensity to attend events of multiple groups. The combination of these groups attracted supporters from across the country through this loose network and increased the turnout compared to the July event. Previous studies established that the opportunities for violent conflict provided by EDL demonstrations played an important role in attracting members, particularly those with a football hooligan background (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016; Treadwell and Garland, 2011).

Protest Location

The August and September protests were characterised by questionable police tactics, including facilitating alcohol consumption by the EDL. This had two key influences on the behaviour of EDL supporters on protest days. Firstly, it prolonged the presence of the group in the protest location, increasing the exposure of local residents to the rhetoric of the group. Secondly, the inebriation of supporters increased the likelihood of provocative behaviour and violence towards the counter-protesters. Both of these will be consistent themes throughout EDL protests.

Few details were published regarding the August protest, However the EDL headed towards the Bullring shopping centre in the city centre at 7pm where the UAF were holding a rival protest, resulting in clashes between the groups (Coysh, 10 August 2009). These were significant enough that as a result the City Council urged West Midlands Police to ban the EDL and stop them holding a protest in September (Tyler, 24 Aug 2009). The police tried to restrict attendance to 250, limit the duration of the protest to two hours, and prevent the use of sticks for holding signs to reduce the impact the protest would have on the city (Elkes, 4 September 2009). Additionally, the Home Secretary granted an order banning the protesters from the area around the Bullring shopping centre where the violence had erupted in August (Guardian, 6 September 2009). However, these measures did not limit the disruption caused by the protests.

One of the significant contributing factors to the level of disorder seen in the September protest was the role of alcohol. This started with EDL supporters meeting ahead of the protest in the Figure of Eight pub on Broad Street in the city centre, and their reluctance to move from this pub to the protest site (Bradley and Greatrex, 6 September 2009). Local MP for Perry Barr, Khalid Mahmood, lamented the failure of the authorities to prepare for the violence: "why weren't the EDL escorted by police away from the city centre and why were these people allowed to get drunk before the protest?" (Haste, 7 September 2009). The demonstrators eventually left the pub at approximately 2pm and headed across the city centre to their allocated protest site at Lancaster Circus (Kerbaj, 7 September 2009).

Additionally, around 70 members of the EDL, some brought along bulldogs with the intent to intimidate others, then made their way to Victoria Square where a group of 30 counter-protesters had gathered to confront them (Bradley, 6 September 2009; Cowan, 7 September 2009).

Whilst West Midlands police stated that the August protest was largely attended by locals, the September event was largely attended by those from outside of the city, with some travelling from Luton and Bristol (Cowan, 8 Sept 2009; Elkes, 4 September 2009). Protesters were willing to travel from other parts of the country to attend the protests as they provided access to violence, group solidarity, and increased self-worth (Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2017). Therefore, the benefits of attendance outweighed the costs of time and money to get there as well as the unwanted police attention and stigma, resulting in well-attended demonstrations (Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2017).

The Provocation of Muslims

Neither the EDL leaders or supporters had a coherent plan of how the group's street-based protests would achieve its anti-Muslim goals (Marrow and Meadowcroft, 2019). Similarly, while the EDL claimed that their protests were to raise awareness against radical Islam, in reality "there was little discussion or knowledge of the particular issue about which awareness was being raised in advance of the national demos" (Pilkington, 2016: 38). This suggests the opportunity to participate in violence as the main motivation for attendance.

The counter-protests by local Asians and Muslims also contributed to the disorder at these early demonstrations. Their reactions created a veneer of legitimacy for the EDL's anti-Muslim rhetoric, justifying the EDL's future protests in the city. The police chief blamed the Muslim communities for the violence and for allowing themselves to be provoked by the EDL. It was the culmination of these factors that resulted in an increase in racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded in the months during which the protests were held.

The EDL provoked local Muslims through the use of provocative signs carried by some supporters, alongside screamed insults against Allah and Islam (Bradley, 6 September 2009). The signs had inflammatory statements such as “Islamic Extremists Out” and “Make Britain Safe” in a deliberate attempt to inflame local community tensions (Kerbaj, 7 September 2009). The use of signs demonstrated a failure on the part of police to protect the Muslim community from exposure to offensive and provocative slogans. Slogans such as “no more mosques” did little to further arguments against ‘radical Islam’, but were designed simply to be derogatory towards the wider Muslim community, and to provoke outrage. Birmingham City Councillor for Aston, Ayoub Khan, noted that the chanting of anti-Muslim slogans provoked the desired responses from Muslim communities in the city (Savage, 8 September 2009). These outbursts of the EDL were met with little response by the police.

The close protest sites in August resulted in clashes between the EDL and local Muslims, resulting in 35 arrests. There was sparse detail in these reports as to how Muslim youths came to be involved – whether they were in the counter-protest or were locals who had been provoked, how many of the 35 arrested were members of the EDL, and how many were Muslim youths. The majority of the arrests were for public disorder rather than for racially and religiously motivated offences.

The September protest culminated in clashes involving 200 people involving the counter-protestors made up of the local Asian community and local left-wing anti-fascist groups, Asian youths and EDL supporters shouting anti-Muslim chant (Booth, 7 September 2009; Cowan, 8 Sep 2009; Walker, 17 November 2009). Additionally, gangs of White, Black and Asian youths were described in reports as throwing bottles and glasses at the EDL (Goldby, 25 October 2009). While it was not clear in these reports whether these individuals were part of a specific group or if they were locals who had been provoked by the EDL, their presence contributed to the level of civil unrest and violence that ensued on the day. The disorder was also directed at the police who were pelted with bricks as they struggled to contain and curtail the violence (Goldby, 25 October 2009; Bradley, 6 September 2009). In total 90 people were arrested during the September protest, all males aged between 16 and 39, with many reported to be local to the West Midlands (Collins, 7 September 2009). However, arrest figures for August

and September do not include the arrests that followed CCTV appeals by the police as these took place after the protests, and so would not be recorded as taking place during the week or the month of the protests. The offences included criminal damage, violent disorder and possession of an offensive weapon.

The clashes between the groups involved both antisocial behaviour and the perpetration of racially and religiously aggravated violence (Elkes, 9 September 2009). However, instances of racially and religiously aggravated violence were not disclosed in the media coverage of the event, nor in media updates regarding the arrests of protesters. The media only reported arrests for anti-social behaviour, violence, possessing a weapon, and public disorder (Branagh, 6 September 2009; Coventry Evening Telegraph, 7 September 2009). The Chairman of Birmingham Methodist Church, Rev Bill Anderson, lamented the impact of the protests on the city: "Their sole aim is to create tension and to intimidate and provoke the people of Birmingham with racist and Islamophobic abuse" (Elkes, 4 September 2009).

Attribution of Blame

Shahid Malik, the MP for Dewsbury and the minister responsible for preventing extremism and encouraging good community relations, surprisingly placed the blame for the disorder on the local Muslim community, claiming they had let themselves be "provoked" (Walker, 17 November 2009). He went on to say:

> "The English Defence League has one primary objective, which is to provoke a reaction. It's perfectly reasonable to protest against them peacefully but if people are provoked into doing more than that, then the English Defence League win" (Walker, 17 November 2009).

A police source, who did not want to be named, claimed that the involvement of Muslim youths in the September protest flared tensions and created a flashpoint (Savage, 8 September 2009). This source also claimed that:

> “It was only when the young Muslim lads got involved that tempers flared and there was a flashpoint. From our point of view, that made things far more difficult than they needed to be" (Savage, 8 September 2009).

This placed the blame for the disorder was on the Muslim counter-protesters for being provoked, rather than on the EDL for their conduct at the event. As, by responding to the EDL with violence, these Muslim youths provided the EDL with a level of legitimacy. The depiction of Muslims as the cause of disorder could be used to encourage a negative view of these communities. It could also be a means by which Muslims, or those believed to be Muslims, are subjugated and dehumanised, and thus deeming crimes committed against them as justifiable (Mythen et al., 2009).

Birmingham City Councillor for Sparkbrook Salma Yaqoob, raised concerns about how the response of Muslim youths was presented, and how the Muslim community were held responsible for reacting to a deliberately provocative protest, whereas nothing was done to prevent the protests from taking place:

> "[T]he 'just stay away' message we are hearing won't wash with today's Muslim youngsters who won't put their heads down and carry on walking when they are subjected to racist taunts. They will react and fight back” (Tyler, 24 August 2009).

Some of the blame for the reaction of the Muslim population was directed specifically at the chairman of Birmingham Central Mosque, Dr. Naseem, with the police calling his behaviour “inflammatory” (Savage, 8 September 2009). He was described in media reports as encouraging race riots after stating that Muslims had a right to stand up to the EDL protests and encouraging them to attend events to express the Islamic community's solidarity (Savage, 8 September 2009; Kerbaj 7 September 2009). Dr. Naseem justified his statement by arguing that the presence of Muslims was an important signal to the EDL "that the community has got a sense of cohesion". He also blamed the police for the disorder due to their poor handling of the protest: "If it was kept as originally intended, then everybody would have had a chance

to give vent to their feelings without coming into contact with each other" (Kerbaj, 7 September 2009).

Media Coverage

There was significantly more news coverage of the September protest compared to the previous ones. Those interviewed for this study felt strongly that the media attention given to the protests influenced the perpetration of hate crime. One interviewee who worked at a community centre that was registered as a Third Party Reporting Centre for hate crime commented that "these gatherings get more attention and airtime by the media than they deserve and as a result people feel more threatened by them" (Interview 18 conducted with a White male working in Wolverhampton)[2]. They argued that media coverage promoted both the EDL and the ideology that they espouse, which encouraged controversial behaviour by supporters and in turn attracted further media coverage and crime.

Media coverage is therefore problematic as it extends the reach of the EDL's ideology to those sympathetic to their cause towards those who may not be as aware of the group, or attended its protests. The coverage can normalise the attitudes and behaviour of sympathetic but unaffiliated ideologues, encouraging them to perpetrate aggressive behaviour towards ethnic minorities in the form of hate crime.

Hate Crime

The cumulative effect of the events held in consecutive months in Birmingham contributed to an observable effect on hate crime as August and September showed increases in the number of racial and religious crimes recorded. The combination of hooligans, close protest sites, alcohol and the resulting clashes contributed to the EDL protest in August coinciding with a small increase in racial and religiously motivated hate crime reported in the West

[2] More information regarding the individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this research can be found in the appendix

Midlands of 122 compared to 116 in July. There was an increase of 50% recorded the week following the protest (from four to eight). Whilst this effect is small, it demonstrates that despite the EDL being relatively new to the region, their protests were impactful on the local community. Similarly, the September protest saw an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences, from 5 the week before, to 9 the week of the protest, and 15 the week following. When looking at the monthly data, there was a minimal increase in the level of racially and religiously aggravated crimes compared to August – from 122 to 124. This gives some support to the claim that the repeated presence of the group in the city has had an impact in the hate crimes recorded. Through this repeated presence, and the use of chants and banners, the EDL were able to establish ways to successfully provoke Muslim communities.

The August and September protests both exhibited the same pattern, beginning with the collaboration with football hooligans. The protests began with the EDL protesters' alcohol consumption, and city centre protests sites that were close to the UAF's counter protest locations. This resulted in not only confrontation between the protesting groups but also local Muslims who were provoked by the EDL. However, it was only the local Muslims who were blamed for the disorder as opposed to the EDL.

Despite their collaboration with groups known for violence, the EDL claimed the September protest and resulting fracas proved that Birmingham was too violent, and they would no longer hold any events in the city (Walker and Cowan, 18 September 2009). This declaration was an attempt by the EDL to avoid being established as the instigators of disruption and violence. It allows them to conceal the attraction of EDL supporters to attend protests for the opportunity to engage in violence, and to instead present the local community as the cause of the problems. However, the EDL returned to Birmingham multiple times, with the city becoming a prime protest location for the group as a platform for support and media attention.

2010

In 2010 the EDL managed to build upon the image they established in Birmingham by embedding themselves in the region, expanding into Dudley and Wolverhampton. This growth allowed the group to utilise the protests to attract new supporters and cultivate their local support network. Despite efforts by the police to separate the sites of the protesting groups throughout the year, the EDL were able to break away from their protest to confront counter-protesters. The opposition to the EDL was made up of local Asian and Muslim groups, giving credence to the anti-Muslim rhetoric of the EDL, further justifying their protest, as seen in Birmingham in 2009. The EDL became more threatening to Muslim communities using a purpose-built mosque and holding multiple protests to establish them as a meaningful target. Therefore, keeping the protest sites apart did not eliminate violence from the events, nor did it remove the desire of the protesters to engage in violence. Their activities also coincided with increased levels of racially and religiously aggravated crimes in the region, with each protest having significant impact on the region.

The Dudley Mosque

The protests in Dudley demonstrated two things. Firstly, they were a shift from protesting against radical Islam to a local issue of a proposed new purpose-built mosque. This garnered the EDL local support by focusing on an issue that was pertinent to some local residents in Dudley. Secondly, by reaching out into new areas, the EDL further targeted mainstream Muslim communities.

The issue of the Dudley mosque first arose in July 2009 when the Dudley Muslim Association (DMA) won outline permission for a new purpose build mosque, as the two existing mosques no longer had the capacity to cater to the Muslim congregation (Henwood, 5 March 2010). The plans for the mosque included a dome, minaret and community centre to serve the needs of the local Muslim community. The initial drawings connected to this proposal were the focus of early local opposition due to the size of the dome and minaret, which would overshadow the nearby Grade II listed St Thomas' Church.

The erection of new mosques is often framed by the radical right as a symbolic incursion, a sign that Islam is 'taking over', or that the Muslim community is given special treatment (Pilkington, 2016). Radical right groups are concerned with policing "spaces for races", to which the emergence of new places of worship for minority communities, including mosques, is central (Perry and Blazak, 2010). These groups then use verbal and physical assaults towards minorities when they are perceived to threaten the racialised boundaries which exist to separate "us" and "them" (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Dudley was no exception to this, with the EDL claiming the new mosque would foster Islamic extremism, and threatened to visit the town every month until the plans were withdrawn or overturned (Henwood and Bradley, 2 April 2010). This was a deliberate attempt to leverage the community tensions and disorder that their presence would cause. This was a concern, as the legacy of the EDL's violent protests in Birmingham in 2009 were still fresh in the minds of residents. The claims of extremism were unfounded and ignored the fact that Dudley had a Muslim community for 30 years, and two mosques.

The EDL's focus on the proposed mosque allowed them to try and capitalise on local sentiments, especially as local complaints that their objections over had been ignored by the council aligned with the EDL's anti-Islamic and anti-establishment rhetoric (Allen, 2013). Although less prominent, the local opposition also focused upon religious differences and how the erection of a new mosque would not fit with the Christian character of that area (Allen, 2013). This provided the EDL the opportunity to attempt to integrate and position themselves as championing local issues and frame them within the broader landscape of anti-Muslim and Islamophobic messages with an aim of exacerbating inter-community tensions within Dudley, and garner local support (Allen, 2013). They hoped that these local tensions could motivate local support at their upcoming protest alongside their loyal supporters whose motivation to attend was more strongly linked to the possibility of violence. However, this local opposition was not as prominent or as vocal as was assumed by the EDL, as there were alternative means to oppose the plans for the mosque beyond merely protesting (Dudley News, 10 March 2010). In fact, the EDL's involvement was criticised by Dudley Council's deputy leader Councillor Les Jones, who said their actions "have hindered very delicate negotiations" (Chadwick, 4 May 2010).

The Protests

Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council were unable to ban the protest, or impose unfavourable environmental factors for the EDL. Instead, they resorted to imploring the EDL to cancel the event, and for locals to ignore the protests via public notices (Henwood, 5 March 2010). This use of public notices was an attempt to deny the EDL any claims of demonstrating on behalf of local residents. They were also a means to try and to prevent Dudley from earning a reputation of supporting the EDL's ideals, and to deter them from returning to the city by removing a potential local support network.

The police modified their approach to the EDL – preventing them from congregating in pubs ahead of the event, and separating the protest and counter-protest times and locations. For the first protest, 2,000 EDL supporters congregated on the Dudley Southern Bypass, with riot police surrounding one of the main routes into the town centre (Greatrex, 4 April 2010). At 2pm they marched northwards before funnelling into their planned protest site in the Constitution Hill car park – on the opposite side of the town centre to their UAF rivals. This separation of sites, combined with reports that locals stayed out of the area, limited the violence accompanying the event (Sunday Mercury, 4 April 2010).

The second protest was unorthodox, as 40 EDL supporters protested for 24 hours on the rooftop of a factory on the site earmarked for the mosque within a residential area of Dudley. The leaders of the EDL suggested that the protesters had enough food and water to stay inside the building "for weeks" (Chadwick, 4 May 2010). To further inflame tensions, protesters flew an Israeli flag and played Islamic-style chanting in an attempt to mimic the call to prayer that would be heard by locals if the mosque went ahead (Chadwick, 4 May 2010). The protest ended with the arrest of two masked campaigners and eight others by police wearing riot gear and wielding tasers (Chadwick, 4 May 2010).

To the frustration of the local council, the EDL returned to Dudley again in July. The council were consistent in statements that the EDL and their non-peaceful protests were not

positively contributing to local issues (Dudley News, 17 July 2010; Dudley News, 16 August 2010). In total 900 police officers from neighbourhood forces were drafted in for the event, outnumbering the 500 EDL supporters. However, trouble flared when a group of EDL supporters attempted to break through police lines, throwing cans, bottles and bricks resulting in clashes with officers in riot gear and EDL protestors (Stourbridge News, 21 July 2010). Councillor Anne Millward for Gornal Ward said: "Yet again this group of outside extremists have shown they are incapable of demonstrating peacefully and have brought public disorder and violence to our town" (Stourbridge News, 21 July 2010). In total, 21 were arrested during the protest, including 17 for violent disorder, two for affray, one for a public order offence and one for possession of an offensive weapon (Stourbridge News, 21 July 2010; Dudley News, 17 July 2010). Other offences on the day included criminal damage caused to cars, residential homes, restaurants and a Hindu Temple (Stourbridge News, 21 July 2010).

Provocation of Locals

Many EDL supporters used similar tactics to those in the 2009 Birmingham protests to provoke local aggression. Once the EDL had been escorted to their town centre protest location during their first protest, the police created a ring of metal fences to contain the protesters and prevent any spill-over of disorder (Greatrex, 4 April 2010). However, violence soon ensued as a section of the EDL crowd tore down the metal fences and threw them at the police (Greatrex, 4 April 2010; Daily Star, 4 April 2010). In addition to the aggression towards the police, EDL protesters started fighting their own stewards who were trying to deescalate the situation (Daily Star, 4 April 2010). The attempts were unsuccessful as approximately 400 EDL supporters broke through their protest site barriers to confront the UAF supporters, who were leaving their “carnival against racism” event held with local inter-faith groups (Henwood, 5 April 2010; Stone, 5 April 2010; Greatrex, 4 April 2010). This resulted in five for possessing offensive weapons, two for public order offences and two for criminal damage (Greatrex, 4 April 2010). Joint secretary of UAF Sabby Dhalu said:

> "The events in Dudley showed the real face of the EDL. They are a group of organised fascist football hooligans looking for trouble, who broke past heavily policed lines. The EDL were trying to provoke a reaction. They didn't get one" (Stone, 5 April 2010).

This signalled the success of the local council's public notice in discouraging residents from attending and denying the EDL a sense of legitimacy or representing local grievances. It must be noted that whilst the police consider the arrest numbers and the destruction to be limited, that does not mean that the protest had little impact, as there is a correlation between the protest and hate crime.

Another provocation tactic included holding signs reading "No one wants this mosque", "Labour forcing mosques on Britain", and placards reading "Muslim Bombers off our streets" and "say no to the mosque" (Stone 5 April 2010; Daily Star, 4 April 2010). They also brandished the St George flag while playing the national anthem (Usherwood, 3 April 2010). The actions of the EDL during the rooftop protest sought to encourage hate crimes by those in attendance and to provoke the local Asian community (with supporters vandalising Asian-owned shops and harassing Asian drivers). This resulted in the EDL being pelted by stones thrown by local Asian youths, and consequently one was arrested (Nousratpour 4 May 2010). Both the UAF and the DMA criticised the police for ignoring the EDL's law-breaking, including acts of incitement of religious and racial hate (Nousratpour, 4 May 2010). UAF spokeswoman Sabby Dhalu accused the EDL of a "deliberate attempt to provoke Muslims and cause violent confrontation, potentially a riot […][and] encouraging thugs on the street to engage in racist violence" (Nousratpour, 4 May 2010).

The Influence of Hooligans

The EDL refuted news reports of their supporters being the instigators in the violence during their first protest. Instead, they alleged they had first been pelted with bricks, causing the group to surge forward and break down the steel barriers (Sunday Mercury, 4 April 2010). The EDL did not specify who they believed threw these bricks, nor was this claim verified in

media reports. In a further attempt to minimise the EDL's responsibility for the violence and to refute the conception of them as the instigator of trouble and violence, the group claimed that their protest had been hijacked (Sunday Mercury, 4 April 2010). There was some support for this claim as news reports specified that football hooligans including members of Birmingham City's Zulus and West Bromwich Albion's Section Five attended the EDL's event with the aim of instigating violence (Greatrex, 4 April 2010). Cheryl Pidgeon, regional secretary of the Midlands TUC stated,

> "We know that this group includes football hooligans and racist thugs who are intent on causing trouble. Their claim to be protesting against radical Islam has been shown to be a fraud […] they quickly descend into exposing their hate for all Muslims" (Stourbridge News, 3 April 2010).

The involvement of football firms is consistent with the assumption of permission to hate, as it supports the assertion that the inclusion of their members increases the violent capacity of the protest. This is in addition to the EDL's association with other groups such as Casuals United and Welsh Defence League. Their involvement also highlighted the fluidity of protest attendance. Individuals are able to attend one protest and not another, attend every protest in their region, or attend every protest nationwide and travel specifically to attend these events. This informal support means that there is no way to verify if the attendees were all EDL supporters, allowing the EDL to deny responsibility for the actions of any individuals who cause disruption or violence. Specifically, the events featured public disorder, and violence directed at police and towards counter-protesters, culminating in arrests.

As a result, the EDL's presence in Dudley was reported in papers as being reminiscent of the community fractions and violence caused by the National Front in the 1970s (Bayliss, 18 April 2010). However, as far as their leader Tommy Robinson was concerned, the local disruption to businesses or councils was irrelevant; the EDL wanted their voices to be heard and he believed that they would be thanked in the long run (Bayliss, 18 April 2010). This attitude was a digression from the expectations of permission to hate and suggests that the EDL were not solely concerned with protesting in areas where they believed they had local support. Instead,

they were acting on behalf of White communities that they believed were at risk of Islamic encroachment, irrespective of whether this was perceived or wanted by the local community.

Hate Crime

Each of the protests in Dudley had a correlation with hate crime. For the first protest, there with an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded in the week following the protest from 40 to 52, and a further increase to 54 recorded two weeks after the protest. This is also seen in the monthly data as there was an increase in the total number of arrests in April compared to March, from 290 to 314. There was an increase from 48 racially and religiously aggravated offences the week before the rooftop protest to 60 the week of the protest. This was also seen in the monthly data as May saw a small increase in the level of racially and religiously aggravated hate crimes compared to April, from 314 to 318. There was also a lagged effect for both protests culminating in an increase in these crimes to 322 in June. This lagged effect is a result of the EDL holding two protests in quick succession that were designed to maximise community tensions and establish the mosque as a more divisive issue than it had been previously felt by residents. There was a stagnation for the third Dudley protest as there was a minimal increase in the number of hate crimes recorded during that week from 46 to 47. Additionally, the July event saw a consistent level of racial and religiously aggravated crimes from June with both months having 332 crimes recorded.

Wolverhampton

In November, the EDL held an unplanned protested in Wolverhampton with 100 demonstrators, which it received comparatively little media attention, and no justification was given. Tensions unfolded at 11.40am when EDL supporters, many wearing masks and scarves, gathered in Bilston Street in the city centre (Express and Star, 22 November 2010). The group proceeded to chant and swear at passers-by whilst marching through the town, and later had to be contained by the police. Meanwhile an impromptu anti-EDL

demonstration was launched by around 40 people in Queen Square (Express and Star, 22 November 2010). This November protest had little impact on hate crime figures at either the daily or monthly level due to the EDL's limited focus on local issues, the lack of media coverage, and the lack of confrontation or clashes with local Muslim communities.

The protests in Dudley were more residential compared to the Birmingham protests the prior year. Whilst the protests also saw the absence of pubs as a congregation point for the EDL ahead of the protests. The EDL co-opted a prominent local issue to continue to cultivate local support. Whilst there were separated protest sites, the EDL were still able to provoke the local community coinciding in increases in hate crime. As three protests were held in quick succession, they provided opportunities for the police and the local communities to establish an unfavourable environment for the EDL. Whilst the council was unable to ban the protests, they attempted to signal that Dudley did not have a history of hate, or sympathetic views towards the EDL's rhetoric and ideology. The EDL were unable to entrench themselves in the city due to the police tactic of staggering the protest times of the main protest and the counter-protest, and holding them in separate sections of the city centre. This limited the opportunities for the two groups to provoke each other and to engage in violence. However, this did not prevent the EDL from provoking reactions from the local Asian communities or from their actions contributing to the level of hate crime.

2011

2011 was characterised by the decline of the EDL who were unable to fully capitalise upon a favourable environment due to internally inhibiting factors (Morrow and Meadowcroft, 2018). The decline was perpetuated by rivalries between regional EDL divisions, a resurgence of rivalries between football firms, and internal divisions within the nationwide organisation. Busher (2018) argued the EDL's decline was a result of being "at a tactical impasse" with many supporters being "sceptical about the value of flash demonstrations, leafleting, organising petitions and undertaking legal challenges against proposed Islamic buildings". The repetitiveness of their protests alongside the leadership's attempted crackdown on violence,

hooliganism and alcohol, alongside police tactics of moving their protest sites away from counter-protesters reduced the atmosphere and excitement of events (Mulhall, 2016). This resulted in a downward spiral of smaller protests, which increased internal tensions and infighting, resulting in many EDL activists forming their own groups or leaving the movement entirely (Mulhall, 2016).

Prime Minister David Cameron played a role in establishing favourable conditions for the radical right when he publicly criticised multiculturalism. Cameron claimed that some Muslim organisations were part of the wider problem of violence and extremism, and that some receive public money intended to combat extremism but do little effective with it (Bentley and Sinclair, 6 February 2011). Cameron's comments were consistent with the radial right's negative presentation of Muslim communities. Another potentially favourable factor for the EDL was the death of Mark Duggan, who had been shot by the police in Tottenham in the summer of 2011 which instigated riots across the country. Further, the summer of 2011 also saw a series of right-wing inspired acts of terrorism in Norway at the hands of Anders Breivik. Whilst the EDL condemned the actions of Breivik, and denied any knowledge of him, Breivik claimed to have attended an EDL protest in London in May 2010 (Morris, Hall and Blake, 26 July 2011). During this year the EDL held only two protests in the West Midlands, both in Birmingham, contradicting their 2009 pledge not to return to the city as it was too violent.

Riots erupted across the United Kingdom in response to the shooting of Mark Duggan in August by police in London. The riots in Birmingham were both divisive and violent, resulting in the deaths of three Asian men in Winson Green, who were killed trying to protect local businesses from Black looters (Meierhans, 6 August 2016). The incident sparked fears of a race riot in the city due to the level of social unrest. This was susceptible to being translated into EDL support as they looked to capitalise on social and racial tensions in areas with higher demographic diversity.

The decision of the EDL to hold protests in the aftermath of the riots was therefore seen as attempted conversion of local tensions into protest attendance and permission to hate. Labour councillor Waseem Zaffar, for Lozells and East Handsworth, one of the suburbs most

affected by the summer riots, wrote to Home Secretary Theresa May urging her to ban the proposed EDL march. Previous events had demonstrated that the presence of the EDL is associated with increases in vandalism of mosques and other places of worship, and assaults on both Muslims and police (Nousratpour, 4 February 2011). For example, at a demonstration in Nottingham, a pig's head was put on a stake alongside anti-Muslim graffiti on a site proposed for a new mosque (Henesey, 28 June 2011).

The EDL went on to hold two protests following the riots. The first protest was small scale involving a local Ahmadiyya Muslim book stall and Qur'an exhibition in Cradley Heath, a residential town in Sandwell where a group of EDL supporters abused and attacked the volunteers (Halesowen News, 17 October 2011). By protesting against a book stall catering to Muslim communities, the EDL were seeking to deny the community the legitimacy to be self-sufficient and to continue police the spaces that Muslim communities occupy. This is a central tenet of permission to hate, as radical right groups aim to maintain a societal hierarchy where minority groups are marginalised (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). However, Perry and Scrivens' (2019) account of permission to hate does not currently explain the impact of different types of activity of the radical right on hate crime, nor the impact of attendance. The volunteers did not react to the EDL's hostility, preventing the group from being able to once again paint Muslims as confrontational and violent. It may also explain why they did not replicate the tactic. Compared to other EDL protests, this incident at the book stall received minimal news coverage due to the limited confrontation, violence, and police activity, and consequently it had no effect the number of hate crimes reported.

The EDL held their second Birmingham protest ten days later. Despite the concerns about the timing, there was minimal media attention and low attendance of only 500 EDL supporters from across the country. This highlighted how despite the presence of environmental factors such as the post-riot tensions that had the potential to be translated into higher turnout, the EDL were unable to exploit it due to their decline.

The police moved the EDL's protest location from Victoria Square to Centenary Square in an attempt to avoid a repeat of the violent clashes in 2009, increasing the distance to the UAF's

counter-protest site in Chamberlain Square (Tyler, 27 October 2011). However, as the two squares were still in close proximity in the city centre, this change would not significantly reduce disorder. The likelihood of confrontation rose as 300 EDL supporters gathered outside the Brasshouse pub on Broad Street and refused to move (Tyler, 31 October 2011). Supporters were described in reports as having thrown glasses and fireworks at onlookers and police, before eventually moving to their protest site (Tyler, 31 October 2011).

Once the protestors arrived at their protest site three lines of police armed with riot shields, as well as a ring of steel stood between the UAF supporters and the EDL (Tyler, 31 October 2011). This demonstrated that the effort to move the protest sites was insufficient to separate the two groups which were still able to confront each other, and resulted in four arrests (Tyler, 31 October 2011). There was a small increase in the number of racial and religious offences recorded that week from 35 to 38, with a further slight increase the following week, to 39. Despite two events being held in the region in quick succession, and the presence of enabling factors from the riots, there was little impact on hate crime. There was a reduction in the number of racial and religiously aggravated crimes recorded in October when compared to September – from 255 to 233.

The EDL developed their activities from 2009, when they protested against radical Islam, to protesting against a purpose-built mosque in 2010, to confronting an Islamic book stall in 2011. The EDL attempted to create a local issue in Birmingham, related to a bookstall, however as this was not considered an issue locally, the EDL's actions had little impact. The protests were held towards the end of 2011 to capitalise on increased tensions in the aftermath of the riots after Mark Duggan's death, which had resulted in three deaths in Birmingham. The protest held in the aftermath of the riots saw the EDL congregate in a bar prior to the event, and protest sites moved to add some, but not much distance between the protesting groups. Despite the low attendance, the EDL were still able to clash with counter protesters coinciding in an increase in hate crime. However, the EDL were not able to fully capitalise on this momentum in the form of increased turnout or media attention on their events. The reduced presence of the group – their holding of only two events in the region in

2011 – and the minimal media coverage both locally and nationally that the events received, illustrates their decline, which would continue into 2012.

2012

The EDL's decline continued through 2012, with only one protest in the West Midlands. The sustained decline was a result of the creation of offshoot groups that formed outside of their network, namely the North West Infidels, North East Infidels, South East Alliance and Combined Ex-Forces.

In September the EDL held a protest in Walsall over what they claimed to be the Islamist manipulation of the Muslim community in the town, however no evidence was given to justify such claims. Once again, the protesting groups were kept apart by police, with EDL protesters contained in Leicester Street in the city centre, while the UAF event was held in Gallery Square. While the police response was initially minimal, more officers arrived as the EDL crowd grew to about 300. The UAF's event had the support of local MPs alongside, Muslim and Sikh groups and to presenting local unity to combat the EDL (Bradley, 29 September 2012). The counter-protest was peaceful, with the speakers urging the community to come together in peaceful protest against racism, to deny the EDL permission to hate (Greatrex, 30 September 2012).

Whilst the EDL protest was initially peaceful, supporters attempted to deliberately provoke Muslim counter-protesters and passers-by by tearing out pages from the Qur'an and burning a Pakistani flag (Warrilow, 16 December 2013). Additionally, they shouted abusive and racist chants, including "Muslim killers off our streets" and "Our Walsall will not be part of Pakistan" (Warrilow, 16 December 2013). These actions had not been reported in previous protests and demonstrate an escalation in their tactics to incite reactions from Muslims.

At around 2.30pm, the EDL directed their violence at the police when supporters charged at the riot police trying to hold them (Greatrex, 30 September 2012). The 800 police formed a

human barrier to try and contain the 500 EDL activists through the use of shields and batons. In retaliation, the EDL threw bricks, bottles and litter bins, resulting in 28 being arrested (Greatrex, 30 September 2012; Draycott, 4 October 2012). The conflict between the EDL and the police lasted an hour, while the town's bus station was temporarily closed to prevent any new protesters joining (Greatrex, 30 September 2012).

Whilst the police were focused on containing the EDL, around 20 masked Asian youths attempted to attack the back of the police line to get to the EDL (Greatrex, 30 September 2012). It was not clear in reports whether this group of youths were part of the counter-protest, or were locals who had been provoked by the EDL protest. This demonstrated that the tearing pages of the Qu'ran and burning a flag were successful in generating conflict. These antagonistic factors had a lagged effect on hate crime as there was an increase from September to October. Such a lagged effect can be explained by the EDL's protest being held at the end of September, meaning its effects were seen in October.

The EDL were in decline in 2012 and attempted to capitalise on a non-relevant local issue, however they still succeeded in provoking locals resulting in a lagged increase in hate crime. The EDL's single protest had a lagged impact upon the level of hate crime reported in the month following the protest. The large police presence that exceeded EDL numbers did not constrain the group, instead leading them to direct their violence towards the police. The EDL also engaged in provocative behaviour such as setting alight the Qur'an and the flag of Pakistan, instigating a reaction by Muslim groups, and heightening cultural tensions in the area. By provoking the local Muslim community, the EDL were again able to resurrect and exploit community tensions and permission to hate in the region. The strong response from the local community, counter-protest groups and the police limited the disruption that the EDL were able to cause on the day.

2013

The EDL experienced a resurgence towards the end of 2013 both in the number of protests they held and the number of those in attendance compared to previous years. However, the

first three protests of the year had low attendance, caused little disruption and received limited local news coverage. As two of the protests featured regional splinter groups of the EDL, it demonstrated the fragmentation of the EDL and the development of the radical right in the West Midlands. Local anti-Muslim sentiment culminated in April with the murder of a local Muslim man leaving a mosque. The assailant continued to pursue the Muslim community in the succeeding months across the West Midlands by placing bombs outside mosques. Whilst they did not cause fatalities, they heightened the sense of fear and isolation felt by Muslim communities. This marked the transcendence of the radical right from seeking permission to hate to acts of terrorism, with the latter being a physical and extreme manifestation of the anti-Muslim rhetoric that they promoted. It also demonstrated that the radical right created their own permission to hate through their established presence in an area, and the danger that this increased and prolonged exposure poses for the community.

Local and National Terrorist Incidents

The anti-Muslim ideology of the radical right reached a zenith in April 2013 with the murder of Mohammed Saleem by Pavlo Lapshyn as he was walking home from his mosque in Small Heath (McCarthy, 21 October 2013). In police interviews Lapshyn later said "I would like to increase racial conflict because they are not white and I am white." (Lumb and Casciani, 21 October 2013). Lapshyn continued targeting the Muslim community by planting an explosive device outside of a mosque in Walsall in June, a nail bomb outside a mosque in Tipton during Ramadan, and finally a bomb outside the Wolverhampton Central Mosque, none of which resulted in casualties (McCarthy, 21 October 2013; MacKinnon, 21 July 2013). Whilst no direct link was established between the bombings and the EDL, Lapshyn's activities were extreme examples of hatred towards Muslims perpetrated in a context of permission to hate that had been cultivated by the EDL, and were instances of racial and religiously motivated hate crime.

The murder of Lee Rigby by two radical Islamists in London took place in between these attacks in May. The EDL used this murder to exploit the latent anti-Muslim sentiment, and increased community tensions across the country, holding protests in the succeeding weeks. The murder gave the radical right a claim of legitimacy as it highlighted harms caused by

certain interpretations of Islam, providing a filter for those who were angered by the murder, and to vocalise their frustrations. This included an influx in online supporters, with the group's number of Facebook supporters tripling in the 24 hours after the murder (Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015). As tensions were high, the reactions of Muslim protesters allowed the EDL to once again frame Muslims as problematic.

EDL Splinter protests

The EDL held a low profile protest in the predominantly White town of Solihull in January. It was not held in reference to a pertinent local issue, but instead against the Islamification of the West Midlands (Hallam, 13 January 2013). The protest small and with only 60 attendees and no counter-protest (Birmingham Evening Mail, 14 January 2013). The event included the typical waving of flags and anti-Islamic chants that had underpinned other EDL events (Hallam, 13 January 2013). The EDL had attempted to bolster the turnout and their reputation by collaborating with the British Nationalist Party who had experienced some electoral success in the town. However, the BNP clarified that whilst the EDL informed them of the event, they did not wish to participate or be associated with the group after witnessing violent scenes in Dudley in 2010 (Hallam, 13 January 2013). This distancing of the BNP indicates that – whilst the EDL sought to claim additional legitimacy – they failed to achieve it through partnership with a more politically palatable party. The event was too small in scale and received too little media attention or local disruption to have a significant impact on recorded offence that week. However, there was a small increase in the number of these offences recorded the following week, from 37 to 41.

Shortly afterwards an EDL offshoot, the English Volunteer Force (EVF), held a small protest in Birmingham, also against the 'Islamification of Great Britain' and to lament the failures of multiculturalism, as opposed to any local issue (Greatrex, 27 January 2013). 50 supporters and 50 UAF counter-protesters attended the 30 minute protest, after which the attendees went to a nearby pub (Greatrex, 27 January 2013). Despite the minimal turnout and seemingly low impact of the event, there was an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded that week, from 41 to 59. This effect was also seen in the

monthly data as the impact of the two events coincided with an increased level of hate crime when compared to the previous month, December – from 194 to 280.

This was followed by a protest by the Infidels of Britain, another EDL offshoot, outside a primary school in Erdington in March. This protest was called in response to reports that a White student took their own life after being bullied by Asian students. There was no corresponding counter-protest and there was minimal media attention. Despite these factors, the event had a lagged impact, as there was a reduction in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded that week, followed by an increase the week afterwards. Additionally, the protest coincided with an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded at the monthly level compared to the previous month, from 202 to 257. Therefore, whilst there was limited coverage of the event, the protest impacted upon local tensions surrounding a local issue.

Coventry and Wolverhampton

The EDL organised over 50 demonstrations across England the weekend following the murder of Lee Rigby in what Nick Lowles from Hope not Hate described as the largest mobilisation of the far right in 30 years (Taylor, 31 May 2013). As there were multiple events on this day, they individually received little specific news coverage. One protest was a march through Coventry city centre in Lee Rigby's memory, however the EDL were outnumbered by the anti-fascist counter-protesters (Reid, 3 June 2013). This strong turnout by the community was an attempt to establish Coventry's opposition to the EDL's ideology and rhetoric and to deny them enabling environmental factors.

During the same weekend, the EDL also held an impromptu protest in Wolverhampton (Bassey and Hallam, 26 May 2013). The 1,500 EDL supporters took the opportunity to shout anti-Taliban songs, air their frustrations in general, and to provoke responses from local Muslim communities (Bassey and Hallam, 26 May 2013; Taylor, 31 May 2013). This risk of provocation raised concerns of civil unrest and race war, with the EDL being criticised for encouraging hate crime as their event coincided with an increase in the level of racially and

religiously aggravated crimes in the region (Bassey and Hallam, 26 May 2013). There was an increase in the weekly data from 39 before the protest to 64, and the monthly data increased from 251 in April to 297 in May.

Birmingham

The EDL held a static protest in Birmingham against Islamic extremism shortly after Lapshyn's bomb in Tipton in July, despite community vulnerability and the potential to cause significant harm to already fragile community relations (Hallam, 16 July 2013). Police Crime Commissioner Jones lamented the protest as an attempt to capitalise upon the recent bombings in the region (McCarthy, 17 July 2013). The protest saw a resurgence of EDL support with a turnout of 2,000, a counter-protest by the UAF and 1,300 officers from West Midlands and 12 other forces (Tyler, 2 August 2013).

The Role of Alcohol

Controversially, the police requested that the EDL be hosted in a bar from 11am until their protest at 1.30pm, organising coaches to shuttle the supporters from the train station to the bar (Oldham, 20 July 2013). The police justified this on the grounds that it would keep the streets safe, by limiting the level of disruption by the supporters ahead of the protest. However, the decision gave supporters time to get drunk, and the consumption of alcohol previously contributed to clashes and vandalism at the protests (Oldham, 20 July 2013). Despite police being stationed inside and outside of the bar, the supporters shouted anti-Islamic chants as they congregated (Lloyd, 20 July 2013).

This demonstrated that the police had not adapted their tactics from previous protests in the city and across the country. By allowing the EDL to repeat behaviour that previously contributed to disruption and disorder, it reinforced the perception of tolerance and even encouragement by the police. This was especially pertinent as police from multiple forces were brought in for this event, and had the expertise to advise on strategies that had been

successful at minimising disruption and the perpetration of hate crime, given the sensitive timing of this event and the local tensions at the time. The actions of the police contributed to permission to hate, and by extension hate crime, by allowing the prolonged presence of the EDL in the city and their consumption of alcohol.

Disruption

Of the 2000 EDL supporters, 200 were involved in the disturbance with police in the Broad Street and Centenary Square areas (BBC News, 11 December 2014). Further arrests followed, with 50 found guilty for their part in the violence. During the sentencing of four of those arrested for violent disorder, a judge at Birmingham Crown Court called the rally "plainly racist and/or anti-Muslim" (BBC News, 11 December 2014). One EDL supporter told a police sergeant she was intent on “Paki bashing with the EDL” and pled guilty to racially aggravated public order offences (Birmingham Mail, 22 July 2013). Further examples of anti-Muslim antics at the protest included a Muslim prayer cap and a Pakistani flag being set on fire (BBC News, 11 December 2014).

In an attempt to demonstrate community unity following the attacks, and minimise the impact of the EDL, the chairman of the Central Jamia Mosque Ghamkol Sharif in Small Heath appealed for young Muslims to stay away and not be provoked (Bradley, 16 July 2013). He also said the following leading up to the event:

> "The recent attacks on mosques in Walsall and Tipton are examples of what happens when hate speech is given freedom to spread. These mindless acts are designed to spread fear and anxiety across communities” (Bradley, 16 July 2013).

Once again, the burden of responsibility was placed on the Muslim communities to not be provoked by the EDL’s protest, rather than on the EDL for the behaviour of their supporters. Despite these measures, the protest culminated in an increase in the level of hate crime perpetrated across the West Midlands from 296 in June to 347 in July, albeit without this being seen in the weekly data.

The EDL experienced a resurgence in 2013, coinciding with both local and national terrorist events, which when combined with the EDL's congregation in a pub ahead of their Birmingham protest resulted in their provocation of locals. However there were little details regarding the Coventry and Wolverhampton protests. Despite this, each of the protests coincided with increases in hate crime.

These factors provided a veneer of legitimacy for the provocation of Muslims and racial and religiously motivated crimes that the EDL perpetrated and encouraged at the protest. The attacks on mosques across the regions once again established the West Midlands as having a favourable environment for the radical right, and the means for these groups to exploit local tensions and anxieties. These factors could be manipulated to further police the spaces that Muslims and ethnic minorities are allowed to occupy, and therefore provide fertile ground for permission to hate and the activities of the radical right in the following year.

2014

In 2014 Birmingham was the focus of the 'Trojan Horse' scandal following an anonymous letter sent to Birmingham City Council, claiming that hard-line Islamists were plotting to implement an "Islamist" ethos into schools across Birmingham (Poole, 2016). The letter claimed the plot had five steps: identifying an appropriate school; selecting a group of Salafist parents; putting in a sympathetic governor; identifying key staff to disrupt; and finally, a public relations campaign (Awan, 2018). Birmingham City Council was keen to dispel fears over Islamism in schools and to protect the reputation of the city, and investigated 21 schools, and – despite no evidence of extremism – five schools were placed under special measures (Abbas, 2017; Wilson, 2015). As a result, the Trojan Horse plot was the precursor for a range of measures including Ofsted spot-checks to ensure that British values were included in the curriculum (Abbas, 2017; Bartoszewicz, 2014: 98).

The letter and the council's investigation affirmed existing narratives of the radical right around ethnic and cultural diversity, where faith was no longer regarded as a requirement for

social cohesion (Abbas, 2017). During this period, government policies moved "between 'soft community cohesion', in the form of interventions, to 'hard community cohesion', in the form of coercive forms of surveillance, with alarming speed" (Cowden and Singh, 2014: 33). The government took a hard-line on the schools at the centre of the scandal due to existing fears around "Islamisation" in society, via "sharia councils", the growth of Muslim populations, and the concerns over violence and terrorism (Abbas, 2017). This included the targeting of young British Muslims through divisive and discriminatory government-funded initiatives such as the Prevent counter-terror strategy and state surveillance (Kundnani, 2014). These measures provided permission to hate as the state legislated and promoted an anti-Muslim agenda which aligned with the radical right's views of the risks of Islam and Muslims. Ultimately, "the Trojan Horse forgery in Birmingham not only reflected Islamophobic tropes, fantasies and simplicities which already existed but also acted as a gift horse for certain pre-existing agendas and interests" (Richardson, 2015: 15).

The media coverage mirrored the EDL's anti-Muslim rhetoric and provided the ground for them to mobilise in the region, with headlines such as "Trojan Horse Jihadist Plot" conflating British Muslims with terrorism, spreading divisions and fear (Birmingham Mail, 9 June 2014; Abbas, 2017). Additionally, the framing of these issues created community responsibility for the crimes of a few individuals presenting Asian and Muslim communities as a security threat (Allchorn and Feldman, 2019). Examples of this from the EDL include:

> "Perhaps most reprehensible is violence against – and the bullying of – women and girls. But this is also the place to draw attention to the violence, bullying and sexual assault against English girls – some of it sustained for years without intervention – by Muslim rape and trafficking gangs whose distinctive tactic is grooming' (EDL Website, 16 July 2016).

This framing of Islam and Muslims by the radical right and the media more widely was considered by some of those interviewed to perpetuate negative and misinformed beliefs about the community within the UK. In the course of this research the portrayal of minority

groups in the media was considered by many working in local community centres to be damaging due to its influence on the public opinion:

> "the media will inflate things and give a very negative narrative, give a single narrative about certain communities and certain people, call Muslims radicalised you know and the fact that they're fundamentalists you know just label Muslims as the trouble causers. It causes animosity" (Interview 20 conducted with a White female working in Walsall).

However, the EDL were limited in their capacity to exploit local concern about the perceived encroachment of Islam following the allegation. The group was still reeling from the departures of charismatic leader Tommy Robinson and his deputy Kevin Carroll at the end of 2013, which created an internal crisis. On his departure, Robinson said "I acknowledge the dangers of Far-right extremism and the ongoing need to counter Islamist ideology not with violence but with better, democratic ideas" (Bentham and Randhawa, 8 October 2013). This claim was short lived as Robinson soon went on to lead another radical right organisation, Pegida, in 2015 and to become a prominent figure in the anti-Muslim protest scene thereafter.

The EDL held protest in October in Birmingham in order to maintain "pressure on government, officials, police and the Muslim community to deal with the abuse of English girls by Muslim men", not in relation to the Trojan Horse scandal exclusively (Birmingham Post, 9 October 2014). This presented Asian communities and Muslims in general as a security risk, but also a safety risk to children. The EDL and their supporters portray Muslims as deserving of vilification, marginalisation, subjugation and control, through the use of hate crime. The development of this narrative establishes scenarios for permission to hate. Whilst the EDL made some reference to the Trojan Horse scandal and the issue of Muslim-only cemeteries in Solihull as reasons why they were protesting in Birmingham, they were not prominent issues for the group or the protest.

In comparison to other years, local businesses changed their approach for the EDL's October protest. Many restaurants, bars and pubs closed ahead of the event, with others delaying their opening until after the protest ended (Oldham, 10 October 2014). In contrast, the police remained, and for the second year in a row the police arranged for the EDL to be hosted in a bar on Broad Street before their protest. Once again this move was defended as a way to limit the impact it would have on the area (Oldham, 10 October 2014). Therefore, the local businesses were able to adapt and provide a more effective response to the EDL than the police.

In all other aspects it looked like previous EDL protests, with supporters engaging in anti-Muslim chants and flag waving from as early as their journey to the bar. Further, the EDL and the counter-protest by the UAF were located in the same sites as previous events, with the EDL in Centenary Square, and the UAF's in nearby Chamberlain Square the city centre (Oldham, 10 October 2014). These routines were particularly significant for the EDL, who – after the public departure of their vocal leader Tommy Robinson – were in a state a turmoil, unable to expand, lacking both the leadership and creative capacity to utilise multiple scandals to maximum effect. Instead they relied on the antagonistic and aggressive tactics applied over previous years.

As it had on previous occasions, the close proximity of the UAF's neighbouring protest sites in the city centre again resulted in clashes between the two groups (Buckley, 12 October 2014). Additionally, the EDL antagonised members of the public, resulting in police intervention and ten arrests for public order offences (Lloyd, 12 October 2014). The event had an impact on the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded by the police. There was an increase from 40 to 46 of these offences recorded the week of the protest, and subsequent weeks also saw increases. However, this effect was not seen at the monthly level. There was a decrease in the number of these offences recorded in October compared to September, from 264 to 250.

In sum, due to the absence of leadership of the group that created an internally inhibiting crisis, the EDL did not build upon on the momentum they had developed in 2013. By 2014

they were stagnating, unable to capitalise on local anger towards the alleged attempt to introduce aspects of Islamic teaching in local schools. The allegations sparked local caution towards the perceived encroachment of Islam and aligned with the anti-Muslim ideology of the radical right. The Trojan Horse affair and the role the media played in how the Muslim community were presented provided the context of the EDL's protest and the concerns of the local community. Whilst the police remained consistent in their approach to the protests with close protest sites, the local bars decided to remain closed.

2015

In 2015, the radical right returned to holding multiple protests across the region and sought to insert themselves into local issues to mobilise local support and establish legitimacy. The EDL had remedied their internally inhibiting factors, reorganising in the aftermath of Robinson's departure and regrouping under new leadership to focus their efforts again on the West Midlands, and position themselves within local issues. The EDL held three protests in Dudley, Walsall and Solihull. The year also saw the introduction of Britain First to the region, holding their first event in Dudley. Both Dudley protests were met with strong opposition from local communities who sought to deny the groups any legitimacy in the area.

Both the EDL and Britain First focused on the Dudley Mosque. The EDL's event in Dudley was their characteristic static protest, with supporters kept in place by steel rings, and a large mobilisation of counter-protesters. Alcohol continued to play a prominent role in the EDL's protests, with the police's consistent use of a host bar prior to the protests. It also entrenched levels of comradery, presenting the protests as opportunities to meet and connect with other like-minded people, and lowering barriers to provocative and discriminatory behaviour, in the process encouraging hate crime. This is a point of contrast between the EDL and Britain First, who did not encourage the same drinking culture or hooligan behaviour from their members.

One significant point of difference between the groups was the presence of alcohol at the EDL rally, compared to its absence for Britain First. At the behest of West Midlands Police, the EDL was hosted in the Rock Zombie bar in the town centre prior to their protest. Chief Supt

Chris Johnson, responsible for policing in the borough, justified the decision saying that the "West Midlands Police does not have any powers to stop any group drinking alcohol pre-protest so having one such venue makes absolute sense" (Gibbons, 3 February 2015). By confining the EDL in one easy-to-police location, it reduced exposure to or potential for conflict with members of the public or counter-protesters. But providing EDL supporters with a base for their operation gave them time ahead of the event to connect with each other and create a sense of shared identity and purpose. Other studies have found the bond that is created between supporters to be a motivator for attending protests, resulting in the creation of a group identity (Pilkington, 2016).

There were notable points of similarity between the EDL and Britain First. The anti-Muslim ideology and rhetoric used by Britain First was largely in line with that of the EDL. Britain First's deputy leader Jayda Fransen argued that mosques are "eroding British culture; every time one of them is erected it's causing irreparable damage" (Dudley News, 21 April 2015). Britain First however distinguished themselves from the EDL by emphasising militarism. This was invoked by the language and imagery used to give their 'mosque invasions' and 'Christian patrols' grandeur, and present them as protecting British Christian society (Bennett, Furlow and Goodall Jr, 2011). Britain First framed their response to the encroachment of Islam and Muslim aggression as 'Operation Fightback' and used it as a means of encouraging the activism of their followers to protect 'our people' against the aggressive representatives of Islam (Brindle and MacMillan, 2017). This reflected the official slogan of the group: 'Taking our country back', and the prominence the group gives to anti-Muslim retaliation (Brindle and MacMillan, 2017).

Like the EDL, Britain First denied accusations of racism, and sought to establish their grievance against Islam as a cultural issue, and present themselves as defenders of British culture and values (Allen, 2014). They targeted Muslim communities with visibly 'British' displays of opposition in the hope of provoking emotional and physical reactions that in turn would allow them to depict Muslims as aggressive and violent. Such displays included loud patriotic music, waving the Union Jack flag, banners that read "no more mosques", and chants of "We want our country back" and "Terrorist scum off our streets". These chants and anti-Muslim

sentiments align Britain First with the EDL, and allowed Britain First to benefit from the permission to hate that the EDL had already established in the West Midlands. Britain First modified their tactic of mosque invasions to protest against the plans for a new mosque in Dudley. In doing so, they added to the tensions provoked by the EDL's protest a few weeks prior.

The Protests

The return of the EDL to Dudley in February was ostensibly in aid of stopping the "Islamisation" of Britain. As whilst revised plans for the mosque were smaller, the EDL felt it was a "monstrosity" that would cast an Islamic shadow over Dudley (Dudley News, 6 January 2015). The group claimed that "the size of the mosque is nothing more than a statement of supremacy. If built it signifies to the rest of the UK that Islam can do what it wants in Dudley" (quoted in Dudley News, 7 February 2015).

As they had previously, the community leaders of Dudley were quick to denounce the EDL's return to the town, and appealed to residents not to attend the event (Lilington, 7 February 2015). This rejection by the local community and community leaders was a repeat of their attempts in 2010 to both deny the EDL legitimacy in the region and to prevent them from establishing permission to hate. This messaging was successful, as evidenced by Colin Lunn from EDL's media team lamenting that:

> "We had 2,000 people here from all over the country including Newcastle, Devon and East Anglia. It was a shame the people of Dudley were not given the chance to see us. The media told everyone the thugs of the EDL were coming to town. And the police operation kept us away from the people of Dudley" (Dudley News, 7 February 2015).

The council also rejected Britain First's claim of legitimacy with Dudley Council's Chief Executive Sarah Norman arguing that "Britain First can add nothing to the council's discussions in relation to the Dudley Muslim Association's proposed mosque in Hall Street" (Dudley News, 9 May 2015). However, in contrast to the EDL, the leader of Britain First, Paul

Golding, refuted these sentiments, claiming Britain First had legitimacy because they were called to the area, and their protest had attracted many attendees from the Black Country (Dudley News, 9 May 2015):

> "We have been contacted by many locals to hold a protest and they have assured us many locals will attend. Unlike other protests in Dudley, ours will be disciplined and tightly controlled. We also intend in the run-up to the demo to leaflet the town and confront the town councillors" (Dudley News, 18 March 2015).

The EDL's protest was similar to their previous events as the 600 EDL supporters and 50 counter-protesters were allowed to protest near each other separated by police barriers, culminating in 30 arrests (Birmingham Evening Mail, 4 March 2015; Lilington, 7 February 2015). Whilst the EDL had focused their activities in one protest site, Britain First held a moving protest through the town with 150 supporters. They first assembled at a car park on Flood Street at 1pm before marching to the steps of Dudley Council House, where they protested for two hours (Dudley News, 5 May 2015).

Despite community efforts the protests the EDL continued their tactic of targeting Muslims with provocative signs, chants and the wearing of pig masks. This included a group of EDL supporters chanting racist and offensive statements outside Dudley Central Mosque (Dudley News, 7 February 2015), which created a hostile environment for many locals, as noted by Chris Green from the Al Karim Foundation, an organisation providing support for Asian communities, who said people in the Kates Hill area were "on lockdown", and too afraid to leave the area due to the protest (Dudley News, 26 February 2015).

This was also seen in the FOI data, as the EDL's protest corresponded with an increase to 45 (from 42) racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded the week of the protest, and a subsequent increase the following week to 54. This was also seen at the monthly level, as there was an increase in the number of these crimes recorded in February compared to January (from 244 to 269). There was also a lingering effect of the protest into March, when 287 of these crimes were recorded.

Britain First's introduction to the area in 2015 differed to that of the EDL in 2009. Britain First sought to differentiate themselves from the EDL, whom they did not consider disciplined or controlled. Britain First did not foster notoriety through violent behaviour or drinking. Instead they tried to establish themselves as the more credible outlet for anti-Muslim and anti-Islam concerns and frustrations. Britain First modified their antagonistic 'mosque invasions' towards more traditional forms of protest, and established their own enabling factors in the West Midlands. Dudley had already been established by the EDL to be a fruitful venue for high profile protests that would provoke strong reactions from both local politicians and Muslim communities. Britain First sought to differentiate themselves from the EDL, presenting themselves as a more appealing alternative to the EDL by avoiding bars, alcohol, violence and arrests (Dudley News, 8 May 2015; Dudley News, 9 May 2015). Britain First also attempted to create their own enabling factors, by presenting themselves as champions of local community interests by virtue of being invited to the town, whilst also projecting their ideology of the dangers of Islam onto Dudley. Britain First presented themselves as actor on behalf of a community which was being failed by local politicians who were allowing Islamic encroachment via this new mosque:

> "the treacherous councillors and local Muslim groups have forced through an application for a new mega mosque. The locals are furious at this new mosque and thanks to our contacts in the town many of them have pledged to attend and support our protest march." (Layton, 20 March 2015).

Britain First's protest was met by two counter-protests were organised: one by the UAF in the form of a Unity Festival, accusing Britain First of "threats, intimidation and Islamophobia", and one by Dudley Central Mosque (Layton, 20 March 2015; Dudley News, 11 May 2015). The latter was an attempt to address community tensions and to counter the anti-Muslim ideals espoused by Britain First, and thereby demonstrate community resilience to their ideology. As a spokesperson for the mosque put it, "the Muslim community [has] felt under siege from this scaremongering [by the radical right] which has led to attacks over the past six or seven years" (Larner, 9 May 2015). In an effort to cut off support for Britain First, the mosque invited

members of the public to come and visit their premises for tea, and to view the revised plans for a smaller mosque with additional facilities to cater to the community more widely, such as a sports hall (Larner, 9 May 2015).

Similarly to the EDL, Britain First encouraged the perpetration of hate crime towards Muslims during the protest. The group's leader, Paul Golding personally contributed towards the perpetration of hate crime – falling under police investigation after saying he would bury a pig's head at the proposed site of the new mosque to prevent it being built (Layton, 9 May 2015; Buchanan, 13 November 2014). This is an example of direct and targeted provocative action and hate speech by the leadership, designed to encourage similar statements or incite equivalent actions from supporters. There was an increase in the number of recorded racially and religiously aggravated offences the week following Britain First's protest. According to the monthly data, there was an increase in the number of these offences recorded in May compared to April, from 251 to 279. Additionally, there was a lagged and cumulative effect of the protests, as in June 305 of these offences were recorded.

Solihull and Walsall

In April the EDL and UAF returned to Solihull over the localised issue of plans for a Muslim-only cemetery. This came shortly after windows of the Solihull Community Hub had been smashed, and four severed pig's heads were found on the doorstep (Bourke, 18 April 2015). These incidents were in response to accusations that the building was being used as an unofficial mosque.

Once again alcohol consumption was at the core of the Solihull event as the 60 EDL supporters based themselves at O'Neill's pub in the town centre. However, in a divergence from usual tactics, the EDL distributed leaflets in the town centre against the repeated applications for the Muslim cemetery (Layton, 9 May 2015). The EDL were met by a large police presence, intended to keep the EDL apart from a small number of counter-protestors who had tried to approach them (Lloyd, 18 April 2015). Despite the low turnout, the Chief superintendent Alex Murray stated that the protest "drew significantly more attention than usual", although it

was not clear whether this was media attention, from the local community, or from elsewhere (Bourke, 18 April 2015). This April protest coincided with a reduction in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences, from 45 the week prior to 36. This was also seen in the monthly data as there was a reduction in the number of these offences recorded, from 287 in March to 251 in April.

In an attempt to embed themselves in another local issue, EDL protested in August in Walsall, claiming it had become a “hotbed of terrorism” and was “rife with Muslim gangs” (Gibbons, 14 August 2015; Newbould, 31 July 2015). The allegations fitted the EDL’s narrative about Muslim communities and mobilisation strategy, but were disputed by the police, and had little was not something of specific local concern.

The protest was consistent manner to previous events, with the EDL meeting in the Oak Inn pub in the town centre ahead of the event, reinforcing the police’s established strategy (McCarthy, 13 August 2015). Local Labour Councillor for Willenhall South, Sean Coughlan, vocalised reservations about this tactic:

> "There is a clear link between the violence of the EDL and drink. Bizarrely, the EDL blame the police for the violence their drunken members caused when they came to Walsall” (Newbould, 31 July 2015).

The 150 EDL supporters protested in Gallery Square, where they remained for over an hour (Horner, 21 August 2015). As opposed to a retaliatory traditional counter-protest, the 250 counter-protester attended a diversity event groups called ‘We Are Walsall’, located outside St Paul's church (Horner, 21 August 2015). Councillor Aftab Nawaz for St Mathews recalled:

> "The EDL, with its message of hate, could only muster around 160 even with shipping them in from across the country. The message was sent; the EDL are not wanted in Walsall" (Horner, 21 August 2015).

In total, nine arrests were made for public order offenses, seven of which were of EDL protesters (Birmingham Evening Mail, 17 August 2015). There was a small reduction in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded the week of the protest compared to the week before: from 54 to 53. This effect was also seen at the monthly level with 292 of these offences recorded in July compared to 279 in August. It indicates that the attempt to create a localised issue and support around terrorism, Muslim gangs, and child exploitation, was not successful in mobilising residents against minority communities.

In 2015, the Dudley protests were preceded by unity statements from the council, with the EDL congregating in a pub and having close protest sites, whilst Britain First conducted a march. In addition to the hate crime perpetrated by Britain First leader Paul Golding, there was also increases in hate crime across the West Midlands following the protests. The Solihull and Walsall protests were relatively short and small scale and did not correlate with hate crime.

2016

The most significant political event of 2016 in the UK was the Brexit referendum. The key issues around EU membership were frequently featured in the media. These included the return to parliamentary sovereignty and control over immigration and British borders. Notably, some of the rhetoric used by the Leave campaign had similarities to the anti-immigrant ideals of radical right groups, providing them with a level of mainstream legitimacy and an enhanced enabling environment, upon which they could capitalise. This emboldened the anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments of the radical right, which can be seen in the inaugural event of the UK branch of Pegida, a German radical right protest group. In total three protests were held across Coventry and Birmingham by the EDL, Britain First and Pegida.

Each of the towns in the West Midlands voted leave. Birmingham voted 50.4% to leave, Coventry 55.6%, Dudley 67.6% Sandwell 66.7%, Solihull, 56.2%Walsall 67.9%, Wolverhampton 62.6%. Many of those who worked in Third Party Reporting Centres described the Brexit referendum as contributing towards permission to hate. They recounted

that the campaigns encouraged verbal abuse of minorities, legitimising the sentiments of the radical right, and leading to the perpetration of hate crimes or incidents on a daily basis. For these individuals, Brexit was characterised by more violent and aggressive behaviour towards ethnic minorities. Numerous examples were highlighted in the interviews:

> "there's been more hate crime since Brexit, I think Brexit seems to have given far-right sort of people permission to abuse others, to use words like go back home, you don't belong here and that kind of thing. I think the danger is that Brexit might almost normalise hate crimes and discrimination and prejudice" (Interview 9 conducted with a White male working in Solihull).

The campaigns around EU membership focused significantly on the issues of national sovereignty, border control, and the threat of migration (Creighton and Jamal, 2020). Muslim immigrants became a salient issue for the Vote Leave campaign, emphasising that the potential admission of Turkey into the EU would encourage refugees from Syria and Iraq to settle in the UK, therefore linking EU freedom of movement with border security (Salam, 2016; Abbas, 2020). This resulted in the consistent portrayal of immigration as an uncontrollable security threat and social burden with the hypothetical Muslim immigrants portrayed as "sexual predators" (Evolvi, 2018; Virdee and McGeever, 2018; Virdee and McGeever, 2018). Although support for Brexit did not necessitate antipathy toward Muslims or diversity, it has been found that the vote was associated with anxieties over racial and religious diversity (Matti and Zhou, 2017).

The first protest held in 2016 was the relaunch of Pegida – 'Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West' – a pan-European anti-Islam, anti-refugee movement. The group was led by Tommy Robinson, who was keen to stress that Pegida was a 'step away' from the violent, balaclava-wearing and alcohol-fuelled EDL he had left in 2013 for being too extreme (Allchorn, 2016). However, Pegida adhered to the anti-Muslim ideology and opposition to mosques that remains central to the EDL's ideology and success (Allchorn, 2016).

Robinson said that the aim of the event was to "preserve our culture, save our country and save our future", protesting against the “growing influence Islam has on society”, as opposed to any local issue in the city (Chan, 8 December 2015; Charlton, 6 February 2016). Whilst the protest took place in Solihull, just outside of Birmingham, Robinson referred to it as Birmingham and claimed to have chosen this location because the city was the "terrorist epicentre" of Britain, “where most of the terrorists have been from” (Chan, 8 December 2015). Pegida’s event was not well received by local politicians, with Birmingham City Council mirroring the tactics previously used by Dudley and Walsall, and issuing a joint statement of condemnation:

> “We wish to declare that Pegida are not welcome and have nothing to offer our city - apart from a huge bill for policing and the clear up operation after they have gone" (Walker, 18 January 2016).

In a divergence from previous protest locations, and in an attempt to limit potential disruption, the police moved the EDL’s protest to Solihull. The 160 Pegida supporters conducted a silent march outside the city centre from Birmingham International train station to a remote business park, accompanied by heavy police presence (Charlton, 6 February 2016). Additionally, there were no reports of the group congregating in a pub prior to the event. Whilst it does not remove the possibility that some supporters may have met in a pub, visited one after the protest, or consumed alcohol, it was not done with any prior arrangement with the police to host the group in one venue.

The police hosted the counter-protest in Victoria Square in Birmingham city centre, making it the furthest apart the protest sites had been since 2009 (Charlton, 6 February 2016). Moving these sites limited the exposure and proximity of the groups as a motivation to participate in disorder, and successfully reduced the conflict between protesting groups. There was only one arrest of a counter-protester (Charlton, 6 February 2016). This tactic of keeping the protesting groups in sites in different parts of the city in order to limit the opportunities for them to clash could have been a new model for how the police organised the protests. However, this method was not repeated in the West Midlands.

The more restrained event contributed to its minimal impact on hate crime. The protest coincided with a reduction in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded compared to the week prior, from 55 to 42. However, there was an increase the following week to 44. There was also a lagged effect in a monthly data with an increase in the number of these offences recorded in March, from 224 in February to 280.

Coventry and Birmingham

In May the EDL protested in Coventry, which was by graffitied swastikas on road signs and walls in the hours ahead of the event. The EDL denied responsibility and accused the UAF of painting the graffiti to set up the EDL and make them appear anti-Semitic (EDL Website, 21 May 2016; Gilbert, 22 May 2016). The EDL justified their protest as defending the “once-proud cathedral city [from] falling below the national radar while it’s being gutted by its transformation into a Muslim ghetto” (EDL Website, 23 April 2016). Additionally, the EDL claimed to be protesting against child grooming and sexual offences that they alleged were taking place in the city, however neither were felt locally as a significant issue. Ian Crossland justified the protest by saying:

> "There's similar issues up and down the country that Coventry is suffering. Sexual offences, grooming of children, by a predominantly Muslim community. They're not all Muslims but they're from that community. There's also massive issues with hate preachers touring mosques in Coventry trying to radicalise young Muslims and recruit for Jihad" (Gilbert, 23 May 2016).

In this framing, the EDL went further than their previous claims of extremism and invasion, and accused the local Muslim population of being complicit in these issues:

> “Can abuse on this scale have gone unpunished without sustained cover-up by Coventry’s Muslim community? […] At the very best, they looked the other way to protect their own” (EDL Website, 23 April 2016).

As with previous events, faith leaders rejected the EDL's claims of acting in the interests of the community, and instead presented Coventry as a unified multicultural city (Eccleston, 19 May 2016). Additionally, the local resistance, the drafting in of police from across the region, and close protest sites were consistent with previous years. The EDL's 220 supporters met in a pub ahead of the event before attending the protest opposite the Council House. The proximity to the UAF's counter-protest site resulted in clashes culminated in the arrest of four EDL supporters (Mullen, 30 May 2016). The EDL blamed the police for these clashes and accused them of being excessively violent:

> "it was only the discipline of the EDL, not the police, which prevented an escalation of violence. Our efforts to convey our message about the threats from Islamification to the wider public will not be deterred by state-sanctioned violence and provocation" (EDL website, 31 May 2016).

The protest contributed to an increase in the racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded the week of the protest, and a corresponding increase in the number of these offences recorded in May, rising to 312 compared to 245 in April.

The EDL went on to hold a small protest of 30 people opposite the Muslim organisation the Manarat Foundation in Birmingham in June (Vernalls, 27 June 2016). It was reported that they chanted racist and offensive slogans and waved St George flags (Birmingham Evening Mail, 27 June 2016). With the exception of these sparse details, the protest was not well covered in news reports making it difficult to build an accurate picture of the day. Whilst the impact of the event was marginal, one man was charged with two racially aggravated public order offences (Vernalls, 27 June 2016). There was also a decline in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded that week when compared to the week prior, from 56 to 49. However, there was an increase the following week to 79. When looking at the data at the monthly level, there was a reduction from the 312 recorded in May to 297 in June.

In contrast to the EDL's activities in the region this year, Britain First experienced a number of potentially inhibiting factors in 2016. Notably, the group was subject to an injunction from the High Court in August, which prevented them from entering any mosque in England and Wales for three years (Samuel, 18 August 2016). Additionally, the leaders Paul Golding and Jayda Fransen were prevented from entering, or encouraging their members to enter Luton after causing "community tensions" (Samuel, 18 August 2016). Golding was also imprisoned for eight weeks for contempt of court after driving four members of Britain First to the Al-Manar Centre in Cardiff after his ban (BBC, 2016; Colley, 15 December 2016). During sentencing, the judge said that Golding's conduct was "calculated to increase tensions between different members of the community […] particularly to affront the Muslim community in relation to their religion" (Colley, 2016). And, finally, in November Fransen was found guilty of religiously aggravated harassment for telling a Muslim woman she encountered during a "Christian Patrol" that Muslim men "cannot control their sexual urges" and are "raping women across the continent" (Osborne, 2016; Bullen, 3 November 2016).

These inhibiting factors impacted the types of protest Britain First were able to hold. Despite these limitations, 30 members of Britain First held a flash demonstration in Birmingham in September, in response to which a last-minute counter-event was organised by the Socialist Workers' Party (Kuczora, 4 September 2016). Whilst this received little media attention and therefore it is difficult to build an accurate picture of the protest, it coincided with an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences, from 56 the week prior to 61 the week of the protest.

To summarise 2016, the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the Brexit campaign mirrored some of the sentiments of the radical right. The media and political elites helped generate and confirm stereotypes about, and ill-feeling towards, ethnic minorities, which resulted in an increase in hate crimes after the referendum (Devine, 2017). All three radical right groups discussed above capitalised on this by organising protests in the West Midlands, beginning with Pegida's inaugural event in the UK held just outside Birmingham. This was the first time that the protest location of a radical right group was moved outside of Birmingham city centre by the police, and held away from the counter-protest, which took place in the city centre. The

increased distance reduced opportunities for the groups to provoke and clash with each other. Additionally, Pegida's silent march without chanting or singing or prior drinking, distinguished the group from the EDL. However, the police's tactic of separating the protesting groups was not continued for the EDL's protest in Coventry or Britain First's event in Birmingham. Instead, the police returned to bringing in a high number of officers from neighbouring forces with the intention of physically separating the groups. There was low attendance and little coverage of the Birmingham based protests. The Coventry protest was preceded by racist graffiti and the EDL congregating in a pub. The protest itself resulted in violence and increase in hate crime.

2017

The radical right continued to experience favourable environmental factors in 2017. Firstly, there were still lingering effects from the Brexit campaign, and the polarising, divisive campaigns echoed the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the radical right. Additionally, terrorist offences took place over the summer providing enabling environmental factors for the radical right. In March, a car drove into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge in London. In May, a suicide bomb was detonated during an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, resulting in 23 deaths and injuring 1,017. The EDL responded quickly to the bombing, organising a protest in Manchester three weeks later. The EDL published a call to action from their supporters "*We are asking for your courage,* the courage to say and do what must be done to prevent future Islamic atrocities and intimidation across the UK" (EDL Website, 23 May 2017, italics in original). The language used in this statement could be interpreted either as a call for readers to attend their upcoming protests as a means of protecting the country from Islamic terrorism; or, as encouragement to readers to commit hate crimes against Muslims and prevent them from committing acts of terrorism.

In June, three terrorists drove a van into pedestrians on London Bridge before launching a knife attack at Borough Market killing eight people and injuring 48. Two weeks later worshippers were ran over outside of Finsbury Mosque during Ramadan, killing one and injuring three. The culprit, Daren Osborne, was motivated by anti-Muslim ideals, becoming

"obsessed" with Muslims and had engaged with the radical right (BBC News, 1 February 2018). The police later found a letter in the van used in the attack written by Osbourne, referring to Muslim people as "rapists" and "feral", and that Muslim men were "preying on our children" (BBC News, 1 February 2018). The anti-Muslim inspiration was also evidenced in Osborne's links to the radical right as Osborne regularly read material from Britain First and Tommy Robinson (BBC News, 1 February 2018). In the final terror incident an explosive device was detonated on a London tube, injuring 50 people. The perpetrator had been referred to Prevent, the Government's deradicalisation programme ahead of the attack (BBC News, 16 March 2018). Commensurate with the prominent research in the area, the five terror incidences in 2017 created a wider sense of fear of minority communities, resulting in an increase in the number of hate crimes against Asian and Muslim communities (Hanes and Machin, 2014; King and Sutton, 2013).

The attacks were also heavily promoted by the radical right in their social media and website content. These acts legitimised the rhetoric of these groups that Muslims are a security threat and that Muslim communities in the UK are directly responsible for the reprehensible acts of a few isolated extremists. EDL's response to the London tube incident on their website read:

> "The only way to *prevent* Islamic terrorism is to defuse [sic] Muslims in Britain as individuals and as communities, congregations, organisations, classes and representative bodies. Islam has demonstrated that it, too, needs to be defused for the safety and security of the rest of the population" (EDL Website, 17 September 2017, italics in original).

The media coverage of the attacks echoed the rhetoric of the radical right, focusing on the issue of immigration and the responsibility of the Muslim community to prevent these attacks. These issues were frequently combined, as illustrated in a column written by the journalist Richard Littlejohn: "The politicians have opened the floodgates to mass immigration without insisting on integration", resulting in the creation of "vast, monocultural Muslim ghettoes in our great cities" (Daily Mail, 5 June 2017). In many instances, these acts of terrorism were presented as a problem of "Muslims" in general. As noted by the Daily Mail,

"These terrorists may be on the fringes of mainstream Islam, but they are Muslims nonetheless" (5 June 2017).

When interviewed, those who worked in community centres and places of worship in predominantly Asian areas asserted that in the aftermath of these attacks the media played a significant role in presenting Muslims as terrorists and subsequently a threat to the British people and British culture (Fekete, 2009; Williamson and Khiabany, 2010). This reinforced the idea that Muslims are a direct threat to national security, and that hate crimes against them are justified:

> "When there is an attack anywhere in Europe then you'll find that there's gonna be an increase in hate crimes predominantly within Muslim communities but will cover anybody who fits that profile" (Interview 18 conducted with a White male working in Wolverhampton).

As one interviewee mentioned, this portrayal stamps a "trademark on the Muslims as the creator of violence that really has some impact on the local community" (Interview 3 conducted with an Asian male working in Dudley). Repeated exposure to this kind of messaging can encourage a negative view of Muslims, and can culminate in the perpetration of hate crimes against them. This has been seen in other studies that found increases in the number of hate crimes against Asians and Muslims following terrorist incidents (Hanes and Machin, 2014; King and Sutton, 2013; Awan and Zempi, 2020). Specifically, those who worked in predominantly Asian areas recounted that: "Asian people, especially women, have been targeted because of terrorist activity" (Interview 10 conducted with an Asian female working in Birmingham) due to the visibility of the hijab, niqab and burka, which are symbolic indications of difference and are therefore considered a magnet for hate crime (Mason-Bish and Zempi, 2018; Perry, 2014). One incident that was brought up was particularly poignant:

> "One woman did tell us that she had acid thrown at her from a passing car, and people were telling us that they had things shouted at them […] it's like an overall

climate of if not fear then tension" (Interview 2 conducted with a White male working in Birmingham).

Birmingham

The EDL organised a protest in Birmingham under the guise that one of the terrorists, Khalid Masood, frequented the city and that the city itself had become a terrorism hot spot. This succeeded in provoking the local community despite being poorly attended. They claimed the protest was to counter the "continued increase in Islamic terrorism" linked to Birmingham (Birmingham Mail, 9 April 2017; Telegraph, 8 April 2017). In a statement the EDL announced that:

> "The English Defence League will be demonstrating in Birmingham on 8 April as our response to the 22 March Westminster jihad attack […] We will be focusing on the jihadi threat in the UK, home-grown terrorism, returning jihadists, Muslim ghettos, no-go areas and 'Trojan Horse' schools" (EDL Website, 24 March 2017).

In what had become the standard recourse, a statement was issued by the City Council ahead of the event. Local politicians lamented their inability to ban the protests and their limitation instead to using public statements to voice their disagreement with events, rather than providing any practical deterrence to the EDL. In this vein, ahead of the event, Perry Barr MP Khalid Mahmood condemned the proposals and said the group should be prevented from using the city centre as their protest location:

> "What they are doing is sowing the seeds of discord. That is exactly what these radical people who carry out terror attacks want, to fracture the community […] We have to shut down our city centres for them and they come in to sow hate in the community" (Oldham, 25 March 2017).

The protest in Birmingham did not see the same surge in attendance to that in the aftermath of Lee Rigby's death, with only 100 supporters reported as attending the EDL event in

Centenary Square. However, the EDL again sought to antagonise local Muslims via provocative chants, pig masks and banners, including ones reading “We’ll demonstrate until: Muslims stop rape jihad, police investigate, [and] Muslim communities stop covering up rape” (Birmingham Mail, 8 April 2017). Some EDL supporters went further by directly confronting local Muslims. In one instance 25 supporters circled a woman wearing a hijab who later recounted that the EDL thrusted a flag in her face and “were shouting things like 'you're not English, this isn't your country, this is a Christian country and go back to where you came from'". She believed that she was targeted by them as she was "visibly a Muslim woman" (Mortimer, 9 April 2017). The woman also added that:

> “I was quite alarmed by the level of racism towards me. They were looking at me with so much anger that they were almost looking straight through me with anger” (Dunn, 11 April 2017).

It was reported that police officers who were present did not intervene at the time; instead a passer-by intervened, with the police later escorting the woman away from the protest site after the altercation ended (Dunn, 11 April 2017). Ian Crossland did not welcome the intervention of the bystander and said of her that ‘‘she’s lucky she’s got any teeth left” (EDL Website, 10 April 2017). The lack of police intervention over EDL supporters’ provocative chants and actions provided enabling environments for the radical right by giving the impression that the police tolerated their anti-Muslim ideals.

The main counter-protest was organised by Birmingham Central Mosque who invited members of the public to the mosque as a means of demonstrating unity, as Dudley Mosque had done the previous year (Elkes, 11 April 2017). The mosque displayed Union Jack flags in an effort to dispute the EDL’s claims of a cultural conflict and incompatibility between British and Muslim communities (Young, 9 April 2017). A representative of the mosque recounted the success of the event: “We retaliated by having a tea party and [the EDL] had about 100 people in their march and we had over 300 people come to the mosque on that same day to come and see what Islam is all about and see what a mosque is” (Interview 12 conducted with an Asian male working in Birmingham). Despite these community efforts, the protest

coincided with an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded that week compared to the week before, from 43 to 68. was also an increase in the monthly data from 275 of these offences being recorded in March to 294 in April followed by a further increase in May to 319 recorded offences. Thus, this protest illustrates that whilst the attendance may have been lower compared to previous protests, it was still impactful through the use of provocative tactics.

The week following this protest saw a rare collaborative event between Britain First leaders Golding and Frensen, and Tommy Robinson, who left Pegida to start a media career at Rebel TV. Together they marched through the predominantly Asian area of Sparkbrook carrying large white crosses and handed out leaflets (Richardson, 13 April 2017). The crosses were a recurring prop used by Britain First to demonstrate their Christian faith in contrast to the EDL, and was described as blasphemous by Clive Gregory, the Bishop of Wolverhampton (Leather, 12 August 2017). In a video documenting the event Golding claimed that they were: "Very proud to hold the cross in what they call Jihadi central", announcing that "It's completely Muslim round here, we've already had people screaming and shouting at us" (Rodger, 19 April 2017). The march culminated in the group entering an Islamic bookstore and confronting a volunteer, accusing him of selling extremist literature and promoting jihad (Rodger, 19 April 2017). This claim was disputed by the owners.

These attitudes place Britain First within the category of groups that offer permission to hate, trying to police spaces for Muslims who they claim are aiming for societal dominance which must be prevented. By highlighting such an issue in Sparkbrook, they were hoping to motivate supporters to attend their events and take actions, such as committing hate crime, to maintain societal hierarchies. They believe that the inevitable consequence of Muslim influence is that the indigenous White Briton becoming a minority in his own country:

> "they use their narrative that you know we are losing our country we are being infiltrated. That instils fear and some people will act upon that fear to try to protect themselves" (Interview 10 conducted with an Asian female working in Birmingham).

The provocative actions of Britain First, including the carrying of white crosses, succeeded in garnering a response from locals. One Britain First member claimed that the protest was cut short due to local counter-protesters as: "30 Muslim men have gathered and thrown eggs at us. It got aggressive and violent very quickly" (Richardson, 12 April 2017). Despite these cultivated tactics, the protest did not see an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded that week. However, as there were two protests in quick succession, there was an increased number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded in April, which was followed by a further increase in May.

Shortly after the Finsbury mosque attack, Britain First engaged in another collaborative event, this time with the EDL in Birmingham city centre. Local MP Khalid Mahmood condemned the group and urged authorities to cancel the march which he feared "will serve only to fan the flames of division and hatred […] I cannot believe this gathering of bigots and racists is being allowed to take place so soon after what happened at Finsbury mosque" (Birmingham Evening Mail, 21 June 2017).

Whilst the police had given assurances that the protesting sites would be further apart than previous protests, both Britain First and UAF began their protests in the same location, allowing the groups to antagonise each other (Balloo, 24 June 2017). At around 1.40pm, 250 Britain First and EDL protesters, escorted by police, marched down Hill Street and walked underneath Suffolk Street Queensway towards their protest site at Centenary Square (Balloo, 24 June 2017). Here an Asian man was reported as having goaded the group and was consequently detained by the police whilst Britain First campaigners sang God Save the Queen (Balloo, 24 June 2017). This was another example of the police removing an antagonising bystander, as opposed to policing the provocative behaviour of the radical right protesters.

Once at the protest site, another group of UAF supporters confronted Britain First, with police forming a barrier between them. The leaders of Britain First complained that the UAF disrupted their attempt to recite the Lord's Prayer by shouting, whistling and blowing horns

(Balloo, 24 June 2017). Britain First responded by throwing green smoke bombs at UAF supporters, who in turn responded by throwing water bombs, with the police also getting hit by projectiles from both sides (Cooper, 24 June 2017). The disorder continued after the event as marchers started to try to push past the police, which resulted in scuffles after officers tried to keep them apart (Balloo, 24 June 2017). Britain First criticised the police for their handling of the event, and specifically for not being able to keep the groups far enough apart (Balloo, 24 June 2017). As this event took place the same week as the Finsbury mosque attack, it coincided with an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated crimes recorded, from 73 the week prior to 97 that week. There was also an increase when the data is looked at monthly, where there was an increase in June compared to May, from 319 to 410.

Due to the mobile aspect of Britain First's protest, it provoked responses by both the community and counter-protesters. Once again, 2017 highlighted how the police were permissive of deliberately provocative acts by the radical right, including hate offences such as racist chants. Whilst the police were quick to respond to outsiders who antagonised the radical right, and to escort them away from the protests, they did not respond in the same effective manner to the provocative displays by the radical right themselves, who had instigated the confrontations in the first place. Despite this provocation and limited interventions by the police, 2017 saw the culmination of years of community opposition to the protests organised by the radical right, most notably by Birmingham's Central Mosque. The mosque's event was a celebration of Britishness to directly undermine the radical right's narrative that Islam is incompatible with British values.

Britain First returned to Birmingham in July to confront Islamic Dawah stalls in the city centre (Bullen, 13 July 2017). These stalls are an invitation for discussions on religion and are a frequent fixture in the city centre. Here the radical right had moved from policing the religious spaces Muslims are allowed to exist in, to policing the spaces they can volunteer in. The impact of the confrontation was minimal as there was no effect in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded at the weekly or monthly level. Britain First also held an event in Wolverhampton in August. They had not given the police prior warning of their intention to protest, allowing for a level of conflict between the protesting groups. The event

proved to be highly confrontational, with Golding claiming that a member of the UAF threw a corrosive/toxic substance at Britain First (Bassey, 12 August 2017). This event saw an increase in the number of racial and religiously aggravated offences recorded that week, from 58 to 61. The protests saw collaboration between the radical right groups, which despite low attendance, resulted in provocation of local Muslims and increases in hate crime.

2018

The radical right had a limited presence in the West Midlands in 2018, holding only two events in the region. The first saw the introduction of two new groups, the Football Lads Alliance and the Democratic Football Lads Alliance; both embedding themselves within the Birmingham Bomb Justice Campaign. The campaign highlighted the death of 21 people in 1974 following bombs in two Birmingham pubs, for which no one has been prosecuted or claimed responsibility. The defining local issue this year was a letter that was widely distributed and promoted in the media calling for a "Punish a Muslim day". The contents promoted radical right, such as calling for attacks against Muslim individuals and institutions, awarding points for verbal abuse, pulling a Muslim women's head scarf, or vandalism. It promoted a sense of difference and suspicion that influenced anti-Muslim attacks in Britain (Alllchorn and Feldman, 2019).

In March, the Football Lads Alliance (FLA), alongside the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), protested in Birmingham. The two were street based, direct-action groups that staged several large-scale marches in London between 2017 and 2018. Both groups claimed to be anti-extremism organisations highlighting the concerns of ordinary people. The FLA attempted to gain local legitimacy by embedding themselves in a local issue by holding their protest in relation to the Birmingham bombing and the appeal for justice on behalf of the victims' families' campaign, Justice4the21 (Authi, 24 March 2018).

The groups described themselves as street-protest movements that encourage rival 'football firms' to reject rivalries to unite against Islamic extremism (Allen, 2019). Their anti-Muslim

rhetoric aligned them with groups like Pegida, EDL and Britain First (Allchorn and Feldman, 2019). Additionally, they aligned themselves with the radical right by claiming the protest was against “all extremism and terrorism” (Richards, 18 March 2018). The link between the two groups and the radical right was further evidenced by the presence of Tommy Robinson in support of the protest. Another prominent radical right figure, Anne Marie Waters, former UKIP leadership contender and leader of the political party “For Britain”, was a key speaker at the event, describing Islam as poisoning British culture (Bryant and Frymorgen, 9 May 2018).

In contrast to the origin of the EDL, these groups were able to bring together supporters from across the UK by attracting football fans, as opposed to football firms. The groups had adapted their approach from those of the EDL and Britain First, and their London protests were characterised by a lack of drunkenness and aggressive behaviour, which was a deliberate tactic to avoid getting the reputation for hooliganism which had defined the EDL (Allen, 2017). However, this did not carry over to the FLA’s first demonstration in Birmingham, which coincided with the DFLA’s inaugural demonstration, resulting in a tense and confrontational protest, involving abusive chanting and offensive banners (Allen, 2018). The events also featured Islamophobic chanting that was not responded to by the police. The closure of local pubs to prevent any alcohol-related disturbances differentiated this protest from those by the EDL (Richardson, 24 March 2018). Some pubs claimed this decision was made under police advice, although the police denied giving such guidance.

Over 5,000 protesters and counter-protestors attended the same protest locations as previous events, resulting in confrontation. The DFLA chanted “we're English till we die”, to which the counter-protesters responded with, “racist scum off our streets” (Authi, 24 March 2018). Due to the groups’ proximity, the police formed a barrier between them to limit disorder (Authi, 24 March 2018). This event coincided with an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated recorded offences that week, from 48 to 57, and an increase in these offences recorded from 254 in February to 293 in March.

In mid-2018, the FLA suffered their own internal crisis, with the sudden departure of their leader, John Meighan, who left without appointing a successor (Bryant and Frymorgen, 2018). This was similar to the EDL's slump in the aftermath of Tommy Robinson's departure. However, the lack of leadership not only caused the decline of the FLA, but aided the rise of the DFLA (Allen, 2019). The DFLA transitioned from being identified as a group of football lads, to one that was mainly focused around counter-jihadi ideology, and mirroring other radical right groups (Allen, 2017, 2018). Despite this potential for growth, neither group would return again to the West Midlands.

The majority of those interviewed identified the 'Punish a Muslim' letter, which was distributed in April, as having a more significant impact upon Asian communities than the February protest. The letter resulted in increased anxiety in Muslim communities, especially for Muslim women. The letter, reproduced below, was published online and in the media, and was sent to Muslim MPs, including the MP for nearby Bromsgrove, Sajid Javid (Walker, 15 March 2018).

Figure 18: Punish a Muslim Day Letter - Source David Parnham



PUNISH

a

MUSLIM

day

3rd April 2018

They have hurt you, they have made your loved ones suffer. They have caused you pain and heartache. What are you going to do about it? Are you a 'sheep' like the vast majority of the population? Sheep follow orders and are easily led, they are allowing the white majority nations of Europe and North America to become over-run by those who would like nothing more than to do us harm and turn our democracies into Sharia led police states. Only you can help turn this thing around, only you have the power. Do not be a sheep!

There will be rewards based on action taken. These are as follows:

10 points	Verbally abuse a Muslim
25 points	Pull the head-scarf off a Muslim 'woman'
50 points	Throw acid in face of a Muslim
100 points	Beat up a Muslim
250 points	Torture a Muslim using electrocution, skinning, use of a rack
500 points	Butcher a Muslim using gun, knife, vehicle or otherwise
1000 points	Burn or bomb a mosque
2500 points	Nuke Mecca

The letter called readers to “not be a sheep!” and take action as the “white majority” was being “overrun by those who would like nothing more than to do us harm” (Alllchorn and Feldman, 2019). The letter emphasised the radical right trope of how the experiences of demographic change and British multiculturalism were the result of a hidden plot or conspiracy (Alllchorn and Feldman, 2019). West Midlands Police described the letter as "clearly abhorrent and intended to cause fear and offence" (Rodger, 8 May 2018).

Many local Muslims were reported to have changed their behaviour in response to the letter and the fear of being attacked as a result of it. Those interviewed who worked within Asian communities recounted that some removed hair coverings to minimise the risk of hate crime victimisation, with some being reluctant to leave the house that day for fear of being attacked. The letter was also considered to be a motivating factor for incidents of hate crime reported in the region. This included offensive Islamophobic graffiti that was believed locally to be the result of the inflamed tensions caused by the letter in Yardley, a predominantly Muslim area (Chandler-Wilde, 14 March 2018).

It was in this week in April that the EDL returned to citing vague motivations such as "terrorists plotting" and "drug trafficking" (Birmingham Evening Mail, 6 April 2018). The EDL added that they were also protesting against child exploitation, and they used this as a means of vilifying Muslim communities and motivating actions against them:

> “The rape jihad must stop and resources must be allocated to rout out these criminals and more importantly to attack and destroy the hatred of non-Muslims and particularly women that is part and parcel of the teachings of Islam” (EDL Website, 7 April 2018).

The event was relatively hostile as the EDL marched over to the counter-protest location, which was separated from them only by a line of police. The groups antagonised each other, throwing beer cans and exchanging insults, with at least one EDL supporter wearing a pig mask (Richardson, 7 April 2018). This was followed by an increase in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded, from 58 the previous week to 64. There was also an increase in the number of these offences recorded – from 293 in March to 308 in April, followed by a further increase to 325 in May.

Despite the limited number of events in 2018, they had a significant impact on both the daily and monthly data for racially and religiously aggravated offences. There were displays of community responses to the groups as businesses decided that they would close ahead of the

DFLA-FLA event, preventing them from consuming alcohol. This demonstrated that the local community played an active role in trying to limit the impact of the protests by adapting their responses, whilst the police remained consistent in their approach. The protests this year were also consistent with previous years in generating antagonism between protesting groups, facilitated by the close location of protest sites. The increases in hate crime can be attributed to the heightened tensions in the aftermath of the 2017 terror attacks, compounded by the Punish a Muslim day which had a significant impact on local Muslim communities.

Conclusion

The protest events held in the West Midlands between 2009 and 2018 saw the radical right motivated by their own ideology, local events and national issues. The EDL and their offshoots were the only radical right organisations active in the West Midlands between 2009 and 2014. The later protests held between 2015 and 2018 saw the introduction of new radical right groups into the region, the most prominent being Britain First, Pegida, the FLA and DFLA. Protests typically took the form of static protests, which were met by counter-protests by the UAF and local groups. They also undertook non-traditional demonstrations including protesting book stalls, on a rooftop, and outside of a school. However, the influence of the EDL varied across the time period. In 2009 and 2010, the EDL were assessing the enabling environmental factors in the West Midlands. They focused on local issues to gaining supporters, as well as a lax attitude of the police in regard to taking action against racial or religiously aggravated offences committed during the protests. However, the EDL experienced a decline in 2011 and 2012. The later protests saw a divergence of tactics and a shift of focus towards specific issues such as the Trojan Horse and child grooming scandals of 2014, the Brexit referendum of 2016, and a series of terrorist attacks in London and Manchester in 2017. This can account for the spike seen in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded in July of that year. Nearly all of the protest events (except for those held in November 2010 and October 2011, 2014, April 2015 and July 2017) coincided with higher levels of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded in the month the protest was held.

The most consistent and prominent contribution to racially and religiously aggravated offences was the EDL's ability to aggravate local Muslim communities. In Birmingham, the EDL were unsuccessful in their attempts to garner support by attempts to local issues that were not salient locally. They were instead successful at establishing Birmingham as a popular protest location with a city centre location which could be relied upon for local support and media attention. The EDL were able to exploit specific issues and events that increased their impact upon the region. In 2010 they involved themselves in the local issue of the Dudley mosque and attempted to police the spaces that Muslim communities were able to occupy. This had been a prominent issue for the EDL in their formative stages, and therefore the enabling environment had already been established for Britain First to use the mosque as an opportunity to present themselves as a new and more credible anti-Muslim protest group. Therefore, in Dudley, the radical right were more socially embedded compared to Birmingham, giving greater permission to hate and resulting in higher levels of hate crime. In 2013 they benefitted from both national and local factors. Nationally they saw a resurgence in interest in the aftermath of the murder of Lee Rigby, which they leveraged into turnout at a range of protests across the country. These protests coincided with the actions of Lapshyn and caused high levels of anxiety and fear in the Muslim communities in the West Midlands, making them more susceptible to provocation by the EDL.

There were also two periods that provided the radical right with favourable environments and permission to hate. The first was the Brexit Referendum in June 2016, in which immigration was a central issue, and which coincided with an increase in the number of hate crimes recorded across the country. This was followed by a summer of terrorist incidents in 2017. Brexit emboldened more people to vocalise their more extreme views, whereas the terrorist events of 2017 were capitalised upon by the radical right, and used as grounds for holding a series of protests across the West Midlands, which saw collaboration between Britain First and Tommy Robinson and the EDL. The reactions to these events from these communities reinforced the rhetoric and justification of the EDL for holding these protests. In many of these instances, local Muslims were blamed for being the cause of the violence and the disorder.

The EDL used a range of tactics to provoke responses from local communities, beginning with their initial collaboration with other groups such as Casuals United and the Welsh Defence League. This provided them with a bank of local support and established the region as having an enabling environment, but also the tools to build a nationwide support network. The group also collaborated with local hooligan firms (Birmingham Zulus) to further embed their local support system and to increase the violent capacity of their protests. The result was the establishment of violence as a key initial motivating factor for supporters to attend their events. The proclivity for violence was further encouraged by alcohol, and exacerbated on the occasions the police encouraged the EDL to congregate in a bar ahead of their events. It also increased the time that the supporters were in the area, increasing the exposure of passers-by and locals to the group's sentiments and rhetoric.

The introduction of new radical right groups and new protest tactics was associated with increases in racially and religiously aggravated offences. Whilst the EDL continued with their standardised protests, involving host bars and neighbouring protest sites to counter-protesters, Britain First chose to use a variety of strategies. These ranged from protest marches through city centres to walking through predominantly Asian parts of Birmingham brandishing white crosses. Additionally, there was increased collaboration, with the EDL working with Britain First in Birmingham, and the involvement of Tommy Robinson in activities organised the Britain First and later the DFLA and FLA after his departure from Pegida.

While the EDL and Britain First shared an ideology, they differed in a multitude of ways. These ranged from the motivations for supporters to attend protests, the conduct of those supporters, the strategies of the protests, and the ways in which they provided permission to hate. Both groups staged street-based demonstrations to raise awareness of alleged problems such as 'grooming gangs' and terrorism, but took different approaches to their events. Britain First differentiated themselves from the EDL in order to produce their own legitimacy and permission to hate. Supporters of Britain First did not consume alcohol prior to or during events, did not wear masks or balaclavas, and did not engage in hooligan and

drunken behaviour that would bring the group into disrepute. In contrast, alcohol consumption and face coverings were noted features of EDL demonstrations (Busher, 2015; Pilkington, 2016). This distinction between the two groups allowed Britain First to present itself as a more professional and less violent organisation, and therefore a more credible defender of British values and culture compared to the EDL.

Britain First were able to benefit from the permission to hate that the EDL had cultivated in the West Midlands, as well as the favourable environment that they created through their own protests. The West Midlands had been established as having multiple locations where residents could be both engaged in the protest and provoked. Additionally, the EDL set the precedent for collaborating with a more longstanding organisation such as the Welsh Defence League, which Britain First mirrored in the protest they held in conjunction with the EDL. Their early reliance on football firms for their initial support base was also the precursor to the FLA and DFLA, who were largely made up of 'football lads'.

The presence of two prominent radical right groups strengthened permission to hate in the West Midlands. As the groups used different tactics, they had different impacts on communities, tensions, and their effect on hate crime. Despite the tendency for radical right organisations to view each other as rivals, there was some collaboration between the EDL, Britain First and Tommy Robinson. Additionally, Brexit and terrorist attacks provided permission to hate for the radical right and the protests that were held in the aftermath of these events. The groups were able to filter anti-minority and anti-Islam sentiment and permission to hate that had been stoked by the prominence of media coverage of the events. These heightened tensions increase the likelihood that the protests will involve violence and result in hate crime.

The policing of these protests had not varied significantly over time. The lack of adaptation can be seen in the continued use of host bars and pubs for the EDL to congregate in ahead of their events, and the repeated use of neighbouring protest sites with counter-protesters. In the absence of a new, effective police response, it was left to the local community to present strong displays of opposition to the groups, and to deny them permission to hate through the

closure of bars, and by mosques holding welcome events. These factors will be discussed in more detail in the following and concluding chapter. Media reports noted that racially and religiously aggravated offences were routinely ignored by the police during the protests. This established the perception that the police not only tolerated the protests, but that they were sympathetic towards the EDL. The perception was reinforced by the consistent tactics used to control the protests, and the limited arrests of the EDL for racially and religiously aggravated offences despite their provocative anti-Muslim chants. The use of neighbouring protest sites in city centres gave the EDL opportunities to clash not only with counter-protesters but also members of the public. These clashes were more likely to take place due to the police organising for the EDL to congregate in a bar ahead of the event.

The communities in the West Midlands adapted their behaviours towards the EDL by issuing statements to show that the group were not welcome and to deter locals from attending. By doing so, they attempted to remove enabling factors for permission to hate in the local community. Despite these attempts, the protests enhanced the EDL's media visibility and added to their notoriety as they became more established. This created a 'veneer of legitimacy' for the EDL as they began to focus on causing significant damage via fewer protests.

Chapter 8:

Conclusion

Throughout this thesis I have looked to establish whether there is a relationship between the radical right and hate crime in England and Wales. Further I sought to identify the causal factors that explain the relationship between the radical right and racially and religiously aggravated crimes. These included the spaces and places they occupy, their rhetoric, and the way they portrayed Muslim communities between 2009 and 2018. Within this context, I used a sequential mixed-methods approach to address my research question. This thesis was theory testing as it aimed to expand the scope of the findings of the work of Perry and Scrivens (2019) to new contexts. They developed a framework to account for hate group formation and hate crime in Canada, and this thesis aimed to determine whether permission to hate also applied in a different context (England and Wales). Permission to hate posits that hate crime is used to exhibit social power and control towards minority groups as a means of protecting the existing societal hierarchy. Permission to hate therefore focuses on the enabling environmental factors, such as action or lack of action by state and political actors, that produce the context in which hate crimes occur. This includes the prominence of local anti-immigrant rhetoric which signals to the radical right that xenophobia is accepted in the area. Limited responses by the police to radical right groups gives them a sense of impunity, and regions that have previously been hostile to ethnic minorities will continue to be so. This thesis extends our understanding of permission to hate with a case study of the radical right in England and Wales. This chapter will summarise the findings of the empirical chapters, set out the limitations of the findings and make recommendations for future research before summarising the thesis's contribution to the permission to hate theory.

Research Design

This thesis expands and contributes to both hate crime literature and the permission to hate theory by mirroring the mixed-methods sequential approach of Perry and Scrivens (2019) and applying it to England and Wales. As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, existing hate crime

literature predominantly looks exclusively at the relationship between radical right parties, anti-immigration values and hate crime, or radical right protest groups and hate crime. The studies examining radical right parties are predominantly focused on Western Europe, with few focused on the UK. Whereas the studies conducted so far on the role of protest groups have been conducted within the USA and Canada, with none so far exploring the issue within the UK. This thesis contributes to hate crime literature by examining the role of both radical right political parties and protests groups on hate crime perpetration. Further, this thesis also contributes to this field by exploring how local and national high profile events such as proposed mosques, terrorist attacks and Brexit were exploited by the radical right to further their support at protests. Previous studies had only analysed the short term impact of terrorist attacks and Brexit on hate crime, with the role of the radical right being previously ignored in the analysis.

However, much of the variation in racially and religiously aggravated hate crime remains unexplained. This is especially in the case of the UK, has been the influence and role of the radical right in the promotion of racially and religiously aggravated hate crime. The omission is important as these groups are known to promote a divisive ideology that champions a hierarchical society in which White British communities hold privileged positions of power. As a result, This thesis focused on the research question: in what ways do the radical right influence the perpetration of racially and religiously aggravated crimes in England and Wales? This required a sequential mixed-methods approach, beginning with a quantitively analysis to effectively test whether there is a statistical correlation between the radical right and hate crime, whilst taking into account alternative explanations. Therefore, quantitative analysis is needed to identify which factors account for higher levels of hate crime perpetration and to inform the focus of the following qualitative chapter. The qualitative approach is necessary to produce an account of the ways in which the radical right influences hate crime and drill down into the causal mechanisms as to how and in what ways the radical right influence hate crime in the case study of the West Midlands.

Summary of Findings

The quantitative Chapter 6 used large-N quantitative methods and officially recorded crime data to address the research question of whether the presence of the radical right influences hate crime. This chapter used published crime data from the Home Office, demographic data from the Annual Population Survey, election data from the House of Commons Library, and coverage of protests from local and national newspaper archives. This chapter measured hate crime as a proportion of all crimes, and three measures of radical right activities, radical right party vote share, a lagged vote share variable and the incidence of protests.

As the data used the same units (local authorities) with repeated measures over time, and without any missing observations, the resulting data was categorised as panel data. As such fixed effects models were used to cluster the local authority units, at the higher aggregate level of police force areas. This quantitative data was used to explore whether there was a correlation between the presence of the radical right and the perpetration of racially and religiously aggravated crimes. The results from these models found a negative correlation between *support* for radical right parties (UKIP and BNP) and racially and religiously aggravated crimes. This did not support the assumptions of the permission to hate thesis as it had been established in Canada. In contrast, *protests* organised by radical right groups (EDL and Britain First) had significant and positive correlations with racially and religiously aggravated crimes. This supported the permission to hate thesis, suggesting something about the protest events encouraged or facilitated the perpetration of hate crime. This would be examined in more detail in the case study in Chapter 7. Accordingly, the case study chapter focused on the protests of the radical right in the West Midlands in order to identify and explore the causal mechanisms suggested in the large-N quantitative analysis.

Chapter 6 demonstrated that radical right groups were present in all police force areas in England and Wales. As seen in Chapter 7, the radical right predominantly focused their activities within the West Midlands in Birmingham, as a protest location, producing opportunities to attract and establish local support. Furthermore, they also expanded into other towns in the region (Coventry, Solihull, Walsall and Wolverhampton), with the majority of their protests outside of Birmingham taking place in Dudley. Birmingham became a

standardised protest location for the radical right with the majority of protests taking place in the city centre. These protests were used as platforms of support and to garner media attention. There were attempts by the radical right to create local issues in the city, attempting to emphasise issues such as a bookstall allegedly promoting extremism, and Britain First marching through a predominantly Asian area whilst carrying white crosses. However, not all of the attempts to create local issues in Birmingham were successful in motivating attendance or on their impact on hate crime. In contrast, the protests held in the other towns were justified with varied claims of more localised issues. Whilst in Coventry and Walsall this was vague claims of local extremism and encroachment of Islam, in Solihull and Dudley it was the issue of a newly built mosque. This issue, especially in Dudley had local salience, and alongside historic electoral success, demonstrated how the radical right could socially embed themselves, producing greater permission to hate resulting in higher levels of hate crime.

A central aspect of permission to hate is the radical right's exploitation of racialised societal hierarchy (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Permission to hate theory predicted that minority communities experience hate crimes during periods of poor economic circumstances and rapid demographic change (Burnett, 2017; Perry, 2001, Poynting, 2006; Komaromi and Singh, 2016; Bowling, 1993; Young, 1990). The radical right achieves this by presenting minority communities as responsible for the problems of their supporters. When the presence of minority communities is considered a direct threat by those who are anxious about their economic stability, such beliefs can result in hate crimes being perpetrated to maintain social order (Gadd and Jefferson, 2007). As noted in the quantitative data in Chapter 6, there is little empirical support for the correlation between economic circumstances and radical right support, however there were positive correlations between hate crime and the percentage of White, Black, Asian residents in an area. Chapter 7 supported this finding as radical right protests in the West Midlands were focused in areas that have high Asian and Muslim populations. Their targeting of minority communities was also seen in the deliberate provocation of locals with their chanting and signs including: "Muslim killers off our streets" and "Terrorist scum off our streets".

Chapter 7 showed that between 2009 and 2014 the West Midlands hosted protests by the EDL and their offshoots, allowing them to quickly establish strong enabling environmental factors. These protests were typically static protests in city centres, often resulting in counter-protests by the UAF and local opposition. The protests held between 2015 and 2018 saw the introduction of new radical right groups with the most prominent being Britain First, Pegida, the Football Lads Alliance (FLA) and Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA). Each of these benefited from the permission to hate that the EDL had cultivated in the West Midlands before creating their own favourable environmental factors. This period also saw a diversification of tactics including focusing on specific issues such as proposals for a new mosque and to a lesser extent the local Trojan Horse scandal, as well as more confrontational marches with supporters carrying white crosses through a predominantly Asian area. The radical right also focused on wider national events such as the Rotherham child grooming scandal and the terrorist attacks in 2017, and projected them as being the consequences of Islam.

The findings highlighted the influence that the radical right had on racially and religiously aggravated crimes when the groups were in their formative stages. This was evident in the EDL's August and September protests in 2009 in Birmingham, and their first protests in new cities such as Dudley (2010), Walsall (2012) and Coventry (2013), each of which coincided with increases in hate crime. This trend continued with Britain First's first protest in Dudley in 2015, and the 2018 protests of the FLA and DFLA. Each of these protests coincided with provocation between radical right supporters and Muslim locals resulting in weekly and monthly increases in the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded in the West Midlands.

Chapter 7 also corroborated the findings of Perry and Scrivens (2019) and Morrow and Meadowcroft (2018) that radical right groups experience internal constraints. In the case of the EDL, they suffered internally inhibiting factors with splits and the departure of Tommy Robinson at the end of 2013. This was followed by a period of decline and destabilisation; however, it did not cause their immediate collapse. Instead, it created a leadership void for the group, preventing them from turning the surge in support they experienced after Lee Rigby's death into loyal supporters. This also affected the EDL's ability to capitalise upon the

Trojan Horse scandal in Birmingham in 2014. Internal constraints were not unique to the EDL as the leaders of Britain First, Paul Golding and Jada Frensen, were subject to a series of court cases. During such adversity, Britain First modified their strategies by holding smaller protests which did not produce the same impact on racially and religiously aggravated offences as previous protests.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

Whilst this thesis contributes to the field of hate crime research as the first application of the permission to hate thesis in England and Wales, it does suffer from limitations. Due to the way in which crime data is recorded, this thesis was limited to examining England and Wales as Scotland and Northern Ireland use different criteria to record crime. Thus, a comparative study was not possible. The data used was recorded at the local authority level, which is the lowest aggregate level currently available. Therefore, this data could not account for how hate crime is concentrated within the local authorities. Additionally, the crime figures used in Chapter 6 suffer from an under-reporting problem as they only account for the crimes that were recorded by the police. Therefore, the data cannot reflect the hate crimes that were not reported to the police. This makes it difficult to know how accurately the hate crime data reflects the real-world experience of these crimes, whether underreporting affects some regions more significantly than others, and the extent of the underreporting. Despite these limitations, the officially recorded data is well standardised between the regions and allows for them to be compared and is considered the most reliable available account of hate crime in England and Wales. An alternative source for hate crime data is the Crime Survey for England and Wales. This survey aims to address the gap of the underreporting of crime by asking members of the public, about their experiences of crime over the last 12 months. Whilst the resulting data can aid research focusing on factors that might make individuals more likely to be victims of crime, it cannot be used to explore the influence of external event based factors on crime, and therefore was not appropriate for this research.

The quantitative models showed that there was a positive correlation between radical right protests in an area and the level of racially and religiously aggravated crime. However, this

data did not provide an understanding as to the causal order of this correlation. By using a mixed-methods approach this thesis balances the limitations of the explanatory power of the fixed effects model used in Chapter 6 with the case study of the West Midlands in Chapter 7. This allowed investigation into the causal mechanisms of how the radical right influenced hate crime across the different towns and cities in the West Midlands. These towns and cities had different local issues, including Birmingham's alleged links to radical Islamists and the plans for a new mosque in Dudley, as well as different communities which had varied responses to the EDL.

The qualitative data in Chapter 7 addressed some of the limitations of the quantitative data, using process tracing to identify the ways in which the radical right contributed to permission to hate and encouraged hate crime in the West Midlands. These chapters used a variety of data, including local news coverage of radical right protests, data from the websites of the EDL and Britain First, and FOI police data figures for the number of racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded. They also included interviews with individuals who currently or previously worked at Third Party Reporting Centres across the West Midlands. Thus, the resulting data provided insight into how radical right protests influenced hate crime and the impact their activity had on local communities.

In order to overcome some of the barriers to the reporting of crime, pre-existing community organisations were given Third Party Reporting status to encourage victims to report hate crimes as an alternative to reporting the incident to the police (Chakraborti, 2018). An alternative research design could have been to send questionnaires/surveys to the TPRCs across the region as an alternative means identifying the local causal mechanisms for hate crime as well as the impact of the radical right protests. However, the effectiveness of these centres is predicated on victims being aware of their existence, function and accessibility. Not every reporting centre in the West Midlands agreed to take part in this research, with some claiming that no hate crimes had ever been reported to them. Therefore, there is no guarantee that more TPRCs would have completed a survey compared to participating in an interview. As the interviewees were invited to participate in this study based on their previous or current employment with a TPRC, their accounts were limited to the area that their centre

was located, the timeframe that they were employed there, and their recollection of the protests. Therefore, accounts of the early protests of the radical right were limited by too much time having passed for recollection to be clear, or because they were not in their role during that time, whereas they had better recollection of the more recent protests. Further, by using surveys, there would have been no guarantee that former employees who did recall the protests and their impacts would have been given the opportunity to fill out the survey potentially resulting in a smaller sample of data.

The interviews were conducted either face to face, or via audio and video calls according to Covid-19 guidelines and the personal preference of the interviewees. The form of the interview affected the level of control I had over the meeting. Face-to-face interviews were conducted socially distanced in private meeting rooms to ensure confidentiality and control over the physical space. However, the distancing did impact the level of rapport that was built up and could have affected the openness of some of the responses. The audio calls had the least control of the physical space in which the interview was conducted and did not prevent other people from being in the same space as those being interviewed or from interrupting. This may have limited the level of openness the interviewees felt able to provide in their answers. The interviews that took place via video call had some control over the interviewing space as they were conducted in home offices. Therefore, interviews conducted via video had higher levels of privacy and more open responses to questions compared to those via audio calls.

Not all protests received the same level of media coverage despite the inclusion of both local and national news sources. This was highlighted by the scant details of the EDL's first protest in July 2009 which is absent in most records of EDL protests. The protest following Lee Rigby's murder in 2013 also received little media coverage. On the other hand, other protests were covered in high levels of detail including protest locations, duration, attendance, the split of the arrests between the protesting groups and the offences that these were for. Additionally, some protest coverage provided insight into the chants, banners and physical displays such as the wearing of pig masks, and allowed this thesis to contribute an account of how the radical right influenced hate crime through their tactics. This was also true of Britain First and

the EDL's websites. Both groups deleted their own coverage of their protests from their website content, but this was retrieved using the Wayback Machine, an internet archive. However, not every protest earned a dedicated article on the groups' websites, and in many instances they produced the same article for multiple protests, making it difficult to differentiate their motivations for different protests.

As there was this repetition in the data through the reproduction of articles, it made it difficult to build uniformly detailed pictures of how each protest was conducted and therefore how the protests changed over time. This limitation would only have been addressed through an ethnographic study of radical right protests to produce consistently detailed accounts of the ways in which the groups and their supporters influence hate crime and promote permission to hate. Whilst ethnographies of protests have been undertaken (for example, Pilkington, 2016), they did not focus on how the radical right influences hate crime. An ethnography was not an appropriate method in this study due to Covid-19 and restrictions on public gathering. Additionally, there has been a decline in radical right protests, with just one in London in June 2020 where the radical right claimed to be defending public statues from BLM protesters. Therefore, there were insufficient protests held in the West Midlands in order conduct an ethnography, and as such it would be a recommended focus for future research.

Another recommendation for future research would be to conduct interviews with former or current radical right group members and counter-protesters in the UK. This was not possible in this study due to lack of interest and response by current and former activists in taking part in interviews. Interviews with these individuals would produce insights into what motivated individual supporters to attend the protests, whether they attended regularly, and whether they engaged in anti-Muslim chanting or hate crime. This body of research could assist police forces and local councils to better counter the effect of the protests themselves. Furthermore, by highlighting the local and national issues that are exploited by the radical right, it would allow for local intervention prior to the protest. Additionally future studies could explore whether the finding of this thesis apply to other European countries. This would enrich the permission to hate thesis as other countries with more electorally successful radical right parties may have other tangible means by which the radical right influence hate crime. If so,

such findings would improve the theory and our understanding of the causal mechanisms by which the radical right influence hate crime in different societal, institutional and historic contexts.

Contribution to Permission to Hate

Permission to hate states that hate crimes are rooted within ideological structures of societal oppression based upon embedded notions of ethnic and religious difference (Perry, 2001: 16). Thus, the findings from the quantitative and qualitative chapters broadly fit within the permission to hate framework developed by Perry and Scrivens (2019). Due to the limited electoral success of the radical right in Canada, Perry and Scrivens were not able to quantitatively test the impact of the electoral performance of radical right parties on permission to hate. However, they did find that the inclusion of radical right candidates in the 2014 elections in Ontario garnered the radical right legitimacy and injected intolerant views into the political debates (Perry and Scrivens, 2019: 99). In comparison British radical right parties have become more established electoral contenders, and, therefore, the contesting of elections by radical right candidates did not provide them a new sense of legitimacy in the same way to their Canadian counterparts. Therefore, the findings from this study expand upon permission to hate as it was able to test the impact of radical right electoral support on hate crime in Chapter 6, concluding that the relationship was negatively associated.

By contrast, the introduction of new radical right groups and changes in protesting tactics led to increases in racially and religiously aggravated offences. Therefore, this finding extends the theory of permission to hate. The EDL's first protest in Birmingham was attended by locals and was also characterised by a lack of any formal counter-protest. Therefore, it presented Birmingham and the West Midlands as initially having favourable environmental factors for the EDL and hate crimes to flourish (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). However, their subsequent protests in the city were marked by violent clashes with counter-protests made up of the UAF and local Muslims. As a result, Birmingham was established as a venue for violent conflict, which appealed to the early EDL supporters with backgrounds in football firms (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). This opportunity for violence enabled the EDL to spread permission to hate

through the rest of the West Midlands, holding protests in other parts of the region (Dudley, Wolverhampton, Walsall and Coventry). It also established Birmingham city centre as a key protest location for disorder, support and media attention. Therefore, despite the initial lack of counter-protest, encouraging permission to hate was maintained through the violence that marked subsequent EDL protests.

Permission to hate argues that hate crimes are perpetrated as a means of upholding the racialised societal hierarchy that privileges White male populations over ethnic minorities. This racialised society is maintained by the radical right's use of deliberately provocatively tactics towards Muslims and ethnic minority communities. Such tactics included wearing pig masks and tearing apart the Qur'an as well as setting fire to the flag of Pakistan. These protesting tactics were met with counter-protests by local Asian communities and resulted in increases in the number of hate crimes recorded. Additionally, the violence of the clashes with the Muslim protesters reinforced the radical right's anti-Muslim rhetoric depicting the community as violent. The subsequent clashes between the protesting groups contributed to an increase in recorded racially and religiously aggravated offences. Therefore, the findings from Chapter 7 enrich not only permission to hate but also hate crime literature more widely by highlighting the different ways in which the radical right attempted to uphold a racialised society.

Through their protests and issues that they championed, the radical right promoted permission to hate and influenced hate crime by policing the spaces in which minority communities allegedly threatened British societal norms and values. Specifically, the radical right achieved this by focusing on local issues to scapegoat minority and Muslim communities as being a result of their actions. This began in 2010 when the EDL inserted themselves into the local opposition towards a proposed purpose built mosque in Dudley. The EDL and later Britain First rallied against the repeatedly revised plans for the mosque as not only a symbol of the invasion and threat of Islam, but also an issue where local politicians were not listening to the concerns of the local community. The radical right were effective in rallying support for these issues as they served as examples of the ways in which Muslim or Asian populations allegedly threaten British values. This idea was central to the EDL in their formative stages

which Britain First later adopted to promote themselves as a new and more credible anti-Muslim protest group. This enabled the radical right to present themselves as the champion of local interests in the face of corrupt politicians who are not protecting British values or serving the interests of British people. Additionally, there were incidents where the radical right generated permission to hate by using protests to limit the ability of minorities to express their needs. An example of this was the 2011 protest at a book stall which catered to the needs of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community.

The radical right went further than exploiting local issues; they also capitalised upon Islamist terrorist attacks. During the timeframe of Perry and Scrivens' work (2019: 105), seven incidents of Islamist-inspired terrorism occurred, but none were included within their study. Therefore, the theoretical framework fails to account for the way in which the radical right in Canada responded to terrorist events, and this aspect remained unincorporated into the permission to hate theory. In contrast nine such incidents took place in the UK between 2009 and mid 2018. The EDL benefitted from both local and national incidents of alleged Islamic extremism, such as the 2013 murder of Lee Rigby by two radical Islamists. The EDL exploited the tensions following the incident by immediately organising several protests across the country. This saw not only a resurgence in the interest in the EDL online, but increased attendance at their protests. These protests coincided with the actions of Pavlo Lapshyn who was responsible for four terrorist incidents including the placement of three bombs outside mosques across the West Midlands which caused elevated levels of anxiety and fear in the Muslim communities locally, making them more susceptible to provocation by the EDL.

In many of the protests held after these events, local Muslims were blamed by the EDL and police as being the cause of the violence and disorder, providing support for the radical right's argument that these groups are a threat. This was also seen in 2017 after a series of terrorist incidents in Manchester and London, some of which were perpetrated by radical Islamists. The radical right responded to these events by holding protests in their aftermath, capitalising upon the incidents to garner support at their events. The decision to do so was labelled by local politicians as being exploitive and harmful for community relations. The protests not only attracted higher turnout compared to previous protests but also appealed to individuals

who felt more threatened by the terrorist attacks. As seen in Chapter 7, the protests held in the wake of terrorist attacks by radical Islamists corresponded with increases in racially and religiously aggravated offences. This supports other studies which have found increases in hate crimes recorded in the weeks and months after these attacks (King and Sutton, 2013; Hanes and Machin, 2014). The findings from this study therefore strengthen permission to hate and hate crime literature by showing how the radical right in England and Wales capitalise upon acts of terrorism.

This promotion of permission to hate was not just confined to terrorist incidents, but also applied to high profile events that fit within the radical right's narrative that minority communities are a threat to societal hierarchy. One such event was the 2016 Brexit referendum in which immigration was a central issue, and which coincided with an increase in the number of hate crimes recorded across the country. This also highlights the role that the media play in permission to hate. As coverage mirrored the concerns of the radical right towards Muslim and minority communities, it presented an opportunity to promote their own anti-Muslim discourse and world view. This provided the radical right permission to hate as it enabled them to frame the issue of child exploitation as one that is exclusively the problem of Muslim/Asian communities.

This thesis supports Perry and Scriven's (2019) idea that the online collaboration between radical right groups is central to permission to hate. They identified online spaces and interactions with other Canadian or global groups as what they describe as favourable factors that shaped the development of radical right. Previously, there has been a reluctance of radical right organisations in the UK to have any formal associations with each other. This was evident in the BNP's attempts to distance themselves from the EDL and their reputation for street-based violence. Britain First attempted in 2015 to present themselves as a better organised and more credible protest group than the EDL, and had the additional legitimacy of being invited to the city by locals. However, by 2017 the radical right had evolved their attitude towards collaboration. As such, the findings of this study strengthen permission to hate by demonstrating that in England and Wales there is real world collaboration between radical right groups. In collaborating, these groups promote a network of hate, and provided

each other with a veneer of legitimacy. The EDL set the precedent for collaborating with more longstanding organisations such as the Welsh Defence League and Combat 18 which resulted in an increase in both attendance at, and the violent capacity of, their protests. Their early reliance on football firms for their initial support base was the precursor to the FLA and DFLA who were largely made up of 'football lads'. In 2017 Britain First engaged in joint events with Tommy Robinson and with the EDL in Birmingham, and Robinson was also involved in activities organised by the DFLA and FLA in 2018 after his departure from Pegida. These secondary organisations (FLA/DFLA) therefore were afforded an opportunity to protest alongside more established radical right figures. The resulting violence was committed under the guise of 'fighting back' against the encroachment of Islam, which the radical right had sought to establish as legitimate. This real-world collaboration of radical right organisations contributes towards our understanding of permission to hate as there are situations in which the radical right set aside rivalries to combine forces and protest against their 'common enemy' in minority communities. This is something that has not been widely explored and therefore contributes to the wider hate crime literature.

Perry and Scrivens (2019) also noted the role of police and counter-protesters in establishing permission to hate. They highlighted that where there is limited policing and resistance to the radical right, hate groups interpret this as giving them a sense of impunity. However, when the groups are met with excessive policing or counter-protests, they respond with an escalation of violence (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). My findings show that the radical right benefitted from policing tactics that enabled them to hold protests that contributed towards disorder and hate crime. West Midlands Police repeatedly organised a venue for the supporters to meet, and an enabling environment for supporters to congregate in ahead of the protests. This decision accepts and promotes the consumption of alcohol despite it being a recognised contributing factor to the disorder. The police justified the decision on the grounds that it created a single, easier to monitor location to engage the EDL, but in practice it also enabled supporters to engage with one another, prolonging the length of time in an area and thereby extending their exposure and opportunity to provoke the public. Therefore, permission to hate is supported by the limited responses of the police in regards to

combatting the impact of the radical right. Instead, this contributed towards enabling environments in which protests and hate crime took place.

The police further contributed to this enabling environment in their repeated use of neighbouring protest locations - such as Centenary and Victoria squares in Birmingham - for both the radical right and counter-protesters. The close proximity of their protest sites resulted in the rival groups breaking away from their designated areas to confront each other, separated by barriers and police. The violent clashes that ensued then became a motivating factor for attendance at EDL protests, especially for football firms such as Combat 18 and other football hooligans during the formative stages of the EDL. This presents the city as a hotbed for violence on all sides. The only protest that featured separated sites was Pegida's first protest in Birmingham in 2016 in which Pegida were hosted near Solihull and the counter-protesters in Birmingham city centre. Despite the absence of clashes between the groups, or influence on hate crime, this tactic was not repeated for any subsequent protests. By adapting their response to the EDL by separating the protest sites the police would have signalled that they are restricting the radical right's ability to promote permission to hate. Instead, the use of neighbouring city centre protest sites contributes to our understanding of permission to hate by highlighting how the way in which protests are organised and policed provide enabling factors for the radical right.

This thesis was theory testing as it applied the theory of permission to hate to the new context of England and Wales. By applying fresh context to the critical framework proposed by Perry and Scrivens, I have been able to expand upon their work. My findings contribute towards the theory by confirming the generalisability of some of the assumptions, whilst also enriching the theory with new ways in which the radical right promote permission to hate. This thesis confirms that the radical right influences hate crime, and highlights the tactics the groups use to maintain the status quo in a racialised society and their privileged position within it. The radical right influence hate crime through holding protests in aid of defending British values against the harms of Islam which they deem to be incompatible. By demonising Muslim and Asian communities, the radical right influences the normalisation of hate by signalling to these communities that they are not welcome. Radical right groups were particularly effective

at this when they had a local or national issue to promote as an example of the encroachment and threat of Islam, providing justification for their calls to deny minority communities the space and ability to express their needs. This was highlighted by the repeated focus of both the EDL and Britain First on Dudley and the proposed plans for a new mosque, and the protests organised in the wake of terrorist attacks. The latter provided evidence for how minority communities threaten national security. The work of Perry and Scrivens (2019) introduced a new theoretical approach for understanding hate crime perpetration, and the role that the radical right play in Canada. This thesis contributed to this approach by uncovering the ways in which this applies to the context of England and Wales.

Appendix: Summary of Interview Participants Currently or Previously Working in Third Party Reporting Centres

1 An Asian male working in a support role to the Imaan at a mosque in Dudley

2 A White male currently in the role as the head of a multifaith charity in Digbeth area of Birmingham

3 An Asian male who previously worked in a mosque in Dudley focusing on community engagement until 2017

4 A White female working in a community engagement and support role at a community and welfare centre Walsall

5 A White female currently working as the head of a refugee and migrant centre in Wolverhampton

6 An Asian female who previously worked in a community centre in Walsall until 2017

7 An Asian male who used to assist in the daily running of a Sikh Gurdwara in Coventry until 2017

8 An Asian male currently in the role as the head of a Sikh Gurdwara in Smethwick, Sandwell

9 A White male currently working as the head of a Church in Solihull

10 An Asian female working as an outreach worker an Asian Resource centre in Handsworth, Birmingham

11 An Asian male currently running the community engagement activities at a Muslim Charity in Birmingham

12 An Asian male who had been the advisor to the Imaan in at a mosque in Birmingham until 2019

13 An Asian male currently in the role of the Imaan at a mosque in Birmingham

14 An Asian male working as the assistant to the Imaan at a mosque in the Small Heath area of Birmingham

15 A White female who had worked at a victim support centre in Dudley until 2017

16 An Asian female who previously worked in a voluntary role in a charitable volunteering centre in Dudley since 2014

17 A White female who worked at a Housing Organisation in Walsall until 2016

18 A White male currently specialising in hate crime victim support at a community centre in Wolverhampton

19 A White male who had previously worked at a college that was registered as a TPRC in Walsall until 2016

20 A White female who worked in a community centre in Walsall until 2017

21 An Asian female currently working in an Equality and Diversity centre in Dudley

22 An Asian male running a Youth Trust organisation in Wolverhampton

23 An Asian male currently working at an Ethnic Minority Support centre in Coventry

24 A White female who worked as a support officer and a victim support organisation in Coventry until 2017

25 An Asian male who previously worked as a volunteer in a refugee centre in Coventry until 2016

26 An Asian female currently working at an Ethnic Minority Organisation in Wolverhampton

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