Goldstein, Laurence (2004) Philosophical Integrations. Language Sciences , 26 (6). pp. 545-563. ISSN 0388-0001 .
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Our understanding of malapropism is a phenomenon that cries out for explanation, and we here use this phenomenon as a test case to evaluate the plausibility not just of different versions of Integrationism but also of the ‘Language of Thought’ hypothesis and a rival Dynamical Systems approach to modelling the workings of the mind. The verdict: The Roy Harris version of Integrationism (which overlaps interestingly with some views of the philosopher Donald Davidson) is extravagant and implausible and does not cut the mustard. The ‘Language of Thought’ hypothesis is put under severe strain. The Dynamical Systems approach which incorporates the ‘Extended Mind’ hypothesis, sits comfortably with the plausible version of Integrationism that is found in the late writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
|Subjects:||P Language and Literature > P Philology. Linguistics|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Laurence Goldstein|
|Date Deposited:||13 Sep 2008 19:00|
|Last Modified:||06 Sep 2011 00:18|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/9128 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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