Particularism and Reasons: A Reply to Kirchin

Norman, Richard J. (2007) Particularism and Reasons: A Reply to Kirchin. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4 (1). pp. 33-39. ISSN 1740-4681. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468106072781

Abstract

Valency switching can appear especially puzzling if we think of moral reasons as 'pushes and pulls'—considerations whose job it is to get us to act or to stop us acting. Talk of 'default valency' doesn't remove the puzzle, it merely restates it. We need a different picture of reasons—perhaps as providing a map of the moral terrain which helps us to see which actions are appropriate to which situations, and who the appropriate agents are. The role of virtue concepts in particular is more complex and varied than that of providing 'reasons for acting'. A more holistic picture of reasons can make valency switching less mysterious.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: default valency, particularism, reasons, thick concepts, valency switching, virtues
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Fiona Godfrey
Date Deposited: 27 Jun 2008 15:23
Last Modified: 03 Jun 2014 08:53
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/8827 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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