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The Influence of Honor Threats on Goal Delay and Goal Derailment: A Comparison of Turkey, Southern US, and Northern US

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Abstract

Honor means having a good reputation (e.g., being known as an honest person) and self-respect (e.g., being proud of one's own competence). In honor cultures (e.g., Turkey, Southern U.S.), people are more sensitive to threats to their moral reputation (e.g., being called a liar) than in dignity cultures (e.g., Northern U.S.), and they respond more strongly to these threats to restore their damaged reputation. Taking a goal conflict approach, we propose that among members of honor cultures, restoration of honor in response to a morality threat can become a superordinate goal, and can result in the neglect or derailment of other goals. In two experiments (n = 941), participants from Turkey (a non-Western honor culture), the U.S. South (a Western honor culture), and the U.S. North (a dignity culture) received a morality threat (accusation of dishonesty), a competence threat (accusation of poor writing ability), or neutral feedback. As predicted, participants from honor cultures, but not the dignity culture, were more likely to delay their subsequent goals after receiving a threat to their moral reputation (vs. competence threat or neutral conditions; Study 1). Moreover, Turkish participants were more likely to display goal derailment after receiving a morality threat compared to a competence threat, but there was no difference in responses to the two types of threat among the U.S. Northerners or Southerners (Study 2). This research is the first to examine honor using a goal conflict framework and to conduct laboratory experiments in two honor cultures.

Keywords: culture of honor; goal conflict; reputation; morality

The Influence of Honor Threats on Goal Delay and Goal Derailment: A Comparison of Turkey, Southern U.S., and Northern U.S.

Over the last two decades, cultural psychological research has accumulated evidence demonstrating that members of honor cultures highly value reputation, virtuous and moral behavior, and personal integrity. They are highly concerned with protecting and maintaining a positive social reputation; as a result, they tend to be more sensitive to potential threats to their reputation relative to members of dignity cultures (e.g., Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Cross, Uskul, Gercek-Swing, Alozkan, & Ataca, 2013). Dignity cultures are groups that also have honor in their cultural repertoire but define it more in reference to one's personal integrity and perceive it to be a private matter (for a review see Uskul, Cross, Günsoy & Gul, 2019).

In the most complete theoretical analysis to date of honor and dignity cultures, Leung and Cohen (2011) described a primary characteristic of members of honor cultures as "dedicated to short-term irrationality in that [they] abhor cost-benefit calculations" (p. 510). They went on to describe how the importance of maintaining one's honor may override other goals, even when the honor-restoring actions are costly. We propose that this seeming irrationality can be understood through a goal conflict approach. Goal conflict can be defined as a situation in which seemingly incompatible goals exert force in divergent directions (Kehr, 2003). We suggest that, in honor cultures, the assertion of honor can act as a superordinate goal, which although not always activated in consciousness, is nonetheless actively directing behavior behind the scenes (Bargh & Huang, 2009). Thus, when members of honor cultures experience an honor threat (e.g., false accusations, insults) in the process of working towards a task-related goal, the goal of restoring honor may take precedence and other goals may momentarily become secondary (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Simon, 1967). This can result in psychological resources being reallocated (e.g., attention shifting

away from the initial goal to the honor threat) and in behaviors oriented toward the restoration of honor that may look irrational at times (e.g., not cooperating with the offender even when this is costly to self). The goal of honor restoration may introduce goal conflict, and be costly to the victim, if it distracts the victim from pursuing his or her initial task-related goal.

To date, no studies have investigated responses to honor attacks using a goal conflict framework, nor have studies tested the extent to which responses to honor threats can be "irrational" or come at a cost to the victim of the attack. We aim to fill this gap by making three novel contributions to the social psychological literature on cultures of honor. First, we examine how exposure to honor threats may lead to greater goal conflict among members of honor (vs. dignity) cultures and how their responses to honor threats may result in consequences costly to themselves. Study 1 focuses on the role of honor threats when decisions are made about goal pursuit and examines *goal delay* following an honor threat. Study 2 examines *goal derailment,* asking whether people will avoid working with the most skilled partner, reducing their own performance and access to financial rewards, if the partner has previously threatened their honor.

Most research on the psychological consequences of honor threats has contrasted an honor threat with a no-threat condition, where an honor threat typically included a threat to the individual's masculinity (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Saucier, Till, Miller, O'Dea, & Andres, 2015) or moral behavior (e.g., honesty; Uskul et al., 2015), as these make up important components of honor (Cross et al., 2014; Rodriguez Mosquera, 2016). Lacking other types of threats, these studies fall short in providing an insight into whether members of honor cultures would respond similarly to or distinguish between other types of threat (for exceptions, see Günsoy, Cross, Uskul, & Gercek-Swing, 2019; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fisher, 2002a). Being honorable means having a good *reputation* or social

respect (e.g., being considered a moral person by others) as well as having *self-respect* (e.g., being proud of one's competence and accomplishments; Cross et al., 2014; Pitt-Rivers, 1965). Previous research has shown that in honor cultures, moral reputation is a more critical aspect of honor than competence; and threats to one's morality (e.g., being called a liar) can lead to stronger reactions than threats to one's competence (e.g., being called incompetent; Günsoy et al., 2019; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fisher, 2002b). Members of dignity cultures, however, tend to respond similarly to these two types of threats (Günsoy et al., 2019); in these cultures, positive self-esteem, autonomy, and personal achievements are also strongly emphasized, and lack of achievement and failure are common examples of shameful situations (Cohen, Hernandez, Gruschow, Nowak, Gelfand, & Bowkowski, 2018; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000; Uskul, Cross, Sunbay, Gercek-Swing, & Ataca, 2012). Thus, the second contribution of the current research is that it compares goal pursuit following a morality threat (an accusation of behaving immorally) with a competence threat (an accusation of poor performance on a task). This comparison will help us unfold whether any type of threat impairs goal pursuit among members of honor cultures or whether it is specifically threats to moral reputation that lead to interruption of action toward different goals.

Finally, social psychological studies on honor cultures have typically compared members of Western honor cultures with dignity cultures (e.g., Southern vs. Northern US; Spain vs. the Netherlands) or non-Western honor cultures with dignity cultures (e.g., Turkey vs. Northern U.S.; for overviews see Uskul, & Cross, 2019; Uskul et al., 2019). Although these studies have been influential in advancing our understanding of these cultural contexts, it is unclear whether patterns obtained in one type of an honor culture (e.g., Southern U.S.) would generalize to another type of an honor culture (e.g., Turkey). Thus, the third contribution of this research is that it includes samples from two honor cultures: Turkey, a

predominantly collectivistic context in the understudied Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and Southern U.S., a relatively less collectivistic context in an economically affluent part of the world.

Current Studies

In two studies, we tested the consequences of being subjected to a morality threat versus a competence threat for goal pursuit. We threatened participants' morality through a situation in which they were accused of being immoral (i.e., accusation of dishonesty). The competence threat targeted individuals' performance on a task; participants were given negative feedback on their ability to write effectively. An attack to one's morality (e.g., being accused of lying) has relatively severe consequences for one's reputation. Moral qualities are more influential than competencies when people form global evaluations of others, because moral qualities of an individual directly signal whether one is harmful or beneficial to others (Wojcizske, 2005). Attacks to morality are especially insulting in honor cultures where maintaining a moral reputation is strongly emphasized (Cross et al., 2014; Günsoy et al., 2019). An attack on one's ability or competence, however, is primarily a threat to one's self-perception and self-esteem, rather than reputation, as competencies are mainly self-profitable (Wojcizske, 2005). One's competence can also have implications for one's reputation, but only in situations when one's competence is profitable to others (Wojcizske, 2005). In addition to morality and competence threats, in both studies, we also included a no-threat situation where feedback was neutral.

Given that reputation maintenance is strongly emphasized and threats to one's moral reputation are highly insulting in honor cultures, we expected individuals from this group to be distracted by the morality threat (vs. no-threat), reflected in goal delay (Study 1) and goal derailment (Study 2; Hypothesis 1). Moreover, because moral reputation is a more important component of honor than having self-respect in honor cultures, we expected members of

honor cultures to experience greater goal delay and derailment by an attack to their moral reputation (i.e., being accused of lying; a strong insult to honor in these cultures) than by an attack to their competence (i.e., being called incompetent; Hypothesis 2). For members of dignity cultures, reputation management is not a salient goal to the same degree as in honor cultures; therefore, we expected them to display smaller differences between morality threat and other threat conditions in their goal delay and goal derailment (Hypothesis 3). We did not have specific predictions regarding differences or similarities between Turkish and Southern U.S. participants; we compared the findings across the two groups (when sample sizes allowed) for exploratory purposes.[1]

Study 1

Theoretically, members of an honor culture cannot let a threat to their honor pass; they must identify a way to respond. This may distract them from their pursuit of other goals by interfering with the early phases of goal pursuit: In the pre-decisional phase, individuals decide which goals to prioritize, and in the pre-actional phase, they plan when and how to get started with their goal (Gollwitzer, 1996). Distractions in the environment, such as facing a threat and deciding how to respond, can interfere with goal prioritization and goal initiation, which in turn may impair goal attainment entirely (Gollwitzer, 1996; Guinote, 2007). As shown by Guinote (2007), for example, people primed with less power (vs. more power) tend to report that they would start working towards their goals later, as lack of power makes people more prone to be distracted by irrelevant information in the environment. Thus, using a goal-conflict approach applied to goal prioritization and goal initiation, we hypothesized that members of honor cultures would delay the initiation of other goals after a moral

[1] All measures, manipulations, and exclusions in the studies are disclosed, as well as the method of determining the final sample sizes.

reputation threat (vs. no-threat; Hypothesis 1). Moreover, members of honor cultures would be more likely to delay their goals following a morality threat (being called a liar; a strong insult to honor in these cultures) than a competence threat (being called incompetent; a weaker insult to honor in these cultures; Hypothesis 2). We expected these differences to be smaller in the dignity group (Hypothesis 3).

To test these hypotheses, we used a modified version of a laboratory paradigm designed to deliver morality-threatening (vs. competence-threatening vs. neutral) feedback to participants (Uskul et al., 2015). To measure goal delay, we asked participants to indicate when they would start working towards several goals (Guinote, 2007).

Method

Participants

Institutional review board approval was obtained in all locations before data collection started. One hundred and sixty-nine European-American (103 women) and 19 Latino/a American undergraduates (13 women) at a Midwestern and a Southern U.S. university, and 92 undergraduates at a Turkish university (37 women) participated in this study in return for course credit. Data collection stopped once there were no more student sign-ups in the research participation system of each location by the end of the academic year. Data analysis did not start until data collection was complete.

We asked U.S. participants to indicate in which state they spent most of their life and coded their cultural background accordingly (honor culture for Southern and Mountain states vs. dignity culture for Northeastern and Midwestern states; see Cohen et al., 1996; "Economic Census," 2016). Nineteen Latinx American participants were included in the honor sample regardless of where they spent most of their life (Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998). To achieve an acceptable sample size in the honor group, we combined the U.S. honor sample (n = 68) and the Turkish sample (n = 92). The final sample consisted of 160 honor

culture participants (81 women, M_{age} = 21.06, SD = 2.71) and 120 dignity culture participants (72 women, M_{age} = 20.40, SD = 3.98; see Supplementary Materials for information on additional demographic variables).

Materials and Procedure

The experimenter introduced the study to participants individually as part of a larger project, which examined the training of future recruiters for large companies and was conducted by faculty members in psychology and the business school. In this mock job application study, recruiters-in-training were going to evaluate the participant's application materials and interview the participant. First, the participant was asked to complete demographic questions and filler items used to support the cover story. All materials were translated and back-translated from English to Turkish by bilingual research assistants.

Essay writing task. Next, participants were told that they would be randomly assigned to different job application tasks (e.g., communication skills, essay writing, or problem solving), which would be evaluated by the recruiter-in-training in the lab. Unbeknownst to them, all participants were assigned to the essay writing task. They were instructed to write about an incident in which they behaved in an honest, trustworthy, and fair way even though doing so might have been costly (Uskul et al., 2015). The experimenter told the participant that he/she would see the recruiter's evaluation of their essay before having a short interview with the recruiter. The participant was left alone for 10 minutes to write the essay.

After participants completed their essay, the experimenter made a show of "sending" the essay to the recruiter for evaluation through the lab computer network. While (ostensibly) waiting for the recruiter's evaluation, the participant was given a short article on first impressions in interviews to read until the evaluation arrived.

Threat manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three threat conditions: morality threat, competence threat, and no-threat. The evaluation form contained ratings of the essay by the recruiter on several dimensions (e.g., organization, clarity) and space for open-ended comments. Morality and competence threat conditions contained the same numeric ratings (lower end of the scales) but differed in the open-ended comments. For the morality threat condition, the comments cast doubt on the participant's honesty: *It is difficult to evaluate this applicant because their point is not clear. Also, it is hard to believe that someone would really be like this. Something like this is so easy to fake there is no way it can be trusted. I think they just made it up because this is a job application. There is no way this person would be hired.* For the competence threat condition, the comments focused on the quality of writing: *It is difficult to evaluate this applicant because their point is not clear. The person doesn't express things clearly. This person's application may not stand out.* Finally, for the no-threat condition, the numeric ratings were higher than the other two conditions and the written comments were neutral: *It is a difficult task to remember and write about a specific event in one's life. Every day we face situations in which we have to make decisions that might or might not benefit us. I think there is a 50-50 chance this person would be called for an interview.* Experimenters were kept blind to the threat condition through the use of several strategies (see Supplementary Materials).

The participant was left alone to read the evaluation for three minutes. Subsequently, the experimenter returned and opened up another questionnaire on the computer. This questionnaire was introduced as a measure to assess participants' thoughts and feelings before the interview began. It included filler items to strengthen the cover story as well as the manipulation check questions. Manipulation checks asked to what degree participants found the feedback *specific* and *positive,* as well as to what extent they felt *insulted*, measured by

the following items: belittled, offended, humiliated, put-down, and ridiculed (α_{Honor} = .90, $\alpha_{Dignity}$ = .92; 1: *not at all* to 5: *very*).

Goal delay measure. Next, the experimenter returned and asked the participant to fill out a short questionnaire for an unrelated study, while the recruiter was getting ready for the interview. They were offered an entry in a drawing for $20 (30TL) if they participated. The experimenter gave the participant a fake consent form and the goal delay measure (adapted from Guinote, 2007). Participants answered seven questions about when they would engage in various tasks (e.g., applying for an internship; 1: *today* to 11: *the day before due*). This measure has been used to assess delays in the initiation of goal-directed action and found to be sensitive to contextual changes (e.g., being in a high or low power position; Guinote, 2007). Finally, the experimenter probed for suspicion, ended the study, and debriefed the participant. Thirty-two participants indicated that the study was about people's reactions to feedback, but still believed that there was a recruiter in the lab. Excluding this group did not change the pattern of results, thus we report analyses based on the sample that includes this group.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check. We examined whether the feedback types differed in their positivity and how insulting they were across conditions, but not in their specificity. As intended, univariate ANOVAs within each cultural group revealed that there was no significant main effect of threat condition on the specificity of feedback, $F_{Honor}(2, 157) = .38$, $p = .68$, $\eta^2 = .01$; $F_{Dignity}(2, 113) = .61$, $p = .55$, $\eta^2 = .01$, suggesting that the different types of feedback were structurally not different from each other across conditions. In both cultural groups, however, there was a significant main effect of threat condition on the positivity of feedback, $F_{Honor}(2, 157) = 154.67$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .66$; $F_{Dignity}(2, 113) = 83.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .60$, and on how insulted participants felt in response to it, $F_{Honor}(2, 157) = 18.72$, $p < .001$,

$\eta^2 = .19$; $F_{Dignity}(2, 113) = 18.94$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .25$ (Table 1). As intended, participants in both cultural groups perceived the neutral feedback as more positive, $F_{Honor,\ neutral\ vs.\ morality\ threat}(1, 113) = 345.78$, $p < .001$, $d = 3.48$; $F_{Honor,\ neutral\ vs.\ competence\ threat}(1, 101) = 152.55$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.40$; $F_{Dignity,\ neutral\ vs.\ morality\ threat}(1, 77) = 114.49$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.41$; $F_{Dignity,\ neutral\ vs.\ competence\ threat}(1, 78) = 129.83$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.57$; and less insulting than the other two types of feedback, $F_{Honor,\ neutral\ vs.\ morality\ threat}(1, 113) = 37.25$, $p < .001$, $d = -1.14$; $F_{Honor,\ neutral\ vs.\ competence\ threat}(1, 101) = 15.38$, $p < .001$, $d = -.77$; $F_{Dignity,\ neutral\ vs.\ morality\ threat}(1, 77) = 28.34$, $p < .001$, $d = -1.17$; $F_{Dignity,\ neutral\ vs.\ competence\ threat}(1, 78) = 36.21$, $p < .001$, $d = -1.32$. Moreover, members of honor cultures perceived the morality-threatening feedback as significantly less positive, $F(1,100) = 4.68$, $p = .03$, $d = -.43$, and more insulting than the competence-threatening feedback, $F(1,100) = 4.41$, $p = .04$, $d = .42$; there was, however, no difference between the two conditions for the dignity group, $F_{positive}(1,71) = .56$, $p = .46$, $d = -.17$; $F_{insulting}(1,71) = .48$, $p = .49$, $d = -.17$. This confirms that attacks to one's morality (i.e., accusation of dishonesty) are perceived as more threatening than attacks to one's competence (i.e., accusation of poor writing) in honor cultures, but not in dignity cultures.[2]

[2] The means reported in Table 1 show that honor group participants reported less insult than did dignity group participants in both the morality and competence threat conditions. One interpretation of this finding is that in collectivistic honor cultures such as Turkey, in addition to the importance of protecting personal reputation, values and norms also emphasize preserving relationship harmony and interpersonal politeness ("paradox of politeness"; Cohen & Vandello, 2004; Cross et al., 2013). Being under the influence of these different motives, honor group participants may not report feeling insulted, but they certainly act as if they felt insulted.

Goal delay. An ANOVA with cultural group (honor, dignity) and threat type (morality, competence, no-threat) as between-subjects factors revealed significant main effects of threat, $F(2, 273) = 5.50$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .04$, and cultural group, $F(1, 273) = 16.81$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .06$, which were moderated by a marginally significant interaction, $F(2, 273) = 2.88$, $p = .06$, $\eta^2 = .06$ (Table 1). One participant refused to complete the goal delay scale and was thus not part of this analysis.

To test our hypotheses, we conducted a planned contrast analysis in each cultural group, in which morality threat was compared to the other two conditions. As predicted, this analysis revealed a significant effect of the *morality threat* in the honor group, $t(157) = 2.52$, $p = .01$, $r = .20$; honor culture participants were significantly more likely to report that they would delay pursuit of a goal in the morality threat condition ($M = 5.26$, $SD = 1.41$) than in the no-threat condition ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.94$; Hypothesis 1), $F(1,113) = 5.16$, $p = .03$, $d = .42$, %95 CI [.11, 1.33], and competence threat condition ($M = 4.60$, $SD = 1.52$; Hypothesis 2), $F(1,100) = 5.12$, $p = .03$, $d = .45$, %95 CI[.01, 1.31].[3] Responses of participants in the competence threat condition did not differ from those in the no-threat condition, $F(1,101) = .03$, $p = .86$, $d = .03$, %95 CI [-.59, .71], suggesting that competence threat did not affect

[3] The sensitivity power analysis in the honor sample for an alpha of .05 (one-tailed), power of .80, and two threat conditions revealed a minimum *d* of .47 and .50 for the comparison of morality threat with no-threat (Hypothesis 1) and competence threat condition (Hypothesis 2), respectively (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2013). Note that the actual effect sizes for Hypothesis 1 ($d = .42$) and 2 ($d = .45$) are slightly smaller than those from the power analysis, indicating that a bigger sample size was needed to establish stability of results.

their goal-directed behavior (Figure 1). This pattern was found in both honor culture groups when analyses were conducted separately.[4]

As predicted, the planned contrast analysis for dignity culture participants did not reveal a significant effect of the morality threat (Hypothesis 3), $t(116) = 1.40$, $p = .16$, $r = .13$. Our exploratory analysis, however, showed a significant contrast effect of the *competence threat*, $t(116) = -3.25$, $p = .002$, $r = .29$ (Figure 1). Dignity culture participants in the competence threat condition ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 1.27$) reported that they would engage in goal pursuit more *quickly* than participants in the no-threat condition ($M = 4.37$, $SD = 1.80$), $F(1,$

[4] The planned contrast analysis revealed a significant effect of morality threat in the Turkish sample, $t(89) = 2.43$, $p = .02$, $r = .25$; Turkish participants in the morality threat condition ($M = 5.76$, $SD = 1.35$) were significantly more likely to delay their goals than those in competence threat ($M = 4.93$, $SD = 1.41$), $F(1, 58) = 5.42$, $p = .02$, $d = .60$, and no threat conditions ($M = 4.95$, $SD = 1.75$), $F(1, 60) = 4.13$, $p = .047$, $d = .52$. Turkish participants in the competence threat condition, however, were no different in their goal delay from participants in the no-threat condition, $F(1, 60) = .002$, $p = .97$, $d = -.01$. In the U.S. South, the planned contrast analysis revealed a marginally significant effect of morality threat, $t(65) = 1.69$, $p = .096$, $r = .21$. The pairwise comparisons did not reveal significant differences between conditions (possibly due to the smaller sample size); however, the pattern was similar to the one in Turkey. Participants in the morality threat condition ($M = 4.70$, $SD = 1.29$) were somewhat more likely to delay their goals than those in competence threat condition ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 1.58$), $F(1, 40) = 2.93$, $p = .095$, $d = .53$, and no-threat condition ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 2.08$), $F(1, 51) = 2.01$, $p = .16$, $d = .39$. The difference between morality threat and no-threat condition, $d = .39$, was greater than the difference between competence threat and no-threat condition, $F(1, 39) = .03$, $p = .87$, $d = .05$.

79) = 9.12, p = .003, d = -.67, %95CI [-1.76, -.35], and morality threat condition (M = 4.28, SD = 1.64), F(1, 75) = 8.38, p = .01, d = -.65, %95 CI [-1.69, -.25]. Their responses in the morality threat condition did not differ from those in the no-threat condition, F(1, 78) = .05, p = .82, d = .05, %95CI [-.79, .62], suggesting that morality threat did not affect their goal-directed behavior.

Consistent with our hypotheses, participants in the honor group were more likely to report that they would delay initiating goals after a morality threat than after a competence threat or neutral feedback. This supports the argument that not just any threat has important consequences for members of honor cultures; threats to domains central to honor (i.e., moral reputation) have more impact on members of honor cultures than do threats to domains less central to honor (i.e., competence; Günsoy et al., 2019; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b). Surprisingly, participants in the dignity group were faster in working towards their goals after receiving competence threat than after morality threat or neutral feedback. One potential explanation for this finding could be that by deciding to work quickly on other goals, participants in the dignity group were compensating for receiving feedback that implied their incompetence, which has strong implications for self-esteem (see Marchiondo, Cortina, & Kabat-Farr, 2018).

In Study 2, we examined the role of honor threats and culture in another aspect of goal conflict: goal derailment. Moreover, we ensured that the sample sizes were large enough to have adequate power overall and to examine the pattern of findings separately in the two honor cultural groups.

Study 2

Consider a group project, in which one of your group members has just called you a liar. Unfortunately, the situation does not allow you to confront the person immediately. Instead, you are next required to choose a partner for an upcoming task; if you perform well,

you and your partner will win a prize. The group member who called you a liar happens to be the most qualified partner for this task, so you are posed with conflicting goals: Do you prioritize the goal of performing well on the task and select your accuser as your partner, or do you prioritize your goal of honor management by rejecting your accuser (and reduce your chances of winning the prize)? The latter choice represents *goal derailment*; by rejecting the accuser who is the most qualified partner, you would derail from your goal of performing well and winning the prize.

In Study 2, we created this situation using an online platform and examined the influence of morality threat (vs. competence threat or no-threat) on people's goal derailment in Turkey, Southern U.S., and Northern U.S. We hypothesized that Turkish and Southern U.S. participants (honor cultures) would be more likely to avoid working with a person who had questioned their honesty (morality threat) than with a person who provided them neutral feedback (no threat condition; Hypothesis 1). Moreover, we expected Turkish and Southern U.S. participants to be more likely to avoid working with the feedback provider in the morality threat than in the competence threat condition (Hypothesis 2), because the former is a stronger insult to one's honor in these cultures. We expected these differences to be smaller in the U.S. North (dignity culture; Hypothesis 3).

To make our analysis decisions transparent, we pre-registered our study using the Open Science Framework repository. Our pre-registration was submitted after data collection but before hypothesis testing. In this manuscript, we report the hypotheses, methods, and analyses that we indicated in the pre-registration plan. Some of our pre-registered hypotheses, however, are not included here for the sake of simplicity and coherence between the two studies. The tests of other pre-registered hypotheses can be found in Supplementary Materials.

Method

Participants

Institutional review board approval was obtained in all locations before data collection started. Participants were undergraduates in Turkey (N = 273), and European-American and Latinx undergraduates in Southern U.S. (N = 196) and Midwestern U.S. (N = 303), who received course credit for their participation. As indicated in the pre-registration plan, we aimed for at least 70 participants per threat condition - 210 per cultural group - after the data cleaning process. We followed previous experimental studies on honor-related threat to determine the sample size, which used approximately 50-100 participants per condition (e.g., Uskul et al., 2015). Due to the possibility of losing participants in the data cleaning process, we aimed to collect data from more than 210 participants in each cultural group. Sample sizes differed in each cultural group because of differences in participant pools. For example, we collected more data at the university in Northern U.S. than in other locations because the participant pool there is known to have a high rate of incomplete answers.

To ensure that suspicion of the cover story was low, we excluded participants who had previously participated in a similar study (n = 30). As indicated in the pre-registration plan, we also excluded participants who failed attention checks (n = 87), who could see through the cover story (n = 25), and who did not complete the study (n = 14). We used the same procedure as in Study 1 to categorize U.S. participants according to their most lived states. The final sample consisted of 191 Turkish participants (101 women), 172 U.S. Southerners (123 women), and 253 U.S. Northerners (165 women). Average age was 21.67 (SD = 2.03) in Turkey, 19.06 (SD = 1.15) in the U.S. South, and 20.55 (SD = 3.41) in the U.S. North (see Supplementary Materials for information on additional demographic variables).

Materials and Procedure

Participants were informed that the study investigated an online team-building experience and they were going to interact with four other participants on an online platform. However, participants responded to a pre-programmed situation based loosely on the Ostracism Online Manipulation (Wolf, Levordashka, Ruff, Kraaijeveld, Lueckmann, & Williams, 2015). After providing demographic information, participants were directed to a webpage, in which they entered a nickname and chose an avatar to represent themselves. Then, to create a profile for themselves, they wrote a paragraph-long description about two achievements that made them stand out among their friends.

Threat manipulation. Next, participants entered the online interaction platform where they read other people's achievement descriptions and interacted with them for three minutes (see Figure 2 for an example). We designed the program so that three of the four other "participants" matched the gender of the participant. They were asked to write one comment on other participants' profile and to click on the "like" button if they liked their description. Every participant received three pre-programmed "likes" from others (the average number of "likes" the other hypothetical participants received). Participants also received two comments that were supposedly sent by two other "participants." The first comment (which all participants received) was neutral (*"Hi! Nice to meet you"*). The second comment constituted the threat condition. In the morality threat condition, participants received a comment accusing them of lying about their achievements *("Yeah, right. It looks like you are making this up"*). In the competence threat condition, participants received a negative comment about their writing ability (*"Your grammar is off, I would seriously consider revising"*). In the no-threat condition, participants received a slightly positive comment (*"I enjoyed reading your descriptions"*).

Following this interaction, participants responded to filler questions (e.g., about their social media use) and the first set of manipulation check questions; they indicated to what

extent they felt *insulted* after their interaction, measured by the following items: belittled, offended, and threatened ($\alpha_{Turkey} = .81$, $\alpha_{U.S.\ South} = .91$, $\alpha_{U.S.\ North} = .91$; 1: *not at all* to 7: *very*).

Goal derailment measure. Next, participants were informed that they were going to complete a high-level math task on which they will work in pairs. Participants were told that the pair who solves the highest number of problems would win two $30 (50TL) gift certificates. Participants were led to believe that they were randomly selected as the person who should make the partner choice. Participants could choose one of the three gender-matched "participants" as a partner.

Several details about each potential partner were provided. Pat, who made the threatening (or neutral) comments, was strategically presented as having the background and characteristics that made him/her the best choice for math tasks (e.g., *Computer Engineering major, likes puzzles, logical;* see Supplementary Materials for complete descriptions). The other two targets either made a neutral comment or never interacted with the participant, and they were presented as being less qualified as a partner than Pat in a math task: Chris (e.g., *Political Science major, likes hiking, laid-back*) and Sam (e.g., *Anthropology major, polite*).[5]

Subsequently, participants responded to the second set of manipulation check questions: a one-item measure of perceived *competence* of potential partners (How competent do you think this person is in mathematical problem solving?), and a three-item measure of *liking* of them (e.g. Do you think you would likely to be friends with this person if you had the chance?), $\alpha_{Turkey} = .69$, $\alpha_{U.S.\ South} = .73$, $\alpha_{U.S.\ North} = .78$. Finally, participants were probed

[5] Gender neutral names were selected in Turkish and English.

for suspicion and read the debriefing information. All materials were translated and back-translated from English to Turkish by bilingual research assistants.[6]

Results and Discussion

We created a dichotomous variable called *partner choice*, which reflects the likelihood of choosing Pat (best partner and the perpetrator in threat conditions) as opposed to another partner (1 = *Pat*, 0 = *another partner*).

Manipulation check. We examined whether Pat was perceived as less *likable* in the two threat conditions than in the no-threat condition and as more *competent* than other potential partners in all conditions. We conducted between-subject ANOVAs with cultural group (Turkey, U.S. South, U.S. North), threat type (morality, competence, no-threat), and partner choice (Pat, others). As expected, the interaction between threat type and partner choice was significant for likability, $F(2, 598)= 13.18$, $p <.001$, $\eta^2 =.04$, and there was a significant main effect of threat type on likability among those who chose Pat as a partner, $F(2, 374) = 49.01$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .21$. Pat was liked significantly less in the morality threat ($M = 2.71$, $SD = .97$) and competence threat conditions ($M = 2.77$, $SD = .85$) than in the no-

[6] As indicated in the pre-registration plan, we also measured participants' beliefs about the importance of social image (Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008) and included several hypotheses about it. Our measurement invariance tests showed that there was metric invariance of this measure across cultural groups ($\Delta\chi^2 (8) = 8.72$, $p = .36$), but there was no scalar invariance. Therefore, we could not compare the mean scores of this measure across cultures nor could we test some of our pre-registered hypotheses. We examined the interaction of this variable with threat type (see Supplementary Materials) because sometimes interaction analyses are carried on with partial invariances even though it is not ideal. More detail can be provided upon request.

threat condition (M = 3.54, SD = .67), $F_{Morality\ threat\ vs.\ no\text{-}threat}$ (1, 275) = 66.02, p < .001, d = -1.01, $F_{Competence\ threat\ vs.\ no\text{-}threat}$ (1, 304) = 76.58, p < .001, d = -1.02. There was no main effect of threat type on the likability of other potential partners, F(2, 224) = .23, p = .79, η^2 = .002, suggesting that they were equally liked across conditions. As intended, Pat was perceived as more competent in mathematical problem solving (M = 4.03, SD = .70) than others (M = 3.20, SD = .72), F(1, 598) = 120.88, p < .001, d = 1.17, and there was no interaction with threat type, F(2, 598) = 1.25, p = .29, η^2 = .004. The three-way interaction of culture, threat type, and partner choice was not significant for partner liking, F(4, 598) = .68, p = .61, η^2 = .01, nor for partner competence, F(4, 598) = .17, p = .95, η^2 = .001.

Next, we conducted univariate ANOVAs within each cultural group for the insult variable (belittled, offended, and threatened) and found that threat type significantly predicted the extent to which participants felt *insulted* after interacting with Pat, F_{Turkey}(2, 176) = 13.90, p < .001, η^2 = .14, $F_{U.S.\ South}$(2, 169) = 65.45, p < .001, η^2 = .44, $F_{U.S.\ North}$(2, 246) = 72.99, p < .001, η^2 = .37. As intended, participants in all cultural groups felt less insulted in the no-threat condition than in the morality threat condition , F_{Turkey}(1, 116) = 23.74, p < .001, d = -.88, $F_{U.S.\ South}$(1, 112) = 124.53, p < .001, d = -2.02, $F_{U.S.\ North}$ (1, 157) = 120.80, p < .001, d = -1.62, and competence threat condition F_{Turkey}(1, 123) = 20.71, p < .001, d = -.81, $F_{U.S.\ South}$(1, 120) = 109.84, p < .001, d = -1.87, $F_{U.S.\ North}$ (1, 182) = 159.91, p < .001, d = -1.85 (see Table 2). Unlike Study 1, however, there was no significant difference in any cultural group between morality threat and competence threat conditions, F_{Turkey}(1, 113) = 1.85, p = .18, d = .25, $F_{U.S.\ South}$(1, 106) = .65, p = .42, d = .16, $F_{U.S.\ North}$ (1, 153) = .10, p = .75, d = -.05. To shed light on this finding, we analyzed the three items separately and found that feeling offended and threatened (r_{Turkey} = .57, p < .001, $r_{U.S.\ South}$ = .75, p < .001, $r_{U.S.\ North}$ = .75, p < .001) showed a different pattern from feeling belittled. Turkish participants who received morality-threatening feedback from Pat were somewhat more likely to feel offended and

threatened than those who received competence-threatening feedback, $F(1, 116) = 3.05$, $p = .08$, $d = .32$, but there was no difference between these conditions in the U.S. South, $F(1, 106) = 1.66$, $p = .20$, $d = .25$, or in the U.S. North, $F(1, 155) = .11$, $p = .74$, $d = .05$ (see Table 2). This suggests that only in the Turkish sample, the attack to one's morality (i.e., accusation of dishonesty) was perceived as a stronger threat than the attack to one's competence (i.e., accusation of poor writing ability). There was no difference between the two threat conditions in any cultural group for belittlement, $F_{Turkey}(1, 117) = .09$, $p = .77$, $d = .05$, $F_{U.S. South}(1, 106) = .03$, $p = .85$, $d = -.03$, $F_{U.S. North}(1, 155) = 1.60$, $p = .21$, $d = -.20$ (Table 2).

Goal derailment. We conducted a binomial logistic regression, in which partner choice was regressed on cultural group (Turkey, U.S. South, U.S. North), threat type (morality, competence, no-threat), and the product interaction term (cultural group × threat type). We created two variables (i.e. effect coding) to represent the comparison of the two honor culture groups (Turkey and the U.S. South) with the dignity culture group (U.S. North; cultural comparison 1), and to represent the comparison of Turkey with the U.S South (cultural comparison 2). Threat conditions were converted into two new variables to represent the comparison of the morality threat with the no-threat condition (Threat 1), and the comparison of the morality threat with the competence threat condition (Threat 2).

The results did not reveal a significant interaction of cultural comparison 1 (two honor groups vs. the dignity group) and threat conditions to predict partner choice (see Table 3). However, there was a significant interaction of cultural comparison 2 (Turkey vs. U.S. South) and threat condition 2 (morality vs competence threat). Relative to participants from the U.S South, Turkish participants were less likely to choose Pat (i.e., more likely to derail from their goal) after receiving morality threat than competence threat (see Figure 3). This may be the reason for the lack of an interaction between cultural comparison 1 (two honor groups vs the dignity group) and threat conditions; different response patterns in the two honor cultures

were averaged out, which may have obscured possible cultural differences in partner choice. Therefore, as indicated in the pre-registration plan as the next step, we conducted chi-square tests within each cultural group to test our hypotheses. To correct for multiple tests, we used Benjamini-Hochberg correction.

As predicted, Turkish participants (members of an honor culture) who received morality-threatening feedback from Pat were less likely to choose him/her as a partner compared to those who received neutral feedback (Hypothesis 1; Figure 3), $\chi^2(1) = 33.01$, $p_{adj} < .001$, OR = 10.11, $d = 1.20$, 95% CI_{OR} [4.38, 23.35]. Moreover, consistent with predictions, Turkish participants who received morality-threatening feedback from Pat were less likely to choose him/her as a partner than those who received competence-threatening feedback (Hypothesis 2), $\chi^2(1) = 5.74$, $p_{adj} = .04$, OR = 2.45, $d = .44$, 95% CI_{OR} [1.17, 5.12].[7]

As predicted, U.S. Southerners (members of an honor culture) were also less likely to choose Pat as a partner if they received morality-threatening feedback from him/her than if they received neutral feedback (Hypothesis 1; Figure 3), $\chi^2(1) = 19.02$, $p_{adj} < .001$, OR = 7.01, $d = .90$, 95% CI_{OR} [2.78, 17.66]. Contrary to our predictions, however, there was no

[7] In Turkey, the sensitivity power analysis for an alpha of .05 (one-tailed) and power of .80 revealed a minimum OR of 2.49 and 2.50 for the comparison of morality threat with no-threat (Hypothesis 1) and competence threat condition (Hypothesis 2), respectively. In the U.S. South, this analysis revealed a minimum OR of 2.62 (Hypothesis 1) and 2.74 (Hypothesis 2; Faul et al., 2013). Note that the odds ratio for the result of Hypothesis 2 in Turkey (OR = 2.45) is slightly smaller than the result of the power analysis (OR = 2.50), indicating that a bigger sample size was needed to establish stability of results.

significant difference between morality threat and competence threat conditions in this group (Hypothesis 2), $\chi^2(1) = 1.59$, $p_{adj} = .28$, OR = 1.64, $d = .24$, 95% CI_{OR} [0.76, 3.52].

U.S. Northerners (members of a dignity culture) were also less likely to choose Pat as a partner if they received morality-threatening feedback from him/her than if they received neutral feedback, $\chi^2(1) = 37.07$, $p_{adj} < .001$, OR = 12.2, $d = 1.09$, 95% CI_{OR} [4.93, 30.21]. We expected this difference to be greater in the two honor culture groups (Turkey and Southern U.S.) than in Northern U.S., suggesting a greater goal derailment in honor cultures in response to a morality threat compared to the baseline. Partially in line with our predictions, this was the case in Turkey ($d = 1.20$), but the difference was smaller in Southern U.S. ($d = .90$) than in Northern U.S. ($d = 1.09$). Finally, consistent with our predictions, there was no difference in partner choice between morality threat and competence threat conditions among U.S. Northerners (Hypothesis 3), $\chi^2(1) = .15$, $p_{adj} = .75$, OR = 0.88, $d = .06$, 95% CI_{OR} [0.47, 1.66].

The results of this study were partially consistent with our hypotheses. Turkish participants were most likely to derail from their goal when they received morality-threatening feedback (vs. neutral feedback) compared with the two U.S. cultural groups. Moreover, only Turkish participants were more likely to derail from their goal following a morality threat (i.e., being called a liar) than following a competence threat (i.e., being criticized for one's writing ability). Even though Pat was the most qualified partner who would have helped them achieve their goal of winning $30, Turkish participants were reluctant to choose Pat if he/she threatened their moral reputation by calling them a liar. This suggests that an attack to one's moral reputation may lead to more severe consequences than an attack to one's competence in Turkey; consequently, people may make decisions that are costly to them. As expected, U.S. Northerners did not differentiate between morality and competence threats when it comes to goal derailment.

Contrary to our predictions, Southern U.S. participants in this study were more similar to Northern U.S. participants than to Turkish participants in their goal-directed behavior. This suggests that not all groups considered to be cultures of honor may act in similar ways when exposed to different types of threat to their honor. As the manipulation check analyses showed, the morality-threatening feedback was perceived as equally offensive as the competence-threatening feedback by Southern U.S. and Northern U.S. participants (but not by Turkish participants). Moreover, the specific task and type of goal used in this study was different from Study 1: an academic task (high-level math problems) which would help participants earn money. Perhaps in the domain of academic and financial achievements, U.S. Southerners' moral reputation concerns are less pronounced than their individualistic tendencies, and their similarities to Northern U.S. participants are more apparent. It remains to be examined whether the current pattern generalizes to threats in other domains of life and to other aspects of the self.

General Discussion

For members of an honor culture, does having someone attack one's morality (e.g., honesty) affect the pursuit of other goals? These studies reveal that the answer is yes, depending on the situation and the type of honor culture. Study 1 showed that members of honor cultures – participants from Turkey and the U.S. South – were affected by a challenge to their moral reputation which resulted in delaying pursuit of other goals. In Study 2, participants were asked to make a choice whether or not to cooperate with the person who insulted them, where choosing to cooperate with the insulter could profit them by earning a prize. The Turkish honor culture group (but not the U.S. Southerners) was more likely than the dignity group to avoid the person who had called them a liar (by not choosing them as a partner) and so sacrifice the possibility of earning a prize. In other words, the Turkish honor group made a potentially costly decision presumably in an effort to protect their honor. These

data support our assumption that restoration of one's honor may become a superordinate goal after a threat to one's morality among members of honor cultures, but we acknowledge that this goal was not directly tested in these studies. Next steps include replication of these studies with different types of strong morality threats (such as an accusation of cheating) and competence threats, along with measures or manipulations of the presumed superordinate role of honor restoration.

Critically, this research shows that Turkish participants – a collectivistic honor culture – differentiated between morality threats (being called a liar) and competence threats (being told they are a poor writer) to a greater extent than did the dignity culture group. Given the importance of reputation in Turkish honor culture, the possibility that others would consider one to be dishonest is potentially far more insulting and damaging than being considered incompetent. Certainly, both dishonesty and incompetence can diminish one's self-esteem, but dishonesty has greater implications for others' respect (e.g., Wojciszke, 2005). In short, these studies indicate that members of collectivistic honor cultures such as Turkey do not simply react to any threat; instead, specific threats to one's sense of being a moral and respectable person are most potent.

The distinction between a morality threat and competence threat was less clear for the participants from the U.S. South than for Turkish participants. In Study 1, the Southerners behaved similarly to the Turkish participants, but in Study 2 their responses were more similar to the U.S. Northerners. This could be due to the small sample size of the Southern U.S. group in Study 1, differences in the outcome variables across studies, or differences in paradigms: an interaction in the lab and a detailed feedback form to deliver the threat (Study 1) may be more realistic and effective than an online interaction and a short comment (Study 2), leading to behavior that is more consistent with honor norms. These are the first experimental studies to include members of two different honor cultures, and they

demonstrate the need for future research to further distinguish between types of honor cultures.

Unexpectedly, dignity culture participants in Study 1 indicated that they would initiate other goals quickly and not delay after the competence threat compared to the no-threat and morality threat conditions. Dignity culture participants may have perceived the competence threat as a challenge, which has been found to boost performance (Marchiondo et al., 2018). To report that one would quickly initiate goals may also bolster the self-esteem of dignity culture participants. In Study 2, however, the dignity culture participants responded similarly to the two types of threat. Further articulation of the consequences of different types of reputation threats for motivation across cultures will help flesh out a more global science of human behavior.

The small sample size of the two honor groups in Study 1 was a limitation. When examined separately, however, the goal delay pattern in these two cultural groups across threat conditions was similar, suggesting that there is a greater tendency in both honor cultures to delay their subsequent goals following a morality threat than a competence threat. In Study 2, we overcame this limitation by recruiting more participants from each cultural group.

Conclusion

Depending on their cultural background, people may prioritize different goals in their everyday life. In this research, we found that members of honor cultures, especially Turkey, may experience a goal conflict when they are called a liar. We have hypothesized that this insult may cause Turkish participants to be preoccupied with the primary goal of restoring their honor; consequently, they tend to delay other goals or make choices that may be costly for these goals. In the U.S. North (a dignity culture), however, these effects on goal pursuit were less prevalent; protecting one's honor may not be a primary goal. These results can shed

light on cultural differences in goal pursuit, especially in multicultural work places. In these contexts, people from different backgrounds interact and work toward multiple goals. This can create interpersonal conflict, which will bring different goals to the forefront depending on people's cultural background.

Open Practices

Pre-registration information for Study 2 can be found at the Open Science Framework repository: https://osf.io/7kr38/?view_only=79e2394e41f746fcbd9c2bc5639a77c0.

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Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for Manipulation Check Variables and Goal Delay across Threat Conditions and Cultural Groups (Study 1)

		Honor Group						Dignity Group					
		Morality Threat (n = 57)		Competence Threat (n = 45)		No Threat (n = 58)		Morality Threat (n = 38)		Competence Threat (n = 39)		No Threat (n = 43)	
	Variables	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*
Manipulation check													
	Specific	3.14	1.29	3.00	1.30	2.95	1.07	2.39	0.96	2.30	0.91	2.53	1.03
	Positive	1.28	0.53	1.56	0.76	3.14	0.54	1.39	0.80	1.51	0.61	3.21	0.71
	Insulting	2.34	1.01	1.95	0.83	1.40	0.58	2.70	1.11	2.89	1.18	1.64	0.64
Goal delay measure													
	Goal delay	5.26	1.41	4.60	1.52	4.54	1.94	4.28	1.64	3.32	1.27	4.37	1.80

Note. The variable 'insulting' is the average of items assessing feeling belittled, offended, humiliated, put-down, and ridiculed. Participants used a 5-point scale for the manipulation check measures and an 11-point scale for the goal delay measure.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics for Manipulation Check Variables across Threat Conditions and Cultural Groups (Study 2)

	Turkey						U.S. South						U.S. North					
	Morality Threat (n = 57)		Competence Threat (n = 66)		No Threat (n = 68)		Morality Threat (n = 50)		Competence Threat (n = 58)		No Threat (n = 64)		Morality Threat (n = 67)		Competence Threat (n = 91)		No Threat (n = 95)	
Variables	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*
Insulted (combined)	2.53	1.72	2.16	1.15	1.34	0.85	4.15	1.86	3.86	1.80	1.23	0.85	3.46	2.01	3.56	1.82	1.12	0.43
Offended & Threatened	2.33	1.70	1.87	1.09	1.28	0.77	4.05	1.95	3.59	1.79	1.22	0.88	3.39	1.97	3.29	1.89	1.07	0.36
Belittled	2.96	2.04	2.86	1.83	1.45	1.12	4.34	2.06	4.41	2.10	1.25	0.84	3.58	2.26	4.01	2.03	1.20	0.81

Note. The variable ‘insulted’ is the average of items assessing feeling belittled, offended, and threatened. Participants used a 7-point scale for these manipulation check measures.

Table 3

Results of logistic regression on partner choice (Study 2)

	B	*SE*	Wald	df	*p*	Odds ratio
Cultural comparison			6.901	2	.032	
Cultural comparison(1)	.609	.236	6.656	1	.014	1.673
Cultural comparison(2)	.188	.245	0.592	1	.442	1.207
Threat			29.522	2	.000	
Threat(1)	2.078	.253	67.422	1	.000	7.990
Threat(2)	0.175	.211	.694	1	.405	1.192
Cultural comparison × Threat			7.884	4	.096	
Cultural comparison(1) × Threat(1)	0.449	.541	.687	1	.407	1.566
Cultural comparison(1) × Threat(2)	-0.077	.422	.033	1	.856	.926
Cultural comparison(2) × Threat(1)	1.019	.615	2.748	1	.097	2.771
Cultural comparison(2) × Threat(2)	-1.387	.543	6.516	1	.011	0.250
Constant	-0.253	.157	2.612	1	.106	0.776
Model χ^2 (df)	126.238 (8)					
-2 log likelihood	690.823					
Nagelkerke R^2	.252					

Note. $N = 616$. Partner choice (1 = Pat/perpetrator, 0 = others); Cultural comparison (1) = Honor cultures (Turkey and U.S. South) vs. the dignity culture (U.S. North); Cultural comparison (2) = Turkey vs. U.S. South; Threat (1) = Morality threat vs. no-threat; Threat (2) = Morality threat vs. competence threat.



Figure 1. Reported goal delay across threat conditions and cultural groups. Error bars show standard errors (Study 1).



Figure 2. An example of an online interaction in the morality threat condition (i.e., Pat accuses the participant of lying). The avatar MJ is the participant; her self-description is disguised for privacy purposes (Study 2).



Figure 3. Percentages of participants who chose Pat as their future partner across threat conditions. Smaller percentages indicate greater goal derailment, as Pat was the most qualified potential partner (Study 2).