Bieber, Florian (2005) Power sharing after Yugoslavia. Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power Sharing Institutions Post-war Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo. In: Noel, Sid, ed. From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. Studies in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict . McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal and Kingston, pp. 85-103. ISBN 0773529470.
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Post-conflict societies invariably experience great difficulty in making their new democratic power-sharing institutions work. In Northern Ireland, the system for power sharing prescribed in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement has repeatedly broken down. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the system prescribed under the Dayton Accord of 1995 depends for its survival on the presence of a substantial international peacekeeping force. From Power Sharing to Democracy examines the theoretical underpinnings of power sharing as a means of achieving sustainable democratic governance. Contributors examine key areas, including Afghanistan, Cyprus, Kosovo, Macedonia, and South Africa, where power-sharing constitutions and political institutions have been employed or proposed. They provide an in-depth exploration of consociationalism, under which the previously warring ethnic communities are guaranteed a proportionate share of political offices and protection of their vital interests, and federalism, which provides for substantial territorial autonomy in cases where the communities are territorially segregated.
|Item Type:||Book section|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations|
|Depositing User:||Alison Chapman|
|Date Deposited:||19 Dec 2007 18:29|
|Last Modified:||14 Jan 2010 13:59|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/780 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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