Le Potentiel Démocratique de la Constitution Européenne (ou Les Démocrates doivent-ils voter pour?)

Azmanova, Albena (2005) Le Potentiel Démocratique de la Constitution Européenne (ou Les Démocrates doivent-ils voter pour?). In: Reynie, Dominique, ed. Les Européennes en 2005. Gallimard, Editions de la Table Ronde/Fondation Robert Schuman, Paris, France, pp. 137-149. ISBN 2-7103-2779-1. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Abstract

In the run-up to the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe in the spring of 2005, the author addresses the most politically sensitive question surrounding debates on the draft law: does it achieve the promised balance between policy efficiency and democracy. She examines two types of constitutional solutions to the ‘democracy deficits’ of the EU: on the one hand, measures enhancing the direct impact of democratic legislatures on the policy-process at EU level; on the other hand, measures increasing accountability (rather than direct input), in the tradition of liberal constitutionalism. The analysis leads to the conclusion that, while the first group of measures tends to enhance democracy at the expense of policy efficiency, the second type of measures help solve the democratic deficit while also increasing policy efficiency. Overall, the author asserts that, as the proposed constitutional treaty contains solid measures of the second type, it should be supported by both center-left and center-right constituencies.

Item Type: Book section
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Depositing User: Alison Chapman
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:28
Last Modified: 14 Jan 2010 13:59
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/775 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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