Williamson, J. Learning causal relationships. . LSE Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science
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Abstract
How ought we learn causal relationships? While Popper advocated a hypothetico-deductive logic of causal discovery, inductive accounts are currently in vogue. Many inductive approaches depend on the causal Markov condition as a fundamental assumption. This condition, I maintain, is not universally valid, though it is justifiable as a default assumption. In which case the results of the inductive causal learning procedure must be tested before they can be accepted. This yields a synthesis of the hypothetico-deductive and inductive accounts, which forms the focus of this paper. I discuss the justification of this synthesis and draw an analogy between objective Bayesianism and the account of causal learning presented here.
| Item Type: | Internet publication |
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| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages |
| Depositing User: | Jon Williamson |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Jun 2011 13:49 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Jan 2012 15:00 |
| Resource URI: | http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/7365 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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