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Dispositional versus Epistemic Causality

Williamson, Jon (2006) Dispositional versus Epistemic Causality. Minds and Machines, 16 . pp. 259-276. ISSN 1572-8641. (doi:10.1007/s11023-006-9033-3) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:7361)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-006-9033-3

Abstract

I put forward several desiderata that a philosophical theory of causality should satisfy: it should account for the objectivity of causality, it should underpin formalisms for causal reasoning, it should admit a viable epistemology, it should be able to cope with the great variety of causal claims that are made, and it should be ontologically parsimonious. I argue that Nancy Cartwright's dispositional account of causality goes part way towards meeting these criteria but is lacking in important respects. I go on to argue that my epistemic account, which ties causal relationships to an agent's knowledge and ignorance, performs well in the light of the desiderata. Such an account, I claim, is all we require from a theory of causality.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s11023-006-9033-3
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2011 13:49 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:45 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/7361 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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