What is the reductionist position as regards the epistemology of testimonial belief? Is such a view defensible?

Much of what is generally called knowledge is socially generated from testimonial beliefs. Social co-operation is essential in transmitting knowledge across space (e.g. the Internet) and time (past conceptual ideas being used in the present), however, testimony can also be used to deliberately mislead people into accepting a political ideology, a ‘false consciousness’ thus being produced. This potential for deceit leads to checks and balances being applied to reduce subsequent incorrect views or to reject the justification of testimonial belief without the belief being grounded in non-testimonial evidence. The latter approach is called ‘reductionism’ and is associated with the work of David Hume (cited in Pritchard 2006). Through the course of this essay, the efficacy of the reductionist view of testimonial belief will be analysed, in contrast to a credulist approach that argues that one can accept testimonial belief, if there are no specific reasons to doubt them.