Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium

Cartwright, E.J. (2007) Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium. International Journal of Game Theory, 36 (1). pp. 119-135. ISSN 0020-7276 . (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0077-2

Abstract

We consider a learning dynamic in which players imitate and better reply. Sufficient conditions are provided for Nash equilibrium play to emerge over time. The role of imitation in the learning dynamic is discussed through a series of examples. Most interestingly we demonstrate how imitation can 'help' the emergence of Nash equilibrium where 'more rational' methods do not.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: imitation; better reply; coordination games; Nash equilibrium
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: C. Hudson
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:18
Last Modified: 14 Jan 2010 13:58
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/507 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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