The Stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared

Cartwright, Edward (2004) The Stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared. Economics Letters, 85 (1). pp. 47-51. (Access to this publication is restricted)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.019

Abstract

We consider the stability of the risk-dominant equilibrium in a two-strategy coordination game when players behave myopically. The case of a lattice matching network is compared to that of a random network. We demonstrate that the risk-dominant equilibrium is unstable given a lattice network and stable given a random network.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:17
Last Modified: 05 Dec 2013 09:48
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/505 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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