Cartwright, Edward (2004) The Stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared. Economics Letters, 85 (1). pp. 47-51.
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| Official URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.019 |
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Abstract
We consider the stability of the risk-dominant equilibrium in a two-strategy coordination game when players behave myopically. The case of a lattice matching network is compared to that of a random network. We demonstrate that the risk-dominant equilibrium is unstable given a lattice network and stable given a random network.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Subjects: | H Social Sciences |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| Depositing User: | C. Hudson |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2007 18:17 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Sep 2011 23:20 |
| Resource URI: | http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/505 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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