Cartwright, Edward (2004) The Stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared. Economics Letters, 85 (1). pp. 47-51.
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We consider the stability of the risk-dominant equilibrium in a two-strategy coordination game when players behave myopically. The case of a lattice matching network is compared to that of a random network. We demonstrate that the risk-dominant equilibrium is unstable given a lattice network and stable given a random network.
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics|
|Depositing User:||C. Hudson|
|Date Deposited:||19 Dec 2007 18:17|
|Last Modified:||05 Sep 2011 23:20|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/505 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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