Behavioural conformity in games with players

Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna and Selten, Reinhard (2006) Behavioural conformity in games with players. Games and Economic Behaviour, 57 (2). pp. 347-360. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006

Abstract

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to that of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such conformity can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few societies, each consisting of similar individuals playing similar strategies. In this paper we characterize a family of games admitting the existence of such equilibrium. We also introduce the concept of 'crowding types' into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player-those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others-and his tastes. With assumptions of 'within crowding type anonymity' and 'linearity of taste-types' we show that the number of societies can be uniformly bounded.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: C. Hudson
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:17
Last Modified: 01 Jul 2013 11:21
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/504 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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