Cartwright, E.J. (2007) On the Emergence of Social Norms. Discussion paper. University of Kent, Canterbury
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Abstract
We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We detail the conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences, the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology of agent interaction.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion paper) |
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| Additional information: | Discussion Paper No. 07/04 |
| Uncontrolled keywords: | Social norms, conformity, best reply JEL classification: C7, D11 |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| Depositing User: | Suzanne Duffy |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jul 2008 17:07 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Sep 2011 23:38 |
| Resource URI: | http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/4620 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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