Contagion and the Emergence of Convention in Small Worlds

Cartwright, Edward (2007) Contagion and the Emergence of Convention in Small Worlds. International Game Theory Review, 9 (4). pp. 689-704. ISSN 0219-1989. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198907001667

Abstract

We model a simple dynamic process in which myopic agents are matched amongst each other to play a coordination game. The network of player interaction is varied between a regular lattice and a random network allowing us to model contagion in small world networks. Weighting times for an equilibrium shift from the risk dominated to risk dominant equilibrium are shown to be smallest in small world networks.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 24 Jul 2008 08:42
Last Modified: 14 May 2014 12:41
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/3771 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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