Cartwright, E.J. (2007) Contagion and the Emergence of Convention in Small Worlds. International Game Theory Review, 9 (4). pp. 689-704. ISSN 0219-1989.
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We model a simple dynamic process in which myopic agents are matched amongst each other to play a coordination game. The network of player interaction is varied between a regular lattice and a random network allowing us to model contagion in small world networks. Weighting times for an equilibrium shift from the risk dominated to risk dominant equilibrium are shown to be smallest in small world networks.
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics|
|Depositing User:||Edward Cartwright|
|Date Deposited:||24 Jul 2008 08:42|
|Last Modified:||14 Jan 2010 14:12|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/3771 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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