Wooders, M. and Cartwright, E. and Selten, R. (2006) Behavioural conformity in games with many players. Games and Economic Behavior, 57 (2). pp. 347-360. ISSN 0899-8256.
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In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such behavior can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few societies, each consisting of similar individuals playing the same or similar strategies. In this paper we introduce a notion of a society and characterize a family of games admitting the existence of such an equilibrium. We also introduce the concept of `crowding types' into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player -- those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others -- and his tastes, taken to directly affect only that player. With the assumptions of `within crowding type anonymity' and `linearity of taste-types' we show that the number of groups can be uniformly bounded.
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics|
|Depositing User:||Edward Cartwright|
|Date Deposited:||08 Sep 2008 11:13|
|Last Modified:||14 Jan 2010 14:12|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/3768 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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