Saalfeld, Thomas (2005) Deliberate Delegation or Abdication? Government Backbenchers, Ministers and European Union Legislation. Journal of Legislative Studies, 11 (3-4). pp. 343-371. ISSN 1357-2334.
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This paper analyses how key structural characteristics of the relationship between ministers and government backbenchers influence the extent to which national parliaments of European Union (EU) member states are able to scrutinise and influence EU law-making. Two theoretical perspectives – a ‘parliamentary abdication’ and a ‘delegation’ perspective – will be used to test contrasting hypotheses. The empirical evidence presented is not unequivocal, but more in line with the ‘delegation’ than the ‘abdication perspective’: The extent to which national parliaments have institutional opportunities to scrutinise and influence the national government’s position in EU affairs can indeed be shown to covary (a) with key structural characteristics of the relationship between government backbenchers and ministers and (b) with the electoral saliency of EU affairs in the respective country.
|Uncontrolled keywords:||EU, national parliaments, legislation, legislative scrutiny, delegation, legislative studies|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations > Centre for Federal Studies
|Depositing User:||T.K. Saalfeld|
|Date Deposited:||20 May 2008 07:07|
|Last Modified:||20 May 2011 23:58|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/3704 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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