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In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94 (N/A). pp. 19-40. ISSN 1468-0114. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01442.x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:35950)

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Abstract

Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value, an examination of the most promising pluralist counterexamples casts serious doubt upon the claim that there is any such evidence.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01442.x
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 01 Nov 2013 16:14 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2021 12:48 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/35950 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

University of Kent Author Information

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer.

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