Saalfeld, Thomas (2006) Conflict and Consensus in Germany’s Bi-cameral System: A Case Study of the Passage of the Agenda 2010. Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 14 (3). pp. 247-269. ISSN 0965-156X.
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The chances for the second Schröder government’s Agenda 2010 reforms to be enacted were slim as the government lacked a majority in the Bundesrat and the reforms met with hostility in the governing parties, the trades unions and parts of the electorate. Nevertheless, the reforms were passed in 2003. Building on a veto-player framework, the present case study demonstrates that highly contested policy reforms such as the Agenda 2010 can be passed even if the number of veto players is high, when the legislative status quo is unattractive for the parties; the government is successful in employing its agenda-setting powers; the timing in the electoral cycle is favourable; and the opposition lacks cohesiveness.
|Uncontrolled keywords:||Germany, German politics, veto player theory, veto players, welfare reform|
|Subjects:||J Political Science
J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations > Centre for Federal Studies
|Depositing User:||T.K. Saalfeld|
|Date Deposited:||18 May 2008 09:36|
|Last Modified:||14 Jan 2010 14:11|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/3547 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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