A game theoretic solution for the optimal selection of services

Merad, Salah and de Lemos, Rogério and Anderson, Tom (2011) A game theoretic solution for the optimal selection of services. In: Performance and Dependability in Service Computing: Concepts, Techniques and Research Directions. Premier Reference Source . IGI Global, pp. 172-188. ISBN 9781609607944. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60960-794-4.ch008

Abstract

This chapter considers the problem of optimally selecting services during run-time with respect to their non-functional attributes and costs. Commercial pressures for reducing the cost of managing complex software systems are changing the way in which systems are designed and built. The reason behind this shift is the need for dealing with changes efficiently and effectively, which may include removing the human operator from the process of decision-making. In service-oriented computing, in particular, the run-time selection and integration of services may soon become a reality since services are readily available. Assuming that each component service has a specific functional and non-functional profile, the challenge now is to define a decision maker that is able to select services that satisfy the system requirements and optimise the quality of services under cost constraints. The approach presented in this chapter describes a game theoretic solution by formulating the problem as a bargaining game.

Item Type: Book section
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA 76 Software, computer programming,
Divisions: Faculties > Science Technology and Medical Studies > School of Computing
Depositing User: Rogerio de Lemos
Date Deposited: 04 Nov 2012 23:28
Last Modified: 31 May 2013 14:11
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/32076 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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