Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability

Murzi, Julien (2010) Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. Philosophical Studies, 149 (2). pp. 269-281. ISSN 0031-8116. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9349-y

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most recently, Michael Dummett. Intuitionists can either point out the intuitionistc invalidity of the inference from the claim that all truths are knowable to the insane conclusion that all truths are known, or they can outright demur from asserting the existence of forever-unknown truths, perhaps questioning—as Dummett now suggests—the applicability of the Principle of Bivalence to a certain class of empirical statements. I argue that if intuitionists reject strict finitism—the view that all truths are knowable by beings just like us—the prospects for either proposal look bleak.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Paradox of Knowability; Semantic anti-realism; Bivalence; Idealisation; Intuitionistic conditional
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Fiona Godfrey
Date Deposited: 05 Oct 2012 18:05
Last Modified: 28 Jan 2013 12:06
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/31324 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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