From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic

Williamson, J. (2013) From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic. Journal of Applied Logic . ISSN 1570-8683. (In press) (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2013.03.006

Abstract

Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al. (2011) [7, Part 1]). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010 [16, Chapter 7]). Section 1 introduces the semantics and then, in Section 2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008) [2]. Section 3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (i) that it is language independent in a key sense, (ii) that it admits connections with the Principle of Indifference but these connections do not lead to paradox, (iii) that it can capture the phenomenon of learning from experience, and (iv) that while the logic advocates scepticism with regard to some universal hypotheses, such scepticism is not problematic from the point of view of scientific theorising.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Bayesianism; Objective Bayesianism; Bayesian epistemology; Maximum entropy; Maxent; Inductive logic; Probabilistic logic; Probability logic
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Fiona Godfrey
Date Deposited: 29 Sep 2012 10:44
Last Modified: 18 Sep 2013 08:21
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/31083 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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